Transcendental Inquiry

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/76603

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Kim, Halla	-
dc.contributor.editor	Halla Kim and Steven Hoeltzel	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2019-07-24T11:58:15Z	-
dc.date.available	2019-07-24T11:58:15Z	-
dc.date.issued	2016	-
dc.identifier.isbn	978-3-319-40715-9	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://10.6.20.12:80/handle/123456789/76603	-
dc.description	Moral realism focuses on the discussion that presupposes moral objects which exist regardless of our argumentation. Habermas does not follow this realism, because he explicitly differentiates between the constative statement and the normative statement. He nevertheless constitutes his moral theory in a cognitivist way. And this is nothing other than the argumentative consensus. Valid moral norms become cognitively acknowledged through the consensus that is enabled by argumentation. Consequently, the validity of the moral principle and of the rules of argumentation is acknowledged every time the validity of the individual moral norm is acknowledged.	en_US
dc.language	English	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.publisher	Palgrave Macmillan	en_US
dc.subject	Methods and Critiques	en_US
dc.title	Transcendental Inquiry	en_US
dc.type	Book	en_US
Appears in Collections:	History

Files in This Item:

File	Description	Size	Format
161.pdf.pdf		8.93 MB	Adobe PDF	View/Open