Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/105175
Title: | Accounting Conservatism and Performance Covenants:A Signaling Approach |
Authors: | JEFFREY L. CALLEN, FENG CHEN, YIWEI DOU and BAOHUA XIN |
Keywords: | Accounting Conservatism |
Issue Date: | 2009 |
Description: | This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. |
URI: | http://196.189.45.87:8080/handle/123456789/105175 |
Appears in Collections: | Accounting and Finance |
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