Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/105175
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dc.contributor.authorJEFFREY L. CALLEN, FENG CHEN, YIWEI DOU and BAOHUA XIN-
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-10T06:03:25Z-
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-15T23:01:45Z-
dc.date.available2020-02-10T06:03:25Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-15T23:01:45Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://196.189.45.87:8080/handle/123456789/105175-
dc.descriptionThis study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectAccounting Conservatismen_US
dc.titleAccounting Conservatism and Performance Covenants:A Signaling Approachen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
Appears in Collections:Accounting and Finance

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