|dc.contributor.editor||Seumas Miller, TU Delft, University of Oxford||en_US|
|dc.description||The main arguments and findings in this work are summarised. Dual use issues are to be found in the chemical industry, nuclear industry, in cyber-technology and in the biological sciences. Moreover, they are exacerbated by collective action problems. However, they exist in a somewhat different form in different domains of science and technology, (e.g. nuclear vs. biological sciences), and in somewhat diverse institutional settings (e.g. universities vs. private firms). Therefore, the appropriate responses to the problem in these different domains of science and technology and different institutional settings may need to differ somewhat. That said, these domains and institutions do share some common general features. Firstly, in each case the dual use issues in question may call for restrictions on R&D research and dissemination of findings; something that is, generally speaking, antithetical to scientists and technologists. Secondly, they are a collective moral responsibility, e.g. of scientists and governments. Thirdly, the response needs to be multi-faceted and will typically involve a so-called ‘web of prevention’ (an integrated suite of regulatory measures).||en_US|
|dc.subject||Ethics and Weapons||en_US|
|dc.title||Dual Use Science and Technology, Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction||en_US|
|Appears in Collections:||History|
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