FRENCH COLONIAL FASCISM

THE EXTREME RIGHT IN ALGERIA, 1919-1939

SAMUEL KALMAN
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### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHC/LR</td>
<td>Archives d’histoire contemporaine/La Rocque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Action française</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Amitiés latines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Archives nationales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOM</td>
<td>Centre des archives d’Outre-mer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>Confédération générale du travail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGTU</td>
<td>Confédération nationale du travail unitaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Croix de Feu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENA</td>
<td>Étoile nord-africaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEM</td>
<td>Fédération des élus musulmans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Front populaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRN</td>
<td>Fédération républicaine nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GGA</td>
<td>Gouverneur générale d’Algérie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRM</td>
<td>Garde républicaine mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHS</td>
<td>Institut d’histoire social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JL</td>
<td>Jeunesses latines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Jeunesses patriotes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LICA</td>
<td>Ligue internationale contre l’antisémitisme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRN</td>
<td>Ligue républicaine nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation armée secrète</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Parti communiste algérien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti communiste français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSF</td>
<td>Parti social français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Parti du Peuple algérien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>Parti populaire français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG</td>
<td>Renseignements généraux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNAS</td>
<td>Rassemblement national d’action sociale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAT</td>
<td>Service historique de l’armée de terre (Service historique de la défense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFIC</td>
<td>Section française de l’internationale communiste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFIO</td>
<td>Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UL</td>
<td>Unions latines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSA</td>
<td>Union nationale des syndicats agricoles</td>
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<tr>
<td>VN</td>
<td>Volontaires nationaux</td>
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Introduction

I

In her work on the colonial unconscious, Elizabeth Ezra proposes an “Algeria syndrome,” a colonial corollary to the infamous Vichy syndrome, whereby the French population willfully ignored or deemphasized their nation’s widespread collaboration with the Nazis. Instead, they adopted the narrative trumpeted by Robert Aron and Charles de Gaulle—that the French population had resisted the German conquest, following the lead of Maréchal Pétain, whose regime acted as a shield to protect the people (including Jews) from the Gestapo and the Wehrmacht. Only when faced with overwhelming historical evidence, mostly produced by foreign researchers beginning with Robert Paxton’s pioneering work in the early 1970s, did government and public alike concede a much more active role in repression, executions, deportations, etc. To Ezra, the very same phenomenon has clouded discussion of the French colonial project, whose violence and immiseration are ignored outright by academics and public commentators alike, and in fact openly discouraged by government ministers who speak of the positive role of France in the empire and seek to repress dissenting views.¹

Ezra wrote in 2000, and since that time much important work has appeared concerning terror and intimidation during the pre-1870 period of military rule and events immediately prior to and during the 1954–1962 Algerian War. Thanks to the research of numerous scholars, we now know the full extent to which successive administrations willfully turned a blind eye to atrocities committed against Arabs and Berbers.² Moreover, the most recent official attempts to recast the era have faltered, and the press publishes far more extensively about the torture and murder of Front de liberation nationale (FLN) supporters in Paris and North Africa.³ It is thus seemingly difficult to argue today that the average French man or woman is completely unaware of the sordid aspects of the imperial past in North Africa. Yet many blind spots remain, particularly regarding the period of settler rule prior to the Algerian War, from 1870 to 1940.

One of the most notable gaps concerns the relationship between the Algerian settlers and fascism. Most full-length studies of the
European population in North Africa are hagiographic, attempting to counter charges of xenophobia, economic exploitation, and social exclusion. Although some authors acknowledge a flirtation with the extreme Right in the 1930s, most minimize any contact between the colons and French fascist leagues, underlining their supposedly ardent republicanism. According to this view, the settlers were deeply attached to France, following the lead of the colonial administration and metropolitan authorities, yet equally bound to a land that they considered to be their home, the reservoir of a vast array of traditions, cultural practices, and social mores unique to the Franco-Spanish-Italian-Maltese mixture of local inhabitants and characteristics native to Algeria. Many of the works further display a marked sympathy with the Pied-Noir lobby in France today, and endorse the nostalgia and concomitant feeling of exile that marks the descendants of the colons. Furthermore, the few studies of the extreme Right in Algeria either minimize the impact and actions of the movement, treat the history of the North African leagues as a brief moment in colonial history, or concentrate almost exclusively on the Vichy era.

This book contends precisely the opposite: that far from being benevolent, the Algerian settlers were in reality deeply xenophobic and anti-Semitic, openly favoring authoritarian government while rejecting republicanism altogether. They craved independence from the metropole, and frequently mobilized violence in order to dominate Muslims and Jews, firmly believing that Algerian Europeans constituted a unique racial fusion, heralding a new man at once youthful, virile, and brutal in stark opposition to the degenerate, effeminate, and weak French. In order to support these claims, the settlers turned to a uniquely colonial variant of fascism, concerned with bolstering the imperial order rather than imitating metropolitan French, Italian, or German movements. During the interwar era, the settlers eschewed the political left, centre, and traditional right in equal measure, instead joining or actively sympathizing by the thousands with a variety of the colonial chapters of metropolitan leagues (Action française, Jeunesses patriotes (JP), Croix de Feu/Parti social français, Parti populaire français) or their Algerian counterparts (Unions latines (UL), Rassemblement national d’action sociale, Amitiés latines).

Thus this work is not concerned with the metropolitan extreme Right or European fascism per sé, but rather with an exclusively colonial movement, which responded to imperial demands and not French criteria. It also retains a specifically Algerian focus, for it was in that colony that imperial fascism most fully came to fruition during the interwar era. This is not to deny the existence of similar movements in Indochina, Tunisia, and various other territories. Yet as a full-fledged settler colony rather than a protectorate, containing
almost one million European inhabitants in three departments, electing members to the French Chamber of Deputies while fully participating in the metropolitan economy, Algeria experienced to a far greater degree the anxieties and violence of imperial reality. Its size and importance, along with the substantial settler population, provided fertile ground for the local extreme Right, which sought to provide palliatives for specifically colonial problems. For as Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler observe: “colonial regimes were neither monolithic nor omnipotent.” Tensions of empire were omnipresent, with the boundaries between the colonizer and colonized continuously redefined and buttressed, while (to paraphrase Albert Memmi) the settler constructed his/her own self-image. Neither were colonies mere transpositions of the metropole to the exotic other: Stoler notes that “colonial cultures were never direct translations of European society planted in the colonies, but unique cultural configurations, homespun creations in which European clothing, food, housing, and indeed morality were given new political meanings in the particular social order of colonial rule.” The same was true for political movements, and the doctrine and actions of the metropolitan extreme Right were inevitably altered by the history, society, and expectations of the imperial experience in Algeria.6

Hence this book examines colonial fascism through the prism of what Edward Said calls contrapuntal reading, seeking to discern what is excluded in its imperial history, from the attempt to bolster the colonial system and its values to the economic exploitation of the so-called indigènes, the vast well of ideas, precepts, and historical experience that forms the didactic of empire in Algeria.7 This entails an examination of the Algerian extreme Right as more than a mere extension of the metropolitan leagues, and a concomitant recognition of the shifting nature of fascism in the colonial sphere. As Martin Thomas notes: “Signing up for the PSF in France could be a gesture of protest against the Popular Front and industrial reform. In Algeria, it was an affirmation that the Muslim population should be kept in their place.”8 In Algeria, too, came a propensity for authoritarian rule and brutal repression, linked to a complete reordering of the entire colony (often in the service of “modernization”), during which Algerians found their names legally changed, the legal code transformed, urban space and architecture Gallicized, and criminality and punishment (and indeed daily life in general) subject to the whims of racial bias.9 This process evoked staunch xenophobia and anti-Semitism, antiparlamentarism, militarism, and the prioritization of action over intellect—all mainstays of the French extreme Right. Colonial fascism was thus employed in the process of sociopolitical transformation, in an attempt to rigidly define colonial difference.
Yet it was also mobilized in the construction and maintenance of what Panivong Norindr terms a phantasmatic society, “the ideological reality through which colonial fantasies as the support of desire emerged, operated, and manifested themselves.” This fabrication aimed to simultaneously defend both the fascist values and the political hegemony of the European population, which “wanted at all costs to preserve the image of an idyllic world untouched by political cataclysms.” For the extreme Right (and indeed much of the settler population) Algeria represented what Norindr terms “empty space,” a tabula rasa upon which “an official mythology had to be created and on which public and private fantasies came to be imagined.”

The resulting fiction centered upon the notion of l’Algérie française, a territory dominated by European settlers, and from which its sworn enemies—Marxists, Jews, and indigènes—were to be excluded, by violent means if necessary. Although this Algeria did not exist (and had never actually been realized), the settlers desired such an arrangement, and acted to defend (that is, to create) its likeness. Moreover, the leagues became the perfect vehicle for this struggle, because of their authoritarianism, cult of violence and youth, bellicose xenophobia and anticommunism, and rhetoric of sociopolitical regeneration. Such a program ran counter to the platform of the metropolitan extreme Right, whose leaders often attempted to squelch the imperial sections. Yet when faced with the overwhelming popularity of colonial fascism in all three departments, the marked success of strictly local chapters throughout Algeria, and the unwillingness of the settlers to abandon their defense of l’Algérie française, by the 1930s even the largest French organizations dropped their opposition.

II

Many of the themes associated with colonial fascism first appeared in Algeria after 1871, linked to a colony-wide anti-Semitic movement far more severe than anything encountered in the metropole, even during the height of the Dreyfus Affair. The previous year the Crémieux decree granted French citizenship to 35,000 Jews, raising the specter that a portion of the local population could sway elections and hold office, or worse still enjoy economic and social equality with the European population. The settlers responded furiously, resisting the decree from left to right, forming anti-Semitic organizations and rioting in Tlemcen and Algiers in the early 1880s, assaulting Jews and destroying their businesses, as well as stores or newspapers owned by sympathetic Christians. By the next decade, the movement became organized, centered upon Fernand Grégoire’s Algiers-based Ligue socialiste antijuive, while municipal councils in all three departments
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became anti-Semitic. Jews were quickly robbed of their civil rights, their businesses closed, and their children banned from schools, while any wishing to vote required proof of citizenship. As the vast majority had never applied for official documentation, most found themselves barred from polling stations.12

Riots quickly erupted in major towns and cities, beginning in Oran and Mostaganem in May 1897. Vandals destroyed synagogues and stores across the department, while crowds screaming “Death to the Jews!” appeared in the streets. In elections held from 1899 onward, anti-Semites swept to power and immediately demanded the abrogation of the Crémieux decree, while in Alger in 1898, virulently xenophobic mayor Max Régis led similar disturbances. Inspired by the anti-Dreyfusards, ten days of violence killed two and injured dozens, leading to 700 arrests and 500,000 francs in damages, mostly with the acquiescence of police and gendarmes. The incidents were further encouraged by the popular press, led by the influential Antijuif, whose July 1897 editorial proclaimed: “we will water…the tree of our liberty with Jewish blood.”13 The gravity of the Algerian situation dwarfed the metropolitan Dreyfus-era anti-Semitism, whose inflamed rhetoric and political activism paled before the utter brutality displayed across the Mediterranean. However, such an extraordinary level of violence could not be sustained, and more often than not campaigns devolved into economic boycotts and anti-Semitic legislation designed to remove Jews from prominent positions. Thus in the department of Oran, settlers were instructed not to shop at Jewish concerns, in an attempt to bankrupt stores not owned by “decent French.” Backed by the clergy and law enforcement, municipal councils also fired Jewish police officers and civil servants.14 In Alger, more theatrical protests emerged, including funeral marches and public petition drives to revoke the Crémieux decree.15

The campaigns were not simply temporary manifestations of dissent, a chance for ardent republicans to express their momentary discontent with the metropole. For as Emmanuel Sivan has observed, anti-Semitism defined Algerian politics until decolonization in 1962. Not for nothing did Fernand Grégoire declare: “in the heart of every French Algerian, anti-Semitism lies sleeping.” The participants came from all classes, age groups, and political parties, with no defining characteristics, and not simply confined to anti-Semitic newspaper readers or group members. Heavily influenced by Edouard Drumont, the metropolitan author of La France juive and elected parliamentary representative for Alger in 1898, the settlers moved past the left-wing xenophobia of the mid-nineteenth century and instead adopted the racial model characteristic of the Dreyfus era. To be sure, not all participants in the campaigns were on the extreme Right. Yet they
shared in a discourse that prefigured colonial fascism. The parliamentary-democratic sympathies of many Algerians dwindled as a result of the anti-Semitic movement, while others were Republican in name only, much like Drumont himself.\textsuperscript{16} Political parties followed suit; to be elected meant by necessity to adopt a staunchly xenophobic platform.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus the portrait of the Jew as capitalist and usurer favored by socialists and communists was replaced by the notion of the racial enemy. In Grégoire’s \textit{La Juiverie algérienne}, Émile Morinaud’s Constantine-based newspaper \textit{Le Republican}, and Max Régis’s Alger broadsheet \textit{L’Antijuif}, the Jew was not only greedy, but naturally parasitic and cancerous as well, filthy and verminous, “a horrible kike who vomits on the French.” The riots were portrayed as a revolutionary moment, liberating the settlers from Jewish economic and political dominance, much like a pollutant would be removed from the water supply. All Jews were to be forcibly extricated from Algerian soil with no exceptions, including children and the elderly.\textsuperscript{18} Such sentiments appeared throughout the local press, permeating settler culture, even material printed by traditionally pro-Republican and tolerant groups like the Masons.\textsuperscript{19} To be sure, the stereotype of the greedy and rich Jew also persisted, despite the fact that most lived in abject poverty or earned modest incomes in neighborhoods far removed from European splendor. Thus the economic boycott demanded by \textit{L’Antijuif} responded to the supposedly vast wealth enjoyed by the community. Yet most of the European population followed Drumont’s lead, linking the Jews with the Third Republic and parliamentary democracy in addition to moneyed interests and banks, the latter a stance more popular in Paris, where evidence of genuine Jewish largesse could be found.\textsuperscript{20}

III

The anti-Semitic movement gradually diminished after April 26, 1901, when a Muslim rebellion in the village of Margueritte near Algiers killed numerous settlers, sparking fear of renewed unrest not unlike the widespread 1871 Kabyle revolt. The metropolitan authorities proceeded to ban various anti-Semitic political parties and newspapers, backed by a general public fearful of a race war sparked by Régis and Drumont’s violent rhetorical condemnation of Algerian Jews, a serious threat to the colony given the vast demographic imbalance between Europeans and Arabs/Berbers.\textsuperscript{21} Yet its central tenets—xenophobia, anti-metropolitan sentiment—remained very much in the public consciousness, and became key components of the Algerian extreme Right during the interwar era. Moreover, Régis, Drumont, and their political kin were replaced by nominally republican representatives at
the local and regional levels, but their doctrine was absorbed by the algérianistes, a budding cultural movement whose rhetoric combined the centrality of race politics in Algerian life with a fervent rejection of metropolitan rule and an attempt to recast North African history as European triumphalism. Many of the themes introduced by its exponents also became key components of interwar colonial fascism, complementing xenophobia with talk of the construction of a new man in colonial North Africa in stark contrast to European decadence and degeneration, the prioritization of youth, masculinity, violence, and political authoritarianism.

The notion of a distinctly Algerian identity, separate from the metropole and reflecting a fusion of the various segments of the European population (French, Italian, Spanish, Maltese) was a key component of the anti-Semitic revolt. From their arrival, the settlers demanded increased political and economic independence, and wrangled a variety of rights and benefits from the colonial authorities in times of crises, granted increased autonomy by the newly installed Republican authorities in 1870–1871 in return for their aid in suppressing the Kabyle revolt during the difficult months following the Franco-Prussian war, and then winning an economic parliament in 1899—the Délégations financières—an attempt to wean the colons from anti-Semitic and antirepublican political parties. The latter was twinned with efforts to Gallicize the colony by granting preferential treatment to genuinely “French” inhabitants, thus limiting the influence of the sizeable Spanish and Italian communities, perceived to be the troublemakers behind the campaigns of xenophobic violence.22 The machinations failed miserably, only furthering separatist sentiment and talk of a unique Algerian race, ideas that outlasted the late nineteenth-century revolt. Not for nothing, then, did Charles-Robert Ageron proclaim those events “perhaps the most famous episode in Algerian history between 1871 and 1914.”23

Just as anti-Semitism reemerged with a vengeance in the interwar era, so too did the notion of a unique Algerian identity persist beyond 1901, buoyed by the algérianistes, authors whose North African popularity facilitated the creation of a settler culture in Algeria, and whose doctrine simultaneously mirrored many of the themes present in the xenophobic rebellion, and anticipated the colonial fascist world view of the interwar era. Three best-selling authors in particular became closely identified with algérianité: Louis Bertrand, Robert Randau, and Auguste Robinet. A Lorraine-born schoolteacher and father of the movement, Bertrand worked as a novelist and correspondent for the prestigious Revue des deux mondes from the late nineteenth century onward, eventually earning admission into the Académie française in 1925, his works reprinted in numerous editions. His writings
inspired a generation of North African authors, most famously Randau, a colonial official and author of 20 novels set in Afrique occidentale française and Algeria, whose work proved very popular with North African settlers. Yet one writer effectively eclipsed Bertrand and Randau in the popular imagination: Auguste Robinet (known by his pen name Alfred Musette), a native Algerian author of penny dreadful novels in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century, whose chief protagonist Cagayous became synonymous with the birth of a specifically Algerian racial type in the pre-1914 era. Bertrand and Randau were celebrated as artists, portraying the lives, ideals, and history of Europeans in Algeria, and trumpeting their superiority over both Algerians and the metropolitan French. Yet Musette won universal acclaim for, in the words of David Prochaska, “provid[ing] the greatest insight into the colonial society that spawned him.” Where the *romans algériens* commented upon settler society and culture, Cagayous represented the man on the street in working-class Algiers, speaking *pataouète* and holding forth on matters of the day.

In its most basic form, and to a far greater degree than Régis and company, the *algérianistes* contested the version of Algerian identity constructed in the metropole (assimilation, the *mission civilisatrice*, colonial exoticism) or among non-Europeans (the primacy of Islam, Algerian history, and nationalism). Their work stood in stark contrast to the notion of the settlers as French, owing their allegiance to the Gallic administration and self-identifying as agents of French culture and European civilization. Conversely, as Jonathan Gosnell remarks, algérianité “[proclaimed] their imagined and strongly felt identity, the recognition of a distinct colonial consciousness.” Bertrand’s and Randau’s novels eschewed metropolitan themes and proclamations of loyalty to the mother country in favor of demands for an independent European Algeria. Similarly, as a working class immigrant from the Bab-el-Oued neighborhood in Algiers, the impoverished, crude, violent, and overtly racist Cagayous represented the ne plus ultra of Algerian-ness, the product of the fusion between the French-Italian-Spanish-Maltese stock and the barbarism of Africa. Most importantly, his declaration that “Algériens nous sommes!” rejected all but the most titular association (a common market, military assistance) with the metropole.

Separatist sentiments were not necessarily proto-fascist, and certainly not the exclusive purview of the Algerian *colons*. Yet the language and concepts mobilized were quite similar to those harnessed by French extreme rightists Maurice Barrès, Édouard Drumont, and Charles Maurras—the leader of the royalist Action française (AF). Influenced at once by 1870s anthropologists like high colonial official Paul Bert, and Barrès, whose *déraciné* Frenchmen persisted against
leftist cosmopolitanism and haute bourgeois decadence, Bertrand dismissed France as weak and effete, “fatiguée par des siècles de civilisation,” and claimed that it had been resuscitated by its virile Algerian colony. Hardened by the constant contact with barbarism, the new colonial man provided a virile simulacrum of the weak and degenerate original, what prominent lawyer and colonial publicist F. Dessoliers termed “a new people, a new race which is superior in intelligence and energy.” Randau concurred, writing in his chef d’ouevre Les Colon that “our race became virile through contact with rugged Africa,” and claiming that the settlers worshipped violence, acting with brute force whenever necessary and using their racial superiority to conquer untamed North Africa. Such sentiments would not have seemed out of place in a fascist newspaper in Mussolini’s Italy mere years later.27

Naturally, the act of conquest ended with the subjugation of the barbaric Muslims. Bertrand argued that Algeria was originally Latin, belonging to the Roman Empire before it had become corrodied by Islam. Poor and violent, the indigènes proved fit only to serve the Latin master race, their laziness and decadence to be stamped out by what Randau called the race of conquerors that worked the soil and harnessed a new national energy. This placed the algérienistes squarely in the Barrésian camp, with the Arab replacing the German as the barbarian to be repulsed by violent means. To Bertrand, the indigènes thus became a racial enemy to be vanquished by the strong, uncouth, virile new race epitomized by Musette’s Cagayous.28 As they could never be assimilated, Muslims must ultimately be eliminated (“exterminer sans pitié”) by Latinité, the newly anointed savior of Western civilization. Jews were viewed in the same fashion, with Musette penning a sympathetic story entitled Cagayous antijuif set during the height of the Alger anti-Semitic movement in which the hero runs for office alongside Drumont and Régis, while Bertrand’s and Randau’s novels frequently portrayed Jews in a negative light, their characterizations seemingly drawn from the pages of l’Antijuif.29 Unsurprisingly, such sentiments permeated the Algerian fascist leagues throughout the interwar era, whose settler clientele viewed the defense of l’Algérie française exclusively through the prism of racial defense, authoritarianism, and unbridled violence.30

The racial profile of Muslims sketched by the algérienistes developed various themes that reemerged forcefully in the interwar Algerian extreme Right, and complemented the xenophobic discourse first developed by Régis and Drumont concerning Algerian Jewry. Randau portrayed an impoverished and superstitious non-European population: malodorous, diseased, selling their daughters into forced marriages while their sons became bandits and criminals. In like fashion, in Le Sang des races, one of Bertrand’s central characters rails
against: “All of those monkeys that wrap their dirty linen around themselves, making them look like rats in human form. Their stench was nauseating.” Such primitive creatures could only be met with violence and brute force, and were frequently designated victims of the European population. Hence Cagayous deals with an Arab thief by taking justice into his own hands in broad daylight, without fear of reproach from the authorities: “An Arab tried to nick a roll of fabric and a blue blouse. I smacked him in the head and sent him flying, and if they hadn’t taken him away, I’d have ripped off his moustache, and his big mouth too.”

More than simple displays of physical strength, however, racial superiority involved the revision of Algerian history itself, in order to justify European rule without metropolitan interference or assimilationist tendencies. In Randau’s novel Les Algérianistes, a character named Lourmet regales the reader with a description of life before the French conquest, characterized by utter squalor, infertile land, filth, and piracy. Despite the fact that the settlers engage in modern business and agriculture, having cleaned up Algerian economy and society, Muslims remained in an inferior position—their natural state—and often lived in poverty because they could not adapt to European ways. In adopting this stance, Randau and Bertrand erased the older orientalist portrait of exotic Arabs in travel writing and art, providing a literary counterpart to the Projet Warmer, the Indigénat, and various repressive measures and taxes that underpinned European control in North Africa. That Algeria belonged to the colons, rather than Arabs and Berbers, traced to its Roman origins, and thus the restoration of technological and fiscal progress was deemed entirely natural, while the vast reservoir of local historical experience was negated in favor of the narrative of conquest and renewal.

IV

In some measure, anti-Semitic and algérianiste thought merely reflected the reality of daily life in colonial North Africa. Violence was omnipresent throughout the imperial world, and particularly prevalent in Algeria. Physical assault became a daily reality, characterized by a violent crime rate substantially higher than in the metropole, and the brutal (and frequently public) repression of so-called indigènes, which permitted the state, in Martin Thomas’s words, “to guarantee its monopoly over the use of force and to impose its authority on a subject population designated to play arduous but subordinated parts in a European-dominated economic system.” Furthermore, physical attacks merely reinforced the paradox in which the French republican system coexisted with racial segregation, representing what Etienne
Balibar terms a defense of “the interests, power positions, and forms of social domination,” whereby institutions mobilized structural violence to prevent the formation of competing identities. This process harnessed language, education, culture, and religion in order to construct and preserve racial hierarchy (the enactment of Cooper and Stoler’s grammar of difference through bureaucratic process), reinforcing domination through the construction of white privilege, judicial-legal bias, and segregated housing. Thus symbolic violence bolstered its physical and structural counterparts, making the entire process seem natural—even munificent—for the colonized population.

Nonetheless, neither the anti-Semitic movement nor the algérienistes fully embraced the extreme Right per se, whether colonial or metropolitan. For all of their racist and authoritarian bluster, many of the ardent anti-Semites in Algiers and Oran continued to speak of constitutional government and parliamentarism in an independent Algeria, rejecting violence and regeneration as tools to be used in European society. In the same vein, Bertrand, Randau, and Musette trumpeted the creation of a new man through racial fusion, and prioritized xenophobia, militarism, and elitism, and yet never completely abandoned liberal political and economic assumptions. However, by the interwar era both metropolitan and Algerian extreme-rightist leagues built upon the template forged by Régis, Drumont, and the algérienistes. Where many in the anti-Semitic political movement attempted to combine xenophobia and violence with parliamentary democracy, the leagues instead proffered authoritarian dictatorship, based upon elitism, voluntarism, and a strident rejection of the burgeoning Left.

Yet most importantly, all of the Algerian leagues—whether of metropolitan or local origin—responded first and foremost to the needs and desires of the settlers. For settler support for the Republic had never been ideological. The open sympathy toward Algerians displayed by many military officers in the Bureaux Arabes in the 1850s–1860s turned many settlers against the Second Empire, and the subsequent parliament-approved legal machinations that transferred the bulk of Algerian land to the colons while enacting segregation and a punitive indigenous tax/legal code alone bought their loyalty. As Patricia Lorcin observes, their antirepublicanism was twinned with an innate racial worldview: “the importance of race in colonial society extended well beyond that of castigating the Islamic other. It was the social fabric of this society.” Thus any movement that championed antirepublicanism and xenophobia, while rejecting metropolitan rule and Muslim nationalism, along with projecting a virile antisocialism/communism, received the support of the European population. That the Algerian settlers further proclaimed the creation of a new racial
type in North Africa, touting youth, will, and hypermasculinity/pronatalism, and frequently adopting eliminationist language concerning Arabs and Berbers only heightened the mutual attraction, for the settler credo mirrored metropolitan French and European fascist discourse in many ways.

If it was not a perfect match—settlers cared little for the corporatist economy and the militarization of society, for example—the program of the leagues offered more than enough common ground to ensure that the majority increasingly joined or actively sympathized with fascist organizations throughout the interwar era. For the French extreme Right, Algeria represented a vital reservoir of untapped support, reinforcing metropolitan campaigns against the Third Republic, while local leagues used their impressive membership numbers to convey the strength of the settler resolve, particularly when arguing for increased autonomy, and rendering the desired phantasmatic Algeria a potential reality. The partnership eventually waned with the coming of World War II, experiencing a brief revival during the shortened Vichy era in North Africa from June 1940 to November 1942, yet ultimately collapsing in the post-1945 period, under the weight of revelations about the crimes of Italian Fascism and German Nazism, and their identification as the recently defeated enemy. Nonetheless, the history of the interwar Algerian extreme Right reveals much about the political culture and daily reality of settlers and colony alike. At a time when imperial history and its legacy are frequently contested, with various politicians and pundits speaking in positive terms of French colonialism, while critics attempt to counter portrayals of a benevolent empire bringing progress and modernity to their new acquisitions, the importance of such a study is abundantly clear.

**A Brief Note Concerning Terminology**

The terms “fascism” and “extreme Right” are both used in this work, sometimes interchangeably, due to the near-unanimous acceptance of colonial fascist principles by the Algerian extreme Right, a marked difference from the metropolitan experience. In France, various groups/parties on the extreme Right rejected fascism, retaining certain programmatic elements—corporatism, antiparlamentarism, elitism, and sometimes xenophobia—while rejecting a significant portion of fascist ideology. Moreover, many of the metropolitan leagues were highly factionalized, containing competing blocs ranging from traditional conservatives to Nazi sympathizers, and held together by the populist desire to attain power: Only possible through a collective effort, wherein competing factions temporarily set aside their differences. To
be sure, such leagues often worked in tandem with fascist confrères, and shared the ultimate goal of toppling parliamentary democracy, replacing the Third Republic with a dictatorship dedicated to renovating France according to group principles. Yet the very real doctrinal differences (and public rejection of the political culture and strategy of Mussolini, Hitler, and/or Franco) necessitate a scholarly differentiation between the extreme Right as a political position, and the doctrine of fascism and its Gallic adherents. As a result, many historical works on the subject (including my own) differentiate between the terms extreme Right and fascism.

However, in French Algeria, the leagues (both local and metropolitan) did not experience the same factionalization. The case of the Croix de Feu/Parti social français is instructive here. Colonel de la Rocque and the Paris-based leadership advocated social Catholicism, a corporatist economy, and pronatalism, while rejecting racial anti-Semitism, the militarization of society, sociobiological manipulation, and similar notions. They ran into staunch opposition from sections across the hexagon, whose members countered with a plethora of competing ideals, including Taylorism, eugenics, and strident xenophobia. No such differences emerged in Algeria, where the colonial fascist program attracted members and sympathizers from across the settler population. Where the desire to replace parliamentary democracy with an authoritarian État social français alone prevented open squabbling among metropolitan adherents, the North African sections unanimously rejected metropolitan political culture in favor of colonial fascism. Groups/parties that unreservedly adopted that mantle (UL, Rassemblement national/Amitiés latines) experienced greater success than those that hedged their bets, attempting to force the settlers to accept Gallic ideals (AF, JP). Others quickly adapted; their colonial memberships ignored metropolitan directives, and in response Parisian leaders ultimately turned a blind eye to any insubordination in order to maintain a settler following (CF/PSF, Parti populaire français). As a result, I use the terms extreme Right and fascism in the same sense throughout this work, as they were synonymous in the Algerian setting.
The Action française, Jeunesses patriotes, Unions latines, and the Birth of Latinité, 1919–1931

In the aftermath of the April 1901 Margueritte Affair, the fortunes of the extreme Right dissipated throughout Algeria. Faced with the threat of Muslim violence against Europeans, a constant worry throughout the colony’s history, the population in all three departments abandoned anti-Semitic politics, temporarily eschewing xenophobic rioting and inflammatory rhetoric. Memories of the 1871 Kabyle revolt remained vivid in public memory. In January of that year Berbers in Constantine rose up under the leadership of tribal luminary Muhammad al-Hajj al-Muqrānī, in response to the extension of French civilian control over rural tribal territories and to famine and disease resulting from four years of land seizures, drought, and natural disasters. Fearing the legislative authority of the settlers, whose complete disregard for the rights and properties of Algerians was far worse than the policies of the metropolitan government or the Bureaux Arabes, the 150,000-strong rebel force held out until October, killing 2,686 settlers.¹

These events were greeted with repressive measures, including assessed reparations of 36.5 million francs to all Algerians regardless of their tribal affiliation, along with the summary execution of thousands of rebels following fixed trials. Adding insult to injury, the authorities subsequently initiated land seizures. Laws in 1883 and 1887 voided traditional tribal ownership, replacing it with French legal standards. Courts thus handed entire properties to European colons, and by the turn of the century these rich farmers controlled the wheat and wine industries, in addition to holding over one-third of the seats in the Délégations financières. By 1920, the settlers seized 2.6 million hectares in this manner, leading to poverty and immiseration for Algerian peasants, who now worked seasonally for European owners, paid a pittance for their efforts.² Muslims were also subject
to the *Indigénat*, a legal system that one historian calls “the juridical incarnation of the violence of the colonizer.” Its 33 criminal acts, not recognized in metropolitan France, covered a range of offenses from insulting a European official to traveling without a permit. Algerians were declared subjects rather than citizens (*indigènes*) became a legal category), brutally punished for any infraction without recourse to a jury trial, and forced to pay *impôts arabes* in addition to French tithes, while the *Statut personnel* placed civil matters under Koranic law rather than Gallic courts.³

Given such harsh measures, it is unsurprising that Algerian violence against Europeans persisted in the fin-de-siècle, evidenced by a murder rate eight times that of the métropole, and increasing attacks against law enforcement officials. Fearful for their safety, various communities organized militias to defend local property and the lives of the local *colons*. Banditry also reemerged after 1871, an activity explicitly linked with attacks on French imperial hegemony, engaging hundreds of police officers and gendarmes in manhunts, and fuelling rumors of rising nationalism among the Arab *djwars*.⁴

Yet the threat of violence receded in the aftermath of the Great War, buoyed by the February 1919 Jonnart Law, which rewarded the blood tax paid by Algerian servicemen with the right to vote in a distinct electoral college for 421,000 compatriots. This elite could cast ballots in all regional and local elections, including the Délégations financières and the Algerian Supreme Council. To be sure, they elected fewer representatives than their European counterparts and were thus devoid of any real power. The promise of citizenship remained contingent upon a renunciation of Koranic law, unthinkable for devout Algerian Muslims, and even then possible only for the educated elite and war veterans.⁵ Yet if it left Muslims deeply dissatisfied with the paltry nature of the reforms and the nonabolition of the *Indigénat* and the *impôts arabes*—any candidate who participated in the new system was labeled a collaborator—the Jonnart law renewed hope in the possibility of a more just imperial system and the eventual assimilation of Algerians via genuine French citizenship. Thus in the 1920s the grandson of Abd-el-Kadar, the Emir Khaled, whose moderate nationalism and acceptance of imperialism did little to incite the Muslim population, eclipsed the bandits and rebels of the nineteenth century.⁶

Nonetheless, Europeans reverted to the arguments evinced during the 1890s anti-Semitic wave, that the settlers were denied any real voice in Algerian affairs. With only nine *colon* representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, they were forced to accept unilateral decisions emanating from Paris or Alger. If the Jonnart law never truly threatened their position, for only 8,000 Algerians actually applied for
citizenship under its auspices, it unleashed a torrent of anti-Muslim sentiment, and reinforced the belief that the French government had betrayed them. Thus the actions of “Jonnart l’arabe” were greeted by an official protest from the Federation of Algerian Mayors and the European press, while the settlers again searched for alternatives to the métropole and republican government, in defense of l’Algérie française.7

Unsurprisingly given the success of the anti-Semitic wave during the 1890s, whose self-proclaimed republicanism obscured actions and ideas more firmly rooted in extreme-rightist politics, in the 1920s settlers turned away from French parliamentary democracy. Anti-republican movements were seen as bulwarks against a variety of real or imagined enemies that undermined the European cause: the communist and socialist Left, Muslim supporters of Algerian independence, the substantial Jewish community, and the metropolitan French authorities who supposedly acted to prevent the settlers from establishing hegemony in Algeria. All four categories were interconnected, purportedly working in concert against the European population. In this atmosphere, two metropolitan extreme-rightist leagues attempted to take advantage of settler discontent—the Action française (AF) and the Jeunesses patriotes (JP).

Founded during the height of the Dreyfus Affair in 1898 by anti-Semites Henri Vaugeois and Maurice Pujo, the AF became one of the most notorious exponents of anti-republicanism in Paris. Led by monarchist poet and journalist Charles Maurras, the group’s appeal to replace parliamentary democracy with the pre-1789 alliance of throne and altar attracted leading conservative intellectuals to the movement. The newspaper Action française became essential reading for the French Right, selling up to 60,000 copies per day in the 1920s, while wealthy conservatives provided needed funding throughout the group’s existence. Yet this seeming respectability coexisted with more sinister activities, including a campaign of terror in Paris’s Latin Quarter perpetrated by the notorious Camelots du Roi, who from 1908 onward gleefully assaulted leftists and Jews in the streets and disrupted political meetings, lectures, and theatrical performances. Their Monarchism and violence was twinned with ardent xenophobia, and Maurras frequently pilloried what he termed the Quatre états confédérés: Jews, Protestants, Masons, and foreigners, who supposedly joined forces in order to subjugate the pays réel through the machinations of the republican pays légal. Although the AF only attracted 30,000 metropolitan followers by the 1920s, their rhetoric seemed tailor-made for Algerian settlers whose politics favored anti-Semitism, hatred, and distrust of Muslims, and anger toward the Republic and the Left.8
The JP provided potentially stiff competition to the AF for settler loyalty. Founded by industrial magnate and deputy Pierre Taittinger as the youth wing of the Ligue des patriotes in 1924, from its very beginnings the group operated independent of its sponsor. By 1926, the JP boasted 100,000 members, 77 parliamentary sympathizers, a youth auxiliary (the Phalange Universitaire), and a daily newspaper (Le National). Ultra-Catholic and anti-republican, Taittinger and his colleagues evinced a staunch anticommunism and proposed to mobilize French youth in order to fight the forces of revolution in the streets. In this pursuit, the JP program included appeals to paramilitarism, elitism, and a strong anti-parliamentary bent. Enthusiastic about Mussolini’s success in Italy, Taittinger posited dictatorship as the solution to French woes. Although not as xenophobic as their royalist competitors, the JP was not exactly philo-Semitic either, and members frequently derided non-Christians at meetings or in newspaper articles.

Yet for all of their success in the métropole, neither the AF nor JP elicited the slightest interest from the European population in Algeria. This was certainly not the product of unwillingness on the part of the settlers; their authoritarian streak, anti-Semitism, hatred of the revolutionary Left, and derision of the republican authorities betrayed clear sympathy for the doctrine and politics of the extreme Right. However, both Maurras and Taittinger misunderstood the colons, and mistook anti-republicanism for the desire to retain French predominance in Algeria under a Gallic monarchy or dictator. Although virulently anti-Semitic, local AF leaders and their metropolitan counterparts rarely broached the subject of Algeria’s Jewish community during meetings or in the colonial press. Similarly neither they nor their JP counterparts seriously analyzed Algerian politics and society. Colonial themes were infrequently invoked, and then only through articles lauding the French empire rather than the local populace. In short, the very attitudes rejected by the settlers—the metropolitan assertion of control over Algerian affairs and a concomitant lack of interest in the colon vision of empire—appeared throughout AF and JP imperial discourse. Leaders of both groups even sympathized with the plight of Muslims rather than the European population, blatantly disregarding the quite contrary settler views on the subject.

As a result, after a promising start in the immediate postwar era, the extreme Right faltered by the late 1920s in the Departments of Alger and Constantine. However, in the western Department of Oran, the Unions latines (UL) achieved much greater success under the leadership of a prominent local politician, Oran-Ville mayor Jules Molle. In stark contrast to the métropole-centered discourse and organizational inertia displayed by the AF and JP, the UL succeeded
as a result of their doctrine and aggressive politics, often carried out in the streets rather than the ballot box. They specifically addressed the concerns of the Algerian settlers, rather than French sensibilities. Like Louis Bertrand and the proponents of algérianité, Molle and the UL explicitly lauded the superiority of the Latin race in Algeria, stridently rejecting Muslim separatism and any attempts at Jonnart-style reform. Settlers responded positively to such rhetoric, which was assiduously combined with authoritarianism, government-directed campaigns of violence against “enemies” of the municipality, and official anti-Semitism. Their support was further assured through a leadership cult and the threatened creation of an independent settler state in order to guarantee Latin hegemony. Thus the UL mobilized an authentic colonial fascism, dominating municipal politics with 8,000 votes from May 1924 onward, a clear majority that resulted in decisive victories in mayoral and legislative electoral contests.\(^1\)

I

The AF became the first extreme-rightist organization to woo Algeria’s European population in the interwar era. Riding a postwar surge in metropolitan popularity, during which the group managed to elect Léon Daudet to the Chamber of Deputies in Paris as a member of the Union nationale’s *Chambre bleu-horizon*, they looked to Algeria as fertile ground for recruitment.\(^2\) Thus from March 1919 onward the group’s newspaper informed readers that weekly meetings would now be held in Alger, Oran-Ville, and Philippeville, and noted that the newspaper *Action française* and AF publications could be purchased at local *permanences*, which also accepted donations on behalf of the new Algerian sections.\(^3\)

This appeal attracted no attention in the department of Alger. In Constantine, the group initially proved more palatable, successfully founding sections in Constantine, Philippeville, Khemchela, Sétif, and Bône. Although membership outside of the departmental capital numbered only in the dozens, meetings attracted up to 1,000 locals, particularly if they featured a prominent speaker from the métropole. Thus in January 1926 AF agricultural expert Ambroise Rendu addressed hundreds in Bône and Philippeville, benefiting from a clearly sympathetic local population.\(^4\) The authorities also evinced some concern about AF recruitment activities. Police in Khemchela worried about the ties of the Camelots du Roi to the Toulon family, which in May 1923 engaged in an attempt to control the municipality by toppling the local mayor and replacing him with their pater familias. Similarly in Bône, the *sous-préfet* sternly rebuked a professor at the local *college* in January 1926, demanding that the Prefect take
immediate disciplinary action in order to prevent any civil servant from engaging in anti-republican proselytizing. Police also noted the presence of military officers in the departmental AF, who donated thousands of francs to the group’s Algerian coffers.

However, these worries were tempered by the AF’s incapacity to attract a stable following anywhere in the department. Initially promising, the Constantine section fell apart in 1922 when its membership openly quarreled over the possibility of a ceremonial mass in honor of Louis XIV. Led by the section’s Treasurer, one faction opposed the motion due to the republican sympathies of the Algerian clergy and concomitant threat of administrative reprisals from the hostile French authorities. The ultra-Catholic majority rejected this position and staunchly supported the celebration, yet the section President’s hesitation to support their wishes bitterly divided the membership. The Constantine AF subsequently ousted the Treasurer in May 1923 over allegations of fraud, having discovered that the section’s accounts were empty. His proclamations of innocence fell on deaf ears; in any event members had not met for months, and the section never expanded its reach beyond the city’s small bourgeois professional class. Unsurprisingly, by June 1926 AF activities in Constantine attracted only a handful of locals. Other departmental sections fared no better. Attempts to found chapters in Batna and Aïn-Beida failed miserably in 1927, and the next year a meeting in Bône attracted only eight partisans. Although the AF engaged in a very active propaganda campaign in 1929 in an effort to bolster the group’s membership and morale, rebuilding its sections in Constantine, Philippeville, and Bône, the group never attracted more than 150 settlers in any of the three communities.

The AF faced similar challenges in the Department of Oran, particularly in smaller communities where the local population demonstrated little enthusiasm unless prominent speakers addressed a given gathering. Despite having no significant membership, hundreds in Sidi-Bel-Abbès and Tlemcen attended lectures by Colonel Larpent and Paul Robain from the Paris AF, while the local sections in Mostaganem, Hammam-Bou-Hadjar, and Mascara remained miniscule throughout the 1920s. Thus propaganda efforts centered upon the Oran-Ville section led to the rise of the group’s most charismatic Algerian personality: Paul Sicard. Married to a member of the Bastos family, whose tobacco company was one of Algeria’s most profitable businesses, and a decorated war veteran, Sicard became the AF’s Oran chief in 1921 and regional delegate for the colony two years later. As the General Secretary of the Fédération des syndicats agricoles d’Algérie and President of the Oran Chamber of Agriculture, he also enjoyed the confidence of the local colons, theoretically (if
not in practice) facilitating the dissemination of royalist propaganda throughout the department.20

Yet, despite Sicard’s guidance and a significant propaganda campaign for several years, the Oran-Ville section faltered in the same manner as its Constantine twin. A tremendous success in Paris, the AF’s annual Joan of Arc day celebrations in 1921 attracted a paltry crowd of 100 in Oran, and the majority of those present were not members. By 1925, the Sûreté départementale noted that the local section possessed no fiscal means, and had attracted only 30 adherents. Many actively sympathized with the Oran AF, but most were clerical conservatives or bourgeois notables and paid no dues. Consequently the head of the Sûreté referred to the local contingent as “pratiquement négligible,” wielding no genuine influence over the population at large, and its meetings and banquets ceased to be held with any regularity by the end of the decade.21 Sicard did not help matters by opposing the distribution of the Oran royalist newspaper Éclair africain, despite its links with both the metropolitan and Algerian AF, and demanding the resignation of any member opposed to his decision. Given the department’s paltry membership numbers, and the periodical’s 1,500-strong readership, Sicard’s opposition proved counterproductive.22 Only in 1928 did the Algerian AF introduce its own Action algérienne, which never achieved a comparable level of success.

However, the fate of the Constantine and Oran AF had little to do with leadership, finances, or propaganda. Given their politics, the settlers were clearly not a priori averse to the AF.23 Rather the group’s approach confounded the expectations of the European population. Although anti-Semitism retained tremendous popularity in Algeria, and particularly in Oran, the AF rarely invoked such themes in the Algerian context, preferring for the most part to reference French bankers, Parisian scandals, or the Dreyfus Affair.24 Such metropolitan talk was typical of group gatherings, which rarely mentioned colonial matters, except in passing. The earliest public meetings in Oran included presentations on “La France et l’Allemagne” and the benefits of monarchical government for France in comparison with the Third Republic. Algerian topics were occasionally acknowledged in passing, but rarely granted more than a fleeting mention. One speaker at a May 25, 1922 meeting in Constantine briefly noted AF opposition to the Crémieux Decree, the 1870 legislation that granted French citizenship to Algeria’s 35,000-strong Jewish community, but then proceeded to discuss the evening’s central topic: Judao-Masonic parliamentary democracy and its links to anti-Catholic foreign elements. Local affairs were simply not worthy of further debate.25 Throughout the 1920s, North African and metropolitan AF activists continued
to address French foreign and domestic policy, the precarious state of republican finances, threats to the Alsatian mining industry, and the educational policies of the Cartel des Gauches—all diametrically opposed to the interests and concerns of the settlers.26

Even when presented with a perfect opportunity to capitalize upon local resentment toward the métropole, group leaders failed to take advantage of the circumstances. On May 3, 1927 in Oran, a crowd of 1,600 Europeans attended a talk by AF luminaries Larpent and Robain, the largest such gathering mustered by the Algerian sections during their existence. Yet Larpent chose to lament French foreign policy and then produced a voluminous list of the republic’s erroneous domestic initiatives, while Robain lauded corporatism and the vote familial.27 Naturally, local speakers vainly attempted to shift the focus to the colonial setting, eschewing Gallic politics in favor of specifically Algerian problems. At a March 25, 1925 Constantine gathering, the opening presentation by a Blida lawyer bitterly opposed the views of the metropolitan authorities concerning the question indigène. Reserving particular ire for the Jonnart law and communist propaganda in North Africa, he claimed that the illiterate and barbaric natives voted for whoever produced the largest bribes. Naive imperial administrators failed to understand this truism, and their ignorance enabled a climate of revolt, which could only result in the assassination of the colons, the pillage of their holdings, and the loss of territory built from nothing by their sweat and blood. A clear enunciation of local anxieties and grievances, the speech once again provided the AF leadership with the chance to recruit Europeans in Constantine. Yet the featured speakers completely ignored the preceding discussion in favor of an analysis of metropolitan trends.28 Local AF newspaper articles also focused exclusively upon Algeria, primarily confined to recycling Parisian monarchist doctrine.29 Settlers certainly agreed with the group’s anti-parliamentarism, but remained unconvinced by the royalist program and declined to become members, in no small measure due to the lack of attention to their concerns.

Lacking a sizeable membership or coherent program, the local AF were targeted by the Left on numerous occasions. Socialists and communists disrupted royalist gatherings, frequently in noisy or violent fashion, emphasizing the helplessness of their rivals. First in March 1925 and again two years later, metropolitan leaders speaking in Oran faced vocal demands for rebuttal from socialist leader Marius Dubois and communist party representative Antoine Tabarot, accompanied by partisans singing the internationale.30 In Constantine, such protests often turned violent, forcing the abandonment of meetings and physically threatening AF members. A January 1926 Ambroise Rendu talk resulted in major disturbances, planned in advance by a
variety of leftist associations, including catcalls and fighting in the audience. Outside the hall the mood turned ugly, as 100 protestors chanted “à bas le fascisme,” while trying to force their way inside past a heavy police presence. Only the arrival of reinforcements from the gendarmerie calmed the assembled crowd, which proceeded to march to the Place de la Brèche.31 Similar scuffles occurred during a January 18 meeting in Philippeville. The AF subsequently blamed the police for permitting the demonstrations to proceed, and asserted that local Jews and Masons were behind the attacks, yet the group’s image was further tarnished by its impotence in the face of the leftist opposition.32

The local sections also faced sanction from a previously staunch ally: the Catholic Church. Like their metropolitan brethren, the Algerian AF adopted a fervently pious stance, and attempted to position the group as devotees of the Vatican and the monarchy in equal measure. Sicard publicly proclaimed that the Oran AF best represented Catholic youth, while the Constantine section published a letter in Action française asserting their ultra-Catholicism and noting that royalist doctrine necessarily included an ardent proclamation of faith.33 It was hoped that their popularity with metropolitan Catholics, in no small measure due to the endorsement of priests, seminaries, and teachers, would resonate with the Algerian faithful. After all, the Action française was more widely read than La Croix in France by the 1920s, while leading intellectuals from Henri Massis to Jacques Maritain flocked to the AF; colonial and metropolitan leaders fervently believed that a comparable surge could be orchestrated in Algeria. However, despite his allegiance to Rome, various figures in the Vatican had been irked for some time by Charles Maurras’s pagan leanings (particularly evident in his writings) and his perceived use of Catholic dogma for political ends. Thus in December 1926 Pope Pius XI placed Maurras’s works and the group’s Parisian daily newspaper on the Index of heretical publications. This was followed in March 1928 by the threat of excommunication for any Catholic who retained an AF membership.34

In the aftermath of this decision, on April 15, 1928 Algerian bishops forbade the reading of any AF newspaper, even eliciting local law enforcement to prevent sales by the Camelots du Roi outside the church in Bône.35 Unsurprisingly, this led to a complete collapse of the group’s already precarious membership in Constantine and Oran. Faced with only eight members at a April 19, 1928 meeting, the group’s leader in Bône bitterly blamed the Vatican condemnation. The Oran section simply dissipated, forcing Sicard to form a Ligue des Jeunesses royalistes in order to evade papal approbation and a mass resignation. Even his daughters faced criticism, expelled from
their Catholic school after refusing to sign a declaration in opposition to their father’s politics and his frequent attacks against the Bishop of Oran.\textsuperscript{36} Never a force on the Algerian Right in the same manner as their French colleagues, the Vatican condemnation simply hastened the inevitable, and by 1930 the local AF temporarily disbanded.

II

The failure of the AF opened the door to another prominent metropolitan league, the JP, whose attempt to expand into Algeria coincided with the withering of royalism in Constantine and Oran. Although the group had established an Algiers section in 1924 under the direction of lawyer Eugène Simon, much like the AF they received little public attention there. Yet in 1929, Pierre Taittinger and the central committee inaugurated several colonial sections in response to flagging JP membership numbers in France. At a June meeting, Simon announced a new branch for the city of Oran. Leadership went to local right-wing luminary Alfred Sther, the mayor of Tafaroui who enjoyed strong contacts with the Catholic business community, the local JP’s principal backers.\textsuperscript{37} The section experienced great success, which attracted 170 members in a matter of weeks, and it quickly divided into four subsections each with a “century,” a Comité de defense des intérêts des quartiers, and security force, which prompted the November 1930 formation of other sections in Philippeville and Constantine. Although neither of these had a great impact, in Oran the group attracted several high-profile members, including prominent lawyer and politician Michel Parès and Joaquín Lopez, the managing director of the \textit{Petit oranais} newspaper.\textsuperscript{38}

The JP’s success enabled the establishment of a variety of propaganda initiatives designed to encourage further growth. Under Simon’s watchful eye, the group funded an Algerian newspaper (the bimonthly \textit{Jeune Afrique}, which he personally managed), along with an Algiers chapter of the Phalange Universitaire.\textsuperscript{39} Simon again took the lead, sending delegates from the local lycées, the University of Algiers law faculty, and \textit{Institut Agricoles} to the Phalange’s congresses in Paris. Although less successful, the local JP also launched a section musulman in December 1929, dedicated to Franco-Algerian cooperation, and a section féminine the following March. Simon further announced a series of programs to aid the colony’s poor. The group envisioned a network of sanitaria and employment centers, which would naturally facilitate recruitment among Europeans and Muslims alike.\textsuperscript{40}

The group also regularly sponsored public meetings in Oran, which attracted prominent Catholic businessmen and local right-wing
notables. While the Alger section failed to kindle interest from the European population, meetings in Eckmuhl and Gambetta in Oran-Ville, and the neighboring town of Hennaya, each produced crowds of up to 200 locals. Results in the Department of Constantine were equally encouraging, culminating in a Philippeville gathering of 500 on December 8, 1930, presided by local Conseiller-général Daruty, and featuring a documentary film about the JP.\textsuperscript{41} Given the flurry of colonial activity, it is unsurprising that Taittinger visited Algeria in October 1929. Although officially present in his capacity as the head of the Commission of Colonies, he spent most of his time in the presence of local JP members, attending an apéritif in the Conseil Municipal in Oran and giving a speech attended by several deputies in Algiers, in which he proclaimed the need to create “l’état-majeur Jeunesse patriotes pour toutes les régions nord-africaines.”\textsuperscript{42} Such events were regular features of group life, and JP banquets, speeches, and film nights regularly attracted large crowds, often in the hundreds.\textsuperscript{43}

Yet the success was short-lived. By 1932, the Algerian sections collapsed, and much like the AF, the group’s doctrine proved to be the chief problem. Like the royalists who preceded them, the local JP imported the rhetoric of the Paris-based leadership rather than addressing distinctly colonial themes, paying lip service to the settlers, but in reality reflecting metropolitan clichés concerning the empire. Group publications in both the métropole and Algeria epitomized Edward Said’s critique of orientalism, restructuring colonial reality through the prism of the metropolitan imagination, and formulating a primitive exoticism utterly removed from the worldview of the settlers. If the AF completely ignored the needs and perceptions of the colons, the JP fell back upon trite notions of French (not settler) superiority, Muslim barbarism, and the sense of adventure or opportunity afforded by imperialism.\textsuperscript{44}

Following the example of the early twentieth-century literary movement, the European population in Algeria embraced the concept of algérianité, constantly expounded in fiction, the press, and political meetings. It provided the basis for a distinctly colonial consciousness that both incorporated French politics and mores, yet simultaneously demanded the formation of a uniquely Algerian national construct. The centerpiece of algérianité was the belief in the superiority of the colons, and their concomitant right to rule North Africa uncontested by either the indigènes or the French government.\textsuperscript{45} JP authors feigned an algérianiste stance, referring to “notre maitre Louis Bertrand” and lauding Robert Randau’s novel Les Explorateurs. However, the group’s actual colonial doctrine was far more metropolitan and less Algerian in scope. Rather than focus upon Randau’s notion of European racial fusion and the superiority of the colons, the review praised the novel’s
hero on the basis of his service to France: like Lyautey, his drive created a huge colonial empire in Africa through brute force, sacrifice, and heroism. The colonies were a site of youthful adventure, one author noted in the group’s metropolitan newspaper _Le National_ in May 1929, and he particularly lauded the _sémaine coloniale française_ for affording opportunity and prosperity to Frenchmen while hoping to civilize the natives. In another article two months later, Taittinger himself added the notion that the empire decreased the nation’s diplomatic isolation, while providing markets for French goods in times of fiscal crisis. Only once, during an April 1929 joint meeting with Alexandre Millerand’s Ligue républicaine nationale, did a JP leader (Simon) publicly utter the words _Algérie française_, and then only in passing. In contrast, Ligue républicaine nationale leader Edouard Soulier proudly recognized Algeria as the new blood injected into France to provide youthful energy. He promptly received a thunderous ovation from the 2,000 men and women in attendance.

Characterizations of empire as a metropolitan project ignored the growth of separatist sentiment among the settlers, which by the late 1920s coalesced in a violent campaign against Governor-General Maurice Viollette. Nicknamed “Viollette l’arabe” due to his support for pro-Muslim reform, including a proposed revision of the Délégations financières, he was demonized by the _colons_ and European working class alike. Alger Senator Jacques Duroux led the charge, editorializing in his daily newspaper _L’Echo d’Alger_ against the Governor-General’s proposals to lower indigenous taxes, inaugurate land reform and public health initiatives for Muslims, and establish favorable loans through local _Crédit Agricole_. Overwhelming settler pressure forced Viollette’s resignation in 1927, and his replacement Pierre Bordes embraced the _colons_ and ignored Muslims, whose newfound radicalism coincided with an increased use of police, surveillance, and public displays of colonial power to entrench settler control.

Bordes realized what the JP did not: that the metropolitan authorities had caved in to European demands in Algeria (at least for the moment). Clearly the group failed to understand the gravity of the anti-Viollette campaign. Rather than discuss the former Governor-General’s overtures to Algeria’s Muslim community, _Le National_ instead highlighted his purported role in government corruption, and focused primarily upon the Cartel des Gauches in France. If anything, the Algerian JP actually advocated reform, with _Jeune Afrique_ demanding increased education, economic opportunities, and partnership with Muslims. In a December 1929 article, Simon argued in favor of assimilation for the _indigènes_, stating that hatred and fanaticism could easily be overcome by French respect for all races and religions. Other authors trumpeted education as the key to this effort,
prying Muslims away from *marabouts*, the caste of holy men revered by Algerians as living saints. Learning skills rather than Koranic scripture prepared them for productive working lives, one claimed, enabling a more rapid assimilation into French society.\textsuperscript{51} This trend would necessarily be accompanied by urban reform, in an effort to eradicate the clear difference between rationally planned European neighborhoods characterized by open air and the dank, unhygienic *Casbahs* where “the Arabs, shrouded in their *burnous*, stretched out on their prayer mats, evoke nothing less than death.” Ramshackle housing would necessarily be replaced, its refuse and garbage removed.\textsuperscript{52} Finally, columnist Geneviève Thibault noted that France could emancipate Muslim women, enslaved to husbands and fathers, and living in the same manner of centuries past. Confined to the home, fully covered during rare public appearances, and thoroughly uneducated, the “femme de Harem” would become European through access to the French language and schooling. No longer slaves, many women in Algiers were already abandoning orthodoxy within elite circles, their emancipation a sign of gradual Muslim assimilation.\textsuperscript{53} Such talk certainly countered the discourse of European sexual domination over indigenous women prevalent throughout much of the French empire. Yet the assimilationist rhetoric defied settler depictions of Islam as ultraorthodox and primitive, with Arabs portrayed as sexual deviants whose contemptuous treatment of women explicitly weighed against the notion of increased rights and citizenship for Muslims. In any case, purported Islamic practices from polygamy to forced marriages were commonly used to demonstrate Algerian barbarism, and concomitantly to exert greater control over the local population.\textsuperscript{54} With the exception of leftist newspapers, whose circulation levels were meager at best, no settler publication so forcefully argued in favor of assimilation, and such articles did little to bolster the JP’s European membership.

Neither did its discussion about the settlers themselves improve the group’s position, instead depicting the *colons* in a less-than-flattering light. On one hand, Eugène Simon derided the ignorance of the metropolitan French toward Algerians, and particularly the belief that the colony was a mere seaside resort with quaint locals, instead urging metropolitan denizens to consider emigration. Yet such arguments were twinned with articles that characterized settlers as hard-working but hypermasculine, violent, and brutal, while Simon erroneously claimed that rich *colons* exploited poor European farmers, using their political influence to stifle the ambition of the *parvenus*. To be sure, wealthy landowners did not encourage competition, but many working-class Europeans in Algeria enjoyed greater prosperity than their French brethren.\textsuperscript{55} Neither did the JP acknowledge the historical role
and contemporary predominance of the settlers. In two 1929 articles entitled “Pour la plus grande France” and “L’Expansion civilisatrice de la France,” Jeune Afrique initially parroted the algérieniste line that the French saved the indigènes from Turkish bondage and their own primitive nature, but gave the credit equally to French soldiers and “anonymous colons,” while emphasizing that Algeria represented “un prolongement spirituel de notre patrie [France].”56 In the aftermath of the Jonnart legislation and Viollette’s overthrow, it is unsurprising that these themes proved unpalatable for potential group members. If anything, they symbolized a metropolitan tendency to position colons as “European, but not quite”: uncultured, unmannered, uncouth, and generally below European levels of respectability.57

If the Algerian JP’s discourse proved antithetical to settler concerns, the group further confounded observers by prioritizing opposition to the Left within their political program. In this the local sections mirrored the tactics of the metropolitan league, which faced a strong socialist party, thriving communist activity, and significant union membership. However, the Left did not prove similarly attractive in Algeria. The Algerian sections of the Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière (SFIO) found recruitment difficult, and did not capture a municipal election until 1931 in the small community of Béni-Saf, the same year that Marius Dubois became a Conseiller général in Sédiman. The dockers and miners in Béni-Saf provided the bulk of the SFIO support, and the party’s other sections, in Sidi-Bel-Abbès and Tlemcen, were practically nonexistent. The Algerian socialist press fared no better: neither the colonial newspaper Le Semeur nor the regional broadsheets found a sustained readership. In any case, its metropolitan and colonial membership overwhelmingly supported imperialism by the late 1920s, and in a 1927 article, Secretary Cianfarini of the Constantine SFIO referred to empire as “the duty of all civilized peoples.” Although they nominally favored eventual assimilation for Muslims, and faced serious opposition from certain anticolonial voices within the party, the Algerian delegates in particular held firm to the imperial cause.58 The metropolitan Confédération générale du travail (CGT) echoed socialist calls for increased educational opportunities for Muslims and an end to the Indigénat, but also suffered from a lack of settler interest, and as a result the local unions were incorporated into the French national organization at the 1929 congress. Furthermore, the Algerian partisans were decidedly pro-imperial and anti-Muslim. As one author noted in the CGT newspaper Le Cheminot algérien: “the indigène is an ingrate: he is combustible, insidious, dirty, and thieving; to do him a good turn is to feed marmalade to a pig, but to treat him badly is to teach him self-control and to civilize him.”59 Such arguments
were unlikely to cause controversy among the European population, necessitating a membership in the JP in order to defend against the leftist threat.

Of course, communism remained a concern for the colons and extreme Right in equal measure, as the SFIC openly supported the Rif rebels in Morocco in 1925 and inspired the 1930 Yen Bay rising in Indochina. Yet the Algerian membership was minute during the interwar era, and never engaged in anti-imperial talk despite sympathizing with “barbaric” Muslims. While the metropolitan party split on the issue of indigenous separatism, the North African membership unanimously rejected the official Comintern line, which linked colonial independence and proletarian revolution. Even this proved insufficient to overcome lingering settler suspicions of communist intentions, and thus the SFIC languished on the margins of Algerian politics, at one point simply banned by the authorities as a potentially subversive organization. \(^{60}\)

While Messali Hadj and the fledgling separatist Étoile nord-africaine proved more worrisome for metropolitan and colonial authorities in the mid-late 1930s, their 4,000-strong membership lived almost exclusively in Paris in 1929–1930. \(^{61}\) Only the advent of the Popular Front in 1936 engendered leftist success in Algeria, conscripting settlers into antisocialist/communist organizations.

Nonetheless, the JP addressed the leftist threat at every opportunity, imagining an imminent socialist and communist menace in North Africa. In a September 7, 1929 speech Sther proclaimed the JP antisocialist, specifically condemning the Jeunesses socialistes, whose membership was almost nonexistent in Algeria, as a cabal of leftist opposition to “moral” Catholicism. Simon mobilized the same arguments in Alger and Constantine, railing against the Left as a “virus” following the orders of Moscow and detailing socialist “massacres” of decent Frenchmen. \(^{62}\)

Ignoring the pro-imperial stance of Algerian communists, he further claimed that the movement’s newspaper *Lutte Sociale* engaged in a violent polemic designed to initiate civil war in Algeria. He urged Muslims to remember that communists would not preserve their rights and religion upon seizing power, and that a French departure promised only anarchy throughout the colony. Conversely, he warned settlers to bear the Rif and Yen Bay in mind, addressing the communist threat in conspiratorial terms completely divorced from political reality in 1920s Algeria. If their numbers appeared small, he declared, communist partisans were merely in hiding, from *agents-provocateurs* in trade unions to foot soldiers awaiting the revolutionary call. \(^{63}\) Such talk was usually accompanied by demands for the betterment of the working-class, easily swayed by socialist propaganda due to a lack of education and opportunity.
Considering the group’s rather bourgeois clientele, calls for paid vacations and high wages for labor were unlikely to contribute to JP success in Algeria, where ownership vigorously resisted them. That the North African *patronat* stood fast despite manpower shortages in both industry and agriculture, and production shortfalls in most sectors, further reinforces the folly of the group’s worker-friendly platform.64

Most *colonos* instead linked the Algerian Left to the colony’s Jewish community, particularly despising the Crémieux Decree. A pillar of Algerian political life after 1870, anti-Semitism incited riots throughout the colony on a regular basis, with assaults against Jews and their property a common feature in most urban centers. The 1898 victory of Algiers mayor Max Régis and of Édouard Drumont in municipal and legislative elections was not unique; in the JP stronghold of Oran, for example, the municipal council was consistently dominated by anti-Semitic voices throughout the interwar era.65 Due the prioritization of xenophobia by the settlers, and their identification of the Jewish community with the political Left, the JP necessarily attacked Jews, particularly in light of the success of the thoroughly anti-Semitic UL, which after 1924 galvanized Oran’s extreme Right.66 Hence in the pages of *Jeune Afrique* Simon was quoted in November 1929 as deriding the local community for choosing the cause of revolution over France. In return for the Crémieux decree, Jews supposedly backed the SFIO and Muslim independence, and thus were barred from membership in the Oran JP. Simon particularly defended the Spanish *néos*, the followers of Jules Molle and the UL, in a blatant attempt to appeal to the group’s anti-Semitic clientele.67

Yet this did little to win over partisans of the UL, who preferred Molle’s dynamism and pro-settler politics to the empty pandering of the JP. Perhaps the most telling sign of the JP’s ultimate failure in Algeria derived from the leftist response to the group’s continual attacks against socialist politicians. Despite the flimsiness of their own support base, SFIO partisans hounded the Algerian JP, disrupting meetings and waging a media campaign against the imported “fascists.” When Sther condemned the organization as treasonous at an August 1929 meeting on the Plateau St. Michel, the local socialist leader took the stage to assail the JP, while dozens of leftist sympathizers caused a near riot in the hall.68 In fact, the group was often outnumbered at its own meetings. Thus, Lopez chided a prominent local socialist for being a “foreign Jew” at a September 1929 meeting in Oran, and the primarily Jewish and leftist audience promptly stormed the stage and fought openly with JP members, scuttling the meeting. Three months later, 250 SFIO supporters barred the entrance to a meeting hall in Beni-Saf, launching rocks and tomatoes,
while only a heavy police presence prevented serious violence.\(^{69}\) The
group fared no better with communists, who despite their meager
numbers managed to scuttle a March 1929 JP meeting. Although
they occasionally fought back—Stehr and four members assaulted a
group of Jeunesses socialistes in August 1929, administering a rather
ungallant blow against a young woman—they were simply outnum-
bered and incapable of attracting sufficient numbers to intimidate
the Left.\(^{70}\)

Thus from 1930 onward, the group’s apparent weakness led to inter-
nal squabbling and declining membership numbers. Appeals for help
from the Paris contingent yielded little, due to their own diminishing
prospects at that time. Stehr’s death in 1931 from asphyxiation due to
a carbonic acid leak in his water heater effectively crippled the Algerian
JP. Oran deputy Michel Parès assumed the leadership in March, and
promptly steered the Algiers and Oran sections into the UL.\(^{71}\) The
group’s Algerian newspapers folded, and were replaced in Oran by the
UL *Petit oranais* daily, and the group’s remaining partisans became
members of Molle’s organization. Long the doyens of the local extreme-
Right, the UL were the standard-bearers of settler anti-Semitism. Where
the AF and JP stumbled due to a failure to address specifically
Algerian issues, the UL prospered by adopting the mantra of *l’Algérie
française*, dominating municipal politics in Oran-Ville and throughout
the department for almost a decade.

### III

Throughout its imperial existence, the AF largely ignored colonial
(and notably Algerian) themes, presuming instead that metropolitan
royalist doctrine could be merely transplanted to the empire, luring
anti-republican *colon* to the banner of the monarchy. Although they
proved more open to addressing North African issues, particularly in
articles published in *Jeune Afrique*, the JP’s pro-reformist agenda, ten-
dency toward a metropolitan vision of empire as the exotic imaginary,
and insistence upon prioritizing the fight against the weakened Left
rather than championing the settlers, effectively negated the group’s
Algerian presence. Jules Molle and the UL trumpe their French
counterparts precisely because they harnessed the broad support of
Oran’s European population. Rather than parroting metropolitan
initiatives, the UL directly addressed settler concerns, harnessing a
political program steeped in colonial fascist themes: Anti-Semitism,
algérianité, and appeals to Latin racial hegemony.

Somewhat surprisingly, given the UL’s exclusive focus upon North
Africa, their leader Jules Molle was not a native Algerian. Born in the
small French town of Aubrénas in the Ardèche on June 16, 1868, he
studied at the Lyon Faculty of Medicine and subsequently interned at the Hôpital Saint-Etienne. Molle then returned to his hometown, and was elected mayor, only to subsequently move to Oran in 1903, taking up the post of Médécin capitaine de réserve in the French imperial army. Called up to active duty in 1912, he was initially demobilized when war broke out in August 1914, but abruptly recalled in early 1916 to serve with the Tirailleurs marocains in the Battle of Verdun. By conflict’s end, his wartime experience earned Molle a position at the Hôpital militaire in Constantine.72

A self-proclaimed republican, he also entered politics upon his arrival in Oran, becoming a Conseiller Municipal in May 1908, and repeating this success in the postwar era, winning the 1921 mayoral election and becoming Conseiller Général for the Oran-Sédiman district the following year. His conversion to the extreme Right occurred three years later, in the aftermath of a disastrous campaign to win a parliamentary seat. Molle and fellow candidate Payri were soundly beaten on May 11, 1924 by centre-rightist Roux-Freissineng. Blaming local Jews for his defeat—they had purportedly funded the victorious campaign and voted en bloc for the winning candidates—he joined prominent local conservatives in forming the UL, dedicated to “neo-

anti-Semitism.”73 Taking its name from the term néo-français, traditionally used to describe Oran’s burgeoning Spanish population, the group’s doctrine envisioned the unification of all French, Italian, and Spanish citoyens de la race latine in each Oran neighborhood in order to combat Jewish propaganda and political machinations. To Molle, this entailed “legal” action against local Jews rather than the violence that characterized the late nineteenth-century anti-Semitic campaign, centered upon an effort to sweep the municipal and regional councils, and to win back parliamentary seats in the department of Oran. Unlike the AF and JP, the UL never envisioned the movement in Algerian terms, preferring to concentrate first upon consolidating a local base of support.74

That base included a number of Oran-Ville’s political luminaries, and the bulk of local anti-Semitic opinion. The group’s central committee included a city councilor, the contrôleur de balayage, and the editors of the Petit oranais newspaper, along with Molle as President.75 Their stated intentions, to unite “French elements” in order to suppress Jewish propaganda and moneyed interests while triumphing at the polls, proved immensely popular with Europeans of all classes, clearly visible in the composition of its bureaux politiques. While the AF and JP attracted an exclusively bourgeois membership despite continual appeals to workers and farmers, the UL committee for Quartier de la Marine included three shipwrights and two municipal government clerks, while a house painter was the President of the
Saint Pierre section. Conversely in the wealthy Saint-Eugène neighborhood, accountants for the Tramways Oranais and the Maison Triquier, a lawyer and a municipal councilor, ran the local chapter. As the membership increased throughout 1924, the UL was further reorganized into a federation, with each section electing its own bureau politique headed by a municipal councilor, in turn answerable to the conseil administratif under Molle’s guidance. By the end of 1928, ten such sections existed, blanketing the city. Equally important were his chief assistants Chanut and Menudier, and the latter controlled the Mairie during the mayor’s lengthy absences in Paris following his election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1927. Although police reports noted that they were primarily active during electoral campaigns, members engaged in a variety of noncampaign activities, including regular meetings, banquets, and aperitifs, and a women’s auxiliary headed by Mme Ciari. The group also benefited from its association with the Petit oranaïs, which listed Molle as its directeur politique, and whose authors continually lauded the UL and professed an ardent anti-Semitism in defense of the race latine.

The UL’s organization and membership also permitted Molle to dominate municipal politics, through campaigns run under the banner of his own Parti républicaine démocratique indépendante, whose candidates ranged from industrialists and physicians to mechanics, train conductors, and a good number of municipal councilors. First elected mayor of Oran-Ville in 1921, Molle garnered over 8,000 votes in the May 1925 municipal election, a clear majority of over 2,000 which he again enjoyed four years later in winning a third term. Similar victories for members of his party list throughout the city ensured that the City Council remained under Parti républicaine control throughout the decade, branching out into communities throughout the department. Molle followed up his local success with election in 1928 as Oran’s representative to the Chamber of Deputies, winning almost 12,000 votes and aiding the victorious campaign of his ally and fellow UL member Henri Brière in the second district. Thus the movement gained a foothold in the metropolitan parliament, and Molle chaired commissions on hygiene and Algerian affairs, granting him remarkable influence throughout the entire colony.

Although Molle proclaimed himself a republican, often positioning the UL as centrist, he courted the votes and financial support of the conservative and extreme Right. UL leaders were frequently present at JP gatherings in Oran, and the organization absorbed its rival in 1931 due to a shared membership and ideological affinity. Molle also courted the local section of Alexandre Millerand’s Ligue républicaine nationale, a conservative movement in the métropole that attracted the extreme Right in Algeria. The Oran mayor and his
deputy Paul Menudier both joined, along with nine of the group’s municipal councilors and Joachim Lopez, editor of the stridently anti-Semitic and pro-fascist Petit oranais. While the metropolitan LRN fought the Cartel des Gauches in concert with the Alliance démocratique and the Fédération républicaine, at a December 1925 meeting the Oran chapter praised Mussolini and Italian fascism for revitalizing Italy, saving the nation from leftist revolution. If France was to avoid the communist dictatorship that ravaged Russia, one speaker opined, the authorities must hunt the red terror in the streets or face extermination. Given the LRN’s rhetorical bent, it is unsurprising that the organization worked closely with the UL and invited Molle to address rallies on numerous occasions.79

The group proved far less successful in courting right-wing republicans, who correctly presumed that the UL’s support for parliamentary democracy masked more authoritarian leanings. Metropolitan conservatives were particularly incensed by Molle’s assumption of the Presidency of the Oran chapter of the Fédération républicaine nationale (FRN), the anti-Cartelist umbrella organization founded in 1927 to unite the right behind Poincaré. Given the paucity of local support for the traditional conservative Alliance démocratique and Fédération républicaine, the Oran chapter relied upon the LRN, UL, and Parti républicaine nationale et sociale. Due to his preeminence in Algerian politics and the presence of a UL majority within the FRN, Molle was elected to the section’s presidency. Yet the coalition’s Parisian leadership committee immediately quashed the nomination, voicing disapproval for the UL’s anti-Semitic political campaigns and encouragement of violence against Jews. This effectively condemned the project in Algeria: Molle’s contingent resigned, and the resulting loss of membership hampered the FRN’s influence upon Oran politics.80

A variety of republican individuals and organizations joined the FRN in opposing Molle’s political agenda and activities in Oran. Yet rather than simply condemning the UL, such cases invariably involved legal action against the group and its leaders. Thus the Club civique oranais lobby group launched a formal complaint in May 1928 against the UL as libelous, demanding that the French administration ban the organization outright. Founded in order to encourage racial rapprochement in Algeria, its members naturally rejected Molle’s anti-Semitic campaigns. Writing in the pages of the Petit oranais, the mayor responded that his efforts were no different from metropolitan campaigns against immigration. Facing Jewish money and voters hostile to Algerian “republicans,” anti-Semitism represented nothing more than a defense of the Latin community.81

Yet the following year, he once again faced a libel suit, this time launched by Jules Gasser, the prominent Jewish surgeon ousted from
the Oran Mairie by Molle in 1921. A constant target throughout the
decade, ridiculed in the Petit oranais and UL speeches, the Tribunel
Correctionnel d’Oran awarded him 5,000 francs as compensation fol-
lowing accusations that he participated in shady business dealings. By
1930, Molle simultaneously lost 4,000 francs in damages and ten-
dered a public apology to another prominent Oran Jewish physician,
while socialist party doyen Marius Dubois successfully sued the Petit
oranais for libel in response to accusations of treason. With legal bills
mounting at an alarming rate, the newspaper called for donations that
November, while Molle bitterly complained at an apératif in his honor
that the police and judiciary merely assisted their Jewish patrons. The
group fared no better with the departmental and colonial authorities.
Maurice Viollette effected the removal of anti-Semitic material from
the Petit oranais in 1926–1927, due to the threat of government san-
tion. Relations with the prefecture also soured by 1928, with Prefect
Lambry snubbing Molle and encouraging the Minister of the Interior
to warn the newspaper not to attack the Oran Jewish community.
Although the ascension of the acquiescent Bordes to the Governor-
General’s office provided the UL with administrative respite, the
departmental authorities continued to oppose the group’s modus ope-
randi, which comprised first and foremost of anti-Semitism.

In this regard, Molle and the UL continued a long tradition of
political xenophobia throughout the colony, and particularly in the
department of Oran from the 1880s onward. The territory’s 35,000
Jews may have received citizenship with the 1870 Crémieux decree,
but the settlers refused to accept them as equals despite their legal
rights. The community was denied the socioeconomic standing
enjoyed by Europeans, remaining in the awkward position of superior-
ity to Muslims, who often resented their neighbors’ newfound status,
yet markedly inferior even to recent Spanish or Italian immigrants.
Hence only a minority of wealthy Jews, educated in French schools
and ardently patriotic, successfully assimilated into the European
population. Much of the community remained poor, adhering to
centuries-old tradition, diction, and dress, and often indistinguish-
able from local Arabs and Berbers. To be sure, they were not the
caricatures presented by a variety of European and Muslim orators.
Algerian Jews worked as laborers and merchants, civil servants and
professionals in equal measure, and became far more integrated fol-
lowing the Great War, jettisoning Talmudic law and ancient customs
in favor of increased social mobility. Yet the bulk of the community
continued to live in mixed banlieues with Muslim neighbors in Batna,
Sétif, or Constantine, or in the Jewish quarter in Oran-Ville.

Regardless of social class, all faced anti-Semitism, which was not
confined to the fringes of the population, but rather permeated the
entire population. Novels, newspapers, and speeches were rife with xenophobia, and politicians of all stripes invoked the hatred of Jews in gaining votes. As Geneviève Dermentjian writes, “When xenophobic candidates refused to resort to anti-Judaic propaganda, they were in effect beaten by republicans, for their voters became disinterested in their platform.” Anti-Semitism thus became a convenient vehicle for the creation of a mass movement, uniting diverse interests—French, Italian, Spanish, rich and poor, young and old—in the service of a strictly Algerian politics and identity. As staunch supporters of pro-metropolitan political parties, Jewish electors opposed this coalition, further cementing the divergence.

Yet Oran anti-Semites did not simply engage in xenophobia for electoral purposes. Their chief complaint was equally economic and cultural. Deemed barbaric and uncivilized in newspapers and political meetings, Jews were portrayed simultaneously as the filthy and impoverished slaves of rabbinic law and as wealthy, dishonest usurers who practiced sexual deviancy. Drumont had been lionized in Oran, and the population responded positively to his demands that Jews be violently ejected from Algerian soil due to their lust for gold and barbaric customs, with Jewish children and the elderly placed in ghettos. Similarly, Oran délégués financiers were at the forefront of the movement to repeal the Crémiieux decree not simply due to political expediency but also because they believed Jews alien to European civilization, at once wedded to ancient tradition and un-French manners and hoarding wealth at the expense of European workers, artisans, and businessmen. Thus in addition to their electoral campaigns, from 1870 onward Oran anti-Semites assaulted Jews and boycotted their establishments in an attempt to keep them out of European neighborhoods and eradicate unwanted commercial competition.

UL members parroted such themes throughout the 1920s, despite the waning of anti-Semitism in Alger and Constantine in the aftermath of the Margueritte Affair. This partly resulted from the demographic composition of Oran. The threat of Muslim revolt loomed large in the neighboring departments, due to the presence of an overwhelming majority, viewed as temporarily subdued but invariably hostile to European rule. In Oran, by contrast, the European colonizers outnumbered the Algerians during the interwar era, and thus Muslims were never perceived in the same threatening manner. Moreover, the city had a particularly high Jewish concentration: more than 21 percent of the non-Muslim population in the 1931 census, as opposed to 17 percent in Constantine and 9 percent in Algiers. Thus in Oran, the “Jewish question” never ceased to excite public interest and constituted a necessary component of any successful political campaign or newspaper.
To this end, UL leaders principally invoked anti-Semitic rhetoric in speeches, the columns of the *Petit oranais*, and electoral propaganda, from the notion that Jews secretly controlled politics to the existence of vast fortunes accumulated through greed and corruption.\textsuperscript{90} Ostensibly dedicated to local and international news and commentary, the *Petit oranais* had little in common with its competitors the *Dépêche d’Oran* and the *Echo d’Oran*, instead focusing almost entirely on xenophobia in the manner of *Libre parole* in France. The paper’s anti-Semitism proved tremendously popular, selling briskly despite being produced exclusively in an evening edition.\textsuperscript{91} The newspaper’s regular columns included the “Chronique d’Israël,” which “quoted” a variety of imagined Jewish sources, habitually demonstrating the primitive and greedy nature of Jews in Europe and North Africa, and the “Petite chronique kaschir” detailing incidences of anti-Semitism in the local press. The masthead contained a swastika and a variety of xenophobic quotes, while the content included articles by leading Nazis Joseph Goebbels and Alfred Rosenberg, *Libre parole* stalwarts Urbain Gohier and Edouard Drumont, and reprinted material from the Algerian anti-Semitic periodical *Le Petit bleu*. The local material was written by a variety of leading Algerian xenophobes, including Oran Action française secretary Pierre Guilhon, a veteran of Max Régis’s *Antijuif* and the reactionary dailies *L’Avenir* and *Le Libéral*, while editor Joachim Lopez had previously fought to introduce an anti-Jewish stance to the local Jeunesses patriotes.\textsuperscript{92}

Although the editors declared a “truce” with the local Jewish community in 1926 and ceased to print libelous material for a short time, primarily due to a combination of intense pressure from the Departmental Prefect and Governor-General Maurice Violette, Senator Gasser’s electoral defeat, and new conservative Premier Raymond Poincaré’s successful stabilization of the franc, the swastika remained in place and articles frequently reminded readers to be vigilant. Jews had temporarily ceased their nefarious activities, the *Petit oranais* warned, but the community remained hostile to Europeans. Unsurprisingly, the truce ended abruptly once Pierre Bordes replaced Violette, with Molle’s speeches once again accusing Oran’s Jews of treason, while the UL newspaper obsessed about racial differences in articles describing how to recognize a Jew in the street through secret handshakes and physical characteristics.\textsuperscript{93}

A large component of the UL’s fight against Oran’s Jews involved the construction of a xenophobic worldview in which the Jewish community attempted to dominate regional and national politics, the global economy, and revolutionary movements in order to establish hegemony in Algeria and Europe. Molle derided French republicans as the dupes of Jewish finance, abdicating their responsibilities by
taking orders from the “ennemis du people français.” The personification of such sinecure was Jules Gasser, the ex-mayor and then Senator of Oran and “enfant chéri de la synagogue” constantly pilloried as a race traitor, bagman for the Cartel des Gauches, and philo-Semitic lobbyist. In a January 1925 speech, Molle insisted that the Bloc Israélite—an alliance of Gasser and Jewish big business—worked tirelessly to diminish the Latin race.94 Mere months later during the mayor’s municipal reelection campaign, his chief assistant Paul Menudier warned an audience in Saint-Antoine that either the UL would win every departmental election or Algerian Senators Gasser, Duroux, and Cuttoli were poised to crush French and Spanish Oran. He cautioned listeners that Jews used bribes in an attempt to purchase Latin votes, following Talmudic instructions to eradicate all non-Jewish elements through misrepresentation, theft, or even murder if necessary. The meeting closed with a “Latin” version of the Marseillaise, which called on those present to protect “l’amour sacré de notre race” from its enemies by force of arms.95

The UL linked Jewish political supremacy in Algeria to a series of alliances with the European bourgeoisie and political leadership. Bought with funds provided by the community’s “financial oligarchy,” the group believed that various prominent Oranais betrayed their race in exchange for filthy lucre. Molle’s opponents were labeled traitors, particularly former mayors Gassar and Gobert who purportedly handed the town’s administration to Jews from 1902 onward. In a series of 1928 articles, the Petit oranais also lambasted his chief competitor Boluix-Basset as a “Judas” and salarié du ghetto, proclaiming that so-called republicans were nothing more than shills for the Masons and Jewish finance.96 Similarly, figures from the Archbishop of Carthage to Constantine Senator Paul Cuttoli were derided as Jewish pawns, with newspapers, banks, and even the Catholic clergy deemed philo-Semitic. Hence the Oran mayor emphasized the UL’s anti-republicanism, a form of self-defense against la finance cosmopolite and servitude to the enemy. Jews voted as a bloc, he claimed, benefiting from overrepresentation in the Algerian electoral system, in which each community was accorded a number of electors who cast a ballot on behalf of their constituents. All parties throughout Algeria from 1870 onward consistently leveled charges of bribery and corruption, particularly livid concerning the purchase of electoral votes by a variety of special interests, frequently reported in the press and discussed in the corridors of power.97 In keeping with this tradition, Molle accused Jewish electors of banding together to thwart the wishes of the Latin population by voting exclusively for the centre-Left. Local rabbis ordered the ballots to be cast for certain favored candidates, he claimed. Facing this blind obedience to
foreign movements like socialism, neo-anti-Semitism represented a rival electoral bloc dedicated to protecting the interests of Latinité, successfully uniting French and Spanish voters from 1924–1929, and the UL leader consequently became “la bête noire d’Israël” for daring to challenge Jewish political machinations. If anything, Molle’s movement represented real republicanism, he chided, because of its adherence to anti-Semitism.98

Above partisan politics, the group perceived the contest between Europeans and Jews in Algeria to be a struggle between two antagonistic organisms, each attempting to subjugate the other. No mere religion, Judaism could only be defined by blood, and le juif was a distinct racial entity of foreign nationality, a parasite infecting the host nation. Writing in the Petit oranais in July 1925, Jacques Roure intoned about “The Jew [who] seeks to paralyze his prey, administering social poisons to measure: communism, anti-clericalism, etc.” Those metropolitan French who opposed anti-Semitism could not comprehend the “immense gap that separates the Jewish spirit and the Latin spirit.” The newspaper explained the division as a matter of biological determinism: the Jewish mind proved incapable of thinking in the European manner due to predetermined physiological difference.99 Molle further linked supposed racial differences to fervent anti-clericalism, another bête noire of the pious colons. Group authors frequently opined that Jews blamed European Christians for centuries of anti-Semitic oppression, and that all who rejected their appeal against the church were likened to the “butchers of the inquisition.” Thus the Oran Jewish community sought to eradicate Catholicism, deemed responsible for past hardships and present misery alike. According to Molle, Jewish intolerance appeared on a daily basis in Oran, in the form of religious superiority drawn from the Talmud—“la fortesse de l’exclusivité juifs.” Their chief weapon was laïcité, noted various authors in the Petit oranais, a plot to eradicate Christianity by legalizing abortion, outlawing Catholic schooling, and banning all non-Jewish clubs or associations. If French commentators rejected the notion of a Jewish conspiracy against the church, UL leaders and Algerians in general better understood such machinations because they lived in close proximity to the “enemy.”100

Group leaders further accused les juifs of being the masters of capitalism, which ensnared the European worker and bourgeois alike in greedy profiteering. During a 1931 speech in Eckmuhl, UL luminary and local lawyer Navarro warned the capacity crowd that although only 200,000 Jews lived in France, they controlled two-thirds of the nation’s wealth, and proposed a similar agenda in the colonies. He reminded the audience that while the colons came to Algeria to till the soil with their arms and sweat, Jews exploited this labor for their
own profit. The calloused hands of the sturdy Latin confronted an international cartel of vagabonds, who traveled the world seeking to exploit local hospitality. At a November 1930 apéritif for Molle, Petit oranais publisher Joaquim Lopez echoed this sentiment, claiming of his childhood in a miniscule Spanish village that “there were never any Jews among us because you had to work hard and there was nothing to steal.” Neither were such sentiments confined to speeches. At a July 1931 meeting at the Casino Bastrana, the entrance was covered with a massive banner inscribed with the words “le juif parasite.” To Molle, this difference resulted from the Jewish lack of homeland or sense of national effort. Jews avoided agricultural work and manual labor in favor of less taxing opportunities in the financial sector or the press. Acting above the fray, they reaped windfalls from a variety of shady deals and market transactions for monetary gain, including French imperialism in Africa and Asia, the increased production of weapons and equipment during the Great War, and the ruin of the franc in 1924. Natural usurers, they profited from substantial interest charges forbidden to Christians and Muslims, uninterested in assimilation for it would rob the community of its underhanded modus operandi. Jewish money funded the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations through the “délégué de la finance juive” Woodrow Wilson, and arranged for Jews to emigrate in massive numbers to the United States, Europe, and Palestine.}

The most odious consequence of Jewish capitalist exploitation involved the sponsorship of Algerian socialist and communist parties, in imitation of the “messianic” movements unleashed in Europe to break the old moneyed elites in an “operation de bourse de premier ordre.” Duped by supposedly proletarian revolutionary leaders, local workers unwittingly marched in the service of Jewish business interests and their bourgeois allies. Molle claimed that such movements were invariably led by Jews (Blum and Moch in France, various luminaries recruited by Marius Dubois in Oran) and had been subsidized by Jewish bankers from Jaures’s formation of the SFIO onward. They were natural revolutionaries due to the teachings of the Bible, he lamented, playing a key role in the French revolts of 1789 and 1848, and Soviet success in Russia in 1917. As a German Jew and supposed son of a rabbi, Karl Marx naturally lusted after the modern version of the scriptural Golden Calf, attainable by destabilizing European business through socialist agitation in favor of Jewish concerns. In keeping with this notion, the Petit oranais composed a Jewish version of the Internationale in June 1927: “Arise ye wretches of Israel...this is the repulsive grand finale/The Jew, a bandit and a thief/Has he ever been anything else/Avoiding all work...is the final struggle/Gathered together for the future/The chosen people
anoint themselves/As our masters.” In numerous speeches and articles, Molle pledged to rid Oran of socialism and communism, allowing Latins to once again control their own city/department. Bravely facing down the *embusqué* Marius Dubois, the decorated war veterans of the UL would bar the route to Marxism, he promised a crowd in November 1928 at the Casino Bastrana, ensuring that workers would never be starved, beaten, or shot by a Russian-style Cheka dressed in *burnous* or turbans.¹⁰⁴

True to their word, Molle and the UL unleashed a campaign of government sanction and violence against Oran’s Jewish community, in an effort to marginalize and intimidate opponents of the municipal council. Thus in January 1925, the mayor sanctioned the department’s millers and wheat wholesalers, who stood accused of price gouging. Molle ruled that they sold wheat and flour well above the industry norm, and most of those named were Jews: Cohen, Lévy, and other prominent locals. Although the plaintiffs immediately took the municipality to court, they were jailed for defrauding the public, and Molle’s influence delayed a ruling for two years. The case was finally dismissed in June 1927, after the Tribunel Civil convicted him on charges of slander and rendering false accusations, assessing 30,000 francs in damages. As usual, the *Petit oranais* retorted with a series of articles denouncing the local Jewish community in particularly violent terms.¹⁰⁵

Molle claimed to reject 1898-style pogroms as inefficient and inhumane; instead, a systematic legal exclusion and ghettoization would enable the reconquest of Algeria, beginning with Oran. However, rhetorical calumny toward Jews frequently devolved into street violence, during which UL partisans perpetrated organized assaults in the town’s Jewish quarter. The most notorious case occurred on May 4–8, 1925, following Molle’s victory in that year’s mayoral elections. True to form, the *Petit oranais* published his appeal for calm after the announcement of results, but noted that riots had taken place in Jewish neighborhoods: philo-Semitic hoodlums ransacked the newspaper’s offices and took to the streets. The police had arrested dozens of Jews, whose actions disgraced the city. However, metropolitan newspaper *Le Matin* published a very different account, claiming that on May 8 the Spanish *nèg* engaged in planned attacks against the local community, firing shots at the local synagogue and wounding ten as battles raged on every *carrefour*. Worse still, 200 Muslims participated, armed with clubs, and the crowd ran amok throughout the day and evening with no police intervention. The victims fought back, managing to inflict injuries on several extreme-rightists, including Action française leader Sicard, and acquiring pistols in order to match UL firepower. Finally, the police occupied the city with armed cavalry
units, arresting 50 people, including 40 Jews. Yet disturbances continued until May 7, and metropolitan newspaper Le Quotidien noted the deployment of troops throughout Oran in order to stop continued looting and property damage to Jewish shops by UL members. Spanish mobs also attacked Jewish workers, aided by a group of police sympathetic to Molle and the municipality.106

Another Parisian daily, Le Temps, subsequently published an account of Molle’s electoral anti-Semitism, charging that the UL bore responsibility for the Spanish community’s violent xenophobia due to months of anti-Jewish propaganda. Naturally, the Petit oranais accused their metropolitan colleagues of blatantly lying, insisting that Jews had struck the first blows, necessitating a defense of the Latin population. Yet Le Quotidien retaliated in a May 15 article, claiming that stickers on the walls throughout the recent electoral campaign demanded a Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre against local Jews the day after an electoral victory for the Molle list.107 Given the position of both newspapers within the ranks of the French press—Le Temps was the newspaper of record in interwar France, while Le Quotidien enjoyed a 400,000-strong circulation—Molle and the Petit oranais could do little to counter the offending articles. Worse still, the Paris press took an ongoing interest in Oran politics, gleefully noting as late as June 1928 that Molle had assaulted Algerian parliamentarian Pierre Roux-Freissineng outside the Chamber of Deputies during a dispute over Molle’s portrayal of him in the Oran press.108

IV

The anti-Semitic campaign perpetrated by Molle and the UL proved tremendously popular with Oranais of French and Spanish background, who responded to the group’s electoral appeals, with packed meeting halls from 1924 onward, and descended into the streets when called upon in order to defeat the Jewish and leftist “enemy”. Yet the UL’s appeal was not limited to anti-Semitism, anti-republicanism, and authoritarianism alone, although all three proved popular with the department’s settler population. Like Musette, Louis Bertrand, Robert Randau, and the algérieniste literary movement prior to 1919, Molle and his confères emphasized the primacy of a new Latin race and specifically Algerian institutions, rejecting metropolitan control in favor of settler hegemony throughout the colony. Jews, leftists, Muslims, and republicans were deemed saboteurs responsible for weakening l’Algérie française, a phantasmatic construct that proclaimed a distinct fusion of diverse European populations into a new society, partisans of authoritarian government and algérianité.109 Such a state of affairs was only possible in a colonial
state dominated by the colons. The construction and maintenance of this community required European political power and socioeconomic hegemony, a fact contested by non-Europeans and the metropolitan authorities in equal measure.

As the dominant group in interwar Algeria, the settlers expected that a defined socioeconomic hierarchy would be maintained, with Jews and indigènes relegated to inferior status, providing labor for the European population. Thus even the lowliest European worker was elevated above the colonized other, and the standard of living for the settler population was significantly higher than in the métropole. The old mission civilisatrice, which implied the eventual assimilation of Algerians into French society, was abandoned in favor of the ultimate expression of association: the permanent institutionalization of the colonizer-colonized relationship.110

Thus the colons rejected the rule of the métropole, and particularly its ideological underpinnings, instead attempting to construct their own distinct “imagined community,” a phantasmatic Algeria in which all economic and social progress derived from the arrival of the colonizer, who claimed physical ownership of the new territory. This construct naturally rejected the administrative and commercial reality of French Algeria, perceived by the settlers in resolutely negative terms due to its association with governing forces imbued with republicanism, the preservation of metropolitan hegemony over Algerian affairs, and an apparent neglect of the political culture and daily life of the colons. The settlers and the metropolitan government frequently clashed concerning a variety of economic matters. The colons in particular chafed from the late nineteenth century onward at the perceived interference of the authorities in Algerian agriculture and industry and voiced their displeasure by threatening secession and electing Régis, Drumont, and their fellow virulent anti-Semites in 1890s elections. They were rewarded with the Délégations financières, an economic parliament that exclusively controlled most budgetary matters, granted by the French government to prevent further disturbances.111

By the interwar era the European population variously contested the powers of Maurice Viollette as Governor-General, opposed any reforms to the status of Arabs or Kabyles, and began to speak of the settlers as a distinct race, far more virile and able than the degenerate denizens of the métropole.112 Unwilling to accept any compromises with Algerians, particularly concerning the extension of additional rights and freedoms, the colons instead turned to algérienité. Staunchly ultraconservative and obsessed with the preservation of l’Algérie française, they violently rejected the Jonnart law, which proffered potential citizenship to the évolués, the French-educated Muslim elite. In Oran
this often went hand in hand with support for the extreme-rightist leagues, which pledged to uphold algérianité. Neither the AF nor the JP prioritized the doctrine. The AF preferred to concentrate upon Gallo-centric royalism, while the JP paid lip service to l’Algérie françaïse but ultimately supported a metropolitan vision of empire and a reformist platform for Algerian Muslims. Their doctrine resounded with the vision of the French colonial office rather than Bertrand or Randau. Conversely, Molle and the UL proffered a vision of Latin racial fusion and settler hegemony that proved far more appealing to the local population.

To begin with, they advanced a historical vision of the creation of a modern Algeria through settler efforts alone, rather than the metropolitan army and government. The local press, politicians, and literary works had long trumpeted European accomplishments in North Africa, belittling the primitivism of pre-1830 Muslim society characterized by epidemics and violence, and subsequently replaced by a modern economy and political culture. Both Molle and Pierre Guilhon (writing under the nom de plume Roger Bonsens) emphasized the poverty and insecurity endemic in pre-1830 Algeria. In a July 1928 Petit oranais article, Guilhon characterized the region as barbaric: “The negroes across the Western coast of Africa were hunted and killed by petty noble savages and slave traders, who butchered them or kidnapped them for transport and sale elsewhere.” In Algeria, tribes relentlessly fought each other, pillaging and massacring indiscriminately, while the population continually suffered from razzias at the hands of Turkish soldiers. Worse still, disease, lack of hygiene and medical care, and banditry led to a relentless mortality rate, including the death of up to one-third of the region’s children. By contrast, European efforts transformed the brush into farmland, spurred eight billion francs in economic growth, powered railroads and road construction, engendered unparalleled population growth, and brought doctors into every duvar. Most importantly, noted Molle, these accomplishments were not French, but the triumph of Latin civilization, security, and progress over barbarism, the creation of the colon and not the imperial administration or the gendarmerie. In the same vein as Louis Bertrand, Algeria was proclaimed to be European rather than Muslim, its technological and economic accomplishments exclusively tracing to the civilization of the territory by the settlers in defiance of local barbarians. Most importantly, just as the cols excluded metropolitan participation in the historical construction of Algeria, so too did Molle and company emphasize that Algeria remained “French” only through Latin efforts rather than Gallic imperial policy.

This was not simply lip service to settler anger or the product of a cursory reading of Bertrand or Randau’s œuvre. Throughout the
UL’s history, the group’s leadership consistently proclaimed Latin racial fusion and European supremacy in Algeria. Writing in a local tract in 1924 and in the metropolitan journal Le Monde Latin in November 1929, Molle echoed sentiments frequently heard in Algeria since the 1880s, declaring that the local French, Spanish, and Italian communities had successfully formed a new racial synthesis. Through intermarriage and close proximity “the three races melted in the same pot, little by little forming a new one.” In Oran, this meant the unification of the French and Spanish-speaking Europeans. The latter formed one-third of the department’s population, laboring in agriculture and industry despite hardships and poverty, which the mayor blamed upon the Jewish political and fiscal monopoly. No longer marginalized, in Molle’s Oran the néo community received prosperity and respect, with Spanish heritage, language, and culture celebrated as vital components of Latinité. His assistant Chanut extended the argument to include social class, noting that wealthy settlers were duty-bound to assist their poorer brethren. These appeals to racial solidarity frequently appeared at group meetings and in articles in the Petit oranais. Having no relation to metropolitan politics, the UL’s adoption of algérianité was sui generis in 1920s Oran, the newspaper noted, and marked a new era in Algerian history.

Yet racial fusion and Latin hegemony in Algeria faced challenges from a variety of enemies seeking to restore metropolitan predominance. In keeping with the UL’s xenophobic and antisocialist bent, the group accused Jews, Muslims, and leftists of attempting to thwart settler aspirations. In this regard, Jacques Roure termed Molle’s 1925 electoral victory “an Aryan liberation movement,” confirming that the sweat, blood, and sacrifice of the colons prevailed in Algeria. The Latin civilization characterized by family, morality, and tradition “ennobled by the sublime teachings of Christ” trumped the germes destructeurs of the Jewish community. As Jews controlled the Republic and the socialist party, the UL rejected both institutions, which attempted to atomize the settlers through the efforts of Marius Dubois and the colonial administration.

If Jews, socialists, and republicans were derided as unscrupulous enemies of the Latin race, a variety of UL commentators rejected Muslims with equal aplomb. Group writings concerning Arabs and Berbers were characterized by contempt and fear in equal measure, infantilizing the “savages” on one hand, yet warning of criminality, revolt, and treachery on the other. True to their algérianiste bent, the UL echoed the sentiments of the settlers throughout the colony, proclaiming the Latin race to be superior, preserving the best of European culture and civilization while living among barbarians in a state of constant conflict. To the colons, there could be no
assimilation of Muslims, because this implied an eventual acceptance of non-Europeans as equals. The *indigènes* were to be exploited as cheap labor, their property seized, and legal rights minimized. As an embattled society, the settlers had little patience for metropolitan rhetoric concerning eventual citizenship, even for the minority of *évolués*, the French-educated and loyal Muslim elite. They equated talk of reform with weakness, and thus the European population rejected Republican authority in all matters unrelated to the economy and the army. These ideas appeared throughout Algeria on a daily basis, parroted by local government representatives, the press, schoolteachers, and authors of all political stripes. Skeptics were steadily reminded of the danger inherent in any reformist agenda. Vindictive Muslims merely awaited the chance to launch a renewed insurrection, commentators warned, pushing the settlers into the Mediterranean Sea. Islam itself preached *jihad*, the necessity of driving the infidels from Allah’s land, and thus the perfidious *indigènes* would necessarily be restrained by all available means.

Such fears were present throughout UL discourse concerning Algerian Muslims, used to construct what Homi Bhabha terms the subject-nation, whose “objective is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify systems of conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction.” In a May 1928 *Petit oranais* article, Guilhon tackled the issue of security in the *Bled*, decrying a wave of vandalism and property destruction perpetrated by Muslims motivated by sentiments of revenge and religious fanaticism against farm or vineyard owners. Europeans abandoned the countryside in favor of the city, Guilhon lamented, leaving rural Algeria in the hands of the *indigènes*. In the days of military rule, swift reprisals circumvented ongoing criminality, yet the “idiotic” present-day republican authorities did nothing, seeking an accommodation with Muslim leaders, and lacking any understanding of the differences between the *évolués* and the *fellahs*, who possessed no moral compass. Mere months later, the newspaper ran a serial entitled *La Vengeance du colon*, saturated with Guilhon’s vision of fanaticism and bloodshed. The protagonist’s son is brutally murdered by an Arab criminal, whose tribe protects him by threatening to kill anyone who alerts the authorities. Naturally the government does nothing to bring the assassin to justice, and the author includes numerous victims of Muslim savagery, including a young child whose head is smashed into a wall.

Group authors invoked a variety of solutions to the Muslim “problem.” To Guilhon, the only possible resolution involved pedagogical intervention: The inauguration of Muslim schools where *caïds* and *marabouts* inculcated morality and respect for European institutions.
Students required certain skills, including the capacity to speak French and do basic arithmetic, in order to increase productivity and decrease lingering resentment. Naturally, he rejected any possibility of assimilation, noting that complex philosophy or the demands of the civil service lay beyond the grasp of the Arab or Berber mind. In this regard, Molle supported the extension of Catholic education for Muslims, speaking at the Chamber of Deputies in March 1929 in support of the Pères Blancs, an order whose missionary school in Aïn-Sefra sought to convert the locals to a more “civilized” religion. Group authors also supported pronatalism, noting that an immediate increase in the French, Spanish, and Italian birthrate would effectively counter Arabic fertility, staunching the threat to settler lives and property.126

However, according to Guilhon and Molle a sustained fight against Bolshevism, whose supporters actively worked to foment Muslim revolution and anti-imperialist sentiment, would necessarily accompany education and Christian proselytizing. Where Simon, Stehr, and the Oran JP targeted local socialist and syndicalist cells despite their insignificant memberships, the UL instead identified the Soviet Union as the villain. Guilhon specifically distanced Algerian antisocialism/communism from its metropolitan variant, noting that the vast majority of Europeans in France or Algeria rejected leftist overtures. However, in North Africa, “among the indigènes, such ideas were greatly esteemed.” Rather than fruitlessly attempting to enlist the fervently anti-leftist settler population, socialists and communists instead raised the issue of land ownership with Algerians, claiming that the colons had stolen land from the fellahs. According to Guilhon, no party member addressed class struggle or proletarian revolution in Algeria, ideas far too complex for uneducated and unintelligent Muslims, but instead confined their discussion to throwing the roumis out of the colony, and thus creating cadres of undisciplined, violent, and disloyal workers.127 Attempting to counteract the leftist campaign, Molle and his confreres repeatedly praised Muslim civilization, which the mayor termed “infiniment plus perfectionée” in relation to most world cultures. They also encouraged anti-Semitism, publishing quotes supposedly drawn from the Koran to support Muslim hatred of “pernicious” Jews, the party of Satan whose practitioners sought to eliminate Islam.128

V

Despite the great electoral success achieved by Molle, the substantial readership of the Petit oranais, and the predominance of Latinité in Oran from 1924 onward, the group’s continued success owed
itself primarily to the mayor’s mercurial leadership. Although he served as a parliamentary deputy in Paris by the end of the decade, the authorities spoke of the leader and party interchangeably, justifiably believing that the UL’s success resulted first and foremost from its charismatic founder. Thus his untimely death on January 8, 1931 dealt a potentially crippling blow to the movement at the very moment of its expansion into the Department of Alger. A crowd of 15,000 attended the funeral service, while over 100,000 Oranais were present during the visitation period. Political and societal luminaries recited numerous eulogies, while in a final bizarre twist the processional music was Jewish composer Felix Mendelssohn’s Italian Symphony.129

Group candidates continued to achieve electoral success in the short term, and Molle’s chief assistant Paul Menudier won the 1931 mayoral and General Council elections while local lawyer and former JP member Michel Parè inherited the parliamentary seat for Oran. Although Menudier ran under the UL banner, his list was not unanimously successful, with many contests decided in runoff ballots—a far cry from his predecessor’s impressive majorities. One of the movement’s stalwarts lost in Molle’s former stronghold of Bastrana in April 1931, and the crowds at group meetings grew noticeably thinner in the following months, despite their trademark virulent anti-Semitism and staunch defense of the Spanish néos.130 By November, a scission emerged, with Chanut leading a coup de force against Menudier, questioning his worth as Molle’s successor. Leadership and rank-and-file variously threw their support behind the two rivals, further weakening the entire movement. The infighting quickly reached the city council, where all of the principals remained employed, resulting in fisticuffs during municipal government meetings.131 Although the UL continued to function throughout the 1930s, it never regained the momentum enjoyed during the Molle years.

Nonetheless, the UL provided a template for extreme-rightist success in Algeria, harking back to the late nineteenth-century anti-Semitic movement, the algérianité of Louis Bertrand and Robert Randau, and the rough and tumble municipal politics of the prewar era. Where the AF proposed a colonial fascism that directly copied the metropolitan movement’s organization, doctrine, and goals, Molle’s team instead catered to the worldview of the settlers, harnessing the antipathy toward Jews and the métropole alongside the admiration for an authoritarian style of government at odds with the Imperial Republic. Never genuinely prioritizing the empire, by the late 1920s Maurras and the Paris-based royalist leadership struggled to remain afloat in light of the Papal condemnation and the arrival of the staunchly nationalist Raymond
Poincaré to the Hôtel Matignon. They had neither the time nor the inclination to prioritize North African recruitment, and thus their fledgling Algerian contingent dissipated by the end of the decade.

Similarly the JP’s assimilationist rhetoric and overwhelming concern with a nonexistent socialist and communist threat undermined Simon and Stehr’s efforts. Talk of bringing Muslims into the European fold through increased education and political rights, or tributes to the metropolitan (rather than settler) conquest and maintenance of Algeria, were unlikely to attract supporters in the era of anti-Viollette protest and mounting European concern with the maintenance of the inferiority of the indigènes. Worse still, the primary focus of JP anxieties—the local Left—lacked membership and organization, its few European members supportive of the colonial project and European racial hegemony. Thus Molle and the UL easily absorbed the JP after 1930, its more dynamic program appealing to a wider clientele from the Spanish néos and ardent anti-Semites to proponents of l’Algérie française and the substantial extreme-rightist electorate.

Neither the algérianité nor the anti-Semitism espoused by Molle, the UL, and the Ptit oranais were particularly novel. Both dated from the late nineteenth-century, when anti-metropolitan sentiments and xenophobia fuelled the election of Drumont, Régis, and company, resulting in political and fiscal victory for the settlers in the form of the Déléguations financières, which continued a pattern begun in the wake of the 1871 Kabyle revolt and maintained until World War II: periodic eruptions of European ire in Algeria resulting in concessions from the French administration, eager to assuage colonial anger—replacing the hated Viollette with the pro-colon Bordes, for example. Yet if the late nineteenth-century rebels were staunchly anti-Semitic and anti-metropolitan, some were nonetheless republicans, never succumbing to authoritarian leanings, anti-parliamentarism, antisocialism, or settler hegemony in order to defend colonial privilege. In this the UL were sui generis, marrying the cult of the leader and a rejection of democracy with the algérianiste program of European racial fusion/superiority and uncompromising separatism against metropolitan French rule. If this was not the fascism of Benito Mussolini, it represented a distinctly colonial variant. Less concerned with European fascist tropes that corresponded to continental political, economic, and social reality (the militarization of society, social Darwinist foreign policy, corporatism), the UL instead focused upon constructing a version of the doctrine capable of responding to specifically Algerian problems. As a result, it produced a successful model for the mobilization of settler opinion—in the press, public meetings,
and membership in various leagues—by the extreme Right in the interwar era. Although the UL did not carry this agenda forward after Molle’s untimely death in 1931, unable to survive the loss of their charismatic leader, a variety of metropolitan groups successfully used the UL approach in the new decade, led by the Croix de Feu and the Front paysan.
2

The Algerian Extreme Right, the Great Depression, and the Emergence of Muslim Nationalism: The Croix de Feu and the Front paysan, 1928–1935

I

Algerian political discourse in the 1920s resounded with algérianité, as mayors, Conseillers généraux, and Délégués financiers alike berated the metropolitan administration and promoted self-government. The colonial office and Governor-General stood accused of ignoring the legitimacy of local governing bodies, favoring Muslim demands for increased legal rights and political representation, and enacting policy decisions without appropriate consultation. Although there were limits to the effectiveness of algérianité due to the centralization imposed by the métropole, particularly concerning industrial and agricultural policy, and race relations, the colons were able to quash Maurice Violette’s term as Governor-General due to his perceived hostility to the settlers, ensuring that his replacement Pierre Bordes adopted a policy of noninterference in local affairs. If the French authorities and population rejected the exploitation of Algerian labor, encouraged by Muslims in the Chamber of Deputies, the government did little to actually prohibit such practices beyond vague threats of increased customs duties for North African produce and commodities.¹

By the postwar era, Algerian politicians and businessmen owned major press organs in all three departments, from Senator and industrialist Jacques Duroux’s Echo d’Alger to prominent lawyer/Senator Paul Cuttoli’s Dépêche de Constantine, and increasingly used these
pulpits to demand independence. Separatist outbursts became increasingly common in newspapers and councils alike. In May 1919, the Président des Plénières Edmond Giraud expounded that “a large country like Algeria, where almost everything is completely different than France cannot, must not, be run from Paris.” Commentators were particularly acute in their assessment of the metropolitan attempts to appease Muslims, and in December 1922 the Progrès de Guelma assailed French campaigns in favor of equal rights, noting that illiterate, uneducated, and politically disinterested Arabs could not be expected to make informed choices at the ballot box. Naïve Gallic politicians did not understand that Muslims were influenced primarily by marabouts, commentators proclaimed, their barbaric and superstitious nature precluding citizenship. The Cartel des Gauches initially stemmed the separatist tide in 1924, taking advantage of political corruption and unscrupulous opposition candidates, yet suffered a massive electoral defeat in Algeria in 1928 due to their defiance of local interests.2 Desperate to compete with the (often extreme) Right in Alger, Constantine, and Oran, the Left abandoned anticolonial rhetoric in favor of an enthusiastic endorsement of l’Algérie française, expounding upon the need to civilize Muslims, countering fanaticism and Pan-Islamism with French cultural and institutional superiority. Thus communist calls for anti-imperial resistance at the 1920 Congress of Tours were quickly replaced by the surprising declaration in 1930 from the local Ligue des Droits de l’homme that “Algeria has been French for a hundred years, during which the savage coast and hinterland have been transformed into a thriving domain.”3 Such rhetoric mirrored the pronouncements of the settlers during the centenary celebrations, yet did not boost socialist and communist party membership. The CGT and CGTU remained strong in certain locales—the Oran docks or Alger Tramways, for example—and strike activity increased considerably after 1928, branching out to recruit white-collar employees, including shop assistants, hairdressers, shoemakers, and rug weavers. However, the SFIO’s Algerian membership numbered in the hundreds, and by 1932 the communist party could muster only 130 members, their only publication the monthly Algérie ouvrière. The Left also suffered from frequent police crackdowns against subversive activities. In the aftermath of the Rif War in 1925, and again following waves of strikes from 1928 to 1930, local SFIC and CGTU leaders were arrested and jailed, severely curtailing the movement’s activities.4

Thus by 1930 a certain degree of triumphalism emerged among the settlers, as the Algerian centenary was feted in both Paris and Alger. Freed from metropolitan constraints during the Bordes era, with no seeming challenge from the Left or the indigènes, and enjoying
the resurgence of the algérieniste extreme Right in Oran, the colons became increasingly optimistic. However, this exceedingly positive outlook was soon challenged by the onset of the depression in North Africa, which threatened to bankrupt the settlers, creating widespread unemployment for both Europeans and Muslims. Previously inured to the effects of the slump, the Algerian economy was caught in a scissors crisis, battered by falling global prices for its produce (particularly wheat, wine, and tobacco) from 1932 onward, while recent agricultural and industrial expansion had been financed by credit. Buoyed by substantial profits in the 1920s, farmers mechanized their operations, while urban businesses purchased vehicles and equipment, financed by local and metropolitan lending institutions that demanded cumbersome payment schedules.5 Worse still, population growth outstripped the local economy, worsening unemployment. As Daniel Lefeverre notes: “First and foremost, there was the endlessly worsening contrast between production growth and population increase. While capital stagnated or experienced modest growth, the Algerian population grew at a rapid rate. Malthus took his revenge.”6 By mid-decade only the vast French market and a series of protectionist policies enacted for colonial goods staved off the prospect of fiscal collapse.

The slump affected almost every sector of the Algerian economy. The mining production index fell from 100 in 1930 to 55 in 1935, sowing panic among investors and leading to thousands of layoffs, and despite the introduction of a stiff customs duty in order to force metropolitan companies to purchase North African minerals, buyers continued to pursue far cheaper foreign imports. Agricultural produce fared no better, as wheat prices fell from 153 francs per quintal in 1931 to 75 francs per quintal in 1935, while wine exports plunged 34 percent and the authorities demanded the destruction of excess vines. The French government again responded with protectionism, purchasing 90 percent of Algerian exports by 1933 at a substantial loss.7 Although this did not represent a serious deviation from past practice—in the postwar era France became the primary trading partner for North African business—it tended to favor large concerns at the expense of small- and medium-sized operations, and thus did little to stem the effects of the depression for workers, farmers, and the middle-class.8 Already disinclined toward the French government and the Governor-General’s office, and faced with an unprecedented crisis that many settlers traced to faulty metropolitan economic policy, Europeans in Algeria once again turned to colonial fascism in substantial numbers.9

Settler anxiety was exacerbated by growing unrest among Muslims, who suffered disproportionately from the effects of the depression.
Well before the 1930s downturn, they lived precariously, and bad harvests throughout the postwar years led to starvation and emigration to the métropole in search of work. Yet the financial downturn temporarily precluded the obtainment of employment in Paris or Marseille, and famine, disease, and immiseration became commonplace for the fellahs by 1932 as a result.\textsuperscript{10} The Gallic administration did little to respond to the effects of the slump in the rural communes and the urban casbahs, where Algerians fled in a vain attempt to find work. Previously a primarily rural population, Muslims, unable to purchase land, now crowded into cities, worrying anxious Europeans. Unable to afford housing and denied access to settler neighborhoods, the newcomers lived in dirty, crumbling, and overcrowded districts, segregated from white enclaves in economic, cultural, and architectural terms.\textsuperscript{11} When the authorities finally provided work camps for the unemployed in 1934, corruption and misappropriation of funds undermined the program, with millions of aid credits diverted to a variety of unrelated projects.\textsuperscript{12}

One unintended result of the lopsided effects of the financial crisis and the administration’s botched response to indigenous suffering was a political awakening among Algerian Muslims, who maintained a growing interest in Islamic, nationalist, and anticolonial movements throughout the 1930s. This represented a new trend in Algerian political culture, which from the late nineteenth century had studiously avoided confrontation with the imperial authorities. Informed by traditional Islamic precepts and collaboration with the French authorities, the pre-1914 Vieux turbans movement of old warrior and marabout families, dominated by conservative and rich landowners, agreed to recognize European authority in exchange for respect for Muslim customs and faith. Yet this movement proved unacceptable to young Algerian intellectuals, the so-called évolutés, who formed the Jeunes Algériens in 1908 in order to demand assimilation, objecting to the Indigénat, internement administrative, and unequal political representation in the Conseils régionaux and Délégations financières. Led by the Emir Khaled, the grandson of the indefatigable opponent of French occupation Abd-el-Kadar, the Jeunes Algériens had no objection to imperialism, yet as doctors, lawyers, and Lycée professors refused inequality. Meanwhile the 1919 Jonnart Law, which expanded the Muslim electorate to 420,000 voters, provided the movement with the means to control local politics and eliminate the Vieux turbans.\textsuperscript{13}

Yet the Jeunes Algériens never enjoyed real power, and by 1923 Khaled left Algeria following accusations of treason and separatism from the colon press. By the late 1920s, the Muslim population was represented by the Fédération des élus musulmans (FEM), whose
leaders Dr. Bentami, Dr. Mohamed-Salah Bendjelloul, and Ferhat Abbas believed in accommodation, refusing to criticize the imperial authorities, and arguing that increased civil rights could only result from dialogue with the colonizer. As évolutés, their close relationship with the Governor-General, prefects, and European political organizations, and the clear identification of many members with France (Abbas famously wrote an essay in 1936 disclaiming the idea of an Algerian nation and reaffirming his loyalty to French civilization) increasingly angered Muslims battered by the effects of the depression and suffering from chronic disenfranchisement. The feeling was only accentuated by the FEM’s powerlessness in the face of French obstinence, culminating in July 1933, when the authorities refused to meet with a delegation sent to Paris to discuss increased Algerian representation in parliament. Although 950 Muslim elected officials resigned in protest, the action accomplished little, and produced disenchantment among the Arab elite.

The failure of the Jeunes Algériens and the FEM, and the discontent engendered by the depression, fuelled the ascent of the Étoile nord-africaine (ENA), an independence movement led by the mercurial Messali Hadj, whose organization responded to his claim that “the Algerian reformist movement walks hand-in-hand with colonial power.” Founded in 1926 amid the Algerian émigré labor community in Paris in protest at the pittance wages and horrid living/working conditions, the ENA initially allied itself with the SFIC, enrolling thousands of expatriated Muslims. Yet Stalin’s party demanded obedience to Moscow and paid mere lip service to the idea of Algerian independence. Hence by October 1930 Hadj wrested the organization from the communist party and announced a strictly anticolonial, pro-Islamic program, complete with an ENA newspaper El Ouma, which enjoyed a circulation of 44,000 copies per issue by 1934. Although it initially gained few adherents in Algeria, the French authorities repeatedly harassed the group members, jailed Hadj and his lieutenants, and balked at meetings attended by thousands of interested Muslims. They particularly chafed at his nonnegotiable demand for Algerian independence, and calls for violence, if necessary, to “protect [our] mosques, gun in hand.” Although neither separatist nor physically combative, the Association des ‘ulamā’, Abd al Hamid Ben Bādīs’s reformist-Islamist brotherhood, also unnerved the French administration and settlers. Remarkably different from Hadj and the EMA, believing that Algerian national identity could be reconstructed only on the basis of Islamic principles, and willing to find accommodation with colonial authorities on certain issues, the Association’s reformism nonetheless rejected any competing secular movements, chiming fellow Salafi voices such as Lamine Lamoudi, Ferhat Abbas, and
Rabeh Zanati. Thus they raised the specter of Pan-Islamism, and concomitantly religious revolt against the Christian colonizer.\textsuperscript{18} Despite the fact that neither group attracted a broad following prior to 1936 the combined threat of the ENA and ‘ulamā, particularly during the depression years, alarmed the Governor-General’s office, which constantly predicted serious unrest due to the twin threat of separatism and Islamism. By February 1935, the nervous metropolitan authorities formed the Metropolitan High Committee to investigate Muslim agitation, from anti-Semitic riots in Constantine in August 1934 to the profusion of religious and political associations throughout Algeria.\textsuperscript{19}

II

In the midst of the economic blight and growing unrest the settlers increasingly joined forces with the extreme Right, evincing a clear distaste for the supposed weakness and apathy of the French government and local officials towards the plight of the colons, from the threat of economic ruin to the danger of Muslim activism. Yet unlike the Unions latines (UL) in the 1920s, which won favor by directly addressing the concerns and desires of the settlers, the predominant league in the early 1930s—the Algerian variant of the metropolitan Croix de Feu (CF)—tended to eschew algérianité in favor of a more nuanced approach, responding directly to the new socioeconomic and political climate. The CF won thousands of members in Algiers and Constantine through a wide swathe of propaganda that tackled the economic crisis, assailed the Left, and most significantly claimed to seek an alliance with Muslims. Given the massive disparity between the Algerian and European populations in both departments, the group attempted to preempt separatist rhetoric, in order to funnel potentially revolutionary sentiments into the CF, which supported the imperial status quo. By contrast in Oran, where algérianité and anti-Semitism remained the chief preoccupations of the local populace, and where the Muslim population was significantly lower, the group’s platform mirrored the doctrine of Jules Molle and the Unions latines.

This multipronged strategy bore fruit, and by 1936 the CF became a major factor in Algerian politics, with approximately 15,000 members and thousands of additional sympathizers. Their success owed a debt to the group’s profile in France, where it dominated the extreme Right throughout the 1930s. Formed in 1927 by Maurice Hanot with funds from conservative business magnate François Coty as a strictly veterans’ organization, the group became a force in French politics after the rise of Colonel François de la Rocque as President.
The CF subsequently emerged in the public eye due to its leading role in the February 6, 1934 riots, increasingly appearing in force during demonstrations, parades, and rallies across France, while being profiled by the French press at every opportunity. Under La Rocque’s guidance, the group embraced the nonveteran general public and constructed a veritable counter-society, including women’s and youth organizations, cultural and sporting activities, recreation centers, and charitable works. Unsurprisingly, by 1936, the CF membership rose to 500,000, earning the enmity of the Popular Front, which promptly disbanded the extreme rightist league upon its summer 1936 entry into government. Undaunted, La Rocque and his lieutenants formed the Parti social français with the goal of taking power through parliamentary means, winning over one million adherents by 1938 to its program of reforming the nation through the inauguration of an authoritarian and antirepublican État social français.20

The Croix de Feu first appeared in Algeria in 1928. Much like their French confrères, the initial cohort were war veterans, dedicated to preserving the spirit of the trenches. Thus from 1930 to 1932, the departmental federations primarily recruited anciens combattants, prioritizing the memorialization of the Great War. Group leaders presented the fanion to departmental prefects, took the lead during Remembrance Day celebrations, screened films for members (Le film du poilu was a Constantine favorite), and held meetings and parades devoted to veterans’ affairs.21 This had little appeal for the settlers, who viewed the organization as metropolitan, its local sections receiving orders from Paris-based leaders uninterested in North African affairs.22 However, the Gallic CF progressively abandoned its combattant focus by 1932, actively engaging in anti-leftist politics, and strident antirepublicanism. A similar progression occurred in Algeria, and in the case of Constantine resulted in the June 1932 resignation of President Paul Lévas, who refused to countenance any political role for the group. The departmental sections were suspended for engaging in such activity, due to their proclamation of CF support for candidates in municipal elections, in defiance of the group’s dictum that they were above cliquish parties and corrupt politicians. Nonetheless, Levas’s replacement, Colonel Gros, continued to steer the group into a more active role in departmental affairs.23

Although they subsequently respected La Rocque’s orders to abandon partisan politics, the Algerian membership clearly expected that the local group would follow its own path, acting independently of the Paris-based leadership. Nonetheless, given the metropolitan cohort’s evident success in defying the republican authorities, and particularly the show of force on February 6, 1934, when an array of anciens combattants and delegations of extreme rightists threatened
to storm the Chamber of Deputies, with the CF contributing a particularly large contingent, the movement grew steadily in all three departments. Although the negative opinions about the group’s metropolitan leadership remained unchanged, Europeans in Algeria perceived in the group a useful vehicle to fight against the French administration. Thus membership numbers in Alger, Oran, and especially Constantine mushroomed from mid-1934 onward. Once a section reached an unwieldy size, subsections were organized, each divided into quartiers, then again into groups of fifty containing five dizaines, themselves comprising two mains of five members. At each level the CF appointed a leader, from the chef de main to the section president. If possessing a sufficient membership, sections formed cadres of the Volontaires nationaux (VN) and the nonveteran Regroupement national, along with the Dispos security service, and subgroups for women, children, students, social services, and even motorcyclists and pilots.

In the department of Alger, the CF attracted 6,060 adherents by 1935, variously joining the central organization, the VN, or the Regroupement national. Initially charged with social service and commemorative activities after its 1929 formation, by 1933 the local CF shifted firmly to the extreme Right, purging leftist and centrist elements and adopting a stridently nationalist tone and concerns about Muslim rebellion, in addition to the metropolitan movement’s anti-socialism/anticommunism and anti-parliamentarism. Headed by industrialist Jacques Chevalier, the Alger section housed the Algerian Comité Directeur under Georges Faucon until mid-1935 and Colonel Debay thereafter, and was responsible for 4,480 members in the city alone, including 2,400 VN under the command of ex-leftist Jean Fossati. Although a percentage of local adherents were considered inactive, meetings attracted 500–600 partisans on a weekly basis, and frequently commanded crowds of thousands across the department, such as a June 1935 grande foule of 10,000 (including 2,000 women and children) from across Algeria in Oued Smar, addressed by Colonel de la Rocque. The results were equally encouraging outside of the city of Alger, as the CF formed twenty sections in various locales, including two south of the Tell in Gardhela and Ain-Sefra, and a plethora of sous-sections. Although some included only a handful of interested locals, those in Affreville, Aumale, and Arba numbered in the hundreds. Despite being far less popular among elected officials than the Constantine and Oran sections, the Alger CF nonetheless managed to attract a certain number to their fânioun, including the mayor of Alger Albin Rozis, trumpeted by Faucon as the candidate best suited to the group’s programmatic appeal.
The group’s success in Alger proved somewhat surprising to many observers given the relative inactivity that department’s extreme Right following the fin-de-siècle anti-Semitic moment. However, the mass support offered in Oran shocked no one; the CF there essentially replaced Molle’s Unions latines, quickly gaining thousands of followers among the local French and Spanish populations. Formed in 1930, the Oran-Ville section alone garnered 2,500 adherents by June 1935 under the leadership of section president and later departmental federation chief Jean René Richard, the local representative for the Maison Rouane and a retired infantry captain, officier de la Légion d’honneur, and decorated veteran. A personal friend of Colonel de la Rocque, he founded the Oran CF in 1928, and firmly controlled the departmental sections due to his considerable public profile, despite possessing mediocre intelligence and a fiery temper—he was an excellent fencer and frequently challenged enemies to duels. Yet he was also a former member of Molle’s Unions latines, and thus brought a staunch anti-Semitism to the departmental CF in imitation of the late mayor of Oran-Ville that proved largely absent in Alger and Constantine. Fuelled by the UL legacy and strident xenophobia, the Oran chapter grew to such an extent that its membership was reorganized into sous-sections by the end of the year. The group also achieved preeminence in a variety of smaller communities, attracting hundreds of supporters in the colonial fascist hotbeds of Sidi-Bel-Abbès, Tiaret, Saïda, and Mostaganem. Each of the department’s 23 sections further recruited the local political elite, from town mayors and municipal councilors to administrators of Communes mixtes, gaining a level of official support far beyond the Alger contingent.

Despite the impressive gains made in Alger and Oran, the CF made its greatest inroads in Constantine, a primarily rural department whose population previously displayed far less extreme-rightist fervor than the western and central regions. Although the Constantininois certainly participated in the 1890s anti-Semitic outburst, the populace betrayed less enthusiasm than urban settlers, and they did not join the inhabitants of Oran in renewed xenophobia and authoritarianism during the postwar era. Yet a combination of algérianiste sentiment, the battered rural economy, and fear of Muslim population growth fostered public approbation toward the metropolitan authorities. The latter proved particularly acute, for the slow but steady growth of Algerian nationalism and Pan-Islamicist sentiment seriously threatened the European population in a region where the settlers numbered only 191,488 in March 1936, surrounded by over two and a half million Muslims, a far greater disparity than in Oran or Alger.
As in Alger, the membership initially favored war veterans and mutilés de guerre, and group activities tended toward commemoration rather than confrontation. However, the incidents of February 6, 1934, were widely publicized in the department, leading to a meteoric rise for the CF and a very active contingent of VN. By August 1935, they grew to thirteen sections and five subgroups under the leadership of Colonel Gros and politician and newspaper owner Stanislas Devaud, attracting 3,720 members and thousands of additional sympathizers, a number that increased substantially with each passing month. Although the membership in Constantine, Bône, Sétif, and Philippeville were by far the largest in numerical terms, CF organizations in Biskra, Bougie, Chateau don-du-Rhumel, and Souk-Ahras attracted a large percentage of the settlers, while certain smaller sections recruited the entire local colon population. Furthermore, although certainly not victorious in every political contest, various luminaries won election as mayors, municipal councilors, and administrators throughout the department. The local sections also engaged in a massive propaganda effort, including regular poster campaigns, the distribution of tracts, and brisk sales of the metropolitan CF newspaper Le Flambeau and Devaud’s L’Avenir, which alone sold 2,500 copies per day. The group also held regular meetings, bals dansantes, banquets, picnics, and cinema screenings, all of which attracted huge crowds across the region. Unlike the Alger and Oran contingents, section leaders enjoyed widespread public recognition, particularly engineer Duval in Batna, shopkeeper and hotelier Jules Vidal in Djidjelli, and Dr. Guignon in Constantine. The popularity of the group also led to the formation of a local Dispos section in September 1934 for the coups durs, in order to combat the Left and protect local leaders and meetings, along with Sections féminines, Fils et filles des Croix de Feu, and various groups dedicated to service social from late 1935 onward. Female members frequently visited the homes of poorer members and performed charity work, while the group funded activities for hundreds of members’ children. All of the activities cost a great deal of money, and several sections experienced financial difficulties, avoiding outright bankruptcy yet suffering from limited expansion as a result of empty coffers. Yet in most cases rich colons funded their sections, and thus any shortfalls were quickly corrected by substantial donations.

III

By far the largest effort concerned recruitment in all three departments. Like their French confrères, the Algerian CF was a mass movement, with the goal of eventually taking power and transforming the state
in conformity with the group’s doctrine. In imitation of La Rocque and his lieutenants, the official position taken by the leadership and the rank and file in North Africa emphasized the movement’s inter-class appeal. The group would not merely seek the support of the *gros colons*, industrialists, and businessmen, but also white-collar employees, peasants, and urban labor, in addition to special interests—civil servants, the liberal professions, the clergy, and the armed forces.

For this reason, CF leaders prioritized working-class recruits. At an October 1935 meeting in Arba, speakers demanded that the group take advantage of the economic crisis, offering jobs to the local unemployed, and providing financial aid to families as an incentive to join the movement. Similar appeals were made in Constantine, where members in smaller communities such as Sedara noted that unemployed youth joined the CF and VN in significant numbers. Colonel Gros responded in April 1936 by actively seeking positions for those with membership cards, and inaugurating a Marché Croix de Feu to aid the sale of produce without payments to corrupt middlemen, thus freeing up funds for wages. Yet for all their efforts, workers seldom responded to these entreaties, instead empowering trade unions to speak on their behalf. Although noticeably absent in Oran, the February 12, 1934, rallies against the extreme Right in the wake of the assault on the Chamber of Deputies in Paris attracted large crowds elsewhere, including 10,000 in Alger-Ville. Workers did not flock to the still-stagnant SFIO or SFIC in Algeria—despite considerable growth, only 1,300 partisans joined the communist party by spring 1936, and notwithstanding talk of creating a metropolitan-style Common Front in North Africa, leftist meetings regularly degenerated into verbal and/or physical assaults. Nonetheless, substantial union activity appeared in all three departments, including 3,599 *syndicats* affiliated with the CGT and CGTU by 1931, a significant reversal of fortune from the preceding decade. Given the newfound solidarity of the Algerian working class, railway workers, clerks, and manual laborers often proved openly hostile to the CF, although a significant portion continued to support colonial fascism in Oran, while *Constantinois* farm employees rejected unionization altogether. In any case, extreme-rightist politicians exploited the insistence upon CF membership as a condition of employment, scaling back the *Chantiers municipaux*, concomitantly ignoring the plight of the vast majority of urban labor, and further problematizing working-class recruitment.

Nonetheless, the group continued to pursue Algerian workers, and members controlled the major commercial firms in many towns, placing serious pressure on employees to join the CF. In Blida, Mascara, and Saïda, laborers were ordered to support the movement or face the
unemployment line, a position extended in 1936 to Oran shopkeepers through a boycott of all stores not owned by group members. Such harsh measures were combined with softer appeals to youth through a variety of initiatives, including a CF sports and gun club, and targeted propaganda at group meetings. Yet by late 1935, local leadership increasingly prioritized government employees, professionals, and the army. This was duly noted by the Governor-General’s office, which issued warnings to administrators consorting with the extreme Right, and sanctioned police officers on several occasions for joining the CF in Constantine and Oran. Ignoring the consequences, or perhaps in response to the perceived weakness of the metropolitan administration, by July 1935 reports circulated of civil servants attending group meetings in significant numbers. Prefects in Constantine and Oran displayed an even greater concern with the omnipresence of gendarmes and army officers, many of whom were active members in a plethora of sections. Although soldiers naturally gravitated toward earlier incarnations of the group due to its association with war veterans, the subsequent adoption of authoritarian anti-parliamentarism theoretically prohibited any close ties. Nevertheless, from February 1934 onward, the Sûreté départementale regularly mentioned the presence of officers and rank and file at monthly gatherings, often in great numbers. Authorities in Khénchela further noted in July 1935 that the local CF specifically petitioned soldiers, while those in Constantine and Oran reported widespread sympathy with the movement throughout the gendarmerie, from members and nonmembers alike.

Regardless of the intended audience, the Algerian leadership devoted substantial resources to a diverse array of propaganda initiatives, designed to appeal to a wide swathe of the population. These included an extensive press network, including the metropolitan Flambeau newspaper and a local bulletin devoted exclusively to North African affairs, a regional broadsheet in Sétif, and Devaud’s L’Avenir. Although certain publications proved unsympathetic to the cause, notably the Echo d’Oran, a number of others championed the CF at every opportunity, including the Dépêche Algérienne, whose codirector was a member, and the Dépêche de Constantine. The Algerian press regularly allotted front-page coverage to local and departmental events, endorsed Devaud and other candidates, and protested mistreatment of the leadership and the rank and file at the hands of the authorities.

Much like the metropolitan CF, the Algerian membership also mobilized various specialized sections in order to attract women, families, and the disadvantaged. Although in no way as significant as its Gallic counterpart, the local section féminine was established
in Algeria in February 1935, its 40 members tasked with recruiting workers through aiding the unemployed, needy families, and providing free medicine to the poor.\(^5\) Headed by Mme. Bernard, within months the chapter spread to various towns throughout the department and ultimately to Oran and Constantine, where local women led efforts to improve childcare and charity work under the leadership of Dr. Guignon. Each section experienced significant membership gains and in 1936 added a political requirement, urging CF women to use their domestic influence in order to ensure that their husbands voted in the correct (i.e., anti-leftist) manner.\(^5\) The *section féminine* was further charged with supervising the *section enfantine*, whose activities included regular meetings, field trips, and *colonies de vacances* in the summertime. Comprising children of group members, the section’s participants eventually graduated to the local *Fils et filles des Croix de Feu* at 12, and in certain cases the *section universitaire* in Algiers or Oran.\(^5\)

CF women were aided in their social work by the group’s *service social* initiatives, which combined medico-pharmaceutical activities, workshops, children’s programs, and food donation drives throughout Algeria. In the department of Algiers, members were eligible for free medical treatment by November 1935, along with a *Marché Croix de Feu* that sold deeply discounted produce and clothing, while volunteers served 450 meals per week and attempted to find work for the unemployed. These activities garnered the group a sympathetic public profile and resulted in increased membership numbers, particularly among workers, previously the most difficult recruitment target. The Constantine sections also provided daycare, distributed alms to the poor, held gymnastics and film nights, and operated a *Maison d’Education* for children under 16.\(^5\) Female members further organized flea markets and annual balls throughout the department, which raised tens of thousands of francs for the local poor, and even attracted local leftists, who, quite unlike their metropolitan brethren, contributed to the CF’s effort despite clear political differences.\(^5\)

All of these activities were designed to emphasize the breadth of the CF, underlining its popularity throughout Algeria. As a result, the group did not foster any rapport with competing extreme-rightist organizations. Orders were regularly received from the CF’s Paris leadership explicitly discouraging the Algerian federations from fraternizing with the AF or JP. However, true to form, the local members ignored metropolitan demands. In March 1935, La Rocque specifically warned the Alger contingent not to wear their insignias at AF meetings, while Debay issued similar instructions to the Constantine section, whose leader Colonel Gros had aided the formation of the local JP two years earlier. These words had little impact, and in

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\(^5\) Numbers are approximate and based on the sources cited in the text.
February 1936 many Constantine VN joined a newly formed JP section. Worse still, Oran members were caught in December 1935 and January 1936 sporting their insignia while selling *Action française*, and many VN held dual memberships in the CF and AF. Unlike the metropole, where members stridently refused to associate with rival organizations, the Algerian settlers ultimately remained loyal to their fellows, regardless of affiliation, provided that their political views converged.56

IV

The mass recruitment undertaken by CF sections all over Algeria corresponded with the expressed desire to create a mass party across class and gender lines. Much like the metropolitan leadership, the Algerian *Comité Directeur* wished to eventually supplant the French authorities entirely, seeking to transform North African government and society according to group principles. In this regard, efforts were made to similarly bridge racial divides. In the department of Constantine, the local section openly courted the Italian population, with evident success, given the prevalence of members of the community at CF meetings, and within the local leadership, newspaper columnists, and so on. Similarly in Oran, the group wooed the Spanish *Néos*, the bastions of support for Molle and the UL. However, although the group claimed to represent Algerians of every ethnicity, there were clear limits to such efforts. While the CF actively recruited the *Néos* in Oran and Constantine’s substantial Italian community, the search for a broad clientele was limited by the demographic and socioeconomic realities of Algerian politics.

Nonetheless, recruitment strategies also responded to departmental political and socioeconomic conditions. In Alger, dominated by business interests and home to a large Muslim working class, the CF tended to behave much like a traditional political movement, believing that radicalism was unnecessary, for the population had displayed little fervor for Molle and the Unions latines, and generally ignored extreme-rightist overtures in the postwar era. Thus the group focused primarily upon propaganda, women’s and children’s sections, and a *service social* in order to woo labor and the bourgeoisie. By contrast, in Constantine, the CF leadership and rank and file adopted programs designed specifically to win the support of local populations deemed far more susceptible to more authoritarian and violent appeals. In a rural department the CF needed the support of both *colons* and farm labor, and thus tailored its program accordingly, working with the Front paysan (FP) and proposing authoritarian and/or fascist solutions to departmental woes, and attacking the Left
due to their perceivedly strident anticolonialism. Like the Alger CF, the Constantine sections further engaged the question indigène due to concerns about a serious demographic imbalance that left a small European community surrounded by a vast majority of perceptibly hostile Muslims. However, in Oran, the epicenter of anti-Semitism and algérianité, with a large Jewish community and a tradition of taunting French officials, leaders pushed xenophobia and anti-metropolitan sentiments. Thus the group trumped its predecessors by effectively courting members across Algeria through a variety of different priorities, unlike the purely regional focus of the UL in 1920s Oran, becoming a populist mass movement encompassing a diverse array of factions in the process. The local sections effectively adopted the tactics of the metropolitan CF, where a diverse group of factions (economic modernists and traditionalists, anti-Semites and social Catholics, etc.) coexisted under La Rocque’s leadership in order to further the group’s attempts to gain power.57

Although the group later adopted a staunchly algérianiste position concerning European racial superiority over the “barbaric” Muslims, prior to 1936 the CF leadership claimed that they were welcome in both the group and the colony. Initially opposed to the idea, local partisans actively recruited indigènes from 1935 onward, swayed by the demographic imbalance that constantly threatened the European population of Alger and Constantine. Police in the Communes mixtes of Bordj-bou-Arrèridj, El Biar, and Oujda reported that members used various tactics, including anti-Semitism and cash payments, to bring local Arabs into the fold. Disdained until very recently, Algerian youth were mobilized by group activists against the Left (and particularly the newly enshrined Popular Front) in Bordj-bou-Arrèridj during the 1934 departmental and 1935 municipal elections, and on July 14, 1935, a gathering of Croix de Feu and Volontaires nationaux solicited Muslim agricultural workers in the fight against socialism.58

The most strident appeals for Muslim support invariably occurred during municipal and regional election campaigns. From 1934 onward, candidates in various communities attempted to enlist local évolués and workers, invoking the injustices of the metropolitan treatment of the indigènes. Such tactics bore fruit for Devaud’s 1936 parliamentary campaign in Batna, and also for lesser-known members in communes such as Ain-Beida, where local Muslims took to the streets in support of the local CF leader Bagnère, offering him a méchoui. In Sétif, Batna, and Khenchela, the group’s representatives went even further, encouraging anticolonial sentiment in order to win control of the mairie. These successful campaigns handed the CF over a dozen council memberships, along with seats on the Conseils généraux and the Délégations financières, yet simultaneously raised the expectations
of local Muslims, whose support was contingent upon promises of the vote and eventual citizenship.\(^{59}\) The group enjoyed considerable success in this regard, both encouraging municipal campaigns by non-European members and harnessing local Arab votes in support of CF-approved candidates. During the July 1935 municipal elections in Maison-Carré, two retired army officers— Said Greffon and Amar Akli—actively worked to sway Muslim electors in favor of the group’s slate of municipal councilors. The Medjana-Blondel section similarly colluded with supporters of Dr. Mohamed Bendjelloul, leader of the assimilationist Fédération des elus musulmans in the department of Constantine to successfully elect candidates in Bordj-Bou-Arrérijd.\(^{60}\)

In each case, candidates and speakers also used anti-Semitic themes to buttress their arguments and appeal to Muslims. Despite the fact that such rhetoric was not broadly used during European section meetings in Alger and Constantine, the theme frequently appeared during electoral speeches given by a variety of CF personnel. During the 1935 electoral contest in Bordj-Bou-Arrérijd, the mayor of Ouled Eanèche, a group sympathizer, employed a local Arab notable named Bouhadjar to mobilize the Muslim vote through anti-Semitic rhetoric, urging electors to cast their ballot in favor of the mayor and his friends, all Croix de Feu members, as they opposed the Jews.\(^{61}\) Similarly Devaud’s public meetings led police to worry that his presentation might incite anti-Semitic violence.\(^{62}\) The August 1934 Constantine pogrom, in which rioting Muslims killed 23 Jews and ransacked houses and businesses, also contributed significantly, for the Croix de Feu press blamed the disturbance on the Crémieux decree. Claims that Muslims were justified in attacking them proved very popular in the duwars, and certain sections further attempted to encourage the indigènes to assault their neighbors, labeled as the progenitors of international finance and republican-socialist ideology, held responsible for the second-class status of Arabs and Berbers in Algeria.\(^{63}\)

However, the most effective propaganda continued to be the promise of equality rather than xenophobia. The group continually invited Algerians to take part in meetings, which often left a favorable impression due to their size and scope; the 10,000-strong rally at Oued Smar in July 1935 particularly awed the locals. The Alger CF also took care to attend major celebrations at the Grand Mosquée, often in conjunction with veterans’ groups.\(^{64}\) Hence Muslim anciens combattants proved particularly susceptible to group appeals. From 1932 onwards, the CF leadership and rank and file continuously praised those who paid the “blood tax” for France. As a veterans association, group members claimed no distinction based on race or religion, and early meetings often included testimonials from Muslim officers.\(^{65}\)
However, the looming demographic threat and increasing Muslim radicalism seriously limited the hospitality extended by the Algerian sections toward non-Europeans. Due to their loyal service to France, in 1935 the group’s Paris-based leadership officially invited Muslim *ancien combattants* to apply for membership. Yet support for the endeavor was decidedly mixed, with certain sections rejecting the notion that they could be granted equal status, while neighbors embraced the concept of Arab or Berber colleagues. Thus the El-Biar CF denounced the practice, and in Boufarik a local luminary angrily demanded that “the *indigènes* can only be signed up with the utmost scrutiny, and even then it is preferable to admit only the most prominent Muslims.” In sharp contrast to more skeptical responses, the Oujda section promptly dispatched a retired army captain, Bel Habich, to offer support for higher army pensions, free health insurance, baby bonuses, compensation payments, and other benefits in return for membership. However, few joined in most towns and communes, with the exception of Alger, where four hundred veterans signed on, primarily due to the promised perks. Women from the CF Service Social also used home visits as membership drives, promising a variety of charitable goods and services, along with the threat of a boycott should business owners and their employees refuse to comply. For those who could not afford the annual dues, the group agreed to waive all fees, particularly in the case of unemployed workers.

Yet such sporadic attempts to attract Muslims yielded little, for Algerians continued to mistrust the extreme Right. As Mahfoud Kaddache writes, the doctrinal vision of the CF and like-minded organizations was “fascinated with the political myth of the French empire.” The group’s discourse remained wedded to the notion of civilizing the savages, from creating arable farmland to feeding and employing the listless and barbaric Muslim population. Thus the local sections inevitably rejected talk of indigenous rights, deriding metropolitan weakness and the ignorance of the “savages,” while lauding the idea of *l’Algérie française* only to the extent that European control of Algeria remained uncontested, a fact not lost on leading Muslim intellectuals. Recognizing the portrayal of what Homi Bhabha refers to as “a population of degenerate types” forged to justify the conquest of the subject-nation, ENA leader Messali Hadj frequently lambasted La Rocque and the CF in speeches and editorials, and Algerian membership stalled accordingly. Outside major urban centers, the group’s numbers were far from impressive. In the department of Alger, the section in Maison-Carré reported in June 1935 that only 2 of its 130 members were non-European, both ex-army officers, while the Affreville CF also listed 2 Muslims out of 110 members, along with another 2 in Aumale. The Constantine sections, recruiting
in the group’s stronghold, also failed to convince non-Europeans for the most part, with the exceptions of Khénchela (21 of 59 members) and Batna (7 of 90 members), two Communes mixtes in the south. However, in the first case the individuals concerned were associates of Bendjelloul, including three municipal councilors and the administrateur adjoint of the commune, and sought an alliance with anti-Republican forces in order to further a reformist agenda, rather than proffering genuine support for the CF program.71 As in Alger, cities in Constantine also reported few members, and only two Arabs ever ascended to the leadership ranks: a M. Medjamel in 1937 acted as a Délégue de la propagande in Bône, and a M. Meneroud functioned as President of the Constantine Volontaires nationaux in 1934. Nonetheless, this certainly trumped the participation rate in the department of Oran, where rabidly anti-Muslim sentiment among the European population, along with the ascendancy of the rival Parti populaire français after 1936, effectively prevented any sizable Muslim membership.72

Due to the relative paucity of recruitment, local leaders in Alger and Constantine attempted to forge links with prominent Arab individuals and organizations, hoping to draw their followers to the CF. In 1935 President Faucon of the Alger Croix de Feu initiated contact with Mohamed Benhoura, editor of the newspaper La Justice and later president of the Association des ‘ulama, ‘Abd al-Hamid Ben Bâdîs’s reformist-Islamist brotherhood, to become the head of a new Section indigène.73 This represented a seemingly bizarre choice, given the movement’s belief that Algerian national identity could be reconstructed only on the basis of Islamic principles. Thus a partnership with the Christian and un-Islamic Croix de Feu was out of the question.74 However, if the effort ultimately faltered, in no small measure because of CF rejection of Muslim equality, the enthusiastic response among the évolués nonetheless convinced the group’s leadership to redouble their efforts. Stanislas Devaud was subsequently dispatched in April 1935 to meet with Bendjelloul, a leading voice in the Constantinois campaign to grant assimilation to Algerians. Through the FEM and its newspaper, La Voix indigène, he commanded the loyalty of a large section of the Arab intellectual elite in Constantine.75 Bendjelloul agreed to support Croix de Feu–sponsored candidates in the 1935 local elections, principally in response to the perceived support of the league for the FEM’s aims. By July, CF and FEM partisans collaborated in Sétif, Batna, Blida, and several other large districts, and the Muslim leader privately praised the group’s anti-Semitic campaign in Constantine, while publicly telling the Depeche Algérienne in October 1935: “Genuine sympathy has been forged between the Croix de Feu and Muslims.”76 The local police and French observers
such as the Ligue des Droits de l’homme stalwart Victor Basch, also noted a more sinister rationale for the alliance: that FEM supporters consistently lauded CF anti-Semitism. Various Muslim intellectuals perceived the group as a useful bulwark against Jewish influence in large urban centers, particularly enthused about the group’s rejection of the Crémieux Decree.77

Bendjelloul and others were initially swayed by the rhetoric of the CF. From 1932 onward, group officials consistently praised Algerian Muslims. That year, Constantine section president Paul Levas wrote that the group aimed to replicate the camaraderie of the front, where no divisions existed on the basis of race or religion. He welcomed Europeans and Muslims alike, speaking of common goals and aspirations.78 The group’s paramilitary style, antirepublicanism, and talk of additional rights and freedoms in print and in speeches by group luminaries across Algeria struck a chord with impoverished and long-suffering Muslims. Yet by 1936, both the ‘ulamā and the FEM denounced the CF in no uncertain terms. For the group’s seeming espousal of the Muslim cause in Algeria masked a far different reality: that they were ardent defenders of l’Algérie française and colonization, fiercely opposed to any extension of rights and freedoms to Algerians. Neither the leadership nor the rank and file accepted Muslims as equals in the CF, and no section lobbied for additional rights and freedoms for Algerians. If anything, the group wished to keep them out of the hands of leftist and nationalist associations, safeguarding the settler population through co-option rather than resolving colonial injustice.79 Faced with increasing hostility from beleaguered Muslims, beset by the deepening depression and the burden of servility imposed by French imperialism in equal measure, non-Europeans turned increasingly to the ENA and the ‘ulamā, while the CF after mid-1936 responded by adopting the algérianiste trope of European racial supremacy.80

V

Despite the evident failure of the CF’s Muslim recruitment strategy in Alger and Constantine, the Governor-General’s office was greatly concerned with the group’s use of anti-Semitism to encourage anti-authoritarian sentiments among Algerians. Prefects were repeatedly warned that such quarrels, often directed at the European center and Left, could only lead to open revolt. Thus the order was given in November 1935 for local authorities to use any means necessary in order to stop CF recruitment, restoring order and defending the public interest.81 Despite being sent to Prefects in all three departments, the group’s Oran sections were the real target of the missive. Devaud
and other leaders frequently mentioned anti-Semitism during Muslim recruitment drives; the Oran CF engaged in anti-Semitic violence to such a great degree that it dominated the local membership profile.

Anti-Semitism appeared sparingly in the discourse of the Alger CF, whose leadership consistently rejected racial bias and pilloried Nazi racism. Although Debay wrote the Governor-General in April 1932 to demand protection from violence perpetrated by local Jews against group members and their families, differences between the two communities were seemingly resolved, and no further complaints were raised until 1936, when the rise of the Popular Front led to renewed hostilities. The Constantine sections engaged in considerably more anti-Semitic activity, and it was not uncommon for speakers at meetings to deride Jews. Jewish members were few and far between, and one Constantine veteran resigned due to the clear disapproval of his colleagues. Sections in M’Sila and Biskra refused membership to Jews, while in Ain-Beida, police actively worked to prevent retired army captain, adjoint du maire, and CF head Bagnères from recreating the August 1934 Constantine riot, urging local Muslims (unsuccessfully) to attack Jews and destroy their property. Despite being the municipal councilor for Muslims, Bagnères fortunately proved unable to interest his constituents in a renewed pogrom.

Although CF members in Constantine rarely perpetrated actual violence against Jews, the department’s Jewish community frequently met perceived threats with physical assault, variously disturbing group meetings, brawling with VN in the streets, and promptly removing fascist xenophobic propaganda. The frequency of the attacks so alarmed the local sections that Colonel Gros asked a Jewish municipal councilor to restrain youths from badgering CF adherents. However, the group were far from innocent victims. Although local leaders often spoke publicly about the CF’s openness to all patriots regardless of class, race, or religion, numerous qualifiers were appended concerning the Jewish community. For one thing, the group consistently derided those Jews who were electors, claiming that the Consistoire Israélite distributed money and liquor in order to buy votes away from right wing candidates. Anti-Semitism was thus justified in order to prevent this purported conspiracy. That Jews actually voted against CF-sponsored candidates strictly because of the xenophobia displayed by members was never considered. The group’s public pronouncements proved them right. To Devaud, and by extension the entire CF leadership certain members of the community identified as Jews first and French second. In April 1936, he exhorted a crowd in Ain-Beida to reject all those who did not subject their religious and racial loyalty to the group’s European doctrine.
Devaud’s discourse found a physical manifestation in the spring 1936 parliamentary campaign of Émile Morinaud. A veteran of the fin-de-siècle anti-Semitic moment who was both the mayor of Constantine and a staunch ally of anti-Semitic politicians Édouard Drumont and Max Régis, he temporarily abandoned the extreme Right for a parliamentary seat with the Radical party in the postwar era. Supporting a plethora of leading republicans, from radical-socialist Édouard Herriot to conservative Raymond Poincaré, he succeeded in avoiding obsolescence through careerism, abandoning algérianité and xenophobia and even espousing philo-Semitism in order to attract Jewish voters. However, the August 1934 Muslim anti-Semitic riot in Constantine convinced Morinaud that his old beliefs had once again proven viable, and he sought an exclusively fascist clientele during the 1936 electoral campaign, particularly courting CF members. Addressing a crowd at a campaign stop in Constantine, he left no doubt as to his position concerning Jews, warning the crowd of a Semitic plot to attack local Europeans with sulfuric acid.89

Although Devaud and the CF leadership refrained from joining Morinaud’s calls for violence against Jews throughout the department, leading members willingly shared the stage with the victor on April 27, applauding talk of newfound freedom from Jewish domination, while members joined a victory procession in Constantine’s Place de la Brèche, chanting “les youpins au ravin” and “à bas les juifs.” Officials reported that the local CF voted exclusively for Morinaud, and participated in a subsequent boycott of Jewish businesses. Devaud himself marched in the official parade on April 29, while Jews remained locked inside their homes fearing anti-Semitic attacks.90

Both CF members and VN were involved in sporadic violent incidents with Jews in the days following Morinaud’s victory, yet despite their clear alliance with the deputy’s renewed anti-Semitism, neither the leadership nor the rank and file displayed much serious interest in the Jewish community. In comparison with the human and material resources devoted to wooing Muslims, the fight against Jews proved to be strictly rhetorical at best. If anything, anti-Semitism revealed latent hatred between Europeans, Muslims, and Jews throughout Constantine, noted the departmental prefect, but one that rarely devolved into serious incidents. Most Europeans understood all too well the consequences of such policies among Algerians, especially following the August 1934 riots; few were eager to encourage non-European hostility, no matter what the cause.91

Conversely in the department of Oran, where the European population far outnumbered Muslims, anti-Semitism functioned as a key
recruitment tool. Buffeted by the ongoing depression, and long the site of xenophobic rhetoric and violence launched at the local Jewish community—much larger than in neighboring departments—colonial fascism forcefully reemerged alongside the economic crisis. Thus the principal target of the resulting furor was not the French administration, whose lax planning contributed to the economic collapse, but Oran’s Jewish population, the traditional scapegoat for a variety of social and economic problems. In Oran, the “Jewish question” never ceased to excite public interest and constituted a necessary component of any successful political campaign or newspaper. The postwar local press, led by the virulently xenophobic Petit oranais, lionized Molle’s Unions latines, attacked the city’s Jewish community, and vastly exaggerated its electoral power and financial clout. Hence despite the Crémiéaux decree, Jewish citizens were denied real equality, suspended between the Muslim population subject to the Code de l’Indigénat and largely prevented from economic advancement, on the one hand, and a dominant European community in which even factory workers enjoyed exclusive rights, privileges, and benefits, on the other.92

The death of Molle in 1931 caused a temporary lull in the hostilities, principally because the extreme Right fell into disorganization. However, the worsening depression combined with staunch anti-Semitism to produce renewed violence in the department from 1934 onward. Buffeted by its effects, various CF sections initiated a massive anti-Semitic campaign in the town of Tiaret in 1935, under the leadership of Armand Viniger and Dr. Jean Azam, the president of the local section.93 A small community, with only 11,525 inhabitants, Tiaret contained a significant Jewish population (2,300) and many debt-ridden wheat farmers who joined the CF seeking relief. Both Viniger and Azam exemplified this trend: they owed millions of francs to local financial institutions and were perilously close to bankruptcy. Following the events of February 6, 1934, the local section’s membership steadily increased, resonating strongly with local colons, mostly uneducated farmers battered by the agrarian and commercial crisis. By 1935 the CF boasted five hundred adherents, including local bureaucrats and judges, winning the attention of La Rocque and the Paris leadership, which promptly authorized the formation of a Tiaret section.94 Flush with success, Azam and his conferees attempted to gain control of the municipal council in May 1935, only to be narrowly defeated by a centrist coalition, backed en masse by the Jewish electorate.95

The group responded with an economic boycott of the Jewish community, whom it blamed for the CF defeat at the polls. There had been no history of anti-Semitic activity in the commune during the interwar era, a rarity in the department of Oran. Yet within a month
Jewish businesses were driven out of the marketplace, and local authorities reported that an anti-Semitic frenzy seized Europeans and Muslims alike, many of whom desired to “break everything and douse the town of Tiaret in fire and blood,” in the words of one conseiller général. Believing the election results to be fraudulent, CF partisans and their supporters pressed for the immediate replacement of the council with an appointed special delegation, pending new elections, a demand tendered by Azam himself in a letter to the prefect of Oran. Yet the prefect refused to prorogue the council, and the local CF promptly resorted to violence, venting their frustrations at the Jewish community, demonized as both politically corrupt and responsible for the looming bankruptcy of the European population. The mayor’s office reported that extreme rightists, led by the section founder De Bouard, “engage in acts of terror,” encouraged by columnists in L’Avenir de Tiaret, the local newspaper. Members walked the streets spurring the population to engage in a Constantine-style riot, yelling “Down with the Jews!” and painting swastikas on Jewish businesses and homes. By June 28 the CF held the town hostage, preventing repair crews from reaching Tiaret’s badly damaged water system.

Given the atmosphere of anger and suspicion toward Jews, it seemed inevitable that threats eventually resulted in anti-Semitic assaults. CF propaganda urged Europeans to “fight against the diseased race,” proclaiming: “Various troubles ravage populations: plague, cholera, syphilis. The worst among them is the Jew. Band together to strike him down.” This is precisely what occurred on July 3, when a fight erupted between Viniger and his brothers-in-law, and a carpenter named Raoul Sotto, aided by four Jewish employees. Rumors quickly abounded that Jews had attacked CF members, and the group’s supporters and their opponents clashed at the commissariat, where the participants were being held. By that time CF-led demonstrations had become a daily occurrence, and the government began to fear both a European insurrection and a rebellion of local Muslims, adversely affected by the economic downturn and roused by the anti-Semitic campaign. The local police reported multiple fights between extreme rightists and local Jews, and demonstrators confronted municipal councilors, demanding in no uncertain terms that they resign and prompting the mayor to request 30 additional gardes mobiles to prevent serious bloodshed.

A mayoral ban on public meetings, combined with a visit from a senior prefectural official, managed to calm the European population by the end of July, albeit only after Azam and 150 CDF members stormed the conseil municipal on July 26, threatening the trapped councilors for hours before releasing control of the building.
However, the group’s leadership and rank and file remained bankrupt, frustrated with the government’s inability to resolve either the financial crisis or the question of municipal leadership. Nor had the anti-Semitic fervor receded, and the denouement to the Tiaret crise occurred in the fall of 1935, during the trial of Albert Cohen, a Jew accused of shooting a CF member in the leg on July 17. On October 19 another group member, Jacques Praedel, engaged in fisticuffs with a Jewish bystander—Maklouf Partouche—outside the courthouse, where the verdict in the Cohen case was to be announced that afternoon. As the CF attempted to ransack the building, the judge imposed a lenient sentence, and Viniger subsequently led a 350-strong European and Muslim mob chanting anti-Semitic slogans through the town streets. The crowd eventually arrived at the Partouche house, setting it alight and engaging in a shootout with family members before the authorities intervened to restore order. Although 22 defendants were convicted of assault and battery in the aftermath of the violence, including Viniger and other CF leaders, none served jail time, instead paying a nominal fine.

Despite the severity of these events, they were far from unique in the department of Oran prior to 1936. No sooner had the initial crisis in Tiaret quieted down than numerous similar incidents began to plague neighboring towns. In Sidi-Bel-Abbès that August, during the first anniversary of the Constantine riot, swastika-laden posters calling for the death of local Jews appeared. This distressed the local community, who feared a repetition of that city’s disturbances, during which local Muslims infuriated by the onset of economic depression, and buoyed by the emerging nationalist movement and anti-Semitic articles in the Arab-language press, killed 23 Jews and destroyed stores and residences. The poster campaign quickly heightened tensions in Sidi-Bel-Abbès, leading to fighting in the streets between young Jews and Europeans. As gunfire erupted in the Jewish quarter, police arrested a local print-shop worker who had masterminded the propaganda campaign, while the local leagues subsequently launched an economic boycott, with their members trolling the streets in an attempt to provoke Jews. Authorities promptly released the suspect to prevent violence, while those who had fired their revolvers during the anti-xenophobic agitation received three months in prison.

Conflict between the CF and the Jewish community of Oran-Ville in November 1935 only exacerbated such tensions. On November 13 a group of Jewish taxi drivers attacked three Volontaires nationaux in the downtown Place de la Bastille outside the Théâtre Municipal. The local section vowed revenge, and the authorities openly worried about mass violence against Jews and property destruction in their neighborhoods, particularly noting the agitation among local
Muslims. The CF’s response came swiftly, with the vicious beating of a young Jewish worker and member of the Ligue internationale contre l’antisémitisme (LICA) on November 16 by a group of Volontaires nationaux.

Similar incidents were reported throughout the department during the month of November, in Jemmapes, Tlemcen, and again in Oran-Ville. By that time the disturbances appeared throughout the department and were not confined to farm owners or shopkeepers. In August 1935 Governor-General Georges Le Beau wrote to the minister of the interior, Joseph Paganon, revealing a massive crise morale in Algeria and warning that even the wealthiest colonsthose who owned vast tracts of land and substantial business operations—had joined the Front paysan and the Croix de Feu. In Oran anti-Semitism was rampant as a result, with racial violence on the rise in numerous locations. Worse still, the assaults frequently involved Muslim participants, those most affected by the unemployment and poverty resulting from the economic slump, raising the specter of either a Constantine-style riot or a rebellion against the settler population. Recruited by the leagues with the promise of cash payments and political favors, Muslims joined the fray willingly, albeit not always on racial grounds.

Yet this did nothing to alter the reactions of the authorities, and Le Beau noted that the indigènes watched the struggle between Europeans and Jews with great interest, a battle that supposedly renewed their desire to exterminate the Jewish population. He closed by warning that anti-Semitic disturbances could just as easily lead Muslims to lash out against Europeans, those who empower and protect the department’s Jews, causing “long suppressed violent, even bloodthirsty instincts to emerge, which could push them to commit barbaric acts.” As a result, the Governor-General’s office intervened to halt the conflict, now a department-wide battle. In a November 23 letter, Le Beau ordered the prefect to apply strict limits to all demonstrations or marches, including a ban on all anti-Semitic actions. Noting that racial antagonism was far worse in Algeria than in the métropole, he demanded the application of an October 23 law that permitted prefects to override mayoral authority in this matter and imposed severe penalties for any individual caught with illegal arms.

Thus anti-Semitic violence had petered out throughout the department by December 1935. In any case, by that time the metropolitan leaders of the Croix de Feu acted to quell the growing xenophobia, viewed with disdain by La Rocque and his lieutenants. Thus a CF gathering in Tlemcen was told on October 27, 1935, that the chef had completely rejected “la haine des races,” decrying the ardent anti-Semitism of the Algerian sections and levying sanctions against the
Sidi-Bel-Abbès membership. The Oran leader Jean Richard, himself an ardent xenophobe, nonetheless asked members to refrain from provoking their rivals or fighting in the streets, particularly after the Théâtre municipal incident. Although this had little effect on the views of the rank and file, it certainly cooled the temper of the local leadership.\textsuperscript{112} Such condemnations were aided by a gradual recovery of the Algerian economy in 1936, due strictly to the intervention of the metropolitan government, which vastly increased imports of North African produce and commercial goods. Investor confidence was slowly restored, and although sales and profitability remained uncertain, Le Beau eventually spoke of “the good economic health of Algeria.”\textsuperscript{113} Certain sectors never fully recovered, but phosphate and iron operations picked up steam once again, while almost every French agricultural import came from Algeria.\textsuperscript{114}

Unsurprisingly, the combination of official pressure, the evident displeasure of the CF leadership, and a lessening of the economic slump led to a disappearance of anti-Semitic violence from the streets of Tiaret and other urban centers. Yet the lull was a temporary one. If the effects of the economic downturn diminished somewhat, lessening the pressure on Algerian Jews in certain urban centers, the rise of the Popular Front encouraged assaults against the Left. Although anti-Semitism remained prevalent throughout Oran, it was joined by settler anger toward socialism and communism.

VI

A Common Front formed in response to the February 6, 1934, riots, in which extreme-rightist leagues, veterans’ associations, and disgruntled conservatives threatened to storm the Chamber of Deputies. Enraged by the Stavisky Affair, in which a Hungarian Jewish immigrant stood accused of swindling bondholders with the complicity of a Bayonne bank and leading radicals, and the firing of the sympathetic Paris chief of police Jean Chiappe, the crowds provoked massive street actions, leading panicked officers to fire on the crowd, and resulting in the resignation of Premier Edouard Daladier. Horrified at a perceived coup attempt against the republic, a coalition of leftists of all stripes initiated a massive counter-demonstration on February 12, in an attempt to stave off a fascist threat. Despite lingering bitterness from the communist-socialist split at the Congress of Tours in December 1920, both parties buried their differences in the summer of 1934 in order to form the Common Front, pledging to fight against fascism in France, a move enabled by Moscow’s new Dimitrov line that openly called for cooperation with democratic and socialist parties in order to avoid the internecine warfare on the Left in
the early 1930s that weakened efforts to fight the resurgent Nazis in Germany. By July 1935, the newly rechristened Popular Front broadened to include the Radical Party, aiming to win the upcoming parliamentary elections.115

The Common Front proved less successful in Algeria in the short term, only attracting popular interest in the spring of 1936 during the electoral campaign. If it emboldened socialists and communists, whose paltry membership and limited resources made genuine support unobtainable, the Left posed little threat in any North African locale. Nonetheless, settlers in all three departments vigorously contested a perceived revolutionary resurgence, with the CF leading the charge. The *colon* actively worried about the communist party in particular, which by 1935 shifted tactics in an attempt to reach the Muslim population, prioritizing non-European recruitment. Although it had little immediate effect other than driving the remaining French members out of the party, the newly formed Parti communiste algérien (PCA) spoke openly about the need to grant rights to Arabs and Berbers, questioning colonial policy.116 Much like Molle and the UL in 1920s Oran, the CF more often than not responded to such talk with physical violence rather than verbiage, attempting to staunch the perceived threat with brute force.

Like their metropolitan confrères, the group’s Algerian leadership pledged to destroy socialism and communism root and branch, instituting a dictatorship in order to replace the weak parliamentary republic, susceptible to leftist pressure. Members derided Marxism as a mixture of German and Asiatic elements, a revolutionary movement dedicated to aiding indigenous independence movements and Soviet conquest. The mayor of Arba/local CF stalwart Picimbono warned a crowd in October 1935 that communists actively recruited members in various Algerian companies, training them for future combat against the European population, to seize the territory cleansed and rendered productive by the sweat of the *colon*. Devaud spoke in similar terms on several occasions, cautioning a Constantine gathering not to dismiss the nascent Popular Front as a mere French phenomenon.117 This was not merely idle talk. In October 1935, La Rocque and the metropolitan CF obtained a copy of a July 1935 internal communist party memo that referred to Algeria as a nation annexed by force, and subsequently enslaved by France. Dubbed the Barthel Circular, after its author, a leading figure in the PCA, it was duly leaked to the Algerian press and the premier’s office, resulting in charges of treason against the communist *provocateur*.118

In keeping with the section’s less volatile tactics, the reaction of the Alger CF to the Common/Popular Front was largely rhetorical, consisting of occasional threats to destroy Left-center politicians
such as Jacques Duroux. Only very rarely did members engage the Left in street fighting, although certain partisans perpetrated sporadic assaults with canes against newsvendors, in bar fights, or during public ceremonies. It is worth noting, however, that Oranais CF (rather than local members), arriving by train in Affreville in September 1935, committed the most serious attack in the department, swarming a mechanic who greeted them with the communist salute. Nonetheless, the group’s rapid growth and anti-parliamentary rhetoric seriously alarmed the Alger prefect, particularly following the 10,000-strong rally at Oued Smar in June 1935. Writing to the Governor-General following the meeting, his office noted that the CF threatened to topple the established authorities, a very feasible plan considering the number of municipal politicians and employees, civil servants, and police that joined or actively sympathized with the group, not to mention the caches of weapons owned by various sections. Terming them a military organization prepared for battle, the Préfecture demanded assistance from the metropolitan authorities in order to staunch the threat.

None was forthcoming, largely because the cataclysmic predictions never materialized. By contrast, in Constantine, the group regularly menaced leftist opponents, brandishing an array of threats, assaults, and intimidation throughout the department. To begin with, CF leaders regularly muscled local authorities into prohibiting Common Front gatherings, including a September 1934 Constantine speech by Jules Moch and a November 1935 address by the editor of the leftist newspaper L’Etincelle in Jemmapes. In each case the prefect, mayor, or administrator was warned of violent consequences if the meetings were permitted. Authorities noted a constant stream of threats during departmental gatherings, primarily aimed at the metropolitan authorities or local administrations. In August 1935, the leader of the Bougie CF, a local tax assessor, was sanctioned for demanding that members begin military preparations, sentiments also reported in Oued-Marsa, Batna, Constantine, and Khenchela. Speakers variously urged crowds to “blow away the men in power with machine guns,” and to use violence in order to topple the regime due to supposed government support for the Left.

True to its word, the Constantine CF assaulted the Left at every turn. At a May 10, 1935, campaign stop in Constantine for the Liste républicaine indépendante, whose candidates included Stanislas Devaud, members attacked a rival from the departmental antifascist coalition and a young Jew who interrupted a speech, and only swift police intervention prevented the crowd from battering the interlopers. Later that year in the town of Roknia, two hundred members disrupted a small SFIO gathering, scaling the walls and breaking
into the hall just as the attendees began to sing the *internationale*. Such brawls became commonplace across the department. The Sétif CF regularly attacked left-wing newvendors, destroying their merchandise and forcing future sales to be conducted from a car while surrounded by leftist partisans. Mayors and prefects responded with additional police officers and gendarmes in an attempt to restore order, yet such efforts were hampered by contrasting views of events. While leftist organizations, *syndicats*, and the Governor-General’s office attempted to limit CF activities due to perceivably paramilitary action, antirepublicanism, and the effects of such actions on the Muslim population, the mayor of Bordj-Bou-Arréridj wrote the prefect in July 1935 to request additional security in order to root out leftist traitors responsible for singing unpatriotic anthems that provoked the local extreme Right.

If the severity and frequency of violent incidents worried authorities in Constantine, matters were far worse in Oran, where the local CF already participated in anti-Semitic activities that included organized attacks on the local Jewish community. Like their conferees to the east, the *Oranais* membership disrupted meetings, fought the Left in the streets, and harassed or pummeled leftist newvendors. However, the scale of their actions dwarfed CF provocations elsewhere in Algeria, in terms of organization and participation. On October 6, 1935, members from across the department arrived in Tlemcen to visit the *Monument aux morts* in a large motorcade, inaugurating a statue dedicated to the memory of children killed during the Great War. Although the mayor had recently banned demonstrations regardless of the sponsor, Oran departmental leader Richard ignored orders from the Commissaire Central to disperse the crowd, while members responded with the fascist salute and cries of “Vive Hitler.” Others sought to provoke counter-demonstrators, and many left their automobiles, overpowered the police, and physically assaulted them. Only the personal intervention of the mayor and municipal council prevented serious bloodshed, and gendarmes patrolled the streets throughout the day and night in order to halt renewed hostilities. In an ominous denouement, the departing CF warned that they would return with Muslims in order to root out Jews and leftists, causing serious consternation throughout the region.

Such events lead authorities to openly worry about a coup attempt, labeling group activities as “military maneuvers.” Following the Tlemcen riot, the mayor and the police asked for a ban on all public demonstrations and the creation of a Brigade spéciale de police in order to contain the CF, particularly given their attempts to goad local Muslims into a pogrom against local Jews and leftists. The Governor-General additionally worried about sympathy for the group within
various *mairies* and the effects of European fratricide on watchful Algerians, proposing a universal ban on all weapons in order to pre-empt street fighting, the use of a recent *Décret-loi* to prohibit public meetings and group membership drives, and the application of a little-used 1884 edict allowing a prefect to override mayoral authority. These measures had little discernible effect, however, and in December 1935 the prefect reported repeated clashes between the CF and the Popular Front, noting the group’s dynamism. Nor did members heed the orders of their own leadership, whose confidence was somewhat shaken by the virulence of the Governor-General’s response. Richard repeatedly appealed to the Oran sections to abstain from street fighting unless acting in self-defense, and particularly if wearing the group insignia. Despite his position within the local CF, the crowd booed, hurled catcalls, and insulted him, abjectly refusing to adopt a more moderate stance.

Faced with the inability or unwillingness of administrators to stop the violence, and the unbending attitude of the CF, leftist organizations in all three departments attempted to counteract extreme-rightist aggression. This effort included propaganda aimed at countering the group’s growing profile in North Africa, from the distribution of pamphlets to antifascist graffiti in bourgeois neighborhoods in Oran. Thus one 1935 communist party tract reminded readers that Colonel de la Rocque was no friend of Algerian Muslims, having participated in anti-Arab massacres during his tenure as a cavalry lieutenant in Morocco, and instructing workers that CF bosses routinely exploited the *paysans arabes*. The author closed by concluding that the group represented “support for imperial oppression.” Not content with mere words, leftist organizations also disrupted meetings and harassed opponents on the street. If they accomplished little in right wing strongholds such as Constantine or Tiaret, socialists and communists regularly bested their rivals in working-class neighborhoods such as Bab-el-Oued in Algiers, successfully forcing the suspension of CF newspaper sales in Alger by December 1935. The Left also infiltrated meeting halls, throwing rocks at speakers and shouting “La Rocque au poteau” during presentations.

However, overarching attempts to successfully counter the growing influence and threat of the CF ultimately failed, not least because the settlers rejected the Left and instead supported colonial fascism. Despite a call in October 1935 for the formation of a Comité de défense républicaine in Constantine, with a mandate to wage war against the group with weapons in hand, few Europeans displayed real interest beyond a few employees in the Governor-General’s office. Over six hundred leftists marched to the Constantine *Monument aux morts* in November 1935, but the CF heavily outnumbered them,
following their parade with a lavish champagne aperitif.\textsuperscript{132} Leftist propaganda efforts frequently suffered similar defeats. The President of the Constantine VN successfully sued Richard Hell, publisher of the socialist newspaper \textit{L'Opinion libre}, for libel. The judge deemed Hell’s anti-CF articles defamatory, ordering both the publisher and his managing editor to pay two thousand francs in damages.\textsuperscript{133} Thus the group enjoyed a clear advantage in the press, the courts, and the streets throughout Algeria.

\section{VII}

The Left also faltered due to its inability to successfully address the agricultural crisis that descended upon Algeria in the 1930s. Similarly, if the Croix de Feu served the interests of a diverse imperial clientele in Algeria, the group had little cachet with agrarian interests in 1934–35, at the height of the rural depression. Only in 1936, with the advent of the Popular Front and the Office de Blé did La Rocque and the metropolitan leadership commit significant resources to recruiting the \textit{paysannerie}. However, the group actively collaborated with another metropolitan organization specifically dedicated to mobilizing disgruntled farmers: the Front paysan, led by fascist sympathizer Henry Dorgères. The CF benefited from a close association with the FP, as the settlers responded forcefully to the group’s appeals. Many section leaders performed the same function for the new league, and the two shared a common agenda, supporting authoritarianism, anti-communism, and a hatred of the parliamentary republic. Neither did the Front paysan shy away from violence, frequently threatening the authorities, and often menacing opponents in the streets and countryside.\textsuperscript{134}

The FP unfurled their campaign as French agriculture entered into a period of severe crisis, battered by price drops in wine, wheat, and produce. Overproduction in the wake of the Great War, the result of newly emerging exporters such as the United States, provided competition for Gallic farmers at the very moment when the domestic market plateaued. Worse still, inefficient smallholders continued to predominate in the French countryside, and faced competition from factory farms utilizing technology and mechanized production to undercut their moribund competitors. During the 1920s high prices masked these structural deficiencies. Less than a decade later the depression stripped away temporary gains, and left farmers bankrupt and helpless, lacking the funds to modernize their operations and unable to sell at a profit. Many turned on the Third Republic, accusing successive governments of apathy toward the plight of rural denizens. Rather than prop up faltering farms, they claimed, ministers and bureaucrats
imported foreign produce at the behest of international finance, greedy middlemen, and criminal speculators. Simultaneously, paysans blamed “leftist” schoolteachers, the press, and business interests for mythologizing urban life, triggering a rural exodus led by young men and women desperate to avoid lives of parochial drudgery in favor of Parisian chic, cafes, cinemas, and industrial work.\(^{135}\)

The effects of the financial crisis were particularly apparent in Algeria, where by 1934 the depression began to impact prices, employment conditions, and profits in almost every sector of agrarian business. The staples of Algerian agriculture—wheat and wine—dropped precipitously: wheat prices sank from 198 francs per quintal in 1926 to 70 in 1935, while the wine industry became so supersaturated that the government banned new planting, disallowed all strains of grape deemed inferior, and demanded the uprooting of existing vineyards. In Oran, authorities reported that the 1935 wheat crop was literally worthless, incapable of paying the costs for harvesting it, which produced widespread dissent. Workers and smallholders could no longer afford food, equipment, or seeds, and faced drought conditions and looming debt repayment to French banks and Algerian lenders. Nor did Algerians ignore the widespread importation of cheap foreign produce, which frequently landed in cargo ships in the ports of Alger and Oran. The settlers seethed at government inaction; although metropolitan farm aid in 1935 reached 1.7 billion francs, second only to national defense in the annual budget, farmers only noticed the profligacy of agents de fisc demanding tax payments, lenders charging high interest payments, and auctions of land seized from bankrupt colons. In keeping with longstanding grievances and the dictates of algérianité, they vilified the metropolitan government, “usurious” banks, and magnates such as the “wheat king” Louis Louis-Dreyfus in equal measure.\(^{136}\)

In France and Algeria alike, the Front paysan responded to both real and imagined threats against farmers and their livelihoods. The driving force behind a series of Comités de défense paysanne throughout the early 1930s, tasked with organizing peasants in France and Algeria against a republic deemed apathetic and usurious, Dorgères subsequently inaugurated the Chemises vertes in the summer of 1935, a youth branch designed to vigorously protect farmers and attack state agents. Both organizations joined forces with the Parti Agraire and Jacques Le Roy Ladurie’s Union nationale des Syndicats agricoles in the FP, which tilted toward the extreme Right, and utilized the same tactics as the leagues. Thus Dorgères enjoyed the sponsorship of rural notables across France while attracting tens of thousands of rural denizens threatened with unemployment and bankruptcy at the hands of the fisc and banking interests. Moreover, along with Ladurie and
UNSA President Roger Grand, he greatly admired Benito Mussolini and Italian fascism, hoping to simultaneously defend agricultural interests and oppose republican economic policies, while working to undermine parliamentary legitimacy in the countryside.  

Although Dorgères’s comités gained widespread sympathy throughout Algeria during the economic downturn, the FP provided the opportunity to bring the agrarian struggle to the colonial setting. However, unlike the North African CF, the Algerian Front paysan did not enjoy formal ties with its metropolitan counterpart, corresponding with their Gallic confrères but otherwise retaining complete independence of thought and action. The colonial FP formed in Oran in June 1935, under the auspices of the local Syndicats agricoles and an executive committee composed of Marcel Pitollet, René Alibert, André Dessolliers, Armand Viniger, and Jean Azam. All were in dire financial straits, much like the rank and file, on the verge of bankruptcy due to debts that in certain cases approached 100,000 francs for small holdings. They further enjoyed ties with the Oran extreme Right: Azam and Viniger were leading CF members in Tiaret, while Alibert had been active in the Mascara AF and was known in the region to be a fascist sympathizer and petty criminal with violent tendencies. Within a month, crowds of up to 2,500 attended meetings, unswervingly supporting the group’s platform: a moratorium on debts, the revalorization of agricultural produce, an end to land seizures and bankruptcy sales, and renewed credit for farmers. Committees formed in towns and communes across the department, organized into ten regional sections, and FP leaders promised direct action and punitive measures against agents de fisc who moved against local property or the attempted destruction of vines. Favorable press coverage abetted these efforts, spurred by drought conditions that destroyed crops for colons and fellahs alike, forcing the majority close to bankruptcy.  

The FP quickly expanded to the department of Constantine in August 1935, where the population and economy were overwhelmingly agrarian, and the local sections attracted support from the Fédération des maires and associations agricoles, along with délégués financiers, Conseillers généraux/régionaux, and municipal councilors. Gratien Faure, prominent délégué financier and president of the Fédération des Syndicats agricoles, and Conseiller municipal Cusin initiated a campaign to force the mass resignation of elected officials across the department in protest at low prices, the sale and seizure of land by bankruptcy courts, and an August 18 law obliging wheat farmers to sell their product. Yet nonviolent pressure tactics were soon replaced by outright aggression, as the Constantine FP came under the influence of their Oran confrères, who imported Dorgèrèiste belligerence from the métropole, including calls for the formation of Groupes
mobiles capable of sorties against a variety of enemies. The shift to more extreme tactics coincided with the deepening economic crisis; by September, small- and medium-sized producers in certain communities had no money left to pay labor costs or even feed their families, and were so indebted that their farms would be seized immediately if banks demanded immediate repayment of outstanding loans. As a result, entire towns joined the FP en masse; in Sétif, for example, 1,200 attended a meeting on August 27 to hear speakers openly talk of taking pitchforks and rifles to meet government agents.  

The FP further benefited from the backing of the press, even in the urbanized department of Alger, where the *Echo d’Alger* and the *Dépêche algérienne* proved very enthusiastic.  

Constantine newspapers proved equally supportive, along with a bevy of professional organizations, including the Comité de défense de blé and the Union des dockers coopératifs. Most significantly, the Fédération des Syndicats agricoles joined the FP, finding common cause in action against low prices and crushing debt payments. The producers’ union attended meetings across the department, acting in concert with *délégués financiers*, mayors, and *gros colons* against the metropolitan authorities. However, the Syndicats agricoles played an even larger role in the Oran FP, largely due to the efforts of their leader Paul Sicard, an extreme-rightist long active as a leader of the departmental Action française. The local sections further benefitted from editorial support in the *Oran matin* daily newspaper, including a regular column for Pitollet and Dessoliers and a stream of articles promoting the group’s agenda.

The favorable response first and foremost resulted from the FP’s program, which simultaneously appealed to proponents of algérienité through its rejection of metropolitan political control over Algerian affairs, while defending the rights and property of beleaguered *paysans*. The Constantine and Oran sections developed a comprehensive proposal for reversing the effects of the depression upon the Algerian countryside. Authors and speakers consistently prioritized a revalorization of French agriculture to prewar levels. The state would necessarily sponsor a moratorium on agricultural debt, providing short-term loans in order to calm the populace and prevent bankruptcy. Seizures and sales of property were actively abetted by usurious lending practices, and encouraged by the metropolitan authorities, they claimed, which permitted banks and creditors to provide funds at prohibitively high interest rates and then taxed farmers into penury. The *Crédit agricole* simply could not be run like a commercial bank; during a depression, the state had a moral and fiscal duty to intervene and avoid the complete collapse of Algerian agriculture. The FP thus called for a fight against fraud
and speculation, peasant debt, and restrictions on planting vines. This program necessarily entailed a ban on the importation of foreign produce. Sections throughout Algeria attacked the practice of temporary admission: the suspension of customs duties on certain imports, substantially lowering the wholesale price. Leaders berated the loophole at every FP gathering, and often attacked companies that benefited from the policy. In September 1935, the Oran section assailed Mostagenem millers D & R Cohen Scali so frequently and virulently that the company was forced to publicly defend their actions, instructing their opponents on their legality.

Commentators placed an equal importance on government aid to struggling farmers, and particularly the 400 million francs voted in April 1935 for debt relief, seen by the FP as a smokescreen designed to calm Algerian paysans. Aware of the critical nature of the funding, Oran deputy Paul Saurin and délégué financier and CF/FP member Marcel Gatuing met with Minister of the Interior Joseph Paganon to discuss its disbursement and also to promote Senator Roux-Freissineng’s proposal to delay debt payments, but none of the promised aid arrived either in summer or during fall. The FP naturally objected to the continued delays, accusing the government of fraud, willing to deliver assistance to anyone but the Algerian colons. According to Pitollet, the métrople wished to destroy the colonial market, and hence refused to intervene in the crise. The FP simultaneously demanded an immediate revalorization of wheat prices, to be fixed at 100 francs per quintal. Rather than supporting Algerian agriculture, group representatives lamented, the government had chosen to promote French industry while importing cheap foodstuffs. To Pitollet, such inaction reflected the fact that the regime treated farmers like serfs, while Dessoliers reminded agricultural workers that the colons were not alone in facing ruin: the specter of mass unemployment concerned labor as much as management.

These recommendations did not markedly differ from the remedies proposed by republican commentators or even the prefectorial authorities. Yet, quite unlike columnists and officials, Front paysan leaders twinned prescriptions for economic recovery with colonial fascist rhetoric, from algérianité and authoritarianism to the demonization of various enemies and, most significantly, violence against the state on behalf of struggling farmers. For the FP rejected parliamentary democracy and its representatives. Alibert noted at a September 1935 meeting in Bougie that deputies spent far too much time in the boardrooms of various banks, and thus the group had a duty to expunge them from the corridors of power. Four days later, Azam urged a Mascara crowd to support a seizure of power and forced implementation of the FP program, and Pitollet named those who would
be eliminated, including Premier Pierre Laval, conservative politician Pierre-Etienne Flandin, and financier Louis Louis-Dreyfus.\textsuperscript{148}

The Algerian FP further linked antirepublican sentiment to algérianité, claiming that metropolitan apathy symbolized the need for independent policy-making. In a scathing September 1936 \textit{Oran matin} article, which blamed Laval and Minister of Finance Marcel Regnier for colonial starvation, Dessoliers accused the administration of derailing a century’s worth of settler efforts to civilize Algeria. Termed the new \textit{pachas tyranniques}, a reference to the colony’s Turkish rulers overthrown by Charles X’s troops in 1830, the republican government had no \textit{sens algérien}, but rather wished to colonize European inhabitants alongside the \textit{indigènes}, treating both as chattels. One Blida leader reminded an audience that the settlers fought for France during the Great War. For their ingratitude, the \textit{métropole} would be replaced at the appointed H hour by a new generation of \textit{combattants} and a new administration dedicated to Algerian prosperity. In a similar vein, the Oran sections voted unanimously to protect local producers by all possible means against temporary admission and debt collection, even at risk to members’ lives. Anti-French sentiment, Azam noted in \textit{Oran matin}, would unite Algerians of all classes—\textit{colons, fèllahs}, workers, industrialists, etc.—in defense of their soil. Only with a purge of “corrupt elements” could the necessary moral and agricultural renovation be possible.\textsuperscript{149}

Group leaders similarly preached violence against local enemies, deemed saboteurs out to destroy Algerian agriculture root and branch. The administrator in Saïda noted in August 1935 that the FP encouraged the local population to wreak vengeance against millers and middlemen, blamed for the importation of foreign wheat. Members demanded action against Cohen Scali and Louis Louis-Dreyfus, threatening to attack grain shipments and their owners.\textsuperscript{150} Many of those named were Jews, and the Oran FP proved to be as virulently anti-Semitic as the local Unions latines, Action française, or Croix de Feu, blaming Jews for the depression, land seizures, and even falling wheat/wine prices. Although few \textit{colons} were Jewish, many middlemen and financiers came from that community, foreclosing on farmers during the crisis. In Tiaret and neighboring communities, Sous-préfets evinced concern about renewed anti-Semitic incidents, as Azam and Viniger—the ringleaders of previous CF-led incidents—headed the local FP section. Official worries were not soothed by the lack of response from FP leaders on the issue. Only in December 1935 did \textit{Oran matin} publish an editorial reminding readers that the group attacked Louis-Dreyfus and company due to their exploitative business practices and not their religion. Yet the article,
which further claimed that some Jews were *paysans*, was published after the crisis began to subside and with it the threat of violence.\textsuperscript{151}

**VIII**

However, FP leaders and members did not confine themselves to empty threats, instead directly acting against the state and its agents in three distinct arenas: a campaign to trigger the mass resignation of elected officials in Algeria; a concerted effort against the *fisc*, which included a tax revolt and the prevention of bankruptcy sales; and physical violence. Announced in August 1935, the resignation campaign enjoyed immediate success in Constantine, with 35 of the department’s 64 mayors quitting by the end of the month, along with 45 adjoints, 84 conseillers municipaux, four *délégués financiers* and seven conseillers généraux, and the entire Chamber of Agriculture. Although officially called to protest the depreciation of agricultural produce and the seizure of property from debt-ridden farmers, the increasing role played by the Oran FP in the *Constantinois* gave the protest an antirepublican tinge. Although municipal governments continued to function, the display of FP power in Algeria proved effective, and by mid-September Faure told a meeting of the Fédération des maires that the FP would either realize immediate state concessions concerning agriculture or paralyze politics in Constantine. Only on October 17 did Faure and Cusin end the campaign, once the state took action to alleviate the effects of the crisis.\textsuperscript{152} The Oran FP used comparable tactics, including a major propaganda campaign to sway elected officials throughout the department. Over 150 politicians subsequently crowded a September 16 meeting in Mostaganem, listening with approval to various speakers demanding immediate action against the “corrupt” French government. Although the final tally was nowhere near as impressive as the Constantine record, the group’s authors in *Oran matin* kept a daily record of resignations, and in total 123 acceded to the FP request in 43 municipalities, seriously weakening various administrations.\textsuperscript{153}

Mass resignations represented only one facet of the FP’s campaign against the colonial authorities. Unlike their metropolitan confrères under Dorgères, the Algerian sections did not call for widespread tax evasion, or sign the group’s petition asking members to break off contact with French authorities.\textsuperscript{154} Rather, throughout August and September, the Constantine membership engaged in the intimidation of potential buyers at bankruptcy auctions, in an effort to thwart the seizure and sale of *colon* land. Despite the August 30, 1935, introduction of a law by Minister of the Interior Joseph Paganon to suspend
such actions, various sections threatened to assault interested parties, and then tendered a miniscule bid (usually one franc) for land, livestock, or equipment on behalf of the bankrupt local farmer, subverting the auction process. In some cases, the FP disallowed bids entirely, effectively taking the property off the market, while in Bord-Bou-Arréridj potential buyers at a September 1935 auction were told “if you open your mouth, we will break your jaw.” Similar threats were leveled in the department of Alger, leading authorities in some communes to declare a temporary halt to land seizures and bankruptcy sales. In each case, prefects worried about the effects of such actions on local Algerians; combined with suggestions to Muslims concerning the nonpayment of taxes, these tactics encouraged rebellion against the European population. Thus the Directeur des Contributions in Constantine asked the Gendarmerie for assistance in preventing future FP threats in the region.

Prefectorial fears regarding an FP-inspired Muslim revolt principally reflected the meager state of the harvest in the Communes mixtes, and prices that dovetailed below 40 francs per quintal, further lowered by expenses associated with farming. The fellahs could no longer pay their debts, observed the president of their federation Abdelkadar Cadi, leading to daily expropriations. Naturally, Muslims followed the FP’s campaign against the fisc with great interest, and group leaders consistently encouraged Algerians to evade taxes and resist land sales. In the Commune Mixte of Aurès in Constantine, members actually reduced the wages of indigenous agricultural laborers to further provoke them into action against the regime. Yet despite the FP’s efforts, Muslims avoided violence, preferring to peacefully publish their grievances in the Dépêche de Constantine in September. Although the group’s rhetoric convinced the inhabitants of certain communes that they could avoid taxation by taking a membership, leading to a temporary drop in government revenue in Oran, the Sous-préfets initiated a door-to-door collection policy that quickly halted any noncompliance. Even the normally explosive Alibert urged Muslims not to take up arms in a September column in Oran matin, claiming that their martyrdom would result in a government crackdown.

Moreover, much like the antitax platform, attempts to sympathize with the Muslim plight had little impact, not least because of anxiety among FP members about granting Algerians equal status. Although the Oran leadership openly courted non-Europeans, their staunch xenophobia proved to be a powerful disincentive to prospective recruits, and Algerian employees were often carted to FP meetings like servants, a fact subsequently reported by the leftist and Arab-language press. In Constantine, the demographic predominance of
Muslims meant that the local FP rejected them outright, with the exception of notables such as Abdelkader Cadi. Even in regions like Batna, where the local section did attempt to lure the fellahs, the colons balked at the plan due to the threat posed by indigenous rebellion. Thus the local section managed to recruit only five Muslims, in keeping with the Algerian leadership’s demand that each section contain a titular three–eight indigènes.161

If a revolt of the fellahs never materialized, threats against agents de fisc subsequently devolved into genuine menace against local authorities and the metropolitan government. This was particularly true in Oran, where the FP parroted Dorgères’s ultimatum that authorities could either improve the paysans’ lot by September 15 or face a barrage of violence. Leaders there lambasted government officials from July 1935 onward, noting that the resignation of municipal and regional representatives would accomplish nothing unless accompanied by force. At an August 27 meeting in Sétil, Alibert bluntly outlined the FP’s position: “It is with our pitchforks and rifles that we will greet the agents de fisc.” Pitotet agreed a week later in Tiaret, asking vineyard owners to resist arrachage obligatoire with gunfire, noting that if the government refused to meet the looming FP deadline, members would descend into the streets with rifles in hand.162 The leadership and the rank and file frequently mentioned violence throughout August and September, often in the form of calls for a coup in profane terms. Speaking in St. Denis du Sig on September 20 and 30, Alibert referred to deputies as cowards, thieves, cretins, and a “bande de canailles” who should all be hung, asking the crowd: “What is a prefect? A piece of shit.” Thus the Oran FP seemed to literally interpret Dorgères’s call to place parliamentarians in the outhouse. Two months later, Alibert regaled the Mascara FP with talk of his imprisonment or assassination at the hands of the authorities, stating that government policy was consistently anti-Algerian because the Chamber of Deputies was run by international finance and a “bande de salauds” who could only be stopped when the FP “wallops those people with a sharp kick in the balls.”163

True to its word, the Algerian FP frequently attempted to muscle business and government personnel, when their actions were deemed antithetical to the best interests of the paysannerie. On October 18, Viniger and Azam led an attack in Mostaganem against a ship filled with Canadian wheat, in the midst of being unloaded on the docks. Over 1,500 colons from across the region attempted to scuttle the vessel, overwhelming police and gendarmes, and throwing the contents into the water. For good measure, the crowd toppled the car of miller Scali Cohen and threatened his driver. Only the timely intervention of the Sous-préfet prevented bloodshed and further damages.
Charged with pillaging, the perpetrators were eventually acquitted at trial in 1938.\footnote{164}

Undaunted, on November 12, 1935, FP members from across Algeria provoked serious violence outside the Délégations financières building in the capital. The culmination of two months of preparations, the attack was timed to coincide with the arrival of the new Governor-General Georges Le Beau. Due to inclement weather, only 1,100 members from all three departments converged on the Casino Majestic in Alger for a meeting presided by several prominent politicians. After being cajoled to take the fight to the streets by various speakers, the crowd began to chant “today!” and Pitollet and Alibert subsequently led a march to the Palais in order to “vent their hatred” at the newly arrived Governor-General. As Le Beau exited the building in the late afternoon, FP members attempted to overwhelm the guards, while Alibert personally bullied the commander. Blows were exchanged as police and gendarmes struggled to hold the line, and order was restored only after five hours and multiple arrests.\footnote{165} FP leaders accused law enforcement of using batons against the crowd and baiting members, while arresting prominent extreme-rightists simply for the sake of publicity. In a December Oran matin editorial, Dessoliers claimed that police acted at the behest of newly arrived Le Beau, who wished to wipe out the settlers as “colonial undesirables.”\footnote{166}

Yet by the end of 1935, the movement began to disintegrate, leaving violence behind and instead focusing upon internal battles, while fights with Dorgères himself over the Algerian FP’s extremism led to Alibert’s resignation in January 1936.\footnote{167} Tensions initially flared in Oran between section leader Pitollet and Paul Sicard, the head of the Syndicats agricoles. A moderate voice opposed to the campaign of violence waged by his allies in the local FP, in mid-September Sicard began to argue against the group’s monopoly among the colons, floating the idea of replacing confrontation against the authorities with the lobbying and pressure tactics of the metropolitan Comités de défense paysanne. He publicly quit the group at a December 18 meeting, citing suspicion by the FP leadership and his unwillingness to engage in assault and threats against local officials. This left the crowd in an uproar, causing a massive disagreement among the local leadership. Although he was coaxed back by various prominent members, the group voted to become an independent member of the “Front paysan d’Algérie,” completely breaking ties with Dorgères’s association due to their acceptance of policies such as temporary admission and perceived unwillingness to use any means necessary to defend farmers.\footnote{168}

However, Sicard possessed far greater influence than his opponents, and by mid-October officials in various locales reported that
the Syndicats agricoles had tempered Pitollet and Alibert’s influence among the *colons*, who worried about the group’s impact upon Muslims and potential rebellion. By December, his patience with the Oran FP had run out, and in a December 20 letter to *Oran matin* he publicly decried Dorgères’s support of the metropolitan wine industry in defiance of previous agreements to support Algerian agriculture, charges stemming from a speech in Montpellier in which the metropolitan FP leader proclaimed the need to end the overproduction of wine due to overplanting of low-quality vines by Oran growers. In the aftermath, the Délégations financières dismissed the FP and called for the formation of a Front algérien, while the *colon* press demanded the abandonment of ties with the metropolitan organization, as the Gallic leadership merely used Algerian farmers to assist in the replacement of the current metropolitan administration with a *Dorgèriste* one. Claiming that the corporatism of the metropolitan FP signified a perpetuation of colonial inferiority, Sicard and the Fédération des Syndicats agricoles resigned from the Oran organization, echoing the notion that the rank and file rejected any organization that refused to prioritize Algerian interests. Once again, *algérianté* won the day in the department of Oran. Pitollet’s defense of Dorgères—that he simply wanted to clean up North African viticulture—fell on deaf ears, and demands to allow a Jury d’honneur to settle the matter were summarily ignored by Sicard.\(^{169}\) Rather than quell dissent, the furore resulted in the resignation of key members of the Algerian FP, including Dessoliers, Azam, and Viniger, all of whom jeered the group’s turn toward the *métropole*.\(^{170}\)

In any case, by that time the Algerian economy began to recover, and various governmental policy initiatives consolidated agrarian debt while making additional loans available through a Caisse centrale algérienne du credit agricole. Approved by the Délégations financières and the Governor-General’s office, the new approach restored calm and quickly ended the agricultural crisis. In Alger and Constantine, where the FP had never been primarily insurrectionary to begin with, the movement simply disappeared. Although Pitollet and his confères stubbornly persisted in Oran, only a few hundred at most attended meetings, down from thousands in July and August 1935. By late January 1936, Dorgères reined in the entire Algerian operation, demanding a profession of loyalty, and a less violent platform.\(^{171}\)

**IX**

Alibert and Desolliers, among others, faced a central problem: For many supporters, the Front paysan had never been simply a protest movement echoing metropolitan unhappiness with the price of wheat
and wine, or governmental apathy toward farmers. To be sure, these matters were deemed highly important, but action could only be truly effective if it organized Algerian peasants in an autonomous group, working for Algeria rather than France.172 This attitude underscored the genuine antipathy of the settlers toward the métropole, and their unwillingness to offer extensive support to any organization uninterested in l’Algérie française, meaning the domination of European settlers over Algerians and Jews, backed by an authoritarian regime that virulently opposed the Left while exclusively defending local economic and cultural interests. Given the increasing awareness among Muslims of their plight and unwillingness to accept the status quo of French dominance, and the growing presence of the ENA and ‘ulama, settlers expected colonial fascism to reassert its predominance, particularly given the presumed weakness of the metropolitan authorities. The same was true for the defense of the Algerian economy in city and countryside, the political autonomy of the settlers, and anti-Semitism, all of which received little or no support from prefects, Governor-Generals, and the colonial office.

Hence despite the tenuous support offered by the CF throughout the first half of the 1930s, and the prioritization of agricultural recovery above all else by the local FP, an algérieniste undercurrent fueled the local extreme Right. Although the Croix de Feu sought Muslim support and courted Algerian members, meeting with Dr. Bendjelloul and approaching the ‘ulamā, members in Constantine and Oran simply would not accept equality with those deemed racially inferior. Talk of reform hid attempts to pacify the numerically superior Muslim population, ensuring the vitality of the colonial relationship. In this way, the local CF leadership and the rank and file appealed to the sensibilities of the settlers, eschewing metropolitan talk of acceptance for Muslims in favor of buttressing an established racial hierarchy that Patricia Lorcin terms the social fabric of Algerian society. More importantly, they reaffirmed the rectitude of settler sentiment, as opposed to naïve metropolitan efforts to befriend Muslims, the lazy, primitive, criminal nomads unable to cultivate their land, work hard, lying in wait with knives behind their backs awaiting the chance to throw Europeans into the sea.173

Similarly, the league took up the exclusionary mantle of Molle and the Unions latines, particularly in Oran, where the CF perpetrated a serious of violent anti-Semitic incidents clearly aimed at excluding Jews from the European community. Incidents in Tiaret and elsewhere confirmed the unwillingness of settlers to accept the Crémieux decree and equality for the Jewish community in Algeria. While the metropolitan CF and local leaders in Oran voiced disapproval for the xenophobic violence that transpired across the department, the rank
and file rejected their overtures, identifying with the rabid anti-Semitism that had characterized European life in Oran from the 1880s onward. Finally, the metropolitan FP’s demands for agrarian renewal, a moratorium on debts, and the provision of credit to desperate farmers struck a chord with harried and bankrupt *colons*, yet the expectations of French and Algerian leaders often contrasted with settler demands. If Henri Dorgères envisioned an authoritarian state built upon rural foundations, he never considered a similar proposal for Algeria, and for all of their violent talk and actions, neither Pitollet nor Faure offered an *algérieniste* alternative to metropolitan governance. Yet this is precisely what the movement’s supporters expected, and the resulting tension destroyed the local FP, eradicating its membership when the group refused to censure Dorgères for his pro-metropolitan bias. While Azam and Viniger attacked foreign shipments of wheat, Alibert and Dessoliers preached independence and revolt, and Sicard demanded an unrelenting defense of Algerian *agriculteurs*, the metropolitan directors sought to bring the Algerian sections to heel, lining up firmly behind a Gallo-centric policy.

Thus by 1936 partisans of the Algerian extreme Right were clearly at odds with their metropolitan leaders, who since 1919 had failed to address local concerns and desires. The support for colonial fascism was clear: The Left proved to be a distant second in terms of membership and influence, as tens of thousands joined or sympathized with the leagues throughout the territory. Settlers approved of the basic doctrine of such groups, but simply wished to shift the focus from France toward Algeria. Yet just as the FP crumbled and the metropolitan focus of the CF caused dissent in the ranks, a new local leader emerged to push the extreme Right firmly into the *algérieniste* camp. Formerly a staunch (albeit conservative) republican, the Abbé Gabriel Lambert responded to the rise of the Popular Front with the Rassemblement national d’Action sociale, an attempt to unite the leagues against the newly invigorated Left, Muslim separatism, and the Jewish community. Unlike its forebears, Lambert’s initiative focused exclusively on *algérianité*, overcoming settler doubts and completely rejecting the metropolitan authorities and outside influences altogether.
From 1931–1935, the Algerian extreme Right temporarily shifted away from algérianité. The effects of the economic downturn, combined with the oversight of the Gallic Croix de Feu and Front paysan, whose leadership refused to support anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim xenophobia, or European separatist sentiments against the métropole, acted to temporarily obstruct the settler agenda. Nonetheless, despite the best efforts of La Rocque, Dorgères, and their North African lieutenants, the local memberships engaged in protracted warfare against Jews in Constantine and Oran, sabotaged half-hearted attempts to initiate dialogue with the Muslim population, and continually undermined the authority of the Governor-General’s office and prefectures. Clearly the settlers continued to expect that the extreme Right would support an algérianiste program, whether metropolitan or North African in origin.

Thus in 1936 colonial fascism once again embraced the style and credo of the Unions latines (UL), abandoning any pretense to Greater France, détente with Muslims and Jews, or acceptance of French authority. From 1931 to 1935, such a program had not reflected the sociopolitical reality of Algeria, where the depression battered urban industries and rural producers alike, and Gallic interference with the settlers all but disappeared. Following Maurice Viollette’s departure from North Africa in 1927, Governor-Generals Pierre-Louis Bordes and Jules-Gaston Henri Carde evinced sympathy for the colons, mirroring a metropolitan desire to leave local politicians to their own devices in order to placate the settler anger that greeted Violette’s reformism. Furthermore, the purported Muslim threat remained remote. From the advent of the Jonnart law in 1919 until the mid-1930s, the European population believed that any reforms would invariably lead to anti-imperial sentiment, open revolt, and consequently a
potential overthrow of the colonial regime. Yet the most vocal independence organization, Messali Hadj and the Étoile nord-africaine (ENA) were based in Paris and largely unnoticed in Algeria, while the ‘ulamā brotherhood and Dr Mohamed-Salah Bendjelloul’s moderate Fédération des élus musulmans (FEM) both expressed a willingness to work within the colonial framework. Believed to be actively collaborating with Muslim separatists, the Algerian Left was also targeted, from the Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière (SFIO) and Confédération générale du travail (CGT) to the Parti communiste français/Parti communiste algérien (PCF/PCA) and Confédération générale du travail unitaire (CGTU), and the settlers charged its leaders with fanning the flames of revolution on orders from Moscow. Yet neither the socialist nor communist party enjoyed a sizeable membership, their periodicals and speeches demonstrating a pro-colonial bent, complete with settler racism and stern rejection of additional rights and freedoms for non-Europeans.

All of this changed in 1935–1936, with the advent of the Popular Front (FP), the rising popularity of Algerian nationalism, and a sudden mushrooming of leftist organizations. Prior to the formation of Léon Blum’s ministry in June 1936, the SFIO and PCF/PCA were dormant. The SFIO had so few members that the Constantine section did not even bother issuing membership cards, their electoral efforts yielding as few as three voters in certain districts.¹ Yet the February 12, 1934 counterdemonstration against the antiparliamentary riot six days earlier produced a crowd of 15,000 in Alger, including many socialists, while by June 1936 FP meetings in Oran regularly brought together thousands of Europeans and Algerians in all three departments, under the auspices of the SFIO, PCA, and the Congrès Musulman. Formed by moderates like Ferhat Abbas and Dr Mohamed-Salah Bendjelloul in concert with the Islamic ‘ulamā and Muslim notables like Lamine Lamoudi, the Congrès met with the Blum government in Paris, seemingly gaining its imprimateur, while actively collaborating with the Algerian Left (a fact noted with derision by many settlers).² The PCA experienced an equally significant membership increase. Only months before the FP’s ascension, the 1935 Barthel circular seriously undermined communist support among the settlers, who were displeased with its strident anticolonialism: “the French nation is not the nation of the Algerian; it is a foreign nation to the Algerian people, a nation of oppression, a nation of imperialism that expropriated Algeria and the Algerian nation through blood and iron.” Yet the Dimitrov line negated such sentiments, its strident antifascism engendering collaboration with noncommunists and an end to anti-imperial rhetoric, epitomized by Maurice Thorez’s statement that “the right to a divorce does not
oblige one to get divorced.” Thus the PCA’s paltry 150 members in 1934 increased 20-fold by 1936, as new local leader Robert Deloche derided the nationalist ENA.3

However, the increased membership did not stem largely from the settlers, for despite the PCF/PCA’s reluctance to support anti-imperialism after the exposure of the Barthel Circular, its reputation as pro-Muslim and anti-Algérie française remained firmly in the public mind. Furthermore, the SFIO and FP embraced reformism, and its Algerian leaders Marius Dubois and Marcel Régis unveiled a North African program that included an end to the lois d’exception, increased political and legal equality, and universal access to education for all indigènes. Unsurprisingly, where the coalition enjoyed tremendous non-European support, the settlers elected only three socialists in ten districts, and one of the winners—Dubois in Oran—profited from a split of the extreme-rightist vote rather than a majority.4 However, if the Left horrified many Europeans, they were extremely well received by Muslims, who believed that the new government desired a genuine partnership between France and Algeria. They placed great faith in the new Prime Minister, SFIO leader Léon Blum, and his colonial team: Minister of State Maurice Violette, reformists Marius Moutet (Minister of Colonies) and Charles-André Julien (head of the Haut Comité Méditerranéen), and Pierre Viérot (Chargé des pays musulmans aux affaires étrangères). Non-Europeans believed that the new administration would bow to the inevitability of reform, enshrining an era of increased equality, including legal and economic rights, the termination of the hated Indigénat, and the vote.5 In the aftermath of the election, leftist meetings drew record numbers in Algeria, principally due to high Muslim participation. On July 14 in Constantine, police reported a crowd of 5,000, including 3,000 non-Europeans listening to a translation of the speeches into Arabic, while almost half of the 4,000 in attendance at a January 17, 1937 meeting in Oran were Arabs.6

The high levels of support were further aided by the partnership between the FP, the PCA, and the Congrès Musulman, which demanded increased economic and legal equality, the product of Muslim labor militancy. The outpouring that greeted the Blum government’s electoral victory in France found an echo in Algeria, where thousands protested low wages, long working hours, and miserable working conditions. Local CGT and CGTU membership mushroomed in 1936; however, the new recruits were again primarily Muslim, adding an anti-imperial edge to the strikes and factory occupations in Alger and Oran. In Alger, the CGT expanded from 6,000 members in early 1936 to 40,000 a year later, while the Union départementale in Oran ballooned from 3,000 to 23,000 during the
same period. In the department of Alger there were 12,000 strikers by May 1936, along with 8,000 in Oran by June 25, triggering the armed intervention of the police and gendarmerie once the strikers occupied oil refineries, docks, and transport facilities. Almost all were Muslims, as European workers refused to join any strike action with non-European participants.

Furious settlers blamed Blum and the FP administration for the intensity of the agitation, which affected both large and small communities in all three departments by July 1936. Yet the biggest fear for authorities and population alike stemmed from the effect of the strikes and factory occupations upon the nascent nationalist movement. Previously docile, Muslims suddenly became politically active, attending meetings and reading propaganda, with clearly defined grievances and a sympathetic ear.

The main beneficiary of the newfound support was Messali Hadj. Although not invited to join the Congrès Musulman in June, Hadj nonetheless addressed a crowd of tens of thousands at an Algiers stadium, demanding independence and the abolition of the Délégations financières and Governor-General in favor of a parliament based upon universal suffrage. His rousing speech received a thunderous reception, and was followed by a tour of Algeria to found sections in all three departments. Although the government banned the organization in January 1937, responding to increasingly inflammatory anti-French rhetoric and threats, Hadj and his lieutenants promptly founded the Parti populaire algérien and continued the fight against the métropole in the electoral arena.

Neither were Hadj and the ENA the only threat to ongoing settler hegemony in Algeria. For Bendjelloul and the Fédération des élus musulmans, the ‘ulamā, and a segment of the previously pro-French évolutés began to openly question the colonial status quo, demanding major political and social changes and prioritizing the Islamic faith, increased educational opportunities, and the right to vote. If Ferhat Abbas and Bendjelloul were not interested in outright separation, they nonetheless expected access to education, a defense of the Arabic language, and legal rights that proved anathematic to the settlers. By 1936, the FEM leaders used their évoluté status to bring together Muslim notables and fellâhs at gatherings where speakers trumpeted increased equality and the right to directly elect parliamentary deputies, demands that took on an extremist tinge to Europeans faced with mounting nationalism in the casbahs and ûwars.

The ‘ulamā presented a similar challenge to French authorities, on the one hand supporting the statut musulman and eschewing political rhetoric, yet on the other pressing the administration for control of mosques and schools. If Ben-Bdîs did not necessarily envision an
end to the empire, the ‘ulamā’s unwillingness to unhesitatingly accept the French imperial narrative and policy-making directly challenged settler hegemony. For the French empire represented, in the words of James McDougall, “a brutal operation of the power of modernity to reorder the world,” invoking judicial inequality, a geographical—architectural—patronymic domination of the colonized, and the historical fiction of imperial legitimacy. Thus Ben-Badîs’s insistence upon Islamic resurgence disturbed “the language with which this world was given meaning…the civilizing subjectivity of the French colonial citizen was framed.”¹⁴ Neither partisans of the FEM’s assimilationist rhetoric nor supporters of the ENA’s movement for Algerian independence, by 1936 the ‘ulamā proudly proclaimed the existence of an Algerian Muslim nation based upon a distinct history, culture, and religion.¹⁵

To be sure, there existed clear differences (and often outright hostility) between the various Muslim movements and organizations, based upon social class, the primacy of Islam, and the choice of assimilation or independence. Yet the settlers perceived only a barrage of threats. Within a matter of months, Muslim economic grievances—the desire for increased employment opportunities or better wages and working conditions—had been seemingly supplanted by a much more radical program, one that aimed to redraw the political and social boundaries between colonizer and colonized. In the ensuing mêlée, the European population turned in overwhelming numbers to fascism, mobilizing algérianité as a weapon against the Algerian Left and Muslim reformism/separatism in equal measure.

II

In the introduction to their collection Tensions of Empire, Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper conclude that “categories of race, class, and gender helped to define moral superiority and maintain cultural differences that in turn justified different intensities of violence.” The colonizer-colonized dichotomy did not exist a priori, but instead formed the “most basic tension of empire…that the otherness of colonized persons was neither inherent nor static; his or her difference had to be defined and maintained.”¹⁶ The portrayal of non-European (and particularly non-French) Algerians as inferior required constant effort by the administration and a variety of local agents in the political, economic, legal, and social spheres, further aided by settler organizations and initiatives. Following the election of the FP government in May 1936, this effort’s effectiveness diminished. Faced with increasing Muslim rebellion, and the possibility of a successful drive for Algerian independence or increased political and legal
equality through reform, the Oran extreme Right sought to reinforce colonial difference, maintaining \textit{l’Algérie française} and with it European hegemony and privilege.

Led by the Abbé Gabriel Lambert and the Rassemblement national d’action sociale (RNAS), settlers invoked algérianiste arguments in order to extinguish anti-colonial rebellion. The RNAS constantly proclaimed the superiority of the European race in Algeria, a distinct racial fusion that (pace Louis Bertrand) proved superior to the declining stock of the degenerate \textit{métropole}, and alone capable of defending the colony. This would be accomplished through the introduction of authoritarian politics in defiance of French republicanism, a cult of elitism, militarism, and voluntarism, admiration and imitation of fascist practices in Italy, Germany, and Spain, and the elimination of Algeria’s enemies: Jews, leftists, and Muslim voices deemed contrary to European interests. Somewhat ironically, the viability of such a program depended upon a competing separatism, in which settlers would wrest the territory from French administrators. Although impractical due to Algeria’s dependence upon Gallic markets and soldiers for funds and security, Lambert nonetheless spoke of seizing control of the Algerian government through violent means, adopting the mantra of \textit{l’Algérie française} merely to signify European rule rather than affiliation with the Gallic empire. The goal thus became the construction of what Panivong Norindr terms a phantasmatic society, “the ideological reality through which colonial fantasies as the support of desire emerged, operated, and manifested themselves.” This fabrication aimed to buttress both the ultraconservative values and the political hegemony of the European population, whose members “wanted at all costs to preserve the image of an idyllic world untouched by political cataclysms.” Hence the staunch defense of \textit{l’Algérie française} against leftists, Jews, and \textit{indigènes}. For colonial fascism (and indeed much of the settler population), Algeria represented what Norindr terms “empty space,” a tabula rasa upon which “an official mythology had to be created and on which public and private fantasies came to be imagined.”\footnote{Representing the polar opposite of \textit{l’Algérie française}, the FP became the victim of extreme-rightist violence, because the government’s program threatened the vision of algérianité promulgated by the Right. Although the movement was based almost exclusively in Oran, its influence was felt in all three departments, for the success of Lambert’s doctrine and tactics forced the Parti social français (PSF) and Parti populaire français (PPF) to adopt similar positions. Hence from 1936–1939 both the extreme Right and Algerian politics as a whole became identified with hostility to the \textit{métropole} and Jews/Muslims/leftists in equal measure.}
Much like the UL in the 1920s, the RNAS were identified with their leader: Gabriel Lambert. Born on April 3, 1900 in the French town of Villefranche-sur-Mer, Lambert initially became the curé at a small Toulon church, only to be defrocked and excommunicated. He subsequently migrated to Algeria in 1932, retaining the official title “Abbé” and becoming a sourcier under contract to supply fresh water to Oran-Ville. However, Lambert’s chief interest lay in politics, and buoyed by popular acclaim for providing relief to the drought-riddled area, in 1934 he won a seat on the Municipal Council. Directly challenging Paul Menudier’s mayoral administration, he successfully courted the town’s 6,000 Jewish electors. Nonetheless, in what became typical of his future administration, Lambert clinched his electoral victory through violence, benefiting from a February 1934 brawl in the Council Chambers, triggered by the Mayor’s entourage in order to avoid further discussion of a projected two million franc plan to provide the town with a permanent water supply. Seriously injured with broken bones and multiple facial lacerations, he became a cause célèbre in Oran, and the assault precipitated a mass demonstration of 8,000 supporters that degenerated into a riot, resulting in 150 arrests and the resignation of Menudier’s team. The public promptly voted Lambert into the Mairie in May, won over by a vague platform aimed at eliminating racial divisions and engendering class collaboration.

However, it became clear in the first year of Lambert’s administration that his intentions were far from benevolent. He initially courted the Republican Left, taking a membership in the Amis de l’URSS and proclaiming his loyalty to republican democracy. Yet Jews were not hired in any administrative position despite their electoral support, unsurprising for a politician who publicly dined with Action française (AF) stalwart Léon Daudet in the months before the election. He subsequently declined an invitation to join the Ligue internationale contre l’antisémitisme, and the local press revealed that his deputy had been affiliated with the UL under Molle. The new Mayor further declared war on the PCA and positioned his movement as a third way between the Left and the extreme Right. In response, one author in Le Semeur bluntly stated that Lambert was no different than his predecessors from the UL. It was no coincidence that Oran matin—a key supporter of the local Front paysan and Croix de Feu—backed Lambert and opened its pages to his editorializing. Neither did the Abbé live up to his moralist billing, as a man of the cloth who tirelessly advocated for the public good. His private life quickly became infamous throughout North Africa, culminating in a 1938 arrest at a Paris brothel for public drunkenness and threatening to molest a prostitute with a rubber cannula. His business interests were likewise
mired in scandal, with rumors of loans from criminal elements and the threat of bankruptcy proceedings in January 1935.22

Nonetheless, Lambert built a solid electoral base in Oran, and in April 1936 announced his intention to run in upcoming parliamentary elections. Through the Amitiés Lambert organization, local sections throughout the department provided charitable works, drop-in-centers, and aid to unemployed workers. The group’s distribution of toys and food drives at Christmas and Easter proved particularly popular with Oran’s diverse political factions.23 Conscious of the need to attract the Néos, Lambert established relations with conservatives in Spain.24 He further pledged to defend the interests of the colons in the Chamber, calling himself the candidate of “Algerian defense,” attracting crowds of thousands to electoral rallies.25 Yet the support of Jewish electors had been crucial to the victorious 1934 mayoral campaign. Thus Lambert concomitantly rebutted charges of fascism and anti-Semitism leveled by his opponents, positioning the Mairie between the proposed right-wing dictatorship of the French leagues and the “Committee of Public Safety” promised by socialist leader Marius Dubois. Proclaiming his steadfast support for democracy, and stating that he would sit with the Radical Left in the Chamber, Lambert frequently reminded the audience that he had eliminated the threat of racism in Oran by defeating Menudier and the UL.26

Despite these assurances of legality and restraint, the campaign became enmeshed in violence and xenophobia, much of it produced by the Lambert camp. Leftist protestors had long dogged the Mayor’s public-speaking engagements and large crowds frequently formed outside the hall, singing the Internationale while issuing threats, and Croix de Feu partisans adopted similar tactics in April 1936 on behalf of rival candidate Marcel Gatuing.27 Lambert promptly established a municipal security division, the service de nettoiement, to act as mayoral bodyguards. Composed of Muslim toughs, they disrupted rival meetings, surrounded Lambert with weapons in hand, and mercilessly attacked socialists in the streets. One SFIO crew was caught affixing posters for Marius Dubois on 22 April, and savagely beaten and injured, particularly from blows to the face. Such attacks sent a clear message to the SFIO and PCA, and because many members were Jews, Lambert’s campaign did little to quell racial tensions in Oran, where police warned during the campaign that his mere presence in the Jewish quarter could lead to violent incidents.28

Given the prevalence of anti-Semitism and anti-leftist sentiment throughout the department, these incidents did not present a significant problem to the Lambert campaign. More serious was the candidacy of Marcel Gatuing, the local Croix de Feu leader whose impeccable extreme-rightist credentials and previous administrative
experience on the Conseil régionaux and Délégations financières provided stiff competition. If the SFIO’s Marius Dubois was linked with anti-colonial policies, calls for pro-Muslim reforms, and supposedly revolutionary rhetoric, Gatuing could not be accused of anything other than unwavering support for the colons and l’Algérie française. Hence at the conclusion of the second round of voting on May 4, Dubois triumphed due to vote splitting, garnering only 11,586 votes—far short of the majority—while Gatuing (9,440 votes) and Lambert (8,440 ballots) divided the right-wing electorate.29

Lambert immediately blamed Oran’s Jews—his previous electoral clientele—for abandoning his campaign on racial grounds, doing the bidding of community leaders who ordered electors to vote for the Left. Thus in a May 15 Oran matin editorial, he proclaimed that anticommunism provided common ground for the nationaux and unleashed daily abuse against Oran’s Jewish “new masters,” rescinding his previous opposition to the leagues in favor of algérianiste language reminiscent of Molle and the UL, pledging to “defend Algeria against those who are prepared to drown in the sea or expel all the French.”30 In Lambert’s newfound demonology, Muslims and the metropolitan authorities joined Jews and leftists as enemies of the settlers.

Most importantly, Lambert inaugurated an organization dedicated to uniting the extreme Right against the enemies of l’Algérie française. Created on June 24, 1936, and finalized at a July 2 meeting of the Oran Municipal Council, the RNAS brought together 13 departmental groups, including the CF/PSF, the PPF, and Lambert’s own Amitiés latines (AL). The group’s Administrative Council included several prominent league members: Gatuing from the Oran CF/PSF and Paul Bellat of the UL in Sidi-Bel-Abbès, and leading members came from the AF and PPF among others. All participants contributed money, men, and propaganda to the cause, meeting in common to decide major policy initiatives or public campaign strategies. Following the mayor’s lead, the group’s founding declaration avowed an intention to “ensure French predominance in Algeria,” while fighting against revolutionary elements and “international finance”—the department’s Jewish population.31 Lambert was named President of the RNAS, which formed 17 sections throughout the department, and branched out into the department of Alger, under the auspices of Alger mayor Albin Rozis and ex-CF luminary Jean Fossatti.32 The collective promptly gained the endorsement of 86 mayors and hundreds of municipal councilors, who marched on the Prefecture in Oran in support of “law and order” against the Left and their Muslim allies.33

The RNAS also proved tremendously popular among the departmental population, with 5,000 memberships on the first day of the organization’s existence alone, and wealthy colons from Sidi-Bel-Abbès
and Mostaganem provided substantial funding, enabling a variety of charitable works, medical assistance, and paying the costs of meetings and speakers across Algeria. Lambert’s team further benefitted from the endorsement of the right-wing press (Echo d’Oran, Oran matin, Petit oranais, Nouvelle Oranie, and various local papers), and meetings across all three departments attracted thousands of enthusiastic participants.34

The latter support partially resulted from Lambert’s willingness to seek out established regional allies, bringing local municipal administrations and colonial fascist organizations into the RNAS wholesale. Thus in Sidi-Bel-Abbès, a town of 55,000 inhabitants—two-thirds European—in the southern portion of the département, he won over the local UL, whose leader Lucien Bellat served as town mayor from 1929 onward, surviving the group’s post-Molle decline. An ardent anti-Semite, his son Paul served as the region’s Délégué financier, and UL militants included the local CF President and Vice President, both municipal councilors. Although efforts to attract Muslims bore little fruit with the exception of municipal politicians eager to curry favor with the Mairie, the European population overwhelmingly supported Bellat. Jewish and Muslim electors were effectively neutralized by widespread electoral fraud, with UL members handing out ballots at polling stations with the “correct” choice already marked.35 Few argued publicly, for Bellat controlled the police and regional politicians, all intimately involved in corruption, illegal fundraising, and influence peddling, while judges were bribed to ensure that extreme rightists were acquitted of arms possession, assault, or xenophobia.

By 1937, his fiefdom grew to the extent that the municipality attempted to simply block Jews and leftists from voting altogether, and the alliance with Lambert and the RNAS represented a natural extension of Bellat’s political program.36 Like the Oran mayor, the UL remained violently anti-Semitic, and xenophobic propaganda appeared frequently throughout the town, often accompanied by swastikas and the slogan “mort aux juifs.” UL speakers also linked Jews with Bolshevism and Muslim separatism, and proclaimed the need to defend the “racial union that conquered and civilized Algeria” against the SFIO, PCA, and ENA.37 Finally, the UL and Lambert shared an affinity for Franco and Mussolini, with Paul Bellat joining the Oran mayor on voyages to nationalist Spain and ending public appearances with the fascist salute in imitation of the Duce.38

By 1937 the RNAS also became intertwined with Lambert’s own fascist project, the anti-Semitic and abrasive AL. Its eight sections primarily situated in the Mayor’s Oran-Ville fiefdom, the group accumulated 3,000 members in that city alone, and attracted a bevy of politicians and prominent citizens throughout the department.39
The AL further boasted a very active youth section—the Jeunesses latines (JL)—which sponsored sporting clubs, a youth choir, and a variety of self-improvement courses. The JL leader Camille Botella organized frequent excursions into the Oran countryside, where the leadership spoke to dozens of young recruits about the AL as a rampart against Judeo-Marxism. The AL also sponsored the Amitiés Lambert féminines, run by the Mayor’s mother, whose hundreds of members involved in a variety of charity initiatives in Oran, including the distribution of clothing, food, and children’s toys to the poor at Easter and Christmas, promoted fundraising balls, and invited visiting speakers from various extreme-rightist organizations. Female members also engaged in propaganda, screening films that displayed group activities in an effort to win new members.

III

Although the RNAS and AL both continued to distribute alms to the poor in imitation of the defunct Amitiés Lambert, their primary function was far from charitable. Rather, they engaged in the proliferation of Cooper and Stoler’s tensions of empire, redefining and maintaining the fiction of colonial difference. Like Molle and the UL before them, Lambert and the RNAS/AL constructed a phantasmatic society, yet the targets of their extreme-rightist violence were just as frequently socialist union organizers, communist sympathizers, or Muslim separatists than Jewish electors or metropolitan officials.

In order to legitimate their authoritarian politics and emphasize racial differentiation, the RNAS and AL turned to fascism, lauding corporatism, the primacy of youth, voluntarism, and the politics of dictatorship in equal measure. Lambert and his confères made no effort to hide their admiration for various European fascist regimes. In September 1936, the Oran mayor accepted an invitation to travel to Italy, and wrote a series of Oran matin dispatches describing Mussolini as a savior who forged Italian unity using youth to transform the nation into patriotic producers. Not only did the state provide tremendous benefits for the worker (the 40-hour week, paid vacations, social insurance), but concomitantly destroyed Bolshevism in contrast to weakened France. RNAS Constantine leader Eugène Réthault, a Lycée professor fired for his extreme-rightist views in fall 1936, further claimed that Nazi Germany and fascist Italy represented virility unmatched by the Gallic “gerontocracy born of a loudmouthed and stale parliamentarism,” which could never regenerate family, labor, and nation. Both men urged readers to visit Rome and Berlin (where Lambert subsequently traveled in 1938), in order to view first-hand the benefits of class collaboration, discipline, national strength and
remilitarization, and technological advancement.⁴³ RNAS and AL leaders and members alike copied the aesthetic and rhetorical style of the Duce and the Führer, including the fascist salute (renamed the “Olympic salute” by Lambert) that became commonplace at meetings, in addition to being frequently used by supporters at the Gare centrale in Oran as Lambert departed or arrived.⁴⁴

However, given fact that two-thirds of the department’s was Spanish, the RNAS and AL lauded Francisco Franco’s Spain far more than Italy or Germany, responding to the high level of support for the Caudillo among the Néos in Oran. Faced with a narrow FP triumph in February 1936 elections in Spain, a ministry led by liberal Manuel Azaña (with socialist participation) immediately introduced a program of rural, religious, and educational reform, while anarchist-led peasants initiated land seizures in the south. Fearing a Soviet-style revolution, a group of army officers and extreme rightists staged a revolt in July, beginning a protracted civil war. The nationalists entrenched themselves in the conservative north, and Franco emerged as the de facto chief of a diverse array of interests, from full-blown fascism to monarchism: A dictatorship that liberally borrowed the theoretical corporatism, militarization of society, and virulent anticommunism of Mussolini and Hitler, along with their secret police, cult of the leader, and emphasis on youth. However, Franco’s regime was no mere copy, but rather emphasized conservatism and Catholicism as much as the fascist model for state and society, and hence attracted a great number of French extreme rightists from the métropole and Algeria alike.⁴⁵

Lambert initiated contact with the rebels in June 1936, attending an aperitif with the mayor of Alicante and Franco’s Spanish ambassador to Oran. The RNAS leader visited Spain a few days later, departing with a fascist salute to FP protesters while his supporters yelled “Vive Hitler!” The following year, the Oran mayor received an official invitation to tour the rebel zone and deliver an address on Radio Seville, an experience that his personal secretary François Rioland recorded in the book Avec l’Abbé Lambert à Travers l’Espagne nationaliste. By November, local authorities noted his growing influence among the nationalists, while the Néos increasingly referred to Lambert as Franco’s emissary in Oran.⁴⁶ In January 1939, the links between the Abbé and the Caudillo led to the former receiving military honors in Spanish Morocco (along with Rioland and PPF leader Alain de Berthois), while 2,500 RNAS and AL supporters attended the March inauguration of a new rebel consulate in Oran, chanting “Vive Franco! Arriba España!”⁴⁷

For his part, Lambert promoted Franco’s Spain as a model for Algeria, a nation like Mussolini’s Italy, populated by disciplined workers imbued with nationalism and antirepublicanism. In Oran as
in Madrid, fascism meant the eradication of the anarchy that caused poverty and laziness, he instructed an audience of 1,200 RNAS partisans in September 1937, while in his book Rioland contrasted the supposed terrorism, rape, and murder in republican Spain with the prosperity, law and order, and social programs on the nationalist side. The “abominable crimes” of the “reds”—the murder of priests, the institution of a police state to root out the Right, the forced collectivization of farm and factory—would surely be repeated by the French FP in Paris and Algiers. Thus in order to prevent the implantation of Bolshevism, Muslim separatism, and the destruction of Christian civilization, Lambert and the RNAS/AL must necessarily declare war on the French Republic and its leftist masters.48

IV

In the Algerian context, this process necessarily began with resolving the *problème indigène*, by successfully negotiating the socioeconomic problems that plagued settler-Muslim relations, simultaneously ensuring continued European predominance while blocking attempts at “radical” reform. For the RNAS and AL, this entailed Muslim recruitment, to counter separatist sentiment and potential revolt. The AL founded a *section musulmane* led by local *évolué* Abdelkadar Belkacem, primarily composed of municipal employees from the notorious *service de nettoielement*, along with a number of war veterans. Yet this effort hardly constituted a successful penetration of the Muslim masses, and in October 1937 the RNAS Oran central committee called upon section presidents to intensify efforts to attract non-Europeans.49 Such efforts seemed to bear fruit, as RNAS rallies regularly attracted hundreds of Muslims, some of whom engaged in protracted street battles against FP partisans. However, the participants were hardly motivated by support for fascism, algérianité, or devotion to the settler agenda. In July 1936, police noted that Oran sections promised Algerians 50 francs and a free sweater in exchange for their presence on a protest march. Lambert also resorted to inflammatory anti-Semitic rhetoric in an effort to attract Muslim opinion, leading to complaints from both Ligue internationale contre l’antisémitisme (LICA) and regional politicians.50 These efforts yielded few tangible results, with the AL’s section musulmane attracting a paltry membership, perhaps due to a glaring lack of respect for Islamic custom; a 1937 Méchoui given by the section for the birth of a member’s son began with a stiff drink, unlikely to appeal to practitioners of Islam.51

Much like the Front paysan, the RNAS wedded Muslim recruitment drives to economic programs ostensibly designed to combat unemployment and poverty in *duwar* and *casbah* alike. From June
1936 onward, the Governor-General’s office warned of huge debts and penury in the Bled, and factory occupations in the cities that could easily devolve into renewed anti-Semitic riots or *jacquerie*. Although the report condemned partisan fighting instigated by the FP and the leagues in equal measure, Lambert’s confères did far more to provoke *fellahs* and Muslim labor than their leftist enemies. This included attempts to contrast the benevolence of the RNAS and AL with FP duplicity, in an effort to foment Arab violence against the metropolitan authorities. While Blum and Dubois’s team encouraged strike action and offered the vote to a select group of *évolués*, Lambert cajoled, Arabs faced mass starvation, instead requiring government assistance and food subsidies. In his response to a 1937 inquest into the extreme Right in Oran, Lambert outlined a series of measures undertaken by his administration in order to reduce indigenous economic malaise, from the provision of work to the unemployed and soup kitchen service to school milk programs and free medical care. He further highlighted restoration work on the town’s central mosque, and the construction of new facilities, including a cemetery and prayer hall.

Muslims were also deemed susceptible to communist propaganda aimed at encouraging separatist sentiment in order to end the French presence in Algeria. In a July 2, 1936 editorial, Lambert denounced leftist cells led by teachers in the *Bled*, while two weeks later RNAS Muslim leader Dr Bentami derided the fact that Oran prisons were filled with Arab strikers duped by the PCA, an organization dedicated to the disappearance of the settlers and Islam in equal measure. Echoing this leader’s pronouncement, at a mass meeting in August at the local municipal stadium Alger mayor Albin Rozis linked the infamous Barthel circular to the popularity of the ENA, and the group frequently blamed the leftist press for stoking independence.

The prevention of leftist meddling in Muslim affairs involved waging war against the Left, and RNAS/AL leaders pledged to protect Algeria from the ravages of the FP government and its communist partners. This entailed a refusal to accept the lawlessness and anarchy that characterized Soviet Russia and Republican Spain, where opponents were dispatched to the firing squad or Siberian prisons, members claimed, their freedom suppressed by a Committee of Public Safety. In order to prevent the Left from fomenting revolution and Muslim independence, the RNAS and AL implemented a variety of programs in order to wean labor away from the FP. Lambert hired ex-syndicalists to establish an autonomous dockers union in Oran and a construction-workers collective in Mascara, providing competition to the CGT. The RNAS *syndicat* reserved employment for those rejected by the Left, and frequently fought union labor and strikers
with fists and firearms. He further asked the department’s mayors to fund a *caisse central* collected in each locale and dedicated to providing funds for anticommunist propaganda and activities in imitation of fascist movements in Italy and Spain. Such initiatives protected Algerian settlers and territory from Soviet-style revolution, the Oran mayor proclaimed, and suppressed Muslim demands for independence at the behest of Stalin’s henchmen.

Muslims themselves were portrayed as child-like and passive victims, lacking the intelligence or willpower to fashion their own opinions, and thus easily duped into serving communist masters. The same rationale applied to separatist groups, a category into which Lambert and the RNAS variously placed Messali Hadj and the ENA, the ‘ulama, leading Algerian newspapers from *La Défense* to *El Ouma*, and a potpourri of politicians and *évolués*. Despite Ben Bâdis’s clear opposition to independence and willingness to accept French rule if Islam regained its cultural predominance, Lambert claimed that the ‘ulama were leaders of the Pan-Arabism movement, clamoring for sovereignty in both printed articles and sermons at local mosques. Countering the brotherhood’s public renunciation of such groups, he instead demanded administrative sanctions against the movement, asking the Chamber of Deputies Commission d’Enquête in April 1937 to ban them due to purported attempts to create an Islamic state in North Africa. To Lambert, Réthault, and other RNAS luminaries, infantilized Arabs were willing to throw the European population into the Mediterranean on the order of Ben-Bâdis and Messali Hadj, in tandem with the communist party.

However, the FP government itself offered the greatest challenge to the RNAS’s algérieniste vision through the Blum-Viollette act. Long a strident foe of the Algerian settlers, in 1931 the former Governor-General formulated a proposed law that would grant citizenship to approximately 25,000 *évolués*, principally decorated army officers, members of the Chamber of Commerce, trade union leaders, university graduates, and elected officials. Far from being anti-imperialist (despite settler taunts of “Viollette l’Arabe”), he intended to staunch growing anger with the French administration and European population, perceived as apathetic to Muslim poverty and inequality. Eager to initiate colonial reform in order to gain the support of *indigènes* throughout the empire, Léon Blum brought Viollette into his June 1936 cabinet and the proposal was placed before the Chamber of Deputies.

The response from the settlers was swift and uncompromising, a unanimous and violent rejection of the law and its sponsors. Critics pointed to the bill’s refusal to retain the *statut musulman*, which demanded that any Muslim seeking French citizenship renounce
Koranic law in favor of the Gallic civil code. Muslim cultural practices were further deemed incompatible with the right to vote, from polygamy to the degradation of women. However, only 8,000–10,000 Algerian families included multiple wives in 1936, and many Muslim women enjoyed greater freedom than their French counterparts; the real issue remained the viability of metropolitan policy-making in the face of renewed opposition from the settlers. For all their talk of l’Algérie française and rejection of Muslim separatism, local Europeans demanded autonomy in the same manner as Messali Hadj and the ENA, opposing the Right of the French government to legislate in their name, and particularly to grant additional freedoms to the perceptively inferior indigènes. Hence almost every Algerian newspaper attacked the Blum-Viollette law, all but two mayors resigned in protest, and one prominent Senator declared the bill to be tantamount to a declaration of war by the métropole. Settlers were equally concerned by the Muslim response to the law. At meetings across Algeria sponsored by the FP and the Congrès Musulman, Arab community leaders promoted Blum-Viollette as a first step toward emancipation and increased Franco-Muslim cooperation. Faced with unmitigated settler hostility toward the proposal, deputies eventually scuttled the bill, officially abandoned by Édouard Daladier’s 1938 ministry. This act only contributed to rising Muslim anger with the metropolitan administration, best summed up in the angry declaration of one Congrès Musulman delegate that “France could not care less about us!” Yet the fight over Blum-Viollette also galvanized settler opposition to the métropole, and the RNAS played a leading role in the campaign.

Much like editorialists and politicians throughout Algeria, the RNAS criticized the Blum-Viollette law as the first step toward Muslim control of Algeria, rejecting the assimilation of Arabs and Berbers in favor of association, using orientalist language to proffer a parallel evolution of indigènes alongside Europeans in the same fashion as Molle and the UL. For the RNAS, Muslims could never become truly French until they demonstrated a capacity to behave in a civilized fashion, abandoning the statut musulman and adopting French customs. To Alfred Cazès, the editor-in-chief of Oran matin and an RNAS stalwart, the Muslim refusal to separate church and state was a symbol of their barbarism, a rejection of the customs and morality of civilized people. Eugène Réthault was even more blunt, describing them as possessing the heart and mind of an eternal slave, and thus inassimilable regardless of education or profession due to centuries of servitude and heredity. Living in primitive conditions, battered by poverty and disease, they inhabited a society rife with harems, strange rituals, mud huts, black magic, and arcane laws to subjugate women.
who lived as virtual slaves in their homes and did not see the sunlight. How could such creatures be granted the right to vote, “evolved” or not? Lambert completed this ethnographic portrait by emphasizing the irrationality of the indigènes to the 1937 Commission d’Enquête, claiming that they had received the bill like a new book of the Koran, “the blueprint for a new world that conjures a Shangri-La, the prelude to the heavenly afterlife promised to true believers.” This orientalist critique was wedded to socioeconomic rationale, with Lambert adding that the law would merely breed resentment among non-évolués who received nothing, their lives still dominated by poverty and hunger, needing schools and hospitals more than ballots.

The RNAS matched the Blum-Viollette plan with support for conservative Senator Paul Saurin’s counter proposal: A separate electoral college to be voted in through universal suffrage, and special representatives to the metropolitan Chamber to be consulted on all matters pertaining to Algeria. Further rights and privileges could be discussed subject to the renunciation of the personal statute and Koranic law in favor of French administration. Those who opposed the plan were labeled communist agitators, and RNAS speakers and authors continuously wrote and spoke about the love of Algerians for their European masters. In a February 1937 Oran matin article, Cazès related the story of a colon landowner named Poutingon who owned 4,000 hectares and managed a fleet of happy Muslim workers, paid well and treated like the man’s own children. When “interviewed” by the author, they wanted nothing to do with the Blum-Viollette law, and harbored no desire to become Russian-style peasants in a communist Algeria. To be sure, problems existed from time to time, Cazès proclaimed, but most were due to urban factory owners who exploited labor regardless of race, whereas the fellahs supported European farm owners who unwaveringly defended their interests. RNAS leaders positioned Lambert’s administration and colonial fascism in general as a bulwark against Marxist-inspired Muslim insurrection, which aimed to shatter the tranquil idyll of colons and content workers.

Like Molle and the UL, the RNAS and AL bolstered these arguments with algérianité, mythologizing the colons and their ancestors while denigrating the métropole, viewed as weak and decadent. Both ignorant of North African reality and inferior to the settlers, who represented a successful racial fusion between the rugged barbarism of the colonial world and the superior European intellect, the French administration could not effectively govern or defend Algeria. Lambert and his confrères frequently praised the work of the colons, often insulted by the metropolitan French, and unrecognized as the architects of territorial conquest. Writing in Oran matin, Cazès noted the massive effort
required to render savage and overgrown land suitable for farming and habitation. Through their sweat and labor, the *colons* built towns and cities, and the settlers would permit neither the metropolitan authorities nor Muslim fanatics to threaten their patrimony.70 Lambert further explicitly dismissed those critics who charged that Europeans had stolen the land and decimated the existing civilization, telling a crowd of 8,000 supporters in Mostaganem in July 1936 that Arabs and Berbers instead owed their livelihood to the newcomers. Communists and Muslim separatists declined to discuss the conditions of pre-1830 North Africa: mass starvation and piracy, state bankruptcy, slavery, and malaria.71 However, Lambert equally upbraided the metropolitan administration, claiming that Algeria under the RNAS could regenerate France, in dire need of assistance during the FP era, yet required no help whatsoever from the métropole. Thus *l’Algérie française* came to mean *l’Algérie latine*, with limited ties to the mother country, and Lambert repeatedly pledged to defend Algerian economic and political interests rather than Gallic ones.72

The demonization of the Left and Muslim separatists, and the mobilization of *algérianiste* arguments in defense of imperial hierarchy, formed a large component of the RNAS/AL program. Yet the SFIO/PCA and their supposed allies in the ENA and ‘ulama were joined in the pantheon of enemies by the Algerian Jewish community. Anti-Semitism remained a serious problem in mid-late 1930s Oran, overwhelmingly adopted by the extreme Right and anxiously tracked by Le Beau’s office and the local Prefect. The size of the local Jewish community (6,000 strong by 1936), and the rise of Nazism in Germany—monitored with great interest by the settler population and press—ensured that xenophobic politics and propaganda continued to flourish throughout the department. That Blum and the FP government were perceived as Jewish only heightened anti-Semitic sentiment, and in the métropole conservatives and fascists variously accused the ministry of being the exclusive preserve of “foreign” Jews. Its personnel were invariably listed as Jews (including many who were from old Catholic families), while Blum was labeled a foreign émigré from an eastern European ghetto, a sexual libertine due his authorship of *Du Mariage*, and an effete pederast rather than an Alsatian and patriot.73 In Algeria, Lambert’s organizations were at the forefront of such criticism.74 In the eyes of various administrators, the new group acted as a successor to the UL, with the current occupant of the *Mairie* imitating his predecessor Jules Molle. Like Molle, Lambert understood that anti-Semitism could be used to mobilize mass support, and the AL certainly prioritized such talk in group writings and speeches. Hence it remained particularly prevalent in the department of Oran, and threatened to provoke a veritable civil war.75
Yet the department had changed in 1936–1937, and the success of the FP and the rise of the ENA meant that xenophobia supported anticommunism and algérianité rather than vice versa. To be sure, Lambert’s team often borrowed the anti-Semitic rhetoric of Molle and the UL. The pages of *Oran matin* were rife with anti-Semitic columns, which offered xenophobic jokes about stereotypical Jewish physical characteristics (large nose, dirty hair, scraggly beard) and behavior (vulgar, tight-fisted, hypersexual), in addition to perpetuating myths about Jewish wealth and control of politicians and the press. On several occasions, Lambert rejected the notion that xenophobia against Jews was a foreign import, stressing its Algerian roots in the 1898 riots under Max RéGIS and Edouard Drumont, while praising Molle for treating Jews as a racial bloc and rejecting Jewish commercial and political domination:

> We will never accept the Jews—Jewish first and French only for appearance’s sake… These Jews that refuse to assimilate, that continue to exist as a race within the race, and international scattered throughout the world, a state whose capital is not Paris but Jerusalem, a people that forever cherishes the messianic dream of universal domination.

AL leaders in particular certainly sympathized with Nazi race hatred, termed a natural reaction to Jewish “racism” and self-defense against the community’s schemes for world domination. Thus the Jews were deemed responsible for Nazi persecution. Yet Lambert and his confrères did not seek to imitate German xenophobia, rejecting the notion of Aryan racial supremacy and belligerent foreign policy in equal measure in favor of the Latin anti-Semitism of Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras. Echoing the Barrésian notion of defined racial traits, Lambert invoked Jewish deracination in explaining their “malevolent” nature, claiming that their lack of homeland rendered the community criminal. Thus Léon Blum lacked “French soil on the soles of his shoes,” unable to comprehend the attachment to native customs, the cemeteries of one’s ancestors, or the pealing of village church bells. Jews were dubbed “kokos” in the RNAS/AL press, foreigners from eastern European ghettos, whose blood could never be truly French despite naturalization. They contrasted with the racial character of Oran, RNAS Vice President and local lawyer Mesny concluded, and thus “l’oranaïs est latin, le latin est anti-juif.”

To the RNAS and AL, Jews possessed a homeland—Palestine—to which they should be deported, preventing their control of the banks and government. In Algeria, this included the manipulation of local authorities, including the police, which Lambert claimed to be but one element in a “reign of terror” perpetrated against the settlers.
Jewish insolence traced from the Crémieux decree, whose promise of citizenship enabled the community’s actions. Certain Jews naturally professed allegiance to France and Algeria, yet they always followed rabbinical orders, voting for leftist political parties and serving their own racial interests first and foremost. Even millionaires voted for the SFIO, he claimed, simply because Blum was Jewish, and despite the FP’s anti-bourgeois program. Hence their betrayal in the 1936 elections: despite Lambert’s philo-Semitism, he was not Jewish and thus discarded when deemed no longer useful.81

Hence leftist leaders and parties were the primary targets of the RNAS/AL anti-Semitic campaign. Each meeting contained speeches denouncing the FP government and the Soviet Union, accompanied by cries of “A bas Blum” and “A bas les juifs,” mixed with applause for Franco, Hitler, and Mussolini. In a 1937 work, Eugène Réthault derided Blum as a “fils d’Israël,” controlling the electorate through the Algerian rabbinate in order to enlarge the FP voter base while pleasing the SFIO, PCA, and the Congrès Musulman. Blum’s ministry and his communist party allies were proclaimed to be overwhelmingly Jewish, and in a May 1937 Oran matin article Lambert justified the abuse of North African Jewry on the grounds that they refused to force their political leaders/coréligionnaires to change their ways.82

V

Like Molle and the UL, the RNAS and AL did not confine themselves to mere criticism, publishing editorials and making speeches against leftists, Muslim separatists, and Jews. Rather than confront the “enemy” at the ballot box or in the press, Lambert and his confères wished to remove opponents from Algeria root and branch, unleashing a campaign of violence and terror in Oran against the FP, radical Muslims, and the local Jewish community, supposedly acting in concert to dismantle l’Algérie française on orders from Moscow or Cairo. Thus at the same time as Algerian extreme-rightist politicians fought the Blum-Viollette law in the Chamber of Deputies and the Délégations financières, RNAS and AL goons hunted down SFIO, PCA, and ENA supporters in the streets. The resulting climate of fear and intimidation culminated in a virtual civil war between Left and Right in the department, in which the police, gendarmerie, local politicians, and the majority of the settler population backed Lambert.

The emergence of the FP, and particularly the electoral victory of June 1936, threatened the phantasmatic vision of French Algeria. Both the socialist and communist parties received enthusiastic Muslim support, and although neither evinced the slightest interest in anti-colonial nationalist movements, despite fascist assertions to
the contrary, they did assist indigenous labor, whose representatives participated in PCA- and CGT-sponsored strikes and protests. To the extreme Right, this cooperation could mean only one thing: the Left overwhelmingly championed Algerian independence. Members of “Blum’s team,” many of whom were supposedly Jewish, tricked unsuspecting European workers into engaging in protests and riots at their behest, thus betraying French Algerian unity and turning labor against the notion of *l’Algérie française*. Worse still, socialists and communists incited the indigenous population to violence and supported Arab nationalism, a far more profound threat.83

RNAS members thus proposed a stern defense of *l’Algérie française*, and in Oran physical violence was now mobilized against the Left. The leagues had already sporadically fought socialist and CGT demonstrators from the July 1935 formation of the FP onward, often during mass rallies throughout the department. Such occasions inevitably unleashed anti-leftist sentiment, and protesters provided clear targets for extreme rightists eager to engage groups perceived as pro-Muslim or anti-*Algérie française*. Hence in the wake of the factory occupations that greeted the FP’s electoral triumph, swastika stickers appeared on the streets of Oran, while the slogan “Down with the Jews!” adorned city walls, including those of synagogues.84 The fear of civil war, particularly one initiated with the participation of Muslim workers, also led to widespread antipathy toward left-wing militants. At the forefront of the anti-FP campaign, the RNAS and AL responded with violence aimed at leftists, Jews, and other supporters of Blum’s ministry, provoking them with the fascist salute and attacks with rocks and clubs. Lambert and the AL frequently instigated the assaults, a pattern established on June 10, 1936, when the Oran mayor presided over the departure of Spanish nationalist luminaries at the docks. The festive event quickly devolved into a pitched battle between 300 FP supporters calling for Lambert’s resignation and 200 extreme rightists (many of them municipal employees) crying “Vive Hitler!” while holding their right arms aloft in the fascist salute. When police moved in to quell the disturbance, the mayor instructed them to charge the leftists, and he subsequently fought with several socialists himself. Clearly, the RNAS intended both to provoke the “enemy” and to identify itself with fascism, a tactic designed to appeal to the staunchly anti-leftist population at large and initiating a crusade against Oran’s socialists and communists.85

The campaign began in earnest on June 24, 1936, when, during a cigarette break outside the mayor’s office, Lambert responded to a group of Jewish socialist demonstrators with the Hitler salute, provoking a huge brawl defused only by the arrival of an entire police squadron.86 Members of the leagues subsequently ransacked a local bar on
June 26 while chanting anticommmunist slogans, before making their way to the Jewish quarter with cries of “Down with the Jews!” “Blum to the gallows!” and “Vive le fascisme!” Ensuing riots pitted FP supporters against the extreme Right throughout the downtown core for four nights. The latter shot, beat, and clubbed their opponents, killing one and injuring more than a dozen. Many police openly sympathized with the perpetrators, and some beat Jews and leftist counterdemonstrators with truncheons, while various local newspapers supported the leagues. Noting that both the forces of order and the civic government were firmly in the hands of the extreme Right, and particularly under the influence of Lambert and the RNAS, Le Beau asked Blum and the minister of the interior, Roger Salengro, to introduce a state police in Oran and several other locations.

Yet the worst was still to come. On July 14, 1936, during Bastille Day festivities in Ain-Témouchent, 1,000 fascist partisans attacked a crowd of 3,000 FP supporters, including many Muslims, leading to an exchange of gunfire that wounded 19. In the town of Sidi-Bel-Abbès, whose mayor Lucien Bellat headed the local UL chapter, the municipality refused permission to the FP to march, only to be overruled by the Prefect. Despite the presence of numerous women and children, Bellat’s thugs attacked the parade, aided by police armed with tear gas, revolvers, and rubber batons. Although 46 demonstrators were injured, some seriously, sympathetic judges refused to indict any of the assailants. Yet the local RNAS chapter in Mostaganem was responsible for the most brutal episode on August 2, staging attacks against CGT-affiliated dockers. Extreme rightists punched one worker in the face, and Eugène Réthault led an armed gang that threatened to assault FP supporters. Leftist employees promptly announced a strike, and a tense standoff ensued, with police separating both sides. Each pelted the other with a barrage of rocks and debris, until the deadlock was broken by the nationaux in late afternoon, their supporters firing hundreds of shots from rifles and pistols, killing an unarmed worker. The violence continued the following day, during which more shots were fired and windows broken during the funeral procession, while mourners threw up barricades at the cemetery when hundreds of RNAS members arrived with iron bars. Further shootings occurred later in the day, while Mostaganem mayor and fascist sympathizer Lemoine refused to restore order. Local officials were so shaken by the events that they subsequently demanded the prohibition of arms sales in the region.

Although they resulted in fewer casualties, street brawls became frequent in Oran-Ville, often at the direction of extreme-rightist leaders like Lambert and Alain de Berthois, the subeditor of the PPF daily Oranie populaire, who was charged with incitement to riot and murder in November 1936.
The Left, of course, attempted to defend its meetings and memberships against continued aggression, while countering fascist beligerence with their own pugnacious strategy. Partisans of the CGT, SFIO, and PCA variously disrupted meetings and confronted individual members of extreme-rightist organizations, paying particular attention to Lambert, whose stranglehold on the Mairie enabled the campaign of anti-leftist violence. For the mayor’s office controlled the city’s police force, whose vicious brutality against Jews and leftists regularly victimized opponents. Actions against extreme-rightist gatherings ranged from the launching of projectiles at speakers and shouting slogans (“Vive Dubois!” “Vive Violette!”) to the singing of the Internationale and the Marseillaise. Yet certain instances involved the invasion of a meeting hall, and the cancellation of an event due to the threat of serious violence. As the mayor of Oran, Lambert was the most blatant target of leftist ire, and various groups often organized demonstrations against his administration and just as frequently attempted to physically attack him, usually during a public appearance. The most notorious incident occurred on March 28, 1937, during a mayoral lunch at the Café Cambrinus in downtown Tlemcen. Hundreds of demonstrators gathered in the Place d’Alger, causing Lambert to abandon his meal and seek safety in a nearby hotel. When lunching society matrons responded with the fascist salute, the crowd overpowered the few police on duty and wrecked the establishment with rocks and chairs, while diners fought back with a variety of projectiles.

Far fewer in number than assaults perpetrated by the extreme Right, FP attacks had little effect upon anti-leftist violence in Oran, which continued unabated throughout 1937. The renewed fighting first occurred in Perrégaux, a working-class town long a battleground between communists and the leagues. On February 22 FP partisans attacked four PPF members setting up an office in advance of coming elections. A group of Europeans and Muslims burned their car and violently assaulted the men with truncheons. The following day Lambert responded in a telegram to the minister of the interior, Marx Dormoy, asking if the government had decided to “grant immunity to groups of savages” due to their affiliation with the FP and promising that the nationaux would take matters into their own hands if the authorities abrogated their responsibilities. He was even more direct in an editorial in Oran matin on February 25, claiming that civil war had been declared: “I decree henceforth the mobilization of the department.” The response to his appeal came swiftly. Local members of the PPF and PSF took up arms in Sidi-Bel-Abbès, beating leftist newsvendors with truncheons. When cheminots exited nearby factories to aid their comrades, fascists opened fire in tandem with
the police on a crowd of Algerian workers, killing two and wounding eight.97 The Governor-General subsequently appealed for calm in the department of Oran and prohibited all public meetings for 15 days, ordering the extreme Right to refrain from violence or face a prefectural ban. He additionally demanded the proliferation of state police units in all Algerian towns and cities to combat the violence perpetrated by the RNAS and the leagues. Given Lambert’s threats and the regularity of fascist assaults on FP supporters, the Procureur générale further requested the dissolution of the manifestement illicite RNAS, deeming it a threat to public order. Although the latter request was denied in Paris, in part because of Le Beau’s stated fears that serious administrative sanction would simply transform the RNAS leader into a martyr for the extreme Right, the campaign against the Left clearly disturbed the authorities in France and Algeria, where the government prosecuted Lambert for his Oran matin editorial. The mayor was eventually found guilty of disturbing the peace and fined 100 francs. Attempts to ban the RNAS similarly floundered, despite the support of the Governor-General’s office, the Procureur générale, and the Oran FP. Faced with such paltry punishment, Lambert defiantly reiterated the offending statement in an editorial the following day: “I once again declare the mobilization of the department against administrative fiat and injustice; arrest me, M. Blum!”98

Worse still for the metropolitan authorities, a solid majority of municipal and departmental voters continued to support Lambert and the RNAS, whose June 1936 loss to the FP had been the result of vote-splitting rather than support for the Left. In October 1937 Conseil général elections, Lambert won handily in Karguentah-Gambetta, with three times the number of ballots as the nearest competitor, while the RNAS took all twelve seats in Oran and eight more throughout Algeria in the first round alone. Although the numbers abated somewhat in the June 1938 campaign, the organization continued to dominate various departmental locales like Oran, Sidi-Bel-Abbès, and Tiaret, outduelling the Left. Clearly, a majority of Algerians remained undisturbed by the RNAS/AL campaign of violence, instead showing explicit support for the extreme Right.99

Hence mere weeks after the Perrégaux events, a group of Algerian demonstrators staged a riot outside the Mairie in Sidi-Bel-Abbès on March 16, demanding immediate government action to eliminate unemployment. Hours later the RNAS-dominated Garde mobile ambushed the participants, savagely beating several of them, while PPF and CF members fired on the crowd. By the time the police managed to restore order, three Muslims bore serious gunshot wounds.100 A similar trap was laid by municipal authorities in Oran during the Joan of Arc day parade in May, when a Jewish musical society received
an invitation to march in the cortege, only to be greeted with the fascist salute and cries of “à bas les juifs!” When the leader responded with a loud reminder that his troupe contained patriotic French citizens, demonstrators physically attacked them. Lambert personally urged the band to rejoin the festivities, where they were pelted with rocks and stone blocks. Nine society members were seriously wounded in total, yet only one assailant was sentenced to six months in prison; in any case, Lambert’s office had been well aware that the event attracted thousands of extreme-rightists and anti-Semites from across the department. Once again, the local FP demanded that the Prefect be recalled and Lambert sanctioned, but to no avail.

In other cases, the mere presence of Lambert guaranteed aggression, particularly in towns or suburbs with a heavy left-wing presence. Thus a May 1937 visit to Rio-Salado provoked calls for Le Beau to ban the meeting outright, particularly from the local SFIO section, fearful that anti-Semitic sentiments or assaults against leftists would ensue. The local RNAS had already been the subject of an inquiry in March, when the town Prosecutor linked the extreme Right to assaults by Muslims against Jewish merchants, along with the pil- laging of cars and vandalism of shops belonging to local Jews. Although neither the Governor-General nor the prefect complied with the request, the unnerved mayor prevented Lambert from laying a wreath at the Monument aux Morts. Despite his best efforts, clashes between the RNAS and FP supporters left several injured. The sheer hubris of fascist violence often shocked the authorities. In Mostaganem in June 1937 four RNAS supporters—including the local section chief Réthault—were arrested on charges of inciting a crowd to riot and carrying firearms. They were subsequently acquitted by the tribunel correctionnel in Mostaganem on July 23, 1937. Upon exiting the courthouse, an unrepentant and defiant Réthault addressed the large crowd gathered outside with antigovernment invective: “I was acquitted, but thanks to a Popular Front law, and that makes me sick!”

Such incidents continued throughout the year, gradually lessening after the fall of Blum’s ministry in June. Lambert was further slowed by an assassination attempt in July, during which he was severely injured after being shot repeatedly in the chest and lungs by Fernando Augustin, the Director of the Section des Beaux-Arts at the Musée d’Oran. Although not politically motivated, the attack led to a prolonged convalescence for the RNAS leader. Yet even then the rhetoric and activity of the extreme Right remained extraordinarily violent, constituting a warning to the Left should the FP return. Thus during the October 1937 cantonal election campaign, a sizeable brawl broke out in the Oran suburb of Eckmuhl, resulting in
multiple stabbings and beatings. As late as April 1938, Lambert’s ally
Dr. Théo Maraval proclaimed the AL “un parti de combat” dedicated
to eradicating the Asiatic hordes in favor of Latinité, and declared
war upon Jews, Masons, and communists. Neither did the extreme
Right abandon the defense of algérianité. Fear of Muslim indepen-
dence, linked to socialist and communist agent provocateurs, became
standard fare in the Oran press and in the public meetings well into
1938. 106

VI

Given the level of violence perpetrated by the extreme Right against
Jews, socialists, and even Muslims affiliated with the SFIO, PCA,
or ENA, and the concomitant animus toward the RNAS and AL
on the part of the Governor-General, the absence of police interven-
tion is particularly glaring. In theory, any sustained disturbance was
rendered impossible by strict governmental control of public secu-
ritу. In the métropole, policing was both a national and municipal
affair, with the Sureté nationale’s 7,000 officers under the purview
of the Ministry of the Interior, while municipal forces and the Police
judicière composed of detectives solved crime on a local level. The
Renseignements généraux (RG) provided additional support, track-
ing the movements of those groups and individuals deemed danger-
ous to the state.107 A similar arrangement existed in Algeria, where
the Governor-General controlled the police through the auspices of
the Sûreté générale, who were supported at the departmental level by
both the RG and the Police administrative in charge of public secu-
ritу. The Police municipale patrolled certain communities, includ-
ing those in the Department of Oran. However, in practice these
resources proved insufficient, and the gendarmerie were frequently
needed to restore order in various municipalities in times of crises,
while patrolling rural areas and communes mixtes at the behest of the
Governor-General’s office.108

Throughout the empire, the colonial state frequently called upon
these auxiliaries to utilize violence against a variety of enemies.
This was particularly true in Algeria, where authority often became
equated with brutality. The army perpetrated multiple massacres of
such severity during the process of “pacifying” Algeria that one his-
torian has termed the colonial state “a power that saw itself more
as a purveyor of death than a regulator of life.”109 Neither was this
unique to Algeria: units stationed throughout the empire were acutely
aware of their brutal role, crushing insurrections in Morocco, Syria,
and Indochina during the interwar era.110 Although overwhelming
physical force was used more sparingly after the defeat of the Kabyle
revolt in 1871, at least until the 1945 massacres in the department of Constantine, the Algerian authorities did not hesitate to utilize municipal police at the slightest hint of trouble, particularly from the indigènes. 111

The combination of official xenophobia, the FP electoral victory, the increasing popularity of Algerian independence movements, and the overwhelming presence of fascist groups in various locales throughout Oran naturally impacted the municipal police and gendarmerie. Officers and soldiers were also affected by the social and political nature of the institutions in which they served. Neither police nor gendarmes were necessarily fascist upon recruitment, but many were selected on the basis of their political leanings, and candidates were often inculcated with such views during training and service. 112 In various municipalities, mayors and their assistants personally selected recruits to the local force along racial and ideological lines. That a candidate was not Jewish or Muslim—or worse still, a leftist—was paramount, even if they were highly undesirable in other respects. Hence in Sidi-Bel-Abbès, certain officers were functionally illiterate or did not fulfill their military service, while others included pimps and ex-convicts. This situation became so acute by 1937 that the Governor-General recommended the censure and removal of the metropolitan force in that city. 113 Similarly, in Oran Lambert personally vetted all recruits and frequently disallowed candidates for reasons of race or political orientation, despite a shortage of qualified personnel. 114 Such attitudes reflected both the institutionalized racism inherent in the colonies and the long history of brutality and violence throughout the French Empire, and particularly in Algeria.

This xenophobia was combined with the realities of colonial policing: principally the role of police officers and gendarmes in the maintenance and defense of the colonial system, and their marginal living and working conditions. For as David Killingray notes in surveying the British Empire: “the subjection and domination implicit in colonialism meant that policing could not but be political.” In addition to preventing criminal activity, Algerian police officers and gendarmes were expected to function as a paramilitary unit against nationalists and leftists, an armed response team during riots, and the defenders of colonial order, including the preservation of racial hierarchy. These duties were carried out in an often-hostile environment, with limited intelligence resources and manpower. 115 Moreover, police and gendarmes performed these tasks as underpaid and poorly housed individuals, their potential loyalty challenged by the reality of disease, alcoholism, and a language barrier—most spoke little or no Arabic. 116

These factors combined to create a culture of violence and xenophobia in the Oran police force and gendarmerie. Serious incidents
occurred following the election of Blum and the FP in June 1936, in
the wake of increasing labor militancy and wildcat strikes in imitation
of metropolitan unrest, and the promulgation of the Projet Blum-
Violette. In Oran, run by a fascist mayor, police frequently clashed
with demonstrators, seeking to suppress any manifestation of support
for the FP. Recruiting in tandem with various officers across the city,
Lambert brought a significant number of municipal policemen into
the RNAS, often with the encouragement of their Commissaires. Thus
from June 1936 onwards, the municipal police allowed mem-
bers of the leagues to run riot throughout the city, assaulting and
intimidating Jews and leftists, and refusing aid from the gendarmerie.
Officers actively suppressed any demonstrations by FP organizations,
and particularly those led by Jews or Algerians. A gathering of social-
ists, Jews, and Left-leaning Muslims on June 28, 1936, for example,
was met with extreme force from the local constabulary. Led by neo-
fascist Commissaire Pancrazi, the police charged those gathered in
Oran’s Place d’Armes, injuring 15 demonstrators with “extreme bru-
tality,” in the words of the Prefect. They were particularly vile with
Jews. As the local Sûreté leader noted in his report: “With each sortie,
this same police force mercilessly attacks Jews, with utter contempt
for the law.” During the June 28 demonstration, witnesses testified
that officers rounded up Jewish demonstrators with blood streaming
down their faces, while one superior on the scene shouted “allez-y
et frappez fort!” Such incidents were frequently repeated, leading
the Public Prosecutor in March 1937 to declare that the RNAS had
successfully substituted brute force for law and government, policing
Oran with a private militia. With this in mind, his office called for the
immediate dissolution of extreme-rightist organizations throughout
the department.

By far the worst situation occurred in Sidi-Bel-Abbès, where Bellat
and the UL dominated local politics, and the fascist mayor antago-
nized opponents through violence. Operating in tandem with the
RNAS and AL, the UL enjoyed the patronage of police officials and
the local gendarmerie, often recruited from his electors and thus
unfailingly loyal to his administration. The former beat leftist leaders
and newsvendors in the streets and intimidated voters, or looked the
other way when the town’s hired thugs attacked opponents. In the
mayor’s employ, hoodlums pillaged stores, hoarded arms, and plotted
a Spanish-style uprising against the metropolitan government. Police
officers and rank and file openly supported such actions, often affili-
ated with the UL or RNAS, including the Commissaire Central and
several of his assistants. Jews and socialists were strictly forbidden
from serving on the police force and denied municipal employment—
 obtainable only with a UL or RNAS membership card.
Thus gendarmes and police were permitted to engage in extreme violence at the behest of the mayor and commissaires, as on June 14, 1936, when a cortège of FP supporters, including women and children, were attacked by the mayor’s hired muscle alongside police wielding batons, revolvers, and tear gas, resulting in 46 injuries. Due to fascist sympathies among the local judiciary no indictments were handed down, and there was no official inquiry into police brutality despite a request to Léon Blum, the Governor-General, and the Sous-préfet from the local FP committee. The following February, police once again openly supported the extreme Right, intervening in an armed dispute between members of fascist parties and leftist newsvendors, railway workers, and laborers. A wave of police descended upon the town center, firing first into the crowd of workers, and subsequently on a group of Muslims, killing two and wounding eight, and causing general panic in the streets.

The mayor’s office frequently played a leading role in the violence, inciting protestors and ignoring police brutality. On March 16, 1937, a municipal councilor’s mistreatment of unemployed workers—he urged a crowd to “go ask Blum” for bread and jobs—predictably resulted in a near riot. This was facilitated by the use of an agent provocateur in the crowd, urging those assembled to attack the police and gendarmes, after one of them savagely struck a demonstrator. The official response came from the Garde républicaine mobile (GRM), who proceeded to the Village Nègre, where they attacked protestors with truncheons, while Bellat supporters fired on the crowd, resulting in mass hospitalizations. The restoration of order by the GRM left many injured and hospitalized, primarily Muslims.

Faced with such actions from municipal authorities and the police in Sidi-Bel-Abbès and Oran, and the testimony of disgruntled officers, the Governor-General of Algeria requested an expansion of the state police in the Department, in order to ensure order and suppress fascism. As early as June 1936, Le Beau decried the lack of effectiveness of the Oran police force in combating extremism, particularly in comparison to municipal authorities in Alger, and even Constantine, where the response to riots and disturbances was often tepid at best. Noting that the police were almost entirely sympathetic to Lambert, Bellat, and extreme-rightist organizations, he asked for platoons of state police to be stationed in all municipalities with more than 80,000 inhabitants. Following the incidents in Sidi-Bel-Abbès in early 1937, the request was renewed, this time for all towns with 25,000 residents, due to fears that fascist violence would spread throughout the department. Le Beau observed that police corruption and patterns of assault had spread to Blida and Mostaganem, as well as various communities in Constantine, and appended the
draft of a décret-loi to the request in order to speed up the process.\textsuperscript{128} Mere months later, Blum and Minister of the Interior Marx Dormoy subsequently ushered in legislation mandating the expansion of the state police in Algeria.

The Governor-General’s request also responded to several incidents involving the Gendarmerie. Government personnel initially assumed that the GRM would provide support in case of disturbances. Despite its small numbers—only hundreds of men patrolled an area the size of France—troops were regularly used in a support role, buttressing local police squadrons, particularly during demonstrations and riots. However, the effectiveness of the Oran gendarmerie was compromised by a marked partiality for any number of fascist organizations that assailed the local FP, which became so prevalent by February 1937 that the Oran section of the SFIO wrote the metropolitan leadership to complain, demanding that the government be pressured into censuring the GRM’s Algerian officer corps.\textsuperscript{129}

A xenophobic mentalité was equally evident in the gendarmerie. Discussions of strategy at the highest levels invariably portrayed Algerian Muslims as religious fanatics, defenders of barbaric customs, and out to murder the European population. A 1938 memorandum prepared by the Ministry of War delineated the need for surveillance networks and troops to combat ultra-Islamic and nationalist movements, describing the enemy as “an indigenous mob, far superior in number, and easily led into acts of savagery due to racial and religious hatred.”\textsuperscript{130} The indigène, one author concluded, “n’obéit que la force.”\textsuperscript{131} Neither did gendarmes shy away from anti-Semitism. In Constantine, the Public Prosecutor accused the GRM in Sétif of engaging in verbal and physical acts against the local Jewish community in May 1937, a charge weakly refuted by Général de Brigade Lavigne as resulting from ineffective leadership.\textsuperscript{132}

Hence gendarmes and their superiors claimed that Muslims were anti-European zealots, a homogenous morass rather than a diverse population. True, certain reports mentioned socioeconomic conditions, hinting that poverty and exclusion might be to blame, as low salaries and unemployment had battered Algeria since the onset of the depression. Yet most authors simply saw a subversive threat to be neutralized, along with the Algerian leftists who mobilized Muslim discontent in the service of global revolution. Naturally, nationalist and communist agents-provocateurs exploited the situation, transforming Muslim discontent into disrespect for French authority. The FP worsened things, allowing “foreign influences” to inflame opinions and thus leaving the Gendarmerie in the line of fire.\textsuperscript{133} Although commanding officers claimed that the solution to the “Algerian problem” ultimately rested with civil authorities, the GRM frequently sought
to pacify Muslims through violence. As North African Commander General Baert noted: “Far too often officers and gendarmes resort to violence against the individuals that they have the duty to protect.”

This was certainly the case in Oran in January 1937, when the GRM intervened on behalf of local authorities during a strike, wounding 87 demonstrators, many of them women and children. Almost all were Muslims, for the action occurred in the neighborhood of Eaux de Brédéah, and the beatings were particularly brutal, administered with truncheons and rifle butts. Numerous witnesses, many of them seriously injured, testified against the gendarmes, and specifically accused Captains Chevalier and Didion of leading the assault. One onlooker described being hit in the head and right leg with a rifle butt as he stood in conversation with an Oran Commissaire de police, while others received similar head traumas, including a 15-year-old boy. Neither were the victims alone in their harsh assessment: in a memo to the Prefect of Oran, the head of the Sûreté départementale noted that the GRM charged into the crowd merely because they were booed by the local Algerians, and acted with “une brutalité toute particulière, against a group primarily composed of women and children.” Far from calming the crowd, their actions stiffened the resolve of the strikers, most of whom had not previously displayed any hostile or violent behavior.

The combination of official pressure and Muslim outrage led to an official inquest at the request of the Minister of National Defense, conducted by the GRM’s Inspector-General Lavigne, who received testimony that accused both Chevalier and Didion of being fascist sympathizers and mingling with the local extreme Right during the demonstration. Both had allegedly revealed their sympathies in private conversations on numerous occasions, and had a history of brutality toward Jews, Muslims, and leftists, demonized due to their association with the FP and the Oran anti-fascist movement. One local commissaire on the scene backed up these claims, stating that the crowd had posed no threat to public order, neither rioting nor threatening businesses or private property. In fact, he noted that subsequent violence was the consequence of GRM brutality, a position backed by Oran’s Commissaire Central, and that Didion personally charged into the crowd brandishing a whip, yelling “cognez sur cette vermine” in order to encourage his men.

Chevalier and Didion naturally declared their innocence on all charges, and their superiors blamed the Algerians as a whole for the demonstration and its aftermath. Rather than being a victim of GRM aggression, they stated, the injured child merely fell to the ground. Furthermore, the Oran company commander noted the frequency of strikes and riots in FP-era Algeria, including Muslim-perpetrated
violence in Oran before and after January 1937. The real issue, he claimed, was “the arrogance of certain indigènes,” who believed that they could treat gendarmes like slaves after breaking the law. Striking Muslims were probably armed with canes, just like their brethren all over the country, and sought to correct perceived injustices through violence, as they were prone to aggressive behavior. If anything, he concluded, the officers had shown restraint, using rifle butts rather than live ammunition, a position defended with the false allegation that Muslims throughout the country often menaced Europeans and law enforcement officials.¹⁴⁰

For his part, Lavigne’s report principally worked to debunk testimony against Chevalier and Didion, rejecting the notion that either was a fascist, while insisting that police eyewitnesses were leftists looking to denigrate the Gendarmerie. All those who were attacked clearly threatened security forces (including, presumably, the victimized child) and those who claimed otherwise should be transferred, as their subterfuge compromised police work and GRM operations.¹⁴¹ Lavigne declared the Commissaire who testified against Chevalier and Didion dangerous to the security of the department, and devoted a large portion of his official correspondence to debunking the account of the offending officer and an inspector who testified along similar lines.¹⁴² He further claimed that the true author of the complaints against his men was Oran socialist leader Marius Dubois, responsible for the press campaign against the GRM’s actions and the false accusations of the eyewitnesses, while the General in charge of the Gendarmerie wrote the Governor-General demanding the immediate transfer of all officers who testified against the accused.¹⁴³ Curiously, in his final report Lavigne did not directly confront the issue of fascist sympathies in the gendarmerie, noting in response solely that a few mistakes had been made, while claiming that the riots were simply an excuse to perpetuate racial antagonism, the product of religious zealotry, economic malaise, and extremist propaganda. Neither did he attempt to counter charges of GRM xenophobia, instead positing that where the indigènes had once been respectful of authority, this “insufficiently evolved race” had become prone to shootings, senseless violence, property destruction, and open revolt.¹⁴⁴

For their part, GRM commanders simply tied the events of January 1937 to a larger pattern of violence in Oran, placing the lives of gendarmes in danger on multiple occasions across the department. Yet they reminded soldiers that the use of lethal or excessive force was proscribed, and simply exacerbated the hostile attitude of Algerians. Responding in an internal memorandum to public criticisms of the GRM in April, including charges of fascist sympathies and police brutality, Lavigne reminded gendarmes that pacifying Muslims required
“very firm” action. Any weakness only encouraged aggression, and he claimed that the department was ripe with shooting, stabbings, and property destruction caused by indigenous discontent with European status, continuing recession, and high unemployment. Although its commanders successfully prevented the imposition of disciplinary action against the GRM, the Governor-General openly contradicted their complaints, consistently claiming that the chief security threat in Algeria and Oran came from European extremism, and not Muslim violence.

VII

Far more than Molle and the UL, Lambert and the RNAS/AL dominated the department of Oran, unleashing a campaign of intolerance and violence that marked the FP era in Algeria. That they developed a refined variant of colonial fascism, borrowing doctrine and tactics from Rome, Berlin, and Seville in combination with Louis Bertrand’s algérianité, traditional oranais anti-Semitism, and the simultaneous rejection of internationalism and Muslim independence movements proved even more effective in mobilizing settler support than their predecessors. As a result, from 1936–1938, Lambert consistently trumped the metropolitan authorities, defying the Governor-General’s office and successive Ministers of the Interior, while maintaining the power of the colons in the face of challenges from the resurgent Left and increasingly confrontational non-Europeans.

The assault and obloquy perpetrated by the RNAS/AL, and Lambert’s formulation of a distinctly colonial fascism, were motivated by the desire to redefine and buttress the hegemony of the colonizer over the colonized in Algeria. As Hannah Arendt famously observed: “Power and violence are opposites: where the one rules, absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy.” To Lambert and his colleagues, Blum’s ministry, including the Governor-General and the prefect of Oran, represented the triumph of international Jewry, Muscovite revolutionaries determined to aid Muslim independence movements and the repression of specifically Algerian ideas. The professed link between the Left and efforts to promulgate decolonization was deemed a threat to the designs of the settlers, whose phantasmatic notions of algérianité depended upon continued European rule. That the centerpiece of this project—l’Algérie française—never actually emerged was unimportant: as Panivong Norindr notes, “Its mere existence elaborate[d] a complex restructuring of both physical and cultural reality.” The formation of an ultraconservative, authoritarian French Algeria, a unique social construct that would eclipse the métropole, demanded
the expulsion of harmful elements. In the view of the leagues, fascist violence against the Left served this purpose, preempting independence movements and evicting socialists and communists from government and territory alike.

That this project diminished in importance and momentum by 1939 owes less to a sudden decline in anti-metropolitan sentiment or the weakening of Muslim support for independence. For the success of the Vichy administration in Algeria owed much to a program that appealed directly to settler desires, from state-legislated anti-Semitism and authoritarian government to the suppression of Muslim reform and virulent anticommunism. Echoing the half-century old hands-off old policy toward the European population, Pétainiste governors lauded the settlers as a virile, regenerative force, providing a palliative to republican decadence. Neither did Algerian separatist sentiment disappear: even the arch-évolué Ferhat Abbas headed a 1942 initiative to gain American sponsorship for the creation of an independent nation-state.

However, various external factors combined to dampen the RNAS and AL campaign. The decline of the Left in Algeria was precipitous after the fall of the second FP ministry in April 1938, and effectively removed one of the primary targets of settler anger. The Daladier ministry’s turn to the right initially excluded colonial affairs, with minister Albert Sarraut calling for reforms similar in tone to the Blum-Vilolette legislation. Yet by late 1938 such plans gradually dissipated, replaced by Bordes-style noninterference in Algerian affairs. The concomitant failure of the Congrès Musulman and the stagnation of the PPA—primarily due to the imprisonment of Messali Hadj—further calmed settler fears of armed Muslim insurrection or political radicalism. New community leaders Abbas and Mohamed Benjelloul demanded reform in moderate tones, rejecting the Left and violent rebellion in equal measure. Thus the RNAS/AL appeals to settlers to assault the “enemy” lost much of their vitality. Perhaps the final blow came from the threat of war, a constant menace following the failure of the Munich accords and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Prefect’s reports from late 1938 onward emphasize the silence prevailing in duwar and town alike in Oran and elsewhere, noting that discussion of potential conflict with Germany had eclipsed local matters.

In any event, Lambert was not the only leading voice on the Algerian extreme Right. Confined primarily to Oran, neither the RNAS nor the AL made significant inroads into the department of Constantine, which remained the near-exclusive preserve of the CF/PSF, while the PPF predominated in Oran. However, the strength of the RNAS and AL and its adherence to anti-Semitism and algérianité, combined with
the rampant enthusiasm displayed by the settlers for Lambert’s initiatives, pushed competing extreme-rightist factions to adopt comparable programs. Although they soon came to predominate among the European population, the PPF in particular owed much of its Algerian success to a doctrinal and tactical evolution toward the Oran mayor’s position.
The Transformation of Metropolitan Strategy into Colonial Practice: The Parti populaire français and the Parti social français

By early 1938 political normalcy seemed to have returned to Algeria. Visibly strengthened in the aftermath of the June 1936 Popular Front electoral victory, the Left receded once again in the wake of staunch European resistance to the Blum–Viollette plan, the increasing popularity of the Etoile nord-africaine (ENA) and the ‘ulama among Muslims, and the waning economic crisis. In June–July 1936, authorities recorded almost 40,000 workdays lost due to strikes in all three departments; in January 1937, they noted only a two-day tilt in an Oran chemical factory. The PCA met its Waterloo in October 1937 cantonal elections, losing its hold over rural labour and the urban proletariat in equal measure. Communists fared especially poorly with Muslims, capturing only 756 of 30,000 votes. The party’s subsequent plans to “Arabize” the party yielded little, as non-Europeans increasingly defected to Messali Hadj’s camp and sales of the communist press plummeted.1 Prefectorial and police reports further noted the decline in attendance at Popular Front meetings, often in the dozens as opposed to hundreds or thousands just two years earlier.2

For the colons, however, the decline of the Left merely reflected the radicalization of Algerian Muslims, who defected from the reformist promise of Blum–Viollette to the separatism of Messali Hadj. Despite the French government ban of the ENA in March 1937, Hadj simply transformed the movement into a political party—the Parti populaire algérien (PPA)—mere days later, and by 1939 its 40 sections contained 2,500 active militants. Although it was supposedly less radical than the ENA, the PPA successfully called a general strike in November
1937 that shut down 70 percent of the Algiers Casbah, demanding the suppression of the Indigénat and lois d’exception, the elimination of the Délégations financières in favor of a parliament elected by universal suffrage, and the recognition of Arabic as an official language and Islam as the state religion. For his part, Hadj had never supported the moderate Blum—Violette proposal, terming it “a new imperialist tool, used in the traditional French manner, to divide the Algerian people, separating the elite from the masses.” Such statements led to his arrest and imprisonment in August 1937, yet had little impact on the group’s popularity, particularly in the October 1937 cantonal elections (Hadj garnered almost 2,500 write-in votes) and 1938 municipal campaigns. By 1939, despite the administration’s best efforts, PPA rallies attracted up to 25,000 participants. Their repression only heightened Muslim anger and nationalist support, leaving the settlers very uneasy on the eve of the Second World War.

The lack of cooperation partly stemmed from the ongoing economic crisis for fellahs and the urban indigenous working class. In his February 1938 report to the Haut Comité Méditerranéen, Governor-General Le Beau noted a substantial rise in exports over the preceding two years, precipitating an elimination of the trade deficit and a remarkable recovery in the wine industry. To be sure, the bulk of the increase shipped to the métropole, and sectors like wheat, remained fragile, yet the collapse of 1935 had officially ended. Nonetheless, for all of the efforts expended on indigènes, from technical instruction to the extension of credit, Le Beau admitted that non-European operations substantially underperformed, forcing unemployed and starving workers into Algerian and metropolitan cities by the tens of thousands. The colons explicitly linked the ongoing crisis with the growth of Muslim separatists such as the ENA/PPA and the ‘ulamā, while even moderates such as Bendjelloul and the Fédération des élus musulmans began to advocate certain planks of the Messalist plan, assailing the Indigénat while refusing to cooperate with the French authorities. Worse still, Muslim population growth continued unabated, becoming a demographic and economic concern by the late 1930s, with the state distribution of food to impoverished fellahs a major budget item and political quagmire.

Far from receding, then, the tensions of empire had merely shifted ground once again. In the long term, the conflict between indigènes and settlers, nationalists and the French administration, would only be resolved in the Algerian War of Independence from 1954 to 1962. Conversely in the years following the Popular Front’s annus mirabilis, the shift to Muslim nationalism reinforced the popularity of the extreme Right, as anxious colons continued to abandon a metropolitan administration that they increasingly perceived to be weak and
apathetic. Previously confined to Constantine and Oran, where the Croix de Feu (CF), Front paysan, and RNAS/AL dominated local politics during the middle–late 1930s, the threat of Muslim separatism and the growing popularity of Hadj and the PPA heralded significant fascist success in the department of Alger for the first time. Although the Amitiés latines experienced continued popularity in Oran (and the Unions latines in Sidi-Bel-Abbès), two new groups eclipsed their older rivals, attempting to forge interdepartmental organizations that transcended regional fiefdoms: The Parti social français (PSF) and the Parti populaire français (PPF).

Both were Algerian chapters of metropolitan movements. The PSF was a known quantity in both France and Algeria, the successor to the CF, which dominated local politics in Constantine from 1934 onward. Founded in summer 1936 following the banning of the extreme Right leagues by the Popular Front government, it retained much of the CF’s structure and leadership. Colonel de la Rocque attempted to shift its doctrinal emphasis from the primary of the anciens combattants to social Catholicism, emphasizing national reconciliation and corporatism in place of violent anti-parliamentarism and the extirpation of various enemies. Yet populism trumped party discipline, and by 1938 the party attracted over one million members, many of whom profoundly disagreed with the Paris-based leadership. The Algerian sections were prime examples of this phenomenon, adopting the PSF banner while rejecting the positions of La Rocque and his lieutenants on almost every issue, from anti-Semitism to the treatment of indigènes. Similar squabbles had emerged within the Constantine CF, but during the PSF years the conflict widened, and where La Rocque previously disciplined recalcitrant sections, the metropolitan leadership after 1936 chose to ignore differing opinions in Algeria, often capitulating to local opinion.

A good part of the rationale for La Rocque’s acquiescence came from the competition provided by the PPF in both France and Algeria. The success of the Abbé Lambert had been confined to the department of Oran, and the RNAS incorporated the CF rather than seeking to eclipse them, but the new group directly competed with their more established rival. Although PPF leader Jacques Doriot frequently spoke of collaboration with the PSF, particularly in a Front de la liberté against Blum’s ministry, the group’s success in North Africa, and particularly Oran, came at the expense of their rivals, who lost thousands of members throughout Algeria in 1936–1937 (with the exception of its Constantine stronghold). Yet Doriot too faced daunting challenges, not least from a serious misunderstanding of colonial realities, including a refusal to prioritize anti-Semitism and the fight against Muslim separatism. Only Lambert’s sponsorship
and the PPF’s staunchly anti-republican/anti-leftist stance allowed the group to build an Algerian following. In order to avoid a mutiny within the colonial ranks, Doriot and his local leadership adopted the tactics used by La Rocque and the metropolitan CF, tailoring its platform and actions to suit the xenophobia, algérianité, and hegemony proposed by the settlers.

I

In metropolitan France, the PPF was synonymous with its leader, Jacques Doriot. An ex-communist jailed during the Rif War for encouraging desertion, Doriot headed the Jeunesses communistes throughout the 1920s and was elected to the Chamber of Deputies. Despite his mercurial reputation, and the popular belief that he could eventually succeed Maurice Thorez as Parti communiste français (PCF) leader, his growing stature alienated his superiors. Matters came to a head in February 1934, when Doriot led communist militants during the February 12 counterdemonstration, and was promptly purged at the urging of Thorez and Jacques Duclos for insubordination.10 Unfazed, he won election in 1936 as the mayor of the Parisian working-class suburb of St.-Denis. Although he proclaimed unwavering loyalty to the Left, in reality his support came increasingly from the middle class, and the campaign’s anticommunist electoral bent reflected a growing fascination with fascism. Thus in summer 1936, Doriot founded the PPF, funded by the decidedly bourgeois Worms bank, while the party’s metropolitan program argued for corporatism, anticommunism, a defense of artisans and the middle class, and a move from republicanism to authoritarian government.11 Leaders also engaged in violence, threatening leftists while demanding civil war and physical assaults against foreigners.12 Buoyed by growing bourgeois unease with the Popular Front government, the PPF attracted tens of thousands of members and provided serious competition to La Rocque and the CF/PSF.

Given the popularity of fascism among the Algerian settlers, the PPF quickly established sections in all three departments in late summer 1936, targeting “susceptible” recruits in each quartier and unleashing a substantial propaganda drive in order to publicize the party’s arrival.13 The metropolitan leadership selected ex-communist militant, Worms bank executive, and Doriot devotee Victor Arrighi, who had married into a wealthy colon family in Mostaganem, as the North African delegate and president of the Bureau colonial devoted to the study of empire and the PPF’s colonial needs.14 Each department further received a Secrétaire fédéral: in Alger, ex-CF militant Jean Fossati, in Constantine local luminary Raoul Aubertie, and
prominent lawyer Gaston Vidal for Oran. Although a central committee controlled Algerian operations and the treasury, in practice local *bureaux politiques* enacted day-to-day policy, and sections operated with little outside interference. Regional and local PPF also mobilized special brigades to protect leaders and police meetings, where they patrolled the hall and ejected troublemakers.\textsuperscript{15} Party news was regularly reported in *Le Pionnier* and *Oranie populaire*, the PPF’s Algerian press organs, which sold thousands of copies daily by 1937–1938, while *Oran matin* and the *Echo d’Oran* both devoted significant column space to the nascent movement. Finally, an annual North African Congress was inaugurated in 1937, to raise the PPF’s colonial profile and promote the imperial project in political and economic terms.\textsuperscript{16}

Settlers immediately responded to the group’s appeal, and initial meetings attracted thousand of participants in all three departments. Following Doriot’s fall 1936 tour of the region the PPF had attracted over 15,000 members in Algeria, primarily from urban middle-class and farm communities. If workers tended to ignore the group’s propaganda, businessmen, professionals, shopkeepers, and *paysans* lauded Doriot, while municipal politicians in Alger and Oran publicly declared support. In the former department, the leadership’s leftist pedigree attracted the interest of local Popular Front luminaries, including Alger CGT dockers union leader François Bruno, while Mayor Albin Rozis publicly joined in 1938, defecting from the PSF. This success significantly increased the departmental membership, with the Alger-Ville section gathering almost 2,000 supporters.\textsuperscript{17} Due to its rapid rise, the city’s cohort also sponsored the École fédérale du propagandiste, teaching PPF members about a variety of topics to prospective militants. The party experienced far less success in Constantine, where local sections attracted a paltry 400 exclusively middle-class members. Given the strength of the rival PSF in the department, public officials rejected PPF overtures, while entire communities (including Bône) ignored Doriot and Aubertie altogether. By June 1937, the Constantine section disbanded due to lack of interest, leaving a tiny Philippeville quorum as the last remaining departmental outpost.\textsuperscript{18}

By far the greatest PPF success occurred in Oran, where Lambert sought a partnership with Doriot and took the movement into the RNAS from its inception. By July 1937, the departmental membership surpassed 11,000 in 17 sections, with over 4,000 in Oran alone. The local Action française (AF) and Jeunesses patriotes (JP) also merged with the PPF, while the vast majority of PSF members defected to the rival camp.\textsuperscript{19} Given the level of success attained by the departmental organization, the Oran sections sent 43 delegates to the 1938 Congrès national in Paris, while metropolitan leaders
frequently arrived to speak to crowds of thousands in each locale, including délégués financiers and municipal councilors.20

The Oran PPF also took the lead in women’s and youth auxiliaries, providing the bulk of the membership and financial support. While the Alger section féminine failed to muster sufficient volunteers for charitable activities, dozens of their Oran counterparts under the leadership of Mme Sainton regularly attended political talks on the fight against the enemies of France or the role played by women in the defense of the empire.21 Much like the metropolitan PPF, local leaders regularly exhorted them to participate in propaganda efforts, proclaiming that fighting communism could not be accomplished without female assistance. One author in L’Oranie populaire declared that in addition to raising children and tending house, women infused families with nationalism and patriotism, even combating the Popular Front by forcing husbands to work rather than striking or rejecting bourgeois snobbery in favor of class conciliation.22 Most importantly, Oran PPF female militants tirelessly contributed to charity drives, staffing regular bals and kermesses in order to feed poor families and fund summer camps, and running the service médical.23

None of this differed greatly from the PSF or AL, both of which mobilized women’s auxiliaries in much the same fashion. However, the PPF placed a far greater emphasis upon youth than its competitors, and a good portion of section féminine efforts concerned educational activities for the Pionniers Jacques Doriot (7–12 years) and Lionceaux (13–16 years) for boys and girls. These groups were charged with the formation of a morally sound and physically fit elite through sporting activities and non-Marxist education by forging cells of 6–10 children linked by comradeship and solidarity. Dozens of Pionniers and Lionceaux attended weekly meetings, playing games and singing the PPF anthem “France, libre-toi,” while learning about the party leadership, its salute, and its mots d’ordre (“Doriot arrive,” “Doriot au pouvoir”). Authorities rightly noted that the organization consisted of propaganda, despite frequent field trips, outdoor excursions, summer camps, and Disney carton screenings.24 Somewhat less successful, the Union populaire de la Jeunesse française served youth aged 16–21 from spring 1937 onward, providing university-level courses, sports teams, and talks by such local luminaries as Gabriel Lambert. Although its leaders claimed hundreds of members, UPJF meetings usually gathered fewer than a dozen participants in Alger and Oran.25 However, the UPJF proved far more imperial than the Pionniers/Lionceaux, forging a colonial program that lauded Francis Garnier and Marshall Lyautay as empire-builders, while eulogizing the phalanse héroique of soldiers, missionaries, and colons whose suffering enabled l’Algérie française.26
The PPF had much greater success with adults in elections from 1936 to 1938, once again primarily in Alger and Oran. In the former department, PPF luminaries triumphed in regional and municipal contests in Alger, Maison Carré, and Hussein Dey, while local leadership coordinated voter drives and placed members on the electoral list in every district. Buoyed by the RNAS electoral machine and steady campaign contributions from bourgeois supporters, the Oran PPF fared even better, taking more seats in that department although the margin of victory for the extreme Right proved slimmer by the October 1937 cantonal elections, the first with Doriotiste participation. By June 1938 when the Popular Front stumbled in France and Algeria alike, group candidates successfully routed leftist opposition, with Gaston Vidal, Alfredo Sansano, and Jean Azam winning seats in the Délégations financières. However, much of the Algerian electoral success hinged upon the PPF’s partnership with the RNAS, which imposed a candidature unique on the first ballot in order to avoid the vote-splitting that plagued the spring 1936 parliamentary election. Thus party candidates benefited from the support of PSF and AL electors, and leaders worried openly about the 1940 vote, when Lambert and long-standing conservative deputies Paul Saurin and Enjalbert would undoubtedly persevere.

II

A good portion of the Algerian PPF’s anxiety stemmed from the ambivalent nature of its relationship with settlers. Local leaders frequently ignored or dismissed popular concerns, only to backtrack when faced with spirited opposition. If the party’s Oran membership numbers were impressive, they could be explained by a lack of competition (Lambert’s AL did not emerge until 1938 and the CF/PSF never prioritized Oran), while the PPF made no inroads into Constantine and their Alger support (although substantial) fell short of political dominance. Thus the group adopted a variety of stances from anti-Semitism to algérianité, in an attempt to bolster their credibility with the European population.

Despite strong membership numbers, the Algerian PPF initially received a rather tepid reception, primarily due to the program revealed at meetings. While a crowd in Mostaganem applauded Arrighi’s anticommunism during an October 1936 gathering, they proved less enthused by his rejection of violent anti-Semitism, speaking out against his argument that Algerian Jews were not Marxist, but merely overly involved with local politics. Neither did the audience respond favorably to claims that the occupation of factories in May 1936 was justified or PPF proscriptions for eliminating private
companies.30 Faced with indifference and even outright hostility to the party worldview, Doriot instructed Arrighi in December to avoid any discussion of metropolitan concerns in Algeria, instead demanding reconciliation between Muslims and Europeans through an increase in indigenous political representation and autarky throughout the French empire. The latter was quickly abandoned; given settler concerns about rising Algerian nationalism and their algéri-aniste rejection of French control, the local population construed such sentiments as provocative. However, by spring 1937, Doriot, Vidal, and others once again referenced the notion of collaboration between France and “colonial peoples,” speaking of French power and grandeur, and explicitly linking “notre mère la France” with the PPF.31 Almost every Doriot speech in Algeria discussed specifically French events, while the local press devoted an inordinate amount of space to non-Algerian affairs. Yet much like the other North African fascist organizations, the Algerian PPF could succeed only if its program reflected the views of the settlers, leaving the party with a difficult choice: to comply with local wishes or risk alienating thousands of supporters. In each department, the leadership attempted to navigate the divide between official policy and Algerian demands on a variety of issues, frequently reversing course in the face of opposition from the rank and file.

In Oran, the settlers viewed supposed philo-Semitism as the most galling component of the party’s program. As Laurent Kestel notes in his work on the PPF and xenophobia, Doriot and company eschewed anti-Jewish rhetoric in the metropole and colonies until mid-1937, when intellectuals gradually introduced the theme in print and speeches. Although certain Algerian commentators referenced the “usurious Jew” or criticized the Crémieux decree, North African leaders and membership alike remained relatively silent on the question, unlike their fellow RNAS participants.32 Various historians have attempted to explain the shift by pointing to the death of founding metropolitan member (and Jew) David Abremski in February 1937, which would have freed Doriot to adopt anti-Semitism, while others instead denote the PPF’s sagging political fortunes in spring 1938 as the key element.33 Although these theories may well be accurate concerning the French sections, the overarching rationale for the adoption of an anti-Jewish tone in Oran responded solely to the ire of the settlers in 1936–1937, whose continuing support hinged upon the party’s response to local European concerns.

The 11,000 PPF members in Oran consistently prioritized anti-Semitism. Yet local leaders did little more than critique the Crémieux decree, while in a speech in Alger in January 1937 Arrighi demanded that Jews abandon loyalty to their religion first and foremost in order
to become French citizens. While Lambert called for violent opposition, a PPF speaker in Sidi-Bel-Abbès rejected hatred of Jews, for this simply pushed the community into the arms of the PCA. They were welcome to join the party, he related, as long as they worked for France and not Palestine. Although far from friendly, such remarks contradicted the views of the majority of settlers, whose demonization and assaults recognized no exceptions. Harsher judgments were primarily reserved for Léon Blum, who Arrighi likened to a *mohel*, circumcising Algeria with the Projet Blum–Viollette, or visiting metropolitan speakers such as Simon Sabiani, who in a February 1937 speech accused Jews of attempting to initiate a civil war with Muslims. Similar remarks occasionally reflected attempts to calm the crowd: when faced with cries of *les juifs* in Oran while critiquing the supposed profits made by European companies after the Russian Revolution, Doriot sought to appease the audience by stating: “Oh no! The Jews were gunned down in great numbers, and those who survived were confined to their ghetto.”

Nonetheless, by October 1937 Arrighi’s speeches rejected anti-Semitism altogether, and he unhesitatingly told the party’s Oran General Assembly that the PPF accepted all non-leftist Jews in its ranks, even ex-communists. Responding to accusations that he was secretly Jewish and thus sympathetic to the community, he scolded a Sidi-Bel-Abbès crowd for being hypocrites, screaming “mort aux juifs” while buying goods from Jewish shops. With an entire empire to defend, the PPF had other priorities besides hating Jews. Privately, he decried the Unions latines and the constant complaining by Oran settlers about the community and concomitant calls for their destruction, and demanded in November 1937 that his assistants prevent members from engaging in displays of anti-Semitism, even during party meetings.

However, it soon became clear that the PPF had lost control of its own membership. Responding to taunts in the *Pétit oranais* at an October 1937 Oran gathering, Arrighi termed the newspaper “a defamatory rag that knows only how to start a riot,” and warned Lambert and the RNAS that they would either prioritize anticommunism over xenophobia or lose the support of his organization. This statement triggered a partial exodus from the meeting hall, with one women screaming: “Vive Lambert! A bas les juifs!” while those who remained interrupted the proceedings with anti-Semitic chants. Unsurprisingly, the Sûreté départementale reported that membership numbers in Oran dropped to 850, with comparable decreases in neighboring towns. The main beneficiaries were the party’s extreme Right rivals, due to the PPF’s refusal to prioritize anti-Semitism. Faced with the intransigence of the Paris-based leadership and its
Algerian lieutenants, local members simply ignored Arrighi’s instructions, insulting or threatening Jews. At a December 1936 Oran gathering, PPF Muslim leader Zine Bentabet told the crowd that *indigènes* should reject the leadership of the “Jewish” Popular Front, a recruitment tactic so pervasive that by summer 1937 Muslims referred to the organization as the “Parti Hitlérien.” Mostaganem accountant Marcel Boucherat further warned in April 1937 that international Jewish finance controlled Europe, having provoked the Great War for monetary gain. Faced with mounting dissent, by November even Oran section leader Gaston Vidal demanded a boycott of the local community, urging female PPF members to do without certain products rather than purchasing from Jews.39

Vidal’s position responded to ongoing campaigns of intimidation against the local community on the part of PPF militants. In December 1936, members of the Rio-Salado PPF painted the town walls with various anti-Semitic slogans—“ici maison juive, danger de mort,” “à bas les juifs, pourrisseurs du genre humain”—and the party’s initials. Similar incidents occurred in the village of St. André in April 1937, and in Sidi-Bel-Abbès five months later, while the administrator of the *Commune Mixte* at Trézal reported the vandalism of a Jewish-owned store and home by local members.40 In defiance of party leadership, Oran PPF members also placed the party slogan on a series of banknotes that proclaimed “n’acheter rien chez les juifs,” and unveiled a song about the *sale juif* Léon Blum.41

Given the level of anti-Semitic militancy in the departmental sections, party leadership and press organs adopted a staunchly xenophobic tone by late 1937. In both *Le Pionnier* and *Oranie populaire*, cartoons regularly depicted a stereotypical Jew: either an overweight banker, wearing a black suit and hat, with hooked nose and Hasidic beard or a barbaric communist, with bulbous nose and big lips, slouched and drooling.42 Reprinted articles from the virulently anti-Semitic metropolitan newspaper *Je suis partout* often accompanied the images, while local leaders used similar iconography in their speeches, painting Jews as inassimilable foreigners. Abandoning his previous staunch defense of the Oran community, at an April 1938 meeting Arrighi told a crowd of 1,700 settlers that they could never become truly French, and thus the state must revoke their political rights. Heckled the previous year, he now received a thunderous ovation from the crowd, and subsequently told a gathering of 5,000 militants in May: “Jews they are, Jews they will remain. Rejecting our ways, foreigners on our soil, they present a clear case for a *statut d’étranger.*”43

The newfound anti-Semitism took several forms, variously attacking supposed Jewish financial predominance, a purported alliance with
leftist revolutionaries, and Blum and the Popular Front. Throughout 1938, a series of articles in *Oranie populaire* proclaimed that they worshipped the biblical golden calf while Christians instead sought to love their neighbor. Rather than polluting Catholic and Muslim inhabitants, they should remain in the ghetto. One author reminded readers that Jews were so foreign that they simply could not assimilate into European society, while others adopted Jules Molle’s neo-anti-Semitism as a palliative to Jewish speculators and the “messianic dream of [world] domination.” PPF commentators linked the desire for power to Jewish support for communist insurgency in Algeria and abroad. *Oranie populaire* regularly reported on leftist activities in the department, and frequently ascribed the blame to Jews. Thus in November 1937, an article complained about a teacher named Cohen, who allegedly forced his class to sing the *Internationale*, and demanded the immediate firing of all Jewish teachers. They were further portrayed as backers of Spanish communism, a shrewd propaganda move given the pro-Franco stance of Oran’s sizeable Spanish population. One frontpage cartoon entitled “nos brigades internationales” depicted a group of Jewish and foreign demonstrators chanting “des ganons pour l’Espagne” while leading barbaric workers wearing hammer and sickle jackets.

Various local Jews were similarly accused of aiding the revolutionary cause in the department itself, chief among them Michel Rouzé, the publisher of the socialist newspaper *Oran républicain*. Dubbed Kokohezinski by the PPF, he was invariably portrayed as a foreigner taking advantage of French hospitality. He was joined in the pantheon of local Jewish enemies by Bernard Lecache, the founder of the left-wing watchdog Ligue international contre l’antisémitisme, who migrated from France to Algeria in the early 1930s. Dubbed “le juif Lecache” in PPF publications, an advocate of “Jewish racism, the LICA founder stood accused of being a wealthy malcontent whose sole vocation consisted of slandering Christians and Muslims, and a staunch ally of the PCA and Muslim separatists. Both *Le Pionnier* and *Oranie populaire* condemned his campaigns against the leagues in France and Algeria as mere fundraising exercises, and regularly assailed prominent local members: Marnia leader Grimbert became Isaac Grumberg, an immigrant from Odessa, for example.

By far the greatest anti-Semitic opprobrium was reserved for Léon Blum and the Popular Front, a ministry depicted as thoroughly Judaic, and dedicated to fomenting the revolution conceived by the “prophet” Karl Marx. All of Blum’s ministers were declared Jewish regardless of their background (Georges Mandel was dubbed Jeroboam Rothschild, for example), their mission to seize power in the name of their race. Writing in *Oranie populaire*, Jean Breal accused Algerian Jews of
supporting Blum’s team on exclusively racial grounds, the community’s electors combining with leftists in all three departments to block the campaigns of supposed enemies like Émile Morinaud and Gabriel Lambert. The PPF further mobilized anti-Semitism against the Popular Front in an effort to turn the Muslim population away from Blum–Viollette reformism and towards the extreme Right. Articles in the Oran party press consistently referenced Jewish violence against Arabs in Palestine, and Oranie populaire regaled readers with tales of the exploitation of local Muslims. The June 1938 edition contained the story of a poor Arab businessman who scraped together his savings in order to open a café maure, only to be trumped by Jewish competitors in cahoots with the local Popular Front, who rejected the notion that a member of the race d’esclaves should be permitted to sully the Place d’Armes with an immoral and loud clientele. Djillali Bentami, a Mostaganem doctor, municipal councilor, and member of the PPF Oran’s Bureau departemental, transformed such rhetoric into party policy. A prominent war veteran and close friend of Arrighi, Bentami personified the évolués, the educated Muslim elite targeted by the Blum–Viollette proposal. Yet he refused to accept the reform, telling an Oran crowd in May 1938 that a revolutionary government led by Jews formulated the plan, the same group that proposed to transform foreigners from the Polish ghetto into French citizens. Exploiting Muslims for their own profit, they would be the first victims when the PPF took power. The first task would be the removal of the Crémieux decree, which granted citizenship to Jewish Algerians, while denying concomitant rights to Muslims. Stating bluntly that “the Arab is a Muslim, while the Jew is a dog,” a speaker in the Pasteur neighborhood in Oran demanded its immediate abrogation. Responding to the numerous appeals, at the second Algerian party congress, PPF members proposed to replace the decree with a Jewish statute, in order to reverse the invasion of foreign Jews into French and North African cities, taking benefits that rightfully belonged to Muslims.

III

Clearly, then, by 1938 the Oran PPF abandoned the notion of incorporating Jews into the party, regardless of their political affiliation and personal beliefs. They discovered what the local extreme Right had always known: political success in Algeria depended upon the adoption of the attitudes and beliefs of the chief clientele—the settlers. However, the PPF’s attitude toward Jews was not the only party initiative contested by the European population. Throughout Algeria, settlers were initially hostile to Arrighi’s approval of strikes and factory occupations, which betrayed a lingering leftist bent that
seemingly recalled the party leadership’s previous affiliation with the communist party. Although none of the PPF’s central committee members retained any trace of support for the Left by mid-1936, and the party platform and membership base remained solidly middle class throughout their existence, the Algerian leadership evinced a staunch anti-leftist bent whose violence went beyond metropolitan efforts and greatly contributed to alleviating settler concerns.

The metropolitan PPF economic program provided a trenchant critique of capitalism, concerned exclusively with production at the expense of labor, which was frequently trapped in a cycle of unemployment and poverty, low wages, and horrid working conditions. To leading party intellectual Robert Loustau, social justice would necessarily be the primary goal in the new state, with a hierarchy of merit replacing one based solely upon wealth. This did not imply Soviet-style equality, a pure myth that disguised bitter Russian reality, but instead the substitution of class collaboration for class conflict, with all workers receiving a *libre contrat d’association*. The resulting industrial federalism, in which each business operated exclusive of powerful capitalist interests, enabled workers to gain power and responsibility while maintaining profit for owners, with the entire system backed by the state. By 1938, party propaganda spoke of replacing the Matignon accords with a labor charter, corporatism, and social insurance laws that guaranteed a living wage, the purchase of a home (or land for farmers), professional education, and organized leisure.⁵⁰

Although the Algerian sections reflected this program to a certain degree—one article in a local party publication referred to workers as exploited wage labor—the overarching concern remained strictly North African.⁵¹ However potentially disingenuous, the PPF’s insistence upon the capitalist enslavement of the proletariat resonated badly in Algeria, where European labor represented a minority of the population and Muslims provided the backbone of the workforce, existing at the mercy of white employers. Thus the local sections prioritized a propaganda campaign to expose PCA and CGT activities. Rather than sympathize with labour’s travails, the party cast leftist Algerian politicians as foreign revolutionary agents. One author in *Oranie populaire* described the Oran working-class neighborhood of Perrégaux as “a cesspool of hooligans, apaches, and nutcases of all sorts.” The paper leveled similar charges against Mascara’s leftist mayor Muselli (accused of corruption and profiteering).⁵² The party singled out the PCA for ignominy in this regard, advising settlers not to be fooled by its name into viewing the organization as separate from French communism. Arrighi and the Algerian leadership continually warned them that communists exploited the misery of non-European labour, concluding that “le musulman [est] en général
bon enfant,” yet susceptible to anti-French propaganda, which engendered hatred toward the settlers, and inevitably criminal acts, from violent attacks to riots. Given the monopoly enjoyed by the PCA and CGT over labor, PPF authors intoned, their courtship of the indigènes constituted a threat to the empire, and in April 1937 the Bulletin de presse du Bureau africain called for the banning of both organizations due to their support for Muslim independence and attempts to transform the economic crisis into a full-scale civil war.53

Members further warned non-Europeans to ignore communist entreaties throughout 1937–1938; promises of bread and work for Muslims could not be realized, as the Popular Front government purportedly spent all available capital to house tens of thousands of Marxist refugees from Spain. Neither did the PCA truly respect Islam, having demolished mosques in the Soviet Union and fully intending to ban the faith once in power in North Africa, speakers emphasized at a February 1937 Alger meeting, simultaneously denouncing the Blum–Viollette proposal as a sham designed to aid wealthy aghas while ignoring the needy masses. Worse still, PCA and SFIO anticolonialism was deemed dishonest, and local leaders Zannetacci and Dubois encouraged Muslim emancipation in order to perpetrate a massacre of anticomunist settlers and thus pave the way for a Stalinist state. To PPF Comité federal member Henri Queyrat. Moscow trained Arabs as cannon fodder, to be arrested and jailed or even killed outright in order to advance the communist cause.54

Given the substantial leftist threat to l’Algérie française, the Alger and Oran PPF launched a campaign designed to supplant socialist and communist influence among European and Muslim labor alike. In this regard, Le Pionnier regularly published exposés of supposed CGT misdeeds, conducting a veritable crusade against its Secrétaire générale Bernard Yacono. Throughout 1937, authors decried the presence of foreign labor during a financial crisis, the syndicalist bias against Muslim labor, and the blind compliance of dockers in Alger and Oran.55 The party also reached out to non-leftist workers, asking them to ignore union demands. During the November–December 1938 Oran general strike, PPF speakers decried the lack of democratic process in the decision, while claiming that the exercise aimed to topple the Daladier government, replacing his ministry with a communist regime led by Maurice Thorez. The party further sent a delegation to the Prefect to demand that workers be allowed to cross the picket line, and throughout the duration of the conflict speakers regaled crowds with stories of martyred employees beaten by Marxists for trying to do their duty.56

In addition to its rhetorical opposition to the PCA and CGT, the PPF attempted to provide an alternative organizational structure for
Algerian labor. From the party’s metropolitan beginnings, its leadership established sections d’entreprise in large industrial concerns like Renault and Michelin, and the model was exported to North Africa by 1937, despite the fact that the working class constituted only 12 percent of the European population there. Nonetheless, the sections proposed to fight communism from within the factory, while representing the seeds of the corporatist future once Doriot took power. At the January 1937 Algerian congress, a report referred to the project as “the best PPF method to conquer the working masses,” requiring only a few sympathetic workers to convert their comrades, perhaps hired by the boss himself to combat the influence of the CGT. The sections further acted as a bilan psychologique et social of the workplace, revealing the attitudes of management and employees, working conditions, and the provisions of the collective contract, along with grievances at every level. Finally, although they would not side exclusively with the employer, the Sections d’entreprise acted to prevent strikes and communist-inspired revolutionary activity in each concern.

Despite the party’s lofty ambitions, the sections enjoyed little success, in no small measure due to the small size of the European working class in Algeria, yet also due to the predominance of the CGT. Workers may not have voted for the Left, or supported the PCA or SFIO, but few considered any alternative to existing unions. Thus in Alger, the PPF managed to inaugurate 20 groups by February 1937, but only attracted 700 workers, with the party itself admitting that they were “un peu squelettique” at the annual congress, and members reporting widespread fraud and few attendees at meetings. The sections experienced greater success in Oran, where PPF members owned several prominent businesses (e.g., the Fonderies Ducros), and loyal workers dominated the Tramways oranais. Yet these were isolated cells, and despite active links to the 3,000-strong Syndicats professionnels libres d’Oranie, recruitment efforts fell short of their targets across the department. Furthermore, despite much talk from the Secrétaire corporatif Garau, the sections did not stand up for labor. A visiting Parisian deputy reported in February 1937 that workers were hired on Mers-el-Kébir construction sites only through obtaining a PPF membership card, a common occurrence throughout Alger and Oran.

IV

Many of the workers in question were non-European, and the PPF’s advocacy suggested a pro-Muslim stance at odds with the staunch xenophobia of the settlers and the Algerian extreme Right. That the group actively recruited Arab and Berber members and seemingly
agitated on their behalf concerning a variety of socioeconomic issues only heightened this perception. Once again, the PPF’s program appeared to reject established norms, bringing Arrighi and company into open conflict with their colon supporters. Worse still, the North African leadership spoke in terms of Greater France, expounding on the virtues of the French Empire as a whole, rather than adopting the algérianiste discourse preferred by the European population. As Doriot himself noted at the first North African Congress, the group’s reconstruction of France included the union of Muslims and Europeans under the Gallic banner, forging a nation of over 100 hundred million inhabitants. Unlike its purported philo-Semitism or socialist defense of the worker, however, the PPF’s promotion of Algerian Muslims engendered little controversy, primarily because the group’s stance was disingenuous, simultaneously calling on the authorities to provide education and employment to Algerians, while denying them political rights and social equality in no uncertain terms. Similarly, the rhetoric of empire proved to be flexible, and the group frequently hinted at an underlying sympathy for the algérianité of the settlers.

The PPF’s public stance was certainly pro-Muslim. In Algiers, the group attracted ex-PPA stalwart Foudil Larabi, while in its Oran stronghold, the local leadership recruited several prominent Algerian politicians: Mostaganem Conseiller municipal and vice president of the Fédération des elus musulmans Djillali Bentami; Oran Conseiller, municipal and ex–Echo d’Oran editor Zine Bentabet, Sidi-Bel-Abbès Conseiller municipal Cheikh Moulay, and ex-communist leader Abderrahmane Mehanni. Bentami served on the North African Comité central, while Bentabet earned a place on the Oran Bureau fédéral. The party’s Algerian newspapers also contributed to the recruitment effort, in the form of a regular column by Georges Roux, the PPF’s Algerian affairs editor and veteran of a variety of publications, including Benito Mussolini’s Gerarchia and the virulently anti-Semitic Je suis partout. An editor of the PPF’s Paris-based Emancipation national, his pro-Arab column in Le Pionnier and Oranie populaire investigated numerous aspects of the Muslim world, variously criticizing European colonial policy and expounding on the virtues of Middle Eastern/North African life and Islam.

However, the group’s largest propaganda effort concerned the ongoing famine and drought in the Algerian countryside, and its deleterious impact of the fellahs, who did not experience the economic recovery enjoyed by the European colons. From early 1937 onward, the PPF adopted the slogan “le pain, l’habitat, l’instruction,” and tracts and publications urged the French authorities and settlers to release extra funds throughout the empire, concentrating on providing food
and a steady salary to Muslims rather than debating voting rights while millions starved. In a May 1937 *Oranie populaire* article, founding member Henri Queyrat proclaimed it intolerable that after a century of French rule, Muslims continued to die of starvation: “If we have settled in this land only to exploit its inhabitants and enrich ourselves with their booty, we are nothing but low and despicable creatures.”

In response to such immiseration, PPF leaders demanded a *grande souscription* in order to collect food for starving *indigènes*, and ultimately a North African *Comité de secours* headed by the Governor-Generals of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and supported by all political parties regardless of their sectarian bent. However, this plan was only a temporary palliative, and thus they further demanded better wages and employment opportunities for *colons*, while the government provided increased access to education and apprenticeship programs in order to introduce modernity into Algeria while eliminating “certain bad habits that persist in the Muslim population.” This included courses on agriculture, in order to maximize yields on land farmed in an inefficient manner, and simultaneously stem the exodus of labor from countryside to urban centers. For such a plan to work, the metropole would necessarily cease foreign imports and buy North African produce, the only possible means to ensure indigenous loyalty and love of France.

However, leading Algerians correctly perceived the group’s paternalist stance to be disingenuous, led by secretary general of the Philippeville Congrès Musulman Mohamed Benslimane, who attacked PPF “charity” in *La Défense*, claiming that only a massive investment in schools, hospitals, and employment could attenuate Muslim suffering—a step *colons* were unwilling to take. Mohamed’s criticism reflected a flurry of anti-*indigène* rhetoric from the party leadership that negated its purported concerns with Muslim well-being. Such comments dated from the group’s earliest appearance in North Africa. In an October 1936 speech, Arrighi thundered that Muslims were uncivilized, and if need be France would arm the *colons* in order to beat back the *indigènes*, leaving a stunned Bentami to placate the riotous crowd of angry Algerians and uneasy settlers. Such sentiments were also expressed in local meetings, with Constantine section head Blanchard decrying the Projet Blum–Viollette in January 1937 as an attempt to grant rights to the barbarians, who would savage French Algeria in the same fashion as they destroyed Ancient Rome. Members were particularly pointed in their critique of Muslim leaders, with Queyrat referring to the *évolués* as “prétendus intellectuelles” while Arrighi labeled the Congrès Musulman as communist agents out to foment a civil war, their leader Mohamed-Saleh Bendjelloul derided as nationalist for stating that the settlers were not
chez eux in Algeria. The ‘ulama were particularly reviled for preaching that France had enslaved Arabs, and thus befriending communists and separatist elements. They supposedly preyed upon simple-minded Muslims, who believed whatever they were told, including Ben-Bâdî’s radical Islamist teachings.67

The case of Messali Hadj and the ENA/PPA proved somewhat more contentious. Leading Alger PPF members unleashed a violent critique of Muslim separatism, deemed Hadj “a dangerous enemy of France and Algeria,” and demanded his continued imprisonment on charges of treason and reconstituting a banned nationalist organization. Yet Le Pionnier columnists nonetheless praised his anticommunism, noting that he would have received their organization’s backing if he had chosen to defend the French presence in Algeria.68 The Oran sections went even further in hailing Hadj’s efforts, with Vidal writing in L’Oranie populaire in November 1937 that the PPA leader’s jail sentence was directly related to his newfound anticommunism. Having jettisoned Stalinism, the group’s toned-down rhetoric rejected the idea of throwing the settlers into the Mediterranean in favor of a North African Union along the British model—not the PPF’s policy, but not communist-inspired bloodshed either. Group leaders reprised the argument to great applause during rallies in Tlemcen and Mostaganem in subsequent months, with Bentami reminding an audience in December that the authorities had jailed the PPA leader while the author of the infamous Barthel circular remained free, a communist enemy of France and Islam.69

Although the colonial authorities took the Oran PPF’s support for Hadj quite seriously, noting their approval of the PPA’s apparent call for Franco-Muslim partnership and potential as a necessary counterweight to the “genuine threat” posed by the ‘ulama and the PCA, the party’s actual support was illusory at best. Leaders were certainly aware that their version of the PPA program bore little resemblance to reality, instead representing a tool to facilitate Muslim recruitment.70 Unsurprisingly, few joined the Oran sections, principally because pro-Messaliste talk served to obscure a repressive program designed to defend l’Algérie française. Facing harsh criticism from settlers over their refusal to issue a blanket condemnation of Algerian Jewry, and clouded by the suspicion of possessing leftist sympathies due to the PPF socioeconomic proposals, leaders sought to reassure anxious colons through an algérianiste program that denied any substantial reform to Algerians, while preserving the hegemonic status quo for the European population, and defending North African political sovereignty from the métropole.

To begin with, Arrighi and company completely rejected the notion of assimilation, a key component of the évolué platform, urging the
Muslim intellectual/professional class to remember that the vast majority of their coréligionnaires were uninterested in French mores and tastes. Much like their policies toward Jews, the initial PPF stance on the indigènes was not enthusiastically received by the membership. At the January 1937 Algerian Congress, Sidi-Bel-Abbès leader Lassouly declared that Muslims would be granted complete economic equality and civil rights, ending the exploitation of uneducated Algerians by European corporations and enabling the purchase of decent lodgings, clothing, and consumer goods, a boon to both the colonized and the French economy. Yet clear limits were quickly established to their socioeconomic status. Muslims would necessarily be treated with respect, Arrighi intoned during a December 1937 talk in Sidi-Bel-Abbès, and be granted socioeconomic concessions, including land and agricultural technology for starving fellahs and industrial apprenticeship and employment for urban labor. Nevertheless, while France would respect Muslim customs and the Islamic faith, these very traditions prevented millions of Arabs and Berbers from ever becoming truly French.71

Much like Lambert and the RNAS/AL and the CF, the PPF’s associationism naturally brought the group into conflict with the Popular Front government and its Blum–Viollette law. From its inception, the Algerian organization assailed the proposed legislation as antidemocratic and elitist, granting the vote to 20,000 évolutés, while leaving the status of the impoverished masses untouched, including the notorious lois d’exception. This supposedly pro-Muslim fiction provided a convenient mask for the PPF’s true motivations: the elimination of the European Left and Algerian nationalism from North African politics, and the preservation of racial difference through the statut coranique. Thus the group’s contre projet, the Plan Doriot, demanded that the existing provisions for citizenship be upheld: rather than granting suffrage to a tiny minority, any Algerian would be given such status only if they agreed to abandon Koranic law in favor of the French civil code. The remainder would receive a special Muslim electoral college open to all Algerians, responsible for the direct election of six parliamentarians to the Chamber of Deputies, a number equal to those selected by the European electorate.72

The Algerian PPF further viewed the Projet Blum–Viollette as a revolutionary plot, the first step toward assimilation, and thus the fulfillment of nationalist objectives and the end of French Algeria. Led by their communist partners, Arrighi charged, the Popular Front attempted to install an Arab government in Alger, a 20,000-strong Trojan horse designed to initiate a violent insurrection. Labeled an “attempt to attack French sovereignty in Algeria,” the Blum–Viollette law thus bore the brunt of PPF efforts until the fall of the Blum
ministry in summer 1937.73 However, this effort alienated the very Muslims that the group sought to recruit, negating its pro-Algerian propaganda campaign. Thus when Doriot spoke in Mostaganem in May 1938, rejecting Blum–Violette and declaring that Europeans and indigènes “could live in the same house without sleeping in the same bed,” a young Muslim responded “yes, but the Frenchman takes the bed, and the Arab has to sleep on the rug,” sparking a fight in the audience and alienating the town’s non-European community. Similarly, attempts to distribute tracts in Batna in February 1937 were met with apathy, and resulted in 300 Algerians attending an SFIO-sponsored pro-Blum–Violette rally. When Muslims attended PPF meetings, they were usually present at the insistence of their employers, and did not respond to the group’s entreaties, even when delivered in Arabic.74

However, the Muslim rejection of the PPF further responded to the group’s increasingly algérieniste stance, which wedded renewed racial hierarchy with the primacy of European settlers as the predominant force within l’Algérie française. Arrighi made this position clear during a March 1938 Oran speech, in which he critiqued metropolitan and colonial decadence, trumpeting the settlers as the necessary palliative, transmitting the imperial values of Lyautey, Gallieni, and Mangin to future generations of Europeans in Algeria. Rather than the colons venerating France, he demanded a French Rudyard Kipling, to seize the spirit of adventure and exploration while moving to the empire.75 Much like Lambert and the RNAS/AL, PPF commentators linked such sentiments to the settlers who had worked tirelessly to transform an arid and harsh land into lush farmland, “the men of a dogged race” who conquered the empire piece by piece. They effectively replaced pirate-infested seas with modern ports, sterile and dangerous underbrush with wheat fields and vineyards, and built railroads, schools, and hospitals. To Paul Guittard, the result was nothing short of a modern Garden of Eden of immense prosperity, and in a December 1937 column he equated the colons with true Frenchness, in stark contrast to the criminal and degenerate metropole. Given this algérieniste bent, it is unsurprising that the group’s proposed anti-Popular Front initiative was titled the Comité de défense de l’Algérie française.76

V

Much like the RNAS/AL and PPF, the Algerian sections of the Parti populaire français unleashed street violence in order to simultaneously combat leftist opposition and implement its imperial program. Frequently implicated in campaigns of physical assault and intimidation,
members stockpiled arms, invaded PCA and SFIO meetings, and assaulted rivals throughout Algiers and Oran. Although their actions inevitably provoked a harsh response from both Popular Front supporters and local government in equal measure, the incidents were only curtailed by the party’s declining fortunes from mid-1938 onward.

Party leadership unleashed a constant stream of threats from November 1936, aimed at the colonial authorities and the Left in equal measure. Leaders urged crowds to attack a variety of enemies, with Arrighi proclaiming in February 1937: “If I step back, kill me; if I fall, avenge me; if I advance, follow me!” A similar message was delivered by youth leaders, and the UPJF were ordered to attack communists, heeding the dictum “for an eye two eyes, and for a tooth the whole mug.”77 The chosen targets were frequently leftist leaders—Vidal publicly threatened to give socialist leader Marius Dubois “a kick in the ass”—but also local government officials, accused of aiding the Popular Front. Thus in February 1937, PPF Marseille luminary Simon Sabiani informed supporters that the Commissaire de police in Perrégaux would be assassinated during “H-Hour” for abetting communists in attacking PPF members. Unsurprisingly, such campaigns frequently led to criminal charges for verbal assault in Alger and Oran.78

The rhetoric also spurred on violent action against a variety of targets, including leftist meetings, which were frequently assailed by PPF agents provocateurs. Popular Front followers present at party gatherings were particularly victimized, bullied by both men and women in attendance. Much more nefarious to Algerian officials, however, was the propensity of members to own firearms in large quantities. Officials estimated that the Oran section alone hoarded up to 1,500 pistols and revolvers by mid-1937, and bemoaned the fact that the entire rank and file sported guns in many smaller communities, while Arrighi and other leaders regularly received arms shipments.79 Unsurprisingly, the weapons were often trained against striking workers, Jews, and political opponents, and PPF members were involved in shootouts at the Oran docks and factory district, and indicted for attempted murder and homicide on several occasions. However, most incidents involved simple assault or property destruction. Thus in the town of Trézel on April 12, 1937, the local section attacked a shopkeeper and vandalized his business following a rally in Tiaret.80

Facing organized attacks against their gatherings and organizations, Popular Front supporters frequently countered PPF malevolence with force. Communists in particular picketed meeting hall entrances while singing the Internationale and chanting slogans in all three departments, often in the hundreds, and prevented from physically attacking their opponents by a heavy police presence. Occasionally partisans fought openly with PPF members, attacking
one Philippeville leader in his car after a December 1936 function, or
gained access to the hall in order to disturb the proceedings.\textsuperscript{81} The
most serious incident occurred on February 21, 1937, in Oran, when
PPF Marseille politician Simon Sabiani addressed a rally at a cinema
in the Arzew neighborhood. Six hundred demonstrators surrounded
the building, while a Popular Front supporter threw sledgehammer
sleeves from the balcony. Police summarily scuttled the talk and evac-
uated the hall, and upon exiting PPF leaders were greeted with a hail
of rocks and gunshots fired at the retreating automobiles.\textsuperscript{82}

However, such incidents were few and far between, and overshad-
owed by the successful PPF actions against the Left. Both \textit{Le Pionnier}
and \textit{Oranie populaire} consistently ran articles detailing communist
“crimes” against members, extracting the maximum propaganda
value from the actions of “a group of maniacs” who hurled insults
at UPJF students or attacks against the rank and file in the streets of
Philippeville and other leftist strongholds.\textsuperscript{83} Victims of more serious
incidents became PPF martyrs, giving their lives in the fight against
communism and the Popular Front. Thus Manuel Manchon, a young
\textit{employé de commerce} killed by leftist demonstrators in 1936, became a
symbol of the PPF cause, eulogized by Paul Guitard in \textit{Oranie popu-
laire}: “Our dead increase our strength. They bind us to the soil. In
difficult times, they tell us that we do not have the right to give up,
that we must avenge the dead.”\textsuperscript{84} The attacks also became a galvaniz-
ing force, leading to reprisals against communists or trade unionists,
particularly in the aftermath of the February 1937 Perrégaux assault,
when four PPF members were seriously injured while attempting to
outfit an electoral office in the Popular Front stronghold, events that
subsequently led to anti-leftist ultraviolence throughout the Oran in
subsequent months.\textsuperscript{85}

Much more deleterious to the vitality of the organization, financial
problems and leadership conflicts abounded from the Algerian chap-
ter’s inception. Almost every issue of \textit{Oranie populaire} contained a plea
for funds, either through the payment of dues (members were notori-
ously lax in this regard) or donations. Already in October 1936 the
Oran PPF found themselves two months in arrears for rent, wages,
and printer’s fees, while in July 1937 the treasurer warned that the sec-
tion would shortly go bankrupt without an immediate cash infusion.\textsuperscript{86}
Although the Governor-General’s 1938 report claimed that such trou-
bles resulted from a lack of public confidence in the PPF, the reality was
more complex, and often related to the shifting fortunes of the metrop-
olitan leadership. While Colonel de la Rocque and the PSF benefitted
from substantial funding from a variety of industrialists, businessmen,
and private interests, by 1937 the PPF began to lose its backing from
elite sympathizers such as François de Wendel.\textsuperscript{87} Worse still, local
dried up completely by late 1938, as the rank and file in Algeria and Oran tired of the group’s dithering concerning *algerianité* and anti-Semitism, while subscriptions to the Algerian PPF press failed to demonstrate growth, leading to the shuttering of *Oranie populaire*, and the bankruptcy of the Oran–Delmonte section in May 1939. These problems were compounded by factional strife within the Algerian PPF, which culminated in the January 1939 firing of Central Committee stalwart and Délégué général for North Africa Victor Arrighi due to a disagreement over candidates in the upcoming legislative elections. Arrighi had announced his intention to run in Oran, a move opposed by Jacques Doriot, who supported RNAS/AL leader Gabriel Lambert and announced that the North African leadership would face salary cuts due to the group’s financial distress. He thus joined Paul Marion, Bertrand de Jouvenel, and an array of PPF notables in leaving the organization, and the resulting squabble combined with the financial travails to cripple the North African sections. Within months, PPF rallies went from attracting hundreds and thousands of attendees in large venues to hosting ten to twelve faithful in the party headquarters. By July, only Gaston Vidal and Djillali Bentami remained in the organizational leadership, multiple thefts were reported on PPF property, and various prominent members began to consider the formation of a rival organization. Burdened with a 100,000-franc debt and internal disorder, the Algerian sections finally folded along with the metropolitan organization on the eve of the Second World War.

VI

The collapse of the PPF proved highly problematic for the Algerian extreme Right, not least because Doriot’s organization had effectively challenged the largest such metropolitan group, the CF. Renamed the Parti social français in the wake of the summer 1936 banning of the leagues by the Popular Front government, the PSF initially seemed poised to enjoy substantial growth. By the time of Blum’s ascension to the Hotel Matignon, the CF regularly attracted crowds of up to 10,000 to meetings, and constituted a genuine threat to metropolitan and municipal authorities alike. Although the loss of a substantial portion of the Oran membership buffeted the North African operation, La Rocque and company held firmly to their flagship Constantine sections and also persevered in Algiers. In fact, their continued success eventually proved to be the undoing of the Algerian extreme Right, for the rivalry among the PSF, PPF, and Gabriel Lambert’s organizations inevitably resulted in vicious infighting, severely weakening them all from late 1938 onward.
The group’s popularity in Algiers remained unchanged, with crowds of thousands regularly attending meetings, alongside a variety of prominent local politicians and industrialists. Similarly the Constantine membership experienced substantial gains throughout 1936–1937, reaching 1,900 in Constantine-Ville and 1,600 in Bône, and they attracted the entire European population of several smaller communities in each department. However, the Oran sections suffered a tremendous blow in a matter of months following the arrival of the PPF. The total number of partisans there dropped from 3,000 to 800 by the end of 1936, while numerous local politicians defected to the Doriot camp. Although group meetings continued to draw respectable crowds, this reflected the strategizing of the Rassemblement national (via Lambert’s insistence on public displays of extreme Right unity) rather than genuine support for the PSF, and the numbers were much higher for speeches by La Rocque and other leading figures. Thus in December 1936 the Comité directeur evinced concern about PPF success in Oran, where thousands had left the PSF in a matter of months, and by June 1937 the rank and file openly spoke about recruitment difficulties and began to doubt La Rocque, a position shared by the local police and politicians, and even the Governor-General’s office.

The PSF membership also proved to be more homogeneous than its rivals. While the PPF attracted a large percentage of workers and white-collar employees in Oran, the CF’s farmers, colons, and staunchly middle-class rank and file remained loyal after the transformation into a political party. Thus the overwhelming majority came from bourgeois Alger and agrarian Constantine, and unlike Arrighi and company the PSF added fédérations for doctors, pharmacists, and fonctionnaires. Like its predecessor, the PSF also established sections throughout each department for members, but devoid of the military style that characterized the CF. Each comprised an electoral district, and decisions were made by a General Assembly that voted on all major decisions, led by a President and a local committee. Above the sections lay a departmental federation, with a Comité federal and a President, each of which formed a Bureau fédéral. The leadership proved remarkably stable, and very few CF luminaries left the fold, most notably Algerian delegate Colonel Debay and Oran chief Jean Richard, the former due to a disagreement with the transformation into a political party and the latter as a result of age and fatigue.

Roger Roumegous took the reins in Algiers, ceding the position to Christian Sorenson in 1938. To the west, Oran section chiefs Fernand Muzy, prominent lawyer and well-known right-wing political figure Marcel Sarrochi, and Délégué financier Marcel Gatuing proved very influential despite the success of their rivals in the PPF, although
due to the departmental contingent’s vast size Constantine section President Colonel Gros wielded a disproportionate influence in the North African PSF.\textsuperscript{95} Much like the CF, the PSF further attracted a plethora of local and regional politicians and notables: mayors (including Albin Rozis in Algier), municipal councilors, conseillers régionaux, délégués financiers, colons, and industrialists.\textsuperscript{96}

Furthermore, in place of the paramilitary units of old, the PSF instead mobilized electoral and judiciary committees within each federation. Just prior to the transformation into the parliamentary PSF, the CF elected three representatives in Constantine during the 1936 legislative elections, including leading member Stanislas Devaud. The party was less successful in Oran, primarily due to the vote splitting between Marcel Gatuing and Gabriel Lambert. Both sides engaged in vicious tirades against the other, and Gatuing physically assaulted one offender who mounted the stage and called him “Hitler.” By May 15, the situation became so unwieldy that CF Délégué de la propagande Jacques Bonhomme publicly responded to reports of supporters attending Lambert electoral meetings by berating those members incapable of following orders.\textsuperscript{97} Yet the campaign was also marred by serious violence between extreme rightists and Popular Front supporters, with pitched battles taking place in meeting halls and the streets. In one case, armed Dispos arrived in dozens of automobiles and several combatants were injured by rocks and broken glass; in another, shots were fired outside the meeting hall by an irate Muslim.\textsuperscript{98}

In the aftermath of the election, during which the Oran seat went to SFIO leader Marius Dubois, the PSF agreed to join Lambert’s Rassemblement national in order to neutralize the Algerian Left, and thus did not run against other extreme Right candidates in certain districts in order to maximize the movement’s success.\textsuperscript{99} This led to increased success in regional elections in 1937, and a serious breakthrough in the 1938 Déléguations financières contest, when seven PSF candidates won their districts, including three in PPF-dominated Oran. The party continued to experience electoral success throughout the year, winning two byelections for the Conseil Général, along with the Senate seat for the Department of Alger.\textsuperscript{100}

Another significant change from the CF days was that the organization paid much more attention to women, whose Action sociale and Action civique delegations buttressed a variety of PSF efforts across all three departments. The CF meetings and membership had been highly gendered affairs, with little female involvement—perhaps a few dozen participants at best. No longer a movement dedicated to war veterans, and more inclined to electoral participation rather than street violence, the PSF openly courted women, inaugurating sections
féminines in each department. By mid-1938 there were 29 in Alger alone, led by Mme Crespin and Mlle d’Arras, whose members propagated during electoral campaigns, performed administrative tasks (registering members and collecting dues), and participated in charity work. The latter included staffing a Service medico-sociale that scheduled medical consultations and provided pharmaceuticals for members, hundreds of childbirth deliveries, home visitations by assistantes sociales to offer aid to poor families, and the provision of alms to the needy throughout the year. This hands-on work was complemented by courses on “le sens social” (assistance-family-childhood), “les exigences de l’enfant,” and “la psychologie du malade.” Finally, Algerian PSF women’s auxiliaries ran charity bazaars and summer camps, the latter involving 220 children in 1938 alone.101

Much more active than their confrères in the PPF or AL, the women’s sections met frequently, and were well attended. Of potentially greater importance, their fundraising filled local coffers. One November 1936 banquet raised 17,500 francs for poor relief, while a month later a Kermesse in Bône collected 12,000 francs for that section’s accounts.102 These gatherings were intricately planned and designed; a March 1938 fête at the Hall de l’automobile in Alger featured 350 costumed women in a space redesigned by local artists, with a sit-down dinner, entertainment, and a concert on Saturday, and food, fun, and games for children during a charity sale on Sunday, with visitors bussed in from the town center.103 The sections féminines were further charged with organizing youth sections for children aged 7–14, 14–16, and 16–21 years, whose activities were to emphasize physical and moral development through field trips and exercise. During Oran excursions, each child received a sweater and treats sporting the PSF logo. On Joan of Arc day, boys and girls reenacted her life in scenic episodes, while older children dressed in tricolor sashes formed the Service d’ordre at meetings featuring metropolitan speakers. In Constantine, the local sections also provided a Université populaire whose courses attracted 800 students, along with 80,000 francs in funding from local business interests.104 Once again, the militarism that characterized similar initiatives during the CF years was nowhere to be found.

VII

The emphasis upon electoralism and nonviolence was consistent with the metropolitan PSF program, which reflected the conservative and Catholic bent of party leader Colonel de la Rocque. Having overseen the evolution from a mouvement des anciens combattants to a mass-based political movement with over one million adherents by
1938, he wished to emphasize social Catholicism and corporatism, and rejected belligerent xenophobia, pro-fascist/Nazi sentiments, or overt anti-Republicanism in an attempt to soften the PSF’s image. His traditionalist vision encountered opposition from a variety of economic modernizers, admirers of Mussolini and Hitler, and staunch anti-Semites in sections throughout France. Yet in Algeria, leadership and rank and file alike soundly rejected almost every proposal emanating from the metropole. Unlike the PPF, which could at least count upon Arrighi and the Algerian section heads to back Doriot’s program, the North African PSF simply ignored requests from Paris, acting according to local dictates rather than following orders. As a result, the party engaged in fascism, anti-Semitism, and algérianité on a consistent basis from 1936 onward.

Seldom heard in the metropole, pro-fascist sentiments abounded in Algeria, with speakers variously praising Mussolini and Franco for ridding their countries of Jewish bankers and government corruption, and providing genuine leadership, unlike the weak parliamentary Third Republic. Almost every rally included the fascist salute from a section of the crowd, often at the instigation of Volontaires nationaux, and frequently in public spaces. Cries of “Vive Mussolini” and “Viva Franco” also abounded at PSF functions. Given the preponderance of Spanish Néos among the supporters of Algerian fascism, and strong sympathies for the Caudillo among the party’s metropolitan leadership, the latter is hardly surprising, and various speakers attempted to cast La Rocque as the Gallic version of the Spanish Generallissimo—both called for national reconciliation and defended Christian civilization, praising the heroism and sacrifice of the rebel soldiers in the fight against Bolshevism. However, certain members invoked the legacy of the disbanded CF, and during a September 1936 rally, one leader implied that Francoist violence should be mobilized by the PSF, particularly the notion of an H-Hour, when the faithful would rise up and overthrow the Republic in imitation of their Spanish neighbors.

If La Rocque and the Paris-based leadership eschewed fascist rhetoric, they were equally wary of anti-Semitism, repeatedly instructing local sections to avoid such talk, particularly in public. In Algeria, certain party luminaries patiently explained the official position to crowds, proclaiming the stance to be a useless tactic that divided France and aided foreign powers. La Rocque himself dismissed cries of “à bas les juifs” at north African rallies with a flick of his hand, explicitly forbidding the sentiment at a July 1937 Oran meeting. Writing in *La Voie indigène* in December 1938, Antoine Debay further noted that the PSF was a Christian party, and thus preached religious tolerance and the respect of different faiths. Various speakers also expressed
concerns about the link between xenophobia and Marxism, insisting that the hatred of Jews would only push them into the arms of leftist political parties. Sarrocchi scolded an Oran crowd in April 1938 in no uncertain terms, warning them not to aid Hitler by turning Jews into communists out to destroy France and Algeria, while cementing support for Blum and the Popular Front.\(^{108}\)

Yet the stern tone failed to quell anti-Semitism in the Algerian PSF, whose members responded by claiming that La Rocque’s entourage and spouse were Jewish, and that Jews provided the party’s financial backing, charges refuted by party leaders across the region. Certain members in Oran joined the exodus to the PPF, hoping that Doriot could be more easily persuaded to adopt the xenophobia of the settlers.\(^{109}\) However, the vast majority of the Algerian leadership and rank and file ignored metropolitan directives altogether, often chiding the naysayers. At the February 1937 meeting of the PSF Comité d’Oran, members demanded that the party declare itself completely anti-Semitic, while in Constantine, Mme Vicrey of the local women’s auxiliary instructed an audience accordingly: “In Constantine, one is either French or Jewish.”\(^{110}\) Others responded by defying the ban on collaboration with rival organizations. Hence in April 1937, Constantine partisans teamed with the local PPF to present a talk by the notorious French anti-Semite and \textit{Libre Parole} editor René Barthélemy. Members also rebuffed calls for the normalization of relations with Jews, yelling “Blum au poteau!,” “à bas les juifs!,” and “les Youpins au ravin!” with arms raised in the fascist salute at almost every meeting in all three departments. When Richard demanded that an Oran gathering stop the practice, he was greeted with a rousing chorus of “Vive Lambert!”\(^{111}\)

In the aftermath of the Popular Front electoral victory, Blum became the primary target for settler anger, and the PSF followed suit. At meetings, speaker resoundingly rejected the notion of a Jewish leader, and violently critiqued every policy decision made by the metropolitan ministry, while cartoonists in PSF daily \textit{La Flamme} consistently depicted the premier as an Eastern European foreigner, Chasidic rabbi, or homosexual. In February 1937, a drawing portrayed him as an ultra-orthodox rabbi, opening a prison door in order to free a stereotypical big-nosed Jew raising his fist in the communist salute, an overweight Jewish banker, and a parade of unshaven, thug-like, and unkempt leftists, along with a dirty and primitive black African and a fez-wearing Arab. A similarly themed May 1938 effort entitled “Le Succès triomphal de l’emprunt” featured Blum in his office, with a Star of David on the wall, a menorah of a table, and a portrait of an Eastern European ancestor, complete with huge nose, yamulke, and robes. Other artists pictured him as an effete, queer male. In an October 1938 cartoon
entitled “L’Homosexuel,” he wears a tight suit with coiffed hair and a dandyish pocket-handkerchief, while being embraced by a muscular Maurice Thorez in Roman legionnaire garb.112

The artists also portrayed ministers and bureaucrats as stereotypical “foreign” Jews. In one such piece, a Russian Jew with a hooked nose, big lips, glasses, and a shabby fur coat and cap with cigar in hand stands in a drawing room with well-dressed French gentlemen, rudely informing the butler: “The President is waiting for me: Ephraim Krankfünchsteinblatt. I have just arrived from Czernovitch to succeed Stavisky and Tannenjatz in the good graces of French justice...that is, if a Ministerial portfolio is available.” Alongside the drawings, articles characterized the community and the Popular Front as Bolsheviks who controlled politics and finance behind the scenes in France, the United States, and elsewhere. In an August 1939 tract distributed by the PSF in Médéa, Jews were accused of raping Christian women, murder, theft, and the wanton destruction of European culture and the white race. Jewish doctors poisoned patients and lawyers robbed their clients, the author alleged, and Europeans accused of sexual relations with them should be imprisoned, or executed if a repeat offender.113 Naturally, allies of the French Left were equally abused, with Michel Rouzé’s newspaper Oran républicain renamed Aaron republic cain due to its purported philo-Semitism, while commentators charged Bernard Lecache and the LICA with “Jewish racism.” Rejecting the olive branch extended by the PSF, Rouzé and Lecache represented the “hysterical excitations” of a bunch of zealots whose hatred rivaled that of the Nazis, noted Pierre-Louis Ganne in La Flamme in November 1938, decrying as fascist the one Algerian party willing to respect Jews.114 The LICA was further charged with aiding the nationalist cause, in the service of Soviet efforts to effectuate independence and throw the settlers out of the colony, and ultimately for profit. Hence in April 1937, one editorial cartoonist in La Flamme portrayed a stereotypical Jew, effeminate and hairy, with hooked nose and glasses in a gaudy suit extending his hand to a burnous-clad Arab. A large hammer and sickle formed the background and the caption read: “You understand, Ahmed? Once the settlers have been thrown into the sea, I will lend you all the money you need to run their estates, at a fair interest rate.”115

The anti-Semitic campaign culminated in a boycott of Jewish businesses throughout Algeria. First mentioned by Richard in Oran in March 1937, the movement gathered steam one year later in response to charges that Jews voted according to the wishes of their rabbi rather than according to their own conscience. During an April 1938 meeting in Constantine, extreme Right lawyer Albert Redares decried supposed electoral manipulation as un-French and a further example
of Jewish “racism,” a position that became standard fare at party meetings across the department, reprinted in Devaud’s newspaper *L’Avenir* and in *La Flamme*, which proclaimed it a humane alternative to violence or useless cries of “à bas les juifs!” at every meeting.\(^\text{116}\)

Given the need to placate the increasingly irascible Algerian sections, La Rocque assented to the boycott, and in October 1938 at the PSF Congrès fédéral before a crowd of 4,500, he watched Devaud give the party’s blessing to the strategy. However, his disapproval remained clear, and the visibly irked leader angrily reproached those who yelled anti-Semitic remarks during his speech, stating: “I find it idiotic to yell down with the Jews,” and asking that the crowd simply ignore the Algerian community until their behavior changed. Nonetheless, he publicly supported the boycott in a December 18 press release, claiming that it merely responded to Jewish hostility toward the PSF and their electoral “racism” in favor of the Left. No members were to shop in Jewish stores, yet assaults or insults were strictly prohibited.\(^\text{117}\)

The ostensible rationale for the boycott concerned Jewish votes being cast exclusively for the SFIO and PCA on rabbinical orders. Party newspapers and speeches constantly referenced the close ties between the two camps, first and foremost due to Blum’s position as leader of the socialist party. In a regular column entitled “Petit lexique franco-frontpopulaire,” attributed to a Docteur Vladimir Blumoschwig, Jews were declared to be natural leftists, and utterly foreign in speech, dress, clothing, etc. However, they were also conflated with communism, due to their desire to profit from revolution and destabilization.\(^\text{118}\) Speakers and authors frequently pointed to the Soviet example as the ultimate expression of leftist–Jewish collaboration, and feared a reprise of the Russian Revolution in France or Algeria. In this regard, Debay reminded *La Flamme* readers of the notorious Barthel circular, and claimed that the communist party/Popular Front worked in tandem with the PPA and the ‘ulama to throw the settlers into the Mediterranean Sea. Naturally, PSF authors also perpetuated the stereotype of communism as anti-Islamic, claiming that Bolsheviks destroyed mosques throughout the Soviet Union.\(^\text{119}\)

On one hand, such sentiments reinforced the strident antiso- cialism/communism of the metropolitan PSF. Yet once again, La Rocque’s expectations were thwarted, as violence became central to the Algerian PSF’s campaign against both Jews and their supposed allies in the SFIO and PCA. For the metropolitan party leadership specifically eschewed fisticuffs, instead adopting a legalist bent, content with a harsh critique of the Left and implied menace rather than direct engagement. Algerian leaders and members alike summarily ignored this strategy, just as they had in the CF days, engaging
in open warfare with Jews and leftists in all three departments. Dismissing the Paris leadership’s pro-Republican talk (disingenuous though it may have been), one Alger leader told an Affreille crowd in October 1936 that the seizure of power was the ultimate party goal, to be obtained by force if necessary, against the “reds” from Moscow. Jacques Bonhomme agreed, instructing a Sidi-Bel-Abbès gathering several months later that the PSF would fight a civil war to rid France and Algeria of communism if necessary, in order to “cleanse our country, putrefied by politicians.” Neither were such sentiments mere idle talk, for the North African PSF actively planned sabotage operations aimed at the Left, from the LIC to the Popular Front, disrupting meetings and countering their presence in the streets.\footnote{120}

The attacks began during the 1936 electoral campaign, designed to complement political propaganda with street fighting. Violence first appeared in Bougie in the department of Constantine on May 26, when CF supporters exchanged barbs (“sales youpins,” “M. Blum c’est un juif”) with socialists following a Ferhat Abbas talk there. The chief perpetrator was viciously assaulted the next day by a local Jew, who was subsequently tracked down by a dozen Volontaires nationaux, and savagely beaten before escaping into a nearby shop.\footnote{121} In response, a firefighters parade on June 20 became an impromptu PSF rally, marching through town yelling: “la France aux français” and ignoring orders from the local commissaire to disperse, leading the municipal police to attempt a ban on all political insignia throughout the town.\footnote{122} Yet by that time the violence spread to larger metropolitan areas throughout the department. On June 24, crowds in Constantine marched through the Jewish quarter proclaiming: “Blum au poteau!” and “les Youpins au ravin!” without any police intervention, while three days later in Sétif a similar gathering turned violent, with men, women and children assaulted by CF members, including an attack perpetrated by section leader and Lycée professor Martin, while police only charged the victims. Worse still, in subsequent days officers beat and arrested Jews who had been subjected to fascist salutes and anti-Semitic threats. By June 29, they actively encouraged crowds of extreme rightists who muscled leftists and Jews, dragging one unfortunate victim along the streets while being punched and kicked by a hostile crowd. Police merely catcalled “sale juif,” “hit him again,” and stood aside when witnessing the vandalism of Jewish stores and property.\footnote{123}

Given the stamp of approval by officers and politicians, by October the PSF upped the ante, hijacking a Popular Front meeting in the city to be addressed by communist deputy Vaillant-Couturier. Members stopped cars in the area, declaring to approved drivers: “You are French, so you can cross,” while turning on those containing leftists;
in one instance five Jews were dragged from their automobile and bludgeoned, while in other cases shots were fired. Neither were these random events, for partisans blocked all downtown arteries with meticulous planning, abetted as usual by a sympathetic Commissaire de Police and 20 officers who were party members.\textsuperscript{124} The campaign of violence climaxed in Bône during Remembrance Day celebrations on November 11, 1936, when the town mayor and PSF sympathizer grabbed a Popular Front demonstrator by the collar, causing a crowd to surround him, and leading to mass arrests and several injuries among leftists present, while extreme rightists continued their calumny untouched.\textsuperscript{125} Not to be outdone, the Oran CF engaged in a similar campaign of violence and intimidation against the local Jewish community. On June 30, the local sections incited a riot in a Jewish café, firing shots at the crowd. The latter tactic became so prevalent that the president of the local Ligue des droits de l’homme wrote to the Governor-General, complaining that leftists faced cartloads of Muslim workers throwing rocks and revolver shots fired by the leagues. The Mostagenem sections were singled out for their use of firearms, in collusion with the local authorities and constabulary.\textsuperscript{126}

In Alger, too, political violence became commonplace by September, with the newly minted PSF regularly taunting the Left with anti-Semitic jeers and projectiles.\textsuperscript{127}

Much like the PPF, the PSF inevitably endured counterattacks from the Left and local Jews, but transformed the victims into martyrs in the global fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry. Thus \textit{La Flamme} regularly noted the slightest injury to members at the hands of communist and Jews. Yet even these counterattacks were often staged, the product of baiting by PSF leaders, designed to elicit a violent response, demonstrating the “savage” character of the party’s opponents. Thus on October 25, 1937, Bastrana section chief Benassar baited demonstrators, and was lightly wounded in a resulting scuffle, and the incident was widely reported in party newspapers. Such actions occasionally backfired, and in Alger in May 1937, PSF members threw a rock at a group singing the \textit{Internationale} only to have their clubhouse surrounded by 300 angry socialist youths.\textsuperscript{128}

Yet such incidents were rare, primarily because of police harassment of leftists and Jews, and concomitant judicial bias in favor of settlers. During the campaign of street violence in Oran, the same police who turned a blind eye to PSF brutality, intervened immediately to prevent counterattacks from Popular Front supporters. Those who deigned to publicly decry the double standard faced severe reprisals. After filing charges against the leaders of a mob of CF who attempted to injure him in March 1936, Oran shopkeeper Marcel Hazan was beaten by extreme rightists, his property repeatedly vandalized.\textsuperscript{129}
Those officials loyal to the metropolitan authorities rather than the settlers responded with a flurry of decrees, attempting to stop the violence by administrative fiat. In the leftist borough of Rio-Salado, the mayor banned a June 20, 1936, meeting ordering the municipal police to arrest members on sight. Prefects were equally active in this regard, with the PSF’s 1937 Algerian congress cancelled by governmental edict in April due to the threat of disorder. The departmental authorities in Alger deemed La Rocque’s mere presence provocative, leaving a furious Debay to take to the editorial pages of La Flamme, contrasting leftist riots and assaults with the supposed PSF respect for legality. His words had little effect, and in the coming months both the Alger Popular Front and the Oran chief Prosecutor called for the banning of the party, as a reconstitution of a dissolved league: the CF. Only Le Beau’s concern that such a move could trigger serious disturbances scuttled the plan.¹³⁰

VIII

The crux of the group’s anti-leftist argument concerned Muslims, and the supposedly pernicious impact of the Popular Front upon the non-European population. Given the growing demographic imbalance between the settlers and the Algerians, the PSF joined their fellow extreme rightists in denouncing “Bolshevik” attempts to abet Algerian independence and drive the colons into the sea. Hence despite their profound disagreements concerning anti-Semitism and violence, the Gallic and North African leadership and rank and file wholeheartedly supported the pacification of the indigènes. However, the PSF platform concerning Arabs and Berbers remained unchanged from the CF days: they attracted few nonsettler members and offered little to appeal to all but a few Gallicized Algerians. As with the RNAS and PPF, most simply ignored the party’s overtures and, by 1937–1938, their program veered increasingly toward the algérianité that characterized rival organizations. Although clearly unacceptable to the Paris-based leadership, few criticized this digression, perhaps with the foibles of the PPF clearly in mind.

Algerian leaders initially appealed to the idea of “reconciliation” in imitation of the metropolitan PSF’s social Catholic discourse, believing that economic paternalism and stern Christian morality would prove equally appealing to followers of Islam. Thus one Muslim speaker at a March 1937 meeting in Bône claimed: “Our leader is no false prophet. He knows you and speaks your language. He wants what is best for you.” The group’s mantra of “travail-famille-patrie,” he opined, embraced all Algerians, regardless of religion or race.¹³¹ Yet few responded to this appeal. Cities in Alger and Constantine reported
few members, and only one Arab ever ascended into the leadership ranks: in 1937, M. Medjamel acted as a Délégué de la propagande in Bône.\textsuperscript{132} Nonetheless, this certainly trumped the participation rate in the department of Oran, where rabidly anti-Muslim sentiment among the European population, along with the ascendancy of the rival PPF after 1936, effectively prevented any sizable Algerian membership. Subsequent attempts to recruit through anti-Semitism, social security benefits, and anti-Bolshevism also failed, and the Constantine Sûreté départementale estimated that the effort actually pushed many non-Europeans into the arms of the communist party.\textsuperscript{133}

Worse still, both the ‘ulamā and the Fédération des elus musulmans denounced the PSF in no uncertain terms. For much like the PPF, the party’s seeming espousal of the Muslim cause in Algeria clearly masked a far different reality: that the PSF were ardent defenders of \textit{l’Algérie française} and colonization, fiercely opposed to any extension of rights and freedoms to local Muslims. The party attempted to counter the influence of both groups by inaugurating a propaganda campaign de-emphasizing the less flattering aspects to PSF plans for the \textit{indigènes}. In a July 1937 memorandum on the subject, Alger departmental leader Christian Sorenson wrote of forming a new ostensibly non-PSF subgroup specifically for non-Europeans, in order to lure Arab and Berber sympathizers. However, little became of these ambitious plans, primarily due to PSF hostility toward indigenous reform, and their clear conflict with party policies.\textsuperscript{134}

To begin with, the vaunted collaboration between \textit{français} and \textit{indigènes} could only be achieved under the rubric of Christian civilization. The group frequently contrasted the “good Arabs,” who recognized the benefits of French dominance with “a minority of more or less cultured citizens, very ambitious, very unruly, jealous of French privileges, eager for status and power.”\textsuperscript{135} Thus in September 1938, a cartoon in \textit{La Flamme} portrayed an Arab tribesman, an \textit{évolué} intellectual, a settler, and Colonel de la Rocque joining hands in unison under a French banner, with a Muslim and European woman holding children together in the background. Yet the accompanying caption made clear the limits to any collaboration: Arabs and Berbers would have to share the French vision of Algeria as a colony, rallying to the \textit{tricolore} and accepting their reduced socioeconomic status. For the PSF defended Christian civilization and the French empire, rather than the hopes and needs of the Islamic and non-European \textit{indigènes}.\textsuperscript{136} Muslims must join their European brethren in respecting \textit{la France civilisatrice}.

This discourse echoed common \textit{algérieniste} tropes widely accepted by the settler population. Much like other metropolitan extreme Right luminaries, La Rocque and his lieutenants prioritized Gallic
affairs, consistently discussing French politics and society, along with staunch patriotism, while in 1938 steering La Flamme into the national press network. Conversely, North African leaders touted the notion that Algeria had been a chaotic mess before the French arrival, mired in civil war, its people starving due to inefficient agriculture. To Debay, a simple palliative existed for these symptoms: the acceptance of French rule. Charles X may have invaded Algeria due to the insulting behavior of Hussein Dey and the vicious activities of Mediterranean pirates, he declared, but the true French mission of the colons—to repel savagery in North Africa—remained a priority over a century later. The settlers were invariably portrayed as heroes liberating the indigènes from backwardness, disease, and slavery. In a June 1939 La Flamme portrait of Constantine native and former Secrétaire général des colonies Xavier Coppolani, he is described as horrified by mass murder and rape, and naked and starving children encountered in the Sudan. Coppolani summarily pacified the entire territory, introducing Christian justice and banishing Islamic feudalism. A close friend of algérieniste author Robert Randau, the author claimed that he was martyred in 1905 for his trouble, assassinated by savages who could not bear enforced civilization.

However, Coppolani was declared an exception to the rule of metropolitan apathy toward North Africa. In a March 1938 article, Debay berated the French government’s ignorance concerning imperial affairs, while various La Flamme columnists decried Blum’s insolence and spite demonstrated in his ministerial appointment of the hated Maurice Violette and Albert Sarraut, clearly flagrant affronts to the Algerian colons. To various members, this type of response only highlighted the chasm between Algerian Muslims and the European settlers, who were deemed a superior race, a creuset français of Mediterranean peoples, separate from the metropole. As one rural doctor noted in a report to the 1937 PSF Congrès du question indigène nord-africaine, the settlers considered themselves Algerian rather than French, having no desire to live in France. Quoting Louis Bertrand to the effect that they constituted a distinct race, he contrasted the European population with Arabs and Berbers who “continue to vegetate in their ancient Gehenna,” attached to domineering Islam as lazy and barbaric primitives, and destined to be ruled by their betters.

However, certain members further charged that a minority of extremists obfuscated the wishes of the silent Muslim majority. Determined to win Algerian independence and replace French rule with an Islamic state, allied with international communism, and inspired by Nazi Germany, local provocateurs simply awaited their chance to drive the settlers into the Mediterranean Sea. At an October 1937 meeting in Bône, one speaker referred to the combination of left-wing
and nationalist forces, singling out Messali Hadj and the PPA as the worst offenders. One month later, Debay berated the colonial administration, accused of ignoring the threat of foreign provocateurs and rebellious Muslims in equal measure. Addressing a crowd in Bougie, he begged his frères indigènes to eschew violent nationalism in favor of the PSF doctrine of reconciliation.\[^{143}\]

These concerns mirrored another common algérieniste trope: that non-Europeans were instinctively Jihadists, perfidious Muslims out to eliminate the presence of infidels in Algeria. Writing in the Dépêche Algérienne in 1935, one colon summed up the fears of every settler, bluntly stating: “We are living on top of a volcano, where the Arabs, with knives in their teeth, stoke the fire.”\[^{144}\] Yet such responses also reacted to heightened indigenous agitation in both the countryside and the urban Bidonvilles, where increasingly impoverished Muslims demanded bread and liberty. Rioting became a constant feature of Algerian life by the mid-1930s, and the heavy-handed response of the French authorities only aggravated the situation. Prior to the 1933 banning of the ‘ulama by the colonial administration, for example, Ben-Bâdîs had explicitly rejected attacks against the colons. Yet by 1936, persistent French legal feints engendered broad support for the organization from both the Arab intellectual elite and the working masses. Henceforth Ben-Bâdîs spoke in both religious and secular nationalist language: “The Algerian Muslim nation was formed and exists just like all others on earth. This nation is not France and does not wish to be France.” Although far from the unified and cohesive movement of the post-1945 era, the mere threat of organized indigenous reprisals created widespread panic among the European population and the Algerian government, which welcomed the Mediterranean High Commission, created to investigate the new radicalism and recommend palliatives.\[^{145}\]

In keeping with their staunch anticommunism, the Algerian PSF claimed that revolutionary forces had infiltrated the Muslim population throughout the colony. One newspaper columnist blamed the Congrès musulman, the supposed provider of support for communist candidates through its extensive press network. Taking this theme to its logical conclusion, the first annual North African Congress of the PSF tendered a final motion that specifically addressed presumed left-wing participation in the nationalist movement, proclaiming that the group “denounces agitation by Marxist, communist, and pan-Islamic agents that imperils the admirable work of colonization and civilization carried out in this African land by the tenacious labour and creative genius of the French people.”\[^{146}\] Various group polemicists further reminded their audience that such revolts pitted six million Arabs against fewer than one million Frenchmen.\[^{147}\]
The personification of this threat was variously portrayed as the ‘ulamā or the PPA, led by the mercurial Messali Hadj, whose secular nationalism rejected the Islamist formula in favor of the slogan “neither assimilation nor separation, but emancipation.” Courted by the group just years earlier, the newly “nationalist” ‘ulamā were deemed a threat to the public welfare by Debay in a May 1938 newspaper column, the declared enemy of *l’Algérie française*. His confreres heartily agreed, claiming that their ultraorthodox Islamic views formed a tool to build a nationalist consciousness, initiating the complete removal of the French colonial presence. That the group allied itself with a variety of seemingly incompatible partners, from the communists to assimilationist Muslims, was solely a matter of convenience. One of the most commonly mentioned co-conspirators was the PPA. Despite the fact that Messali Hadj was no communist, having rejected the Popular Front and abandoned the PCF in disgust by the 1930s, the PSF accused him of practicing leftist terrorism. According to their account, the PPA provided a training ground for revolutionaries, demanding the vote and equal rights for *indigènes*, and the nationalization of industry and the banks, as a prelude to the seizure of power. In tandem with Moscow, its leaders were cast as traitors, out to dismantle the French empire and diminish Gallic power.

In the resulting climate of fear, Algerians stood accused of nationalism and communism in equal measure, each one a potential insurgent against the rural European population. However, various PSF commentators equally blamed the Governor-General and local authorities in Algeria for this rebellious mentality. Here the group’s analysis criticized the economic dominance of the settlers, who by the interwar era controlled over 2.5 million hectares of land, leaving uneducated and unskilled Arabs to fend for themselves in the *communes mixtes* or *casbahs*. Although the Algerian economy boomed in the 1920s, becoming the metropole’s largest trading partner, and a major global supplier of wine, agricultural produce, and minerals, its effects were limited to European businessmen and laborers. While the industrialized *colons* brandished tractors, automobiles, and factories, the rural indigenous population relied upon animals and plows, while their urban and unskilled brethren often suffered unemployment due to a lack of familiarity with complex tools and machines. Forced to work seasonally, and earning vastly lower wages than their European counterparts, Arabs and Berbers often existed in utter poverty, a fact trumpeted by commentators as proof of their backwardness. As novelist Jules Roy bluntly stated: “It must be accepted as a natural law that the Arabs are the servants, the French are the masters, and that everything works because the French belong to an entrepreneurial but generous race, while the Arabs always depend on someone else.”
Worse still, the global recession arrived in North Africa from 1932 onward, buffeting the Algerian population, always the first victims in times of economic uncertainty. Dependent upon charity to survive, Arabs and Berbers proved increasingly susceptible to the appeals of nationalism and communism.\textsuperscript{154} Solutions to the indigenous plight abounded in the Algerian press and political sphere, from controls on population growth to the export of excess labor variously to France or Nigeria, and the PSF joined the growing litany of voices. Writing in \textit{La Flamme} in February 1937, Jacques Labruyère protested the fact that Muslims lived in unhygienic shacks with no stable income. The resulting exodus to urban centers, with concomitant unemployment, literally spawned revolt against the French presence in Algeria, driven first and foremost by the relative prosperity of the \textit{colons}. Other group authors concurred, variously blaming usurers (usually Jews), unemployment, and poverty for the rise of communist and nationalist agitators.\textsuperscript{155} Debay went further, demanding that the \textit{colons} actually provide steady wages and proper employment conditions, even granting land to loyal Arabs.\textsuperscript{156} This comprised a “special duty” toward \textit{indigènes}; how could they be loyal to France while leading lives of desperation and starvation? Rather than apathy and exploitation, Stanislas Devaud told the PSF 1937 National Congress, the government must act to stem the tide of refugees to urban ghettos and redistribute land.\textsuperscript{157} In his report on indigenous \textit{anciens combattants} at the 1938 Congress, the group’s Directeur générale de propagande Marcel Rédarés went even further, demanding legislation to prevent further European encroachment in the \textit{communes mixtes} of southern Algeria. Not only would land seizures become illegal, but further every community would receive a hospital, a school, and French economic assistance to revitalize local business and agriculture.\textsuperscript{158} In his closing address, Colonel de la Rocque added the need for French employers to pay a living wage to Muslims. By respecting indigenous labor, employers—dubbed the “représentants qualifiés de notre civilisation”—prevented revolutionary activity and aided race relations in Algeria.\textsuperscript{159}

Yet once again the group’s spirited defense of the \textit{indigène} as a crucial component of the \textit{famille française} served to obfuscate far less benevolent plans. During his speech to the 1938 PSF congress, La Rocque specifically rejected the notion that Muslims could be equals within \textit{l’Algérie française}. Although they deserved better treatment, he stated, the notion of assimilation, or even a specifically Muslim Electoral College and bill of rights was absurd.\textsuperscript{160} Devaud likewise derided an extension of political and social policies to include Muslims. Had not the 1865 \textit{Senatus Consulte} declared that any Arab could become a French citizen if they renounced the Personal Statute,
which granted the right to accept Koranic law rather than the *code civil*? Echoing a centuries-old European critique of Islamic practice and recent proclamations by leading *colon* such as Paul Cuttoli, the radical senator and mayor of Philippeville, he decried the acceptance of polygamy and prepubescent marriage, along with Islamic restrictions on divorce and intermarriage, as tenets incompatible with French civilization. Even the renunciation of the statute changed little, for the settlers would never allow an Arabic mayor or governor to rule Algeria. Seemingly barbaric Muslim rituals and purported misogyny thus trumped any genuine prospects for assimilation.\(^{161}\)

PSF refusals to recognize indigenous claims for rights and citizenship culminated in the group’s bitter struggle against the Popular Front’s 1936 Blum–Viollette act. For few Muslims were interested in renouncing Islamic law, the cornerstone of their faith, in order to obtain citizenship. Yet the non-European population increasingly rejected the inequality that characterized Algerian political and socioeconomic life. Although far from universally rich and powerful, every settler, regardless of their nationality or occupation, enjoyed tremendous privileges. Living in respectable housing segregated from the indigenous urban slums or country hovels, enjoying a virtual monopoly on skilled and well-paying employment, and benefiting from the rights and freedoms denied their Muslim neighbors, European superiority was omnipresent. Yet such a scenario, in which a humble docker wielded far greater power than his metropolitan counterpart could even imagine, naturally engendered even greater distrust and hostility among the Arab and Berber communities. For as Pierre Bourdieu writes: “Political life and political conscience [became] Manichean in form.”\(^{162}\)

The introduction of an enfranchisement bill in 1936 thus represented a bold riposte, particularly given its author: none other than the hated Maurice Viollette, the former Governor-General nicknamed “Viollette l’arabe.”\(^{163}\) Naturally, both the metropolitan and Algerian sections of the PSF virulently opposed the Blum–Viollette bill. La Rocque and the Paris-based leadership decried the projected law as a recipe for Islamic domination in North Africa. In March 1938, the group’s French newspaper, the *Petit journal*, characterized Blum and Viollette as “the champions of race hatred, and their religious allies the ‘ulamā.’” How could a true citizen follow Koranic precepts and ignore French legislation? Did the new law recognize the legality of practices like polygamy and prepubescent marriage? The PSF might approve economic reforms—a minimum wage for Arab workers, for example—but nothing more. Legal rights could only be acquired after a painfully slow civilizing process, La Rocque frequently argued, involving education, proper hygiene, and the abandonment of barbaric traditions.\(^{164}\)
Settler members brandished an even harsher critique of Blum–Viollette, often tinged with outright xenophobia. An anonymous contributor to _La Flamme_ in February 1938 used pidgin French to insult both Viollette and lampoon uneducated Arabs: “L’Endigen’s tous dis freres!/Li Endigen’s de mon couer!/Li Arab’s race soperieur, et les colons exploitateurs!/Tous li Francais a la mer!/Et Ferhat Abbas emp’rur.” Devaud similarly derided the plan, not least because the Arabic elite did not really exist: “If you continue to practice polygamy… the repudiation of women, forced marriages, and the disinheriance of girls you may well be ‘intellectuals’… but you are not évolués.” Others noted that the Blum–Viollette plan only accentuated indigenous problems rather than resolving them. For it envisioned citizenship only for a few educated civil servants and politicians, leaving out the Muslim masses, those most in need of assistance. Articles in _La Flamme_ invariably condemned the proposed law, on the grounds that it angered the _fellahs_, driving them into the arms of Messali Hadj, Ben-Badis, and the now-demonized Mohamed Bendjelloul. Only nationalist and communist insurgents, the authors declared, benefited from the provisions contained in the Blum–Viollette bill. Given this fact, in combination with the socialist beliefs of Blum and his ministry, more than one PSF member wondered aloud about the ultimate aim of the legislation and its potentially revolutionary consequences.

Naturally, the group tendered a counterproposal, introduced by Devaud in the Chamber of Deputies on February 11, 1938. The draft was based upon the recommendations of Augustin Iba-Zizen, a Berber attorney from Tizi-Ouzou who headed the PSF Commission des affaires indigènes, a committee of various specialists charged by La Roque with countering Popular Front colonial policy. From 1935 onward, Iba-Zizen directed recruitment efforts aimed at Arabs, warning audiences of the dangers of communist revolution and preaching the gospel of slow assimilation. A true _évolué_, he constantly praised French civilization as superior and claimed that the concept of an independent Algerian nation was a historical fiction, while berating nationalists like Messali Hadj, who he termed “mauvais bergers solde à l’étranger.” Although not exclusively composed of Arabs and Berbers, his audiences were often Muslims, as the group’s European leadership assumed that such gatherings would be more receptive to the PSF message when delivered by one of their own.

In keeping with party doublespeak, the _contre-projet_ was declared a boon for all Algerians, going far beyond Blum–Viollette, which only served the elite. For example, instead of enfranchising intellectuals, Iba-Zizen and Devaud included those who received the Baccalaureate or a professional degree/certification. But there was a catch: citizenship would only be conferred if the candidate renounced the personal
statute, echoing the Senatus-Consulte. Given that few Muslims had previously agreed to abandon Koranic statutes, it was highly unlikely that the PSF contre-projet would make any difference. Iba-Zizen attempted to rationalize the project for Europeans and Arabs alike in a November 1938 report, arguing that it negated sterile debates about assimilation by insisting upon the renunciation of the personal statute. Genuine progress could only be made once the indigènes abandoned fanaticism, laziness, and nationalism. To be sure, Europeans must raise wages, expand education, and provide stable employment—even a Crédit agricole for small farmers. Yet if they rejected the PSF proposal, he could expect little from justly angry settlers.

Iba-Zizen’s rhetoric perfectly represents the duplicitous discourse of the PSF. They publicly preached the gospel of assimilation, that Muslims could be transformed into Frenchmen, albeit only in the long term, and were welcome to join the group and (by extension) France. Yet their real goal remained association, the notion that French institutions and culture would always be superior, and hence colonial domination symbolized a permanent condition. Like the settlers whose cause they staunchly defended, the PSF rejected the notion of a mission civilisatrice in Algeria, because it implied an unacceptable racial fusion as the ultimate imperial goal, or at very least provided the tools (education, steady employment and higher wages, the vote) with which the Algerians could foment rebellion.

IX

One of the major contributing factors to the decline of the PSF—and indeed the PPF and RNAS—was the vicious infighting that developed after 1936, the product of competition for members, doctrinal differences, and contested plans for the unification of the French/Algerian extreme Right. Despite the fact that colonial fascism appealed to a wide swathe of the population in all three departments, easily out-numbering and outmuscling its leftist, centrist, and conservative rivals, the PSF, PPF, and the RNAS/AL each attempted to control the movement with deleterious consequences. Hence by late 1938, although the population actively sympathized with authoritarianism, xenophobia, and algérianité, all three of its principal exponents gradually succumbed to internal struggles and public squabbling. Both the PSF and PPF abandoned Lambert’s RNAS that year, calling for the union of the Algerian nationaux under their banner and on their own terms, while battling each other in the process.

The most severe conflict involved the PSF and PPF, whose contretemps gradually developed from summer 1936 onward, once Doriot’s organization made major inroads in Oran. Initially enthusiastic about
the newcomers, even voicing their opposition to the cancellation of PPF meetings in December 1936 by prefectorial decree, various members were nonetheless suspicious of the communist past of Arrighi and his lieutenants.176 Nonetheless, the PPF acknowledged the misgivings, and in an October 1936 speech in Mostaganem, Arrighi noted that their different prospective clienteles—workers for his party and the middle class for their rivals—would engender collaboration rather than competition. Gaston Vidal further suggested electoral cooperation on the same basis, providing a united front against North African communism. As late as April 1938, Arrighi called for such cooperation in eradicating Algerian Marxism, and its chief exponent SFIO leader Marius Dubois.177 However, by that time, relations between the two groups were irreparably damaged, with Vidal noting an official shift of position toward overt hostilities with the PSF and Bentami beseeching crowds to avoid provoking their opponents.178 For their part, PSF leaders accused Doriot and Arrighi of practicing Marxism and dividing the nations in France and Algeria, while resurrecting the old caveat that the PPF leader was an anticolonial traitor due to his actions during the Rif War in Morocco, a charge vociferously denied by the party’s North African leadership.179

The PPF responded with a two-pronged campaign designed to both discredit the PSF and position their own party as the natural leader of the Algerian extreme Right. Leaders initially attacked the refusal of La Rocque and his confères to cooperate with the RNAS in Algeria and the metropolitan Front de la liberté (the latter a standard Doriot complaint), the prelude to the creation of a massive fascist organization dedicated to seizing power, toppling the Republic, and eliminating the Left. Vidal singled out PSF Oran chief Marcel Sarocchi due to his purported obstinacy, insisting that his party go it alone in order to avoid ceding power to fellow RNAS members. The lawyer responded in a May 1938 Tlemcen speech, proclaiming that the PSF were perfectly willing to join an anti-Marxist front in France or Algeria, yet not under the exclusive leadership of the PPF. Given Doriot and Arrighi’s insistence on ultimate authority, the RNAS disintegrated—although he took pains to rebut the charge that the party had sabotaged election campaigns, stressing PSF collaboration in such matters irrespective of any formal union.180

Faced with a stalemate over the Front de la liberté, Arrighi abruptly switched gears in May 1938, using the PPF’s newfound anti-Semitism to accuse the PSF of being a key ally of Algerian Jewry. At a speech during the party’s second congress, he chided La Rocque’s supposed philo-Semitism, and harshly criticized his refusal to back his own membership’s clear desire to act against Jewish machinations in North Africa. Rejecting subsequent counterclaims that their newfound dislike
of _les juifs_ was opportunistic, in May 1938 Vidal told an Oran audience that La Rocque’s entourage consisted entirely of Jews, a notion repeated in a tract sent by the party to all Oran PSF members entitled _La Rocque sous l’emprise juive_. It claimed to present a comprehensive list, changing the names of metropolitan party leaders and bluntly concluding that the entire organization took its orders from “Israel.”

Somewhat unsurprisingly, given the climate of hostility that pervaded PSF–PPF relations in 1937–1938, both parties forbade members from being affiliated with the opposition, leading to certain high-profile defections beginning with CF stalwart Georges Faucon’s September 1936 move to the Doriot camp. Nonetheless, in smaller communities, where the European population necessarily banded together, a blind eye was turned to multiple memberships, and particularly nonpartisan movements like the Unions latines and the RNAS.

However, the growing rivalry gradually encompassed Lambert’s organization as well, producing a three-way struggle for leadership of the extreme Right in the department of Oran. Given their lack of financial resources and public support in France, the fledgling PPF had naturally looked to the RNAS as a potential partner in summer 1936, steadfastly refusing to move into neighborhoods under the _Abbé_’s control, and despite private misgivings about certain leading members, avoiding public criticism of the status quo. Lambert frequently attended PPF meetings, receiving a standing ovation from the crowd in Oran, while Arrighi insisted that all party candidates for local and regional elections retain their RNAS affiliation. He frequently praised his colleague as a dedicated anticommunist and fascist. Yet faced with accusations of philo-Semitism throughout 1937, often accompanied by a more favorable opinion of Lambert, Arrighi began to speak out against the RNAS leader in the fall, accusing him of undermining the PPF in order to increase his personal prestige, and striking a hostile tone during his speech that October to the Oran general assembly. The accused responded by posting his supporters at the entrance of train stations and rallies, yelling “Vive Lambert!” at their rivals. Nonetheless, within months the escalating tensions cooled, due to Jacques Doriot’s personal intervention, reassuring Lambert of the PPF’s loyalty. Facing dwindling support in the metropole and eyeing a potential move to Oran in order to consolidate the party’s North African operations, he told a crowd of 5,000 supporters in May 1938 that the mayor embodied the _nationaux_, while his colleague warmly reciprocated by declaring: “I will place my hand in yours to form a coalition against Marxist forces.”

Unfortunately for Lambert, Doriot’s rapprochement benefitted the PPF alone; their conversion to anti-Semitic politics permitted the party to eclipse the RNAS/AL by late 1938. However, by that
time, the RNAS also suffered from additional conflict with the PSF, a much better-funded organization, whose standing in the metropole and much of the empire posed equally serious problems for Lambert and his confredes. From its inception, the PSF played a critical role in the growth of the RNAS, its leaders speaking at major rallies with the Oran mayor reciprocating at party gatherings across the department. The Abbé proved so popular that he often took the stage by public demand, praising La Rocque and his organization and lauding their role in the success of his umbrella organization for the Oran extreme Right. Yet the PSF’s insistence that the RNAS remain a purely electoral alliance and the concomitant rejection of sharing power with Lambert or Doriot led to their withdrawal from the organization in March 1938 and a series of acrimonious exchanges beginning in May, when Sarocchi criticized Lambert for refusing to support party candidates in recent elections in favor of Doriot and the Front de la liberté. He was particularly incensed at the demand for the PSF to follow RNAS directives in Oran, rather than consulting the Paris-based Comité directeur. Thus by 1939 the two sides openly attacked each other in the press and at meetings.

Unlike the PPF, the PSF emerged relatively unscathed from the fight, primarily because its metropolitan sections continued to attract substantial membership and financial support, a situation also experienced in Alger and Constantine. Never directly associated with fascism or Munichois sentiment, and enjoying over one million members, La Rocque’s party looked forward to the 1940 election campaign, anticipating a breakthrough. If a few leaders abandoned the PSF during the tilt with the RNAS—Oran secretary general Fernand Musy, for example—the vast majority stood firm, and by the late 1930s, even that section began to recover. As a result, the North African leadership moved in mid-1939 to regain their leading role, refusing to fund the ailing Oran matin, a lynchpin of the departmental extreme Right and staunch RNAS supporter, unless the newspaper opened its books and permitted the PSF to control its editorial content. In refusing these demands the press organ faced bankruptcy, a fact noted by editors on the front page, along with accusations that the PSF had already destroyed the RNAS and now sought to do the same to the nationaux press. In a series of speeches and articles for La Flamme, the party simply rebutted the charges, leaving Lambert and the Oran matin editorial team with little choice but to accept their dwindling position.

As major political movements with thousands of members, the PSF and PPF provided bulwarks for settler identity, dedicated to the
maintenance of French Algeria, whose continued existence provided the spark for nationalist movements in the coming decades. Their rejection of any genuine reforms aimed at the Muslim population, culminating in the unanimous drubbing of the Blum–Viollette bill, furthered a tradition dating from the separatist rhetoric of Max Régis and Edouard Drumont in 1898 onward, encouraging the settler intransigency that culminated in the 1954–1962 Algerian War. In prescribing authoritarian dictatorship for Algeria, dedicated to staunch xenophobia, the racial supremacy of European settlers and the creation of a new man in the colonies, the platforms of the PSF and PPF represented the culmination of a vast interwar effort both to create a genuine colonial fascism and overthrow the metropolitan authorities, unwilling and/or unable to maintain the imperial status quo and to grant sovereignty to the colons.

In this way, both parties also represented the logical conclusion of the algérianité movement, adopting the mantra of l’Algérie française: that the settlers proved superior to their metropolitan brethren, and were better equipped to deal with the indigènes. The Governor-General and his staff, and indeed the Republic itself neither understood the racial realities of colonial life nor possessed the will to fight for the survival of French Algeria. For as Emmanuel Sivan notes: “the algérianiste trend opposed the idea of racial harmony, in a North Africa destined to endure Latin influence … [it] associated the Roman conquest with French penetration—by the sword and the plow—and forged a mythology of the colon which became that of a new nation.”

Exponents of a Manichean doctrine, which contrasted the barbaric “other” with true Frenchmen, the fascist leagues were perfectly situated to adopt the demonization of ‘perfidious’ Muslims and corrupt deputies alike. Neither Louis Bertrand nor Robert Randau would have disagreed.

Yet quite unlike Jules Molles and the Unions latines or Gabriel Lambert’s RNAS/AL, both the PSF and PPF turned to l’Algérie française, and indeed anti-Semitism, solely in an attempt to appeal to the settlers, and often in response to their dogged insistence on prioritizing both ideas. In the case of the PSF, this represented a major shift from metropolitan policy, whereby La Rocque and his lieutenants chafed at the existence of diverse factions within the party, attempting to squelch any dissenting opinions and adamantly refusing to alter their program or plan of action for any one individual or group. Yet faced with the possibility of the Algerian settler population defecting to rival organizations, the Paris-based leadership simply ignored various blatant digressions, from overt anti-Semitism to anti-metropolitan sentiment, in order to lure and retain North African members. That such trends were present in Algeria, across
the Mediterranean and hidden from the Gallic membership, rendered them more palatable to La Rocque and the PSF leadership.

The PPF proved to be far more successful in Oran and Alger, not least because they were far less hesitant in supporting the settlers and adopting their mentalité. Where La Rocque and his confreres reluctantly endorsed an economic boycott of Algerian Jews or made token gestures toward algérianité, the PPF overcame initial misgivings to fully adopt the settler doctrine by mid-1938, and Doriot contemplated moving the entire operation to Oran. Having slumped somewhat following its initially triumphant reception in mid-1936, as the colonis lauded the party’s authoritarianism and anticommunism yet proved leery of philo-Semitic tendencies and pro-metropolitan bias, Arrighi led a remarkably successful campaign to consolidate the PPF’s standing, characterized exclusively by xenophobia and l’Algérie française. That the party’s stance was completely disingenuous mattered little; Doriot and company had seemingly turned their back on the metropole and embraced the algérianiste cause.
Conclusion

If the extreme-rightist leagues, and colonial fascism in general, receded somewhat in the face of renewed European conflict in early 1939, the settlers did not become loyal republicans, renouncing xenophobia, authoritarianism, and algérianité in favor of philo-Semitism, parliamentary democracy, and pro-metropolitan sentiment. The colons may have acquiesced to the need for defense against foreign invasion, but such support was half-hearted at best, and revoked at the first available opportunity. The military defeat and armistice of June 1940, along with the emergence of Marshall Pétain’s Vichy regime and the National Revolution, quickly gained the support of municipal and regional governments across all three departments, with the willing participation of the vast majority of the European population. As Michel Abitbol has noted, “for many Frenchmen in North Africa, if the National Revolution had not existed, it would have to have been invented,” a development that directly resulted from decades of extreme-rightist fervor among the colons.\(^1\) Colonial fascism had simply become ingrained in a good portion of the settler population, infusing European political culture and identity.

For by 1940 the settlers had espoused the fascist cause for over four decades, harnessing the leagues to combat Muslim nationalism and metropolitan rule. By that time any doctrine supporting racial and political hierarchy, authoritarianism, and rejecting “sterile” republicanism proved tremendously popular. Hence tens of thousands flocked to Vichy initiatives like the Légion française des combattants, the Chantiers de la jeunesse, and physical education societies, while the colons lauded the regime’s abrogation of the hated Crémieux decree and the promotion of travail, famille, patrie, which echoed their long-held beliefs. They further appreciated its technocratic modernization in industry and agriculture, designed to preserve European economic predominance while protecting colonial wealth, and bolstering racial inequality through the suppression of Muslim separatism and assimilationist doctrine.\(^2\) Given the similarity between the National Revolution and the program of the prewar leagues, extreme-rightist Senators and deputies from North Africa were among those voting full powers to Pétain in June 1940, and the Marshall’s team returned
the favor by appointing officials from the predominant party in each Algerian department: the Parti social français (PSF) in Constantine, Parti populaire français (PPF) and Rassemblement national d’Action sociale (RNAS) in Oran, and a potpourri of conservatives and fascists in Alger. If this arrangement wavered as the war progressed, the fluctuation mainly resulted from the collapse of certain leagues (the metropolitan and colonial Croix de Feu almost disappeared by 1942, for example), and the fear that the Algerian extreme Right represented potential competition to the new colonial administration.¹

However, despite ministerial reservations and quite unlike metropolitan practice, Vichy initiatives in Algeria often became partnerships between the settlers, the local extreme Right, and the designated authorities. Recognizing the intransigence of the European population, the government entrusted key posts to ligeners, beginning with the appointment of Action française [AF] stalwart and head of the University of Algiers medical faculty Lucien Coste, who assisted the staff of the local Commissariat général aux Questions juives, the organization in charge of the persecution of Jews throughout French territory. Algerian representatives to the governing Conseil national in France included mainstays like Stanislas Devaud, while very little change occurred at the municipal level, where mayors like Lucien Bellat in Sidi-Bel-Abbès retained absolute control. Only Gabriel Lambert was removed from office in Oran at the behest of the Catholic Church due to his status as a defrocked priest. An equally heavy fascist presence appeared in the Légion française des combattants, the war veterans association whose Algerian contingent was much more powerful and numerous than its metropolitan counterpart. A similar situation emerged in Vichy youth organizations, the Chantiers de la jeunesse and the Compagnons de France, whose numbers far exceeded their French equivalents per capita, with members displaying a fervent dedication completely lacking across the Mediterranean.²

Such outright enthusiasm for a metropolitan government would have been unthinkable only years earlier. It reflected a conscious effort on the part of Pétain and the colonial ministry to implement the settlers political and social program, made easier by the similarities between the National Revolution and colonial fascism. To begin with, Vichy not only rescinded the hated Crémieux decree, but imported the entire anti-Semitic administrative apparatus, from the Statut des juifs and administrative purges to interment camps and the deportation of foreign Jews. Well aware that Régis and Drumont, Molle and Lambert had demanded similar policies for decades, officials continued to pressure Jews even after the American army seized North Africa during Operation Torch in November 1942, their citizenship and rights only fully restored the following May. Worse still,
violence against Jewish individuals, businesses, and property became commonplace, often initiated by fascist leaders; for example, it was PPF notable Jean Fossati who led a mob in Algiers in September 1940.\footnote{1}

Algerian settlers equally supported the undoing of progressive interwar legislation concerning the indigènes, as Vichy colonialism rescinded all rights for non-Europeans. The National Revolution proposed a virile, regenerative France in the face of metropolitan decadence, echoing algérianiste sentiments heard in the colony from the 1890s onward. As healthy racial specimens, officials believed that the colons represented the polar opposite of communists, republicans, and their Muslim clientele. Using a highly gendered discourse that echoed the virility and fortitude ascribed to the settlers and their conquering ancestors, along with the cult of traditional (hypermasculine) values, Vichy colonial theory opposed the reformism of the Popular Front, reviving corporal punishment, forced labor, and restrictions on education and employment. Settlers were deemed living representatives of the “new man” publicized under the National Revolution, and promulgated by Colonial Minister Charles René Platon.\footnote{2} In such an environment, algérianité and settler independence from the métropole seemed unnecessary. Rather than achieving independence, the settlers instead witnessed a Gallic transformation according to their desired principles.

It was not to last, however. Following Operation Torch, the Allies gradually wrested control of Algeria from pro-Vichy elements, whose usefulness as a counterweight to Charles de Gaulle and the Free French diminished by mid-1943, as the General managed to unify the resistance under his command while establishing credentials as the legitimate representative of anti-Vichyste France. Thus after three years of extreme-rightist government, the settlers faced the shock of a republican restoration, as Gaullists gained the upper hand. By 1944, purges came to North Africa, and collaborators of all stripes—including proponents of colonial fascism—were arrested and charged with treason. Following lengthy interrogations, the accused faced trial proceedings in the Chambres civiques of their home department, which then passed sentences for those deemed guilty of collaboration ranging from the loss of residency to prison terms. For extreme-rightists during the interwar era who had continued their political trajectory under Vichy—most rallied to Pétain from the first days of the regime—the verdicts were harsh: most avoided jail time, but the court effectively removed them from political life and revoked their droit de séjour.

By far the largest contingent came from Oran, where the vast majority of the population joined the PPF, whose leadership became intimately associated with the Nazi occupation authority in Paris, and
flocked to the Légion and the paramilitary Service d’ordre légionnaire. Oran denizens demonstrated considerable public enthusiasm until the allied landings, only to reverse course when faced with prison terms, becoming proponents of the resistance in order to save their own skins, or jockeying for position prior to the first post-Vichy elections. These machinations had little effect: In early 1946, Unions latines leader Lucien Bellat was barred from the department of Oran for five years, while his son Paul faced 20 years removal from Algerian soil, and the court similarly sentenced PSF attorney Marcel Sarrochi to ten years banishment. Leaders of the PPF, PSF, AF, and RNAS-AL were tried en masse, receiving similar treatment. Nonetheless, it proved simply impossible to bring to trial entire memberships, for hundreds of thousands had actively taken part in the 1930s leagues and their Vichyste counterparts. Prosecutors in Constantine were unable to distinguish between membership in the PSF, which ultimately rejected collaboration with the authorities and was banned by Vichy, and the PPF, whose leader Jacques Doriot died fighting for the Nazis on the Eastern front.

Thus Europeans in Algeria faced no sustained pressure to abandon colonial fascism. By June 1946, Louis Chartier, Secretary General of the Paris-based right-wing Parti républicain de la liberté initiated a Comité d’amnistie for those sentenced by the Chambres civiques. Gathering together anticommunist and pro-algérieniste sympathizers, including Paul Bellat, Gaston Vidal, and Marcel Sarrochi, while lobbying the left and centre for leniency, the party served notice that the extreme Right would not quietly disappear in the aftermath of Vichy and Nazism. Although the appeal proved ultimately unsuccessful, components of the colonial fascist program survived into the 1950s, adopted by algérieniste elements within the settler population and (during the Algerian War) the notorious Organisation armée secrète (OAS), whose ranks included Jean-Marie le Pen and other notable future members of the neo-fascist National Front. Various French and Algerian OAS members expressed the desire to eradicate the Republic, to eliminate all traces of metropolitan control in North Africa, and to maintain colonial domination over Arabs and Berbers throughout the region, finding considerable continuity with the doctrine of the pre-1945 extreme Right. Certain metropolitan and colonial OAS leaders had in fact been involved in fascist organizations, including Robert Martel, the Mitidja viticulteur and leader of the Union française nord-africaine that mobilized hundreds of armed colons during the conflict with the rebel Front de libération nationale, the Maurrassian Bernard Léfeuvre, and pro-authoritarian/Jeune nation leader Joseph Ortiz. Martel in particular demanded a defense of white and Christian Algeria, while his confrères supported
the formation of a military dictatorship, and openly campaigned for Pierre Poujade, whose Union de defense des commerçants et artisans attracted 2.5 million voters in French elections held in January 1956, while gaining the support of the vast majority of the colonists in Algeria. A staunch partisan of l’Algérie française, Poujade proposed authoritarian antirepublicanism, economic antimodernism (expressed through a massive tax revolt), and extreme nationalism.11

By 1958–1959, the extreme Right’s contacts broadened to include links with MP13, the Front national français, ex-Cagoulards, and eventually the French army, whose officers were intimately familiar with metropolitan and Algerian fascists, perceived to be allies of the settler cause.12 These diverse strands initially came together in 1958 through the auspices of Ortiz’s 10,000-strong Front national français in Alger, and the Front Algérie française, the forerunner of the OAS whose tens of thousands of members echoed the traditional demands of colonial fascists before its dissolution in late 1960. Moreover, the coalition remained intact upon the April 1961 formation of the OAS by Generals who rejected French President Charles de Gaulle’s “capitulation” to the Front de libération nationale (FLN). Several prominent extreme rightists became leading voices in the organization, including Ortiz (by then based in Madrid as a liaison to Francisco Franco’s fascist regime), Jeune Nation militant Michel Leroy, and Jean-Marie Le Pen.13

Like the 1930s leagues, the OAS inculcated a cult of heroes and martyrs, prioritizing violence and demonizing a series of enemies, from Arabs and Gaullists to metropolitan officials and “traitors,” often in the organizations’s newspapers Les Centurions (for the army) and L’Esprit public (for civilians), and a series of publicly distributed tracts. Much like the RNAS, the authors lionized the fight against metropolitan decadence, contrasting communist and ultramaterialist France with the vigor of l’Algérie française, and lauding hierarchy, violence, and voluntarism, along with what Robert Martel and MP13 called “counter-revolutionary Catholicism.” The organization further reflected the violent xenophobia displayed by the settlers, who portrayed Arabs and Berbers as barbaric and inferior, while proclaiming superior Europeans alone entitled to the land, and solely responsible for holding Muslim “fanaticism” and “savagery” in check throughout the colony. The suppression of the Algerian other, a key component of colonial fascist rhetoric from the algérianiste movement onward, was twinned with violence, as OAS bombings and military reprisals demonstrated a complete disregard for non-European life and those pro-metropolitan elements deemed treasonous for their collaboration with the FLN. As the desperate struggle against the forces of decolonization targeted Muslims and their allies, Jews were no longer the
focus of these hate campaigns. Despite the strong Maurassian and Barrèssian bent among the officers in charge of the OAS, virulent anti-Semites held their tongues, and Jews joined the organization, playing a prominent role in the organization’s struggle. Yet the racial hatred toward non-Europeans remained, and in combination with their authoritarian, antimetropolitan, and algérianiste bent, betrayed the prevailing influence of colonial fascism. On this point, various members were clear, noting that after the failure of the leagues and Vichy, the fight for Algeria represented the last chance to gain power.

The ultimate failure of the OAS came swiftly, their leaders out-dueled by De Gaulle’s political acumen upon his return to leadership in 1958, stung by the French public’s overwhelming approval of Algerian independence in a January 1961 referendum, and jailed for treason. Although the organization’s campaign of terror and murder continued throughout 1962, even after the former colony became sovereign on March 19, partisans gradually left for a variety of new extreme-rightist groups, including Nouvelle droite and the Groupement de recherche et d’étude pour la civilisation européenne (GRECE), while a number of ex-OAS types rallied to Le Pen’s campaign on behalf of Vichy apologist and fixture of the metropolitan extreme-Right Jean-Louis Tixier-Vingancour in the 1965 elections. Tixier’s speeches consistently referenced l’Algérie française as both a memorial and an archetype for Franco-European nationalism and racial superiority—a prototype for “la defense de la civilization occidentale.” Former OAS officers were honored guests at rallies, and henceforth became celebrities on the far-right lecture circuit.

The most infamous of the former OAS supporters is undoubtedly Jean-Marie le Pen, whose Front national (FN) has been a force on the French extreme Right for decades, dedicated to the politics of authoritarianism and xenophobia. Chided by historian Benjamin Stora as a living representative of the “retour du racism colonial,” the FN has consistently welcomed disaffected Pied-Noirs, as the Algerian settlers and their descendants have been termed. Le Pen’s group provided a haven for former OAS luminaries, including General Edmond Jouhaud, Joseph Ortiz, Jean-Jacques Susini, and Pierre Lagailarde among many others. The FN’s staunch anti-Muslim/immigrant stance proved particularly attractive, and it is unsurprising that the party’s best electoral results have come in cities like Marseille and regions like the Midi, where colonial stereotypes and antiquated visions of North Africans persist even today. For his part, Le Pen evoked the OAS and algérianité throughout the 1980s and 1990s, noting that “the fight for l’Algérie française prepared the struggle for la France française.”
Far from disappearing, then, various facets of the colonial fascist program remain embedded in the discourse of the contemporary Gallic extreme Right. Whether complaining that “there [are] too many blacks on the French team” during the 2006 world cup, assailing the Algerian heritage of pop star Patrick Bruel, or leading a campaign to halt nonwhite (often falsely labeled as terrorist) immigration into France, Jean-Marie Le Pen, his daughter (and current party leader) Marine, and the FN membership harness language and policy that mirrors the doctrine of *l’Algérie française*, importing colonial Algerian concepts into postcolonial France. Neither are such episodes confined to the extreme Right. Debates over rioting youth of African or Beur descent are habitually framed in terms that recall the discourse of the barbaric and malevolent other under the Empire, while nostalgia for the imperial past is prevalent in policy initiatives. In June 2005 11-year-old Sidi Ahmed was killed by a stray bullet while washing his father’s car in La Courneuve outside Paris. Future French President and then Minister of State Nicholas Sarkozy responded by threatening to clean up the neighborhood—overwhelmingly poor and nonwhite—with a Kärcher power hose, in order to expunge the *racaille* (scum).

A similar rehabilitation, and indeed a reconsideration of the entire French colonial experience, has also received government sponsorship at various times. Hence on February 23, 2005, legislators in the National Assembly tabled a law discussing potential restitution for former colonial subjects, which specifically referred to the “positive role” played by France within its former empire. To be sure, President Jacques Chirac ultimately opposed the measure, yet the mere existence of such a statement clearly reflects a continual nostalgia for imperialism, despite the violent and oppressive nature of the French empire.

Similarly, a variety of lobbying groups and *Pied-Noir* societies regularly organize public gatherings and commemorations of *l’Algérie française*, while municipal governments unveil memorials designed to elicit sympathy for the settlers and the great achievements of Gallic empire-builders. The participants are not all fascist, but their celebrations invariably invoke themes and representations indelibly marked by the Algerian extreme Right, keeping such ideas alive decades after the onset of decolonization.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION


5. The only full-length study is incomplete, primarily relying upon the fascist press and interviews with participants for evidence, and thus presenting a very sympathetic view of the leagues. See Thérèse Charle-Vallin, “Les Droites en France, 1934–1939,” PhD Diss., Université Paris VII, 1975. A much more fragmentary treatment can be found in


12. Friedman, Colonialism and After, 19.


14. Dermenjian, La Crise anti-juive oranaisse (1895–1905), 145–155. It should be noted that the campaigns were not entirely successful, as some Europeans continued to patronize Jewish establishments, and established families continued to receive invitations to official functions and certain private parties.


18. Friedman, Colonialism and After, 22–24; Dermenjian, La Crise anti-juive oranaisse (1895–1905), 140–144; Sivan, “Stéréotypes antijuifs dans la mentalité Pied-noir,” 167. Frequently heard in the working-class districts of Algiers, the Marseilleaise anti-juive spoke of “disinfecting Algeria” through the removal of all Jews.


22. Ibid., 116, 120, 123, 128–129.


24. Lorcin, Imperial Identities, 206–209; Seth Graebner, History’s Place: Nostalgia and the City in French Algerian Literature (Lanham: Lexington


29. Bertrand referred to Algerian Jews as “travesties à l’européenne,” casually describing assaults against members of the community, with his characters invariably concluding that they were a “sale race.” See, for example, *Le Sang des races*, 12–13.


9. The best summary of the JP’s history is found in Soucy, *French Fascism*, Chapters three and eight. The group officially declared its independence in 1926.
11. Oran/95, April 20, 1931, Commissaire Centrale de la ville d’Oran to Préfet; Oran/95, n.d., “L’Union Latine.” The group’s electoral success peaked in 1928, when 8,875 voters elected Molle to the Chamber of Deputies.
19. Oran/81, Sidi-Bel-Abbès/June 24, 1925, Sous-préfet à Préfet; Oran/81, Tlemcen/January 14, 1928, Sous-préfet à préfet; Oran/81, Mostaganem/February 12, 1928, Sous-préfet à Préfet; Oran/95, Oran/March 3, 1927, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Tlemcen/March 6, 1927, Commissaire de Police à Prefect; Oran/95, Sidi-Bel-Abbès/December 1, 1928, Commissaire de Police à Préfet; Oran F/92/3118, “Groupe d’Action française à Hammam-Bou-Hadjar.”
20. Oran F/92/3118, Oran/September 2, 1918, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Prefect; Constantine B/3/701, Constantine/February 17, 1923, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/95, March 21, 1927, “Renseignements.”
21. Oran F/92/3118, Oran/May 2, 1921, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran F/92/3118, Oran/January 23, 1925, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/95, Oran/March 21, 1927, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran F/92/3118, Oran/January 23, 1927, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/95, February 28, 1931, “Section d’Oran de la Ligue d’Action française.”
22. Oran F/92/3118, Oran, November 14, 1926, Chef de la Sûreté départementale, “Notice sur le journal Éclair africain.”
23. Oran F/92/3118, Oran/November 15, 1926, Chef de la Sûreté départementale, “Notice sur le journal Éclair africain.”
24. One notable exception occurred on the night of March 9, 1922, when the group covered the walls of Oran with posters reading “A bas les juifs! Vive le roi!” In Oran F/92/3118, Oran/March 10, 1922, Chef de la Sûreté départementale, “Note.” However, most speeches and publications centered exclusively upon the metropole.
25. Oran F/92/3118, Oran/April 23, 1921, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/3118, Oran/May 1, 1922, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Constantine B/3/701, Constantine/May 25, 1922, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet. On the Crémieux Decree, see Richard Ayoun and Bernard Cohen, Les Juifs d’Algérie: 2000 ans d’histoire (Paris: Jean-Claude Lattès, 1982), 133–139.
26. See, for example, Constantine B/3/701, Constantine/January 22, 1924, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/3118, Oran/March 19, 1925, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Constantine B/3/701, Bône/January 17, 1926, Commissaire Central, “Rapport”; Oran F/92/3118, Oran/May 22, 1926, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet, Oran F/92/3118, Oran/November 29, 1928, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.
27. Oran F/92/3118, Oran/March 3, 1927, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.
29. “Autour du voyage du ‘Barbouille’ en oranie,” L’Éclair africain, November 12, 1926; “Revue de la presse musulmane,” Action algérienne, June 2–9, 1928. The former is a tirade against Governor-General Maurice Violette’s anti-colon policies, while the latter questions the assimilation of “primitive” Muslims, due to their adherence to polygamy, the degradation of women, and Koranic law. Yet even these two cases deserve caveats, for they are the only such pieces published in the local AF press during the 1920s.
30. Oran F/92/3118, Oran/March 19, 1925, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/3118, Oran/March 3, 1927, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.
33. Oran F/92/3118, Oran/April 1, 1922, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; “La Fidélité française,” Action française, February 17, 1927.
35. Constantine B/3/530, Bône/April 19, 1928, Commissaire Central to Préfet; La Figuière, “Tribune publique,” Réveil Bônois, May 1, 1928.
36. Action algérienne, May 5–15, 1928; Oran/95, Oran/July 10, 1928, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/95, Oran/November 13, 1929, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.
37. Oran/95, June 25, 1929, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet, “Réunion privée organisée par la section locale des Jeunesse patriotes”; “Nos sections: Algérie,” Le National, June 2 and July 7, 1929. Although there were only 80 in attendance, the author noted that this represented twice the number of attendees at an SFIO gathering on the same evening.

38. Oran/95, June 25, 1929, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet, “Réunion privée organisée par la section locale des Jeunesse patriotes”; Oran/95, August 21, 1929, Commissaire Central de la Ville d’Oran to Préfet; “Le Courrier des ligues: Algérie,” Le National, December 15, 1929; Michel Parés and Eugène Simon, “Une oeuvre admirable et féconde,” Le National, November 22, 1931. The group organized members into multiple centuries of 100 men in each district.


41. “Nos sections: Algérie,” Le National, July 7, 1929; Oran/95, Oran /August 21, 1929, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/95, Oran /October 19, 1929, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Constantine B/3/670, Philippeville/December 9, 1930, Commissaire de Police du 2e arrt. to Commissaire chef de service; Oran/95, Oran/December 15, 1930, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; “Phalange d’Alger,” Le National, December 22, 1929.


43. Oran/95, October 19, 1929, Commissaire Central de la ville d’Oran to Préfet; Oran/95, December 15, 1930, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Nos Sections: Blida (Algérie), Le National, January 13, 1929; “Une oeuvre admirable et féconde,” Le National, November 22, 1931.

44. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), 3, 7. The JP vision of Algeria and empire fully corresponds to Said’s notion of an Orient “suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office.”


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64. Oran/95, August 21, 1929, Commissaire Central de la ville d’Oran to Préfet; Oran/95, September 7, 1929, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet, “Réunion organisée par M. Sther, Chef départementale des Jeunesses patriotes d’Oran.” On the steadfast rejection of benefits for the worker by Algerian owners, see Daniel Lefeuvre’s economic history of the colony *Chère Algérie: la France et sa colonie, 1930–1962* (Paris: Flammarion, 2005), 25–68.


66. Oran/95, September 7, 1929, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/95, September 14, 1929, Commissaire Central de la ville d’Oran to Préfet.

67/ “Une reunion socialiste à Alger,” *Jeune Afrique*, November 8, 1929; Oran/95, Oran/September 7, 1929, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.


69. Oran/95, September 26, 1929, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/95, December 2, 1929, Chef de l’Escadron Lemenager /Commandant la 5e compagnie de la 19e Légion de gendarmerie to Préfet. Such incidents were abetted by newspaper articles condemning fascist youth, who sought to attack the left in order to eradicate socialism and deliver Algeria to foreign dictators. See, for example, G. Martel, “Les Méfaits d’un maniaque,” *Le Semeur*, August 24, 1929. This newspaper was affiliated with the Algerian SFIO.

70. “Algérie,” *Le National*, March 10, 1929; Oran/95, Oran/August 21, 1929, Memorandum.

72. Oran/81, Oran/January 10, 1931, Préfet to Secrétaire-Président, Chambre des députés; Oran/81, Oran/January 23, 1931, Paul Menuidier/Premier Adjoint et Conseiller Municipal, speech at Molle’s funeral.

73. Oran/81, Oran/January 10, 1931, Préfet to Secrétaire-Président de la Chambre des députés; Oran/95, n.d., “L’Union latine.”

74. Oran/95, Oran/May 31, 1924, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/81, n.d., “Notice sur la société l’Union latine”; Docteur Jules Molle, *Le Néo-antisémitisme* (Millau: Artières et Mau, 1933), 9–11. This work is a compendium of Molle’s press articles and speeches. He claimed that Oran’s Jewish community had paraded through the streets after the 1924 election drunkenly menacing non-Jews, which provoked the UL’s formation.

75. Oran/95, June 2, 1924, Commissaire Central de la ville d’Oran to Préfet.


77. Jules Molle, “Aux éleclateurs oranais,” *Petit oranais*, May 4, 1925; *Petit oranais*, May 6, 1929; Oran/95, n.d., “L’Union latine.” Unlike metropolitan contests, in Algeria only designated electors could cast ballots, with each community receiving a fixed number of votes. The Molle list appeared in the *Petit oranais* in the days before each election.

78. *Petit oranais*, April 23 and October 15, 1928; “Mort de M. le Dr. Molle,” *Avenir de Mascara*, January 10, 1931; Oran/95, April 20, 1931, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/95, n.d., “L’Union Latine.” Union latine luminaries who won the election under the movement’s banner include future Front paysan and Croix de Feu luminary Jean Azam in Tiaret and Croix de Feu/Parti social français leader Marcel Gatuing in Oran-Ville.

79. Oran/81, Oran/June 25, 1925, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/81, Oran/December 13, 1925, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet.

80. Oran/81, Oran/January 7, 1927, Chef de la Sûreté départementale, “Fédération républicaine nationale de l’oranie”; Oran/81, Oran/April 25, 1927, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet. The FRN’s statutes made no mention of anti-Semitism, instead confining its efforts to the union of republican political organizations in Oran in an
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anticommutist defense of the social order. See Oran/81, “Fédération républicaine nationale de l’Oranie: projets et statuts.”
81. *Petit oranais*, May 23–24 and July 1, 1928.
82. “Nos process,” *Petit oranais*, October 30, 1930; “Aidez-nous,” *Petit oranais*, November 13, 1930; Oran/95, Oran/November 24, 1930, Commissaire de la Ville d’Oran, “Rapport.”
89. GGA 3CAB/95, “Recensement de la population en 1931”; Thomas, *The French Empire Between the Wars*, 303; Kamel Kateb, *Européens, “indigènes,” et juifs en Algérie (1830–1962): représentations et réalités des populations*. (Paris: Éditions de L’Institut national d’études démographiques, 2001), 176, 190–193. Although the percentage of Jews was not substantially higher in Oran than in Constantine, the overwhelming presence of Muslims in the latter department tended to eclipse the Jewish population, particularly for the extreme Right.
90. Oran/95, n.d., “L’Union latine.”
91. GGA 3CAB/54, Oran/November 3, 1937, Préfet to Le Beau. The document lists the *Petit oranais* circulation at 10,000 in 1937, below comparable figures for the morning dailies. Although no data is available for the 1920s, given that the UL’s popularity peaked prior to 1931, it is safe to assume that the sales figures were substantially higher at that time. For 1930s circulation numbers, see Gosnell, *The Politics of Frenchness*, 74–79.
92. Oran/95, Oran/March 21, 1921, Chef de la Sûreté départementale, “Renseignements”; Oran/95, Oran/November 24, 1930, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet. Prior to editing the *Petit oranais*, Lopez directed the JP’s *Le National*.
97. Bouvaresse, Un parlement colonial, 88–109
101. Oran/95, April 20, 1931, Commissaire Central de la ville d’Oran to Préfet; Oran/95, May 18, 1931, Commissaire Central de la ville d’Oran to Préfet; Oran/95, June 20, 1931, Commissaire Central de la ville d’Oran to Préfet; Oran/95, July 6, 1931, Commissaire Central de la ville d’Oran to Préfet. Lopez quote in Oran/95, Oran/November 27, 1928, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.
104. “Un tableau,” Petit oranais, March 23, 1925; “L’Internationale juive,” Petit oranais, June 17, 1927; Oran/95, Oran/November 27, 1928, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet. Molle frequently repeated the charge that North African Jews did not fight in the Great War, displaying little patriotism or enthusiasm for the French side in 1914, because the conflict did not serve their interests. See “A Propos d’un appel,” Petit oranais, June 8, 1929. This charge is patentely false, as thousands served and many died for France during the war. See Richard S. Fogarty, Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914–1918 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).


109. Although many authors refer to Algeria as exclusively French, it contained sizable Spanish, Italian, and Maltese populations. As a result, partisans of algérianité referred to the territory as European, containing a fusion of its various nonindigenous peoples.

110. Gosnell, The Politics of Frenchness, 6–7, 141; Patricia M. E. Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 212. The systematic creation of otherness was not entirely unknown to metropolitan Europeans, and particularly to the nineteenth-century middle-class. As Patrick Wolfe notes: “Ideologically, the production of the European bourgeois self relied significantly on the colonized (savage or barbarian) not-self in a manner congruent with the way in which the productivity of the Manchester cotton mills relied on the coercion of labor in Louisiana, India, and Egypt.” Thus the colonizer—in this case the Algerian settler—bases his or her entire self-definition on the negative colonized (“History and Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism,” American Historical Review 102 (1997): 413).


112. The doctrine of Latinité, the contention of colonial European racial superiority, originated in the fin-de-siècle writings of Louis Bertrand and spread throughout the interwar era in the press and literature of the period. See Gosnell, The Politics of Frenchness, 186–190.


115. Roger Bonsens, “Eclairons les indigènes,” Petit oranais, July 18, 1928. In the North African context, the term Razzia refers to the methodical decimation of territory, and the assault and murder of its inhabitants. It was a favored tactic of French troops during the period of “peaceful penetration” in the 1840s under General Thomas Bugeaud. See Benjamin Claude Brower, A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844–1902 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 53–89; Raphaëlle Branche, La torture et l’armée pendant la guerre d’Algérie, 1954–1962 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 26. However, Brower notes that this policy was not uncontested, and a prolonged debate ensued in France about the probity of both the violent tactics used by the army and the colonial project itself.
116. Roger Bonsens, “Aux Délégations financières,” *Petit oranais*, May 12, 1928. In this article, Guilhon also lauds a Bordes speech in which he adopted *algérieniste* discourse, providing a further example of how keenly the new Governor-General wished to distance himself from his predecessor, and the effect of settler anger (including the UL predominance in Oran) upon metropolitan authorities.


120. “Une mise au point,” *Petit oranais*, February 2, 1925; Paco Gamorra, “En écoutant un brave néo,” *Petit oranais*, April 24, 1929; “Chronique électorale,” *Petit oranais*, April 29, 1929; Oran/95, Oran/April 20, 1931, Commissaire Central to Préfet.


124. In Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 70. See also Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, *Tensions...*


130. Oran/95, Oran/April 20, 1931, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/95, Oran/May 3, 1931, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/95, Oran/May 5, 1931, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/95, Oran/June 20, 1931, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/95, Oran/July 6, 1931, Commissaire Central to Préfet. The group rarely attracted more than 200 people to any meeting following Molle’s death.

131. Oran/95, Oran/November 16, 1931, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/95, Oran/November 23, 1931, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/95, Oran/April 1, 1932, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.


2. Ibid., 273, 537–538, 555; Mahfoud Kaddache, Histoire du nationalism algérien (Paris: Editions Paris-Méditerranée, 2003), 56. Duroux was reportedly the richest man in Algeria.


/ Ibid., 43–56.


22. Constantine B/3/707, Constantine/August 3, 1935, Préfet to GGA.

23. AN Archives Privées, Fonds La Rocque (Hereafter AP) 451/85, Paul Levas to Colonel de la Rocque, June 1, 1932; Constantine B/3/707, June 15, 1932, Comité Général—Croix de Feu/Paris to Constantine Sections; AP/451/85, Association des Croix de Feu/Section de Constantine, “Compte rendu de l’assemblée générale du 26 juin


25. GGA 3CAB/47, Alger/July 11, 1935, Prefect to GGA.

26. Ibid. In order to avoid cumbersome prose, all membership numbers quoted in this section combine CF, VN, and RN into one figure.

2/ Ibid.


31. Oran/70, “Département d’Oran—Croix de Feu et Briscards,” n.d. (1935); GGA 3CAB/47, “Renseignements recueillis en juin 1935 sur Croix de Feu, Volontaires nationaux, et Briscards”; GGA 3CAB/47, Oran/July 5, 1935, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/2413, Oran/July 10, 1935, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/47, Alger/Nov 7, 1935, Préfet to GGA; GGA 3CAB/47, Oran/Dec 6, 1935, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/2413, Mascara/Apr 22, 1936, Sous-préfet/Mascara to Préfet. Although no official membership number exists for the department, the incomplete departmental reports provide membership numbers in excess of four thousand members by July 1935, rising to five thousand by April 1936.


33. GGA 3CAB/95, Alger/March 8, 1936, annual census results.
34. Constantine B/3/707, Ain-Beida/January 29, 1933, Commissaire de Police to Préfet.
35. GGA 3CAB/47, Constantine/August 6, 1935, Préfet to GGA; Constantine B/3/707, Constantine/April 9, 1936, Chef de la Sécurité départementale to Préfet. The Constantine section alone increased from 1,000 members to 1,530 between August 1935 and April 1936. An additional section was founded in Guelma in April 1936. See Constantine B/3/707, Guelma/April 15, 1936, Commissaire de Police to Préfet.
39. The exact shape and scope of the transformation differed dramatically from the vision of La Rocque and the metropolitan CF, as will be demonstrated below.
40. GGA 3CAB/47, Constantine/August 6, 1935, Préfet to GGA.
41. Constantine B/3/323, Sedrata/July 18, 1935, Administrateur de la Commune Mixte to Préfet; Alger 1K/26, Arba/October 18, 1935, Commissaire de Police to Préfet; Constantine B/3/707, Constantine/April 9, 1936, Chef de la Sécurité départementale to Préfet.
43. GGA 2CAB/3, “Rapport sur la situation politique administrative des indigènes de l’Algérie au 31 janvier 1931”; Oran F/92/2413, Oran
/October 25, 1934, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/47, Constantine/August 6, 1935, Préfet to GGA; Constantine B/3/567, Constantine/December 16, 1935, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport.”

44. Despite the promise of Alger’s deputy-mayor to hire 150 unemployed, only six were taken into the local chantier, all CF members. See GGA 3CAB/47, Alger/November 26, 1935, Sûreté départementale d’Alger, “Comité de défense de chomeurs.”

45. Alger 1K/26, Blida/15 July 1935, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran F/92/2413, Mascara/22 April 1936, Sous-préfet to Préfet; Oran F/92/2413, Oran/27 March 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.


49. Although not technically a Croix de Feu publication, L’Avenir nonetheless reported favorably on group events, and effectively championed the CF cause in Constantine.


57. On the populism of the metropolitan CF, see Kalman, *The Extreme Right in Interwar France.*


60. Alger 1K/26, Préfet to GGA, July 1935; Constantine B/3/323, Administrateur de la commune mixte de Biban to Sous-préfet, July 4, 1935.
63. John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington, 2005), 140; GGA 3CAB/47, “Notes sur le mouvement Croix de Feu parmi les indigènes,” 1935; Alger 1K/26, Affreville /September 30, 1935, Commissaire de Police to Préfet. In one such case, a CF leader in M'Sila was convicted of selling arms to local Muslims, to be used against Jews. See Constantine B/3/707, M'Sila /April 27, 1936, Administrateur de la Commune Mixte to Sous-préfet.
64. Alger 1K/26, Alger/July 1935, Préfet to GGA; GGA 3CAB/47, Alger/February 12, 1936, Commissaire Central, “Rapport.”
66. Alger 1K/26, Commissaire de Police d'El Biar to Préfet, June 25, 1935; Alger F/405, Commissaire de Police de Boufarik to Préfet, October 25, 1935; GGA 3CAB/47, Chef de la Région d'Oujda to Résident général, 1935.
67. GGA 3CAB/47, “Notes sur le mouvement Croix de Feu parmi les indigènes,” 1935. In many cases, Muslim membership dwindled significantly when the promised benefits did not appear. See GGA 3CAB/47, Chef de la Région d'Oujda to Résident général, 1935.
68. GGA 3CAB/47, Chef de la Région d'Oujda to Résident général, 1935.
70. Rarely did the drives reach double digits. See, for example, Alger 1K/26, Administrateur de la Commune Mixte de Bou-Saada to Préfet, June 27, 1935, Alger 1K/26, Commissaire de Police de Maison-Carre, “Rapport de quinzaine,” June 29, 1935 and Commissaire de Police d'Affreville to Préfet, June 29, 1935; Constantine B/3/522, Commissaire de Batna to Sous-préfet, “Assemblée Générale de la section des Croix de Feu, Briscards, et Volontaires Nationaux,” June 17, 1934; Constantine B/3/323, Commissaire de Police de Batna to Sous-préfet, June 30, 1935, Commissaire de Police de M'Sila to Sous-préfet, July 1, 1935, and Commissaire de Police de Khemchila to Préfet, July 9, 1936.
71. Constantine B/3/323, Commissaire de Police de Batna to Sous-préfet, June 30, 1935; Constantine B/3/323, Commissaire de Police de Khemchila to Préfet, July 9, 1936.
72. On Medjamel, see Constantine B/3/635, “Liste nominative des principaux dirigeants des différentes sections de Parti social français dans le Département de Constantine”; Constantine B/3/522, Constantine/June 11, 1934, Sureté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport.” In addition, a French citizen named Caid Allahoum Fadi is listed as a member in M’Sila.


75. Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 133.

76. Constantine B/3/323, Sureté départementale de Constantine, “Surveillance politique des indigènes,” April 29, 1935; Constantine B/3/323, Sétif/July 19, 1935, Sous-préfet to Préfet; Constantine B/3/707, Constantine/August 3, 1935; Préfet to GGA; Constantine B/3/323, Sureté départementale de Constantine, notes dated October 7 and 10, 1935; GGA 3CAB/47, “Notes sur le mouvement Croix de Feu parmi les indigènes,” 1935. The CF subsequently attempted to expand the alliance with the FEM to include the ‘ulamâ through their contact with Benhoura.


79. This was duly noted by the Governor-General. See GGA 3CAB/47, “Note sur le mouvement Croix de Feu parmi les indigènes,” 1935.


85. Constantine B/3/323, Constantine/May 11, 1935, Commissaire Central to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/50, Constantine/September 4, 1935, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport”; Constantine B/3/522, Commissaire de Police de St. Arnaud to Sous-préfet, April 11, 1936; Constantine B/3/522, Constantine/March 31, 1936, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Antisémitisme”; Constantine B/3/522, Constantine/April 2, 1936, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport.” Sûreté personnel themselves displayed a certain measure of anti-Semitism, referring to Jewish arrogance in Constantine, and making it difficult to accurately gauge the severity of Jewish assaults against the CF. However, the frequency of such events is undeniable, and local Jews certainly baited group members on numerous occasions, from uttering insults at group meetings to acting as if they were armed with revolvers. See Constantine B/3/572, Constantine/May 13, 1935, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Incidents au Casino Municipal”; GGA 3CAB/47, Constantine/September 5, 1935, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport.”


88. Constantine B/3/522, Ain-Beida/April 7, 1936, Commissaire de Police to Préfet.


91. GGA 3CAB/50, Constantine/August 18, 1935, Préfet to GGA; Constantine B/3/522, Constantine/April 30, 1936, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport”; Constantine B/3/522, Constantine/May 1, 1936, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport.”

92. Gosnell, Politics of Frenchness, 149–151. For an examination of the colonial privileging of Europeans over Jews and Muslims, regardless of social class or ethnicity, see Prochaska, Making Algeria French, 153–154, 204–206.

93. Viniger was also the president of the Tiaret section of the Front paysan.

94. Oran/3121, Rapport spécial/Préfecture d’Oran, July 1935; Oran/3121, Tiaret, May 13, 1935, Commissaire de Police to Préfet. Viniger faced
foreclosure on his extensive holdings despite having married into an extremely wealthy family. Azam’s property was also in receivership by early 1935. See Oran/3121, Oran, July 12, 1935, “Rapport spéciale—Préfet d’Oran.”


96. Oran/3121, Tiaret, May 13, 1935, Commissaire de Police to Préfet; Oran/3121, Tiaret, June 29, 1935, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Tiaret, June 13, 1935, Ghilalamallah Mohamed to Préfet. Mohamed was a Conseiller général and Délégué financier for Tiaret.

97. Oran/3121, Tiaret, June 18, 1935, Commissaire de Police to Préfet; Oran/3121, Tiaret, June 21, 1935, Azam to Préfet.

98. Oran/3121, Tiaret, June 28, 1935, Maire de la Commune de Tiaret to Préfet.


100. Oran/3121, Tiaret, July 3, 1935, Commissaire de Police to Préfet.


104. Oran/3121, Tiaret, December 20, 1935, Commissaire de Police to Préfet.

105. See “Un reporter,” Petit oranais, August 30, 1935; Oran/3121, Oran, August 7, 1935, Chef de l’Escadron Boiseaux to Préfet; Oran/3121, Oran, November 8, 1935, Commissaire Central to Préfet.


108. Oran/466, Oran, November 14, 1935, Chef de la Sureté Départementale to Préfet, “Incidents entre Volontaires nationaux et chauffeurs de taxis israélites”; Oran/466, Oran, November 14, 1935, Commissaire Central to Préfet, “Bagarre devant le Théâtre Municipal.”
109. Oran/3121, Oran, November 18, 1935, Commissaire Central to Préfet, “Violences.” Formed by Bernard Lecache in 1934, the LICA was a Left-leaning republican organization dedicated to fighting anti-Semitism in both France and Algeria. In this capacity, its members frequently came to blows with those of the leagues, particularly the CF. See Kalman, *The Extreme Right in Interwar France*, chap. five.

110. GGA 2CAB/3, Alger, August 12, 1935, Le Beau to Paganon.


112. Oran/2413, Tlemcen, October 29, 1935, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/466, Oran, June 14, 1935, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/466, Oran, November 15, 1935, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.


121. Alger 1K/26, Alger/February 7, 1935, Préfet to GGA; Alger 1K/26, Alger/June 13, 1935, Préfet to GGA; Alger 1K/26, Alger/July 1935, Préfet to GGA.


126. Oran F/92/2413, Tiaret/December 31, 1934, Commissaire de Police to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/47, Oran/August 7, 1935, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/466, Tiaret/April 15, 1936, Commissaire de Police to Préfet.


128. Oran/466, Alger/February 4, 1935, Memorandum/Préfet; Oran/466, Tlemcen/November 9, 1935, Sous-préfet to Préfet; Oran/466, Alger /November 23, 1935, GGA to Préfet; Oran F/92/2413, Alger /November 23, 1935, GGA to Préfet; Oran/466, Oran/December 10, 1935, Préfet to GGA.

129. Oran/466, Oran/June 14, 1935, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/466, Oran/August 8, 1935, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/47, Oran/November 15, 1935, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.


134. Constantine B/3/324, Lafayette/September 12, 1935, Administrateur de la Commune Mixte de Guergour to Sous-préfet; Oran/117, Mostaganem /September 16, 1935, Sous-préfet to Préfet; Oran F/92/2413, Oran


136. Ibid, 12–21; Oran/117, Oran/August 1935, Chef du Service agricole général to Préfet; Oran/117, Mostaganem/August 22, 1935, Sous-préfet to Préfet.  


142. See, for example, Marcel Pitollet, “Front paysan de l’Oranie,” Oran matin, August 30, 1935.


145. “La Crise de l’agriculture algérienne,” Echo d’Oran, September 14, 1935.

146. Constantine B/324, Batna/September 1, 1935, Sous-préfet to préfet; Marcel Pitollet, “Front paysan d’Oranie,” Oran matin, October 21, 1935; “Front paysan d’Oranie”, Oran matin, February 1, 1936. It is worth noting that the Préfecture in Oran endorsed many of the FP’s goals, including the 400 million franc aid package, the Roux-Freyssineng plan, and higher wheat prices. See Oran/117, Chef du Service agricole générale to Préfet.


150. Oran/117, Saida/August 23, 1935, Administrateur de la Commune Mixte to Préfet; André Dessoliers, “Quels sont nos ennemis,” Oran matin, August 26, 1935; André Dessoliers, “Front paysan d’Oranie,” Echo d’Oran, August 26, 1935; Oran/117, Tiaret/November 18, 1935, Commissaire de Police to Préfet.


152. “Les Agriculteurs de Constantine s’adhèrent au Front paysan,” Dépêche de Constantine, September 4, 1935; GGA 3CAB/50, Constantine
153. André Catroux, “Qu’attendent nos élus pour nous aider?”, *Oran matin*, September 5, 1935; Oran/117, Mostaganem; September 16, 1935, Sous-préfet to Préfet; Oran/117, Tiaret/ October 3, 1935, Commissaire de Police to Préfet; GGA 3CAB, Oran/October 8, 1935, Préfet to GGA.


157 GGA 3CAB/50, Constantine/September 13, 1935, Directeur des Contributions diverses du Département de Constantine to Préfet.


3 An Algérieniste Insurrection: The Rassemblement National and Amitiés latines, 1936–1938


8. Ibid., 105–111.


12. Planche, *Sétif 1945*, 35. As John Ruedy writes, the FEM were certainly not the ENA, but their assimilationist doctrine inevitably advocated...
civic, political, administrative, and juridical equality for all educated Muslims, and an expanded school system in order to increase the number of those eligible for such treatment. In *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 132–133.

15. Ibid., 85
20. GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/April 23, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.
22. GGA 2CAB/1, Oran/January 29, 1935, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Tract—“Avis à la population oranaise,” n.d (1937); Oran F/92/2531, Paris/August 5, 1938, Préfecture de Police, “Rapport.”
24. GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/March 21, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.
25. GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/April 7, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/April 19, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté
départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/50, Oran/April 24, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.

26. “L'Abbé Lambert poursuit son triumphal périple,” Oran matin, February 20, 1936; GGA 3CAB/50, Oran/April 17, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/50, Oran/April 18, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; “Profession de foi de l'Abbé Gabriel Lambert,” Oran matin, April 21, 1936; GGA 3CAB/50, Oran/April 29, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.

27. GGA 2CAB/1, Oran/January 28, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/50, Oran/March 10, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/50, Oran/April 24, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.

28. GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/March 27, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/April 22, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/50, Oran/April 29, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.

29. For the complete election results, see Oran matin, May 4, 1936. Lambert’s riposte took the form of an editorial: “Soyez heureux, Monseigneur Durand,” Oran matin, May 4, 1936.


31. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/November 5, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/89, Alger/January 11, 1937, Sûreté départementale d’Alger, “Rapport”; Institut d’histoire sociale/Archives Charles Dumas (Hereafter IHS) III, Alger/March 10, 1937, Procureur générale/Alger to Garde des Sceaux.

32. Oran matin, July 19, 1936, July 26, 1936, August 6, 1936, and October 10, 1936; Alger F/405, Alger/August 10, 1936, Sûreté départementale d’Alger, “Groupement politique Rassemblement nationale d’action sociale”; Oran/424, Mostaganem/February 7, 1937, Commissaire de Police du 2e arrondissement to Commissaire Central; Oran/424, Saint-Denis-du-Sig/April 3, 1937, Commissaire de Police à Préfet; Oran/424, Tiaret/April 25, 1938, Commissaire de Police à Préfet.

33. “L’Immense majorité de maires d’oranie,” Oran matin, July 2, 1936, Oran/424, Oran/February 5, 1937, Préfet to GGA.

34. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/September 1, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Directeur général de la Sécurité générale de l’Algérie; Oran/424, Mostaganem/February 7, 1937, Commissaire de Police du 2e arrondissement à Commissaire Central; “Sous les murs de Tlemcen,” Oran matin, April 28, 1937


37. Oran/3361, Oran/May 6, 1935, Préfet à Sous-préfet; GGA 3CAB/52, Poster—“Ouvriers et employés latins,” n.d. (1935); GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/July 31, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; GGA 3CAB/95, Mostaganem/December 11, 1936, Commissaire de Police de 1er arrondissement à Commissaire Central.

38. GGA 3CAB/52, Sidi-Bel-Abbès/November 3, 1936, Commissaire de Police Nicolas, “Rapport”; GGA 3CAB/95, Mostaganem/December
11, 1936, Commissaire de Police de 1er arrondissement to Commissaire Central.


41. “Amitiés latines,” Oran matin, March 26, 1938; “Amitiés Lambert féminines,” Oran matin, April 15, 1938; Oran/3361, Oran/July 2, 1938, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran /December 21, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/December 23, 1938, Commissaire Central to December 23, 1938; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/March 25, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet. Women’s charity drives and evening activities regularly attracted 500–600 participants.

42. Oran F/92/2531, Oran/October 10, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; “Amitiés latines,” Oran matin, January 2, 1939.


44. Oran/3361, Oran/June 15, 1936, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/2531, May 27, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/June 24, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/June 25, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/October 8, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/October 10, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/March 21, 1938, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/June 27, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.


46. Cantier, 28; GGA 3CAB 95, Oran/June 7, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB 95, Oran/June 10, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran /November 15, 1937, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet. Population statistics in Oran in F/92/2513, Oran/July 15, 1939, Préfet to Sous-Directeur des affaires d’Afrique and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

47. Oran F/92/2531, Oran/January 2, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/January 3, 1939, Commissaire
divisionnaire à Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/January 5, 1939, Préfet à GGA; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/March 2, 1939, Commissaire Central à Préfet. Although the metropolitan authorities forced Lambert to decline the medal received in January, he returned in July with a plethora of local extreme-rightist luminaries and was again decorated, and the Prefect subsequently demanded that he be recalled for dereliction of duty. See Oran F/92/2531, Oran/January 5, 1939, Préfet à GGA, Oran F/92/2531, Oran/July 4, 1939, Préfet à GGA; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/July 18, 1939, Préfet à Général Nogues; Résident Général du Maroc; Henri Bourrières, “Une belle manifestation d’amitié franco-espagnole à l’ouan.” Echo d’Oran, July 21, 1939; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/July 11, 1939, Préfet à GGA.


49. Oran/84, Oran/October 2, 1937, Commissaire de police du 5me arrondissement à Commissaire Central; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/April 24, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet.

50. Oran F/92/2531, Oran/June 25, 1938, Préfet à GGA.

51. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/July 10, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/July 15, 1936, Préfet à Minister of the Interior; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/June 24, 1938, Préfet à GGA; “Amitiés latine,” Oran matin, September 27, 1938. Lambert claimed that the AL’s section musulmane contained 1,500 members, yet given the paltry turnout at group events, socialist claims of a dozen members seem much more likely. See Abbé Gabriel Lambert, “Oran Koko dit républicain,” Oran matin, October 19, 1938.


56. “Le Service du nettoiement a été joyeusement hier,” Oran matin, February 24, 1936; “Le Rassemblement national à Saïda,” Oran matin, August 28, 1936; GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/5 November 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/424, Oran/November 18, 1936, Commissaire Centrale to Préfet.


58. GGA 3CAB/95, Alger/August 10, 1936, Sûreté départementale, “Rapport/Meeting au Stade municipale du Rassemblement national d’action sociale.”


64. I use the terms “assimilation” and “association” in the manner of Alice Conklin here, referring to the “refined” versions of Raymond Betts’s definitions, mobilized by the Pied-Noirs during the interwar era. The new definitions were much harsher than the nineteenth-century originals, precluding any real advancement for indigenous peoples in North Africa, or anywhere else in the French empire for that matter. See Raymond F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890–1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961),


70. GGA 10H/90, Abbé Gabriel Lambert, “La France devant le problème indigène en Algérie”; Oran/424, Mostaganem/February 7, 1937, Commissaire de Police du 2me arrondissement to Commissaire Central; Alfred Cazes, “Ce que les colons ont fait en Algérie,” *Oran matin*, February 27, 1937.


76. See, for example, Gwynplaine, “Chronique des Kokos,” *Oran matin*, September 20–21 and October 11/14, 1938. The column appeared daily in *Oran matin*.


84. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/July 1, 1936, Prêt to Le Beau.

85. GGA 3CAB/54, “Renseignements,” n.d. (1936); GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/May 30, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Prêt; GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/June 10, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Prêt.

86. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/June 25, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Prêt, “Incidents à la Place Foch.”

87. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/July 1, 1936, Prêt to Le Beau.

88. GGA 3CAB/95, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Prêt, reports of July 25–27–29, 1936.

89. IHS Dumas/III, June 30, 1936, Le Beau to Blum and Salengro.

90. IHS/Dumas 1, “Rapport sur la situation politique à Sidi-Bel-Abbés,” n.d. (1936); GGA 3CAB/95, Mostaganem/August 4, 1936, Commissaire Central de la ville de Mostagenem to GGA; GGA 3CAB/95, Mostaganem/August 13, 1936, Commissaire Central to GGA.
91. GGA 3CAB/95, “Evénements d’Aïn-Témouchent le 14 juillet 1936.” Interestingly, the report notes that a number of extreme-rightist colons brought Algerian employees with them to swell their ranks even further, although many subsequently defected to the Popular Front crowd. For accounts of various fascist émeutes with the left, see GGA 3CAB/50, Oran/April 29, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet, “Réunion de l’Abbé Lambert au Casino Bastrana”; GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/June 10, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/84, Oran/January 25, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet, “Parti populaire français: Réunion au Cinéma Lido à Gambetta.”

92. On police brutality in Oran, see IHS/ Dumas I, Oran/February 2, 1937, SFIO Secrétaire de la Section d’Oran à Paul Faure and Jean-Baptiste Séverac/Secrétaires du Parti SFIO; IHS/Dumas III, Alger/June 30, 1936, Le Beau à Léon Blum and Roger Salengro; GGA 3CAB/95, June 24, 1936, Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/July 1, 1936, Préfet to Le Beau.


94. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/June 7, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet, “Inauguration de la Braderie d’Oran”; GGA 3CAB/89, Oran/January 6, 1937, Commissaire Central de la ville d’Oran to Le Beau; “Une nouvelle aggression contre l’Abbé Lambert,” Oran matin, September 16, 1937; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/November 11, 1937, Lambert to Préfet. IHS/Dumas III, Alger/March 28, 1937, Le Beau à Sûreté Nationale; IHS/Dumas III, Tlemcen/March 29, 1937, Commissaire Central à Le Beau; “M. l’Abbé Lambert est assailli à Tlemcen par une bande d’énergumènes,” Oran matin, March 29, 1937. Such actions were not confined to adults. The Oran police also reported that Lambert’s inauguration of a day care in the leftist neighborhood of Nemours was disrupted by 100 young children who sang the Internationale and ruined his prepared speech with a stream of cat-calls, whistles, and invective. The shocked mayor retreated hastily, to the delight of the crowd. See Oran F/92/2531, Oran/April 23, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet.


100. IHS/Dumas I, “Rapport sur les événements du 16 mars 1937 à Sidi-Bel-Abbès.”


102. IHS/Dumas III, Alger/March 10, 1937, Procureur générale to Garde des Sceaux.


105. Although Blum made an aborted comeback as premier from March 13 to April 8, 1938, the brevity of his second ministry prevented a renewed outbreak of serious violence in Oran. On the Ferrando shooting, see Oran F/92/2531, Oran/July 1, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran F/92/2531, Oran/November 24, 1937, Commissaire Central to Préfet.

106. GGA 3CAB/54, Oran/October 26, 1937, Commissaire divisionnaire to Chef de la Sûreté départementale; “La Sous-section de Karguentah reçoit les Amitiés latines,” Oran matin, April 15, 1938.


109. Benjamin Claude Brower, A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844–1902 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 18. As the author rightly asserts, this pattern of violence and murder deflates to a certain degree (although it does not entirely eradicate) the claims of certain historians that the French Empire provides an effective case study of what
Michel Foucault termed “bio-politics.” Far from merely acting as a “bio-power,” concerned with controlling/regulating the physical and biological environment of the colonized, both French and municipal authorities far too often intervened solely in a threatening manner.


16. Thomas, “The Gendarmerie.” The living and working conditions of the colonial police and gendarmeres was in no way specific to Oran or Algeria. See the articles concerning Cyprus, India, etc. in Anderson and Killingray, Policing the Empire.


18. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/June 29, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.

19. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/July 1, 1936; Préfet to Le Beau.

20. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/June 29, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet, “Incidents en ville dans la journée du 28 juin.”


23. IHS/Dumas I, “Rapport sur la situation politique à Sidi-Bel-Abbès” (1937). On Lambert’s notorious Service de nettoiement in Oran-Ville,
see Oran F/92/3121, Oran/July 24, 1936, Marcel Hazan to Procureur de la République.

125. IHS/Dumas I, “Rapport sur les evenements du 16 mars 1937 à Sidi-Bel-Abbès.”
129. IHS/Dumas I, Oran/February 2, 1937, SFIO Oran to Paul Faure and Jean-Baptiste Sévérac.
130. SHAT ZM 1/307/676, Perpignan/January 24, 1938, Ministère de la Défense et de la Guerre, memorandum.
131. SHAT ZM 1/307/676, Ministère de la Défense et de la Guerre, January 24, 1938; SHAT ZM 1/307/676, Perpignan/ January 20, 1938, memo from Général de Brigade Lavigne. This point is underscored in Thomas, Empires of Intelligence, 26, 76–77.
133. SHAT ZM 1/307/692, Alger, December 14, 1936, General Lavigne to Minister of War and National Defense; SHAT 1/307/676, Perpignan, January 20, 1938, Général de Brigade Lavigne, memorandum; Thomas, Empires of Intelligence, 17–18.
134. SHAT 1/307/676, Perpignan, January 20, 1938, Général de Brigade Lavigne, memorandum; SHAT ZM 1/307/666 Marseille/December 15, 1934, Général Baert to Général de Division Commandant le 15e Région.
135. IHS Dumas I, Oran/February 2, 1937, Secretary of Oran SFIO to Paul Faure and Jean-Baptiste Séverac.
138. SHAT ZM1/307/692, Paris/March 23, 1937, Ministre de la Défense nationale et de la Guerre to Général Inspecteur du 4e arrondissement de Gendarmerie; SHAT ZM1/307/692, Oran/March 31, 1937, Marceau Gitar, Commissaire de Police (Oran) to Général Lavigne /Inspecteur Générale de la Gendarmerie (Algérie). Gitar also confirmed eyewitness accounts concerning the beating of children with rifle butts. Interestingly, the Commissaire Central denied that fascist sympathies played a role in the events. Nonetheless, he did admit that excessive force was used in response to mere hostile language, and no disciplinary action was taken against Gitar for his (supposedly false) testimony. In SHAT ZM1/307/692, Inquest notes—interview with Commissaire Central/Oran.
139. SHAT ZM1/307/692, Oran/April 1, 1937, Rapport du Capitaine Didion, commandant les 3e et 4e compagnies.
140. SHAT ZM1/307/692, Oran/March 4, 1937–April 1, 1937, “Rapport du Capitaine Chevalier, Commandant la Section d’Oran,” “Rapport du Capitain Didion, Commandant les 3e et 4e Compagnies,” and “Rapport du Chef d’Escadron Roubaud, Commandant la Compagnie d’Oran.” The notion that Muslims hoarded weapons is completely false. In fact, Europeans in Algeria were deemed a serious security risk due to increased possession of firearms in the aftermath of the Popular Front electoral victory and the rise of the RNAS. See GGA 3CAB/95, “La Vente des armes en Algérie,” Report prepared for Senator Roux-Freyssineng, 1937.
142. SHAT ZM1/307/692, General Lavigne, “Conclusions et propositions” and “Discussion des éléments de l’enquête.” Lavigne claimed that the testimony of Gitard and Inspector Cabet was substantially different. Yet his evidence—that one claimed that the crowd yelled “he he” while the other had them screaming “hou hou,” or that Gitard exaggerated in his claim that the 15-year-old boy who sustained a head injury was a “child”—was clearly insubstantial.
144. SHAT ZM1/307/692, Alger/April 7, 1937, untitled memos by Général de Brigade Lavigne.
146. See, for example, IHS/ Dumas III, Alger, June 30, 1936, Le Beau to Léon Blum and Marx Dormoy.
150. Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 145, 151. Abbas subsequently created a political party, the Union démocratique du manifeste algérien (UDMA), dedicated to Algerian independence.
151. See, for example, Oran/3361, Sidi-Bel-Abbès/May 25–July 24–August 25, 1939, Commissaire Central, “Rapport mensuel sur la propagande antisémitique.”
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4. Stora, Messali Hadj, 144.
6. GGA 3CAB/55, “Rapport de M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Algérie au Haut Comité Méditerranéan,” February 1938,
13. The metropolitan PPF maintained combat groups under the leadership of future Milice chief Joseph Darnand.
16. Laurent Kestel, “The Emergence of Anti-Semitism within the Parti populaire français: the vrai but de Doriot,” Echo d’Oran, July 18, 1937; Oran/84, Oran/October 10, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; “Impressions sure le 2e congress nord-africain du PPF,” Oranie populaire, November 19, 1938. The PPF ultimately attempted to buy Oran matin in order to control one of the larger departmental newspapers, but were rebuffed by Alfréd Cazes and the Conseil d’administration. See Oran/84, Alger/October 10, 1938, Préfet to GGA. Nonetheless, PPF subscription rates were quite high for Algeria—even the metropolitan Emancipation nationale sold 400 copies per issue in the Department of Alger, handily outselling L’Humanité and Le Populaire—although government seizures of contentious editions seriously impacted the finances of L’Oranie populaire. See GGA/89, Alger/January 6, 1937, Congrès algérien du Parti populaire français, “Camarades”; Oran/129, Oran/October 20, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet.


20. Oran/3361, Sidi-Bel-Abbès/November 28, 1936, Commissaire de Police, “Rapport”; Oran/84, Oran/March 8, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet; Oran/84, Sidi-Bel-Abbès/May 1, 1938, Commissaire de Police à Commissaire Central.

21. Oran/84, Oran/June 17, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/84, Oran/June 28, 1937, Commissaire Central à Préfet; “La Section feminine d’Alger doit faire plus mieux,” Le Pionnier, November 11, 1937; Oran/129, Oran/March 23, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet.


23. Oran/84, Oran/February 6, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/84, Sidi-Bel-Abbès/July 21, 1937, Commissaire Central à Préfet; Oran/November 22, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet.

24. Oran/84, Oran/January 29, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/84, Oran/February 5, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/129, Oran/February 10, 1937, Commissaire

25. Oran/84, Oran/December 17, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet; Oran/129, Oran/January 3–February 10, March 2–May 16–May 26, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet.


30. Oran/84, Mostaganem/October 20, 1936, Commissaire Central à Préfet.


35. Oran/84, Oran/November 30, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet.

36. Oran/84, Oran/October 29, 1937, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet; Oran/84, Sidi-Bel-Abbès/October 31, 1937, Commissaire de police du 2me arrondissement à Commissaire Central; Oranie populaire, November 6, 1937, steno of meeting; Oran/84, Oran/November 29, 1937, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet.

37/ Oran/84, Sidi-Bel-Abbès, October 31, 1937, Commissaire de Police à Commissaire Central.


39. Oran/84, Oran/December 20, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/84, Mostaganem/April 8, 1937, GGA 3CAB/100,
Oran/July 25, 1937, “Rapport Général sur l’activité du Parti populaire français dans le département d’Oran”; Commissaire de police du 1er arrondissement to Commissaire Central; Oran/November 10, 1937, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Alger F/408, Médée/Ja nuary 30, 1938, Commissaire de Police to Préfet.

40. Oran F/92/3121, Rio Salado/January 15, 1937, Mayor to Préfet; Oran F/92/3121, Mascara/April 8, 1937, Commissaire de Police to Sous-préfet; Oran F/92/3121, Trézia l/April 17, 1937, Administrateur to Préfet; Oran F/92/3121, Sidi-Bel Abbès/September 23, 1937, Commissaire Central, memorandum.

41. Oran/84, Oran/March 26, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/84, Oran/May 28, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.

42. See, e.g., Oranie populaire, 22/29 1938, in which French communist leader Jacques Duclos is portrayed as the Jew, and Le Pionnier, June 2, 1938.

43. Oran/84, Oran/April 29–May 9, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.


50. Robert Loustau, Notre doctrine devant le problème social (Paris, 1937); Oran/84, Tract—“Le Parti populaire français avec les travailleurs
français,” n.d. (1938). The *libres contrats* recalled the practices of the ancien régime.


56. Oran/84, Oran/November 29, 1938, Commissaire Central to Préfet and Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/84, Oran/December 8, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.


GGA 3CAB/100, Oran/July 25, 1937, “Rapport général sur l’activité du Parti populaire français dans le département d’Oran,” “Garau fait acclamer par 150 travailleurs des Tramways oranais,” Oranie populaire, December 31, 1938. On low attendance at Section d’entreprise meetings, see Oran/84, Oran/October 13, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/129, Oran/May 11, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.

60. IHS/Dumas III, Dumas to GGA, February 10, 1937.


64. GGA 3CAB/100, Tract—“La Bataille pour le pain,” n.d. (1937); Henri Queyrat, “La Bataille pour le pain,” Oranie populaire, May 22, 1937; Oran/84, Oran/May 26, 1937, Commissaire Central to Préfet.


69. Gaston Vidal, “Moins que le séparatiste, c’est l’anticommuniste qu’on a frappé,” L’Oranie populaire, November 13, 1937; Oran/84, Tlemcen/December 2, 1937, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/84, Mostaganem/December 28, 1937, Commissaire de police du 2e arrondissement to Commissaire Central.


74. GGA 3CAB/89, Batna/January 23, 1937, Commissaire de Police to Sous-préfet; Constantine B/3/279, Batna/February 5, 1937, Sous-préfecture de Batna, “Rapport sur l’état d’esprit des indigènes”; Oran /March 24, 1939, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/84, Mostaganem/May 12, 1938; “Réunion que Doriot a donné à Tiaret le 12 courant.”

75. “Quand Arrighi parle de l’empire,” Oranie populaire, March 26, 1938; “L’Organisation politique de l’empire,” Oranie populaire, April 2, 1938. Writing about Lyautay, Gallieni, and Mangin, one author in Le Pionnier concluded that “only one of these men is the equal of the whole bunch of [French] politicians who have led us to the brink.” In “La politique impériale du PPF,” May 12, 1938.


78. Alger F/408, Alger/February 25, 1937, Sûreté départementale d’Alger, “Rapport”; GGA 3CAB/54, Oran/May 8, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/84, Oran/December 12, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.

80. IHS/Dumas I, “Rapport sur les événements du 16 mars 1937 à Sidi-Bel-Abbès”; Oran/129, Oran/March 29, 1939, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran F/92/3121, Trézel/April 17, 1937, Administrateur de la Commune Mixte to Préfet; Oran/3361, Sidi-Bel-Abbès/June 1, 1937, Commissaire Central to Sous-préfet; Oran/84, Sidi-Bel-Abbès/December 20, 1937, Commissaire de police de 1er arrondissement to Commissaire Central.
82. Oran/84, Oran/February 21, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet. See also Oran/84, Oran/April 18, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté générale to Préfet.
85. For a detailed account of the Perréaux attack and its aftermath, see chapter three.
86. Oran/84, Oran/October 24, 1936, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; “Doriot Vaincra,” Oranie populaire, July 17, 1937.
88. Oran/84, Oran/October 24, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/84, Oran/November 22, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; “L’Oranie populaire va disparaître,” Oranie populaire, February 25, 1939; Oran/129, Oran/May 27, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/129, Oran/June 1, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.
89. Oran/129, Oran/January 7, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/129, Oran/January 12, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/129, Oran/January 17, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.
90. Oran/129, Oran/March 2, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/129, Oran/March 27, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/129, Oran/May 23, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/129, Oran/June 13, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/129, Oran/July 5, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/129, Oran/June 10, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.
92. GGA 3CAB/95, Constantine/July 1936, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport”; Constantine B/3/567, Batna/October 19, 1936, Sous-préfecture de Batna, “Rapport Mensuel sur l'état d'esprit des population européens et indigènes”; Oran/70, Oran/December 3, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/70, Mostagenem/December 11, 1936, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Constantine B/3/635, El Arrouch/n.d. (April 1937), Administrateur Adjoint to Sous-préfet; Constantine B/3/670, Constantine/May 13, 1937, Préfet to Général commandant la division; GGA 3CAB/100,
Notes

Oran/April 22, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet; GGA 3CAB/93, Cabinet du Gouverneur Générale, “Situation politique européenne de l’Algérie en 1938”; Archives Privées La Roque/451/121, Membership directories for Hussein Dey and Fort de l’Eau, 1938. In Bône alone, the municipality reported that the local PSF recruited 30 new members per day.

93. Oran/70, Oran/December 3, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/December 11, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/June 2, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; GGA 3CAB/93, Cabinet du Gouverneur Général, “Situation politique européenne de l’Algérie en 1938”; Oran/70, Mostaganem/October 25, 1938, Commissaire Central à Sous-préfet; Oran/70, Oran/January 17, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet.

94. Alger 1K/75, “Fédération du Parti social français pour le département d’Alger: Reglement intérieur” and Alger 1K/75, Alger/November 23, 1938, complete list of PSF sections; Cantier, L’Algérie sous le régime de Vichy, 226. The group established sections in every town and commune in the department of Constantine, and counted 41 in Alger. There were far fewer in Oran, however—21, compared with 39 for the PPF. See Francis Koerner, “L’Extéme droite en oranie (1936–1940),” Revue d’histoire modern et contemporaine 20 (1973). On the resignations of Debay and Richard, see Alger 1K/75, Alger/June 10, 1937, Sûreté départementale d’Alger, “Rapport”; GGA 3CAB/47, Alger/June 19, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet. Debay nonetheless pledged his loyalty to La Roque and rebuffed all offers from competing groups.


96. AP/451/127, Alger PSF Secretary-General to La Roque’s Secretary Edouard Carvallo, n.d. (July 1936); Alger 1K/75, Arba/June 1, 1937, Commissaire de Police à Préfet; Alger F/405, Alger/June 16, 1937, Sûreté départementale d’Alger, Alger/June 16, 1937, Sûreté départementale d’Alger, “Réunion du Parti social français,” Oran/70, Oran/December 8, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire à Préfet.

97. Oran/466, Oran/April 9, 1936, Commissaire Central à Préfet; GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/April 23, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Oran/466, Oran/April 21, 1936, Commissaire Central à Préfet; Oran F/92/2413, Oran/May 15, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet.

98. GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/March 30, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/April 10, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/April 18, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; GGA 3CAB/49, Oran/April 24, 1936, Commissaire Central à GGA.


103. La Flamme, March 5, 1938.

104. Oran/70, Oran/January 30, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Constantine B/3/635, Constantine/February 22, 1937, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport”; Oran/70, Oran/May 29, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/December 3, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/May 15, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.

105. For an overview of La Rocque’s platform, and the opposition that it engendered, see Samuel Kalman, The Extreme Right in Interwar France: The Faisceau and the Croix de Feu (Burlington and Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).

106. Constantine B/3/567, Constantine/July 16, 1936, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport”; La Flamme, October 10, 1936 (photo of crowds at PSF rally doing the fascist salute); Constantine B/3/327, Bougie/December 15, 1936, Commissaire de Police to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/January 5, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.

107. Constantine B/3/327, Constantine/September 27, 1936, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Parti social français”; Oran/70, Oran/January 24, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/February 23, 1939, Poster—“Arriba España!”; Oran/70, Oran/March 7, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/March 21, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.

108. Oran/70, Oran/July 1, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/April 22, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/70, Mostaganem/May 12, 1938, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Antoine Débay, “Causons,” La Voie indigène, December 1, 1938.

109. Oran/70, Tract—“La Rocque sous l’emprise juive,” n.d.; Oran/70, Oran/April 27, 1938, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/June 8, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/December 17, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/February 7, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to
Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/May 10, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.

110. Constantine B/3/327, Constantine/November 8, 1936, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Parti social français”; Oran/70, Oran/February 23, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.

111. IHS/Dumas I, LICA, “Premiers éléments d’enquête de la section constantinoise sur les grands incidents des 24–27–28–29–30 juin et 1er juillet 1936”; Oran/70, Oran/February 20, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/March 6, 1938, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Constantine B/3/635, Batna/April 27, 1937, Commissaire de police to Sous-préfet.


118. Oran/70, Oran/January 16, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; “M. Jouhaux veut tout nationaliser,” La Flamme, September 18, 1937. The name Blumoschwig refers to the French Premier and Undersecretary of State for Education Cecile Brunschvicg.


121. Constantine B/3/567, Bougie/May 26, 1936, Commissaire de Police to Préfet; Constantine B/3/567, Bougie/May 29, 1936, Commissaire de Police to Sous-préfet. The victim was sentenced to 20 days in prison for the initial attack, while only two of his assailants were charged, and eventually given 15 days in prison. On June 29, a similar assault perpetrated by CF members resulted in another 15-day custodial sentence. See Constantine B/3/567, Bougie/June 29, 1936, Procureur Générale à Sous-préfet.

122. Constantine B/3/522, Bougie/June 21, 1936, Commissaire de Police to Préfet. The authorities further noted that even schools were bitterly divided, as children sided with the leagues or the Popular Front.


125. Constantine B/3/327, Bône/November 12, 1936, Sûreté départementale, “Rapport”

126. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/June 30, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; GGA 3CAB/95, Mostaganem/July 2, 1936, L. Raibaldi à Le Beau.

127. Alger F/405, Alger/September 26, 1936, Commissaire Central à Préfet.

128. “Des incidents graves se sont produits hier sous divers points de la ville,” Echo d’Oran, October 25, 1937; “La journée a été marquée...” Oran républicain, October 25, 1937; Alger F/405, Alger/May 2, 1937, Commissaire Central à Secrétairé générale/Affaires indigènes et police générale. True to form, La Flamme trumpeted Benassar’s victimhood in a December 7, 1937 frontpage cartoon.

129. GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/June 24, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale à Préfet; Constantine B/3/707, Constantine/June 30, 1936, Rapport du Capitaine Goudain/19e Légion; Oran F/92/3121, Oran/July 24, 1936, Marcel Hazan à Procureur générale.


132. On Medjamel, see Constantine B/3/635, “Liste nominative des principaux dirigeants des différentes sections de Parti social français dans le Département de Constantine.”


134. ADC/LR 19 II, Christian Sorenson to La Rocque, July 24, 1937. Sorenson’s plans were supported by much (false) talk of Muslim discontent with communism and Islamic leaders. See ADC/LR 19 II, Iba-Zizen to La Rocque, July 22, 1937.


137/ Constantine B/3/635, Constantine/October 3, 1937, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport”; Oran/70, Mostaganem/October 25, 1938, Commissaire Central to Sous-préfet. Somewhat ironically, this often occurred following attempts to portray La Rocque as a genuine Algerian due to his tutelage under Lyautay in Morocco. See GGA 3CAB/95, Constantine/September 27, 1936, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport.”


141. ADC/LR 19 II, Congrès du question indigène nord-africaine,” n.d. (1937). In handwritten notes in the margins, La Rocque completely rejected the author’s argument and, by extension, algérianité as a viable program.


143. Constantine B/3/635, Commissariat spéciale de Bône, Rapport—“Parti social français: Préparation de la campagne électorale,” October 2, 1937; Constantine B/3/635, Commissaire de police de Bougie to Préfet, November 6, 1937.

144. Quoted in Kaddache, Histoire, 348.


151. Lefevre, *Chère Algérie*, 62, 71; Thomas, *The French Empire*, 68, 253. These facts were not lost on the metropolitan government and the Governor-General’s office, whose Haut Comité Méditerranéenne in 1937 stated: “La cadence de la progression de la natalité est telle que dans l’avenir proche la marge des possibilités offertes par l’Algérie à l’économie indigène sera dépassée.”


156. Alfred Debay, “De la terre et du travail pour nos populations indigènes,” *La Flamme*, March 5, 1938. CDF/PSF leaders viewed such policies as an extension of leader Colonel de la Rocque’s policy of service social and the “equality of souls,” a social Catholic platform that concentrated upon helping les humbles.


160. Ibid.


163. Thomas, *The French Empire*, 297–302; Malcolm Richardson, “Algeria and the Popular Front: Radicals, Socialists, and the Blum-Violette Project,” *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History*, 5 (1977), 356. That the provision against the practice of Koranic law had protected the settlers by preserving their monopoly on citizenship was never discussed. It is also worth noting that the actual interest of the Popular Front government in colonial reform was minuscule at best. Few ministers actively opposed imperialism, and no voice advocated a major role in government for the *indigènes* (including Blum and Viollette).


169. Counterproposals were tendered by PPF leader Jacques Doriot and JP head Pierre Taittinger among others.

170. La Rocque announced the commission in June 1937. See ADC/LR 19 II, “Le PSF devant les problèmes algériens,” n.d. (1937); Alger 1

171. Constantine B/3/655, Commissaire de Police de Sétif to Sous-préfet, November 2, 1936; Alger 1K/75, Commissaire Centrale de Police a Blida to Préfet, June 1, 1938, Alger 1K/75, Tenès/January 9, 1939, Commissaire de police to Préfet.

172. See, e.g., Constantine B/3/707, Commissaire de police to Sous-préfet, April 10, 1936. The report describes a meeting in Bougie addressed by Iba-Zizen, where 800 indigènes were sent special invitations.


174. The commission’s report appears in its entirety in La Flamme, November 11, 1938.

175. “Un peu d’histoire,” Le Pionnier, June 9, 1938; Oran/70, Oran/April 4, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Cantier, L’Algérie sous le régime de Vichy, 29–32.


177. Oran/84, Mostaganem/October 20, 1936, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Gaston Vidal, “Union,” Oranie populaire, September 25, 1937; Oran/84, Tlemcen/December 2, 1937, Commissaire Central to Préfet; “Nos rapports avec le PSF et les Amiètes latines,” Oranie populaire, December 25, 1937; Oran/84, Oran/April 29, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.

178. Oran/84, Oran/March 10, 1938, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/84, Mostaganem/May 10, 1938, Commissaire Central to Sous-préfet.


181. Oran/84, Steno of Second Party Congress, Oranie populaire, May 7, 1938; Oran/84, Tiaret/May 18, 1938, Sous-préfet to Préfet; Oran/84, Oran/May 20, 1938, Commissaire Centrale to Préfet; Oran/70, Tract—“La Rocque sous l’emprise juive,” n.d. (1938).

3, 1937; Oran/84, Sidi-Bel-Abbès/December 20, 1937, Commissaire de police du 1er arrondissement to Commissaire Central; Oran/70, Oran/May 11, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.

183. Alger F/391, Henri Queyrat to Arrighi, August 25, 1936 and September 13, 1936; Oran/84, Oran/October 22, 1936, Sûreté départementale to Préfet; Oran/84, Oran/December 23, 1936, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/84, Mostaganem/January 8, 1937, Commissaire Central to Sous-préfet; Oran/84, Oran/March 8, 1937, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.

184. Oran/84, Oran/October 29, 1937; Oran/84, Oran/October 29, 1937, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/84, Oran/November 3, 1937, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/84, Oran/May 10, 1938, Commissaire Central to Préfet. On Doriot’s Oran gambit, see Kestel, La Conversion politique, 187–190.

185. Constantine B/3/327, Constantine/August 14, 1936, Sûreté départementale de Constantine, “Rapport”; Alger F/405, Alger/October 12, 1936, Sûreté départementale d’Alger, “Réunion privée du Parti social français”; Oran/70, Oran/November 6, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet; GGA 3CAB/95, Oran/November 6, 1936, Chef de la Sûreté départementale to Préfet.

186. Oran/70, Oran/May 17, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/May 18, 1938, Commissaire Central to Préfet; Oran/70, Oran/March 8, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.

187. Oran/70, Oran/May 27, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet. On the PSF in the late 1930s, see Kennedy, Reconciling France, chapter five. Sarocchi, too, eventually came to blows with the Oran federation, although this resulted from their refusal to fund his legislative election campaign. See Oran/70, Oran/November 3, 1938, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.

188. “Le Parti social français et le conseil politique d’Oran matin,” La Flamme, May 26, 1939; “Marcel Sarocchi, “Première et dernière réponse à M. l’Abbé Lambert,” La Flamme, June 2, 1939; Oran/70, Oran/June 10, 1939, Commissaire divisionnaire to Préfet.


190. Thomas, The French Empire, 138–140. He notes that “the idealization of the settler farmer as the embodiment of virile, patriotic dynamism echoes the ultra-rightism of French leagues such as the Croix de Feu.”

**Conclusion**


4. Ibid., 86, 130–134, 202–203, 218, 293–300. Formed to provide meaningful activities for unemployed youth during the economic downturn following the 1940 defeat, the Chantiers attracted 25,000 youths in Algeria, along with 3,800 Compagnons (youthful cadres) by 1942, while the LVF cadets additionally counted thousands of members.


7. Oran/70, Oran/December 11, 1945, Président de la Chambre civique-Oran to Premier and Procureur général.

8. Oran/70, Oran/March 2, 1946, Préfecture d’Oran, “Circulaire”;


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