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African Football, Identity Politics and Global Media Narratives

The Legacy of the FIFA 2010 World Cup

Edited by

Tendai Chari
University of Venda, South Africa

Nhamo A. Mhiripiri
Midlands State University, Zimbabwe
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We would like to sincerely thank our anonymous reviewers, without whose dedication and sacrifice this book would not have seen the light of day. We would also like to sincerely thank the reviewers of our book proposal for their insightful comments, and Andrew James at Palgrave Macmillan for his support and expert guidance throughout the compilation of this edited volume.
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<td>AFN</td>
<td>Athletic Federation of Nigeria</td>
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<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Congress for a Democratic South Africa</td>
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<td>EPL</td>
<td>English Premier League</td>
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<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</td>
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<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Human Science Research Council</td>
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<td>IAA</td>
<td>International Association of Athletics Federation</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>Local Organizing Committee</td>
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<td>NFF</td>
<td>Nigerian Football Federation</td>
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<td>NIHL</td>
<td>Noise-Induced Hearing Loss</td>
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<td>PVAs</td>
<td>Public Viewing Areas</td>
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<td>SATOUR</td>
<td>South African Tourism</td>
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<td>UEFA</td>
<td>Union of European Football Associations</td>
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Introduction: Towards an Epistemology of African Football – The Symbolic Significance of the 2010 FIFA World Cup

Nhamo Mhiripiri and Tendai Chari

Mega-football events are highly mediated, with a vast potential to attract the attention of millions of people across the globe. Live matches are broadcast on television and big screens in public viewing areas, and radio, newspapers and the internet do their fair share of mediation of the actual sport and the politics and fanfare surrounding the sport. This edited volume uses the FIFA 2010 World Cup in South Africa as a lens through which the multiple narratives about Africa, both those rooted in stereotypical assumptions and those with counter-hegemonic tendencies, are critically examined. In particular, it focuses on how media constructions of the 2010 FIFA World Cup contributed to and were informed by these narratives. The book examines football as a mediated discourse imbued with potent symbolic meanings that permeate ordinary life. The backdrop for such theorization is the FIFA 2010 World Cup, the first World Cup on African soil. Various chapters in the book reveal how the FIFA 2010 World Cup became a site upon which identities are imagined, constructed, reconstructed and deconstructed, thus demonstrating how football events can become positive forces for transforming societies.

Contributions in this volume draw from a range of interdisciplinary scholars based in the African continent, the African Diaspora, Europe and the USA. More broadly, the volume explores the way in which football in Africa is intimately bound up with deeper social, cultural and political currents. Chapters examine the 2010 FIFA World Cup as a potent social signifier from different theoretical and methodological approaches. The idea of the book sprang from the realization that sport, and African football in particular, existed on the margins of the academic enterprise and was narrowly being studied as a mere form of leisure, while its social elements remained on the back burner.

We are convinced that the contributions in this book will expand knowledge on the cultural and symbolic value of football in the African continent
Introduction

beyond the realm of leisure. Our intention was to broaden and complement the growing body of scholarship on African football, particularly its interface with the communication media, and we felt that there was no better way to do so than by using the 2010 FIFA World Cup as the backdrop of this academic enquiry. Unlike earlier publications that focus on various aspects of African football (Darby, 2002; Armstrong & Giulianotti, 2004; Hawkey, 2009; Alegi, 2010; Alegi & Bolsmann, 2010; Korr & Close, 2010), our edited volume has been conceived around the backdrop of a mega-football event, with a particular focus on the symbolic significance of football in society.

The edited volume illuminates the multiple narratives around the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic logic of the event. The book straddles a range of disciplines such as cultural studies, media studies, the sociology of sport and the social sciences of sport. It will be the first to consider African football as a mediated discourse around which multiple narratives cohere. These narratives not only broaden understanding of the social significance of football and its enmeshment with African politics and culture, but also the socio-political character of Africa. It seeks to augment and complement scholarship on African sport, media and cultural studies, adding more voices, theoretical approaches and empirical enquiry. Our inspiration derives from the realization that the disciplines mentioned above have been slow to recognize African football as a legitimate field of academic enquiry. An epistemology of sport in Africa, especially one with more and more African scholars called to the party and sharing their views, has come a long way since the publication of Baker and Mangan’s groundbreaking collection, Sport in Africa: Essays in Social History, in 1987. The 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa gave new impetus to examining the multiple utility of football in Africa from an academic perspective, and this book is evidence of this impetus. Raymond Boyle (2012: 89) opines that ‘sports matters most because of what it tells us about aspects of society rather than specifically about the nature of sporting competition…It reveals aspects of individual and collective identity and its rich diversity of forms…’

Scholarly publications in the form of books and journals and postgraduate theses on the socio-economic, cultural and political significance of sport throughout the continent have been written. In addition, critical studies assessing the interface between sport and society in Africa, straddling the precolonial, colonial and post-colonial periods and applying a range of disciplinary perspectives, including political science, history, anthropology, human geography and sociology, have been produced. We also acknowledge the coterie of works on the study of sport in Africa, which include esteemed journals and dissertations (some of which have been inspired by the FIFA 2010 World Cup).

While previous scholarship on African football has been championed by scholars from the Northern hemisphere, the hosting of the FIFA 2010 World
Cup in South Africa has witnessed new interest on the subject by scholars from the African continent. Our volume attempts to combine voices from the North and from the South.

We are encouraged by the fact that the study of sport in Africa is gaining recognition as an important field of social-scientific and historical enquiry, not only because of a fast-evolving fandom on the continent but because of the critical position of sport as popular spectacle, albeit a part of the culture industries entangled in production, distribution and consumption of sport commodities. It is befitting that sport is finding its deserved space in critical African scholarship. The academic legitimization of African sport scholarship has seen the inclusion of panels on sport and leisure being organized at conferences such as the African Studies Association. In 2010 a number of journals such as Ecquid Novi: Journalism Studies, African Identities and Third World Quarterly, Soccer & Society, to name but a few, had special editions on the FIFA 2010 World Cup, and for the first time featured a significant number of articles by African-based scholars. Other serious journals such as Africa Today, Journal of African History, Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies, Journal of African Media Studies and International Journal of African Historical Studies have, in recent years, published papers dealing specifically with African sport. Notwithstanding these efforts, scholarship on African football remains peripheral compared with football epistemology in other regions, notably Europe, Asia and the Americas.

Our book is being published soon after Peter Alegi and Chris Bolsmann’s ground-breaking Africa’s World Cup: Critical Reflections on Play, Patriotism, Spectatorship, and Space (2013). Although critical differences are anticipated to arise from the set of scholars and writers in the two edited volumes, our wish is that these books will complement each other and inspire a more humane, insightful and critical appreciation of and engagement with African sport and the African condition as a whole. Gone are the days when the study of African sport/football was a peripheral subject in academic scholarship, and the publication of African Football, Identity Politics and Global Media Narratives is a further reminder of this fact. At no time will there be adequate literature on any specific issue. Literature on African football, particularly its cultural dimensions, can never be enough in comparison to the popularity of the game on the continent and the pervasiveness of football imagery in all facets of social life in Africa. Historian Peter Alegi (2010) notes how football has become a rare form of ‘national culture’ in post-independent Africa, having gained its mantle as a tool for expressing dissent against the colonial system. Alegi and Bolsmann (2010) note that football is the most popular sport on the African continent, and many African countries have thriving domestic leagues.

The collection coheres around media narratives, identity politics and the 2010 World Cup, so it has a tight thematic focus. The methodological
Introduction

approaches adopted in various chapters in the proposed collection are innovative and have, no doubt, elicited highly original empirical data gleaned from a variety of sources, such as blogs, travelogues, surveys and media content analysis. Many of the chapters also adopt original theoretical perspectives in their analyses of football during the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament. Contributions in this volume utilize different theoretical and methodological approaches to examine representations of football events in the media, popular culture and everyday communication in the context of the FIFA 2010 World Cup. The initial call for chapters was ambitious and expansive, inviting abstracts in sub-thematic groups linked to the 2010 FIFA World Cup. These included mediation of African football events in Africa; representations of the FIFA 2010 World Cup in the Western media; the FIFA 2010 World Cup in the African media; the interface between football and popular culture in Africa; football, music and dance; football and commercial advertising; football, patriotism and myth-making in the African context; football, politics and society in Africa; football, nationalism and identity; football as a leisure activity; commercial imperatives of football; football and gender in Africa; corporatization of football; football, religion and religiosity; football as a developmental tool; football, fandom and fanaticism; and representations of national soccer teams.

The ambition was not fully realized due to, among other factors, spatial considerations; sheer author burn-out, resulting in some contributors falling by the wayside along the long road of writing and rewriting; and editorial interventions, not least the rigorous peer-review work that saw the rejection of full papers whose abstracts were initially appealing and promising.

This volume is, therefore, an attempt to bring African football to the centre of sport media and cultural studies scholarship through engaging with the cultural and symbolic aspects of football and football events in Africa using a multidisciplinary lens. It examines the multiple narratives on the first football extravaganza on African soil: the FIFA 2010 World Cup, which was held in South Africa.

Unlike other single-authored books which focus on a single aspect of African football, this volume brings together papers on diverse aspects and experiences of African football written from a multidisciplinary perspective. Authors hail from different academic backgrounds and deploy equally diverse methodological and theoretical approaches to interrogate the way in which the FIFA 2010 World Cup was experienced in different parts of the world. Existing books on sport and Africa, which are either single-authored or single-country case studies, have a bias towards a historical perspective on the development of football in Africa. For instance, Peter Alegi’s *African Soccerscapes: How a Continent Changed the World’s Game* (2010) chronicles the trajectory of football in Africa from the 1860s to the time when South Africa won the bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup, with South Africa being the main focus of the book. Because the book covers a long period and primarily
focuses on one African country, it is difficult to delve more deeply into the social signification of football in an African context. Alegi and Bolsmann’s book South Africa and the Game: Football, Apartheid and Beyond (2010) has a bias towards one country, as it examines how South Africa transformed from international isolation in the world of sport to win the bid to host the FIFA 2010 World Cup in 2004, and how the hosting of the mega-event enhanced the country’s image. Another book by Ian Hawkey (2009), The Feet of the Chameleon: The Story of African Football, gives a historical account of the development of football in Africa, covering a number of countries with diverse cultures and histories. What is missing in many books on African football are diverse perspectives engaging with the multiple meanings of football in African society and how those meanings are mobilized in different spheres of life. Alegi and Bolsmann’s Africa’s World Cup is an exception, and our African Football, Identity Politics and Global Media Narratives is a worthy companion, presenting apt contrasts and verisimilitude.

Chapters in the book examine the instrumental logic of football in the sphere of nation-building, national identity and national development. Equally important, but omitted in most existing studies on African football, are football and its interface with communication, and the question of fandom and African fan cultures. These issues are also addressed in this volume, and of particular interest are chapters on gender and fandom by Rosemary Chikafa and Emma Durden, written against the backdrop of dominant patriarchal assumptions that soccer is a male sport.

The collection of essays in our edited volume straddles diverse disciplines, and authors hail from equally diverse geographical regions, but their contributions are unified and converge around common thematic, theoretical and methodological approaches. The list of authors speaks of a combination of emerging, mid-career and established academics and some early career researchers. The contributors are well positioned to engage with the subjects of sports, media and cultural studies, as they are well published in the area of communication, media and society. A few, such as Horky and Grimmer, have established backgrounds in the social-scientific study of sport per se, but those without such a background compensate for the lack with their informed understanding of media and cultural studies and the capacity of these fields to accommodate interdisciplinarity. What was refreshing in all the chapters was a preparedness to engage with other existing literature on African football and sport.

That the hosting of any future mega-sports events particularly in contexts where socio-economic disparities exist and huge expenditure of national resources on sports mega-events is difficult to justify, makes this volume both timely and relevant. The struggle over the meaning of mediate sports events was evident during demonstrations that plagued Brazil before and during the 2013 Confederations Cup and the preparatory stages for the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil. These developments echo events in South Africa in the run-up
to the FIFA 2010 World Cup. As the World Cup in Brazil beckons, similar issues, themes and legacies will manifest themselves, thereby reinforcing the currency of the issues explored in this volume. Inevitably, race remains a key to understanding Africa, admittedly with much more humane and sensitive encounters and representations of the continent. Whether Brazil will be viewed through the prism of race and class remains a question that is yet to be answered. Whereas Africa and South Africa in particular, had to struggle against Afro-pessimism, it remains to be seen whether any other host country or continent will be viewed through its human or racial archetypes, and to what extent the transcendental human identity will over-ride narrow conceptions of personhood, nationhood and cosmopolitanism. This book appeals to a range of disciplines. While its primary market is, admittedly, the social sciences of sport, it nonetheless remains relevant for sociology, politics, media and cultural studies. It would be a useful resource for final-year undergraduate and postgraduate students and researchers.

Summary of chapters

The volume comprises 14 chapters organized into four parts. Part I examines identity construction around narratives about the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Part II focuses on African fan cultures in the context of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, with particular attention to hegemonic constructions of gender. Part III examines African media narratives, focusing on media coverage of South Africa and Africa during the 2010 World Cup tournament. Part IV explores global media narratives of the 2010 World Cup, with special focus on the Western media representations of Africa during the World Cup. In Chapter 1, media scholars Nathalie Hyde-Clarke, Rune Ottosen and Toby Miller examine audience views on nation-building during the 2010 FIFA World Cup, questioning whether the ‘nation-building’ spirit engendered by the tournament was evident during and after the tournament. They observe that both the banality and the liberatory aspect of nationalism were on full display during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. On the one hand, there was a desire by football fans to use the vuvuzela as a red herring to distract opponents, a symbol of superiority and an expression of emotion, while, on the other hand, football was used as a tool to forge national unity in a manner that transcended South Africa’s apartheid legacy. Although nation-building and pan-Africanist sentiments were evident during the World Cup, they were too brief to be significant, underlining the inherent shortcomings in the instrumental logic of mega-football events. In the next chapter, semi-professional football player and ‘football tourist’ Luke Jones critically examines the potential influence of the various narratives about contemporary South Africa circulating during the 2010 FIFA World Cup on tourists from the global North. Using extracts from his diary, Jones considers how the various narratives about South Africa’s socio-cultural and political reality
shape the tourist’s knowledge and perceptions about South Africa upon his return to the global North, and how such knowledge and experience contributed to the formulation and solidification of certain truths about contemporary South African socio-cultural and political reality. Jones opines that how the tourist from the global North chose to re-story the various narratives about the host country could have far-reaching implications for the knowledge and perceptions of other Northerners about South Africa. The chapter demonstrates how visitors to South Africa during the World Cup were exposed to complex and conflicting accounts about the country’s social reality, and how their experiences contradicted the dominant narratives about the country’s racial harmony and stability. The experiences highlighted in Jones’s diary extracts resonate with Foucault’s (1977) view that there is no single regime of truth about South Africa’s social divisions, and the 2010 FIFA World Cup became an occasion for interrogating certain normalized narratives about the country’s racial stability which had been promoted by officialdom. Sociologist Kiran Odhav explores simulations of FIFA World Cup activities in Mahikeng, a town in the North West Province of South Africa. His analysis shows that, despite being excluded from the main activities of the World Cup, the activities involving the local community in Mahikeng constituted a hegemonic contest to the FIFA festivities around the country. He argues that the creation of a mini-World Cup for the youth in Mahikeng was an opportunity to host cultural events involving rural residents, thereby transforming the multicultural landscape of the World Cup. He argues that the projects in Mahikeng during the 2010 FIFA World Cup demonstrate some form of chipping away at the hegemonic domination over nations and their sports regimes and proof that the global is not immune to subversion. For Kiran, the activities that took place in these excluded locations are an indication that the World Cup needs to be democratized in order to be harnessed for multiple purposes of social change. In the next chapter, University of Texas-based health and kinesiology expert Wycliffe Njororai explores the demographic characteristics and affiliations of African players at the 2010 FIFA World Cup and their implications for the domestic league. He observes that the majority of African players at the World Cup ply their trade in Europe, a trend that is attributed to the unequal distribution of resources between the global North and the South, the lucrative financial compensation offered by European teams and the prestige of the European soccer brand. This analysis reveals that, while African teams with foreign-based players benefit through their domination of African continental competitions, such as the Africa Cup of Nations Cup, and opportunities to represent the continent at the World Cup final tournament, they are robbed of the top talent which would enhance their marketability. The real legacy of the 2010 FIFA World Cup is the realization that the domestic African game needs urgent revamping and professionalization if it is to compete on the global arena. The chapter illuminate
how the global sports labour migration system has been undermining the
development of African football. Part II of the volume turns to African fans
as a critical legacy of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Theatre for Development
specialist Emma Durden explores the phenomenon of new-found football
fans during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Employing a qualitative ethnographic
approach, she examines the sense of national identity of a group of party-
goers turned football fans for the duration of the 2010 World Cup. Durden
observes how the ubiquitous excitement and positive spirit engendered by
the World Cup intensified positive feelings of ‘South African-ness’. Her anal-
ysis reveals that the World Cup in South Africa offered white South Africans
an opportunity to break out of their self-imposed identity enclaves to inter-
act with the rest of the population. However, the sense of fandom exhibited
by this group was short-lived; the sense of camaraderie, community and sol-
idarity characteristic of the World Cup faded, and the sense of pessimism
returned as the curtain was brought down on the tournament. Although
there was an overwhelming feeling of a single South African identity dur-
ing the World Cup, this was transient; such a feeling was impossible to
sustain in the post-World Cup phase. Findings in this chapter bring to
the fore the malleability of national identity, in so far as it is continually
moulded by the ever-changing matrix of historical, cultural and social fac-
tors. In the next chapter Rosemary Chikafa takes up similar issues, but goes
further by bringing aspects of gender into World Cup spectatorship. Her
analysis interrogates the potential and reality of the 2010 FIFA World Cup
in transfiguring gender relations. Combining a focus group discussion with
semi-structured interviews with Zimbabwean female football spectators, she
asks whether the 2010 FIFA World Cup gave women more access to pub-
clic spaces to articulate their fandom due to the absence of any significant
discrimination against women. Her analysis reveals that full participation
by Zimbabwean female audiences in these public spaces during the World
Cup was hindered by their desire to maintain a harmonious co-existence
with their male counterparts. The ‘African’ context of the World Cup obliged
female spectators to conform to cultural conventions rooted in patriarchal
hegemonies embedded in the Zimbabwean culture. Chikafa argues that the
negotiation of gendered sports spaces by Zimbabwean spectators during the
2010 FIFA World Cup mirrors gender relations in Africa, whereby the wom-
anist struggle is essentially in concert with, rather than against, men and
women embracing their domestic roles as key figures in the family. Writing
from the USA, State University of Arizona communication scholar Jeffrey
Kassing explores the controversy around the vuvuzela, focusing on the com-
peting narratives on its cultural significance during the 2010 FIFA World
Cup. The chapter reveals how, as a cultural symbol, the vuvuzela became
a polarizing force during the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and discourses about
what is a permissible and appropriate enactment of fandom illuminated the
different meanings about how fandom should or should not be enacted.
The sound of the vuvuzela, and the manner in which it was played during the World Cup, further challenges certain notions and expectations about football fandom. The debate about the vuvuzela further demonstrates how sporting traditions continue to evolve and become revitalized over time. The competing versions of fandom – pitting an ethnorelativist approach to football fandom that recognizes all football traditions against a universal one that accentuates an ethnocentric notion of football fandom – is testament to the fact that the vuvuzela is an artefact of South African football tradition as much as a counter-hegemonic tool. The debate on the vuvuzela reveals how fandom during the 2010 FIFA World Cup projected ethnocentric notions of football fandom which is intolerant of difference, and how the globalization of mega-football events such as FIFA World Cup fosters narrower versions of football fandom. In Part III the volume focuses on African media narratives, particularly on how African-based print and electronic media framed the host country and the African continent. Howard University (Washington DC)-based academic Chuka Onwumechili investigates the Nigerian media’s framing of sports stories before, during and after the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament and the possible impact of such framing on Nigerian football fans. His study reveals that, prior to the World Cup, football reports in Nigerian newspapers echoed those of the Western media, characterized by negativity about South Africa’s capability to host the mega-sporting event. South Africa was projected as incapable, unorganized and the Other, and this anticipated failure was framed as expected and systematic. However, there was a shift from negative to positive media framing during the tournament, as the anticipated chaos did not take place, and the event resulted in South Africa being separated from the rest of the African continent. In the aftermath of the World Cup, Nigerian framing of news about South Africa was characterized by the perpetuation or rejection of Western media frames, depending on the type of story at hand. This ambivalence in media framing reflects the post-colonial context, in which the African media operate in liminal spaces and are amenable to, as well as resisting, colonial influences of Western media. The long-term implications of such influences are that the stereotypical framing of stories by the African media may engender Afro-pessimism (see also Tendai Chari, Chapter 9 and Nothias Toussaint, Chapter 14) in this volume. In the next chapter, Tendai Chari similarly focuses on framing of South Africa and Africa during the 2010 FIFA World Cup, with a view to ascertaining the extent to which such representation was pivoted on a counter-hegemonic lens. Employing textual analysis and informed by framing analysis, Chari analyses the discourses about South Africa and Africa in selected newspapers before, during and after the tournament. He observes that the framing of South Africa and Africa hinged on three main frames designed to re-image and re-imagine South Africa and Africa. However, these frames unwittingly elicited images that might undermine the image make-over enterprise, thus underscoring the
ambivalence inherent in the symbolic signification of mega-sports events such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Like Onwumechili, Chari’s analysis alludes to the subtle and not so subtle influences of the global media on African media through their agenda-setting processes. In the next chapter, Joyce Tsitsi Mhiripiri and Nhamo Anthony Mhiripiri examine the representation of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in media and scholarly articles. Drawing from purposively sampled archival press reports published between 2009 and 2013, their analysis hinges on an attempt to glean insights on whether the World Cup tournament presented any opportunities for the implosion, sustenance or perpetuation of Afro-pessimistic discourses that have held the continent back from being embraced in the global community of nations. Their analysis points to the fact that, although there were a considerable number of articles showing that the World Cup had engendered fervent moments of national identity cohesion, the moments of intense group, national and pan-African identification were fleeting and fraught with contradictions and suspicion, if not hostility. According to the authors, this shows that sport’s intended ideals are sometimes at odds with the reality on the ground; football may inadvertently reproduce narrow identities such as ethnicity, racism and regionalism rather than fostering higher transcendental social goals. This ambivalent function of football is a motif that connects most of the papers in this part of the edited volume.

Part IV of the volume focuses on global media narratives about the FIFA World Cup in South Africa, with particular focus on the hegemonic constructions of South Africa during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Writing from Germany, sports journalism scholars Thomas Horky and Christoph Gimmer examine the reporting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup on German prime time television and social media, focusing on the image of the ‘Dark Continent’ projected in these media through a longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis of German public television reports and a qualitative content analysis of selected social media. Their study concludes that the image of the African continent in the German media was ambivalent. While discourses on the vuvuzela in the social media and tabloids tended to be a perpetuation of Eurocentric views, reporting on public television and the broadsheets was found to be more balanced and often provided sufficient background information on the topic at hand. In addition, the study observes the currency of inter-media agenda-setting between traditional media, notably newspapers and television, and social media platforms such as Facebook and blogs, where journalistic forms are increasingly shaping the image of South Africa. In the next chapter, media studies scholar Teke Ngomba explores the coverage of Africa during the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament in nine mainstream newspapers with a view to understanding the correlation between the hosting of global mega-sports events and a country’s or region’s mediated image. Ngomba’s analysis reveals that coverage of Africa during the World Cup in these newspapers was more complex, with some clearly noticeable differences in the level of country-based thematic diversity. However,
findings do not indicate any correlation between the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and positive representations of Africa, signalling the fact that the hosting of the tournament was not a unique period as far as the Western media were concerned. The chapter contends that the hosting of a mega-sport event such as the FIFA World Cup does not necessarily lead to significant alterations in the image of a country or region. Given the obsession of the Western media with negative stories on Africa, it might be more fruitful for African governments to change their mediated portrayals by vigorously attacking these ‘media menus’, in Ngomba’s opinion. Writing from Cape Town, media scholar Bernadine Jones takes up the issue of Western media hegemonic constructions of Africa. She, however, adds a different dimension to her contribution by spotlighting both local and foreign television channels’ coverage of Africa during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Through a semiotic analysis of news on five television channels, Jones observes how the diversity of themes and types of frames used in foreign television channels significantly differed from those deployed by local television stations. While the foreign television stations viewed Africa and South Africa through a colonial lens, coverage in local television stations emphasized detachment. This underscores how coverage of the 2010 FIFA World Cup was circumscribed by the exigencies of history, geography and politics. Jones argues that media framing of an event has wider ramifications, in terms of not only audience ratings, but also the way in which locals and international audiences perceive a place. The concluding chapter, by Toussaint Nothias, examines French and British media coverage of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, questioning whether or not such coverage was dominated by Afro-pessimism. The chapter opens critical pathways for understanding Afro-pessimism as a discourse by outlining three rhetorical steps through which Afro-pessimism can be conceptualized, namely, observation, interpretation and prediction. He also highlights the different discourses between and within the newspapers, including Afro-pessimism, exoticism, social critique, positive discourse on media and reflexivity. He argues that the map of meaning construction in the coverage of the 2010 FIFA World Cup was more complex than has been contemplated in previous empirical studies on representation of Africa. Thus, coverage of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in the selected French and British newspapers, to some degree, disrupted Afro-pessimism. The chapter argues that both the French and the British developed a reflexive analysis of the World Cup, and the successful hosting of the World Cup by South Africa also produced an image that disrupted Afro-pessimism.

References


Part I

FIFA 2010 World Cup and Identity Construction
1

Nation-Building and the FIFA World Cup, South Africa 2010

Nathalie Hyde-Clarke,1 Rune Ottosen2 and Toby Miller3

Introduction

There is endless debate about the legitimacy of major global sporting events, most notably the summer Olympic Games and the World Cup of men’s football. At a symbolic level, they are heralded as grand opportunities for sport to express the brotherhood and sisterhood of humanity. At a national level, they are regarded as a source of national pride in the face of world competition. At a commercial level, they are seen as a boost to economic development through infrastructural development and tourism. Conversely, these occasions are also and equally pilloried, for precisely the obverse of the positive claims made about them (Pellegrino et al., 2010; Carreño Lara, 2012; Ferreira & Boshoff, 2013).

At a symbolic level, these occasions are derided for glorifying competitiveness and humiliation to express hierarchy and pride. At a national level, they are criticized as chauvinistic and privileging a tiny sector of society. And at a commercial level, vast public subsidies are shown not to bring a return on investment, and the organizers are found to have favoured business interests that vend unhealthy products. These political–economic controversies are exacerbated by environmental concerns to do with massive international travel (Witt and Loots, 2010). Despite the weight of evidence on both sides, governments rush to compete for the privilege of hosting these events, buoyed by boosterish arguments and ignoring cultural critiques and cost–benefit analyses.

The reason why these acts of seeming public policy folly keep being repeated is that sport supposedly signifies something greater than itself, reflecting and reinforcing emotions about the nation as a whole. One view is that countries usually unable to compete in the international arena with other states that are economically stronger may briefly ‘escape and reverse the previous disadvantageous relations’ (Maguire, 1999: 19) through sporting success. International sport and national identity are intertwined (Keim,
2003: 176), and political figures use this relationship to build a sense of unity. Leaders such as former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and South African President Nelson Mandela have trumpeted sport’s capacity to counter discrimination through hope, merit, universality, peace, justice and tolerance, at the same time as they accept its corporate and governmental dominance (Donnelly, 2008: 382). Post-apartheid South African leaders have utilized major spectacles to construct a ‘rainbow’ nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011: 280). In 1995, the Rugby World Cup was deployed as a symbolic means of uniting a newly democratic society emerging from the minority privilege mentioned above. It was ‘seen as a political masterstroke’ (Keech, 2004: 105) when Mandela arrived at the Final wearing a Springbok rugby shirt. A sport once regarded as the acme of white male minority privilege was instantaneously heralded as a vehicle for transcending that heritage and representing national pride, honour and identity (Maguire, 1999: 177).

It has been argued that the FIFA World Cup has influenced attitudes towards national identity within hosting countries (Ismer, 2011), as well as perceptions of those nations in the global community (Vidacs, 2011). Of course, the process of nation-building is a complex one in a country such as South Africa, diverse in terms of ethnicities, languages and beliefs. However, there is general agreement that international sports events may obscure those divisions that would otherwise threaten national stability. As such, there is a growing interest in the relationship between sport and national identity – and, when literature on the relationship between nationalism, nation-building and football is studied, it is clear that Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ continue to play an influential role (Bairner, 2009). Ismer (2011) argues that mass football tournaments, such as the World Cup, create a national euphoria that enables people to move past individual differences and to construct a common ‘world’ that relies on collective emotion to reflect shared meanings and values. This results in social cohesion for the duration of that event.

In the international arena, the national team represent the nation symbolically, and so the population tend to be very supportive of their efforts, even if they did not support the side in the past due to either lack of interest in the sport or the team’s poor performance in previous games (Bairner, 2009). This aspect is clearly demonstrated in the 2010 World Cup, as the national side, Bafana Bafana,4 would not otherwise have qualified, due to a series of losing games leading up to the tournament. In addition to team allegiance, the nation is promoted through commercial products, tourism and political rhetoric – all of which place emphasis on the hosting country’s ‘unique’ attributes. It is, of course, ironic that many of these attributes are stereotypical renditions that would, under other circumstances, be challenged as offering too limiting a depiction. Regardless, the mechanisms in play make it easier to ‘imagine’ the nation, both locally and abroad. It is, therefore, not unusual to find that government intentions and the population’s reactions are complementary, ‘even if the population resented
the government’s attempts to co-opt such sports achievements’ (Vidacs, 2011: 33).

When South Africa hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup of men’s football, the rhetoric of both the state and the bourgeois media was that the event united the nation under the banner of sport, creating a platform for further nation-building based on patriotic fervour. There was a related, more pragmatic claim: that urban development would follow (Steinbrink et al., 2011). This chapter investigates the manifestation of these desires among spectators during the World Cup, and whether the putative nationalism generated by the event still maintained its momentum a year later.

The destructiveness of chauvinistic nationalism, as well as its productivity as a source of subaltern struggle, make our project and its terms of measurement ambiguous and ambivalent (Czegledy, 2009). Such research provides a means of studying the success of nationalism as both a contingent and a prevailing discourse in popular culture. Nationalism is a popular logic that is at the same time open to the nativist, the imperialist and the subaltern under particular circumstances. A liberatory rhetoric in terms of democratization can quickly become a repressive rule that denies difference. As a late entrant to post-colonialism, South Africa is a fascinating way in to this complexity (Alegi & Bolsmann, 2010).

South Africa was unusual among the white settler colonies of European imperialism in that its invading populations never became majorities demographically, and hence relied more than most on generations of physical repression and nationalistic supremacism as cornerstones of domestic security. Sport symbolized this dual material and cultural hegemony (Ismer, 2011). The apartheid nation’s most rhetorically prized recreational activities, cricket in summer and rugby in winter, were coded as white yet truly national (Swart et al., 2011).

Football was introduced to the region by colonial settlers, teachers and missionaries in 1860. Today, it is the most popular sport across Africa (Luginaah & Otiso, 2010: 5). Under apartheid, football was the province of the oppressed black majority and coded as sectarian by white hegemony. As a subaltern subculture, football strengthened morale among black South Africans in the fight against apartheid. On Robben Island, for instance, the prisoners held football tournaments every Saturday with different clubs, creating their own team identity, in many cases across political differences:

Saturday’s football became the greatest escape from the routine of the prison. What struck many of the prisoners was the ‘sheer happiness’ of being out, either playing or watching. Even the harshest football weather was remembered as the ‘brightness’ of Saturday morning. Playing or watching football felt so natural to the men at the times they had to remind themselves of the bizarre setting in which the matches were taking place.

(Korr & Close, 2008: 212)
The importance of sport was recognized in an international struggle to highlight the horror of apartheid. From the late 1960s on, thanks to global campaigns, sport became a crucial means of isolating South Africa through the Gleneagles Agreement and associated bans. The state’s transformation in the mid-1990s into a democracy ushered the nation back into the pantheon of global sporting competition, from which it had been isolated for over 20 years. Sport immediately became a key part of foreign policy and cultural diplomacy in post-apartheid society.

Because FIFA had expelled the then all-white South African team in 1976, it had a high standing among black football fans, who mostly supported South Africa’s application to host the 2010 World Cup (Ndlovu, 2010: ix). There was also a pan-African dimension to the choice of South Africa as host (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). Many African leaders favoured the selection of an African country. One top player, the Cameroonian striker Samuel Eto’o, said: ‘I’d like my country to win but I am first an African before being a Cameroonian’ (Ndlovu, 2010: 150). This regional and cultural identification was also visible in the Cup logo, which featured a player kicking a ball, and a stylized background abstraction of the African continent in different colours (Czeglédy, 2009: 284).

Awarding the World Cup of football to a previously pariah state indexed its welcome into the world of states and emphasized that a sport coded as black was, ironically, the universalist key to this re-emergence. And, indeed, we are told that one in every two living people across the globe watched some part of the 2010 men’s World Cup on television (fifa.com).

None of this is to deny the complex diversity and ongoing fissures and pressure points of South African society, which is home to rich and sometimes conflicting cultures and ethnic groups with varying levels of incorporation into the ideological state apparatus. For example, the government recognizes 11 languages, and the national anthem includes four of them. Less pluralistically, two decades into democracy, the legacy of apartheid can still be seen, as ‘different population groups continue to inhabit different residential areas; the majority of (Black) Africans still live in the same townships as under apartheid; often under equally difficult conditions’ (Keim, 2003: 175). Unease continues to surround discussion of national identity (Keech, 2004: 119), and one frequently encounters tensions that articulate to race and socio-economic status, with wealth and power frequently structured in dominance through skin colour. The notion of the ‘rainbow nation’ – a collective that prides itself on cohesion through diversity – is a riposte to the cultural correlates of ongoing socio-economic sectarianism. South Africans supposedly share a love of sport. That said, the choice of sport still varies along racial lines. The majority of blacks prefer football, while whites favour rugby (Keim, 2003: 204), in accordance with the racialization and differential coding of these sports under apartheid.
This chapter draws on this symbolic and political–economic background and the empirical research of two surveys to measure nationalism through verbal and non-verbal expressions of patriotism and national symbols (Alegi, 2004; Calland et al., 2011). A quantitative survey was conducted during June 2010, with 778 participants, and a qualitative one on 24 May 2011, with 55 respondents. We use these instruments to determine whether the South African public perceived immediate and ongoing benefits from hosting the World Cup in terms of nation-building, and how that sense was communicated to the larger population. The study does not assume such forms of nationalism are desirable or undesirable; merely that they form a core part of the claims made for the Cup and are hence worth investigating.

Results of a survey conducted in Johannesburg, June 2010

This instrument gauged fan culture across countries via the display of national symbols through supporter apparel as signs of allegiance to the various international football teams. The 877 questionnaires distributed derive from a non-probability convenience sample of the population living in or visiting the Greater Johannesburg Area between 11 June and 11 July 2010. In some cases, respondents were so enthusiastic about their participation in the survey that they added comments to the requested responses, a few of which are included in the discussion below.

The vast majority of respondents were South African (66.7%), followed by visitors from Ghana (2.5%), Mexico (2.3%) and the USA (2.2%). The range of international visitors was influenced by the match schedule and the allocation of specific locations to the four groups in the first round. There was a relatively equal split between male (54.3%) and female (45.7%) respondents. Most fell between the ages of 20 and 35 (60.6%), although ages 15 and up were represented. Of the sample population, 29% identified as black, 37.2% white and 23% coloured. The first two racial categories were relatively evenly split between South Africans and those from other countries of origin. This is similar to the findings of a separate research team (Swart et al., 2011).

Of the respondents in our study, 61.5% agreed that ‘Football is my favourite sport to watch’. Men opted more frequently for ‘strongly agree’, whereas women tended to ‘agree’. The South African contingent accounted for the majority of these favourable responses, with 43% (mostly women) indicating that hosting the World Cup in South Africa had heightened their interest in the sport.

Fan culture

For 89% of respondents, 2010 was their first time attending a World Cup. Most (66.8%) had never even attended an international football match
prior to the event. This was notably the case among South Africans, 90% of whom had never left the country to watch football. By contrast, almost half of those from other countries, mostly men, had been to previous World Cups. The overall study also supported the fact that men seemed more determined to attend a match (40.8%) than women (17.2%), who preferred to watch on TV (for an account of the gendered implications of the Finals, see Pillay & Salo, 2010).

These numbers partly reflect a culture of affluent male football fans keen to see as many matches in person as possible. For example, a Swedish father (aged 70) and son (aged 41) were among the respondents. They had been to every World Cup Final since 1990. This was part of their lifestyle: they were football fans at home, supporting a local team, but the trip abroad to combine the World Cup with tourism was the highlight for them as fans. Their wives, sisters and grandchildren stayed home. This was a ‘guy thing’.

As many as 93.5% of our respondents indicated they would support a specific team during the Cup – with 37.7% favouring the home team, Bafana Bafana, a nickname that worked to encompass and at the same time transcend national identification and endorse fan speech as well as official speech (Awad, 2012). Other frequently mentioned teams were Brazil (9.7%), Spain (6.7%), England (5.2%), Ghana (5.1%) and the Netherlands (4.9%).

Many people surveyed were concerned that ticket costs would diminish attendance (41.7%). This perspective was especially apparent among the home crowd: almost half the South Africans indicated they could not afford the price of admission. Of these, 67.9% preferred to watch on television, with 55.5% citing ‘comfort’ as their principal reason. Of those able to purchase tickets (50.6%), the ‘bringing the nation together’ slogan seemed to hide the class aspect. One of the respondents was ‘Mark’, a white University teacher. He attended his first-ever football fixture when he entered the ‘Soccer City stadium’ for the opening match, South Africa versus Mexico. Jacob, a black engineer on his way to the match against Uruguay in Pretoria, explained that he was an old Kaizer Chief fan and had attended many matches through the years. (Across the continent, club fixtures have long engendered great passion; Luginaah & Otiso, 2010). After turning 60, he mainly watched on television, but was excited to take part in an historic event and wanted to experience it live. The white debutant and the black veteran had a crucial thing in common: they could afford the tickets.

This issue raises the question of FIFA’s commodification and government-alization of football fandom. FIFA is profit-oriented, and the World Cup is a money machine. In terms of the Association’s rights-protection programme, spectators were not permitted to wear mass-produced, commercially branded clothing or accessories during matches unless those products were licensed to FIFA. Special courts were set up to deal with violations of these regulations. This kind of commodity fetishism and its inevitable accompaniment of corruption have been well documented over decades of studies of the
World Cup (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998; Jennings, 2006). In 2010, two FIFA vice-presidents were suspended because of corruption prior to the vote for hosting the World Cup in 2014 and 2018 (Ottosen et al., 2012). Despite the clear evidence of FIFA’s greed, few people in our survey agreed that the World Cup was about making money rather than promoting sport (26%). This is in accordance with the World Cup’s successful encoding as a contest of nations, even though it serves as a corporate bazaar (Luginaah & Otiso, 2010).

1. Fan Culture and Supporter Wear

Given FIFA’s policing of clothing – and the fans’ determination to interpret the Finals in nationalistic rather than commercial frames – we wondered whether they would wear officially sanctioned supporter outfits. In response, 87.7% said ‘yes’. These items included t-shirts (32.4%), flags (15.5%), caps or hats (13.3%) and scarves (13.8%). While both men and women were generally eager to wear supporter apparel, women indicated a slight preference for face paint. The vast majority (72.3%) stated they did so to show support, while 8.2% said it would make them feel part of the crowd. Most respondents had purchased these items themselves (70.3%), while 24.9% (mostly women) had received them as gifts.

But among the commodities on display was the vuvuzela, a brightly coloured plastic horn emitting a very loud noise akin to the sound of angry hornets that emerged organically via small businesses rather than Association-licensed corporate manufacturers. It turned out to be a firm favourite, with 66.4% of respondents saying they would blow one or had done so at a match. Kåre Siem, a Norwegian and secretary-general of the South African football association, had followed South African sport closely for many years. He observed that vuvuzelas now also appeared among white supporters at rugby matches. He saw this as a trend whereby sports brought races together, and was confident that the World Cup would have that effect in general (VG Net 13 June 2010).

It was generally accepted that Bafana Bafana was unlikely to progress to the second round, based on very poor performances ahead of the tournament, and locals often referred to the vuvuzela as South Africa’s secret weapon (Calland et al., 2010). Many hoped the noise would distract other teams:

The only way Bafana Bafana will go through to the next round will be because of the vuvuzela. Hopefully the noise will scare the other teams and they won’t play so well. Then we can win.

(White female, 27, 7 June)

This conspiracy theory was supported by Marcello Lippi, coach of the Italian team. He claimed that the hosts increased the sound from the vuvuzela
through loudspeakers at the arenas to disturb foreign teams (VG Nett, 15 June 2011).

The vuvuzelas divided the media along national lines. While South African media like the Johannesburg newspaper The Sun wrote favourably about vuvuzelas as signs of national unity and commercial success stories, the foreign media were highly critical. Many international television networks expressed concern about the noise disturbing their audience. Advertisers were worried as the audience turned down the sound on their TVs because of the noise from the vuvuzelas and therefore missed the commercials (Ottosen et al., 2012: 121).

And in the event Bafana Bafana did not succeed, despite the intervention of the vuvuzela, there was the question of whom South Africans would support. The response was varied, although a fair number cited Brazil as their second choice. The reasons given varied:

I support Bafana Bafana. If they go out, then I will support Brazil. They wear the same colours as Bafana.

(Black female, 23, 7 June)

Quite a few South Africans supported Ghana once they became the last African team remaining (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011: 406). But others favoured Argentina, Spain and Brazil – none of which were major 19th-century colonizers of the continent.

2. Perspectives on South Africa

Most respondents (95.5%) thought the World Cup would be good for South Africa’s international reputation. This finding is widely supported in the literature on the World Cup in 2010 (see Alegi & Bolsmann, 2010). Despite fears expressed in the mainstream media, 47.4% did not believe criminal activity would increase during this time. Most of those surveyed (72.9%) indicated excitement and enthusiasm about meeting fans from other countries and tended not to dwell on negative sentiments about South Africa or its ability to host the event. In fact, many saw the Cup as a means of building national pride:

At 12:00, we went to bridge. You know the one across the main road here? Okay, so there are hundreds there, and everyone is blowing their vuvuzelas. The sound was crazy. People were laughing and dancing. Then, you won’t believe this, the cars stopped below the bridge and start hooting. People jump out their cars and they are dancing and shouting. Everyone was so happy – and so patriotic. It is great that we have become so patriotic.

(Black female, 19, 9 June)
I live in Soweto. You never see white people in Soweto. They are too afraid. Last week, I decide to go see Soccer City. And I nearly fell down...there were white people in the streets...walking like you see in the shopping mall with black people. No one is afraid. They are just walking like that. We are coming together now. This has changed us. We are coming together.

(Black female, 38, 10 June)

In October 2010, the Southern Africa Tourism Service Association claimed that approximately 400,000 foreign visitors arrived in South Africa during the World Cup tournament. According to a FIFA poll, 83% of visitors said that they would return and 94% said they would recommend South Africa as a tourist destination (Calland et al., 2010: 200–1).

The sustainability of national pride: 2011 follow-up survey

The direct costs to the taxpayers of building ten World Cup stadiums and other investments exceeded R40 billion. Income from the Finals was estimated at R27 billion (Calland et al., 2010: 200–1). But was this expenditure worth it in the eyes of the South African public? In order to determine whether the nation-building exercise of the World Cup had longer-term effects, a follow-up qualitative survey was conducted with 55 participants almost one year after the event, on 24 May 2011. Almost all (98%) of the participants believed that the tournament had contributed to nation-building and national pride in 2010. During the Finals, 84% of those questioned had demonstrated that sentiment through the display or use of supporter attire or items – but just 29% continued to use these symbols and items a year later. Items identified included a wrist band, scarves, beanies/hats, national soccer jerseys and t-shirts, bumper stickers, flags (in cars and at sports events), vuvuzelas, and wigs. Seven people mentioned ‘pride’ in South Africa as their rationale. A number linked this feeling to identity. Quotations include:

- It gives me a sense of pride in my country.
- I continue to wear my jersey out of pride and to show my SA identity.
- I wear my jersey to show how proud I am to come from SA.
- This way, people are constantly reminded of who they are.

A few others mentioned the importance of keeping alive the unity and nationhood they had experienced during the Finals:

- I believe the legacy should continue even after the World Cup.
- For me the whole campaign of flying a flag around was to support our country, and that shouldn’t stop.
I just like the flag stuck to my windscreen, so it just remained. I still enjoy showing that I support SA after the event.

The dynamic of fan as consumer was clearly relevant:

- I bought the paraphernalia, so I might as well still use it.

Those who no longer used these items and symbols listed two main reasons. The first was the end of the event (19 respondents) and the second the ‘wear and tear’ or deterioration of the items acquired (ten). Some more poignant comments included:

- The World Cup spirit died when the World Cup ended.
- The national spirit and pride lasted as long as the World Cup did.
- We are way past that excitement!

Even though a large percentage of respondents no longer used supporter gear, comparatively few (22%) thought there were no long-term benefits from hosting the World Cup in terms of nation-building. The vast majority (78%) said it had been a positive experience that continued to reverberate throughout the population. Many mentioned ongoing national pride (seven respondents), while others thought it had improved relations between cultures and races (23 respondents). Statements included:

- It still brings people together. We can be proud.
- Many more white people attend the stadiums in the townships than before.
- Soccer is a sport supported by mostly black people, but everyone supported Bafana Bafana. I am more aware of my country’s team now.
- It helped to create tolerance of other cultures.
- Reduced racial tension.
- People have found a common interest through sport. Friendships have been built.
- It helped to build respect. It brought people together.
- More white people watch soccer than before, and more black people watch rugby. This is different from what we saw before.

Those who could no longer see benefits cited a number of factors. The most prominent was lack of momentum and commitment to building a national spirit:

- We all seemed united, but when the World Cup ended, the unity ended with it. It could have been retained through other activities.
• We did this to show unity to foreigners, and now they are not around so it is pointless.

Others saw the Cup as a hiatus from everyday realities:

• All the problems and segregation were swept under the rug for one month.
• People are back to the reality of being jobless.
• Most people are still poor. So how did that benefit anyone?
• Racial tensions continue to bubble undercover.
• The country returned to its own hateful self. There is racism. This is evident in everyday life. There is tension between South Africans. During the World Cup this was not visible, and for the first time I can say the atmosphere was perfect.

Lastly, a few suggested that political issues had worked against the unifying effect of the Cup:

• I think that the municipal strike that came immediately after the World Cup was the end of any feeling towards national pride. The constant bombardment of negative communication in the media makes it difficult to maintain any pride.
• The local elections came too soon and spoiled the momentum.

People were divided again because of the political parties they supported. It is clear that, while the euphoria of national pride during the World Cup persisted one year later, the reality of everyday tensions and struggles had eroded the phenomenon. While all agreed the event itself was instrumental in creating a brief yet essential unifying force in South Africa, it seemed that the effects were not long-lived. This is in keeping with findings elsewhere about the esteem of the nation, both at home and abroad (Holtzhausen & Fullerton, 2013; Kaplanidou et al., 2013).

Conclusion

Both the gruesome banality of nationalism and its liberatory potential were on symbolic display in the 2010 World Cup. On the one hand, we see the desire to use vuvuzelas to distract opponents, the idea of sporting success as a metaphor for superiority, the expression of emotion through corporate commodities, and the endorsement of FIFA- and state-sponsored chauvinism. On the other, we see the desire to act ‘as one’ in a way that transcends South Africa’s history of imperialism, colonialism, segregation, discrimination and authoritarian populism for the few under the sign of a black-coded
sport. In this way, nation-building has occurred, albeit briefly. It is also of interest how the improved South African national image and social cohesion result in a stronger pan-African sentiment, as participants admitted to intentionally choosing other African teams once Bafana Bafana failed to qualify for the next round. However, one should also be aware of the dangers of encouraging ‘90 minute patriots’, which may impact on more serious political policy-making and deliberations (Bairner, 2009). Without doubt, the fundamental ambiguity of sport and nationalism continues to beguile both publics and researchers (Czeglédy, 2009; Desai & Vahed, 2010; Calland et al., 2010).

Notes

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2. Professor in Journalism at Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences, Norway.
3. Sir Walter Murdoch Professor of Cultural Policy Studies at Murdoch University and Professor of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies at Cardiff University/Prifysgol Caerdydd
4. Boys, Boys.
5. A Southern African term that refers to mixed-race descendents, usually associated with, but not limited to, Cape Malay culture. In 2010, it was estimated that coloured people accounted for 8.8% of the South African population. The two other main race groups were identified as 79.4% black Africans and 9.2% whites (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 7).
6. Interview conducted by Rune Ottosen, 14 June 2010.
7. Interviewed by Rune Ottosen on 11 June 2010.
9. On 9 June 2010, South Africans were asked to show their support for Bafana Bafana and South Africa’s ability to host the World Cup. Thousands flocked to Sandton, Johannesburg, to wave to the team as they rode by on a bus. Around the country, people were asked to join in the fun at 12:00.

References


Sunday 13 June 2010

In 2006, my best friend and I jumped in the back of a Mazda Combi van. It was furnished with an IKEA futon and we trekked around Germany and most of continental Europe, drinking in the experience of the German World Cup 2006. Today I left for another World Cup in South Africa, but this time I was leaving on my own…

I was pretty nervous leaving today. I have everything planned, tickets safely packed, places to stay all organized, and even a few people to stay with. However, South Africa has an undeniable history and reputation for violent crime and racial division (Demombynes & Ozler, 2005; Ozler, 2007) that has been linked to residual racial inequality from the apartheid era (Lemanski, 2004). And here I am, a privileged white guy, travelling by myself. It will be revealing to see if I notice anything untoward on this trip, or if I will feel uncomfortable or out of my depth. In Germany four years ago I saw none of the reported violent nonsense and chanting about whose granddad did what to whose. The environment in 2006 was amazing, carnivalesque, a real coming-out party for supposed German stoicism.

Along with acquiring an appreciation for contemporary South Africa, I hope to see the best side of football this fortnight. I am craving a huge portion of the side of football that provides enjoyment like nothing else. The shared escapism of football allows a special thing. When watching football, men and women of every creed can be united and transported to somewhere special. Football has a mesmeric, captivating quality that allows us all to escape. The promise of football, the ‘Beautiful game’, and her capacity to unite this new ‘rainbow nation’, is a romantic ideal that excites me. I am looking forward to noticing if I do indeed see any evidence of this ‘new’ South Africa in the coming weeks.
From the broadcasts so far one thing is clear; this is going to be a noisy trip! So, armed with my ear plugs to combat the vuvuzelas, I checked in at Heathrow terminal five. Before long, my hour-long delay had elapsed and I boarded my flight, ushered in by a brightly dressed cabin crew, all wearing yellow *Bafana Bafana* team shirts and wide smiles. Cape Town here I come . . .

**Football in South Africa, tourism and the ‘African Renaissance’**

Roche (1994: 1) notes that ‘Mega-events are short term events with long term consequences for the cities that stage them.’ Without doubt, the FIFA World Cup 2010 held in South Africa was a global ‘mega-event’. Desai and Vahed (2010) note that, alongside the Olympics, the FIFA World Cup is the most prized international sporting mega-event, which demands the highest interest from around the globe and is watched by millions of viewers on television across a diverse group of nations. In the 21st century, the magnitude and worldwide appeal of the FIFA World Cup meant that not only would the host cities of World Cup matches be affected, but the impact upon the nation of South Africa as a whole would be significant, economically, culturally and politically. Cornelissen and Swart (2006: 108) note that

Sport mega-events are complex affairs which originate from specific sets of economic objectives but which have political and social corollaries that usually extend far beyond the event itself. Sport mega-events are generally initiated and driven by cadres of societal (i.e., political and corporate) elites and are aimed at satisfying developmental goals or ambitions around projection, competitiveness or growth targets. *In planning, implementation and execution of events, however, cultural, social and other imprints are left that can have enduring impacts on the society.* (italics added)

The ambition of this chapter is to critically examine the cultural and social imprints made by the World Cup upon a football tourist (me), during my fortnight in South Africa in June 2010. In this chapter I use extracts from my World Cup diary to consider the varying narratives that I was exposed to during my trip, which framed my understanding of contemporary South African society upon my return. I also consider how these experiences contributed to the formulation and solidification of certain ‘truths’ about South African society in contemporary times that I, as a tourist, would export. In doing so I aim to show how my re-storying of these narratives may potentially impact the views and opinions of others who have never even been to South Africa. As Satour (1995: 3) notes, ‘Personal experience and word-of-mouth communication have been shown to be the most important factors influencing a tourist’s decision to visit South Africa.’
How did my personal experience of the FIFA World Cup 2010 influence the ‘truths’ about South Africa that I would choose to export and repeat upon my return to the global North? As Cornelissen and Swart (2006) note, mega-events have many spin-off consequences, and this chapter is an illustration of how one British football tourist would describe contemporary South Africa upon his return.

Before an examination of my World Cup experiences is presented, it is first necessary to set the scene, and, as Cornelissen and Swart (2006) suggest, to identify social and cultural factors and the political agenda behind South Africa's hosting of the FIFA World Cup 2010. I will begin with a brief contextualization of the role of the World Cup in relation to historical and contemporary opinions surrounding South Africa as a potentially ‘dangerous’ tourist destination. Also, I will consider the 2010 World Cup’s role in framing South Africa as a ‘rainbow nation’ and its contribution to the ‘African Renaissance’ of the 21st century, not only for South Africa, but for the continent as a whole.

Tourism, violent crime and South Africa

Rogerson (2007) notes that during the early 1990s South Africa’s tourist industry was in a state of crisis, beset by problems such as under-investment, low numbers of international tourists and the legacy of apartheid policies (Rogerson & Visser, 2004). Ferreira (1999), in concurrence, also highlights that tourism was identified as the main avenue for post-apartheid South Africa to ‘kick-start’ her economy. Rogerson (2007: 231) notes that ‘In post-apartheid South Africa, tourism is viewed as an essential sector for national reconstruction and development, and one that offers enormous potential as a catalyst for economic and social development across the whole of the country.’ This claim is supported by Ferreira (1999: 314), who emphasizes that ‘since the advent of democracy, tourists have flocked to South Africa’. Satour (1995) also notes that post-apartheid South Africa was one of the fastest-growing tourist destinations in the world. This is a trend that was sustained and improved into the 21st century as the country’s tourism industry was ‘fundamentally recast’, and the number of international arrivals to the country quadrupled (Rogerson & Visser, 2004; 2007).

Murphy (1985) notes that tourism sells the physical and human elements of an environment in an effort to engage the visitor and multiply the benefits to the home nation. Murphy’s description of tourism was clearly adopted as South Africa advertised the 2010 FIFA World Cup to the global tourist market. This is also true when considering how the World Cup was advertised as an opportunity for the continent of Africa to be reconsidered as a global tourist destination. As the build-up to the competition intensified, vibrant displays of African culture (including vuvuzelas, drumming, singing and dancing) coupled with panoramic images of South Africa’s physical
environment (such as Table Mountain and Kruger National Park) were heavily interlaced with football images in advertisements and also Shakira’s World Cup music video ‘Waka Waka – This time for Africa’.

Shakira’s song and video are heavily themed with a spirit of determination to succeed and rejuvenate in the face of adversity. The song suggests that, for the African continent as a whole, the World Cup 2010 was an opportunity to ‘dust yourself off’ and ‘get up if you fall’. Along with Sepp Blatter’s agenda ‘to bring the World Cup to Africa’, Shakira’s song illustrates how this World Cup was considered not only part of a rejuvenation project for South Africa, but, by extension, a means to promote and re-invent the continent as a whole, including as viable and safe tourist destinations.

Heading into the 2010 World Cup, it was clearly part of the South African government’s agenda to utilize the competition as a ‘mega-event’ to stimulate and sustain further economic growth. As Rogerson and Visser (2004) hypothesize, sports tourism linked to South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup is seen as a real area of possibility for future growth. This was to be achieved by providing the visiting tourist with what Monitor (2005) labelled an ‘authentic tourist experience’ of South Africa. Selling the physical and human elements of South Africa was therefore seen as key to maximizing the potential economic benefits of hosting this ‘mega-event’. And, as a result, South Africa would also improve its international image, which, in the long term, may generate increased numbers of private and conference tourists, as well as attracting external investors (Jasmand & Maennig, 2008).

One of the perceived barriers to South Africa’s successful hosting of this mega-event is her reputation for violent crime. Schoneteich and Louw (2001) attribute this high level of violence in South Africa to her divisive recent political history and the imposition of an ‘institutional violence’ against the majority of her people, a process that compounded the disruption of family life and led to criminal behaviour as a major consequence. Ferreira (1999) notes that, despite the changes in post-apartheid South Africa, violent crime remains an issue, and that the security of visiting international tourists continues to give cause for concern. Although this was over a decade ago, Ferreira’s observations that the metropolitan areas of Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban were the most dangerous for tourists is also substantiated by more contemporary figures on crime (Allmers & Maennig, 2009). Violent crime can be symptomatic of the vulnerability and frustration experienced by poor urban residents in the context of an almost cruel juxtaposition of wealth and poverty that is characteristic of contemporary cities. Young men often have few prospects, and those aged 15–25 are particularly vulnerable to street violence (Beall & Fox, 2007). The fact that the cities identified by Ferreira (1999) were host cities for the South African World Cup provided no little concern for many planners and reluctant tourists ahead of the tournament. As Allmers and Maennig (2009: 513) note at length,
Violent crime is a major concern in South Africa and incurs high social costs to South Africans and to tourists (Maennig & Maennig, 2002). Crime may be an important reason for many people not to travel to South Africa in 2010... A broad international communication of new policies of crime prevention and its successes will be necessary to fully profit from the opportunity to stimulate tourism connected with the World Cup. If, however, the World Cup is hosted without many major criminal incidents involving tourists, the country’s international image would stand to gain immediately.

South Africa is without doubt a growing tourist nation, and ahead of the World Cup, although concerns about violent crime were apparent, the potential economic benefits of a successfully staged mega-event could not be ignored. This historical problem would just have to be managed if South Africa was to have her moment and contribute to the ‘African Renaissance’.

The FIFA World Cup 2010, a ‘rainbow nation’ and an ‘African Renaissance’

The continent of Africa as a whole has changed rapidly in recent times. Bloomfield (2010: 5) again notes that ‘In the first decade of the 21st century Africa has been through more changes than at any time since waves of independence swept across the continent 50 years ago.’ And, as one of the most populated nations in the continent, South Africa has seen its share of change, especially as she rebuilds in the post-apartheid era. A clear reflection of this climate of change was FIFA’s decision to award the 2010 World Cup to South Africa. Organized football was first played on African soil at the Cape in the 1860s (Alegi, 2010), so, perhaps fittingly, South Africa was the first nation to have the honour of hosting the first FIFA World Cup to visit Africa. New stadiums were built and tickets were to be made available to the South African ‘average Joe’.

Foer (2009) shows that all over the world football never occurs in a vacuum. In Africa, it is often adopted to further a political agenda (Bloomfield, 2010). Four years before the World Cup, Sewpaul (2008: 150) noted that ‘South Africa’s successful hosting of the event holds the potential to deconstruct commonly held ideas of Africa and to unify the nation.’ Without doubt, the World Cup was to provide huge political opportunities for South Africa and the continent of Africa, and, as Alegi (2010: 131) notes, in the run-up to the tournament,

South Africa’s hosting of the World Cup represents the latest and most ambitious attempt by an African country to use football to showcase its political achievements, accelerate economic growth, and assert the continent’s global citizenship.
Clearly the World Cup was to be an opportunity for South Africa to exhibit to the world her new social face, to debunk stereotypical views of 20th-century South Africa and all her social scarring. As Allmers and Maennig (2009: 510) note, ‘The successful execution of a mega-event demonstrates organizational and technological know-how, and it often provides an exceptional opportunity to showcase the host country’s hospitality and beauty.’ The World Cup offered a chance for South Africa to ‘take hold of the consciousness of people and imbue them with a sense of national pride and identification’ (Sewpaul, 2008: 143). Nearly two decades since the demolition of apartheid, South Africa had an occasion to display itself to the watching world.

In 2010, the South African World Cup was heralded as a culmination and tipping point of post-apartheid social progress. Central to this was a narrative thread of progression stemming from Archbishop Tutu’s integrative sentiment of ‘rainbow nationalism’ (whereby South Africa belongs to everyone who lives in it, black or white). As Sewpaul (2008: 144) notes, ‘Post-apartheid South Africa has seen various attempts to undo the meta-narratives and practices of apartheid and to forge an alternative view of a non-racial, rainbow nation.’ Football in South Africa has always been seen as a cultural space where the promotion of this democratic sentiment could take place. This was a fact that was not lost on the political leaders of South Africa (specifically the president at the time, Thabo Mbeki, as he endeavoured to attract the World Cup to South African shores during the lengthy bidding process). Furthermore, several independent observers predicted the possibility of the South African World Cup being an economic success if handled appropriately (Cornelissen and Swart, 2006; Allmers and Maennig, 2009).

On a shop window level, Desai and Vahed (2010: 155) note that the exposure provided by the World Cup 2010 presented an opportunity to show that Africa could match the best in Europe in terms of the infrastructure, services and razzle-dazzle that are part and parcel of a mega-event. Alegi (2010: 129–30) describes Mbeki’s agenda for the World Cup at length:

Under Mbeki’s stewardship, the 2010 World Cup became a massive national project designed to enhance the status of the nation-state and globally market ‘Brand South Africa’ – an image of a country as modern, technologically advanced, democratic, business friendly, and an exotic tourist destination…Another critical factor behind the national government’s firm commitment to the World Cup was the influence of the philosophy of the ‘African Renaissance’ – the belief that modernity and globalisation, combined with African cultural heritage, can be harnessed to reinvigorate the continent economically and politically…As in previous decades, football was being used to advance a pan-Africanist cause.
This pan-Africanist attitude meant a release from the bondages of cemented racial ideologies (Appiah, 2001) and, if harnessed appropriately, was read by some as a constructive, unifying and enabling force (Seepe, 2004). Was the South African World Cup 2010 an event that could be considered as an appropriate harnessing of this enabling progressive social sentiment? This is the central question to any critical discussion of the social and political impact of the South African World Cup, including this chapter, and will be returned to in my analysis.

Several significant academic research studies have critically examined the virtues of Mbeki’s claims, including a consideration of the social morality and political validity of his fairly grandiose pre-World Cup intentions for South Africa (Cornelissen & Swart, 2006; Sewpaul, 2008; Desai & Vahed, 2010; Labuschagne, 2011). Desai and Vahed (2010: 156) illustrate that the World Cup was promoted as a boost to South Africa and as a key piece in fostering an ‘African Renaissance’ agenda. In reality, these authors go a long way to highlight that this was a ‘hollow’ claim. Despite promising to escalate the growing unity of the continent in its quest to escape the quagmire of poverty, the reality reported in this research was far from the romanticized narrative promoted. These authors reported that in reality, in order to accommodate the World Cup, ordinary South Africans were forced to make immediate personal sacrifices. These included abandoning local food-stalls to major international food suppliers, gentrification and eviction from certain areas, and less public spending on social and community projects. These authors also reported that, instead of achieving romanticized pro-African intentions, the World Cup was to reinforce the country’s exceptionalism and chauvinism. Months before the World Cup was due to kick off, Desai and Vahed (2010) noted that

Within South Africa the touted benefits include; enhancing South Africa’s international popularity as a destination of choice for tourists and foreign advisors, black empowerment, infrastructural development and job creation. Intangible benefits include forging national pride and nurturing the ‘rainbow nation’ identity. It is becoming increasingly clear that claims about the spin-off of the World Cup have been exaggerated.

Clearly, ahead of the FIFA World Cup 2010 two poles of sentiment were present in South African society. A public majority of excitement and anticipation fuelled by a political agenda of African Renaissance was opposed by a genuine concern for the exploitation of an already impoverished African nation, where, as a result of the government expenditure on World Cup stadia, ‘kindergartens, schools and hospitals are likely to suffer’ (Allmers & Maennig, 2009: 513). Roche notes (1994) that conflicting opinions surround any mega-event, especially one on the scale of a World Cup; therefore this oppositional tension was unsurprising.
In this brief contextualization of South Africa's pre-World Cup state I have addressed the state of tourism and violent crime in South Africa and South Africa's desire to contribute to an ‘African Renaissance’ via the successful hosting of the FIFA World Cup, a global mega-event. In what follows, I consider varying points of view and the opinions of several members of contemporary South African society as they emerged during my trip. However, before I go on to present my diary extracts I will briefly explain the poststructural theoretical tools I will use to analyse my experiences.

Towards Foucault

In order to analyse my experiences of the FIFA 2010 World Cup, I have adopted the poststructural philosophical thoughts of Frenchman Michel Foucault. Foucault is considered part of the ‘French school that started it all’ (Cahoone, 2003: 222). Through the development of new methods of analysis and forms of thought, these philosophers became the source of much of what is known as ‘postmodernism’ in academic philosophy. However, for the purposes of this chapter, I will adhere to the descriptor ‘poststructuralist’.

Markula and Pringle (2006) identify that, since the 1980s, many sports sociologists have drawn upon a wider range of social theorists to help examine the broader workings of power that are at play in the multiple realms of sport. Part of the recorded diversification within this field has included the interrogation of sport using the work of Foucault (Hargreaves, 1986; Heikkala, 1993; Shogan, 1999; Markula & Pringle, 2006). Consequently, the applicability of Foucault’s theorizing to the study of sport and the growing influence of his work have become increasingly evident within the sociology of sport over the last two decades.

Since the emergence of sports sociology informed by poststructuralist thought (much of which adopts the work of Foucault), a new, more sensitive line of approach has served to encourage a deeper critical awareness of certain taken-for-granted and potentially dangerous practices within and surrounding sporting contexts. This abundance of increasingly applicable Foucauldian theorizing illustrates that, if it is correctly applied, much can be learned about a sporting sphere or specific sporting event when it is examined through a theoretically appropriate Foucauldian lens.

In this chapter I choose Foucault's analysis, as I believe it provides an appropriate forum to consider how the language used within relationships that occur around a sporting context can produce certain ‘truths’ (in this case, how the South African World Cup produces knowledge of South African culture). Furthermore, it allows an investigation into how these truths become normalized and an accepted part of parlance, regardless of their ‘quantifiable’ merit or a tangible record. Adopting Foucauldian thought, I examine how during my journey as a football tourist I was exposed to a range of extremely conflicting, yet intensely normalized,
‘truths’ about contemporary South African society. I also aim to consider the effects of this rampant normalization of certain narratives and consequently expose questions about how these normalized ‘truths’ potentially become exported by a football tourist (me) as a result of the mega-event of the FIFA 2010 World Cup.

A football tourist’s view – My trip to South Africa

The aim of this chapter is to examine how a visitor to the country would perceive the contemporary state of violent crime and the levels of racial harmony in this blossoming ‘rainbow nation’ while visiting for the purpose of the World Cup. How can I analyse these conflicting narratives and produce a coherent explanation of my experience of South Africa? How was I to develop a logical description to give to those I would meet upon my return? Which of these ‘truths’ is representative of the ‘real’ South Africa? I believe that considering my experiences through the poststructural lens suggested by Michel Foucault has allowed me to contextualize and understand how such polar opposite ‘truths’ can co-exist.

Cape Town

Monday 14 June – Italy vs. Paraguay

Cape Town is wet. But, when the sun emerged from behind the clouds and cast a rainbow across Table Mountain I began to see why this was such a popular place. My ride from the airport to my bed and breakfast was a shuttle Combi skilfully driven by Mohammed, an incredibly friendly guy who described himself as ‘Cape Town, born and bred’. I sat up front as the bus filled up with boisterous Mexican fans. This allowed Mohammed and me to talk football non-stop and even discuss the impact of the competition on the city. In his eyes this competition is much more inclusive for all sectors of South African society and ‘for the people’ than the rugby World Cup of 1995. Mohammed criticized the construction of the Greenpoint stadium as an unnecessary expense, but told me not to worry about walking around Cape Town. Mohammed was excitable and clearly allowing himself to be caught up in the euphoria of the tournament, but he was also very realistic about South Africa’s chances, rather saying he was also ‘Cheering for England’ because he loved the Premier League. We shook hands firmly as he dropped me off and I wished him well.

I got to Greenpoint very early to avoid any trouble negotiating big crowds, and two hours prior to kick-off I found myself high in the upper tier, watching as the stadium slowly filled. Shakira’s bilingual ‘Waka Waka’ song blasted out on repeat and her colourful video dominated the large screen at the south end of the stadium as she danced around in ‘authentic’ African dress. The immaculate pitch shone brightly as the torrential rain fell and salty
coastal scent wafted in on the breeze. Vuvuzelas echoed around the place as fans from all over the world trickled in. Two small pockets of Italians and Paraguayans began to take shape but I was also amazed at the diversity of flags on display, and at the number of American fans. I was also very happy to see a number of local South Africans of all racial backgrounds in attendance. I sat next to a middle-aged couple of East Indian descent all dressed in cheap South African gear and to be honest they looked very lost. As the game began they let the experience wash over them as they huddled together in the cold, occasionally smiling in my direction. The game ended in a cagey 1–1 draw but the quality of football was very high, Fabio Cannavaro a real stand-out for me.

After the game the marshalling was very poor, and it took a long time to get out of Greenpoint. In the morning I learned that staff had gone on strike 15 minutes before the game so fans were left in the hands of young police officers, untrained for marshalling. I am beginning to see that in South Africa things are done slightly differently and people are happy to go with the flow. Despite the cold and damp this disorganization was met by the exiting spectators with only slight bemusement and only a mild hint of frustration. I doubt your average Premier League fan would have displayed as much patience.

My week with Pieter

Wednesday 16 June

Much to my relief, Pieter was right there to collect me when I landed in Johannesburg. Pieter is 63 years old and has recently lost his wife to cancer. As we sat down together to have a drink and to introduce ourselves to each other, there were a few sorrowful moments. I am much indebted to this man, who despite his recent loss, has agreed to host me. I learn an awful lot about our plans for the next five days and they sound very exciting, we will head to Kruger Park in search of big game and wilderness. ‘I promise you’ he said, multiple times, in a thick Afrikaans accent.

As we waited to pay our bill, Pieter became impatient with the black waiter's slow service. This sparked off the first of many (mainly one-sided) discussions we will have about the state of contemporary South Africa under black governance. Pieter tells me of rampant crime and how he has recently been robbed at home. He has clearly had a torrid few months and has evidently had as much as he can take. He has decided to downsize and move to a smaller place.

We took the short drive to Kempton Park and as we arrived at Pieter's house we were greeted by his lovely black maid who proceeded to cook us schnitzel with delicious pumpkin mash. The house has a tired feel about it and I can understand why Pieter wants to leave, it is too much for an older guy living by himself. I am very grateful to have met Pieter and be welcomed
into his home. Some of his political statements are very anti-black; this is perhaps not surprising given his recent burglary and South Africa’s history of racial division (Lemanski, 2004).

Pieter has lived in South Africa all his life, so his opinion interests me greatly. I cannot say I could ever agree with many of the things he says about the inherent nature of black people, but I do agree that overpopulation and poverty are big problems. Sadly, Pieter is convinced that these problems are to be attributed solely to the nature of black people. Still, I have been here six hours; he has lived here going on 60 years and feels that his South Africa is slipping away.

Thursday 17 June
We get up in six hours to start our long trip north to Kruger National Park. Pieter is excited and I am looking forward to some wilderness and tranquility away from all the vuvuzelas which are now really getting on my nerves. I am tired, yet still on a high after watching Lionel Messi play at Soccer City, as Argentina beat South Korea by four goals to one in an exciting game.

On my way home from the stadium we drove through some of the old parts of Johannesburg and past a vast shanty town. I found it very hard to bite my tongue as Pieter’s comments are becoming quite hard to take. It is becoming increasingly apparent that white South Africa must have been a very nice place to live (as a white South African that is). I cannot really argue with the evidence that Pieter presents to me, it is clear to him that the number of poor blacks is placing immense strain on this apparently poorly organized country. He feels that he is living in the middle of a thunderstorm which he sees as being caused by a massive influx of parasitical black immigration. Migrating blacks have come to the new nation of South Africa in search of a better life. South Africa is now faced with huge problems and is poorly organized. Pieter thinks that his country has been overrun by ‘vermin’ or a ‘cancer’, which truly saddens me to hear. After passing through Johannesburg today, and hearing Pieter’s stories, it is not hard to see why many older white South Africans might feel this way... it does not however, mean that they are right.¹

Friday 18 June
Today was another painful day for my tongue as during our drive north to Kruger National Park, Pieter explained why South Africa’s woes are to be attributed to the black population. Again, as he told his stories I somewhat saw his perspective, especially as we drove past a hillside blanketed with white crosses, each representative of a murdered white farmer. Blacks attacking white farmers is a major grievance for the Afrikaner population and hearing multiple stories from Pieter I can understand this. However, it is no secret that racially motivated atrocities have been committed in South Africa on both sides.
As we arrived at Kruger National Park, Pieter’s Isuzu needed refilling so we headed to local station in Sabie. Later on that night, Pieter realized he had underpaid his petrol bill by 22 rand (around two pounds). He insisted we return to the station to ensure the difference would not be taken from the black attendant’s wages. This is an interesting man. Quick to anger and clearly hurt, he is evidently angry at his country’s perceived decline. Yet, he is loving and gentle with others (including me) while in the midst of dealing with hugely scary life changing events. In his individual interactions he treats black people with respect and even affection, but when talking about their general presence a large amount of bitterness comes to the surface. It is a sad thing.

Faubion (1994: xv) notes that ‘Foucault was interested in the possibility of gaining new, more effective political ways of seeing. These new ways of seeing concerned, in particular, the relations of power and knowledge.’ Foucault (1977: 92) himself noted that ‘power is the multiplicity of force relations imminent in the sphere in which they operate’. Power is therefore relational, and can occur in any context. Furthermore, it is not possessed or located in a single group or individual. The result of power relations is the production of certain normalized truths which support or marginalize certain societal groups. In South African society, this is evident as certain truths surrounding each racial group (much like those repeatedly expressed by Pieter) have dominated throughout the nation’s history, oppressing some and benefitting others.

Saturday 19 June

Up at 5.30 am we left our bed and breakfast to reach the park gate at 6.00 am as the gates opened. We drove into the Park and were met by one of the most beautiful sunrises that I have ever seen (granted I have been a student now for nine years so I haven’t seen that many!). Pieter was amazing today. His enthusiasm about the beauty of his country knows no limits and his knowledge is vast. He continues to get excited about wildlife after years of return visits to Kruger and the other major parks in Southern Africa.

Today in the park I mentioned to Pieter how it must be terrible for the impalas and the other plain grazers to be constantly on the lookout their entire lives to avoid predation. Pieter turned to me and earnestly told me that he felt in a very similar situation as a white South African in what he called black South Africa. This was the only sad moment of a wonderful experience in Kruger. I try to remind myself that Pieter is in his sixties and has had a rough go of it but I really need to talk to other South Africans if I am to get a more rounded picture of this clearly complex country.

Foucault’s (1977) ontological basis (that there is no single truth or reality, rather a multiplicity) suggests that no one ‘truth’ about the divisive nature of South African society has to remain, be it right or wrong; rather, each truth
and its prevalence is representative of the relations of power that each individual South African may be experiencing/have experienced. Charon (2007: 288) notes that

All human beings categorise and generalise. They do it every day in almost every situation they enter, and they almost always do it when it comes to other people...the problem for almost all of us, however, is that many of our generalisations are not carefully arrived at or accurate, and it is sometimes difficult for us to recognise this and change them. Too often our generalisations actually stand in the way of our understanding, especially when we generalise about other human beings.

Promoting any oppressive social truth (such as the lazy, violent and aggressive nature of a black man) is intensely problematic. Foucault’s (1977) tools of historical analysis suggest that the heritage of any social truth can be uncovered as he reveals that no knowledge is inherent or simply falls from the sky. Rather, as a result of certain interactions over time, certain knowledge is produced that becomes normalized, having multiple effects, often with dangerous consequences. These include the production of certain practices and hierarchies that can marginalize minority groups. The positive outlook using Foucault here is that, because they are relational, the operations of power are subject to change. People can be active in attempting to change the workings of power and therefore have the potential to influence and reconstruct problematic truths.

**Sunday 20 June**

Today was my last day with Pieter and we drove back to Johannesburg from Sabie. We had stayed in a very staple bed and breakfast and enjoyed an early meal accompanied by a one-sided history lesson from the overly talkative white host. Openly racist comments were made in reference to the ‘Bafana Bafana’ in relation to their perceived poor performances, which was a shame, but, by now, not surprising. As we arrived in Linden, a northwestern suburb of Johannesburg, I said an emotional goodbye to Pieter, who despite his radical opinions is a very warm and generous man. He told me a lot about his country in a very short period of time and I am forever grateful for his hospitality.

Tonight I am staying with Gerry and Alice, friends of a colleague from the University of Alberta, in a huge, beautiful house with high railings in the suburb of Linden. We all had tickets to the Brazil vs. Ivory Coast game at Soccer City so we all travelled in together. So, off I went with a young white couple and their two children to the game, arriving very early to watch the stadium fill up. I liked this family immediately and as we waited for the game the boys entertained themselves by practising their flag waving and vuvuzela skills.
As kick-off was still 2 hours away I had a good long chat with Gerry about all kinds of sport and some of the issues I had talked with Pieter about. When the bar opened I offered to buy him a drink. Budweiser or Budweiser…I will take two Budweiser please. As we bonded over our shared distaste of American beer, Gerry reassured me that a generation gap plays significantly into how many people view contemporary South Africa, and that Pieter's strong views don’t necessarily reflect those of the majority of white South Africans. In fact, Gerry projected an alternative, largely optimistic viewpoint. He listed a growing economy and a culturally diverse society where his children go to school with kids from all racial backgrounds as serious improvements from only a short while ago (relatively speaking). He thinks that Zuma is a poor politician. This conversation was comforting to me as, much as I appreciated my time with Pieter, in Gerry I found a certain admission that post-apartheid South Africa was a significantly better place for many. This perspective came as a welcome relief to me after the constant black bashing I had recently been exposed to. Gerry did have a word of warning though, the violent crime was no picnic, nor was it over-exaggerated. Sadly he explained that not only would people break into your house, but in the process they will rape your family and shoot you without a second thought.

Playing with the boys

Monday 21 June
Arriving in Durban, I was greeted by a definite increase in temperature. Sam, 21, and his brother Dean, 18, were to be my new hosts for this leg of my journey, along with their mother Charlotte, an old school friend of my aunt. Sam picked me up from the airport and after an hour's drive we made it safely to Hillcrest and their family home. We enjoyed a quiet beer by the pool as we waited for his mother Charlotte to get home from work. On the drive from the airport, Sam and I discussed several aspects of South African society, and he suggested that the reputation for violent crime was somewhat over-exaggerated. He then proceeded to tell me a story about being held up at gun point while eating an ice cream, leaving me a little confused.

That evening, after I had settled in, we went for a few beers in Hillcrest and I thoroughly enjoyed myself. It was clearly a predominantly white area but well dressed young people both black and white intermingled and it reminded me of any North American bar you might pop into.

Tuesday 22 June
Today we all got up at 7.00 am for an incredibly cheap round of golf at a local Gary Player designed golf course called ‘The Cotswalds’. It took us all a while to sober up, but as we did, the weather and the golf improved. It was nice to enjoy some male banter and share the relaxing feeling of being on
holiday (the lads were on a break from their university placements). It was very interesting to note the amount of casual racism that formed the large part of the shared jokes but when we observed direct racist behaviour being shown to a black waitress in the clubhouse, the boys showed genuine anger at this event. It was very interesting to see how when it came to the crunch these youngsters were offended by ignorance, yet in the comfort of their own company, racism as a component of humour (along with the usual sexism and homophobia) goes on unquestioned.

My experiences with Pieter revealed that the historical legacy of a certain normalized knowledge of race continues to influence a large number of white South Africans. From this perspective it would be hard to argue that South Africa is a fully integrated nation. However, the alternative more integrative truth revealed by Gerry's younger family's experiences, and by Sam and Dean's anger at the open racism we observed at the golf club, illustrates that it is dangerous and presumptuous to simply dismiss South Africa as falling short of Desmond Tutu's goal of harmonious racial co-existence.

As a football tourist, I travelled to South Africa for the FIFA World Cup and was exposed to several conflicting descriptions or ‘truths’ about the socio-cultural state of the nation. What Foucault's (1977) analysis of power and knowledge suggests is that each of these truths can be traced to wider workings of power that have a distinct identifiable lineage. Individuals within a country can be exposed to differing normalized truths; each truth is then accepted or promoted depending on each individual's specific interactions or personal experience. Not only will they accept such a truth; they will perpetuate it as a result. This was particularly evident in my interactions with Pieter, as he repeatedly regurgitated certain normalized truths rooted in South Africa’s racially divisive past.

**Cape Town**

**Thursday 24 June – Cameroon vs. Netherlands**

As I left the Holiday Inn for my fifth and final game I journeyed down the specially cordoned ‘mile’ to Greenpoint, caught in a wave of Orange and the smell of Marijuana. You have to love Dutch fans. On closer inspection many were South Africans of Dutch descent and this led to a bit more feeling and anticipation surrounding this fixture than the others I have been to on this trip. This was a very entertaining game and I was sad at the final whistle as it was to be my last taste of live World Cup action on this trip.

As I filtered out of the stadium I considered myself blessed to have seen at close quarters some of the best players in the world, in an unknown place amongst such a variety of people. All around me fun has been had. Although it wasn’t the do or die passion and intensity I had expected from a World Cup, it did have a much more relaxed party minded vibe. I have shared this
experience with people of both sexes, of multiple races, backgrounds and all ages. It has been fantastic, fulfilling and memorable. Some sights have left me confused. Drunken American fans hollering USA for no good reason at a Brazil vs. Ivory Coast game, and food that you wouldn’t licence for distribution at a penitentiary being sold at great expense alongside American beer. I have tried to let it all wash over me and enjoyed the quirks of this World Cup for what they are.

This World Cup has been a wonderful opportunity for the people of a healing country to share in a cultural phenomenon that is globally enjoyed. It has been an opportunity for South Africans to present themselves to the world in a fresh guise, and for South Africa to be talked about for a reason that is positive and unifying rather than as divisive. The World Cup is a wonderful and important event every time it is held. I am glad that in 2010, I was lucky enough to be part of it in such a colourful and remarkable place.

Closing thoughts...

Cornelissen and Swart (2006) note that unplanned cultural imprints occur when hosting a mega-event. This chapter has attempted to illustrate that, as a tourist in South Africa for the FIFA World Cup, I was exposed to certain normalized narratives about the racial harmony or disharmony of this nation. Perhaps an unplanned effect of this mega-event is that, as a result of the variety of opinions that abound in this complex country, many of my observations did not entirely match up with the integrated utopia of ‘rainbow nationalism’ promoted before and during the World Cup. As a result, a less idealized view of South African society in the 21st century was what I exported back to the global North, rather than the ‘ideal’ harmonious description which the government had hoped that the World Cup would universally promote.

It is evident from the few diary extracts I have presented that during my visit to South Africa I became exposed to complex, conflicting accounts regarding her social state around the time of the World Cup. Nearly 30 years ago Jarvie (1985: 2) noted that, during apartheid, ‘Black people, regardless of class position are systematically denied equality of opportunity in political, economic and cultural spheres.’ On my first visit to South Africa I was well aware of her segregated past, so, as an interested tourist, I was intrigued to observe her contemporary cultural fabric. As my diary extracts have highlighted, during my trip I was exposed to a number of dominant narratives regarding the racial relations in present-day South Africa (some troubling, some inspiring). Despite these conflicting reports, and some concerns about the racial stability of this nation, I still left with an over-riding sentiment that the FIFA World Cup 2010, despite its arguable economic justification, was a party that all South Africans were invited to embrace (regardless of the everyday social climate). Although my first experience of South Africa did not
leave me fully convinced of universal racial harmony, it was thankfully a far cry from the oppressive status quo described by Jarvie only a few decades ago.

Allmers and Maennig (2009: 511) suggest that the impact of a World Cup on the image of its hosts to a large extent depends on the quality of the public being presented as ‘likeable, hospitable, progressive and capable’. This was indeed my experience of South African culture, and, as a result, the image of a nation striving to be progressive and inclusive was one that I readily accepted and subsequently share, despite the prevalence of certain oppositional racial narratives that I was exposed to during my trip.

Labuschagne (2011) said that the World Cup reinforced a belief among South Africans that, as a nation, they could achieve a display of unity on a global scale. As a warmly welcomed visitor, I definitely felt this sense of unity and pride during my trip. In all of my interactions with South Africans I experienced a display of almost universal pride that they were the hosts of such a globally relevant mega-event. All who I spoke to were genuinely pleased and proud that the World Cup was unfolding successfully in their country and that they had provided an environment that was welcoming and inclusive. Whatever their personal opinions regarding the complex state of South Africa, these people were united in their pleasure that South Africa was, in her moment, safely hosting and entertaining tourists and football fans from around the world.

Note

1. Aedpoju (2003) notes that the striking disparities in economic development and living standards between South Africa and other African countries, and the remarkable transition to post-apartheid rule, attracted migrants of all categories from Africa and beyond, despite the daunting problems of unemployment, crime, widespread poverty and the spread of AIDS.

References


The 2010 World Cup Celebrations in a Non-hosting Location: Voices from the Periphery

Kiran Odhav

Introduction

Conceptually, four aspects provide alternative visions to the traditional ‘spectacular’ World Cup that drowns out the personal and local, especially for rural South African citizens. First, the World Cup was transformed into a local event, as in the creation of a mini-World Cup for youth in the area. Second, the World Cup celebration was reconceived not just as a football event, but also as an opportunity to host alternative cultural events, particularly for rural residents. These included a film production and a ‘home-made’ candle-lit dinner. Third, an international collaboration of local and Dutch artists introduced alternative celebratory occurrences (e.g., to transform prison blankets into fashion garments): while these were practical alternatives to the International Federation Football Association (FIFA)’s domination over World Cup products, they also have conceptual implications that transformed the multinational landscape of World Cup football events. What was evident was concepts revolving around notions of collaboration and creativity. Nevertheless, these alternatives did have their limitations in terms of scope and effectiveness, which is recognized in this chapter. After 2010, the engagement of some local groups in similar areas of cultural work, and in the arenas of sports and entertainment, can be observed. The value and level of commitment of these activities, despite a lack of resources, are also presented in this chapter.

A four-pronged methodology is used: the ‘autobiographical–narrative’, ‘survey–interactive’, ‘mobile–educational’ and ‘data capturing through media storage’ methods. The first is autobiographical and part narrative. It revisits events in which the author took part, to transform the 2010 World Cup from an ostentatious media event to one that catered for local participation. The second relates to a public and interactive survey that sought to determine the needs of the public, which served as a guide for the
construction of alternative celebrations. It created a forum for interactions between artists and the public. The third saw many people in the region brought in by their involvement in a mobile soccer tournament and educational videos and with local partners for educational, health, artistic and public entertainment value, and their input formed part of the projects outlined later. Fourth, data were captured through film and camera, and by the creation of multiple internet websites that are cited in this chapter.

The information gathered through these methodologies also provided a measure of social commentary. Thus, one website video portrays an empty chair race at the Mahikeng stadium track. This adds to the surrealism of the strange spider-like concrete architecture of the stadium, whose side stands do not actually face the soccer pitch directly. Such a video can, first, be interpreted as a commentary on the minimal legacy of the former Bophuthatswana (Bop) regime. The second misplacement is similar, though its context is different. It symbolizes a denial by politicians of the new order of the fact that the former regime made significant infrastructural developments. This is evident in the non-use of much apartheid-inherited infrastructure, such as the Bop Recording Studio, which has been sold and bought back, or Bop TV, which was shut down. Such a boycott remains political in intent, for it identifies such infrastructure and cultural achievements with the previous Bantustan (Bophuthatswana), despite the demise of that formation and its political players in post-1994 South Africa.

What follows contextualizes the World Cup, alternative interpretations of global sport, and the activities that took place in Mahikeng as alternatives to FIFA’s formats.

**Contextualizing the World Cup**

While the World Cup was awarded to South Africa, with a strong desire to have an African host, it was also an unexpected bonus, given the often negative and pathologized publicity the continent receives, especially in a world dominated by Western media. Once the Cup was awarded, it became clear that the locations selected to host the matches were a matter of intense political alternatives, with two competing agendas – to make it financially viable (a hegemonic move) and to select locations to meet the demands of communities in peripheral areas who love football, in order to bring about social equality. This chapter relates how a peripheral community subverted hegemonic practices by reclaiming the centre, through a series of events and activities, in opposition to FIFA.

The 2010 World Cup began broadly in *two locations*, and in *two senses*. The first location refers to the bigger cities, where the World Cup stadiums are located. The second meaning of ‘location’ relates to the rest of South Africa, mainly consisting of the peripheral and smaller towns in South Africa. Mahikeng is one such small town where soccer is popular.
In terms of the two meanings, the first sense is related to its being positively demarcated and limited to an African country as a hosting choice. This decision was seen as some kind of a historical payback for Europe’s colonial relationship to with Africa politically, and particularly in sports. The narratives of colonialism are well articulated by many (Fanon, 1961; Obeng, 1970, 1997; Rodney, 1972; Cabral, 1973), and is not necessary to outline them here. Yet, one cannot help but point to the strong sense of the African continent having to count itself as lucky to host the World Cup: this is after 20 World Cup events, and 80 years after it first started. Some may retort that historically ‘Africa was not ready’, and so the rumours circulated of South Africa’s non-readiness in the months prior to the event, and of Germany being touted as a back-up choice by FIFA. Such misgivings may seem cynical in the context of the broad ‘feel good’ factor of 2010. But one needs to remember that European fans were prone to laughter when African teams came onto the pitch at World Cup tournaments in the 1960s. This has changed of late, with African players now considered a vital cog in European clubs and leagues. Yet racism remains a problem in international sports: laudable as FIFA’s anti-racism campaign is, it still indicates a site of struggle in that arena.

This leads one to the second sense of sports narratives in the periphery of the South, which remains so much part of our global economic geography. This sense relates the promise of the World Cup, which lies in its particular moments, in its marginal tendencies and in the (local) periphery of the (global) North–South divide. The promise for Mahikeng (unbelievable as it may seem) was that it is situated in such a ‘double peripheral’ relation of being in the South and also on the periphery of the World Cup. It was initially chosen (for the 2006 bid) as a host city, which saw the promise of a much-needed rejuvenation of the town after its ironical slow-down in the era following the political liberation of South Africa.

But, of course, the promise of hosting the World Cup was not fulfilled, due to various reasons. These included logistical arguments about the town’s lack of readiness and capacity, security threats and the inadequate structure of the stadium, including the lack of facilities and the public safety dangers it presented. Other problems would have been the capacity of the local municipality and the political will of provincial (and even national) government to back Mahikeng as a host ‘city’. Whether the logistical arguments are true or not, the result was that Mahikeng was excluded as a host city. Ironically, the building of ten new stadiums at huge expense since 2010 may face financial sustainability problems, if only one-off games are played there. This may easily replicate the ‘white elephant’ tag earned by the Mmabatho stadium after the collapse of the Bophuthatswana regime, and still carried in present-day South Africa. This brings us to a discussion on Mahikeng.
Mahikeng: The continuation of a forgotten history

The small town of Mahikeng (‘place of rocks’) is situated near the Ramatlabama border of Botswana (its erstwhile capital, when the latter was under British rule). It has since become a South African town, but with the apartheid policy it emerged as the site of the newly built Mmabatho, as the ‘independent’ Tswana bantustan emerged. The architects of apartheid sought to employ ethnic ‘self-determination’ as a justification of its racial policies. Despite some political opposition within Bophuthatswana after the national elections following the political negotiations at CODESA (Congress for a Democratic South Africa) in 1994, the bantustan was incorporated into South Africa. Mahikeng then became capital of the North West Province.

Unfortunately, it did not maintain its status as a hub-capital in the post-1994 era. This was partly due to the deployment of resources to the rest of the Province, which was necessary since most of the Province is rural. The neglect of the capital town was due to various reasons, of which one aspect was lack of political will and capacity, by successive city councils, government planners, and bureaucrats heading the ‘capital city’. Since the incorporation of Bophuthatswana, Mahikeng shows little evidence of living up to its name as a capital. One indication of administrative and financial inadequacies is reflected in the council being frequently rescued by national government.

One aspect dealt with here is the provincial political project that leans towards wanting to negate the bantustan legacy, including its infrastructural legacies. This was part of the experience of the people involved in the projects related in this chapter. The old regime was dictatorial and highly repressive, and it built some white elephants (five such stadiums). It also created some important, though limited, avenues for cultural production, including the Mmabana Cultural centres and ‘Bop TV’. As for 2010, there was little or no institutional preparation by government or civics to partake in the World Cup games. This was despite the fact that soccer is popular in this part of the world: it was the home of BOPSOL, where both Joe Frickleton (ex-Highlands Park) and Lucas Radebe (Lehurutse Birds and national captain of SA) were active. The result was resistance by City Council and politicians to using the stadium for World Cup activity in 2010.

With this in mind, a rescue situation for locals to be able to participate in enjoying sport was thought up in 2009. I took it upon myself to organize the funds, and find partners to work with. The aim was to have a local form of celebration of soccer that the World Cup failed to capture. Mahikeng may be situated in the rural periphery, but it is somewhat peri-urban around the town areas and outlying suburbs. Although the funding took over six months to secure, the National Lottery (National Distribution Trust Fund) funds eventually came through, allocating funding for an arts-based project in Mahikeng for 2010. Basically, the proposal began as a rural entrepreneurial
project but was later converted to an arts-based sports project, with the World Cup in mind. It generally envisaged four major sub-projects to unfold in June, during the 2010 World Cup: a performance art project, a heritage bike race event, one that dealt with artistic, cultural and design events, and one based on green projects. Each sub-project had a host of events planned, of which the main ones are outlined in this chapter. Before going on to describe the Mahikeng projects, FIFA and the World Cup have to be put into context.

**The World Cup and FIFA**

Pillay *et al.* (2009) speak of the ‘dubiousness and secrecy surrounding the bid’. They also cite its stringent requirements for hosting, which only a few developing countries (SA, Brazil or China) can afford. Moreover, the FIFA World Cup is the world’s largest sporting and media event... Economically, the World Cup is a significant event, with its cumulative television audience... The same cannot be said for host countries... Economic projections are invariably erroneous, overestimating the benefits and underestimating the costs... Considerable debate regarding whether World Cups benefit or harm... [the] host country’s economy.

(Pillay *et al.*, 2009: 3)

While there are arguments about the positive legacy of the event, others (Pillay *et al.*, 2009: 11) see the event as harming the national economy, and promoting inequality with ‘displaced investment’. More alarming is Cornelissen’s (in Pillay *et al.*, 2009) account of tourism reinforcing the segregated structure of SA’s cities. He sees such tourism as biased towards urban areas, resulting in tourism displacement. Estimates of an expected tourism boom (and its consequential impacts) were thus overestimated. Without being Afro-pessimistic and discarding the positive impact of 2010, these statements are a sober reminder of the consequences of hosting the event.

Czegledy (in Pillay *et al.*, 2009: 14) is more optimistic, seeing such mega-events as repositioning Africa from a colonial imaginary divorced from time and space, and associated with under-development, famine and war, to a post-colonial imaginary. One major effect of the World Cup as a mega-event, he argues, is to ‘destabilize the hegemonic project of colonialism’. While this is true, in harking back to colonialism, this account faces two problems. First, it does not build adequately on that counter-hegemonic post-colonial project, so as to work against that colonial imaginary. The argument also simply gives a symbolic narrative (important as that is), and does not suggest...
how alternatives can work towards a more offensive counter-hegemonic position. Such alternatives are suggested by the projects reported here. These projects show some potential for being more offensive than simply offsetting negative images of Africa in the international community, important as the struggle of image-building is for Africa. Such gross portrayals of Africa's incompetence or dependence are central to the colonial imaginary.

Some, like Alegi (2006), seek to establish the historical place of football with a legacy foundation and research centre, to which this account contributes. But there is some difference from the latter's mainly historically oriented project, in the sense of recounting current history as a project of rebuilding. The argument here also takes issue with the view that what 2010 ‘does is prove our ability to be able to host such an event’, as stated by Finance Minister Gordhan (in Jory, 2011: 17; Jory & Boohawahon, 2011). This account does see some merit in hosting, but argues against minimalist arguments of African competence in hosting. It also seeks to resist the wholesale Afro-pessimistic views of South Africa, as in press reports of SA not being able to host a World Cup, and which led to a back-up plan for an alternative host. Sport is a contested terrain like any other, and FIFA is the dominant player in world football. The following account of the contests in sport is, therefore, vital, before going on to outline the Mahikeng projects.

**Contestations for global dominance in sport**

Globally, sport is dominated by a few multinationals. In football, FIFA dominates. It does so by virtue of its geographic location and European representation (including its offshore Europeans in Oceania), in relation to the developing world. Its languages are all European-based. All these lend to its structural hegemony, with a modern technical and business-minded efficiency. This is why FIFA enhances ‘its reach’:

> Enhancing and extending the reach of football is the business of FIFA. Its key product is synonymous with its brand… the… FIFA Football World Cup… [with]… FIFA’s role in organizing… [it]… is evident… [in]… countries… [to]… host the… Cup, with the event… being ‘owned’ by FIFA, and together with the LOC prepares and organizes the event but FIFA provides the entertainment while the host country provides the infrastructure and services.

(Pillay et al., 2009: 33)

No doubt FIFA effected sanctions against apartheid internationally (Alegi, 2006: 422), and ‘unified leadership and management around a multi-billion rand vision for 2010’ that resulted in some legacy projects, skills and technology transfer in SA. One study also cites the views of African
immigrants to SA as being positive in areas relating to job creation, football development, and increased tourism and investment opportunities (Achu & Swart, 2012: 33). Still, major problems remain, as the following indicates:

FIFA...[masquerades] as...[an NGO]...Its [unaccountable] policies and actions...[are aligned to a]...quasi-multinational corporation...[It]...disregards South Africa's developmental and socio-economic problems...to maximise...profit...[and shares guilt with local] political leaders and organisers in trying to dispel Afro-inability...[SA spent]...more money than budgeted for...[The] internal dynamics...[and socio-economic problems] of developing countries...are ignored.

(Labuschagne, 2011: 42)

Lefebvre's account, by contrast, seeks to strengthen 'city'-zens' participation rights to 'conceive, create and implement urban spaces as they desire rather than to rely on the state decisions'. Yet FIFA, despite its global development programme, did not allow street traders during the World Cup. This problematizes FIFA's own 'World Class Cities' programme. Such traders are part of a global South community, resulting in unequal distribution of benefits. This gives rise to arguments about recognizing informal traders as integral to urban economies in the South and as partners in the process of social dialogue (Celik, 2011: 62, 86). It also finds expression in sociological and social movement literature. In the former case, Jarvie (2011) expresses three forms of inequality: of condition, of opportunity and of capability. He sees sport as being able to improve life chances, but markets are neither self-regulating nor free-standing. Global sport and capitalism are seen to produce uneven and unjust results. Others (Maharaj, 2011: 49–51) point to the ruthless profit motive of World Cups, which offsets their alleged benefits to the poor. FIFA has a poor democratic record, being linked to oligarchic regimes, undermining democracy (disallowing protests or relocating street traders), and exemption from taxes in the country where it runs its activities. It is even described as a 'travelling oligarchy presented as philanthropic, trumping both citizens constitutional rights' (Runciman in Maharaj, 2011: 61) and the media freedom of nations. Yet it spent 60 billion rand (conservatively speaking) of South African money, while it earned R25 billion from media rights even before a ball was kicked.

The socio-political protests during the 2010 World Cup 'highlighted the heterogeneity and schisms' that mark the country. They reflect a 'fragile compact between the masses and the elite, which the tournament masked but did not hide' (Cornellissen, 2012). Cornellissen thus cites a network of organizations that used the World Cup to display their struggles on the ground: the 'Anti-Eviction campaign', 'Abahali Basemjondolo' and the 'StreetNet International' campaign for street vendors, the 'Homeless World Cup' in SA and the 'Alternative World Cup' in Brazil.'
What was distinctive in SA was ‘the degree to which protests were motivated by grievances and factors that included but also extended beyond the World Cup’. Concerns over tournaments’ costs and benefits were also raised by many grassroots organizations and interest groups. This gave rise to what Ngonyama (2010) sees as ‘critical voices’ of labour and social movements, NGOs and left-leaning individuals.

One account (Burger and Goslin, 2005: 8–10) sums up global organizations’ responsibilities as follows:

- **Accountability**: to structures, commitment and ethos.
- **Responsibility**: of behaviour and sanctions for individual or group transgressions.
- **Transparency**: of decisions, strategies, principles, finance and performance to stakeholders.
- **Social responsibility**: to internal or external stakeholders.
- **Independence**: financially, politically and commercially.
- **Fairness**: stakeholder interest balance.
- **Commercial revenue**: to be distributed to development and events in a balanced way.
- **Representative governing boards**: performance indicators and policies on various aspects of governing boards.
- **Discipline**: for management to adhere to universally accepted codes of conduct reflected in ethical policy.

In FIFA’s case there are transgressions of national governance systems. With the co-option of Local Organizing Committees (LOCs) into FIFA’s fold, it curbs constitutional and media rights to report critically and independently on the World Cup. The two bodies made unilateral decisions on media rights and journalists’ accreditation (Matidze & Palmer, 2010). At least two of the above principles are transgressed: stakeholder participation and procedural fairness. So, FIFA operates like a mobile country, using Africa as a battleground for its presidency (Daby, 2003: 19–24). While it does some good work in Africa, even benefiting Africa financially, it is also destructive for the African game and for unity in African football (e.g., in the Confederation of African Football). Moreover, the Qatar World Cup bid (2022) sees exploitation of foreign workers, being paid one Euro per hour, and facing problematic labour and human rights conditions. The International Trade Union Confederation calls this slave labour, and expects more deaths in Qatar (Farhad & Slobodian, 2012). While the $4.5 million sports donation to Palestine is useful, it may be a form of economic guilt. One cannot rule out FIFA indulging in predatory practices. What about resistance, one may ask? The following section gives an account of this, to give some framework to the Mahikeng projects that follow.
Globalization, new social movements and ‘alter-globalization’

Globalization in the economic sense refers to the transfer of goods, services, resources and capital across countries, with concomitant cultural, ideological and political expressions. ‘Alter-globalization’ sees global social movements supporting new forms of globalization and urging for the values of democracy, justice, environmental protection and human rights to be put ahead of purely economic concerns. It involves alternative forms of sport, which are invented out of social movements but are global, since they move from state level to other multiple levels, interactions and a new specific principle of ‘totality’ (Tourraine in Harvey, 2009: 383–403). They aim at developing new humane forms of globalization. Historically, social movements have seen three phases: a workers’ movement, a women’s movement and alter-globalization. The latter’s essential feature is diversity. It sees a World Social Forum contesting the World Economic Forum. While neoliberalism allows globalization to expand the markets and capitalism, alter-globalization seeks to do away with all globalization, and look to local rather than national responses. Reformists and transformists seek either to harness the force of globalization for institutional reform through a mixed economy or to use globalization for various purposes. These include the quest for social change or human security, to protect the environment, and for a wide range of human rights. The possibilities of alter-globalization are ‘technological and organizational developments, greater public awareness of global problems, larger trans-world solidarities, and increased receptiveness among political and economic elites to policies on globalization’. The social, political and economic instances need new articulations due to neoliberalism’s fragmentation and its effects on ordinary people. In sport, this has meant that teams have become multinationals and fans have become an extension of the market. The challenges here are ‘neo-liberal economic ideology, capital’s massive power, and attachment to state ideology at key levels of government (Harvey, 2009).’ Further challenges result from under-developed institutional capacities to establish alternative practices, and a lack of alternative economic strategies to free trade and foreign direct investment (Harvey, 2009: 388). ‘Grassroots globalization’ is one alternative (Appadurai in Harvey, 2009: 340) for transnational activist networks to get involved in new forms of international bargaining and global social movements, and to create a third space outside the market and the state: this can be achieved through street protests or by slowing neoliberal processes to deepen democracy, build capacity, develop expertise, share knowledge and generate commitment. This does not simply imply declaring universal principles but may arise from ‘smaller convergence of interest in a more ad hoc, inductive and context sensitive manner’.
Similarly, with greater optimism for international gains, Giulianotti and Robertson (2004: 549-50) suggest a non-reductionist analysis of globalization and its relation to football. They cite a dialectical connectivity of multiple socio-cultural, economic and political processes. They use the Japanese business practice term ‘glocalization’ to explain broader cultural objects in sport. They see ‘glocalization projects as a constitutive feature of contemporary globalization’. The former is defined by ‘a heightened awareness of the world as a single place’ and the ‘global intensification of social and cultural connectivity’. They view globalization as marked culturally by glocalization, where ‘local cultures adapt and redefine any global product to suit their particular needs, beliefs and customs’. Football is thus converted to ‘Aussie rules’ in Australia for the fitness needs of cricketers in winter, or Americans adapt rugby rather than Association Football to come up with the game called ‘Gridiron’. Also, specific cultures worked inside football’s universal rules to establish their own particular traditions (‘universalization of particularisms’), in the form of distinctive corporeal techniques, playing styles, aesthetic codes, administrative structures and interpretative vocabularies. But another process was also under way from the 1930s to the 1960s: the ‘particularization of universalism’. It saw the rise of international tournaments and different tiers of the governing body (e.g., continental bodies, the World Cup). Moreover, glocalization is shaped by intensive flows, which in football involve ‘trans-actional circulation of labor, capital and commodities that can underpin non-national forms of cultural particularity’. Thus, while little difference exists in tactical and aesthetic sports practices between nations or continents, nations ‘still struggle to relativize themselves through successful competition’. Spectator culture ‘represents locality or nation through particularistic symbolism’, including forms of dress or songs. Such processes are also evident in the economic realm, which cannot be explored here for reasons of space.

Four reference points are used (Giulianotti et al., 2004: 557–8) as elemental to the human condition: ‘individual selves’, (national) ‘societies’, the ‘world system of societies’ (international societies) and ‘humankind’, with each being constrained by the other three. These take differing forms. Legal rights of players in their contracts with clubs are one form. Another form is found in supporters expecting safety standards at stadiums. Another form is punishment of players or spectators by national associations for contravening rules. Still another sees the world football body adjudicating on behalf of players. Humankind, as a species, comes into focus when developmental work by coaches and national and international governing bodies spreads to the developing world and war-torn regions.

Of importance for this chapter is the application of such analysis to FIFA and its governing bodies. While football has ‘greatly enhanced the consciousness of humankind’, such bodies need to ‘prioritize distributive justice over profitability’, and respond appropriately to corruption charges. They
need to work on various areas, such as informal doubling of ticket prices and sale of television rights to pay-per-view stations (in 2002 but not in 2010), since

[such policies] can undermine social integration within football's 'family', reducing the global co-mingling of football cultures and identities, and weakening the game's aesthetic development by discouraging sport participation among marginalized social groups – ironically, the very groups whose contributions dominate football's folklore and official histories.

( Giulianotti & Robertson, 2004: 559)

These are some of the necessary conditions for world football to become more democratic in prioritizing humankind. Grassroots representation can lead to adding other groups (women, supporter associations, etc.) that are necessary for FIFA to include into its fold. It has to veer away from being seen as a World Trade Organization (WTO) in sport, and add to its global responsibilities. It also has to have stronger legal initiatives against exploitation of players, especially coming from the developing world, and to finance much wider programmes there. No doubt, FIFA has begun to engage in some of these responsibilities. But what is relevant here is Giulianotti's argument for a foundation of normative arguments that needs to be developed, exploring issues of distributive justice, global citizenship and democratic political structures inside football's public sphere rather than the current discourses regarding market access though the consumption of sports paraphernalia. Theorists like Habermas, Walzer and Archibugi are seen as being able to structure such debates. This could lead to developing some of their ideas to try to realize the utopian ideal of 'cosmopolitan democracy' ( Held ) or a 'practice community' ( Morgan ) that reforms the sporting public sphere (all in Giulianotti et al., 2004: 560). They could embed 'genuine citizenship' for 'programmatic solidarity', and 'inclusive dialogue and cultural exchange' instead of just buying into football through mass consumerism. FIFA's re-invention needs a democratic vision, and, while 'club support narrows the idea of competition into narrow self-interest, it remains true that club support is dependent on support for football per se'. Giulianotti and Robertson thus conclude that 'only a reformed, truly democratic governing body [of FIFA] can revitalize that ethos and carry it forward through effective governance'.

This chapter differs somewhat from this vision, not in any fundamental sense but in a strategic sense. The vision has its weak points, as its proponents admit:

as ... [football] ... commodification intensifies ... glocalization at the ... top end ... become[s] increasingly elitist ... [and] ... football's ... globalization ... [sees more tensions between various levels internationally], [World football] ... [would] ... prioritize 'humankind' ... through institutional
democratization of its major political structures. Reformed football governance...[promotes]...social inclusion within the game...[and]... commodification...impacts upon glocalization cultures...[excluding]...communities from meaningful participation in the constructive relativization of their cultural identities and practices through sport.

(Giulianotti & Robertson, 2004: 562–3)

An argument is made here for intervention in that gap where such increasing ‘elite glocalization occurs’, with resulting tensions between various international spheres. While internal reform of FIFA is possible and necessary, it also needs an external point of pressure to change. If it is not possible to challenge FIFA as a dominant international player in soccer, then it needs to be listening to outside events, structures and excluded communities. Most of the Mahikeng projects described in this chapter aim at such an effort. The following outlines the various projects generated in Mahikeng, with some indications of their anti-hegemonic content.

Projects hosted in Mahikeng during (and after) the World Cup

Of the numerous projects enacted in Mahikeng in 2010, the main ones were: a stage show, a ‘dream project’, Boy Scouts and bicycle interventions, stadium activities, a ‘mobile radio shack’ project, mobile ‘wing style football’, some documentary and miniature films, cultural performance projects, a skills development project and, later, a ‘yoga-cum-writing workshop’. Many of these had multiple partners, ranging from local business and organizations to the City Council, and members of the public were invited to partake or were offered the services provided by the various projects. After the 2010 events, other projects continue in the cultural area.

A kick-start concert

To begin with, the Provincial Arts and Sports Department and the World Cup representative (North West) showed little response to my call for joint work for the 2010 celebrations. A stage performance and dinner-cum-fund-raiser was held at the Mmabatho Convention Centre: the first event to kick-start the World Cup celebrations locally, whose content had cultural resonance. It involved numerous acts and local and international participation. These included Indian and hip hop dance, kids’ gymnastics and the World Cup (local) ‘diskie dance’. It also saw stage performances of story-telling and a play (on themes of homelessness, the family and crime). It also rendered dance performances by Mmabana dance artists, with the themes of slavery and indentured labour. This was in the light of the 150th anniversary of the indentured labour system in South Africa. These are some of the socio-historical voices raised in such cultural work. Apart from the traditional
forms of audience participation, through raffle prizes and draws for the audience, one relevant participatory aim of such performances was to empower local individual and group participation and to define their own performance parameters. Such an event evoked a range of collective, individual and historical memories on the broad themes performed on the stage.

New dreams in the midst of weary histories of public pandemics and crises

One important methodological tool, to gauge public opinion, was used to gain both public views and to feed their ideas into its sub-projects. People in the streets were asked: ‘What is your dream for Mahikeng?’ This ‘dream project’ aimed to implement such dreams and to inform the Mahikeng programme for its own World Cup activities, as distinct from the actual World Cup celebrations engulfing the country. A follow-up was made, with an artist’s construction of wooden binocular-like boxes through which people gazed at stadium areas and related their dreams. Many ideas emerged from this public survey, which also proved useful for numerous activities that engulfed the town during the World Cup. One aspect of this effort was the development of new spaces for new kinds of activities: a new dance studio, a new running trail, a new park, a new food market, a new Fight Club and a new Night Club. On the day of the Public Viewing Areas (PVAs) there were guided tours to all such new areas, and local groups used such newly developed spaces (e.g., a dance group) or provision was made for the regular use of such new areas (e.g., running trails) after the World Cup.

Moreover, a new food market was constructed from cold drink crates and established at the entrance to the stadium, following the spontaneous use of such material by street traders in Mahikeng. During one World Cup match screened at the stadium, the public was invited to a free evening candle-lit dinner on these home-made tables. Such events converted the architectural spaces around the stadiums from neglect and disuse to a more functional and attractive use of such space. The cold, massive and spider-like cement stadium structure became a warm environment for such personal events, which rural participants appreciated. Furthermore, with the new playground, some (huge) swings were constructed, with technical assistance from an engineer in town. Moreover, sofas were made out of old tyres to be used by children. The re-use and recycling of waste material was intended as a message to the public. A room was identified at the under-utilized stadium for boxing (‘Fight Club’) for local audiences to watch amateur fights. Another unused space was made functional by establishing a nightclub for dancing, with the provision of a bar that would be used during and after the World Cup games to be screened at the stadium.

Furthermore, the intention was also to educate the public, and to circulate the goals of one of the main partners (LifeLine), which does province-wide
work on AIDS and counselling. ‘Slow Res’ displays were shown to audiences at a big screen match at the stadium, with tiles structured as alphabets on the seats of the main stand. They included such messages as: ‘No Shame in HIV+’ or ‘Hey Sister, Got tested?’ These domino-effect messages were legible all around the stadium. Such personal messages contrasted with both the impersonality of the stadium and the FIFA multinational games. They highlighted some solution pathways for AIDS-infected people, and for partners or family members who live in shame. They also spoke to infected women, who are doubly oppressed in a patriarchal culture, being easily labelled as promiscuous carriers who transmit the HIV virus to others.

All the above, making dreams practical, claiming and using neglected spaces, converting stadium space into areas of play, entertainment and a makeshift restaurant, and the massive displays of educational and health messages, either share a local form of anti-global culture or constitute forms of glocalization or local forms of adopting global cultures. In a globalized age, a restaurant serves for profit, and does not simply cater freely for the public. The surreal appearance of free food at a candle-lit dinner at the stadium became a warm cosy environment for the public to indulge in. Using the stadium so freely was a stark contrast to earlier City Council resistance to the use of the stadium (aligned to ‘Government-Think’ that the stadium legitimizes Bophuthatswana). Mixing educational messages in an entertainment complex (the stadium) goes against global multinational practices of separating the spheres of work, education and play. Significantly, many projects were youth-directed, and to these we can now turn.

Youth awaken to fashion, a gold cup, films and a mobile radio shack

Since the Boy Scouts originated in Mahikeng, project organizers invested in a hundred bicycles for the Scouts projects. One offshoot was a cycle maintenance workshop held at LifeLine, with free riding lessons and road safety lessons. Larger public interventions included a bike parade accompanied by a fire truck, and a mobile radio shack with over 50 participants of various ages. There was also a Boy Scouts Heritage cycle ride taking about 75 cyclists on a 25 km heritage route that consisted of 36 route sites. This detailed tour was devised by a local Boy Scout leader and Mahikeng student (Pablo). The aim was to enhance youth cycling and celebrate the long history and heritage of a small town, especially neglected regarding the rich social research it can produce in the context of its hundred-year-old history. To further the educational aim, a multifunctional mobile screen and kitchen unit on a trailer was developed. It had a TV and a PA system, which was used in various parts of the North West for educational videos and for mobile ‘wing style football’. The latter is a skill-based game with a raised umpire chair (as in tennis), and a set of ribbon-type borders for a five-a-side
type game with limited space to play in. This artist-invented game was used to organize teams in nearby villages, with the final of the league tournament played in Mahikeng Stadium. Bodibe 11 won this mini ‘gold World Cup.’ The mobile unit has a kitchen unit and gas canister for meal preparation on the vehicle. LifeLine is continuing to use this unit for its Post-Test (AIDS) clubs for educational and soccer videos, and for games.

As one point of articulating the transformation of global events to feed into local talent, the invention of mobile heaters, with large clay pots placed atop Bunsen burners, was seen as a possible entrepreneurial feeder for local development. The public sat warmly next to such heaters in the wintry evenings, watched educational sports movies (on a cinema, from reclaimed stadium spaces) and obtained their free popcorn through a hole in the screen of the movie. Such projects reiterated educational, green-related and developmental messages.

More active was the mobile radio shack, built out of recycled wooden pallets as an affordable form of housing, with corrugated iron roof and a tool shed as a template. It was customized as a mobile radio without a frequency. It actually went to listeners (e.g., to advertise the LifeLines mission), doubling up as a mobile space for an exhibition, for photography and as a dressing room for a fashion parade. In the latter (‘Maf-Fab’) the public were given blankets and coffee provided for the chilly wintry night. It also displayed dresses made out of cheap ‘prison blankets’ knitted to ‘Tsale’ (cosy baby) blankets, which was called the ‘Hi Tonkana’ project. The creative workshops for dress designs resulted in creative local fashion items.

Four more large projects included a set of film workshops, the heritage day cycling and fun walk, a youth skills development camp, and a yoga-cum-writing camp. The film workshops, based on the ‘My Town’ project, saw training in story conceptualizing, filming, directing and editing a documentary film. In three days, the students produced four short films, shooting and directing a film with an editing team to assist in constructing short narratives. The project resulted in one long documentary about the struggles of participants to be given the space to foster (anti-)World Cup activity. It also produced three short films, with one (‘Ghost Town’) emerging in the top ten at the Cape Town Film festival.

In sum, the theme of regeneration of local activity was engineered for youth and locals; if not through entrepreneurial activity, then through media production; if not through various mobile activities, then through diverse forms of training and education; if not through fashion, then through resuscitating heritage issues. The World Cup stage of FIFA was transformed, if not upstaged, by adding an old heritage aspect to its projects (Boy Scouts), and by re-inventing the medium of radio to create a mobile form (radio shack) to resist media domination of FIFA/LOC. It also created a miniature form of the World Cup for local consumption, with the Gold Cup winners coming from a nearby village (Bodibe) to create a participative mechanism in World
FIFA 2010 World Cup activities. Activities were meant to (re-)invent the town, and saw film directorial debuts for the public to give alternative media versions of what it means to live in Mahikeng.

Post-2010: Mixing heritages and hoping to get rid of the ghosts of the past

Following up on these projects, various age groups partook in a heritage fun day. The aim was to create synergy between organizations and youth health activities in a competitive environment, and to appreciate SA’s national heritage. It included walking and cycling in Mahikeng Game Reserve, three months after the World Cup. This was done in partnership with Mahikeng Lions Club and the South African Scouts Association. Among a host of activities, it included wing football and an open theatre at Mahikeng campus (NWU). The dramatic piece directed by Kgafela Moagagodi (a local poet, musician and playwright) was enacted by non-drama students after two weeks of training. The play was of international quality, and was enacted in the open air at the Mahikeng campus (NWU), with no charge. Another project was for a youth camp, when 27 young children were exposed to skills development in theatre, meditation, leadership, teamwork, negotiations, self-defence, communication and interpersonal skills. The young delegates were challenged intellectually, spiritually and emotionally, to expand their outlook on life and identify their strengths. Finally, a yoga-cum-writing camp included learning the Indian art of pressure points (mudras), ‘hatha yoga’ with a focus on health issues, and a camp for ‘Yoga in education and writing’. It provided a unique combination of physical yoga and mental writing exercises. Feedback sessions revealed that most participants were satisfied with their learning at camp.

While the forms of cultural activity are local, their ambit is transdisciplinary, and they take particular forms to celebrate universal aspects, as displayed by the theatre piece that simultaneously delved into local cultures and universal themes of existence and conflict. Of importance was that each project had some or other social concern with an artistic slant. So, while there was a social research methodology, there was also an artistic method introduced. It included collaboration of local and international artists on the various events, happenings and counter-World Cup strategies that emerged during the course of the 2010 World Cup.

Each of the projects contributed to a particular social concern in Mahikeng or in the wider North West Province itself. The Mahikeng stadium is a good place to begin the narrative of countering the hegemony of the ruling elite, which remains particularly historicist and obsessed with the ghosts of the past in the form of the legacies of Bophuthatswana. Such obsession is selective, in that the ruling party also uses Sun City, itself a legacy of that ethnic bantustan, when it makes full use of it as a venue for various government or
political party functions. While liberation in South Africa was and remains an ideal worth striving for and to build on, there are problems within certain sections who inherit the liberation mantle. Thus, even elements within local cultural workers, City Council administrators and provincial politicians in the North West tend to veer away from taking stock, fairly and squarely, of the positive and negative legacies of that apartheid construction. While there is no doubt of the negative legacy of the bantustan regime, there is a low recognition of the achievements of that regime when taking stock of its shortfalls. Fortunately, the inheritance of mines, entertainment areas (like Sun City) and the various gambling casinos and stadiums (five in total) across the bantustan created a base, albeit insufficient due to the lack of an internally generated and developed economy with its own support mechanisms. The stadium is therefore seen as a legacy of the ethnic Bophuthatswana regime, making it politically and ideologically difficult to capture as a venue for the various projects outlined above. This is clearly documented in the above-mentioned docu-film about the activities in Mahikeng at the time. This docu-film narrated, through various views, both the struggles and victories of local and international partners, and how they tried to use the Mahikeng stadium merely to screen some World Cup matches at the stadium and to host some events there. The various projects also sought to use the stadium as a site of strategic interventions for unpacking and reconstituting the World Cup locally. Such activities took place despite the global presence of the World Cup, which became empty of meaning, particularly in towns that were not in physical proximity to live World Cup action. The themes of health, heritage, drama, youth and creativity were all used in various ways to elicit local action.

Limitations and problems of projects

In terms of the limitations of the projects, the following is worth noting with regard to the core activities described in this chapter. First, though the sustainability of many projects was kept in mind, not many have continued, apart from ‘mobile soccer’ that has a TV attached to a trailer on a bakkie. There is still a need to tap into rural resources, since artists still remain peripheral to provincial and local governments, which affects cultural output. One current struggle is to have development tennis for youth, which is being ignored by local authorities, despite all the factors being in place. Second, while the project sustained a short-lived collaboration between diverse organizations, there was less input from local artists: some notable Mahikeng artists did not even participate in the project. Thus, there was a lack of sustainability and intensity, as was evident in some of the events described above. Such synergy needs to be encouraged and intensified if rural areas are to be ignited, not just in the entertainment sector but also in cultural and other sectors. Third, some local groups were not contactable to add to
the programme (e.g., the Montshiwa group of cultural workers, or Mahikeng students on winter break). The response from the university (NWU) to the project was, to put it mildly, lukewarm as compared with small businesses in town. Also, the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture’s response to a joint venture was bland (‘we are doing something similar’). Thus, even provincial World Cup organizers were not contactable for a hearing on what could be done in the town for 2010. Fourth, despite the project work undertaken, both the lack of continuity of such work and problems of weak institutional leadership (e.g., NWU and Mmabana), make it difficult for arts and culture talent clusters to flourish.

Looking back: A discussion

A retrospective view is necessary to review the events, to square up achievements and give a critical distance to the activities outlined above. There are nine areas within which such a discussion can be enacted. All these are critically reflective of the traditional form of hosting a World Cup, and thus are important in their local enactments. They all relate voices that emerged at the geographical periphery, when the centre of activity in 2010 was predominantly in the main cities. Such kinds of voices do need to be heard, in their variety of contexts in the developing world. What is important is that rural citizens became self-participatory in the events of 2010.

The first area relates to civic participation: almost all the events were public events, from the announcement of the 2010 games when a concert was staged, to the World Cup final that was viewed on a large screen at the Mahikeng stadium. The concert emphasized various aspects, ranging from diversity, by encouraging a range of dramatic skills, through to youth empowerment and historical and other forms of education and entertainment. For FIFA to spread its wings in a similar manner, it has to make use of the social functions of sport as a generator of other value chains, with country-based relevancy and meanings.

Second, both scientific methodology and political and development methods were enhanced by such public participation, with the two artistically based public surveys. The conjuring up of a host of new activities and clubs, and developing tourism and guide skills, saw the youth empowered with activities at the stadium. Youth and adults were amazed to find that they could take a photo of themselves attending a match viewing (or related events), and come back with such a personal memento, without any charge. This struck a deep chord in the hearts of rural folk, as did many of the warm evening events, such as the free candle-lit dinner under the stars. Public participation renewed a trust in the broad public realm too, while the FIFA model is predominantly based on spreading its private power (albeit with some development concessions).
Third, *spaces and places were redefined* from their long-term non-use and became not only functional but also enjoyable and entertaining, as with the boxing or bar venue or the ‘Slow Res’ event. Many buildings and event-related outdoor spaces had been rendered useless due to negligence. Many of the events related in this chapter assumed that such spaces needed to be resuscitated and reworked, to redefine the present rather than hark to its past (e.g., most infrastructure seems to be identified by politicians with the Bophuthatswana regime).

Fourth, there was a *development of inter-organizational connectivity*, with a variety of organizations participating in the activities described above. Such connectivity was crucial for the short-term period of the World Cup and to energize and re-ignite the previously unused stadium through a variety of means. But it remains important to build on this, in the rural North West as well as the peri-urban Mahikeng area, due to the lack of (support for) a strong civil society and movement. Citizenship and related issues are not strongly contested in such areas, to say the least. Public participation in such events does not just allow a cultural refresher, but can also engender a growing and stronger civilian (if not civic) life for many.

Fifth, many of the *projects were multidisciplinary, historical and innovative*. They combined history, art, skill acquisition and entertainment. Bike tours, for instance, were educational and physically mobilized people to tour the heritage areas in Mahikeng. The use of Boy Scouts not only encouraged the skilling of such scouts but also allowed historical phenomena associated with Mahikeng to be re-invented and re-advertised, and to become more visible and perhaps more functional, in civil society.

Sixth, the *notion of mobility* was used in several projects. Its importance is not only physical, or even material, but also metaphorical and symbolic. The bike events provided a platform upon which to render these senses more obvious. Some of these meanings included the following. The mobile screen attached to the mobile wing style football expanded the limited notion of mobile phones having a monopoly over metaphoric and symbolic mobility: it allowed educational and sports skills to be mobile and mobilized. With the scarcity of facilities, coaches and educational material in rural areas, the mobile unit provided not just the facility to respond to such needs but also possibilities of training, education and skills beyond the traditional methods used to do this. The attached kitchen unit and the mobile unit of LifeLine Post-(AIDS)Test clubs are now used by LifeLine as a mobile clinic: thus, multiple functions were combined in this mobile unit, from health to food, and from skills to entertainment. Other mobile functions included the clay oven heaters and the mobile radio shack that re-invented a radio station as a public and mobile facility.

Seventh, most of the projects revolved around the area of *scientific and political creativity*. The former took shape in the manner in which projects found out about public needs (by various forms of approaches to the public).
The latter was formed by that very public act of finding out about needs, and thus sought political legitimacy for its actions and for the participation of the public. The training provided for the production of three short films, simply one form of that creative process, resulted in the production of a documentary. It engendered its own legitimacy by allowing the public to participate in reproducing their own realities in the form of short documentaries. Apart from the many websites that emerged from the project, the popular press also reported that Mahikeng was ‘the safest city in SA’ in the months following the World Cup. This was in contrast to some foreigners, who had had it drummed into them (from embassies or travel agents) that SA was a dangerous place. One website in particular, the backward bike race at Mahikeng stadium, captured the surrealistic political situation in the town. This retells the story of the strange-looking stadium built before 1994, with its side stands that do not face the grounds unless one turns one’s body. Its disuse is ‘constructed’ by various groups: not only the previous regime and post-apartheid dispensations, but also sports federations and schools in the area. The backward bike race in such a stadium evokes such displacements to be more visible to the media public, including the lack of use of the wealth of infrastructure that the town possesses due to such facilities being associated with the past regime.

Still, in the aftermath of the World Cup, there is some follow-up work being done – but it is taking place in a resource-scarce environment. Thus, the heritage day celebration (September 2011) saw the staging of an open theatre by low-skilled but well-trained students to capture the various moments of post-apartheid. Another project, mentioned earlier, saw a camp attended by youth, and a yoga and writing camp that involved further involvement in creative exploration for and by youth. There were also bi-monthly open mike sessions at the Mahikeng campus (2011) that gave birth to an open-air theatre production, with no entry charges. Recently (2013), a storytelling group has emerged, through social media contacts. FIFA could use many such innovations, if it is really interested in generating local cultural development.

Finally, while many of these projects were liberatory and offensive in challenging the hegemony of soccer from different viewpoints, a summary of some other worthy ideas that emerged from such efforts is necessary. They serve as a reminder of the possible ways of combining various disciplines, ranging from drama and communication through to history and youth, for youth skills and creativity to celebrate sports. One idea was to have a five-a-side tournament site added to World Cup viewing at a local coffee shop, where various cultural events could take place. Another was to screen the live World Cup matches on a truck, in rural areas in the Province at night with a mobile screen. FIFA would certainly oppose such events, yet it does need to engage with civic groups on such kinds of strategic interventions. One particularly locally contextualized idea was to screen matches with the unique
South African radio commentary (fast-paced, exciting and in an African language). Another was to approach foreign media during matches at stadiums, to give specialized, incisive and social commentary on the World Cup. These last three ideas combined could have formed a very powerful form of mediasoccer ‘voice’ for 2010 – but it needed resources, support and organizational verve. FIFA would most probably not engage with many such powerful ideas, leaving out marginal communities, mainly due to financial implications or its hegemonic claims to the game of football. Such ideas may even be able to effect some change in a continent where soccer is the dominant sport, and where civic support and growth are as vital for political development. If the call for Africa to be more democratic is to be heeded, applied and realized, international sports organizations also need to be further democratized with more diverse and intensive programmes, especially in the context of the negative perceptions of multinational corporations in Africa.

**Conclusion**

Soccer remains a great asset of Africa, and the World Cup may have blessed its shores with the wonders of the game and some indirect positive effects. Yet there are also the shortcomings of FIFA as a multinational predominating over national entities, their stadiums and other regimes, especially in developing countries. Due to FIFA’s preponderance, the projects outlined in this chapter give some indication of some forms of chipping away at the hegemonic domination over nations and their sports regimes. Both the glocal and the anti-global aspects convey a sense of working from some form of alternative position. The former does not see global processes as untouchable, since local processes are infused within them. The global is also open to subversion from the inside. Anti-global is yet another position from which reflections of the global are possible. The projects described in this chapter included both glocal and anti-global aspects. The former saw local fashion and heritage aspects subverting football for their own entrepreneurial and historico-educational purposes. The latter may not have included direct protests against FIFA or the LOC, but saw forms of resistance and alternative creative projects which, if sustained, could form part of the anti-global thrust against forms such as FIFA in a variety of ways.

World Cups are massive events, but, precisely for this reason, they need to be harnessed for multiple social change purposes, with the simultaneous democratization of such entities as FIFA, since the struggle is both inside and outside such organizations. The predominance of African youth as a demographically increasing population group means that the kinds of interventions described here are more urgent, so as to generate a variety of mechanisms to galvanize such important social formations. Additionally, there is also a dire need to argue for creating sustainable jobs and projects in developing countries where they are needed most, and not only during
mass events like the World Cup. These forms add to traditional modes of intervention in societies where rupture has become a way of life. This needs to change, and it has to be done through the vocal participation of people who are affected by such ruptures and from whom a variety of voices can be heard and understood.

Notes

1. The projects described in this chapter were all funded by SA’s NLTDF (National Lottery Distribution Trust Fund).
2. These included Lotto, LifeLine, Operation Blanket, Mahikeng City Council, NWU: Mahikeng campus, Mmabana Cultural Centre, CASCOLAND, various local groups and artists, Harry Wels and Henk Goede (VU), Mahikeng Boy Scouts, Plexus films, Boxer, DAC, Avalanche Water, Lion Clubs, National Parks Board, Mmabatho Hindu Sabha, Vishwa Shakti, Mahikeng Traffic Department and Fire Brigade, Molopo Shopping Centre, Atamelang Bus Transport, and Mafikeng Auto Renovators as the main participants, in their varying capacities.
4. This ‘slow-down’ is reflected in many ways, even though it is the capital of the North West Province.
6. General areas of historical research are its shift from being an administrative capital of Bechuanaland (a British Protectorate), to Mafeking/Mafikeng during the apartheid/Bophuthatswana era, and now Mahikeng, the capital of the North West Province. Numerous other areas of research remain under-exploited.
8. A longer documentary, for which I am accredited as its producer, relates struggles to enact the projects related in this chapter. Three other short films saw novices trained and creating their own stories on ‘My Town’. Source: personal copies: CD films on disc, 2010.
9. Sun City, a huge entertainment venue, is situated in the North West. It is an inherited legacy, from both the Bophuthatswana ‘government’ and apartheid SA. It was meant to keep South Africa ‘pure’ by allowing ethnic ‘homelands’ to set up such gambling centres.

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South Africa FIFA World Cup 2010: African Players’ Global Labour Distribution and Legacy

Wycliffe W.S. Njororai

Introduction

The football World Cup tournament represents the pinnacle of the game globally. It is the dream of a player not only to take part in the World Cup final tournament but also to win it and be crowned as a world champion. Association football (soccer) is one of the most popular sports, with more than 270 million players worldwide and 209 national associations affiliated to Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) (FIFA, 2012). The highest point on the calendar is the international competition in which all countries throughout the world can participate – the FIFA World Cup, an international football competition contested by the men’s national football teams of the member nations of FIFA, the global governing body of football. This championship has been held every four years since the first tournament in 1930, with the exception of 1942 and 1946, due to World War II (Wong, 2008).

The Confederation of African Football has had representatives at the World Cup since 1934. However, it was only from 1970 that the region was guaranteed a place in the finals tournament (Darby, 2005). It is also significant to observe that, as a continent, Africa had never hosted the World Cup tournament until 2010. Thus, the 2010 football World Cup was held for the first time on African soil in the Republic of South Africa. This World Cup also had the highest number of African national teams participating, including the hosts, Republic of South Africa, Algeria, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. These countries had also represented Africa at previous World Cup final tournaments and, therefore, are among the cream of the African game. Cameroon has participated in the World Cup final tournament six times (1982; 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2010), Nigeria four times (1994, 1998, 2002 and 2010), Algeria three times (1982, 1986 and 2010), South Africa three times (1998, 2002 and 2010) and Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire twice
each in 2006 and 2010 (FIFA, 2010b). One common characteristic of these countries is the high proportion of players drawn from overseas clubs, especially those playing in the lucrative European leagues. The questions that come to mind are: why are these players attractive to the European countries? What characteristics do they possess that may be appealing across Europe? For aspiring African players, what is it about these professional players that the young ones can compare themselves with and try to emulate? This study endeavours to establish the demographic characteristics of the national team players of the African teams at the 2010 World Cup Soccer tournament, their club affiliation and, by extension, the countries that host most of the African elite soccer players. Given the popularity of the World Cup, players representing African countries at that level are looked upon as cultural icons and role models who shape the dreams of young yet ambitious players on the African continent. It is, therefore, imperative that we explore the migration of African players to Europe within the larger global nature of the sport so that we can draw lessons for the fledgling African leagues.

This chapter, therefore, looks at the demographic characteristics and club affiliation of the players of African teams at the 2010 World Cup held in South Africa from 11 June to 11 July 2010 and the implications for the domestic game. The aspects considered include their age and height as well as their club affiliations and situating them within the dynamics of football labour migration. The analysis aims to demonstrate the fact that these players possess demographic characteristics that are attractive, that the cream of the African game is based in foreign countries, and that there is a need to restructure the African game to make it appealing to upcoming players if the flight to other parts of the world is to be contained. The data used in the analysis are drawn from the FIFA World Cup South Africa list of players for the participating teams (FIFA, 2010a).

Globalization and African football

Globalization has been defined by Giddens in Alvito (2007: 525) as an ‘intensification of worldwide relations, via which far-flung places are linked together in such a way that events in one place are affected by processes taking place many miles away, and vice versa’. Thus, the state of African football is greatly influenced by developments around the globe. The existence of a thriving football labour market is having an enormous impact on both the donor and recipient countries. For African countries, the contribution to the global phenomenon of football labour is that of the production of the young talent that is then exported to the international consumer market, which is mostly located in Europe and, of late, in the Middle East as well as the Republic of South Africa (Alvito, 2007; Cornelissen & Solberg, 2007; Darby, 2007a, b; Darby et al., 2007).
It is, therefore, noticeable that there is a dramatic increase in the number of African players who earn their living in the European football market. The key questions that come to mind are: Does the export of the African players to the European clubs (and any other) improve the state of the African game at national and international level? Do the individual players benefit from this international labour migration to Europe? And do the recipient clubs and countries benefit from the presence of the African players in their leagues? Answers to these fundamental questions vary between those taking functionalist and those taking critical positions. Those of the functionalist perspective aver that exposure of African players to the European game, characterized by good training infrastructure, scientifically proven methods, highly qualified coaches, and highly systemized and administrative structures, as well as the overall sporting environment, positively rubs off on the African players and their respective national teams, leading to better performance at international level. Indeed, the consistent representation of the African teams at the World Cup level by teams such as Cameroon, Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Ghana, Tunisia and Cote d’Ivoire in the recent past can partly be attributed to many of their players playing professional football in Europe. This trend lends credence to the argument that African players based in European leagues have a positive impact on the performance of their respective national teams. This means that the more players an African country has that play in Europe, the better it is for the national team.

At an individual level, the players earn money that they could only dream of if they remained in African football. As for the recipient clubs and countries, there is increased competitiveness of the teams and leagues, thereby improving the entertainment value and leading to better and enhanced television contracts. There is also an increase in the fan base in Africa, as more people tend to support teams that have their country mate on the roster. Thus, the functionalist view of African player migration is that exposure to Europe’s elite leagues positively contributes to the development of the African game. Those who hold such ideas argue that African footballers should be allowed to migrate unfettered to ply their talents wherever they choose (Darby, 2007a, b). However, this functionalist approach of looking at the supposedly positive side of the African football labour migration glosses over the serious negative ramifications of the lop-sided trade in muscle. According to Darby (2007a), the loss of Africa’s football resources to Europe is comparable to broader colonial and neo-colonial exploitation of the third world by the first one. African football has, in the past 25 years, developed into a globalized network of commercialization and commoditization, leaving the domestic leagues bereft of any established stars (Cornelissen & Solberg, 2007). With such a corporatization of the sport and the rise of internationally idolized celebrities based in Europe with a huge following in Africa, there has been a heavy demise of the notion of football as a local game for friendly interaction and competition (Armstrong, 2010). This
ultimately has caused a disconnection with African star players, who are only seen on television and not in the domestic leagues.

The major emergence of football academies in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s has been no exception to this neo-colonial economic dominance, and has continued to rob football of its essence as a local game. One of the key critics of this unequal trade transaction is the President of the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Sepp Blatter, who referred to European clubs buying African players as neo-colonialists involved in ‘social and economic rape’ (BBC, 17 December 2003). According to FIFA (2005), Blatter reiterated his criticism of the European clubs in an article published in the Financial Times on 11 October 2005 that alluded to underhand dealings with under-age players:

Football is now a multibillion-pound global industry. Unfortunately, the haphazard way in which money has flowed into the game – reminiscent of a misguided, wild-west style of capitalism – is having some seriously harmful effects…A few fortunate clubs, however, are richer than ever before…all too often, the source of this wealth is individuals with little or no history of interest in the game who happen upon football as a means of serving some hidden agenda. Having set foot in the sport seemingly out of nowhere, they proceed to throw pornographic amounts of money at it…a new type of slavery has been spawned that should be opposed by everyone.

(FIFA, 2005)

Darby (2007a), though echoing Blatter’s sentiments about the exploitation of African footballers, argued that the African football diaspora has enriched professional leagues and thrilled football audiences throughout Europe. He also asserts that elite-level players have earned salaries and acquired the sort of fame and wealth that they could only have dreamt of had they remained in Africa. However, it is his contention that it is not clear what impact African player migration has had on the development of African football at both domestic and international levels. This study, therefore, looks at the international teams that represented Africa in the 2010 World Cup held in South Africa. Trends in the early 21st century indicate that more of the national team players for African nations are playing their football away from the African continent. For example, an analysis of the club affiliations of those players representing their countries in the recent past editions of the Africa Cup of Nations final tournament reveals that the majority of Africa’s talented footballers are based in Europe. At the 2000 tournament co-hosted by Ghana and Nigeria, just over 50% of the players were signed to a European club. For the 2002 edition in Mali, this figure had increased to 66%, and, for the 2004 tournament in Tunisia, the figure reached 67% (Darby, 2007a). At the 2006 World Cup tournament in Germany, 75% of the
African squad players were based in Europe (Scherrens, 2007), whereas in 2010 the percentage had increased to 85% (FIFA, 2010a, b).

**Sports labour migration**

According to Darby (2000b), the expropriation of African players by wealthy European clubs at the expense of domestic leagues and competitions can be interpreted as an extension of the economic imperialism of the colonial period, beyond which first world development has been sustained by exploitation and impoverishment of other parts of the world. The migration of African players to Europe and other parts of the world has a long history, dating back to the colonial period. A colonial power such as France had a policy of assimilating its subjects into the greater France. This proactive encouragement of Africans to compete for the French national team maximized the exploitation of indigenous African talent. The exploitation of African soccer talent was in line with the imperialist economic policy of locating and harnessing cheap raw materials for manufacture and consumption elsewhere (Darby, 2000b). This explains the presence of many players with African backgrounds on the French national team. Other than France, some European countries that have also recruited players with African roots include Portugal, Germany, England, Belgium and Italy. The consequence of the unabated player migration to European leagues and elsewhere has been the de-skilling of the African domestic game. The continued diminishing of football as a local game over the past 30 years has seen African footballers adapt towards a global spectrum of the game. In essence, African players have become export products of their nations in the search to play football abroad, in Europe in particular (Poli, 2006; Andrews & Ritzer, 2007).

In terms of labour migration as a whole, the process of modern globalization has increasingly allowed migrants to develop and carry out their ambitions of travelling abroad. From 1980 to 2000, the number of legal international migrants worldwide rose from 48 to 118 million, and the number of African football players in Europe doubled from 463 in 1995 to 998 in 2006 (Poli, 2006). Although Confederation of African Football (CAF), the body in charge of football on the African continent, has come up with measures such as the sponsored Champions league with financial compensation to players to entice them to train and compete on African soil, the migration patterns show no signs of slowing down.

Movement of elite sports talent is referred to in terms of labour migration, and it takes place within a nation, between nations on the same continent and between nations on different continents (Apparadurai, 1990; Bale & Maguire, 1994; Maguire & Pearton, 2000; Chiba, 2004; Cornelissen & Solberg, 2007; Darby, 2007a, b; Maguire, 2008; Eliasson, 2009; Thibault, 2009). The sports labour migration is a phenomenon that is gathering momentum, and, as Bale and Maguire (1994) and Thibault (2009) correctly
point out, it is closely interwoven with the broader process of global sports development as well as accelerated globalization taking place in the early part of the 21st century. Some of the factors that have facilitated the enormous growth of the sports industry interwoven with globalization include: an increase in the number of international agencies; the growth of increasingly global forms of communication; the development of global competitions and prizes; and the development of notions of rights and citizenship that are increasingly standardized internationally. The sports labour migration process is interwoven with the commoditization of sport within the capitalist world economy. According to Maguire and Pearton (2000), sport development depends upon several elements, including the focus and efficiency of sport organizations, availability and identification of human resources, methods of coaching and training, and the application of sports medicine and sport sciences. This echoes earlier sentiments by Kunath in Singh (1982), who expressed the point that sports performance in international competitions and tournaments not only denotes the high level of efficiency of an individual sportsman or woman, but also gives expression to the overall efficiency of a nation, society and culture. Thus, the countries that produce world champions at major international championships also have political, economic, social and cultural conditions that are indispensable for producing such results. The absence of conditions which act as a medium in which sports training can be effectively carried out minimizes the achievements in a high-level sports competition (Singh, 1982; Njororai, 2003; 2007a, b; 2010). This creates a vacuum, and therefore the motivation by some wealthy countries to import athletes with the requisite and proven talent to reap quick results (Njororai, 2008; 2010; 2012).

Thus, sports in some less developed nations tend to under-utilize their talent, as they lack the physical, economic, organizational, human and technical capacities to fully exploit the athletic talent available. The inadequacy of the sporting infrastructure, the administrative flaws and corruption, therefore, leave the developing countries vulnerable to the designs of the more wealthy nations in the global sports figuration (Bale, 1991; 2004; Bale & Maguire, 1994; Darby, 2000b; 2007a, b; Lanfranchi & Taylor, 2001; Thibault, 2009). This explains why the team roster for the national team of France that won the soccer World Cup in 1998 had more African immigrants than the indigenous Caucasian French and many other nations are now represented by immigrant athletes (Woodward, 2004).

According to Bale and Sang (1996), global sports processes, therefore, can lead to the under- or dependent development of a nation’s talent. The authors illustrate this under- and dependent development process using Kenyan athletes, who were massively recruited by American-based universities starting from the mid-1970s to spur success in the track and field programmes so as to market the host institutions. This development was a positive one, as it diversified and exposed the Kenyan athletes to
Western training methods, facilities, international competitions and personnel, accounting for Kenya’s international successes in the 1970s and 1980s. Kenya went on to establish itself as a powerhouse in the identification and nurturing of world-class middle and distance runners. It is debatable whether the same applies to soccer, where many African countries have their players in European leagues (Darby, 2000a, b; 2007a, b). Indeed, the team rosters of African teams at the recent World Cup tournaments indicate that these nations have a high number of foreign-based players. This is also reflected in the nations that dominate at the African Cup of Nations. This dominance by nations with a majority of foreign-based players shows that players playing in European leagues add quality, leading to ongoing success at the international level. However, the search for sporting success will continue to arouse controversy. This is because the performance ranking in sports competitions at the Olympic Games, the soccer World Cup and world athletics championships, among others, fuels the drive by individual countries to be at the top of the medal standings. This has created an international rank order of nations in sporting terms, which compares with the grouping of nations along political, economic and cultural lines into core, semi-peripheral and peripheral blocs. According to Maguire & Pearton (2000), the rank order of sporting nations falls into three groupings:

1. Core Countries: Western Europe, North America and former White Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand
2. Semi-peripheral countries: former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, some Central and South American societies and several emerging nations, such as South Korea
3. Peripheral countries: Most Islamic nations, the majority of African countries and those from South Asia

In Africa, one can also categorize the level of development of soccer on a regional basis. The countries that dominate are those from West and North Africa. These regions are represented by dominant soccer nations such as Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Cameroon. The other region which has made progress is the Southern African region, represented by South Africa, Zambia and Angola. These countries have now become regular participants in the Africa Cup of Nations and the World Cup, except for Zambia. However, East and Central African countries rarely participate in the Africa Cup of Nations and, except for Zaire, they have never had a team qualify for the World Cup Soccer tournament. The dominant African countries in soccer are those that have many players playing in European leagues or in Tunisia, South Africa and Egypt, where the leagues have well-run professional teams and competitions. The professionalized leagues demand better organizational structure, strategic marketing, promotion and funding, and a better resource base for
investing in upcoming players, as well as retention and import of talented players, leading to overall performance at the national level. This emphasizes the need for African soccer administrators to push for the professionalization of the game. However, this is bound to pose enormous challenges, because administration of the African game is one of the major impediments to the progress and development of the sport. Thus, given the weak administrative and amateurish set-up of the game in the majority of African countries, the continent will continue to be an outlier in terms of soccer development, except for isolated nations that have established professional and commercially driven soccer programmes.

Therefore, while the endeavour by Maguire and Pearton (2000) to group the nations as core, semi-peripheral and peripheral based on performance in individual and team sports is laudable, one has to appreciate the fact that the typology hides unique successes in selected sports as well as regions of the world. For example, not all economically peripheral countries are also peripheral in all sports, and vice versa for core countries. Nevertheless, the economic and politically core countries tend to control the content, ideology and economic resources associated with sport even when they are being challenged on the field of play by non-core countries. The field of play is, therefore, more contestable, given that, through state policy, non-core countries can use major sport festivals to solidify internal national identification and enhance international recognition and prestige. This explains the rapid growth in the membership of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF) and the FIFA, as every newly independent state was quick to affiliate (Darby, 2000a).

Despite the development on the field of play and in the administrative hierarchy of the various international sports organizations, the fact that much of the economic and political power is exercised by the core countries creates an unequal relationship, with the West dominating in international recognition, respectability, status and prestige (Darby, 2000a; 2001; Maguire, 2008). The more ‘high technology’ and commoditized the sport, the more talent identification and development are reliant on the elements of the global sport figuration, including coaching, training, competitions, management, sports medicine, marketing, merchandizing, sponsorship and branding, among others. The highly developed sports system in the West tends to be more attractive to African players. Thus, the West becomes an ideal destination for all sorts of talents and expertise, as witnessed in the broader migration processes by which the last decade has seen not only the recruitment by Western nations of sport scientists and coaches from the former Soviet bloc, but also the drain of sports talent from Africa and South America. This has been most evident in soccer, to the economically more powerful leagues and clubs of Europe (Darby, 2000b; 2007a, b; Maguire & Pearton, 2000). This economic dominance leaves the non-core leagues in a vulnerable state of dependent relationship with the dominant European
core. In other sports, such as baseball, this drain of talent flows to the USA, while in track and field the flow is in favour of the USA, Europe and Japan. The African players at the 2010 World Cup and their club affiliations demonstrate the dependent state of the African game and European football. To some extent, this relationship benefits both the European game and the individual players, and to some extent the African national teams.

**African players at the 2010 World Cup**

The FIFA records show the names of the players, positions, shirt number, date of birth, height and club affiliation. Table 4.1 shows the demographics of the African players at the 2010 World Cup. Since the FIFA World Cup is highly competitive, only the best players within the specific country are selected to represent their country (Wong, 2008). Knowledge of the characteristics of these players is important, since it has been reported in other similar sports (e.g., rugby and American football) that various anthropometric characteristics of athletes, such as body mass and height, are reasonable predictors for participation and success at the highest level. In soccer, body height is advantageous in jumping tasks like heading, thereby presenting strategic advantages to a team. Furthermore, knowledge of the World Cup players' characteristics gives clues to prerequisites for playing at the highest standard (Poli et al., 2013) for African countries, many of whom have not had a long history of the beautiful game. Many young players look up to those who have participated at the level of the World Cup; hence, knowing the latter's characteristics is useful in nurturing and modelling the aspiring young talents at the developmental level of the game.

Table 4.1 shows that the age of the African players varied from an average of 24.57 years for Algeria to 27.43 for South Africa. Comparatively, therefore, Algeria had the youngest squad, followed by Ghana (24.91), Cameroon (25.57) and Nigeria (26.43), with Cote d'Ivoire (27.17) and South Africa (27.43) having the oldest squads. The average age of the African players (26.01) is slightly on the lower side compared with that of all the players who took part in the 2002 and 2006 World Cup soccer tournaments, where the mean ages were 27.04 and 26.80, respectively. In these two editions of the World Cup, the mean ages of the African players were 25.50 and 25.7, respectively. According to Wong (2008), the average ages of the African players were significantly lower compared with players from other confederations. The author attributed these differences to the high-speed and high-intensity playing style among the African teams, and therefore the higher reliance on youthful players who are able to keep up with the fast pace. On the other hand, these players are at the early peak of their careers and still have a chance to progress in their club careers. The trend is for African players to start off in marginal European leagues and gradually make it to the top leagues, including England, Italy, Spain, Germany and France.
### Table 4.1 Demographics of the African players at the 2010 World Cup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Height</th>
<th>No. of clubs represented</th>
<th>Foreign-based players</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Local-based players</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Foreign countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>24.57</td>
<td>182.17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>25.57</td>
<td>182.66</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>95.65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>27.17</td>
<td>180.96</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>95.65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>24.91</td>
<td>178.43</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>26.43</td>
<td>184.09</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>177.91</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>30.43</td>
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<td>69.57</td>
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<td>181.0367</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>82.61</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Compiled by the author from FIFA (2010a) World Cup player statistics.*
According to Poli, Besson and Ravenel (2013), the average age of players in the major leagues is 26.5 years of age, and in less competitive and wealthy leagues players are younger. What is interesting is that there are fewer young players in the Big Five leagues: only 16% of them are under 22 years, compared with 24% in the other leagues. A scrutiny of this pattern reveals why African players are attractive in the less competitive European leagues. This is because the progressive increase in the percentage of young players in the less wealthy leagues is accompanied by the need for players to progress by stages in the football labour market (Scherrens, 2007; Poli et al., 2013). It is a reflection of the strategies adopted by European clubs with average financial means: get cheap, mostly foreign, players, give them a platform to showcase talent and then sell them to wealthier clubs at a huge profit. Hence, the youthfulness of the African players at the 2010 World Cup is a positive attribute that makes them attractive to European clubs.

Youthful players are, therefore, an asset to the teams at global level. It should also be pointed out that there are an increased number of youth players from Africa, who migrate to play soccer abroad and thereby earn their stripes on the national teams at a younger age. This trend flourished in the late 1990s and the early part of this century due to the success of the African teams in junior, youth and Olympic soccer competitions. According to Darby (2007a), African successes at the world youth levels effectively showcased the potential of African talent to European clubs and created the demand for African players in Europe. Once an African player makes a breakthrough into the European league, he stands a very good chance of being picked by his national team. This explains the relatively younger age of the African players who took part in the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. The emergence of youthful players characterized the whole tournament, too. According to FIFA statistics, there were 123 players under the age of 23 (born on or after 1 January 1987) at the 2010 World Cup, and 99 of these players were actually fielded. Additionally, many teams had a number of U-23 players in their ranks, with Germany using nine such players, while Ghana fielded eight, Argentina used seven, Spain, Serbia, Cameroon and Mexico each had six, and Chile boasted five such players.

Apart from age, the physique, and, indeed, the whole constitutional make-up of a player, is critical to his success at professional level. A major characteristic that is useful in talent identification is the height of a player. In terms of height, South African players were the shortest on average (177.91 cm), compared with Nigerians, who were the tallest among the African players (184.09 cm). On average, the African players measured 181.04 cm, which is slightly higher than the average for all African players of 180.15 for 2002 and 181.01 for 2006 World Cup tournaments. It appears that African players are very close to the average of 180.77 and 181.4 for all the players in the 2002 and 2006 World Cup soccer tournaments, respectively. The height of the African players at the World Cup continues to increase slowly. This is consistent with global trends, as evidenced by the increase in average height.
from 180.77 in 2002 to 181.4 cm in 2006. These data show that the African players had almost ideal height, given that the overall average is close to that of all other players in the tournament. The dynamics of the modern game increasingly demand physically athletic players, with strategic deployment of tall players in goal, central defence and attack. These demographic characteristics of African players are not lost on the European talent scouts. Selection of players for age group and senior teams has to take into consideration the physical characteristics as well as the age of the players, among other factors.

Club affiliations of the players

It is apparent from Table 4.1 that Nigeria drew 100% of its players from clubs abroad, and Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire 95.65% each, followed by both Ghana and Algeria with 87%; only South Africa drew the majority of its players from within the domestic league (69.57%). In total, 82.61% of the 138 African players representing African nations played their football away from their domestic leagues. It is also worth pointing out that the players are widely scattered, as shown in Table 4.2. Algeria drew her players from 20 different clubs, Cameroon from 21, Cote d’Ivoire from 20, Ghana from 22, Nigeria from 21 and South Africa from 15 different clubs. The diversity of clubs is also reflected in the number of different countries where the players are based. Players from Algeria came from ten different countries; Cameroon from nine; Cote d’Ivoire from 11; Ghana from 12; Nigeria from nine and South Africa from the lowest number, six. The actual countries and clubs where the players were based are shown in Table 4.2.

According to Table 4.2, the dominant football leagues that provided the bulk of African national team players for the 2010 World Cup Soccer tournament are England, France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. The other leagues from Europe include Scotland, Italy, Russia, Israel, Switzerland, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria, Belgium, Austria, Romania, Turkey, Norway and Ukraine. Outside Europe, players were drawn from Qatar in Asia, and South Africa and Egypt in Africa. The only African leagues that had foreign African players who participated in the 2010 World Cup were Egypt and South Africa. This shows how limited the intra-African football migration is compared with the trans-Mediterranean migration. Table 4.2, therefore, shows that the cream of African football is played and consumed in Europe. Although the pressure of hosting the tournament for the first time could have impacted the African players, it is also clear that the scattered nature of players did not lend itself easily to the building of winning teams. According to FIFA Technical report (2010, p. 98),

Although 85% of the African players who tasted action at the World Cup are contracted to European clubs, they have so far been unable to fully
### Table 4.2 Countries and clubs where African players at the 2010 World Cup were based

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Country and Clubs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Algeria**| 1. Algeria – Chief, Setif 2. France – Lorient, Sochaux, Istres, Boulgne, Ajaccio, Valenciennes, Nantes  
            | 3. Germany – Bochum, Borussia Moenchengladbach, Wolfsburg  
            | 4. England – Portsmouth, Wolverhampton  
| **Cameroon**| 1. Camroon – Coton Sport 2. France – Monaco, Lyon, Valenciennes, Lille, Marseille  
                | 3. Germany – Nuremberg, SC Freiburg, Kaiserslautern, Schalke 04  
                | 4. Spain Espanyol, Betis, Sevilla, Mallorca  
                | 8. Italy – Inter Milan 9. Netherlands – Ajax  |
| **Cote d’Ivoire**| 1. Cote d’Ivoire – ASEC Mimosas 2. England – Manchester City, Wigan, Chelsea, Portsmouth, Arsenal  
            | 3. Italy – Bologna, Inter Milan, AC Milan, Udinese 4. Germany – Bayer Leverkusen, Hoffenheim  
            | 3. Israel – Hapoel Tel-Aviv, Hapoel Petah Tikva, Bnei Yehuda  
            | 4. Russia – Lokomotiv Moscow, Alania Vladikavkaz, CSKA Moscow  
| **South Africa**| 1. South Africa – Orlando Pirates, Mamelodi Sundowns, Ajax Cape Town, Kaizer Chiefs, Moroka Swallows, Supersport Utd., Golden Arrows, Maritzburg  

*Note: *Compiled by the author from FIFA (2010a) World Cup Player Statistics.*
bring their experience to bear when playing for their national teams. The different playing systems and team-mates are two possible reasons for their inconsistent performances. Furthermore, five of the six African teams had foreign coaches, most of whom were either brought on board at short notice or only for the World Cup finals. The coaches’ chances of success were limited by the fact that they often did not fully identify with the African culture, mentality and lifestyle or knew too little about these factors.

The consequences of having players scattered around the world at club level and having foreign coaches for the teams, coupled with the traditional administrative shortfalls in African football, compromised chances of major success. This is because it is expensive for players called up to the national team to have thorough build-up training and warm-up matches, given the prohibitive cost of travel. Serious investment in the training and preparation of local technical personnel would also be helpful to avoid hiring foreign coaches on the eve of major championships. Building of team chemistry is complicated by the limited time that foreign-based players are released by their clubs to join their respective national teams. It is interesting that African teams drew their national teams from between 15 and 22 different clubs, compared with Spain, which drew almost all its starting players from Barcelona and Real Madrid.

The widely distributed nature of African football talent in Europe and elsewhere, as reflected in the club and country affiliations of the 2010 African World Cup players, is an affirmation of a trend that started in the 1990s and accelerated in the early part of the 21st century. For example, at the 2002 African Cup of Nations, the 16 teams that qualified for the final tournament drew their players from 26 non-African leagues (Darby, 2007a). This diversity of clubs and countries of affiliation showed that players no longer ventured to play in leagues abroad solely on the basis of cultural and colonial ties. Some of the countries where African players are based have no colonial links with their home countries. Thus, the migration of African players to Europe and elsewhere now goes beyond the earlier explanatory theoretical models of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Whereas the initial migration started in the colonial period, the nature of migration and the motivation have evolved with time.

The current trend is for a young player to find himself an opportunity to play in Eastern or Northern Europe and make his way to Western Europe, where the best football is available, as well as greater financial resources. This trend is well captured in a review article for Time Magazine titled ‘What Soccer Means to the World’ (Karon, 21 July 2004). In this article, the book reviewer captures the migration tendencies of African players as well as the motivation behind the less fancied European leagues seeking cheap but gifted talent, especially from Africa:
Even more enlightening is his account of the experiences of young African players on the margins of European football. He tracks the story of Edward Anyamkyegh, a young Nigerian star playing at Karpaty Lviv, a Ukrainian team with a fiercely nationalist tradition. In the Soviet era, the Ukraine was recognized as the cradle of the Union’s soccer talent, regularly supplying a majority of the national team’s players. But despite its tradition of representing Ukrainian pride (particularly against Russian teams during the Soviet era), the accepted wisdom in independent Ukraine is that soccer success requires buying the best talent available – and given the fact that far wealthier clubs in Western Europe are going to take the cream of the world’s soccer talent, clubs in the Ukraine and Russia – and France and Belgium – who can’t afford top-tier Brazilians, Frenchmen, Scandinavians or even the established stars of African football have looked increasingly to Africa’s second tier as the prime source of imported talent to raise their game. KSK Beveren, the Antwerp team who reached last season’s Belgian cup final, has been known to field a team composed entirely of players from Cote D’Ivoire… It can’t be much fun emigrating from the sunshine of Africa to the icy wastes of the former Soviet Union as rundown industrial cities brimming with angry, racist skinheads. But there’s more than money to compensate: the Russian and Ukrainian teams play in the pan-European tournaments, offering their imports a platform on which to impress the scouts of clubs in Italy, Spain and Britain, who’ll offer a better wage and more benign living conditions. Today’s estimates are that around 1,000 African players earn their keep in Europe, a low figure compared with the Brazilian pro diaspora which is believed to number in the region of 5,000 players. And none of the African players who regularly start for an English Premiership team was recruited directly from Africa – all were bought from other European teams.

(Karon, 21 July 2004)

Early migration trends

The geography of African football labour migration to Europe in the colonial period clearly reveals that African colonies were recognized by Europeans as being rich in natural resources, raw materials and cheap labour, not just in the economic sense but also in relation to football talent (Darby, 2007a, b). Football as a sport was widely used by the colonial powers to advance their cultural and economic designs on the African people. According to Darby (2000a; 2005; 2007a, b), Mählmann (1988), Mazrui (1986), and Njororai (2009) football was a major tool of the imperialist drive to acculturate the indigenous people into Western civilization. This entailed socializing African people into accepting colonial rule as the norm and thereby facilitating continued economic exploitation of the natural resources. This early
socialization of the Africans into the game of football was very successful, as the indigenous people took to the game with enthusiasm. To date, no other sport has commanded the same sentimental appeal as football has done in most parts of Africa. Indeed, football is the unrivalled number one sport on the continent.

However, this early obsession with the game was quickly exploited by the colonial powers to control the people, and eventually to exploit the footballing talents by exporting them to Europe. This trend of colonialism and neo-colonialism, therefore, continues to be reflected in the African game, where we export talented players and in return hire foreign coaches who never stay long enough to make a lasting impact on the African game. It is also noteworthy that quite a number of players are in leagues whose nations had no colonial ties with the players’ home countries. This trend simply emphasizes the ‘product’ nature of the African players, who are bought cheaply from Africa, given a platform to shine, and then sold to more competitive leagues by countries that are less competitive in Europe. Ultimately, the beneficiaries from the trading of African talent in Europe are European clubs.

The colonial powers were particularly active in recruiting African players from their colonies, especially France and Portugal. This illustrates the imperialistic function of African football during the colonial period, when the mining and export of indigenous football talent for consumption on the European football market was prevalent. This trend, which started during the colonial period, has persisted and continues to thrive in the present globalized world. Thus, the economic imperialism of the colonial period, which involved sourcing, refinement and export of raw materials in the form of football talent for consumption in European countries, continues unabated. Although the colonial and post-colonial migration patterns of African players to European leagues were underpinned by shared colonial history, the 21st-century patterns reveal different trends. Indeed, in the 1970s French, Belgian and Portuguese clubs sought to recruit African football talent based on the colonial connection. The African players, too, seemed to base their decisions on the language and cultural relationships. According to Darby (2007b), the opportunity of playing in a country where there were likely to be fewer linguistic and cultural barriers and where players had more opportunities to mix with compatriots in broader social settings was paramount in this regard. However, the recent trends are more dictated by economic forces rather than cultural connections. A similar trend is taking place in other sports, such as track and field, where many African runners, especially from Kenya and Ethiopia, have moved to run for countries such as Qatar and Bahrain, primarily for reasons of financial compensation as well as seeking an opportunity to compete at the highest level (Njororai, 2010; 2012). Thus, the economic disparity between the exporting and importing countries and the direct financial benefit to the player, as well as an opportunity to develop
to the highest level in a sport, are now a fundamental consideration in the
global migration patterns.

As a consequence, African footballers find opportunities in varied places
and leagues across the world, and mainly in Europe. The scattered nature
of players makes it difficult for the African countries to build any cohesion
in the teams. This could be one major contributing factor to the poor per-
performances of the senior national teams in the World Cup tournament. For
example, at the 2010 World Cup, the final ranking showed that Ghana was
seventh, Cote d’Ivoire 17th, South Africa 20th, Nigeria 27th, Algeria 28th
and Cameroon 31st. The situation is made worse by the hiring of coaches
from abroad at the last minute. These two factors, among others, contribute
heavily to the challenge of preparing a winning African team at the senior
World Cup level. Additionally, the fact that to date only three African coun-
tries have ever reached the quarter-finals of the World Cup (Cameroon, 1990;
Senegal, 2002; Ghana, 2010) suggests that there is more to winning this
tournament than just having a squad of European-based players handled by
European coaches.

Conclusion

The trend in the 2010 World Cup whereby the majority of the players for
the African teams were drawn from foreign teams has its roots in the mid-
1970s and 1980s, when many African players started the exodus to European
teams. Since the mid-1980s, there has been an influx of African players into
the European football market. This migration of African football players is
an aspect of a much wider international sport migration, which continues to
grow at an alarming rate (Apparadurai, 1990; Bale & Maguire, 1994; Maguire,
1999; 2008; Cornelissen & Solberg, 2007; Darby, 2007a, b). Cornelissen and
Solberg (2007) attribute this migration trend to the globalization of sport
and the commercialization as well as commoditization of the international
football sector in the last 20 years. Added to these are the mediatization and
globalization processes that have reduced the geographical space.

It is apparent from the analysis of the African players representing the
African teams in the 2010 World Cup Football tournament that the major-
ity of them ply their trade in Europe. This scenario of top players playing in
Europe is situated within the global phenomenon of sports labour migration.
This sports labour migration is fuelled and sustained by the unequal distri-
bution of resources and financial compensation for the individual players,
as well as the dominance of the European soccer brand, which is the best
for player development and self-actualization. As it is, the European soc-
cer brand is the core of world football. Hence, most players want to move
there to experience the highest level of training, competition and financial
reward for their talent. On the other hand, African countries that continue
to export players benefit by dominating at the African Cup of Nations as
well as representing Africa at the World Cup football tournament final. Success in these highlight events attracts media and monetary compensation from FIFA, as well as corporate sponsorship, which helps advance the game nationally.

The unfortunate result of players going to Europe to play is the disconnection between those players and the local coaches, fans, fellow citizens and local football administration. Additionally, the local leagues, robbed of their top talent, find it hard to market themselves and fill the stadia with spectators during league matches, which again weakens their efforts to land good corporate sponsorship. Name recognition is critical to marketing of sports programmes, including football. When the African leagues lose the top stars of the game to Europe, fan loyalty tends to follow. This is why the African continent is a huge fan base for European leagues where African players are represented, such as the English Premier League, Spanish La Liga, Italian Serie A, German Bundesliga and French League. In the era of global media, matches played in Europe and relayed live to African audiences compete with the local leagues, to the disadvantage of the latter. If there is any legacy emanating from the 2010 World Cup, it has to be the realization that the domestic game is in need of urgent revamping, re-organization, marketing and promotion. The game needs to be elevated to a professional status and players contracted properly so that they can earn a decent living as well as the African clubs benefitting from sale of players to European clubs. In this regard, South Africa offers the best model out of all the teams that took part, as the majority of its players were drawn from the local league. It is, therefore, vital that the African soccer leaders strive to elevate the game to professional status, as well as investing in the infrastructure, technical and administrative personnel to make it attractive to play and earn a living from in players’ home countries.

References


Part II
African Fan Cultures
5
New-found Football Fans

Emma Durden

Introduction

This research examines the phenomenon of new-found football fans, those who were not fans before the FIFA World Cup was hosted in South Africa, but who embraced the spirit of the tournament, and who became, for a period of two months, fans of both the game and the country that hosted the tournament. The paper explores conceptual notions of fandom and of national identity among a group of unlikely short-term football fans.

The term ‘fan’ is generally understood to be an abbreviation of ‘fanatic’, a person with an extreme enthusiasm for an idea. However, fandom is not always defined clearly. For the purposes of this chapter, the definition put forward by Hirt et al. (1992) is a useful one, where fandom or fanship is seen as ‘an affiliation in which a great deal of emotional significance and value are derived from group membership’ (Hirt et al., 1992: 725). So, in this instance, a short-term football fan is understood as a person who, for a short period of time, derived value and significance from feeling part of a community of other like-minded people during the course of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa.

Beth Jacobsen (2003) explores the concept of sport fans, and argues that ‘a fan identity, as with any group identity, is beneficial to the individual in that it may provide a sense of community’ (2003: 1). She goes on to note that fandom offers social benefits such as ‘feelings of camaraderie, community and solidarity, as well as enhanced social prestige and self-esteem’ (2003: 1). This chapter seeks to explore how these feelings were engendered among a small sample of predominantly retired white people resident in South Africa during the 2010 World Cup.

Given South Africa’s racial and social divides, this research limits its focus to a white population because notions of South African-ness, national identity and pride are often tied up with concepts of fandom and sports support, and are particularly complex among this often under-researched minority community.
The fanfare of the World Cup

The FIFA World Cup was hosted in South Africa in 2010 amidst much fanfare, coupled with a certain amount of scepticism. Much of this scepticism came in the wake of recognition of the failure of South Africa to live up to the ideal of the ‘rainbow nation’, a concept of non-racial harmony that was coined by then Archbishop Desmond Tutu and widely promoted after the first democratic election of 1994.

Adam Habib notes how the ‘rainbow nation’ metaphor took on a life of its own, and was adopted in both the political and business spheres, often ‘to exhort the broader public to buy some or other commodity in the name of patriotism’ (Habib, 1996: 1). The phrase became a rallying call for South Africans to reject the past of apartheid, and to embrace a new, brighter future. It also became a celebrated concept in the international press, and Habib comments that it ‘beguiled the outside world into trumpeting the “miracle” of the South African transition’ (1996: 1).

The ‘rainbow nation’ was a patriotic concept, and as such was linked with the idea of a South African identity of togetherness and reconciliation. While the media have been responsible for trying to forge and even force a single South African identity, it is important to note that notions of identity are constructed by individuals themselves rather than from the outside.

Social identity theory suggests that individuals themselves identify with a social group through processes of comparison, self-categorization and labelling of themselves as ‘same’ or ‘other’ (Stets and Burke, 2000). These processes are strongly linked with individuals defining the similarities and differences between themselves and others for themselves, and are related to contrasting identities.

Stets and Burke (2000) argue that this process of social comparison is based primarily on aspects of the self that are more highly valued, and that ‘one’s self-esteem is enhanced by evaluating the in-group and the out-group on dimensions that lead the in-group to be judged positively’ (2000: 225). The correlation of this is that the out-group or the ‘other’ is judged negatively by those who are part of the in-group. Given that this process of comparing the self with others is ongoing, it is difficult to forge a single national identity when there are so many differences between South Africans. The concept of a single national South African identity can be seen as being as flawed as the concept of the ‘rainbow nation’.

With its diverse population of multiple races, ethnicities, languages and classes, South Africa is characterized by multiple diverse identities. Each of these identities is constructed by those who embody them and the ‘others’, who define their own identity both by who they are and by who they are not. These identities are continually changing, and ‘are moulded by a continually changing matrix of historical, cultural and social factors’ (Williams,
As this matrix changes, so does the way in which South Africans themselves identify change. Melissa Steyn (2001) argues that white South Africans in particular were affected by the changing social policies of South Africa in the early 1990s, and that this forced a redefining of their social identity. Studies shortly after the democratic elections in 1994 showed evidence to suggest that a South African identity was increasing among white South Africans (both English and Afrikaans speakers) and Asians, but that among black and coloured South Africans there was an increase in the development of separate ethnic identities (Habib, 1996).

Goodwill and a feeling of national identity were at a high after the 1994 elections, but these have been eroded over time as crime and corruption appeared to escalate in the country, and the ‘South African dream’ has started to fade. However, the idea of the ‘rainbow nation’ is still embraced both locally and abroad by those who cannot or do not wish to acknowledge the deep class and racial divides in the country.

Rocky Williams (2000) explores the notion of a South African national identity through examining (1) the notion of a coherent national identity upon which conceptual assumptions are based, (2) the notion of a uniquely South African philosophical framework, (3) specific conceptual and strategic elements or themes which constitute a national world view, and (4) the notion that a national identity has ‘emerged from something’ (2000: 1).

Williams goes on to note that this identity rests on the key tenets of respect for and commitment to democracy, human rights, justice and constructive conflict management as well as a recognition of a common African-ness and the affirming of African potential while still recognizing the cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity of South Africans.

While discussions of sports and nation-building are common in the public domain, there has been little academic exploration of the social capital generated through national sports (Nicholson & Hoye, 2012). Nicholson and Hoye note in particular that the social capital built through sports is based on relationships and social networks that unify people beyond the normal social identities based on the categories and similarities that are defined in social theory and identity theory.

If, indeed, sport does have the possibility to build these relationships, the 2010 World Cup offered a perfect opportunity for politicians, businesses, sports bodies and the tourism industry to reclaim the metaphor of the ‘rainbow nation’ and to look for opportunities to bring South Africans together despite their differences. For many, the potential offered by hosting the tournament was seen as a second chance for South Africa, economically and socially, and offered a chance for people to come together and celebrate their commonalities rather than their differences.

The notion of commonality is perhaps the most difficult for South Africans to grasp in a country that has been based on concepts of difference for many
decades. This research explores whether or not a group of people who are otherwise steeped in the sense of being ‘other’ and a clear minority in the ‘new’ South Africa felt this sense of South African-ness during the football tournament, and whether they felt a sense of commonality and the affirming of African potential during the World Cup.

**Having a party**

This research rests on a sample of a small population who attended a single event during the 2010 World Cup. The event was a 70th birthday party, which happened to coincide with the second day of the tournament. The host decided to theme her birthday party as a football party, and invited 60 friends, through football-themed invitations, to celebrate her birthday and the start of the tournament. The party (which I attended) was a very festive affair, with most of the guests in full football regalia, with team shirts, makarapas (traditional workman’s hard-hats decorated by football fans in support of their team) and vuvuzelas (plastic horns) abounding. Most of the guests were retired, white, in their 60s and 70s and ‘ex-pats’, people born in other countries but now living in South Africa. Few were football fans. The contrast of these unlikely fans fully embracing the spirit of the World Cup on that particular day sparked this research.

From the population of party-goers, 15 were selected through convenience sampling, based on those who were easy to communicate with given that they had access to email. These 15 were sent a letter and an open-ended questionnaire to complete. The questionnaire was pre-tested on the host of the party, and, after being adapted and refined, was forwarded to the other respondents. Twelve responses were received from individuals who noted that they were enthusiastic to be a part of the research.

Respondents emailed their responses, and all were happy to have their identities revealed; however, for the sake of simplicity I refer to them simply by their initials and their ages in the discussion below.

The questions were designed around five key areas: demographic information about the respondents, their experience of football, and their feelings before, during and after the World Cup. Data from the completed questionnaires was collated and subjected to a thematic analysis that looked at notions of identity, attitude, experience and their belief in South Africa’s potential. To some extent these themes are based on Williams’ (2000) notions of identity, and to some extent they were generated from the collected data itself.

**Being South African**

Of the 12 respondents, six had been born in South Africa. Just six had grown up in South Africa, while the others had grown up in other countries,
or in a combination of countries. Respondents were given an opportunity to classify their own nationality. Five of the 12 respondents classified themselves as ‘South African’. Five respondents classified themselves as being of more than one nationality, either ‘South African/British’ or ‘South African/Zimbabwean’ depending on the land of their birth. The notion of dual citizenship is a common practical consideration, where people born outside South Africa or those whose parents were born outside South Africa carry two passports. This practice, despite being legal, has come under criticism from certain local politicians and has been the topic of much rhetoric.

Respondents were asked to define what they thought it meant to be ‘South African’, as this is an elusive concept, particularly in a country where race, class, land-ownership, inheritance and colonialism have influenced the definition of the concept, and where members of the ruling party have made racist pronouncements on what it means to be South African. A variety of responses about ‘being South African’ were received, including those related to birth, parenthood, residence and feelings about the country.

Those who did not define themselves as South African were more likely to see South African-ness as an issue of birth or of citizenship, taking a more pragmatic approach. One respondent who was born and raised in South Africa commented that being South African was about ‘the land of my birth, the country where I belong, the people and environment I relate to and care about’ (JS, aged 78). This notion of belonging is an important part of establishing a social or national identity. This heartfelt sentiment was echoed in the words of a respondent who had been born and grown up in the UK, but felt that she was South African, having ‘brought up a family here and loving the country’ (NS, aged 76).

One respondent noted that the concept of defining a national identity was an outdated one, and another noted that it was ‘a bit complex now that we are one rainbow nation but very much a “can do” society with rotten politicians’ (PS, aged 79). Others also commented on the difficulties and problems faced by South Africa, which may be indicative of the fact that people are less likely to feel South African in a country facing a myriad of social and political problems, although one commented that being South African meant ‘no wish to be anywhere else despite the problems’ (ST, aged 68). For the majority of the respondents, being South African was related more to a feeling for the country and the people than to ideas about birthplace or immigration laws.

Interestingly, every respondent, including those who had not classified themselves as South African, noted that they felt more South African during the World Cup. A number of the respondents commented on their surprise about the feelings of patriotism and pride that the World Cup generated among them, with one commenting: ‘much to my surprise I felt proudly South African’ (ST, aged 68). Even those respondents who had declared
themselves as British or of a different nationality noted that they had felt ‘proudly’ South African during the tournament. Reasons for this were not expanded on in the initial research; however, follow-up discussions with some of the respondents showed that the excitement and the media hype around the tournament generated a feeling of patriotism which was difficult to ignore.

**Fandom and football viewership**

In addition to understanding how people felt about the country during the tournament, it was important to establish how they felt about football. The collected data reflected that just one of the 12 respondents had watched local South African football before the tournament. Five had watched international football before the event, but two of these noted that this was very occasionally. Most of the respondents were more interested in other sports on television, including cricket, rugby, tennis and motor-racing. These sports are more commonly associated with white viewership, whereas football is often seen as a ‘black’ sport in South Africa. However, all 12 white respondents watched football during the tournament, some avidly, and some watching just a few games which featured the teams that they supported.

The collected data suggests that a great deal of interest in football was generated during the tournament, despite a lack of interest in the game prior to South Africa hosting the World Cup. However, further questioning revealed that this interest was short-lived for most respondents. Just four of the respondents note that after the World Cup they had continued to watch football. For three respondents, this continued interest was in international football only, and two of these three respondents had noted that they watched football before the tournament. Only one previously non-regular viewer noted that he now (two years after the tournament) watched football, commenting that this was ‘with greater interest and a lot more than before’ (TT, aged 76). One respondent, who had not previously been a follower of football, had continued to watch the South African team after the tournament, and had developed an interest in watching local South African teams as a result of being introduced to the game and the players during the World Cup.

Choices to support teams during the tournament were in many cases based on feeling ‘South African’ during the tournament, and therefore resulted in most of the respondents supporting the South African team. Other teams supported included Brazil, England and Italy. This was based on familial associations (family in other countries) in the case of supporting England and Italy, and in the case of support for Brazil it was based on the popularity, skill and style of the Brazilian team.

Despite the fandom being for a short period, it was definitely noticeable during the tournament, and particularly at the birthday party which provided the sample population for this research. The party host notes:
By theming my 70th birthday, which coincided with the start of the competition, as a ‘soccer party’ representing the various teams involved in the opening matches – the food, the decorations and the costumes worn by friends supporting their favourite teams. Everyone entered into the spirit of the occasion.

(MD, aged 72)

**Anticipating the World Cup**

The respondents were asked to recount how they had felt about the capacity of South Africa to host a successful World Cup prior to the tournament starting. Of the 12 respondents, only one commented that he had been positive that the country would be able to host the tournament successfully. Without any prompting, the most common response to this question included the word ‘doubt’, with six respondents noting that they had been ‘doubtful’, to varying degrees. For some of these respondents the doubt was associated with the country’s ability to handle logistical arrangements, and to control flights, traffic and crime during the tournament. Others noted that they were uncertain, with one describing himself as being ‘sceptical’ and another being ‘pessimistic’. These responses varied across nationalities, so whether or not the respondents identified themselves as South African did not influence their feelings about the country’s ability to cope with the event before it commenced.

**Experiencing the tournament**

Despite the predominantly negative feelings before the 2010 World Cup, all of the previously doubtful or negative respondents commented that their feelings had changed dramatically during the tournament itself. Respondents noted that they had become far more positive about the country during the tournament, and many associated this feeling with pride, with one noting that she was ‘delighted and surprised with pride’ (ST, aged 68) and one noting that he was ‘impressed and proud of all that had been done and achieved’ (TT, aged 76). The sense of pride engendered by the successful management and hosting of the tournament managed to sway even the most hardened of the earlier sceptics.

The respondents also felt more positively about the public image of South Africa during the tournaments. Without exception, all the respondents noted that the public image of the country was good; some rated it as ‘outstanding’ and others thought it was ‘excellent’. Respondents commented that they felt more ‘upbeat’ and ‘enthusiastic’ about South Africa based on the face it put forward during the tournament. For some this was unexpected, and one noted her ‘surprise that we were capable of pulling it off, admiration that the organisation actually worked and that there was no crime to speak of during the period’ (ST, aged 68).
This positive image of South Africa that was experienced by the respondents appears to have been partly responsible for their feeling more proudly South African during the tournament. Comments from the respondents included the fact that the tournament had generated excitement and an ‘amazing unifying spirit’ (JM, aged 68) and had engendered feelings of unity and pride among South Africans as the host country. For many this feeling was unexpected and was a pleasant surprise, with one respondent commenting that this was ‘against all odds’ (MD, aged 72).

One respondent noted that she had experienced ‘pride and joy to see people coping successfully and working for a common cause’ (NS, aged 76). A further respondent commented that the tournament had opened up possibilities for South Africans, no matter who they were, to be part of something that was bigger than the individual or normal social groupings:

> It showed the potential we have to be great when we work together and focus on things we share, such as sport, music, and performing artists. We have so much talent and the good will is so close to the surface. I loved the way we all could participate, whether by a friendly exchange, being a volunteer, or a greeter, a performer or a star.

(JS, aged 78)

Glowing in these feelings during the tournament, many of the respondents felt that they had experienced something unique. For many, this feeling of national pride was heightened by the fact that both the local and international media were constantly covering the tournament, and also that the small town where most of the respondents live was alive with the excitement of the tournament and with the football regalia, including clothing items that were readily available in shops, and themed and decorated restaurants in the area. One respondent noted that these external shows of expression enhanced the experience of the tournament:

> There was an atmosphere in and around the Garden Route towns, particularly those hosting overseas teams – the flags on cars, the bunting around the shops and markets, the vuvuzelas everywhere – and the general feeling of camaraderie.

(MD, aged 72)

Other respondents noted that personal interaction with strangers in their small town increased because of the tournament. One commented that she ‘loved sharing highlights and lows of the tournament with fellow citizens who I normally would not talk to. We really were united’ (JS, aged 76). All respondents, except for one who was working throughout the tournament period, noted that they experienced heightened feelings of goodwill and sharing during the period, and that this was an uplifting and positive
experience for them. The sense of fun that was generated through this hype appears to have been beyond most of the respondents’ expectations.

The responses suggest that the tournament did indeed offer an opportunity for white South Africans to break out of their self-imposed identity groups and to interact with others during this period.

Returning to normal

The respondents were asked to comment on whether they thought that the feelings and positive spirit generated during the World Cup had remained. One respondent commented that ‘some people thought that the image would fade after a while, but I feel that it did South Africa a world of good and that the image is far better now than it would have been without the 2010’ (TT, aged 76). However, this respondent was in the minority when it comes to the long-term experience of these positive after-effects.

Nine of the 12 respondents noted that the positive feelings that they themselves had experienced had evaporated. The three remaining respondents felt that some of the goodwill remained, but that this had definitely diminished since the tournament.

Among those who noted the disappearance of the World Cup unity and goodwill, there was a feeling that things went back to normal very quickly. Many of their comments reflected the cynicism that they had felt before the tournament began, with one noting that ‘the vibe evaporated the day after it was all over’ (JM, aged 68), and one noting that the ‘negative vibes’ returned soon after the tournament (ST, aged 68). Another respondent commented that ‘very little remains – just a golden memory’ (NS, aged 76), while for others even that positive memory has been eradicated by political problems such as ‘poor leadership and corruption’ which have had a negative impact both on football and on government in the country (PS, aged 79) due to ‘problems in top management of soccer in South Africa’ (PH, aged 82). It is clear that the energy and excitement generated during the tournament were short-lived, with most people experiencing no residual positive effects.

The respondents were also asked to comment on whether they felt that there had been any positive long-term benefits for the country as a result of the tournament. Despite the assertion that none of the feelings of goodwill and the positive ‘vibe’ had remained, ten of the 12 respondents felt that there had been some other positive spin-offs.

These were related to some extent to infrastructure developed in preparation for the tournament, with respondents commenting on the stadiums and the new rapid transport systems developed in Gauteng Province, but most felt that it was the less tangible things that remained. For many this was the international publicity and the sense that the World Cup had put South Africa on the map and would boost international tourism and investment.
For some, what lingered was a memory of the feelings of goodwill and camaraderie that had been experienced during the tournament, and for one it was ‘the knowledge that we can pull together’ (JM, aged 68). This was reiterated by another respondent who felt that there was a residual sense of commonality generated by the tournament, including ‘a knowledge that the people of SA can work together effectively and harmoniously. Sport provides a common interest which can bind people together when politics do not interfere’ (NS, aged 76).

These notions of ‘pulling together’ and ‘working together’ are indicative of a sense of the social capital that is perhaps otherwise lacking in the country, where people from different backgrounds can relinquish their separate identities of ‘otherness’ and identify as a more unified group to work towards a common goal. Some of the respondents commented particularly on the fact that the tournament engendered a sense of identity and commonality, noting that ‘it did a lot for race relations’ (PH, 82) and ‘it did us a lot of good and helped a lot in the bringing together of races in South Africa’ (TT, aged 72).

Respondents were also asked whether they felt that there had been any noticeable negative impact on the country in the wake of the event. Just two of the 12 felt that there were no noticeable negative outcomes. However, the majority felt that there were. Many of these related to the huge costs of building new stadiums and managing the event, noting that the ‘financial effects on provinces have been negative’ (IH, aged 75), that these costs would ‘take years to absorb’ (MD, aged 72) and would ‘burden taxpayers for generations to come’ (NT, aged 40).

One respondent felt that, beyond the cost implications, there was a sense of ‘missing opportunities to move forward; and initiatives have been allowed to collapse’ (NS, aged 76). This respondent refers to some of the development projects that had been initiated during the 2010 period but had since dissolved. This sense of missed opportunities was echoed by another, who noted that ‘I can’t see that our soccer skills and facilities have benefited as much as we were led to believe they would’ (JS, aged 78). Another respondent commented on this lack of follow-through with regard to sports development, suggesting that the World Cup experience in South African offered ‘proof that FIFA were only interested in their profits and not in improving sport in South Africa’ (ST, aged 68).

One respondent commented further on the lack of other development as a result of the government’s decision to host the tournament, and noted that he believed there were ‘possibly millions of disgruntled poor folk who would prefer to have had the money spent on housing and schools rather than soccer and encouraging tourists’ (PH, aged 82).

It is clear that the negative impacts are seen to be longer-lasting, of greater impact and more dominant in the respondents’ minds than the positive effects, which were short-term and less tangible. One respondent suggested
that the positive effects experienced should not be based around a single event, but should be a result of strategic governance in the country:

The current bunch of politicians is seemingly incapable of galvanising South Africa’s disparate ethic groups, quite the opposite, in fact. However events such as the world cup clearly can… We should not have to rely on outsiders like FIFA to bring us events which provide us with the ‘gees’ (spirit) that is needed for this country to really lift off. What is needed, for starters, is a president who can bang heads together, sort out the shambles and unite us all again, as we were for that wonderful few weeks in 2010. That is the only way forward.

(JM, aged 68)

For some respondents there is still hope for change within the country to build a sense of longer-lasting national pride and unity, but others reflected on how difficult this would be:

Without political and racial hyper-sensitivity people can and will pull together but the past is still with us in so many ways. Can we hope for those who are now growing up; or is there just too much poverty and inequality, in fact just too many people for everyone to have an acceptable life?

(NS, aged 76)

Without intending to, the research appeared to encourage the respondents to consider the reality of everyday South African life and to contrast it with the spectacle of the World Cup, and they found reality wanting.

Conclusions

In a study that explored the sports viewing habits of people from 15 countries, the first choice for South Africans was football, at 79% of the surveyed population (Watt, 2011). However, the majority of football fans are black, and this research focused on a minority group of white South African residents. Research with a different population sample might have reflected different results.

The collected data indicates that there was a greater sense of fandom created for the country than for the game among the research respondents. While the respondents became more interested in football for a short period during the World Cup, this appears to have faded faster than the feelings of possibility engendered by the spirit of togetherness during the tournament.

The tournament built the feelings of camaraderie, community and solidarity that Jacobsen (2003) identifies as being part of fandom. They were
imbued with an excitement that took on the emotional significance and value that Hirt et al. (1992) associate with fandom. There appear to have been fewer feelings of being part of a racially based in-group or out-group during the tournament, self-imposed social identities were discarded momentarily, and divides were to some extent overcome by the sense of being one country behind the team. However, missed opportunities and the reality of poor governance, crime and corruption resulted in this feeling of a more proud national identity being time-bound to the tournament.

After the tournament, the British-based Guardian newspaper carried the headline ‘World Cup 2010: Sceptics drowned out by another rainbow nation miracle: South Africa rises above all the pre-tournament pessimism to host a successful and memorable event’ (Smith, 2010: n.p.). All the respondents who were interviewed admitted to being surprised and delighted by the spirit engendered by the World Cup, which seems to support this notion of the event being a ‘miracle’ with the potential to bring together a previously divided nation. However, this feeling has not lasted.

For a short period of time, the ‘matrix of historical, cultural and social factors’ referred to by Williams (2000) changed to the extent that a single identity of being South African was possible. But the changes were short-term. There was an overwhelming sense among the respondents that it was unrealistic for sustainable change to have been brought about by the tournament, and a sense of pessimism has returned for many.

While this newly constructed sense of national identity was observable for a short period of time, respondents felt that this feeling was impossible to sustain in a country that is otherwise divided on so many levels. The feelings experienced by the respondents that were created by hosting the World Cup seem to align more closely with the criteria of fandom than the criteria that Williams (2000) sets out for national identity.

Perhaps it is too much to ask for a short sports tournament to ignite conceptual notions of a coherent national identity with a unique philosophical framework and a national world view. However, the feel-good factor of fandom, even if it is short-lived, certainly laid the basis for optimism and a sense of possibility that, under the right leadership, there is the potential to build the bridges that are needed to bring South Africans together.

References


6

Zimbabwean Female Audiences: Negotiating (En)Gendered Spaces in the 2010 FIFA World Cup

Rosemary Chikafa

Introduction

The FIFA World Cup is largely recognized as the world’s largest sporting and media event. Many scholars of the 2010 FIFA World Cup agree that the significance of South Africa’s hosting of the mega-event lay in debunking myths and representations of Africa (Pillay et al., 2009). The event was transformed from a national into a continental event which put the burden of re-invigorating, re-inventing and re-imagining Africa on South Africa. Andre P. Czegledy (Czegledy, 2009) reflects this when he intimates that 2010 was about ‘peeling off as much as back’ the biased layers of African history and redefining the meaning of Africa well beyond its borders. His train of thought is also reiterated by Achille Mbembe (2006), who reckoned that the World Cup would be Africa’s opportunity to celebrate its culture and identity through moral and cultural victories in order to reassert African identity.

South Africa’s neighbours were thus also keen to be participants in such a historical opportunity for their political, economic and socio-cultural benefit. There was also much potential for the destabilization of Afro-pessimism (Pillay et al. 2009). Van de Merwe (2009: 21) reflects the notion of Afro-pessimism with the statement: ‘Africa remains the most impoverished continent in the world, ravaged by AIDS, poverty and human rights abuses.’ This is a reflection of the global perception of Africa, which, by implication, meant that the global world was sceptical of Africa’s potential and capability to host an event of world-class stature. Africa’s strength, therefore, depended on its unity as well; hence the pan-African rhetoric that permeated South Africa’s bid to host the cup in 2006 and in 2010 (Bolsman, 2012). All this, and the bid’s accompanying discourses on development, modernity, democracy and infrastructural capacity, entailed that South Africa, its neighbouring countries and Africa as a whole were on guard so as to satisfy South Africa’s claims of suitability to host the World Cup.
Africa was thus geared up to present a World Cup that would meet world-class standards. Of concern is whether Africa was able to meet the world-class standard in terms of gender and its definition in the larger picture of African identity and culture. Thus, this chapter seeks to interrogate the potential and reality of the FIFA 2010 World Cup in re-imagining the gender social order, using Zimbabwean female audiences as a case study.

The 2002 FIFA World Cup, co-hosted by Japan and Korea, was dubbed a ‘feminized’ World Cup due to the huge number of female spectators in the stands, while the 2006 FIFA World Cup, hosted by Germany, raised queries as to the right label for women spectators (Rubin, 2009). What is clear from the above references is that patriarchal hegemonies, in their divisions of the social world into dualistic gendered spaces (Shehu, 2010), reject the presence of women in male-defined spaces such as sport and other public spheres. It thus remained to be seen whether the South African-hosted World Cup would allow the inverting of gender spaces and identities in Africa; all the more so given that there were fears that the World Cup would exacerbate gender-based violence and prostitution and consequently increase the spread of HIV/AIDS.

The gendered implications and significance of the African World Cup

After South Africa’s bid towards an ‘African Renaissance’ of sorts had been considered, loopholes remained in the gender dimension of the World Cup prospectus. The gender dimension seems to have been somewhat lost beneath Africa’s socio-economic and political concerns. Attractive African women made an appearance in the bid book documents as part of the promise of an African experience. They appear in the bid documents dressed in football regalia with an accompanying header strap linking them to ‘Africa’s Stage’ (Bolsman, 2012), which, by implication, only ties them to the African landscape. What, then, was the place of gender and women in all this drive towards re-imagining African identity and culture? What room was there for the African woman in the African World Cup?

This is not to say that gendered initiatives were not made. The United Nations and other gender stakeholders such as Genderlinks undertook to champion the cause of gender. The 2010 FIFA World Cup UNICEF South Africa Programme (United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace) initiated the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), of which MDG 3 – to promote gender equality and empower women – was of significance. The launch of the MDG song and the football-themed electronic game to end violence against women and girls, the Genderlinks’ ‘Score a Goal for Gender Equality’ (Chingamuka, 2010) campaign, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Gender
Protocol and soccer 2010 were milestones in the promotion of gender equality.

Most of the gender studies undertaken so far in relation to the 2010 FIFA World Cup are largely based on a developmental scope that interrogates the political and economic benefits of the hosting of the cup by South Africa and the preparations thereof, which are apparently gendered to the disadvantage of women (Walter, 2009; Pillay & Salo, 2010; Wadesango et al., 2010; Machingambi & Wadesango, 2011). In studying the potential and reality of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in re-imagining the gender social order using Zimbabwean female audiences of the World Cup, this study also examines the socio-cultural dimension of negotiating gendered spaces during the FIFA 2010 World Cup. The study also moves away from the trend of studying the FIFA 2010 World Cup in the context of South Africa. It recognizes the efforts made by other gender organizations, such as the Gender and Media Diversity Centre of Genderlinks in their implementation of programmes that advocated gender equity and fairness in South Africa and its neighbouring countries such as Namibia, Malawi and Zimbabwe.

Pillay and Salo (2010) question whether the 2010 World Cup realized the promise of development for all in a substantive way. They question the gender impact of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and its benefits and consequences for South African women. Pillay and Salo note how the world only conceptualized the relation of women to the World Cup in typical hapless victim terms of sex trade and human trafficking instead of the economic and developmental potential of informal women street vendors and of women’s sport. Even the organizational structures of the FIFA 2010 World Cup were highly gendered, without a significant percentage of women at the helm of the FIFA and South African local organization committee (Wadesango et al., 2010).

This study expands on Rubin’s perspective on the rejection and possible ejection of women from masculinized spaces, which she terms ‘the offside rule’. According to Rubin (2009), men resent women venturing into their field of machismo and eject them by denying them any space as fans. Hence, transgressing females are defined as not being real fans, as was exemplified in the Japan and Korea 2002 FIFA World Cup (Tanaka, 2004). Much expectation was placed on the 2010 FIFA World Cup, as particularly revealed by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) development and dreams project. The general view, as espoused by Rubin (2009: 277), was that the FIFA 2010 World Cup had the potential to challenge hegemonic gender roles, if only a range of parties, including female football fans, their male counterparts, the players and FIFA itself, were committed.

Bob and Swart (2010) address the 2010 FIFA World Cup in relation to spectatorship and the politics of sex. Their study is a mirror of gender and the social impact of large sporting events. What their study brings out are gender biases which indicate that sport and competition are male and natural
masculine domains where women do not stand a chance. The discourse of such a domain ranges around ideas that women are ‘complements’; they are not real fans, they are sexual bodies to be gazed on and consumed by the male.

Many of the studies mentioned above reiterate the views of earlier studies on gender and sport outside the framework of football World Cups. Many international scholars agree that sport is generally gendered and women face a myriad of challenges as sports figures or sports fans (Crawford & Gosling, 2004; Jones, 2008; Pope, 2011; Pope & Williams, 2011; Hoeber & Kerwin, 2013). Hoeber & Kerwin (2013: 328–9) reflect on the marginalization of women as sports fans and cite some of women’s reasons for attending sport events as spending time with family, socializing with other women, supporting their partner or spouse and sexual attraction to male sport figures, among others. Pope and Williams (2011) further state that women are viewed as spectators or supporters and not fans because some of the reasons why they attend sport events are not the reasons why men attend sports. A study of female soccer fans in Britain by Katherine Jones (2008) shows strategies that were adopted by female fans to negotiate their own gender identities in sport. These women negated and downplayed sexist, abusive and homophobic behaviour and embraced gender stereotypes as part of the game in such a way as to demand recognition as fans instead of ‘female fans’.

**Zimbabwean society, soccer and female fandom**

The gender and sport situation in Zimbabwe is not very different from other national sporting scenarios. Gender and sport scholars argue that sport, and football in particular, facilitates and reproduces the cultural hegemony of masculinity and femininity (Knoppers & McDonald, 2010). Soccer is a highly gendered activity which is essentially male-dominated, chiefly because sport is associated with aggression, competition and physical energy: traits which are traditionally linked to masculinity. This implies that, once women make initiatives towards engendering this male space, they are impinging and are therefore unwanted (Rubin, 2009; Daimon, 2010; Kapasula Kabwila, 2010; Manyonganise, 2010; Shehu, 2010; Machingambi & Wadesango, 2011).

Zimbabwean soccer has for a long time been associated with and characterized by violence. According to Daimon (2010), Zimbabwean stadiums are arenas for the display of machismo. The violence ranges from obscene humour, vulgar language and songs to sexual abuse. The sexual abuse includes sexual extremities of hooligans forcefully stripping women and sexually molesting them. No wonder public spaces such as sporting or soccer domains are quite intimidating for most Zimbabwean women.

Sport, soccer in particular, in Zimbabwe is rife with gender inequalities. The majority of women are denied full participation in sport due to the prevailing social construction of spaces earmarked for men and women
(Manyonganise, 2010). Manyonganise notes that, despite the progress Zimbabwe has made in attaining equal access for both sexes in such areas as education, employment, health and business, among others, the sports arena still remains a restricted space for female participation due to strong cultural and traditional practices. It would seem that the socialization process, not only in Zimbabwe but in Africa as a whole, is too strongly rooted. Certain spaces are regarded as ‘decadent and mortifying’ for women in the African milieu. Sport arenas in Zimbabwe are therefore ‘unsafe’ and ‘immoral’.

In the Zimbabwean society this is not gender oppression; it is not a question of equality and inequality but a question of safety and cultural preservation. Hence, the mobility of women is restricted for ‘security’ reasons. The home, church, female gatherings and health/baby clinics are some of the safe spaces for women. This, therefore, has meant that for the female Zimbabwean there are fewer opportunities to learn, play, socialize or participate in sporting activities (Manyonganise, 2010). The female fan who crosses this security boundary and ventures beyond the safety of the home is a rebel who is ridiculed and labelled. She is an immoral woman, and if any violence is meted out to her she deserves it; there is no sympathy for cultural renegades.

The Zimbabwean soccer scenario is also considered a vibrant space for political fermentation. The Zimbabwean ‘crisis’ period of 1998–2008 is a case in point, with studies revealing the political processes involved in Zimbabwean soccer fandom and the discourses of dissent and resistance, respectively. Even the two highly competitive political parties ZANU PF and MDC T were reportedly using soccer and the 2010 World Cup tournament to further their political goals (Chiweshe Manase, 2011; Zenenga, 2012). In essence, what all this implies is that Zimbabwean audiences held the potential to further gender equality goals, if only there was adequate commitment.

**Methodology**

The research question that guided the study was: did the South African-hosted World Cup allow the inverting of gender spaces and identities in Zimbabwe (and/or possibly Africa)? The major objective of the study was to interrogate the potential and reality of the FIFA 2010 World Cup in re-imagining the gender social order using Zimbabwean female audiences as a case study.

The study followed a qualitative research design in order to establish the socio-cultural formations of Zimbabwean female soccer spectatorship and fandom and how these were expressed in the historic 2010 FIFA World Cup. Using focus group discussions and interviews, the study sought to establish the experiences of Zimbabwean female audiences in the capital
city, Harare homes, fan parks, bars, community halls and school classrooms, among other public spaces where the FIFA 2010 World Cup matches were screened. Two separate focus group discussions and ten interviews were undertaken. The division was based on sex: the first focus group discussion comprised 15 women and the other comprised 15 men. The interviews were carried out with five men and five women soccer fans. These were conveniently selected in order to have a group of men and women from different age groups, social classes and backgrounds. Hence, the groups included married and single men and women aged between 16 and 40. It also comprised housewives, professional women, employed and unemployed men and dependent boys and girls. The main reason for this separation was to create a suitable environment for objective discussion, given the gender disparities that are part of the construction of the Zimbabwean social fabric, where the male is supposed to be dominant. This might have presented a complication for the women, as they might have felt constrained from expressing themselves honestly.

The focus group discussions were utilized to provide an expository view of Zimbabwean attitudes to and perceptions of female soccer spectatorship and fandom. These focus group discussions also provided room for in-depth interactions that revealed the nuanced spectrum influencing gender disparities in Zimbabwean sport and soccer. The in-depth interviews were very useful in bringing out personal insights, experiences, beliefs and attitudes. Qualitative content analysis was used to analyse the data.

Theoretical framework

Africana womanist theory is the preferred conceptualization of this study, largely because of the fact that the experiences of female sport fans in many parts of the world are different due to divergent cultural contexts related to gender and sport, and processes of ‘feminization’ in sports crowds may have different meanings in different societal contexts (Pope & Williams, 2011; Hoeber & Kerwin, 2013). Africana womanism is an ‘African feminist’ theoretical positioning (though Clenora Hudson-Weems, the proponent of the theory, vehemently expresses that it is not African feminism), necessitated by African feminist rejection of the Western feminist canon, which allegedly universalizes the plight of womanhood without paying due attention to the determining conditions of black womanhood, which go beyond patriarchal and sexist relations to race, class and colonial relations. Africana womanism, according to Hudson-Weems (1997), is an ideology specifically designed for all women of African descent; it is grounded in African culture, so that it focuses on the unique experiences, struggles, needs and desires of African women.

In this study, the theory is used to ground understanding of the determining gender relations that governed the gendering of the 2010 FIFA World
Cup in Zimbabwe, in an African context, with a view to grounding a plan of action for social change. According to Birrell (2000: 3), feminist theory is an openly political or critical practice committed to not only analysing gender in sport but to changing those dynamics. There is a need to ground understanding of the dynamics involved in Zimbabwean female audiences’ negotiation of gendered spaces from a conceptual framework grounded in Zimbabwean and/or African gender relations so as to be able to authentically ground possibilities for change.

The gendering of spaces in football spectatorship

Both the interviews and focus group discussions revealed that the home is the preferred venue for female football spectatorship, largely because it is ‘safer’ and ‘decent’. Most of the female respondents revealed that they rarely watch soccer in stadiums, fan parks, bars or other public spaces, with most having only watched soccer outside the home at least once. The interviews revealed that men have freedom and flexibility in choosing soccer-watching venues. The majority of male interviewees had watched soccer at all the places in question – home, stadiums, fan parks, bars and other public viewing places. There was unanimous agreement that bars are no place for women to venture into for soccer, beer and socializing. Apparently the only women who are permitted to venture into bars are prostitutes; the men reiterated that no decent woman can go to a bar, even for her team.

There were diverse views pertaining to women fans in stadiums, with some expressing that stadiums are not any safer than bars, as many ‘improper things’ not suitable for decent womanhood happen there. Seven out of ten interviewees actually felt that stadiums and other public spaces are only safe for a woman in the male company of her husband, boyfriend or brother. These ‘improper things’ include breast grabbing, backside clutching or slapping and fondling of private parts, among others. One interviewee revealed that a woman attending a soccer match in a stadium without a man is assumed to be available and looking, thereby making her a victim of male improper behaviour. Others argued that stadiums and other public viewing places are not 100% safe even for a woman in male company, as vulgarities in talk and song are rife.

The male focus group discussion was a reiteration of the information found in interviews. There was a general consensus among the discussants that mature married women should watch soccer on television at home, and that if they are fanatics, even of the European Champions league, they should just ask their husbands to buy them digital satellite television. Married male respondents were particularly vocal and unyielding about women attending soccer matches outside the home. They were, however, notably tolerant in the case of single women attending soccer matches in stadiums, fan parks, bars and other public spaces. Asked whether the men would
tolerate such soccer-attending habits after marrying one of these single fans, the men responded in the negative, citing that, once married, ‘single’ habits must be discarded. One respondent expressed his disapproval with the words: ‘Imagine! While some women are busy attending prayers and praying for their families and some silly woman is busy thinking of watching soccer! If such a woman were near me I would slap her!’ Another uttered: ‘Let her come to the stadium so I can fondle her behind!’ while another cautioned: ‘If you want to come to watch soccer in a bar, bring condoms with you.’ The more liberal men only recommended stadiums and other public places for women who were in the company of their husbands or other male relations. Bars were unanimously pronounced a no-go area for women.

Liberal female focus group respondents were also apprehensive of stadiums, which they felt were not safe, although if they wanted to go and watch soccer they were free to do so. Some married female respondents felt that wanting to watch soccer away from home was simply a case of making much ado about nothing, because the only difference between watching soccer at home and in a stadium is the singing and dancing in the terraces, which a decent married woman can really do without. One married housewife was incredulous, and asked other respondents to imagine going to her home to visit her only to find her husband at home and to be told that she had gone to the National Sports Stadium to watch soccer. Another respondent responded by saying: ‘Then I would have my chance with your man.’ Asked what they would do if the husband wanted to go with them to the match, mixed feelings were revealed. Others felt that then it would be an obligation, lest the husband find another willing partner. It was also interesting to note that few of the married women had an interest in soccer in the first place. Some were very much open to the idea of being taken to soccer matches by their husbands, as it meant that they would enjoy the game in a different setting and also enjoy the company of their men, which is sometimes hard to come by.

The authenticity of female sport spectatorship

On the question of thoughts on women spectatorship, there were a range of mixed feelings. It would seem that the authenticity of female fandom is also intertwined with the place it is expressed in. One 22-year-old student nurse felt that those women who go outside the home for soccer matches are genuine fans who ‘are keeping in touch with changes in the world’. She said this despite the fact that she herself is apparently not a genuine fan who goes to watch soccer in a stadium because it’s also good for women fans to be there but ‘because players know that their women and other women are cheering them on’ and ‘every sport needs cheerleaders’ [emphasis mine].

The same interviewee thought that watching soccer with men was ‘cool’ because they help her figure out the game and buy drinks and do braai. She
was also excited that they really spoil the women when their team wins (hopefully this does not mean that they bash the women when their team loses). Two of her single counterparts expressed the view that they are real fans, who not only go to stadiums in the company of male friends and relatives but occasionally go with fellow girls and enjoy the game in the popular fan terraces along with the ‘die hard boys’ (staunch male fans who are regarded as rowdy). Married women fans, however, revealed that they only attend soccer matches outside the home in the company of their husbands and do not get to mingle with the crowd, mostly because they sit on the VIP stands. VIP stands and male company have since proven to be other women’s safety zones during soccer spectatorship.

A male interviewee expresses the view that women who mix with men in the soccer arenas, be it in stadiums or fan parks, are daring and therefore interesting, and deserve to be viewed as the real fans that they are. These women are vibrant, find their way in the noisy part of the stadium, and simply ‘show some love for the game’ and are part of the ‘crazy’ fan base. Other men, however, had sentiments that those women who ‘claim to be fans’ and want to watch soccer outside the home are ‘stupid’, certainly know nothing about soccer, and are actually prostitutes in masquerade. There were murmurs of such phrases as ‘dhimoni rechihure iro’ (possession by the demon of prostitution) in reference to women fans watching soccer in public spaces. There were even some snide remarks that a woman who insisted on watching soccer in a stadium had lost her virginity there in the first place and hence cannot stay away; a strong implication that the stadiums are not only fan bases but spaces for sexual escapades as well.

It came as a surprise to discover during the female focus group discussion that most women, especially married women, shared almost the same sentiments as their male counterparts. Most of the female respondents seemed not so sure of the genuineness of female fandom. There was a strong implication that women fans are prostitutes in masquerade. Among these married women were professional women who are educated up to tertiary level, university and college students and housewives. Some of these respondents were, however, non-committal, and said that stadiums and fan parks were fine as long as the women knew why they were there, that is, to support their teams and not to prostitute themselves.

The World Cup scenario

Surprisingly, despite most of the negative sentiments on women and soccer in Zimbabwe from the interviews and focus group discussions, the negativity was toned down when the discussion was shifted to the context of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. There was an almost unanimous agreement that the 2010 FIFA World Cup was a totally different experience altogether. For the majority of the respondents it was a beautiful once-in-a-lifetime experience, with
others merely uttering: ‘It was the African World Cup.’ By this they were asserting that everyone (regardless of age and sex) had the privilege, if not the right, to watch it. Watching the matches at home on television was not a readily available choice, particularly because of electricity power cuts due to load-shedding and lack of satellite television in some homes. The respondents revealed that people gathered in their ‘affluent’ friends’ homes (one was considered affluent if one had a generator and a full Digital Satellite Television (DSTV) subscription), bars, city council community halls, school classrooms and fan parks, among other possible public spaces. Only the bars in this case were still not good for women spectators. Otherwise the halls, homes and fan parks were open to men, women and children.

Discussion

A study by Dementhou and Ichou (2010) which assessed gender relations in Zimbabwe led to conclusions that during the FIFA 2010 World Cup men would dominate public spaces such as bars and ‘buy and grill’ restaurants; men would display their power, even through violent means, so as to celebrate competition, aggression and physical power, and, lastly, that the tournament would reinforce hetero-normal stereotypes and homophobic behaviours. On the contrary, as this study reveals, the 2010 FIFA World Cup scenario did not reach these extremities. In fact, the 2010 FIFA World Cup’s being an ‘African World Cup’ obliged its African audiences to experience it from the basic unit of the African communal spirit, the family, to the communities thereof, then the nation, and up to the continental pan-African appeal. Hence, Zimbabwean audiences over-rode gendered biases. Many of the respondents revealed how fan parks and other public spaces, with the exception of bars and other drinking spots, were distinctively different in that there were no significant gender discriminations. The environment carried an African spirit of humility (ubuntu), whereby men brought their wives and children to watch the matches as they basked in the African glory of hosting the FIFA World Cup for the first time.

From an Africana womanist perspective, it may be argued that the negotiation of gendered sport spaces by women during and outside the FIFA 2010 World Cup scenario in Zimbabwe is congruent with the lived reality of African man–woman relations, whereby the womanist struggle (as opposed to Western feminism) is not essentially against men but in concert with men, and where women embrace their domestic role as central figures in the family (Hudson-Weems, 1997). What the negotiation of the FIFA 2010 World Cup spaces by Zimbabwean women reveals is the African woman’s desire for harmonious existence with her male counterpart.

The findings of this study almost echo those of Manyonganise (2010) and Daimon (2010). Manyonganise’s research on women’s mobility between ‘safety’ zones and public spaces in their participation in sport revealed that
Zimbabwean women are restrained from full participation in sport because of social construction of spaces for women and men. Her findings reveal that there are deep-rooted patriarchal hegemonies in Zimbabwean society, born out of cultural and traditional belief and expectation, that ground women. Both male and female respondents in this study revealed this depth of stereotyping in their attitudes towards women watching soccer in bars, which were viewed by both sexes as decadent and mortifying. Apparently some of the lack of interest in soccer in women can be attributed to the patriarchal imposition of norms and conventions on women who would rather save themselves from the shame of being labelled loose, undignified and all the terms used to describe women who deviate from the social norms. They thus choose to stick to their safety zones. There is also notable collusion among married women and their male counterparts on ostracizing other women fans who attend matches in public spaces. For the married women in this case, this is a way of recoiling from direct confrontation with the men in their ‘socially constructed domain of the public space’, and is in keeping with their central role as wives and mothers in the family.

However, notwithstanding, I argue that the African woman’s desire for harmonious existence with her male counterpart should not prevail at the expense of her free expression of enjoyment in sport and in other contexts. Following Lefebvorean thought, Cathy van Ingen notes how power relations are inscribed in space and that cultural geographical analysis is an important and often overlooked tool for understanding and progressively intervening in social change (van Ingen, 2003). Advantages of the inverting of gendered spaces during the FIFA 2010 World Cup should be exploited by the Zimbabwean and African women sports audiences and fans in opening up more channels for being in the picture alongside the men.

This decisive effect of the World Cup in mediating gender relations in sport is not new, and has proven effective elsewhere, for example, in Argentina and in England (Lopez, 1997; Rodriguez, 2005). Rodriguez (2005) has shown how the reactions to the 1998 Soccer World Cup finals in Argentina saw the inversion of conventional domestic roles associated with female supporters as their fandom was legitimated and they were regarded as national supporters. Lopez (1997), in the same vein, reflected on how the winning of the 1966 World Cup in England even revived women’s soccer and female fandom.

The presence of families during screenings of the FIFA 2010 World Cup matches witnessed football being described as the most beautiful sport in Zimbabwe, and not the ‘most gender violent sport’, as Daimon (2010) puts it. This does not necessarily mean that some of the norms of football and patriarchy were lost in Zimbabwe, particularly in the realm of language. The ‘patriarchy of football spectatorship’ that Jessie Kabwila Kapasula (2010) and Anusa Daimon (2010) locate in the use of gender-discriminatory language during football matches was not easy to eradicate in the instance of
the FIFA 2010 World Cup. The respondents revealed that there were few, if any, instances of spectators using vulgar language, largely in cognizance of the presence of wives and children. Nevertheless, much of the language that is used to feminize the losing team was carried through, with a rival team being called ‘women’. The word ‘hurray’ is screamed as ‘hure’ (translated as ‘whore’ in the Shona language) at the score of a goal. Such words were still screamed by excited children and male and female fans at their team’s score because they have become normative, regardless of their vulgar and gender-discriminatory connotations. The word ‘hure’, though meaning ‘prostitute’, is used to refer to a goal score, the ball going into the net being synonymous with the penetration of a prostitute during sexual intercourse (Daimon, 2010).

The flexibility of norms of female soccer spectatorship and fandom during the 2010 FIFA World Cup in Zimbabwe only indicates significant possibilities for change in the society’s attitudes towards gendered differences. It is also significant that this flexibility indicated pan-African attitudes to preserve the dignity of the African continent in the face of Afro-pessimism. However, the unity that was displayed during the screenings of the matches at various public spaces can also be viewed as synonymous with the unity exhibited by the leaders of the main opposition parties in Zimbabwe coming together during the 2 June 2010 friendly match between Brazil and Zimbabwe. What was of importance to Zimbabwean political and economic interest was that Zimbabwe had to be rebranded and marketed as a safe tourist destination in order to attract thousands of fans who were billed to attend the Soccer 2010 World Cup. The friendly match was the biggest sporting event ever held in the country, and everyone was obliged to be on their best behaviour for the image of the nation; and so it was that the leaders shook the hands of the players together and sat side by side enjoying the game. Nonetheless, the sheer possibility of inverting gender relations in sport cannot be denied.

Yes, as Zenenga (2012) argues, Zimbabwean soccer is situated as an example of how subordinate groups create and develop forms of social, cultural and political construction in a particular sporting context to challenge a dominant hegemonic system. However, this is not the case with gender contestations, because the sport arena is male-dominated. The political arena is, arguably, the same. Furthermore, even at grassroots level the process of fandom is handed down over ‘patrilineal’ generations, as presented in Chiweshe Manase (2011), whereby one becomes a fan of a particular team through the male lineage or male peer legacy. The gender socialization process in Zimbabwean society is, thus, the culprit in keeping women and girls out of male-engendered spaces.

It goes without saying that gender discrimination in sport is limiting to women and girls not only in Zimbabwe but the world over. This systemic socio-cultural marginalization of women and girls does not merely limit their physical potential; it affects even their contribution to national
economic and political development. This is a concern that becomes glaring when women’s self-efficacy is affected. Self-efficacy, according to Machingambi & Wadesango (2011), can be viewed as a person’s belief in their capability to chart the course of actions required to manage prospective situations. Machingambi and Wadesango’s conception of Bandura’s social cognitive theory thus reveals the limitations on women’s personality development, which is key not only to meaningful social interaction but also to developmental discourse.

Conclusion

Indeed, there was much speculation as to the benefits of the World Cup for women in Africa. This study confirms and concurs with other works on the FIFA 2010 World Cup and gender that soccer and the FIFA World Cup are generally male-dominated and regulated spheres, where women can only be seen as intruders. Be it in sport or developmental discourse, the woman is always referred to in terms of sexuality; hence the hype that the only recognized female benefits from the World Cup are in the line of sex work. Women are considered only for their physical and sexual vulnerability.

On a sarcastic note, the World Cup lived up to world-class standards of gender inequalities in sports. Without being too harsh, let it suffice to also say that there is hope for women’s engendering of the sports arena if the flexibility shown during the FIFA 2010 World Cup can be looked at as a beginning that left possibilities for the cultivation of better gender relations in the future. There is, however, a need for a resolute womanist (and/or feminist) movement in Zimbabwe that is prepared to reclaim spaces for women. This is an option that Dementhon and Ichou (2010: 75) explored through advocating that, during the FIFA 2010 World Cup, Gender Links, through its Gender and Media Diversity Centre, should open a pilot women’s autonomous centre during the month of the World Cup in Zimbabwe where women would meet to ‘build strength and cohesion to fight gender challenges’. They also suggested that, once organized, the movement could be taken outside the autonomous centre to reclaim spaces through organizing women’s expeditions to bars, sports clubs and stadiums. My enquiries did not reveal whether these possibilities came to fruition. From the findings of this study, I am sceptical about the possibilities of radically reclaiming public spaces designated for men in the Zimbabwean scenario. The women interviewees and focus group discussants revealed that most Zimbabwean women are apprehensive of taking radical stances to negotiate their presence in the male-dominated sporting arena. Asked how they responded to violence during soccer matches, few of the women showed willingness to even face the gendered confrontations; hence the majority preference to stay at home, attend sporting events with male relatives or partners, or watch matches from VIP stands in stadiums.
The hindrance to possibilities of a radical stance as noted by Dementhon and Ichou (2010) and Chikafa (2012) is that the Zimbabwean womanist/feminist movement, among other African feminist movements, has since been diluted by national economic and political agendas and has now been overtaken by government and donor agendas. Thus, activism has consequently become reductive. It would seem that the spate of gender arrogance on the male part in organizational bodies, down to the ordinary male sport participant, is going to continue as the vocal gender and feminist advocacies gradually talk and research their way into gendered male domains in soccer and sport in general.

References


Noisemaker or Cultural Symbol: The Vuvuzela Controversy and Expressions of Football Fandom

Jeffrey W. Kassing

Introduction

Awarding the 2010 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup to South Africa was a watershed moment, the first time the sport’s hallmark event would be held on the African continent (Hawkey, 2009). While football came to the continent through colonialism, the game actually served to bolster ‘African resistance, not only against colonialism but also against social inequalities within African communities’ (Alegi, 2010: 22). In this way, Africa developed a unique brand of football – signified by neighbourhood clubs, pan-ethnic teams, magic and religion, and the liberal and creative use of praise names for players. Confined spaces, limited training facilities and material poverty combined to create a playing style that emphasized the display of individual talent. This attribute of the African game was reflected in the aforementioned nicknaming of players, which included Dancer, Phantom, Magician and Steamboat. Alegi (2010) noted that in Africa ‘players and fans self-consciously enjoyed the cleverness, beauty, and excitement of feinting and dribbling, delightful moves that elated fans but also captured the cultural importance of creativity, deception, and skill in getting around difficulties and dangerous situations in colonial societies’ (Alegi, 2010: 34). Thus, a long and clear football tradition grew out of a unique African context – which combined the elements of European football, as imported via colonialism, and the unique characteristics and circumstances of Africa.

This unique African footballing tradition was challenged, though, when one of South Africa’s cultural symbols – the vuvuzela – was called into question. The vuvuzela is a horn blown by avid South African soccer supporters. According to FIFA, the vuvuzela is a ‘vociferous air horn that reverberates around arenas with rare energy’ that stands as a ‘proud and permanent symbol of its patrons’ (FIFA.com). For some the horn is a cultural symbol
of South African football that has evolved over the past 15 years, while for others it remains a noisy nuisance that poses serious health threats (Swanepoel et al., 2010). The origins of the horn remain unconfirmed, with accounts tracing it back to a kudu horn used to summon distant people to meetings or to religious worship and healing ceremonies (CNN.com, 2010). Regardless of its exact origins, the fact remains that South African football stadiums fill with the loud and sustained sound for football matches.

To show the global differentiation in how supporters celebrate their national sides, FIFA likened the horn to the samba drums of Brazil, the ringing cowbells of Switzerland and the Mexican wave (FIFA.com). In an effort to prepare and perhaps inoculate fans regarding the potentially disturbing drone of the horn, FIFA framed the vuvuzela as one of the many national idiosyncrasies that become apparent at football matches. But, despite these efforts, the vuvuzela quickly proved quite controversial. As a result, the 2010 FIFA World Cup legacy will be inextricably linked to the vuvuzela. It was here that the notorious plastic horn was introduced to global football spectators. As a cultural symbol touted as emblematic of the event, the vuvuzela became the focal point of a controversy fuelled by discourses about what is permissible and appropriate in football fandom. This piece attempts to decipher those discourses as they underpin arguments for and against the vuvuzela’s place in contemporary football.

The case of the vuvuzela at the 2010 World Cup

Prior to the World Cup final in South Africa, FIFA deliberated about banning the vuvuzela, but decided to allow it, as it brought a particularly African flair to the tournament (Guardian, 2010). Allowing it made an indelible mark in the collective memory of spectators worldwide. This sentiment was captured well at the close of the World Cup by New York Times Magazine contributor Rob Walker (2010: 18), who recognized that ‘this simple, slightly silly, mass-produced noisemaker/instrument became a highly unlikely symbol of cultural meaning’.

From the onset, players, broadcasters and television audiences throughout the world registered their annoyance with the vuvuzela (Guardian, 2010; Walker, 2010). Media reported about international stars like Patrice Evra, Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo publicly denouncing the instrument, about a Facebook group of 100,000 strong that was lobbying for a ban, and about a website allowing fans to vote on banning the horn that had garnered over 65,000 votes in just a few days.

Amidst this criticism, World Cup CEO Danny Jordaan intimated in an interview with BBC Sportsweek that a ban could be forthcoming (BBC Sport, 2010). The possibility of a ban was picked up and reported widely. In response to the criticism and suggestion of a ban, FIFA President Sepp Blatter took to Twitter in defence of the horn, stating:
“To answer all your messages re the Vuvuzelas. I have always said that Africa has a different rhythm, a different sound’, and added: ‘I don’t see banning the music traditions of fans in their own country. Would you want to see a ban on the fan traditions in your country?’

Sport and new media

Fans regularly use the internet to engage in a broad range of sport-related activity, including visiting sport websites, checking on and confirming match results for their favourite teams, purchasing team apparel and related merchandise, seeking and enjoying interaction with other fans through discussion forums, and participating in online fantasy sport leagues (Hur et al., 2011). In fact, the number of sports fans using new media is notable. Consider that 83% of sports fans check Twitter at least daily and an additional 39% check it multiple times a day (Clavio & Kian, 2010).

Thus, new media are having a considerable impact on sport, fandom and spectatorship (Sanderson, 2011). The properties of new media enhance the sports experience for fans in a multiplicity of ways. McCarthy (2011: 266) captures these possibilities succinctly, stating:

Never have sports fans been able to enjoy such an integrated media experience of sports. On the Internet local information becomes global information at the same time that the general is made specific. This information can be circulated quickly and widely.

Sanderson and Kassing (2011) illustrate through several case studies how new media have transformed interaction between fans and athletes, paying particular attention to how these relationships become integrative but also adversarial.

One particular way in which fans interact with athletes and sports organizations is by posting messages on websites. Scholars have examined this behaviour in a recent collection of studies (Sanderson, 2008; Kassing & Sanderson, 2009). Findings indicate that, while fans can be playful and supportive, they also can be unusually and unfairly critical of their sporting heroes and one another (Sanderson, 2009). One way in which this occurs is through the policing of fellow fans posting messages that run orthogonal to the general consensus (Kassing & Sanderson, 2009, 2012). Policing is one of several disconfirming trends apparent in new media use. Others include maladaptive (para) social interaction and displays of hypermasculinity. Able to take many forms, disconfirming trends serve to delineate membership boundaries and work to exclude people from membership in the community of sport (Kassing & Sanderson, 2012).

Thus, explorations of fan postings on websites have proven fruitful. In that tradition, this work considers fan reactions to the vuvuzela’s use during the
2010 World Cup. The Guardian, a leading UK newspaper that champions itself as the source of balanced news, ran a feature discussing the possible ban in its online edition. The article allowed fans to post reactions, which flooded the website for three days until the comment board was closed. This study seeks to explore the nature and content of these comments as a representative set of opinions that reveal much about how people contend that football fandom should be enacted.

Methodology

A thematic analysis using constant comparative methodology of postings that appeared on guardian.co.uk was conducted (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The postings were in response to a piece entitled ‘World Cup Organizer Considers Vuvuzela Ban after TV Complaints’ (Gibson, 2010). The article ran on 13 June 2010, two days and four matches into the tournament. It began with ‘Their cacophonous din has so far been a soundtrack for the World Cup, to the delight of some and the profound annoyance of others.’ It then referenced comments from organizing committee chief executive Danny Jordaan regarding the need to monitor the situation and the possibility of enforcing a ban if necessary. The article continued by outlining the complaints registered against the vuvuzela and balanced these with arguments for retaining it espoused by FIFA officials and local fans endorsing the vuvuzela and its place in South African football.

The first comment, a simple ‘About time’, appeared at 7:52 pm GMT on 13 June. Comments were closed 52 hours and 44 minutes later, at 12:36 am GMT on 16 June, ending with ‘Bunch of lunatics complaining about something so futile. I bet some idiotic cab driver started all this off.’ The closing comment offered message board managers the opportunity to close the comments with a posting that seemingly put the whole thing to rest, but it belied the level and nature of contestation that had occurred within the 881 comments. It also underplayed the importance of the issue and the opinions shared about it for readers unwilling to dig into and read the canon of earlier texts. The relevance of the issue, and the potential for it to forge lasting memories in the minds of fans, was evident in the following comment: ‘South Africa will be remembered for this [the vuvuzela] sadly when it was such an achievement to get the World Cup into their country.’ Thus, understanding the nature of the comments stands to reveal much about football fandom and the World Cup.

Comments ranged in length from two words to 636 words. Some were simple descriptive statements like ‘I really can’t stand the bzzzzzz’ and ‘It’s like being inside a huge beehive’, while others were eight to nine-paragraph essays. While the vast majority of comments came from different participants, there was some indication that several people contributed multiple
comments across the lifespan of the message board. Furthermore, there was evidence that they engaged one another directly and aggressively at different points in time (Kassing & Sanderson, 2009, 2012).

The analysis employed a grounded theory approach whereby texts (i.e., posted comments) were reviewed by reading through them multiple times. Data were grouped into emergent themes, and exemplars of the themes were noted. Development, clarification and refinement of themes continued until new observations did not add substantively to existing themes or introduce additional ones. Thus, themes developed as data analysis unfolded and were consequently clarified and refined as more observations were included in each. This step of the process resulted in six themes that contributed to two distinct sets of discourse. This approach has been used successfully by others studying the use of message boards in the context of sports (Sanderson, 2008; Kassing & Sanderson, 2009).

The data revealed several arguments for banning the vuvuzela, which included: questioning the veracity of the vuvuzela as a cultural symbol, qualifying the use of the vuvuzela, and collective crisis. Underpinning these themes was discourse that perpetuated ethnocentric notions of football. By comparison, arguments made in support of the vuvuzela involved humour and irony, the sanctity of the World Cup and the proprietary rights of its host, and (re)defining football fandom. The discourse surrounding these arguments revealed the need to allow for ethnorelative notions of football. Each of these themes and the larger discourses that support them are described in greater detail in the section that follows.

Results and interpretation

Questioning the veracity of the vuvuzela as a cultural symbol

One tactic that vuvuzela detractors used was to attack the idea – which had been widely popularized in media reports – that the vuvuzela was a cultural symbol of South Africa, particularly associated with football fandom. These attacks hinged on several premises, which included the fact that the vuvuzela was mass-produced, made of plastic, and manufactured in China, and that it had only been apparent at football matches for a comparatively short time. Protestations incorporating these types of criticism included ‘these things have only turned up in the recent past and are belched out of Chinese plastics factories’ and ‘As if those plastic trumpets thrown onto the market in the 1990s were part of African cultural heritage!’ A tension is revealed here, regarding notions of antiquity and quality versus those of commodification and tackiness, with the implication being that cultural symbols need to be aged and high-quality in order to be authenticated.
This argument was extended to an economic one when message board contributors noted that a cultural symbol should benefit the population in some way. For example, one contributor commented:

 Seriously, if this symbol of South African football was actually made in South Africa and provided jobs for South African workers then it could be forgiven but the only people profiting from it are the Chinese factories that actually make them.

Thus, detractors worked to inauthenticate the vuvuzela by reminding readers that it was too new to be culturally significant, that it was mass-produced in another country, and that it provided no economic benefits to the people of South Africa. These tactics served to call the veracity of the vuvuzela into question as a cultural symbol. While these dismissals of the vuvuzela as a cultural symbol were grounded in particular, albeit perhaps misplaced, conceptions of what cultural symbols should be, others were less strategic in their attacks.

Some posters sidestepped the issue of whether or not the vuvuzela was a cultural symbol and instead attacked the idea that it should be prioritized as one. While these contributors seemed to accept that there might be some legitimacy to the vuvuzela’s status as a cultural symbol, they steadfastly dismissed the idea that it should be given privileged status at the matches. People claimed:

 Just because it’s local, indigenous, African, does not excuse it from being bloody annoying’ and ‘Just because something is part of a nation’s “culture” doesn’t make it right or something that should be tolerated. Apartheid was also part of South African culture.’ Comments like these reveal a logic that places comfort and tolerance above favouring a cultural symbol – fundamentally endorsing the idea that symbols should not be expected to transfer well across cultures.

Some of those willing to concede that the vuvuzela was a cultural symbol reacted strongly to its presence at the early matches. These arguments framed FIFA’s unwillingness to ban the horn as an exercise in political correctness. For example, people claimed that the vuvuzela ‘would be banned in any country outside Africa’ and that FIFA was ‘being over politically correct to appease the Africanness of the tournament’. Others added: ‘Being annoying and ruining the hearing of the fans and the game for everyone on the planet watching should not be excused as cultural. It’s just being rude.’ Thus, contributors to the message board called the vuvuzela into question as a cultural symbol and routinely challenged its use as one. A softer approach was apparent in football supporters who espoused qualifying the use of the vuvuzela.
Qualifying use

This theme emerged from supporters’ comments that provided some suggestion for how and when the vuvuzela should be used. Suggestions qualified the use of the vuvuzela in multiple ways. Supporters indicated that it should be used only at certain times during particular matches. One tendency was to suggest that the vuvuzela be used in celebration of goals or key moments in games versus consistently across the game. For instance, people commented: ‘If they just did it at the start or after a goal no one would mind, but it’s all the time’ and

What I really don’t like is that the noise is constant and doesn’t respond to the highs and lows of the game – they would be great if blown in celebration of a goal or a good bit of play.

Statements such as these indicate that supporters would be more tolerant of the vuvuzela if it conformed to their expectations of use; that is, if it were blown only at particular moments in time. This is an interesting qualification given that it relies on preconceived notions of how supporter noise should be scripted into a game. Apparently, the idea that noise can run concurrently and consistently throughout the game is an aberration that needs to be corrected.

Others qualified the vuvuzela’s use more broadly in terms of the tournament, suggesting that vuvuzelas ‘had a novelty value in the build up to the tournament and perhaps before and after a match, they may still have a purpose’. This suggestion and those like it maintained that the vuvuzela might have a role, albeit a marginal and restricted one, in the World Cup. Another line of questioning centred on the use of the vuvuzela across all matches in the tournament. People wondered why its use was not limited to just those games being contested by African sides. Questions like ‘if they are designed to capture the African feel of this tournament, why aren’t fans just playing them during matches involving African teams?’ were recurrent. This qualification indicates that the vuvuzela should be used only by supporters of particular teams. What people forwarding this line of questioning failed to realize, though, was that South African fans populated many of the games and that supporters from other sides adopted the vuvuzela as well.

While not directly challenging the vuvuzela, supporters who qualified its use provided a set of guidelines that they claimed would better suit a global fan base. These suggestions prescribed using the vuvuzela only at certain moments during play, at certain places within the tournament, or only during certain matches. This form of advice-giving has been observed in previous research on fan postings (Kassing & Sanderson, 2009). On the surface, such comments appear more conciliatory than those provided by people who outright challenged the vuvuzela’s inclusion, yet their very
presence and dictatorial nature undermined the place of the vuvuzela in the World Cup with equal but less evident force.

**Collective crisis**

Another tactic that was apparent in the texts was the concerted effort to construct the circumstances as a crisis collectively shared by all those associated with football. This entailed marshalling the opinions of players, coaches and broadcasters as necessary to support one’s claims about how dire the situation was. One particular appeal in this line of commentary was to stress empathy for players with comments like ‘players from just about every non-African team have already complained because they can’t hear themselves calling to each other, it’s like playing with earplugs on’ and ‘Goodness only knows what that relentless cacophony is like if you experience it live. It’s not fair to the players.’ This sentiment was amplified in the following comment: ‘But perhaps the most powerful argument against them is that it’s hindering the players’ ability to hear each other, or their coaches’ instructions.’ Framed as obstructionist, the vuvuzela runs the risk of actually affecting the communication among players and between players and coaches – and, by implication, actual play in matches.

While some fans took it upon themselves to direct attention to the impact the vuvuzela was having on players, others chose to pull additional stakeholders into the equation. These supporters regularly produced collective crisis by identifying a host of constituents who apparently had been affected negatively by the vuvuzela’s presence. Claims such as ‘Most people at home hate it, coaches and players hate it, broadcasters hate it. It’s diminishing a lot of people’s enjoyment of the World Cup’ exemplified this approach. Others extended the argument to global fans, claiming:

> Real football fans who have stood on the terraces, who sing, and who understand the passion in the cheering and the clapping from Italy to Brazil, from Ireland to Japan know, this instrument must be banned to save the soul of football.

Protestations then sought to galvanize people against the vuvuzela in order to protect players, the quality of the game and the traditions of football. Supporters posting on the message board referenced other principals in the context in order to signify a growing crisis that affected not just the individual fan but the entire constellation of those who participated in and cared deeply about the World Cup.

**Perpetuating ethnocentric notions of football**

The aforementioned themes contribute to a larger discourse that reifies an ethnocentric, and more specifically Eurocentric, version of football fandom.
At a tactless level, this was evident when those posting comments took to insulting fans who favoured the vuvuzela. Comments like ‘Don’t these brain-dead supporters have any songs they can sing or is this the limit of their intellect [sic] blowing on some cheap trumpet like a 3 year old?’ and ‘Anyone tooting that stupid horn throughout a game is obviously not a football fan’ delineated boundaries regarding how fandom should be enacted. Clearly, blowing what equated to a child’s horn was a breach of acceptable behaviour, particularly in comparison to long-standing European football traditions like singing (Power, 2011).

Less offensive commentary suggested that the vuvuzela overpowered the ebb and flow of the game. This brand of comments routinized fan cheering in response to action on the pitch as an inherent part of the game. For instance, one comment offered that

> It’s not so much the sound itself (though it’s hard to argue that it’s nice) – it’s what it blocks out. The crescendos when Messi sets off on a mazy dribble. And above all that noise when the crowd erupts after a goal. Completely lost. What a shame.

By lamenting the loss of other sounds affiliated with the game, fans promoted a particular sonic backdrop upon which football should unfold – a highly scripted backdrop in which sound was emitted at precise moments by particular supporters in the cause of specific players or teams. This common script held strong for most detractors, suggesting that a unifying football soundscape had been concretized in the minds and practices of football fans. The noise created by the vuvuzela disrupted this soundscape and, in doing so, competed with other, more established ways of doing football (Meán, 2001). So entrenched were notions of football fans’ role in producing the proper soundscape for matches that one commenter likened its absence to playing in an empty stadium by suggesting that:

> The trouble with the Vuvuzelas is that they nullify the drama that the crowd’s reaction brings to the game. Without this, it’s not massively different to playing the games in empty stadiums.

The choreography between fan noise and action on the pitch was the cornerstone for this line of reasoning, taken to be innate and immutable. Comments like the one that follows revealed the certainty with which fans instinctively adhered to this conception.

> The applause as the players emerge from the tunnel. The songs sung in unison by thousands supporting the same team, the witty chants from the opposition in reply. The beautiful tension as a player steps up to take a decisive kick. The atmosphere that makes watching football such an
enjoyable experience for millions. All of this is replaced by a constant, intolerable atonal drone bearing no relation to events on the pitch.

Priority is placed on fandom being synchronized with action on the pitch, and the possibility of asynchronous noise gets cancelled out. Alternative soundscapes for football are dismissed, while those held to be universal remain privileged. Closing the possibility of other soundscapes was found even among the most apologetic fans. For example, one claimed:

I’m all in favour of a different and genuinely South African World Cup, however, it’s sad that we can’t hear the usual range of national singing and chanting that reflects the diversity of the World Cup and the ebb and flow of what’s going on in the match.

The persistent theme that the vuvuzela overpowered the appropriate way to respond during a football match was apparent throughout the texts examined. It showed that many football fans adhered to a particular version of how football fandom should be enacted and, in doing so, dismissed alternative versions of football fandom. In contrast, other football fans recognized this incongruity and were more tolerant of it. To better understand this variation, the themes that showed support for the vuvuzela at the World Cup are considered next.

**Humour and irony**

Humour can be used to disarm critics (Bell, 2007) and to obscure marginalization (Patton, 2008). In earlier research on fans’ use of message boards, it was apparent that fans also used humour as a form of play – interacting with a favoured athlete and fellow fans (Kassing & Sanderson, 2009). It appears that people posting comments in support of the vuvuzela often deployed humour in these same ways. More specifically, humour was used to poke fun at the sounds vuvuzelas blanketed. This took the form of drawing upon opinions about past and current broadcasters with comments like ‘I like the vuvuzelas. They drown out the ignorant comments from the British commentators of the BBC and ITV’ and ‘I have to say, although I find the vuvuzelas slightly annoying I’d rather listen to them than to Mick McCarthy’s commentary.’ In addition, vuvuzela supporters chided those complaining (e.g., ‘They sound indefinitely better than all the people whinging about them’) and stereotypes about the English Premier League (EPL) by stating:

Don’t know about others here, but I don’t see it as a tradition so much as a part of the South African game. A bit like morally dubious club owners in the EPL.
Vuvuzela supporters also deployed humour ironically to show that noise and celebration routinely combine in sport settings (e.g., ‘Who let all the locals in, honking their strange instruments, dancing around and having a good time. Football should be watched in silence’), that other sports are far noisier than football (e.g., ‘The incessant droning noise completely destroys the pleasure of watching the sport on TV. Please ban Formula 1 immediately’) and that sport often leads to excess (e.g., ‘I suspect those complaining strongly about the vuvuzelas would have considered the ticker tape at Argentina 1978 as incessant littering’). Thus, irony was used effectively to temper complaints against the vuvuzela by framing them as antithetical to fundamental components of sport, such as celebration, noise and excess.

Humour also surfaced when vuvuzela supporters attempted to illustrate how illogical excessive protestations against the vuvuzela could be. This occurred when people exaggerated the aforementioned crisis espoused by vuvuzela detractors with comments like ‘Its house prices I’m worried about. Just imagine the drop in property value if a family of vuvuzela players moved in next door.’ It also happened when people responded to and contested particular themes (e.g., that the vuvuzela compromised the give and take between fans and athletes). For example, ‘I think there should be complete silence throughout the game perhaps with a ripple of polite handclaps if a goal is scored.’

Humour, then, used in a variety of ways, proved effective for those who contested vuvuzela detractors. It drew attention to shared conceptions of the shortcomings in the English production and presentation of the World Cup and the English game, while also revealing the illogical and excessive nature of complaints against the vuvuzela. When used effectively, humour defused the arguments made against the vuvuzela, but it was only one of several approaches – another involved reminding readers of the understood rights of the host country.

Sanctity of the World Cup and the proprietary rights of its host

Mega-sporting events present considerable benefits and prestige for the countries that host and produce them, as sport can serve for a tool for development (Guilianotti, 2004). It is prestigious for a country to host such an event, and there is an expectation that the event will emit the flavour of the host country. This fact was not lost on the fans who recognized that, regardless of how they felt about the vuvuzela, the event’s host and traditions should be respected. For instance, one person simply commented: ‘It’s South Africa. It’s their world cup. It’s going great so far. Leave it alone.’ Another recognized that the vuvuzela was part and parcel of the host country’s World Cup trappings and should be appreciated as such, despite admittedly being annoying, stating:
Oh come on, it’s what they do in the host country, who are we to complain? It’s one of the things that makes this world cup unique, special, memorable. Get over it. And yes, I do find it annoying.

This comment and similar ones revealed that a cohort of fans adhered to a code of respect for the host nation and that they expected others to do the same.

This same degree of respect was extended to the mega-event itself. People drew attention to the unparalleled nature of the World Cup as a global mega-sporting event and implored others to keep this in mind. The following comment captured this sentiment succinctly: ‘People grow up. It is not called the world cup for nothing. So I suggest you all ssh and watch the games’, while others, such as ‘Furthermore, those saying they have turned off cause it’s sooo soo painful. GET A LIFE! It’s the World Cup and very little can detract from the theatre of it all’, emphasized the notoriety and expectations affiliated with the World Cup. Thus, people posted comments that defended the sanctity and recalled the pageantry of the World Cup alongside remarks about showing respect for its host nation. These tactics reminded readers that events like the World Cup have the potential to unify fans across cultural differences, and, as such, should be appreciated for that capacity (Guilianotti, 2011).

(Re)defining fandom

Another theme that emerged among those offering support for the vuvuzela involved questioning and interrogation of the assumptions certain messages perpetuated about English football fandom. One line of questioning probed the accuracy of claims made about football fans. This entailed challenging assertions about how football fandom should function. For example, one contributor to the message board offered the following query:

Do any of you people actually go to football matches? Where are these wonderful theatres of noise people go to with imaginative chanting and singing? I am afraid that’s in the past and you here most of the same chants at every ground with a different name thrown in. A lot of the time the crowd is quiet. Internationals are usually worse for this. Complain about the vuvuzelas if you want but please do not pretend they drown out anything more imaginative.

This comment and similar ones punched holes in the uniformity of English football fandom, highlighting how the experience had grown dreary and repetitive for some fans. In a similar vein, other posters contested English football fans’ apparent sentimental attachment to singing at matches. One
contributor quipped: ‘At least it [the vuvuzela] drowns out that god awful, mindless singing’, while another claimed:

I’d rather hear the chorus of vuvuzelas than a dirge-like rendition of God Save the Queen. Years ago football fans made a tremendous din with rattles but now the prawn-sandwich brigade want the sport to be a sedate affair.

Commentary like this challenged the novelty of singing at matches and the unimaginative way in which English fans performed repetitive and well-trodden songs. It also opened the possibility for readers to acknowledge that fandom had evolved in English football, and was continuing to evolve – thereby providing room for newer and alternative forms of fandom.

Questions targeting English football also juxtaposed it against alternative footballing traditions from across the globe. Doing so indicated that there was no singular way in which fans should be expected to participate in support of their national sides, and showed the insular perspective some English football supporters held.

All the Africans, Mexicans and South Americans I know are laughing their heads off knowing a bunch of cotton-ears are getting their knickers in a twist over this. A Mexican game is typically an amorphous sound wall of endless rattles, whistles, drums, flares, pops and chants. How this is considered more tolerable than a monotonous sound wall is a mystery to me.

Showcasing football traditions in other countries served to remind readers that football is a global sport – one accentuated by local traditions and customs.

Another tactic involved pointing out less admirable attributes of English football fandom. Critics who raised these points understood that historically there were elements of dishonour that had tarnished English football fandom – including rioting, racist chanting, hooliganism and property destruction. One critic had this to offer readers:

I wonder (depending on where 2018 and 2022 are hosted) what African TV viewers would think of (racists chants, hooligan activity like stabbings and setting fires). Seems like African fans have a long way to go before they match up to our civilized punters.

Those levelling such criticism sought to draw attention to the comparative inoffensiveness of the vuvuzela considered against far greater atrocities perpetrated by English football fans. At a fundamental level, comments that gave shape to this theme asked readers to (re)consider the ubiquity and
quality of the English version of football fandom and the fairness, and at times foolishness, of espousing it so vociferously. While historic and certainly influential, English football fandom did not provide licence to assail other versions of football fandom. This sentiment was well captured in the following post:

We may have taken the ubiquitous kicking a pig’s bladder around, and turned it into the world game we know and love, but that doesn’t give us whinging rights on how the world’s supporters show their appreciation.

(Re)defining fandom, along with the other tactics discussed, underpinned discourse that defended ethnorelative football.

**In defence of ethnorelative football**

Discourse that grounded arguments in support of the vuvuzela made room for ethnorelative versions of football fandom: that is, versions of football fandom which vary from one place to another versus those that subscribe to a universal approach. Through the use of humour and irony, the recognition of the sanctity of the event and the proprietary rights of the host, and the (re)definition of football fandom, ethnorelative discourse created space where alternative versions of football fandom could exist and flourish. For those adopting an ethnorelative position, the vuvuzela struck a very natural chord – something that did not even merit criticism. For example, one football fan shared:

What is there to complain about? This is how South African fans are celebrating football in their country and as such is a massive part of the atmosphere of the whole tournament.

The use of the vuvuzela in this case (or whatever local custom may be appropriate in other cases) was expected and accepted. At the same time, it helped to make the tournament both global and ethnorelative.

The vuvuzela makes the atmosphere more specific to South Africa. So much of football these days is locationless. The stadiums are all big all-seated basins, the players all play in the same three or four national leagues. Well done the Africans for creating such a distinctive atmosphere all of their own.

Thus, ethnorelative football fans understood that the vuvuzela, both despite and because of its sound, proved fundamental in marking the event as uniquely South African and unmistakably global. While some fans may have concluded this from the onset, others seemed to have come to this
conclusion as they worked through states of cultural acceptance. This was evident for the football fan who shared the following comment:

I have watched every match since the SA 2010 started. I like that sound. It’s different, monotonous, incessant but after a while, I just treated it as background noise. Same way that I treat English fans belting out Jerusalem off-tune non-stop at the Oval. It’s loud, it’s annoying but it’s their country. If they want to enjoy the game like that then so be it.

Others moved past tolerance and acceptance to actual appreciation for both the sound itself and what the horn was able to do for the tournament. This was apparent in statements such as ‘I like the Vuvuzela it is a mad noise, epic and strange’ and ‘The sound is fantastic. It shows the World Cup is actually somewhere rather than a politically correct everywhere.’

Thus, an ethnorelative approach to football fandom was promoted through the arguments offered in support of the vuvuzela. This approach recognized the merit of the vuvuzela itself, but also the important role it played in both localizing and globalizing the tournament. Ethnorelative football fans understood that the vuvuzela showcased the specific location while reminding supporters that the event was a global-cultural showcase. Ethnorelative approaches also worked directly against and in response to the powerful ethnocentric expectations of football fandom. In doing so, they reminded readers and participants on the message board that there is no one universal version of football fandom and that banning a symbol associated with African football would undermine this truth. The following excerpt makes this point well.

It would be an absolute travesty if the vuvuzela was to be banned. They’re used at games across South Africa and apparently create a killer atmosphere at the Soweto derby. It’s part of the South African Football experience. Why bother having a host nation if it is not permitted to stamp its footballing identity on the game?

**Conclusion**

Without a doubt, the vuvuzela was a polarizing force in the 2010 World Cup – one that illuminated conceptions about how football fandom should transpire. The sound produced by the instrument, as well as the way in which it was played, challenged certain expectations about football fandom. These challenges were hotly contested in the texts considered here, revealing that detractors of the vuvuzela found it troubling because it interfered with their ethnocentric conceptions of how football fans should behave at live matches. This was achieved by questioning the authenticity of the
vuvuzela as a cultural symbol – inauthenticating it as too new to have a significant tradition, too cheap to be meaningful and too commodified to be genuine. This type of criticism overlooks the significant place commodification occupies in modern sport (Wenner, 2010) and how sport traditions continue to evolve, change and become revitalized (Power, 2011). In addition, there was commentary about qualifying the use of the vuvuzela, suggesting that the intolerance it produced could be curbed by use practices that adhered to particular standards. These standards, however (i.e., use before and after games, after goals), further implicated ethnocentric versions of football fandom, as those providing such prescriptions imagined vuvuzela use as something that could be graphed easily onto existing football practices. Finally, detractors referenced many parties (i.e., players, coaches, managers, fans, etc.) to demonstrate the extent of the vuvuzela’s offensiveness – leveraging the opinions and attitudes of others and attempting to orchestrate them into a collective crisis that merited attention. This is a tactic that online fan communities have used previously to draw attention to sporting concerns and successfully overturn the decisions of governing forces (Kassing & Sanderson, 2012). Fans incorporating the tactic in these texts hoped for the same.

Those showing support for the vuvuzela displayed several key strategies too. Vuvuzela supporters used humour to bring into relief what the vuvuzela served to cover up (i.e., annoying commentary and whinging). They also deployed irony to call out vuvuzela contestations that seemingly opposed enthusiasm and celebration – acknowledging the power of sport to produce and use irony to great effect (Brayton & Alexander, 2007). Additionally, they relied upon commonly held understandings that promoted the sanctity of sporting events and the appropriate amount of respect that should be afforded them (Anstead & O’Loughlin, 2011; Seifried & Smith, 2011). Doing so hinged on reminding readers that the World Cup was a global event and its host an esteemed entity. Finally, those in support of the vuvuzela provided commentary which forwarded an alternative definition of football fandom – particularly by illuminating the shortcomings of English football fandom. This involved drawing attention to the accuracy of claims being forwarded about the level of enthusiasm and passion displayed at matches, the overt and unwarranted sentimentality attached to the singing of dated and unimaginative songs, and the disgraceful moments that have historically blighted English football traditions. Together, these efforts opened space for readers and participants to adopt a more ethnorelative approach to football fandom – one that respected all traditions but subscribed to no single one universally.

These texts are telling, and clearly showed a strong split among football fans, differentiating those who were tolerant and accepting of alternative footballing traditions from those who were not. These same discourses continued to surface after the World Cup in powerful ways. For example,
the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) banned the vuvuzela at games it oversees (The Guardian, 2010). Accordingly, all 53 member nations are expected to enforce the ban which prohibits fans from taking vuvuzelas to European Championship, Champions League and Europa League matches. The official UEFA statement read:

In the specific context of South Africa, the vuvuzela adds a touch of local flavour and folklore, but Uefa feels that the instrument’s widespread use would not be appropriate in Europe… The magic of football consists of the two-way exchange of emotions between the pitch and the stands, where the public can transmit a full range of feelings to the players… Uefa is of the view that the vuvuzelas would completely change the atmosphere, drowning supporter emotions and detracting from the experience of the game… to protect the culture and tradition of football in Europe – singing, chanting, etc. – Uefa has decided with immediate effect that vuvuzelas will not be allowed in the stadiums where Uefa competition matches are played.

The statement begins with an endorsement of the vuvuzela that qualifies, as some of the fans considered in this work did, the use of the vuvuzela to a particular geographic location. It then turns abruptly to the protection of the European football tradition – one ordained and positioned to be the gold, and ideally global, standard. Charged with protecting and advancing European football, UEFA is well within its purview to impose such a ban and to make the argument that the vuvuzela detracts from how the game is played in Europe. However, doing so delineates and, in essence, subordinates alternative football traditions.

In the end, the vuvuzela is more than a horn, more than an artefact of South African football tradition. It is a direct challenge to universal and ethnocentric notions of football fandom brought about by the global reach of football and the movement of the World Cup to uncharted territory. The World Cup has only been held outside Europe and the Americas on two occasions, but it is noteworthy that those two occurrences were in the recent past (Japan/South Korea hosted in 2002 and South Africa hosted in 2010). There is a clear trend, then, to take the tournament to under-represented parts of the globe – as evidenced by the awarding of the 2022 World Cup to Qatar. The continuation of this trend will invite further contestation between versions of football fandom. There already is early talk, for example, about moving the Qatar World Cup (historically played in the summer for the Northern hemisphere) to a winter tournament due to extreme summer temperatures. It will be interesting to see the impact this may have on football fans if it comes to pass, as it stands to disrupt domestic and European league play. Will such a change be met with the same resistance that the vuvuzela faced? Perhaps, as this analysis indicates that, despite efforts to project
more ethnorelative versions of football fandom, it remains comparatively ethnocentric, relatively intolerant of difference and slow to evolve.

References


Part III
African Media Narratives
Reports in the sports media about Africa and its sports have often framed the continent as the Other. In essence, Africa was considered at the periphery among sporting nations. Such was the perception that the Western media, in particular, focused on crime, corruption and poverty in numerous reports preceding the World Cup in South Africa. But there was belief, notably from the Special Adviser to the United Nations’ General Secretary on Sports, that the World Cup hosted in Africa would change this image of the continent. Media narratives at the 2010 World Cup and from the International Federation for Football Associations (FIFA) tended to ameliorate adverse reports on Africa that pervaded and persisted in the Western media. However, months after the World Cup, Western media reports of Africa as backward, crisis-filled and corrupt, among other vices, continue, with new headlines focused on corruption, for example. Unfortunately, such reports are not limited to Western media. Increasingly, as acknowledged by studies such as Onwumechili (2009), similar reports appear in local and multinational African media. Reports in African media raise special concerns, juxtaposed with the increasing impact of transnational media on football identity among African football fans.

This chapter investigates this complex phenomenon in African media, specifically Nigerian media. It applies post-colonial theory by Edward Said, George Gerbner’s cultivation theory and Erving Goffman’s work in order to understand: (1) the framing of football reports by local Nigerian sports media, and (2) the long-term effects that sports media reports on football may have on Nigerian football fans. Nigeria is particularly interesting because it has been a significant focus for media reports on football. Nigeria’s local media are bustling with sports radio stations and significant sports programmes in other radio stations, newspapers dedicated to sports, and the presence of transnational media transmitting sports programming. Sport, particularly football, is, indeed, big business in Nigeria. Additionally, Nigeria was one of only six African nations to participate in the 2010 World Cup
in South Africa, and, thus, narratives on the event and related issues are abundant in local Nigerian media.

**Background**

FIFA, as well as other international organizations, has long presented football as capable of assisting social change. Prior to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, the Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Sport for Development and Peace, Wilfried Lemke, said about the 2010 World Cup:

> I am convinced that the World Cup will *change the image* (italics added for emphasis) of the continent for the better. It will send a positive signal to the world, a message of achievement and capability which will be conducive to investments and tourism . . .

(UNOSDP)

Clearly, Lemke’s statement alludes to an extant negative image of the continent that needs to change for the better. This image includes perpetual crises, crime, corruption, poverty, inadequate facilities, disorganization, insecurity and several other negative frames. Lemke’s summarization of a negative image of Africa is supported by research results obtained by scholars such as Fair (1993), Carruthers (2004) and Kalyango (2010). Furthermore, several scholars (Rogers, 2003; Awodiya, 2013) have identified mass media as critical to social change and studied their use for image change. Rogers (2003) argued that communication is essential in diffusing change through a community. Lemke’s statement alluded to an image change of the continent, but such change cannot occur without media participation in diffusing the new image across the world. Thus, our interest is to investigate the role of the media before, during and after the World Cup and whether an image change occurred as Lemke predicted. That is the central question that we address in this chapter.

Though there is far less literature on African football than on European football, in particular, it is important to note that the little that exists provides us with insight into media narratives on African football. Media narratives on the 2010 World Cup hosted by South Africa are particularly extensive. Perhaps it is important to reiterate that this chapter’s interest in the 2010 World Cup is not in sporting performances during the event but in media coverage of African football before, during and after the 2010 World Cup and its effect on the continent’s image.

The trajectory of Western media coverage of the 2010 World Cup pointed towards an unchanging image of Africa in the eyes of the West. The Western media perpetuated a focus on negativism and what Berger (2010) refers to as ‘noble savage’ imagery of Africa. This coverage came from a perspective of Afro-pessimism and neo-colonialism (Czegledy, 2009; Hammett, 2011).
It reached such a stage that FIFA General Secretary Jerome Valcke directly accused the media in England and Germany of leading a wave of negative publicity about the World Cup (‘African Media’, 2010).

While there are studies of media coverage of Africa’s World Cup by the Western media and its effect on image, what is often left unstudied is how African media framed the 2010 World Cup. Nigeria, with its media resources and particular interest in the 2010 event, provides an opportunity to investigate how Africa’s media framed the event. Did they frame the event in a positive or a negative image? Did such framing exist before, during and/or after the event? Nigeria is a particularly intriguing case for several reasons. It has relatively vast media resources, and its national team was a participant in the 2010 World Cup. More importantly, Nigeria is the most populated African country, and its media have been described as free and vibrant.

Shortly after the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, we conducted a textual analysis of sports news in Nigerian news media. The intent was to investigate the following as they pertain to the Nigerian media:

1. Identify and analyse coverage of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa before and during the World Cup.
2. Identify whether the frame used in the 2010 World Cup coverage was also used post-World Cup.
3. Discuss probable effects of media framing of football and, particularly, whether such framing is helpful to image change.

This chapter uses findings from that study to discuss how local African media, in this case Nigerian media, contribute towards the image of football in the continent. Most scholarship tends to focus on how Western media narratives help create the image of Africa as the Other, a subaltern continent where conflicts, poverty, crime and several vices occur frequently. This focus has often left unstudied the continent’s own media and how that media’s coverage affects the continent’s image. It is this gap that the study was intended to close.

Understanding framing, Nigerian media and football

Framing narratives on sport in Nigerian media significantly shifted from nationalist days (1940s to 1960s) to post-media industry liberalization (1990s and after). During the nationalist days, local Nigerian sports news framed the country as a strong Nigerian sporting nation with an inward focus on the performance of Nigerian teams and sportspersons. This coincided with the country’s indigenous population fighting for political independence from the colonial government. The frame supported this quest for independence and pride in the local people and their products. This lasted until media liberalization in the early 1990s, when foreign transnational
media were allowed entry into the Nigerian market and local Nigerian media began to face competition that directed increasing attention to a more global and post-colonial focus. In essence, rather than the earlier pride in nationalism, the focus shifted to globalism.

The shift from a nationalist frame to a post-colonial frame is best understood from the lens of a few incisive theories on the subject. These include scholarly works by Erving Goffman (1974), Edward Said (1978) and George Gerbner (1998). Each of these scholars provides descriptions that illuminate understanding of media coverage. While none of them focused on sports, it is easy to apply their descriptions to sports from a perspective of media framing bias, long-term coverage effects and ubiquity of media frames. Importantly, they also provide lenses through which we analyse reports on the 2010 World Cup in South Africa and afterwards.

For instance, Edward Said’s *Orientalism* argues that Western scholarship viewed the developing world in a distinct and continued pattern best described as the *Other*, uncivilized and having a subaltern existence. The term *Other* describes a different and non-Western civilization which is often seen, perceived and described as opposite to the West. This pattern of thinking in the West created the myth of the East as the *Other* and was used as a foundational frame from which the non-West and Africa were, and are, understood. While Said did not specifically discuss media or sports, the implication of his scholarship for the media is evident. The media, largely, are the conduit for framing, and thus understanding, the non-West. Goffman, who is regarded as the father of framing, noted that frames are conceptual pillars that guide our understanding of phenomena. He argues in his seminal work that frames enable us to organize situations that we encounter, to categorize and understand them within the context of a previous concept that we hold, and to act upon subjects or objects based on those frames. Frames are persistent, enduring and re-occurring. Though Goffman focuses on individual behaviour, media also use frames to develop story patterns over time.

While Goffman defined frames for us, Said focused on frames used for understanding of the non-West. However, Gerbner’s work focuses on the long-term impact of media frames on media consumers. Gerbner’s work is particularly important because our focus, in this chapter, is not just on how reports of the 2010 World Cup were framed in the Nigerian media, but also on probable effects on the Nigerian public that consumed those narratives. In the late 1960s, George Gerbner began to monitor effects of television viewing in a series of studies. In 1980, Gerbner, Gross, Morgan and Signorelli concluded the following from the studies:

*Television makes specific and measurable contributions in viewers’ conceptions of reality. These contributions relate both to the synthetic world television presents and to viewers’ real life circumstances. These are the*
basic findings of our long-range research project called Cultural Indicators, and they have been supported, extended, and refined in a series of studies (p. 10).

Though Gerbner and his colleagues focused on television’s influence on heavy viewers, results of those studies can be applied to other widely and frequently consumed media, including print and digital media, since it is media content and not media type that provides the source of such impact. Not only did Gerbner et al. (2002) find that television programmes affected political leanings of heavy viewers and their belief about the amount of violence in the real world, several other scholars, including Pingree and Hawkins (1981), Morgan and Shanahan (1995) and Kang and Morgan (1988), found that content of television in Australia, Argentina and Korea, respectively, influenced the views of heavy viewers of such content.

After the 2010 World Cup, we analysed Nigerian newspaper texts found in the microfiche archive at the United States Library of Congress as well as from the Lexis-Nexis database. We used frame analysis, which is a qualitative text analysis method, to investigate selected Nigerian newspapers. Frame analysis is derived from Erving Goffman’s seminal book *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (1974). Frames are persistent and recurring values that guide how media interpret events and report stories. To analyse frames, we used judgemental sampling in selecting 39 stories pertaining to the 2010 World Cup published in the following eight Nigerian newspapers: *Daily Trust, The Guardian, PM News, The Spectacular, Nigerian Vanguard, ThisDay, The Nation* and *The Punch*. In addition, we selected stories from a web aggregator of news – pointblanknews.com. A judgement was made as to the content of the sporting article and its relevance to coverage of the World Cup before and during the event, and then coverage of critical sporting news post-World Cup. Stories chosen for this analysis after the World Cup were not necessarily related to the World Cup of 2010 but to World Cup in general. The logic was to analyse each text to extricate frames used by the media to organize their stories. The selected articles were read in depth and analysed with intent to discover underlying framing patterns for the stories. Our report here uses content drawn from some of those newspapers to provide examples of frames.

**Framing the 2010 World Cup in South Africa**

As noted by several scholars (Fair, 1993; Carruthers, 2004; Chari, 2010; Kalyango, 2010), Western media have often framed Africa as uncivilized, crisis and crime-ridden, corrupt and negative. Those frames, while not specific to football or the 2010 World Cup, remain highly applicable. Said’s *Orientalism* provides a framework for why this Western media framing of the 2010 World Cup in Africa influenced comparative reports in the Nigerian
media. While Said focused on how the West visualized Africa as the Other, what was left unstated was the long-term effect of media in solidifying or sustaining such frames, not only among journalists in the West but also among their contemporaries in Africa, who were educated on the same principles and used the same news agencies for their source of news. As we noted earlier, in our discourse on Gerbner's work, these long-term effects ultimately create ‘reality’ in the minds of the audience that consume media content and frames. It is this framing of Africa, developed by the West, and its impact on African journalists that influenced Nigeria’s reporting of the 2010 event before it commenced on 12 June 2010.

In several cases, Nigerian media reuse stories, particularly international stories, from international news agencies usually based in the West. This ultimately affects framing of the news by local Nigerian media, which largely leave unchanged the news agency frame. In other cases, they modify the stories without changing the frame, or they add a frame that is unconsciously derived from long-term learning of Western principles. Some of the World Cup stories in the West raised alarm about the ability of South Africa to successfully host the mega-event. For instance, the London Daily Star warned of a ‘Machete War’ in South Africa during the World Cup. Franz Beckenbauer, who chaired the hosting of the 2006 World Cup in Germany, raised his own concern, claiming that ‘The organization for the World Cup in South Africa is beset by big problems… But these are not South African problems – these are African problems’ (BBCSport, 2006). In essence, Beckenbauer had stereotyped Africa as a continent with organizational problems. The Beckenbauer quote was used in the West as confirmation of the frames Western media had established for Africa. Though Beckenbauer later apologized for his stereotypical statements, it was clear what the framing of Africa was from the West. There were other examples of how Western media framed Africa. The Western media framing of the South Africa World Cup is amply captured in this passage, which appeared on the Sports Illustrated website (SI.com). The article was written by South African-born journalist, Mark Gleeson:

There has been an almost constant questioning of the country’s readiness and suitability to stage the finals, fueled in recent months by political instability, xenophobic riots, high levels of crime and labor disputes.

The doubts reported by Gleeson increased in the Western media in spite of several denials and assurances by FIFA President Sepp Blatter, the head of South Africa World Cup Danny Jordaan, and other top South African organizers. The Western media were entrenched in their doubts, but what became remarkable were the African media reports of similar doubts in the Nigerian media. These reports, bordering on scare tactics, implied that South
Africa was an inadequate host and incapable of protecting several persons who usually travel to World Cup events. Below, we analyse those reports in the Nigerian media through the lens of two periods – before the event and during the event.

Towards the World Cup

Prior to the 2010 World Cup, there were several reports in Nigerian newspapers that mirrored negative reports in Western media about South Africa’s ability to successfully host the 2010 event. These stories often focused on venue construction problems, safety issues, poverty and inability to sell tickets and attract fans to the stadium. It is important to note that the central issue here is how these stories were framed, and not just the fact that they were reported. They were often framed as systemic, expected and confirmation of a chaotic system. The narratives emerge from the frame of Africa as incapable, unorganized and the Other. In essence, Africa was not expected to effectively host a mega-event such as the World Cup, for which Europe has served as ‘effective hosts’ in the past. Though most of these stories were initiated by Western media, Nigerian media regurgitated the same stories (including the frames) or they developed new stories, such as the accreditation story below in the Nigerian ThisDay, using borrowed frames with very little critical analysis.

[Accreditation process] exposed the darker side of the buildup, which the organizers would not love to read and that is the issue of organization. Journalists, including ThisDay reporter, had a hectic time securing accreditation….

(Sulaiman & Abonyi, 2010)

In reality, journalist accreditation was successful as long as the journalist made it into the hall. However, this basic fact was hidden deep in the story, and instead the focus was on the large crowd that was outside the building and the fact that journalists had to make their way through this crowd to enter the accreditation hall. Furthermore, Sulaiman and Abonyi clearly understood that South African organizers were increasingly disturbed by negative reports of preparation for the World Cup with their reference to ‘which the organizers would not love to read’. However, they (Sulaiman and Abonyi) were more than happy to add to such reports by focusing on minor inconveniences. World Cups have always jostled with organizing issues, but the volume of negative reports on organization before the 2010 World Cup finals was extraordinary. It appeared that every little hiccup became another story confirming the ‘inadequacy of the African host’. Such negative reports were, of course, having an impact. The Nigerian team’s preparation for the World Cup became ultra-focused on safety. The team initially selected a hotel
in Durban, South Africa, for its stay at the World Cup, but requested a fence to be built around the hotel. This request was unusual for a Nigerian team, which had been at World Cups in 1994 in the USA, 1998 in France and 2002 in Korea/Japan. When the fence was not built, the Nigerian government ordered the team moved to a ‘safer’ hotel. Here are reports chronicling the process of the hotel change:

Also at the time, the hype about security issues (italics added for emphasis) was not so pronounced. The Hampshire Hotel management promised to do the fence by April 28 but they failed, and now gave us a new date of May 6, which we rejected.

The statement above was made by the Nigerian Football Federation (NFF) Secretary General, Dr Bolaji Ojo-Oba, who explained the sudden change in the team’s hotel. The use of the word ‘hype’ by Ojo-Oba points to extraordinary media focus on security at the World Cup. There were several stories about gun-toting and knife-wielding in South Africa, and one report in the English newspapers referred to teams taking armed security to the event. These reports affected Nigeria’s preparation and the team’s demand for a fence around its hotel. Dr Ojo-Oba’s statement was also a response to several news reports on the event, such as the report in PMNews on 5 May 2010 excerpted below:

However, the Acting President, Jonathan Goodluck-led government felt the hotel is not secure enough for the Super Eagles, hence the change to Protea Bay Waterfront Hotel. (emphasis added)

FIFA virtually stood alone in reassuring the public that South Africa (Africa for most people) was not going to disappoint. But the fact remained that FIFA’s statements were not entirely convincing, since FIFA had an interest in the success of the World Cup and was not seen as an objective party, compared with hordes of media that thought otherwise about a World Cup hosted in Africa. At one point, a clearly exasperated FIFA President, Joseph Blatter, quipped: ‘If you are good, people are envious about you and even jealous about you… We are asking the blessing of the Lord, We are asking the blessing of the whole football family that finally Africa can stage the World Cup.’ Blatter’s request for divine blessing and his categorization of negative reports as a demonstration of jealousy indicated that he was, indeed, at his wits’ end with biting criticisms. More telling is also Blatter’s reference to the ‘Lord’. It marks his level of exasperation with negative media reports and his prayers that the event would be successful and that Africa would not let FIFA’s ‘football family’ down.
During the World Cup

The tone of coverage of the event changed from negative to positive as soon as the World Cup finals began on 11 June 2010. The question was: Why did such a change occur? There are several plausible reasons for this remarkable change. First, the event had begun, and media focus switched to on-field games. Second, most of the earlier negative reports were conjectures of dystopia built up by a media-sustained frame of Africa, but during the event there were few actual significant crimes to report or other crises to narrate. Instead, visitors from outside Africa confronted a ‘surprisingly’ welcoming environment, not the one constructed by the media. The Pan African Newspaper Agency (PANA) reporting from Lagos reviewed the coverage by several Nigerian newspapers and wrote the following:

_The Spectacular_, wrote under headline ‘Frenzy, Joy as World Cup begins’ that ‘the excitement is already mounting.’ Global attention is focused on Africa. At least positively, this time around. (emphasis added)

Igbokwe, writing in Nigeria’s pointblanknews.com, was full of praise for South Africa, but it was clear that he had separated South Africa’s triumph from the usual frame of Africa and suggested that South Africa has ‘crossed over into civilization.’ He argued as follows:

South Africa became the first African country to successfully host the World number one sporting event and it was successfully done too… In fact it would not be an exaggeration to say that South Africa has successfully joined the first world… It was a bold statement that South Africa has grown up to join the league of World civilized nations… Nigeria would have spent five times that amount (cost of World Cup) and yet the project would not be realized… Nigeria has a lot to learn from South African experience. (emphasis added)

In a sense, Igbokwe’s report, also reflected in other reports in the Nigerian media, excluded South Africa from the frame of Africa as Other. This signalled a shift. Importantly, the shift was not that predicted by Lemke. Instead, it was one in which South Africa was suddenly ‘excluded’ from the rest of Africa where the World Cup visitors had not yet trod. The rest of Africa was still the Other, while South Africa had suddenly become separated and exempt. This separation is important, as most literature analysed the World Cup as Africa’s World Cup. That conceptualization of ‘Africa’s World Cup’ was true in the media prior to the World Cup in South Africa. However, with South Africa surpassing media expectations, South Africa was then excluded from the frame, but the rest of Africa was not. This separation
or disentangling of South Africa from the concept of ‘Africa’, which had dictated sports media coverage of the World Cup before the tournament, was amazing. It appeared that the world had waited for the expected ‘crime wave, disorganization, and crisis’, but, when the expectations did not match what was actually observed, rather than an acknowledgement that they were wrong about ‘Africa’, it became a case of being wrong about ‘South Africa’, with the rest of the negative framing retained for the rest of the continent. This differentiation was clear in reports provided in the Nigerian media. It is clear that, if the expectations of the media about the World Cup had been met, this would have confirmed the media frame of Africa, and South Africa would not have been excluded from the frame; instead, the chances of an African country hosting a future sporting mega-event would have been severely dented.

Aftermath of the World Cup and media framing

The exclusionary status accorded to South Africa in the Nigerian sporting media during the World Cup was, indeed, notable, particularly when South Africa did not appear to be accorded the same status prior to the World Cup. For the rest of Africa, the negative frame appeared to be the same before, during and post-World Cup.

We reviewed some Nigerian media coverage of such stories post-World Cup and found two divergent patterns: (1) continuation of the use of Western media frame to report stories on Africa and (2) rejection of the Western frame in reporting some of the stories on Africa. These two categorizations of reports in the Nigerian media pertaining to the World Cup are diametrically opposed. Thus, the challenge was to find out why some stories were reported with Western frames and others were not. Below, we use two stories to illustrate the divergent patterns, and explain why the Nigerian media may have chosen a Western frame for one and not for the other. The first story is a post-World Cup report on the vuvuzela (musical instrument) and the other on FIFA scandals surrounding corruption of FIFA’s top officials. Clearly, numerous other sporting stories were covered after the World Cup. We chose these two stories because our interest is not in which stories are covered by the Nigerian sporting media but in how such stories are framed.

Vuvuzela rejection

The vuvuzela is a plastic musical horn that comes in a variety of colours, and it is used by South African soccer fans during games. A chorus of vuvuzelas makes a loud buzzing sound. The vuvuzela is commonly used by South African football supporters in both local and international games, and is widely visible in local games, including those involving the traditional rivals
Kaizer Chiefs and Orlando Pirates. It was introduced to a global audience during the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup in South Africa. The horn immediately received negative media coverage in European media, with calls to ban the instrument for the subsequent 2010 World Cup in South Africa. Gysin (2010) reported that BBC was considering offering fans ‘vuvuzela-free’ television coverage of the World Cup. Western media framed the possibility of a ban in positive terms, citing high levels of noise, health issues and widespread complaints. In reality, most of the complaints came from the West. However, the instrument was not banned, to the discontent of the Western media. FIFA argued that use of vuvuzelas was ‘the way the South Africans express their joy and pleasure at the tournament’ (BBC Online, 2010). After the World Cup, the Western media continued to write negatively about the vuvuzela, contributing to its ban in venues in England and elsewhere (‘Premier League…’, 2010; ‘Vuvuzela banned…’, 2010). In its banning of the instrument, the European Football Union (UEFA) stated: ‘In the specific context of South Africa, the vuvuzela adds a touch of local flavour and folklore…. UEFA feels that the instrument’s widespread use would not be appropriate for Europe…’ (‘Vuvuzela banned…’, 2010). In essence, it was a cultural decision to ban the instrument in the West. The Nigerian media, notably, did not mirror the Western media perspective on the vuvuzela. While Nigerian media reported news from the West that sought to ban the instrument, we did not find any frame supporting a ban. Instead, reports in the Nigerian media were mostly positive about the vuvuzela. In fact, the Daily Trust (2011) reported an interview with South African football administrator Danny Jordaan which supported the vuvuzela. An excerpt from that interview is presented below:

Of course, there was a huge outcry from the European broadcasters and others who said, but this is a terrible thing. They said that this is a terrible thing and that we must ban it [for the World Cup]. The vuvuzela became quite popular, and was loved by many people. I was on the plane shortly after the World Cup with an American tourist who had six vuvuzelas in his bag… I once saw a vuvuzela at the White House while visiting.

What was the difference? Why did the Nigerian media not adopt a Western frame on this issue? The difference here is best explained by Bhabha’s (1994) discourse on hybridity, in which he argues that the post-colonial context creates a new hybrid culture that is neither fully local nor fully colonial. In essence, it is in a liminal space, a space of in-betweenness of cultures. Nigerian media, affected by colonialism but also maintaining some traditional cultural values, operate in such a liminal space or in-between sphere. Thus, while the Nigerian media are deeply affected by the Western frame of Africa, they maintain some aspects of resistance to some of the framing. The
question is: where do the spots of resistance appear? From our investigation, it appears that resistance is present if the issue involves clearly identified cultural tools or artefacts such as the vuvuzela. For non-artefacts such as operational and organizational issues, the Western frame is sustained. Second, awareness that a significant number of fans, including those from Europe, adopted vuvuzelas perhaps confirmed to the Nigerian media that the vuvuzela was a major African cultural artefact. Third, the Nigerian media may have also felt that the vuvuzela was truly a major African contribution to the World Cup and had to be protected. Finally, the local media may have also interpreted the negative attitude towards the vuvuzela by Western authorities as a symbol of colonial attitude towards African traditions and artefacts, especially in the knowledge that the mass of football fans had seemingly adopted the vuvuzela.

**FIFA scandal**

While the Nigerian media did not adopt negative framing in the case of a cultural artefact such as the vuvuzela, it was different in the case of FIFA corruption scandals that emerged just a few months after the end of the 2010 World Cup. Several top FIFA executives were involved in the scandal, including officials from Africa, Asia and the Americas. However, reading the Nigerian media, it appeared that the focus was squarely on African officials involved in the scandal, and attacks on the officials mirrored Western media reports, even though there had not been a conclusive investigation or indictment of the officials by the time of the media attacks. It appeared that the officials were already deemed guilty of corruption from the word go. More importantly, there was an underlying message that corruption was indeed an ‘African behaviour’. The *Nigerian Vanguard* provided two reports with this underlying frame. The first appeared in a 23 November 2010 report with the following excerpt:

> Scandals are a notable part of our national life…Africans should be bothered about the high number of their people caught in these scandals…. (emphasis added)

Corruption scandals occur in Africa, as well as elsewhere in the world, and they must be reported in the media. However, our interest here is the frame, chosen by the Nigerian media, in reporting these cases of corruption. Corruption in the West is reported as a social aberration, but in Africa it is reported as a social malaise that is endemic and intrinsic among Africans. As we have seen in Western media reports on Africa, scandals, crimes, conflict and the like are often associated with African countries. It is a frame that has been well used and continues to be used by Western media to describe or
report Africa. In this case, the same frame is used by local Nigerian media to report the FIFA story, which involved a Nigerian official – Amos Adamu – as part of the scandal. The report claimed that scandal is ‘part of our [Nigerian] national life’, and it linked the scandals to Africa as a whole. There is little mention of Asia or the Americas, whose executives were also involved in the said scandal. The narrative does not focus on Adamu’s corruption alone, but uses Adamu’s corruption as an example of ongoing African corruption behaviour. In essence, the story is about Africa’s vices and not about an individual’s vices.

Two weeks later, Adefioye of the *Nigerian Vanguard* cited the former president of the Athletic Federation of Nigeria (AFN), Mr Daniel Ngerem, who made the following statement:

I don’t care whether they were set up or not, why is it that only blacks (Africans) are predominantly involved in this mess? This is an opportunity for the government and sports ministries in the continent to also get involved and ensure that only people of high integrity are nominated to represent their countries [in FIFA]. (emphasis added)

Mr Ngerem’s statement, again, was referring to Africans who were involved in the scandal. One of them, Mr Issa Hayatou, as it turned out, was later absolved. However, this did not matter at the time; it was easy to simply conclude that as Africans they were all corrupt, and there was no need to address each person as an individual with a varying level of integrity.

**Conclusion and implications**

Mr Lemke’s statement pertaining to the World Cup’s ability to change the image of Africa was the catalyst for the main idea discussed in this chapter. In response to this, the chapter focused on Nigerian media framing pertaining to the 2010 World Cup before and during the event and reports after the World Cup. In this concluding section we link our findings, identified in previous sections, to their possible effects on the image local football fans and/or consumers of such media reports may have about Africa and its football. Here we rely on a growing literature on media effects, particularly in the area of fan image of local football, which we discuss below. Additionally, we discuss implications of the findings.

**Image of African football: Fan perception and attitude**

Heavy consumers of football media reports are often those who have deep interest in the game. This has been demonstrated through the uses and
gratifications theory (Blumler & Katz, 1974; Chen, 2001) and the electronic colonialism theory (McPhail, 2006), as well as through several previous studies on sports. While uses and gratifications theory proposes that individuals choose to consume particular media content in order to satisfy personal interests, electronic colonialism argues that transnational media influence the minds of heavy consumers of such media content. So, while the first points to who is more likely to consume the media content that we analysed, the second points us to the effects of such consumption on consumers. If consumed media reports are framed in such a way that Africa is viewed as the Other, full of vices, scandals, crises and the negative, as our study finds and as previous studies have also found, it means that consumers are more likely to have a negative view of African football. After all, football does not exist in a vacuum. It exists within a context and culture that determine how it must be viewed and perceived. The cultivation theory proposed by Gerbner et al. in a longitudinal study found that heavy consumers of television often share a view of the world that may not be real, but yet is amply presented by television, which they frequently watch.

As our findings indicate, pre-World Cup frames in the local media portrayed South Africa as unsafe and disorganized. The effects of this portrayal by Western, as well as local, media were significant. For instance, the Nigerian team’s decision to fortify security surrounding the team’s proposed hotel and its eventual change of tournament hotel is an example of such an effect. In essence, persistent reports about an insecure South Africa that preceded the World Cup may have ultimately affected Nigeria’s decision to request a fence around its team hotel in South Africa. It is important to note that Nigeria participated in three previous World Cup finals before the South African tournament. In none of the previous tournaments had Nigeria expressed concern with security to a point of requesting a fence around its accommodation facility.

As we noted already, the perception of South Africa became positive as soon as the World Cup began. Reports in the Nigerian media began to publicly separate and exclude South Africa from the rest of Africa, a distinction that did not exist in Nigerian sports pages prior to the World Cup. We do not have data showing how these changes in the framing of the World Cup may have affected the perception of Nigerians. However, one expects an effect among large consumers of those media reports, based on our knowledge of McPhail’s electronic colonialism theory and Gerbner’s cultivation analysis.

It is clear from reports in the Nigerian media on African football after the 2010 World Cup that the hope that the World Cup would change the image of the continent for the better remained unrealized. If anything, the image change was fleeting. A positive image existed in the period of the World Cup, perhaps restricted only to South Africa and not the entire continent. As indicated in an earlier section of this chapter, this positive image is reflected in media reports praising South Africa for successfully hosting the World Cup.
and providing a thrilling opening ceremony that was considered one of the best in a World Cup. Additionally, reports of crime and other vices were muted during the period. The framing of the rest of Africa before, during and after the World Cup as the Other remained, and it is important to note that such framing never stopped (except in the specific case of South Africa).

A recent survey of opinions and attitudes of over 200 Nigerian football fans by Onwumechili and Oloruntola (2014) provides us with insights into how media framing of Nigerian football impacts images that fans hold about Nigerian football. For instance, the survey linked heavy consumers of media reports to perceptions that Nigerian football was inferior to European football. Statements included beliefs that local football is of poorer quality, corrupt and in insecure venues. The results of the survey demonstrate the significant impact of media framing of football. It is an extremely powerful weapon that impacts the minds of those who frequently come in contact with such media messages. The fact that the media within, the local media, exhibit the same patterns of framing as their Western counterparts compounds the effect on local consumers of media content.

Wider implications

Besides impact on fans, framing in the Nigerian media has wide-ranging implications. For instance, it may impact Africa’s chances of hosting future mega-sporting events, it may scare away tourists, it ignores the development strides made by several African countries, and, ultimately, it focuses Africans on negatives instead of positives about their own country and continent.

The frenzied reports on the inadequacy of South Africa to host the 2010 World Cup that appeared in both the Western and Nigerian media could ultimately have forced FIFA to consider an alternative country to host the event. In fact, in the midst of the media barrage there were reports that FIFA had a Plan B involving three unnamed alternate countries (‘FIFA: Plan B...’). The reports were nothing to sniff at. After all, FIFA had stripped Nigeria of hosting rights to the World Youth Championship twice, in 1991 and in 1995, and reports about security and health were cited, at least in the 1995 decision. Thus, media framing of stories surrounding mega-sporting events is critical.

Additionally, persistent negative media reports could have scared away visitors to the World Cup. Indeed, it takes a brave soul to venture to an event which media had consistently warned would be insecure, and, in one case, the London Daily Star vividly described machete-wielding hoodlums roaming the streets. That Nigerian media joined in reporting similar impending doom meant that even Africans might have been persuaded to stay away. In fact, as we noted in this chapter, it was such reports that forced Nigerian authorities to demand the building of a security fence around the hotel where its national team was billed to stay. These reports had economic implications for South Africa, because host nations depend on the spending of
visitors to the World Cup, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, to help recoup expenditures for preparing for the World Cup (Nodell, 1993; Deady, 1994). In fact, one report indicated that visitors to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa declined compared with previous World Cup finals (Lapper, 2010).

There are other implications, including ignoring development strides made by several African countries. Reports based on an old and enduring Western frame of Africa assumes that the continent is unchanging. In essence, any gain in development made in the continent is ignored, as the entire continent is viewed collectively through this old lens that sees an undeveloped part of the world. Moreover, such reports also persuade Africans, in this case Nigerians, who consume the local media to focus on negatives about its unchanging nature, its inability to compete favourably with the West and its inability to host a mega-sporting event. Unfortunately, post-World Cup reports indicate that such focus on negatives is likely to continue, at least for most parts of Africa, including Nigeria.

References


‘FIFA: Plan B has three alternate 2010 World Cup hosts’. *USA Today*, 10 July, viewed 10 June 2013.


9

Tendai Chari

Introduction

The FIFA 2010 World Cup in South Africa was more than an occasion for the host country to make money, build new infrastructure or flaunt its economic prowess to the outside world. Dubbed as the ‘first ever football World Cup on African soil’, the event was also envisioned as an occasion to expunge negative stereotypes that have held back the continent for a long time while creating a positive image signalling the continent’s entry into the global community of nations. It is instructive to note that the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa was punctuated by discourses that cast aspersions on South Africa’s capability to organize such a complex mega-event. Some sections of the Western media predicted doom and gloom for South Africa, warning about crumbling stadiums and rampant crime, adding that FIFA needed to put in place ‘Plan B’ in case South Africa did not live up to her billing (Gibson, 2010). This Afro-pessimist sentiment was poignantly evident in the Daily Star, a British tabloid, which warned British fans about the possibility of them being caught up in a racial machete war in South Africa (Hughes, 2010). The newspaper further reported that machete-wielding gangs were roaming the streets in South Africa and prospects of a civil war in that country posed a threat to the World Cup.

The Telegraph (UK) (21 October 2009) weighed in, reporting that German players would wear bullet-proof vests during the tournament to protect themselves in the crime-ravaged country. The newspaper quoted an official
of the firm responsible for the security of the German Football Federation and their guests as saying:

The possibility for players of moving outside of the hotel boundaries should be kept to a minimum. Otherwise there must be full escort, armed security guards and bullet proof vests.

(The Telegraph, 21 October 2009)

Two months before the tournament, The Daily Star warned that South Africa would almost certainly ‘be hit by a major national disaster’, adding that ‘it could strike during this footie tournament’ (Sales, 2010). The newspaper quoted an earth scientist, Dr Chris Hartnady, who revealed that ‘a major earthquake in the region was inevitable because wide areas of Southern Africa are affected by slow, southward spread of the East African rift system’ (Sales, 2010). Negative stories like these, complemented by such events as the murder of white supremacist and leader of the Afrikaner Weerstands beweging (AWB) or Afrikaner Resistance Movement Terre’Blanche, and rumours about the possible outbreak of xenophobic violence, cast a dark cloud on South Africa’s suitability to host the most prestigious football extravaganza.

Against this backdrop, revising the country’s image became a key rhetorical trope in the press, as well as in public engagements by South Africa’s corporate and political elite. The then president of the country, Thabo Mbeki, argued that hosting the event would provide ‘a powerful, irresistible momentum to the African Renaissance from Cape to Cairo’ South African Football Association (SAFA, 2007). Mbeki added that:

We want, on behalf of our continent, to stage an event that will send ripples of confidence from an event that will create social and economic opportunities throughout Africa. We want to ensure that one day, historians will reflect upon the 2010 World Cup as a moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the tide on centuries of poverty and conflicts. We want to show that Africa’s time has come.

(SAFA, 2007)

Addressing a Financial Times Future and Legacy Dinner Gala hosted by the International Marketing Council on 22 July 2010, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan succinctly crystallized South Africa’s image make-over agenda in this way:

In essence, our hosting of the World Cup was, and has been, about the creation of new realities and the destruction of old myths and pessimism about South Africa and indeed, the rest of Africa. The euphoria we experienced in the past month isn’t going to last forever, but the momentum
that it created, I believe, will last for many years to come. There existed a big gap between the old myth of a backward continent where lions roamed freely, and the reality of a country that is capable as Germany in hosting a World Cup tournament.

(Gordhan, 2010: 2)

Placed within the larger context, the World Cup was an opportunity to change global perceptions about South Africa and Africa, and to position the country as an equal player in the global community of nations.

The chapter mainly focuses on discourses about the unmaking of (South) Africa’s negative image and, in particular, how such discourses were framed by the selected newspapers. Whether these discourses changed global perceptions of (South) Africa or not is beyond the scope of this chapter. Rather, it aims to interrogate the degree to which press narratives were geared to ‘talk back’ to Afro-pessimistic narratives in the global media. The chapter demonstrates how re-imagining and re-imaging (South) Africa through positive symbolic signification constitutes a counter-hegemonic narrative to discourses on Africa as a dark continent. The chapter argues that the image make-over enterprise, as manifested through the frames of the rainbow nation, organizational competency, and safety and security, reactivated negative stereotypes that undermined the endeavour to re-inscribe (South) Africa’s image in the global arena.

**Mediating the 2010 FIFA World Cup: A framing analysis**

That the press has the power to shape people’s perceptions and attitudes about events happening around the world is a matter of public record. The framing theory, or second-level agenda-setting, provides a useful lens for better understanding how press power is realized through construction of social reality. Entman (1993: 52) defines framing as ‘selecting some aspects of reality and make them more salient in communicating text, as a way to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral education and/or treatment recommendation for the item being described’.

Thus, framing involves selecting and emphasizing some aspects of reality while downplaying other aspects of reality. Parenti (1993: 200) contends that framing entails using emphasis, nuance, innuendo and peripheral embellishments in order to create a desired impression, and is achieved through such journalistic techniques as placement of stories, the tone of presentation, visual effects, labelling and vocabulary. Framing speaks to the way in which the audience of mediated discourses interprets and understands particular events or issues by invoking certain interpretations while suppressing others (Parenti, 2003). Goffman (cited by Cissel, 2012: 68) views framing as a ‘schemata of interpretation that enables individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences or life experiences’. Framing helps individuals to
construct meaning, and media discourse is part of the process through which meaning is constructed (Gamson and Modiglian cited in Cissel, 2012).

The framing theory assumes that journalists deliberately or unwittingly determine the frames to use in a news article. The framing theory is well suited to understanding the instrumental logic of mega-sports events because, as argued by Black (cited by Gonzales, 2011: 9), mega-sports events are an opportunity for the host nation to signal important changes of direction, which entails reframing dominant narratives about the host. The reframing entails giving salience to some aspects of a message while downplaying or completely ignoring others. Given the global scale of the World Cup, there are bound to be competing narratives through which the host nation is re-imagined and re-imaged. The framing theory provides a lens for gaining insights on the way in which this re-imagining and re-imaging plays itself out in the press.

**Methodological discussion**

Empirical data were drawn from a non-representative textual analysis of hard news, feature and opinion articles retrieved from the online archives of the Mail & Guardian, The Sunday Times (Times Live) and The Sowetan (Sowetan Live). Articles were identified by typing the phrase ‘2010 FIFA World Cup’ into the search functions of the newspapers’ websites. However, due to the syndication of news articles in the newspaper industry, some of the articles originated from wire agencies. A total of 225 articles, published between December 2009 and 31 July 2010, were retrieved and classified according to the relevant thematic frames as indicated below. The dates were strategic in that they encompass the period before and after the staging of the tournament, and, therefore, enabled the author to assess changes in discourses before and after the tournament. Only those articles which helped the researcher to obtain rich data on discourses about image make-over were used in the study.

Selecting only those articles that addressed the selected themes was less time-consuming than a random selection would have been. This is in line with Patton’s argument that the logic and power of purposive sampling lie in enabling the researcher to select information-rich cases in the midst of an avalanche of information (Patton, 1990: 61). Three thematic frames were identified through which the identity revision issue was conceptualized: the rainbow nation frame, the organizational competence frame, and the safety and security frame.

The choice of the three newspapers mentioned above was dictated by, among other considerations, their dominance in the news and information market in South Africa and, consequently, their potential to influence public opinion in the country during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. All three have a robust online presence, meaning that their influence on perceptions about
South Africa transcends the geographical boundaries of South Africa. Their print editions command significant readership nationally and regionally.

The Sunday Times is a broadsheet-size weekly owned by Times Media Limited (formerly AVUSA Media), a Johannesburg Stock Exchange-registered conglomerate with interests in the entertainment and retail sector. Its print edition is read by over 3.8 million people in South Africa (Media Club South Africa, 2013), and is also distributed in a number of countries in the southern African region. The paper is primarily targeted at the black middle class and white English-speaking community, and has the largest circulation in the country.

The Mail & Guardian is owned by Zimbabwean-born businessman Trevor Ncube’s company, Newtrust Company Botswana Ltd, which owns 87.5% of the shares, with the Guardian (London) holding a 10% stake and the rest owned by minority shareholders (Media Club South Africa, 2013). The Mail & Guardian has a circulation of 50,230 and a readership of 428,000. Like The Sunday Times, it is also distributed in neighbouring countries in the region. It has maintained its relationship with the Guardian (UK), which dates back to the apartheid period. This has enabled stories to be syndicated, thereby making inter-press agenda-setting between the local and global press a possibility.

The Sowetan, also owned by Times Media Ltd, is a tabloid-size daily newspaper distributed nationally and is targeted at the ‘English-literate’ black readership (Media Club South Africa, 2013). Its print edition has a circulation of about 125,490 and a readership of 1,522,000, making it the newspaper with the second largest circulation after the Daily Sun. With a combined circulation of approximately six million readers, the three newspapers were influential in shaping perceptions about South Africa during the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

Re-imagi(ni)ng the nation: The rainbow nation frame

A key rhetorical trope in disrupting Afro-pessimism during the 2010 FIFA World Cup was the projection of South Africa as a unified, cohesive, multiracial nation that had miraculously broken away from its apartheid history. In the run-up to the World Cup there were two key events that shook South Africa’s democratic edifice to the core: the xenophobic violence of May 2008 and the murder of white supremacist and leader of the AWB, Terre’Blanche, allegedly by his farm workers, in April 2010. Threats by the AWB’s supporters to avenge the death of their leader were viewed as proof that South Africa would be unsuitable to host the prestigious event due to safety concerns.

Against this backdrop, the tenor of press discourses revolved around reimagining the country as a rainbow nation galvanized around the successful hosting of the World Cup. For instance, The Sowetan of 12 July 2010 ran a
story headlined ‘World Cup has united SA: Khoza’. The story claimed that
the World Cup had united South Africa and the country would ‘never be
the same again’. Irvin Khoza, the chairperson of the Local Organizing Com-
mittee, was reported as having said that he had never witnessed an event in
South Africa that had ‘succeeded in bringing all the citizens of the country
under one umbrella like the 2010 World Cup had done’.

Ostensibly, social imagining about the event transcended the realm of
infrastructure development as the event became a tool to repudiate nega-
tive stereotypes about South Africa and Africa. An article in The Sowetan,
headlined ‘World Cup made us a true rainbow nation’ (The Sowetan, 7 July
2010), clearly illustrates the point. The writer claimed that he had witnessed
a ‘united nation singing together, eating together, drinking together, danc-
ing together and blowing the vuvuzelas together’. The World Cup did not
just create an opportunity for South Africa to remodel its image as a united,
happy and peaceful nation, but also brought about a spirit of exuberance
and optimism. The notion of unity and cohesiveness is further embold-
ened in news headlines such as ‘Zuma: World Cup is uniting South Africa’
(Mail & Guardian, 6 June 2010). In a story headlined ‘Football contributes to
nation-building: Jordaan’ (The Sunday Times, 10 July 2010), the chief exec-
utive of the Local Organizing Committee, Danny Jordaan, reportedly said
that the World Cup had closed the racial gaps between South Africans.
‘We have seen black and white side by side at fan parks and stadiums
[when] for many years these people were prohibited by law to sit together’,
Jordaan said.

Thus the World Cup became an occasion for engineering positive social
change. This is what Black and Nauright (cited by Lin et al., 2008: 30)
mean when they argue that sport has been deployed by states, elites and
counter-hegemonic movements in a ‘self-conscious and instrumental fash-
ion’. Projecting South Africa as a rainbow nation served to show that the
country was not a typical African country. That apartheid legacy has been
South Africa’s greatest obstacle in attempts to re-image and position the
country as a rainbow nation. Persistent racial, gender and class divisions are
testament that the country is struggling to overcome its past. Farquharson
and Marjoribanks (2003), who examined how South Africa’s national rugby
team, the Springboks, was imagined as a tool for nation-building during the
1995 Rugby World Cup, caution that the rainbow nation symbolism has not
been translated into practice. Although the team was supposed to symbolize
unity and reconciliation, it remained dominated by whites. This shows that
there is a discrepancy between the idealized functions of mega-sports events
and their real impact on society.

In the context of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, myths about unity were
extended to the continental sphere as well. From the onset of the bidd-
ing process in 2004, the event was constructed as an ‘African World Cup’.
It was emphasized that, while South Africa was the theatre, Africa was the
stage (SAFA, 2007). South Africa and Africa became one. The pan-African inflection of the World Cup is best illustrated through such newspaper headlines as ‘Shaping Africa’s destiny’ (The Sunday Times, 24 June 2010), ‘Africa fills with pride as World Cup looms’ (The Sunday Times, 6 June 2010) and ‘Ndebele: World Cup a chance for Africa to shine’ (The Sunday Times, 25 May 2010). In a story headlined ‘World Cup a chance for unity: Motshekga’, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) chief whip Mothelo Motshekga was quoted as having said that, given the history of conflict and instability on the continent, the 2010 FIFA World Cup should be used ‘to foster peace and usher in a new era of unity and stability in the continent’, adding that ‘We are confident that this prestigious world event will not only leave a lasting legacy for South Africans, but for the continent as a whole. It is for this reason that we have called this event the “African World Cup”.

This shows that the World Cup was envisioned to eliminate negative global perceptions about Africa. According to Legum (1971: 203), such perceptions are perpetuated by persistent negative journalism, or ‘crisis journalism’, that engenders defeatist attitudes, a syndrome known as ‘Afro-pessimism’ (see also the chapter by Toussaint Nothias in this volume). Afro-pessimism thrives on negativity and results in under-reporting of positive stories from Africa. Alagiah (cited in Ankomah, 2000: 17) argues that, due to saturation of negative news about the continent, Africa is perceived as ‘a far-away place where good people go hungry, bad people run government and chaos and anarchy are the norm’.

As a media event, the 2010 FIFA World Cup was an opportunity to invalidate negative stereotypes about the continent by mobilizing positive discourses such as unity, solidarity, hope and peace. When the South African national team, Bafana Bafana, was knocked out at the group stages of the competition, the team’s fans switched their allegiance to the ‘Black Stars’ of Ghana, the only African team to qualify for the quarter-finals. The Black Stars were nicknamed ‘BaGhana BaGhana’, an allusion to the South African national team, Bafana Bafana. An opinion piece in the Mail & Guardian of 10 July 2010 made reference to the headline of a Johannesburg-based newspaper which stated that ‘We are all Black Stars now’ as signalling the Pan-Africanist sentiment prevailing during the tournament. The article added that everybody who attended the Ghana–US game flew the Black Stars flag, attesting to the spirit of continental unity pervading the World Cup at the time. Thus, football can be a powerful symbolic force for underpinning lofty political, cultural and philosophical ideas such as Kwame Nkrumah’s United States of Africa vision, which some scholars, like Asante (2012), have advocated as a solution for ending Africa’s exploitation and domination by Europe.

Juxtaposed to the rhetoric about cohesion existed an oppositional narrative questioning the authenticity of unity in South Africa and Africa. Two key points that formed the locus of the oppositional narrative were the
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exclusivity of the FIFA World Cup and the transience of the event. For instance, there were news reports about some sections of the South African community being excluded from the World Cup, thereby challenging the view that the World Cup was unifying South Africa, let alone Africa. Examples of news headlines which attest to the disenfranchisement of certain social groups in South Africa include: ‘Soccer ball in a window a “violation”’ *(The Sunday Times, 22 June 2010)*, ‘South Africans bristle at FIFA marketing rules’ *(The Sunday Times, 29 June 2010)*, ‘Union calls for boycott of World Cup concert’ *(The Sunday Times, 7 April 2010)*, ‘Cape traders to be moved ahead of the World Cup’ *(Mail & Guardian, 26 April 2010)* and ‘Thousands protest against World Cup spending’ *(Mail & Guardian, 16 June 2010)*.

These headlines register the disquiet of various social groupings in South Africa that were alienated from the World Cup. An article published in the *Mail & Guardian* of 1 April 2010 graphically illustrates the social tensions in South Africa at the time of the World Cup. Headlined ‘Life in “Tin Can Town” for those evicted ahead of World Cup’, the article highlights the plight of people evicted from the streets of the wealthiest city in South Africa, Cape Town.

These people now lived in ‘temporary shelters’ made of corrugated sheets. The residents of the town describe it as a ‘concentration camp’ and a ‘dumping place’. A resident of the town complained that South Africa was not ‘showing the world what it’s doing to its people. It only shows the World Cup.’ These sentiments puncture myths and proclamations about South Africa being a rainbow nation or, as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, South Africa’s moral conscience, would say, the ‘beautiful butterfly’ *(Larlham, 2012: 29)*. A political commentator quoted in the *Mail & Guardian* (1 April 2010) argued that South Africa did not need the World Cup, as it was ‘a jamboree by politicians to focus attention away from the 16 years of democracy that have not delivered for the majority of black people in this country’. This statement echoes conflict theorists’ view that mass spectator sports such as football are an escapist opiate used by the elite to distract the attention of the poor from socio-economic policies that reproduce their powerlessness in society *(Cloakely, 2008: 32)*. This illustrates how discourses about re-imaging South Africa invoked stereotypes that undermine South Africa’s reputation as a harmonious society.

News reports about threats of xenophobic violence against African immigrants after the World Cup attests to the exclusivity of the World Cup. As the veneer of pan-Africanism displayed during the World Cup began to peel off, there was a slippage into exclusive discourses approximating ‘nativism’ *(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008)*. For instance, *The Sunday Times* of 31 May 2010 reported that ‘Elders’, a group of eminent global leaders, had warned about the eruption of xenophobic violence after the World Cup. The *Mail & Guardian* (6 July 2010) had ‘Xenophobia and the World Cup’, while *The Sowetan* (21 July 2010) had ‘Cosmos gives xenophobia the boot’. These news
headlines show that xenophobic violence was undesirable and exposed the superficial nature of pan-Africanism.

These alienating discourses invoked South Africa’s ‘exceptionalism’, the apartheid myth that South Africa was an outpost of civilization and modernity on the ‘dark continent’ (Zeleza, 2008). For instance, after the tournament, collective references to the African continent gave way to South Africa being seen as a unique country, implying that it was not exactly an African country. Examples include headlines such as ‘World Cup success shows that SA can tackle its challenges’ (The Sunday Times, 11 July 2010). The article argued that South Africa had every reason to be proud about what it had achieved over the past month. Thus, South Africa was eager to prove that it had confounded all nay-sayers, ‘Doubting Thomases’ and ‘prophets of doom’ who had prejudged the country’s ability to host the prestigious global event. The newspaper reported that

We confounded our critics in an emphatic fashion by delivering what will surely go down in history as one of the best soccer World Cup tournaments. Almost all of the more than a million fans who visited the country over the past four weeks have been raving about the experience.

As references to Africa disappeared from press discourses, South Africa became the focal point. It was stated that South Africa ‘specialises in miracles’ (The Sunday Times, 9 July 2010) implying that it was because of the country’s exceptional organizational ingenuity that the World Cup had become the success that it was. A writer in The Sowetan (6 July 10) condemned these ‘euphoric self-congratulations’, arguing that the successful hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup was not entirely ‘the doings of the host country’, adding that the ‘feel it, we did it shouts’ by the host country were uncalled for. This shows how the positive portrayals of South Africa during the World Cup elicited oppositional discourses that question attempts to essentialize South Africa and Africa.

Banishing Afro-pessimism: Organizational competence frame

One way through which press discourses sought to disrupt Afro-pessimism was the accentuation of South Africa’s organizational competency. Ginsberg (2010: 196) notes that FIFA and the South African government ‘continually and forcefully staked the future of the continent on the success of the tournament and made it a referendum on Africa’s ability to govern competently on par with global competitors and potential partners’. Thus, press discourses portrayed South Africa as able to deliver a faultless World Cup in a manner that would change global perceptions about the country. For instance, the Mail & Guardian (29 December 2009) carried a story headlined ‘Will World Cup Change Africa’s image?’ The writer claimed that South
Africa was close to finishing the construction of top-class stadiums that bore ‘comparison with the world’s best’, thereby shaming prophets of doom who were predicting that the country would not be able to do so. The article added that the World Cup gave Africa an opportunity to ‘finally reverse stereotypes of famine, pestilence and war that still blight the continent’. This shows that South Africa was eager to be viewed as a modern state with immense organizational capacity comparable to that of developed countries. Such a status was to be achieved through flaunting its state-of-the-art infrastructure, as well as exceptional logistical efficiency. Headlines such as ‘Soccer City Metrorail and National Pride: Antony Adelaars’ World Cup’ (The Sunday Times, 29 June 2010) and ‘SA has enough beds for 2010, says Van Schalkwyk’ (Mail Guardian, 8 December 2010) testify to the fact that South Africa was eager to demonstrate that it was not the jungle that is portrayed in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, but a modern state matching the standards of any developed country.

The emphasis on organizational competency and achievements in infrastructural developments is significant in the sense that lack of these is what separates the continent from other continents and also qualifies it as a continent in need of illumination. While narratives about the country’s abilities could be described as cautiously optimistic before the tournament, a euphoric mood set in during and after the tournament as the country indulged in a frenzy of self-congratulation. On the eve of the opening ceremony, The Sowetan (10 June 2010) ran a story headlined ‘Opening gig to dazzle world.’ The newspaper quoted the Local Organizing Committee Marketing Chief Derek Carstens, who promised that the opening ceremony would be ‘great’. The Sunday Times (10 June 2010) ran a story headlined ‘We’re standing on the threshold of history.’ The country’s newly built stadiums were described as the best that the World Cup had seen. FIFA Secretary General Jerome Valcke is quoted as having said that

If you compare, if you take the number of stadiums we have got in the past World Cups and the number of great stadiums we have here in South Africa for the World Cup, definitely, South Africa is above all countries. South Africa is a new benchmark in the organisation of the World Cup.

The above quotation suggests that South Africa was no longer striving to meet international standards, but had become a benchmark in organizational efficiency. Such hyperbolic statements demonstrate that South Africa was anxious to be embraced as an equal partner in the global community of nations. As the tournament drew to a close, the tone in the press became more narcissistic. News headlines which demonstrate this include:

- ‘Blatter rates Word Cup nine going to ten’ (The Sunday Times, 12 July 2010)
- ‘We did it, we showed the world’ (Mail & Guardian, 10 June 2010)
• ‘South Africa confounds afro-pessimists’ (*The Sunday Times*, 12 July 2010)
• ‘Cup great success-UN’ (*The Sowetan*, 15 July 2010)
• ‘2010 shows we can achieve anything’ (*The Sunday Times*, 13 June 2010)
• ‘World Cup success shows that SA can tackle its challenges’ (*The Sunday Times*, 11 July 2010).

These news headlines show that South Africa was eager to have the approval of the world about its ability to organize complex events such as the World Cup. It could be argued that such hyperbolic statements were a tacit admission that South Africa was not quite equal to previous hosts of the World Cup, but a ‘junior student’ clamouring for recognition. This notion that South Africa was a candidate for sympathy is clearly illustrated in the headline ‘SA graduates *cum laude* as host nation, says Blatter’ (*The Sunday Times*, 12 July 2010). The newspaper reported that FIFA President Sepp Blatter had awarded South Africa nine out of ten for its organizational acumen, which, according to Blatter, was a ‘*cum laude*’. This image is not only patronizing, but also evokes the stereotypes of underdevelopment with which Africa has always been associated.

This shows how much effort countries from the global South have to expend in order to gain recognition in the global community of nations. Gonzales (2011: 33) has observed how Mexico’s Local Organizing Committee of the 1969 Olympic Games invested so much effort in proving to the world their organizational acumen, in order to project an ‘image of a Modern Mexico that has banished forever the erroneous image held by many that we live in an apathetic, lazy and backward country’. This is symptomatic of nations that suffer from lack of confidence due to pervasive pessimism. Tomlinson *et al.* (2011) contends that the need to enhance national self-confidence underpinned the South African government’s motive to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

A writer in *The Sunday Times* (13 June 2010) argued that South Africa’s achievement was proof that ‘Africans are capable of doing anything, given a chance’, implying that the only obstacle which undermined Africa’s capacity to deliver was marginalization in the global arena. South Africa was conflated with Africa, thus, unwittingly, inviting stereotypes about Africa as a homogeneous bloc rather than a continent of diverse cultures. The tendency to confl ate South Africa with Africa is vividly shown in a *Mail & Guardian* story (09 July 2010) headlined ‘Lula: Africa enchanted the world with cup.’ Lula, then president of Brazil, is quoted as having said that Africa had enchanted the world with its ‘wonderful’ hosting of the World Cup, adding that Brazil, the next host in 2014, had a lot to learn from South Africa’s example. Lula is also reported to have said that, although the African continent was ignored because it was poor, ‘it was now slowly managing to break away from this prejudice’, meaning that the 2010 FIFA World Cup was a major catalyst for this image revision.
In a similar vein, a *Mail & Guardian* story headlined ‘Sceptics drowned out by rainbow nation miracle’ (11 July 2010) reported that the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa had put Africa on the global sporting map in a way which had been unthinkable. The newspaper reported that

No one died, no one was stabbed, no one was kidnapped and none took a wrong turn into the clutches of a gang of garrotters. One American tourist did get shot – in the arm – but he wasn’t here to watch the world cup. History will show that South Africa defied fears of violent chaos to host one of the best-attended World Cups to date. It has put Africa on the global sporting map in a way which seemed unthinkable, only six months ago when Togo footballers were ambushed by machine-gun fire before the Africa cup of Nations in Angola. Afro-pessimism spiked, with a prophet of doom in the unlikely shape of then Hull City Manager Phil Brown questioning whether South Africa was up to the job.

The above quotation does not only attest to the fact that South Africa’s organizational efficiency was conflated with that of Africa; it was also the magic wand needed to dispel stereotypes about Africa being violence-prone. As will be shown in the next section, it is not a coincidence that the provision of safety and security for visitors became a key theme in the image revision project during the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

Suffice it to say that the conflation of South Africa with Africa makes it difficult for South Africa to construct a distinct identity for itself, thereby engendering a superficial understanding of the country (Gonzales, 2011). South Africa has the most dynamic economy on the continent and diverse cultures, to the extent that this conflation masks its unique history and position both in the southern African region and on the continent. Further, the hyperbolic self-praise around the ‘success’ of the World Cup unwittingly exposes the deep-seated inferiority complex among host nations from the global South. This view is shared by Mabogoane, a critic who wrote in *The Sowetan* of 6 August 2010, berating South Africans’ ‘mindlessly gloat ing’ over what he described as a ‘customarily successful’ event. He argued that ‘such fantasies expose the deep seated inferiority complex’ among the hosts, who are too eager to gain recognition from the West. Mabogoane opines:

None of the previous host countries of the World Cup gloated about their successful hosting of the event. Americans, French, Germans, Koreans, and Japanese, who recently hosted FIFA did not boast about their abilities as the tournament in their midst was a side show among people who have demonstrated their achievements in other fields.

(Mabogoane, 2010)
This quotation suggests that, although the World Cup was supposed to be an opportunity to challenge negative stereotypes about Africa, discourses around it activated those very same stereotypes, either consciously or unconsciously. The euphoric celebrations and self-praise about the successful hosting of the tournament could be interpreted as a form of compensatory behaviour by people who are not accustomed to victories or successes.

**Africa is no jungle: The security and safety frame**

‘Rampant crime’ was probably one of the major concerns in the run-up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. As has been observed by Swart et al. (2010: 232), the safety and security of tourists was identified as one of the major challenges for ‘tourism in relation to the 2010 Soccer World Cup’. Previous attempts to bid for the hosting of mega-sports events, such as the 2004 Olympic Games bids, had failed because of perceptions of high levels of crime in the country (Swart et al., 2010). Inevitably, a key element that underpinned the organizational competency discourse was South Africa’s success in the provision of safety and security for visitors during the World Cup.

Against the background of a British tabloid warning about the possibility of a ‘World Cup machete threat’, there was considerable focus on crime prevention measures by the press, the general tone of which was that everything was under control. *The Sunday Times* of 13 June 2010 published a story in which Police Commissioner Bheki Cele warned foreigners who were committing crimes in order to create the impression that South Africa was crime-ridden. The story, which was headlined ‘Foreign crooks pasop’, portrayed the South African security agencies as being on top of the situation. For instance, *The Sunday Times* (14 July 2010) ran a story headlined ‘Cele: South Africans will be safe’, while *The Sowetan* (15 June 2010) ran a story headlined ‘Police on “standby and prepared” for World Cup crime.’ *The Mail & Guardian* (13 April 2010) ran a story headlined ‘Expert gives World Cup security thumbs-up.’ A security expert from Germany, quoted in the story, gave South Africa’s security precautions during the World Cup a clean bill of health, adding that fans who wanted to visit South Africa ‘should not be put off by sensational headlines about the purportedly high security threat to visitors’.

South African authorities were, therefore, eager to dispel stereotypes about South Africa being crime-ridden, and there was no better way of proving this than securing the endorsement of a European security expert. Swart et al. (2010) contend that the media play an important role in forming perceptions about places and, in relation to tourism, they can influence the image of the destination, because news reports tend to magnify the danger of crime destinations, resulting in tourists staying away and a limited economic impact to the host nation.
It is instructive to note that the focus on safety and security, as an image revision strategy, was underpinned more by FIFA’s and the government’s desire to maximize the economic benefits of the tournament than by a genuine need to improve the welfare of South Africans. In a sense, the re-imaging agenda was externally rather than internally driven. It is not surprising that some sections of the South African community raised concerns about the huge expenditure on security and safety during the World Cup when the government was failing to provide the same to ordinary South Africans, thus bringing into the spotlight the country’s socio-economic divisions. Swart et al. (2010: 240) note how preparations for the 2010 World Cup mainly focused on ‘creating secure zones at event locations’, implying that safety and security mattered most to the visitors rather than residents of South Africa.

Efforts to combat crime during the World Cup also foregrounded tourists. When some sections of the Western media raised alarm about the prospects of terrorist attacks during the World Cup, authorities were quoted in newspapers attempting to allay the apprehensions of foreign visitors. The Mail & Guardian (30 May 2010) ran a story headlined ‘SA quells terrorism fears ahead of World Cup’, while the Mail & Guardian of 31 May 2010 ran a story headlined ‘Mthethwa: There is no World Cup threat.’ The story quoted police minister Nathi Mthethwa dismissing a rumour that there were plots by terrorist groups to disrupt the World Cup. The minister is reported to have said that even if such a threat was to emerge, the country’s forces were more than prepared to deal with the eventuality. The newspaper quoted the US State Department dismissing threats of terror attacks, adding that ‘the US government had no information on any individual or group’ planning attacks to coincide with the World Cup. Having the US State Department validate South Africa’s preparedness was crucial in boosting South Africa’s confidence, because the US had previously issued a travel warning to its citizens when reports of impending terrorist attacks surfaced elsewhere in the world. This also shows the extent to which outsiders shape perceptions about the hosting of a mega-sport event. It also shows how negative stereotypes about South Africa being a crime-ravaged country became obstacles to remoulding the country’s image.

News articles that suggested that crime levels had either gone down or remained manageable were common. Examples include: ‘SA rampant crime largely spares tourists’ (Mail & Guardian, 8 May 2010) and ‘Crime drops with beef-up policing’ (The Sunday Times, 16 June 2010). There was also considerable focus on measures put in place by the security organs to combat crime. Examples of such news headlines include ‘Immigration bars bad apples’ (The Sowetan, 24 June 2010), ‘Hooligans deported’ (The Sowetan, 17 June 2010), ‘SA refuses entry to British hooligan’ (The Sunday Times, 12 June 2010) and ‘Police on standby and prepared for World Cup crime’ (The Sowetan, 15 June 2010). These headlines portray South African security agencies as proactive,
leaving nothing to chance in their quest to ensure the safety and security of visitors to the country.

South African authorities were eager to depict an image of a country that was safe and secure. This is not surprising, given the fact that the country’s high crime rate was the reason why some sceptics felt the tournament should have been held somewhere else. This was particularly the case following the death of Terre’Blanche in April 2010, after which the estimates of tourists visiting the country during the World Cup were revised downwards from 450,000 to 300,000 (Mathebula, 2010). Among other reasons for the reduction was the ‘fear of crime and possible terrorist attacks’ (Mathebula, 2010). When a bomb exploded and killed 74 people who were watching a World Cup game in a restaurant in Kampala, Uganda, in July, there were attempts to link the motive for the attacks with the World Cup in South Africa, thereby activating stereotypes of Africa as a violence-prone continent. Denouncing the bombing, FIFA President Sepp Blatter is reported to have said: ‘Can you link it to the World Cup? I don’t know . . . Whatever happened, linked or not linked, it is something that we all should condemn.’ A spokesperson of the ruling ANC party weighed in, stating that

It’s only individuals and groupings without a soul who can mount this kind of an attack on civilians at a time when the world is rejoicing over the successful hosting by South Africa of the 2010 FIFA soccer World Cup – to be held on the African continent.

(The Sunday Times, 12 July 2010)

The quotation above creates the impression that the Uganda bombing was a conspiracy to taint Africa’s image during the World Cup. The attempt to establish connections between a politically motivated violent incident in Kampala, a place which is 4,000 km away, invokes the Eurocentric stereotype that Africa is a country rather than a continent. The reasoning, therefore, is that, if Kampala is not safe, Pretoria cannot be safe either. Such generalizations result in a superficial knowledge of the continent, what Adorno (cited by Hebenstreit, 2010: 11) refers to as ‘half-education’. It is this half-education about the continent which promotes half-truths, prejudices and stereotypes about the continent.

While FIFA 2010 was an opportunity for debunking old stereotypes about Africa, it was also an occasion for the reactivation of the same stereotypes. Some stories in the South African press appeared to be rebuttals of negative stories in the Western media. For instance, the Mail & Guardian (19 January 2010) published a story headlined ‘2010 fans “do not need stab vests”’. The World Cup Local Organizing Committee in South Africa was reported to have criticized a British company that was marketing stab-proof vests to football fans intending to visit South Africa during the World Cup. The committee is reported to have accused the British company of using scare tactics
in order to ‘make money out of crime fears’. A LOC spokesperson is reported
to have dismissed such marketing tactics as ‘abominable’ and a ‘joke’, adding
that South Africa had put in place adequate measures to guarantee the secu-
rit y and safety of visitors to the country during the World Cup (Swart et al.,
2010: 226). Steyn et al. (cited in Swart et al., 2010:226) contend that one
of the key issues in the run-up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup was the ‘neg-
ative impact of high crime levels in South Africa, and the concerns that this
was likely to deter tourists from visiting the country’ (cited in Swarts et al.,
2010: 226). This shows how the World Cup reactivated South Africa’s label
as ‘the crime capital world’. Thus, discourses about re-imaging the coun-
try unwittingly invoked stereotypes about South Africa as a crime-ravaged
country.

It is also instructive to note how the authorities in South Africa were
eager to assure the nation that the crime policing standards and strategies
used during the World Cup would be maintained after the tournament,
impl ying that the country’s image would be permanently changed. For
instance, Police Commissioner Bheki Cele was quoted by The Sunday Times
(14 July 2010) as saying ‘we are not going back to crime levels before the
tournament’. Other news headlines which show that the World Cup had
permanently transformed South Africa’s safety and security image include:
‘Cops aim to maintain security efforts after World Cup’ (Mail & Guardian,
14 July 2010) and ‘South Africans will be safe’ (The Sunday Times, 14 July
2010). These headlines are consistent with a desire by South Africa to prove
that the World Cup would permanently change global perceptions about
South Africa.

**Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the representation of South Africa and Africa during
the 2010 FIFA World Cup in three South African newspapers, in order to
assess the extent to which such representation was informed by the desire
to re-imagine and re-image South Africa and Africa. The chapter argues that
press representation in South Africa was characterized by counter-hegemonic
narratives intended to eliminate negative stereotypes about (South) Africa by
portraying it as a competent and equal partner in the global community of
nations.

The chapter argues that, during the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the press
in South Africa foregrounded counter-hegemonic narratives characterized
by optimism and confidence about the host country and, by extension,
the African continent. Three main themes were critical in re-imaging and
re-imagining South Africa and Africa during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. These
were the projection of South Africa and Africa as cohesive entities, the
accentuation of the host’s organizational efficiency, and its portrayal as a
safe and secure destination during the global extravaganza. However, the
chapter concludes that the counter-hegemonic discourses foregrounding an optimistic outlook about South Africa and Africa unwittingly elicited negative stereotypes about South Africa and Africa, thereby undermining the re-imaging instrumentality of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Thus, the World Cup in South Africa became an occasion upon which ambivalent discourses about Africa were activated.

Gonzales (2011: 8) posits that ‘mega-football events are complex spaces where issues of representation are contested’. The currency of paradoxical discourses about the 2010 FIFA World Cup attests to the contentious nature of media representation of such symbolic events. It brings to the fore the potency of football events as sites for ideological tussles in the Gramscian sense (Lin et al., 2009) and how the media become catalysts in the articulation and amplification of such struggles. While the search for theories that help in appreciating the relationship between sport and society is an ongoing enterprise, one thing that emerges from this study is that sporting events are ideological tools that can be deployed for different purposes in society. This has far-reaching implications for sports journalism in the sense that, rather than being treated as a ‘toy department’ (Wanta, 2013), sports have an immense cultural significance in society, and the involvement of the capitalist oligarchy in the World Cup is proof of the cultural capital in sports.

Thus, sport and sporting events have great signifying power and can reveal a lot about the inner workings of society. Lin et al. (2009: 30) illustrate the dynamism of mega-sports events thus:

sport can take so many different meanings that it can be all things to all people (and societies and governments) at all times, depending on the needs of those people, societies and governments. This supposition would of course lead us to the view that sport is an exceedingly powerful and influential entity; an exceedingly flexible tool with no one overall dominant meaning.

This statement clearly demonstrates the dynamism of mega-sports in general and mega-football events in particular, and the way in which they are enmeshed in social struggles, politics and culture. Thus, mega-football events are sites for hegemonic and counter-hegemonic contestations, and societies can use them to construct, deconstruct or reconstruct myths about themselves by harnessing the symbolic power of mega-football events.

Note

1. ‘BaGhana BaGhana’, a ‘Zulunization’ of the word ‘Ghana’, which entailed affixing the isiZulu prefix ‘Ba’ to the word ‘Ghana’. IsiZulu is the main indigenous language spoken in South Africa.
References

The 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament was expected to bring economic development and financial opportunities to South Africa and the African continent. Infrastructural development, especially the building and improvement of stadiums, roads and hotels, was generally anticipated, but it was in the ability by African companies and entrepreneurs to win lucrative deals that the success of the soccer showcase would be measured locally. There were expectations on the African continent that the World Cup would help reduce dehumanizing discourses and stigma, dating back to colonial days, which emphasized the notion of Africa being a dark continent, a nest of diseases and poverty-stricken (Alegi, 2010; Pannenborg, 2010). This chapter traces media and scholarly reportage of business or economic success, or lack thereof, associated with the 2010 World Cup. The research largely draws from archival press reports of selected online newspapers from South Africa and the rest of the world that tried to represent the take-up of opportunities by African business people. We conveniently sampled press reports from the time South Africa won the bid to host the World Cup to 2013, when some stories continue to be produced on the success or failure of African entrepreneurship.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) was applied to ascertain the knowledge-power dynamics in the representation. This also allowed us to investigate whether Africa continues to generate negative stories of failure and ineptitude, even when opportunities and responsibilities are placed before it. Some quarters have reported the 2010 Soccer World Cup as the most successful ever in terms of crowd attendance. Did this translate to financial spin-offs for Africans and their companies? There are again stories about the appropriation and reproduction of key African products, services and symbols by foreign companies, especially the Chinese – the manufacture
and distribution of the vuvuzela (blowing horn) immediately comes to mind – and how African entrepreneurs lost out in the mass (re)production and distribution of this key cultural symbol of the tournament.

This chapter is partly rooted in the cultural studies epistemology, which assumes that all industries are culture industries with both economic and symbolic significance. Africa, as a historically marginalized continent, is therefore expected to have benefited the most from the World Cup, both economically and in terms of its overall image. This means that stories on the success, or lack of success, of Africans in exploiting the opportunities presented by the soccer showcase inevitably have implications for the continent’s identity. The historical negative and demeaning stereotypical images about Africa will be imploded, sustained or perpetuated in relationship to the stories on success or failure.

**Soccer-induced tourism**

Heritage, cultural and sport tourism is flourishing in South Africa, and museums and cultural villages with related performances have been initiated in the country. Hosting mega-sport events is believed to boost South African/African-focused tourism; this explains why South Africa routinely hosts events such as the Rugby World Cup, the Cricket World Cup, and the 1996 and 2013 African Nations Soccer showpieces, and plans to host the Olympic Games in future. Besides boosting national identity and morale, different sectors of industry and commerce often anticipate sport-induced revitalization. For instance, there were plans to expand the crafts industry in anticipation of the good business that would come with the hosting of the 2010 Soccer World Cup. ‘Cultural tourism’ is presently a significant market segment attracting attention from both tourism practitioners and academics (Rogerson & Visser, 2004). Academics are concerned about several issues pertaining to cultural tourism. These include policy issues relating to cultural tourism and the politics and economics of tourism, especially the power dynamics between tourism entrepreneurs and local communities involved in the tourism ventures. However, scholars are also preoccupied with identity issues integral to cultural tourism ventures, especially when elements of anthropological performances and displays of local indigenous peoples are involved. Since culture is a key tourism resource, ‘[t]ourism marketing and products are saturated with cultural signifiers’ (Rogerson & Visser, 2004: 139). Identities have always fascinated cultural studies scholars, especially identities of ‘marginalized’ people (Grossberg, 1996). Sport and the 2010 Soccer World Cup were expected to attract cashable interest, not only for conventional industry and commerce, but also for the cultural tourism industry as cultural commodities and experiences were consumed.

Tourism is perhaps the fastest-growing industry in southern Africa, given the relative peace that prevails in the region after apartheid. Some African
governments have complied with the perspective that Africa’s future lies in the tourism industry, in line with the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s assertion that it is the fastest-growing sector of the world, with excursions to ‘exotic’ destinations like Africa dubbed as ‘one of the industry’s brightest diamonds’ (Garland & Gordon, 1999: 267). There are fears that Africa might soon lose the market of exporting extractive raw materials, as post-industrial conditions are rapidly finding synthetic substitutes. African countries are finding ecotourism and cultural tourism viable alternatives (Rogerson & Visser, 2004).

South Africa has committed itself to making tourism its future economic mainstay. South African Tourism (SATOUR), a major marketer of the country’s tourism resources, prizes the country’s unique selling point: its diversity in people, nature and scenery. According to SATOUR, South Africa’s dynamic mix of socio-economic contexts permits tourists diverse experiences whenever they so wish; tourists can download their email while watching a lion in a ‘remote’ setting. The country’s tourism industry is wide and diverse. It includes cultural tourism, conference tourism, political and historical tourism, golf and sport tourism, ecotourism, fossil tourism, and so on. Some of these types of tourism are dependent on one another and practised at the same time. The SATOUR report on the impact of the 2010 FIFA World Cup on tourism indicates that many of the visitors took part in a variety of activities, including shopping, nightlife, natural attractions and visits to heritage sites. Transactions took place at all levels: acquiring accommodation, paying for food, transport, telecommunications, and arts and crafts, among other commodities and services. The SATOUR report notes that tourist expenditure was distributed as follows: 30% on shopping, 20% on accommodation, 19% on food and beer, 16% on leisure activities and 11% on transport. Figure 10.1 illustrates the variety of activities found to be popular in the SATOUR leavers’ survey of visitors who came for the World Cup.

The South African government and the private sector worked together to involve the entire population in soccer-induced tourism. Arts and crafts within the context of cultural tourism are part of the celebration of South Africans’ cultural renaissance, reflecting their unity in diversity. They encourage self-discovery and self-assertion of the marginalized rural and urban South African women and men who through sheer resistance have survived the denigration associated with being colonialized. Writing a ‘Foreword’ in Creative Crafts South Africa, Volume One (undated), Z. Pallo Jordan, the Minister of Arts and Culture, noted that crafts have huge potential ‘for making direct interventions into the second economy in South Africa’. By ‘second economy’ he refers to millions of South Africans engaged in semi-formal/informal economic activity of one sort or another. Crafts provide an opportunity to reduce the disparities between the very rich and the very poor in the country if they are efficiently produced and marketed. During the world soccer showcase, souvenirs of every type were in great demand.
Shopping and enjoying nightlife were the two most common activities which tourists engaged in, apart from watching the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

### Figure 10.1 Activities engaged in by FIFA World Cup visitors

*Source: SATOUR 2010*

#### Pessimism about attendance of soccer games

There were pessimistic media reports three weeks before kick-off about the downward revision of visitor estimates – and thus tourism income – from an initial 750,000 to 200,000. South Africa’s revamped airports and spruced-up cities were reported to be staging an impressive show of readiness for the arrival of international fans – although now it seems there may be half a million fewer than expected. Airlines, hotels and guesthouses are slashing their prices. On 15 April, hundreds of thousands of cut-price match tickets went on sale in South Africa, in a bid to fill 3.2m seats at 64 matches. At the taxpayers’ expense, municipalities and state-owned companies such as Telkom have bought thousands of tickets to give away to employees or offer as prizes.

*(Smith, 2010a)*

Despite the pessimism 310,000 tourists eventually turned up, spending an estimated R3.64 billion. Figures for tourist arrivals remained high for the period immediately after the tournament, showing an 8% increase on the
previous year’s figures for the same month. The distances that fans from outside Africa would have had to travel to reach South Africa and the travel costs involved might explain the lower attendance. The distance to South Africa and the idea of Africa may also have made the venue seem remote and terrifying to some of the traditional European attendees. In addition, the tournament took place during an economic downturn. Tourists from Africa made up 36% of all arrivals who came specifically for the World Cup. Despite the low tourist turnout, overall attendance at the stadiums was the third highest ever, after USA 1994 and Germany 2006 (CBC Sports, 2010). The majority of African arrivals, 32%, came by road from the neighbouring countries, with the remaining 6% coming by air. Most of these visitors were attending a World Cup event for the first time; therefore, this was a wonderful opportunity for African tourists to attend live World Cup matches, rather than watching matches on TV. It was also an opportunity for South Africa to strengthen positive perception about the country as a tourist destination. On the whole, the World Cup 2010 experience exceeded most visitors’ expectations, to the extent that 96% would consider coming back for another visit to South Africa, while 98% would recommend South Africa as a tourist destination to friends and family (SA TOURISM, 2011).

The good or bad tourist/business person

During encounters between Western peoples and Africans, certain attitudes are exhibited that either perpetuate Africa’s image as backward and primitive, or are viewed as a contemporaneous existential phenomenon deserving of respect and dignity, in spite of assumed differences from where visitors come from. In the past, encounters were largely predicated on strategic attempts and policies to denigrate the African in order to justify control of African labour and resources for the benefits of the visitors (Fabian, 1983, 2006). Much as Africans were historically denigrated and condescended to, racist attitudes and actions are now generally criticized, and political correctness in all aspects of life is a prerequisite for any claims to enlightenment and refinement. The interactions between ‘visitors’ and ‘hosts’ ought to be predicated on mutual respect of ‘differences’ to further understanding; hence, social, cultural and business encounters are viewed here as basically ‘dialectical’ and ‘humanizing’, facilitating entertainment, play, education and cultural exchange involving equal ‘partners’. We prefer to be optimistic about the contemporary ‘Western’ viewer’s motives for ‘gazing’ on the ‘non-Western’ Other, although we might remain suspicious of the intentions of ‘Other’ people, given that we are coming from a racial category that has been historically denigrated and marginalized. Worse still, we cannot exactly know the secret thoughts and feelings of the ‘Western’ Other in a world

Good tourists are defined and qualified using a combination of moral and political theory. According to Allen and Brennan (2004: 183), a responsible tourist, as part of being a virtuous human being, will know how to act properly in tourist settings. Though rare, it is not unimaginable to encounter uncouth and insensitive tourists who are unbearable and provocative, or those who make unreasonable demands, exploit ruthlessly or demean those they meet.

The tourism business puts demands on the host to be courteous and hospitable, and the tourist obviously wields relative power over the hosts. The hospitality industry is designed in such a way that the pleasures and security of the visitor are top priority; hence, it is assumed that the economic and political power of the visitor is stronger than that of the host. During the tourist encounter, therefore, tourists have a responsibility to be consciously civil, polite and reasonable, and desist from abusive or provocative behaviour that belittles or demeans the hosts. Good visiting business people with a sense of moral and social justice will not be rapacious and unscrupulous, and will have the conscience to evaluate the ramifications of their transactions. Securing a deal should not be plunder, and relations should be cultivated for further mutually beneficial interactions and transactions. Indeed, African culture and performances for visitors could reinforce the old stereotypes in a visitor if the context and purpose of African behaviour is misunderstood. The bad African host and business person may be corrupt and philistine. The bad host also may be a criminal, hi-jacking, robbing, raping or mugging the tourist. It seems that South Africa was mostly too busy revelling in hosting the World Cup to engage in many criminal activities. A few foreign nationals suffered thefts and robberies, but crime during the World Cup appeared to be on the low side. There were reports that the Colombian and Greek national teams suffered thefts of cash from their five-star hotel rooms. Such a traumatic encounter might engender negative feelings about the host country in the victim, such that the victim is likely to discourage friends and family from visiting the country. In such encounters, ‘being there’ in Africa with a ‘bad African’ can ultimately confirm the old biases; instead of empathy, there is further revulsion and prejudice from the visitor/viewer. The good tourist in our case of cultural tourism can easily be substituted by the good business person coming to do business with Africans, including African corporate entities.

We can question whether FIFA is a good business partner in the organization of the World Cup tournaments, especially given the apparently escalating protests against FIFA by those in the host nations who feel that the millions spent on preparations for the soccer extravaganza by host governments could have been better spent elsewhere. The protests in South Africa did not get as much media coverage as those in Brazil 2013 during
the Confederation Cup – a rehearsal for Brazil 2014. The typical protester in the South African scenario was from the very margins of society, mostly vendors and informal settlement dwellers. Such people cannot spend a lot of time in protracted protest action as they need to work on a daily basis just to survive. Time taken off for protest has economic costs that are immediately felt. The protests in Brazil, on the other hand, were more broadly based in terms of the demographics and numbers involved. University students and middle-class people were included among the protesters. The main issues in the Brazil protest appear similar, in that they question the spending of millions preparing for a soccer extravaganza in a developing nation where there are many who live in and die from extreme poverty, without even basic amenities. In fact, sports extravaganzas like the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup are becoming difficult for governments everywhere to sell to their populations, in the face of economic recession, under-development and demands for inclusion from minorities.

The politics of forgetting or denial

Critical works by anthropologist Fabian show that the colonial act of denying the colonized’s humanity inversely disclosed the colonizer’s own personality. Fabian finds the Other a psychological creation of the Western Same’s own consciousness, and thus an integral part of his identity (Fabian, 1983, 2006). Fabian notes that recognition and remembrance of the Other, just like forgetting, is a performative act. European travellers to Africa often recognize African scenery and people in reference to what they already know from their own home countries. However, Europeans’ denial of Africans and their terrain as ‘familiar’ phenomena is a state of mind with discursive implications. He writes: ‘Political, economic and scientific appropriation of Africa was based on denial of recognition and therefore on suppression of memory’ (Fabian, 2006: 140).

We locate our research in the present ontology where the contemporaneity of Africa and her subjects is indisputable, and performative, business and other encounters thus have to be contextualized and understood for their purposes and intentions. Africa is aware that it is in need of development and recognition of its best efforts, and staging a FIFA World Cup tournament and other global showcases is part of those endeavours, from which it genuinely wishes to extract benefits of political, economic and psychosocial value to validate itself as a confident competent player in the global dispensation.

Sport is now recognized as deeply commercialized, and run as a business enterprise just like any other. However, sport is equally implicated in the reproduction and perpetuation of racial and cultural differentiation, in which Western values and organizational life are viewed as superior to ‘Other’ world cultural systems. Hebenstreit (2010: 4) quotes cultural theorist Hugh O’Donnel to illustrate:
Sport…functions on an international level as a site in which advanced countries can and must act out their preferred myths through self and other stereotypes, and celebrate those qualities which, in their own eyes, make them more modern, more advanced, in short superior…This process routinely involves downgrading other national groups.

The hosting of the World Cup in South Africa did not diminish the Eurocentric ‘downgrading’ of the African people, as it were. In fact, South Africa and the tournament became a site of commercial and ideological contestation that exposed traditional prejudices. Questions were asked about the organizational capacity and competence of South Africa to host such an event, and observations were made on how it lost business to the Chinese.

**Sport in identity formation processes**

Soccer is supposed to foster loftier values in group and interpersonal relations, such as national unity and identity. However, in spite of its intended ideals, research often points towards the opposite. Soccer inadvertently (re)produces narrow identities such as ethnicities, racism and regionalism (Roche, 1998; Foer, 2004), and mega-investments in soccer stadiums highlight to the poor their marginalization (Bond & Cottle, 2011; Cottle, 2011; Chuma, 2013). Instead of producing a higher transcendental South African and pan-African nationalism, the period immediately before the 2010 World Cup saw a spurt of wildcat strikes as workers wanted to immediately improve their situation and earnings, and the poor resorted to xenophobic attacks linked to unemployment and lack of service delivery. Investments in the World Cup made a poignant contrast with lack of service delivery for the poor and marginalized. Cronje *et al.* (2010) observe that the South African state redirected significant resources to the development of infrastructure associated with the World Cup; these are the same resources that could possibly have gone to service delivery in poor areas. The scholars conclude that outbreaks of xenophobia (which the authors prefer to call ‘Afrophobia’, since the attacks were by poor black South Africans on black African immigrants) often occurred as part of service delivery protests. ‘Afrophobia’ and service delivery protests signified the deprivation resulting from the awarding of the World Cup to South Africa (Cronje *et al*., 2010: 297–332). Like state policy-makers and planners of the event, some scholarly articles were uncritical and readily focused on growth in GDP that would predictably emanate from successfully hosting the mega-event (see Antón *et al*., 2011: 6940–8). Indeed, many more articles show that there were moments of fervent national identity cohesion as people across race, class, gender and age distinctions coalesced around South African-ness or African-ness during the World Cup. But these moments of intense group, national and pan-African
identification were fleeting and often fraught with contradictions, suspicions and even hostilities. Racial manifestations and Afrophobia continue to haunt South Africa and the continent in spite of the occasional glorious moments of ‘unified’ identity. Media scholar Wallace Chuma’s (2013) recent article aptly notes the ‘bigger’ noble intentions of the World Cup, the euphoria and sense of togetherness that the hosting of the event created, and the concurrent discourses manifesting a ‘fractured’ nation that seemed to underline even the best moments of blissful cohesion. Chuma says that, when ‘the largest sporting and media event on earth’ was held for the first time on African soil, South Africa as host country had the opportunity to parade it as a successful ‘African event’, while simultaneously ‘celebrating contemporary African culture’ and ‘challenging commonly held prejudices about the continent’ (Chuma, 2013: 315). He elaborated further on the identity formation processes in South Africa associated with the mega-event:

Within South Africa itself, the event – as was the case with previous such mega-events like the 1995 Rugby World Cup – created imaginaries of cohesive, shared national identity. And yet, when one explores the contours of the (mediated) public debate leading to the hosting of the 2010 even, it becomes possible to see the cohesion as transient in a country in which a segregated racial past keeps lurking beneath the surface of a fractured post-apartheid transition.

(Chuma, 2013: 315)

That Africa was historically denigrated and exploited is now commonplace, but the implications should not be underestimated. Some prejudiced representations of Africa reproduce the dominant images of the continent as one of doom, plagued with wars, corruption, hunger, pestilence, disease and ignorance. Such representations conveniently overlook Africa’s humanity and contemporaneity – thereby ‘forgetting Africa’, as Johannes Fabian is wont to say. This forgetting and not remembering is intended to justify acts such as interventions, exploitation and condemnation of the people and their resources by those who do not see the humanity of the condemned peoples.

Sport is part of popular culture and is deeply implicated in processes of identity formation and identity ascriptions; hence power, politics and policy-making (Roche, 1998). In South Africa both the colonial and apartheid regimes created and provided separate and unequal sport amenities for different races. White sporting facilities were well equipped, and rugby became the embodiment of White Afrikaner cultural and social identity (Maralack, 2010). Soccer remains a predominantly ‘black’ and low-class sport, which paradoxically evoked tensions when facilities were constructed to upgrade it through a commercialized mega-event.

The South African nation continues to be in a continuous state of formation, fraught with the usual frictions associated with the precolonial,
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colonial and post-colonial dispensations that established various ethnic, race and class problems. Ethnic, racial, class and other ‘minor’ but not insignificant identities should ideally strategically subordinate themselves to the nation-state if the latter offers temporal, spatial and equitable opportunities and a relatively loftier humanism (Carton et al., 2008). South African policy-makers hence often enunciated the transcendental benefit to national cohesion that could emerge from successfully hosting the soccer mega-event.

Literature that directly refers to the business opportunities offered by the event and how these are mediated is available, but tends to be highly economistic and instrumentalist, and somehow undermines the significance placed on psychic identities in media and cultural studies. Bond and Cottle (2011), and Cottle (2011), again, elsewhere present the whole affair of the World Cup as a major rip-off for South Africa and the African continent in general. The radical scholars focus on the ‘economic promises and pitfalls of South Africa’s World Cup’, and argue that the money and resources could best have been channelled into housing, education and other pressing areas for a country with millions of poor people. The provision of basic services to the poor and improved incomes are valorized at the expense of gratification with the hosting of the tournament and the fostering of national, pan-African and, why not, global identity for African citizens. Yes, Africans deserve(d) to celebrate and cherish the fact that they are hospitable hosts capable of staging mega-events, competing with the best in the world. This is especially significant since doubts were thrown on the organizational skills and competence of Africans to stage such a mega-project (Hebenstreit, 2010).

Press reports about the African Other and the European Same

Much as it was written to capture the peroration of the 2010 soccer extravaganza, David Smith’s (2010b) article in The Guardian of the UK vividly summarized much of the fear, condescension, snobbery, and outright stereotyping and denigration in which South Africa and Africans in general were regarded by their Western counterparts with regard to the hosting of a successful tournament. The imagery used in the article deliberately evokes, inverts, subverts and implodes popular myths and stereotypes about chaotic bloodthirsty Africans in the ‘dark continent’. The article is a clever mélange of primordial and contemporary allusive images that evoke disparate senses. Historical tropes and recent events that were ‘popularly’ disseminated through the world media are counterpoised with the success of the World Cup.

The ‘stabbing’ could trigger memories of Zulu impis of precolonial times, much as they evoke images of black-on-black violence in apartheid and post-colonial South Africa. ‘Machetes’ at worst are reminiscent of the orgies in Rwanda in 1994. Burning tyres can evoke past images of the infamous ‘necklacing’ of ‘traitors’ during apartheid, or the smoke barricades during
riots for service delivery and running battles with the police amidst xenophbic attacks. The reference to Hull City manager Phil Brown has been read as a sign of ‘Afro-pessimism’, ever persistent regardless of whether or not its explanations are rational or historically contextualized. Read in another way, this is an articulation of age-old prejudices about the African Other and their supposed inherent barbarism. Cross-referencing will allow us to track similar Afro-pessimistic statements published in world media, not least those by the German media. Franz Beckenbauer, the German soccer coach, was cited as doubting Africa’s organizational capacity, not only that of South Africa. Stefan Hebenstreit (2010) has done a splendid job in tracing Eurocentric stereotyping of the 2010 World Cup and how Africans resisted denigration, especially on the emotive issue of the possible banning of the ‘noisy’ vuvuzela. We are tempted to quote David Smith (2010b) at length to prove the play on popular myths and their discursive implications, much as the article is celebratory of a successful soccer carnival that set its own new positive records:

No one died. No one was stabbed, no one was kidnapped and no one took a wrong turn into the clutches of a gang of garrotters. One American tourist did get shot – in the arm – but he wasn’t here to watch the World Cup. History will show that South Africa defied fears of violent chaos to host one of the best-attended World Cups ever. It has put Africa on the global sporting map in a way which seemed unthinkable only six months ago when Togo’s footballers were ambushed by machine-gun fire before the Africa Cup of Nations in Angola. Afro-pessimism spiked, with a prophet of doom in the unlikely shape of then Hull City manager Phil Brown questioning whether South Africa was up to the job. In fact, low expectations were the hosts’ greatest gift. When Armageddon did not happen and smiling crowds flocked to world-class stadiums, it was hailed as a glorious surprise, if not another rainbow nation miracle. The ultimate accolade was that, from the moment of kick-off on 11 June, people were debating French egos rather than burning tyres, goalline cameras rather than CCTV evidence and hands of god rather than hands wielding machetes.

(Smith, 2010b)

Yes, some visitors to South Africa might have suffered some nasty experiences that went unreported in the media, like the fate of the unfortunate American tourist, and some South Africans could have exhibited manifestations of bad hosts, but that was not the norm. A bomb planted by extremists instilled a sour taste into the bonanza when several revelling fans died in Kampala on the African East coast, but this did not dampen the enthusiasm, nor can it be generalized as the norm, just as the UK cannot be judged a very dangerous place simply because of a reported bomb scare prior to the
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London Olympics. Read using CDA, the dominant British and German attitudes fall neatly into the discourses of coloniality, whose purpose is to sap former colonial peoples of confidence and self-worth. In this case, coloniality further subjugates the condemned as useless, unproductive and prone to mistakes in the absence of eternal stewardship and direction. Tracing the structural epistemology of this insidious condition, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 129) writes:

Coloniality is rooted in a particular socio-historical setting that included the discursive formation of racialized subjectivities that were linked to specific cartographic social formations known as continents. As Maldonado-Torres (2007: 243) argues, coloniality has survived colonialism and is kept alive in old and current books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the image of peoples and in aspirations and perceptions of self. Human beings, as modern subjects, live and breathe coloniality all the time and every day. At the centre of coloniality was and is race which formed the foundation of the codification and institutionalization of differences between conquerors (white races) and the conquered (black races). The conquerors assumed a superiority complex and assigned inferiority to the conquered and colonized peoples.

In popular Western media the general denigration of Africa has persisted and assumed nearly commonsensical proportions, so that certain assumptions often go unchallenged. Ruminating on the African Other’s frailties, vulnerabilities and incapacities, then, becomes a discourse of power and a discourse of knowledge (Mudimbe, 1988: 188).

Marketing and the good business partner

FIFA has been characterized by critics as being over-grasping and exploitative. The over-exclusivity of FIFA, whereby only FIFA sponsors were permitted to display advertisements or carry out activities at official FIFA venues during the duration of the tournament, is one of the issues which raised criticism of FIFA. FIFA defends itself by citing the need to maintain the integrity of the FIFA World Cup brand so that it remains valuable. Some informal traders were able to have access to licensed vending facilities at some of the official venues like Fan Parks and Fan Walks during the tournament, but under stringent conditions. The vendors could not do any vending in or around stadiums, as local by-laws introduced in time for the tournament prohibited all promotional and marketing activity within a one-kilometre radius exclusion zone around the stadiums. Those who already had businesses within the exclusion zones could carry on their business as usual. That is to say, the businesses within the exclusion zone were not permitted to hold
any extraordinary launches of products or give away any products specifically targeting soccer fans. These by-laws are in place to prevent ambush marketing, whereby companies and entities that have not contributed anything to a sporting event in terms of sponsorship still try to take advantage of that event for their marketing.

Two prominent cases of ambush marketing can be cited from this tournament: the Bavaria Beer orange mini dress incident and an advertisement by the South African Airline Kulula. Bavaria Beer, whose rival Budweiser was an official sponsor, sought to sneakily promote their brand by having 36 women in orange dresses with a Bavaria logo on them attend the Holland versus Denmark game (Evans, 2010). The women were ejected from the game; two were detained by police under charges of ambush marketing and were later released on R10,000 bail. The two were arrested under the Contravention of Merchandise Marks Act, which prevents companies benefiting from an event without paying for advertising. A police spokesperson reportedly said that the police take cases of ambush marketing ‘very seriously’. Ambush marketing is an interesting crime in that it is ‘victimless’, in the sense that neither FIFA nor Budweiser can really quantify in any way the harm done to them by such a stunt. Issues of ambush marketing raise the same arguments raised by others over other types of intellectual property rights, where ideas and things that originate from commons are appropriated by an organization. Given that FIFA did not invent soccer, albeit soccer has become the most popular sport under FIFA's stewardship, the question is: what are the limits of what can be reasonably protected by Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) laws, and when does such protection become excessive? The Netherlands' foreign minister, Maxime Verhagen, was quoted by De Telegraaf newspaper as saying the arrest was disproportionate and senseless. ‘If South Africa or Fifa want to go after a company for an illegal advertising campaign, they should start a legal case against the company and not against ordinary citizens who are walking around in an orange dress’, Verhagen said (Evans, 2010).

Kulula, the domestic South African airline, was forced to retract its advertisement when it received a letter from FIFA's lawyers which stated that Kulula was infringing on FIFA's trademarks by having footballs, vuvuzelas and a stadium portrayed in the advertisement. The advert was replaced by a new one which changed the soccer balls into other sports gear and transformed the vuvuzelas into golf tees. The new tag read: 'Because there are more exciting things to travel for this year than just for that thing we wouldn't dare mention.'

The ban on promotional activities in the exclusion zone was severely criticized by AIDS activists, who had wanted to distribute condoms and AIDS awareness literature to fans. The fact that South Africa has one of the highest HIV infection rates in the world was of particular concern to the activists, and they bemoaned their inability to distribute the literature and condoms
as a lost opportunity to combine sport with health messages (Smith, 2010c). This concern for the well being of fans is all too real, as the British All Party Parliamentary Group on AIDS has warned that research shows that large-scale sporting events are often followed by an increase in the incidence of sexually transmitted infections (STIs). Results of a survey of 454 British 18 to 34-year-olds by the London-based Terrence Higgins Trust found that one in ten admitted drinking so much alcohol while watching sporting events that they could not remember what they did afterwards. Jason Warriner, clinical director at the trust, said: ‘When people go on holiday their behaviour pattern is very different to back home…People sometimes drink more than usual or use social drugs – opportunities may arise and they may not make the judgement call like they usually do’ (Dawson, 2010).

Much as the Bavaria and Kulula incidents might appear as ‘big’ corporate capital in competition with each other at exclusionary levels, their fate is similar to the exclusion suffered by the very weak and poor, who also had very few opportunities for direct participation. This led Cottle (2011: 1) to note that ‘trickle down’ benefits totally ‘evaporated’ by the time they were supposed to reach those sectors.

The story of the vuvuzela

The vuvuzela was perhaps the most controversial merchandise mass-produced and distributed for the tournament. The controversy was mainly over, first, whether it was not a nuisance and a distraction to Western players, fans at South African stadiums and spectator-audiences at home, and, second, where, how and by whom it was produced. On the former issue, framing of the vuvuzela story generally had insinuations of othering Africa, whereby the horning sound was seen as not only an irritant but an insane pollutant devoid of any rationality. Calls for the ban of the vuvuzela were made, ironically, by European countries after they experienced the sound during the 2009 Confederations Cup, a test run for the 2010 World Cup. FIFA President Sepp Blatter rejected the proposal by European football players and their governing bodies, charging the vuvuzela’s detractors with failing to understand African culture. He believed the instruments would be a welcome addition to the atmosphere in World Cup stadiums, not only in sonic fashion, but as a visual performative aesthetic. An alternative view could be that this was ‘Blatter’s’ World Cup, which he had brought to Africa to say ‘thank you for voting for me’, so at least he wanted Africans to feel respected and be allowed to exhibit and parade their ‘unique’ culture.

*The Guardian* reporters Owen Gibson and Owen Bowcott (2010) recount: ‘When not being blown at top volume, they are an arresting sight when waved in unison’. The plastic instruments came in different colours and these certainly had a visual impact, especially when they were included
in the Mexican wave. However, FIFA banned their use during national anthems, a pretty reasonable directive in line with observance of protocol.

The Online Urban dictionary defines the vuvuzela and gives example statements in which the noun can be used. Here are three supposedly humorous but unfortunately denigratory examples:

A mind-numbing torture device made of cheap, brightly colored plastic. It resembles a horn but its pitch cannot be changed. It is being used during the 2010 World Cup in South Africa.

*I thought I heard an angry swarm of bumblebees, but it was the sound of vuvuzelas playing at the World Cup.*

An annoying trumpet-like instrument played by fans, mainly in African countries, in football matches. They may be banned by FIFA for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa.

*Fan #1: Did you hear the fans go crazy when South Africa scored the goal yesterday?*

*Fan #2: No! I had to put my television on mute because of those damn vuvuzelas!*

And, worse still, a fourth definition from the online dictionary;

A horn that ruins football matches with a loud annoying noise that serves no purpose – that’s not used in the tempo of the game – just blown non-stop for 90 mins in a retarded way.

*I very much like football to show my love of the game i will blow my vuvuzela for the next 90 mins – i wont even watch the game i will just blow and blow & blow – phrase the lord!! [sic]*

The vuvuzela is not as offending as the monkey-chants common in many European stadiums, which have caused FIFA to set up an anti-racism committee after top black players have protested, with AC Milan’s Kevin-Prince Boateng even walking off the pitch. To suggest that an individual fan can blow the horn continuously for 90 minutes defies logic. Yes, the sound appears continuous, because different fans blow it at different times, and the overall effect is that there seems to be non-stop blowing. The individual fans have time to talk, cheer and do many other things that are associated with attending a soccer match. Suggestions of irrationality are uninformed, because the fans and their home team are used to the ‘irritating’ sound, but they want to use it to disorient visiting opposing teams, thus gaining the advantage. Fans are often regarded as the ‘twelfth’ player because of their ‘intimidating’ presence, which is intended to unsettle opponents.
Missing the psychological intention is to totally miss the point. *The Guardian* journalists conceded this, only after they realized FIFA was not going to ban the vuvuzela; hence, there was now a somewhat begrudging reason to share with readers the instrument’s better attributes – ‘Discordant on their own, en masse they make a terrifying noise that is at once inspiring and intimidating’ (Gibson & Bowcott, 2010). Concerns about the vuvuzela would have been more persuasive if its health hazards had been prioritized over mere ‘annoyance’, and when Gibson and Bowcott attempt to report on these serious important issues they regrettably spiced it up with the ridiculous, insisting the behaviour was simply irrational. They did mention, in the same vein, damage to hearing and swollen lips due to excessive use.

Lebokang Ramma (2011) made a compelling study about media coverage of the vuvuzela before and during the tournament. The study acknowledges the potential harm the instruments can cause to hearing – so-called Noise Induced Hearing Loss (NIHL). While there are regulations for noise levels in occupational environments, there are currently no such standards developed specifically for non-occupational noise exposure or in leisure spaces. She suggests that criterion levels currently used in occupational settings can also be utilized for social noise exposure. Media coverage was largely about the vuvuzela as an instrument, and not necessarily about NIHL. She notes that there was a series of newspaper articles in all major South African newspapers calling for a ban on the instrument. The anti-vuvuzela campaign should have used more scientifically informed mass-mediated evidence rather than relying on the emotive that insinuates othering, and is, in turn, equally irrational. Science-based reports, presented soberly without other innuendo, would not be instantly attacked as ‘eurocentric condescension’ (Hebenstreit, 2010). Sports journalists might have made an effort to report on scientific evidence and published the findings of top local university audiologists, who made several appearances on local television stations during the tournament warning members of the public about the potential of the vuvuzela to cause NIHL, or the South African Association of Audiologists (SAAA) campaign code-named ‘Operation Jumbo Ears’, in which it was reported that over 14,000 pairs of earplugs were distributed at no cost to spectators during the month-long tournament (Ramma, 2011). A reasonable number of spectators wearing hearing protection devices at the stadiums were flashed across TV screens during televised matches to confirm that the concerns were pertinent after all.

The other representation of vuvuzelas was in line with South African and African companies’ loss of production opportunities to Chinese light manufacturing industries. This applied not only to the vuvuzela but to most of the World Cup merchandise requiring light industry manufacture, such as Zakuni the mascot, condoms and replicas of ‘Jabulani’, the official World Cup ball for 2010.
What country really profits from the World Cup?

Scholarly articles have expressly shown that South African small business lost out on generation of revenue accruing from the World Cup to local and global corporations affiliated with FIFA. There were, indeed, short-term benefits to the hotel and catering industry, transport, accommodation, telecommunications and small merchandise ventures, but these largely lasted only during the event. The anticipation was that visitors who had warmed up to the country would return or urge others to visit later as a result of positive rebranding of the country.

On a general level, Chinese companies were reported as the biggest winners financially, although most of them were not among the biggest partners of FIFA. This defies logic, considering that the Cup is a commercial enterprise and affiliated companies would not want to lose big lucrative deals to China. The Sino-African relations are squarely put into focus in an article allegedly sourced from a Chinese publication, which became the biggest source of information on Chinese light industry’s overall benefits from the event. The article, translated on chinaSMACK, celebrates China’s success in winning big business in the production of merchandise for the Cup, including the soccer mascot Zakuni, the official balls, stadium seats and condoms, among other things. chinaSMACK is a website that ‘provides non-Chinese language readers a glimpse into modern China and Chinese society by translating into English popular and trending Chinese internet content and netizen discussions from China’s largest and most influential websites, discussion forums, and social networks’ (http://www.chinasmack.com/about). It is probably the most trafficked and quoted blogsite on Chinese news and internet culture. It proved to be the main source of news, even for sports journalists, about the way Chinese companies grabbed opportunities emanating from the 2010 World Cup. Citing chinaSmack, the Business Insider reported:

Host countries often come away with debt and dozens of useless facilities, like Greece in 2004. Expensive soccer programs that lose, like ours, may consider the money wasted. And only one team – Spain, German, Uruguay or Netherlands – can win it all. But someone has to make the soccer balls, stadium supplies, annoying plastic horns, merchandise and memorabilia. Not surprisingly, most of this junk was made in China [...].

(Lubin, 2010)

chinaSMACK acknowledges, with pictorial illustrations, that Chinese companies benefited from the 2010 World Cup Tournament (Fauna, 2010). If, to cite Business Insider, China cashed in on ‘this junk’, who then reaped benefits from the decent major contracts? To reduce the entire supply chain of a globalized, commercially viable multinational corporate enterprise like
the World Cup to the production of ‘junk’ merchandise is a serious ideological oversight that suspiciously attempts to distract and divert people from focusing on the major corporate winners in the matrix, such as Adidas, Sony, VISA, Coca Cola, Emirates, Hyundai and KIA Motors, notwithstanding the ‘surprise’ Chinese big advertiser, Ying Li (Fauna, 2010). FIFA is also a corporate body interested in making profits. Contractually, FIFA always owns the soccer extravaganza and has full bargaining rights with advertisers and service providers such as official travel and booking agents, suppliers of services at the stadiums, and so on. According to Glen Robbin (2012: 4) from the SA World Cup, FIFA generated more revenue from ‘the sale of commercial advertising and sponsorship, as well as media rights to the event (mainly in the form of television broadcast rights)’. These so-called ‘advance deals’ turned the 2010 event into the most profitable ever for FIFA, where ticket sales accounted for a small percentage of total revenue. The SA government reportedly contributed USD 3.73 billion, mainly in transport, stadiums and telecommunication, and expected to recoup expenses from direct and indirect visitors’ arrivals, increased consumption and brand profile. The South African Football Association would benefit from a share of ticket sales (Robbin, 2012: 6).

Bond and Cottle (2011) argue that South African ordinary workers were misled into thinking they would benefit from manufacturing opportunities associated with World Cup paraphernalia. The Chinese light manufacturing industry is presented in both journalistic and scholarly articles as the actual winner of the financial deals associated with the hosting of the Cup. This is attested to in articles such as Lubin’s (2010) ‘Here’s why the real World Cup winner is China’, and Bond and Cottle’s (2011) analysis. The latter cite the disgruntlement of the Congress of SA Trade Unions (COSATU) spokesperson, Patrick Craven, when he said: ‘local companies have lost out, Chinese companies have emerged as big winners’. South African companies were allegedly left idle while business was channelled to Chinese companies that were exploiting ‘teenage’ workers in ‘sweatshops’ which underpaid them.

China’s labour policies were criticized implicitly for their over-grasping and exploitative tendencies. Articles only fell short of explicitly campaigning for the consumer boycott of World Cup paraphernalia from China as a registration of moral outrage over human rights abuses and unfair labour practices. Sino-African relations are brought into perspective, and the dominant view that the Chinese are not civilized enough to conduct their business through standard business practices in the neo-liberal environment demands attention. While Bond and Cottle (2011) suggest, for instance, that light industries in the KwaZulu-Natal Newcastle area could have produced the Zakuni mascot, the snide reference to exploitation of Chinese labour implies that the same production could have been conducted in developed countries with a credible labour history.
The Chinese justified their competitive advantage, albeit without responding to allegations of exploitation of local Chinese labour. A compelling argument is provided by a blogger on the highly cited *chinaSMACK* forum:

China is very competitive in light industry products and in many fields. [...] It isn’t that other countries do not want to do this business, but that they cannot outcompete China! [...] (S)ports is just a kind of exercise [...] it is not that important [...] the economy is what is important ...

(Fauna, 2010)

Sven Grimm, director of the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University, discerns a ‘blame game’ and competitive jealousies behind the criticism of China’s trade with Africa. He is quoted by *China Daily*, ‘The major chunk of resources from Africa go to the US and Europe’ (Moody & Yanrong, 2013).

The Chinese are not by any means saints in their labour and human rights record, but to imply that the country is now over-grasping is to exaggerate. It is well to remember that the Chinese offered a hand in friendship to liberation movements in Africa at a time when they were considered ‘terrorist’ movements and communists by Western countries, who, instead, practised ‘constructive engagement’ with the racist and repressive regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. Noam Chomsky notes that contemporary global power is no longer controlled by merchants and manufacturers, but is in the hands of financial institutions and multinationals. The latter institutions have interests in China, and they are happy to exploit ‘very cheap labor in China working under hideous conditions and with no environmental constraints’ (Chomsky, 2013: 9). Chomsky further highlights the ‘myth’ of China’s economic growth in a situation where the country is currently a complex assembly plant for the region and large US companies. Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and the US corporations send advanced technology, parts and components to China, which uses its cheap labour force to assemble goods and exports them. ‘Within the doctrinal framework, these are called Chinese exports, but they are regional exports in many instances and in other instances it’s actually a case of the United States exporting to itself’, explains Chomsky (2013: 9–10).

**South African benefits of the soccer World Cup**

There was always eager anticipation of the benefits that could accrue from hosting the World Cup in South Africa, from the time of lobbying to host, to the preparatory stage when the bid was won, and beyond the mega-event. The general optimistic euphoria can be deduced from South Africa’s Finance
Minister Pravin Gordhan, when he predicted the social and economic benefit would continue flowing into the coffers ‘long after the final whistle has blown’. Hosting was a matter of pride and image, including the diffusion of ‘Afro-pessimism’, and the hosting was an opportunity to express hope embodied in something akin to the catchy affirmative Obamian mantra: ‘Yes we can!’; where ‘Afrophobia’ and ‘Afro-pessimism’ would be dispelled, and the trust and confidence of the rest of the world re-established, notwithstanding the perceived long-term economic gains (http://www.southafrica.info/2010/benefits-020710.htm). The latter gains were anticipated even though the whole venture could possibly have entailed enormous debts for the country, as radical critics correctly note. The concerns about huge debts that would eventually become difficult to service are worrisome, considering that the USA and global corporations are alleged to impoverish the economies of developing countries through loans given in the guise of erecting transport, telecommunications and other capital-intensive infrastructure that cripple development and perpetuate intractable dependence and shaky sovereignty (Perkins, 2005). While suspicions are inevitable, due to the unequal dynamics of colonial and post-colonial African history, it is important to ultimately concede that, while the show unfolded, many expressed pride and were excited and entertained in spite of the wide repercussions. Mere economic instrumentalism cannot fully explain the inherent paradoxes of the World Cup, which were underlined with levels of discontent, protest and further marginalization.

**Sour taste after 2010**

The World Cup did not achieve dramatic results, at least for the lower classes and the unemployed, who often complain about service delivery. This meant that the South African government and its soccer body South African Football Association (SAFA) experienced a difficult time trying to sell and market the 2013 African Cup of Nations, which the country hastily hosted after Libya, originally expected to host, became dangerously unstable due to the outcomes of the Arab Spring. Firing up the enthusiasm and participation of a disillusioned population only three years after the 2010 mega-event was indeed a mammoth task, and journalist David Conn (2013) of the UK *Guardian* rightly asked: ‘Will the Africa Cup of Nations reinforce good impressions or harden opposition to using scarce money on football?’ This pertinent question arises after the critical observations made by many scholars, such as Bond and Cottle (2011), and some ordinary people through their blogs. While officials and FIFA tout the 2010 event as ‘the most profitable in FIFA history’ (cited in Robbin, 2012: 9), the overall economic and service delivery benefits of investment in the event are often critiqued unflatteringly.
While critics might see FIFA and its business partners as rapacious, and not interested in the needs and welfare of the general people, there is need to bear in mind that the soccer body is not a state structure, much as it, too, is duty-bound to the contemporary ethical expectations of social responsibility and fair dealing. FIFA is a corporate entity interested in profit-making. Partly responsive to criticism, FIFA launched the 2010 FIFA World Cup™ Legacy Trust in South Africa as a form of welfare-like plough-back. In its 2011 Statement, FIFA noted: ‘FIFA kept its promise that South Africans would continue to benefit from the 2010 tournament long after the final whistle had been blown. The trust supports a variety of charitable initiatives, focusing on football development, education, health and humanitarian activities in South Africa’ (FIFA, 2011: 40). The report also notes that FIFA provided USD 100 million to the trust, of which USD 80 million was meant for direct investment in social community projects. SAFA had received USD 20 million before the tournament to cover World Cup preparations and the construction of the association headquarters. SAFA was also provided with 35 team buses and 52 vehicles to be used by South African regional teams.

Admittedly, more public money was invested in infrastructural development for the World Cup. Nonetheless, soccer is ‘traditionally’ a sport popular with black people, who constitute 80% of the South African population, and soccer facilities have been few, with most stadiums being ‘rough’ and uncomfortable. Most South African Indians and whites are, arguably, cricket fans, and the latter group’s support predominates in rugby. Cricket and rugby have had better stadiums and facilities since apartheid days. The soccer World Cup offered an opportunity to rectify infrastructural disparities, at least in sport. While the critical evaluation by authors such as Bond and Cottle (2011) cannot be ignored, in a way these critics fall into the historical trap of race and ethnic dichotomies of South Africa. That a sport associated with a mass black followership received massive government support, and the maintenance of stadiums’ infrastructure will entail further government subsidies, can only reflect historical disadvantages faced by the majority black soccer-loving communities.

Africa’s costly public relations projects

That South Africa, as a country and on behalf of the rest of the continent, and perhaps on behalf of people of colour on the continent, had to embark on such a risky and costly public relations project largely to create a sense of national cohesion and to dispel popular myths remains paradoxical and regrettable, but a definitive statement of the sad history of global human relations and multiculturalism. Certainly, money could have been used in other ways, but at times education, by all means necessary, may have its own long-time benefits, not least the boosting of Africans’ confidence and
the re-orientation of dominant prejudiced opinions of powerful sectors that nowadays may not even constitute the majority. Right from the outset, the recouping of huge financial returns was not the main objective of the policy-makers who decided to bid for the World Cup; ‘image rebranding’, for both South Africa and the continent, was arguably the most significant objective. The ultimate vision was, and remains, ideological, and an attempt to dismantle the old racist hegemonic project through a highly enthralling, affective and sensory mega-event. The Same and the Other are compelled to strategically rethink their relations of inequality, and rules of engagement are redefined, with the possibility of mutual respect and dignity asserted as parties know who is who and what we used to think of each other, what we can be together, and what to become together to enable co-existence in a guilt-free world order.

Conclusion: Vigilance and the epistemological project

Vigilance is a virtuous stance in every democratic and emancipatory project steeped in the quest for economic and social justice; hence, the critical admonitions from radical scholars remain very pertinent. Their objective is to maintain critical scrutiny, monitor developments and raise timely concern where it is required. Nonetheless, space is needed for appreciation of actions which might not immediately appear beneficial to the general lives of the historically marginalized. The construction of identities in a new democracy is a project that demands official state and corporate interventions, especially when we are cognizant of disparate groups that aspire to transcendent national identities in a situation where narrow ethnic, racial and class identities were vigorously promoted by previous dispensations for ulterior racist ends. If the World Cup is such an intervention, its efforts are never fully misplaced, and the benefits cannot be fully accounted for through a neat financial balance sheet. The balance sheet for hosting a World Cup does not appear pleasing to the host country, and, with mounting activist pressure, protests and intellectual criticism of the whole investment, governments and national soccer bodies are likely to steer clear of inviting the carnival to their home countries. The protests portend possible future reluctance by governments to risk the civil unrest, protest and disobedience provoked by hosting an event which a substantial section of the population may regard as extravagant and imprudent. FIFA is compelled to rethink and restrategize how it can best revamp its image and practice in the aftermath of the low-scale protests in South Africa, and the demonstrations and protests in Brazil in 2013, which drew media attention. If FIFA’s corporatism is causing certain sections of populations to conclude that they will eventually be left with an untenable, difficult-to-repay debt arising from misplaced investments, the marketability of the soccer extravaganza will surely be cause for concern. Optimistic forecasts about generation of employment and a raised
GDP that do not come to realistic fruition will make massive investments in sports infrastructure, telecommunications and other capital resources appear like fraudulent deals based on distorted truths. Ultimately, the question of benefits, or lack of them, accruing to the generality of the South African people is a critical moral and philosophical issue.

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Part IV

Global Media Narratives
The Football World Cup 2010 in the German Media: Presenting and Constructing a Major Sporting Event

Thomas Horky and Christoph G. Grimmer

Introduction

As the first competition of this sort to be held in Africa, the 2010 Football World Cup was, first and foremost, a media event worldwide. In Germany, but also worldwide, the matches of the tournament show record viewing figures and market shares in television as well as high levels for newspaper editions (epd medien, 2010; Gerhard et al., 2010). The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) had sold the rights to television, radio and the ‘new media’ coverage in almost every country on earth for some Euro 2.1 billion (epd medien, 2010). In new media like Twitter and Facebook, the World Cup attracts high attention; for this reason, the tournament in South Africa could be called the first major sports event on social media. This chapter proposes to present the German reporting of the Football World Cup in two sections, one focusing on more traditional media, exemplified by television, and the other on new social media.

The investigation presented in the first section can look back over the data from a longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis on the quality of reporting in prime time football broadcasts from 1994 to 2010 on German public TV stations ARD/ZDF television (1994–2000, see Stiehler & Marr, 2001; 2002 onwards, own results). A cross-sectional analysis of the 2010 World Cup also allows comparison with the 2006 presentation of the World Cup in Germany and indicates aspects particular to the media treatment. To facilitate comparison with the TV broadcasts, a qualitative content analysis of selected offerings in the area of social media was simultaneously undertaken (see second section of the chapter), thus establishing conclusions on intermedial constructions. How the World Cup was presented, above all on Facebook, demonstrates this clearly and also indicates problems and influences potentially impinging on journalists’ reporting and their topics as regards future events.

South Africa was representing the African continent as it presented one of the world’s biggest sporting events on the biggest of stages. What image
of the ‘black continent’ came across? What was the image the media presented in their reporting on Africa and the 2010 Football World Cup? These questions on the presentation and the construction of a sports event in the media are what this article is setting out to answer.

The 2010 World Cup in prime time

This first section focuses on the German television broadcasting of the 2010 Football World Cup. As a round figure, the 31.10 million viewers for the semi-final between Germany and Spain represent the highest TV ratings since they began being measured in Germany, amounting to a market share of 83.2% (Gerhard et al., 2010). In Germany, the German team’s last game on 10 July 2010 against Uruguay (result: 3:2) attracted particular attention. Some 26.62 million fans (market share: 77.3%) did, in fact, follow the team’s departure from South Africa on ARD. Four years earlier, 23.97 million Germans watched the equally significant third-place play-off against Portugal live on ZDF, with a comparable 76.1% market share (Schröder, 2010).

Live television broadcasts of football matches are high points of reporting. The last games with German involvement form a focus of media attention in Germany, generate boom times in television journalism and can be considered examples of media events (Dayan & Katz, 1992; Stiehler, 1997). The way the broadcasts of this ‘typical prime time football’ (Stiehler & Marr, 2001: 112) are structured reveals patterns of television sports reporting particularly clearly, and at the same time trends and developments in media sports are presented, which can be investigated comparatively (Stiehler & Marr, 2001: 112–15).

In this process, the differing significance of the German team’s pool matches, finals or, in fact, their play-off for third place does, however, on the one hand, make comparison difficult. Yet, on the other hand, it is precisely with these games that similar patterns of presentation can be recognized, by dint of them being almost identically framed, as in the warm-up for the team’s exit with the assessments and explanations accompanying it, as well as the celebrations.¹ The key characteristic of these structures is an extension of the prime time broadcasts through extending the reporting around the sporting event, a move ‘primarily based in economic goals’ (Schwier & Schauerte, 2008: 123, own translation). However, from the perspective of sports sociology, we also have to enquire into the consequences of this development for the quality of television sports reporting and its reception.

The status of the research: Examining the quality of live sports broadcasts on German television

Reviewing the research literature regarding football broadcasts on German television demonstrates how the patterns of reporting are standardized, with
a concomitant loss of input from journalists (Großhans, 1997; Burk, 2003; Rühle, 2003; Kühnert, 2004; Horky, 2007). This leads to questioning the quality of, and inherent in, TV sports broadcasting. Trying to define quality in journalism does prove difficult, but it is not impossible. According to Ruß-Mohl (1992: 85), definitions of quality in journalism do, in fact, resemble the attempt to ‘nail a pudding to the wall’, yet there are criteria capable of rendering quality in journalism comprehensible and quantifiable. In relation to media practice, we can consider quality, first of all, from three dimensions: normative, relational and functional. Weischenberg (2006: 18) has stipulated four levels of relations, the dimensions of which are essentially based on the aspect of diversity. Quality in journalism is linked to variety; hence, diversity is the most important variable enabling measurement of quality.

In relation to the present analysis of programming, the crucial parameter for quality in media utterances is, above all, the diversity in patterns of presentation and in topics reported – and, with that, diversity is a ‘multidimensional product oscillating between macro and micro aspects’ (Weischenberg, 2006: 18, own translation). Schierl (2006: 25–9) can define the concept of diversity in media sport in concrete terms and points to the problems in investigations applying norms, as well as in their basic sampling techniques. Defining high-quality sports reporting by assessing a variety of contents is, indeed, purely normative without differentiated analytical frameworks (e.g., for language and the structure of texts) and without bringing in data on recipients and on their attitudes as forms of uptake. However, diversity in television can be interpreted as ‘as wide a spectrum of topics outside of the sporting contest too, as well as differentiated forms of presentation in the sense of (selective) journalistic assessment and new constructions applied to reality’ (Horky, 2009: 7, own translation).

The reality of presenting sports in the media has already been analysed in several studies, and it offers a different picture: it shows reporting shaped predominantly by entertainment offerings, as its presentation is variously structured yet has a restricted number of topics. In addition, we can note a stronger tendency towards employing emotion and entertainment within sports broadcasts (Bosshart & Beck, 2006; Scherer, 2004) and displaying a focus on ‘fun’ topics, like atmosphere, fans, or comedy, as well as extending live discussions into ‘discursive exchanges’ about sport (Stiehler & Marr, 2001: 115, own translation). Expanding advertising slots and broadcasters’ own previews in the form of promos for game shows and programme content is also noticeable, and it correlates with the reinforced competition over the broadcast rights for live sports events, coupled with a general increase in the extent of broadcasts (see Burk & Digel, 2002).

However, research on sports in media lacks longitudinal studies, which would permit drawing conclusions on the developments described above
and evincing trends. We can summarize the current status of research in terms of the following hypotheses:

1. The programming slots for live football broadcasts have been greatly extended.
2. The programming content of these live football broadcasts is characterized by diversity in its forms of presentation or display, with a simultaneous lack of topics.
3. The programming content of live football broadcasts is marked by emotional elements like atmosphere and fans, as well as by discursive exchanges about sport.
4. The incidence of advertising and promos in live football broadcasts is increasing.

**An investigation into the quality of the TV coverage of the Football World Cup – some remarks on methodology**

In what follows, we intend to examine the theory-based concepts by using detailed, longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis of the structures of German TV’s prime time football broadcasts. For the purposes of this model analysis, quantitative data on TV broadcasts were derived, permitting qualitative conclusions about TV football as well and thus indicating possible future tendencies.

As a first step, the German team’s respective final games (finals) at the major World Cup or European Cup competitions became the object of investigation; the broadcasting of these games was differentiated roughly into its broadcast components (slots). All of the scheduled programmes, as identified by the respective broadcaster as an (official) World Cup or European Cup special broadcast on the day of the game, were included in determining the scope of investigations. Anything else with any football content from that day’s programming was not codified. We availed ourselves of the existing data from Stiehler and Marr (2001) as additional material, so that we could make a longitudinal analysis of nine games and over 16 years of prime time football on German TV (Table 11.1).

Subsequently, a second step saw the two play-offs for third place at the 2006 and 2010 World Cups used as case studies for a more complex, cross-sectional content analysis, in order to clarify (presentation) patterns and reporting topics. As regards their significance, these mini-finals are well suited to comparison, by dint of their identical placing in the competition, and hence almost identical presentation styles. The sample for close analysis, therefore, comprised the following matches:

- 2006 World Cup, play-off for third place, ZDF, 8 July 2006: Germany – Portugal 3:1 (viewing figures: 23.97 million/market share: 76.1%)
Coding the digital material was undertaken by means of a sequence analysis, which could determine for the respective coherent utterances (sequences) both the nature of the form of presentation and the topic. The unit for investigation was the length of these sequences in seconds. We differentiated a category system after several pre-tests and used it for the close analysis as a cross-section of the World Cup play-off for third place.

Table 11.1  Category system for cross-sectional analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Categories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programme slots</td>
<td>Pre-match reporting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Half-time</td>
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<td>Post-match reporting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Match (live broadcast)</td>
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<td>Presentation form</td>
<td>Commentary (with clips)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Commentator (live commentary in stadium excluding match)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Live commentary (match)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experts’ discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item (with inserts), switching to reporter/commentator</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview (as form of item with questions and answers)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statement (flash interviews, short comments, etc.)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Panel discussion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Extra programming (with official reference to live broadcast)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Promo (advertisement/programme presentation)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous (e.g., news)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Live sport</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pre-match reporting (sports-related: training, squad, etc.)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Post-match reporting (sports-related: round-up, analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Atmosphere, amusement, fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portrait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Celebrities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regulations, referees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History, statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comedy, satire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Talk (unstructured panel discussion, e.g., with invited guests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programme presentation (event promos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prize competition (specialized forms of advertising)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advertising (regular advertising slot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous (e.g., news)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Global Media Narratives

Longitudinal study of German prime time football
1994–2010

How the slots are distributed within the overall broadcasting schedule was designated as a fundamental characteristic of a live football broadcast. The longitudinal analysis can demonstrate developments over the last 16 years. For the sake of clarity, the development of the slots is displayed graphically (Table 11.2).

The most important aspect of the longitudinal investigation is the significant increase (Figure 11.1) in the overall broadcast time of prime time football on German television. Table 11.2 demonstrates an increase from 219 minutes in 1994 to 370 minutes of ARD WM live (World Cup live) for the third place play-off in 2010, a rise of 69%. The 1996 data do slightly diverge from this tendency, due to the lengthening of the finals at the European Championship by the Golden Goal, as well as by the importance of the two final matches in the last round of the 2002 World Cup. It is true that the significance of the matches examined, as pool games, as third-place play-offs or as finals, has, in part, considerably influenced the expansion in overall broadcast time by more than two-and-a-half hours over the last 16 years, with a persistent tendency towards increasing airtime in general. Our first hypothesis is thus confirmed and can, in addition, be presumed to indicate an increasing trend for the future.

In one case (1996), the length of the live match broadcast does nominally turn out greater on the basis of the lengthened broadcast time indicated above. However, overall broadcasting time increases too. By contrast, there is a clear trend in the share of the live match broadcast as a percentage of the overall broadcasting time viewed longitudinally: since the 2000 European Championship, the slot for live football has consistently shrunk by about a third, most recently down to a mere 26% at the 2010 World Cup. Yet, in comparison, the proportion of background reporting has notably increased (see Fig. 11.1). It is, therefore, above all, the intensified pre-and post-match commentary on events, in the sense of framing them, that explains why the overall broadcast time has expanded. Over time, programming slots for such commentary bracketing the live game have noticeably increased in comparison to the game-time and half-time slots themselves. In any case, the criterion of highlighting a match’s significance within a competition here seems to determine how pre-and post-match commentary is allotted, yet it is also clear that these two slots have, in general, increased somewhat from 20–30% to around 30–40%, so that they have meanwhile become equivalent, with a comparable share of the overall broadcast time. In recent years, the longitudinal distribution as a percentage thus displays a significant increase in pre-match reporting. As regards the formal structure of this framing commentary, Stiehler and Marr (2001: 113–14) have differentiated between the categories of live discussions (between experts, interviews),
Table 11.2  Distribution of the slots in cross-section, 1994–2010 (1994–2000, see Stiehler & Marr, 2001; 2002 onwards, own results)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>min.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>min.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>min.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>min.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live match</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-match report</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half-time</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-match report</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
inserts in the form of reports or switching live to reporters, and broadcasting short statements, as well as hosting and presentations. In this way, they can establish three fundamental forms of presentation, and have thus set out the overall results for the period 1994–2000 as a variety of different expositions. This crude classification of framing commentary thus subsumes news, advertising, programme information or similar under ‘miscellaneous’. When we wanted to demonstrate a current tendency in the structural development of the overall broadcasting blocks longitudinally, we followed this structural pattern to differentiate within the framing, leaving aside the live broadcasting (the live reporting) of the German final matches from the last three competitions, and in turn presenting a survey of it in a diagram showing percentages (Table 11.3).

By way of an initial comparison, this crude distribution of presentation forms within Figure 11.2, the framing commentary quite clearly indicates the differing significance of the three matches in overall terms: after the 231 minutes in the 2006 play-off for third place, there was a small increase to the 2008 final (242) and finally a noticeable increase to the 2010 play-off for third place – seen as a percentage, there are only significant changes within the components in the case of inserts. Overall, the three last competitions
Table 11.3 Share of presentation forms within longitudinal framing, 2006–2010 (own results)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006 World Cup GER-POR</th>
<th>2008 Euro Champs GER-SPA</th>
<th>2010 World Cup GER-URG</th>
<th>2006–2010 total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>min. %</td>
<td>min. %</td>
<td>min. %</td>
<td>min. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live discussion</td>
<td>74 32</td>
<td>68 28</td>
<td>76 28</td>
<td>218 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inserts</td>
<td>41 18</td>
<td>44 19</td>
<td>83 30</td>
<td>168 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation/hosting</td>
<td>50 21</td>
<td>64 26</td>
<td>50 18</td>
<td>164 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>66 29</td>
<td>66 27</td>
<td>67 24</td>
<td>199 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>231 100</td>
<td>242 100</td>
<td>276 100</td>
<td>749 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11.2 Share of presentation forms within longitudinal framing commentary, 2006–2010 (own results)

display almost 12.5 hours (749 mins) of commentary outside the matches themselves; for the period 1994–2000 (that is, four competitions), Stiehler and Marr (2001) had established only 7.5 hours (452 mins) of framing commentary. Therefore, the variety of presentation forms shown in our second hypothesis seems to be confirmed quantitatively.
A detailed comparison of the last three major competitions enables us to confirm this assumption for this period: the overall broadcast time for framing commentary has expanded, so that the share of inserts has increased from 41 mins (18%) to 81 mins, that is, to 30% (see to Figure 11.2). It is clear that contributions prepared by reporters by means of particular topics are being used more frequently in pre- and post-match commentary, and primarily journalistic contents come to figure increasingly. At the same time, live discussion as the second important presentation form in the course of broadcasts has certainly increased nominally, rising slightly from 74 to 76 mins, yet, as a percentage, the share has fallen to under 30%. Discursive exchanges do, in fact, continue as a dominant pattern of television sport reporting, but they clearly tend to be stagnating somewhat (our third hypothesis).

Instead, the proportion of presentations and programme moderation, as well as the other programming components, has decreased slightly as a percentage; the somewhat deviant result for the 2008 European Championship has clearly been caused by the long presentation times after the final, with commentary on the images of the awards ceremony in the stadium, thus demonstrating the match’s importance. With the 2006 and 2010 World Cups, the amounts are nominally identical – what is clearly recognizable is how this stylistic technique in TV football reporting obviously comes into its own when you are looking to inject an emotional charge into the images being commented on live (our third hypothesis). In addition, the proportion of other forms of commentary reveals a similar effect to live discussion: nominally, the amount has even increased marginally, from 66 to 67 mins, yet on the basis of the overall increase in broadcast time it turns out to be decreasing in percentage terms from 29% to 24%. As far as content goes, it is not the short pointers to programmes that interest us, but, rather, other effects from this area: on the one hand, the 2010 play-off for third place in South Africa kicked off half an hour earlier, meaning that German television’s prime time football broadcast began just after 15:00 – this was also clearly caused by the public broadcasters’ severely regulated advertising capacity at weekends and, with that, the economic reasons already mentioned. This will come in for more detailed analysis in what follows. On the other hand, the comedy or talk shows embedded in the sports broadcasts feature as a further, quite explicit form of presentation: the stations label them as official World Cup or European Championship programming, and they dominate around a quarter of the framing commentary. This confirms our third hypothesis. With the ARD in 2010, an added factor showed up in the large portion of self-examination attendant on Gerhard Delling and Günther Netzer, a prominent duo of football reporters in Germany, stepping down – these effects will also be coming in for close analysis.

Finally, in the structure of broadcasts we can point to an increasing quality reporting in the programmes through this analysis of the superficial tendency shown by the presentation forms.
Cross-section of the two mini-finals at the 2006 and 2010 World Cups

To assess the results of the longitudinal analysis more precisely, we went on analyse the two play-offs for third at the 2006 and 2010 World Cups more closely. It became clear in the preceding chapter that, despite being broadcast by different stations (ARD/ZDF), the two matches lend themselves to comparison on the basis of their identical significance as regards the fixture day (Saturday) and the almost identical kick-off times (21:00/20:30). The complex framework of categories is meant, above all, for investigating the diversity of presentation forms (Table 11.4).

The form dominating live football reporting in both programmes is that of a reporter in the stadium commenting on pictures of the matches. The experts’ discussion has established itself as a further presentation form with a large share of the action, in addition to the reporting slots and crossing to reporters without pictures of the matches. Such switches are filled primarily with emotional pictures of the players, the coaches and the fans after the final whistle. When we add in the proportion of short items from moderators or crossings in the broadcasts, it turns out that in 2006 an overall share of 194 mins (2006), that is, 59% of the slot, contained dialogues or monologues on the football with no pictures of the play. In 2010, too, discursive exchanges on the football amounted to 198 mins (53%), over half of the overall broadcast time we assessed.

In 2006, by contrast, the proportion of presentation forms, such as contributions/reports or interviews and statements, that display a primarily

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World Cup 2006 GER – POR</th>
<th>World Cup 2010 GER – URG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>min.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderating</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live reporting</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts’ discussion</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra programming</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
journalistic character by dint of their, at the very least, selective character is much more modest, at 67 mins (20%). In 2010, the proportion rose to 108 mins (29%), mainly due to a very long pre-match report summarizing the World Cup as located in South Africa, with reflections on the African people, on the status of football in South Africa and pictures of children playing football in townships. This was the only report in the analysed material covering aspects beside sports/the match. This is also responsible for the high percentage of (journalistic) inserts, as demonstrated in the preceding chapter, and will be more thoroughly investigated in what follows.

A particularly noticeable presentation form in both broadcasts continues to be the official extra programming in the form of the items ‘Nachgetreten’ (2006) and ‘WM-Club’ in 2010, moderated by Waldemar Hartmann as casual, entertainment-oriented panel discussions following the live broadcast of the match; together with the experts’ discussions, they further confirm our third hypothesis. Close analysis cannot, in fact, confirm our fourth hypothesis, given just on 15 mins (5%) of trailers in 2006 and only 14 mins (4%) in 2010 out of the entire broadcast time, yet more advertising slots can be codified under miscellaneous, alongside the news at half-time in the live broadcast as well as partially in pauses during the pre- and post-match commentary in 2010 (Table 11.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World Cup 2006 GER – POR</th>
<th></th>
<th>World Cup 2010 GER – URG</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>min.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>min.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live sport</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-match reporting</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comedy</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-match reporting</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atmosphere</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portrait</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme presentation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey of rules of the game</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrities</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game show</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venues</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The distribution of topics turns out to be inconsistent when comparing the two matches in the cross-section afforded by the close analysis. However, the estimates for our second hypothesis do basically hold up, with rather more of a reduced diversity. The pre- and post-match reporting offers expositions or analysis of scenes and of players’ performances, and topics off to one side of the sporting events only register rarely, some never arose over a programme’s entire duration. In 2010, the proportion of post-match reporting was even higher, due to the report described above. We could not confirm the greater proportion of advertising or programme promos, which we anticipated in our fourth hypothesis and which only took some 2–3% of airtime, while there were no prize competitions to go with the 2010 World Cup. In 2010, the only areas to gain larger shares were comedy talkshows in the form of the extra programmes described above, the most ‘fun’ pictures available and the crossing-over to show how the fans were taking it (atmosphere), as well as the topics of media and portraits. At first sight, these proportions are surprising, but they were caused by highlighting the departure of the duo of Delling and Netzer as moderators on ARD and allotting them a large slice of the airtime in the post-match reporting.

Contributions were very significant in the ARD’s pre-match reporting on the 2010 World Cup, so we went back to this presentation form to examine it more closely and to differentiate it according to topics. Table 11.6 clearly shows that, alongside the emotionally coloured post-match reporting on the entire competition, the topic of atmosphere dominated within contributions. Even with those prepared in advance by reporters, we could

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Cup 2010</th>
<th>GER – URG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>min.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-match commentary</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atmosphere</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portrait</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-match commentary</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanation of rules</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venues</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11.6 2010 World Cup, third-place play-offs, presentation form, contribution, distribution of topics (own results)
demonstrate how ‘fun’ and the fans’ mood gained the second highest proportion as topics, attaining no less than 18%, alongside the actual sport itself. However, these reports on atmospheric aspects show mainly sports-related topics, like coloured fans inside the stadium, and very small sections on African culture or topics related to the national identity-building with the World Cup.

In fact, it continues to be possible to discuss a diversity of presentation forms quantitatively in a superficial sense, but, at the same time, this detailed analysis of contributions as a presentation form shows, in qualitative terms, the journalistic acuity in presenting football on television to be actually mediocre.

Longitudinally, the complex close analysis of live football broadcasts shows that our fourth hypothesis on the boosting of advertising and trailers does not stand. In the first place, the superficial diversity in presentation forms rests on a multiplicity of discussions and monologues about football and simultaneously points to a lack of journalistic quality, given the rather restricted variety of topics going into them (our second hypothesis). Analysis of the contributions from the 2010 World Cup further reinforces this point. This result contrasts markedly to other research findings, for example, on live broadcasts during the 2002 World Cup (Schonhardt & Beeskow, 2003), but close analysis of the broadcast of the 2008 European Championship final has confirmed it (Horky, 2009).

**A study of the social media offerings on the 2010 World Cup**

The 2010 World Cup has shown that media consumers increasingly share events via ‘social media’, commenting on them and discussing them. This is the first time people have registered events to this medium in connection with a major sporting event on a large scale. As regards the media treatment of the Football World Cup, we focused on Facebook, above all, as the biggest platform for social networks, and on the microblogging service, Twitter, on which users can send messages up to 140 characters long. What makes Facebook special are its extremely varied ways of publishing: on the one hand, users can post all sorts of their own information (e.g., texts, pictures, videos or links) on one page. However, the decisive function is distributing this information to ‘friends’, with whom you can share as much of the posted content as you want.8

**Twitter use by organizations, associations and functionaries**

The Football World Cup in South Africa generated a large number of records on Twitter. In this vein, the US news broadcaster, CNN, counted 300,000 tweets concerning the World Cup, at a rate of around 150,000/hour, during the opening match between the host country, South Africa, and Mexico.
Goals in the pool matches elevated the incidence of tweets to 3,000/second (record: Denmark–Japan, at 3,283 tps) – according to Twitter’s own figures; around 750 tweets/second is the norm (Mashable, 2010; Roettgers, 2010).

The large number of followers of official accounts, e.g., from the World Cup Organizing Committee, the World Football Association or the German Football Association, indicates Twitter’s distinct relevance for distributing information about sports events. The FIFA President, Josef (Sepp) Blatter, opened his own, official Twitter account shortly before the World Cup kicked off, and only a few days later he already had more than 50,000 followers. Sepp Blatter’s tweets only arrived sporadically, dealt with particular topics or issues and were clearly composed in PR style; he himself did not react to enquiries seeking communication via feedback (questions/discussions). All the same, this large number of interested followers does indicate how significant this instrument of communication is. FIFA’s official 2010 World Cup service (FIFA@FIFAWorldCupTM) had around 130,000 followers as well, and, in this case, there was naturally a large overlap among followers of the two accounts.

FIFA set up so-called Twitter-Guidelines for the 2010 World Cup. The teams’ players were not allowed to send tweets from inside the stadium (Horowitz, 2010). However, the sports organizations and those organizing major sports events have also realized that this attempt to suppress social media’s democratic, public function is ineffective. One indication of the changed attitude, or, alternatively, of a new way of dealing with social media appears in the official Twitter accounts of FIFA and the German Football Association, which counteracted the previous frenzy of regulation by mounting PR offensives and by offering their own photos and videos.

FIFA account: https://twitter.com/FIFAcom
German football team account: https://twitter.com/DFB_Team

At the same time, the Twitter accounts of FIFA and the German Football Association were also used for several, by and large insignificant, messages, for example, from the GFA’s team to its over 30,000 followers (dated August 2010). In these cases, too, the form of communication did not display any exchange, or any use of feedback, but was a one-sided message from a broadcaster to the receiver, or receivers. The way sports organizations inverted social media’s primarily democratic function points to a new form of using Twitter, above all, as a marketing tool.

How journalists use social media

The 2010 World Cup was the first major sporting event that journalists exploited in order to bring in various elements of social media and new forms of transmitting information or (graphic) presentations. Above all, the
English and American newspapers tried to integrate the new possibilities into their own offerings at the 2010 World Cup: accordingly, there were, for instance, live tickers via Twitter, readers’ comments in edited blogs, prize competitions via tweets, and the distribution of interesting links. The offerings from the innovative Guardian (UK) or the New York Times (USA), in particular, aroused a great deal of attention. For every World Cup match, the graphic animation of hashtag use on Twitter could be accessed like a classical moving image on the Guardian’s website. This animation depicted the classification of key words in the reporting on Twitter and thus points to a variety of journalistic possibilities for future setting of agendas.


The German mediascape has still to engage fully with the topic of social media as complementing its offerings. The integration of interactive, journalistic elements in World Cup reporting has to be deemed disorganized and unplanned. The newspaper Bild integrated live streaming of the German team’s daily press conference into a large offering of social media overall, which was published by means of its own Twitter feed. Various regional newspapers, like the Hamburger Abendblatt or the Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, for example, offered Twitter feeds and/or video messages from South Africa by their own reporters, also intending to increase the attractiveness of their overall offering and to address new target groups. The quality of these offerings was very variable, with the level of the content ranging from very professional to amateur.

A survey conducted by news aktuell/Faktenkontor just before the World Cup demonstrates how important social media will be for (sports) journalism in the future: almost half of the more than 2,500 German journalists asked declared social media to be ‘highly relevant’ for their work. Alongside the growing importance of Twitter and blogs, above all, it will be more and more important for the profession in future to be able to be working every day on print, the web, texts and other channels in parallel. During the World Cup, Oliver Fritsch from Zeit online (i.e. from the online edition of the weekly national newspaper, Die Zeit) used the editorial Twitter channel of the Zeit sports’ desk (@zeitonlinesport) for crowd-sourcing projects. The following illustration offers an example of this with his request to all his followers for questions for an interview with the GFA manager, Oliver Bierhoff.

Zeit online tweet: https://twitter.com/zeitonlinesport/status/17397767050
Social media’s function in determining topics, for example, the ‘trending topics’ (the most used hashtags worldwide) registered by Twitter, seems, above all, highly significant in the sense of journalists’ function as observers.\textsuperscript{10}

**Social media agenda-setting**

Looking at the topic-setting process qualitatively made it clear that the classical\textsuperscript{11} and the ‘modern media’ are increasingly passing the ball between them at major sporting events like the 2010 World Cup. For sports, television is especially suitable as a point of departure for setting and re-setting topics because of its live commentary. On Facebook or Twitter, users of social media pass on or comment on particularly unusual, exciting or respectively (un)pleasant events viewers experience in traditional media. In that way, users give the event a new quality on two levels: on the one hand, being turned into a topic highlights the experience as interesting in some way or other, and, on the other, the event is classified qualitatively. Traditional media, in turn, focus on corresponding excitement in the social media in their reporting in order to highlight the attention thus aroused and to use it. The more frequently or more controversially the excitement mounts, the greater is the likelihood that print, radio and television are likely to pick it up.\textsuperscript{12} And, in turn, reactions then occur to the journalistic treatment

![Figure 11.3](image-url)  
*Figure 11.3  Social media agenda-setting: Topic-setting by social media*
of excitement in the social media. This discursive process of topic-setting works like a spiral and can be termed a further development of the theory of agenda-setting as ‘social media agenda-setting’ (Figure 11.3).\textsuperscript{13}

With the 2010 World Cup, this loop of topic-setting and re-setting became particularly visible in Germany under the heading ‘Innerer Reichsparteitag’ (internal Reich party convention – an historical term particularly controversial in Germany as it refers to the annual rallies held by the Nazi Party in Nuremberg during the Third Reich). It was prompted by the half-time analysis by the ZDF’s moderator, Katrin Müller-Hohenstein, during the Germany/Australia match. Her analysis contained the sentence: ‘… and with Miroslav Klose it’s a real internal Reich party convention for him, seriously though, that he gets a result here today…’ Before half-time was over, the Twitter community on the net was getting worked up; several users expressed their displeasure about what they thought was an inappropriate comparison in various tweets – these tweets were addressed and grouped, above all, under the hashtags of #Reichsparteitag and #ZDF.\textsuperscript{14} A short time later on Facebook, several pages had been set up about Katrin Müller-Hohenstein’s utterance (one example: ‘We don’t want a Reichsparteitag World Cup’), which demanded, among other things, her removal as a television moderator; in part, they can actually be viewed as tantamount to libel.

In the second phase of the topic-setting process, the traditional media reacted to the rapidly developing furore in the social media with stories about the ‘slip-up’, and so made a neat package out of the protest and simultaneously endowed it with meaning through their journalistic commentary. During the night following the incident, the ZDF clearly already felt compelled, first of all, to put Müller-Hohenstein’s utterance into perspective, and subsequently an official ‘apology’ from the ZDF sports editor, Dieter Gruschwitz, as well as from the ZDF’s editor-in-chief went out to users via Twitter.

ZDF sports editor, Dieter Gruschwitz: ‘It was a slip of the tongue amid all the enthusiasm at half-time. We have spoken to Katrin Müller-Hohenstein. She regrets using that term. It won’t happen again.’

(own translation)

Apology on Twitter: https://twitter.com/ZDF/status/16098189249

A third phase of the topic-setting saw the debate about using the term ‘internal Reich party convention’ being subsequently assessed and defused through formal argument about it. In this vein, a representative example from, for instance, the 
\textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} (a major regional/national newspaper-of-record from Munich) even analysed ‘“the internal Reich party convention” of the net community’ (own translation) and, with that,
pointed to the way the social media set topics. In fact, this process of topic-setting in social media seems to play a dominant role in the reception of sporting events.

Vuvuzela and YEBO!: The image of Africa in social media

Traditional media aim to represent topics of social communication and so mould cultural values. As this chapter shows, it is precisely where major sporting events are concerned that social communication has shifted largely to social media. This seems to be caused, above all, by the high degree of emotional involvement by all spectators of major sporting events, as well as through the large number of items on these events available in social media. In addition, the discursive character of social media in its capacity for feedback offers the opportunity for exchanging information and opinions. Social media can thus be designated a new site of social communication about sports, yet here the communication is often not sporting in the traditional sense – oriented around results – but, rather, more marked by emotion, content and a range of topics. The qualitative analysis of various items in the area of social media in connection with the 2010 World Cup clearly demonstrates this tendency.

One example was the discussion that went on (even worldwide) about the African fans’ habit of constantly blowing the horns known as vuvuzelas during the matches. Such a noise is something strange to European ears, and it caused a lively and emotionally charged discussion in social media. In Germany, the first tweets under the hashtag #Vuvuzela were published in March 2009, and from June onwards several social media users demanded that the device should be banned during the World Cup. The number of tweets and Facebook entries increased considerably with the opening of the tournament on 11 June 2010. They demonstrated a very negative image of the African continent: ‘By the way, I like being an annoying, Eurocentric, racist, provincial, insolent philistine who hates vuvuzelas’ was a typical tweet by user @probek on 12 June 2010 at 5:53 pm. Frequently, the catalyst was the television live broadcasts, which led to objections from many users in Germany because of the constant background noise of vuvuzelas.

Facebook page against Vuvuzela I: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Ban-those-annoying-Vuvuzela-horns-from-the-world-cup/115664555145233
Facebook page against Vuvuzela II: https://www.facebook.com/pages/A-Vuvuzela-Free-World-Cup-2010/94671715558

The topic of vuvuzelas shows what an intensive exchange took place – in this case, above all on Facebook – over football fans’ culturally determined behaviour at the World Cup in South Africa. This significantly influenced the image of the African continent among European users, as was noticeable,
for example, in the commentaries and in the qualitative character of the item as set out in social media. The impact of this social media discourse on European attitudes to African football culture may be seen in the following decision: on 1 September the European Football Association, UEFA, banned the trumpets from all UEFA football matches (http://edition.cnn.com/2010/SPORT/football/09/01/football.vuvuzela.ban/). This assessment is shared by Hebenstreit (2010), who conducted a qualitative analysis of German newspaper reporting on the vuvuzela and detected racist tendencies in the European view of South Africa: ‘The media coverage of South African subjects in Germany during World Cup 2010 was often full of Eurocentric and stereotypical content’ (Hebenstreit, 2010: 11). Nevertheless, the image of the African continent as portrayed in the German media has to be described as ambivalent. While the vuvuzela discourse in social media and tabloid newspapers tended to be of a colonialistic nature, the reporting in national media (television and broadsheets) was more balanced and often focused on background information on the topic.

In addition, we were able to note two further peculiarities: on the one hand, there was also a reverse effect on traditional media from the communication in social media on the topic of vuvuzelas. Several newspapers and television stations included the term in their reporting and thus confirmed the phenomenon of agenda-setting in social media, as presented in the first example.

In our analysis of items from social media in Germany, we could also note how journalistic forms would increasingly materialize there and shape the image of South Africa. As described above, when it came to sports events, many of the traditional media shifted a part of their commentary onto social media, but during the World Cup independent social media formats for journalism became apparent, qualitatively demonstrating a new form of online journalism. One example of this is blogs, which, as forms of communicating sports in a journalistic vein, focused, above all, on the World Cup (see Becker, 2010).

In this process, cross-media content in blogs becomes increasingly important, especially the combinations of text and pictorial as well as audio-visual content, and we can see them linking up with social media items. It is precisely by dint of this amalgamation of all media channels that these journalistic forms of presenting sporting events seem to demonstrate considerable significance for presenting and conveying cultural values. One example of this is the blog YEBO! from the freelance sports journalist Christian Putsch, on commission from Die Welt, one of the major, traditional German newspapers distributed nationally (accessed at: http://fussball-blog.welt.de/). For his blog, this journalist received the first online prize awarded by the Association of German Sports Journalists – above all, for the multimedia discussions in the item on sangomas in South African football. The portrayal of sangomas in this blog can be described as very multifaceted and
impartial. The author enhanced the impressions he gathered on location with general data and background on sangomas, particularly with regard to their standing in African society and their relationship to African football. Other blogs that display a balanced view of African culture and its values include This is South Africa, by a young journalist from the Axel Springer Academy, Michael Bee, which was published on 13 June 2010 (http://thisissouthafrica.de/debatten/2010/06/die-macht-der-guten-geister/). It may have been influenced by the reporting in social media. On the opposite end of the spectrum is a report from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung from 4 June 2010, in which the South Africa correspondent for the paper ridiculed the sangomas and thus presented Eurocentric prejudices against Africa (http://www.faz.net/themenarchiv/sport/wm-2010/wm-in-suedafrika-hokuspokus-torschuss-1997575.html).

Discussion and prognosis: Sports journalism and the social media at the 2010 World Cup

Section 1 presents the longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis of live broadcasts of football, confirming how the broadcast times expanded in Germany, above all through the heightened pre- and post-match reporting discussing images of the overall atmosphere, and crosses to reporters, as well as extra programmes with talk and comedy items. The background to this expansion is clearly extending a programme with a tendency for high ratings by building in other forms of broadcasting and programme components, especially those strongly oriented towards entertainment.

The sport itself plays less and less of a role in prime time football broadcasts; in the long run, the proportion of programme content shaped by journalists tends to be stagnating. Certainly, a diversity of presentation forms and topics is there structurally, but closer examination of what the content of the reporting is actually emphasizing – especially at the World Cup 2010 – shows up a concentration on fun, fans, atmosphere and emotions. Entertaining conversation about the sport on display takes centre stage in German TV. The journalists’ skill in and organizing of reporting is increasingly deputed to experts (in panels) and comedy shows; journalists’ contributions appear less and less important. Assessing the events, in the sense of journalists putting a new construction on them, scarcely happens in the prime time football we have analysed. Within the programming form of TV live reporting, our results point to a loss of significance for sports journalism – and this despite the simultaneous expansion of broadcast times in German TV from 1994 to 2010 of nearly 70%.

In the face of a strongly growing market for interactive communication, the second section of our investigation of the 2010 World Cup as the first major sporting event in the realm of social media demonstrates that it does, indeed, seem crucially necessary to look at the development and the
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possibilities of social media in sports journalism, together with their consequences. It is obvious that social media represent a variety of possibilities and chances, but also of dangers, for (sports) journalism in future.

The present investigation confirms the tendency towards turning sports commentary on television into entertainment and how the social media reinforce these processes, especially shown in the coverage of the 2010 World Cup with many topics like the debate on the vuvuzela or the issue of sango-mas. The setting of topics by sports journalists is increasingly disappearing and being transferred to social media or blogs, and, in addition, journalists’ expertise in and their organizing and assessing of sporting events in the commentary surrounding prime time football is being deputed to experts and comedy slots. Television and social media serve a wide spectrum of tendencies as regards content: humorous, sexist, racist and much more besides. We can speculate about the consequences – changed attitudes among the television audiences, or among those active in social media, towards sports commentary are just as conceivable as changed attitudes towards sport itself.

Notes

1. At the 2010 World Cup, the framing commentary in the ARD pre- and post-match reached 14.42 million people, despite the warm summer weather in Germany – a market share of 60.7% (Schröder, 2010).
3. ‘without any news at half-time.
4. ‘without any news at half-time.
5. Time elapsed between the beginning of pre-match commentary and the close of post-match commentary.
6. Accordingly, there was scarcely any noticeable advertising accompanying the matches at the 2006 World Cup (kick-off: 21:00), with their longer off-peak time, and with the 2008 European Championship (Sunday) in the public broadcasting stations carrying them.
7. The reason for the meagre advertising component is, however, also the fact that, according to the advertising guidelines of public broadcasting in Germany, no advertising is permitted after 20:00 on workdays and none at all on Sundays – both matches took place on a Saturday after 20:00.
8. In addition, other users can comment on the content on display by publishing statements on the wall, by related comments and responses, by selecting people in images or by activating the function ‘like’.
9. See Petersen (2010) for the results from the 2010 news aktuell trend monitor.
10. There are several internet services on offer for analysing Twitter’s most important topics, and these are, meanwhile, being used by journalists themselves to justify topics’ relevance. Examples are: trendistic.com or twitter-trends.de.
11. Print, radio and TV figure as traditional media.
12. The term ‘shitstorm’ is often used in connection with the internet. It denotes a ‘storm of indignation’ as reaction to an event. Here, constructive-critical
commentaries are mostly mixed up with irrational and, to an extent, insulting or aggressive items.

13. See also Grzywińska & Borden (2012) on agenda-setting and social media.

14. Kwak (2010) has been able to demonstrate how pronounced the function of hashtags is in setting topics in Twitter.

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Introduction

For at least three decades now, research on international news flows has consistently shown that, in terms of both quantity and quality, the mainstream media in the West have failed to adequately cover developing regions of the world in general and Africa in particular. The central findings of these research indicate that mainstream Western media's coverage of Africa often lacks ‘context’ and obsessively focuses on chronicling mainly ‘negative’ stories revolving around issues such as famine, conflict, poverty, disease and bad governance.

Against this record of the coverage of Africa in the mainstream Western media, a key expectation prior to the commencement of the 2010 FIFA World Cup was that South Africa’s historic hosting of the FIFA World Cup, a quintessentially global ‘positive’ event, could lead to a positive change in the way the mainstream Western media cover Africa. This expectation was mainly grounded on the assumption that, because the FIFA World Cup is often a global media event, all mainstream media organs would devote special attention to the event and, by default, give more focus and coverage than usual to the host country or region.

This chapter subjects aspects of this expectation to empirical scrutiny by examining how six mainstream daily newspapers from three Western countries covered Africa shortly before, during and shortly after the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The countries and newspapers examined include the UK (The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph), France (Le Monde and Le Figaro) and the USA (Washington Post and The New York Times).
In a bid to find out whether coverage during this historic moment was marked by a uniquely different kind of mediated representation and discourse about Africa in the selected mainstream Western media, this chapter empirically examines the following key questions: keeping aside all the reports directly related to the 2010 FIFA World Cup, what kinds of stories about Africa were published in these newspapers from 1 June 2010 to 31 July 2010? How was Africa portrayed in these stories? In what ways and to what extent did this portrayal conform to or deviate from previous empirical findings regarding mainstream Western media coverage of Africa? What are the implications of these portrayals for our understanding of the correlation between the hosting of mega-events and a country’s or region’s mediated image?

To address these issues, this chapter proceeds in two main parts after this introduction: I begin with a concise presentation of literature examining mainstream Western media coverage of Africa; thereafter, I highlight the potential accorded to mega-events like the FIFA World Cup as a background to understanding the discourses about positive image effects of the tournament that emanated from the South African government in particular. Discussions about the research design and methodology used for this study conclude the first part. The last sections of the chapter contain the findings and discussion of the findings as well as a synoptic conclusion that revisits the central objectives and findings of this study and their implications for our understanding of the relationship between the hosting of mega-events and national/regional mediated representations.

Mainstream Western media coverage of Africa

For over three decades now, empirical research about international news coverage in the mainstream media in the West has consistently shown what Wu (2000: 115) has termed a ‘familiar pattern’ – ‘Third World countries are less likely to be covered than developed countries’ in the Western media (see also Golan, 2006: 324). With particular reference to Africa, Western news media coverage of Africa has, for a long time, ‘come under scrutiny from international media scholarship’ (Ndangam & Kanyegirire, 2005: 41), and the dominant findings from decades of research on this issue have shown that, whether in print, audio-visual or online media, both quantitatively and qualitatively, mainstream Western media coverage of Africa is ‘wanting’.

Quantitatively, several previous studies have shown that Africa does not receive significant coverage from mainstream Western media. As early as 1979, Charles *et al.* (1979: 148) in their study of *The New York Times* coverage of Africa found the coverage to be ‘sketchy’. More recently, Golan
Teke Ngomba

(2008: 41), in a study examining the coverage of Africa in US television newscasts, concluded that ‘the African continent received limited coverage’ and that such paucity in the coverage of Africa ‘best exemplifies’ the ‘lack of balance in both the flow and coverage of world affairs by Western media’ (Golan, 2008: 43) (for similar findings, see, for instance, Franks, 2005: 129).

Still, as concerns the quantitative dimension of mainstream Western media coverage of Africa, prior research has also shown that only few particular countries tend to get media attention in mainstream Western media. Most of these regularly covered countries are experiencing armed conflict or natural disasters, although aspects such as trade ties or colonial relations between African and Western countries have also been shown to affect the regularity, extent and nature of coverage of an African country in the mainstream Western media (see, for instance, Charles et al., 1979: 152; Singer et al., 1991: 48; Wu, 2000: 116; Fair & Parks, 2001: 36; Wanta et al., 2004: 365–6; Golan, 2006: 325–6; Wu, 2007; Golan, 2008: 41; Kalyango & Onyebadi, 2012: 681; Barry, 2012: 125).

While quantitatively it has been shown that Africa does not receive significant coverage from mainstream Western media, qualitatively, if covered at all, most previous research has shown that there is an ‘inherent tendency’ for these mainstream media to ‘focus on negative aspects of African politics and society’ (Schraeder & Endless, 1998: 35). These ‘negative aspects’ often include stories presenting Africa as a ‘basket case continent’ (Somerville, 2009: 526), a ‘site of catastrophes’ (Orgeret, 2010: 46) or a ‘homogeneous block with violence, helplessness, human rights abuses and lack of democracy as its main characteristics’ (Brookes, 1995: 465; see also Ogundimu, 1994: 7; Mawdsley, 2008: 512; Scott, 2009: 548; Franks, 2010: 71; Kalyango & Onyebadi, 2012: 685).

Furthermore, beyond the thematic focus of such recurrent reports, empirical studies have also shown that mainstream Western media coverage of Africa is often ‘deficient in information about the background and context of news events’ (Orgeret, 2010: 46). In criticizing how the mainstream Western media reports about conflicts in Africa, for instance, Molefe (2004: 119) points out that there is a tendency for these media to offer ‘simplistic explanations’ to conflicts in Africa, and that ‘underlying causes’ of the conflicts are ‘hardly ever brought to the surface’.

With regard to this particular issue, in his study of selected mainstream British media coverage of the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007, Somerville (2009: 526) concluded that a ‘common factor’ in the media coverage was a tendency to rely on simple, all-encompassing descriptive and analytical language to frame the reporting of the conflict – focusing on tribal
and ethnic issues to the virtual exclusion of broader and deeper analyses of factors involved…

Similar findings have been reached in cases as diverse as Norwegian media coverage of the Zimbabwean socio-economic and political crises (Ndlela, 2005) and in *The New York Times*’ coverage of the Darfur conflict (Kothari, 2010).

These recurrent portrayals of Africa in the Western media as a ‘timeless and placeless realm of “tribal” conflict’ (Myers *et al.*, 1996: 21) ‘continually (re)make and represent the continent as Other. A place which is simultaneously in-corporated and excluded as negative reflection of the West’ (Jarosz, 1992: 105; for an extensive and seminal discussion of Western ethnocentric representations of ‘Others’, see Said, 1979). As Brookes (1995: 465) has argued, the ‘cumulative effect’ of such portrayals of Africa is that these mediated images/discourses construct a ‘stereotypical representation of Africa in the minds of readers’.

In their study of the impacts of international news coverage on Americans’ perception of foreign countries, Wanta *et al.* (2004: 364), for instance, found that ‘the more negative coverage a nation received, the more likely respondents were to think negatively about the nation’ and vice versa (for related conclusions specifically concerning coverage of Africa, see also Scott, 2009: 534; Kothari, 2010: 210–12; Odemerho & Spells, 2012: 14). Beyond such perceptual influences, these stereotypical mediated representations of Africa have also been singled out as one of the key factors affecting African development, as seen, for instance, with regard to foreign direct investments in Africa (see Domatob, 1994: 28).

As will be shown below, it is against such a background of significantly negative mediated portrayals of Africa, especially in the West, that one should understand some of the claims made by South Africa to rationalize its bid and hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup – a quintessential mega-event. But, first, it is important to understand what mega-events are and why countries bother to host one. These questions are examined below.

### Mega-events, their expected results and the FIFA 2010 South African bid

In general, mega-events, according to Roche (1992), can be defined as ‘large-scale cultural or sporting events designed to attract tourists and media attention across the globe’ (cited in Baker & Rowe, 2012: 3; see also Giffard & Rivenbuvgh, 2000: 8). With particular reference to sports, Cornelissen (2008: 481) has defined what are generally referred to as mega-sporting events as being
Short term, one-off or recurring international sport competitions hosted on a rotating basis by different states that are of such scale, level of media coverage and spectatorship that they may be regarded as global affairs…

According to Cornelissen et al. (2011: 305), the FIFA World Cup is ‘one of the most important mega-events on the world sports calendar’, which stands out ‘not only for its commercial importance but also for the volume of sponsorship, branding, marketing and merchandising it attracts’. As Black (2007: 261) pointed out, among the ‘most frequently emphasized’ reasons for hosting a mega-event such as the World Cup are ‘touted benefits’ like economic growth and increase in employment and infrastructural development in the host country. Ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the South African government, as well as ordinary South Africans, identified such economic benefits among the main reasons for and expected results of the country’s hosting of the tournament (see Pillay et al., 2011: 19; Alegi & Bolsmann, 2013: 10).

Several scholars have, however, shown that such expectations or forecasts of hosting benefits are often overstated and wrong, and that hosting mega-events can actually be an economic and social ‘drain’ on the host city or country (see, for instance, Black, 2007; Cornelissen & Maennig, 2010; Steinbrink et al., 2011; Kolamo & Vuolteenaho, 2013). Notwithstanding several experiences of these mega-event drains across the world, the last two decades in particular have been characterized, paradoxically, by serious competition among countries to host mega-events (Walker et al., 2013: 80).

An important explanation for this continuous scramble to host mega-sporting events in particular is that, beyond the putative economic benefits, mega-events, as Black (2007: 261) has argued, serve ‘less tangible purposes’ for host countries, such as providing unique opportunities for the pursuit of symbolic politics – a chance to signal important changes of direction, ‘reframe’ dominant narratives about the host, and/or reinforce key messages about what the host has become/is becoming. These signals or narratives are critical vehicles for legitimation, with both narrowly instrumental purposes related to gaining support for event bids domestically and internationally, and more expansive purposes related to the mobilization of societal support for certain dominant ‘ideas of the state’.

(See also Mishra, 2013: 178–9)

These potential effects of mega-events centre on aspects dear to every nation. In his influential explanation of the rise of nations, Benedict Anderson defined a nation as an ‘imagined political community’, and explained that the nation is imagined as a community because ‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson, 1983: 6–8). Furthermore, as a ‘territorial community of shared history and culture’ (Smith, 1996: 359; see also Connor, 2004), each nation is imbued with symbolic elements such as ‘myths, memories, values, symbols and traditions’ which play a crucial role in ‘shaping a sense of national identity’ (Smith, 2004: 197).

The hosting of mega-sporting events constitutes a unique opportunity for nations to foster and articulate particularized forms of national cohesion and identity through different forms of spectacles that echo the myths, symbols and traditions of the nation (see Cui, 2013 for a pertinent and recent discussion on these issues in relation to China’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics). Scholars of sports and nationalism have long shown that sport plays an important role in the ‘construction of national consciousness’ (Jarvie, 2003: 543) and that it promotes a ‘sense of national identity’ (Houlihan, 1997: 113). As seen below, these potential effects transcend dominant discussions about the ‘less tangible’ benefits of hosting mega-events both within and beyond the host nation.

For strategic and marketing purposes, South Africa officially fronted the continental importance of hosting the World Cup, but, fundamentally, hosting the tournament was, at its core, very much about South Africa as a nation making a statement about its national identity and ambitions through the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Since the end of apartheid, South African political and economic elites have seen the hosting of mega-events as a ‘strategy for bolstering national unity and triggering economic growth’ (Alegi & Bolsmann, 2013: 3; see also Steinbrink et al., 2011: 18). Within this logic, hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup was seen, fundamentally, as an opportunity for South Africa, as a nation, to ‘reactivate’ its ‘national narrative’ (Herwitz, 2013: 22) through a ‘shared experience’ of ‘South Africa’s sense of imagined community’ (Alegi & Bolsmann, 2013: 4). The hosting of the tournament was thus seen as an opportunity that would help South Africans to ‘transcend deeply entrenched social cleavages and to help foster national cohesion’ (Kersting, 2007: 277).

Significantly, in bidding for and framing the importance of South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, these ‘less tangible’ national ambitions and expectations attained continental dimensions. Although mega-events are ‘by definition short term events of fixed duration’ (Hiller, 1998: 47), they are often credited with enormous potential, in particular, the potential to improve the host city’s, country’s or region’s image (Preuss, 2007). Hammett (2011: 64), for instance, has argued that hosting mega-events ‘may offer developmental benefits’ and an opportunity for the host country to change its ‘international perceptions’. This is principally because, as Manzenreiter (2010: 31) has noted, ‘any mega-event, standing in the spotlight of the media, focuses the world’s attention on a particular place and a nation and the success thereof, in either hosting or performing well in the event’. Hosting a mega-event, therefore, provides a host country or city with
‘a unique opportunity’ to ‘modify’ its international image by projecting a ‘desired image’ that can go ‘far beyond the event itself’ (Florek et al., 2008: 199–200; see also Getz & Fairley, 2004 127; Preuss & Alfs, 2011: 56).

Since a nation’s image is an ‘important component of a successful tourism policy’ (Lepp & Gibson, 2011: 211), it is for such reasons that mega-events like Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup tournaments are often viewed as a ‘panacea for the host country’s tourism industry’ and providers of a ‘boost to the country’s reputation particularly in the short term’ (Holtzhausen & Fullerton, 2013: 1; see also Panagiotopoulou, 2012: 2337). In line with these perceptions, host cities or countries of mega-events tend to actually use the event to ‘showcase’ themselves ‘favorably in the international arena’ (Baker & Rowe, 2012: 4; see also Bodet & Lacassagne, 2012: 359).

After failing to win the bid to host the 2006 FIFA World Cup, in 2004, South Africa finally won the bid ‘in the name of the continent’ to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Berger, 2010: 176) and ended up spending ‘between $8 and $30 billion on infrastructure improvements’ alone (Holtzhausen & Fullerton, 2013: 1). According to Ginsberg (2010: 191), beyond the tangible reasons for pursuing the hosting of the FIFA World Cup, such as infrastructure development, job creation and the promotion of tourism, South Africa had a ‘less tangible hope of reconfiguring Africa’s reputation’ by hosting the tournament. Ginsberg further notes that, when South Africa was awarded the 2010 World Cup in 2004, supporters of its bid argued that a ‘successful tournament would help improve Africa’s image, thereby increasing foreign investment throughout the continent and boosting Africa’s global political prestige’ (see also Pillay et al., 2011: 19–20; Walker et al., 2013: 80).

Both the South African government and FIFA ‘assiduously marketed’ the 2010 FIFA World Cup ‘as “an African World Cup”’ (van der Westhuizen & Swart, 2011: 172). The tournament was ‘widely touted as a great African mega-event that while located in South Africa, would bring economic and social benefits across the continent’ (Maharaj, 2011: 49; emphasis added; see also Desai & Vahed, 2010: 154; Tomlinson et al., 2011: 39).

The South African government and FIFA ‘hailed the potentially transformative power of the World Cup for the entire continent’ and ‘continually declared it an opportunity to demonstrate the “real Africa” and prove Africa’s discipline and competence’ (Ginsberg, 2010: 192, emphasis added). Hosting the World Cup was therefore seen as constituting a ‘significant opportunity’ for South Africa to help ‘project a contemporary, reinvigorated image of Africa, through celebrating African culture and identity’ (Tomlinson et al., 2009: 3; see also Hammett, 2011: 65). As André Czeglédy (2009: 281) had argued before the start of the tournament, the potential implications of the 2010 World Cup were ‘fundamentally about creating a new Africa in the social imagination’ just as much as new infrastructure (cited in Ginsberg, 2010: 194).
Ahead of the tournament, discourses from South African government officials and other supporters of the South African bid clearly framed the tournament as an event that had come to redress years of the negatively mediated portrayals of Africa, especially in the Western media. Verwer et al. (2010: 19), for instance, wrote that in the ‘run-up to the World Cup and during the event, Africa will be centre stage for a while instead of being forgotten’ (cited in Berger, 2010: 178).

According to Tomlinson et al. (2011), a ‘keen motivation’ in South Africa’s bid to host the games was to ‘show that South Africa can operate on a global level, as well as a visceral component based on the desire to repudiate negative images and perspectives of Africa common in the media’ (cited in Tomlinson et al., 2011: 40). Jacob Zuma, then deputy president, for instance, ‘expanded the geographic scope of the World Cup’s importance’ by clearly stating that the World Cup ‘could help in erasing the stereotypes and Afro-pessimism’ associated with Africa, and that the ‘victory’ of South Africa in the bidding process to host the World Cup was a ‘victory of our sister countries’ (Bon Voyage, 2004, cited in Ginsberg, 2010: 195; see also Desai & Vahed, 2010: 155).

Berger (2010: 185) quotes a South African government minister, who reportedly declared prior to the tournament that South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup

Would be about getting out from underneath the welter of negative press coverage our continent receives. It is about informing the world that Africa has much to offer, that our people are ready to receive the world, ready to host those who come to the World Cup and that when they come they will receive a wonderfully unforgettable African experience.

Since the 2010 FIFA World Cup ended, debates about the different legacies of this mega-sporting event for both South Africa and Africa as a whole have been expansive (for some of these discussions, see, for instance, Desai & Vahed, 2010; Cottle, 2011; Maharaj, 2011; Pillay et al., 2011; Szymanski, 2011; Alegi & Bolsmann, 2013; Holtzhausen & Fullerton, 2013). Looking at all this ‘legacies literature’ and the arguments just mentioned above, it is clear that an important dimension of the discussions has, thus far, not received significant attention.

Against a background understanding of the nature of mainstream Western media coverage of Africa discussed above, all the pre-tournament discourses from the South African government in particular regarding the potential ‘mediated image impacts’ of South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup call for more serious empirical examinations of the extent to which, with particular reference to the Western media, Africa became a centre stage during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. What was happening on the pages and screens of mainstream Western media with regard to their coverage of
Africa as the whole 2010 FIFA World Cup jamboree was underway in South Africa?

More than three years after the tournament, we are yet to obtain rigorous and substantial cross-national empirical perspectives with regard to this question. The few studies done around this topic, such as those by Berger (2010), Hammett (2011), Bolsmann (2012), Moloi-Siga (2012) and Perryman (2013), only focused on examining how selected American and British print media covered South Africa and the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Overall, the findings from these studies show that the tone of the media coverage of South Africa and the 2010 FIFA World Cup fluctuated from standard critical, stereotypical and sensational coverage of South Africa, mostly before and partly during the tournament, to a tone of praise for South Africa at the end of the tournament.

Berger (2010), Hammett (2011) and Perryman (2013) all show that, prior to the tournament, the British mainstream media, for instance, focused their coverage of South Africa and the World Cup on issues such as insecurity, corruption and social inequality in South Africa, as well as doubts about the capability of South Africa to complete the necessary infrastructural projects before the commencement of the tournament.

By the end of the tournament, this critical, stereotypical and sensational tone subsided in several mainstream Western media, and, as Alegi and Bolsmann (2013: 1) have pointed out, at the end of the tournament

[The] global media heaped praise on South Africa for its warm people; high modernist stadiums; tight security; sound event management; adequate accommodation; functional transportation and telecommunication networks...Self-congratulatory headlines and stories filled South African television; radio; newspapers and electronic media.

(See also Steinbrink et al., 2011: 24)

Overall, as Berger (2010: 174) concluded, there was a ‘substantive volume and variety of media representations’ of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, but many of these representations ‘reinforced essentialist stereotypes’ about South Africa in particular and Africa as a whole (see also Hammett, 2011: 63, 70–1; Tomlinson et al., 2011: 42; Bolsmann, 2012: 156 for similar conclusions, and for focused analysis of the coverage of the tournament in other African countries see, for instance, Chari, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011).

While these studies have furthered our understanding of mediated representations of South Africa and the 2010 FIFA World Cup, arguably, there is a significant paucity of published research which systematically examines, empirically, non-tournament related coverage of the whole of Africa in the mainstream Western news media during the 2010 FIFA World Cup to find out the extent to which coverage during that period conformed to findings from earlier studies or deviated from these by reflecting a ‘new
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image of Africa’, as was hoped and claimed by the South African government and other bid supporters. This is what this chapter does, as it seeks to find out whether South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup constituted a uniquely different moment with regard to mainstream Western media coverage of Africa.

Research design and methodology of the study

As indicated in the introduction, this study seeks to empirically respond to the following core questions: leaving aside all the reports directly related to football matches and the organization of the tournament, what kinds of stories about Africa were published in selected mainstream newspapers in the West from 1 June 2010 to 31 July 2010? How was Africa portrayed in these stories, and in what ways and to what extent did this portrayal conform to or deviate from previous empirical findings regarding mainstream Western media coverage of Africa?

The data to answer the questions above come from a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of six mainstream newspapers in three Western countries – the USA (Washington Post and The New York Times), the UK (The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph) and France (Le Monde and Le Figaro).

These three countries are often at the centre of scholarly references to ‘the West’ when it comes to studying how mainstream Western media cover international news and, in particular, places like Africa. Molefe (2004: 118), for instance, had argued, in lines echoing the famous New World Information and Communication Order debates of the late 1970s and 1980s, that ‘it is a known fact that the story of Africa continues to be packaged and edited in London, Paris and Atlanta’.

For mostly practical reasons (relatively easy and affordable access to relevant news reports), I chose to study newspapers. The newspapers were purposefully selected, and they are all very respectable mainstream newspapers, both in their respective countries and internationally, with good circulation levels and an established history of focused international news coverage. In a recent study on British media coverage of Africa, Scott (2009: 555), for instance, found that, unlike tabloids, broadsheets (like the papers selected for this study) ‘contained substantially more articles and column inches devoted to Africa, they referred to more countries and they covered more hard news topics’ (see also Hammett, 2011: 63).

The total period chosen to examine the coverage of Africa in these newspapers was two full months, from 1 June 2010 to 31 July 2010. I chose this period because it includes a few days leading up to the kick-off of the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament (1–10 June), the entire period of the World Cup tournament (11 June to 11 July), and a few days after the tournament (12–31 July). Overall, in terms of methodology, this study draws significantly from recent studies examining Western media coverage of Africa, in particular
Golan (2008), Scott (2009), Hammett (2011) and Kalyango and Onyebadi (2012).

All the newspapers were accessed through the LexisNexis database. For each of the newspapers, I indicated the selected dates (1 June 2010 to 31 July 2010) and typed the key search word ‘Africa’ (‘Afrique’ for {Le Monde} and {Le Figaro}). I then went through all the search results to select the articles to be analysed for this study. The first key criterion in selecting the articles was that, since the overall focus of this study is to look at how Africa was covered beyond the FIFA World Cup tournament, only articles that were not directly related to the tournament were selected. This excluded all articles focusing, for instance, on South Africa’s preparations for and hosting of the tournament; actual matches; fans’ reactions; planned or actual strikes by workers taking care of stadiums; the impact of the FIFA World Cup on South Africa and Africa as a whole; FIFA-sponsored activities in connection with the World Cup such as HIV/AIDS campaigns, and so on.

With regard to the non-tournament-related articles that have been selected and analysed, the key criteria followed were those outlined and used by Scott (2009: 538):

For an article to be considered relevant to the portrayal of Africa and hence to qualify for inclusion in this investigation, it had to satisfy one of two criteria. Either the main angle of the story concerned a topic that explicitly and primarily referred to Africa or a country or countries within Africa or the main angle of the story related explicitly and primarily to a person or persons from a country within Africa and this angle was sufficiently relevant to the portrayal of Africa. The main angle of a story was determined by referring to the headline and the majority of the article.

On this basis, articles fulfilling these criteria were selected from the six newspapers irrespective of their total word count – some articles were just 50 words, others as long as 2,500 words. On the basis of a close reading of the entire article as well as, in some instances, specification from the newspaper, it was then classified as either a news article (conventional news reports); a feature; an editorial; an opinion piece; an interview or a letter to the editor. Table 12.1 shows the number and type of articles selected from each of these media on the basis of the aforementioned criteria.

After selection of all the relevant articles, these were read and coded manually. The codes that were used to categorize each of the 692 articles came mostly from the similar previous studies mentioned above, as well as from a reading of the selected articles (such as the ‘obituary’ code). In deciding on the codes, one of the key considerations was to ensure that I created particular codes for some of the dominant thematic discussions in the literature with regard to Western media coverage of Africa; in this way, it would be easier to compare the findings with these central discussions.
Table 12.1  Number and type of articles selected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>News articles</th>
<th>Feature articles</th>
<th>Editorials</th>
<th>Opinion articles</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Letters to the editor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New York Times</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As pointed out above, several scholars have argued that, in their coverage of Africa, the Western media extensively focus on negative aspects of Africa, presenting it as a ‘site of catastrophes’ (Orgeret, 2010: 46) and a ‘homogenous block with violence, helplessness, human rights abuses and lack of democracy as its main characteristics’ (Brookes, 1995: 465). Given these discourses, a total of 20 codes were created, covering issues raised in previous literature. These codes are: accidents/tragedies; armed conflict; arts and culture; crime/insecurity; domestic issues; economy/business; environment/natural resources; health/disease; human interest; humanitarian crisis; international justice; international relations; natural disaster; obituary; religion; science and technology; sports; terrorism; tourism and other.

The general procedure in coding the stories consisted of reading through the entire article, which constituted the unit of analysis, identifying what the article was centrally about and, if the article was not just about Africa as a whole, or a region within Africa such as ‘West Africa or Southern Africa’, identifying which African country or countries is/are the focus of the article and counting all other African countries that are mentioned in the article. As regards identifying what an article is centrally about, the key issue was to identify the focus of the article, and this was often through headlines or deciding, after reading the entire article, what the central message was, since often other issues are mentioned in one article. For instance, an article about researchers discovering that a gel could be used to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa was coded under ‘science and technology’, since the over-riding message in the article was about the scientific discovery. On the other hand, an article about the daily lives of people living with HIV/AIDS and their struggle to get their medicines was coded under ‘health/disease’.

Prior to presenting the key findings below, I will indicate, in each instance, the methodological procedure used to arrive at the findings. The findings are divided into the following key sections:

a) Which countries were covered and what kinds of stories were covered about Africa in these six newspapers within the studied period?
b) How was Africa ‘talked about’ in these reports?

Findings: Who was covered and who was not?

At the heart of this question is the issue of mediated visibility of African countries – which countries feature in the mainstream Western media and which do not. To get an answer to this issue, I read all the 692 articles and, for each article, I did the following:

a) Noted which country or countries is/are the focus of the article and which ones are ‘mentioned’. It was generally easy to get the country in
focus. For instance, a report about the killing of a journalist in Rwanda caused Rwanda to be coded as the country of focus in the report. Similarly, a report about political tensions in Rwanda which also talked about the shooting of a Rwandan politician in South Africa was still coded as focusing on Rwanda, and South Africa was coded in this instance as ‘mentioned’. For each article, I counted all the African countries mentioned. Each country featuring more than once was only counted once. So, even if an article focusing on African economic growth in general mentioned the Ivory Coast twice, the country was only counted once for that particular article.

b) A report focusing on diplomatic relations between Chad and Sudan was coded as focusing on both countries.

c) If the article focused on Africa as a whole or a region like Eastern Africa as a whole, it was not coded as focusing on any country; rather, all African countries mentioned in the report were counted.

The outcome of this procedure was that it enabled a quantitative mapping of which countries received ‘focused coverage’, defined here as an article focusing on a particular country, and which countries were simply mentioned in an article focusing on either another country/countries, a region in Africa, or Africa as a whole. After this procedure, I then counted how many countries received ‘focused’ coverage for each of the six newspapers and how many countries were mentioned in all the reports analysed. In most of the articles, the countries were clearly mentioned by name, but, in a very few instances, only major cities like Pretoria, Abidjan or Cairo were mentioned. In these very few cases, and following Kalyango and Onyebadi (2012), I took these major city names as representing country names. Table 12.2 shows the total number of countries that were mentioned or received ‘focused coverage’ in the selected newspapers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Total number of countries mentioned</th>
<th>Number of countries with ‘focused coverage’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>26 + Somaliland³</td>
<td>15 + Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New York Times</td>
<td>42 + Somaliland</td>
<td>28 + Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>39 + Somaliland</td>
<td>21 + Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>46 + Somaliland</td>
<td>33 + Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12.2 shows that on average, between 1 June 2010 and 31 July 2010, in addition to Somaliland, about 24 different African countries received at least one focused news coverage from the six newspapers studied. Although this average of 24 countries receiving focused coverage is itself ‘below average’, given that at that time Africa had 54 countries, what we also see is that, with regard to ‘mentioned countries’, an average of about 38 African countries were mentioned in articles published by these media.

The difference between countries mentioned and countries covered ‘focusedly’ also varies significantly between the newspapers: Le Figaro (10); Washington Post (11); Le Monde (13); The New York Times (14); The Guardian (18) and The Daily Telegraph (23). So, while on average the French newspapers mention about 42 different African countries and cover focusedly on average about 31 African countries (a difference of 11), the British newspapers mention on average about 41 countries but only cover 20 countries focusedly (a difference of 21). The American newspapers, on the other hand, mention on average 34 African countries and cover about 22 focusedly (a difference of 12). As will be argued below, one key reason for the French media being different in this regard is because of the high coverage of most of the former French colonies in Africa.

The quantitative assessment of the mediated visibility of Africa in the mainstream Western media needs to take at least two major dimensions: first, a general overview of number of countries mentioned and covered focusedly, and, second, an identification of the countries that are most mentioned and those most covered, since, as the data for this study showed, there is actually a significant difference between countries that receive more mentions in the media and those that received focused coverage in the media. Making these distinctions (often not too explicit in previous literature) is important for us to get a more comprehensive picture of Africa’s mediated portrayals in Western media.

As indicated above, for each of the 692 articles examined for this study, I noted which country or countries was/were the focus of the article and which other African countries were simply mentioned in the articles. At the end, I counted the total number of times a country received focused coverage as well as the total number of times in which the country was only mentioned. Given the large number of countries covered overall, Table 12.3 simply highlights the top three countries that received the most ‘mentions’ and most focused coverage from the six newspapers. The numbers in brackets represent the total number of times the country either was mentioned or received focused coverage in the particular newspaper.

As seen in Table 12.3, there is indeed a difference between the countries that are most mentioned in a newspaper and the countries that receive the most focused news coverage. To the extent that a simple mention of a country in a mainstream medium grants that country some form of visibility, it
makes sense to also watch out for ‘simple mentions’ in discussions about countries’ mediated portrayals.

At least from the British and American newspapers, South Africa appears to have a dominant mediated appearance, featuring significantly in both focused reports and also ‘simple mentions’. Also, in the two US newspapers, what we see is that they tend to focus on similar countries and regions. Both cover South Africa significantly, and the other countries they cover are all in East Africa. This is because, within the period of study, apart from a visit to Kenya by US Vice President Joe Biden, there were suicide bombings in Uganda and Somalia and, given the USA’s leading role in the so-called ‘war on terror’, it was not entirely surprising to see American newspapers paying particular attention to this region through focused coverage.

A similar ‘national interest’ orientation possibly explains why Zimbabwe, for instance, only features prominently in the British newspapers and why most of the prominently covered countries in the French media are French-speaking countries, among them France’s former colonies. But, beyond this colonial linkage during the studied period, French nationals were taken hostage, notably in Niger and Mali, and the search for a regional solution to the ‘hostage crises’ meant that the French media paid attention to the region.

Overall, what the quantitative analysis of the 692 articles showed was that, with regard to Africa’s mediated visibility in these six mainstream Western newspapers within the studied period, only the following nine countries did not get any focused coverage from any of these newspapers: Cape

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Most ‘mentioned’ countries</th>
<th>Most ‘focusedly covered’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Washington Post</strong></td>
<td>Somalia (13); South Africa (12) and Kenya (10)</td>
<td>South Africa (8); Somalia (7) and Uganda (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The New York Times</strong></td>
<td>South Africa (44); Somalia (24) and Uganda (23)</td>
<td>South Africa (29); Somalia (11) and Rwanda (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Guardian</strong></td>
<td>South Africa (50); Zimbabwe (17) and Kenya (13)</td>
<td>South Africa (37); Zimbabwe (9) and Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Rwanda (4 each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Daily Telegraph</strong></td>
<td>South Africa (46); Kenya (10) and Tanzania (8)</td>
<td>South Africa (40); Libya (5) and Zimbabwe (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Le Monde</strong></td>
<td>Mali (27); Democratic Republic of Congo (26) and South Africa (24)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (13); Ivory Coast (11) and Mali and Tunisia (9 each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Le Figaro</strong></td>
<td>Mali (18); Egypt (16) and Algeria (15)</td>
<td>Egypt (11); Sudan (10) and Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali (9 each)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Verde; Comoros Islands; Djibouti; Ghana; Mauritius; Sao Tome; Seychelles; Swaziland and Togo. While the non-focused coverage of countries like Seychelles and Cape Verde was not entirely surprising, given similar findings in previous research (see Golan, 2008), the case of Ghana and Swaziland was somewhat surprising, not least because Ghana was a major country contesting the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and Swaziland is located very close to South Africa, where the whole football action was taking place. One would have expected a ‘geographically induced spillover mediated visibility’ for Swaziland and a ‘performance-induced’ spillover, non-tournament-related visibility for Ghana during the 2010 FIFA World Cup, but this was not the case.

Also, the case of Tanzania, mentioned in Table 12.3, also demonstrates what a difference it makes to examine mediated visibility through the ‘mentions’ and ‘focused coverage’ prisms. Of the 692 articles examined, only one story, from *The New York Times*, focused on Tanzania, but the country is mentioned several times in other articles and even appears in *The Daily Telegraph* as one of the most mentioned countries.

One last important issue to point out with regard to the mediated portrayals of these countries is that there is a clear indication of what can be called ‘differentiated levels of thematic diversity’. This refers to the extent to which a country’s mediated portrayal is thematically fixated or flexible. If one takes, for instance, two extreme cases which best demonstrate this point, what emerged from the data is that South Africa has high levels of mediated thematic diversity compared with Somalia, although both countries receive high levels of total mediated visibility (the sum of their focused coverage and their ‘mentioned’ coverage). If one looks at the coverage of South Africa across these six newspapers, one can read about stories as varied as Desmond Tutu’s birthday and announcement that he is leaving public engagements; a police chief found guilty of corruption; research about HIV/AIDS; President Obama to write the foreword to Mandela’s autobiography; British students killed in a road accident in South Africa; South Africa’s ‘wild east coast’ and its beaches; and a controversial racist video made by some students.

On the other hand, virtually all stories published about Somalia focus on terrorism, piracy and the civil war. These two cases show that, although South Africa and Somalia may, for instance, score the same with regard to their total mediated visibility, they nonetheless have significantly different levels of mediated thematic diversity.

Beyond the countries covered, what kinds of stories featured most about Africa from these newspapers during the studied period? To respond to this, two approaches will be taken. First, I will highlight the top five categories of articles published per newspaper, and later, I will look at some selected categories prevalent in the literature to see to what extent these six newspapers also gave ‘echo’ to such themes. Out of 20 coded categories, Table 12.4 shows
Table 12.4  The three most covered categories per newspaper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Top three categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>1. Domestic issues (13.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Science and technology and terrorism (8.8% each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Crime/insecurity and obituary (6.6% each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New York Times</td>
<td>1. Domestic issues (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Terrorism (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Crime/insecurity (10.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>1. Domestic issues (17.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Arts and culture and sports (13.46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Environment/natural resources and international relations (7.69% each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>1. Economy/business (9.63%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Environment/natural resources (8.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Crime/insecurity and domestic issues (7.22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>1. Domestic issues (21.28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. International relations (19.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. International justice (7.42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>1. Terrorism (15.78%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. International relations (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Domestic issues (14.28%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

which three categories received the most focused coverage from the selected newspapers. The percentages are calculated based on the total number of stories published by each newspaper, as shown in Table 12.1.

In concluding a 2009 study on British media coverage of Africa, Scott (2009: 555) noted that, ‘far from being uniform, coverage of Africa varies substantially between newspapers’. Similarly, as noted earlier, Berger (2010: 174), in his study of British media coverage of South Africa and the 2010 FIFA World Cup, found that there was a ‘substantive volume and variety of media representations’ of South Africa and the 2010 FIFA World Cup, although many of these representations, according to Berger, ‘reinforced essentialist stereotypes’ about Africa.

What Table 12.4 shows is sort of an echo of these earlier studies’ conclusions that mediated portrayals of Africa really vary. On the bases of the coding used for this study, what we see from the table is that, though slight patterns emerge, the issues that take centre stage in these newspapers’ coverage of Africa are really varied – from domestic issues to terrorism, science and technology, international relations and obituaries.

As concerns the patterns mentioned above, the focus on environment/natural resources in the British media was due to the coverage of the discovery of more diamond mines in Zimbabwe, and, given the connection
between Britain and Zimbabwe highlighted earlier, these media published many articles on this issue. As concerns the French media, the focus given to international relations, for instance, was because, during the period studied, many former French colonies were celebrating the 50th anniversary of their independence from France, and the French president had invited many African countries to attend the French national day (14 July). This caused the French media to focus on the relations between France and Africa and between Africa and other regions of the world.

But the over-riding picture drawn by the table is a mixed bag, which cannot be easily described in a sentence if all the coverage of these six newspapers is taken into account. The most that can be stated here is that, in line with Scott, coverage of Africa varies significantly across newspapers and, as we can see, also across countries, for one reason or another.

Berger’s finding and argument that the British media coverage of South Africa and the 2010 FIFA World Cup ‘reinforced essentialist stereotypes’ echoes the assertions in the literature that the Western media tend to focus on negative stories in reporting Africa. Since the codes used for this study include some of these ‘negative’ frames, how did they fare in relation to overall coverage of the newspapers?

Table 12.5 below highlights the extent to which the six newspapers focused on these ‘negative stories’. The numbers in brackets beside the newspaper titles are the total number of articles published by the newspaper during the period studied. The numbers on the table show the total number of articles focusing on that theme published by the newspaper during the period studied. At the end of the table, the total for all these ‘negative categories’ per newspaper is indicated, and the percentages below these totals represent the overall percentage of these ‘negative categories’ in relation to the total number of articles published by the newspaper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accidents/tragedies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflict</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/insecurity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural disaster</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(24.4%) (37.6%) (19.2%) (26.5%) (26.7%) (32.3%)
The table above can easily fall into the proverbial ‘glass half full vs. glass half empty’ debate. While some figures, like those from *The New York Times* and *Le Figaro*, can be singled out as perhaps being too high, the table nonetheless shows that, in all these six newspapers, less than half of their focused coverage about Africa could be categorized as falling into this ‘negative stories zone’. While the table does not ‘prove’ that most of the stories published by these newspapers are ‘positive’ (especially since stories within categories like international relations or domestic issues can be about things that are negative, like election rigging, etc.), it nonetheless shows that, for each of these newspapers, fewer than half of their stories overtly focused on these negative stories.

This might also be because only six newspapers have been studied from only three countries and for just two months. It might also reflect and reinforce the fact that mediated portrayals of Africa or other regions of the world in the international media vary depending on ‘events’ and not so much on a standardized ‘Western script’ to happily chronicle ‘apocalypse’ with regard to Africa. This event-centred logic can be seen, for instance, in the relatively high levels of focused coverage given to terrorism, because, as indicated earlier, during the period studied, parts of Eastern and Western Africa experienced recurrent terrorist attacks and kidnapping of Westerners.

What about some of the main discourses about Africa in these media; did they, as Berger found, also ‘reinforce essentialist stereotypes’? This is examined below.

**Talking about Africa: Mediated discourses**

To find out how Africa was ‘talked about’ in these newspapers, following Berger (2010), I first looked specifically at any evaluative comment about Africa; a country; Africans in general or a collective of Africans like ‘African leaders’ to find out what kinds of discourses are there. I also looked at subtle discourses which may conjure particular interpretations of a country, region or people.

Without distinction, I looked at these discourses from direct statements made by journalists or the writers of the articles themselves as well as quotations from sources. I did this principally because, as Berger (2010: 174) argued,

> To the extent that the content was evidently deemed fit for publication, the discourse is ‘mediated’ even though much is often verbatim from sources rather than subjected to specifically journalistic significations. However, by being made manifest within the media, the discourse’s assumptions are promoted uncritically in the public arena…

So, what kinds of discourses about Africa emerged into the public arena through these six newspapers? In reading through all the evaluative extracts,
what emerges is that, similarly to the points made earlier; the representations vary significantly, more often influenced by the country being written about. These discourses range from praising the flora and fauna of Africa as well as selected countries for their governance records to the decrying of the spread of HIV/AIDS, undemocratic governments and terrorism in Africa. So, for instance, from the *Washington Post*, one can read that South Africa makes some ‘delicious wines, especially whites, and can make a case for producing some of the world’s best chenin blancs’. In the same *Washington Post*, one reads that South Africa has ‘remarkable, resilient citizens’ who ‘seem capable of anything or perhaps of everything’ but that ‘four great barriers stand’ on their way to progress: ‘corruption is pervasive at both local and national levels’; ‘crime is a daily threat to blacks and white alike and is fed by staggeringly high unemployment among youths’; the country’s educational system is ‘a national disaster’ and ‘finally, one in eight South Africans is infected with HIV and an estimated 350,000 a year are being added to the 3 million believed to have died from the disease’.

What we see above from just one newspaper is a mixed picture of South Africa: producer of good wines; resilient and ‘remarkable’ citizens; but a country where, from the next lines, it seems everything is in chaos. Such mediated images of South Africa confirm Berger’s findings quoted earlier, and this, overall, captures the central mediated discourses about Africa from these media.

As pointed out above, these discourses are also country-specific. *The Washington Post*, for instance, contrasts Zimbabwe with Botswana, where, unlike in Zimbabwe, the government of Botswana, according to the newspaper, has ‘prudently managed the country’s mineral wealth, resulting in decades of economic growth and infrastructure development’. The Democratic Republic of Congo is presented by the paper, for instance, as the ‘rape capital of the world’ and Somalia is a ‘failed African state’ with a ‘war-torn’ and ‘lawless’ capital.

As another example, the main discourses about Cameroon from these newspapers conjure these direct and subtle ways in which particular regions or countries are presented. In the *Washington Post*, for instance, Cameroon is described as a country located in a region ‘known for spawning autocratic regimes that often enforce censorship through violent intimidation’ and the country’s ‘substantial oil wealth revenues’ are being ‘pocketed by wealthy supporters of the president’. When a plane carrying an Australian business tycoon crashed on its way to Congo from Cameroon, *The Daily Telegraph* headlined that ‘Mining Executives Perish after Plane Goes Missing over African Jungle’, and, when a British researcher was murdered in Cameroon, *The Daily Telegraph* once more headlined: ‘British Gorilla Expert Killed in Machete Attack in Cameroon.’

While the discourse describing politics and society in Cameroon from *Washington Post* is more direct, that from *The Daily Telegraph* headlines are more subtle, but, once these subtle messages are merged, they paint a picture
of Cameroon as being located inside a bush, a ‘jungle’, a frightening place where perhaps ‘machete-wielding’ vandals parade the streets.

These discourses about South Africa, Botswana, Somalia and Cameroon which have been highlighted here as examples from the data are important in unravelling the broader issue concerning Africa’s mediated portrayals in the selected Western newspapers for at least two reasons. First, they both support the as yet inconclusive findings now prevalent in the literature that Western media portrayal of Africa is, indeed, mixed. At times, these are deemed ‘positive’, and at other times, they are also deemed to be ‘reinforcing stereotypes’ about Africa as a backward, poverty-stricken and violent place. But what the case of Botswana and the discussions indicated above about mediated thematic diversity show is that certain generalizations need to be watered down.

Second, these discourses also raise the perennial question of whether these reported incidents or mental images that are conjured up by such discourses are not actually true. Looking across Africa, it seems apparent that, while there are indeed ‘resilient and remarkable’ people and governments, there are also issues, ranging from corruption to insecurity, that plague ordinary Africans every day. Perhaps a cross-section of South Africans or Cameroonians will readily agree with the portrait drawn of their countries by the *Washington Post*. Furthermore, the ‘reality check’ regarding these discourses also touches on another issue worth emphasizing. Scott (2009) has recently shown how African media coverage of Africa is also tainted by similar discourses to the Western media coverage of Africa. Anybody following the Cameroonian media scene, for instance, will know that what the *Washington Post* wrote about Cameroon constitutes an almost daily staple of the media in Cameroon. Front pages of newspapers are awash daily with stories of corruption, crime and insecurity, poverty, and repressions of basic democratic rights. These seem to suggest that the tendency for some scholars (especially of African descent) to take a ‘moral high ground’ to ‘pounce’ on the Western media for excessively covering issues like corruption, crime and insecurity in Africa also needs to be watered down.

**Conclusion**

On 2 March 2013, *The Economist* published a special report titled ‘Emerging Africa’, in which it recognized Africa as ‘the world’s poorest continent’ but went on to brand Africa, among others, as a continent that is ‘rising’ and ‘hopeful’. For anybody versed in recent scholarly discussions about mainstream Western media coverage of Africa, this March 2013 special report from *The Economist*, in particular, is nothing but a *volte face* and a ‘non-conformist’ perspective on dominant views of mainstream Western media coverage of Africa. *The Economist* itself acknowledged this – perhaps remembering clearly how it had thrice famously and prominently called Africa a
‘hopeless’ and ‘Dark Continent’ in 1995, 2000 and 2009 (see Ginsberg, 2010: 193–4 for a discussion of these particular discourses from The Economist).

Given these earlier discourses of Africa as ‘hopeless’ and as a ‘basket case’, the South African government strongly hoped and argued that South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup would constitute an opportunity to ‘repudiate negative images and perspectives of Africa common in the media’ – especially the Western media (Tomlinson et al., 2009 as cited in Tomlinson et al., 2011: 40).

The central objective of this chapter has been to check empirically how Africa was eventually covered in selected mainstream Western newspapers in the period leading up to, during and immediately after the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Through an analysis of two months of coverage of Africa in The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, Le Monde and Le Figaro, this chapter has shown that there was a more complex and diversified coverage of Africa in these newspapers, with some clearly noticeable differences in the level of country-based thematic diversity.

Even though this study did not examine these newspapers’ coverage of Africa long before the 2010 FIFA World Cup and then both during and after the tournament, on the basis of prior research, especially looking at the coverage of South Africa before and during the tournament, the findings of this study do not seem to convey a clear picture that South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup had a tremendous impact or was a uniquely different period, as far as the mediated representations of Africa in the Western mainstream media are concerned. The cases of Ghana and Swaziland, examined above, also portray clearly the limited ‘quantitative or qualitative visibility spillover effects’ from South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

Academic scrutiny of Western media coverage of Africa is absolutely important (Scott, 2009: 556), but, looking at the dominant literature in the field, it seems that there is perhaps a need for a more pragmatic engagement with the analyses of our phenomena of interest. To do this effectively, these three key realist statements from previous studies on international news flows need to be on scholars’ minds all the time:

a) Okigbo’s (1995: 109) assertion that we need to acknowledge that, whether in Africa, Europe or America, ‘it is in the nature of journalism’ to focus on both the ‘unusual’ and the things that are going wrong in a society
b) Chang’s (1998: 528) blunt assertion that ‘all countries are not created equal to be news in international communication’ and
c) Wu’s (2000: 110) assertion that ‘not all countries can be covered everyday by the news media’.

Having these pointers in mind can actually help to nuance some of the broad assertions and oftentimes legitimate concerns that are raised in
analyses about the way the Western media portray Africa, not least because, with more than 50 different countries of varying sizes, histories and connections to the West in particular and the international system as whole, adequately covering the whole of Africa in a regular and comprehensive way understandably poses a challenge to any news media, whether in Africa or, more so, in the ‘distant’ West.

Finally, as far as South Africa’s hopes and claims about the mediated visibility results of the 2010 FIFA World Cup for Africa are concerned, the findings presented in this chapter seem to suggest that connections between hosting a mega-sporting event like the FIFA World Cup in Africa and significant alternations in the mediated portrayals of a region should not be easily assumed.

On the contrary, given the obvious tendency of the mainstream media in the West (and in Africa) to focus on ‘negative stories’ about the continent, such as corruption, crime/insecurity, poverty and disease, it might actually be more fruitful for African governments to change their mediated portrayals by attacking, in a determined manner, these ‘media menus’. The case of Botswana, cited earlier, seems to suggest that this can work.

In an op-ed piece published by The New York Times on 12 June 2010, one day after the start of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, Pierre Englebert, a professor of African politics at Pomona College, argued that

African states that begin to provide their citizens with basic rights and services, that curb violence and that once again commit resources to development projects would be rewarded with re-recognition by the international community. Aid would return. More important, these states would finally have acquired some degree of popular accountability and domestic legitimacy.

Pursuing this line of argument recently, and in an argument appropriate to the overall theme of this chapter, Holtzhausen and Fullerton (2013: 12) recently concluded their study on the longer-term effects of South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup on the country’s reputation by poignantly arguing that

Finally, to improve its reputation, the South African government will need to clearly articulate its competitive advantage on the African continent and set itself apart from other countries in Africa. But in the final analysis, it is the country’s leaders who are responsible for a country’s reputation. If South African leaders cannot address issues of poverty, disease and violence in the country itself or distance themselves from actions that portray poor leadership, as Anholt (2010) contends, no strategic communications campaign or no mega-event will improve the country’s reputation (emphasis added).
The lesson above is as instructive and valid for South Africa as it is for the rest of Africa. The hosting of mega-events can be a significant opportunity for the host country to momentarily and forcefully articulate and reflect, through diverse forms, a sense of national unity, identity and ambition. But, just as Tan and Ma (2013) argued recently, while the hosting of a mega-event can increase the mediated visibility of a country, it does not necessarily follow that, qualitatively speaking, this visibility will be positive. These arguments, as well as the broader analyses presented in this chapter, suggest that it takes more than the hosting of a mega-event for a country or region to create, project and maintain a positive and sustainable national or regional identity.

Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their useful corrections and suggestions.

Appendix: Code descriptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Accidents/tragedies</td>
<td>The article focuses on issues like car accidents; boat sinking; collapse of buildings/bridges leading to loss of life, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Armed conflict</td>
<td>The article focuses on armed conflict within a country or between countries and no reference is made to words like ‘terrorism, terror’. An example would be the Darfur conflict and the conflict in the DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Arts and culture</td>
<td>The article focuses on things like African art and culture, broadly speaking: for instance, African music; novelists; painters; cultural shows/exhibitions. Also to be included are articles focusing on reviews of books or other media programmes about Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Crime/insecurity</td>
<td>The article focuses on an activity framed as a criminal act (for instance, cocaine trafficking in Guinea); burglaries; murders; piracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Domestic issues</td>
<td>The article focuses on aspects such as the politics in the country; development policies or challenges; court cases held in the country, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Economy/business</td>
<td>The article focuses on the economy, bilateral or multilateral trade; companies, business deals; economic growth, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Environment/natural resources</td>
<td>The article focuses on issues like nature; animals; parks; environmental impacts of industries; the discovery of minerals; managing a country’s natural resources, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>The article focuses on HIV/AIDS and other diseases, in particular the toll; how people are living with disease; health policies of governments, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Human interest</td>
<td>The article focuses on things like birthdays of public figures/celebrities or an out-of-the-ordinary report like chimpanzees stealing tourists’ food on beaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Humanitarian crises</td>
<td>The article focuses on crises like famine; refugees in need of help; orphans in need of help, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>International justice</td>
<td>The article focuses on any legal issue concerning an African country but which is taking place outside Africa, for instance, the trial of Taylor at The Hague; the indictment of the Sudanese president; or the trial of the company charged with discharging toxic wastes in Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>International relations</td>
<td>The article focuses on diplomatic relationship between two countries or more; on the relationship between a country and an international organization like the UN or its agencies, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Natural disaster</td>
<td>The article focuses on things like earthquakes, viruses or locusts attacking food crops, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Obituary</td>
<td>The article focuses on the death of an African but goes further to refer to things that portray the deceased’s country, region or Africa in a particular way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>The article focuses on religious beliefs; inter-religious relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Science and technology</td>
<td>The article focuses on technology like the use of mobile phones in Africa; the importance of telemedicine in Africa; academic research findings, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>The article focuses on a sporting event involving an African country or focuses on an African athlete, etc., but contains information that talks about the athlete's country or region. With regard to football, the tournament in focus must not be the 2010 FIFA World Cup.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18. **Terrorism**  
The article clearly mentions terrorism as focus; talks about suicide bombings; the ‘global war on terror’; plans to fight terrorism; hostage-taking that is clearly talked about as being undertaken by a ‘terrorist group’.

19. **Tourism**  
The article focuses on describing a tourist site or trip in Africa; gives tourist-focused information like best places to eat, what to watch out for, etc.

20. **Other**  
Any other article that cannot clearly fit into any of the categories above.

**Notes**

1. It is important to point out that the discussions about the ways and impacts of mainstream Western media coverage of Africa are not ‘exclusive’ to the region. Several other scholars have shown that other non-Western regions, such as Asia, the Middle East or Latin America, ‘suffer the same fate’ as Africa (see, for instance, Mawdsley, 2008; Al Nashmi *et al.*, 2010; Cao, 2011, 2012; Chuang and Roemer, 2013). Similarly and interestingly, the few studies examining African media coverage of international news suggest that, since the news media in Africa tend to get their foreign news from news agencies based in the West, their coverage of Africa is actually not too different from that of mainstream Western media (see, for instance, Nwuneli and Udoh, 1982; Okigbo, 1985; Scott, 2009).

2. See the Appendix for a description of the codes which I used as a guide to code the articles.

3. Somaliland is a self-proclaimed breakaway state from Somalia, and, given the de facto separate attention given to it both in the media and in policy circles, I have indicated it here as a separate region from Somalia.

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Of Sunsets, Savagery and Soccer: Framing Africa during the Final Days of the 2010 World Cup

Bernadine Jones

Introduction

As Chimamanda Adichie (2009) described, stereotyping a nation flattens the experiences of a diverse people. Their histories and practices become indistinguishable, and the homogeneous ideal of ‘Africa’ is born: war-torn, disease-ridden, a continent of failed states, a place of mysterious peoples and majestic animals. Western, particularly American and British, news frames Africa negatively, with a go-to list of ‘symbolism that convinces the Western media audience that indeed what is being viewed, read or written is “African” ’ (Kromah, 2002). News media appear to contribute significantly to this skewed perception of African realities and symbolism (Kromah, 2002; Berger, 2010: 182; Ginsberg, 2010: 199). De Beer (2010: 598) calls this ‘go-to’ list an Afro-pessimism code book, which entails common stereotypes of conflict, famine, entrenched poverty, failed democracy, and so forth. Spurr (1994) defines this Afro-pessimistic discourse as the ‘rhetoric of empire’ – extending control over a post-colonial country through the language and imagery used to represent it.

South Africa’s crowning moment, the FIFA 2010 World Cup, was documented in acute televisual interest prior to and throughout the month-long event. Did the broadcast journalists use audio and visual signs to depict South Africa as their predecessors had done for centuries? Was Africa’s ‘crowning moment’ seen through the Afro-pessimistic lens of hopelessness, savagery, disease, poverty and corruption, or through positive images of a country teeming with wild animals, statuesque natives and beautiful sunsets? Could South Africa’s first World Cup finally be the mould-breaker that changed perceptions of the nation?

The lasting effect of the World Cup depends, in part, on how the local and international community perceives the country and the event, and this study gives a snapshot of the journalistic perspectives of South Africa’s biggest and brightest event to date. Perry (1985: 609) suggests that
unrepresentative imagery of a nation can lead to inaccurate ‘top-of-the-head’ judgements made by tourists and investors alike. A skewed perception of South Africa’s ability to host and benefit from the World Cup could affect the lasting legacy of the event. At first glance, the World Cup appeared to be a positive event for South Africa, strengthening the economy and its reputation for investment. Digging deeper, however, this positivity and enthusiasm for ‘Africa’s first World Cup’ was tainted with essentialist and reductive stereotypes.

Common themes of African representation

A consistent thread that remains throughout the decades of representation is a perception of Africa as homogeneous, exotic and dangerous (Hammond & Jablow, 1992; Jarosz, 1992; Louw, 2009: 157; Berger, 2010). Themes most prominent among the literature are those where journalists classify African experiences and circumstances into binaries of ‘success’ or ‘disappointment’ of Westernization, and an opposition of Afro-pessimistic and Sunshine Journalism.

Promise and disappointment

In discussing the rhetoric of empire, David Spurr (1994: 19) argues that Western narratives tend to divide Africa into ‘showing promise for [an idealized] Westernized development’ or that there is a ‘disappointment of that promise. The representation of a non-Western culture seems to be predominantly based on the ‘lack’ of Westernization (ibid: 107). Louw (2009: 157) agrees that Western values are hegemonic to the rest of the world, deemed right and proper, ‘valid and incontestable’. Westernization is desirable; anything else is invalid or odd.

Control of the subordinate culture or country is often seen in what Spurr (1994: 38) calls the ‘rhetoric of appropriation’, whereby passive grammatical construction of African discourse and action ‘leaves unnamed the agents and means of pacification and control’. He argues that, when Africans are ‘[g]azed upon, they are denied the power of the gaze; spoken to, they are denied the power to speak freely’ (ibid: 13).

Africans depicted in these narrow frames of reference are, therefore, perpetually kept in a position of subservience to this ‘Westernized development’ ideal, and, without voice or agency to speak, are unable to criticize this portrayal. This style of post-colonial rhetoric was the most prevalent theme throughout the narration of the event, hinting at a deeper notion of lingering Western control, even during ‘Africa’s crowning moment’.

Afro-pessimism and Sunshine Journalism

De B’Beri and Louw (2011) and Wasserman and De Beer (2009), among others, show that Afro-pessimism permeates news out of Africa, and many
scholars call for a new approach to the way Africa is framed in Western news (Hunter-Gault, 2006; Berger, 2010; De Beer, 2010). Enough with the dark, dangerous, disease-ridden stereotypes built from the bones of colonial imagery, they shout; give some time instead to the positive portrayals of Africa. A crucial characteristic of Afro-pessimism is the belief that Africa can never do well, despite its best efforts or intervention from an outside source (Evans, 2011: 400). Afro-pessimism may reflect Afro-reality (ibid.), but Khor (2010: 41) suggests that continual negative coverage such as this could be due to Western short-sightedness (she calls it ‘Eurocentric Myopia’), echoing Louw’s (2009: 157) hegemonic Western values argument.

Versfeld, Kruger and Smith (1996) and Kuper and Kuper (2001) would argue that Sunshine Journalism may counteract much of this pessimism, but may, indeed, be equally flawed. Sunshine Journalism focuses only on the good aspects, such as the financial success of the World Cup, the joy and exhilaration of the fans, for example, and ignores the negative. The concern here is that Sunshine Journalism is still a biased stereotype and not a balanced reflection. Like mysticism or noble savagery themes, Sunshine Journalism may be equally damaging in representing a complex nation, because it is still, as Adichie (2009) proclaims, a ‘single story’: flattening, reducing and unrepresentative.

This chapter presents a view of the World Cup through television news. It is a snapshot of a few television news broadcasts that appeared towards the end of the event and mentioned the legacy of the World Cup. While this is a qualitative sample of a small timeframe, the study of each broadcast’s underlying narratives is pertinent to the way the World Cup and its legacy were framed on foreign and local news channels.

**Method of analysis**

**Television news**

Television news is a difficult medium to analyse due to the juxtaposition of audio and image. Several have attempted a systematic analysis using semiotic, discourse and content analyses (Chandler, 1994a; Dueck, 1995; Berger, 2010, for instance), but investigation is awkward without a specific methodological approach. As Montgomery (2007: 96) suggests, television news is best analysed by adhering to two simultaneous rules:

A primary principle of intelligibility of the televisual discourse of news reports may be formulated as follows: Rule 1: For any referring expression in the verbal track, search for a relevant referent in the image track. Conversely... a secondary and complementary principle might be formulated thus: Rule 2: Treat any element depicted in a shot in the visual track as a potential referent for a referring expression in the verbal track.
Each broadcast transcription used this juxtaposition method, and the visuals, discourse and gestures were then subjected to paradigmatic analysis (described by Chandler, 1994a) and social semiotic frames (such as demand/offer opposites from Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2005: 126). This method proved helpful in deciphering underlying messages and meanings.

Sample dates

The sample broadcasts were taken over five days across the closing ceremony of the World Cup, 9–13 July 2010. Four news channels were sampled, chosen for their availability on the Digital Satellite Television (DSTV), South Africa’s leading satellite provider platform and their coverage of the World Cup (Sky News, for example, was left out, as little coverage existed after England were beaten by Germany in the quarter-final play-off, an interesting point in itself). World Cup coverage occurred for many months, but ‘legacy’-style coverage tended to occur more towards the end of the event, hence the sample dates.

Sample broadcasts

Relevant broadcasts entailed any mention of the World Cup legacy and South Africa’s hosting of the World Cup. The most pertinent examples of the World Cup-related broadcasts and those that suggest the impact on the World Cup’s legacy are presented here. Al Jazeera’s Field of Dreams commented on the impact the event had on South Africa’s poorest community, while the BBC’s A Lasting Legacy asked various South Africans how the event had transformed their lives. CNN’s coverage was limited to a shallow, soft-news commentary on South African landscapes, wildlife and football games, but McKenzie’s Road Trip hinted at the underlying legacy discussion through discourse and imagery. Finally, South Africa’s own eNews channel gave little introspection about the World Cup or its legacy. Two broadcasts towards the end of the event were important, and add depth to the study because of their local perspectives.

Focus

Two pertinent questions needed to be asked of these broadcasts in order to determine the narratives about the World Cup legacy: What common themes were used during the sample? The literature on common African stereotypes was helpful here. How does the use of these themes on television news impact the world’s view of the World Cup and South Africa as a nation? Discourse and semiotic analysis uncovered the deeper meanings behind the broadcasts and the speculation on the World Cup’s legacy.
The broadcasts

Al Jazeera’s ‘Field of Dreams’

Al Jazeera English was chosen as a second, ‘non-Western’ news channel for this sample. A hypothesis was that Al Jazeera would be more sympathetic to representing the World Cup without Afro-pessimistic frames because of its aim to equalize the perceived imbalance of information flow between the South and the North. Correspondent Jonah Hull’s Field of Dreams (Hull 2010), broadcast on 10 July, shows a comment on the World Cup’s impact on township residents, and exists as an example of the channel’s overall depiction of the event: as a ‘glitzy’ affair that has no tangible impact on the real inhabitants of South Africa, who are poverty-stricken township dwellers forever stuck in their circumstances, despite ‘Africa’s first World Cup’.

Anchor David Foster opens the broadcast, standing outside a small Alexandra football stadium that is noisy with football fans. He mentions the visibly contrasting wealth and poverty aspects of the World Cup in South Africa, and subtly implies that the World Cup acts as a kind of cure for the threat of xenophobic violence:

David Foster: We’re in the Alexandra township in Johannesburg, one of the poorest neighbourhoods in this part of South Africa, and where in 2008 there was terrible ethnic violence; well contrast those scenes with what we’ve got here behind us... The whole idea of the festival is to bring together people from different backgrounds, mostly disadvantaged backgrounds, from all over the world and to get them to play together and work together. To be friends.

Foster tacitly explores the idea that football has moved the country away from violent xenophobia to a ‘Football of Hope’ tournament, to enable players ‘to be friends’. This framing hints at a narrative concurrent through most news channels in this sample: the FIFA 2010 World Cup was responsible for the calm, celebration, social cohesion and hope that South Africa experienced during this event.

Finally, Foster leads into Hull’s story: ‘Now if you think this is far removed from all the glitz and glamour we’re going to see on Sunday in Soccer City’s final, take a look at this.’ Foster positions the audience as ‘viewer’, gazer, a detached onlooker onto a scene of devastation.

The imagined field

Hull calls the small dust pitch located on the Alexandra rubbish dumps a ‘Field of Dreams’, alluding to the similarly named American film that validates dreams and hope. In Hull’s broadcast, township youngsters from the surrounding shacks play an imaginary World Cup match. During the package, Hull interviews two young black players, Fabian and Tebogo, and asks
them what they want to be when they grow up. ‘Footballers’, they enthuse. There is a sense of childhood innocence here, but in the next shot Hull shatters this frame, as he reminds the viewers that these boys live in deplorable conditions: ‘the stench of burning refuse is eye-watering’, Hull says, as the camera pans down from the boys to a pile of burning rubbish.

Manifestly, the intention was to, perhaps, present the township soccer game as a magical escapist outlet for the children living in abject poverty. Through a careful analysis of symbolism and juxtaposition, however, the latent meaning appears to show a hopeless, pitiful and shameful situation for a people who will never leave the rubbish dump, despite their best efforts, and who barely feel the World Cup’s ‘uplifting’ presence.

Poverty and the World Cup

When Fair and Parks (2001: 49) spoke of the West’s perception of African poverty, they described it as ‘dirty, unhealthy, and diseased’. Hull’s package presents the kind of poverty evident on this ‘Field of Dreams’ as just that: the scale and depth of the appalling poverty are shocking, enhanced, in part, by the dialectical editing. Shots of chubby babies and wide-smiling youth appear next to images of burning refuse and dirty shacks. The poverty experienced by these township dwellers is deplorable, but, crucially, it also appears entirely opposite to the imagined ideals of the Western ‘glitz and glamour’ World Cup.

Towards the end of the package, Hull describes the sprawling township homes as ‘tumble-down shacks’, surrounded by rubbish, grazing pigs and young children in ripped clothing, a tableau starkly juxtaposed against backdrop of the Johannesburg skyline. Emphasizing the township’s close proximity to a capitalistic centre indicates the opposites contained within this package – the hope for capitalism/the reality of poverty, the promise of Westernization/African existence, subsistence living/concentrated wealth – and exemplifies the difference between Foster’s ‘glitz and glamour’ description of the World Cup and the reality experienced by children in townships in South Africa.

Antithesis of the West

Hull employs a fairly common frame of reference of portraying Africans within his package. Through the use of juxtaposition between discourse and image, Africans appear as the antithesis of Western expectations: Africans often exist, as Spurr (1994: 19) explains, as the ultimate ‘disappointment of the promise of Westernisation’. The ‘tumble-down shacks’ and rubbish dumps are filthy, but a ‘hope that another life is possible’, as Hull says, propels the black teenagers to participate in the Westernized football tournament. Western ideals adorn this ‘Field of Dreams’, from the starched England flags on tin shacks to old adverts for the ‘traditionally white sport
of rugby (Black & Nauright, 1988: 10) used for building supplies. These signifiers suggest that the ‘another life’ of which Hull speaks is a Western life, away from the dirt and despair of this African existence.

The Western football tournament is ‘glitz and glamour’, but Africans play a different style of football, on dusty pitches, barefoot, and with ripped clothing. Hull reflects a perhaps accurate image of Fabian and Tebogo, but, crucially, this image is a stereotype of African football. Young black boys who want to play football on the continent inevitably start out playing on a dusty pitch, shoeless, surrounded by sunsets and tin shacks. Ian Hawkey (2009: 57) argues that this image of the African soccer player has ‘for decades been the staple assignment of visiting photojournalists’.

While these residents hope and dream for a ‘better life’, constructed from the remains of a Western world, there appears no solution to their poverty. Babies are left in the filth, the children pick at rubbish when they are not playing football, and parents live a meagre hand-to-mouth existence. Little appears to be hopeful for these residents. The situation is a hopeless entanglement of deep-seated poverty, disease and filth, which the World Cup has no hope of alleviating.

**Representing the real?**

World Cup journalists may argue that their broadcasts merely reflect already-evident experiences within South Africa, such as the poverty in Johannesburg. The concern here is not whether they reflect this reality accurately, but how they choose to present it.

Juxtaposition is powerful in this package. Showing this poverty in a dedicated broadcast during the World Cup is, perhaps, an attempt at reminding the world of the reality many poor South Africans experience. This poverty does exist in South Africa, and in abundance. Framing these poverty-stricken people, however, through the title of the package – ‘Field of Dreams’ – and with David Foster’s introductory kernel attached, moves what might have been an observation of reality into a judgement of the township resident’s lifestyle and the World Cup’s impact (or lack thereof) on their experiences. The hope that exists here is ‘imagined’; the football played by Fabian and Tebogo is stereotyped; the World Cup’s fecundity is a fleeting and distant view for South Africa’s poor.

**BBC World’s “A Lasting Legacy”**

The experience of the World Cup was seen on the BBC mostly through white Western eyes, with the black African majority population having little voice. When black people were interviewed, it was for their opinions on the games, on its localized effect, and on their support of Bafana Bafana. Few were positioned as ‘experts’, as white Westerners were in turn. Experiences of local South Africans during the tournament, such as live broadcasts from
the Newtown cultural hub hours before the final kick-off, provided journalists with an opportunity to interview locals, but few did so. The viewpoint was solidly from a Western ideology to an African reality; no normalization occurred during these crossings.

Hunter-Gault (2006: 112) considers the journalistic ability to ‘come in right’ a key characteristic of truthful and candid journalism when reporting from an other’s perspective. In order to practise ‘coming in right’, she says, it is necessary to use local sources, local language and local perspectives to represent a local story. She argues that there is a disturbingly prevalent use of reliance on Western perspectives when reporting on African news. Molefe’s (2004) ‘African voice’ for African representations is needed, apparently, to contradict what Khor (2010: 41) terms ‘Eurocentric Myopia’ during African representation on the news:

The privileged access that a European voice has to press coverage can, consequently, guarantee that his compelling picture of Africa, whether it is true or not, runs the risk of defining Africa to the world. The result can be another colonizing gaze albeit from a post-colonial generation.

The subject of the story has no agency in their own narrative: they do not tell their own story, but the viewer is, instead, guided through the foreign terrain by a recognizably Western source. This shifts the focus from ‘engage’ to ‘gaze’. In Andrew Harding’s *A Lasting Legacy* (Harding, 2010), there is a lack of South African agency in creating a Westernized space, with entrepreneurship, multiculturalism, peace and general improvement attributed to the World Cup’s presence in the country.

Harding investigates the ‘legacy’ of the World Cup on 9 July, using multiple vox pops and interviews to portray the rate of change evident in South Africa during, and due to, the World Cup. Interviewees include entrepreneur Mahleni Majolo, who has been ‘hauled out of poverty’; an elderly white male bowls player, who is ‘worried’ about various issues in the country; a white Afrikaner man pictured with a silent black woman and girl walking around a stadium; and a severe-looking black adolescent in the middle of a squalid township explaining how the World Cup has changed nothing for him.

Although Harding’s report was interesting semiotically, from the camera angles and shot scale to the juxtaposition of image and language, the key element in representing the World Cup’s impact on South Africa was the use of passive construction in spoken sentences, discovered through discourse analysis.

**Passivity**

A consistent thread in Harding’s report is that the World Cup has transformed the residents of South Africa. Agency is removed from the residents and placed onto the event through the passive construction of sentences.
Spurr (1994: 38) suggests that one of the ways Africans are invalidated in action and kept in subservience is through language: the verb is neutralized and hidden, ‘obscure[ing] the nature of concrete action’, a process he calls the ‘rhetoric of appropriation’ (ibid.). A discourse analysis of Harding’s report illustrates this process.

When Andrew Harding introduces entrepreneur Mahleni Majolo, the journalist does so with the precursor that June/July was a ‘miraculous month’ for South Africa, and asks: ‘but how much has the tournament really changed the country?’ Thus, when Harding exclaims ‘some entrepreneurs have been hauled out of poverty’, South Africans seem to need outside intervention (FIFA, the World Cup, tourists) in order to attain the ‘promise of Westernisation’ (Spurr, 1994: 19) – becoming a successful entrepreneur.

Andrew Harding: Some entrepreneurs have been hauled out of poverty. Mahleni Majolo was jobless, in a squatter camp. Now his catering business is thriving.

The transformation here is from Majolo’s undesirable existence from ‘jobless’ and living in a squatter camp to having a desirable ‘thriving’ catering business (Figure 13.1). This ‘miraculous’ transformation appears to originate from an outside source, and so, when Harding suggests Majolo has been hauled out of poverty, the inference is that the World Cup, an outside helper, has come to drag him out of the dire circumstances in which he would otherwise be stuck.

Harding introduces another interviewee, the white Afrikaner, as a ‘conservative’ man who has seemingly put aside a racial past because of the World Cup (Figure 13.2).

![Figure 13.1 Majolo’s ‘thriving’ business. Permission given by BBC Africa](image)
Andrew Harding: This tournament has helped forge some unlikely friendships. Conservative Afrikaners and Apartheid struggle veterans volunteering together.

Afrikaner: My eyes were opened in a way that I’ve never thought that I would become such big friends with people who had different cultures and different outlook on life.

Harding categorically links the World Cup event to the transformation of South African society, but provides airtime to the Afrikaner’s passive voice: ‘My eyes were opened’. The inference here is that, without the World Cup, the conservative Afrikaners would still be separate from other races, metaphorically ‘blind’. It seems due to the World Cup’s presence in South Africa that the bridge between races, cultures and creeds can finally be built. The Afrikaner and the veterans presumably chose to volunteer and thus met through the World Cup, but here the agency of action is not on the South Africans but instead on an outside source, the World Cup.

As a closing statement to the broadcast, Harding makes one final passive inflection.

Andrew Harding: A fractious nation, re-energized.

More interesting than Harding’s inference that South Africa is fractious, crotchety, or perhaps disobedient, is his final denial of agency at the broadcast’s close: South Africa has been transformed and re-energized; they have not done this themselves.

Indeed, it is not just discourse that is constructed through the passive voice in Harding’s broadcast. The interviewees all speak through voice-over, with their impassive faces in medium to close-up shot (Figures 13.3–13.6,
Figure 13.3 White bowls player

Figure 13.4 Majolo

Figure 13.5 White Afrikaner

Figure 13.6 Township youth
permission for use given by BBC Africa). They are denied a direct voice, gazed upon by an audience.

Passivity is the over-riding theme in this broadcast. These South Africans presumably attempt to create a better life for themselves: Majolo wants a ‘thriving’ catering business, the Afrikaner wants non-racial friendships, and the country wants a sense of coherence. Indeed, South Africa was changed for the better thanks to the World Cup, and Harding may simply have tried to reflect that reality. Crucially, however, instead of depicting South Africans as working with the World Cup to change their circumstances, Harding’s broadcast denies the residents any responsibility in their actions, and this is problematic. South Africans do not seem to have the wherewithal to enact any change on their own, flattening their experiences into a pitiful child-like stature. This image intimates the popular idea of a people ‘unable to speak for themselves and waiting to be saved by a kind, white foreigner’ (Adichie, 2009) while echoing Spurr’s (1994: 38) ‘rhetoric of appropriation’. Harding’s journalistic representation is the opposite of Hunter-Gault’s ‘coming in right’ philosophy.

Help required

The discourse of passivity propels the speaker from attempting to create a better life straight into having little or no agency in this change of direction, his actions or his desires. The subject of the clause is missing or hidden through passive construction, but there should be no misgivings about it being anything other than the World Cup. Without this tournament’s presence in the country, none of these changes would have occurred. The subtle judgement in moving or obscuring the subject of the clause could be about the country’s ability to even host such a prestigious event: if this country needs help with such things, how could it be expected to succeed in creating a successful space for a Western football event, or even continuing the legacy of Western success (entrepreneurship, multiculturalism, enthusiasm and peace)?

While Harding’s package was the only one to use such obvious creative methods to depict the World Cup, other reports do show the experience of the event in a similar manner. CNN dedicated much of its broadcasts during the sample to stories on the periphery of the World Cup – a game ranger playing soccer in Skukuza, a journalist’s road trip from Cape Town to Soccer City, and bungee jumping from the Moses Mabida stadium. It was the road trip conducted by David McKenzie that most hinted at CNN’s view of the World Cup legacy potential within South Africa.

CNN’s ‘Road Trip’

CNN’s South African journalist David McKenzie stated that he wanted to ‘bring South Africa to the world’, and conducted a 5,000-km trip around the
Global Media Narratives

country in a campervan (McKenzie, 2010). Braving harsh winds and wintery rain, the journalist and his small crew visited ‘Africa’s southern-most football pitch’ in Cape Agulhas, an old Transkei-Natal bridge with a local reciting apartheid stories, Mandela’s hometown, a Skukuza game ranger who plays football on the weekends, and a Xhosa grandmother in Qunu. These stories were split into multiple broadcasts over three weeks, spilling over into various programmes including Backstory, Inside Africa and World Sport. While his stories had little to do with the World Cup directly, this is in itself an interesting point, as it depicts what CNN assumed were the important topics to present to its audience during the World Cup period. The overall tone of the CNN coverage was for the most part convivial, with journalists getting caught up in the festivities live on camera. Little of the impact of the World Cup was mentioned, however, with journalists preferring to talk to rural inhabitants about their daily lives, rather than what they thought about the tournament. CNN’s depiction of the World Cup during the sample skims over any real representation, aside from football scores, vuvuzela-blowing and loud fan-fests. David McKenzie’s Road Trip stories reflect that tone.

The same formula

Relatively little is said in McKenzie’s stories regarding the context of the games, the impact of the event or the experiences of the people on the ground. Wild animals, elderly black men and women, schools in Cape Town, living in the old Transkei, all these were programmes about the World Cup on CNN. The ‘route to the World Cup’ actually had little ‘World Cup’ in it.

McKenzie at one stage visited an octogenarian Xhosa grandmother and focused on the tabloid journalistic interests of sex, food, clothing and dancing. Despite the World Cup being the sole reason for such a broadcast, McKenzie hardly mentions the event in his encounters with her. CNN’s perspective of South Africa appears to be as a distant, disengaged ‘tourist’, rather than engaging with locals.

The World Cup on the CNN sample is seen through speeding car windows and brief breaks in strange places, and has seemingly little or no impact on the host country. While CNN was the least pessimistic of all the sampled channels, it was also the least actively engaged with the event. The lack of discussion or relation of the World Cup to South African perspectives is concerning. There is no judgement of the impact of the tournament, let alone adequate depiction of the individuals who engage with or participate in it. Unrepresentative news about a country may eventually lead to an unrepresentative global image of that country. Audiences may then use this unrepresentative information to make inaccurate top-of-the-head judgements about the country (Perry, 1985: 609). Without a balanced depiction of the impact of the World Cup in South Africa, investors, tourists, academics and other audience members may feel there is no real impact to be spoken of. While broadcasts such as Road Trip (McKenzie, 2010) are simplistic but
amusing forms of Sunshine Journalism, they are also somewhat damaging
to the image of South Africa and its ability to host a successful World Cup.

McKenzie has good intentions throughout his broadcasts: he seems gen-
une in his desire to ‘bring South Africa to the world’ through his brief
glimpses in Road Trip. The resultant narrative, however, does not always
get that point across because of the existence of the distorting ‘code book’
(De Beer, 2010: 598) stereotypes, flippancy and fleeting glimpses of a dis-
tant land. While the journalist may not necessarily be aware of using these
frames, they are nonetheless evident through the narration, editing and
tonal quality of the inserts.

The clicks
A brief comment on the World Cup, South Africa and CNN’s ideological
practices occurred during the end of Inside Africa, Isha Sesay’s weekly pro-
gramme, which predominantly looked at the World Cup game play. While
that broadcast mostly normalized the continent, focusing on football stars,
基本 economic interests in Angola, and McKenzie’s blithe trip around South
Africa, one brief conversation between Sesay and McKenzie highlights South
Africa’s perceived otherness.

McKenzie is the only CNN reporter to correctly use the South African clicks
during the entire sample. That he correctly pronounces isiXhosa, isiZulu
or Afrikaans words is notable only because of its exception to the general
pronunciation on CNN. Occasionally, American and British CNN journal-
ists mispronounce South African words to such an extent that it becomes

Toward the end of Inside Africa, McKenzie speaks to Isha Sesay outside Soc-
cer City. He relates his experience of Qunu (with the post-alveolar click) and
Ngxixolo (with the lateral click), and Sesay first wrinkles her nose at him
and smiles, a gesture that implies she thinks this pronunciation is amusing
or quaint. Later, as McKenzie ‘clicks’ again, she interrupts with a sponta-
neous laugh and says, ‘You’ve got the clicks down!’ Sesay’s spontaneous
giggle, speech and nose-wrinkle highlights that she was not expecting the
click, either because she did not expect McKenzie, a white journalist, to be
capable of pronouncing the words in this way, or because she assumes these
clicks are a funny or strange pronunciation to begin with.

The othering of this type of journalism is profound: there is little nor-
malization in pointing out the ‘strangeness’ of the language. While CNN
could have viewed the World Cup from the perspective of the people on the
ground, McKenzie instead became the focus of the story, not the landscape
or the people. In a jarring example of Khor’s Eurocentric Myopia (2010: 41),
the Western journalist is foregrounded at the expense of the situation he tries
to explain and evaluate. Focus is taken off the World Cup and instead put
onto ‘observing’ rather than ‘engaging with’ this strange world. The impact
of this journalistic style lessens the normalization of South Africa’s ability to hold a Western-style event, and perpetuates the ‘single story’ of an othered country.

With the foreign news channels ‘gazing’ at rather than ‘engaging’ with South Africa’s World Cup, eNews was hypothesized to have dedicated much broadcast time to the enthusiastic normalization of the event, complete with Afro-optimism and active participation. It appeared, however, as if the most important stories were not those of introspection, but, instead, an impassive, objective gaze onto the country’s news events. In this respect, eNews was unique. Other channels judged South Africa’s abilities from the start, but eNews reflected on the difficulties and the euphoria only at the end of the sample. *Unity* and *Journey to the Final* showcase eNews’ introspection candidly.

*eNews’ *Unity*

eNews (now eNCA) is South Africa’s flagship 24-hour rolling news channel. It dedicated a considerable amount of its coverage to the World Cup during the sample, as expected. Very little, however, was outright discourse about the World Cup. The most prominent stories during the sample included the Simon Wright journalistic scandal, the King Shaka International Airport (KSIA) plane debacle, the Barefoot Bandit’s capture and the football matches, all presented in a plain documentary style, an impassive gaze onto the country’s news events. Like all other news channels, however, eNews journalists did get caught up in the festivities, because it would take an extremely pragmatic reporter to avoid the contagious chants of ‘Ke Nako’ with vuvuzela blasts. A few components set eNews apart from the foreign channels, though, and the primary difference is the positioning of South Africa as an agent of change.

**A background**

Part of eNews’ coverage of the World Cup focused on the tournament’s contribution to the euphoric unity observed in South Africa, much like the foreign channels. eNews regularly used blue graphics with current headlines as a break between programmes. On 10 July, at various times throughout the day, one headline read: ‘World Cup closes racial divide in South Africa.’ To ‘close’ the divides, not just to bring together but to actually shut them, infers that the deep-seated racial divides have been knitted together over something as trivial as supporting the same team, wearing the same shirt as your countrymen, and forgetting the past atrocities in a single month of games. Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu called this effect ‘one magical day’. Alegi *et al.*, (2010) held a round-table debate on the usefulness of the World Cup to bridge racial divides and close economic gaps, which suggests that this issue may not be such a strange conclusion. Perhaps the World
Cup’s presence in South Africa has a real possibility of healing racial divides. In the eNews headlines, however, it appears the World Cup has already done this, rather than its being a possibility.

Echoing Andrew Harding’s *A Lasting Legacy*, the indication is that the tournament ‘closed’ these racial divides, with South Africans having little or no agency in this event. This one line makes light of very real divisive societal problems, suggesting that all that was needed was a sense of patriotism to secure a shifting sense of unity in a society highly charged with xenophobia, racial divisions and culture clashes.

Against this backdrop, Hajra Omarjee’s *Unity* (Omarjee, 2010) on 12 July shows a euphoric, easily attained togetherness. Digging deeper, however, Omarjee makes a latent comment about Western power and subservience.

**Using the tournament**

Omarjee opens the broadcast with the line: ‘South Africa is famous for using sport to unite the nation.’ Here, she refers to the 1995 Rugby World Cup tournament, with the iconic images flickering on screen. The way she uses the example is critical: this broadcast permits South Africa to be responsible for the action of unity. BBC World and Al Jazeera, conversely, say that South Africa has been transformed, rather than the country transforming itself. The distinction is small, but important. Throughout the other channels’ discussion of the World Cup’s legacy, transformation (of unity, security, Westernization) has occurred thanks to FIFA’s presence in the country. The outside influence of FIFA is not the focus in Omarjee’s sentence, however; South Africa is.

**Sunshine and unity**

Omarjee’s report is filled with the ‘feel-good’ journalistic style of Sunshine Journalism. She tends to skim over the bad news, while focus is instead given to the euphoric eruptions of jubilant patriotism (Figures 13.7–13.8).
Kuper and Kuper (2001: 357) argue that Sunshine Journalism ‘amplifies the extent of social cohesion and development’ but at the same time ignores the troublesome aspects of the same story. This is, they suggest, a false positive of news reporting. Omarjee’s report has very strong Sunshine Journalism tones, as she chooses to focus on the jubilant moments of the World Cup during the broadcast. While Omarjee does allow through a somewhat pessimistic voice (Jonathan Jansen, UFS Vice Chancellor), the statement is brief and counteracted to some extent by the bright and colourful shots of the World Cup final ceremony fireworks. At first glance, Unity echoes CNN’s style of reporting: detached, ‘feel-good’, focusing on superficial stories. As the framing continues, however, phrases within the broadcast indicate that all is not as it first appears.

**Proving them wrong**

Omarjee starts the broadcast by suggesting that ‘the international community saw South Africa’s potential’ in using sport to heal divides during the 1995 Rugby World Cup. She repeats this notion later in the broadcasts by suggesting: ‘South Africa has proved it can deliver.’ Both these sentences insinuate that it is the international community that needs convincing of South Africa’s worth and capabilities. It is the foreign perspective that counts in this jubilation, not South Africa’s own. This faintly subservient rhetoric echoes Hutchison’s (2004) observation that post-colonial nations rebel against the colonizer’s gaze, through sport, to ‘prove’ they deserve credit as a ‘modern nation’. Perhaps this is a tenuous reading, but it is interesting to note this is not the only time this tone is used in the overall sample. CNN journalists repeatedly say: ‘South Africa proved the critics wrong’, and that ‘at the 11th hour’ South Africa ‘pulled it off’. BBC World occasionally remarks, in astonished tones, on ‘just how far they have come’, referring to South Africa’s transformation during the World Cup.

Astonishment about and admiration of South Africa’s capabilities, apparently against all odds, is a theme throughout the foreign news channels.
sample. While foreign journalists seemingly admire South Africa, eNews represents the World Cup as ‘proof’ of South Africa’s worthiness to be part of a Western space (civilized, modernized, capitalist, developed). Hammond and Jablow’s (1992: 99) description of noble savages mimicking their Western masters to ‘prove’ their worth is informative here. Africans attempt to mimic a Western space, building the stadiums and infrastructure against all odds, and appear, using the Western notion of sport, to achieve this. This is the ‘proof’ needed: asking the Western gaze to simply view South Africa as noble, worthy and good. South Africa now appears, according to this broadcast, to have ‘proved’ itself worthy and honourable to a judgemental, morally and developmentally superior foreign gaze. Spurr’s (1994: 19) argument that Western news media often judge an African or non-Western nation on the state of progress towards Westernization is an undercurrent in Omarjee’s broadcast, something she tacitly suggests has been accomplished. Thus, under the superficial tone of Sunshine Journalism, Unity (Omarjee 2010) has deeper, uglier connotations of subservience to an unnamed and vague Western gaze that appears to be continually watching for ‘development’ of a Western space.

While Omarjee’s broadcast has manifest tones of Sunshine Journalism, Serusha Govender’s Journey to the Final (Govender, 2010) package, in contrast, appears, on the surface, negative and pessimistic. A similar technique applies, however, in that further latent meanings and connotations lie just beneath the surface.

**eNews’ ‘Journey to the Final’**

As with Omarjee’s Unity (2010) package, Serusha Govender presents a package that has manifest and latent evidence of common representational themes. Journey to the Final (or simply Journey) (Govender, 2010) was broadcast on 11 July, minutes after the closing ceremony took place and immediately before the final match. On the surface, Journey appears pessimistic and negative, focusing on rioting, violence and a lack of control. In fact, through close analysis and comparison, Journey is a fairly balanced report detailing a bumpy road to Westernization ridden by a novice host. In the end, Govender suggests, the result was a successful tournament for a country that can look forward to further successes in its future.

**Logistical setbacks**

As with all broadcasts used in this chapter, Montgomery’s (2007: 96) two-part television analysis method was used here and, as such, Govender’s language sounds euphemistic when compared with the onscreen images (Figures 13.9–13.10).

**Serusha Govender:** Barely a week after the competition kicked off, stadium security was already a problem.
Serusha Govender: Thousands of security workers at several World Cup stadia in the country's major centres went on strike, protesting over wages.

Govender uses understated phrases to describe the discord during the tournament: ‘logistical setbacks’ for Eskom’s rolling blackouts due to strike

Figure 13.9  Riots 1. Permission granted by eTV

Figure 13.10  Riots 2. Permission granted by eTV
action and that ‘security was already a problem’ when the ‘problem’ appears to be violent riots through the streets in the shadow of the Moses Mabida stadium. This is not pessimistic discourse. In fact, portraying the uneasy journey to the World Cup final in this manner focuses, instead, on the ease with which the government and police dealt with the problem. Against the background of CNN reporter David McKenzie’s phrase of South Africa succeeding ‘at the 11th hour’ and Al Jazeera correspondent David Foster’s speech when he mentions South Africa ‘pulled it off’, it appears that Govender is making a similar point: the South African World Cup could have ended in chaos, but somehow the nation came through in the end.

Her broadcast differs from those on the rest of the channels because this is the only mention of the specific problems in sequence. CNN, Al Jazeera and BBC World mention the process of hosting the World Cup in a vague, far-away manner, while Govender mentions the specific problems (Bafana was knocked out, security issues, Eskom workers conducted strikes over pay, the subsequent rolling blackouts, and the KSIA crisis). Govender’s package argues that, even though there are ongoing problems, the triumph is hard-won and sincere. Govender normalizes the hosting of the event, while at the same time downplaying the negativity.

Local versus foreign

That the foreign channels overlooked or dismissed these problems is interesting. No foreign news channel in this sample mentioned the problems of preparation so ferociously pounced upon by print news media during the run-up to the tournament (see Collins, 2009 for a description of those stories), almost blatantly ignoring anything negative about the tournament at all. While poverty was mentioned briefly on foreign broadcasts (Hull’s Field of Dreams, for example), Sunshine Journalism, it appears, was a common foreign news method of representing South Africa’s capabilities as a host and the World Cup’s effect on the country. eNews did not abide by this journalistic style, as it included this broadcast and 11 references (headlines, tickertape, kernels and a montage shot) throughout the sample to the perceived problems. Govender’s warts-and-all broadcast was the only full-length example during the study to show any negative side to hosting the tournament.

Conclusion

There were two predominant themes in the broadcasts, mostly determined by the difference between the local and foreign news coverage. Afro-pessimism and Sunshine Journalism occurred on all channels, although only visible once discourse and semiotic analyses were applied. The impact of this style of journalism requires further research, but suggestions are furnished here.
Local versus foreign coverage

Foreign channels were manifestly engaged with the event and South Africans, dedicating month-long coverage to ‘bringing South Africa to the world’. Through semiotic and discourse analyses, however, it seemed that little normalization occurred in the sampled coverage. The World Cup in South Africa was seen through colonial frames of reference: Spurr’s ‘rhetoric of empire’ was seen throughout the foreign news sample, while Afro-pessimism peppered the narratives.

Al Jazeera, the only other non-Western news channel apart from eNews, judged the success of the World Cup on its ability to alleviate poverty – albeit for one ‘imagined dream’ of a township. The BBC, likewise, attributed transformation of South Africa to the World Cup. Perhaps unlike events in Western countries, the World Cup’s success meant everything to all walks of life. Friendship, economic success, restoring faith in one’s country, alleviation of poverty, pride, all these rested on South Africa’s participation in a Westernized event. Soccer in South Africa means more than a game; it means restoring and ‘re-energizing’ a once fractious nation. Without this event, South Africa would be stuck in a cycle of poverty, division and discord.

Perhaps the journalists picked up on the local pessimism that the government overspent on the roads, stadiums and branding of the event, and were simply reflecting the local perspectives in their stories. If they were simply re-voicing the local concerns, they certainly did not mention this in their broadcasts. In fact, it seemed these concerns came from the journalists themselves, as they rarely voiced local trepidations.

Local coverage was distinctly different. Manifestly, eNews was an objective and impassive gazer at the event, with little ‘legacy’ discussion. An impassive gaze, however, does not mean superficial journalism. The local channel did hint at a form of subjugation to a higher power: ‘proof’ of Westernization is still needed in order to be a successful host, but it seems the primary concern was to simply report the actions of the day, rather than judge them.

Impact and suggestions

Adichie’s ‘single story’ is at play in the media’s view of the World Cup, at least during the last week of the event. All channels, barring eNews, othered South Africa’s experience of the World Cup significantly. Interviewing tourists and dressed-up football fans does not mean ‘coming in right’ (Hunter-Gault, 2006: 112). Gazing on grandmothers and neglecting to ask the opinions of locals is not effective engagement. Perhaps this was not the intention, however. It would be excessive to ask the reporters, who are, necessarily, ‘parachuting’ into the area, to accurately represent the ‘real’ South Africa in the space of a month’s programming. However, representing the event in a detached manner, through the common ‘code book’ stereotypes,
contributed to an overall *othering* process cultivated through tone, discourse, gesture and imagery.

Journalists must realize that their framing of an event has wider ramifications, not simply in terms of audience ratings and local perceptions. The effect and legacy of an event such as the World Cup is prolonged by news media’s coverage as much as by socio-political implementation, and it is this argument that needs to be stressed. Using common themes of African representation to interpret such an event is far from an ideal method of representing a diverse and interesting country to a world that is currently so interested in it.

References


Afro-pessimism in the French and British Press Coverage of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa

Toussaint Nothias

The FIFA World Cup receives the largest media coverage on the global agenda and is always the subject of many discussions about globalization, cultural imperialism and nationalism (Jarvie, 2006). However, the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, according to the media reports, was unique because, for the first time, the tournament was hosted on ‘African soil’. This chapter focuses on the French and British press coverage of the 2010 Cup and investigates media representation of South Africa and Africa. Since South Africa was awarded the bid in 2004, there were growing concerns from the organizing committee about the Afro-pessimism of the European media, that is, the sense among Western news media that South Africa would not deliver a successful hosting because African countries are doomed to failure (Gibson, 2010a). This chapter explores this question of Afro-pessimism in the French and British media coverage of the Cup. I will argue that an Afro-pessimist ideology does underlie some of the French and British newspaper coverage of the World Cup. Yet, I will show that there are competing discourses between, and within, the different newspapers. Finally, I will investigate the consequences of South Africa’s successful hosting of the World Cup in terms of disrupting Afro-pessimism and interrupting widespread representations of Africa in the French and British media.

This chapter uses a methodology particularly suited to study media representation and the power relations embedded in them: discourse analysis. The idea of discourse as a theoretical concept has its roots in the work of Foucault (1972), who defined discourse as the constitution of knowledge about a topic or an object at a given time in history (Hall, 1992). Discourses pervade texts, social practices and institutions and contribute to regulating practices and behaviours by distinguishing, for instance, what is acceptable from what is punishable (Foucault, 1977). Such a discursive perspective holds that meaning is not natural or fixed but, in fact, socially constructed and infused and constrained by historical power relations and structures.
A discursive approach to media holds that media massively frame an event, the way it is exposed and the issues associated with it. There is no guarantee that this is how the reader will read it, but the media do frame the debates, impose some issues instead of others and usually command the language used to talk about it (Hall, 1980). In short, they play a decisive role in the way people make sense of the news. By analysing the language, speech, images and rhetorical strategies, discourse analysis makes it possible to understand what kind of order a discourse imposes on an object, hence organizing the field of knowledge in a particular configuration at a given time (Tonkiss, 2004). By analysing newspapers’ discourse – that is, how things are said, rather than merely what – I therefore aim at understanding the ideological assumptions and the power relations they reproduce and sometimes try to challenge (Tonkiss, 2004).

The data were collected over two weeks: the one prior to and the one after the World Cup (7–13 June and 12–18 June), hence covering the immediate build-up and the way newspapers summed up the competition, highlighting the most decisive and significant elements. I collected 115 articles from the print versions of the newspapers. I selected all articles that principally focused on the hosting and logistical aspects of the Cup, as well as articles discussing the political, economic and symbolic dimension of the event. These articles were found in different sections of the newspapers (international news, editorials, interviews, sport, opinion pieces). Articles that only focused on upcoming games, on games results or on sports per se were discarded. The time frame covered every important fact that happened during the competition. It was also a way to compare differences in the way the event was reported over time. I have decided to focus on French and UK newspapers. The two countries are former colonial empires; the two countries also have a strong history of football linked to national identity and racism (Carrington & McDonald, 2001).

I have monitored three newspapers per country (The Times, The Guardian, The Sun, Le Monde, Le Figaro, L’Équipe). This selection covers some of the most widely read and influential papers in both countries, with a mix of broadsheet and tabloid and left/right political leaning. The Times and The Sun are both part of Rupert Murdoch’s media empire. The former is a well-established broadsheet with a generally conservative political orientation, while the latter is a tabloid known for its sensationalist and populist style. The Guardian is a broadsheet with a centre-left and liberal orientation. Le Monde can be seen as the French counterpart of The Guardian, both newspapers having developed partnerships in recent years. Le Figaro – owned by industry magnate and conservative politician Serge Dassault – is the other leading broadsheet in France, and sides to the right of the political spectrum. Finally, since the broadsheet/tabloid divide does not apply to the French media market, I have included a sport newspaper, L’Équipe, which is the third most read national newspaper in the country (after Le Figaro and Le Monde) according to the professional association that monitors
Afro-pessimism: Background and preliminary observations

The term ‘Afro-pessimism’ gained currency in the 1990s, when post-colonial Africa faced many conflicts and challenges, including genocides, wars, famines, diseases, dictatorships and corruption (Louw & De B’Béri, 2011). In order to explain how this discourse – which has historically characterized Western news media coverage of Africa (MacBride, 1980; Sreberny-Mohammadi et al., 1985; Hawk, 1992; Fair, 1993; Schraeder & Endless, 1998; Ojo, 2002; Orgeret, 2010; Paterson, 2011) – reproduces racist stereotypes inherited from a colonial ideology, I have identified three key steps which, taken together, allow identification of an Afro-pessimist discourse.

(1) It starts with an empirical observation of the present situation of the African continent and takes the form of a neutral and descriptive statement: Africa is not going well. It should be noted, already, that this seemingly neutral statement already holds an ideological dimension, in that it essentializes the continent.

(2) It then summons the past to explain that Africa has always been dominated, poor and violent: in other words, that there seems to be something in the very essence of Africa that could explain its eternal violence. Therefore, it moves from an observation to an interpretation grounded in a very specific image of Africa.

Mudimbe (1988) argues that the colonial and racial episteme of the late 18th and 19th centuries contributed to creating a particular conception of Africa. The domination of imperial powers was based on civilizational classifications, which correlated with the racial classification available from the newly born anthropology. On the physical, aesthetic, moral and intellectual scales, whites ranked the highest and blacks the lowest. This episteme contributed to the way Europe started to represent Africa as the ‘Dark Continent’ (Mudimbe, 1988; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Bassil, 2011). The expression ‘Dark Continent’ epitomizes the dominant perception of Africa in the Victorian period. Its best expression is found in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1995). The darkness of the African land, echoed by the skin colour of its inhabitants, ultimately affects the white colonizers and turns them into brutes and savages. The book is inspired by the many stories of colonizers who were reported to act extremely brutally and madly against
Africans, and eventually against their fellow colonizers. Yet, their extreme cruelty was blamed on their being in Africa, with Africans, under an African sun. Thus, it implied a determinism linked to Africa’s very own essence: the darkness is inevitable, essentially arising from the place (see also Achebe, 1988; Lindqvist, 2007).²

In order to understand how Africa was shaped or ‘invented’ as the myth of the ‘Dark Continent’, Barthes’s (1957) application of semiotics to popular culture is appealing. According to him, a word – the signifier – and an idea – the signified – are put together to create a sign (Barthes, 1957). For instance, the word ‘Africa’ is a sign made of two components: the signified – a large continent located to the west of Asia and south of Europe – and the signifier, the word itself, A-F-R-I-C-A. This association is, according to Barthes, arbitrary: it could be called ‘Preta’ instead of ‘Africa’; the idea signified would remain the same. A myth, then, is a second order of signification in which the sign becomes itself a signifier for another signified (Barthes, 1957); for instance, in my case, when the sign Africa signifies darkness. ‘Dark Continent’ is, in this sense, a myth that associates Africa with violence, brutality, poverty, absence of culture, being outside of history, and primitivism. But, even though a myth is a construction, it is immediately accessible and appears as natural (Ibid.). The second step of the Afro-pessimist argument implies that if Africa is going bad nowadays it is because there is something essential to Africa that prevents its development. This determinist statement, which imposes a necessity between past and present situations, finds its roots in the myth of the ‘Dark Continent’ and has, according to Ahluwalia (2001: 133), ‘a tendency to homogenize the “African Tragedy”, concluding that Africa has neither the political will nor the capacity to deal with its problems’.

(3) Eventually, the third step of the Afro-pessimist position is to predict a bleak future for the continent. Africa is condemned to failure. This pessimistic view of the continent uses, again, a determinist explanation grounded in the myth of the ‘Dark Continent’: the continent’s fate is sealed in an essential darkness and its future is necessarily bleak. Afro-pessimism starts as an ethnocentric interpretation that implies a determinist conception of Africa; but it also predicts the future, and thus uses determinism not only upstream but also downstream. In doing so, it both reproduces past stereotyped images inherited from the colonial era and also actively contributes to reinforcing them.

We can therefore see three key steps to the Afro-pessimist argument: (1) observation, (2) interpretation and (3) prediction. It functions as a vicious circle that can be summed up in the following syllogism: Africa is a place of violence; it has always been so and therefore will remain this way. In this sense, Afro-pessimism contains a set of ideological assumptions that
contribute to normalizing and reproducing an image of Africa created in historical relationships of power. As Momoh (2003: 34) argues, it is thus possible to describe Afro-pessimism as a ‘racist ideology that is a mere continuation of the “Dark Continent” thesis and the view that nothing good can ever come out of Africa’.

In the build-up to the Cup, two events were given particular coverage by the media. The fact that these events have been interpreted as significant to the hosting of the Cup will contribute to a better understanding of how Afro-pessimism works. On 9 January 2010, gunmen attacked Togo’s national squad in Angola. The terrorist attack, claimed by a separatist group from the Cabinda’s enclave, killed one man and wounded nine. According to William Gumede in *The Guardian* (2010), ‘a large part of the western press has portrayed the attack as if it happened in South Africa’. Indeed, many Western media intensively questioned the South African official committee in charge of the World Cup and expressed their concerns over the security in South Africa. Danny Jordaan, chief of the World Cup organizing committee, responded:

I don’t think the world has ever asked one country to take responsibility for what happens in another country… If there is a war in Kosovo and a World Cup in Germany, no one asks if the World Cup can go on in Germany, everyone understands the war in Kosovo is a war in Kosovo.

(Myers & Smith, 2010)

Immediately after the attack, the players went back to Togo; but three days later they asked to re-enter the competition, and the Confederation of African football refused. Criticizing this decision, Owen Slot (2010a), *The Times*’ chief sports reporter, writes: ‘Is it any surprise that there are afro-pessimists around when we can’t even get Togo back in the African Nations Cup?’ This example suggests not only that *The Times* is mainly Afro-pessimist, but that it assumes and understands this position, in opposition to *The Guardian*, which warns about the risk of Afro-pessimism.

A second event, similarly understood by the media as significant and relevant to the Cup coverage, was the murder of Eugene Terre’Blanche, head of the white supremacist movement Afrikaner-Weerstands-Beweging, in his home, two months before the competition. The most compelling coverage can be found in a *Daily Star* article entitled ‘World Cup Machete threat’:

England fans could be caught up in a machete race war at the World Cup in South Africa. The killing of white supremacist leader Eugene Terre’Blanche caused far-right campaigners to warn teams to avoid the ‘land of murder’ this summer.

(Hughes, 2010)
Mentioning possibilities of ‘civil war’, ‘total nightmare’ and ‘explosion of violence’, Hugh also lists threats of ‘machete gangs…roaming the streets’ (Ibid.). While the article mainly quotes ‘fair-right campaigners’, it nonetheless creates a strong sense of insecurity and violence, notably using the image of the machete and thus evoking scenes of horrors seen during the darkest hours of Africa, such as the genocide in Rwanda. Moreover, it foresees the worst-case scenario: ‘if civil war erupts [it] means the tournament cannot be played in the country this summer’. Because it summons images of a ‘savage’ Africa rooted in the colonial imagery of the ‘Dark Continent’, because it fosters an atmosphere of racial violence and because it promises that the World Cup in South Africa will be a failure, this article can be seen as a case in point of Afro-pessimism.

These two examples follow a similar pattern: observation of an event (attack on Togo/ murder of Terre’Blanche), interpretation of the event (a problem representative of Africa as a whole, and representative of an essential African violence alluding to the myth of the ‘Dark Continent’) and prediction of a bleak future (anxiety/promise of future violence). However, it is interesting to see that there are different degrees of awareness: in one case (The Times) the author more or less explicitly claims its position as Afro-pessimist; in the other (The Daily Star) he does not.

Afro-pessimism: Cementing the new image of the ‘Dark Continent’

One week before the competition, there was a stampede outside a stadium before the preparation game between Nigeria and North Korea. Fourteen supporters were injured and one policeman suffered critical injuries. The following day, The Times published four articles (Brown et al., 2010; Clayton, 2010a). This overwhelming wave of concerns described the event with the most hyperbolic and sensationalist vocabulary: ‘chaotic scenes’, ‘chaos’, ‘lethal conditions’ or ‘potentially catastrophic’. All four articles shared the same fatalistic view. The future, bleak and scary, is bound to happen. Matt Dickinson explains that ‘it was an accident waiting to happen’ and it was ‘No surprise’, though the organizers must take the event as a ‘lucky escape’. Patrick Barclay (2010) comments:

It could have been worse. That was the only consoling thought on a day when Africa’s World Cup euphoria evaporated…. The potential for further problems is massive. We were promised a peaceful World Cup with a smile on its face, not stretchers and anguish and reminders of horrors that have been visited on African stadiums at intervals in the past, closely followed by cries of I told you so.

In addition to the sense of fatality – the idea that it was bound to happen, ‘I told you so’ – there is also a strong sense of pessimism – the idea that the
situation will probably get worse. By stating that euphoria had evaporated, it almost gives a definitive judgement, even before the competition started, that hopes of a quiet competition were now gone. The observation becomes an interpretation, which in turn implies a prediction – a pessimistic vision of the future.

Afro-pessimism in the media actively participates in cementing a certain image of Africa, especially for a Western audience with generally little to no real-life experience of the continent. Here is an example of the pervasiveness of this image. *The Times*’ humourist Frank Skinner (2010) describes the way he feels about going to South Africa for the World Cup. Though the tone is humoristic and portrays an over-stressed person, it still reveals the kind of fears, images and feelings a European who has never been to South Africa might have. In a sentence, he sums up the fears contained and initiated by both the terrorist attack on the Togo bus and the ‘machete war’ *The Daily Star* promised to English fans:

One friend did reassure me I wouldn’t be sliced up by machete-wielding bandits but he based this on the fact that, before that could happen, I’d almost certainly be blown to pieces by Al-Qaeda at the England US game… Johannesburg, I’ve read, is a city where people get murdered for their mobile phones. God knows what will happen when they see my Ipad.

Though the humoristic tone is clear, it reveals, nonetheless, his fear and that this fear comes from what he has been told and from what he has read. We can assume here that these fears are mainly constructed by a general image of South Africa conveyed by Western media over the years. This image is realistic, derived from observation of South Africa’s extreme violence, but mixed up with fantasies, horrific representations and irrational stereotypes that give people an impression of South Africa – grounded in broader Western narratives about Africa – as a nightmare kingdom. In an astonishing self-reflexive analysis, he writes:

The thing is, I really don’t want to feel like this…. It seems like only yesterday that it was morally reprehensible to eat [South Africa’s] fruits and now it’s hosting the biggest football tournament on the planet. I’ve been trying to conjure up Rainbow Nations images of dancing locals welcoming visitors with warm grins but they always culminate in me getting my throat slit.

(Ibid.)

In a final attempt to rationalize himself, a stereotyped image of the savage and violent Africans gets the better of another image of the dancing and smiling indigenes. These two categories are, according to Mudimbe (1988), at the core of the ‘Invention of Africa’. More precisely, he argues controversially
that the debate between Rousseau and Hobbes on man in the state of nature affected the way Africa came to be perceived in Europe. For Rousseau (1867), men in the state of nature are authentic, natural and good. In Hobbes’s interpretation (1652), the natural man is part of a world where violence and savagery are legion. Assuredly, Afro-pessimism has more in common with the latter. Skinner, at first, is caught between two stereotyped representations that allude to the Rousseau/Hobbes dialectic. But it is the latter that gets the last word as he gets his throat slit. This confession depicts perfectly the kind of fears Afro-pessimism helped to foster around the hosting of the World Cup by South Africa.

**Framing the World Cup as a test for Africa**

Another important feature of *The Times*’ coverage of the World Cup was to present the event as a test for Africa, not only South Africa. Matt Dickinson (2010) writes: ‘Only if events in Makhuling prove an effective alarm call to police and organizing officials, both local and from FIFA, will there be optimism that Africa can survive its great test.’ The World Cup establishes the ability, performance and reliability of South Africa to host the biggest sport mega-event, and, by extension, the World Cup also tests Africa’s ability as a whole. Yet, when South Korea and Japan hosted the World Cup in 2002, the media did not question the ability of Asia as a whole to host it, even though it was the first World Cup there. But, for Dickinson, ‘the host country and the continent it represents still have a bit of proving to do’.

In *The Times*, this test takes two forms: a) an outcome predicted in advance or b) an observation without prediction but a propensity to think it will go wrong.

(a) Matt Dickinson (2010) writes:

> Even those wary of taking the tournament to Africa the continent, with all the envisaged concerns about organization, security and the gap between rich and poor, hoped that South Africa the country could handle it.

This idea alludes to a more general argument, which denies that South Africa is an ‘African’ country. South Africa, despite a high rate of criminality, diseases and social inequalities, is democratic, liberal and multiracial, and claims to be gender-equal. In a way it is, at least at a constitutional level, extremely close to the model of Western liberal democracies. As a result, according to the quote above, if one country in sub-Saharan Africa can handle hosting a World Cup, it is indeed South Africa. This position ultimately leads to the conclusion that, even if South Africa succeeds, it will not confirm Africa’s ability as a whole. If South Africa fails, then Africa fails; but if it
succeeds, it will not necessarily prove Africa’s success. In this case, the test is an instrument for Afro-pessimism because it is a test already lost for Africa.

(b) The other perspective for Afro-pessimism is to accept the idea of the test: if it is a success, both Africa and South Africa’s image will improve, but if it is a failure, the determinist and pessimist views will be confirmed. Therefore, this framework of the test is double-edged, and the Afro-pessimist position tends towards the more negative predictions. However, the ultimate judgement will stand only if some conditions are met.

In addition to a safe World Cup, another requirement is to deliver what has been promised: a festive ‘African’ World Cup: ‘For people to be in fear of their lives was starkly at odds with the festive atmosphere we have been promised ever since South Africa was awarded the World Cup at the second attempt’ (Dickinson, 2010). The underlying idea of what has been promised needs to be understood in the light of FIFA’s conception of the Cup as an ‘African’ event. FIFA’s logo of the World Cup has a ‘stylized background abstraction of the continent in different colours that reminds us this World Cup is about Africa as much as it is about South Africa’ (Czeglédy, 2009: 284). It is the first time in the history of the World Cup that the logo mentions a continental dimension, which is, according to Andre Czeglédy, ‘a telling demonstration of how 2010 is conceived of as a distinctly African event’ (Ibid.) Furthermore, when asked his opinion about the vuvuzela, soundtrack and symbol of this World Cup, Sepp Blatter, president of FIFA, answered:

It’s the local tradition. It is what African and South African football is all about: noise, excitement dancing, shouting and enjoyment.

(The Times, 9 June 2010)

This idea of an ‘African football’ is based on a serial of features that are supposed to be essentially African. These characteristics of the African football echo the way European press described the Cameroon team during the 1990 Cup. For Blain et al., Cameroon’s style was described as instinctive, joyful, creative, imaginative and sometimes irrational (1993). This image of an African style recalls ‘the image of man set in some idealized pre-industrial non-European society where people were free of constraints of modern living and able to act in accordance with their instinct’ (1993: 73).

Thus, Blatter depicts an authentic ‘African’ culture whose specificity – dancing, shouting, enjoyment – can be traced back to a stereotyped image of Africans rooted in Rousseau’s depiction of man in the state of nature. This image, described by Blatter, and Skinner earlier, matches Dickinson’s perception of the African World Cup ‘we’ have been promised and that South Africa must deliver: ‘the authentically African World Cup, the earthy, organic, spontaneous, soul festival’ (Dart, 2010). However, while this ‘African authenticity’ is expected, South Africa is also asked to deliver a World Cup within European norms. The debate on the vuvuzela is a compelling example. Many
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journalists complained about its noise (Brown, 2010). For some, it was actually ruining the atmosphere in the stadium, preventing people from hearing the supporters’ songs: ‘Soon, we were really tired to have the same circus going on at every game. Let’s hope that we won’t find this back home in the import section of the shops’ (L’Équipe, 13 July 2010). This example highlights the way football remains shrouded in a Euro-centric system of references (Darby, 2002). In this framework of the test, Africa has to prove to the world that it is able to do as well as other developed countries. This idea alludes to a judgement of civilizational maturity: if they manage to do it, there are no reasons to keep seeing Africa as a continent behind the others. It judges relative to a certain idea of European football, a model at the centre that other nations and cultures must strive to emulate.

So far I have shown that The Times’ coverage of the World Cup is underpinned by Afro-pessimism and that this Afro-pessimism contributes to reinforcing fears grounded in the myth of the ‘Dark Continent’. I have also explained that the World Cup is presented as a test where South Africa is asked both to deliver an ‘authentically African’ World Cup and yet to remain within certain Euro-centric norms. I have drawn mainly on the British press to question Afro-pessimism and media representation. But what about the French press? Was there any Afro-pessimism?

**Lurking around the corner: The spectrum of Afro-pessimism**

Le Figaro, standing at the right political wing of French broadsheets, dedicated its first article on South Africa at the dawn of the competition to the Diepsloot Township and its violence. Tanguy Berthemet (2010a) reports attacks that took place a few months and even a year ago and links them to the World Cup by arguing that the poorest of the poorest will not benefit from the World Cup: ‘for them, the World Cup is already far, a dream impossible to catch’. Therefore, the article links the news of the Cup with some of the worst images of the country. This is reinforced by the harsh description he makes of the violence and insecurity in the township:

> At the end of March, two dismembered corpses were found in the wastelands. The victims were two women, possibly prostitutes, who had been raped – a very common practice in the district….Lynching has become a common tragedy; a man is suddenly pointed out by his victim and this gives way to popular prosecution….In a few seconds the mob gathers and beats him to death.

(Ibid.)

The journalist calls upon an imagery of savage violence and de facto links it to the World Cup by saying that it is pointless. The problem does not lie in covering poverty and violence, for it is a reality that must be denounced
and, if anything, is not reported enough. Rather, the problem lies with the extreme violence the media chooses, the darkest aspects, and the way these choices become a filter through which news from Africa is systematically described. However, *Le Figaro* also gave more positive accounts before the competition, and thus cannot be reduced to Afro-pessimism. A few days later, the same journalist praises South Africa and its preparation towards the tournament (Berthemet, 2010b). Everything is ready on time; most of the difficulties have been overcome and ‘the infrastructures have already changed the face of the country’. It would, therefore, be unfair to talk of a simple and straightforward Afro-pessimism. Instead, the event is here framed between pessimistic concerns and positive aspects.

*L’Équipe* followed a similar pattern. The first main article on South Africa investigated the district of Hillbrow. During apartheid, it was a residential district for wealthy whites. After apartheid, ‘it became a district for gangs and dealers’ (Cazadieu, 2010). This image, the journalist argues, embodies the ‘whole South African paradox’. Though he recognizes that the place is quieter with the World Cup just about to start, the gaze he puts upon South Africa is simple: before there was apartheid and oppression, now there is insecurity, poverty and violence. This argument does not necessarily imply a prediction for the future – though the journalist talks of a circle of violence – and, therefore, it is not as such Afro-pessimist. But this comparison between post and pre-apartheid South Africa is sometimes closely followed by an Afro-pessimist argument: the idea that South Africa was safer during apartheid, and therefore better off.

I have found the most extreme formulation of this argument in an interview on French television during the World Cup. The French historian Bernard Lugan draws an apocalyptic picture of South Africa:

Mandela did not do anything for the South African people. South Africa faces challenges of racial, ethnic and social tensions. There are issues of criminality, AIDS; there are terrible problems at every level. Before 1994, the rate of unemployment was much lower and electricity was working properly. It is a country in distress.

(Lugan, 2010)

He implies ultimately that South Africa was better off during apartheid by saying ‘I sing the praises of the Bantustan.’ Translated into a European context, this comparison amounts to saying that Italy was better off under Mussolini than now. Though it might be true that there was a lower rate of unemployment at the time, for instance, such a statement would be seen as sympathizing with fascism and therefore very shocking. Indeed, it is not just a neutral statement of a mere fact, but one that regrets a fascist, racist and colonial society. Instead, Bernard Lugan concludes, ‘South Africa’s situation is dark and is going to be darker.’ His reasoning starts with an observation,
then moves on to an interpretation that praises apartheid. Finally, it predicts a dark future with little or no hope for improvement.

This argument was not found directly in *L’Équipe*; but comparisons between post-and pre-apartheid can easily lead to the most vivid Afro-pessimism. However, and as in *Le Figaro*, arguments close to Afro-pessimism were contrasted with more positive accounts. Finally, both *L’Équipe* and *Le Figaro* framed the event as a test for Africa. In ‘Africa, now or never’, Nizar Hanini (2010) argues that it is Africa’s chance to show the world it can be part of the ‘First world’. As for *L’Équipe*: ‘this first World Cup in Africa raises a lot of questions. But if it is a success, it is the credibility of South Africa, and the rest of Africa that will be reinforced’ (Cazadieu, 2010). Therefore, the two newspapers shared with *The Times* the framework of the test for Africa. However, *L’Équipe* and *Le Figaro* had different patterns, because their position ranged from Afro-pessimism to more positive statements.

**Afro-pessimism vs. social critique**

Afro-pessimism, I have shown, is a form of scepticism. But does this mean that scepticism always ought to be understood as Afro-pessimist? The two left-wing broadsheets *Le Monde* and *The Guardian* have written much more about South Africa and the World Cup than any other newspapers. And they have assuredly been the most critical about it. Their very diverse analyses converge in what I will call a social critique of the event. What is this social critique? Why is it different from Afro-pessimism? And are there any differences between *Le Monde*’s and *The Guardian*’s perspectives?

Social critique refers to the idea that the Cup’s euphoria contributes to hiding the ‘real’ social problems of the local population. This critique contextualizes issues within the South African context, rather than within the problems of Africa as a whole. Such a perspective calls for investigation of the types of policies chosen by the government, or questioning structural poverty. Following the line of the respective newspapers, this approach focuses on social inequalities, and the lack of security, not only for tourists but also, and mainly, for the South African population. Jean-Philippe Rémy (2010) writes in *Le Monde*:

> The South African miracle, the great myth invented in order to end peacefully apartheid in fact turned out to be hell for the poor and excluded, whose numbers keep on growing consistently… The idyllic idea of the new ‘South Africa’ pervades everything and prevents from addressing the disturbing aspects.

One can see that this has a connection with the Afro-pessimist argument that starts by comparing apartheid and the new South Africa; yet it clearly presents the actual situation as a historical result, for which the apartheid
era can be held accountable. Moreover, he argues that the framing of the Cup is based on a ‘selective memory’ and that ultimately ‘South Africa will be caught up by its history, whether it likes it or not’ (Rémy, 2010). Thus, he summons an idea of inevitability and determinism that is not miles away from the fatality present in Afro-pessimism. Yet, even if it shares certain features with Afro-pessimism, it cannot be described as such. It does not interpret South Africa’s problems as the determinist result of an essential darkness – the ‘African tragedy’ (Ahluwalia, 2001).

In *Le Monde*’s perspective, the symbolic and historical value of the World Cup is simply a myth, which, far from being beneficial to the country, is actually preventing it from facing pressing social issues of inequalities and violence. Behind what is presented as an historical event, there is an ideological domination. Thus, it stands against the idea of a symbolic legacy of the World Cup. The symbolic value of the event is further undermined by the analysis of the Cup and the FIFA into a broader critique of sport as a capitalist alienation. Philosopher Fabien Ollier argues in an article in the paper:

> It is indecent to pretend that the population will benefit from the financial gains…. It all comes down to an obvious political diversion, an ideological control of a population.

(Hernandez, 2010)

*Le Monde*’s social critique broadly denies any social meaning or symbolic value to the World Cup. The myth surrounding the World Cup and national unity through sports takes on symbolic dimensions; it is hegemonic, imposed by FIFA – with its obvious financial agenda – and the South African government as well, and it is towards this hegemonic production that the social critique of *Le Monde* is aimed.

Though *The Guardian* also remained critical, it did not dismiss the symbolic value of the event as simply an ideological illusion. The World Cup might be an entirely commercial operation controlled by FIFA; and it might be an ideological construction from the South African government. But its symbolic dimension might also have strong and practical social implications. Thus, *The Guardian* recognized the specific and symbolic meaning of football in South Africa (Hill, 2010). Richard Williams (2010) explains:

> Football has a special significance to modern South Africa, not least to its president Jacob Zuma, once a centre-back in the Robben Island prison team that played a part in the long struggle against the apartheid regime. It is the game of the people.

Football in South Africa can be understood as a cultural symbol within the struggle against the white hegemonic order in apartheid South Africa. *The Guardian*’s pattern of interpretation thus tries to grasp the specificity and
complexity of the South African context. The reason for this specific pattern is probably to be found in the close links the newspaper has with the country thanks to its collaboration with the South African newspaper *The Mail & Guardian*. This is probably why *The Guardian*'s syndication has been numerous, diverse and critical, ranging from a strong social critique to the recognition of a symbolic legacy of the Cup.

**Beyond Afro-pessimism? Recreating a new imaginary**

The scepticism of *Le Monde* and the *Guardian* therefore differed. But both of them are different from an Afro-pessimist position, because the social critique questions the outcomes and practical legacy of the World Cup for the South African population. However, the two newspapers do not escape the framework of the test for Africa as a whole. Pascal Boniface (2010a) in *Le Monde* writes:

> The hosting of the World Cup is a test. If it is a success, South Africa credibility, and the African continent credibility by extension, will be reinforced. If it is a failure, afro-pessimists will be confirmed in their prejudices.

It is clearly formulated as a test for Africa. However, by referring to Afro-pessimists and their ‘prejudices’, it clearly takes a critical stand towards this position. If something goes wrong, it will not imply that the Afro-pessimists were right; it will just imply that they will remain in their dark vision of Africa. The test is, therefore, more a way to trump Afro-pessimism than to prove something about Africa. Already in January, *The Guardian* had taken a clear position against Afro-pessimism by warning European media against stereotyping the whole of Africa (Myers & Smith, 2010). In this sense, the idea of a test in *Le Monde* and *The Guardian* takes the form of a meta-discourse, where what is really at stake is the disruption of Afro-pessimism.

On the concluding week of the Cup, all newspapers agreed that the competition had been a real success, not so much on the soccer fields, but on the organizational side. Because the outcome of the World Cup was quite consensual in the media, I will provide in this section a general account of the press and link it to the ideas of the test and Afro-pessimism.

First, the press unanimously presented the event as a success for South Africa. Sepp Blatter declared that South Africa delivered an event of the highest standards in terms of organization: ‘in any university in the world that would be a pass with distinction’ (*L’Équipe*, 2010). Danny Jordaan argued: ‘this World Cup has helped change the image of South Africa. It’s almost a rebranding of the country’ (Slot, 2010b). European media witnessed an outburst of national unity and hope, ‘the embodiment of the dream of Nelson
Mandela’s democracy, with countrymen of all races working and supporting side by side’ (Ibid.). This was in sharp contrast to all the fears and violence promised by Afro-pessimists. Furthermore, as planned by the framework of the test, the success affected Africa’s image more generally, and the event was therefore presented as a success for Africa. Le Figaro concluded:

it was a success for this first time in Africa without almost any issues of security. As a result, the sceptics who doubted South Africa’s ability to host such a big event were proved wrong.

(Le Figaro, 12 July 2010)

In this way, André Czeglédy (2009) argued that the positive image of South Africa, and by extension Africa, conveyed during the World Cup is about ‘creating a new Africa in the Social Imagination’ and ‘meeting – and substituting – established prejudices of what constitutes African reality’ (2009: 281–5). For instance, Africa is usually seen as a point of departure rather than arrival: a place from which people leave or want to leave, instead of a place where people go. The Times (12 July 2010) wrote at the end that, thanks to the warm welcome, ‘some English fans may even feel tempted to move there’. Similarly, another dominant representation of Africa as an under-developed place with no modern infrastructures has been significantly weakened. A journalist from Le Monde described one of his significant memories of the tournament:

So, the World Cup takes place in Africa, we’ve been told… The arrival at the airport is a first slap in the face. We could be in Europe. Once outside, there are freeways as smooth as an ice rink and glittering malls.

(Davet, 2010)

Thus, the World Cup disturbed conventional prejudiced views about Africa and is, according to David Smith from The Guardian, the ‘ultimate symbol of a normalising Africa’ (Smith, 2010b). Eventually, most of the articles went on questioning the post-World Cup situation: will the security efforts made for foreigners remain? Will the investments increase as expected? What will be done with the stadiums? Media highlighted the many challenges to come and expressed new concerns about the future of South Africa. The difference, though, is that they looked, in the immediate aftermath of the World Cup, at South Africa’s future with more pragmatism and less fatalism.

Afro-pessimism and meta-discursivity: The media looking at themselves

With regard to the scepticism that dominated the build-up, the success of South Africa can be seen as a significant blow to the Afro-pessimist argument.
Frederik W. De Klerk, former president during the transition from apartheid to post-apartheid South Africa, argued in a paper published in *Le Figaro*:

This World Cup must help reject once and for all the ruling discourse which explains the troubles of the continent by its ‘africanity’, mysterious uniqueness which would be intrinsically African and would prevent its development.

(De Klerk & Leridon, 2010)

The media conveyed a disruptive and renewed image of South Africa – and, by extension, Africa – undermining the imaginary of the ‘Dark Continent’. But the media themselves discussed this disruption within the media. It is made clear by Pascal Boniface in *Le Monde*:

To say the least, scepticism was the rule in the media before the competition started in South Africa... However what was given to see is an open, dynamic, welcoming and modern Africa. In the battle between afro-pessimists and afro-optimists, the latter won.

(Boniface, 2010b)

In the same way, a journalist from *l’Équipe* explains the effect the Cup had on some foreign journalists’ perception of South Africa and Africa:

I have been discussing a lot with foreign colleagues who are coming back from this trip, with less certainties and more inclined to believe in the future of a continent so often criticized.

(Pénot, 2010)

What changed, therefore, was not only the image conveyed by the media, but the fact that some journalists possibly became more aware of their own representations and tried to integrate more complexity into their way of looking at both South Africa and Africa, even going as far as discussing this disruption in their own coverage and hence creating a disruptive meta-discourse (i.e., a reflexive discourse about disruption of Western media representation of Africa).

It would be imprudent to think that the World Cup signalled the end of Afro-pessimism in Western media, because the range of Afro-pessimist arguments exceeds far beyond the context of sport mega-events. It will assuredly take more to challenge Afro-pessimism in media coverage of African politics, development and societies. But, as far as the future media coverage of mega sport events in Africa is concerned, it is plausible that media will have in mind the success of the 2010 Cup. A quick look at a *Times* article after the World Cup is compelling. The newspaper was the main contributor in terms of Afro-pessimist analysis in my data. But, on 14 July, two days after...
the World Cup, it published an article on South Africa’s desire to host the Olympics in the near future. Referring to the World Cup, Jonathan Clayton mentions that the ‘fears that visitors would be victims of crime and poor organization were proved to be misplaced’ (2010b). As a result, the article does not express any form of scepticism towards the ability of South Africa to host the Olympics. This might not be the end of Afro-pessimism in the media, but it is very likely that it weakened this myth in the context of sport mega-events.

Because it was a success, the World Cup was an opportunity to ‘tell different, more meaningful and contemporary stories about African life and experience’ (Tomlinson et al., 2009: 4). But what if it had gone wrong? Would the Afro-pessimist argument have been confirmed? Yet, should the success or failure of a sport event determine the gaze European media should have on Africa? Here Peter Guest from The Guardian makes an important point:

Yes, we should be taking a fresh look at Africa, but not because a football tournament puts it on the precipice of success. We should be reassessing Africa because it is a long way along its trajectory of growth and development and our ignorance has prevented us from seizing its opportunities.

(Guest, 2010b)

In that sense, the headlines of ‘This time for Africa’/‘Pass with distinction’ are patronizing in that they let a Euro-centric multinational company – FIFA – dictate what Africa is able to do and the way the continent should be looked at. Then again, changing the gaze on Africa because of its ‘trajectory of growth’ (‘Africa Rising’) is also an ideologically loaded proposition that needs to be addressed further in the future.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the map of meaning constructed during the coverage of the 2010 World Cup was, in fact, quite complex and multifarious – a finding at odds with long-standing claims about the homogenization of Western media coverage of African news (see also Scott, 2009, for a recent criticism of this analysis of Western media coverage of Africa). There was, indeed, an Afro-pessimist discourse in the media before the competition, predominantly located in The Times, and to a certain extent in Le Figaro and L’Équipe. The data analysis provided a deeper understanding of Afro-pessimism as a discourse with three steps: observation – interpretation – prediction. I have argued that Afro-pessimism is grounded in images of Africa inherited from the colonial era and the myth of the ‘Dark Continent’. The World Cup was presented as a test not only for South Africa, but also for Africa as a whole. In the Afro-pessimist perspective, the test was either lost
in advance, or was possibly a success depending on South Africa providing an ‘authentically African’ World Cup while remaining in norms imposed by the Euro-centric experience of the game.

Both French and British left-wing broadsheets developed an analysis of the World Cup that I have called social critique. Furthermore, they addressed the issue of Afro-pessimism in the media and thus contributed to establishing a meta-discourse and a self-reflexive gaze upon and within the media. Therefore, the media themselves not only contained Afro-pessimist discourse but also discussed Afro-pessimism, and positioned themselves along different lines, thus bringing to light a ‘semiotic struggle for meaning’ (Fiske, 1989: 98). And, in this semiotic struggle for meaning, the successful hosting of the Cup by South Africa provided an image that disrupted Afro-pessimist discourse, although the seemingly different and more positive representations of South Africa and Africa in the media assuredly have their own ideological dimension that needs to be investigated further.

Notes

1. Due to space limitations, I have decided to leave aside my findings concerning The Sun's coverage of the World Cup. I did find elements that were linked to a colonial imagery, and even colonial nostalgia. For instance, journalists often used tropes of wilderness and nature. One compared his interviewee to ‘the great white hunter from yesteryear’. But, as such, there was no Afro-pessimism (no active prediction of failure). These narratives of wilderness nonetheless share a common colonial ancestry with Afro-pessimism and can also be traced back to the myth of the ‘Dark Continent’.

2. Vigorous criticisms of the Western ways of looking at Africa, and black Africans especially, can also be found in the writings and ideas of the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and independence struggle movements. See, notably, Fanon (1967).

3. It should be noted that both FIFA and the South African government hold their share of responsibility for framing the World Cup as an ‘African’ World Cup, as highlighted in the choice of the Cup's official song, ‘This time for Africa’. What matters, then, when it comes to media coverage is to see how this frame is then used as part of a more traditional Afro-pessimist frame.

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