Who One Is

Book 1:
Meontology of the "I":
A Transcendental Phenomenology
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Meontology of the “I”: A Transcendental Phenomenology
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This work is dedicated to the philosophical dyad at The Catholic University of America, in Washington, DC

Thomas Prufer (†1993) and Robert Sokolowski.
Preface

The first volume of this work is a transcendental phenomenological wrestle with what is referred to with the first-person singular pronoun. Its central concern is to sort out the sense in which who one is, is not identical with what one is. The second volume shows how transcendental phenomenology is of necessity also “existential.” There we develop the claim that the “I,” as it is uncovered in transcendental phenomenology, i.e., both as the personal I as well as the transcendental I, has a core sense. This sense, which we, following Kierkegaard and Karl Jaspers, will call Existenz, is awakened by what Husserl calls the “absolute Ought” or the unum necessarium. The demands of this, to which each can be awakened, not only enrich the sense of the personal I but challenge the apparent hegemony of the transcendental I and the seeming philosophical self-sufficiency of the I of the transcendental phenomenologist.

Both volumes are written secundum sententias Edmundi. This is to say, they are “Husserlian” both in the sense that the indebtedness to Edmund Husserl is evident on every page, even when the discussions have to do with past and present thinkers who have never heard of him, but also in the sense that both volumes attempt to think along with Husserl in places where, as far as I can see, he had not addressed the problems explicitly.

What alone is novel in these two volumes is the way familiar themes and discussions are juxtaposed and related. Nevertheless, as every avid reader of philosophy knows, the contemplative delight that is found in the acquisition, explication and propounding of insights and displays of the world which already are the work of others at the very least approximates that of the original thinkers. This is one reason we have schools of thought and philosophical movements.

Both volumes enrich the positions sketched in The Person and the Common Life (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992) but they also provide a correction. In that work I did not appreciate sufficiently the theme of the uniqueness of the self or ipseity, the central theme of both of these volumes. On the other hand, that earlier work attends to the themes of intersubjectivity, community, and polis which this work had to neglect. In the earlier volume I developed the notion of the first-person nominative plural, “we,” as a performative achievement (comparable to a “quasi-indexical”) that app represents and represents Others and therefore builds on the apperception of the Others’ first-person nominative singular self-reference. This achievement of “we,”
the fulfillment of personal life and the basis for a proper notion of community, is
deepened and appears to be even more remarkable when one gains a better insight
into the uniqueness of each individual.

Another caution bordering on a regret is that this work’s emphasis on spirit
pushes the themes of nature, human nature, ecology, and natural processes into the
background. Perhaps on some other occasion we might be able to attempt to do
justice to this imbalance. It is hard to say which dimension, nature or spirit, is today
under greater assault by our cultural, economic, and political theories and
practices.

The transcendental phenomenology of the first volume is called a “meontology.”
Because ontology has to do with being, and meon refers to non-being, we might
appear to have a contradiction. Yet this venerable term signifies for us some of the
problems of the distinctive mode of reference of “I” as well as the distinctive mode
of self-presence which “I” presupposes. The transcendental sense of “I,” as the
agent and dative of manifestation (terms of Robert Sokolowski which this work
appropriates), is presupposed by all senses of being. There is an incongruity in
thinking of this, as that to which and by which all that appears, itself appearing as
a being or an object, and therefore we have found reason to follow Husserl’s
meontological suggestions in this matter. Further, the reference of “I,” but also the
empathic presencing and address of Others in the second-and third person, just
like all demonstratives, can be a non-ascriptive form of reference, i.e., a reference
free of any seeing-as or taking-as which always involves property ascription. In
both volumes this becomes a theme of special interest in the consideration that
love’s intentionality is beyond the qualities or properties of the beloved.

In the transcendental phenomenological meontology “who one is” refers basic-
ally to the “myself” which the indexical “I” presupposes and refers to. With tran-
scendental phenomenological reflection this sense of “I” reveals itself as a uniquely
unique, propertyless, unworldly, unbegun, unending, non-temporal, non-spatial,
non-reflectively self-aware, and therefore not a posited being. If I am asked in this
ultimate foundational framework, Who are you? I always know and can never not
know the answer, even if I have become amnesiac. Yet, in response to, Who are
you?, I, in this ultimate framework, cannot say anything except “I,” and even this
token expression betrays a commonality among all speakers that distorts the unique
uniqueness. Of course, in the transcendental ultimate framework important things
may be said about “the transcendental I” in terms of what it is, i.e., the sense in
which it is a substance and the sense in which it bears properties. Similarly, in the
everyday perspective of the natural attitude, when a person asks of someone, Who
are you?, she typically has other, often pragmatic or ethical, contexts in mind. And
so do I when, e.g., I translate the perhaps anguished “Who am I?” by “What sort of
person am I?”

“What sort of person am I?” raises questions with which Book 2 will chiefly
deal. Yet in the first Book we must also wrestle with the sense in which “person”
is a “sortal” term, as the phrase “sort of person” suggests. In Book 2 we study
how this question may be construed ethically and thus have to do with a different
sense of identity, namely one’s personal-moral identity, in contrast to that of the
transcendental I. This moral identity is not given from the start but rather requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution. Here the theme of vocation emerges in conjunction with love. The speculative resolution of this work is that the moral-personal ideal sense of Who is linked to the transcendental Who through a notion of entelechy or vocation. The person strives to embody the “myself” or I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not and who one ought to be. At the conclusion of Book 2 we will address speculatively the philosophical-theological issues at stake here.

In Book 1 we have primarily to do with the transcendental-ontological sense of Who one is. Prior to self-reference there is a non-reflective self-awareness of “myself.” This is named, in the spirit of Duns Scotus and Gerard Manley Hopkins, an “individual essence” or “haecceity” because “Who one is” is “essentially” distinct from Others in a non-propertied way. One is an individual through oneself being a “myself,” and not because of individuating factors apart from oneself; one is uniquely oneself per se and not per accidens. This sense of oneself coincides with the transcendental I as an I-pole which likewise is bereft of properties.

Of course, this sense of oneself is not the whole of oneself because each is a person, and persons have of necessity properties and forms of individuation by reason of their insertion in nature, society, and culture. As Husserl has pointed out there are paradoxes in this double-aspect we have of being transcendental I’s and persons in the world with others. We will spell out some of these paradoxes in accord with the theme of the “transcendental person.” For example, we look at how one is both the transcendental observer and something observed, a person, in the world with Others; how one is both a part/piece of the world, and that to which and for which the world appears; how one is non-temporal and in time; how one is not in space and in space; how one is part of the causal, bodily world-nexus and free and transcendent to this. Special attention is given to the paradox of death, how it appears in the natural attitude in the second- and third-person in contrast to the first-person. Of special interest is that death, which, along with birth, seems, in the first-person transcendental analysis, to lack for essential reasons phenomenological evidence – whereas in the second- and third-person its evidence is compelling. We will look at this matter from various angles. The final chapter of Book 1 discusses various possible meanings of the “afterlife” in the light of transcendental-phenomenological considerations.
My reading of the general lines of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and my take on the spirit of Husserl are indebted to the philosophical dyad at Catholic University in Washington, DC, Thomas Prufer and Robert Sokolowski. Thomas Prufer, even in his passing, remains the constant mentor. I continue to sense him, as it were, looking over my shoulder. Robert Sokolowski is an adopted mentor and an exemplar of the philosophical wonder and patience which permits essential distinctions to emerge. For these reasons I have dedicated this work to them.

Similarly I want to express my thanks to Ullrich Melle and John Maraldo for their steady support in this project and for friendship in all matters.

Readers will soon see that I owe to the Danish philosopher, Erich Klawonn, some of the key insights and arguments around which especially the first volume revolves. Dan Zahavi’s work introduced me to Klawonn and here I also thank Zahavi for always being helpful, in his writings and conversations, in clarifying many matters in the philosophers we have commonly studied.

It will be likewise evident to readers how much I owe, among the earlier generations of phenomenologists, to Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Dietrich Von Hildebrand, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, J.-P. Sartre, J. Ortega y Gasset, E. Levinas, Eugene Gendlin, and, especially, Michel Henry, whose thought, although scarcely mentioned, has been an impetus throughout this work. Very important also are my debts to Maurice Blondel, Louis Lavelle, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Vladimir Jankélévitch, H.D. Lewis, and Robert Spaemann, all of whom thought and wrote outside of the explicit phenomenological movement, but whose common passion for evident distinctions made such a border artificial.

I am likewise obviously indebted to phenomenology-friendly analytic philosophers, especially my colleague Hector-Neri Castañeda, whom I was able to call a friend. I am indebted to his account of indexicality and quasi-indexicals, but also for challenging me in regard to the issue of non-reflective self-awareness. Similarly the debts to the writings of Roderick Chisholm, Peter Geach, Thomas Nagel, Sydney Shoemaker, Michael Loux, Andrew Brook and Martha Nussbaum will be obvious.

It is to Manfred Frank and Dieter Henrich especially that I am grateful for opening my eyes to how important the work of these analytic philosophers is for my understanding of phenomenology.
And I want to thank the Indiana University (Bloomington) colleagues of an earlier era who instituted a policy of relatively early paid retirement, the leisure from which enabled the writing of this work.

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I also want to thank Michael Koss for patiently reading this volume for typos and other moments of inadvertence.

I thank my wife, Julia Livingston, for encouragement and patience with my prolonged periods of going mentally AWOL, due to the demands of this work.

Finally, I wish to thank Ullrich Melle, the Director of the Husserl Archives in Leuven, for permission to quote from Husserl’s unpublished MSS.

James G. Hart
Bloomington, Indiana and Manitoulin Island, Ontario
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## Contents

Preface ............................................................................................................. vii

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................ xi

I Phenomenological Preliminaries ................................................................. 1
  §1 Appearings, Looks, and Phenomena ...................................................... 2
  §2 Appearings, *Eidé*, and Possible Worlds .......................................... 14
  §3 Possible-World Theory and Phenomenological Eidetic Analysis ... 25
  §4 Perspectives, Appearings and Givenness ........................................... 32
  §5 General Remarks About the Phenomenological Reduction .......... 36
  §6 Further Parallels in the Natural Attitude ........................................... 41
  §7 Bracketing the World .................................................................... 49
  §8 The Setting of Phenomenology ....................................................... 54

II The First Person and the Transcendental I .............................................. 65
  §1 The Achievement of “I” .............................................................. 65
  §2 On the Reduction of the Nominative to the Accusative in Henry and Levinas ................................................................. 80
  §3 The Ineluctability of I-ness in Awareness and Self-Awareness ...... 81
  §4 The “Transcendental I”: The Dative and Agent of Manifestation... 93
  §5 Dasein, Being-in-the-World, and “Meontology” ............................. 100
  §6 Self-Awareness, Self-Blindness, and “The Externus Hypothesis” .. 105
  §7 First-Person Perspective .............................................................. 118
      A Perspective .............................................................................. 118
      B Lived Perspectives are First-Person ......................................... 118
      C Transcendental Phenomenology and the First-Person Perspective .............................................................................. 121
      D Chisholm on Self-Presenting Acts .......................................... 123
      E A Note on Terminology ............................................................. 124
  §8 Reflection and the Itinerary of Consciousness .................................. 125
  §9 Non-Ascriptive Reference of “I” and the Degenerate-Soliloquistic Position ................................................................. 127
### Contents

#### III  Ipseity’s Ownness and Uniqueness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§1</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§2</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§5</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### IV  Love as the Fulfillment of the Second-Person Perspective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part One: The Second-Person Perspective</td>
<td>§1</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§2</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§3</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§4</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§5</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§6</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§7</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§8</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§9</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§10</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§11</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§12</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§13</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Two: Love, Person, and Ipseity</td>
<td>§14</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§15</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§16</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§17</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§18</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§19</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§20</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§21</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§22</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§23</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### V  Ontology and Meontology of I-ness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§1</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§2</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VI The Paradoxes of the Transcendental Person

§1 General Remarks About Paradox in Phenomenology

§2 The First-Person and Phenomenological Regional Ontology

§3 Aporiae and Paradoxes Within Regional Ontology
   A The Contemporary Scene
   B Bodiliness and Mentality
   C Panpsychism
   D Individuation from the Regional-Ontological Perspective
   E Spiritual Causality
   F The Problem of the Natural Scientific Account of Animated Beings
   G Again: The Problem of the Psycho-Physical Connection
   H Consciousness and Meaning as Epiphenomena

§4 Some Paradoxes of Human Subjectivity in Regard to Nature and World

§5 The Spatiality and Bodiliness of the Transcendental Person

§6 The Transcendental Person

§7 Inalienable Dignity and the Transcendental Person

§8 Transcendental Person as Microcosm

§9 Transcendental Person as Necessary Being and Essence

VII The Death of the Transcendental Person

§1 Death and Birth in the Natural Attitude

§2 The Transcendental I and the Awareness of Inner Time

§3 The Non-temporal Character of the Awareness of Time

§4 Freedom and Love’s Contest with Temporality and Death

§5 The Beginninglessness and Endlessness of the Transcendental I

VIII The Afterlife and the Transcendental I

§1 Wordsworth and Schopenhauer on Ignorance of Pre-existence

§2 Sleep as a Transcendental Phenomenological Theme

§3 Sleep as the Brother of Death

§4 Vedanta and Husserl on Consciousness, Sleep, and Death

§5 The Conservationist Optic

§6 Conceiving Personal Immortality and Resurrection:
   A Stranger in a Strange Land?
   B Bodiliness as a Determining Factor
   C Variations in Intelligence
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Variations in Gender</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>The Moral-Personal Identity</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Variations in the Social-Historical World</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>H.H. Price’s Spiritualist Afterlife</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>The Resurrection of the Body</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§7</td>
<td>Aristotelianism, Resurrection, and Reincarnation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Problem of Being a Stranger to Oneself in a Strange Land</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§8</td>
<td>The “Myself,” Memory and the Afterlife</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A Critical Passage of Husserl</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Some Problems of Memory in Regard to Personal Reincarnation</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Shoemaker and “Quasi-Memory”</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Possible-World Speculation and the Death of Phenomenological Philosophy</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>More on One’s Being Reborn Without Remembering Who One Is</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bibliography** | 545 |

**Index** | 555 |
Chapter I
Phenomenological Preliminaries

Lumen naturale intellectus nihil aliud est quam manifestatio veritatis.

(St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q. 106, a. 1; I, q. 67, a. 1.)

We see, My Essence was Capacitie.
That felt all Things,
The Thought that Springs
Therfrom’s it self;...
This made me present evermore
With whatsoever I saw.
An Object, if it were before
My Ey, was by Dame Natures Law,
Within my Soul, Her Store
Was all at once within me; all her Treasures
Were my Immediat and Internal Pleasures,
Substantial Joys, which did inform my Mind.
With all she wrought
My soul was fraught,
And evry Object in my Heart a Thought
Begot or was; I could not tell,
Whether the Things did there
Themselves appear,
Which in my Spirit truly seemd to dwell;
Or whether my conforming Mind
Were not even all that therin shind.

(Thomas Traherne, c. 1675)1

In this first chapter we offer a brief introductory statement about some basics of phenomenology, especially as it relates to the main themes of this work. The passage from Thomas Traherne nicely sets the stage for both the medieval version of “intentional being” (or the inesse of the known world) as well the idealist pull of some readings of transcendental phenomenology, both of which we mean to resist. The passage from St. Thomas, of course, points to the fundamental theme of the transcendental I as the “agent of manifestation.”

§1 Appearings, Looks, and Phenomena

“He looked surprised.” “Appearing,” like “looks,” is at least a quadruple-faceted word. The appearing or appearance may refer to what appears (the one surprised). But, of course, it also refers to the looks or appearing of what appears. What are these looks? They belong, are attached, to what appears. But how? Being surprised is connected to widened eyes and perhaps a mouth hanging open. “I looked surprised because I was surprised.” Or: “I looked surprised because that was what I wanted you to believe.” It is of great importance for us that we determine whether there is a merely contingent, adventitious, or appropriate and revelatory connection between what appears and its appearings. But that means that there is a third and fourth facet, i.e., we the perceivers, and how the perceivers engage or interpret what appears through its appearings, and the peculiar appearing of the engagement. Phenomenology has to do with what appears as it is tied to the appearings to someone of what appears.

Even today ancient residual meanings of “appearing” obscure this claim. The scholastics might begin a disputed question with the suspicious sense of appearing: “It appears…” “It seems that…” "Videtur quod…”: “It appears that such and such is the case but in fact, it is otherwise.” Yet this age-old suspicious, doubting sense of “appearing” presupposes another more properly phenomenological sense: “It seemed (appeared) that Peter was courageous, but he later revealed himself to be otherwise.” The latter sense of appearing as a revealing or showing, indeed a self-showing or self-manifestation, is often brought best to light with a reflexive pronoun (“he showed himself”). This formulation makes the looking, appearing, disclosing, or showing transparent to what shows itself. Thereby the suggestion that the appearing was a veil, a disguise, a semblance or dissemblance is undermined. “Handsome is as handsome does” (or Forrest Gump’s “Stupid is as stupid does”) expresses the conviction in moral-aesthetic matters that appearing in a certain way is not possible unless one truly is this way. A translation of a passage from Schiller’s *Maria Stuart* states, “and what she is, that dares she to appear.” This formulation states the distinction and tension between being and appearing as well as the way the latter can be transparent to the former.

The first suspicious sense of appearing or phenomenon is not, of course, unmotivated. We say and hear: “Appearances are deceiving.” Things appear to be X when, in fact, they are Y. Science’s history may be thought of, depending on many other philosophical assumptions, either as a history of “saving the appearances” or of “getting rid of appearances” and being in touch with “things in themselves.” Mirages, delusions, illusions, magic, scams, etc. are, subsequent to veridical disclosure, “mere seemings.” That is, oftentimes we correct the appearances with new ones, new disclosures. We see for ourselves that the “water on the highway” was only an illusion; that, as we arrived at the spot, the highway showed itself to be dry. We see for ourselves that the stick in the water is not really bent; it only looked that way because our perception of it was refracted through the prism of the water. Now, out of the water, it looks perfectly straight.
Science also may be thought of as getting rid of appearances in so far as it finds appearances as irrelevant. It deals with “the things themselves” in their contingently necessary or randomly probable, if not their essential, determination. The appearings of things that appear, as we shall say, the display or manifestation of what appears, is properly regarded by science as irrelevant to its quest for the truth of things. This is an appropriate claim that phenomenology must respect and at the same time, as we shall see, qualify. Yet modern (post-Galilean) natural science has taken the further metaphysical step of declaring that manifestation and display are something subjective, i.e., appearings are very much thing-like, except that they stand in the way of the real things, and that what appears in fact is not really tied to a display to a subject but rather what appears is comprised of complexes of mathematical relations. These relations are held to be the language of nature, a language which is indifferent to perspectives. Reality is absolutely heterogeneous to appearings (as a mathematical equation is heterogeneous to a sensible appearing object) and therefore appearings are not only contingent but seemingly unnecessary – even though no one has yet been able to do science without them.

Science, and being or reality as it appears in the typical everyday or “natural” attitude, is indifferent to manifestation or appearing or display because it sees being as given or “there” intact completely in itself. Then, it enters, somehow, into appearing and display. This kind of ineluctable prejudice (the natural attitude is indeed “natural” or what we naturally do) results in talk about the really real as “apart from appearances” or what is “behind all appearances.” Esse quam videri, “To be rather than to seem.” (As this latter quote implies, the moral reality is transcendent to what appears in “society” and to other public appearances. Of course whether it is beyond all manifestation, all sense of self-manifestation, hardly seems likely, even if we prize the non-reflective and non-narcissistic aspects of moral agency.)

Phenomenology takes its name from the Greek word phainesthai for “to manifest” or “to appear” and phainomenon for “an appearing.” These words themselves are tied etymologically to other words that have to do with showing, disclosing, revealing, making visible or evident; they have to do with words connected to the luminosity or shine of things, their coming forth into the light. These ancient senses seem naïve in contrast with the ancient skeptical and modern, post-Kantian philosophical sense of phenomenon or appearing where the suspicious sense reigns: “It seems/appears to be X, whereas in fact it is Y.” “Think not I am what I appear.” “All that glistens is not gold.” “The Pharisees look well from the outside but within they are full of dead men’s bones.” The Kantian distinguishes the merely appearing, as the realm of being conditioned by transcendental mind, from the unknown unconditioned noumenal realm that exists in itself and unconditioned by the finite mind. Because what we experience is, according to Kant, framed by the a priori structures of sensibility and understanding, the unconditioned noumenal thing-in-itself is not known as such but only as it comes forth into the light of human understanding; then it becomes epistemically conditioned because submitted to the mind’s framing structures. Being and display, or being and phenomenality, are disconnected.2
For Kant, a perfect divine knowledge of things creates them and knows them in an intellectual archetypal look-free immediate intuitive grasp, an "intuitus originarius," appropriate to the author of the very being of things. Thus it will know things infallibly without perspectives, without any appearing. An issue undiscussed by Kant is whether this divine mind may be said in any way to appear to itself. Does it know the being of things as other than itself or as itself? If other, how can the divine mind tell – by the "looks"? Surely, if instead of a self-aware divine mind, there were only an unconscious "mind," and if it alone existed, the distinction as well as inseparability of being and display, along with the world’s intelligibility, would be seriously jeopardized.

Phenomenology asserts, with some qualifications, the unity of being and display or appearances. Husserl makes this dramatic when he calls "a fundamental error" Kant’s view that God would know a perceptual object without perspectives in an intellectual intuition. For Husserl, if God knows a perceptual object, God perceives and knows the object from a perspective. This very important topic will be visited again in the conclusion to Book 2. But here we may note that behind the Kantian formulations there are ancient theological-religious themes of the absolute transcendence of the divine and divine "point of view" to all things human. For phenomenology properly speaking there is no access to the ancient dogma that things are true because the creator God knows them, God does not know them because they are true. Relative to this "point of view", we see the true essence of things darkly and through a veil; we are immersed in a realm of Maya. Kant’s noumenal realm, quite against his wishes perhaps, may be taken to stand for a theological supernatural realm that is absolutely inaccessible to mere mortals. Of special interest to us is the sense in which the divine knowing does or does not know what each refers to with the indexical "I" and whether first-person experience has access to the divine knowing of what each refers to with "I." Of special interest in this regard is Thomas Prufer’s summary of an Augustinian position which we will address in the concluding chapter of Book 2: “There is a cleavage between phenomenal and noumenal, between man insofar as he can show himself and be seen in the world by others and by himself and man as abyss, who is as being known by God, man who is whatever God knows him to be.”

In terms of our display of the world (which, we will argue, is essentially different than our first-personal non-intentional self-manifestation), there would seem to be at least four directions we might take here: (a) a radical separation of all appearing from being: All being that we know through appearing is at best an approximation, at worst a mere illusion and of no significance for ultimate salvation or ultimate truth; (b) All phenomenality is contingently related to absolute being but still can serve as an analogous pointer to unconditioned being; (c) All phenomenality is illusory except consciousness; consciousness itself does not appear if this means appear as an object or something standing over-against consciousness, but rather it, consciousness, as self-luminosity, is a coincidence of appearance and being or reality; (d) All intelligible being is necessarily tied to appearing; if something exists, it appears at least in principle or as a possibility, and therefore is a correlate to an actual or possible mind as the agent of manifestation.
A thorough transcendental phenomenological philosophy interested in metaphysics and the philosophy of religion would have to address each of these possibilities at length. Here we make only a few brief comments. The first two options would not seem to be able to be philosophically demonstrated, at least in a way acceptable to phenomenology. However, while inimical to a phenomenological philosophy of our being in the world, these positions may, because of religious faith, raise questions about the adequacy of this philosophy. But this philosophy would still insist on some kind of display or “revelation” if one were to assent to what is beyond all phenomenality. Further, it would insist that the source of this revelation be itself manifest and manifest to itself – even if the display were essentially epistemically deficient because its vehicle were alleged to be “faith.” For this third option, whereas what appears properly can be negated, consciousness does not appear as something negatable because the negation would presuppose the negating consciousness. For the South Asian Indian Advaita form of Vedanta, consciousness itself, understood as non-intentional and unreflexive self-consciousness, is eternal, changeless and undifferentiated and, properly understood, is itself Brahman or the absolute. The fourth option is the proper transcendental phenomenological position. It too faces some questions about its founding of its own position, especially in regard to the opposition provided by the first two positions. Further, if taken without some finessing, e.g., without developing a sense of transcendence that is not merely that of other selves or the world, its relevance to religion in customary senses will appear to be jeopardized.

Being and display are inseparable for phenomenology in part because all talk of the mind-independent thing-in-itself bereft of all display, phenomenality, articulation, etc. leaves us without anything to say. Even the bare categorical intuition, “It is,” or “It is ‘there,’” is not possible. Or, if this view of being’s mind-independence is not taciturn, it presents the thing-in-itself on the basis of how things would look to a mind anonymously on the scene, e.g., how they would look through the appropriate theory serving the investigators as if they were fortunate enough to be on the scene of, e.g., “the Big Bang” or the first appearing of the human consciousness out of the long evolution of hominoids or out of the development of the fertilized egg. “A world without subjects who really experience it (with spatial-temporal-causal intuitions) is thinkable only as the past of a world with such subjects.”

Phenomenology’s claim that being and display are inseparable and that there is no mind-independent thing-in-itself as a subject for philosophical reflection is not the absurd claim that knowing is making. Nor is it the claim that to the be (esse) of the world is reducible to being perceived (pericii), or that the being of what is known is, as truly existing being, dependent for its existence on the knowing’s display. Rather it merely claims tautologically that the actual displaying by mind itself of actual being is a necessary condition for how being gets articulated by mind or how being is manifest to mind. The common sense view that there are mind-independent entities is not contradicted by transcendental phenomenology; it only asserts that if we are in a position to say something about these entities, then we have displayed them, and their being is tied to their display. The theological matter is left open whether, as the scholastics put it, being (or ens) and truth (or verum)
are convertible in the sense that if the true is necessarily a relationship to mind, so
must all being whatsoever stand in relationship to mind. But it is not a theological
matter to hold that if being is displayed as being true, as verified, as essential, etc.,
then, of course it stands in a relation to mind.

The tautology is not just a proposition or claim of *idem per idem* because the
natural attitude holds the opposite ontological view, i.e., being’s intelligible display
is indifferent to mind. It is within the transcendental attitude’s shift or putting in
quotes of the natural attitude that the tautological description appears as tauto-
logical; if one has not forgotten the natural attitude, one sees that the tautological
description is an enrichment but not distortion of the original state of affairs.
One sees that being displayed enriches being regarded as mute possible intelli-
gibility as does the elegance and articulateness enrich the presence of any being
we come across.

Let us think of “truth” as the “making true” (verification) of something proposed.
Truth as making true occurs in our experiencing the matter in a “filled intention” of
that which we first had in an “empty intention,” e.g., in a hypothesis, proposal, or
report. A “filled intention” enjoys the mind’s target “in the flesh,” presentially. It
contrasts with an “empty intention,” where what the mind targets or is directed
toward is not given “in the flesh” or presentially, but only mediately, as in a report,
a guess, or symbolic representation. Thus, through the appropriate perception
(“There is a lion in the hall”) we ourselves now enjoy in a filled presence “in the
flesh” what before we had in an “empty intention,” e.g. through the report of some-
one else that “There is a lion in the hall.” (Whether this other person was articulating
a perception, making true someone else’s report, or merely reporting a report, is of
no relevance to our making true.) Here we see that phenomenology’s concern with
display is concern with “the truth of being” and our own “being truthful.” (We can,
instead of making it true (verifying it), e.g., chatter endlessly as if
we were in pos-
session of the truth, and treat hearsay as unquestionably true.) The individual per-
son’s agency is the necessary condition of the display, and in this sense the person
is the author of the display and of the truthfulness of being. This is the basic sense
of “constitution” in phenomenology. But the agent of manifestation, a term, along
with many other ideas we take from Robert Sokolowski (see below for our discus-
sion of the agency of manifestation), is not to be envisaged as the author or maker
of the being that is manifested. Further the human as the agent of manifestation is
not a sufficient condition of the display. Display is a display by consciousness of
something transcendent to the act of consciousness, i.e., some thing in the world; it
is not merely consciousness’ self-display.

But what of the case of error? Is this not the crucial instance that shows that dis-
play is merely a mental event? Does it not raise the specter that being or what truly
is might be beyond all display? Such views would be valid only if we were to think
of error as demonic madness and not a mistake. Such demonic epistemic madness,
in so far as it is not an interpretation of the world but a fantastic version of the world
generated by a demon or by an agency apart from the “I” as center of the self,
would seem to exist only in the (over- or under-populated) mind of the author. But
as a rule madness does not appear to be demonic possession or the performances of
an automaton apart from the ill-person’s own self, and therefore it usually involves misinterpretations. These might be generated, e.g., by powerful emotions or schemas of interpretation that secure the self against its perceived peril. The world is often, depending on our situation, like a Gestalt picture, genuinely capable of multiple interpretations. Common mistakes are to take one look or aspect of something for the whole (e.g., racial or ethnic prejudice) or to take a whole for an aspect (e.g., capitalism regards persons as commodities and resources for capital growth, totalitarianism takes persons for aspects or functionaries of the state).

If knowing has its telos in propositions which give expression to judgments, and if judgments are always a deployment of the syntactical “is” by which what is to be determined acquires a determination, then a “false” or “erroneous” knowing has to do with the predication, the determination, of the substrate to be determined. The determination is always a display of what is to be displayed or determined. As Heinrich Barth has noted, even a false judgment might be a display of being and one who judges falsely might show greater knowledge than one who does not judge because he recognizes something to be determined and what determines it. Both of these, what is to be determined as well as what determines, the substrate as well as the property to be predicated, can well be founded on a prior true determination or display. In a false judgment it is not as if the syntactical tie of the “is” is missing, as if there were a vacuum existing between the subject and predicate. Rather the one knowing, even in error, knows of the possibility of a predicative syntactic tie between the subject and predicate. In every judgment there is inherent at least this possibility of the tie, at least the possibility of its being true. Thus the subsequent negation of a judgment, its appearing now to be false, rests on the prior possibility of its being true. This of course is supported by the analogy with the Gestalt reversible picture wherein something appears as neither determinate nor sheerly indeterminate but rather as sheer determinability prior to its determination as, e.g. a duck rather than a rabbit. Of the one who errs it cannot be said that she has not displayed anything of being. At least it can be said that she displays the possibility that in her circumstance what appears is a mountain cabin (instead of a patch of cliff), a duck (instead of a rabbit). When she is corrected by the one who judges the state of affairs correctly, the presuppositions for the erroneous judgment, i.e., how the matter appeared, are not called into question. Just the opposite: Assuming good will, the will to truth, there must be acknowledged, that this is a meaningful possibility of the matter being so determined. Indeed, correcting the error most effectively requires displaying this very false appearing as possible and then pointing to where the false determination misses the mark, e.g., by showing how it inadequately or distortingly displays the being in question.

Truth does not merely have to do with theory and merely epistemic achievements but it has to do with what is at the center of ourselves. For this reason, because truth is that to which we are called and determined in the core of our being as agents of manifestation as well as in the center of our I’s, as Existentz, there is always a note of disapproval, verging on a moral reproach, in regard to the occasion of a false judgment. The false judgment is not the extinction of the actualization of knowing but a relative momentary failure.
Thus, in instances of true as well as false knowing, the actuation of the display is equally conditioned by both the capacity of the agent of manifestation and how the world appears. That the world, at least on occasion, appears ambiguously, would seem beyond doubt — indeed questioning this proposition would seem to be a step towards demonstrating its validity. The misinterpretation is not something merely in the mind, but like any mistake is motivated by the way the world looks, even though the particular looks of the world themselves may have been fraught with mistakes or distortions occasioned by the one interpreting as well as her appropriating mistakes and distortions of other interpreters. The weight of the conventional views of one’s society is subtly telling. Consider how class is a taboo theme in political discourse among the powerful in the USA, and how Aristotle, the tutor of the Emperor of an empire whose economy was based on slavery, made an intriguing case for slavery, in spite of being quite aware of where his position was most vulnerable. From the most ancient times there has been the recognition that the problem of truth and error is often, but not always, connected with the moral character of the knower, whether the agent of manifestation is taken individually or collectively.

Although being is more basic than display because display is always of what exists in some sense, display is a most original “relation” of being to consciousness and consciousness to being. Display happens when we make sense, see something as..., distinguish, affirm, deny, doubt, syntactically link, etc. We display also in our practical-emotive engagements, as when in our repugnance we find something to be repulsive or in our devotion we find something to be worthy of love.

Display is the achievement of intentionality and what has been called “the intentional relation.” But a difficulty here is that one seems first to have something called consciousness and also something called being, and then we relate these through “display.” The priority that we wish to assign to display and manifestation can be side-tracked by inherited understandings of the I and consciousness. Both of these may be conceived to be first and even given to us after the fashion of an object, as when we think of “I” as one among the others, or consciousness as the kind of being capable of intentional acts. But display and manifestation are more original than any senses of I, consciousness, or being, in so far as we are inclined to think of these as given prior to display and to make them the “foundations” of display. (Why appearing, manifestation and display require some sense of “I” and “consciousness” will occupy us later on; here it suffices to say that what will be meant by these is tied to the primacy of appearings or manifestation and not the other way around.)

A passage from Hobbes helps us think about these matters. He announces a sense of science which has its principles in the appearances of nature in as much as “things as they appear, or are shown to us by nature we call phenomena or appearances.” He calls this science “the phenomena of nature,” but he also says its proper name is “physics, because it reaches its completion in a knowing of natural causes.” He then adds:

Of all the phenomena or appearances which are near us, the most admirable is apparition itself, τὸ φανερόν; namely that some natural bodies have in themselves the patterns almost of all things, and others of none at all. So that if the appearances be the principles
by which we know all other things, we must needs acknowledge sense to be the principle
by which we know these principles, and that all the knowledge we have is derived from it.
And as for the causes of sense, we cannot begin our search of them from any other phe-

nomenon than that of sense itself. But you will say, by what sense shall we take notice of
sense? I answer, by sense itself….8

Hobbes is correct that appearing itself is the most amazing of appearings. Indeed,
coming upon it is to receive a shock from one’s philosophic nerve. But in the text
it is not clear where his amazement is focused, i.e., whether at the human body (as
the setting for “sense”), or whether at appearings themselves as displaying things,
or whether at appearings as displayed things. It further suggests that the category
of mind or intellect may be dispensed with in favor of “sense,” in spite of his linking
appearings to “patterns.” Yet his notion of “sense” echoes Aristotle’s nous, which
not only contains the “patterns” of most things but “is in a certain sense every-
thing.” The text seems to suggest that all three targets of his amazement (four if we
include “mind”) are inseparably one and equally worthy of our wonder. Yet the
distinction between what or who displays, what is displayed, and its display may
not be overlooked. Further the sense in which the human body contains appearings
is not at all clear. Further, the human body as an agent of manifestation involves
more than “sense” and the patterns of appearings, and furthermore precisely as the
agent of manifestation it does not appear among what appears, e.g., after the fash-
on of the bodies that we experience. And surely the achievements of human bodies,
not least of which is that of “sense,” are remarkable and hold a unique place in our
meditating on phainesthai. Yet it is a fateful determination that we should interpret
a body’s having appearings (as the meaning of a body’s having the patterns of
almost all of what appears) to mean that this body has a mental representation and
it is this which we know in knowing our surroundings. Hobbes recognizes that there
is something fundamental and prior about manifestation or appearing. He then con-
nects appearing with those bodies that have mental images of other things.
Therefore, he implies that appearings are mental events, pictures, which are inside
animal or human bodies.

For Hobbes we are aware of appearings by “sense” and are aware of sense by
sense, by which latter he means an “inner sense” which he assigns to memory. In
his account, that which phenomenology calls the natural attitude prevails. And fur-
thermore what has been called the reflection theory of self-awareness (see the next
chapter) is evident in his description. Nevertheless, we honor Hobbes for calling
our attention to the ineluctability of phenomenon for science. We also pay him
tribute for noting its elusive character. And this consideration, in spite of the reduc-
tionist bent of his thought, adumbrates concerns of transcendental phenomenology.
(Connected with display/appearing as an astonishing consideration is the equally
confounding issue of the relation between consciousness and brain or physiology;
but more about that later in Chapter VI.)

Even the temptation to think of appearing as something grounded in “being” or
an “object” as what is there independently over against the subject, and the appearing
as the display of the object to a human or animal subject misleads. It presupposes
that beings are given in advance, e.g., the subject and the object, and that their
agency or passivity is a more fundamental consideration than appearing, display or manifestation. Of course, for the natural attitude, for which the agency of manifestation is of no account, it makes perfectly good sense to say: “we can’t in general first identify beliefs and meanings and then ask what caused them. The causality plays an indispensable role in determining the content of what we say and believe.”

“Reality” plays an efficacious causal role in our beliefs and it is an inherent part of beliefs that we believe this to be the case. Thus, if we hear a report about there being a lion outside our door in the hallway, we emptily intend the lion’s being outside our door in the hallway. We entertain either skeptically or credulously the proposition, “There is a lion outside the door.” But when we poke our heads outside the door and indeed see it “in the flesh” we now say with conviction and do not merely report or opine: “There is a lion outside the door.” Our belief here indeed makes no sense apart from the filled intention as filling what before was an empty one. But this transposition of the causal account into a phenomenological description is not a mere isomorphic translation. It is not the case that there is, as it were, a one-to-one causal relationship between the perceptible aspects of the lion and the state of affairs of the lion truly being in the hall outside the door. Nowhere in a primitive perceptual account are we to find the “outside,” “the truly being,” or “truly is.” It is not as if we dispatched or displaced intentionality in favor of physical reality’s causal efficacy impacting on our sensory apparatus and then on our brain.

Furthermore, physical reality’s being efficacious in regard to our beliefs is still a matter of beliefs. We cannot first identify the causes and say how they play an efficacious role in our beliefs, as if the causes came to light independently of our beliefs. But, at the same time, this position helps us to see why we may dispense with regarding intentionality as something merely in the head. It further is consonant with our effort to discourage thinking of our intentional attitudes as representations of what is outside of them. The filled intention is an enjoying of the lion itself in the flesh, even though “the truth” of the lion being in the hall, is precisely a syntactic achievement and complex intentionality that undermines the simple sense of reality efficaciously (i.e., working as an “efficient cause”) causing our propositions.

Once we recognize the essential naivety of the natural attitude, once we recognize that although there is surely a distinction between manifest transcendent things that exist independently of us, on the one hand, and our acts of manifestation of them, on the other, we, nevertheless, may acknowledge with William James “that the question as to how much of our web of beliefs reflects the world ‘in itself’ and how much is our ‘conceptual contribution’ makes no more sense than the question: ‘Does a man walk more essentially with his left leg or his right.’” Again, to quote Putnam, “the word ‘fact’ no more has its use fixed by Reality Itself than does the word ‘exist’ or the word ‘object.’”

All the temptations to regard display or appearing as a relation in terms of familiar worldly relations that presuppose it, like causality, projection, unconscious organic process, mirroring, likeness, making, etc., are bound to failure because “appearing” always goes in advance and is presupposed by all these relations. Appearing goes in advance in the sense that the one explaining always presupposes it for all descriptions and explanations. It goes in advance also because, so it seems to transcendental
phenomenology, any ontology defined in the absence of phenomenality decides a priori against the basic theses of phenomenology, and therefore defines it out of the game. Further, it not only goes in advance but the applications of other kinds of relationship to the appearing “relationship” itself have a way of destroying the very possibility of both display and knowing. For example, if all appearing/display/knowing is a “constitution” in the sense of a production or making out of pre-existent materials or out of nothing, then the question of how one “knows lets appear/displays” this to be true, i.e., that “All appearing/display/knowing is a making,” cannot be answered except by saying: I don’t know it, in the sense the question implies, but I make it to be so; or: What I so make stands by force of my will and does not answer to such questions!

Similar problems are posed by all the other candidates, like mirroring or representing. Thus as we cannot regard the presence of things to consciousness or the presence of consciousness to things (these are better formulations than in consciousness) as a matter of the physical causality of things impacting on consciousness, so we may not regard the manifesting presence of consciousness to things as a matter of the human’s productive or poetic capacity. The former view is swayed by the dogmatism that holds explanation is to bring something under a physical cause; the latter view is swayed by the sister dogma that explains intentionality away in favor of efficient causality.

In short, the account of display and manifestation in terms of things or beings and the properties of things short changes display or manifestation. It assumes that what is first and more basic are undisplayed things and the properties of these things, and then we have the thing, “display,” that must be accounted for by our ontology of things. If we are compelled to think of “every thing” of interest to philosophy as a thingly substance, or a property of a substance, then appearings of things must be ruled off the table of classifications.

Appearings are no more mere “contents” in the mind than the mind’s display of things is a natural property of the things. Of course, in the perception of the diseased tree, the disease is a property or aspect of the tree. The fact that the tree is diseased is not a natural property or aspect of the tree. Similarly in the exclamation that articulates a perception, “How cute that both the kitten and the rubber mouse are lying near one another on the rug,” we have a clear natural or physical arrangement of bodies, the kitten, the toy and the rug. But the “both” and the “lying on the rug” and “near one another” is an articulation, a bringing to light that is the work of display. And obviously the “being cute” is not a natural or physical component of the natural state of affairs. But clearly it is awry to say that the articulation is something merely in our minds and not “out there” having to do with the kitten, the ball and the rug. Facts, values, states of affairs, etc. are not “in the head” or even “in the mind.” They are “in the world” or better are ingredients of the world’s articulation. But they are not in the world in the way the toy mouse is in the cat’s mouth or in the way calcium is an ingredient in her diet.11

There is a well-known phrase in German philosophy (from the influential nineteenth century German psychologist, J.H. Herbart): So viel Schein, so viel hindeuten aufs Sein.12 The translation perhaps might run: There is as much reference
to being as there is display of being. Or: There is an increase in (the intelligibility of) being when there is an increase in display. The more perspectives, the more contexts, the more information, the more reflection we can bring to bear on something in the world, whether it be a historical text, an event, or a rock, the more there is of that literary work, event, or thing “there” for us because prior to the display the being is mute and has zero intelligibility. This is evident with persons. The more “they dare to appear what they are” 13 through speech and action before others, and the more perspectives gained on the person through, e.g., historical records, the more there is, e.g., of “Thomas Jefferson.” (This claim, however, will face a unique challenge when we come to deal with “myself” or what I am for myself [a unique kind of appearing] prior to my “daring to appear” to myself and the others – and my apperception of another as another, i.e., as precisely one who in experiencing herself experiences what she refers to as “myself.”)

The attending to the display of “being” enriches being also in so far as this very attending permits being to appear in correlation with manifestation, and this, inseparably with spirit or the agent of manifestation. The presencing of being, when oblivious to spirit’s anonymous functioning, has its merits for the ongoing advance of special sciences and tasks. Philosophical reflection can get in the way, e.g., of a medical diagnosis. But the display of “the whole show” that excludes the agent of manifestation or spirit is only half the story, and is a massive philosophical mistake if the account pretends to be the whole story.

This understanding of appearing and manifestation is quite different from the phenomenalist understanding that regards manifestation as having to do with the surfaces of things behind which reality hides. In such an understanding appearances are the equivalent of sensations or what causes sensations, and these are understood to be subjective sorts of things that reveal only the circumstances of the perceiver. Such things are givens, data, that sum themselves, and out of this aggregation wholes and wholes comprised of wholes appear. The field of manifestation does, indeed, come as a whole but not a whole in advance of its parts nor does it come as a whole that is the bundle, aggregate, or sum of the parts. From the start there is a whole-part, unity-plurality, identity-manifold differentiation, and these are inseparable from the ongoing interplay of presence and absence.

The naturalness of the natural attitude is such as to make display and the agency of manifestation so diaphanous, that doubt has arisen whether they exist at all. This very naturalness has led some thinkers to hold that there is no such thing as mental acts, intentionality, or display. We “behold” the world in the sense that we look through our sensory and cognitive apparatuses and they themselves are utterly transparent. Thereby we can be and are essentially absorbed in the contents, objectness or representations of the world and the philosophical preoccupation with constitution, intentional acts and display are, from the standpoint of the natural attitude, at least a distraction, if not a myth. This view of the superfluity of the agency of manifestation is connected with themes in the next chapter regarding pre- or non-reflective self-awareness, and what we will call the problem of “Externus consciousness.” It is of interest here because it suggests that the transcendental attitude itself is otiose and superfluous because the realism of the natural attitude appears to
be “absolute” and not needing any other consideration for its completion. Yet we have been arguing that the world does not merely confront us with objects and representational contents or being; rather it is configured, syntactically tied together, modalized in terms of necessity, possibility, etc. Furthermore, this “absolute” view is self-undermining as an absolute view because it is soaked with Others and the viewpoints of Others which make one’s own view emerge as a viewpoint or perspective. As Ned Block has put it, over and above the content of the world there is laminated “mental paint.” Manfred Frank has proposed that instead of mental paint as the alternative metaphor we entertain the metaphor “mental glass.” Even in the natural attitude we may say that the transparency of glass not only lets the properties of the world come to light but yet, because it is of a sui generis material, it too can be brought to light with a reflective attending. To the extent this is true the glass is not absolutely transparent but translucent. Yet in being aware of the objects in the world one is also pre-reflectively aware of the “mental glass,” i.e., the agency by which the world is displayed as well as the way this agency “paints” or arranges the world. It is the job of transcendental reflection to make this “paint” or “glass” explicit. However, to the extent that the metaphor of “mental glass” suggests a dualism of physical being and mental being, such that manifestation is an extrinsic lamination of mind on top of physical being, it misleads. Articulation, syntax, indexicality, quantification, modalization, categoriality, etc. of the world are not separate substances, like paint or glass, placed on top of or between another substance. Display belongs inseparably to being and the relationship tends to be obfuscated by analogies from what is displayed because it is prior to all such displayings. Mind and body offer two aspects or regions of being, the unity of which raises a different series of questions than does the unity of display and being.

The theme of manifestation is not identical with the regional ontological question of how to conceive the relationship between consciousness or “mentality” and physicality or body. This latter issue, with which we will briefly wrestle in Chapter VI, presupposes a third-person presentation of spirit as juxtaposed to physical bodiliness. In such a setting a main focus is to contrast and, if possible, unite the different if not incommensurate properties of the two regions. Manifestation, on the other hand, is ubiquitous, i.e., it is even present in such regional ontological discussions, and all such third-person perspectives ultimately must be tied to the first-person agency of manifestation of the inquiring philosopher. Here “mental paint” is clearly inappropriate as a way to categorize display because it is pictured as a kind of laminated intrusion on the really real physical base; but even proposing “mental glass” concedes too much to the aspired-to hegemony of the third-person regional ontological perspective.

This leads to a final consideration regarding display and the central theme of this book: Display is by and to persons. And the basic philosophical sense of the transcendental person as the one who at once is the one to whom and by whom display occurs is the transcendental I. This sense, we shall argue, is of what is uniquely unique and without properties. Therefore it is unsharable or communicable. Display of the world is the transcendental I’s basic activity, and display is properly in sharable and communicable language. Yet display of the world through the
sharable and communicable medium is an achievement by the I, which itself is unsharable and incomunicable. Being a transcendental I, an agent of the manifest-
tation of the world, is precisely to be a contraction or condensation of the world 
through display, through a perspective. In this sense persons as transcendental I’s 
are incommensurable and worlds unto themselves. This theme, which Leibniz and 
Husserl were later to pick up, was first formulated by Nicolas of Cusa: “\textit{Individua 
sunt actu, in quibus sunt contracte universa}.”\textsuperscript{16} (We will return to these themes later 
in Chapter VI, §8.)

§2 Appearings, \textit{Eidé}, and Possible Worlds

Display or manifestation necessarily has an “eidetic” mark. The Greek word \textit{eidos} is 
often translated as “idea,” “form” or sometimes “essence,” where the concrete senses 
of Gestalt and shape are best not forgotten. Other old senses, clearly connected to 
Gestalt or shape, also suggest “look,” “face,” “countenance,” or appearing. As the face 
sheads light on the whole person, so does the essence shed light on what we are bringing 
under consideration. For phenomenology it means the “essential look” things have 
and which can itself become a theme through a certain kind of reflection, what 
Husserl called “free imaginative variation.” Let us dwell on this briefly.

In attending to the essence of something we today face deeply rooted opposition 
that takes many forms. In antiquity, as the word \textit{eidos} suggests, it referred to that 
which was supremely intelligible and, as the central emanating light, illuminated 
what was being considered. It made the thing being considered what it was and to 
stand out with a unique light from all the other things that might be considered. It was 
that which most lent itself to a clear conception. In modernity it came to mean almost 
the reverse, i.e., what carried no light in itself and on which no light can be thrown. 
It is the “point of darkness” in all things which is inaccessible to thought or observa-
tion or conception.\textsuperscript{17} It is a “I know not what” that eventually becomes disdained.

In post-modernity there is even an inclination in some circles to hold that an 
essential claim or a reference to essences or what is essential is associated with an 
authoritarian tyrannical ideology that surreptitiously argues for eternal values and 
norms, especially in matters of class, gender or race, when in fact the matter at 
hand does not lend itself to such determinations. Or essences, e.g., are held to be 
hidden occult forces postulated by outdated science or philosophy. We “explain” 
by merely restating the sought-for cause or explanation in general terms that bring 
us no new light.

Yet who can deny that in the course of an inquiry or discussion we sense what 
is trivial, irrelevant, and adventitious when, in fact we want what is to the point, on 
target, and necessary. Thus, as we write today, pressing questions are what is “gender,” 
what is “pornography,” what are “rights,” what is “terrorism,” what is “torture,” 
what is there about “the state” that allegedly makes non-statist agents unqualified 
to have the rights of statist agents. People in power or the media are held to be 
thoughtful in so far as they can see what is essential in these topics, and we often
find that few do. Insisting on what is essential by no means equates with holding
that there are non-physical thing-like entities behind this world, or in another world,
that guide our inquiry or discussion. But everyone seems ready to admit that discus-
sions quickly get stale if no interest is shown in “what is essential” and the drift is
always to the non-essential, incidental, etc.18

This sense of the essence or what is essential thus is inseparable from the horizon
of the intentionality of any serious inquiry or conversation. What is essential for one
group or individual at a certain time is not necessarily essential for others – in the
sense that each will let certain matters weigh more heavily than others and neglect
or be oblivious of the rest. But this is a far cry from saying that what is truly essential
and necessary is non-essential and contingent; nor is it to say that what is essential
is to be reduced to the psychological-cultural profile of the inquirers. It merely
acknowledges the inseparability of being and display.

Another prejudice against essences stems from post-Galilean science. Understanding
nature has become increasingly less grasping what is essential about what appears
than grasping the physical efficient causes or the physical causes that bring something
about. Understanding is grasping “what makes it work.” Understanding is precisely bringing
something that before we did not understand under its physical cause. When we do this we have “understanding.” In antiquity
understanding something, especially in the realm of living things, meant in part
knowing it as having a development, and this meant understanding that towards
which the thing developed, its goal or purpose. Understanding “how things are”
meant understanding not only what brought them about, but this was inseparably
tied to seeing what they are, and this was inseparably tied to the way they are
is a function of what they were for or where they were headed in terms of a
teleological unfolding. In modern science the What and the purpose tend to be
replaced by the quest for seeing what brought about the things as they are now.
What things are, their essential look, is bleached out in favor of “what makes them
tick,” i.e., the moving physical causes whether or not presently evident. This has
paved the way to thinking about everything homogeneously and obliterating the
differences of natural kinds. After all, it is alleged, understanding anything is find-
ing the underlying physical cause. And physical causes will be ultimately what physics,
physiology, and biology show them to be.

Of course, because what we are doing is science, “the” physical causes of inter-
est will always be “kinds” or “types” which permit generalization from the particular
situation. Thus even in the move toward efficient causes there is an interest in the
What or kind that characterizes the cause. The What and kind of necessity are “formal”
and thus not collapsed into the particular; kinds are of necessity what are instantiated
and displayed by many. It is knowing the What as a universal form which makes
possible expertise, not merely knowing that one particular was brought about by
another particular. But the What of the state of affairs is not of interest for modern
science itself except as it has to do with a kind of explanation of what makes some-
ting work in terms of physical efficient causality.

This increasingly exclusive interest in the efficient cause is in part motivated by
the technological nature of modern science. In biology this shift occurs when one
is led to think of an animal as not a natural kind with perhaps an analogous first-person perspective on the world, but as an “organism,” which is thought of as a kind of complex physical machine, whose main interest for science is either its potentially useful parts, or how manipulating the machinery of its life processes and behavior may be beneficial for the medical and pharmaceutical industries. The great over-arching theme in biological science, the “gene,” is precisely the fruit of the focus on an efficient physical cause that abstracts from the manifest “form” or “eidos” of the manifest living thing. It is here where all the funding for research is to be found.

Given these interests, there is little motivation to study the animal by raising the question, “what sort of being is this?” Even less is there the interest which might generate an implicit dialogue, “what kind of being are you?” Not only is there a principled suppression of the question of what except as it serves the pragmatic-technological task of the research, but even more so there is a suppression of the consideration that the neglect of questions regarding what may miss what is most essential. Indeed, if the widespread assumption is that all life is founded on a “mindless scrap of molecular machinery” in which “nobody is there” the only task before us is to mine the scraps and manipulate the machine for our purposes. There is no question of a moral responsibility toward, e.g., the animals in the laboratory, because the direction of attention is toward the “what makes them tick,” i.e., the relevant efficient causes (genes) that show what makes the thing in question work, given the abstract descriptions of “the thing in question” and the “workings” of the thing.

Thus modern science is predisposed to a very limited interest in the “whats” of nature. It is not interested in the “what sort of being” questions, and certainly none that would assume the dialogical situation where one was analogously asking plants and animals, “what sort of beings are you?” And most clearly, because ultimately “nobody is there” for modern science, the most essential theme of this work, i.e., that Who cannot be subsumed under What, is totally irrelevant. And it is irrelevant not because natural science recognizes this distinction and knows that knowing who could not possibly be a pursuit of science. It rather is irrelevant because science typically is not interested even in the question of what or what kind. And because what is of exclusive interest is the type of efficient cause that accounts for some aspect of the phenomena in question both what and who questions do not figure into the inquiry. And this type of efficient cause itself, although ultimately only intelligible in the context of a kind and a Who, comes to light by the investigation’s pre-scinding from both the kind and the Who.

It is of special interest that in genetic biological studies genetic programming as the defining nature of research is under stress. Up until recently, because proteins “are involved in virtually every aspect of the organism, it began to seem as though DNA, with its full complement of genes, encodes a kind of computer operating system for directing the organism’s development.” Of course, if it is “an operating system” it is an “ideal object” that can be endlessly duplicated (e.g., by being put on CD ROMS) and endlessly manipulatable and patented! In spite of its pure ideality and status as a pure logical form (which in the interests of entrepreneurship becomes a piece of private property!) such an ideal object appeared to be what
controls the organism, i.e., “the physical machine.” Here the sense of understanding animals would be to grasp the encoded DNA and tinker with the operating system, and then see what happens.

However there have been numerous developments which challenge the conviction that genes encode the controlling logic of an organism. It is beyond my scope and competence to rehearse these considerations here. Yet increasingly the evidence, for at least some experts, points to the need to move the scientific inquiry away from the interest in merely the efficient causality of the gene and its conception as an “operating system” and to raise the question “what sort of being do we have to do with here?” The chief insight is that “the cell as a whole controls its DNA at least as much as the DNA controls the cell, just as the organism as a whole controls its cells at least as much as any group of cells controls the organism. All of which is to say that none of this is really about mechanisms of control at all.”

Let us return to phenomenology’s interest in essences as the answer to the question, “what sort of thing do we have to do with here?”

In phenomenology’s third-person engagement with the world, essence appears as the essence of something and it is the formal feature of what presents itself. The world and the things in the world come soaked with not only a “thisness” but also a “whatness.” We see things as..., i.e., having forms, shapes, properties. Because the essence or whatness is embedded in a concretion, in “this,” it is not simply, as such, a “universal” because it is the essence of this thing and thus itself has a kind of individuality. We can say of two flowers both that they have the same color and that the color of one is the same as the color of the other. We need not decide here (cf. our discussions in Chapters III and V), whether it is true that the essence of an individual object is individual in the same sense as the individual object itself is, as Roman Ingarden proposes. Put this way it seems to be either to support a basic contention of this work that, at least in the case of persons, there is a basic principle of individual essence or haecceity (a theme to which we will repeatedly return); or it appears to be a reification or, as the scholastics would say, it makes a principium quod out of a principium quo. As the essence appears in the original presentation, e.g., as the essence of this act of promising, it does not appear as a “universal.” Whether, however, it follows that in the presencing of two individuals, e.g., two acts of promising, we have two essences in the same sense as two acts of promising is debatable. Further, let us assume it is true that an individual object or thing which has such an essence, necessarily involves being-p, i.e., it requires a certain property, e.g., that a promise necessarily requires at least an analogous speech-act. If this is true then we might ask, is the being-p of S true about the essence itself or is it true merely about S, i.e., about the promise. We can say that it is the latter, because we have not yet brought the essence as such to light. But this being true only of the promise does not, it seems to me, establish that the essences of two individual objects or things are individual in the same sense as the objects or things are. It only states that the essence has not come to light “as such” so that it can be a bearer of predications.

To appreciate the essence as what is instantiable and not bound to a particular individual object is to begin to appreciate it in contrast to the essence of something.
In appreciating the essence as instantiable we appreciate the essence or whatness as such. To do this we have to engage in a certain kind of reflection that lifts the essence out of its status of being the essence of this thing here. For this to happen we must do two things: (1) we must prescind from the individuality and facticity of the thing, its thisness; phenomenologist have called this “the eidetic reduction.” (2) we must spell out what is involved in the whatness as it is adumbrated in the meaning-parameter of the matter at hand. Thus we begin with a vague generic meaning-field wherein the proper necessities are horizontally implicated.

We therefore move from the actual existence wherein the essence is immanent as a meaning frame to the realm of the essential. Because what we have to do with is indifferent to the actual existence the essential has to do with the possible. By prescinding from our belief-allegiance to what actually exists we are freed up to deal with the essentially possible. Although the possible is always a modification of the actual and our belief-allegiance to the actual, it at the same time sheds light on the essence of the actual which otherwise would not be shed.

The explication of this generic horizontal field is a familiar exercise, as when we press someone for what they mean by a term, e.g., “terrorism.” In such a case we may hear the term being used as synonymous with something else, e.g., violence. Or it may sound like the person means any exercise of power or authority. These uses clearly seem too general for the way the term is determined by the context at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As a result most would likely say that (essential) distinctions must be made. But we might first have to clear up what “violence” means, and that would have to be distinguished from power and force. (Along the way we might have to ask whether animal behavior can be characterized as “violent.”) The conversation might take a more focused and essential turn when another speaker might hold that the term applies to violence toward civilians by resistance, revolutionary, or insurgent forces. Someone else might find it too restricted when applied merely to these. Here clearly we have moved beyond just any case of the exercise of power or violence and have moved it into a kind of political setting. Now the question might surface of whether there are forms of terrorism that are essential to the survival of the state. If so, the very moral legitimacy of the state becomes a question because it might appear that its sole legitimacy is its own capacity to be a threat of violence, i.e., terror. But another might interject, does not the sense of terrorism today presuppose the legitimacy of the existing states? Another proposal would urge that we abstain from introducing the question of legitimacy of states and stay close to the trends of popular discourse. Therefore she might propose: “Terrorism is the act of exciting terror in the hearts of civilian non-combatant and military citizenry by the exercise of unpredictable and seemingly uncontrollable violence. This violence will be perpetrated either by the existing (e.g., statist) power and have the aim of suppressing any political change or it will be by the insurgency or resistance seeking to bring about a political change opposed by those presently holding power.” And so forth.

Our point, of course, is formal; this is not an inquiry into terrorism but an illustration of what we are doing when we strive after what is essential. Clarifying what is essential is always searching for necessary properties of what we strive to clarify, i.e., of the
“substrate” or focal point which has these properties. Note also that such an essential matter cannot take place without clarifying other essential matters, here, e.g., violence, power, legitimacy, civilian, the state, etc. Essential reflection of necessity points to other potentially endless meaning spaces. We further see that our inquiry must prescind from actually existing states of affairs because it aims at “necessary properties,” e.g., for terrorism as such. Therefore getting at “terrorism as such” may well be sustained merely by fictional examples (e.g., Orwell’s *1984*) which bring about the essential distinguishing properties. Properties here are “essential” in the sense that they are necessary conditions or that without which the matter or essence cannot be. (For example, terrorism without any use of any sense of violence by someone to someone seems impossible.) They are what the essence necessarily “has” or “owns.” The essence’s invariant property is its *proprium* or ownmostness.

When we get to the essence as such we get to something that is *not* tied to an actual particular thing, event, or agency. “Terrorist” now is not the “what” of a person, act, or organization, and thus tied to this person, act or organization, but is lifted from this concretion. Phenomenologists have referred to the essence as “the What” as in “terrorism as such,” or “terrorism-ness,” as opposed to the individual object, “this act of terror.” The eidetic reflection requires foremost the use of imagination by which we vary the circumstances in order to spell out what are the invariant properties without which there is not any such thing. The essence as such, “terrorism as such,” can be instanced in endless ways, and is not tied to a particular act or object. When the essence is so brought to light it is properly an “idea,” i.e., an *eidos*. But the *eidos*, in our earlier sense, as the essential look that suffuses the display of things, events, and actions, i.e., as the essence of these matters, is already there implicitly in the original presencing or seeing as… and it, as the essential look of this thing, provides the guiding framework that functions initially in an implicit felt-sense for the free imaginative variation. The free imaginative variation simply explicates this felt-sense evoked by the concept which refers to the *eidos*. Without the initial felt, implicit sense, eidetic analysis would have nothing to work with, i.e., reflect on. If one were to claim to be able to dispense with the implicit felt-sense and the analysis it generates such a one would not need essential-eidetic reflection and would know the *eidos* along with its essential properties intuitively or a priori.

Transcendental phenomenology devotes itself less to the essences of material regions of the world and the synthetic a priori essential meanings in this world than to the essences of the agency of manifestation by which this world is revealed. It does this in part because the material synthetic a priori considerations are entangled in history, convention, culture, etc., and disentangling the genuine necessities here often gets mired in questions of fact. One need only think of the notorious discussions in phenomenology of “the essence of the feminine.”

The reflective analysis of the agency of manifestation is accessible through reflection on what is accessible only in first-person reference. Because it belongs to the same stream of consciousness as the stream of reflection the chances are lessened for the gross errors that can characterize regional and material analyses, which have to do with what initially can only be known perspectively in third-person analyses.

§2 Appearings, *Eidé*, and Possible Worlds
For this work the question which is particularly important regards the essence, *eidos*, of the individual person, e.g., Socrates. An ancient sense of *eidos*, i.e., “face” is pertinent in so far as the countenance is what typically reveals to us the core of the personality. An abiding project for us is whether we may best pursue this “individual essence” in the third-person, after the model of the essence of objects. We will be preoccupied with the connection between who and what one is, and whether a person has an essence and what is involved in the free imaginative variation of the person. (We will return to these matters in connection with possible worlds below; but they will occupy us *passim*, especially in Chapters III and V and in §§6–8 of Chapter VII we will wrestle with the essence of the person; also discussions of these matters are to be found *passim* in Book 2.)

Phenomenology brings to light the ultimate substrates about which we can make statements and which get displayed. These are either particulars like acts of memory, trees, promises, and “the world,” or they are ideal objects or entities, as concepts, numbers, etc. Essences or *eidé*, as what emerge out of free imaginative variation, are also ideal objects, i.e., what are communicable and instantiable, and what are not tied to particular expressions and languages. They too may serve as substrates about which we make statements. Thus “democracy,” “terrorism,” and “circle” are such essences. (But, as we have indicated, there is the special case of “myself” being an “individual essence.” This is not only not able to be a predicate for any other substrate of predication but further about this “individual essence” we can make no predication as a property ascription, and therefore our ascriptive reference to persons, which one might rightly want to connect with this individual essence, would appear to pose special problems. We will address these especially in Chapters V and VI.)

The essential substrates themselves, e.g., “democracy,” “person” or “flag,” or “this” or even “this person, Peter” or “this flag,” become objects of focus and as such serve as essences or bearers of essences that themselves may be further determined essentially. These determinations are either going to be part and parcel of any possible world “for us all,” i.e., “us” as universal unbound spectators (with a view from nowhere), or they will be determinations that only belong to certain life-worlds. “A shop steward” does not enjoy the same universality as “remembering,” “number,” “sky” or “ground.” The properties characterizing a “book-discussion club” do not have the strong senses of necessity or universality that characterize those constituting, e.g., “a number” or “a perception.” If we may assume that *eidos* refers to the essential aspect, “face,” determination, or delineation of things, then the claim that all manifestation is soaked with essential aspects or determinations is the most obvious sense in which the realm of appearing and manifestation are “eidetic” and in which display belongs to being.

One of the words used to translate *eidos* is “idea.” “Idea,” however, is used to refer not merely to *eidos*, but is also taken, following (*ceteris paribus*) Kant’s usage, to mean a more encompassing and dynamic look or guise. Everything has its essence as the essential “look” and this is present as the determinable, not indeterminate or determinate, horizon to be explicated. Determinability, and in this sense possibility, is a kind of datum or givenness proper to a horizon. But with idea as *eidos* this horizon is finite and of necessity the reflection as an essence-analysis
comes to a halt: there are a finite number of essential properties. In contrast, when *idea* refers to what Husserl has in mind in a case such as “thing” or “world” or “the true self,” it opens onto infinity. The “idea,” as a determinable horizon of experience, functions as an indication and rule for endless further determinations. (Cf. Kant’s “regulative ideal.”) *Idea* as the determinable endless horizon is dynamic in the sense that the matter under consideration, although in some way present or given, is of necessity “inadequately given” and is endlessly presentable because of its having an open, endless horizon of determinations. *Eidé*, as essences, do not enjoy that kind of infinity but have a definite or finite field of determinateness and determination, even though the determination makes contact with numerous, perhaps endless, other logical or essential spaces or fields.

The field of manifestation, which itself is an idea, i.e., is present as a determinable horizon, is delineated by a variety of ideas, just as it is delineated by an endless variety of *eidé*. The pure field of manifestation or appearing may be thought of as the “clearing” or space in which everything comes to light. We may also think of it as the pole of the transcendental “I” providing we do not succumb to the temptation to make either the clearing or the transcendental I somehow “there” and complete prior to manifestation.

All determinations are made from out of the field of manifestation. But this field is not able to be sustained without the functioning of the transcendental “I.” Everything that comes to determination appears within this field that the transcendental “I,” in an unobtrusive anonymous sense, sustains. Further, there are formalities that essentially pervade bringing into view and all that comes into view from out of the field of manifestation, i.e., everywhere in play are identities in manifolds, interplays of presence and absence, sameness and difference, rest and motion, and unity and plurality.21

The “eidetic” aspect of the field of manifestation is threatened in its purity when one *eidos* is envisaged as having hegemony and therefore the power to nullify the plurality of *eidé* and bleach out the variety so as to bring them under a common denominator. This is the great temptation of modern reductionist science or any monist metaphysics. The primacy of display, properly understood, does not itself present us with such a suffocating imperialism. It does not say what may and may not appear; nor does it even make appearing ultimate absolutely, i.e., we will have occasion to raise the question of the contingency of manifestation. (See the next chapter as well as Chapter VI, §8.)

We must distinguish the phenomenological sense of world as the lived determinable endless horizon that frames all that we perceive from world in “possible world” analysis where world is a mere concept defined by its scope and comprehensiveness. For the former, “world” of necessity refers to what encompasses and surrounds the focal consideration of the thoughtful perceiving consciousness. In contrast to “a possible world” which is a mere concept, and thus constituted by an empty intention, the phenomenological world merges with filled intentions to the extent that the surroundings are *experienced* and co-given and attached to what is given. World in this latter sense makes no sense without consciousness. This holds not only for the world of perception but also for the fictio...
perspectivality and indexicality are also in play. And even a world of scientific objects, which makes reference to spatial and temporal determinations and therefore uses indexicals must also refer to a real or possible perceiving subject. For phenomenology, a possible world always implies the lived possibility, i.e., the lived determinability, of the ultimate horizon called world. World itself is a “unity of potential positings” and these are experienced as within the lived capacity of transcendent subjectivity and (the apperceived) intersubjectivity, i.e., what subjectivity or intersubjectivity is capable of, in contrast to the actual positings of the actual perceptual world. “Horizon” and “background” are indicators of this capacity for potential modifications of intentionality.

Clearly a world of mathematical entities, such as the realm of the series of whole numbers, of fractions, or a world of propositional truth tables, or a world of essentialities with their a priori laws of generality, extension, and inclusion does not require as its correlate my actual contingent being. What such worlds display in their positings, implications, and general syntactical ties, i.e., what they require as intentional objects, are possible I’s, not my actual existing I. Their being true, consistent, their being valid requires possible I’s achieving the possible display, they do not require an actual I displaying them.

This contrasts with any real world whose actual display, i.e., its being an object of intentionality, or its capacity to be displayed, requires of necessity an experiencing I with determinate capacities and possibilities of experience. Any particular world’s “displayability” requires a stock of habitualities which cannot be ascribed to just any I. There is a strict correlation between the I as historical person or the intersubjective community of historical persons and the world. As we will repeatedly see, it is not as easy a matter as some fictional portrayals would have us believe to live as a stranger in a truly alien world. Indeed, the technology-soaked world of the twenty-first century would make little or no sense to a stone-age aborigine – and vice-versa in regard to the technocrat’s encounter with the judgments and decisions the aborigine makes in her world. Thus, as Husserl once put it, we have two correlate ideas, an experiencing I and its corresponding world, or a world and its corresponding experiencing I. As there are endless guises of the idea “world,” and therewith an infinity of manifolds transcendent things which can form a unified world, so correlatively there are infinities of possible experiencing I’s.

Ideal possible experience is a realm of empty possibilities which encompasses all possible worlds and does not single out a definite world. If I posit that there is a determinate world, then that world’s display, its being an intentional object, requires for its displayed sense the positing of a definite I positing and displaying this world. The same holds if I imagine a possible world and consider what the ideal possibility of this world requires for its displayed sense. In such a case it is necessary that I co-posit a possible I capable of experiencing such a world.

For Husserl world-possibility is tied either to unmotivated empty intentionality and thus to any possible I or it is tied to the motivation to posit it and therefore to something’s being able to be experienced or conceived, and therefore it is tied to a real possible I. The empty unmotivated possibility (like the underside of this piano having ten live raccoons for its “feet,” or a diamond the size of the sun) are possible
inhabitants or fixtures in possible worlds. But positing an unmotivated and alleged possibility, e.g., of a world where one’s memory is not founded in one’s own perceptions but in someone else’s perception who may be unknown, dead, or part of another possible world, challenges the essences of this world. This challenge is not gratuitous to the extent that it is “thinkable.” But the conceivability itself becomes vacuous in as much as its conditions are sustained by equally gratuitous, i.e., unmotivated, conceptual postulates.

Motivated, real possibility is that which “has some basis,” which “has something going for it (in what we actually experience).” Further the possibility is always something that is eventually experienceable and conceivable by an I. Empty posited possibility may be governed merely by the compatibility it has with other posittings which are alleged to be free of the essential necessities of this world. Furthermore, the more these alleged empty unmotivated posittings are removed from what is intuitively grasped in either perception or imagination, the more easy they seem to render as unessential the essences posited in actual experience or in the free imaginative variation of this experience. And the greater the distance from the perceived or imagined they are the emptier is the sense of their conceivability.

The good fiction author has no less a task of consistency than does the perceiving agent of manifestation of the perceptual world. But the thinker building possible worlds on empty unmotivated posittings which have little or no connections with the world of experience would seem to have increasingly less norms than would even the author of the wildest fictional narrative. He would seem to approach the problematic freedom from inconsistency enjoyed by the perceiver for whom all experience is reduced to demonstrative pronouns. That is to say one might never be wrong, but equally one might never be right about “this” being “this” and “this” being “that.”

For the possible-world theorist, we may assume that the essentially necessary correlation between the real world as an intentional object, on the one hand, and the transcendental I, on the other hand, to whom this real world appears, may be undone in favor of a world where this essential correlation does not hold. World need only be thought of as an object of sufficiently encompassing scope; it can be either actual or possible. Presumably both the phenomenologist and the possible-world theorist have the conviction that some things are true “no matter what” and it is this which motivates the search for essences that hold across all possible worlds. Further there is the pre-philosophical conviction that something could have been otherwise, and if they had been otherwise then things might have gone a different way. That is, both recognize the difference in the modes of what is necessary and what is contingent. Both further would seem to be convinced that we illuminate what is essential by what is possible. Further, our talk about what is necessary or possible is taken to refer not merely to the world that we actually experience. Rather, if indeed something is essentially necessary it holds for any conceivable world – and this is just a step away from saying it has to do with the totality of all possible worlds. If something is essentially and necessarily true in this possible world it may be said to be true in every possible world – and, of course, whatever is true in every possible world is true in this world.
Yet another direction of this thinking is that because it is conceivable as true for a possible world, then it might be true for other possible worlds, and therefore the necessities we experience in this world are only apparent. For possible-world theory the essences and necessities of perceptually-given things do not have the center stage. It is not primarily a concern about de re modalities, i.e., matters we experience, but equally about de dicto modalities, i.e., the modalities of propositions, and how these modalities are joined together in the actual and possible worlds. And even the attention to de re matters has less to do with the uncovering what is essential and necessary in regard to perceived things and states of affairs in this world than with their posited modal status and the relationship of the modalities to the various worlds.

As Michael Loux has stated, possible-world theory stems from the concern to provide a philosophical response to empiricist skepticism regarding the modalities like possibility and necessity. For the empiricist, modalities are mere manners of speaking and the rigorous adherence to the positivities of experience never shows what is necessarily or possibly the case but only what is the case.

Before we attend to some of concerns we have regarding possible-world theory let us return to the theme of essence and eidos and their relationship to possibility through free imaginative variation. Recall that for Husserl there is a sense in which the "knowledge of possibilities has to go in advance of the knowledge of actualities." “Knowledge of the actualities” refers to the properly phenomenological knowledge of the essence or eidos of what we experience as actual. It does not state that perception of particulars does not found all our knowing of what is actual. Yet we properly know actualities when we grasp their essence. We get at this eidetic knowledge by prescinding from what is actually given in perceptual experience and opening up the realm of essential possibility that is the determinable horizon of what we actually experience. In phenomenology, the essence, with its necessary properties, is brought to light by imagination’s explicating the determinable horizon and entertaining essential possibilities, such as whether terrorism “as such” requires belief in the actuality of terrorists, whether terrorism requires covert actions, whether one might be a terrorist without knowing it, whether terrorism is more compatible with comedy than with tragedy, whether terrorism is conceivable in a situation bereft of all violence, injustice, and power inequity, whether terrorism could be an initiative of injustice rather than a response to perceived injustice, etc.

Thus in the phenomenological work of finding necessary properties and distinctions phantasy has a privileged place before perception. In this respect possibility is equated with imaginability and/or conceivableability. For phenomenology, possibility is co-perceived or lived marginally as the determinable horizon of any theme, yet something is available as possible if imaginable and/or conceivable. Therefore the essential parameters or “conceptual scheme” of something actually given in experience, i.e., the parameters through and by which something is displayed and which parameters are only predelineated or adumbrated in thoughtful experience, might well be enriched by the imagination explicating these parameters. As imaginable something finds its point of departure in what is experienced and able to be experienced. As such the possible as imaginable is “really possible” in the sense that the existing actual world opens onto a horizon of possibilities.
Yet the term, “really possible,” here need not refer to what is probable or to what is likely to be temporally continuous with the essential parameters of the actual world. The fictional world, for example, is a possible world. Yet it is not continuous with our world, nor is it a real possibility of our world, even though it may be exactly like the one we experience, even though not identical with the one we experience.29

§3 Possible-World Theory and Phenomenological Eidetic Analysis

Phenomenological free imaginative variation in the service of essence analysis operates within the parameters of the actual world and its adumbrated horizon of possibilities. The properties of what is essential emerge out of the pre-conceptual apperception of what is actually experienced. These properties are brought to light in the realm of the possible, i.e., in the realm of free imaginative variation which prescinds from what is actual. As such the possible “appears” precisely as what is not actually given in perception but what could be given eventually and what now can only be given in imagination.

“Givenness” is correlative to all phenomenological themes. Here it extends from perceptual particulars like a promise to loan someone some money, to states of affairs, like Peter having been promised by me to be loaned money, to the essence of a promise as such, to the essence of an essence as such. It embraces the perceived promise, the predication that the promise was in earnest, the theme of the syntactic tie which links the promise and the property of “in earnest” or “serious,” the assertoric modality of the “is,” i.e., it was unconditional. Further all the modalities have their own mode of phenomenological givenness. Modalities, pace Quine, are given. For example, the past is present as having necessarily preceded the present “no matter what”; this is present as what cannot be denied or what cannot be eliminated in experience, thought or imagination. (Cf. Quine’s “quality spaces.”30) Necessity is made present not as some thing in experience given along with other things, but rather it is given analogously to the way a state of affairs is given or as the weave or Gestalt may be said to be given, or the way something (“it”) is given when one “gets ‘it’ (“the point”),” e.g., of a joke, and says “Oh, now I get it” or “Now I see it.” Similarly what is contingent is given with perceptual experience as the feature that it is a fact and its positing is always conditional and experienced-based. It is given in the sense that what we are experiencing is experienced as what could be otherwise and its duration is experienced as temporal with no guarantees that it be actual in the future. This givenness contrasts with, e.g., the way colors must be extended, and sounds come always with a pitch, and the odd givennesses of ideal objects with their necessities, e.g., If A > B, and B > C, then A must be > C. And it surely contrasts with the way the absurd and the impossible are “given,” e.g., in the way “the multi-colored haze of the square root’s deafening erotic quotient” fights and resists any self-presentation.
Phenomenological free imaginative variation always operates within the horizon of “the” world. And in so far as the possibilities are made present by prescinding from this world, possibilities are always possibilities of the actual world and their variations stand in correlation with the actual transcendental. Possibility brought to light through imaginative variation is always the lived possibility of “I-can” as pre-indicated by one’s apperceived horizon. Yet clearly in conceiving or imagining fictional possible worlds, where both the conceiving and imagining are displaying intentions, we, who do the conceiving and imagining, do not posit ourselves as the cognitive and moral subjects of the imagined world, i.e., we are not the subjects experiencing this world as actual or really possible. Rather, the subject imagined is in the world and of course he might be an imagined version of us. In this case, the imagined heroic self is in the natural attitude and absorbed in the imagined world, unmindful of the agency of manifestation, i.e., the agency of conceiving and imagining.

We have noted that the positing of a possible world, or a meaning-whole of logically compatible objects or beings, co-possits a subject of such a possible world. The posited world imposes on the possible subject a special kind of lawfulness and coherence. Therefore, a plurality of possible worlds that are not compatible with one another cannot co-posit one and the same subject of such worlds precisely because of the incompatibility of the details of the lawfulness which would be enjoined on the one and same subject. Neither of these theses are essential parts of possible-world theory because there is no essential correlation between worlds and subjects. Worlds tend to be “posited” without any meaningful or intentional sense of positing. The partial exception to this is David Lewis’ theory which ties actual world to indexicality, yet, it seems to me, indexicality for Lewis stands alone and world itself appears to be posited apart from the intentional life of a subject. (See below.)

Possible-world theory is of interest to the transcendental phenomenology in this work not because of the way it seeks to defend the modalities from the skepticism of radical empiricism, but rather for two other reasons. Possible-world theory highlights the difficulty of talking about modalities as well as any sense of “world” apart from intentionality and the transcendental I; further it resurrects the question of essences, in particular the question of the trans-world identity of the individual essence of persons. In this work, “possible world” is of special interest for the project of conceiving or imagining the parameters of personal identity, e.g. by placing persons in other possible situations or worlds, such as those required by beliefs in an afterlife. “Possible world” is also of interest in regard to conceiving a sense of “oneself” in the varied settings or worlds where the conditions of one’s personal identity in “this world” are no longer fulfilled. In the remainder of this section, with the help of Michael Loux, we will briefly review the two leading kinds of possible-world theory with only these two themes in mind. (We will return to these matters especially in Chapter VIII.) There will be no pretense to do justice to all the issues involved.

According to Loux, the possible-world metaphysician believes he merely explicates and formalizes some pre-philosophical convictions. Thus, the idea that a proposition $p$ is necessary means that it is true no matter what. And a way of saying
this, for example, is that just in case for any possible world, $W$, $p$ is true in $W$. And to say that $p$ is possible is to say just in case there is a possible world, $W$, $p$ is true in $W$. And to say that an object $x$ has a property, $P$, necessarily or essentially “is to say that that $x$ has $P$ in the actual world and in every possible world where $x$ exists.” One main kind of contemporary possible-world theory is the nominalist one of David Lewis. Again we note that possible-world theory dispenses with the phenomenological notion of the world as horizon as well as the transcendental agency of the display of the world. Yet in David Lewis there is a necessary connection between consciousness and the actuality of the world. For Lewis “worlds” refer to massive concrete objects which are spatially-temporally closed and all of which are possible worlds. “Actual world” merely refers merely to the indexicality of this possible world, i.e., its indicating or indexing its presence to the present speaker, just as “this,” “here” and “now” do. (See our discussion of indexicals in Chapter II.) Another possible world is a world other than the one in which this speaker’s indexicality occurs and in which another speaker’s indexicality occurs. If the other world has another observing speaker it is just as actual, only it is without the indexicality of the world we share with the original speaker. The term “actual world” is thus a mere device for referring to the possible world in which it is uttered. Inhabitants of other possible worlds would use “actual world” and mean the same, i.e., the possible world in which their indexical references are valid. Worlds as possible worlds all “exist,” i.e., are “really out there.” And they are indifferent to actuality, which is mere indexicality.

But if actuality is mere indexicality bereft of display are not the worlds indifferent to display? This seems to be the case. Indexicality itself displays nothing of the world in itself, only the fact of its relation to the speaker. Indexicality, we shall argue, does, of course, in the case of the personal pronouns display the speaker and the addressee. In the demonstrative pronouns the achievement is rarely a “this,” “here,” “now,” etc., by themselves but there is always that to which the indexicals are affixed. Thus indexicality is tied to the intentionality by which we inhabit or dwell in the world. Indexicality as a singling out of items that are present in our perceptual field as so present presupposes the manifestation of the world. Thus although Lewis thinks of possible worlds as of the same status as the actual world we inhabit and display he still acknowledges that our inhabiting, as indexicality, is not bereft of display. “So when we speak of our world as actual, we are not marking it out as an ontologically privileged possible world; we are merely picking it out as the world we inhabit.” Yet each of the worlds is replete with really existent concrete objects, which may or may not be “actual.” Indexicality, intentionality, and display are not necessary for the integrity of all the terms used by Lewis, e.g., real, possible, concrete, abstract, and spatial-temporal; they are necessary only for the “actuality” of a possible world.

Because all possible worlds are fully real, fully existent “in themselves,” each individual inhabits only one world and the idea that it exists in more than one world is unintelligible. It is nonsensical that we would live our lives and careers in several different worlds because this is tantamount to living several different lives simultaneously. For Lewis, such a mistaken view presupposes the falsehood of the (Leibniz-inspired) principle of the “indiscernibility of identicals,” which Loux
formulates in this way: “Necessarily for any objects, \(a\) and \(b\), if \(a\) is identical with \(b\), then for any property \(\Phi\), \(a\) exemplifies \(\Phi\) if and only if \(b\) exemplifies \(\Phi\).” This is the converse of the “identity of indiscernibles” which states that “indiscernibility with respect to properties entails numerical identity.”\(^{35}\) If we cannot make out any difference in the properties of something then we have numerical identity of this something, even though we might be tempted at first to see two rather than one. (We will return on several occasions to this Leibnizian theme.)

Thus for Lewis all individuals have “world-indexed properties,” i.e., if an individual exists in one world with certain properties, e.g., being a swarthy surfer, then it is not possible that he exists as a pale metaphysician in another possible world.

But this view of Lewis faces the difficulty that it makes the properties I have in my being in this world to be necessary. Normally, when I say: “I, the pale metaphysician, could have been a swarthy surfer;” I mean, in another possible world I could have had these properties. To say that I exist only in one world means that the properties I have are necessary ones and I could not have had any others. Similarly the familiar distinction between contingent and necessary properties collapses if I exist only in one possible world – because I am who (or what!) I am necessarily by reason of these properties.

Lewis says his theory can accommodate these intuitions about lived possibility and necessary and contingent properties by considering that each of us has “counterparts” in other possible worlds which are like us more than other things in their worlds but they are not really who we are, for we are bound to one world. Rather they only resemble us.\(^{36}\)

In this work we will work on the assumption that it is I myself who has these possibilities and that there is a distinction between my necessary and contingent properties. Yet we will agree with Lewis that any “counterparts” are numerically distinct from me even if they, pace Leibniz and Lewis, are so similar as to violate the identity of indiscernibles, i.e., they would have all the same properties I have without being me.

Alvin Plantinga’s more Platonic theory of possible worlds is a foil to that of Lewis. Most critics of Lewis find his positing of non-actual objects called possible worlds difficult if not absurd. Lewis approaches, but does not achieve a phenomenological account of actuality by relating it to indexicals, i.e., by relating it implicitly to the field of perception of the knower. Yet he immediately devalues such a consideration because “actual” means “merely indexical” and referring to a speaker, as if the speaker were bereft of a constituted world and the indexicals were mere “tails” or markers tacked onto bodies whose function was to indicate the speaker. Endless possible worlds exist with their possible actuality through endlessly possible indexalizing speaking inhabitants.

The critics, notes Loux, appeal to an “intuitive” sense of what is actual, and hold that Lewis’s possibilist approach to modal phenomena undermines these basic intuitions. If, as some maintain, existence is tied to what is actual, the claim that there exist possible worlds that do not actually exist, verges on the incoherent.\(^{37}\) Note that this critical view does not involve an intentional analysis of what is actual or possible;
modality is disconnected from all manner of givenness. We are dealing first of all with the meaning of concepts which are emptily meant. “Actuality” has nothing to do with the filled intention or the possible filled intention, or an apperceived filled intention or the possibility of an apperception of a filled intention. Notice that Lewis’s claim, the actuality of another possible world is a result of another’s indexicality, does not state that the actuality of the other possible world is through one’s apperception of another’s indexicality and the apperception of her apperception of the world. Lewis’ account merely ties indexicality to actuality but the sense of this actuality for the speaker and the person apperceiving the speaker’s indexicality is of no interest. This sense would come out in terms of the contrast between the achievements of indexicality in the perceptual world and the way they function in quoted, fictional, or conceived worlds. In the perceptual world they have of necessity the modality of actuality; in these other contexts there is a modalization into fictional, possible, etc. Our critique of modalities of necessity coming to light through intentional display of the world is partially echoed in aspects of Plantinga’s critique of Lewis.

Plantinga leads the charge against Lewis with his claim that the ineluctable reference to things like properties, kinds, relations, and propositions themselves must be understood in modal terms. As Loux puts it, “talk of the modalities and talk of things like properties and propositions go hand in hand.” Again, whereas the phenomenologist would agree about the interconnectedness of properties and modalities as well as the intrinsic relevance of modality to the kind of syntactical ties that make up propositions, this would be through showing how this is so through the differing intentional acts and modes of givenness. In Plantinga, in contrast, we are talking about the meanings of concepts, and these meanings are completely independent of modes of givenness. The meanings of the modalities of propositions are to be brought to light bereft of any intentional analysis and discussion of modes of evidence. Similarly the properties assigned to things, whether they are accidental or essential, are worked out on the basis of a conceptual analysis, with no reference to how the matter at hand presents itself and what kind of intentionality is engaged in this manner of predication.

For Plantinga “actuality” in the strong sense has to do with the exemplification of a property. Yet, echoing Plato, abstract entities, like properties and states of affairs, are held to be eternally existing or eternal beings. Properties are necessary beings which may or may not be exemplified or instantiated. Similarly “states of affairs” are necessary beings which may or may not “obtain,” i.e., hold in the actual world, analogously to the way properties are instantiated.

Because not just any state of affairs amounts to a world or possible world, a possible world is a “maximally comprehensive state of affairs.” In spite of the earlier caution about the incoherence of the claim that possible worlds exist, Plantinga distinguishes between the “actuality” and/or “existence” of states of affairs which make up possible worlds and the actual existence or “physical” world which “obtains;” that is, is valid or holds in this world in which we live. It is this “obtaining” which makes it privileged ontologically and entitled to a proper claim to actual existence.

“Obtaining” here is a conceptual-logical distinction; there is no necessary reference to a kind of perceptual evidence or filled intention to account for it. As with
any possible-world theorist, a proposition is necessarily true if it is true in every possible world; it is possibly true if it is true in some possible world; and it is impossible or necessarily false if it is true in no world or false in every world. But, for Plantinga, it is important to note that if one says a thing exists in a possible world, this is not to say it exists physically in this possible world. Rather it is merely to say that had the world been “actual,” i.e., obtained, the thing would have existed. And the same holds for talk about something’s having necessary or accidental properties. It has a property necessarily if it has it in the actual world and in every world in which it exists (even though it does not obtain); it has it accidentally or contingently when it has it in the actual world, but there is a world in which it exists and fails to have it.

Because Plantinga maintains the distinction between properties which are necessary and those which are contingent he can endorse the view that an individual is not bound to this world and therefore has properties beyond the one he actually has and therefore the possibility of living and being himself in other possible worlds. This possible existence in other possible worlds stands in contrast to Lewis’s view that we could only have “counterparts” in other worlds. The counterpart theorist deals with the intuition that I could have been a swarthy surfer and the beloved of all the beachcombers by saying this wistful reverie is not really about me but rather about someone who very much resembles me. But if I believe that “things could have gone otherwise for me, I believe they could have gone otherwise for this very person; and that belief can be true only if I am a transworld individual,” which, for Lewis, I cannot be.

In Plantinga’s view, which, on this point, is the same as that for which we will argue in this book, I am an “individual essence” or haecceitas prior to being world-indexed. In this regard Plantinga and the position in this book verge from the Aristotelian position that what is essential to something or someone is a feature it shares with other things. Rather, with Plantinga, we will argue that there are individual essences, at least in the case of persons. Yet we will not be comfortable with the notion that being “Bill Clinton” is best thought of as a “property” of something, but rather shall propose that who one is, is a substance or substrate to which the properties proper to “Bill Clinton” apply. We further do not wish to follow Plantinga’s view that there are a plurality of individual essences, of such a sort as one’s occupying a certain space at a certain time. For us these are properties of individual essences or substrates, not the substances or substrates themselves.

For Plantinga, as for Leibniz, it is important to acknowledge all the individual essences because a divine omniscient being would know the individual if and only if in knowing the individual essence of the person He would know inferentially all the properties this person has. We will come back to this theological matter in the concluding chapters in Book 2. Here it suffices to note our agreement with Plantinga on the individual essence as the basis for the individual’s world-indexed and transworld identity. This is a major theme of this work.

A final remark about possible-world theory. Because possibilities are regarded independently of the adumbrated horizonal possibilities of the actual world they may simply be posited. As such they are emptyly posited as propositions that allegedly hold in the other possible worlds, and these worlds and their inhabitant propositions
can be absolutely heterogeneous to this world. In this case, and in so far as the work of phenomenological and conceptual analysis is not carried out, there is a mere empty unmotivated conceptual positing. As such it is not an altering of this world’s possibilities but rather its negation, on the basis of the freedom to negate the necessities manifest in “this world.” Thus because of this freedom to so posit other worlds, there is the temptation to deny the capacity of imagination to bring about the essential possibilities or to confuse imagination with the mere positing of empty possibilities and concepts.

Sometimes, especially if nominalism is at the heart of the theory, this amounts to no more than the declaration that the distinction between necessary and contingent properties is a basic mistake. Therefore, so the thinking seems to go, because in “this world” what we call the contingent properties may be regarded as necessary, so, from the point of view of other possible worlds, the lived “this-world” necessities are to be regarded as in fact contingent. The phenomenological imaginative labor, along with that of serious conceptual analysis, which shows the necessities and contingencies, are thus regarded as futile if not vacuous exercises. What facilitates this is perhaps the modus operandi of possible-world theory, i.e., it seems often to work primarily with purely empty intentions (propositions and concepts) which are not explications of intentional horizons and which in no way are anchored in the meaning-parameters provided by the experienced world as they are evident for the transcendental I. In short they are unmotivated. Indeed, crucial to such possible-world analysis is a conceptual-propositional world bereft of intentionality’s display of the world and the essential connection of concepts and propositions to indexical reference. As a result the phenomenological necessities of “this world” are regarded skeptically, but not by way of correcting filled- or quasi-filled intentions of imaginative variation which bring to light latent possibilities of the actual world. Rather they are regarded skeptically simply because of the consideration that what is essential or necessary in this world may not or need not be necessary in another world. Thus all *eido* lose the sense of necessity which make them of philosophical interest. Synthetic a priori truths give way first to the empty positing of sheer possibility governed only by a consistency in the posited propositions and concepts of what is valid in the possible world, and then, it seems to me, to a self-destructive skepticism that makes all phenomenological philosophy, and perhaps any philosophical aspiration to uncover what is necessary, ultimately impossible.

(We return to these matters below in Chapter VIII, §8, D.52)

Thus a basic question which transcendental phenomenology asks is whether the conceived worlds, whether mere emptily intended posittings or genuine imaginations of possibility, make any sense if the transcendental I is not in play. Whereas the modalities of necessity, contingency, and possibility, reality, error, and fiction, etc., along with the syntactical achievements are implicitly in play in carrying out the consistent possible-world narratives, for phenomenology these narratives further presuppose posittings, evidence, and modes of givenness, and therefore the transcendental I. With Plantinga we hold that the notions of property, kinds, propositions, etc. are interlaced with the notions of modality. But then the question is whether all these terms make sense in the absence of the transcendental I and its agency of manifestation. Our inclinations of course are No; for phenomenological
I. Phenomenological Preliminaries

Philosophy display is fundamental for being. But we merely mention and operate with this view here and do not engage the larger issues of transcendental-phenomenological idealism.

§4 Perspectives, Appearings and Givenness

We have used “perspectives” as an example of display and phenomenality. The word builds on the Latin *spectare*, to look, and *per*, the pronoun here for “through.” This suggests looking on the Latinate, to look, and per, the pronoun here for through...

The building meant in a perception is always more than what a particular perspective, i.e., being something that coincide with the thing’s looks, both the takes and the looks are tied to the observer’s situation, but being in space and time, a definite intersubjective community, as a particular stage of personal and cultural development, etc.

Perspectives are always displays of something of which they are displays. Of necessity they are diaphanous and point beyond themselves. Even when illusory they appear, prior to their unmasking, as perspectives of… e.g., the stick submerged in water. The looks of the stick in water and out of water belong to the display of the stick, and especially the display of the stick as illusory. Not understanding or forgetting this difference in display distorts the sense of the stick, e.g., it may appear as two different sticks or as in fact as really bent by the water. Someone’s walking around a pentagonal building while forgetting its prior profiles can well result in a distortion of the sense of its present profile. One might say in the face of a present aspect, “What a lovely Gothic building!” when just earlier (now forgotten) modernist or Byzantine features predominated.

The display is to be understood as a perspective, i.e., being something that coincide with the thing’s looks, both the takes and the looks are tied to the observer’s situation, but being in space and time, a definite intersubjective community, as a particular stage of personal and cultural development, etc.

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that present the building. The building “gives itself” in this display. The display is not some intervening entity standing in for the thing. It is the thing itself perceived, articulated, apprehended, presented by someone here and now. It is how the thing is given to someone here and now.

It is a fateful philosophical move to think of the perspective as an intervening mental or ontological entity rather than simply the way the world is manifest or displayed. If someone holds that we are not in a position to know the world in itself, he might be understood to be saying that no particular point of view is privileged in the sense that it is a better perspective of the world as it really is. Connected to this might be the view that perspectives are not directed in more than a trivial sense upon a single object or the world. If one holds that perspectives are held to be directed upon a single object or the world in more than a trivial sense, then, so it would seem, we must

use terms that every point of view must acknowledge; and this is either to dispense with points of view altogether or to claim that one of them is inherently superior to the rest and represents the world as it really is, “as if a world would still remain after one deducted the perspective.”

This view holds that to say that “perspectives are perspectives of…” is either trivial because it merely says that what we know is tied to a standpoint: it is not what we know but that from which we know. Or it is non-trivial, but wrong, because it suggests that when you say perspectives are perspectives of something you claim to know that of which the perspective is a perspective apart from the perspective or apart from the appearing, “as if a world would still remain after one deducted the perspective!”

But is this not to resurrect a sense of world or being apart from display or manifestation? Is it not the view that holds that perspectives are manifestations of the world-in-itself, somehow accessed apart from its manifestation through perspectives? But if we hold that this is not possible, then why hanker for an understanding of appearings that necessarily implies that, after all, they are mere appearings or a contamination of being or the world? There is nothing trivial in acknowledging that perspectives necessarily are perspectives of…, because this is an essential elaboration of the claim that what appears (being itself, reality itself, the world itself – but not in-themselves) is inseparable from its display.

Further, to detach appearings from that of which they are appearings, and to suppress the confirmation of the ongoing emptyly intended other aspects of the thing itself in question (not the thing “in itself”) through the filling of intentions, as, e.g., in walking around the building, is to claim allegiance to a bundle theory of appearings. This allegiance is often due to the desire to avoid the gratuitous postulating of the hidden “noumenon” underlying the appearings, the “I know not what,” of the manifold of appearings. (We return to some of these issues in Chapters III and V.)

We have been solicitous to give to the realm of manifestation or appearing a priority that does not get subordinated to beings that are said to “found” it, as if these beings were given in advance and then we were able to see the intentional noetic or phenomenal tie, i.e., the appearing, that bound them and that they founded. It is of interest that appearing is not a transitive verb, and knowing is. Knowing suggests
agency. The realm of appearing however, as an intransitive verb, does not denote a noetic agency. This may lead us to hold that we may think of the realm of manifestation or appearing apart from noetic agency. Yet the position here is that even though noetic agency is not anything happening really or naturally in the known (the knower does not change the tree’s health-status when he takes it to be diseased), the realm of appearing, of manifestation, still points to cognitive agency and eventually a cognitive agent and an I. To avoid making this agency prominent, we may want to think of the realm of manifestation as “something’s giving itself to be known,” and here the agency is placed more in the thing manifesting itself, its “self-donation,” and the theme of noetic agency is muted.

Yet this interpretation may be pushed to an extreme so that the appearing of something, i.e., the genitive of manifestation, is conceived to hold in the absence of that “to which” or “to whom” this appearing appears, what we, following Thomas Prufer and Robert Sokolowski call the dative of manifestation or dative of appearing. The sense in which this dative is an “I,” the senses in which some sense of “I” must accompany the dative of manifestation will preoccupy us throughout this work. In the extreme unacceptable case of the thing’s “self-givenness,” we could have something presenting itself, or there could be a presence, but nothing to which that which was present was present. But this clearly is not possible for what is within the world or field of manifestation. Yet the basic concern of this extreme position is to be acknowledged, namely, that the measure of what is given through its appearings, its givenness, to mind is the thing itself (not in itself) and, further, that we get at the most fundamental sense of “mind,” “consciousness,” “I,” “knowing,” etc. not from the analogy with some form of poesis but rather from the basic theme of appearing and manifestation. In this case we understand “mind,” “consciousness,” etc. in connection with manifestation, i.e., the dative and agency of manifestation facing a genitive of manifestation, rather than understanding “consciousness,” “I,” “knowing,” etc. as the pre-given foundation or “cause” for considerations of appearing and manifestation. Indeed for phenomenology, consciousness itself, the I, and knowing may be shown to gain their distinctive intelligibility in both how they relate to what appears as well as in their distinctive self-appearing. Furthermore, although “to appear” is an intransitive verb, “to manifest,” “to reveal,” “to disclose,” etc. are transitive verbs. We thus may maintain the fundamental character of appearing by using the terms of Robert Sokolowski of the agent/agency of manifestation. In doing this we clearly do not think of manifestation as a real change in what appears nor do we think of the agent or what is displayed as somehow given prior to manifestation.

Talk about the phenomenon as something giving itself to be known veers toward language that suggests a kinship with the act of giving something, a gracious present, and something’s self-presentation or self-manifestation. That is, the use of the terms “being given,” “givenness,” “data” (as the past participle of the Latin verb for “to give,” donare), “presentation,” etc., raises the question of the relevance of the metaphor of gift-giving, donation, making a present, etc., in the project of understanding what phenomenality is.

The medieval notion of intentionality may be understood as the thing’s giving itself. Instead of existing merely in nature and apart from any consciousness,
esse naturale of a thing, the thing also can take residence outside of its natural being in the knower’s mind in the form of intentional being, esse intentionale. Here the thing gives itself, and its appearing is the way the form of the thing exists ecstatically outside of its natural being and takes residence in a mind. Being and Truth, as the manifestation of Being to mind, are convertible.

The difficulty with the medieval notion is twofold. The first is that we have a kind of priority assigned to the natural thing or being and, along with this, to the being informed with the capacity to know. Intentionality becomes first a property of the natural being, pursuant to the being endowed with intellect. Manifestation is accounted for by the priority of intrinsically and independently intelligible beings, i.e., beings indifferent to their being given. The second difficulty is the implication that things now exist “in the mind,” as representations, species or likenesses. For phenomenology this leads to an endless regress: Knowing would be comparing what is within the mind to what is outside the mind. What is outside the mind itself would however only be present as a likeness to be compared with what is outside it, which likeness itself would only be known by a likeness, etc. What is in the mind would be known only by knowing its likeness and comparing it with something that is outside it. But knowing the likeness itself, as well as what is outside it would be only knowing likenesses. This “outside the likenesses” would itself only be known through likenesses by comparing these likenesses with other likenesses of what is “outside the likeness,” etc. If all we know are likenesses of the known, knowing likenesses is knowing a likeness of a likeness, etc.

Modernity and much of contemporary cognitive science take another turn that has kinship with, and perhaps historical ties to, the medieval view. They hold for not merely a representationalist position but, in recognizing the infinite regress, regard knowing primarily as poesis, and reality as a “construct.” And this, in turn, may assume two forms. One is that of a relativism of contingent conceptual schemes. These schemes derive from the historical a priori of language and culture. Another form is a physicalist position envisaging mind and consciousness as brain. In this latter case mind/brain is to be thought of as shaped most basically by some physiological analogy to default programs or hardwiring.

In the view of this work, instead of thinking of things being in the agent of manifestation or consciousness or present within consciousness, it is better to speak of the agent of manifestation (consciousness) as manifesting and thereby as present to things. And therefore the display or presencing by the mind is not a private affair. The basketball fans’ presencing the referee’s signaling that the ballplayer’s foot was on the line is not something happening inside the head. We all see his signaling, even when we disagree with his judgment which the signal expresses. And when the video-replay proves him wrong, the evidence is a display of what happened on the court; it is not inside the head or mind. As Robert Sokolowski has often reminded us display typically enjoys a wide publicity.

Of course, the categorical articulation that the referee was wrong or that indeed he was right, are not on the court in the way the basketball and the shoed feet of the players are. But neither are they merely “in the mind.” They are the way the mind presences articulately being. But then, where are the displays? The display of things
is not to be treated as of the same order as the thing displayed, and therefore not, e.g., as a physical object in space. The fact that the foot actually was on the out-of-bounds line or the fact that it was not there are not themselves things that can be on the court or on or off the out-of-bounds line. This is the achievement of wakeful mind articulating the game. If we counted all the things on the court, the facts about the location of the feet, indexicality of reference to the feet, the conjunction, disjunction, quantification, and syntactic tying of the feet (all, some, none, this one and that one, this one or that one, etc.) – none of these would be on the court in the way the feet are.

Articulations/displays of the things in the world are not of the same order as the thing displayed, i.e., not things in the world. As we shall see, not everything of which we are aware is in space and time, even though we face the irrepressible temptation to treat everything, even philosophical notions, as such things. This is the prejudice of modern materialist philosophy: Understanding something is bringing it into relation with a physical cause.

The being-given of things in phenomena, in appearings, is not a gift or a giving of gifts; it is more basic than any such relation among things and agents, each of which, the thing given, the giving, and the giver, has its own mode of being-given. The givenness of things is especially not a gift if we are inclined to follow the metaphor of being-given and to look for a gracious agent behind the scenes. The temptation to think of manifestation and the givenness of being-given as anything but a loose analogy succumbs to the temptation to subordinate manifestation and display to something or a pre-given being and thus to something that is eventually displayed. Of course, there is a kind of “grace” in so far as the wonder of phenomenality can strike us as something that cannot be accounted for because all accounting for presupposes it. As Jaspers put it, echoing Hobbes, “This basic fact that something appears (or put otherwise: that it shows itself, reveals itself, is there, becomes language) is, as certain as it is present, very much as a whole the mystery (Geheimnis).”

In a quite different sense, we may say that “grace” adds to the inherent richness of things, as when we speak of a person walking with grace. Surely display as knowledge adds to the richness of the agent of manifestation. But, similarly, the givenness or display of things may be thought of as a grace: the more display, the more there is “there” of the things, and the richer articulating display “graces” the thing that apart from the display lacks this richness, this grace, this “giftedness.” “The actuality involved in truth perfects not only the perceiver but the entity displayed as well.”

Even the display of what is evil and hideous similarly enriches what is displayed in so far as these are actual facets that otherwise would have been overlooked. In this respect, phenomenology, philosophy, and in general knowledge and science “grace” the world.

§5 General Remarks About the Phenomenological Reduction

The phenomenological reduction is a philosophical move that reflects phenomenology’s theory of phenomenality. As a “re-duction” it is a leading back. One wants to say that it leads back to “the sources” of phenomenality. But that is unsatisfactory in so
far as “causes” or “conditions” in a worldly, non-transcendental-phenomenological, sense would be implied. Let us say simply that by these “sources” nothing other is meant than the “factors” involved in phenomenality that otherwise, i.e., in the “natural attitude,” are overlooked. The “leading back” itself presupposes the device of the epoché or the inhibition of the always presupposed belief in the world that characterizes the natural attitude, i.e., how we are for the most part prior to and apart from the philosophical interest in the display of what is.

The phenomenological attitude is the disposition or habitus adopted in order to establish doing philosophy on the basis of the epoché and reduction. The position of the inseparability of being and display is secured for philosophical practice by the “phenomenological reduction.” Within the phenomenological reduction and its antecedent moment, the epoché, the inseparability of being and display is a tautology: Being and display are inseparable because the phenomenological “bracketing” places us in a position to see being only in correlation with display; this inseparability is not demonstrated by the phenomenological reduction or the epoché, but rather it is made manifest in these.51 Prior to the epoché and the ensuing reduction the conjoining of being and display is not only not a theme, indeed, its proposal seems unnatural, primarily because it appears to distort common sense’s salutary conviction that things exist independently of my knowing them. It further, for the person in the natural attitude, sounds like a reduction of world to appearings inside the head.

This epoché and its ensuing reduction undo the natural attitude wherein precisely the belief in the indifference of being to display prevails. But the display’s anonymity in the natural attitude and the natural attitude’s obliviousness and indifference to display are not absolute: appearing/display is not absolutely hidden and it is the purpose of the technique of the reduction to bring it to light.

The disclosure of the phenomenological attitude requires the disclosure of the natural attitude and its distinction from the phenomenological attitude. The standpoint disclosing the natural attitude as such is one anchored in the phenomenological attitude. While standing exclusively in the natural attitude one can only have a distorted view of the phenomenological standpoint. Although it is true, it is pedagogically imprudent because easily confusing to tell newcomers to phenomenology who are immersed in the natural attitude that the disclosure of the natural attitude is from within the phenomenological attitude. What suffices is that the disclosure happens and that the initiates become aware of the anonymity of display in the natural attitude’s relation to being. Thus there are propadeutic reflections such as indexicals or deictic achievements, like “you,” “this,” and “that,” which reveal that the senses of worldly beings are inseparable from their being displayed. Similarly, examples of seeing as..., Gestalt reversible pictures, and mistaken perceptions can raise the question of the relationship between being and display.

In the natural attitude we are taken up with things while we remain indifferent to theirappearings and the manifold achievements by which these things are enabled to appear the way they do. For example, when riding along in the car, I see “the red barn.” I am quite oblivious to the disclosure of the red barn as the same thing perduing in time through a manifold of appearings: its now “looking at me” from the front, then from the front and this side, then from the broadside, then from the broadside and the backside, and then from the back alone – all along the way
“the red barn” is increasing and decreasing in the way it fills out my field of vision while I conceive (understand) that it itself is not increasing or decreasing in size. And all the while the continuum of displays of aspects of “the red barn” fills in and supplements the discrete slices that I name “the sides of the barn.”

Although the natural attitude is the way we are for the most part, it is not something we are aware of as such until we start thinking about being and display, i.e., until we begin to feel the tug of the phenomenological attitude. In this sense awareness of the natural attitude is not “natural” and, certainly, being in the phenomenological attitude is even more “unnatural” from the posture of the natural attitude. It is only from the phenomenological standpoint, i.e., after the reduction, that we are aware of the phenomenological sense of the “naturalness” of the natural attitude.

In the natural attitude we are taken up with things in the world and are not interested in how it is that they come to light in this way, how the agency of manifestation brings it about that they look this way rather than that. In the natural attitude, and the philosophical reflection in the natural attitude, it is evident that all consciousness is consciousness of..., i.e., is intentional, and related to an object or something toward which it heads. This is to say that in philosophical, not necessarily phenomenological, reflection on the intentional act, the intentional act or display of something makes a whole in which we cannot think of the intentional act/display without implicitly having in mind what it displays or intends.

At the same time in this attitude it is evident that what consciousness is conscious of exists in itself without needing to be related to the mind intending it. It is a complete whole when we regard it apart from its being known or being intended or being displayed. Here we may think of consciousness as having the property of “intentionality” without associating this property with “constituting” the display of being. Similarly being known or being displayed is not a constitutive moment or natural property of the being of nature that eventually is known or displayed. This is the eternal legitimacy of the imperative to realism. Indeed, something’s being known is contingent; there is no necessity inherent in the thing that it be known, that it be displayed. Yet for knowing, the display of the eidos of what is, there is a necessary connection with the known as what the knowing means and displays. But knowing and philosophy need not be and this is different from the sense in which a being or even “being itself” need not be. Here we are dealing with different and very difficult kinds of contingency. (Cf. our discussion in Chapter VI, §9.)

This important and obvious consideration, that we may not attend to the knowing or displaying apart from what is displayed, but we may attend to what is displayed apart from the display of what is known, ought not to be understood as a denial of the thesis of the inseparability of being and display for phenomenology. For phenomenology, the obvious possibility of naturally entertaining being by abstracting from its being known, is an insight that is never to be yielded. Yet this abstraction’s significance is missed if it is taken to be the basis for a denial of the relevance of display to being. It cannot mean that “there is being” in the sense that being is made present and available for predication apart from the mind’s engagement. It cannot mean that “There is a ‘being in itself’” apart from thoughtful presentation because this “being in itself” is a categorical display that makes no sense apart from the mind’s engagement.
The phenomenological reduction secures for us the evidence of the philosophical scene where display is an “inherent moment” of what appears, i.e., where being and manifestation are inseparable. For phenomenology, the radical separation of being and display leads to the silencing of phenomenological philosophers. On the one hand, the natural attitude’s dogmatism regarding the irrelevance of display leads to naivety and transcendental dumbness. But even in this attitude we must assume that the being that is “there, in itself” is capable of some sort of manifestation – which necessarily presupposes the mind’s engagement. If we are not permitted to assume this we face a “nothingness, an empty space, where there would be neither question nor answer.” On the other hand, the realist insistence, implicit in the natural attitude, on the contingency of display to the being of what is known, is equally honored by phenomenology. Phenomenology acknowledges this unique contingency and the facticity of its being displayed along with the facticity of the agent of display or manifestation. But, as we shall see (see Chapter VI, §9), it also points out that both of these facticities are not of the same order of contingency as what gets displayed. If all science presupposes display necessarily for all its determinations of necessity and contingency, then the fact of display and the agent of display are a unique kind of necessity and contingency.

The natural attitude with its accompanying realism is indispensable for the pragmatic requirements of everyday life as well as for the advance in scientific research and medical practice. For example, doctors and mechanics deal with bodies in space and time that are wholes with interrelating parts. Their task is the optimal functioning of the physical body-thing at hand, i.e., either the organism or the machine, by securing the good functioning of the parts. It would be a disaster for all of us if we expected the mechanic or the doctor to be “phenomenological” about their claims, e.g., the doctor’s claim that the artery to the heart is clogged. We may well want to know why this is so, even how she knows this, but we do not want the doctor to tell us how the artery is present to her consciousness as it is not present to the patient’s, how “the artery” is there as an identity in a manifold that encompasses the patient’s perceptions of constriction, the doctor’s perception through the x-rays, the blood-pressure measurement, and the testimony of the stethoscope; how each of these presencings itself is an identity in a manifold, how the perceived artery is co-meant as part of systematic not-given apperceived whole and how this whole is made up of parts that may be intended individually only in perception but the whole may be intended conceptually all at once; that the immediately relevant consideration is a whole, the blood-moving system centered in the heart, that is part of the larger whole of the body; that the perception of the blood flow occurs over time and space and there are normal and anomalous versions of this motion of the blood based on statistical research of random samples; that altogether there is a synthesis of numerous acts of presencing of what is perceptually given and what is not perceptually given that together make up the full significance of what is meant by “the clogged artery”; that this is a phenomenon that while being evident now to the examining physician, confirms what was “the same for all” in the physician’s textbook and medical school class as well as for the same physician last week, the week before that, and in weeks of the prior fifteen years of practice.
This kind of reflection, of which, no doubt, most doctors would be capable if interested, would interfere drastically with the diagnosis and the progress of medical science. Again, the natural attitude is how we, in our everyday theoretical and practical exigencies, are taken up with things in the world and oblivious to how these things and the world come to light through the agency of manifestation. Thus it is far from regrettable that all human beings are not always transcendental phenomenologists and indeed it is both necessary and laudable that at some times some human beings are not practicing phenomenologists.

Something similar be said about the phenomenological philosophy of art and religion. As the phenomenology of science presupposes and does not substitute for the scientists’ practice of science, so the phenomenology of art and religion presupposes and does not substitute for the practice and experience of art and religion in the natural attitude. A life-long contention of Husserl is that the ultimate notion of science is significantly deepened and enriched by the phenomenological reduction because all particular sciences leave out the question of the larger whole which is the science of manifestation. This position raises the question of whether the sense of religious faith and practice as well as aesthetic experience and practice too may not find a deepening and enrichment through the phenomenological reduction. We will not address these matters here. But what surely is clear is that the enrichment occurs from the manifestation or revelation, regardless of whether the person phenomenologically reflects on her agency of manifestation.

Because “the natural attitude” is always in advance of philosophical reflection and because it is how we are by reason of the pressures of life, it is not properly an attitude, except for the phenomenologist. “Attitude” in German is rendered as Einstellung or Stellungnahme, and we mean by this a stance that is the result of an act of will. The natural attitude is for most of us most of the time, to use computer language, the “default position.” It is properly “assumed” only by the transcendental phenomenologist when she “returns” to it. As an act of will we understand it to encompass what we will call a cognitive position-taking, i.e., a categorical enrichment or articulation of what is given in advance, or a position-taking in the sense of a moral commitment or taking a stand, like agreeing to a labor contract, joining a resistance movement, taking an oath, making a resolve or a promise, etc. (We will return often to the issue of stances and position-takings in this volume and the next.) All our attitudes or stances build on the natural attitude as our most elemental way of being in the world by allegiance to the actual reality of the world.

Within the natural attitude there are two species of attitude or stance we commonly assume. We may think of them as not being compatible at the same time and in the same respect. The first is the personalist attitude which has as its foil the naturalistic attitude. The personalist attitude is how we encounter one another as persons through empathic perception, i.e., as Others who are aware of themselves in the first-person. This attitude is inseparable from the attitude by which non-personal objects are brought to light. Both attitudes, especially the personalist one, have as their foil the attitude we assume when we study the world around us, including persons, as mere things within the framework of the sciences which practice “misplaced concreteness” (Whitehead), or the abstractions that pervade a particular
discipline and illuminate by focusing and specialization what otherwise would not be brought to light but which, at the same time, ignore or suppress wider contexts and other aspects which ought not to be ignored. In this attitude we think of everything from the standpoint of either physics, or biology, or statistics, or economics, etc. In such cases, persons and everything else are present to us through the grid of the mediating categories of the, often, naturalistic lens. This tends to suppress the normally ineluctable empathic perception of persons and to squeeze the phenomena of persons to fit in with the naturalistic categories.

Manifestation and display are not established by the phenomenological attitude. There is not an act properly speaking that brings about manifestation or display – any more than there is an act, properly speaking, bringing about wakefulness or awareness or consciousness. All acts presuppose these, indeed, as we shall claim, all acts of display, are not only displays of something but self-manifesting. (And even acts that are not acts of display are self-manifesting.) Consciousness is not only consciousness of... but ineluctably self-aware in its being consciousness of something else. All these matters become themes for the phenomenological attitude. The phenomenological attitude is the result of an act that is a stance or position-taking initiated by the epoché. The phenomenological notion of “act” may be distinguished from the actuality of the ongoing involuntary field of presence and manifestation which is inseparable from the mind’s merely being awake. This ongoing “activity” is richly complex and we will have occasion to dwell on it at length.

§6 Further Parallels in the Natural Attitude

Phenomenological philosophy practices a universal disengagement of the belief-allegiance to all that appears and the world as the co-given and/or co-meant framework of all that appears. Thus the phenomenological epoché, Husserl’s Greek term for the suspension of this belief-allegiance to the actual existence of the world, exceeds the scope of the suspension of disbelief that occurs in the world of play. That is to say, it exceeds also the scope of the assumption of “the as-if-it-were-true belief” regarding a fictional world. It also exceeds the scope of the aesthetic transfer of interests in something that appears to how it appears. Both these forms of bracketing leave the whole world in place. These forms of reduction modalize or suspend slices of the world’s actual existence but they leave intact the background of world.

The world is the setting in which all our doubts, negations, aesthetic and playful bracketings, etc. occur. When we decide that the government has lied to us, that a friend has been treacherous, etc., the world still persists as that within which everything comes to light in spite of our suspicions, doubts, etc. with respect to a massive segment of life. These major contextual interruptions may require enormous readjustments in regard to what we believed about the past and what we will believe about the future and therefore how we may interpret the present. But in spite of these massive traumatic interruptions the belief in the world itself persists. (We will
attend to the issue of limit-situations later where world itself suffers a unique trauma.) Our point here is simply that typically in the natural attitude the world, as the correlate of our complex intentional life, has a pervasive integrity and resilient ability to re-establish itself both as the ultimate scene or horizon of life as well as the basis of all the believes regarding what is in the world.

There is a fascinating cipher of the phenomenological epoché in sleep that adumbrates the letting go that one does when one actively “dies.” Before I “go” or “fall” to sleep, I exist wakefully, i.e., in the world. As such I am launched into possibly exciting projects, burdened with responsibilities, disturbed by possible dangers and failures, unsettled by personal conflicts, etc. To fall asleep I must let go of the world as it holds for me, let it run its course without my active participation and involvement. I must put out of play for the time being, i.e., for the stretch of sleep, the exigencies and importunities of life, my plans, desires, goals, judgments, responsibilities, etc. Instead of taking up the challenges of the flow of ever novel impressions and attending to them with the force of my will and the framework of my projects, I become passive toward them and let the feelings of weariness take over that subtly disengage me from the world by enticing me to their comforting and healing embraces. I do not really renounce the world or depart from it, but for now, I must let go of everything and not let anything get to me. I want to put to rest the presencing of the world in order that I too may rest. Husserl says that this letting go of sleep too is an epoché, one that typically is not freely performed but rather one into which we are drawn. In the course of the experience of being weary and falling asleep, of course, one can freely take steps to facilitate this letting go, e.g., by shutting out the lights, focusing on something soothing, using techniques to empty one’s mind, etc. In dreaming we are in an anomalous form of waking life in so far as there is a disengagement from the surrounding actual world. We are in a quasi-world, but not a world “as if it were true” of fiction; rather it is a world that usually seems real while it is unfolding, but which, upon waking, takes on another aspect, i.e., one of “mere dreaming.”

Let us return to the world of waking consciousness that encompasses the state of sleep as well as the world of dreams, because it is this that has to do with the phenomenological reduction. Two spatial images may help evoke the basic sense of world: It is the ground, like the earth, upon which we always stand, no matter how much we are in locomotion; it is the surrounding expanse or field in which and through which we move. Less-metaphorically we may say that world is both the ultimate context or setting, the ultimate horizon, within which, as well as the elemental basis upon which all our position-takings, novel categorical intuitions, predicative ties rest. It also is that upon which are founded the “modalizations” of these position-takings and categorical intuitions, i.e., our revising or modifying what was certain to what was doubtful, what was likely to what was unlikely, etc. If we may think of a limit-situation as precisely one in which we do not move in and out of, then world as base and horizon is a limit-situation. But it is not a limit-situation necessarily as a “crisis” of our life and life-world, the central concern of our later discussion of limit-situations. Husserl wrote of such a critical limit-situation that it “ventilates all horizons and calls them into question.”

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42 I Phenomenological Preliminaries
Another parallel in the natural attitude to the transcendental reduction is the “suspension of disbelief” we perform when we give ourselves over to a novel, a play, or movie. Consider how one might be enjoying the seaside, taking a break from reading a novel. In reading the novel I entered into a different, fictional world, with its own heterogeneous time and space, with its own hierarchy of matters of importance. Now, during the break from the novel, the play of colors, the texture on the surface of the sea, the woods, the gulls, etc. all hold firm, are still “valid” as states of affairs, within the wider world of my interests, even though I had entered the “world” of the novel and “bracketed” them. In an emphatic sense that we will later study, I turned my attention from the novel to the seaside. Now, after the break, I am returning to the novel.

Living in the world portrayed by the novel requires a major shift in stance that contrasts with the “passive-synthetic” activity of merely observing the sea or even reading. Reading the novel too involves acts sustained by the passive synthesis of the perception of the words on the page. In witnessing the sea become the scene of a Tsunami the emergent real fear is tied to an implicit judgment as to the real danger; in reading in the novel’s account of the approach of a Tsunami the perception and the fear is make-believe. That is, these position-takings are real as position-takings but their doxastic commitments are neutralized. The perceptions one has in reading the novel are not real perceptions but “as-if-it-were” perceptions. Therefore the fear awakened by reading the novel is tied to the “as-if-it-were” perceptions in the novel. Real fear is inseparably bound up with the perception of danger whereas the fear awakened by the reading the novel, although it has the form of this specific emotion, i.e., it is fear and not, e.g., hate or joy, it is not a fear resulting from facing a real danger. Therefore it is an “as-if-it-were” fear. Every real perception may be so fictionalized in imagination and every fiction can become in imagination real. When we try this we see that it is amiss to call one “real fear” and the other merely imagined in the sense that it has some other form or essence than fear – e.g., it is really anger. Yet in the one case it is pervaded by “as-if-it-were,” in the other case it is real. In the one case I fear and find this situation frightful; in the other case I quasi-empathically perceive and perhaps identify with the fictional hero; thus I quasi-fear or fear as if it were, and find this situation, as if it were, frightful. That is, because fear is tied to the doxastic allegiance and this is modified in the fiction to an as-if-it-were-real, the fear itself is modified to an “as-if-it-were-real-fear.”

Living in the novel’s world through reading, like observing the sea, is a form of “passive synthesis” which emphatic I-acts presuppose. In turning to the novel, I act, of course, by entering a fictional world, a world that holds my allegiance “as if it were true.” This turning to the novel resembles the act of deciding to observe the sea or anything else. But what is different in these latter acts is that I do not suspend my disbelief in what I am experiencing and that the perceptions and emotions are not “as if they were true.”

Of course in reading the novel I am still in the world that encompasses the seaside in as much as I am doxastically related to the real printed page and am joining the letters into words, words into sentences, sentences into paragraphs, etc. as they are found in this real thing, the book. Moreover, I am not attending to the print as
a forensic chemist, or a bookmaker or font-specialist; I am seeing the marks as significations and go through the marks/printed words to what they mean. And at the same time, of course, there is an elemental, perhaps irrepressible, kinaesthetic or “animal” faith of my body in relationship to the book I am grasping, the chair I am sitting in, and the ground my feet are resting on, and the air I am breathing. Further, in spite of the fictional narrative, with its heterogeneous time and place, the fictional world is constrained by my “real” life and the obligations I must fulfill. For now I can prescind from or “bracket” these in order to enter a fictional world. Although this as such is not continuous or co-existent with my perceptual seaside world the latter still has a kind of validity.

In order to enter this fictional world I must suspend my disbelief. But this is not merely not to disbelieve; I have to regard the fictional adventure as if it were really happening. The suspension of disbelief is retained and plays a role in entering the fictional world. Yet there is a unique kind of belief, the belief-as-if-it-were-so, of the fictional world that is here functioning. I am not merely believing nor am I merely suspending my disbelief. Nor am I merely entertaining possibilities as possibilities. I am treating what is in some respect possible as if it were real, as if it actually were so.

There is no doubt that we can “be lost” in the fictional world in the sense that we become so unmindful of where we are that for the moment its pull is greater than the real world. Here we only wish to highlight how the natural belief-involvement with our surroundings may be put out of play when we enter a realm of play, whether it be through a novel, movie, a theater piece, or a game. This putting out of play is a familiar stance or position-taking. It is in itself not the move to the phenomenological stance because one still keeps in play the doxic or belief relation to the wider world and also remains oblivious to the theme of appearings or display. Nevertheless it is a suspension of the disbelief in the fictional world that occurs with a kind of disengagement or postponement of the real world of perception.

There is a faint adumbration of the phenomenological reduction in basic ethical reflections where we have to stop our immediate engagement with the world and reflect on how we are engaging the world and how the world appears to us. “Stop and Think!” suggests that we often or occasionally are exploded into the world thoughtlessly. This stopping, of course, is not an entertaining of our achieving-displaying of the world and a disengagement of the pull of the world. It is rather a challenge to be more appropriately thoughtful and responsive to the world, and this means that a disciplined monitoring of how one is in the world and displaying the world is called for.

We get closer to the phenomenological reduction with the imperative to get our whole life in order, where we find reason or are exhorted to let our whole life become a theme. Death and other “limit-situations” occasion such a thematization of “the whole show” and how we have up until now displayed the whole show. We will return to these matters in Book 2.

Psychotherapy foreshadows the reduction in as much as it enables the client to become, as St. Augustine put it, a question to himself. Each of us has many voices, roles, convictions, etc., informing ourselves and our being in the world. We often
give doxastic allegiance to these matters without thinking about it and, often enough, they may be the source of many of our most painful experiences and situations. The therapist thus can enable the “I myself” to come forth so that I can learn to distinguish from what you and they want and say what I want and say. Prior to this I am immersed in a sea of voices and perspectives and forms of agency without being aware of myself as properly myself. My “ownness” is invisible to me. The therapist uses the technique of quotation where a statement is repeated or reflected back in such a way that it is there as proposed, there to be heard, there to be entertained. By listening, as Carl Rogers says, with unconditional positive regard, without judging, indeed, by listening in such a way that the client comes to have unconditional positive regard for his own capacity to reveal the truth about himself, a space is created for the client to listen to himself. This listening is accompanied by quoting, sometimes paraphrasing, what the client says. Here the therapist does not judge or take up even the client’s point of view but reflects back what the client says about himself and his being with others in the world, and the client is enabled to hear what he truly or allegedly believes and feels for the first time. The words enable to come to light the client’s affectivity, his mooded attunement with the world, because it is only out of this affectivity or “felt-meaning” that the appropriate words describing how he is in the world emerge. Often times prior to this one is in the world simply on the basis of what one ought to do because “one must” or because of a long habit of being so motivated. “Quotation” by the therapist/listener is a way of letting the world appear detached from the world’s power to overwhelm because the therapist/listener’s quotation brackets the doxastic and emotional attachment and engagement and lets one’s being in the world this way appear.

This comes out clearly in such areas as anger management and focusing. For example, when angry we have the remarkable epistemic stance of absolute conviction of the validity of our anger. Similarly we identify completely with this very self, ourself, this personality, who finds himself so disdained. This remains true even though we might dimly apperceive that in ten minutes it will “blow over” and we will see the matter differently. In the discipline of “anger management” we find reason to “distance ourselves” from the self who is so angrily living in the world. This means this person or this self and its so being in the world becomes what appears and we are a kind of dative of manifestation to ourselves.

Similarly in Eugene Gendlin’s focusing psychotherapy we as persons and how we are in the world are given the chance to appear. The therapist/listener may well hear: “I’m angry as hell with my friend.” The therapist/listener will say something like, “You are feeling anger” or “You sense something in you which is angry” or “There is a part of you which is angry.” This response may help shift the focus or attention to how the client constitutes himself and his world. “I am…” is a statement of identity and identification. It nails me to this predicate adjective, when not only am I as a person less a noun than a verb, a process, but I myself am more than any aspect of my process of personal development. This is the advantage of mirroring back to the client, “There is something in you which is extremely angry with your friend.”

But if the client objects and asserts forcefully, “NO, it is not a part of me that is angry. I am angry,” then the therapist/listener may reflect back, “No, it is important
for you to say that you are angry and not to say that a part of you is angry.” Or, depending on how insistent or impatient the client is, “NO, you are angry!” Here we see that the client is being given a space in which to attend to the way he is displaying the world and his being in the world through the felt-meaning he calls “anger” and in the latter response to the protest of the client, the client is being given the chance to see that he wants to identify himself with this anger. And at the same time he is being helped to dis-identify himself from this felt-meaning wherein his being is totally defined by this being angry and anger-occasioning situation. He is being helped to have his being in the world become a theme to him and to appear to him; he is enabled to see that he is more than merely this angry being in the world – even if at the moment he may resist that opportunity to dis-identify. Of course, here there is no interest in display for its own sake, but rather the goal is the person’s becoming whole and learning to trust that he has resources for being in the world the way he, at a deep level of respect for the truth and himself, wants to be. Yet along the way the client is enabled, by attending to the felt-meaning out of which speech and action emerge by which the world appears the way it is, to be disengaged from the importunity of the world. Gendlin suggests that all therapy begins with the felt-meaning happening now and tucked in this Now is everything, i.e., the whole of our being in the world, and this itself informs each aspect of this feeling and in explicating any feeling, e.g., anger, we are explicating “the whole show.” Of course, here there is not any disengagement of the world, but there is the kind of stepping back which enables the world, as that in which we dwell, to appear.

Another approximation to the phenomenological attitude or stance occurs in the familiar attitude we assume when attending to artworks and when we consider what the artist’s aim is in his or her production of the art work. Consider how someone who works in a realist medium like fictional documentaries or photography may be said to “put a frame around” segments or aspects of the continuous whole of the stream of real life. This is similar to the phenomenological “bracketing.” Life normally is experienced as a continually experienced flow of “events.” Yet the continuity can be interrupted and an aspect of life may be set off, e.g., by a photograph or a narrative, and the viewer or listener is compelled to relate to this aspect of life differently than he would if he were meeting it as it is immersed in the flow of real life. In which case the aspect of life is not simply actually happening nor is the interest of the artist or the subsequent viewer focused simply on what was actually happening at the time.

Often, if not always, what here is in play is the power over us of what pleases and delights us in its being experienced and as it is displayed, foremost in its being seen and its being heard; that is, in short, in its being beautiful. Later (in Chapter IV), foremost in regard to the beauty inseparable from persons, we will correlate the beautiful and love. Love is a special delight in, indeed, a celebration of, the other person. Why something delights in its being so displayed, e.g., in the unique affirmation of love, is of course much disputed, e.g., whether it comes from, e.g., its size, order, integrity, due proportion, resplendence, its organic unity of a manifold from out of a center, etc. will not detain us. Rather we want to focus on the relationship of beauty to display and suggest that the other alleged properties of beauty have to
do with how the display of being or the display of display delights. What so delights us in its so being displayed has the power to generate the tendency to protect it, to duplicate itself, to let itself be displayed in endless ways, to have copies of itself produced. The artist with enhanced sensibilities for beauty might even have a permanent disposition to put everything in her life within a frame, to experience all of life as if “everything is a story to be told.” (This would be at least as difficult to truly pull off as the phenomenological reduction where we meet the irrepresible exigencies of the body and their implicit doxastic allegiances.) The artist’s putting a frame around an actual event for us, e.g., with the photograph or with the fictional documentary, disengages herself and us from what appears and we are taken up with how it appears, and in this How we find a source of delight.

We all make this shift when we enjoy the look of sunsets, landscapes, vistas, or even when seeing people appearing in a unique intriguing way, in their dress, appearance, pose, stylish look, etc. At a fashion show, or even a dog or horse show, we take delight in the look, we look for and at the look, not at, e.g., the suffering imposed by the handlers that the model, dog, or horse has had to put up with. The looks themselves of people and things can draw our attention and we are less interested in their actual real existence as events in the real world than how they appear. (The person of courage “dares to appear what she is,” whereas the hypocrite dares not to appear what she is and the con-artist dares to appear as other than what she is.)

Some forms of non-representationalist art attempt to focus precisely on the looks or display and suppress our spontaneous natural absorption in what is displayed. Much music radically disconnects the reference of sounds to feelings, moods, things, and states of affairs and forces us further to entertain the conventional distinction between sound and noise. Therefore it makes a theme out of the appearings as such, foremost the appearings of what we take to be music.

But even in representationalist art our interest need not be primarily in what appears in terms of the actual existence of the depicted or whether the depicted actually exists, e.g., the mountains, woods, streams, etc.; rather there is a shift in interest to the appearing and a delight in the appearing of what appears. The natural attitude’s spontaneous interest or concern with the real appearing things is “inhibited” in favor of how it appears. The artist and the thoughtful perceiver of art will be attentive to perspectives, lighting, timing, silence, pauses, etc., in ways the more typical person is not.

Of course the artist’s emphases are decisive here and we are absorbed in the perspective, the how-it-looks, as it gets highlighted out of and detached from the real pressure and flow of everyday life. Of course, in this kind of artwork, in contrast to non-representational artwork, it is not as if we lose all interest in what appears; but as an artwork it provokes the shift in interest to how what appears appears. We might say that the work is to that degree not successful as an artwork to the extent that it merely awakens or reawakens the doxastic allegiance to what appears and does not awaken a delight in how it appears. And yet, disclosing how something appears, e.g., in a portrait study or in a landscape, we may feel that the artist captures the “essence” of the person or the place better than any single or multiple in-the-flesh experiences – and here art becomes the measure of the real – just
as we might have occasion to say that Who someone is may be revealed in what she shows herself to be capable of under fire. (See Book 2.)

Further, as a counterpoise to the aesthetic stance, we may consider that when we meet a profoundly beautiful piece of representationalist art, we have something approaching the “ontological argument”: It is too good not to be true, i.e., there is awakened in us a desire that it actually exist. The essence portrayed here, whether fictional or not, embodies the power to awaken in us the desire, if not the conviction, of a kind of necessary being. (Cf. our discussion below of the phenomenological ontological argument, Chapter VI, §9.) Here the look is not readily detached from that of which it is a look, and this “substance” lays claim to existing actually. Furthermore, the viewer, as in the natural attitude, and in contrast to the aesthetic attitude as a modification of the natural attitude, and in contrast to the modification of the natural attitude in the theme of indexicals, and in contrast to the transcendental reduction, is not indexed and his existence is not deemed relevant at all to the required existence of the beautiful object.

With the phenomenological reduction what appears is seen in conjunction with its appearings to an agent of manifestation. The I of the transcendental agent of manifestation is not a person in the world with others, because this doxastic personal nexus too is disengaged. With the reduction the “I” is part of the theme of reflection even if not part of the scene of what is being reflected on. I may be taken up with a game, and watching a game is not watching myself watch a game. But with the reduction, there is a shift away from the game’s imperious claims on me and my display of the game through “watching” becomes a theme. The “watching the game” thus includes the game, the act of perceiving it that is called “watching,” as well as the ways I am involved in this activity. The shift away from the game to these other themes is accomplished through a doxastic disengagement or bracketing of our belief-allegiance to the actual reality of the game. In the next chapters we will start to attend more explicitly to what “I” means.

The preceding brief descriptions of the world of play, the psychotherapeutic practice, and the artist’s creation surreptitiously presuppose already the transcendental epoché because in each case there is required a standpoint that brackets the real world, e.g., of the one playing, of the client and listener, and the everyday perceiver. In the natural attitude’s naivety we can say that the world is the absolute whole in which everything comes to light or appears. Only with a modalization of the basic belief in the world, e.g., through doubt, does this whole itself appear as a penultimate because it appears over against the doubting I. A universal doubt, if such is possible, might be able to transform the world into a “mere appearance.” World would then be a mere appearing to the doubter who, as long as she is doubting, cannot be doubted as doubting, even though very little else perhaps might be able to be said about the one doubting.

The epoché aims precisely at getting the correlation of being and display established as the proper field of philosophy. It thus resembles the phenomenon in the natural attitude where we through indexicals achieve the reference and signification through the use of personal, demonstrative, and possessive pronouns and adverbs. With the achievement of the indexicals, we become marginally aware of the speaker
as the necessary correlate of the deictic achievements of the other indexicals and that to which they are singled out and displayed. Thus the indexical “I” is not itself what is singled out in the achievements of “here,” “you,” “she,” “now,” “tomorrow,” “this,” “that,” etc., but of necessity “indexed” as inseparably belonging to their sense. Similarly, the transcendental reduction establishes the scene in which the transcendental I is indexed in all that appears but itself is not initially a theme. Thus we may think of the reduction as the task of turning all that appears into an index, a “transcendental index,” of the agency of manifestation. The index feature of the world thus would resemble but not be identical with “indexicality” in our natural attitude. As Castañeda has said, “indexicals” are basic mechanisms for finding our place in the world. In using them we achieve or perform an “executive function” of placing items we encounter “in the flesh,” or “in person” in relationship to us. In short, “we make indexical reference to items present in our [perceptual] experience as so present.”63 We will dwell on this topic in the next chapter. Suffice it here to point out that a dog is not naturally “this dog” any more than it is “my dog.” What is disclosed by an indexical bears an indexical “tail” that marks the speaker’s reference to, e.g., the dog. As the indexically disclosed thing can be shown to indicate the circumstance of the speaker vis-à-vis what is referred to (the dog through this dog), so all the appearings of the world, through the reduction, become manifestly a transcendental index of the agency of manifestation.

§7 Bracketing the World

First let us attend to an ambiguity in regard to “the” world. In so far as “the” is a definite article it typically is a way we single out indexically some specific referent for consideration, as “The man standing in the corner.” Here we assume that the listener knows of other men and corners, but here the listener is drawn to the man and corner evident in the speaker’s field of perception. But “the world” as “the Good” or “the sky” may be used in such a way as to absolutize or display as one and only what is being referred to. Thus “the” may be as definite as a proper name, as in “The president is a war criminal.”64 This use is also evident in the German use of the definite article before proper names, as “der Ullrich.” Obviously “the” in “the sky” does not refer to something existing in the sky nor does “the world” refer to anything in the world. Clearly when we refer to abstract entities like logical forms, e.g., “the quantifier” (as in the phrase, “the quantifier in this proposition”) the quantifier is not “in the world” but for different reasons than “the world” is not in the world. Yet there are some things that we can refer to in general, like “justice,” whose generality is such that they resist receiving a definite article even though they serve as substitutes for predication and thus are logical individuals.

We might think of “the” world as a singling out of the world, as in “this” world, and in contrast to other possible worlds. Yet “world” refers to the ultimate horizon that encompasses all others, and therefore it would seem to be absolutized, like
“the” All, “the” whole, “the” absolute, etc. In such cases we are not properly speaking singling any thing out from others that are generically or specifically the same. There are not several Alls or wholes or absolutes. World thus resembles a universal like “justice” which resists the definite article. But world is not merely a universal concept. By world we refer to something experienced or “apperceived,” co-experienced. It is uniquely unique in the sense that there is only one world. Whereas the world may be made present non-phenomenologically through a concept, like “the universe,” and thus we may acknowledge the possibility of a plurality of possible and actual worlds, there are not other worlds because even such concepts as “possible world” or “universe” emerge within the world as the correlate of the transcendental I. All possible or alternative worlds must be within this one unique world. (See our discussion at §§2–3 above.)

As we shall see, both “myself” and “world” are similarly uniquely unique: Both are lived and neither are particulars or instantiations of kinds. In the case of world all existing real particulars are within it. Of course, one might say it is itself a kind or species of “horizon,” just as the Absolute Whole is a unique kind of whole for there are many kinds of wholes each of which has numerous instantiations. “World” thus resembles “being” when it is used without the article. Thereby when we refer to “being,” we do not refer to “the” being as a being which gets specified. All this is by way of accounting for the common ambiguity where we have used “the world” or simply “world,” without the definite article.

We said that the world or all the world’s appearing becomes a theme for the transcendental reduction. How is this brought about? The natural attitude is defined primarily by its allegiance to the world which is sustained even when we move in and out of play, dream, and fictional worlds. How is the natural attitude’s obliviousness to this correlation to be overcome? We already said that the project of a universal doubt, even though impossible, points in that direction. But the doubt undermines the basic thesis of the unity of being and display. Phenomenology disengages, brackets, suspends the natural attitude’s belief allegiance, it does not doubt, undo, or cancel it.

Because doxastically disengaging from the things of the world would be an endless task, just like doubting the infinity of things would be an impossible task, we must disengage from the world all at once so that the “whole show” can appear as an index. Unfortunately, the impression is created that this can be something undertaken prior to an initiation into phenomenology. But that is misleading. The first reason is that the reduction requires a phenomenological understanding of what is being bracketed. Because this is “world” as base and horizon as they are lived and as they enrich or thicken the certainty of Now, there must first be an elucidation of this to the initiate. Secondly, the answer to the question of what could possibly be the target of an act of disengagement similarly requires bringing to light the certainty and allegiance to Now as thickened with the world as base and horizon. We hope eventually to have made a cumulative case for holding that the world is known as the implicit basis for all explicit articulations and therefore as the basic foundation of all that actually now “holds,” or is valid, or is real, etc. Further it will become clear that the world is known as the implicit horizon of things, propositions, etc. that hold although they are not now being explicitly attended to. The world-certainty, thus as both basis and horizon, is an incessant ongoing certainty now.
As such it cannot itself come forth as the result of any single explicit positing but rather is always the presupposed basis and implicit horizon for any positing. World, then, as the presupposed basis of all actual displays and the co-meant and not actually explicitly given displays that have been but still hold, is an ongoing synthesis that accompanies each and every passive achievement and explicit act. We may say: World gets constituted or gains its sense in the ongoing achievement of any whatsoever bringing to light. We may, therefore, take this ongoing achievement, which does not emerge apart from phenomenological reflection, and which is the ineluctably presupposed and horizonal or contextual synthesis, and make of it the target of an intentional act of disengagement.

Of course the target is not any thematic object as something in the world. Disengaging our belief in specific objects is a rather straightforward affair. But how do we disengage that which surrounds all specific objects and is presupposed as still engaged in all modalizations of belief in regard to things in the world? Husserl wrestled mightily with this. His view seems to be something like the following: Phenomenological analysis permits us to attend to the ineluctable spontaneous basic belief and allegiance to the validity of the world as base and horizon as it is present in the thickness of the present Now. We are able to reflect on this as a thematic whole. "I can transform this living unity of life from that which is given actually in the momentary present into the form of one thematizing its synthetic unity of validity. The implicit consciousness of the existence of the world becomes now explicit: the world becomes an intentional this." We take this to mean that first we have the things in which we believe. Then we have world, singled out with the demonstrative indexical this into which all belief-allegiances are interwoven. As such, it is the thick temporal and spatial horizon synthesized in the Now, believed-in by way of the primal doxastic allegiance. Then we make a theme of this; i.e., we move from the world believed-in to this belief-in as concentrated in the Now and Here. Thereby both world and the original belief-in undergo modification. That from which we refrain is not the irrepressible Now phase – which refraining in any case would be impossible – but the whole of the Now as thickened with both the world base and the world horizon. The basic act of allegiance itself, as constituting the world base and world horizon, is modified, i.e., disengaged. Again we do not disengage the upsurging Now, which is irrepressible, but the Now as thick with the This-Here and as rooted in our allegiance to the world-base and world-horizon. This itself is the disengagement of the world and is itself one with bringing to light the basic belief allegiance which, although always irrepressibly in play, is now modified. It is now apparent or brought into relief analogous to the base note which now is heard whereas before it was not heard because it blended in with the mix of the other notes.

Even in moments when “the whole world,” i.e., all that provides the familiar contours of our life-world, seems to fall apart, the basic world-belief based in this Now-Here surfaces continuously willy-nilly. And it must be added that we do not disengage the irrepressible “primal doxa” of the self-awareness of the reflecting transcendental agent of manifestation because this it is which brings all this to light and for which agent of manifestation the world base and world doxa themselves have become themes.65

§7 Bracketing the World 51
But what could possibly be the motive for such a reversal of life and relinquishment of the natural attitude? There is obviously no motive within the world that could possibly justify disengaging the fundamental belief-allegiance to the world. From within the natural attitude it might well appear as a form of madness. Further the inhibition of the basic beliefs about oneself, one’s identity, one’s being in the world with others within a cultural, religious tradition, etc. can have no appropriate justifying motivating reason. In fact, all motivation, except perhaps that of skepticism, would point in the direction of loyal allegiance to one’s beliefs.66

What emerges here is this: Although one may be hard pressed to find a motive to make of me myself, “JG Hart,” a world-phenomenon, by putting out of play my belief in my historical identity as a being in the world with others within a tradition, in so exercising the freedom to bracket myself, i.e., JG Hart, I cannot put of play I myself as the agent of the epoché or agent of manifestation. There is a sense of “myself” that is not able to be “modalized,” i.e., doubted, bracketed or disengaged. As Husserl has often noted, the validating, being certain, intentional conscious having, through which I, as my self-aware soul-life (not something of which the soul-life is aware – see the next chapter), have the world and through which things and the world come to light as valid, is not itself something that is believed to hold or to be valid, not itself something of which we are conscious, not something whose validity can be bracketed or inhibited, not itself something in the world, something human or a matter of soul.67 The result of the inhibition of the world-belief and all that holds or obtains as valid as the whole texture of the world lets come into the picture the unique features of the transcendental I: As such, i.e., as a “theme” of the reduction of the world, it is not properly something of which we are conscious in an intentional act; it is not something held to be valid; it is free of any validating context, it is not a specific kind of being in the world nor even an identifiable person in the world. Bringing this to light is the ultimate achievement of the reduction that follows upon the epoché as the disengagement or refraining from the basic world-belief. We will later consider reasons for referring to this as the nothingness or non-beingness of the transcendental “I.” We may here content ourselves with briefly noting: If “being” is what the transcendental I constitutes or displays through intentionality, and the transcendental I is not so constituted, then the transcendental I is meontic, or non-being.

The beginner therefore is not in a position to conduct the full sweep of the epoché, because this sense of world, and how it can become the target of an act is not evident. Nevertheless the beginner can see the merits in the Cartesian-like project of disengaging all that can be disengaged. She can see that there are no worldly validities or belief-allegiances that cannot be disengaged. She can also see that the effort to disengage the agent of manifestation as something in which we believe is not possible; that in the agency of manifestation the agent is that through which and by which all that comes to light or is modalized. But at the same time the agent of manifestation itself is not held to be valid, to be true, etc. She can see that the reduction, as a going back, is a disengagement of the validities that acts posit and that surround what is “given,” with sense. She can see the necessity of a study of the motivational contexts that bring about the acts; she can come to see that
these contexts function within the horizon of temporality and its syntheses and that
this is the founding consideration of world as base and horizon. When in such a
position, she can appreciate what the phenomenological reduction aspires to be. But
then she is no longer a beginner.

Let us return to the consideration that there might not be a sufficient motive in
the natural attitude for the reduction, but there still might be possible insufficient
motives and pointers. We already mentioned some ethical and psychotherapeutic
pointers toward the reduction. Later in Book 2 we will consider the “existential
limit-situations” which ventilate or explode what we take for granted in terms of
the ultimate horizon of meaning or our taken-for-granted being in the world, e.g.,
one’s own death and guilt. But even cognitively we may see how a radical question-
ing can surface that can cause the world as such to become a theme. For example,
it may arise from the anticipation of the extinction of humanity, e.g., through an
ecological or nuclear holocaust. Is not the death of humanity the death of display
or meaning? With the theme of the death of humanity and the canceling of display,
the whole world could become absolutely silent – but what does “silent” now
mean? How and to whom is such a claim evidently displayed? Or it might surface
through the imaginative anticipation of one’s absence from the world in one’s own
death: Is not “the world” inseparably “my world” and does not my mortal existence
suggest that I exist in such a way that “my world” will give way to “the world,”
i.e., the world for everyone but me? (We discuss in detail these matters in Chapters
VI and VII below and Book 2, Chapter I.) But does this make sense if “the world”
is always constituted out of the plurality of unique selves, all and each of whom is
mortal? Only a certain practice, that of mathematics and natural science, renders the
world as the “same for us all” regardless of who or when one is; this is the view
from nowhere and for no one. But this is an abstraction that builds on the inelucta-
ble first-person experience of the world in which the scientist lives. That is, a world
soaked with indexicality and perspectivality that serves as the basis for the scien-
tist’s perspective-free descriptions. The world is not merely what astrophysics dis-
plays it as being, that is, the whole made up of entities and processes whose nature
and necessity are presented through mathematical functions indifferent to the
agents of display because this whole itself is inconceivable without the agents of
manifestation for whom these mathematical functions are meaningful. Rather it is
also a whole, displayed by and to individuals and communities of individuals, that
is soaked with the cognitive and value perceptions of these individuals and
communities. If this be true, what then is “the world,” given that all for whom the
world is and who have made their home there will eventually be absent? This
experiment of the absenting of the agents and datives of manifestation enables the
phenomenality of world itself to appear. It also permits the radical dimensions of
the transcendental I and the intersubjective community of I’s to be adumbrated
because the ephemerality and fragility of the personal and cultural-communal
identity itself becomes a theme.

Consider another possible kind of motivation. Life requires of us to give up cer-
tain beliefs and we must relinquish even things we hold dear, because, e.g., of error,
disappointment, treachery, etc. At the same time we hold on to the validity of the
world as a whole and its basic integrity and unity. Yet when I go to sleep I have to let go of the way the world depends on me myself and permit my “soul” or the unconscious agencies that support my conscious life to take over without my interference; I let go in order for the vital activities that animate me to be recharged. When I awake, of course, these responsibilities, claims, requirements, etc. kick back in. We may think of death as what happens to us, overcomes us, etc. But we may also think of it as an act of relinquishing the world. In which case, dying actively is an act which appropriates what willy-nilly happens, i.e., the relinquishing of the world. Is not death as the end of me as this person in the world a letting go of my being in the world and a relinquishing of the world as what is the ongoing achieved synthetic basis for my acts of display and the horizon of all my prior displays and anticipated ones? This letting go of the world and relinquishing of one’s being in the world is not an invalidation, denial, or canceling of the validity of the world or of one’s personal identity; but at the same time one “dies,” i.e., one becomes a nothing in the world, absent for others and oneself as an imagined post-mortem experiencer, and the life in the world as one’s passive and active achievement is relinquished. This relinquishment or letting go of the world is not the phenomenological epoché but does provide an analogy with it. The epistemic disengagement of the world brings the basic belief allegiance to light and actively dying is a relinquishment of one’s being in the world, all that one has, has done, committed oneself to, etc., without a devaluing or invalidation of these. Relinquishing or letting go of the world in death enjoys, in spite of the dissymmetry, some parallels with the phenomenological inhibition of our world-allegiance.68

Finally, we may note once again the themes of ethical taking stock and psychotherapy as forms of the search for “authenticity,” i.e., consistency, integrity, personal honesty, etc. which may well involve rethinking, if not uprooting, oneself from the prior appropriated and inherited understandings of oneself and one’s world similarly enables one’s being in the world to come to light in a new modalized way. Prior certainties and necessities may well lose their hold. The radically lonely “Existenz” who has launched a new life uprooted from former prejudices of course still affirms wide swaths of the texture of the world. But along the way, the confrontation with the “limit-situations,” e.g., of death and guilt, may generate an anxiety where the sense of everything, even many of these wide swaths of doxastic allegiance, may suffer from the quakings and tremors that verge on meaninglessness. Here too is a kind of adumbration at the more wholistic and “existential” level of what the transcendental phenomenological reduction strives to achieve cognitively and epistemically with its disengagement from the “whole show” of the world. In both cases “world” becomes a theme for an engaged subjectivity who has become an issue for herself, both in her self-constitution and in her constitution of the world.

§8 The Setting of Phenomenology

The term “the world” is further useful because it implies the publicity and intersubjectivity of the world. This is not relinquished in the transcendental reduction. Indeed, Husserl taught that the reduction properly reduces the world not merely to
an index of my possible experiences, but it is also an index for the corresponding systems of experience of certain relevant other I’s and, depending on the theme, possibly all other I’s. Obviously this does not mean that it is possible that I intervene in Others’ streams of consciousness and disengage their doxastic allegiances. Rather this intersubjective reduction enables the proper sense of the world to come to light: the world as it appears for me and you and the others and for us all. 59

There is a further aspect of this matter that we wish to discuss here. Even though the reduction disengages the doxastic allegiance to the world as the same for us all, the Others are implicitly affirmed as real in the phenomenological setting as the interlocutors of phenomenological discourse. The reduction, by transforming all appearings into transcendental indices, may enable us to bring to light the sense of the otherness of the Other and the hidden presence of Others’ achievements as accounting for “the same for us all”; but this bringing to light is in an intersubjective-linguistic context of actual interlocutors. Whereas it may well appear that phenomenological studies and research are monologues for disembodied, isolated, autistic hermits, it is obvious that as published studies they are not such. Nevertheless there are philosophical issues here that sharpen and qualify the dialogical thesis. (See also Chapter IV, §2.)

Even though, as we shall see, much of phenomenology is typically carried out in third-person discourse, and even though this discourse is primarily a reflection on first-person lived experiencing, it is unusual in that it typically appears not to be addressed to someone, a “you.” (For personal perspective, see Chapter II, §7 and Chapter IV, §§1 ff.) Of course, in its formal execution, like all discourse, it usually appears to be someone speaking/writing about something to someone else. In this sense its use of declarative sentences, by which it displays the world, is not the activity of a lonely acosmic transcendental I, exercising the cognitive agency of displaying to itself how persons as such are engaged in the world. (Even though transcendental reflection reveals that the transcendental I may be displayed as, in certain respects, acosmic and of necessity absolutely unique and singular (see especially Chapters IV–VI), this display by this same I is in an intersubjective setting.) The declarative sentences are always by a transcendental I who is embodied and communualized and they presuppose at least the anonymous or implicit presence of listeners or readers, who can be addressed as “you.” Nevertheless, as is evident not only in the case of Husserl’s huge Nachlass, but in anyone’s sliding into appropriate distinctions, there is a sense in which it is monologic in so far as the writing or speaking is simply the vehicle for the thinker to express what she means, which itself is not properly known until the expression (e.g., the declarative sentence) takes form, and lets the necessary distinctions emerge for the first time. It is a matter of filling the empty intention of wanting to bring to light by “meaning/wanting to say.” Whereas it is true that display typically is never the achievement of a single person’s heroic, arduous bringing out of hiding what before was hidden to everyone, it is, in original thinking, very much this sort of thing. This, of course, is not to say that the thinker does not stand in debt not only to the persons and circumstances that made her linguistically competent, but also, of course, to the myriad persons with whose thinking she has come into contact explicitly or implicitly. However dialogical the context originally was, the thinker thinking originally is not

§8 The Setting of Phenomenology 55
even thinking out loud or thinking “for herself” but rather pulled by the eros to fill appropriately the empty intentions which are always already linguistic.

Nevertheless, to the extent the phenomenologist acknowledges, in the work of thematization, that her use of language implies an apperceived intersubjectivity, phenomenology cannot involve doxastically disengaging the Other’s reality while addressing him. “Doxastic disengagement” is not doubting or disbelieving but rather the way we mute our engagement in regard to what appears in favor of how it appears. The reduction enables “you” to be there in such a way that how you appear serves as an index for my presencing you, my agency of manifestation; it may also enable me to be there in such a way that how I appear serves as an index for your apperceived agency of manifestation. (Of course, in the rich presencing of you, e.g., in love, the agency of presencing you can be precisely a “self-displacing” agency over and above the self-displacement brought on by the analogous “pairing” where the here, now, I myself are “othered,” e.g., in acts of self-abnegation, jubilation, delight, restraint, self-discipline, etc.) Further, in speaking to you I cannot disengage my belief in you any more than I can disengage your existence in loving you. But I can make a theme out of the phenomenological display of the world (to you) and how you appear as the interlocutor during this display. In this case your existence is disengaged in favor of how the display to you is displayed and how you are displayed as the recipient and interlocutor of the display. But, of course, in so far as I am writing and speaking to you your being is not disengaged but necessarily affirmed. But I may mute your reality in favor of the hunt for the necessities proper to the themes. This is another respect in which the reduction to “primordiality” can never be complete.70

Yet, it is not as if the agent of manifestation lives primarily a life of contemplative display and transcendental phenomenology merely reflects this. Quite the opposite is true. The “natural attitude” is the life of a person in the world, and this typically comprises most of our lives most of the time. The natural attitude is not there as a theoretic object but rather is that “from which” and “out of which” we live. It is how we live in our solitude as well as vis-à-vis Others in our familiar linguistic and cultural practices.

The life-world, Others, and language are intimately incorporated into our lives as we live them in the natural attitude. They come to light for phenomenology by way of reflections which remove us from this thick concreteness of life because these reflections are precisely not the living of this life but the disengaging attention to this life. What phenomenology has to reflect on in the natural living of its life is not only the I-acts but also the immense realm of passivities which it encompasses under the rubric of “passive synthesis” which provides the stuff for the I-acts. To treat the life-world, the Other, and language themselves as the products of the discrete and occasional acts of constitution, which acts, in fact, presuppose them, is to create grand distortions and problems of infinite regress. Yet to substitute for these realms of passivity, which have enabled us to assimilate the life-world, the Other, and language, a postulated realm of “the unconscious” or a naïve non-constitutional passive gnosis which remains ineffable for philosophical reflection is not possible for phenomenology.
For example, the life-world has its seminal shape in the way we automatically hang onto the past and lean into the future (retentions and protentions) and surround what is present now with these passive intentions. What we immediately hang onto includes something we have already immediately hung onto (retentions are retentions of retentions), and we lean into the immediate and remote future on the basis of what we have hung onto (retentions are retentions of retentions and protentions themselves a kind of thick expectation which forecasts onto the future the retained past, all without I myself doing anything). This gives a hint of how the world is not something we merely intend in an act but what we live from by way of being awake and wanting to live (a “proto-intentionality”) rather much like, as Levinas has stressed, enjoyment. But the identity of the world, as the passive synthesis of all the passive synthesizing out of which we live, is not a strict identity synthesis, like objects of cognition can be. As the basis for all explicit predication and identity synthesis, it itself cannot be thought of as an identity of the same order as what transpires in discrete acts of identification. The syntax occurring in this passive dimension is only analogous to what happens in the formation of propositions and sentences. The determination of the unity and identity of the world as that endless continuous context within which I make any explicit determinations (the unique indexical “this” that is the target of the epoché of the world) is different from these explicit discrete syntactic determinations, such as I might make after serious study of reliable books, news reports, journals and newspapers, e.g., that “America’s current foreign policy has ugly imperialist features.”

Similarly Others are not properly present for the first-time in constituting acts. Indeed, there is good evidence for thinking of the Others as a priori “absent presences” at the heart of the infants’ importunate desires. Faces are that toward which infants and adults gravitate (see Chapter II, §7), and Others are what are presupposed by us in our most elemental advance in personal development and knowledge. Language therefore does not exteriorize what is internal to me as something already in tact, e.g., “a thought,” but it, as something belonging to us from very early stages and toward which the pre-linguistic development gravitates, rather enables me to articulate and express what I mean and want to display. In normal development it is already integral to a child’s learning the elemental practice of learning to follow an act of display, a showing, a pointing, a referring, etc., and then the child’s wanting to display by herself the world through “meaning to say,” showing, pointing, etc. It, from my first, e.g., mimetic, enactment of linguistic behavior, such as pointing, puts me in touch with a common world of gestures and things. As Husserl has insisted, the wanting-to-say and meaning-to-say that precede the articulation of sentences, is a unique empty intention already pervaded by language, language in a sense more basic and comprehensive than making statements. The rich tacit pre-propositional and pre-linguistic felt-meaning at the basis of all meaning-to-say is already an intending of language in this extended sense which includes mastery of the practice of showing, predication, pointing, etc.71

Further, as Sokolowski has shown, language, in the elemental form of naming, is how we have something present in such a way that its meaning is independent of our imperious needs. In presencing something through a name we are indifferent to
its presence (e.g., as filling our needs) or absence (e.g., as being a cause of discomfort). Thus with the name we have something there to be displayed quite apart from its presence or absence. However, as Sokolowski has also noted, the display for the child begins with the introduction to a common universe of names and predicates that become the general properties of the named individual objects. Through the appropriation of these basic practices and general predications infants are ensconced in the world with Others.

Thus the acts of display of propositions through sentences presuppose already the “language game” or practice of naming and predication, and these presuppose the elementary practice of showing and referring which themselves are that “from which” display is lived. This basic practice of showing and being shown is that founding achievement from and through which communication through language is acquired and achieved.

Thus elemental often dramatic bodily displays through gestures that display, e.g., “Fire is hot,” and “Fire hurts,” guide the experience of infants into a common world where already the “language game” of predication has been mastered. Again, this game itself presupposes “mastery” or appropriation of the “language games” or elemental practices of referring, showing, calling attention, singling out, etc. Through the mastery of these practices and through elemental displays the infant moves from out of her interiority of pleasure and pain and takes joy in the actualization of her a priori dynamism towards being an agent of manifestation and thereby deepening her participation in the common world and life with others.

In time, the elementary categorial display and framework of predication mastered by the child become the presuppositions of the display of the common world wherein “things” exist in relation and juxtaposition to one another. This elementary display and framework sets the stage for the assumptions of predication, i.e., that “things” exist by themselves or by inhering in another, that the things that exist by themselves have inhering properties through which we learn about them, and which we might name, e.g., as living or non-living, as sentient or not, as capable of addressing me in speech through declarative sentences, etc. These venerable categories of living and non-living, sentient and non-sentient, speaking and non-speaking, etc. are first of all the common shared ones. Young and old have novel considerations brought before them by taking advantage of the presupposed common universe of concepts implicit and explicit in elemental predications.

Prior to language, in particular, prior to the setting of the display through declarative sentences, one may imagine the infant to see in a murky way through a more or less continuous flow of experience, i.e., in a gerundial world where the discretions of experience achieved by naming and syntax are at a minimum or nonexistent. The infant is engaged not only in mimetic activities but appears to incline toward a “wanting to express” analogous to the adult speaker’s “meaning to say.” The adult speaker means to say in the context of the lexical and syntactical framework acquired as a child. For the adult, wanting or meaning to say is always a wanting to say something about something, and the array of predicates, as well as the very “language game” of predication, are things that she has learned by being with Others. What “wanting to express” might mean in the absence of such a framework is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine.
Language and display are tied to Others, and in particular to the face of Others. Others are behind what is said and what is displayed. This is to say that what is unique underlies what is common and what has a repeatable form. (See below Chapters II–VI.) All display is by someone for someone of something, even if the one displaying is the same as the one to whom it is displayed. The something displayed, which is inseparable from the said and the saying, unites and makes common what essentially resists becoming common, i.e., the unique I’s that are behind the saying.

The other person who is an agent of display enables me to see something in our common world in a new light. This display is first of all a reference to the thing already having some familiar guise, to something that already binds us, and then to the displayed new guise, the new property, which binds us in a new way. Prior to all that there is the trust in the Other, and then in the Other’s referring. Very early, when a child follows the display there is an initial trusting in the one displaying and the display, but there surfaces early a desire to see for oneself. This desire can reach a feverish philosophical pitch such that seeing for oneself casts the Others into the background.

Initially the signification of the referring by the adult displaying the world to the child presupposes a prior trust by the child whose correlate is a unique self-legitimating authoritative presence of this one signifying. In this respect there is much merit in Levinas’ proposal, that the primary elemental sense of signification and all subsequent comprehension of signification is founded on this original signification of the adult face. It is this signification which goes in advance of all other significations and which founds the most elemental practices upon which the explicit senses of language build. The self-showing of the face goes in advance, therefore, of the most elemental “language game” of smiling, cooing, showing, pointing, etc., because it is upon the encounter with the face that such elemental practices are initiated and instituted.

Clearly therefore the face is unlike the significations that we associate with language, signs and symbols which are conventional and sometimes arbitrary, and which point to ideal meanings that a variety of signifiers can point to. Further the significations carried by the conventional signs and language practices, e.g., the printed page, the sounds, etc. are indifferent to this physical carrier; as the signified, “lion,” can be presenced by numerous signifiers, so endless physical substrates can bear the significations of what signifies “lion.”

But matters are different with the face. The face, unlike a word, a description, a painting or a gesture embodies filled significance. A word, e.g., “lion,” points to what is not in itself given. The face presences a meaning not in an empty intention but in a unique filled meaning whose “significance” therefore is unlike the conventional significances. For example, the carriers of significance, e.g., words, sentences, marks, etc., are conventional and the sense is contingently attached to the particular physical carrier. The sense is ideal, i.e., repeatable, communicable, etc. and therefore this sense as such is emptily intended and to be filled by, e.g., a perception or a picture or an elaborate description.

The sense of the face is quite different. It is not given in an empty intention and this is evident itself in the filled intention of the presence of the face: The face as
such does not need any other filled intentions for it to be meaningful. Even when it “looks enigmatically” and when this look points to supplementary intentions, the face itself is soaked with meaning. Further its meaning is necessarily attached to this physical “carrier” who is present in the flesh. The sense of the face is not therefore one established by conventional carriers of meaning, as is the meaning of a sentence which can be expressed in various physical media, instances, fonts, languages, paraphrases, etc. Furthermore the signification of the face is not endlessly instantiable and repeatable nor is it indifferent to the physical carrier or actual bodily substance that bears it. The “sense” or signification of the face for the infant is, if not immediately, then very soon, one that is unique and irreplaceable. (We return to some of these matters in Chapter IV.)

As such this fullness of presence is itself typically the basis for the elemental trust of the infant, prescinding here from the possibility of monstrous or pathological forms of presence of adults to infants. (Note that the non-sighted person dispenses with the face and presences the carrier of the presence as it is mediated through the other senses.)

These are some of the considerations that might be brought forth for holding that the face is an elemental signification that all other significations presuppose.

The chief points we wish to make here regarding the setting of phenomenology are made by both Sokolowski and Levinas: Phenomenology is misunderstood (a) if its work of disclosure is taken to dispense with the kind of phenomenality that is manifest prior to the act-life of the I, and (b) if the context of phenomenological disclosure is not seen to be typically within the intersubjective realm of discourse. There are basic “phenomena” which the act-life presupposes, e.g., language and the Other, and whose functioning presence and enjoyment can be brought to light with the appropriate phenomenological reflections. Yet (c) is also true, namely, that the eros toward filling intentions, although implicitly in the dialogical setting, may mute this setting and instead be pursued with the habitual apperception of a general listener or reader who, in fact, is often enough for the thinker indistinguishable from her own vigilant reflective self. In the both early and later stages of a philosophical reflection, we might not have the philosophical friend with whom there is no danger of laxity and indulgence and who is bound to see what oneself fails to see. Furthermore the thinker can eventually develop the habitus of apperceiving the ideal reader and listener and this may occasion an indifference to any particular dialogical partner. Nevertheless, this monologic pursuit of the filling of empty intentions through speaking and writing always apperceives that there is still a filled intention which is outstanding and which filling takes place with the grace of an eventual engagement with the real other listener or reader. Nevertheless there is a delight and legitimacy in doing it solus ipse, as if one were alone, even if it always involves the risk of self-deception and self-indulgence. Eventually, nurturing this risk by avoiding the critical eyes and ears of Others spawns the worm of the corruption of the quest for truthful display, and sets up obstacles for the gracious bestowal by the Other of her undivided attention to what one has to say.
Notes


2. The use here of “being” takes advantage of the natural attitude’s spontaneous realism and the Kantian thing-in-itself. In both cases the sense of being is such that the mind’s agency is irrelevant. For phenomenology “being” is itself a categorical articulation and therefore manifests the thesis that display is inseparable from what display displays. The honorific sense of “being” found in Husserl refers to what gets displayed. Heidegger’s own sense of Sein which is juxtaposed to “being” (das Seiende) as what is present (or what is displayed before us) moves the conversation about “being/To Be/ Sein” into an intramural debate within the phenomenology in so far as it takes account of the presencing of what is present from out of and in interplay with what is absent. In this respect there is some symmetry between Heidegger’s Sein and Husserl’s transcendential I. For all the necessary precision, see Thomas Prufer, Recapitulations (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 72–90, 105–112.

3. Husserl, Ideas I (Husserliana III), § 43.


6. Husserliana XXXVI, 141, n. 2.


8. Thomas Hobbes, de Corpore, Ch. 25, in Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, Ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 213. I am indebted to Karl Jaspers, Der Philosophische Glaube Angesichts der Offenbarung (Munich: Piper, 1962), 129, for pointing out this text. Husserl does not indicate any knowledge of this passage. Rather in Husserliana VII, 88 and 94, Hobbes is said to pursue a “natural science” of the psychic (des Seelischen). For Husserl Hobbes is the father of modern materialism in that he not only ascribes to material nature a status of absolute being but, inversely, reduces all absolute being, even the inwardly experienced psychic being, to nature. The life of subjectivity is therefore mere subjective being whose true sense is to be fond in the material psycho-physical correlates. We wrestle with some of these issues in Chapter VI.

9. Donald Davidson, cited in Shoemaker, First-Person Perspectives and Other Essays, 58; the title of Davidson’s essay is not given by Shoemaker in the note or bibliography, other than as 1986, 317.


11. See the works of Robert Sokolowski, especially Presence and Absence (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978) passim, especially Chapter V; and Pictures, Quotations, and Distinctions (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1992a), passim, especially Chapter VIII; also Husserlian Meditations (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), passim, especially Chapter II.


13. Compare the translated text from a passage from Schiller’s Maria Stuart: “…and what she is, that dares she to appear.”

14. The “natural attitude” is not the same as what Thomas Nagel has called the “objective conception” or the “view from nowhere.” This latter is closer to what for Husserl is the naturalistic or scientific point of view. In this view the world is replete with properties but it is centerless and featureless in the sense of bereft of perspectives and points of view. See Thomas Nagel, News from Nowhere (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 14–15.
I Phenomenological Preliminaries

15. See Manfred Frank, *Selbstgefühl* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 212ff.
19. For these last paragraphs I am indebted to Craig Holdrege and Steve Talbott, “The Question Science Won’t Ask,” *Orion* 26: 4 (2006), 24–31. I am grateful to Heather Thoma for calling my attention to this article. For a phenomenologically-based defense of formal and final causality as appropriate categories for biology, see the writings of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, especially *Der Selbstaufbau der Natur*.
22. See the texts referred to and the discussion by the editor, Robin Rollinger, in *Husserliana* XXXVI, xxvii.
24. *Husserliana* XXXVI, 117–120 are particularly good on this.
27. *Husserliana* III, (Ideas I), §79.
28. Ibid., §70.
30. Quine’s empiricism, which was skeptical toward modalities, was indirectly instrumental in giving birth to “possible-world theory” as a foundation for modal thinking. Yet, the question has surfaced of how free Quine’s thought was of acknowledging necessity in the articulation of the world. Chomsky has called attention to the non-empirical notion of “quality-space” which Quine introduces to account for the innate or a priori system of properties which makes language learning possible. What is at stake for Chomsky is whether basic language learning is learned and whether there is not in play a universality and necessity in the fundamental rules of this learning, i.e., in the basic, i.e., generative, grammar. See Noam Chomsky, *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), 5ff.; also his *Reflections on Language* (New York: Pantheon, 1975), 198ff. We need not take sides on these issues here except to note that modality of necessity creeps in even among an arch-empiricist like Quine. I further touch on cognate themes in Husserl in my review essay of Nam in Lee’s book on Husserl’s theory of instincts in “Genesis, Instinct, and Reconstruction,” in *Husserliana Studies* 15 (1998), 101–123, especially Section 9.
31. See *Husserliana* XXXVI, 187–188.
32. Loux, 183–186.
34. Loux, 194.
35. Loux, 194.
36. Loux, 197.
37. oux, 202.
38. oux, 201.
40. Loux, 209.
41. This is one of the themes of Richard Cobb-Stevens, Husserl and Analytic Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990).
42. For a rich and more favorable interpretation of the relationship of phenomenology and “possible world” theory and semantics, see David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982), see the listing in the index. Much hinges in this interpretation around the understanding of Husserl’s noematic Sinn. See John J. Drummond, Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990) for, among other things, a critique of the Smith-McIntyre view of Husserl’s noema.
43. See, besides Ideas I, e.g., Husserliana XXXVI.
45. Ibid. Here Nietzsche is quoted.
46. Nehamas, 52, refuses to admit that that of which perspectives are perspectives is found in any one of them, and yet then goes on to admit “except in the trivial sense in which there is, of course only one wall or painting, one ‘object’ there” – presumably throughout the flux of perspectives which profile these. But this is only more than trivial for Nehamas if one implicitly thinks that of which the perspectives are perspectives, e.g., the wall, painting or object, is the thing in itself apart from perspectives or manifestations. Nietzsche and Nehamas both protest such thinking but seem to cling to it after all. The same problem occurs in Nietzsche’s claim that the world in itself has no features. It is not merely that it is incompatible with infinite determinations, but rather it itself has none. See Nehamas, 64. But this position is not evident from the view that the world or anything that admits of endless determinations has no character in itself. “In itself” of course the world has neither determination nor no determination if this refers to the world existing apart from its perspectival display. But only if we cling to the view that perspective or display is an intervening mental entity, and that world-in-itself is articulate and meaningful independent of its display may we hold that our determinations of the world are mere creations ex nihilo of what in-itself is indeterminate, or that our determinations of the world are copies of or correspondences to what is already determinate.
48. See J.-L. Marion, Being Given, op. cit. especially 249ff. for an effort to mute the agency of manifestation in favor of the “gift” of what gives itself.
51. I have been helped here by conversations with Barry Smith.
52. Heinrich Barth, Erkenntnis der Existenz, 151.
53. Husserl, Husserliana XXIX, 336.
55. Husserl, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung in Husserliana XXXIII orchestrates these and many more distinctions.
56. Here a “normal” person more or less voluntarily enacts something analogous to what the “mentally ill” person involuntarily enacts in his delusions and dissociated personality.
57. See our discussion in The Person and the Common Life (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992), 27ff. We return to these themes in Book 2.
60. The connection of beauty to display is on the edge of St. Thomas Aquinas’s reflections when he writes “Pulchra dicunter quae visa placent….pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius apprehensio
placet... pulchrum habe rationem causae formalis, bonum autem rationem causae finalis,... pulchrum praecipue pertinet ad visum et auditum, quia sunt maxime cognoscitivi, non autem ad alios sensus. See Summa Theologiae (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1950a), e.g., I, q. 5 a. 4 ad 1; I, q. 3 a. 4, ad 1; I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3.


The American philosopher D.W. Prall has a position quite similar to that of Husserl. In his Aesthetic Analysis (New York: Thomas Crowell/Apollo, 1936/1967) he seeks to tie aesthetics to “the top level of all that is consciously experienced, the qualitative surface of all that we are acquainted with.” This aspect of our experienced world may be dominant and absorbing or it may be “the merest passing sense of a qualitative presence, interesting only as fitting in with ideas and purposes directed through it to all that it may mean – beyond its surface – for the past or future.” The failure of aesthetic response is not “so much because it goes beyond into other interests. Rather it goes beyond because it is not competent to apprehend the presented surface fully and determinately, and hence richly and excitingly.” (See Chapter I, “The Field of Aesthetics.”) Prall draws the aesthetic and phenomenological attitudes near one another when he says that aesthetic experience is “aloof because what such experience takes as its object is not existing things but their essential qualities, not events but appearing essences or forms immediately and satisfyingly present to us, whether as embodied externally in things or in imagination.” See his Aesthetic Judgment (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1929/1967), 13.


65. Cf. Husserliana XXIV, 220–223 and 440. For this sense of the “primal doxa” as the self-affection of self-awareness, see below Chapter II, especially §6, and Book 2, Chapter V, §8, F.


67. Husserliana XXIV, 466.

68. Husserliana XXIV, 470–477.


70. Cf. my The Person and the Common Life, Chapter III, but especially 184–186.

71. See Husserliana XX/1, 85ff. et passim and XX/2, 77, and 225ff. et passim.

72. See Robert Sokolowski, Presence and Absence, Chapter 1.


Chapter II
The First Person and the Transcendental I

My Naked Simple Life was I,
That Act so Strongly Shind
Upon the Earth, the Sea, the Skie,
It was the Substance of My Mind....
It Acts not from a Centre to
Its Object as remote,
But present is, when it doth view
Being with the Being it doth note.
Whatever it doth do,
It doth not by another Engine work,
But by it self; which in the Act doth lurk.

(Thomas Traherne, c. 1675)1

The reduction’s ultimate accomplishment of disengaging the allegiance to the world turns “the whole show” into an index of the achievement of the transcendental I. We must dwell on how that for which the whole show is an index itself relates to the indexical “I.”

§1 The Achievement of “I”

For the grammarian, “I” is one of the “personal pronouns,” i.e., the first-person singular. In the nomenclature of traditional grammar, a pronoun stands for a noun (pro-noun) or indicates a noun without naming it. However, as we shall see, the pronoun “I” may lay claim to a more basic philosophical status than nouns, names, or descriptions. For grammar and linguistics, “person” (as in first-person) is a “deictic category,” i.e., a category of display, not an ontological one. This means because the speaker or writer is displaying or showing something that is present to herself, the interpretation of the reference of the pronoun is bound to the speaker’s situation.

Consider how the personal pronouns function as pointers if parties conversing are wholly unacquainted. Generally what is meant by the third-person is what is spoken about. “He,” “she,” “it,” etc. are neither immediately present as the one
speaking or the one addressed. In this sense the third-person is what is pointed at. Yet because the speaker may be pointing to himself or pointing to the one to whom he is speaking, i.e., the speaker may be speaking about himself or about the person he is addressing, it is better to give a minimalist account and say that the third-person is always neither the speaker nor the one spoken to.

“I” serves as pointing or showing the one speaking, and if the reference to “I” is sustained, the speaker’s subject of conversation becomes himself. Thus, this conversation can become one where the speaker is both pointed to and spoken about. In which case there is a coalescence into a third-person discourse, as “I am he who does such and such.” Yet to say that first-person reference of “I” is to the speaker or the one speaking is, as we shall see, insufficient, as if we could capture the full sense of “I” by substituting for “I,” “the one speaking.” (See our later discussion in this section.)

Here we may indicate but not spell out that in this work, we will distinguish the first-person as a grammatical consideration from the first-person perspective. As Thomas Traherne put it (in the epigraph for this chapter), this is the sole “engine” which works “by it self” and “which in the Act doth lurk.” This latter is prior to the grammatical consideration and informs all the other perspectives as well as grammatical considerations. (See in this chapter passim, but especially §7 below.)

“You,” the “second person” as the one nearest to the heart or interests of the “first person” or speaker, singles out the one addressed and in this sense is the one pointed to and not pointed at. Yet the discourse in the second-person can be so sustained by the speaker that the addressee becomes the subject of the conversation. The pointed-to can become the pointed-at. This may take a form such as, “You are the one who has done such and such.” Thus the first- and second-person can coalesce into the third-person, i.e., there is no absurdity in the one speaking being also the subject of conversation or the one addressed being the subject of conversation. Yet it is typically absurd if there is a coalescence of the speaker and the one addressed, such as in “I am you who are doing such and such.” We will have occasion to return to this important distinction.

“I” and “you” resemble demonstrative pronouns (like “this,” “here,” “now,”) because they too are demonstratively (“showingly”) used, i.e., they are deictic. As such they call attention to or display the situation of the speaker, thinker or writer. Because they refer back to the speech situation they are also called “token reflexives” or “indexicals” or “indicators.” (We will not give preference to any of these terms. Husserl himself, because he belonged to an older tradition, called these terms “occasional expressions,” because their sense is inseparable from the occasion of the uttering of them. We will generally follow the more recent usage.)

“Expressions,” in contrast to “indications,” present “meanings” inseparably from the spoken, written, or otherwise signified medium. An “indication” of fire through smoke, or an “indication” of rain through dark clouds, or an “indication” of patriotism through a flag hanging on the porch, is such that we could have the indicated and the indicating quite independent of one another. These may be contrasted with “objective expressions” where the meanings signified are not independent from the linguistic significations. Thus “Thomas Paine was a radical
democrat” and “faults of style are largely faults of character” are each wholes that are comprised of the linguistic components and meaning. Each of these components is a non-independent part. The meaning of course could be translated, paraphrased, appear in a variety of contexts, and rendered by innumerable speakers through a variety of acts, e.g., of judgment, interrogation, exclamation, quotation, etc. But it is noteworthy that the expression does not express the acts of insight, interrogation, judgment, etc. that constitute the meaning. Furthermore, the expression does not express or display in the flesh the referent or object of the act of meaning. The expression expresses the meaning which itself refers to Thomas Paine or faults, whether of style or character and their interrelation. There are other meanings which refer to the referent, e.g., “the author of The Rights of Man” or the faults of character which are not faults of style, the faults of style that erode character, the faults of character that erode style, the strengths of character that promote style, etc.³

An “objective expression,” one such as we have been considering, e.g., “Thomas Paine was a radical democrat,” can be understood without reference to the speaker and the circumstances of the utterance. In contrast an “indexical expression” or “occasional expression” is such that its actual meaning takes its bearings from the speaker and the circumstances of the utterance. The personal pronoun “I” dispenses with any objective meaning and expresses a meaning which is not independent of the speaker’s self-awareness. In this non-reflective self-awareness there is no distinction between the meaning and the referent of the meaning. From case to case “I” refers to a different person, and it does this by having in each case a new meaning – which the listener knows only from the context of the speaker and the circumstance, but which the speaker knows ineluctably and prior to the self-referential “I.”

When we come across the word “I” without knowing the author/speaker or circumstance, as when we find a slip of paper on the ground which simply reads, “I beg you, if you find what I have written here, please give it back to me,” the word “I” is not meaningless, but its sense is alienated from its normal setting. Note that the meaning which is awakened in this note is not properly grasped as a word which signifies merely “the one writing/speaking on this occasion.” If it were we could substitute, “I am delighted” with “The one now presently referring to himself through a speech-act is delighted.” But as Husserl puts it, “it is the meaning-function [Findlay: semantic function] of the word I to signify the one presently speaking, but the concept through which we express this function is not the concept which immediately makes up its meaning.” “The one presently speaking” is an ideal entity, a concept, an essence which could just as well be emply referred to or referred to as something supposed for our consideration. The indexical “I,” not the philosophical anomaly, “the I” or “the eidos I” to which we will often refer, refers to the unique individual who is self-present immediately in her unique essence and who may be present for the listener “in the flesh,” (‘registered” as Sokolowski puts it), and not in an empty intention. “I” is immediately “deictic,” an immediate self-manifesting of the speaker to herself and to the listener. It is not an intending of an ideal entity, a meaning, like “the one speaking” or “the eidos I.”⁴
“I,” in contrast to an objective expression which, as we noted, does not express the object or referent of the act of meaning, does express its referent; here the referent and meaning/sense coincide and are inseparable. “I” as a linguistic token, of course, is a universal term that can be used in endless situations with the same semantic function but in each case its meaning/referent is different. For the speaker there is with the performance of “I” not a distinction of sense/meaning and reference. As deictic, as dealing with what is manifest to and manifested by the speaker, occasional expressions or indexicals (other than “I”) are used to single out an item currently present in the thinker’s (or writer’s or speaker’s) field of perception, or to single out the person who is currently in a cognitive relation to the speaker or thinker. Thus deictic or showing expressions are of necessity tied to perception and part of what we mean by perceiving is that the one perceiving is in a position to show (cf. the Latin, *monstrare*) or point out “demonstratively” (*demonstrare*) something to someone. We will return to this.

Indexicals are “purely referential” in the sense that they are non-ascriptive, i.e., “they attribute no property to the entity in question.” In this work, we shall argue that whereas it is true of all indexicals that they are non-ascriptive, there are some important differences. Whereas some of the indexicals are personal pronouns, others are demonstrative pronouns (“this” or “that”) and adverbs (e.g., “here” and “then”). All of these are indeterminate in the sense that they refer without assigning any properties. However, the “this” or “that,” which as such is an indeterminate substrate of predication, may disclose itself as “he” or “you” – in which case these personal pronouns have an essential referent, i.e., a “self” or “person.” “He” or “you” (as in the vocative or interpellative form of address) may well be empty of any properties, and like “this,” a bare substrate of predication individuated by its spatial-temporal place, yet it is not just “anything whatsoever.” Yet, we will show that the personal pronouns are non-ascriptive references to individual essences. The individual essence here is not a property of what we refer to but is what (i.e., *whom*) we refer to and the eventual substrate for personal properties (even though the substrate itself, we shall propose, is propertyless). This reference itself is only to the “person” herself who, we shall claim, as a “self” or “ipseity,” is, in one respect, not propertyd and not individuated by being in space and time, as is in contrast, e.g., “this.” (As a person in the world with others, of course, she is individuated and propertyed.) In the case of “I,” in contrast to “you,” “she,” and “he,” the referent is in an odd sense filled without being a filled intention, whereas in the other cases the individual essence referred to is given in an empty intention even though the person is there “in the flesh.” Thus even though it might well be the case that “you” and “she” are given in filled intentions as perceptual bodily objects or persons, there is a sense in which the core referent, the individual essence, is not given in a filled intention. (This chapter and the two following it develop these views.)

This “not attributing properties” is more emphatic in the use of “I” because it, in a very proper usage (there are other improper ones, as we shall see), does not objectively refer or single out, and in this respect it does not resemble the demonstrative pronoun. Wittgenstein was making this point by saying that “I” in “I have a pain” resembles more the moaning, rather than “someone is in pain” or “he is in
pain.” His point seems to be that although “I,” like the demonstrative pronoun, does not ascribe properties or identify, it also is not here being used to show anything in the world, as does, e.g., “This man is in pain.” Indeed, as analogous to moaning, it is not referential at all.6 Our view is that “I am in pain” is indeed referential, but Wittgenstein’s analogy with a moan is good in so far as it points to the non-referential and non-ascriptive self-awareness that makes possible any use of “I.” (See below.)

In reflecting on “I” we must distinguish how it appears or is used in oratio recta, or direct discourse, and in oratio obliqua, or indirect discourse. In the latter case it is used in clauses subordinated to cognitive verbs or “propositional attitudes” (as in “She thinks that I am too tired to drive”) or enclosed in quotation marks (as in much of this work when we refer to the indexical “I,” or “I myself” or “the I”).

Let us attend to some of the features of oratio recta, the direct use of “I.”7 “I,” as we already noted, is a deictic or indexical expression. That is, like all such words, it signals to the listener the direct presence to the speaker/thinker/writer of that which is referred to, (or it signals who stands currently in a cognitive relation to the speaker/thinker/writer), and thereby heralds the importance, for the listener/reader, of knowing the speaker’s situation in order to know precisely what is being referred to. For the speaker/thinker/writer herself the case can be made that this is never a problem. That is, in using the demonstratives, e.g., “this,” “here,” “now,” there is a strong case for a kind of inerrancy and impossibility of misidentification about the reference. Of course, when we use the demonstrative it usually implicitly is attached to something which is stated in the form of a noun, verb or predicate. A sheer “this,” like a sheer “now,” or “here,” occurs in a philosophical context which abstracts from the natural attitude. Even if I say “this boat,” and there is no boat, or “this red” when confronted with something “red” even though I am color-blind, the “this” and the “red” still inerrantly refer to something undeniably perceptually or quasi-perceptually present to me, the speaker. When names or descriptions, apart or with demonstratives, are used we may make mistakes in reference because, e.g., there may be not just one but many objects which have the name or fit the description. Thus the reference to “The person in the White House named George” might aim at the person who is president at the time of this writing, but the president’s father might be visiting also and the cook also might have this name; or it might be a sentence taken from a narrative where the US’s first-present is being referred to. In contrast, “this” or “that” may be argued not to fail in so far as for the speaker there can only be one “this” or one “that.”

Even if it were false that demonstratives like “this” can never fail in their reference, e.g., if it were true that in a given instance “this” is taken as a singular when in fact the referent is a multiple, or vice-versa, “I” can never fail in this way. If a numerical identity presupposes that it is meaningful to deny that there are two, the “I” does not refer to a numerical identity (see Chapter V, §4). Further, all demonstratively used pronouns like “this” must be replaced by names and/or descriptions if they are to be remembered and known subsequently. I cannot recall or say I know something if later all I have is the retained “this” of the experience because there is next to nothing to hang on to (through passive synthesis) and actively
synthesize in the present. Further, remembering is re-presencing what before was given in perception. There is here an implicit “sameness” relation. If all I have is a “this” I have next to nothing, i.e., not any thing with a handle or properties, to recognize as the same. Thus demonstratives may well be “ineliminable” in the sense that no description ultimately is possible unless there was an original deictic presence to a knower/speaker of what was being described. Nevertheless demonstratives are, as Castañeda says, “necessarily eliminable” when we consider that without the filling in of the demonstratives with descriptions memory and a strong sense of knowing are not possible. (As we shall soon see, this distinction returns when we discuss two basic senses of personal identity, one of which does and the second of which does not depend on the filling in with identifiable properties and on the memory of them.)

Whereas all indexical-free descriptions build on indexicality and what Husserl calls the life-world; and whereas all indexicality requires to be supplemented with descriptions and names in order for knowing to be possible, none of the indexicals and no indexical-free description can be substituted for “I.” No matter how detailed an indexical-free description of someone is it cannot possibly, by itself, entail that I am that person or be equated with what I refers to. “There is no token-reflexive-free description of any person from which it would follow that that person is myself.” This claim is resisted because there is not only the “monist theory of manifestation” (Michel Henry) which holds that all manifestation requires an intentional act (see what follows, especially §5), but essentially connected to this is the monism that would limit knowing oneself to an identifying knowledge by which one would determine properties. Thereby one would establish that one is aware or cognizant of herself only by way of knowing objects. (This knowing of objects may or may not be dependent on the use of some indexicals, depending on the theory.) It also necessarily entails the monism that true disclosure occurs only in third-person reference to something in the world.

The evidence against the view that the third-person token-reflexive-free descriptions may substitute for “I,” is found in the failure of the attempt to substitute descriptions. One example is to think that “the husband of Julia” is a suitable referent for what I, who happen to be the husband of Julia, refer to with “I.” Yet not only might there be many referents of “the husband of Julia,” but the polygamist might have forgotten his recent exploit; or he might have mistook his most recent partner for an earlier one. But this example does not do justice to the prospect of a definiteness of descriptions, i.e., “the husband of Julia” might be supplemented by the long list of biographical details which would net this referent and no one else. This “definite description” allegedly would therefore do what “I” does.

An example which problematically addresses this objection of definite description (we shall consider others) is that of the amnesiac, X, who reads the most thorough biography, or even autobiography of X and is not in a position to see that this is about himself – even though he inerrantly refers to himself with “I.” This is initially problematic if it seems to be a zombie-like self-reference, i.e., to no one or nothing. But in fact the “myself” of X is referred to. What that “nothingness” of the referent means will occupy us for the next few chapters.
At the start we claim that “I” or “myself” as the subject of names, statements, predications or certain properties, does not become manifest by way of one’s having identified oneself as something in the world in regard to which one knows or believes or wishes to say that certain predicates belong to it (the “myself”). This seems so contradictory and perverse, that many thinkers balk at it. Nevertheless, one of the central themes of this work is that no names, descriptions, or properties in the world are the condition for thinking of what I refer to with “I” and “myself.” And what “I” refers to is not only referred to “nonascriptively,” i.e., without assigning properties, but further there is an important sense in which attempts to capture it with properties and descriptions fail.

Of course, for the listener, “I” does not reveal very much if I do not know already the person being referred to. Thus when, in response to my question, “Who is there?,” I hear “I,” I might be tempted to ask “Which I?” But as Husserl often enough pointed out, the I as lived life was what gave unity but itself was something at once identical and without content. Kant too showed cognizance of this matter when he claimed that it was evident that “the subject of inherence, through which to our thoughts ‘I’ is attached, is transcendentally designated, without noting any quality whatsoever, or having any acquaintance or knowledge at all about it.” (As we shall see, everything depends on what Kant means here by “acquaintance,” “knowledge” and “designated.”)

We, following Castañeda, have claimed that there is no token-reflexive-free description of any person from which it would follow that this person is myself. We can go further and claim that even with the use of token-reflexives there is still a shortfall unless there are first-person indexicals in play. To make this evident, let us hear from the hard-nosed common sense voice of reason: Is it not clear that what I mean by “I” is “this body here,” to which I point in order to make you see it? (And, by implication, are not all senses of consciousness and first-person therefore to be housed in the processes of “this body here?”) As obvious as this seems to be, nevertheless this position must face the question of how or in what respect “this body here” is the body which the one doing the speaking and pointing may rightfully claim as his own.

“This body” can refer to any number of bodies. Further, in our context, “this body” purports to determine “my body.” Pointing to “this body” as “my body” is surely corrigeable, i.e., we can imagine a circumstance in which this demonstrative reference of “this” would fail and would in fact indicate another’s body (as in the jumble of bodies at a “slumber party,” or in a “House of Mirrors” where one’s normal visual perspective would be distorted).

Presumably the speaker would have to say this here body is mine because it is obviously the one that he uses for his speaking, hearing, thinking, moving, etc. However, as “this body here” it does not of necessity refer to his own body. As this body, it is not as such his own body, i.e., what he would refer to as “my body.” If by “my body,” he insists “the body from whose eyes I see, the body whose mouth emits sounds when I speak,” etc., he must ask, what makes this body here my body and how I am acquainted with this I? The sense of “seeing eyes” and “mouth emitting sounds” may well be used in an objective thingly propertied sense. But in order
II The First Person and the Transcendental I

for them to be known as mine, in order for them to be known as belonging to me I have to know me myself and know a sense of “mine” prior to any such properties, and not through the identification of properties. Thus there is a fundamental philosophical step missing in someone’s (third-person) witty exclamation to his opponent in a duel: “Now, ridiculous as it may seem, I am partial to my head because it seems to fit my shoulders so well.”13 The witticism lies in one’s appreciating that this “seems to fit” is not really a third-person observation regarding the matching of objects in space or geometrical shapes but the lived experience of their both being “his own.”

Thus if we take the route of knowing myself and mine through identification of properties or activities we must ask, how do I know that the mental states or acts of consciousness are mine or about me, or how are activities mine, unless I know that the self having these states or doing these things is myself? What makes me to be me and mine to be mine? Are there some signature properties or descriptions that signify me and make them clearly mine? In which case they are me and mine because they have the property X; but what makes the property X such that it is me or mine? What is there in the property or description that makes it me and mine? Is it because this property points to another property that is more basic? But what makes this more basic property mine?

The difficulty is clear. We want to establish that the self-knowledge of self-awareness is through the identification of things in the world; but the attempt to do this leads to a vicious infinite regress because all senses of self and mine require a signature property that requires authentication by a more legitimate authentication. “On pain of infinite regress, it must be allowed that somewhere along the line I have some self-knowledge that is not gotten by observing something to be true of myself.”14 “Observing something to be true of myself,” whether in external or internal perception (“introspection”), is to be understood either as recognizing a distinguishing or salient property, a seeing as…, or as having in a filled intention what was meant in its absence, e.g., “I recognize now that this is me myself because an unimpeachable authority has taught me that what is marked with feature X is identical with me and this which I am experiencing is marked with X,” are forms of perception. These will never yield what is at issue, namely the basis for self-knowledge and the establishment of properties as belonging to me.

Again, suppose we say, this body here is his because it is the body that he inhabits or uses? But does this not say it is his because he already is he himself and aware of himself and has a sense of his? If not, could he not very well inhabit and use a body without knowing it was his? His effort to establish himself and what is his by reason of identifying properties, like finger prints, scars, physiognomy, silhouette, signature, bearing, DNA, etc. makes no sense without his knowing already himself and what is his. It can always be asked, what makes these things his?

Of course, someone, e.g., a police officer, may tell me that such and such properties are distinctively mine, and they serve as criteria for how he identifies me, but they surely are not how I know who is I, what is mine, and what is I myself. The possibility of massive “identity theft” for someone, like myself, living in the wired bureaucratic Megamachine, may well confront me with irrefutable evidence that I,
JG Hart did this, or that this other person is JG Hart, not me. Yet as far as I am concerned, as long as the evidence does not recognizably have to do with me or mine, neither of these claims have merit. (My having been drugged, sleepwalking, etc. would not count as evidence that I did certain things.)

Common sense might well say, I know what is mine and who I am through my believing equivalently what others identify me as. But here “I” and “mine” are evacuated of meaning and declared, by “common-sense,” to be of no consequence for illuminating “my body” and what “I” refers to. For such “common sense,” everything worth talking about is to be put in the third-person, and this is the province of other experts or authorities, like neural scientists or the CIA. And, by implication, all descriptions, identifications, and the other indexicals may substitute for the first-person.

But this will not do. All descriptions and identifications (even those of neural scientists) ultimately are tied to indexical reference, and the indexicals have no sense or basis unless there is one for whom they function, what we call a dative of manifestation, i.e., unless they are manifest “to me.”

Consider another yet similar version of the common sense realist position which holds that, of course, what is “mine” and what is “me” or “I myself” is what becomes manifest as an object of introspection or inner awareness, both of which are understood after the fashion of perception. Since this is an inner perception and always a seeing something as something, it does not advance us in solving our problem. What is “mine” cannot be evidently “mine” if all we have to consider is an object in introspection. For one can still ask what is it about these introspected objects that make them mine? Unless I know that it is I that undertakes this introspection of objects, that the introspective act is mine, that the introspected object belongs to my stream of consciousness in the way an external object does not, there is no way that the objects will appear as mine.

What is decisive is the consideration that there is no “signature” object that unquestionably marks them as mine; and no object can be marked as identifying me if there is no prior, non-objective, non-identifying, sense of “myself.” And this is not to be confined merely to an I-center or I-point but is to be acknowledged as diffused throughout the lived sense of one’s body, motion, and agency.

Consider that I cannot identify myself in the mirror by any distinctive marks unless I am already self-aware, already self-present as “myself.” Think of how someone may seek to see how she looks after an accident or surgery, and may even ask, Is that me? Similarly I cannot identify objects of reflection or introspection as mine unless I am already self-aware and aware of my act of reflection as mine and aware of my stream of consciousness as mine. And this sense of oneself is a non-criterial, non-intentional, non-perceptual ineluctable self-awareness.

Shoemaker gives a good example of what is at stake from the movie *Duck Soup*. Doubtless there are uses of “I” and “myself” that refer to me as a person, i.e., something identifiable and public and therefore for which there are criteria. Think of Groucho Marx looking in a huge empty frame which he took for a mirror, and looking back at him was his brother Harpo seeming to be his double or reflection by agilely aping his actions. Groucho nevertheless suspects something and goes through all
sorts of motions to fake out and expose “the reflection” which is under suspicion. Shoemaker suggests that contrary to the movie, let us suppose Groucho assures himself that it is a mirror image, i.e., that he was really seeing himself in the mirror. Shoemaker notes that clearly “in order to identify the man in the mirror as himself in this way, Groucho had to know that he himself was performing those movements, i.e., had to know what he could express by saying ‘I am moving the ways I see that man moving.’” If we are to avoid infinite regress, we “must allow that at some point Groucho had first-person knowledge that did not rest on an identification,” even the kind of identifying that occurs in introspective judgments.  

Thus there is no criterion that one may apply to determine whether I am an I; this is a primitive “datum,” and immediately apprehended by one who is wakeful, foremost as a thinker and responsible agent. No third-person characteristic, even if it be an indexical, is decisive for experiencing oneself as oneself or referring to oneself as I. As we shall repeatedly say, I am immediately and non-ascriptively present to myself and, on the basis of this, I refer to myself without ascribing any properties to myself, whether properties of gender, neurophysiology, humanity, etc. We will soon return to this matter of non-intentional, non-reflexive, self-awareness.

In contemporary philosophy the ineluctable nature of what the first-person singular refers to has received a strong case in considering the inevitability of the use of the third-person form called the “quasi-indexical.” This form, which was first brought to light by Castañeda and Peter Geach, enables us to avoid confusion in the presentation of another’s self-understanding. This discussion also points to the way self-reference with “I” dispenses with descriptions. Consider the famous example of Oedipus at the beginning of Sophocles’ *Oedipus Rex*. Oedipus is in fact the slayer of Laios and he is in a state of mind which may be described in the following way.

1. Oedipus holds that the slayer of Laios is hateful to the gods. This means that we may say either:
   2. Oedipus judges that the slayer of Laios is hateful to the gods, or
   3. Oedipus holds that Oedipus is hateful to the gods. (Oedipus’ judgment hits directly Oedipus, but Oedipus does not know it).

From 3 we may infer:

4. Oedipus judges in regard to himself that he is hateful to the gods.
   Here, as Geach points out, “himself” is a direct, reflexive pronoun. 3 and 4 above function just as: “Oedipus blinded Oedipus” and “Oedipus blinded himself.”

But we cannot infer from 4:

5. Oedipus believes that he himself is hateful to the gods.
   Here “himself” is not a direct, reflexive pronoun but is, as Geach and Castañeda propose, a proxy for “I” in direct speech, “I am hateful to the gods.” As such it is an indirect reflexive pronoun. It is, as we shall soon see, an internal self-reflexive reference to oneself. In 4 Oedipus is not making the judgment at 5. 3 and 4 are true if Oedipus thought of himself in an external way, e.g., like others might think of him. Further 3 and 4 can be inferred from 5, but
the truth of 5 does not follow from the truth of 3 and 4. In 5 Oedipus is referred to in the third-person in a way that substitutes for Oedipus using “I,” i.e., that “I slewed Laios” and “I am hateful to the gods.” The quasi-indexical of 5, “he himself,” makes this clear. The quasi-indexical, however, says nothing unless there is a prior sense of oneself for both the one spoken about, Oedipus, and the speaker; and this is not merely a first-person judgment that is an external reflexive reference to oneself, one that I make but has the sense that anyone can make it; but rather it is one that presupposes what is prior to any such judgment, i.e., a non-reflexive, non-intentional self-awareness. This prior experience is not merely the self-acquaintance (as a horizontal empty intention) and reflective self-perception as a kind of identifying introspection (which both McTaggart and Geach content themselves with) but rather is a non-reflexive, non-identifying, self-awareness. See our discussion below, §§3–6.

Whereas Others must use third-person terms to think and gossip about Oedipus, Oedipus not only does not need such third-person ways to think about himself, but he must “use the first-person way to really think about himself,” to think of himself as himself.”

When I learn about myself through names, properties, and descriptions, they never become knowledge about me myself, unless I manage to replace every single reference to myself in terms of names and descriptions and other demonstratives by a reference in terms of “I (me, my, mine, myself).” Obviously this need not involve an explicit act of translation, as “JG Hart has hypertension,” “I am JG Hart,” and “I have hypertension.” Rather, as Castañeda insists, the point is an essential (“logical”) one. JG Hart cannot remember or merely consider later on that he himself has hypertension, unless he remembers or considers what he would formulate by saying, “I have hypertension,” or “JG Hart has hypertension and I am JG Hart.”

Of course, as we noted earlier, this sense of the ineliminable status of “I” (there are others which we will dwell on) is only from the viewpoint of the user of “I” in oratio directa. To report a conversation, the listeners must replace someone else’s reference to himself (where he uses “I [me, mine, myself]”) with references in the form of descriptions or names. Otherwise, on hearing “I,” they are left with the analogous emptiness of someone, who from his own experiences, has only “this” left over, i.e., no names or descriptions affixed to “this.” And of course they cannot use “I” and refer to what the Other refers to when she uses “I.”

When “I” is correctly executed it inerrantly refers to what we will call the “individual essence.” Other mechanisms of singular reference, as names, descriptions, and indexicals may be properly tendered and yet may fail to pick up the intended referent or intended category. “I” cannot fail in this way. Even when the tragedy of amnesia occurs and one literally does not know “who in the world he is,” there is still an unfailing reference by the amnesiac speaker who says, e.g., “I can’t tell you who in the world I am” because the “I” captures what is essential to his being, i.e., the non-reflexive self-awareness.

“I don’t exist now” is self-contradictory in the sense that in the act of utterance it negates itself, negates its negation. This is not to say that what “I” refers to exists...
of necessity in the world, i.e., is a necessary being like a god. Later in Chapter V, §8, we will discuss senses in which “I” is necessary and contingent.

When “I” is correctly tendered it inerrantly picks out its referent. What is this referent? Wittgenstein made the distinction between the subjective and objective “use” of “I” and the words like “my,” “mine,” etc. that are akin. The subjective use is found in “I see, think, touch, etc. so and so,” “I have a toothache,” etc. The objective use, in “I have grown six inches,” “My arm is broken,” etc.19 Castañeda spelled out this objective use when he noted that I can refer with reflexive external reference, i.e., to myself as something in the world “for us all.” Thus I when I carefully shave my chin by attending to the reflection of its contours in a mirror, or wrap my injured foot just as the doctor advised, or listen to a description of me as given in a news report or a friend’s account, etc. – in all of these cases, whether or not the reference is in the first-person (as e.g., “I have a cut,” “I have gotten fat”) or third-person (“JG Hart stated that…”), I refer to myself as someone or something in the world. In contrast, in internal reflexive reference I refer to myself as myself. No one else can so refer to me that she has this precise referent. Someone saying “you” targets what I call myself as myself but this speaker achieves “yourself as yourself” not what I call “myself as myself,” just as when I say “you” to her I target what she refers to as “myself as myself” but she is present for me only as “yourself as yourself.”

Thus it is not sufficiently accurate to say that first-person reference is to the speaker himself, as when a speaker might say, instead of “I,” “The one speaking,” “The present speaker,” etc. In such a case the declaration would be missing the reference to oneself as oneself. “The present speaker,” could be a way a speaker refers externally to himself as one who was having trouble interrupting another speaker; or it might refer to someone whom the parliamentarian has in mind during a cacophony of speakers. Of course, every external reflexive reference is a reference to myself in one or some of its aspects or guises. I am not referring to someone else but to me myself. But with “I” the unique guise is manifest of “myself as myself.”

This distinctive guise suggests that “myself” is not utterly unfamiliar to me prior to the referring of “I.” Indeed, with the exception of “I,” and also “here” and “now,” the referents of all the demonstratively used pronouns were at one time unknown prior to the act of attending which founds the act of reference. (Of course, there is always a “this” and “that” in the sense of a present endless continuous spatial field, but the execution of these demonstratives carve up that infinite spatial continuum into something more or less precise.) Prior to the act of attending which the demonstrative pronouns explicate, they were outside the horizon of interests and perhaps even the field of perception. Even “now,” as an occasional or indexical expression, is unknown prior to the act of attending reference because it refers to the specific actual novel “now.” “Here” similarly is typically a novel “here,” indicating our changing embodied situation. (But one can imagine, as in Plato’s cave allegory, a prisoner always confined to the same place, where even any movement of the body was impossible, i.e., where “here” would always be the same place, except for the flights of fancy which would generate novel “as-if ‘Heres.’”
Of course, for all of us as embodied persons in the world, it is always inevitably “here” and “now,” no matter where we are or when it is. In this sense these terms resemble “I” from which they are inseparable. But in these cases although it is always “now” and “here” it is also always a different “now” and typically a different “here.” Yet it is far from obvious that it is always a different “I” when used by the same person. Indeed there would be no evidence for it always being “now” or “here” if the “I” were always different. Further, whereas we can conceive of “I” in the absence of “here” and “now,” as in the case of an eternal disembodied observer from nowhere, which is the ideal of formal logic or mathematics, we cannot conceive these ubiquitous and abiding senses of “here” and “now” without “I.” Without “I” these make no sense because it is always “here” and “now” for or to an I, a dative of manifestation. “I” therefore enjoys an epistemic priority over the other demonstratively used pronouns in as much as its referent is never not known prior to its achievement, and all the others presuppose it for their sense.

But what is the referent which is never not known? What does “I” pick out from out of the ever prior circle of acquaintance? Prior to the achievement of “I” there is already the lived familiarity with oneself. However with “I” one refers to oneself as oneself. “I” thus achieves a novel display or guise and thus enjoys a sense that was missing before. Only with “I” am I present to myself as myself.

The elemental sense of what “I” refers to is perhaps hinted in the etymology of “self” and by basic grammatical structures. “The Proto-Indo-European root of self is seu, a pronoun of the third-person that is reflexive, referring something else in a sentence back to the subject of the sentence.” Granted that many reflexive forms reflect more the inflexion of the verb than a reflexive pronoun, and therefore many such verbs are not straight-forwardly self-referential, there are still the cases where pronouns are reflexive. Further, even in some ambiguous cases where the reflexivity is subordinate to the inflexion, the self’s involvement and inwardness are highlighted, as in, e.g., “He is ashamed of himself,” “Er schämt sich.” Besides for purposes of self-reference or reference of the subject to itself, the same form as the reflexive form is also used for emphasis where the particular subject is singled out and not someone else. “Peter himself did that.” The distinction between (a) emphatic and (b) reflexive come out respectively in the examples: (a) “Tom offered himself to them” or “Tom himself offered them” and (b) “Tom offered himself to them.” The reflexive and emphatic forms reflect connections of sense between “self” (ipse) and “same” (idem), e.g., Selbst and dasselbe, selfsame, soi-même. Our view is that ipseity and identity/sameness are not disparate concerns in thinking about what “I” refers to but rather both provide clues for the ontological sense of the “self” that “I” refers to: it is that which ineliminably and ineluctably subsistively abides as reflexive or self-regarding.

The prior lived acquaintance with oneself means that awareness of “oneself” is not like picking out some “this,” as “this boat,” from out of the field of perception, which before was not part of the circle of acquaintance. It is not as if a regional ontological category of “self” or “selfhood,” as one of the learned general categories of things within the world, was come upon and instanced in the achievement of “I.” Yet, of course, it was “pre-given” even prior to learning “I”
or “self.” But it was not pre-given as an a priori category, e.g., sameness, but more basically perhaps (if there is something more basic than sameness and difference!) as one’s presence to “oneself.” (We neglect here the question of whether there is an analogous prior pre-givenness of the Other or “you,” a question that becomes particularly pressing in thinking of the constitution of the Other as another self and accounting for infant behavior.24)

What “oneself” is as a person becomes articulated by the sortal categories one comes to appropriate, but “oneself” is referred to without these properties and the reference does not create “oneself.” (We will later discuss the issue of whether “person” itself is a sortal term.)

Consider the question, how do I know that when I say “I” I am referring properly to me myself? Compare this question with that which arises in response to “I have a toothache,” when someone asks, “How do you know that it is you who has this pain?” The use of “I” in the question suggests that “I” is functioning like a corrigible perception of something in the world, or, at best, a demonstrative pronoun that may take as singular what in fact proves to be plural. In which case it looks very much like, “How do you know it is she who has this pain?” It is assuming that “I” and the painful experience are referred to as things with identifiable properties or as an identifiable thing with a property. In fact, as Wittgenstein noted, “I have a pain” is no more a statement about a particular person than groaning is. It is not a matter of objective reference. Further, the question (How do you know you are referring to you yourself when you say “I”?) suggests that there could be something more fundamental which might serve as criteria for identifying me, e.g., some inalienable properties that could be discerned. But first-person reference cannot be analyzed in terms of anything else like a list of properties or a description or “having a reason.” There is nothing more fundamental and every other consideration presupposes that the one considering has this ineliminable acquaintance with himself as the condition for any consideration. And in my reference to myself with “I” this acquaintance is explicated and referred to in such a way that what is referred to enjoys a kind of simplicity of “givenness” such that the reference is free of the ascription of properties.

It is helpful to compare the referents of “I” and “world.” There is a sense in which everything is within “world” and we have a prior acquaintance with this within which everything is. This acquaintance with world is thus to be starkly contrasted with the entrance of something novel into our circle of acquaintance which before was not only not latently or implicitly within the field of perception but was never before met or known through an empty intention. “World” itself never enters into our circle of acquaintance the way things, whether novel or not, do.

The sense in which world has a prior familiarity is to be distinguished from how what “I” refers to has a prior familiarity. World as the ultimate horizon is held open by the empty intentions that are the penumbra of my filled intentions. Thus, put most simply, what is present is surrounded, on the one hand, by what I before actually have done and perceived/known but which I now retain and, on the other hand, by what I expect to do and perceive/know and now protend. Stating that world is the a priori framework for whatever appears means that if I am ever to do or know something, it
is going to be something within the world. As the framework of whatever changing appearing things it will be present perspectivally and its presence will be an interplay of present and absent intentions, and, in principle, something to be known (always inadequately) by “us.” World is always an appearing of – to me/us.

In contrast, the prior lived familiarity of myself with myself never appears properly speaking as an appearing of —, to…. (We will dwell on this in the next section.) This prior familiarity is never in this sense world or in the world; it is not ever known through either empty or filled intentions (as a filling of what was meant in its absence). As we will continually stress, it is not a matter of intentionality at all. And further, this prior familiarity itself is something that cannot be known in a special intentional act. Thus my prior familiarity with, e.g., my choosing, is not due to a reflecting on this but by choosing. And this is so as a matter of principle. If it were known by the act of reflection, we shall continually argue, what “I” refers to would require an infinite series of acts of reflection and therefore could not exist.

Yet it remains true that what “I” refers to is connected to my personal being and thus with world, as the open field and ultimate horizon of all agency and perception, within which my personal self unfolds, my deeds are launched, and everything comes to light. And the prior acquaintance of myself with myself which “I” presupposes is the condition for both the luminosity of the world as the ultimate horizon as well as for all reference to what is within world.

We may say that what “I” displays or constitutes in its reference, myself as myself, is ephemeral and exists only in the occasional execution of “I.” Husserl himself maintains that the I appears as agent of manifestation and deeds only occasionally, i.e., in the position-taking acts, decisions, etc. But this fact of the occasional display of “myself as myself” or of the pre-linguistic agent of manifestation and deeds may not be taken to mean that the Myself has a similar ephemeral “existence.” (The scare-quotes here refer to the special difficulties of ascribing a univocal sense of existence to that which is the source of all positing and which is non-objectively present prior to all positing; we will have occasion to return to this theme.) Prior to the act of referring I am present “to” myself in a non-referential, non-reflexive say. Again, the scare-quotes indicate the impropriety of the preposition “to” if this is taken to mean that this is a form of objective presence “to” a dative. (See §4 below.) The self-presence is not ephemeral in the way the guise of “myself as myself” is, nor is it ephemeral in the way the I-center and I-source of acts is; rather it is the abiding conscious condition for all referring and acts, even the internal reflexive referring of “I.” (We will return to the ineluctable persistence of “I” as self-presence later.)

St. Augustine had a glimmer of this position when he spoke of “mind” [(mens) rather than ego]. “But the mind has no need to look for itself as though it were somewhere else. There is nothing more immediately present to cognition than what is present to the mind and there is nothing more immediately present to the mind than the mind itself.” Further this knowledge of the mind of itself would seem to be a knowledge of one’s individual self. Augustine discusses this in regard to the peculiarity of what it means to “know thyself,” how it is not an invitation or exhortation to know just any thing absent or present. Nor is it the exhortation to
know something in the world that is proximate and taken for granted, like “your face.” When told to “know thyself” the mind “knows itself the very moment it understands what ‘thyself’ is, for no other reason than that it is present to itself.” Similarly, this knowing of itself is a knowing of its substance “and when it is certain of itself it is certain of its substance.” Also for Augustine this original self-presence prior to reflective acts may be thought of as a kind of original loving and knowing and understanding of oneself: “Nor does the mind, after coming to know itself, see itself by recollection as established in its own memory, as though it had not been there before becoming the object of its own knowledge. Assuredly, from the moment of its beginning to be, the mind has never ceased to know itself, to understand itself, and to love itself…”

§2  On the Reduction of the Nominative to the Accusative in Henry and Levinas

Michel Henry and Emmanuel Levinas both give reasons to subordinate “I” to a prior accusative out of which the nominative “I” emerges. This work agrees with both these thinkers that there is a sense of oneself prior to reflection. It concurs also that this sense of oneself is not effected by self-referring acts. Further this prior “being” is pervaded by but not exhaustively characterized by various senses of “passivity” which are on the “hither side” of the self’s self-referring acts. These various senses of passivity, e.g., those of passive synthesis, of self-affection, of temporality, of one’s being oneself prior to one’s acts, one’s not being the source of one’s beginning, etc. are the occasion for these thinkers to posit a beginning prior to the “myself” whose “agency” brings me about. They have different ways of talking about the agency. They are both clear that it is prior to oneself or “myself” and prior to any properly phenomenological-intentional knowing. That is to say, the evidence for the source of the accusative of me, “the accusation” and “persecution” (Levinas) is of a quite different order and kind of reflection that is beyond the properly phenomenological sense of this work.

However, this work will adopt, in the theological conclusion (of Book 2), a position that can accept Levinas’ suggestion that “I” means, from a trans-phenomenological perspective, “Here I am!” “Here I am!,” a theological equivalent of “I myself,” is an answer to a prior call or summons. One problem for us is that this Other, which is prior to “I myself” and to any Other I meet, often seems to make Its demands in the demands of the Others I meet. The transcendent alterity of the Other merges with the transcendent Other Who is prior to my being me. How this is a phenomenological assertion and not a theological one is an important question. The prior call, when understood as a divine creation, needs no “myself,” as this topic is developed in this work, to witness or undergo the declension into an accusative, dative, nominative, and a being responsible for the Other. Rather, because “myself” is totally created from nothing by the call, and therefore not a conscious recipient of the call, it is not a witness and the responding is not something I do but
rather responding is my coming to be or identical with my being. The sense of being an accusative is not being a “myself,” but being a “patient” first. This patient is ontologically nothing before the call, if there is a time before the call, and therefore not conscious in any sense. Therefore its being accusative is more radical than the passivity of prime matter to form and sensibility to hyletic impressions and I-acts. This accusative, upon existing, then becomes non-reflectively conscious and, through the silent but relentless creative summons, brings me about, who then becomes an “I.” When this happens we may return to more familiar senses of the declension of “I.”28 Again, here there are theological speculations to which we resonate in the final chapters of Book 2. But they are not accessible, it seems to me, to a phenomenological philosopher.

Michel Henry’s view, which we have discussed elsewhere,29 proposes that the origin of “I myself” is a passivity born of the eternal generation of the eternal Son of God with Whom I am essentially intertwined. Here we may note that we address below some of the issues of the problematic “eternity” of “myself” in Book 1, Chapter VI. In the final chapter of Book 2, we will rehearse some historical views that have kinship with Henry’s from the angle of this work. This angle is very much indebted to Henry, but there the reader will find different emphases and essential differences.

§3 The Ineluctability of I-ness in Awareness and Self-Awareness

Since the revolutionary inaugural moment of Descartes’ cogito, understood as a determination of consciousness as an explicit inescapable self-awareness (and not a matter of mere inference of the thinker’s existence from the fact of thinking30) there have been criticisms to the effect that if there be such an original awareness it must be described in terms of egolessness, anonymity and impersonality. Thus the well-known proposal by Georg Lichtenberg that what is most original is not “I think” but “It thinks,” analogous to it is raining, lightning, snowing, etc. has found sustained resonance.

Husserl himself early argued for an I-less notion of consciousness because he then believed that all we had was “consciousness” and this was exhausted with a consideration of its acts and experiences. If we prescind from the lived body, argued early Husserl, the alleged I as the relation-point is nothing but the unity of consciousness. What we are aware of is the flux moving from content to content, context to context, within the overarching whole; the “phenomenologically reduced I” is nothing but this structural totality. The individual contents come together and fuse into novel unities within the structural totality. This is all there is and all we need, claimed the early Husserl.31 In this respect Husserl seemed to be saying there is no “I think” but only an “it thinks,” where “it” was the systematic context of consciousness.

But Husserl was also at this time arguing for a theory of non-reflective awareness that pervaded all acts: Acts are “lived through” or “experienced” (erlebt)
they do not objectively appear; objects objectively appear, they are not lived through. What does this “lived through” mean that is not perceived or objectively appearing? It is the self-luminosity of our intentional and volitional life. (See §6 below and our discussion of self-awareness and ipseity.) But is there in the early writings a strong sense of “self”-awareness, “self”-luminosity in Husserl? Apparently not yet. Because consciousness was doubtless an immanent system by which the experiences were connected, he did not ask whether and how this connectedness was experienced. He did not connect living through (Erleben) the acts or pre-reflexive awareness of the acts to an awareness of a synthesizing center which imbued all acts and immanent contents with “mine” or “ownness.” He did not yet hold that this self-awareness was in any sense an I-awareness. But does this not mean that one could think and desire and not be aware that the thinking and desiring were one’s own? Does this mean that the desiring and knowing might just have well been done by someone or anyone else? Husserl came to see that the “living through” or das Erleben of one’s acts could only mean that they were lived as one’s own. How could the acts be one’s own or “mine” if I did not achieve them? He realized that although contents and acts are not explicitly related back to an I, each experience is not merely part of the system but is lived by me. They are systemically one’s own or “mine,” and, upon reflection, “for me.”

We will often have recourse to the consideration (especially as voiced by H.D. Lewis, Chisholm and Klavon): If you are in doubt about this “ownership” and are tempted by the “no-ownership” view, ask yourself whether it makes a special difference that you or someone else is about to suffer from a horrible painful calamity, e.g., to the brain. If the basic sense of the stream’s flowing is that it is no one’s, then it can be a matter of indifference who will suffer this calamity. Any no-ownership theory, like, e.g., some Buddhist theories, must face the type of question associated with “floating pains.” Could there be pains which are no one’s? Is it not a matter of eidetic necessity that the pain be someone’s? That is, is it conceivable or imaginable that there be free-floating pains? The same, of course, holds for pleasures. Yet in the philosophical literature the no-ownership theory typically stays with pains because of the stark importunity of the evidence that the experience of it requires me or someone else. “Thoughts,” however, as intentional acts similarly are always mine or someone’s. “Remembering,” as we shall later have occasion to insist, cannot simply pop into my stream of consciousness as someone else’s achievement. The same holds for “thinking” about, e.g., the claim of the no-ownership theory. This puzzling is mine, even though it is without the importunate character of my pain. Further, by “thoughts” we also mean what is thought and the thought, “the no-ownership theory,” is precisely an ideal object enjoying publicity for all. In so far as it has this publicity it seems to have a residence “from nowhere” and appreciated “by no one” in particular. Yet this anonymity of the act entertaining the theory is always someone’s.

If we are tempted, as was Simone Weil, to speak of this anonymity of the act of attending or entertaining as “impersonal,” we have no objections if this is a way of canceling out any cognitive or emotive self-reference, self-involvement, or self-reflection in the act of attending. She makes an interesting case that the purest
forms of human achievement, e.g., in theory, love, and devoted practical agency, are those kinds of intentionality which reflect less our personal being than this pure selfless “impersonal” anonymous achieving. Later we shall pursue the appropriate description for this aspect of our being. Here we merely state that it is not best captured by removing it from the personal (or egological) or consigning the personal (or egological) to the realm of impurity and what is reprehensible. What we will call in Book 2, Existenz, places this aspect of our being at our center and core, and this is the center not merely of our theoretic contemplative engagement but also our personal-practical ones. As such it has a priority over even the realm of theoretical attention and contemplation. But the distance we open up here in the following paragraphs between the position of this work and that of Weil, one of the most distinguished writers on Christian spirituality of the twentieth century, will become narrowed when we have occasion to refer to some of her other ideas in Book 2.

Weil’s formulations border on being reprehensibly “radical” in the sense that they root out the condition for the possibility of what I believe she wants to maintain. For Weil the supreme acts of anonymous impersonal attention require automatically the elimination of this I-ness. According to her, in life our chief task of loving and purely attending are foremost giving up this power which each has to say “I” to God. In fact this power is alone what we can give to God. Thus there is a logical or essential connection for Weil between her view that the great achievements of humans are essentially anonymous, i.e., impersonal, and her view that the major calling and imperative in life is to give to God one’s capacity to say “I.”

The mystic thus has some affinity with the great scientist, artist, or philosopher in this matter of “impersonality,” i.e., each lives so attentively that there is no self-interest or self-reference in one’s intentionality. Thus the mystic’s goal which has always to have no part left in her soul which permits her to say “I” resembles what apparently happens automatically in great thinkers and artists.33

Weil gives a provocative example of this when she claims that when a child does a sum wrongly the mistake bears the stamp of his personal being or his personality (which she holds is pervaded by sin). “If he does it exactly, his personality does not enter at all.” This appears to mean that for Weil the subject matters or issues themselves absorb the consciousness of the child and the “impersonal” power of spirit or intellect is so focused on the subject matter that the potentially distracting or hindering limitations of her personal being are disengaged.

Presumably Weil here does not want to imply that children or adults who are good at math are morally superior to those who make mistakes and are distracted; rather her point is that there is an impersonal capacity for purity of attention in each of us which is burdened by our personal being, and mathematical prodigies too will have their own ways of being distracted from this purity of attention. Indeed, math might be a way in which individuals avoid the purity of attention in other, e.g., personal, realms of life. But it further seems to us that this impersonal being of spirit, which is the realm of the sacred for Weil, is in some sense this very child’s own center and which surely is targeted when she has occasion to say “I,” even though more and less pure aspects of her self may also, but need not, be part of this reference. After all, someone is striving and exhorted to pay attention, be
patient, etc. The child is not merely subsumed by or into this realm of the impersonal but rather, as Weil insists, it is what is sacred about her. This raises a basic question in Weil as well as Buddhism: Is the freedom and power to become “impersonal” or to permit the selfless, i.e., non-egocentric, principle in us to reign and not succumb to the enticements of self-referential, self-reflexive, self-centeredness someone’s? Is the power to render one’s soul bereft of (this reprehensible sense of) “I” a power which, in some sense, someone has and to which someone may be exhorted and which, when achieved through good works or grace, is a desired state of or for someone?

Weil holds that the energy which enables us to rise to the heights of contemplation, devotion and love, is something that we both do and to which we consent. We do it primarily by desiring it, but by desiring what it is that draws us in such a way that we consent to this attention to and devotion toward what is worthy of our attention and devotion. And this does not mean we can accomplish it by our desiring it, but rather the desire is to desire and it is a desire to consent to its energizing power. But, again, we must ask: Who does this renewing, desiring, and consenting? Clearly I do, but how is this not the reprehensible power to say “I”? Here Weil offers an important response: “In such a work [of desiring to desire to be purely attentive] all that I call ‘I’ has to be passive. Attention alone – that attention which is so full that the ‘I’ disappears – is required of me. I have to deprive all that I call ‘I’ of the light of my attention and turn it on that which cannot be conceived.”

Here we have a clear passage indicating the importance of the anonymity and “impersonality” of the intentional consciousness absorbed in what is worthy of devotion. I work to be I-less and the result is consciousness functioning anonymously; I do not direct my attention to it. Paradoxically, this supreme achievement of the I requires that the I be missing, i.e., not explicitly part of the scene; but this, pace Weil is not the destruction of the I. Further, what is in play reverberates a classical sense of a “grace.” This is to say that the evidence is compelling for one’s being “inspired” and propelled by the energizing forces of the presence of the truth and beauty of the matter at hand quite apart from any explicit self-referential doing of anything by me. The “I” and “I myself” are muted in this supreme achievement. This is the sense in which the impersonal in the person is what is sacred. And yet, for the Husserlian, Weil’s celebration of the impersonal and even her work of the destruction of the “power to say ‘I’” are honoring what, is eminently “myself” and “egological.”

She distinguishes the impersonal aspect and the personal-bodily which is contaminated with the reprehensible I-ness. Whereas the former is sacred, the latter is pervaded by sinfulness. In the view of the position of this work, the “myself” is not the personal but the neither is it merely the impersonal. It certainly is not bereft of important senses of “I.” What Weil singles out as the impersonal is the “pole” of certain intentional acts, i.e., those in which the anonymity of the achievements of intentional life may be singled out. As we shall see the life of feelings and emotions indeed reflects the personal being in the world with others and does not always reflect the more appropriate impersonality of I. Doubtless there is much of the personal life that requires the anonymity of the I, as in the attention and concentration in both
theory and everyday conversation, in the challenges of the workplace, and even in
sports and entertainment whereby our personal self-awareness recedes into ano-
nymity and “impersonality” and we permit ourselves to be taken with, e.g., the fic-
tional world. Indeed, do not some highly reprehensible activities, e.g., like those of
a thief or a terrorist, require the total attentiveness and absence of the contamination
of explicit self-reference? This is not to gainsay Weil’s thesis regarding the purify-
ing powers of the pure attentiveness to what is true and beautiful; indeed our later
accounts of love and Existenz will make a similar point. But anonymity and
“impersonality” as such are not equivalent to the moral purity she would have us
retrieve and feature in our lives. Thus Weil’s position seems to inflate the anony-
mous to the pure and spiritual, and at the same time to rob the pure and spiritual of
its innermost core, i.e., “I.”

Pace some formulations of Weil, the evidence does not support a position hold-
ing that I, in my heightened moments of pure attention, contemplation, and devo-
tion, experience myself being invaded by an impersonal or trans-personal Spirit or
“Agent Intellect” thinking in place of me or for which I am of no consequence.
Contrary claims along these lines, e.g., those having to do with being moved by
the “spirit,” or being inspired, or being gripped by an idea, never amount to a
denial of my being at least a passive vehicle of the creative agency; i.e., they never
deny that I was inspired. Even “automatic writing” requires some more or less
conscious stream of consciousness serving as the instrument of the principal
causal thinking agency.35

Of course, a Buddhist might hold that the point of the goal of ascetic striving
is release from illusion and suffering; this would be precisely the complete disso-
lution of all senses of egoity for consciousness. Three points are worth mentioning
here. First, there is a distinction between senses of I-ness that are reprehensibly
egocentric and senses which are morally neutral. If moral agency requires a sense
of responsibility, and even if one is responsible for her selfless behavior, then not
all senses of egoity are reprehensible. This raises the second question whether
any claim for any form of essential I-ness is reprehensible on the grounds of the
ontology that the soteriology requires. Because a soteriology has assumptions
that typically elude the philosophical-phenomenological field, we will postpone
it until the final chapters of Book 2 of this work. The third matter is whether
release would be someone’s release and whether nirvana would be any one’s at
all. Again, the question is whether all senses of “whose” consciousness are
inappropriate and dispensable. Our position is that selfless devotion and love are
ultimately important acts, but they are of necessity someone’s who is non-
reflectively self-aware.

Recently the proposal has been made that we think of Buddhism as holding
“self” to be properly a “verb,” as “to self,” or “selfing.”36 In this interpretation of
Buddhism we are asked to think that what is ontologically fundamental is process
and to entertain the view that what we are calling the person is a construct. And to
this construct the various strata of “identity” belong, as name, family, gender,
nationality, profession, value-preferences, etc. These we take on and let go of, each
being “a relic of an experience.” The self “selves” by its relation to the objects it
constitutes and attaches itself to. More basic than the self is a non- or impersonal process that lies behind the flux of objects and the formation of the self. The consciousness of the self as selfing is intentional, i.e., an awareness of something. Desire, we are told, is “a state of disequilibrium between what is arising and what one wants to be arising.” (“Wanting” here is apparently itself not a desiring.) Desire as such is problematic and the chief point is that the condition for its manifestation is the person who desires. If we attend to the proper state of the flux of feeling and perception without the person who experiences and desires we have “an elegant but selfless, interdependent arising of physical and mental phenomena (aka the five aggregates), in response to the presentation of information at a sense door…” Selfing is the ongoing attachment to what presents itself, or wanting what presents itself to be other than it is. There is no fault to be found in what presents itself, but rather in the desire and attitude toward what presents itself. What are at fault are attachment, ownership, and identification born of concupiscence, avarice, covetousness, lack of true humility, etc. The core evil is mineness, and the opposition between me and not me, mine and not mine.

In this interpretation “grasping is not something done by the self, but rather self is something done by grasping.” Thus more basic than the self is the disturbance of the deep process. This disturbance is called desire, which itself tends toward self-refering. In this view the self is not anything “given” but rather a construct which is the result of something one comes to believe as a result of a theory fostered by the illusory disturbance called desire. If there were not this root of self-reference there would be no self. This means that there is “no inherent bond between subject and object or between consciousness and desire.” We can conceive of a subject or a consciousness bereft of objects and desires, and therefore bereft of self. And Buddhism teaches how this distinction or liberation is possible. True freedom is the equanimity born of a conscious subject who engages what appears without self-reference, narcissism, and egocentrism.

In this view under discussion consciousness and subject seem to be regarded as identical, provided that neither refer to a “self” which is what desire creates and refers to. How “consciousness” which is a process of “selfing” itself is a substrate of this “selfing” is not clear. But we may say, from both the first-person perspective and the perspective of a third-person ontology, that consciousness, as aware activity or experiencing, requires a subject of experience (experiencings are “adjectival on a subject”) in a way analogous to the rising of the sun requires the sun or the bending of a branch requires a branch. One cannot experience the rising of the sun without the sun or the bending of the branch without experiencing the branch. The “processes” of consciousness, the experiencings, acts, etc., whether or not desirous, may be thought of as the facts or states of affairs of what is more properly basic and “non-factual,” i.e., the subject of consciousness. Again, there are no free-floating pains. “Experiences and the like seem as ill-suited as sun-risings and branch-bendings for being the primary nonfactual objects of a mode of perception.”

Similarly to insist on getting rid of “self” as a noun and substituting for it the verb raises the question of the ownness of the process and how “I” am a verb.
To I like to self have some plausibility when what is referred to is taken as an object/process in the third-person examples, as “ice” may be regarded as a verb, to ice, and where the notion of an underlying substrate seems to be as illusory as looking for an underlying substantial “it” for “it is raining.” But “selfing” or “I-ing” makes no sense whatsoever if there is not ownness and one for and to whom the undeniable process and temporality of consciousness happens.

Of course, properly speaking, neither experiences nor subjects of experiences are properly perceptually “given,” either in the first- or third-person, whether as states of affairs or factual perceptual objects. Yet it is the propensity to see these as thing-like distortions of the processes, which are alleged to be the one true reality, that occasions some of the problems.

Perhaps on this latter point we might find agreement among representatives in much of Buddhism. Further, we will find ways to agree with other aspects of this version of Buddhism. Yet if the claim is that the ultimate wisdom is the recognition that the self and its identity do not “matter” and what “matters” is to be rid of self, is there not implied an ultimate concern about self and getting “selfing” right, even if self-abnegation and self-renunciation, in the sense that these require an eradication of self-centering desire, turn out to be the ultimate wisdom? If the ultimate soteriological truth is that absolutely there is no sense of self subsequent to the ultimate “release,” then the question of what matters, ultimately would have to be put in square quotes or even cancelled. If mattering has to do with one’s concern about something and, at the same time, mattering requires something which is of concern to someone, then what are we to think of the truth of the ultimate soteriological position that there is no self? Does it not mean that self-referential concern would be something about which I can not be legitimately concerned? If there is no reason for “care for the self,” even to the point of “de-selfing,” because there is no self, then there can be no true doctrine about either the salvation of the self or its appropriate extinction through one’s agency or practice. Most basically perhaps is the consideration that concern as the attitude or position-taking in regard to the teaching is a self-referential act and the truth of the ultimate soteriological position cannot be true “for me,” because there is no “I myself” for whom something can be true.

When we hear that “to self or not to self…it’s a choice to be made,” or that Buddhism enables us to cognize objects more intimately without the intermediary epiphenomenon of a “subject” or a “self,” or that selfing constructs absolutely “the one who” selves or constructs, there are clear divergences from positions laid out in this work (in especially Chapters III and IV). We have urged that any theory of knowing which is dependent essentially on intermediate phenomena is philosophically objectionable. We have proposed, but not developed, the view that although “personhood,” character, etc., are constituted, they are of necessity constituted by a self. Thus we must again ask: Is consciousness as process conceivable as essentially bereft of any sense of “ownness” or “mineness”? Is the liberating commitment “not to self” (understood verbally) strictly speaking no one’s? Is the appearing process behind the selfing and the emergent self absolutely no one’s and manifest to no one? Is to be or not to be someone in the world with others truly an option?
It would seem that some versions of Buddhism, perhaps even the one which we just briefly discussed, would find a point of contact in our position that the “myself” is non-sortal, and a non-ascriptive referent. In Zen (and some forms of Mind-Only Buddhism), there is the exhortation to directly see into one’s true nature and become who and what one most fundamentally is, one’s original Buddha-essence. As in Hakuin’s “Song of Zazen”:

How much more when you turn to yourself
And directly confirm your own self-nature.
Then your self-nature is no nature,
You have parted from vain words.

Of special interest to us is the reference to a reflective turn to “yourself.” And even though “your own self-nature” is a modern interpellation for “seeing into essential Nature” it perhaps can be taken to refer first to a kind or having properties and then this is negated, apparently without the negation of every sense of ownness. Often times this self-nature which is no nature is also referred to as “emptiness.” And it is also referred to as “suchness” (tathātā). In Yogacara one type of “suchness” is regarded as applicable to the self-nature “because it is not tied to any category; nor can self-grasping depend on it to grasp (anything).”

Perhaps some of these Buddhist thinkers were struck by precisely the non-sortal and non-objective nature of first-person experience, and how its intelligibility resisted any of the efforts to handle it in a proper rational or intelligible way by grasping it through conceptual determinations.

Perhaps one such thinker was the modern Buddhist Hisamatsu Shin’ichi who is recorded as having said in a dialogue with Paul Tillich: “The Self is the true Formless Self only when it awakens to itself… it is always at once ‘one’s own’ and ‘not one’s own;’” and: “… the Formless Self includes, in so far as it is Self, Self-awareness. But by this Formless Self (or Self-awareness) I mean the ‘Formless-Myself,’ which… expresses - or presents - Itself in its activities…”; and, finally, “The True Awakening - or Formless Self - in Itself has neither a beginning nor an ending, a special place, nor a special time.”

All of these statements about the ambiguity of ownness, about the formlessness of the non-sortal self as present in non-reflective self-awareness which expresses itself in its activities, its having neither a beginning, ending, or “special time” (see below, Chapter VI), and finally, the sense in which individuality is here not removed but fulfilled may be taken to formulate aspects of what we here are calling the “myself.” We will argue for the incomparably unique essence of the “myself”; the sense in which this individuality is the fulfillment is addressed with our proposal that the “myself” is an entelechy pointing to the “true self.” The fulfillment of this infinite ideal remains problematic. But in our final Chapters VI–VII in Book 2, we offer a speculative theological framework for the sense in which the “myself”
also points to the fulfillment of individuality. Whether the comparison we have suggested here between aspects of Buddhism and the position of this work is a legitimate interpretation I must leave to others to decide. But the (at least superficial) symmetry is intriguing.

Finally with Husserl and Buddhism we may say that “Das Ich-Sein ist beständiges Ich-Werden,” to be an I is to become an I. But the “I” as “I myself” itself involves a problematic numerical-essential identity even though it necessarily “selfs” or negotiates an expression of this identity in the world with others, even if it be in a life of radical self-abnegation and world renunciation. At this level will and desire are neither eliminable nor is it desirable to eradicate them. The most elemental levels of consciousness as passive temporal synthesis reveal a striving toward harmony, consistency, and unity, without which we would have no awareness of either sameness or difference, duration or its interruptions. We ineluctably are launched toward truth and consistency quite apart from any decisions or choices — and even in spite of those decisions and judgments which go against truth and consistency. And it is precisely this extended sense of will that gives birth to the quest for the liberation from forms of self-deception and false allegiances. Thus phenomenology’s claim for an ineluctable sense of ownness and mineness is not necessarily incompatible with the ethical and even soteriological concerns of Buddhism. It too has problems with ontologizations of notions of selflessness. Indeed, as we shall see, the problems are so acute that there is good reason to think rather of the self as non-being and to think of transcendental phenomenology as “meontology” (see below §5).

The most basic issue the Buddhist has with phenomenology is perhaps not the transcendental phenomenological claim that the heart of consciousness is an event or a happening, but rather this eventfulness is inseparably suffused with ownness or ipseity; “I myself” is never a foreign construct, even though doubtless the persons we become can be our own worst enemies.

Let us dwell briefly on this most basic claim regarding the primal event at the basement of self-awareness. Because the stream is “egological” in this extended less-restrictive sense, “the I” is always present, immer dabei, even though it is only anonymous or tacit during the flux of experience bereft of I-acts or what we are calling “position-taking acts,” acts which determine my stance toward the world. For transcendental phenomenology, “the I” becomes manifestly present in these acts because they require that “I act” and they bring about how I as this person am in the world. With these I-initiated acts there emerges the I as the act-center. This serves as the basis for the indexical reference to myself as myself achieved by “I.” This I-center as the center of I-acts is the self-referential explanation of “the myself”; it is also the basis for a life of self-formation, self-determination, even a life of self-renunciation. In spite of the Husserlian caveat that the egoic presence in the stream of experience prior to acts is a kind of readiness to come into play and in spite of the caution that the egoic presence is but a pervasive ownness affixed to the stream of consciousness, for “the Buddhist” and J.-P. Sartre any talk of the presence of “the I” seems necessarily to veer toward sliding
a divisive opaque substantial blade into the non-reflective diaphanousness and unity of self-awareness. Nevertheless, in spite of such excessive prohibition of any egoity to self-awareness, Sartre, and perhaps some Buddhists, hold that consciousness is always non-reflective self-awareness, i.e., we are ineluctably self-aware even if not aware of ourselves. The sense of “self” in this non-reflective self-awareness is typically neglected or under-determined as not being anything like a thing-like substance.

There is another temptation to substitute “it” for I in Husserl’s later thought that is perhaps of interest to Buddhism. Even as late perhaps as 1930 Husserl resonated to the position that “I” properly was constituted and the original constituting was a pre-egological, I-less (“hyletic”) primal streaming. There is no doubt that the I, in the proper sense, as the I of acts, and foremost the I of acts of reflection on the I of acts whereby is constituted the I-pole as an I of acts, is “late” in terms of transcendental genetic constitution and it is preceded by a realm of primal hyletic streaming. Thomas Prufer has beautifully captured the issues here:

…the primal presencing with absencing, the primal showing together with retention and protention cannot be gained or lost by us, cannot be begun or ended by us. Inexorably and gratuitously it presences and absences the whole network of presencing and absencing acts or achievings and their presenced and absenced objects or themes, and out of it comes about what we call “I” as the center of responsibility which initiates and as the recipient of objectifications which are displayed. We cannot represent or manipulate the bringing about of us, we who can represent or manipulate beings only because we are caught up on the web woven by the interplay of primal presencing/absencing happily beyond our control.

The pre-egological primal presencing/absencing brings me about in the sense that it is what I presuppose and count on for my theoretical and practical agency. This is “happily beyond our control.” Yet it is also true that my stances and position-taking acts bring me about as the center of acts as well as a person in the world with others. Further it is true that this passive anonymous functioning (a favorite term of Husserl) is a fungor, not only in the permissible active sense (of this deponent verb) of an agent of manifestation and deeds but also in the passive sense of one’s being engaged through suffering, enduring, going along with, in short: passively experiencing. The primal temporalization goes in advance of the transcendental I of phenomenology, and also of the I as I-pole of acts and responsible center of a life in the world, i.e., the I of the person. But the “primal ground” of this temporalization is the I that is inseparable from the streaming and that undergoes the streaming and for which this life unfolds. In the streaming of the concrete primal presence the pure immanent time temporalizes itself as primal time in which there is the primal individual I. In the original primal streaming, a primal event, there is a self-presence of the unique I, the primal being. There is a coincidence here of process, identity, unity, sameness, and uniqueness.

The primal presencing is indeed an elemental sourcing, synthesizing, presencing, and absencing; but inseparably it is an I-affection, an undergoing by the I. Even though this primal sourcing occurs without the agency of I, the I is always dabei, present, taking part by undergoing and being affected; to the hyletic inexorable streaming there is wedded (vermählt) I-ness. This inexorable streaming clearly is
not me as a person in the world with others. Rather it is what \textit{I} in an emphatic sense build on. Yet it is still in a most fundamental sense me myself. This passive streaming happily beyond \textit{my} control is the passive streaming of \textit{my life}. As Husserl decisively claimed: “The streaming is always in advance; but also the \textit{I} is in advance.”\textsuperscript{45} If \textit{I} go in advance, then it is also true that I am not brought about by “It.” When Prufer says “out of it comes what we call \textit{I} as center of responsibility,” he is referring to \textit{I} as center of \textit{acts}, not the \textit{I} which is always “there” (\textit{dabei}) as suffusing and witnessing the primal streaming. But neither do I bring me about, just as Prufer states. “\textit{I} myself” am given to myself and my ipseity as “myself” is not constituted by me and certainly not by anything in the world beyond myself.

Lichtenberg’s proposed improvement of Descartes has serious difficulties. “There is thinking” may involve a true statement, as when I say in reference to some remote part of the heavens or to some marvel of DNA, but it would miss Descartes’ point that this thinking is apodictically evident to me and evident as mine. “It is thinking” and “There is thinking” enjoy plausibility because of the \textit{I}’s anonymous functioning; thus they appear initially quite compatible with leaving out what is essential, namely the evidence that this thinking is \textit{mine} and uniquely and originally present to me.\textsuperscript{47} Thus Lichtenberg’s point gains approval only because of the implicit and tacit way \textit{I}-ness is at hand in the \textit{cogito} as well as in all forms of original first-person evidence.

Robert Sokolowski has presented good reasons for thinking that the elemental pre-linguistic passive-synthetic stream of perceptions is linguistically mirrored in gerundials and impersonal expressions. Such expressions capture the continuity of experience and dispense with the discretion in experience that subjects and verbs require. They capture the “verbal undertow of each noun” (Ezra Pound) and the way verbs are on the verge of being nouns. The world here is present passively and more continuously and the speaker “lets himself be led by what appears about him” in the sense that his intellectual activity lacks the initiative, decisiveness, and detachment that comes from names and from the agency involved in the display of the properties of what is named. Thus impersonal forms as “it is raining,” “it is thundering,” and gerundials as “selfing,” “timing,” “running,” “thinking,” “praying,” “meditating,” “being blue,” point to lived encompassing continuities that can dispense with subject-verb distinctions and, like parataxis, dissolve the hard edged discreetness of the articulated world. As such they reflect better how things appear prior to the thoughtful linguistic engagement that naming and syntax achieve. But, nevertheless, even though “\textit{I}” here is not among the components, these elemental forms of experience are still kinds of presencing of the aspects of one’s life that have continuity; and the anonymous emergent process itself is always manifest, i.e., it is always a lived presencing of the passive-synthetic stream, and is thus always a presence to me and it is my presencing.\textsuperscript{48}

Most readers will be familiar with David Hume’s famous “discovery” that he could not find the self when he entered into himself, that he could never catch \textit{himself} at any time but always stumbled onto sensations or perceptions. He never found purely \textit{himself} without the sensations or perception; and when he sought to uncover \textit{himself} alone he could never observe anything but the sensation or perception. It
would seem that Hume is looking for the self or the “I” by way of other telling indexicals and adjectives, such as “this here, warm, familiar, and deep inside.” But even so, this would have to be “this here, warm and deep inside of ‘me’” and familiar “to me;” but this “me” is what Hume wants to see along side of “this,” “here,” “warm,” and “deep inside.” As Thomas Prufer has put it, for Hume the impressions are “free-floating”… because undervived, unappropriated, uncombined: neither presence of…nor presence to…nor presence with….” They are “uncollected timeless flashes illuminating nothing for no one.”

Another futile philosophical search is for myself in a description that is without indexicals, i.e., a search for a “token-reflexive-free description,” that would result in uncovering the self as myself. But there is no reason why, in establishing whether something or someone is myself, I need be limited to facts about it or me that can be captured without the use of token-reflexive expressions, unless it be a dogmatic “monist” theory that absolutely all knowledge, therefore including the odd non-ascriptive first-person access to oneself of pre-reflective awareness, is a knowing of properties.

Hume does not address the question, which he implicitly answers in the affirmative, of whether that self that he professed to be seeking to know does not “know itself as seeking;” and whether that self he professed to be unable to find was not precisely the one “that he finds to be stumbling, to be stumbling on to different perceptions.” If he is correct is saying he finds himself to be stumbling, how can he say he doesn’t find himself?

Husserl himself observed that one finds in advance all other objects of the world as over against, or as objects. Then he asks: “But what about the I or the consciousness that finds things in advance… Does one find among the things found the finding consciousness with its I?” His answer, of course, is that the I or consciousness, as “found” in reflection is not found exactly as a thing is found in the world.

Further, according to Hume, the self had to be an “idea,” i.e., a rather bleached and general representation, deriving from a more vivid in-the-flesh sensation or impression. To his question, from what impression could the idea of the self be derived, Chisholm, echoing Kant, nicely responds, “any impression whatever.” Not only is each sensum or impression inseparable from the “I-pole” around which it ineluctably gathers but it is pervaded with “mineness,” i.e., it belongs to me and my own stream of consciousness. (We will turn to a discussion of “mineness” and “ownness” soon.) And it is precisely the ongoing primal presencing to me that pervades every more or less discrete impression, and it is this ongoing primal presencing, which always “must continue invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives… constant and invariable,” that alone, on Hume’s own terms, could give rise to the meaning of self and I, even though this “constant and invariable” stream is comprised of third-person givens, i.e., free-floating flashes, not illuminating anything for anyone.

Throughout this discussion we have been claiming, sometimes showing, that first-person reference is not reducible to third- or second-person reference. It has been argued that substituting “person,” “speaker,” or “self” for “I” will not do. Nor may we substitute for “I” a demonstrative use of “self,” “person,” “this body,” or “the one now speaking.” The basic reason is that although “I” can be used in the third-person or objectively, there is a unique first-person sense that eludes third-person forms of reference and is the basis for all forms of reference. That is, the
third-person substitutes do not capture what is alone captured in the first-person reference and what alone enables the decisive, basic, sense. For example, just as I can not use “I” to refer to you or her, so neither can she refer to herself as herself with “she” or “you,” or “the one speaking”; nor can either she or you refer to me with “I.” We will be repeatedly returning to this point.

To supplement this consideration on the non-substitutability of “I” with third-person reference, we may here recall Castañeda’s distinction between internal and external self-reference. Consider how someone might say, “The person who wrote that letter lacks subtlety.” This expresses quite a different belief than “I lack subtlety.” But suppose, in fact that she who disapproved of the letter writer and said so is in fact the one who wrote the letter but for some reason or other this fact eludes her at the moment. Here clearly the meaning and truth are not preserved by the reduction of the first-person reference to the third-person one.

Castañeda provides us another particularly poignant example (reminiscent of an example used by Ernst Mach): Consider Gaskon who believes that men with a certain facial appearance have a certain illness, Fness, that indicates imminent death. One day Gaskon sees his own reflection in the mirror, without realizing that the one he sees is himself, and sees the dreaded facial appearance. Gaskon thinks out loud: “He (or this person, or that man [pointing to the reflection in the mirror, but of course referring to the person, not merely the image, who is there reflected]) is going to die soon of F.” Castañeda then proposes that we suppose that Gaskon no sooner says this than he dies of a heart attack. “Thus, Gaskon never thought the first-person content I have F.” We will later discuss the “existential” importance of envisaging death in the first-person in contrast to the third person. The dramatic impact of this example, which shows clearly that the meaning and truth of the third-person or non-reflexive self-reference does not capture the first-person or reflexive self-reference, hints at this distinction.

We already discussed how a reference to oneself such as “this body here” is capable of misfiring in terms of reference and how it, to be successful, needs to nail down “my body” and what makes this body “mine.” There are numerous other angles from which to undermine the temptation to reduce first-person reference to third-person reference, and Castañeda tirelessly undertook this project; but that will suffice for now. The chief point is that the truth value of first-person references so contrasts with the third-person references that the former are not reducible to the latter. “The person who wrote that letter lacks subtlety” is not an adequate substitute for “I lack subtlety.” “That person there will die soon of X” does not render “I am about to die of X.” And so forth.

§4 The “Transcendental I”: The Dative and Agent of Manifestation

We now want to begin contrasting the typical pre-philosophical referent of “I” and the transcendental I. In so far as the transcendental I is a display or guise of “myself” that is manifest only in the phenomenological reduction, it too enjoys the
ephemerality of the guise we already associated with what “I” refers to. But in so far as both the transcendental I and the indexical “I”-guise presuppose the original prior self-presence or self-awareness, that of which they are guises is not ephemeral. That is, there is a sense of I which is pre-indexical and foundational for the indexical sense. This sense of I is not ephemeral but constitutive of consciousness.

The transcendental sense of “I” contrasts with the indexical first-person singular “I” as used in the natural attitude. When I say “I,” I single myself out from others present in the second- and third-person and for whom I am present in the second- and third-person. When I say “I” there is always implicitly at least someone in the second-person, a you, to whom the I is addressing itself with “I.” This sense of “I” refers to somebody in the world, just as the “others,” (he, she, they, it) and “you” similarly are there as apperceived lived bodies in the world. But the I as agent and dative of manifestation, as that for whom and by whom the world is manifest, is not totally coincident with the sense of “I” that places me in the world as something bodily appearing along with other things to Others and myself. Indeed, there is, depending on the level of the phenomenological reduction, an essential solitude or an essential transcendental community under consideration by “the I.” (Bringing to light the transcendental community itself is an exercise in solitude that displays and presupposes the essential solitude of the “I’s” that found the transcendental “we.”)

In between the transcendental I and the I as someone in the world there is the “I” of declarative speech which adumbrates the transcendental I and which is transcendent to oneself as a mere body in the world. Robert Sokolowski has beautifully orchestrated the distinction between the declarative and informational senses of “I.”

Both senses build on and render explicit the non-reflective and pre-reflective senses of “I” that function in our passive synthetic and pre-linguistic apprehension of the world. In the informational use of “I,” I refer to myself simply as a reported fact, the function of which could be rendered equally well by referring to myself in the third-person or referring to me as others might. The informational sense is proximate to, and an enrichment of, what we earlier, following Wittgenstein, called the objective sense of “I” and what Castañeda referred to as the external reflexive use of “I.” I simply relay a fact about myself, as “I weigh 200 pounds,” or “I live in Bloomington.” In this usage I refer to myself as anyone else might refer to me.

Thus when we fill out a doctor’s form or apply for a driver’s license, loan, grant, etc. we give a series of autobiographical descriptions that could very well be given in the third-person: The one applying has the name X, he was born here, lives here, has this income, has blue eyes, weighs so much, had the gall bladder removed, is married to Y, etc., and, it goes without saying as not worthy of mention because presupposed by the questionnaire, he happens to be me myself.

In the declarative use we approximate the “subjective use of ‘I’” (to use Wittgenstein’s terms) and what Castañeda calls the internal reflexive use of “I.” By way of bringing to light “the declarative use of I,” Sokolowski’s discussion takes advantage of and corrects Wittgenstein’s (“logical” not “psychological”) observation that there is no significant difference in adding “I know that this is a zebra” to “This is
a zebra.” It is clear that with the latter sentence the speaker’s mind is directed through the demonstrative reference to the zebra; and similarly for the listener: her mind is directed to the zebra, whether present or not for the listener, but which presumably is in the presence of the speaker, if “this” is functioning in its normal setting.

“I know that this is a zebra” adds nothing more about the displayed world, in particular about the zebra in the world, but, as Sokolowski notes, “something new is said in another dimension on the margin of the world, and specifically on this particular margin that is me as an agent of truth in action; I am indexed as such.” In contrast to the passive non-reflective self-consciousness, I index that I have not only taken the initiative of being a knower, but I index further, that besides this being a zebra the modality of the zebra’s display is indexed, i.e., it is a successful achievement of “knowledge,” whereas it could have been displayed in the mode of belief, doubt, or query. I do not call attention to myself as a person in the world, my ipseity is not a theme nor is my character. “I know…” here exhibits me but does not say anything about me. There is no ascription of properties to me besides the modality of my agency of manifestation. I am exhibited merely as a responsible agent of manifestation. What is here brought to light, although it adds nothing new about the zebra and it does not intrude upon this being here being a zebra, nevertheless enriches the presentation of the zebra because the agent and modality of the presentation is brought to light. In the declarative use there is not merely the manifestation (in an original sense) of this being a zebra, but I explicitly manifest (in a second and different sense) myself in the act of manifesting (in the original sense) the world. I catch myself in the act of disclosure and display myself. How do I do this?

In the act by which the zebra is manifest the display of myself may well be absent; but it can be that in the very display of the zebra I catch myself being the one displaying and the declarative usage gives expression to my agency. Although my agency need not be explicitly acknowledged, it is recognized by philosophical reflection as necessarily operative or functioning. The declarative use of the I is this proto-philosophical recognition of its necessary functioning.

It is appropriate that the declarative use of I not be at the expense of what the subordinate clause displays because agency of manifestation requires that display always be of something else; even a display of display makes invisible the displaying display; showing is always of something else. This display of myself in the declarative “I”, although in the natural attitude, provides a launching pad for transcendental phenomenological reflection.

Castañeda makes a move similar to Sokolowski’s “declarative use of the ‘I’” when he notes that every utterance expressing a thought, e.g., “This is a zebra,” is subordinate to an implicit “transcendental prefix” or epistemic achievement that can be generalized as “I think (here now),” as in, e.g., “I think (here now) that (this is a zebra).” As a consequence, Castañeda holds, every statement lies either implicitly or explicitly in indirect speech (oratio obliqua), “and the only true or genuine oratio recta (direct speech) is the unspoken…I think here now.” Thus for Castañeda, even the declarative use of “I,” in so far as it presupposes the reflective achievement of “I myself as myself as the agent of manifestation,” has an “anonymous,” tacit transcendental I think here now at its base.
Castañeda would seem to need to posit (and not know immediately) the tacit unspoken direct speech (?) of the \textit{I think here now} because for him any sense of “I” emerges only in a reflective act and not non-reflexively or in the performance of the living-achieving “I.” For Castañeda, there is no “anonymous” non-reflexive self-awareness of “myself.” We soon will wrestle with this problem of self-awareness and whether here and now are appropriate for the transcendental prefix. We mention only in passing that for Castañeda the transcendental prefix is a prefix to “the balloon” which is his way of portraying, after the device of a comic strip, the articulation in the subordinate clause of the \textit{phenomenal} world, e.g., “that this is a zebra.”

The natural attitude contains both the informative and declarative uses of “I.” But in the declarative use of “I” we are on the verge of the transcendental attitude, i.e., the attitude by which, through the epoché, the agent and agency of manifestation become habitually a part of our thematization of what is displayed. Because the epoché disengages our doxastic allegiance to the world, the appearings of the world are enabled to come to light. The epoché at once takes us out of the “natural attitude” and sets up the framework for the new attitude, the phenomenological one. In this new stance wherein being and manifestation are inseparable we lead ourselves back, (reduction here is best associated with \textit{re-ducere}, from the things, to their manifestation, to the various levels of achievements that bring about the manifestation of things. Implicit throughout the display is the anti-pole or counter-pole to the pole of the world. Think of the world as a massive identity synthesis analogous to that which occurs in regard to any thing. In regard to any thing and the world we may think of the identity emerging out of the synthesis as a pole around which the differentiating moments cluster. The counter-pole to that of the thing and/or world is the identity which is also the source of the differing achievements that bring about the world’s display, i.e., the agent of manifestation that always refers to itself with \textit{I}. The I, here, as pole, disengaged from the doxastic allegiance to the world and oneself as a person in the world is the agent of the display of the world. We perhaps can take Traherne’s description, “But being Simple like the Deitie/In its own centre is a Sphere/Not shut up here, but evry Where” to mean that who I am as a person in the world is also disengaged. I am “without neighbors” and here there is no question of “identifying” who I am as someone in the world because I have disengaged (“shut up”) my being me, JG Hart, and I am present to myself utterly bereft of the ascription of properties. Thus it is only partially true that “You cannot know who you are at a level where you are simply reduced to ‘everything’s being there’”\textsuperscript{61} as in Traherne’s description or Husserl’s account of the transcendental I. Who I am is not absolutely coincident with my personal identifiable being.

The sense of “who one is,” when taken as an identifiable person in the world, does not exhaust or even have an inkling of the more basic sense of “who one is,” which is surely intact in the first-person achievement of the transcendental reduction. Even here in the transcendental attitude wherein there is a doxastic disengagement from “the whole show” there is no doubt of who it is who says “I.” \textit{I} is the first-person singular nominative form that refers to my ineluctable first-person experience. In the phenomenological philosophical attitude, it is before all else a dative and nominative-agent of manifestation, even when it is, as we shall see,
always also a person and Existenz, immersed in agency with regard to the world, Others, and itself. Yet, as we shall see, this phenomenological attitude is not the primary philosophical attitude when Existence is at stake. There are times when it is more “philosophical,” i.e., imperative in the context of what is wisest, that one not be phenomenologically philosophical.

As Castaneda often said, phenomenological philosophy is done in the first-person, for the first-person, by the first-person. The “I,” which is the agent of phenomenological philosophy, of course is not first active in philosophy and the phenomenological attitude. As we have insisted, the I is not some particular experience which is preceded and followed by other experiences. It remains one and the same throughout the course of the entire manifold of experiences. “I” is not a particular content of any particular experience. Rather the experiences are mine because all experiences have this ineluctable feature of belonging to me who has them. Further, they “gather around” the I as iron filings around the magnet’s pole (as William James put it). In an emphatic, pronounced way, some are mine because I achieve them. But even if the experiences are not acts I put into play, the I is anonymously there. We can use Shaun Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of agency, where I am lived as the initiator or source of a thought or action, and the sense of ownership, where there is awareness that it is my body that is moving, that the experiences I am undergoing are mine, etc. In normal voluntary actions these senses coincide, as in reaching for a cup. But in involuntary action the two senses can come apart, as in undergoing spasms, but more basically in living the flow of the stream of my experiences and what Husserl calls passive synthesis.62

Husserl repeatedly described the anonymous functioning of the I as the source-point out of which acts surface; it is the living-pole prior to the acts in the passive streaming of experience. Thus the agency of manifestation, the I-pole, and first-person-experiences are in play in the natural attitude and prior to philosophical-phenomenological reflection. But it is the phenomenological reflection which makes a theme out of all of these. Indeed, it is only the phenomenological reflection which draws our attention to how all experience is rooted in the first-personal achievements of the agent of manifestation, whether active or passive, and how this agency as the agency of the subject of manifestation is not absolutely coincident with the person’s first-personal agency. As personal agents we are in the world with others. Thus we are for them and our personalities are constituted by them. This means many things, e.g., we are shaped by beliefs passed on by significant Others as well as by the larger sedimented beliefs of our history and culture. However, as first-personal agent of manifestation, “the whole show” is for me, even the for us of transcendental intersubjectivity is manifest by being for me.

The world as displayed is for the I, even when I have incorporated others into my perspective or have displaced myself to the perspective of others so that what is displayed is “for us all.” “For us” is an achievement by each of us, but from the standpoint of phenomenology even the “for us” is first of all a display by me, i.e., a display by me of us displaying. The scope of “us” depends on what is at stake. The “us” or “we” of some forms of reflection tied to imminent ethical agency,
e.g., in an emergency, will include all the “relevant” others; the “us” of phenomenological reflection includes “us all” who aspire to think about these matters, because we aspire to disclose what is essential, which generally refers to what is both universal and necessary. The achievements of the display are achievings of the I — and this is basic for their being our achievements. The self-reflexive phenomenological achievements, where each in her solitude is the field of investigation, is also “for us” not because the philosopher makes public what is essentially private and one’s own, but because she makes essential articulations in regard to “ownness” which aspire to be evident “for us all.” The achievements of the agent displaying, as having ongoing validity by being memorially retained, become havings or habitualities of the I. By force of the retention of the validity, e.g., of such achievements as judgments which have generated propositions, and the commitments which emanate from them, there is set up dispositions in regard to not yet experienced events. (All this will occupy us at length later.)

Whereas all that the I has, and all of the world’s things, and even the world’s believed-in coherence as the basis and frame for everything, can be taken out of commission, the I itself cannot be invalidated, modalized (doubted, made probable, negated), bracketed, or doxastically suspended. This sense of “I” is not in the world but what stands in correlation to the world. This “I” is called transcendental because it is that to which and by which the world appears. As such it is not to be found in the world or among the things in the world. It, as the dative and agent of manifestation transcends the world and is the lived or experienced condition for the world’s manifestation.

Although every transcendental I is someone in the world with others, a person (see below), an embodied spirit/soul, etc., and in this sense there is an identity between, e.g., Edmund Husserl, the husband of Malvine and the father of Wolfgang, Gerhard, and Ellie, and the transcendental I embodied in the production of such works as Ideas and Formal and Transcendental Logic, there nevertheless is not absolute coincidence. In this book we will often be dwelling on some aspects of this weak identity (or sameness relation) and non-coincidence.

All appearings are appearings of... “The cocky swagger” is an articulation of someone’s manner of walking. Indeed, “someone’s manner of walking,” is already a more general categorial display, “The graceful conquest of gravity” is the letting appear of a dancer’s motion. “These colors indicate it is granite, not igneous, and certainly not a meteorite” when spoken by a trusted geologist, might bring to light something important about a rock I am looking at, something that the geologist sees and which articulation I do not see but go along with. Phenomenology distinguishes the appearings of something, the “genitive of manifestation,” from the “dative of manifestation.” There are no showings, looks, manifestations, etc. of things, no genitive of manifestation, even if they be suspicious or eventually bogus, if there not be one to whom (dative) the appearings appear.63

The dative of manifestation is never merely passively receptive of the world’s self-givenness, as if it were bereft of all activity whatsoever. We have good reasons to assume that very early on the infant begins to articulate the world from the start in terms of presence and absence, sameness and difference and rest and motion, and
the one and the many. It is of course doing this within the framework of its needs and instincts. The latter might well begin already endowed with an a priori frame or schema of “you.” However this may be, this would not really be separable from the infant’s drive toward “sense-making” in terms of elemental identity syntheses.64

Even the adult, after putting in play the act of looking at or observing, e.g., the sea, and after having relaxed into an aesthetic and contemplative attitude of “just looking” wherein she would acknowledge: “I am not doing anything,” is achieving passive syntheses of identity, is accomplishing modalizations, etc. with regard to the play of light and darkness on the surface of the sea. But she very well may not be identifying the species of the birds, which one was just now shrieking; she may not be dealing with the contradictions and tensions that surface in the course of the flow of the stream of consciousness (Husserl: the modalizations). She may not be thinking about the causes for the change in colors or about the consequences of the change of wind from out of the north instead of the south. To do this she herself must become active.

For she herself to become active means that she can say from her lived experience: I come into play to make the distinctions, establish the cause, get clear on what is obscure. In which case use of the dative of manifestation is not fully appropriate to describe the state of affairs but rather the nominative first-person singular case is in order because I am the agent. In a special way I am responsible for the manifestation and can be held responsible. The use of the first-person in declarative sentences not only discloses states of affairs but signals that the speaker is an agent of manifestation who takes responsibility for the manifestation. The speaker and his achieving, “I think that…,” “I believe that…,” “I confess that…” are implicit in the declaratives, like “This is a seagull not a loon,” “The wind out of the north will chill the water because there will be an offshore breeze,” “The US is drifting toward fascism,” “There is eternal life.” Thus even in the natural attitude the actual use or tacit functioning of “I” in declarative sentences reveals a subtle transcendental point: states of affairs, propositions, etc., as expressed in declaratives are manifestations for which an agent is responsible.

Thus besides the active passivity of the dative of manifestation that holds the world together in a more or less delineated space of appearing without the I doing anything, there is the agency of manifestation. When I perceive intelligently, and am not merely wakefully functioning by letting familiar categories come into play by way of association, but rather bring out of fuzziness distinct considerations, establish states of affairs, reach conclusions, etc. I am present in a way that contrasts with the way I am merely “there” or undergoing the unfolding of perceptual events. This agency of the I, as brought to light in phenomenological reflection, is the proper sense of the transcendental I as the I of acts.

In this respect we can appreciate the metaphor of center and periphery. The I in its awakened agency may be regarded as center, whereas the realm of primary and secondary sensibility or soul is peripheral. And while I am busy with the allure of one field or part of a field of sensibility, e.g., gazing at the sea, there are other fields or realms of interest, e.g., family concerns, health, the preoccupation with the foreign policy of my country, etc., that are “on the back burner.” They may remain there for now, but something can make any one of them importunate, i.e., they can
come to take over my field of attention. Think of how one’s field of concern shifts with the sudden news of misfortune befalling a loved one. Where before I was attentive elsewhere and the other’s life was on the margin of my horizon of concerns, now it becomes focal. Or less dramatically, think of how a sound in the background that first was unnoticed becomes louder so that it becomes noticed but still background, but then becomes so importunate that now I must attend to it or it becomes so intrusive that it swallows my entire horizon of perception.

We may think of the realm of soul as the realm of the havings of the I of acts (“spirit”). (See the discussion in Chapter III, §3.) As we shall see, the person is the whole made of I-spirit and soul, and what the I-informed soul organizes or informs in its insertion in the natural-physical world with Others. This is the realm of the lived and objective “body” with its drives, instincts, and more or less autonomous functions. Doubtless the I is often passive and weak in the face of the forceful powers of life and soul even when these are informed by frameworks the I has established. In thinking and willing we say with degrees of emphasis I think, I choose/will, I act, etc., and these expressions reflect frameworks the I-acts have established and which determine much of what follows in the person’s cognitive and volitional agency. But in the face of the great events and currents of life that we feel we may say: It overwhelmed me, It shattered me, It enchanted me, etc. Here “life” is the agent and I am what is the patient. All this, of course, is true, but it is clear that on these momentous occasions I am called upon to take a position, to judge, act, comply, resist. As powerful as these feelings, which reveal the world, might be, they are mine to appropriate, to manage, to hold at bay, etc. As we shall see, they are not eo ipso, by reason of the force they exercise on me, what ought to displace the I or be at the center of my life. Rather I am “archonal,” my being I myself is to be my beginning, to be the source of my agency. In this sense, the center is also the periphery, transcends the periphery that it “has” and what allures it by going back behind, “retroscending,” itself. Even though pulled beyond myself by what affects me and what I have, I take hold of myself as I am pulled away from myself and “I arouse myself” (Kierkegaard). Here the center-periphery metaphor loses its static character and the center retroscends itself and irradiates out to itself, to its periphery. Even though my present agency is ineluctably motivated by the frameworks I have established, the agency is “archonal” in as much as I have established them, even if through appropriating them from Others. Because I am motivated by my constituted frameworks of perception and agency one may not conclude that it is the efficient causation of the physical events which are the bases of my interpretation and execution of how I am to act in this situation.

§5 Dasein, Being-in-the-World, and “Meontology”

It might appear that another reason for eliminating “I” from consciousness is to be found in the Heideggerian third-person consideration that what we call human consciousness is the “there”/“here” (“Da”) of To Be/Being/Sein. Although it might
seem that Da-Sein is completely lost in the world or Being and then subsequently turns toward itself and acquires self-acquaintance, Heidegger in fact clearly held that the self is self-present prior to any reflection. The non-reflexive presence of the self to itself is co-original with the lighting up or display of the world. Furthermore for Heidegger Dasein, although a third-person description, is pervaede by an ineluctable “mineness” and is defined in relation to the task to exist authentically, i.e., to avoid living on any other terms than that which is evident and properly so for oneself alone.

Dasein has to do with the being who is essentially concerned about that for the sake of which everything else is undertaken and, inseparably, the meaning of the ultimate horizon (Sein). Such a being is essentially self-transcending. This is to say that a human being is “there” (da), ahead of itself in its quest for that for the sake of which everything is undertaken, and inseparably, in the search for the meaning of Sein. At the same time this being in its concern about what is beyond beings is the place where Sein (To Be or Being) discloses itself. Its being is not merely to be ecstatic to itself in the quest of Being but it is also the place “here” (da; in German da can mean both “there” as well as “here” – as in, for the latter case, one might answer “Ich bin da” in answer to the question “Wer ist da?” or “Who is there?”) where To Be discloses itself. (The infinitive lays claim to more legitimacy than the verbal noun or gerund because the latter pressures the reader to make of Sein a Seiende, an entity or being.) As the “here/there” of To Be, Dasein is necessarily both the dative and agent of manifestation as well as the anticipation of To Be as that for the sake of which everything is undertaken, including manifestation. In both respects, in this being’s striving as well as in this being’s agency of manifestation, it is Dasein. The consideration that this “being” is both ecstatic to itself and intentionally beyond itself as a being in the world with others, as well as that it is the place in which world and To Be get manifested inseparably from its own self-presence raises the question about the being of this “being,” the meaning of Dasein, e.g., in what sense is it or is it not an entity in the world.

We may think of Da-Sein to be a way of construing oneself or consciousness as an “is-ing” rather than something which is a finished entity, i.e., we may think of it as involved in the gerundial all-pervasive self-luminosity and lighting up of the world as a field of display and not of display itself. For Husserl and Heidegger, the telos of display is the proposition which appears in the world in the declarative sentence whereby something is brought to light in a certain way; but this syntactic achievement involves our prior taking something as something. The “is” of the proposition by which we assert P to be q (even P plus an action verb or a passive form may be rendered with “is”) presupposes the prior having appreciated P as q. But prior to, and more basic than, the taking as… is the gerundial achievement of being in the primal presencing’s proto-doxastic “is-ing” as the basement of the continuity of being prior to its articulation. But this very continuity shows up in the discontinuity of taking as, where something emerges discretely from out of this more or less continuous context; and it shows up in the proposition where things are syntactically linked, P is q, i.e., when the “is” enables an emphasis of the link or tie of P and q. This emphasis occurs when the surmounted discreetness of P and q in a passive synthetic achievement becomes a responsible tie. But, again, the ongoing
continuous primal presencing is always a presencing to me; and “each time” it is always my retention and “each time” it is always mine to pretend. And the articulations themselves, as we have seen, point to the declarative, and eventually the transcendental, sense of I.67

The hyphenated phrase derived from Heidegger, “being-in-the-world,” is a way of amplifying the thesis of intentionality, i.e., that all consciousness is consciousness of something and that any act of consciousness is within the wider weave of the horizon of acts and passive syntheses. We have said that world is the ultimate context of which we are conscious in our being conscious of any thing. The perennial temptation to think of consciousness as the brain or as a self-contained repository of mental events that projects schemas of meaning subsequent to getting stimulated from outside is rejected by phenomenology: The kind of being of those who are conscious and wakeful in a more or less human way requires a being-in, which, as Heidegger suggested, we might think of in terms of dwelling or inhabiting a surrounding. All animals dwell in and constitute a surrounding. If they are human-like their surrounding is not confined to their immediate physical surrounding or environment as highlighted by their drives and instincts, but the environment as well as the encompassing surrounding of all there is itself is a theme for consideration. We have reason to believe that the vanishing Great Lakes perch, however much they may suffer from the causes of their demise, e.g., the predation by other species, not only do not concern themselves with causes of environmental degradation of the lake water, such as the Zebra mussels, that threaten the extinction of themselves and many fish species; nor do they take cognitive interest in the causes of the lowering of the lake water level, or how this might be connected to “development” and global warming, and how the “global economy” (which understands the Great Lakes as “economic resources” which may be dredged when deemed necessary by the authorities for facilitating NAFTA shipping traffic which bears the Zebra mussels) might stand behind these issues, and what this might all mean for the future of the planet and the possible extinction of all species; a fortiori the perch do not reflect on what the extinction of themselves and the human species means with respect to the dative of manifestation, and what the extinction of the dative of manifestation might mean in regard to the philosophical thesis about the inseparability of being and display. Humans, of course, do not undertake these reflections as a matter of necessity. And yet one can say that humans exist “in the world” and not merely in an ecological environment. And in order that the world and questions like these not be a theme they have to constrict the horizon of interests of their lives, and work at suppressing the ultimate horizon of the world.

In this work we appropriate Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as the both the “here” and “there” of “Being.” Dasein’s being ecstatic to itself appears first of all in first-personal lived experience in the form of a practical quest of the unsurpassable Good, but also, and inseparably, in its concern about that encompassing realm that enables beings to appear categorically, e.g., as things in the world, and eventually as beings within Being. Whereas the Good is the encompassing practical concern, the theoretical concern for Heidegger is Sein, which initially may be thought of as that which comes into view in all bringing into view – but which itself holds
itself back and eludes being brought into view. Thus the theoretical eros attends to the ultimate encompassing horizon and this forever explodes the reduction of world to environment. Thus Dasein is a useful term in so far as it emphasizes the conative, and ecstatic features of intentional being in the world. We live in the not yet, sometimes in joy, sometimes in dread; we live facing goals and ideals; we are aware of fearful deadlines and our death as the ultimate ownmost ineluctable “possibility.” Tendency, striving, and a general sense of will are inherent in the notions both of life and intentionality. The transcendental phenomenology proposed in this volume appropriates Dasein as the luminous “here” to which beings appear and to which world appears as that within which all that appears appears.

Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, his “ontological” study of being human, seems to take place almost exclusively in the third-person. Yet the very rich pages on the Who of Dasein reveal that Dasein is that being that I myself always am and the Sein of Dasein is always mine. The Who is indeed I myself who am maintained as identically I myself in the course of the flux of comportments and experiences and who stands in relationship to these. Indeed “substance” is the ontological clue for the determination of that being of the I who answers to the question, Who is the being that Dasein is? But the tendency to see substance as what is present before us as an object is to be resisted. (See our discussion below in Chapter V, §3 on I myself as substance.)

Because of my intersubjectivity and world-involvement, my being in the world with Others, the view that I myself, JG Hart who is so and so and done such and such, am precisely who it is who is the being of Dasein leads us to the problem that any ready answer to this question of Who is the being of Dasein might well be one which, because of its false identifications, inauthenticity and confusion, bears witness precisely to who I am not. (These are matters we discuss in Book 2.)

Of abiding interest is the standpoint of the one speaking about Dasein. If we take the “da” as the “here” of the speaker and thinker, then, of course, we slide into a first-person perspective: I, here, in standing out in the openness of Being there. Yet there is also the possibility of taking Dasein Itself as “there” for the author of Sein und Zeit. In this case the “here” of the author is juxtaposed to Dasein “there” so that Dasein is a third-person term being disclosed by the agent of manifestation who is the anonymous thinker behind the analyses comprising Sein und Zeit. In both Fichte and Heidegger Dasein is sometimes understood as the “there” of Sein; but that is done in a third-person perspective and neither takes up a position which would presume that the speaker/author occupied the first-person perspective of the “here” of Sein, so that the da of Dasein would be “there” for the here of the speaker identified with Sein. We will later have reason to ask whether the transcendental phenomenological “I” is not indeed the necessary standpoint of the investigation of Dasein, just as it would seem to be the presupposition for the fine analyses of Existenz in Karl Jaspers. Nevertheless, of neither Heidegger nor Jaspers, in spite of this neglect of the transcendental I, could it be said that there is a temptation to subordinate who one is to what one is.

In this work the “here” (da) of “Being” is the transcendental I. Heidegger faulted Husserl for not really raising the issue of the oddness of the kind of being it was
that brought the world to light. “What is the kind of being of the entity in which the
‘world’ is constituted?… [What is most important] is showing that the kind of being
of human Dasein is totally different from that of all other entities and that the kind
of being, which it is, shelters right within it the possibility of transcendental consti-
tution…. What constitutes is not nothing; but it is something and exists – though
not in the sense of something positively existing.”70 In fact, ten years earlier (1917)
Husserl himself highlighted the difficulty of talking about the transcendental
I when he noted that as the identical pole for all that is disclosed and posited as
being in time it is not temporal but rather trans-temporal, and as an individual it is
not individual by being individuated by having a place in time. As an individual,
something typically exists as contingently now and here, not so the I. Of course, an
individual object in the world is contingent, but the I is not an object but a subject
for which the world is. Therefore in the case of the transcendental I there is both
individuality and necessity. It is the uniquely necessary unique individual. Further:
“The I is necessarily [in itself] individual and uniquely unique (das einzige).” 71 (We
will explicitly address the uniqueness and necessity of the I in the chapters that fol-
low; for the problem of individuality, see especially Chapters III and IV; for the odd
sense of necessity, see especially Chapter V, §6.)

Such passages illustrate that although Husserl inveterately is talking about a
What, i.e., the eidos transcendental I, nevertheless by calling it “the eidos I” he does
not subordinate who one is to what one is. “The I” is always the essence of a
uniquely unique individual, a singularity, an haecceity; it is the eidos of an individ-
ual essence. This is the central theme of this work.

In these same passages Husserl went on to urge that we think about the transcen-
dental I in terms of non-being. This kind of “ontology,” since Plotinus, has been
called “meontology.” Just as in the case of Plotinus’ refusal of the property of being
to the One, so the analogous meon (μη'ον) in Husserl is not simply non-being or
nothingness, not a mere nihil negativum. (Even though the “myself” is central to
this work, “meontology” is not to be confused with a “me” (first-person singular
accusative) ontology, where the being referred to becomes an absolute; even
though we feature the “myself” and “ownness,” the English first-person accusa-
tive pronoun, “me,” is to be distinguished from the Greek word for a negation or
privation, “not” or “non,” mé (μή). Yet teasing out its peculiar “kind of ‘being’ or
non-being is a difficult matter. We have already had occasion to mention that the
referent of “I” is not a kind; we will show how “I” is not a sortal term and how,
when we refer to it, we do so without ascribing properties. It is surely not what is
present among what we make present and never simply over against us (Gegenstand),
but rather is the primal shining and showing by which all that comes to light is
brought to light but itself is never among the displayed and artificed beings
brought to light.

As Husserl put it: “The I ought not properly be called I, indeed, it should not be
named at all because then it is already become objective. It is the nameless, beyond
all that is grasppable and beyond all not as what stands or hovers or exists, but as the
“‘functioning,’ grasping, valuing.” He further notes that it is not an object
(Gegenstand), but a primal substance (Ur-stand). The nameless is not “being;” but
“functioning.”? If our names are a result of a display of something which comes to be present and absent, and then we learn to have it before us in a way that is indifferent to its presence and absence, “I” is never present or absent precisely in this way and therefore what the transcendental I refers to is not properly a name.

In the course of this work we will be deepening an appreciation of this so-called “meontology.” It is non-being as not something posited, not in the world, not in space, not in time, without content and properties. Yet this non-being is odd because we will claim that the I is always “myself” and an “individual essence,” and, as we saw, inseparable from an odd kind of “flow.” Although the theme of the transcendental I as meon is not identical with the I as unique ipseity, there is a coincidence in that each case there is a nothingness. In the former case the nothingness has to do with its being that through and by which any being appears but which itself does not appear as such a being; in the latter case it has to do similarly with its not being among the beings that appear but also with its being present as bereft of properties by reason of the unique mode of manifestation in self-awareness and, as well, in the indexical reference. The transcendental I as an eidos of course has properties, e.g., being the center, source, and pole of acts, being free, having the dimension of soul, etc. But as lived non-reflective functioning source, it is the “myself” and a unique essence bereft of properties. (See Chapters III and V.)

§6 Self-Awareness, Self-Blindness, and “The Externus Hypothesis”

The light metaphor enjoys a venerable status in discussions of ultimate issues. Things stand out, are visible and manifest, because they are lustrous, luminous. But without the sun or some artificial light things would not have this lightsomeness, visibility, and luminosity of things. Yet even here these two senses of light are insufficient for what we call the manifestation or visibility of things. Only if we also include the light of mind as part of the setting for things to come to light are the luminous things, as brought to light by the light of the sun or artificial light, displayed. Nothing shows itself in the absence of the dative of manifestation, regardless of the colorfulness of things or the brightness of the light. “Light must meet light in order that there be light.” (Conrad-Martius.) However we understand this meeting of light by light (we may think of the light that is met by the mind as a natural light or merely as the luminosity of the intelligibility of “dark matter”), it is clear that pitch blackness and the darkest darkness can reveal secrets to intentional probing. (Telescopes, microscopes, etc., incarnate and amplify this probing.) Intentionality of world may be thought of as providing the lightsome space in which things in the world come to light.

Dasein, as the luminous “here” to which and through which world appears, is also self-luminous, self-present. We here pick up our earlier discussion of the prior self-acquaintance or familiarity that enables first-person reference. Self-luminous means here that the manifestation is not “from elsewhere,” not from a source outside
itself, even an intentional reflective act. This self-luminosity of intentionality is not emergent from intentionality bringing forth something, e.g., itself or oneself, into the light, as if prior to intentionality’s shining on itself, intentionality’s directedness was dark, mute, nothing. Rather here is a manifestation that exists independently of what the ray of intentionality brings to light; indeed, it makes of the intentional act an act of disclosure because it makes the act itself self-luminous and this accounts both for intentionality’s being mine and my being the “here”/“there” percipient of what it discloses. Unless I am of necessity self-present in my intentionality I could not be “there” and have what is “there” revealed to me “here.” That is to say that it belongs to intentionality’s essence to be self-present or luminous to itself prior to and as the basis of its being the active agent of manifestation of itself and of the world. There would be no agency of manifestation of the world, if there were not the prior self-luminosity of the agent. It is this prior self-luminousness that makes the dative of manifestation open to the genitive of manifestation and enables the appearings to be appearings to me who am already wakeful and open to such revelations.

Thus the world’s illumination is not best thought of as the illumination of an artificial beam, e.g., of a flashlight. The flashlight’s cone or periphery is finite even if not determinate. World’s horizon is open-ended. We stop where we do because of contingent and often practical circumstances, not because we necessarily want to or must stop. Further the flashlight does not shine on itself. But even if it did, e.g., through hitting a mirror, that would not eo ipso make it self-luminous. The luminosity would still be from outside itself, i.e., the reflected light off the mirror. But we may not let this analogy with the flashlight or torch mislead us, for what we are talking about is the metaphor of light for knowing and consciousness. The luminous cone brought about by the flashlight requires the self-luminosity of the one using the flashlight in order for itself and the illuminated the things to be visible “to” the perceiver. Things do not come to light for the unconscious flashlight by itself.

Consciousness may be thought of as being-in-the-world and as being the luminous “here” of the world. As such it is inseparably a form of self-awareness. “Here,” like “there,” “now,” “then,” “this,” “that,” “today,” and all the indexicals, makes sense for the listener through the self-awareness of the “I,” the self-awareness of the one speaking the sentence. They all take their bearings and their sense from “I,” not the other way around. If there were absent any sense of “I” the other indexicals would make no sense at all. For example, “there” is tied to “here” and “here” is inseparable from me or I myself being “here.” “There” or “here” in the absence of my being here is meaningless. “Then” is tied to “now” and “now” is inseparably “present” and inseparably present to me, a presence for my self-presence. Although “I” as an indexical is always bound to other indexicals, e.g., “this, here, now,” there are important anomalous senses of “I” that are not so bound. (More about this soon.)

The performative achievement of “I” is not what brings about self-awareness, nor is it the reflective act that brings about self-awareness. What we may call the philosophical (because the non-reflective is a theme only for philosophers) sense of “first-person” underlies the performative sense. It also underlies the grammatical
The grammatical “person,” as one of the properties of nouns, has to do with the speaker (first-person), the one spoken-to (second-person), and the one or thing spoken of (third-person). If in the first grammatical case we do not have to do with “the myself” as not non-reflectively lived but rather the speaker speaking about himself, the speaking “first-person” slides into the being absorbed by himself in the third-person. In the other case, the “second-person,” the one spoken to, is the addressee addressed with “you.” “You” makes no sense unless the one addressed is appresented as non-reflectively self-aware in living her life, i.e., as a second first-person. As a second first-person she is present as non-reflectively self-aware and this is the condition of her reflectively and responsibly saying “I” and “you” in return. In the third case, we have to do with someone who is absent from the scope of our address and about whom one is speaking. And if the one spoken about is a person, a third-person and third first-person, this one is apperceived as living first-personally her or his life (“she” or “he”). If the one spoken about is not a person we say “it” and may or may not regard “it” as deprived of the capacity to live her or his life.

Because the achievement of “I” refers to the speaker as herself, and thereby requires a kind of thematization or objectification, even though often marginal, of “myself,” philosophers are tempted to think of the first-person as always having to do with “propositions” or intentionality or forms of reference. However, both the achievement of “I” as well as self-reflection presuppose a prior familiarity with oneself as the lived foundation for self-reference and self-reflection which gives birth to propositions. Prior to reflection and self-awareness I am present to myself but in no way as a genitive of manifestation to a dative of manifestation. In reflection I am aware of myself; myself is a target of my intentional act and thereby I become an accusative for myself; and in this awareness myself is present to me myself.

The bifurcation that brings about this kind of self-awareness is the necessary condition for phenomenological analysis wherein properties of the life of consciousness are elicited from out of the reflected-on substrate. What characterizes this analysis is the unique kind of identity synthesis brought about by reflection: I experience this which is under analysis and receiving predication as the same as what I (pre-reflectively) experienced prior to the reflection. I now reflectively experience in a categorical and syntactic intending as a filling of what I before and anticipatorily protended as a possibility (“I can reflect”) prior to the act of reflection. Further the subsequent reflection’s retention is precisely a retention of this protention as prior to reflection. What before was life and lived with its retentions and protentions becomes a theme for intentional analysis.

Doubtless language and especially the declarative performative utterances are essential for this distancing and readying for reflection. There is sense and proto-syntax prior to language and reflection, but the sense is differently “there” in language and reflection. Sense is differently present in the full-blown linguistic articulation that the bird is perched on the limb than in seeing the bird perched on the limb. The articulation gives me something more explicit to think about and reflect on than does the former case. Similarly, the sense of “myself” is different in the passive flow of the stream of consciousness from the sense that emerges in
using the indexical “I.” Or consider the difference between the state of affairs of the passive synthetic tacit apperceiving “someone standing next to me at the table laden with wares” and the same state of affairs transformed by the agency of the I intervening with a position-taking act, as “Hey! The ‘one’ next to me is a mannequin and not a person at all!” This latter case is not only an articulation of what before was pre-propositionally present, but it negates the prior implicit proposition that “someone.”

The directedness of consciousness that was totally oblivious to itself would resemble the directedness of a projectile in space. It would be a “directedness-toward” bereft of agency of manifestation because bereft of self-awareness. Of such a “consciousness,” e.g., a code-bar scanner, we do not ask, “What would it be like to be a code-bar scanner?” because it is bereft of the self-awareness that we apperceive in a bat or gazelle. How could there be display and articulation if “no one is there.” Flashlights, mirrors, computers, code-bar scanners, thermostats, calculators, etc. do not display to themselves but rather are devices by which we humans display the world to ourselves. Even a computer’s cursive, or “self-referring” activity does not involve the self of self-awareness and the self’s self-reference, but that of an non-conscious non-living electronic part acting upon another non-conscious non-living electronic part in a circular way. Part A connects with B which connects with C which connects with A in such a way that, next time, when A connects with B connecting with C, A will be connected again. Even if there is a logic and necessary inherent sense of A, B, and C, the evidence for the logic and sense is evident to the electrical engineer or the programmer or the one studying the functions of the computer, not to the parts (A, B, C) of the circuit board, or not even all the parts taken together.

All the conative, voluntary and epistemic attitudes, if bereft of self-awareness, would mean I would know, desire, choose, etc., without my knowing it in any sense whatsoever. I would have, as it were, received knowledge, passions, options, etc., as I might receive an external coloring or even a virus, without my having to take a stance toward them, and without knowing that they were mine and changing me. I would know, desire, choose, etc., without knowing in any sense that I did such things. Or I would be said to know, desire, choose, etc., when you or someone else might just as well have done these things. Someone doing something would be a matter of a third-person ascription to an “agent” that she was a recipient of an agency, or it would be a third-person description of “agency” as a motion or other change of a body identified as continuously the same. In neither case would it have anything to do with the agent’s being aware or her agency.

But how can I have knowledge and know, have had choices and choose, without my awareness and knowing that they are mine? How can I know that they might just as well belong to and have been done by someone else if there were no difference between my doing it and you doing it? “Can I know without knowing that it is I who know?” Knowing and desiring are forms of living intentional directedness; a knowing or desiring that was not self-aware would neither be a disclosure of the world nor would it be something I did that was evident to me. They could not be something for which I was responsible in any way and which I could pursue or realize.
If there were no self-awareness, how could the intelligible be intelligible, i.e., soaked with meaning meant by me and for me? How could the good or desirable be desirable, if it were not present as desirous for me in my desiring it? The known would be cut off from its being intelligible, its being known, and its articulation, and the desired cut off from its desirability and goodness. One can not speak of knowing something or of “something known,” without a knower aware of her capacity to manifest and articulate this known through thoughtful acts and speech. There is no knowing something, no being intentionally directed toward, whether or not in a propositional attitude (knowing that…) without one non-propositionally knowing “that” one “knows,” i.e., is aware of this knowing. A known requires a knowing and an awareness of oneself as an agent of manifestation, just as something desired requires awareness of oneself as a practical agent and awareness of oneself as a source of having feeling and desire. This is to say that the admired and charming requires oneself to be struck with awe and charmed – and I could not be charmed or in awe without being aware of this.

When I know, I must know that I know. When I feel I must know that I feel. When I desire I must know that I desire. The knowledge, the feeling, the desire, are possible only under the condition of being known, and being known by me. For if I did not know that I knew, I would not know, – and if I did not know that I felt I would not feel, – if I did not know that I desired, I would not desire.74

Three things are to be noted here:

1. Because we are here addressing the issue of the essential state of affairs of the self-awareness accompanying all acts, the compounded “knowing that I know” may not be a compounded propositional act, otherwise we would face an infinite regress. It thus is distinguished from attending reflectively to an act, e.g., of knowing, as in not only perceiving the parade (perceiving that there is a parade, that the elephant is wearing a diaper, etc.) but being aware that I am perceiving the parade. The pre-reflective and pre-propositional “knowing that” (I know that…) must be placed in scare-quotes because it is knowing in an improper sense: It is a living or living through, not yet an intentional act directed at the first-order knowing. If we do not make this distinction we have the impossible task of requiring an infinity of acts of reflection in order to know anything. If the original knowing requires a second act of knowing for it to be a knowing, then because all knowing requires another “knowing that I know” the act of reflection itself as a form of knowing would require another third act of knowing, a second act of reflection, and this act as an act of knowing (the knowing of the act of reflection on the original knowing) would itself require another act; but then this fourth act of knowing, i.e., the third act of reflection, in order to be a knowing would require another, fourth, act of reflection, etc. On this account I could never know at all because there could never be a way of (consciously) knowing without the impossible achievement of the infinite number of acts of reflective knowing of knowing. Therefore the consciousness, i.e., self-presence or self-awareness required for intentionality is one that is prior to reflection. If it required a reflective intentional knowing, I would never know that I know.
2. Because all intentional acts, e.g., knowing, feeling, desiring, are disclosures of the world, e.g., of what is known, felt, desired, then there must be another kind of manifestation than that of the genitive of manifestation to a dative of manifestation in order for the kind of disclosure that characterizes the self-presence of intentionality to occur. The agent of manifestation must be already self-manifest in order for it to actuate the scene of a genitive and dative of manifestation. There is no presence of something to me unless I am already self-present. And this self-presence is not of something to me, i.e., I am present not as a genitive of manifestation to a dative of manifestation. There is no awareness of... or manifestation of... unless I am already self-aware and not aware of... This is not a deduction or a postulate. One need only ask herself whether when she experiences “Ah hah!” she is in no way aware of understanding, or, if she is astonished, is she unconscious of being astonished, or if she desires something is she absolutely bereft of any awareness of this desire, etc.

3. On the surface, the formulation, “if I know, I know that I know,” sounds like a thesis about the relationship between first-order and higher-order acts which are founded on the first-order ones. As such, it could be contrasted with belief implications, like: “It is raining, and therefore I believe that I will get wet if I go outside.” My second belief about my getting wet is dependent on the first belief about it now raining and in this sense is founded in the first. But the higher-order belief is not a result of a logical implication but rather of an act intending an act. The higher order belief is founded in the first-order belief and could not exist without it; yet the first-order belief (“It is raining”) could exist without the founded inferred belief (“Therefore I will get wet”). The first-order belief intends a state of affairs whereas the second-order act intends it, the first-order belief. Thus the founded second-order belief is not of the order, “It is raining, and therefore I believe it is raining.” The latter belief may be thought to be entailed by the first assertion or proposition, “It is raining.”

None of these are the sense we want to give to the formulation, “When I believe, I believe that I believe.” Even the declarative use of “I” and the transcendental pre-fix as implicit in any declarative sentence get at what is at stake in “when I believe, I believe that I believe.” The reason is that even the declarative transcendental pre-fix, e.g., “I see,” is implied as a transcendental condition in “There is a zebra” so that the fuller display is “I see that (there is a zebra).” But our immediate point here is that even this transcendental prefix is enjoys through a non-reflective living-through the act of seeing there is a zebra. That is the “I see that” itself is self-luminous, and this is not inferred as is its existence as the transcendental pre-fix, but it is essential to its being an epistemic act of “I see.”

Thus what we here want to highlight is that desires and beliefs are lived, not inferred from declaratives, or postulated unconscious conditions for the possibility of a cognitive achievement, or third-person behaviorist perspectives on ourselves. “It is raining” has for its tacit or explicit pre-fix the declarative “I,” as in “I see that it is raining.” This living-through of the acts Husserl speaks of occasionally as a belief, a primal belief, and that would seem to be a higher-order act.
In which case, non- or pre-reflective self-awareness of our selves in our act-life would be a belief that I believe. But this is misleading. Our thesis, and this is surely Husserl’s, is that non-reflective self-awareness is not an intentional act of belief, not even an act of reflection.

Rational and responsible action very often is a case of informing our desires with belief-informed desires. It therefore presupposes the first-order desires and that the second-order desire is not foreign to the sense of the first-order desire. This points to the view (of both Husserl and Sydney Shoemaker) that the desire for rationality, evidence, coherence, etc. is in play from the start in all our first-order agency. Thus first-order acts are not only self-aware but they are informed by the basic will to rationality and justification, and this motivates second-order intentions in the face of conflicts, obscurity, etc. It motivates rational self-reflection. The deliberative and self-constituting and self-transforming second-order intentions, like knowing (in a proper reflective sense) that I know and knowing (in a proper reflective sense) that I desire, and desiring or willing to have specific desires that are informed by beliefs, etc. build upon the lived first-person experience of the first-order intentions which themselves have a latent rationality and desire for rationality. In these cases typically second-order intentions as lived do not themselves motivate rational self-reflection because they themselves are precisely in these cases rational self-reflection. That is, they typically are or can be acts of filled intentions of the appropriate and adequate evidence and motivations.

This view is challenged with the thesis of “self-blindness.” Self-blindness is a thesis allied to what we will refer to below as the “Externus hypothesis.” The self-blind creature would be one which has the conception of mental states as applying to itself in the third-person but it is not in a position to know these by first-person access. (Cf. our earlier discussion of the no-ownership theory and free-floating experiences.) Moore’s paradox, “It is raining, but I don’t believe it is raining,” would generally be acknowledged to be not rationally achievable as an assertion – because “it is raining” requires the transcendental pre-fix, “I believe that (it is raining.)” However, in the case of the possible world self-blind person it may be true. The transcendental pre-fix or the declarative I could be not mine who self-blindly says, “It is raining,” but someone else’s! Or the transcendental pre-fix could be mine, but that to which it was a pre-fix could just as well be someone else’s statement. Thus for one imaginative construction of the self-blind person, the proposition “It is raining” would be true; but for this person there would not be any “transcendental pre-fix” nor would there be the “declarative I,” as in: “(I believe that/ I think that) it is raining.” Thus it is not merely that the acts by which the present raining is displayed are so anonymous that they would be non-existent for the self-blind person.

The true assertion would be this person’s in an odd sense because it could just as well be in someone else’s stream of consciousness; the particular mind’s agency and involvement would be of no relevance and the achievement “It is raining” would simply be a free-floating mind-independent present state of affairs of the world which can only loosely be called an “assertion” only in the way a proposition may sometimes be called a judgment or a “posit,” i.e., without reference to any responsible agency of manifestation. (Think of the computer’s announcing: “You
have given an unlawful command.”) Further, in this view, the second phrase, “but I don’t believe it is raining,” in order to be paradoxical would have to be an achievement of the same self-blind person. This same person, who has “mastered the language,” in particular the use of the personal pronouns, applies the first-person forms to his exclusively third-person behaviorist perspective on himself, e.g., observing himself in mirror or through the eyes of others or through introspection. Thus he observes “himself” going out without an umbrella or raincoat and infers: this JG Hart clearly believes it is not raining and is going outside as if it were a clear day. Therefore this “I,” i.e., this JG Hart, does not believe it is raining. “I don’t believe it” would therefore not be witness to any first-person non-reflexive experience of oneself not believing.

In our view, the paradox lacks intelligibility in both its parts and therefore fails as a paradox. “It is raining” is not the achievement of a zombie or tape recorder, nor does it resemble the thermometer registering 0°C under the appropriate conditions. Rather it is an articulation of the world by someone. When “It is raining” is a result of my observation then it can be rendered by “I see or observe that it is raining.” I cannot be aware that I am observing the rain without being aware (in a non-intentional sense of awareness) that I am observing the rain and making the judgment. The use of syntax in displaying the rain coming down is not the work of a barometer or logic machine but a display of the world through a judgment.

Similarly the “paradoxical” second-part (“but I don’t believe it”) would require that the one saying (inferentially) “I” observes, i.e., displays himself in the third-person. We have already briefly discussed the difficulty in making the claim that to be aware of, and in this sense, to know, oneself requires a third-person identifying, criterial knowing. If such a stipulation is in place, the sense of “but I don’t believe it” here is made impossible because of the problem of infinite regress.

Further, the conjunction, “but,” refers to the prior (un-minded) belief and takes issue with it as a belief which itself is unminded. But this is like saying that a recording on the tape recorder took issue with what was “said” by a thermostat.

Furthermore, this, the third-person perspective on “himself,” is still as a perceiving, a display in the first-person by the one who allegedly says “I” only inferentially and who allegedly self-blindly displays himself in the third-person as not believing that it is raining. The basic issue of such an example of self-blindness is whether it makes sense to speak of assertions or observations as if they were detached from the articulating acts of the one making them; it is the issue of whether the displayed world occurs absolutely without the tacit awareness of the achievement of the one displaying. This is the issue of “Externus” to which we will now turn.

The observation (a) “There are many people in this room,” is equally rendered by (b) “There seem to be many people in this room” and more precisely by (c) “There seem to me to be many people in this room.” But this claim has been rejected. Rather it holds (b) can very well be translated into (a). But to say that (c) is really translatable into (a) might be taken to imply that there is a form of intentional consciousness occurring without my knowing it. This phenomenological philosophy rejects this view that has been called by Castañeda “the Externus Hypothesis.” “There are many people in this room,” taken as a categorical display (and not a
parroting), where articulations of syntax, quantification and a state of affairs are brought to light, makes no sense if the agent of manifestation is unconscious and the display is absolutely unknown to the speaker or agent of manifestation. “It makes no sense” literally because “making sense” and “display” are always for at least the speaker or agent of manifestation. “Making sense” does not happen unconsciously, even if it is true that not all that goes into the agency of sense-making is explicitly known and even if it is true that not all the implications of this articulation are explicitly known.

Here we may recall that so far this discussion is consonant with Castañeda’s thesis regarding the transcendental pre-fix. But the Externus Hypothesis points to how we might sometimes be in less articulate forms of agency of manifestation and how non-human forms of consciousness might be. It also points to the more basic issue that for Castañeda all self-awareness derives from reflection and therefore the Externus Hypothesis is quite central to his basic theory on self-reference.

Our position is that there is an essential lived prior self-acquaintance as the condition for all intentional acts and disclosures of the world. Whether this self-acquaintance holds in all kinds of animal consciousness and human consciousness remains unclear. A difficulty is the obvious one that our reflection on animal and anomalous human consciousness can occur only through a reconstruction from our own wakeful articulating consciousness. The consciousness, e.g., of human embryos or bugs, or even the fixated consciousness of the prey by the predator may involve a non-self-aware consciousness. Because of this possibility “the Externus Hypothesis” has merit. For the human intentionality, however, there is no appearing of something in the world to me unless I am self-present, immanently, consciously, alive to myself, regardless of how absorbed I am in the thing or object. The Externus Hypothesis ultimately permits one to have a knowing or desiring without any awareness of it being one’s own; it permits the knowing or desiring just as well to have been achieved by someone else.

Spelling out this original self-awareness, this non-intentional, non-reflective self-manifestation is a cardinal task of phenomenology.77 Key for this book’s main theses is the position that it has to do with a particular form of “I” or “I-ness” or “I myself-ness.” We say it is “a form of I-ness” because the linguistic achievement of the first-person singular pronoun, “I,” is a self-referential and reflective act. In this act I have “myself as myself.” This is to be distinguished from how I am for myself prior to the linguistic act of achieving “I.” Being present to myself as myself explicates the prior sense of myself that I always carry prior to and apart from using the first-person singular pronoun. This aliveness to myself is the condition for my being the “here;” i.e., being the da, of the world’s manifestation; it is also the condition for my being “there;” i.e., intentionally in-the-world. The sense of prior “sense” here is surely odd because it is quite apart from any act of meaning or sense-making act; yet our thesis is that this “primal sense of oneself,” even though not properly a knowing, is still in an important sense a display, a manifestation, and what is displayed even has an “essential sense.”

Thus we face the oddness of the “reference” of “I,” a theme to which we will repeatedly return. “I” is not a description or name of what it refers to. It is an
indexical. But if “I” unfailingly refers only if I know the semantic rule and properly apply it, it could turn out that I forget the rule or mistakenly apply it. Further it appears that if “I” is the way I am aware of myself self-reflexively, then how is it that I know that when I use the token “I” I refer to myself? “If I always knew something of myself via a term or referring token, there would be needed the additional (unexplained) fact of my knowing the term referred to me, of my knowing that I was its producer.” And this consideration typically sets off an infinite regress of knowing that the terms of “me,” “knowing,” and “producing” refer to me, my knowing and my producing, because these in turn are likewise terms requiring authentication, etc. Therefore we must have a kind of access to ourselves which is not via a referring expression, not by way of a knowing that a term or referring expression holds true. But this kind of access to ourselves is not to be thought of through a kind of self-referring intentionality which is analogous to observation in which we single out ourselves because of distinctive signature properties. Such a model inevitably re-enacts the endless regress in an alleged pre-linguistic realm where we do not have linguistic terms but somehow recognizable properties.

Our view in this work is that “I” indeed refers, but does not absolutely constitute what it refers to, what we are calling the “myself.” This latter is a term for our non-reflexive self-presence and “I” brings this to light, i.e., it brings to light “myself as myself.” In this sense non-reflexive, non-intentional, non-referential self-awareness underlies the reflexive, intentional, referential awareness established by “I.” In this respect there is a kind of mirroring at the linguistic level of “I” of the non-reflexive non-linguistic self-awareness, but this is misleading if we find reason thereby to transform the non-reflexive, non-referential, into a kind of reflexive referring.

There is a grain of truth in the “bundle” theories of the self that deny any sense of I-ness in the stream of consciousness: “I” does not appear among the givens of the stream. Buddhism and Hume perhaps are the most famous representatives of this type of position. (See §3 above.) This view tends to want I-ness to appear as one of the items bundled, e.g., objectively as a source and target of desire or pain or as the reflected-on agent of bundling. For a bundle-theory there is no non-reflexive self-awareness: I am always an appearing of myself (we add: to an anonymous self). Thus the self is always a bundle of manifestations or guises (to me). The bundle theory perhaps best addresses the anonymous “to me” in the “Externus Hypothesis” which, as we have noted, posits a form of consciousness bereft absolutely of self-awareness or I-ness. In this proposed hypothetical case, one, e.g., an infant or a cheetah, is so absorbed in what fascinates it, that the conscious attending has no trace of I-ness or self-awareness. Inserting an egological dimension here would seem to detract from the concentration, e.g., on what is to be done, e.g., catching the prey. Such a distraction, Castañeda has speculated, would have proved fatal for the survival of the species. On this hypothesis, in such cases there is no sense of oneself as oneself, and the insertion of an “I”, as Sartre maintains, is an opaque blade into what is otherwise diaphanous. The reason for asserting total and unconscious anonymity here is clear. Mineness, ownness, I-myself are indeed missing as explicit themes. It is only upon reflection or memory that they surface. However, they surface immediately and evidently as the framework for the prior
anonymous experiences. For the one reflecting there is no doubt whose experiences these are. The Externus theory holds that these acts are not unconscious but conscious; further it holds they are conscious without any self-awareness. This position makes sense in typically human cases only if we take self-consciousness to be an explicit consideration of oneself. Yet the Externus hypothesis falters when we consider that the person involved in the alleged Externus consciousness will remember these experiences as ones which she herself had. The sense of, e.g., the former memory of the parade in which one was “totally engrossed,” will be that it unfolded as she perceived it. It will be relived as her former perception.

Further, the alleged Externus consciousness can always be asked, what are you doing? Strictly, if the Externus hypothesis were correct, she could not give an answer. But our view is that the person would likely answer, “I am doing, perceiving, etc. X.” As Sartre himself observed, this answer aims at, and is valid for, not only the instantaneous consciousness resulting from the act of reflection, but also for those prior fleeting “I-less” moments of consciousness which had passed without this act of reflection. Consciousness clearly is not always I-consciousness, but it is always self-aware, even if not aware of itself. It is this non-reflective self-awareness which “I” explicates and makes emphatic.

Perhaps the key issue here from the side of Castañeda is the following: When I say “I,” I refer to myself as myself. Thereby I have established a relationship in which there is both strict identity and necessity between the reflecting I and the reflected on I. In no way can this not obtain, as we see in the case of the amnesiac who, having forgotten all the learned forms of reference to himself, still unfailingly can refer to himself with “I.” But for Castañeda, it is this achievement of the first-person singular demonstrative “I” which creates self-awareness; prior to this there is none.

Castañeda has taught us that one relates to oneself as oneself only by way of “I” referring to oneself in this way. “I” can relate to myself in an externally reflexive way quite as I am seen by others, as the owner of this vehicle, or in an internally reflexive way, as e.g., finding myself in this mood or having these thoughts, etc. The relationships of these “guises of the self” to myself are all contingent and not strict identity relations. They need not obtain and can conceivably be in error.

But does the I that achieves this identity by an act of self-referring depend solely on the “ephemeral” I being constituted (by presumably an ephemeral referring I) such that there is absolutely no prior sense of oneself, or absolutely no sense of I-ness? If the presenting self/I is to present itself to itself as itself, does it not require a prior sense of itself upon which is based its self-presentation? How are we to understand the matter if the acquaintance with oneself is exclusively through the ephemeral I’s reflective self-referring. Does the presenting self not need a prior acquaintance of the presented self in order to know to what to refer to as itself? If the reference is inerrant does not the presented self reveal itself as the same self as the presenting self? But if this prior acquaintance, itself requires an act of the presenting self, does this not require a prior presentation that accounts for the self-presentation, and does not this prior presentation that accounts for the prior acquaintance itself become acquaintance, and does not the acquaintance presupposing it become acquaintance? And given acquaintance’s dependence on an act of self-presentation,
require another prior acquaintance, which itself must be more basic, thereby itself becoming acquaintance, to the prior reflectively constituted acquaintance which accounts for its self-presentation, etc.?

Our answer is that the relationship of the “I” as a self-referring, self-presenting act to itself requires a prior familiarity with itself from the start, otherwise it will never arrive at itself and “I” will not be possible. This is not a contingent sameness relationship, like the relationship of the indexical I’s referent (“myself as myself”) to a historical property or description of me. Such are not necessary and strict identity relationships. But the relationship of the unreflected anonymous self-awareness (“myself”) to “myself as myself” or, similarly, the relationship of the anonymous life of intentionality to the reflected-on intentional life is not a mere contingent sameness relationship. Indeed, it is the prior non-reflective self-awareness that makes “I” as a reference of myself to myself, a reference that can never fail, be a strict identity relationship. But it is evident not as an indexical-achieving “I” fully present to itself achieving (and thus “myself as myself”) related to its referent “myself as myself,” but rather it is evident in the form of the relationship of the non-reflective first-person anonymous self-awareness (“myself”) to “myself as myself.” This may be called a self-awakening which the “I” brings about. “I,” as a power or capacity to self-refer, i.e., as “myself,” is there from the start because the self is always self-aware (even if not aware of itself), and as such is always an anonymous “myself” or ipseity.

The position of Castañeda, that there is no “I-ness” or I-guise until the achievement of “I,” has parallels with another view that there is no I-ness in conscious until re-presenting acts, like memory, imagination, reflection, occur. In these cases “I” emerges as an identity between the re-presenting or reflecting act and the agent of the reflected-upon act. When I remember a prior perception, I become aware of myself as the transcendent center of acts, because I now make present myself as also the one who before perceived. In this view any sense of I-ness requires the proper identity-synthesis of acts. Of course, this may be a pre-linguistic achievement. But if we specify “I” here as the act-transcendent unifying center, then the linguistic achievement builds on this. Thus the declaratives, “I remember…,” “I imagine…,” would reflect the acts of re-presentation. But does “I” ever short-circuit this sense of “I,” i.e., does it ever not reflect a re-presenting act? It would seem that the answer is No. Even direct reports signaling one’s presence (“I am me myself,” “I am JG Hart”) still involve the apperceiving re-presenting of you (or myself as the imagined dialogue partner) whereby an identity synthesis is established between I as I experience myself in the first-person and as I appresent you (or the imagined me as dialogue partner) experiencing me, and between you as you experience yourself in the first-person and as I perceive you in the second-person.

But none of these considerations undermine the view we here are promoting: The passive stream of consciousness is not ever bereft of self-awareness. And this self-awareness requires a sense of the I as what is affected, what lives or undergoes the flow of experiences. This sense of I can well be bereft of any sense of itself as agent, but not bereft of a sense of ownness and ownership. (See Chapter III for these topics.) If the “myself” and “ownness” are intrinsically part of the stream of experiences, if these experiences are always different while pervaded by this sameness of “myself” and “ownness,” then we may say that there is an implicit sense in which “myself” is
present as transcendent to the stream of experiences. This is implicit, of course, because in this case the “myself” is not thematized as transcendent to the flux. While this transcendence is not given in any one experience, and this transcendence as an I-center only comes to light as such in a plurality of acts, nevertheless, even at the pre-reflective level of the flow of experiences “myself” is lived as the invariant, even if it is not highlighted as such until reflection. It is given in any one of them, and that is the basis for the reflection which permits the I center as such to emerge.

In the past, philosophers struggled with the problems of self-awareness and the conditions of reflection. Manfred Frank has shown how a variety of eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers proposed that “feeling” best got at what later was called pre- or non-reflective self-awareness.81 “Consciousness” and “awareness” in the past connoted a knowing of a knowing, i.e., an intention accompanying another intention, as in reflection. In this tradition, perhaps under the influence of Leibniz, “apperception” sometimes meant reflection, or, as in Husserl, an intentional act that co-perceived the non-given aspect of what was perceived. “Feeling” had the advantage of typically being not concept-laden and not inherently an achievement of the I. Sometimes of course it is used to mean an intentional act, e.g., of valuing, esteeming, finding repugnant, etc., by which something was experienced as having a value or disvalue. Yet often it refers to a non-intentional “state” as in the experience of comfort, warmth, pain, hunger, etc. In this latter sense it does not reveal the world but only the self or a state of the self.

In English “feeling” and the German Gefühl are especially at home in the tactile sense, as when we say something feels rough or smooth. In German here the reflexive verb form, es fühlt sich glatt an, is used, whereby the self is reflected in the feeling. (This does not happen in the English, “It feels smooth.”) This seems true also in the equivalent words in the Romance languages. Here the awareness of the touched is always an awareness of oneself touching. Yet “feeling” often extends to a more massive comprehensive bodily awareness, as when we report that we feel nauseous or elated. Obviously it would be wrong to say that only with touch do we have an immediate sense of ourselves, but we may say that it is especially with touch, among all the other “five senses,” that we have a sense of ourselves. (Cf. in the next chapter, §2, the passage from Gerard Manley Hopkins, where, besides feeling, other senses are employed to describe what we are calling the non-reflective self-awareness of ourselves.)

Yet, it remains true that in cases of touching or feelings of pain the feeling is something of which we are aware – unless, of course, the pain is extreme. In such a case, as Sartre has shown, our field of consciousness and self-awareness are reduced to the throbbing: we are the pain, we do not have it, nor do we have the distance from it which characterizes, e.g., “I felt her dislike for me.”

For these 18th and 19th precursors of phenomenology, feeling was typically a self-feeling, an intimation of oneself as an individual, etc. Although this self-feeling was incessantly modified by other sensations and feelings, the self-feeling abided as the one unique same affected by these affections.

Feeling is particularly suitable in so far as it has to do with what is non-ascriptive, simple, and concrete. That which in its essence excludes all multiplicity can only be grasped in a non-conceptual way. A conceptual approach to any thing in the
world implies of necessity the plurality of predicates. Feeling was thus regarded as the candidate for apprehending precisely a simple “object,” i.e., one without parts. Thus a referent or concept of “myself” or perhaps “God,” without the feeling, does not exist. (Husserl, we will see in Chapter VI, §9, says that the I is not able to be conceived apart from its being lived as actually existing.)

In this work we have preferred, because of the manifold senses of feeling, to stay with the contemporary phenomenological usage of the “non-intentional self-awareness” to capture this immediate ineluctable self-presence.

§7 First-Person Perspective

A Perspective

We have earlier modified the grammatical sense of “personal pronoun” which defines “first-person” as the speaker, the one addressed by the speaker (the second first-person), and the one spoken about by the speaker (the third-person). We have noted that grammarians also call attention to the deictic or demonstrative function of the personal pronouns. When we use first-person in this work we are referring most basically to what the first-personal pronoun, “I,” refers to. And from this standpoint we attend to what I regard when I regard the ones I refer to with “you,” “he,” and “she,” and what these refer to analogously when they use “I” in their own person. Thus “first-person,” most basically, refers to the lived non-referential, non-objective sense of oneself which all references to oneself and others presuppose.

A perspective is the aspect under which we perceptually experience something from our standpoint. Perspective is shaped both by the standpoint which is on the hither side of the perceived as well as by the horizon as the limit of our view from the standpoint. What the standpoint and the horizon shape is the aspect of the object that gets highlighted. Given that we are attending to the object from this standpoint’s limiting horizon, I see this side or this aspect of, e.g., the side of this building.

Of course “perspective” and “standpoint” can be metaphorically and analogously understood. It is that through (per-) and by which we see and display (spectare). Standpoint, by way of analogy, can be extended to refer to the thickness that accrues to our standpoint, understood as the primal presencing through the temporal horizons sustained by the habitualities of our experience. This will determine the objective or “noematic” horizon as the limit of our perception and knowledge. Thus we can have “perspectives” even on essentially non-spatial themes, e.g., ethical, historical, and political matters.

B Lived Perspectives are First-Personal

The reference to first-person, second-person, and third-person perspective is misleading. When I am referring I necessarily am in the first-person, regardless if
I am referring to you or her or it. Thus in my perceiving someone “in the third-person perspective” I (in the first-person) am referring to her or him. In the third-person perspective, neither she nor he is present as a second-person referent, and certainly not present in the first-person. But my referring as such is always first-personal, even though the referent, what I refer to, is present in the third- and second-person. With “I,” I refer to myself as myself, i.e., I do not refer to “the self” or to “the myself,” but rather refer in such a way as to sustain the first-person of the one-referring – until, of course, I begin to speak about me or say something like, “I, who am the father of this child…”

To say that the referring to the third-person, or taking up a third-person perspective, is first-personal is merely to repeat what we earlier said that intentional or referring acts are acts that are lived. But this means that they are that of which one is immediately non-reflectively, non-intentionally, non-criterially, non-identifyingly aware. And this means we have immediate access to them, or first-person access. In this respect, prior to the grammatical person, where the issue is whether the referent is to the one speaking, spoken to, or spoken about, “first-person” has an adverbial sense, i.e., what we have access to “first-personally” is the myself and its life consciously lived, and in this sense it is “present.”

There is always thus a first-person functioning in all referring, even when the grammatical referent is present in the third-person or second-person. First-person reference always presupposes the first-person pre-referential awareness that accompanies the referring. “I” highlights this by bringing to light myself as myself, i.e., making myself a referent, who before as “myself” was merely functioning and non-reflexively present.

When I am involved in any personal perspective, I imply “the transcendental prefix.” That is, even though I can, e.g., on the phone, give a play by play account to someone of what others are doing presently, there is the implicit “I perceive that…” If it is a past event, there is the “I remember that…” (In the next chapter we will call attention to how this consideration can become problematic in the second-person.) Further, because we are talking about our interpretations and memories of our interpretations, the first-person perspective is laced with fallibility. Similarly, when we might object to the shift in perspectives, e.g., when it seems that lived experiences are detached from the first-person and treated as physical things in the world, it remains true that the one doing this is still referring in the first-person, even though he is regarding himself and his experiences as a form of non-personal thing in the world. This is, to use Castañeda’s terms, one of the many forms of “external reflexive reference.” This kind of reference differs from simple external reference because we refer not merely to an other person or thing (which is purely and simply external, but not reflexive, reference) but to ourselves as we appear in ways other than in the first-person. An example therefore would be talking about our experiencing and our life in terms of physiological or neurological processes, as when an eliminativist might describe his delight at seeing someone in this way: “and then when she entered the room there was a cascade of neurons flooding this brain.” (The eliminativist strictly speaking wishes to abolish or at least demythologize first-person experience in favor of the referent of, not the referring to, physiological
processes because she holds first-person experience is an “epiphenomenon” of neural-chemical processes.)

Further, “first-person perspective” is ambivalent if it suggests that there are genuinely other lived perspectives. My necessarily being open to you and your perspective for the constitution of myself as a person cannot mean that my *cogito* is not unique and can be shared in by Others in the sense that it is “transferable to others.” In such a view, which is contrary to what is here being proposed, the first-person perspective gives way to or is adequately accounted for by the Others’ perspectives; indeed “I” gives way of necessity to a “we” which is not founded on I’s but is more basic than they are.\(^8\)

If there is a perspective given, then it is a lived perspective, a direct awareness of perspective, and it is necessarily one’s own, i.e., first-person. Perspective is the how of givenness, and as such is not an ideal object but tied to the experiencing. Strictly speaking I can share ideal objects but not “perspectives.” When I hear others’ views, I become acquainted with how they view differently the same thing and how this difference can be communicated in propositions. I can treat their propositional articulation of their perspectives as if they were true, and as if they were mine. As propositions the differing views become communicable ideal objects. But their perspectives as such are not lived by me until they become mine, until appropriated and thus functioning in the beliefs comprising my first-person experience. Until then I regard it as their perspective, not mine.

This is just like my standing here seeing the thing from this angle apperceiving that you have a different perspective from the opposite side. I appreciate your perspective as a genuine one, but it is not mine. When I walk over to where you were standing, for all practical purposes I have approximately now the perspective you were having. But now it is *my* perspective. In matters where perspective is used analogically, e.g., where viewpoints are present in propositions, something analogous to the lived perceptual perspective holds. I don’t have your perspective by merely apperceiving the differences. It must become mine in order for me to enjoy the perspective. For example, I will have to believe things I do not believe now, I will have to have an intellectual insight or Gestalt that now is missing for me, etc. Similarly I can imaginatively self-displace myself to take up the Other’s perspective, but then this is an imaginative living of the other perspective, as if it were mine.

Thus properly speaking, perspective is had in the direct awareness of perspective and is only in the first-person. In acknowledging other perspectives we do not have as our own second- and third-person perspectives, we rather become acquainted with the fact of the others’ perspectives. Dialogue or the “loving battle of communication” (Jaspers) can permit that I eventually share your perspective so that in this matter at this time I now live what you lived because I appropriate your perspective, your beliefs, your feelings, etc., as my own. There can be even a kind of habitual communal merging, diverging, and an interplay of perspectives so that what is at issue is how we perceive it, always with each keeping the other’s shifting perspective in mind, always honoring the difference while wanting that the differences be ultimately compatible and harmonizable. Yet such harmony and merging is always only partial. Persons remain more or less individual and the “myself” radically
individual, i.e., *per se* or not individual by being individuated by what is other than themselves. The question of whether there is ever an overcoming of the essential difference of a lived life-perspective is the question of whether one person can become another. We will have occasion to return to this issue often in what follows.

C  Transcendental Phenomenology and the First-Person Perspective

Transcendental phenomenology seems to be a somewhat paradoxical enterprise of amassing a huge body of highly technical third-person terms like the reduction, the transcendental I, primal presencing, the Other, passive synthesis, act, intentionality, etc. And, at first glance, it would seem that this massive array of third-person referents is what phenomenologists are preoccupied with. But this is misleading. All the terms of phenomenology have their home in lived, non-reflexive first-personal experience. Even the pre-thematic, pre-conceptual, pre-linguistic, i.e., the realm that is emptily intended and to be filled in with in-the-flesh intuitions, is first of all at home in the “I myself” that is lived prior to the achievement of “I.” What distinguishes the phenomenological discourse is its claim that that about which it is talking is first of all lived in the pre-reflexive, even non-reflexive, apodictic realm of self-awareness. What one talks about in phenomenology are the aspects of the articulation of what, prior to the reflection, was not yet articulated. And the articulation aspires to present in a new guise, but *as the same*, what prior to reflection was not yet present in this guise. Is the prior self-presence without any guise at all? Yes, if by guise we mean an articulation through an intentional act of reference wherein ineluctably categorical intuition comes into play. No, if by guise we mean it has no distinctive determinable “sense” whatsoever. Thus it would seem that transcendental phenomenology is an elaborate orchestration, through being a rehearsal, of the achievement of the indexical “I.” Here I refer to “myself as myself.” In this I am present to myself not as “the myself” or “a self,” but “as myself,” i.e., in a way that is sufficiently even if uniquely “thematic” to sustain the identity with myself prior to the indexical reference. But, of course, I can then have occasion to form identity-syntheses and sameness relations through further thematization of “myself,” i.e., “the myself,” how this is non-sortal and non-ascriptively referred to, etc. We will soon return to this topic in D. below and in other subsequent chapters.

The project of the analyses of passive synthesis (as in *Husserliana* XI and elsewhere) is to bring to light not only the odd feeble, instituting, and seminal logos prior to speech and position-taking in the realm of what is present to consciousness, but also the anonymous passive and active sense-making that brings about both the feeble “syntax” before proper syntax as well as the explicit syntactical and categorical display. For transcendental phenomenology the non-reflexive is not absolutely bereft of sense, even though it is non-conceptual. But the sense is not merely that of the pre-conceptual or pre-objectifiable, i.e., of that of which we are marginally
aware, the determinable, waiting to be made determinate. Nor is it the indeterminate
like what is beyond this room, beyond the horizon, etc., where there is nothing there
that is determinable. No, ipseity, the “myself,” we will insist, is not that sort of
thing, not a \textit{nihil negativum}. We can begin here to unfold that story.

If we grant that prior to “I,” I-ness is not a guise as an appearing of—, to…. is it
not nevertheless a guise? No, if “guise” is an inadequate presentation by a \textit{sense}
of a \textit{referent}. Yes, if we are disposed to see a coincidence of sense and reference. Frege
is right when he observed that everyone is given to himself in a particular and origi-
nal manner in which he is present to no one else (\textit{ist jeder sich selbst in einer beson-
deren und ursprünglichen Weise gegeben wie er keinem anderen gegeben ist}). Like
early Husserl, Frege acknowledges that “I” names a different person in each case
and thus has an ever altering meaning. But how are we to understand this original
manner of givenness? Is it a kind of special presentation, like the front of a building,
besides which there are also the other sides, or is the original manner of givenness
not the principle thing itself, indeed where the distinction between sense and refer-
ence, between the mode of givenness and what is given is overcome? We suggest
that the latter is closer to the mark. Husserl adds that the meaning of “I” is essentially
realized in the immediate presencing (\textit{Vorstellung}) of one’s own personality. Every
speaker has his own I-presencing, and thereby his individual concept of I.85

But Husserl here, in this early formulation, is not clear why this immediate pres-
encing of one’s own personality founds “the meaning of the word in the communica-
tive speech.” How does what is uniquely unique found what is communicable? And,
does not the lived experience of what is uniquely unique found the I-concept, for
surely the I-concept is not a condition for the lived experiencing of oneself. As Frege
was later to observe, when I say “I am wounded,” “I” has to mean something that is
graspable by another, something like “the one who this moment is speaking to you.”
But Frege is clear that “The one who this moment is speaking to you is wounded” does
not have the same referent, is not the same thought, as in “I myself am wounded.”
Such an expression might well capture the occasionality of the speech-act, but the
third-person referent does not have the same truth-value as the first-person one. An
example that would justify Frege’s hesitation to make the truth-value of “the one
speaking to you now is wounded” the equivalent of “I am wounded” is the following:
Think of a spiritualist medium who believes herself to be a real instrumental source,
but not the principal source of her communications from the other world. Rather she
is the human instrument of the principal communicator or speaker who has just
revealed that She, the person from the other world, is wounded. Thus, when the
medium says “the one speaking to you now” she does indeed refer to herself (she is
more than a dummy of a ventriloquist), but she does not refer to herself as principle
communicator, but only as the human instrument of this principle speaker. But let us
suppose that it turns out that the medium is indeed wounded but she does not know
this. Thus she truthfully says “the one speaking to you now is wounded” but she does
not refer (internally reflexively) to herself. This third-person formula does not have
the same referent (or truth value) it would have if she expressed truly that she, not the
principle communicator, or not exclusively the principle communicator, is wounded.
For that she would have to say “I am wounded.”
Proposals by Roderick Chisholm help us think further about first-person perspective. Chisholm attempts to root first-person perspective in an understanding of self-awareness which involves “self-presenting acts” such that whenever they occur, they are certain for the one having them. But strictly speaking they are self-presenting subsequent to the reflective intention of them. (That is the importance of the Fregean qualification that each is present in a particular and original way that no one else enjoys.) For Chisholm, it is in the reflective attitude where the knower has for his object himself “self-presentingly.” This “direct attribution” is a matter of reflection when “something presents itself to me in such a way that while having this object there is an indubitable belief that one is having it.” Reflective self-awareness maintains the distinction, as does Chisholm’s “direct attribution,” of the dative of manifestation and genitive of manifestation. Yet it would seem what Chisholm’s really wants to get at with the immediate and direct awareness or acquaintance of self-consciousness is what is prior to any intentional or identifying act of reflection. As long as it is properly an identifying act, the degree of certainty or indubitability is not going to overcome its being a genitive of manifestation. And as long as it is an identifying act it might well establish it as an empirical property of mine but it will never establish how this gets to be mine because what is me or my self-presentation is not reached by an identifying act.

Further, because it seems Chisholm sought to get at not the original self-presentation but at the original self-presence that surmounts the genitive of manifestation/dative of manifestation opposition, he claims that the self-presentation requires an identity between knower and known. The strong sense of identity sought by Chisholm will not be reached by an intentional identifying act.

Thus the original “presentation” would seem to be non-reflective and one may ask whether the self-presenting account which requires a distinction between dative and genitive of manifestation really does the job here. But Chisholm is committed to the view that we only have acquaintance with objects. And he also seems obliged to think of this direct attribution as a knowledge of propositions when, in fact, prepropositional knowledge is in play.

Transcendental phenomenology seeks essential clarifications of the self-presenting indubitable acts as objects presented to the transcendental observer. They are present as the same as what I myself lived prior to the presentation emergent from this reflection. They are now present as intentionally targeted objects or marginal quasi-objects for me. “I” in a self-referring act similarly brings about the marginal quasi-object which is “myself as myself.” Does this mean that we are holding that “first-person” has nothing to do with “I”? No, “myself as myself” is still myself and still the self of self-awareness. But is it true that in achieving “I,” in making myself present to myself as myself, or making present my acts and sensa, I am on the verge of moving myself into the objective realm, ready for predication, etc.? Certainly this verging toward being ready for predication does not mean actual predication or objectification. There is no such thing in the normal indexical use of “I” or in its declarative use. Rather, as Castañeda points out, “I” is a “direct reference that attributes no property to the entity
in question.” “Without predicating selfhood, it purports to pick out a self *qua* self, and when it is correctly tendered it invariably succeeds.” Therefore with “I,” the “myself” is there as “myself as myself,” on the verge of being ready for predication, but not properly there as a substrate of predication. This can perhaps be thought of analogously to the way language provides a marginal motivation for thematization that non-linguistic perception does not. Seeing the bird on the tree branch enables the utter anonymity of the act of seeing and the manifesting I. In contrast, “I see (that there is) a bird on the branch” interrupts this total diaphaneity and anonymity but still does not make a theme out of the words, concepts, syntax, or the perceiving agency and the seeing. But in the very speaking, the agency of manifestation and perceptual intentionality, along with the referring and the syntax, are there in a way they are not in the sheer seeing. “I” makes the “I myself” or I-ness available for reflection in a way it is not prior to reflection. But it is not yet there as an objectified substrate with properties assigned to it.

Another analogy: Think of how the lived body becomes present immediately after a lack of dexterity or a mishap like a stumble or the beginning of a pain. Prior to this, as lived body, it was simply the anonymous “through which” or “from which” and not at all a theme itself. After the stumble or the pain it is there with less anonymity and transparency, yet it is not yet there as that through which or from which I am in the world; nor is it there as something to dwell on. Again, this is similar to “I” as the reference to myself as myself. It is a kind of interruption of the anonymity and a kind of pause in the flow of intentional life. Yet it is not yet there as a theme, nor surely is it there as a substrate of prediction.

### E A Note on Terminology

“Myself” is how in this work we will typically refer to what is non-reflexively prior to the indexical “I.” It will thus be used technically as the expression for what “I” refers to, what “I” presupposes, and what is non-reflectively and abidingly lived. Of course it will also be used in its normal way indicating emphasis and reflexivity.

The reason we do not simply say “self” is that this is a third-person term, suggesting there is no first-person experiencing; “i-self,” i.e., employing the lower case, would get closer because it is without the emphatic connotations. But it is one more barbarism that we choose to dispense with. “Myself” has the advantage of eliminating the fuller-blown “I myself” which suggests the nominative and an ongoing achievement of the indexical. Nevertheless it ought not to be forgotten that “myself” is without a support if it is essentially bereft of any sense of “I.” For that reason we occasionally use “I myself” to indicate what is the basis for “myself as myself.” Because the pre- or non-reflective “myself” is pervaded by temporalizing, we might have chosen a verbal noun, like “am-ing” or “self-ing.” But clearly this is equally awkward.

For sake of variety and further convenience, instead of using “the myself” or “self of self-awareness,” as that to which “I” refers as its lived presupposition, we
will often use the third-person term “ipseity.” And later we shall introduce “Existenz,” another third-person term for the actuation of a central aspect of “myself,” what, with Husserl, we will call the center of the I.

Using the strictly first-personal form, e.g., “myself” or “I,” in a philosophical context can have the disadvantage of creating the appearance of an “occasional” or deictic/indexical reference when we, in fact, are concerned about essential states of affairs “for everyone.” Disaster is in store if this distinction is not clearly made. Nevertheless, because transcendental phenomenology is distinguished precisely by this “mindfulness” of its first-person roots, the risk of confusion must be taken.

§8 Reflection and the Itinerary of Consciousness

Phenomenology happens in the wake of the epoché which enables philosophy to keep what appears inseparable from its appearances and the agency of the agent of manifestation. It is a kind of “reflection” and would not happen if reflection were not already a familiar possibility. The “Externus” type of consciousness, i.e. one in which consciousness is bereft of all self-consciousness, points to a kind of being for which reflection is not possible nor is there any sense of one’s ownness and ipseity. (Candidates for such a possible consciousness are perhaps, e.g., a coyote’s earnestly contemplating prey or an infant’s absorption in a mobile.) For such a hypothetical consciousness there is absolute diaphanousness or transparency. Yet there is doubtless diaphaneity in the natural attitude and in our (adult) everyday relating to the world. Indeed, even the act of reflection is transparent to itself. But these are not absolutely transparent or diaphanous. That is, there is not only the transcendent perceptual thing which of necessity is pervaded by the opacity of empty intentions or the saturatedness of filled determinateness, but there is the non-reflexive awareness of the act and egological source of the act. Thus the transparency or diaphanousness is relative: We readily acknowledge the anonymity of our awareness of our acts and ourselves while being taken up with the matter at hand; and yet when asked what we are doing we do not say, “I don’t know,” but we give an account of how we are intentionally in the world, i.e., we say, “I am staring at the person across the street,” or “I am thinking about whether I was unconsciously staring at that person across the street,” etc.

We have spoken of this anonymous self-presence as a kind of luminosity and wakefulness, because without it nothing appears “to me.” Husserl on occasion also referred to it as meon or non-being. As we have proposed, the reason is that if we think of being as what is brought to light, the anonymous self-presence is that through which and by which everything is brought to light, but it itself is not among the things brought to light. Reflection, on the other hand, transforms that lightsomeness into being and determination. Prior to reflection there is only the lightsomeness without determination and being. If self-possession requires reflection taking hold and taking stock, then prior to the work of reflection each for herself is not properly in possession of herself. Each is aware and self-aware but
without awareness of and knowledge of herself. As Husserl put it, there is a higher form of self-determination, self-possession when my acts are directed toward myself in I-me acts or acts wherein an I-to-I relation holds, i.e., where my act turns back on me. Even though the prior familiarity with oneself of self-awareness is ineluctable, in the absence of reflection through acts which make us a theme for ourselves, we are unfamiliar with ourselves in the proper noetic or cognitive sense. Up until now we have been making a case for the self-luminosity of self-awareness in order to make room for a kind of self-preservation and not reduce all presence and manifestation to what our act life brings about. We will have repeated occasion to insist on this “non-ascriptive” presence as a non-proper knowing. But here we note that indeed it is not knowing in the proper sense. In this sense we may say that reflection is the teleology of non-reflective self-awareness. In Book 2 we will show that there is an ever more proper self-possession when we are awakened to the center of our person, the center of the I, in responding to the truth of one’s self. This we call “Existenz.”

We may illustrate the proper sense of self-having by considering how, prior to reflection, each is gifted with a sense of the possibility or potentiality of power but without a sense of the actuality of power. I-can is present as “mine” and a sphere of ownness, but its actuality awaits my agency. My power is potential power awaiting the actualization of itself. For example, I am capable of learning Arabic, even though less capable than a child; but my capability is purely potential compared to the person now speaking English but who has also mastered Arabic. Such a clear sense of potential possibility parallels that of the I-can of non-reflective awareness prior to reflection and self-referential acts. Prior to reflection pure self-awareness is invited to this power and determination by its being in possession of its just-past present and its not-yet present. In this sense there is a fissure in pure self-awareness because it is always already “transcendent” to the primal present it presences. This being present to what it retains and protends stretches it beyond its actuality to its possibility. It must say not only “I am” but inseparably “I can.” But until this “can” is actualized it remains a diaphanous light to itself and not self-possession and self-knowing. Reflection is possible only on the basis of two interrelated conditions: (a) there is not absolute diaphanousness as in the hypothetical case of “Externus”; if one is bereft of any sense of oneself, self-reference is not possible; (b) there is no absolute rupture in the stream of consciousness between the act of reflection and the actuality of what is reflected on. Thus reflection requires a fissure at the heart of self-awareness as well as an identity of the one reflected on and the one reflecting. This identity is also the same anonymous source in both the reflected on and the reflecting: For the reflecting its source point remains hidden and it itself as luminous act eludes itself in its illumination of that which is prior to self-reflection, which “prior,” subsequent to reflection, reveals itself as the same as what before was not yet reflected on.

This identifying reflection is, as Husserl has noted, at once an extinguishing of the lived life in its naivety and a transforming quickening of this life by lifting it up to determinateness. Again, this identity comes to light in the recognition of what was there prior to reflection: The reflection now enjoys as its retention what before
was in the protentional horizon of the pre-reflective as its I-can. But it is also a discovery because now it is lifted out of its indeterminacy to a determinateness ready for predication. At the same time, the reflection is a double surpassing: It is a going beyond the pre-reflective self-awareness and a lifting it to a state of determination and a new kind of luminosity; but at the same time, the reflection itself exceeds itself by having in its horizon the protention of the illumination of itself in a subsequent reflection. In this sense there is never an equation, adequation, or coincidence of the self with itself through reflection.90

In the course of this work we will have occasion to explore the sense of the essential inadequation of oneself with oneself that occurs as the ipseity takes flesh in personhood and Existenz.

§9  Non-Ascriptive Reference of “I” and the Degenerate-Soliloquistic Position

A basic thesis throughout this work is that the indexical “I,” “myself” as the non-reflective self-awareness, and the transcendental I are ways of referring to oneself which are the same but not identical, not absolutely coincident, with referring to oneself as this person, JG Hart. If all that I may mean in using “I” or “myself” is this person in the world, JG Hart, the account of the propertyless, non-ascriptive, non-sortal, etc. “aspect” of “I” (as brought to light with the indexical “I,” non-reflective self-awareness, the transcendental I, and, as we shall see, aspects of empathic perception and love) reveal nothing at all but are misleading abstractions. In which case the evidence on behalf of the non-reducibility of first-person terms to third-person ones would have to yield to the position of the hegemony of third-person reference. It is this view which we wish briefly here to discuss. Because the “I” of Cartesian and Husserlian meditations does not properly refer to the person but to “myself,” “myself as myself,” and “I myself” it may be said to prescind from being a person in the world with Others. Such uses of “I” have been called both soliloquistic and degenerate.91 It is soliloquistic to say, as we shall say, that “There is no I besides myself,” and “I cannot doubt my existence while doubting”; “I cannot know that I am, and in this sense who I am, but I can be quite ignorant of what I am.” But surely this form of soliloquy is meaningful, even if it prescinds from the conditions of being a person, which are, as it were, the infrastructure which makes such a self-communication in language possible. In fact, the staying power of this soliloquy since the time of St. Augustine, is precisely intersubjective evidence of what is available only in private first-person form. According to Peter Geach, the “soliloquistic” furthermore is “degenerate” in the sense that “There” in “There is a difference between pride and vanity” no longer refers to a place or spot in space. Thus if one asks, of someone who is bemoaning his pain, Who is in pain?, we have a degenerate use of I or Who because we have a question where the ordinary common sense answer has been excluded.

But transcendental phenomenology professedly moves us beyond common sense because common sense is typically at home in the dogmatism of the natural
attitude. Thus if there is “transcendental reflection,” if we have something like non-ascriptive reference, then we have opened a new space of admissible questions as well as answers: These senses of “I” have meaning even if they do not, as such, refer merely to the person speaking as a person in the world with Others. Of course, they do refer to the person, but the charge of a degenerate use (a) begs the question about the relationship of the I to the human being and the person; (b) it further denies the non-sortal nature of the reference to say that they refer only to the person as this human being.

(a) That we can make present the I as non-ascriptive, propertyless, and transcendental; indeed, that there are senses in which it is non-temporal, non-spatial, and the dative of manifestation of the world, and that this I, at the same time, is a person in the world with others, and therefore only intelligible as richly propertied poses a problem, indeed a paradox that must be addressed. (See Chapter VI.)

(b) Much is lost if we do not wrestle with the assumption that what we mean by “person” has to do with its distinctive properties. Indeed, if “I” is the core of the person, then “person” is a non-sortal term and the sense of person is impoverished if we think of it primarily as an instance of human kind able to be exhaustively captured by identifying its signature properties. (See Chapters V–VI.)

Notes

4. This paragraph draws on Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, First Logical Investigation, §26. On concept and essence, see Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, §23.
7. Hector-Neri Castañeda, The Phenomen-Logic of the I. Ed. James G. Hart and Tomis Kapitan (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), especially 46ff. This section, especially the discussion of oratio recta, as will be obvious, owes much to Castañeda.
9. This is a theme prominent in the early work of Sydney Shoemaker and of course was a central topic for Castañeda.
10. Issues surrounding “which I” will be returned to in Chapter V.
11. Husserliana XXIII, 288.
15. Sydney Shoemaker, ibid., 211.
22. In this work, “myself” is used for what “I” refers to. As such we intend to soften both the emphatic as well as the reflexive senses. Yet, as we shall see, it refers to non-reflexive self-awareness and inwardness as well as the “ownness” which distinguishes me from all the others. Non-reflexive inwardness and ownness are more basic than reflexivity. We will return to this matter of terminology at the end of §7 below.
26. Ibid., X, par. 12 and 16. It is unclear whether we can take these two points to agree with our eventual thesis that we know in our non-reflective self-awareness we are aware of our “individual essence.”
27. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Bk. XIV, par. 14; *Later Works*, 112. For passages where I-ness is deemed essential for consciousness, see *De Trinitate*, Bk. XV, par. 42 and *Contra Academicos* Bk. III, par. 26; See *Opuscales, IV, Dialogue Philosophiques*. Trans. R. Jolivet (Paris: Desclée, Der Brouwer, 1939), 164–165.
28. The most provocative formulations are to be found in Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*. Trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1998), especially Chapter IV.
31. Husserl, *Logical Investigations* IV, §4 and §8
32. For pioneering historical analysis, see Eduard Marbach, *Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1974). And see also Dan Zahavi’s succinct discussion in *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, Chapter 2.
34. Ibid., 213.
36. See Andrew Oledenski, “Self as Verb,” *Trycycle: The Buddhist Review*, Summer (2005), 26–27. As we shall see, we find in G.M. Hopkins’ poetry and philosophical theology likewise the proposal to render “self” a verb. But Hopkins’ proposal is more congenial to this work.
40. I have been helped here by John Maraldo who also translated this text of Hakuin’s “Song of Zazen” as it appeared in Nishitani Keiji, “The Standpoint of Zen,” in *The Eastern Buddhist*, Notes 129
For some of the uses of tathata see Sōhei in the index of Erich Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1956); also see Dan Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 299, 509, 529–531. John Maraldo has helped me avoid some pitfalls of interpretation; where the reader finds that I have insisted on falling this must be said to be in spite of Maraldo’s efforts.

41. The first quote is to be found in “Dialogues East and West: Conversations between Paul Tillich and Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, Part One,” *The Eastern Buddhist* 4: 2 (1971), 98 and 101; the second and third in “Dialogues East and West: Conversations between Paul Tillich and Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, Part Two,” *The Eastern Buddhist* 5: 2 (1972), 107 and 124. Again, I am happy to express my thanks to John Maraldo for these references.

42. *Husserliana* XXXVII. 104.


44. Thomas Prufer, *Recapitulations*, 64.

45. Cf. Husserl, Nachlass MS, B I 13, 109–110. Cf. this citation from Nagarjuna cited by Dan Lusthaus, ibid., 509: “That which is rushing in and out [of existence] when dependent or conditioned, this, when not dependent or not conditioned, is taught to be nirvana.” Of course, for Husserl, there is no indication of how one might move effectively and soteriologically beyond the primal streaming’s contingency; theoretically it is evident as a transcendental phenomenological necessity. See below Chapter V, §7.


51. As St. Augustine put it, in *De Trinitate*, Bk. X, par. 5.


54. Chisholm, op. cit., 52.


58. Even if Gaskon was to recognize that the one having the sickly pallor was he himself, there would have to be what we will call a “realization” for there to be an existential recognition of his death. Robert Nozick, *Philosophical Explanation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 73, gives us another example. Imagine that you and two other persons are lying bandaged on three beds in a hospital, all suffering from amnesia. The doctor comes in and tells each person by name what has happened, and each person has his condition reviewed, perhaps even the entire life history. Because each is completely bandaged no one will know if he is being addressed or pointed at by the speaking doctor. They learn that X will live, Y will die, and Z has a 50/50 chance to live. “Since you are suffering from amnesia and you do not remember your name, so there is something important you don’t know yet, namely what is going to happen to you.” Again, for our work, it is not only important to see that unless the premise essentially contains “I,” “me,” and “mine,” I cannot infer that the reference is to me, but also that the uniquely important knowledge regarding my death remains of a quite different order as long as it remains a reference to the possible death of X, Y, and Z or as long as I persist in have an external reflexive knowledge of my death.

60. For Castañeda, we have no access to this world apart from the transcendental prefix, i.e., the mind’s engagement and display of the world. Philosophy is *phenomenal-logical*. It is transcendental and apodictically evident within the realm of the transcendental prefix, even though this too is not strictly a noumenal realm but merely points to such. We will not here spell out the further intriguing similarities and differences with transcendental phenomenology. Cf. for a start my editor’s Introduction to Castañeda, *The Phenomeno-Logic of the I*, 17–31. For a more guise-focused comparisons one may consult, David Smith, “Mind and Guise: Castañeda’s Philosophy of Mind in the World Order,” in *Hector-Neri Castañeda*. Ed. James E. Tomberlin (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), 167ff.; Guide Küng, ““Guises’ and Noemata,” in *Thinking and the Structure of the World/Das Denken und die Struktur der Welt*. Ed. Kalus Jacobi and Helmut Pape (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990), 409ff. Finally for a brief comment on these latter comparisons, see my “Being’s Mindfulness,” the “Excursus: Noemata and Guises,” in John Drummond and Lester Embree, *The Phenomenology of the Noema* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992), 122–126.


63. The term “dative of manifestation” was first coined by Thomas Prufer. It implied the “nomina- tive of manifestation.” This philosophical declension was put to good use and enlarged to the “agent of manifestation” by Robert Sokolowski. Even when explicit egological acts are not in play, when the I-center of acts is not yet active and there is only the dative or that to which what is manifest is manifest, there is still the agency of manifestation of the ongoing passive streaming presencing.


65. This theme of the I as “archonal” and retrosending is taken from Hedwig Conrad-Martius, *Das Sein* (Munich: Kösel, 1957), 118ff. We will return to it.


69. Ibid.


71. *Husserliana*, XXXIII, 286; brackets and emphasis added.

theme of *meon* in describing the I. See Selbstgefühl, 8–9, and 240–242. Wittgenstein moves toward a meontology when he says: “The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that ‘the world is my world’. The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit – not a part of the world.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 5.641, pp. 116–118.

73. J.F. Ferrier, *Institutes of Metaphysic*, 88. See the entire discussion, 82–90.
75. See Shoemaker, *The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays*, 25–49, for a rich, complex analysis of this paradox and its relation to self-awareness. What we do here is to engage in a surface if not superficial way Shoemaker’s discussion by asserting a basic Husserlian position that perhaps Shoemaker loses sight of in the logical thicket.
76. In spite of Shoemaker’s valiant effort to make self-blindness credible he appears to think it is not a “conceptual possibility”; “only if it were a conceptual possibility” would the basic error he has refuted all his life have merit, namely that our self-awareness was really in fact a matter of identification and reflection. See *First Person Perspective and Other Essays*, 31.
77. Dan Zahavi’s *Self-Awareness and Alterity and Subjectivity and Selfhood* masterfully do this.
78. Robert Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 81. As far as I can see, Nozick too, even with his theory of self-synthesis, is guilty of what Manfred Frank has called the “reflection theory of consciousness” and Michel Henry has called a monist theory of manifestation.
80. For this last paragraph see the fine discussion by Zahavi of the views of Iso Kern and Edward Marbach, in *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, 142ff.
81. Manfred Frank, *Selbstgefühl*. Some of the earlier thinkers discussed by Frank (he also has fine discussions of contemporary analytic and phenomenological thinkers) are Maine de Biran, Johann Bernhard Merian, Novalis, and Schleiermacher. To the already lengthy list of significant thinkers in Frank’s book, there would have to be added that of Antonio Rosmini (1797–1855), especially Vol. 1, Book 1, of his *Essence of the Soul* (Durham, England: Rosmini House, 1999).
86. Chisholm develops his view of self-presenting acts in especially Chapter I of *Person and Object*. See the essay by Gerald Myers, “Self-Awareness and Personal Identity,” which received full endorsement by Chisholm and where the question is raised whether Chisholm indeed is not in search of a pre-propositional knowing, in *The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm* (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1997), 175ff.
89. Husserl, *Husserliana XV*, 89. The lived indeterminateness of this life is not a *nihil negativum*, i.e., bereft of any “knowing” or “sense.” This will be a constant theme throughout this book.
90. Some of these formulations are indebted not only to Husserl, but also to the work of Jean Nabert.
Chapter III
Ipseity’s Ownness and Uniqueness

It seems… that we can only speak of Having where a certain quid is related to a qui, treated as a centre of inherence and apprehension, which is in some degree transcendent… I must develop what I said about the uncharacterisable. We cannot think of a character without attaching it to a subject by the link expressed by the verb to belong. But this supposes a sort of pattern whose nature we must try to make clear. We are here in an order which essentially carries with it the use of the expression “also”; this character is chosen among others. We are not, however, faced with a collection, as phenomenalism would have us believe, there is always the transcendence of the qui.

(Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, 151–153)

§1 Ipseity as Ownness

Even though we have often touched on the theme of “ownness” we must return to it with an eye to securing its position because the core themes of this work imply it. Four interconnected areas may be highlighted in regard to this central phenomenological theme. In this section (§1) we will study one’s ownness, i.e., what one does not share with anyone else; in §2 we will briefly look at the uniqueness of the person that is manifested in moral agency and the agency of manifestation. In Chapter V the problems of the ontological classification of the unique individual will occupy us. We begin with “own,” “ownness,” and, at a later time in conjunction with Existenz, we will move to “ownmostness.”

Although “ownness” as a theme comes explicitly to light when one reflects on the Other and what one does not and cannot share with the Other, it is not constituted as such by our perceptions of Others. Prior to this one is one’s own self and self-awareness. “Ownness” is a basic feature of selves, i.e., of one’s own self-aware self. The original phenomenological site of ownness is the way the I “lurk” (Traherne) in my experiences, or the way I may be said to “have” them and be involved with them. But, again, the sense of my experiences as being had by me is not a result of my contrasting myself with Others and their experiences. What is
referred to with “I,” “me,” “myself,” etc. does not at the start emerge as a theme for itself apart from “mine” as it pervades the flow of experience. This pervasiveness is properly present in reflective self-awareness, especially as it is tied to the way the I hovers or lurks and to the way the I “has” the flow of experiences. Yet it is the non-reflective lived sense of ownness that founds the more explicit senses of consciousness as at once a being and a having.

The use of first-person terms in a substantive form, like “the I,” suggests that the self or “I” is available to us in an original way quite apart from the stream of experiences.

Of course “the I” comes to light in the non-ascriptive reference as not in need of any token reflexive-free references or third-person references. But even in such isolation and absoluteness it is inseparable from, but not identifiable with, the stream of experiences which is eminently one’s own. And, if put into words, it would require the token-reflexive “mine.” Even though, as we shall often say, what we refer to with “I” is not one of the experiences in the stream nor is it dependent on any one of them, but rather it transcends these “immanently,” i.e., by being involved and having each and all of them, it would be a mistake to think of it as first of all enjoying a form of evidence as an entity existing in itself independently of the stream of experiences.1

Thus ownness points to the distinctive self-awareness of the self in terms of its oneness and manifoldness, actuality and possibility, inalienability and alienability, proximity and distance, immanence and transcendence, and sameness and difference. Most properly it points to how being and having pervade all these other ingredients and features of the self-awareness: they each point to me and what is mine. In a normal grammatical setting, i.e., not one which takes fundamental grammatical terms and barbarously makes philosophical substantives out of them, “own” is a reflexive possessive which refers to something already mentioned. Thus, e.g., one speaks of “my (or one’s) own car,” “my (or one’s) own father.” Here we see the proximity of “own” to the possessive pronouns. What is possessed requires a possessor, and “own” emphasizes the possessor’s possessing. Further possessive pronouns hearken back to a reference to a “self” or one who possesses and who says “I.” “Myself” in effect implicitly refers to ‘I’ or ‘me’ three times over: (a) “My” refers back to “me” or “I.” (b) Me/I has already attached to it “my.” (c) And “self” refers to “I” or “me.” Ownness, as appearing in “my own self,” seems only to compound the self-referring of “myself.” Yet it brings out the way the self has itself and the way the self itself pervades that which it has of itself.

Ownness thus has to do with the way I pervade that which I have of myself. No one else has what I have in having myself or what I have of myself. This emerges in the reflection on Others, but it is also implicit in my having myself. “I” refers to the sphere of ownness and uniqueness in a way that the third-person term, e.g., “the one speaking to you now,” does not. Recall that Husserl claimed that with “I” there is an immediate presencing of one’s own personality. How are we to understand this presencing of one’s own personality, this I-presencing and individual I? Initially it must be said: Ownness is what is experienced, first of all, pre-reflectively by me alone. Worldly objects, including other minds, are what I, along with others,
intentionally make present. They, as transcendent objects, lack the mark of own-
ess that characterizes the intentional making present of them and the reflection on
this. This ownness of the intentional making present is not eo ipso “ours” unless
each of us appropriates one another’s own intentional agency and the propositions
expressing this agency.

There is a temptation to say that ownness is an inseparable moment, not a piece,
of the whole of ipseity or I-ness. Following Husserl’s distinction (in the first of the
Logical Investigations) that pieces are parts, like notes that are separable from
wholes that are melodies, and moments are parts, like timbre and pitch, which are
inseparable from the whole which is a note, we might want to say that ownness,
along with mineness, original sourcing, having, and power are moments of I-ness,
and moments of one another. The senses of ownness, like all senses of “mine,”
pre-suppose a core non-reflective sense of “I.” Without this, there is no way of
establishing what is one’s “own” or what is “mine.” We might distinguish by way
of stipulation ownness from what is mine if by the latter we were to mean things
I acquire and perhaps can get rid of. Here “mine” is the same as “my property.”
Ownness is never a property in this sense, and, of course, we here use “property”
in an extended way in conjunction with proprium, i.e., one’s own. Of course
we use it in the third person for what a substrate of predications “has” and what
qualifies a being.

Thus in the view proposed here “mineness” and “ownness” do not refer to rela-
tionships of ownership that one knows through intentionality, as if one were to
establish this matter through an objective observation; but rather it is known first-
personally from within, typically in pre-reflective self-awareness, but also in non-
reflective self-awareness; and therefore it has to do with the basic consideration of
the “myself,” even, as we shall see, of Existentz. This basic consideration is the
presupposition for all possible possessive relationships of a noetic kind and any
other kind. 3 Yet there is a reason to be hesitant to regard “ownness” as a moment of
ipseity or the “myself” in as much as this latter appears to be utterly propertyless.
Of course, “ownness” does pervade, as a constitutive moment the life of the
“myself,” consciousness, what “I” refers to, what I will, etc. Yet it is also synony-
mous with or stands tautologically in relation to these, just as these stand tautologi-
cally in relation to one another. (We will soon return to this problem of tautological
properties.) When, however we think of the “myself” in conjunction with what it
most basically has in pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness, i.e., its temporal-
ity and its personal life, then we of necessity are moved to think of “ownness” more
as a pervasive constitutive moment of the “self” or the personal life than as a feature
of the “myself.”

But let us not fail to make room within the transcendental I for the foundational
consideration of a transcendental temporalizing or temporal sourcing. (Cf. §3
below.) Husserl names this the primal event of primal presencing and regards it as
an ongoing upsurge of me for myself which, at the same time is necessarily a syn-
thesis of the moments of now, no longer, and not yet by the primal presencing,
retaining, and protending. This sourcing synthesizing is most elementally both I
myself for myself and what I have. If this is so, we may say with Husserl, every
sense of mine and having is tied to this original having of this original sourcing (or upsurge) as well as to the synthesizing. The “pole” of this primal synthesizing, to which there comes to be affixed all the sensa and acts of the stream of consciousness that comprise one’s life, and all this in a living synthesis of havings, is the living I-pole, which itself is always and never not “myself.” Nor is the I-pole, at least in wakefulness, ever not conjoined to a temporalizing. In English and German – at least – this inseparability is hinted at in the ambiguous meaning of “present” or Gegenwart. What is present is present to…, but it is also now; the present is inseparably presence, and the presence is always an enduring Now. The Gegenwart as now is what is over-against, or in the presence of; as what is over-against and facing it abides now or presently for that one who is present and to whom it is present. The eternal or abiding present is an eternal or abiding presence. But this present which is a presence is an eternal or abiding present which is an eternal or abiding presencing (Gegenwärtigung).

Ownness encompasses the basic senses of inalienability, sameness, possession, and power which are born of the unity of the twofold in I and the not-I, I and the other, I and my havings, I and my capacity or power. I myself as a sphere of ownness, presupposes what is not-I, yet within I myself there is a kind of upsurring irradiation from the center such that there is otherness or transcendence which participates in the I-myself. This is reflected in how the emphatic coming to light of ownness stands in correlation with the other I who presents the negation of ownness, i.e., das fremde Ich or realm of foreignness that distinguishes the other who says of herself “I,” the ownness sphere that I absolutely cannot enter, with whom I might be joined in love and friendship. This joining establishes “we,” “us” and “ours” where there is a sphere analogous to “I” and “mine,” “I” and “I can,” “I” and “I have,” “I” and “the other” or “stranger.”

Again, the basic sense of ownness is one of a basic distance between I myself and what I own, have, have done, what is “for me,” an “object,” but which also is a distance overcome because it too is I myself and pervaded by “me.” This overcome distance of ownness (Eigenheit, proprium) shows itself explicitly in the meeting of another sphere of ownness, i.e., the other Others. One’s own ownness comes to light as such in meeting the Other who presents me with a sphere absolutely exterior to my own and which could never become my own.

Most elementally, retentions and protentions are other to the primal sourcing presencing, yet there is never a primal presencing without the moments of these “transcendences” which it has. They are the basic havings or hexis that make me to be me. Similarly my body is a having that is inseparable from me being I myself. As inseparable, it is not something I merely have at my disposable in the sense that I may rid myself of it. Yet, in a thought experiment, my body is more disposable, at least in some of its parts, than are retentions and protentions.

The most basic sense of mine or property as having or hexis that is inseparably one’s own (proprium) is precisely what enables and empowers. I am, but my life is never the full actuality of simply being. I am or exist through my I can and my I can is tied to a sense of having and owning – all of which are inseparably my “ownness.” I am only through the empowerment of what I have, e.g., as my past and adumbrated
future possible life, i.e., the temporal horizon that is inseparable from me. And in the concrete personal living of life this horizon is fleshed out with retentions, memories, dispositions, habits, capacities, virtues and vices. In order for capacities and properties to be part of ownness in the strict sense, they must fall within the sphere of “mine” such that I cannot be “I myself” without them. But as we get into the sphere of the concrete personhood which evolves, devolves, thrives, declines, dissolves, resolves, re-resolves, converts, etc., the sphere of ownness becomes more elastic. “The originalness of the Mine itself has levels of originalness.”5 We shall later show that “I” itself has levels of originalness or centrality.

Frege rightly observes, and Husserl would agree, that it is impossible for me to make the same or render common, my presencings with those of another. We can both make present, in this sense have, the same strawberries but each’s presencings of the strawberries is her own. Further, the strawberries have properties that we can, through our intending them, enjoy together, and these are not parts of my presencings, even though they require my presencings as the necessary condition for their coming to light or being evident to consciousness. But the presencings do not hang in the air and link up, at random, with a plurality of consciousnesses; rather, they, like iron filings, gather around me their support or “bearer.” My presencings cannot occur within your consciousness nor yours within mine.

Do I establish my ownness by way of “individuating” myself from what is not me, especially from you and all the rest? Do I, indeed make a comparison, relate this “being” (me myself) to others? Our answer is No, but we defer these matters to the discussion of ontology in Chapter V. Nevertheless, basic to this question is the sense of the “individual concept of I” of which Husserl spoke and the particular and original way I am given to myself in a manner in which I am given to no one else. Certainly it is true of whatever I am aware of, any appearing of —, to…, that I cannot be aware of it unless I have a concept of it, unless we regard it as an X with distinctive properties. But is the non-reflective self that is originally given to us, and therefore not an awareness of…, and given in a way it is not given to anyone else, a result of a seeing as…? Is it a result of an intentionalapperception or concept-dependent perception? If not, how is it that our unique ipseity is present to us. Our answer is that it is pre-conceptual, pre-propositional, as well as non-reflective. Unique ipseity is there from the start. Of course the performance of “I” as well as reflection’s articulation of properties, e.g., I am angry, I am a teacher, I believe that…, etc., puts flesh on this original “givenness,” but these all have their precondition in the original self-presence. It is their bearer or support and they have their home only and uniquely there. And this is no token-reflexive-free, third-person characteristic that one has to think one possess in order to think of oneself as I. We will return to these matters in Chapter IV.

We speak in general terms of having something or owning and possessing something and thereby intend to include not only things we have acquired through work or our powers of acquisition, but also more basically we speak of having and owning in regard to things that make us to be the persons we are, what Aristotle called our hexis. Gabriel Marcel and Husserl have shown the fine line between our being and our having and both have tied our having to our I-can. This most basic proprium,
or most basic sense of owning and ownness, and in this sense “property,” is “my” past and “my” future. It is my past, i.e., my retentions of my former experiences which serve as the basis for my remembering my former life. But the retained past is not “over and done with” and therefore disconnected to the present; rather it actually now informs the present and the presencing. But also originally had is my future, i.e., my elemental leaning into the impinging not yet, upon which is projected my just retained having. This having of retention and protention is the root elemental sense of power and “capacity.” Without retention and protention I have no power, havings, no habitualities and capacities, and certainly nothing to remember and anticipate and no sustained (retained) projects to undertake. Without this capacity I have nothing with which to greet the future.

I am inseparable from my “I can” which is my elemental “I have.” Yet the havings (all based on the retention of retained prior experiences) as my havings, just like my body, are not “mine” by way of any objective characteristic that is identifiable in the world, just as the “myself” is not identified by anything in the world. Thus I do not know what to do with the question, What makes this retention or protention, memory or anticipation, mine? These elemental temporal havings are the extension, the spill-over, of the original upsurge that is inseparable from my original I am. And they are no more mine through identification of properties than I am. Of course, my car is mine because it has a number which matches with the number on my deed; my radio is mine because I have the receipt for it which contains the brand name, description, and the date of purchase. But there is nothing in these things that truly make them mine in the way, e.g., my body and my memories are mine. It is not as if I scrutinize my body, my pains, and my memories to locate properties which enable me to infer that they are mine, as I might if my shoes or car were in a repair shop with lots of similar-looking shoes or cars. Rather, if my memories and pains were not from the start pervaded by “mineness” irradiating from “I myself” they would never become mine by way of inference or identification (as a singling out of distinctive properties). And, of course, as we have often enough stated, following Shoemaker, if there were not a prior sense of I myself, which itself is not a result of an inference or identification, then declaring something to be mine or experiencing it as mine would not be possible. The objective perceiving of something as one’s own, e.g., one’s face, one’s foot, one’s wound, presupposes a prior-non-objective, non-perceptual awareness of oneself. One’s “own,” or what one has, presupposes a non-objective sense of “ownness” that cannot only not be perceived, identified and objectified but it further cannot be disowned. To know that anything is true of me or mine, I must first, in some sense, “know” that it is me of whom it is true and through which it is mine.

The reified understanding of memories, that is, the understanding which permits them to be “experiences” with objective properties, whether or not quantifiable, physical, etc., is what motivates some of the puzzles of identity. They are thought to be somebody’s, and thus ownership claims are made about them because of the contingent fact that they happen to have happened to someone, to be “in this body here,” or they have happened to bundle themselves up with this one person. They thus are judged to be not pervaded by mineness or selfness. This theory misses the
basic phenomenon brought to light by Husserl that a memory is the presencing of a former awareness (by me) of a former perception, and thus is a re-presencing of myself as having a perception. Memories simply do not dangle “in the past air” unattached to me. When I remember I represent a former actual state of affairs, e.g., a spectacular sunset with rainbow after a rainstorm. But I also inseparably, and not merely incidentally, re-present the former presencing or experiencing. I do not merely recall the sunset but I of necessity recall my experiencing of the sunset, i.e., my awareness of the sunset.

But let us, for the moment, not regard this as an essential misrepresentation and consider the view that holds them to be contingently mine, i.e., they could just as well be someone else’s. If they were contingently mine, they too would have to be or have an identifiable property, like a receipt of ownership if I am to claim them. Thus some theories suggest that identities are interchangeable if the memories are interchangeable. Thus, like ramshackle houses or constantly remodeled bikes, cars, ships or computers, selves have a loose identity where parts may be gained and lost over time, and the sense of “sameness” is merely a result of their being gradually continuous, not abrupt and massive. We side with those who have argued against this loose sense of identity and who have urged a more strict one.

Roderick Chisholm proposed this thought-experiment. Imagine that you are going to be totally transformed tomorrow, physically and psychologically. But right now you are given the choice of doing A, whereafter your transformation will be rewarded with bliss, or doing B, whereafter you will be brutally tortured for your transformation. Then assuming the theory that our identity as selves or persons is made up of these loose bodily and psychological continuities, would we care in the least about these offered choices and their results, given the total physical and psychological transformation? If you think of yourself as made up of these more or less continuous/discontinuous changes, then the answer is No, there is no reason to care because one’s memories and one’s body will be no longer the same. But Chisholm rightly thinks that view is mistaken. If you choose B, for example, “It will be you who undergoes that pain, even though you, Jones, will not know that it is Jones who is undergoing it and even though you will never remember it.” Chisholm confesses that although he cannot provide an argument for this view, it “seems quite obvious” to him. We hope, in what follows to make this view more evident. Key, of course, is that what “I” refers to is not identical with who one is as a person in the world with identifiable properties, recallable memories, etc. Ultimately the evidence here is not the result of the logical coherence and entailment of the empty intentions which are concepts. Ultimately the evidence is not through an argument. Yet arguments surely can aid in leading to the intuitive insight.

This position, was also advocated by Castañeda and H.D. Lewis. Lewis argued that of course when I lose my memory I do not any longer know who I am in important respects, e.g., I do not know my name, my family, my profession, etc. In such a case, “I cannot place myself in the sense in which the outside observer would place me on the basis of what is known about me.” In this sense I do not know who in the world I am. But nevertheless in an important sense “I have no doubt who I am” even though many or most particulars of my past history and situation cannot
be retrieved by me. (I perhaps can still speak English, I am capable of massive identity syntheses that enable the recognition of most every day objects, etc.) I “know” in an elusive sense that “I am myself, the being I expressly recognize myself to be in a way, which is not possible for knowledge of any other.” Of course the person has, in an important sense, lost his “identity.” Nevertheless, even in this unfortunate circumstance “the sufferer will know himself, in the full normal way, as the distinct person he is, and he will very probably…bemoan the fact that ‘this has happened to me.’” Lewis’ presentation enables us to see that something essential emerges in thinking about these matters in the first-person rather than in the third- or second-person.

A passage in Husserl here is of special interest. After developing a strong meontic sense of the transcendental I as functioning I-pole, he discusses the possibility of thought-experiments which involve transformations of our concrete monad. At issue in these thought experiments is the way the individual I is both maintained and transformed, to the point of destroying or negating the unique individuality of the I. The monadic unity, Husserl claims here, is a matter of passive and active syntheses. In this text he maintains that it is in principle impossible that two co-existing monadic unities have the same I. The peculiarity of each I is a uniqueness rooted in position-takings. To rethink this peculiarity or uniqueness in thought is to attempt to transform the I of passive synthesis and position-takings. Husserl states that the evidence against there being two I’s with the same uniqueness is not a metaphysical claim but rather what is at stake is the evidence that comes to light in the description of the uniqueness of the I as the person of this unified passive and active synthesis. This unity of syntheses is a self-contained uniqueness with an inherent principle of individuation. We can think of ourselves behaving differently and come up with possible transforming fictions of my I; but I would no longer be I or a variation of myself if I transformed myself into another I.

Husserl then goes on to repeat the position that the primal I or “functional center” with its own uniqueness is what would separate monads: Two monads with the same functional unique center are unthinkable. To have a plurality of monads, e.g., different bodies and/or different humans with the same I, each with different habitualities, cognitive achievements, etc., would require that each recognize the other as the same. Husserl notes that this kind of speculation calls forth the well-known problem of the Doppelgänger.

Although the body of the text takes the position this book argues for, in three footnotes Husserl raises objections to the conclusions in the body of the text. My interpretation of his first point is that we may think that the plurality of monads could have a common center of functioning as a form. The functioning I is apparently at once uniquely individual and a form. Husserl then, assuming here, I believe, the role of devil’s advocate, proposes that the unique functioning I may best be thought of as a genus with lowest specific differences, the differences of personality. This he says is an a priori matter. The fact that my personal I is incompatible with that of another is a matter of its incompatibility with another kind of I, i.e., another personal I; each kind of I is independent of the other in the matter of the affections, acts, etc., but that does not make necessarily for different I’s if we think
of the I as the center of functioning which is the generic form of the plurality of personalities. The third footnote (on 33) expresses discontent with the view that there cannot be two humans with the same personality. (Perhaps here Husserl wants also to express his discontent with the view that there cannot be two personalities with the same I.) The evidence for the necessity of this skeptical view that there cannot be two humans with the same personality, he says, does not come from direct (third- or second-person) intuition. If it did, the poets and writers (perhaps he has Doestoevski in mind) could not have treated the issue of The Double. Indeed, he observes, the poets make the matter even worse: They make it so that the Doppelgänger is experienced as the same I.10

Of special interest is that Husserl, for the most part, pursues this whole (quite unsatisfactory) discussion in the third-person, even though he is referring to what of necessity is a first-person matter. We want to pursue this in greater detail with the help of Erich Klawonn, whose marvelous rethinking of Derek Parfit’s innovative thought-experiments will be our guide.11

The experiencing of another, even if the Other be an “identically cloned version of oneself,” always manifests the unbridgeable abyss that separates one subjectivity from another. As Husserl, in another passage, put it in the context of the awareness of inner-time: “The time of my streaming life and that of my neighbor’s is separated by an abyss (abgrundtief geschieden), and even this expression’s picture says too little.”12 In facing the alleged double of myself, I face one who, when he speaks about himself says what I would say, and who, for others, is unrecognizably different from me, and who, if I am to base my view on what he reveals about himself and what others reveal about him, has equal claim to be me, JG Hart.

Imagining this situation is aided, if one may overlook the initial ontological-metaphysical objections as well as the question of technological feasibility, with the science-fiction phantasy where the Bloomingtonian, JG Hart, requests to be “teletransported” (or “beamed up”) to, e.g., Manitoulin Island, by way of a reconfiguration “there” of the exact bio-chemical configuration (and therefore by way of further speculation, the neurological and mental configuration) that “underlies” the configuration of JG Hart “here.” After the initial time for “beaming up” transpires, the telephone at the other end rings, and the report is made that JG Hart has arrived in Manitoulin Island. Unfortunately, I, JG Hart, am still here in Bloomington because of a technical glitch and we all face the problem of who is truly JG Hart, and how we can distinguish the two claimants.

From the third-person and second-person perspective, all the properties of the two claimants to be JG Hart are the same, except one is in Bloomington and one is in Manitoulin Island. If both are brought “here” and here is accepted to mean present “in the flesh” or “in person” to the perceivers, then there are no discernible differences, except one is “there” on the left and the other is “there” on the right, and one of them just made a trip back to Bloomington from Manitoulin Island, thereby having a series of experiences the other did not have. (The difference of being on the left or right, or having been teletransported to or from Manitoulin Island, we will assume is not significant for our point. If it appears to be, then for the sake of the thought-experiment, we can tinker and, e.g., need only move the
II Ipseity’s Ownness and Uniqueness

It is as clear to everyone observing the matter that there is no difference in properties or qualitative content beyond the spatial-temporal “places,” (one JG Hart being to the left/right of the other; one JG Hart being “here” a few seconds earlier than the other) whether in terms of the “essential bio-chemical configuration” or appearance, or revealed content of historical or present consciousness. Each may lay equal claim to being JG Hart, if JG Hart is a distinctive, in this sense unique, configuration of properties. And “property” here is to be understood to include states and acts of consciousness, as memories, experiences, desires, etc. as well as physical appearance, and physical-chemical-biological make up.

But when we recreate the situation in the first-person, a major difference appears. In this case I place myself in the situation. I am in the teletransporter booth; I hear a click indicating the teletransportation is over. I can imagine I am either in Bloomington hearing about Manitoulin Island, or in Manitoulin Island hearing about Bloomington. In any case “I,” the Bloomingtonian, JG Hart (or “I,” the Manitoulinian JG Hart) would experience, and say on hearing about or meeting my double: “Whoever he is he is not me” and “I am not you, whoever you are.”

From the second- and third-person point of view this sense of “I myself” is missing. Or better, it is more easily neglected. What we mean by JG Hart is a unique configuration of more or less unique properties. Of course in loving empathic perception one aims at the “you yourself” or in the empathic presencing of the other one aims at “he himself” or “she herself”; but, given the hypothesis, this would be the identical same in each case. Seen from the “outside” or second- or third-person perspective, and considering the properties (and the property of the unique arrangement of the properties) it makes absolutely no difference which JG Hart is identified (as JG Hart) by me or by others. Each of these JG Hart’s is as persuasively JG Hart as the other.

Yet, is it not so, and this Klawonn does not discuss, that we apperceive the other in both the third- and second-person to be precisely one who refers to herself with “I” and therefore to non-ascriptively refer to herself. And, is it not true, as we shall attempt to demonstrate in the next chapter, that in loving another we precisely target the very core of what the Other refers to with “I”? As far as I can see this consideration is missing in Klawonn’s presentation. Nevertheless, his basic point is valid in so far as when we are confronting the persons, we focus on them as having properties, indeed, identical properties. We do not, in this thought-experiment, attend to what typically an appresentation intends, especially a loving one, the very ipseity of the Other, i.e., what even each JG Hart refers to when he says “I.” Yet, it seems to me, that Klawonn’s thought experiment helps even to elucidate this very point.

Of course, it will make a dramatic difference, perhaps occasioning a trauma, that I am in such a situation where both Others and I myself seem to have to choose which is truly JG Hart and who JG Hart really is, given that there is that other one claiming to be me. But from the point of view of the thought-experiment it does not matter where I set myself up, i.e., whether I am in Bloomington or Manitoulin Island; in each case I am not he and am I myself. In each case the I can be at home, i.e., whether I move my “I” to the Manitoulinian or to the Bloomingtonian JG Hart, nothing will be
gained or lost. In shifting from JG Hart/Manitoulin to JG Hart/Bloomington I do not shift any properties. These all remain identically the same. I am me myself whether I am the Manitoulin JG Hart or the Bloomington one. But in being one I am emphatically not the other one. If being identifiably JG Hart involves such and such properties, the “I myself” therefore is not exhausted by being JG Hart.

Of course, in the first-person reflection on the matter, I must acknowledge that the Other is there and I am here; and we can change places. The spatial difference remains not only for the third-person but also for the first-person reflection on the matter. However, there is this to note: In the first-person I “appresent” others as self-experiencing. This means the presence of the other JG Hart is a presencing of one who is “here” for himself and not “there.” Therefore even in this regard there is no spatial or place differences in the first-person presentation of the JG Harts because I “appresent” you, the other claimant to be JG Hart, as experiencing yourself as “here” even though ineluctably you are “there” for me. Therefore in the first-person even this difference does not distinguish us. Again, surely the difference between my being me and not being he is not to be exhausted by my being, for the moment here and not there. “I” is not exhausted by “here” nor can “here” replace “I.”

What therefore is at stake is what “I myself” means if “I” or “I myself” is not able to be subsumed under or identified with any of the properties making up JG Hart. If we may speak of “I myself” as what distinguishes me from the alleged JG Hart over there who is in every respect like me as JG Hart, then we must say that it, in one sense, has no “essence” by which we here mean essential properties; a virtue being mine or a pain being my pain does not add any extra property to the virtue or pain. This seems to be both the consequence and explanation of my being able to imagine that a person (JG Hart) remains himself unchanged (whether the Bloomington or Manitoulin JG Hart), while at the same time ceasing to be myself.14 “I myself” or “being me” “cannot be conceived as characteristic of a person or a thing existing objectively in the world.”15 As Castañeda put it: “There is no third-person special characteristic that one has to think that one possesses in order to think of oneself as I.” 16 To be aware of myself as myself there is no unique configuration of essential-universal properties, e.g. human, gender, race, etc., or unique properties, e.g., phobias, appearance, voice timbre, fingerprint, sense of humor, etc., that I have to attach to me to be aware of myself as myself.

At the same time, however, this being “I myself” here and not that JG Hart there, a difference indifferent to being here or there, is real for me. Were this denied then it would not be true that I would be able to say that he is not I myself and that I (in the first-person) would find no difference between that JG Hart there and me myself (as is the case in posing the issue in the second- and third-person), which is contrary to the facts of the matter (in the first-person).17

It is crucial for Klawonn’s insight and for this work to see that Leibniz’s “principle of the identity of indiscernibles” is called into question. This principle holds that what does not permit itself to be distinguished from something else by way of different properties must be the same and what is not the same is different by way of having different properties. In considerations such as those of Klawonn this principle would have to be rejected from both the second- and third-person
perspectives, as well as from the first-person perspective. In the first two perspectives we have two entities which cannot be distinguished from one another but which, by way of the hypothesis of the thought-experiment, are indeed distinct, whether we best call this a numerical distinctness or identity is a question to which we will return in Chapter V. In the first-person perspective, I propose that we have distinct “haecceities” or individual essences, i.e., the “myself” in each case is a different individual essence, but this difference is not determined by way of different properties which are determinable in the second- and third-person. For Leibniz, whose thinking in these matters has, for better or for worse, blazed trails most of us travel on, there is no identity of the “myself” apart from memory and the properties which self-reflexive knowledge and agency creates. As we shall say, Leibniz does not sufficiently distinguish between the “myself” and the person. We will share his position that denies there is any mere numerical identity, but our reason will be different.18 (As to numerical identity, see our discussion below at Chapter V, §4.)

The position we are proposing maintains that “I” in and of itself is completely without any categorical peculiarity and is empty of properties. Castañeda points out that we have no need of science fiction to grasp this: A small child around two years old can make perfect first-person references without knowing any of the relevant categories that are in play when we refer, in the second- and third-person to the child who makes this self-reference: self, gender, person, thinker, human being, etc.19

Further, if there is no third-person special characteristic that one has to think that one possesses in order to think of oneself as I, then I can and do think of myself as myself apart from such third-person identifications. Furthermore, if there is no token-reflexive free description of my person from which it would follow that this person is myself, then I must know myself prior to any such toke-reflexive free identification of myself and know myself as in some sense independent and apart from such a token-reflexive free reference. Thus it must be the case that I have an awareness, yes a kind of knowledge, of myself that is more basic than any third-person identifying knowledge I might have of what characterizes me and more basic than any description of me which is free of token reflexives. As Andrew Brook has elegantly observed: If I am aware of myself “without inferring this from anything else that I know about myself, my knowledge that it is myself of whom I am aware has to be independent, at least in some respects of knowing anything else about myself.” He adds: “I can be aware of myself as myself without being aware of myself as anything except – myself.”20

What is this awareness of oneself as not anything but oneself? We will be calling it an awareness of one’s unique essence. It is also able to be talked about as one’s “ownness” as it surfaces both in first-person non-reflective self-awareness and then in reflective self-awareness, where original senses of “owning” “possessing” and “having” come forth.

In as much as we base “ownness” in this basic non-reflective knowledge of myself and in what the indexical “I” brings to light we may say that when we speak of ownness as what I alone have and cannot share with another, we are not saying that ownness arises and is constituted by way of a mediating perception of the Other. We are not saying that ownness is dependent on the perception of the Other. Rather
it is a constitutive feature of self-awareness which is itself a condition for the perception of the Other. On the other hand, it seems clear that coming to know precisely this sense of ownness “as what is exclusively mine and not communicable to the Other” comes to light through the mediation of the empathic perception of Others.

Considered in itself and apart from its stream of impressions and acts and the ensuing habitualities that inform the stream the “I myself” is bereft of content, if by content we mean something displayed through properties or what we could have in a filled or empty intention. A filled intention here is what is there immediately given to us replete with and awaiting further categorical intuition. An empty intention is what we make present (intend) not in an intuitive present givenness but what we make present through an imagining, picturing, proposed concept or proposition. Thereby we intend what is not presently given. This absent that is made present by the empty intention today in 2007, (e.g., “the winner of the 2050 World Series”) may or may not ever be given in the filled intuitive intention. “I myself” is bereft of content therefore in a different sense. On the one hand, it has no categories that are featured in the world or that are features of a possible world as a variation of this one; on the other hand, it is not emptily intended but enjoys a unique non-reflective “givenness” that is prior to a filled intention.

Although bereft of worldly content, my self-experience, my non-reflective presence to myself, is unique. Indeed this is an absolute presence that is identical with “I myself” and my being me. And in this presence there is nothing that is hidden, nothing that is not revealed, nothing that is not adequately “given.” Thus, even as bereft of contents and considered as (relative to our personal life in the world) an abstract I-pole, I-dimension, or center of functioning, it is self-present and this is the equivalent to saying that it “has” what is specifically its own.21

This “ownness” of “I myself” is directly non-reflexively, pre-reflexively and reflexively accessible and it is the great wonder of the presencing of others that I presence precisely that which is essentially and necessarily absent for me but present as directly accessible to the Other. When I presence the Other I do not presence her or him as “I myself,” i.e., neither as an ingredient of my self-awareness nor as he or she is self-present. The Other is not given to me in his or her original self-givenness. If I could make the other present in this way the other would be a mere moment in my own ownmost self-givenness and the other and I would be inseparably one.22

Yet in the authentic presencing of the Other, I regard him according to his I-being, and I-life. I empathically make present the ownness that is proper to this other I-life. And through the characteristic features I, as it were, look through them to the abiding unique uniqueness which pervades the flux of momentary particulars.

Thus part of the explicit and thematic sense of “ownness” is precisely the uncovering of the Other in his or her otherness, i.e., as a strange or foreign “I myself” present to me. Bringing to light this strange foreign “I myself,” who is not for me “I myself” but the presence of an Other who for himself is “I myself,” is an aspect of Husserl’s project of the epoché: uncovering “I myself” by disengaging all that is not me and ineluctably mine. Recall that the epoché disengages all that can be disengaged or invalidated; “I myself” is a primordial realm of ownness that cannot be so
disengaged and is not dependent on my empathic perception of Others, even though I, this person, JG Hart, am unintelligible without a network of Others upon which network and individuals I am profoundly dependent.

§2 The Paradox of the Universality of the Unique I of Each Person

There is a paradox in the consideration that this unique, unpropertied, uncriterial, ownness and I-ness which is not communicable, non-instantiable, and impredicable (cf. our later ontological discussions in Chapter IV) is what characterizes each and every person. But this commonness is philosophically most interesting not because it is a universal form commonly participated in (even though there is no doubt that there is a universal essence of I-ness), but it is precisely its unique ownness and non-instantiability that merits our attention.

Dan Zahavi has seen this issue precisely, especially as it appears in Husserl. The subject possesses an absolute unique individuality from the start; it is not subsequently acquired through interaction with others. When we focus abstractly on this we have to do with a pure formal and empty individuality which each I shares with every other. Each is unique in exactly the same way, so to speak. This last qualification points to the difficulty: Direct self-awareness is not ascriptive, not mediated by knowledge of any identifying properties. “It is so pure and formal that it does not provide us with an insight into any of our distinctive features. When it comes to the true individuality of the subject it only manifests itself on the personal level, in its individual history, in its moral and intellectual convictions.”

A German poet has captured this matter in the following verses (first a translation):

There is in each of us something eternally alone,
It is that which joins us all,
It announces itself as what is most basically common
The more the soul regards it uniquely as its own.

This translates roughly the original:

Es ist in uns ein ewig Einsames,
Es ist das, was uns alle eint,
Es tut sich kund als Urgemeinsames,
Je eigner es die Seele meint.

I think there is a danger of an overstatement here in regard to the purely formal and empty character of this matter. Our position is that the individual essence is indeed a form, i.e., an essence. But it is not present as a form whose distinctive essential properties can be brought to light. Further, it is not empty as an empty intention or absolutely empty of “content,” i.e., there is the oddly rich content of the “myself.” Surely it is not formal in the sense that what is brought to light with “I” or non-reflective self-awareness is a “mere concept.” Nor is it merely formal
in the sense that we are featuring a form or feature abstractly that typically would inform an individual or concretum. Of course, there is no insight into our distinctive features – because there here are none – but the direct self-awareness is precisely of our propertyless individual essence. If this latter is true then it seems excessive to state that our “true individuality” manifests itself only on the level of the person and that the non-reflective self-awareness is purely formal and an improper or deficient individuality. Putting it this way suggests that there is no manifest individuality at the level of “myself.” We will argue that one’s presencing one’s own “myself” as embodied in one’s person presents an infinite task, often with false starts, twists, and turns, and yet, nevertheless, throughout all of these twists and turns the unique “myself” remains intact. Uncovering this unique individuality, recognizing it in the sense of identifying it in the world or “a rogue’s gallery” is out of the question, even though the task of constituting oneself in terms of one’s true and proper personal life itself is a unique complex process of “identification.” (See Book 2.)

A particularly rich text of Husserl makes the following points. I have a necessary stock (Bestand) of ownness that necessarily goes in advance of everything objective that is “for me.” The elimination of everything in this objective dimension (and we may assume that this has to do with personal constitution) does not eliminate me in my own ontological necessity, ownness. This latter is inseparable from me; it is not able to be eliminated.25 None of this means that we are to think that the transcendental I, and the kind of reflection the above sentences require, have no psychological-genetic conditions in terms of the constitution of the person – as if “I myself” were capable of all the phenomenological gymnastics even if I, e.g., were raised by sheep. See our discussion in Chapter VIII, §6, C, E, and F.

Because “I” is a pronoun able to be used by a speaker of English, and thus a universal term, and because there is here a non-ascriptive reference, i.e., here there is no proper identification of distinguishing properties, philosophers have been tempted to say that the referent of “I” is not necessarily to a unique self or subject. As evidence, e.g., there is brought forth by Manfred Frank the following humorous exchange in Molière’s Amphytrion: In answer to the Mercury’s question “Who is there?” Sosi responds with “I,” to which response Mercury asks, “Which I?” or “What kind of I?” In this view the interrogator is regarding “I” as an exemplification of a species of self-conscious beings. But that possible, even though inappropriate, interpretation may occur only by switching to the third-person from the second-person which involved an apperception of a first-person. The questioner relates to someone as you, i.e., one who the interpreter necessarily assumes refers to himself as himself, indeed as the unique essence he is, with “I,” and then switches to the term of reference as an abstract universal term that is applicable to an endless number of referents. That this is possible in the flow of speech, and that it is a source of humor, is precisely because of this distinctive feature of first-personal reference that enjoys this commonness of referential terms (“token reflexives”) for unique referents. The one answering with “I” meant something quite different than did the questioner with his final question, and the audience would know this and therefore find the exchange humorous.26
The “I” in response to “Who’s there?” that follows upon a knocking at the door, says as much as “It is I who is there for you.” The one inquiring does not properly interpret this to mean an instance of a universal, as “a human” or even “an I,” as in Molière’s joke. The question is not a sortal one, as “What kind of being is there?” as in, “What specification of the genus I is present in the one saying ‘I’?” Rather the “I” refers to the unique referent of the token-reflexive that excludes all Others. Ortega y Gasset, who uses the same example as Frank to reach the opposite conclusion, observes: If the “I” suffices for the one using it, it is because he expects the inquirer to recognize his voice. This voice recognition facilitates the identification. If the speaker is unsure about this prospect he might say, e.g., “Peter” instead of “I.” Thus in someone’s answering with “I” we do not have a common and generic noun that names something and whose usage always targets the same entity or concept; on the contrary, we each use the same token reflexive pronoun to signify a unique reality that is not only a different reality whenever someone else uses it but is used “in distinction from and exclusion of all others.”

Ortega further offers the theory that with “I” one gives a compressed version of one’s individual biography. He gives another example to illustrate this. Suppose we were in a crowded theater, prior to a play, and someone would suddenly shout out: “I.” All would immediately be directed to the place in the theater whence the sound came. Because “I” was the word, our attention would be riveted on that particular person. In this situation we would perhaps take the exclamation to imply a verb, like “am,” “can” or “did.” The “am” is implicit in the “I” as is the adverb of place. Thus “Here I am” seems necessarily implicit. Or perhaps we might think of a context where the word signifies a confession, as in answer to the question, “Who did it?” Ortega says, if we know this person, he would have displayed and exhibited his whole autobiography to us, just as when we say you “we fire at him point blank the whole biography we have constructed.” This contradicts our claim that “I” is nonascriptive, i.e., in referring to myself I do not ascribe any properties to myself nor do I single myself out on the basis of any criterial identification. Ortega seems to be saying that with “I,” indeed, there is a self-identification by way precisely of a display of the totality of the properties comprising oneself but they are implicit and unstated. Similarly with my saying “you” I single you out by identifying you in terms of all the real and imagined properties I believe you to have.

No doubt the situations evoked here by Ortega would involve the listener identifying the person, singling him out, as does the speaker of “you.” But in neither case does the reference of the speaker to himself involve property ascription, even though the use of the “I” typically is accompanied by the sense of one’s personal horizon just as when we say “you” we typically do this on the basis of a personal identification and “you” in the flesh is the core intention surrounded by the massive apperceptions of my acquaintance with you. Yet it remains true that no explicit attribution is thereby in play. Indeed, we might imagine a situation where you are referred to directly but where I, in a position of authority, must chose on the basis of a strict measure of impartiality and objectivity, have to put out of play as much as possible this massive associative apperception I typically have of you, as when a father who is a commanding officer has to order his son to partake in a dangerous
mission. Here he might say, pointing each time: “I want you, and you, and you to report to mission command.” Further, we might imagine a case where a person has suffered from a science-fictional identity theft where all autobiographical claims were equally true of many or even everyone in the theater. Would the shouting out in the theater of “I” (or “Here I am”) still not refer to the speaker himself non-critically, non-ascriptively, and inerrantly, knowing full well that the distinctive biographical details do not single him out? Similarly with the case of the amnesiac who would not know who in the world he was. In both cases might not the despairing person’s “I” take on especial poignancy, especially in its non-ascriptive and non-identifying character?

A thirteenth century parallel discussion which sought its evidence totally in third-person reference is found in John Duns Scotus (as presented by Allen B. Wolter). Here we see that the third-person evidence for the unique ipseity of especially persons (but in the Scotist context, anything that truly exists) is not sufficient for establishing beyond question the “individual essence,” “thisness,” or “haecceity.” Because our articulation of the world in the third-person is tied to sortal properties, the radical uniqueness or individuality of things, *haecceitas*, cannot be grasped in our thoughtful perceiving. We do not perceive the individuating difference of unique individuals but rather we grasp them as individuations of a nature. We see a white object not precisely *this* white object. “Thisness” forever eludes our thoughtful perception, even though we may, as Castañeda has put it, harpoon it with a demonstrative pronoun.

Scotus makes his point with *Gedankenexperimenten*, i.e. through what is thinkable providing only that it is not self-contradictory. If God (unbeknownst to us) were to make two distinct objects of identical shape and form in one and the same place, we would see the two objects as one. Similarly, if God miraculously bilocated one unique object, we would see the individual as twins. These “thought experiments” indicate that we, in second- and third-person reference, do not perceive the individuating difference of singulars but only their sortal natures. (Perhaps for this reason Leibniz was moved to hold that if there are two beings they must have individuating properties.)

But Scotus goes on to say that even though we cannot apprehend intellectually (in intentional second- and third-person referring) the haecceity, i.e., because in our own thoughtful display of the world our articulation is inevitably pervaded by sortal terms and the unique individuality escapes us, this does not mean that the unique individuality is *per se* unintelligible. Consider, he says, that God and the angels can know it directly and *per se*. Again, we may grasp the “thisness” but not its essentiality or haecceity as an individual essence.

We take this position to make difficult if not impossible the knowledge of individual persons in the second- and third-person. Perhaps, however, it opens up the possibility for a direct non-conceptual, non-sortal apprehension of the unique individual which is not in the second- or third-person but which is at the basis of first-person reference. Scotus apparently withheld this capacity from humans. It would seem that for him we apprehend persons only as individuals of a human kind. Robert Sokolowski, explicating Spaemann’s position that “person” is not a sortal
term also explicates and perhaps corrects Scotus’s position. He notes that we may say to someone, “Come here, I want to show you a house,” or even, “I want to show you a human being.” But it makes no sense to say, “Come here, I want to show you a “this” or “I want to show you an individual” or “I want to show you a Peter.” Similarly it makes no sense to say “I want to show you a person.” Of course, it makes perfect sense to say, “Come, I want to show you (introduce you to) Peter.” What we are referring to with “Peter” is, like this, a radically individualized term. Sokolowski calls it a “singularity.” It involves a different kind of logic from genus, species, and individuation of a kind or species.

Here we can note that perhaps in contrast to Duns Scotus’s view that makes impossible the knowledge of an individual haecceity, St. Thomas Aquinas, whose views on individuation (in the third-person) we will have occasion to discuss later, holds that the human soul knows itself in its acts, and not by way of inference from what the acts intend in the world. “The act by which the intellect understands a stone is different from the act by which it understands that it understands the stone.” How is this second-order self-understanding to be understood? Aquinas notes that there are two forms of self-knowledge. The first kind is the simple self-presence of “the soul” (which we take here to be the lived source of acts) in its acts of knowing and willing, etc. wherein, e.g., Plato perceives himself to understand. The other requires more than this self-presence and is a matter of diligent and subtle self-reflection where with acts of understanding and judgment directed at the soul the nature and the properties of the soul are disclosed as the same for us all. The former seems to be a non-intentional knowledge of the acts in their actuality, the latter more what we call reflection and introspection or even phenomenological psychology as the display of the essential properties of spirit, soul, and intellect as such. Aquinas also gives another aspect of the first-kind of self-presence in the form of a “habitual knowledge” by which we are simply and ineluctably present to ourselves, ready to spring into action. Here we have a sense of ourselves as I-can, i.e., I am able to reflect on myself as the same one who prior to this act experienced this as a possibility (potens exire in actum cognitionis sui ipsius). But he adds here that for this sensing or perceiving by the soul that it is, that it is functioning, and that it can reflect on itself, no habit is required; rather all that is necessary is that the essence of the soul be present to the mind and it is from this that the acts emanate in which the soul is actually (non-reflectively) perceived or sensed. Thus Aquinas holds there is an awareness of whose essence is known, an awareness of who is knowing, and an awareness of what is proper to itself in this individual. In knowing my essence in my acts and habitually I know that these acts are mine and the knowledge is of my proprium. Knowing my essence is knowing my unique individuality.

Scotus finds impediments to humans having this kind of knowledge and therefore reserves it to angels. Our position is that in the second- and third-person nonascriptive references we target non-sortal references. We target what in fact for us refers to itself with “I” and this is the exemplary form of non-ascriptive reference to a non-sortal referent. This is the foundation for Spaemann’s claim that “person” is a non-sortal term because a person is precisely what refers to itself with “I.”
§3 A Note on “Soul” in Husserl

Soul in the philosophical tradition typically refers in the third-person to the form or principle that animates the bodies we perceive. (As we shall see in Book 2, in Plotinus, soul or psyche becomes the center of intellectual agency which is experienced in the first-person.) As a third-person term for besouling principle it then becomes the explanatory principle for the specific kind of life that is manifest. Soul, anima, animates in the sense that it is the principle of vitality as well as the principle of organization by which all the parts of this body are related to the whole. In the case of sentient beings this organization is generally taken to have a center and periphery, and the center is a form of consciousness that is more or less diffuse throughout all the parts of the body.
Husserl, on occasion, also stipulates that soul is a third-person consideration. Although soul, das Psychische, das Seelische, is often referred to as if it were identical with the transcendental I or absolute consciousness, it is, in the wake of the transcendental reduction, the apperceived thick penumbral presence of absolute consciousness in the world. It may be present in one’s own embodied objective presence or in that of an Other. As present in the second- and third-person, the soul is transcendent and empirical, and is given as the soul of a body in the world. And because that in regard to which I have indubitable evidence is only the cogito in its momentariness, retaining and protending, in no way does the soul as a transcendent apperception enjoy an indubitable status.  

But soul for Husserl also reveals itself in the first-person. Soul or psyche also has been referred to in the first-person as a conscious center and source of agency (cf. Plotinus and Aquinas), and this kind of reference, along with the third-person reference, becomes the source of descriptions. In the phenomenological tradition the Plotinian tradition echoes because soul is correlated generally with spirit as the I-center. One does not understand spirit without soul or soul without spirit. The agent and dative of manifestation, as properly the center of I-acts, presupposes soul, also called “primal sensibility” by Husserl, as its underground. Soul is the “root soil…in the darkest deeps” that provides the motivating field, the “irritability,” of what stimulates or allures the agency of spirit or the I.  

For Husserl the realm of spirit is inseparable from reason and the I. The human person is not merely soul besouling or animating a body but also spirit. Thus the human person lives in the form of “I live.” This means that the human person is conscious of his living a life of the “myself,” which in the third-person would this be improperly referred to as “this I.” Life has the form of “I am” but this is inseparable not only from the “I do,” “I have done,” but also from the “I undergo” or “I suffer,” i.e., spirit builds on and presupposes the deliverances of soul.  

I act on the basis of the pre-given background of the flux of sensations, associations, drives, dispositions, instincts as the underground. I have this background and the entirety of myself, what we are calling the “person”; but also I am soul, as what I necessarily have as my specifically human drives and spontaneities, and my distinctive power to be the creative agent of self-transformation, change in the world, and the agent of manifestation of the world.  

This primally possessed background is double-layered. (1) What might be called the upper layer contains the contents the initiating, instituting acts that have emanated from the act-center, now “retained” and transposed into a basic hexis, having, or habituality. They establish the primary sense of I-can or my power and capability to act as this historical person. They establish the more or less uniquely personal style of life and dispositions of the I as this incarnate intersubjective person. A great part of the personal life is the reactivation of these achievements through associations. Skills or learned dispositions themselves are cultivated havings that come into being by way of a more or less intended patterning of experiencing so that by acting a certain way now, then at a later Now, I can count on the pattern or design I am now establishing to come into play.
We may think of this upper layer of soul as “secondary sensibility” or “reason sunk into sensibility” or retained I-agency immersed in the havings of the ongoing occurrent I of acts, whether it is moral agency or the agency of manifestation. And this is contrasted with (2) “primary sensibility” or lower layer which, considered abstractly, contains nothing of the precipitation of I-agency. This is soul with its native spontaneities some of which are conscious and others, e.g., the workings of the respiratory system, digestive tract, etc., are not. In so far as we have to do with soul as conscious we have to do with what may also be called the sheer stuff or hyle, like raw pleasures and pains, kinaestheses, instincts, drives, but also the impressions of color, sound, etc. that emerge out of the field of sensations. All such hyle, as Husserl insists, are informed by the primal hyle of the primal temporalizing. At the level of “primary sensibility” a kind of impersonal and universal species-specific, i.e., generally human, character of life pervades. As much of our physical bodily life is interchangeable with that of others, so there is an abstract quality to, e.g., hunger, sexual yearning, pain and bodily pleasure, that bears little trace of uniquely personal or individual, even though the particular pains or pleasures are experienced only by me. Here “who one is” is informed by the heritage of countless years of struggles by one’s ancestors, and these ancient struggles make themselves felt in the present, as when a fearful situation makes the “hackles” on the back of one’s neck stand up.

Yet, having said this, we must note that insofar as this realm is pervaded by time-consciousness and insofar as this is rooted in the unique ipseity, one would seem to find traces of uniqueness everywhere. But how could we say that my pain, apart from being uniquely my experiencing, was unique to me and therefore in contrast to the pain you are having? Because a habit, trait, virtue, quality, sensation, impulse, desire, etc. belongs uniquely to me and my stream of consciousness, and therefore is part of my ownmostness does not mean that it is bereft of common properties. Thus a universal science of this level of soul, as what I myself have, and thus a science of “personality,” is possible in a way it is excluded from I myself or the aspect of the person where ownmostness and oneself prevail.

It is important to keep in mind that this whole structure of I-agency and its pre-given field of having, with its two-fold layering is informed by the primal laws of the awareness of time. The relevance of the past achievements to the present and future is rooted in the laws of passive synthesis, association, and the capacity to reproduce, to re-present, former Nows, former fields of actual perception and agency; but all of this is rooted in the primary association of “retention” where one retains the just past Now and lives the present Now as the fulfillment of the just past Now’s protention. We will soon look at this in more detail.

Again it is important to note that although I am not active in regard to the spontaneities of soul, and from this perspective soul may be named a realm of passivity for the I, it still is active as the ongoing flux of impulse, impression, raw feeling, etc. as they are integrated into the activity of passive synthesis. That is, there is irrepressibly and incessantly the ongoing flowing of automatic vitality of the achievements of time-consciousness as well as the associations and reproductions that fill in this formal structure in terms of impressions, drives, kinaestheses,
habitualities of position-takings, categorical achievements, etc. Further, although I may be passive in regard to the fluctuations of soul, still the source of the streaming of Nows is not something apart from me, but is also inherently me, i.e., the upsurging of the total sense of I myself and what is most basically mine.

The theory of soul as distinct from spirit or the I-principle raises an important metaphysical question regarding the origin of the spirit. Robert Sokolowski has argued for the ancient Aristotelian-Thomist tradition’s position that soul is the source of both the spiritual as well as the bodily life. Sokolowski has further argued that the soul as the principle of reason evident in our being agents of manifestation is what singularizes us. The phenomenological evidence for this is the declarative use of “I” or the implicit transcendental prefix in play in our displays of the world. (See above Chapter II, §4.) It is also what enables us to be reflective and responsible in our agency and in shaping our human nature.40

But, we may ask, is it not the case that in both the theoretical-cognitive and practical-moral sphere reason is already singularized by belonging to the singularity or what we are calling the “myself?” Is not reason always “mine” and of necessity an I-act? In this respect it is the “myself” which enables reason to have its singularizing function in moral agency and the agency of manifestation. The theory that “reason singularizes us” might be taken to suggest that behind the Who there is a What or a impersonal principle. I do not think that Sokolowski wishes to hold this view. This work likewise is an extended thesis that works against such a theory.

Fichte holds that we in our original non-reflective self-awareness we are manifest as radical individual I’s. But as such the unity of Being is disjointed until consciousness becomes thought. Reflecting on the original situation gives birth to “my I,” but in thought we are raised up to the unity of being. It is wrong to think that the individual thinks through itself and its unique power. Rather only as one with the absolute I and with the suppression or annihilation of its individuality is there the thinking of what is One and Universal. In thought I see the manifold of individuals as unique standpoints with their own original self-awareness and see that the others see me as a unique standpoint with my own unique self-awareness. In transcendental reflection I am able to be raised up to a synthesis of all these perspectives wherein the refraction of the one unique Being and Life occurs and wherein there is to be observed that this thought is able to be numerically repeated in the endless manifold of individuals.41

We wrestle with the speculative, implicitly theological, directions of Fichte’s thought in the final chapters of Book 2; here we merely note our reservation in regard to his view that thinking involves the annihilation of one’s unique self in terms of a universal agent intellect I. Recall our earlier reserve in regard to Simone Weil’s doctrine of “attention.” This de-individualizing or de-personalization would be true of thinking in regard to what is thought, e.g., the propositions, especially when taken with working out a calculus or deriving conceptual implications. But even in the genesis of such propositions in acts of judgment, distinguishing, etc., the acts of thinking still remain “mine.” Further, it does not do justice to even Fichte’s own view that the kind of philosophy one holds depends on one’s unique individuality or personality. It also stands in tension with Fichte’s doctrine of
agency as determined by the unique call of the individual revealed in an Absolute Ought, a doctrine Husserl followed and developed, and which we will study in Book 2, Chapter V.

We may raise a similar question in regard to some ideas of Conrad-Martius. Conrad-Martius similarly teaches the I-spirit is archonal, i.e., it is essentially its own beginning, and there is nothing in the world of experience which may serve as the basis for its cognitive and moral agency. Likewise it is meontic. Conrad-Martius’ argument for this claim has to do with the nature of knowing through intentionality. If spirit, in its founding self-constituting of itself as a being existing substantially in itself, would return to itself with a self to which contents are properties were affixed, then the self would be the first and immediate, indeed, single exclusive object of all knowing. But spirit is a being capable of knowing, i.e., is capable of the intentional union with what is transcendent, and it is so by reason of its being itself without content and properties in its return or reference to itself. It is essentially that which comes to itself bereft of identifiable properties. Thereby it comes to its own self which is the bearer of its coming to itself and its turning to itself – and nothing else – and it is this which permits transcendent beings to come to light as transcendent beings.42 Nevertheless, Conrad-Martius holds that the I-principle of each human itself is rooted in a soul principle, which she anchors in a trans-physical potential realm of essence-entelechy.43 Given her own analysis of the radically archonal theory of the I, there would seem to be a problem. For Conrad-Martius, the I has, besides the transcendence of intentionality, the “reverse transcendence” or “retroscendence” (cf. below Chapter IV, §3): It has its having of itself. Strictly, the freedom of the I and its acts is not based in anything more basic in the world or in any regions of the world; in this sense it is both “meontic” and “absolutely immanent.” Yet it is never separated from its temporalization and the field that this provides for it. Even though this does not amount to evidence that the I emerges out of this sense of soul or evidence that soul is the principle of spirit, nevertheless she attempts to anchor the I or spirit in the principle of the trans-physical essence-entelechy’s energizing of contingent matter. This would seem to rob the I of both its singularity and its absolute immanence, and to account for who one is by a what, a trans-physical essence-entelechy.

In Husserl himself there is an ambiguity: On the one hand, the principle of the I-moment is steeped in the animation of the absolute temporalization; without this it has no life. On the other hand, the I-moment is not absolutely coincident with this hyletic temporalization.44 Therefore the hyletic moment of the primal temporalization, an It for the I, does not constitute who one is, even though it is coeval with who one is.

There is the further complication of the teaching of the Christian tradition that the individual soul is created by God. We can ask, how is “soul” to be understood here? Is it to be understood as a rational form? If so, how is it individuated before it is individuated by being immersed in the network of the world? Is it by a divine designation of some created contingent “matter” or individuating circumstances, like genes, family, linguistic and cultural milieu? And therefore the soul is not a unique person apart from the individuation of the world? Yet the same tradition
teaches (cf., e.g., Ephesians 1:4) that each is individuated even before “the foundations of the world?” Of course, in our view the “myself” is not in need of worldly individuation. For more on the ancient theological wrestle with these matters, see Book 2, Chapters VI–VII.

§4 The “Pure” I

The “pure I” refers to one of the paths transcendental phenomenology takes to address the topic that we refer to as the “myself” or ipseity. The pure I comes to light in ultimate transcendental phenomenological reflection on the agency of manifestation’s bringing to light all the life of consciousness, including itself. Although it is a theme proper to transcendental phenomenology, it rehearses the way “I” and the “myself” are available quite apart from the transcendental reduction.

As we have urged, although the agent of manifestation, as the transcendental I, is not properly some given thing, it nevertheless is an indispensable theme if we are to account for the ownness of first-person, non-reflective lived experience. We have insisted that the agent of manifestation, a third-person term, is a first-person achievement by an “I.” Husserl, on occasion, called this also the “pure I.” This term had its predecessor in Kant, who, like Descartes, sought a philosophical consideration that was “purified” of what might “contaminate” it. For Kant one sense of contamination is that which is alien to the pure knowing or the pure I. For Kant this impurity was primarily the realm of sensory perception. For Husserl, the purity gained from the transcendental reduction was what was left after the “purification” of all naïve doxastic allegiances. But for Husserl the pure I was not only that which could not be disengaged, but it was also that which was ownmost to and original and “purified” of that which was other than one’s ownness, i.e., the foreign – a theme of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. Thus the bringing to light the pure I rehearses the original self-appearing of the “myself” as what is always presupposed by all consciousness and self-reference.

Thus for good reason one may be tempted to confuse the pure I with non-reflective self-awareness for it is this latter which brings the former to light. But always the self-awareness, at whatever stage of the transcendental reflection, must be located in some sense of the self or I and in some respect these are all different aspects of the same.

Non-reflective self-awareness functions in all aspects of the person’s act-life and it is all we have in the reflecting phenomenologizing consciousness that brings the pure I to light. Because non-reflective self-awareness is the home of first-person experiences it is the way all “levels” or aspects of the “I” are revealed and it serves as the basis for the reflective explication of these aspects. All experiences, whether of the person in the natural attitude, or whether of the transcendental I thematizing the empirical person in the world with others, or whether of the I in its founding primal presencing, or whether of the transcendental phenomenologizing I that takes account of all these as an identity in a manifold, are non-reflective lived, erlebt,
durchlebt, etc. That means they are pervaded by myself and its irradiating mineness; it also means inseparably that they belong to me, have an “I” for their pole. But the pure I, as such first becomes a consideration by reflecting on how it is that although the entirety of the stream of acts and sensa is pervaded by ownness and mineness the I itself is not itself an experience or even a piece or moment of an experience e.g., not a feeling or tinge of a feeling, not something experienced, e.g., not given properly in an act of perception, not a meant object, not even what is meant in an act of reflection on contents of the stream of consciousness. In this sense Hume was right, there is nothing, no thing, there to be found.

It must be admitted that Husserl on occasion thought of the I in a derivative fashion. For example, he seemed to be inclined to follow Lipps in holding that consciousness in and of itself was in no way individual but simply consciousness and it received its individuation from its being aware of others. In this regard the “pure I” is only properly a form of unity for lived acts directed toward objects. The principle of unification becomes I only therefore in relationship to and in contrast with the You. My interpretation is that in such passages, Husserl did not sufficiently appreciate the I-ness of the pure consciousness functioning as unifying agent of passive synthesis and that it was already uniquely individuated; he further did not appreciate the distinction between the I-ness of the pure I and that of the personal I. Further, this view of the I as derivative was constantly being eroded by his theory of empathic perception, the analogizing of which always presupposed a sense of mineness. If the Other was the source of mineness I would be doomed to be forever without it because the Other would not be present precisely as the other ownness. Empathic perception could not get underway with its framing of another self-experiencing which presupposed my awareness of “my own mineness.” Clearly Husserl did not want to think of the I-pole or pure I merely as meontic unifying pole and bearer or substrate of properties, affections, actions, etc. It was all these but was first of all I and as such was that (“dative point”) to which affections were conveyed as well as the irradiating center of functioning for affections and center of activity for acts.

For reasons Husserl has made clear, the pure I is not absolutely coincident with the person. Other persons and me for myself are necessarily given inadequately, i.e., only in profiles, perspectives or aspects. To know myself or another as a person is, as Husserl says, “to enter into the infinity of experience.” In this respect, persons as embodied, temporally constituted intersubjective selves are presentable like spatial things. I see myself as seen by others, or I see myself in a mirror or photo. In any case this presentation is only one aspect, one perspective. The relevant sense of aspects here of course are not merely spatial because we are also richly textured temporal beings. Even if, per impossibilie, our being were all at once in space now, it would not capture the being of a person. With space as well as time there are inseparably the rich layers of meaning aspects and contexts. Think of a photo of a loved one, whether old or new, where the past and future are conspicuously absent. Not only is the photo clearly a likeness representing somewhere, it is also a temporal “snapshot.” In any one moment of reflection I am not given to my self all at once nor is the Other so given to me. For example, my not so distant, and a fortiori my remote past, which are retained in my present presencing, nevertheless are not
Ipseity’s Ownness and Uniqueness

actually given with the slice given now. Indeed, it takes time and we must become acquainted with narratives in order to get to know not only Others but also to become more reflectively aware of ourselves. We forget or repress parts of our own stories, and friends and therapists help us gather ourselves. More concretely, my present good deed, does not reveal all of me, just as my present small-mindedness does not reveal all of me. My “character” is not something available all at once for me or for others. Even for the one practiced in “examing one’s conscience” the deep strata of oneself are elusive, especially given certain prior dispositions to be excessively hard on or indulgent toward oneself. This is one reason we are often surprised to ourselves. For example, an old grudge or hostility or feeling of indignation can find occasion to surface, and we can honestly ask ourselves, where did this come from? Occasionally an old attitude has persisted, that now expresses itself anew. (This we will return to when we discuss “position-taking acts.”)

In contrast the pure I or the I in the ultimate standpoint of the agent of manifestation does not appear in the proper sense, even in the way JG Hart appears to himself horizonally and unthematically in regard to the full expanse of his life. This latter is an empty intention revealing a manifold of latent and potential genitives of manifestation (more or less synthesized in the unity of consciousness) which awaits explication. The pure I is not so given and is not a genitive of manifestation to a dative of manifestation; it does not offer itself in profiles and aspects. Rather it is “given” in absolute self-hood (absoluter Selbstheit) and in a unity that is not perspectival. Reflection on it reveals that, in contrast to the personal I, the pure I as agent of manifestation is able to be adequately apprehended. It is there all at once and without hidden aspects. Let us dwell briefly on this.

The pure I’s “givenness,” as meontic as it is, i.e., as non-thingly, non-objective, non-propertied, non-present as its “presence” is, is always “present” all at once and never given in perspectives as is myself as person. The pure I enjoys its unique givenness fully in each phase, each act or sensation, of the stream of consciousness. It informs each experience not as a special experience or content of experience or object of reflection but as the first-person agent whose experience each is. The pure I is not merely numerically une and absolutely individual in regard to its stream of consciousness but it is non-reflectively aware of itself as uniquely unique (and this, we shall argue, makes inappropriate the description of “numerically distinct” or “numerically identical”) and absolutely individual in regard to all the phases of this stream. This awareness of itself “as such” emerges through reflection; but this reflection “reflects” the unreflected-upon and it also reveals the unique individuality is not a result of a meaning-giving or interpretive act.

We have already presented this thesis about individuality and will return to it in the next chapter. But here it is important to note that the awareness of the individuality is not like the awareness of a feeling that I interpret as anger when in fact it was something else. Here of course I could be wrong about the precise nature of the feeling. But there is no question about it being my feeling and there is no possibility of misinterpreting whose feeling it is. Similarly if, in the unlikely case, I were not really reflecting on myself and my experiencing but rather interpretively imagining myself and my experiencing, this interpretive imagining itself would be
pre-reflectively given in an absolute undeniable way. Thus the claim for the unique individuality and identity is tied to the ineluctable essential nature of the “givenness” of whatever experience, i.e., that it is pervaded by ownness.49

Thus I myself as person can be for myself as transcendental observer of myself and my life-world, or I am for myself in a different way as the responsible agent who is the transcendent source of the unified manifold of constituting acts, position-takings (see our discussion in the next section), choices, identifications, etc.; but I myself am for myself as pure I in an immanently transcendent way as not-constituted ultimate dative and agent of manifestation originally functioning in all of the stream. I come to light as pure I explicitly in bringing to light all the layers of I myself in all of my constituted personal and responsible living. Again, this “guise” of the pure I only comes to light in the appropriate phenomenological act of reflection, i.e., in how the pervasive streaming as well as each act is indeed “mine” and achieved by the “I,” and emergent out of “I” as a “source-point.” It is source because the ultimate “whence” of all streaming and all I-acts; it is a “point” because no temporal or spatial breadth may be ascribed to it. Such a reflection makes clear that the I indeed is ephemeral in the sense that not all of the stream involves acts where I am in play; but nevertheless the stream is pervaded by its pure self-aware I-pole and each act is lived by me as mine. As a pure pole it has disengaged itself from all the prior founded layers of accomplishment and is that to which all these are manifest.

Because the I pervades all that is in the stream, and bestows on everything in the stream its proprium, its ownness, its property of being das Eigene and belonging to the I, the I itself, as source of all these “properties” (or “proprieties”) itself has nothing of them and is itself without the qualities or properties that make up the stream. As source point of all that is in the stream of consciousness, even the “myself” as it appears in transcendental reflection – not of course the “myself” as it is the transcendental I’s self-luminosity to itself – it itself is not any of these things. None of these things can be ascribed to it as revealing its essence because it is the source-point of them all. In the pure I, Husserl observed, there is not to be found any hidden inner riches, but rather it is absolutely simple and this is absolutely evident. Further, if we disregard its “modes of relation” and “modes of comporting” “it is completely empty in essential components, it has no explicable content, it is in and of itself indescribable: pure I and nothing more.”50 The I as pure I and as I-pole appears to itself but not as a genitive of appearing to a dative of appearing. Husserl says its “self-appearings” are neither presentations nor profiles. Yet it is continuously self-appearing through its living and its being affected by its contents. Further it remains, in spite of the constant flux, identical.51 Even in the passive form of its being affected it lives the form of “I undergo” or “I suffer” the allures of the surrounding world.

Roman Ingarden raises two questions about this position. The first is that we may not simply “disregard” the modes of relation and comporting. Of course properties such as “vicious” or “just” belong properly to the person and not the pure I. But this does not mean that the pure I has no properties. Then Ingarden goes on to list the things that befall or characterize the pure subject, e.g., that sometimes its
agency is passive, sometimes active; sometimes it is concentrated, sometimes not, etc. His other point is that it is not clear whether the pure I simply is a subject of knowing or whether it is not also a moral subject from which responsibility is inseparable.52

In response, let us attend first to Ingarden’s second point. We agree that “the I” is not to be confined to the “I” of epistemic and cognitive achievements which phenomenology brings to light in a special kind of philosophical reflection. Yet what Husserl means by the “pure I” is typically the “I” of epistemic achievements. These achievements are themselves always self-forming, i.e., they shape the intellectual habitus of the particular agent of manifestation. These epistemic achievements already are pervaded by a basic sense of morality and responsibility. Yet there is another sense of “pure I” or the pure “myself” which we will call Existenz and what Husserl himself calls the self-determination of myself as moral.53 Responsibility is, as Ingarden suggests, inseparable from this inner core sense of “I myself” which can take precedence over pure cognitive, even phenomenological, tasks. But we defer that discussion until later. As we shall see, there are clear occasions when the pure I of transcendental phenomenology must give way to Existenz, i.e., to a more central sense of “myself,” that constitutes each person. Although this aspect of “myself” is necessary for my existence as a person in the world and is indeed the center of even the transcendental “I myself,” the propertyless, qualityless I-pole is self-present and intact no matter whether and how this moral determination is actualized. As such this center of the I only comes to light in an appropriate theoretical-philosophical (not ethical or “existential”) enactment; but the ownmost enactment or “arousal” of the I (Kierkegaard) is ethical (or existential), not merely cognitive or theoretical. The non-ascriptive “myself” and the transcendental pure I-pole reveal senses of identity that are not absolutely coincident with the moral-existential identity of the person. Much of this book and the next will wrestle with the sameness and difference of the identity of I as pure I, the I latent in the “myself,” and I as person.

As to the first charge that the pure I or agent of manifestation is of necessity propertied: Ingarden repeats the obvious point that the I is a personal agent and therefore has properties. The question is whether we may abstract or prescind from this concretion and attend to a constitutive moment or piece, e.g., the I-pole. In the next chapter the ontology of “myself” and “I myself” will preoccupy us. Now we simply state that as we may attend to acts and what acts intend without considering the person and the various senses of “I,” so we can consider the “I” as the pole and “myself” as the presupposed referent of “I,” and not as person and as distinct from the acts. When we say “I” we refer to ourselves non-ascriptively, even though most often this pronoun is used in conjunction with verbs of knowing or doing, none of which are necessary for us to refer to ourselves with “I.” We are not saying that what “I” refers to exists as an independent being in competition with the person whose I it is. It will be a major troubling issue whether “myself” as a constitutive part of the person enjoys any conceivable independence or whether it is rather a part that is a moment which cannot be separated even in thought; whether it is a “principle” that itself exists or whether it is a “principle by which” (id quo sed non id quod) the person exists.
The “myself” understood in transcendental reflection as “I myself” is considered as what pervades the stream of acts and sensa without being among these. Further this “I myself” can be itself in the absence of any of these. In the declarative sense of “I” we may prescind from the subordinate clause to the transcendental pre-fix, e.g., “I believe.” But then we may prescind from the “believe” and attend to the “I” that is the pole and source of “believe” and which persists when “believe” passes away. Granting that, as Ingarden notes, this I is sometimes active, sometimes passive, etc., the I-ness or I-pole is precisely what remains constant or the same pole, no matter what the intentional relation, no matter what the involvement. Whether the I is engaged or disengaged there is still the quality-less I-pole.

In later writings, as Ingarden notes, the empty I-pole is acknowledged by Husserl to be always also laden with habitualities and world-engaging acts. Ingarden seems to take this as contradicting Husserl’s earlier position. But in fact, Husserl is merely developing the doctrine of monad, as the concretization of pure transcendental I. In our view, the insight into the unique propertylessness of the I myself and pure I must not be lost sight of. Husserl never claimed that the living pure I was in every respect bereft of world-engaging acts. But he did claim that it differed from the personal I in several ways, one of which was that it was without properties. Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter IV, §4, in contrast to the indexical and personal “I,” the transcendental I, as a matter of essential necessity, has no Other(s).

We regard the pure I, with its inseparable mine, ownness, etc., as another way of bringing to light “I myself” as that which essentially bereft of qualities. The propertyless “I myself” is not brought to light merely through the non-ascriptive reference of the indexical “I.” Nor is it only evident in the non-reflective, pre-referential awareness which we usually have referred to as “myself.” Nor is “I myself” as bereft of properties revealed exclusively in the face of its alleged ontological clone who has all the same properties I have as this “unique person.” Rather, in addition, the pure I itself, when contrasted with the personal I, reveals itself as the underlying bearer of the non-ascriptive non-reflective self-awareness, as the referent of indexical self-reference, and as indistinguishably the individual essence (see the next chapter) that does not get confused with or collapsed into the alleged ontological clone. These considerations all illuminate the pure I, just as it illuminates them.

§5 Ipseity and Person

We are claiming that non-reflective “myself” and the pure I (i.e., the ultimate consideration in regard to the transcendental agent of manifestation) are not strictly identical even though there is a sameness in the sense that phenomenological reflection can reveal that they are aspects of what is the same. Similarly “person” and “personality” vis-à-vis these other transcendental considerations, as well as in relation to one another, are distinguishable even though an identity- or sameness-synthesis
is possible, i.e., they may be seen as aspects of the same. Thus each of these in the first-person is “myself” yet “myself” appears in a different context in each of these. When we begin to think of person and personality in third-person terms there is no strict identity, even though a sameness relation can be made evident. Likewise, the non-reflective non-propertied “myself” will reveal itself to itself in reflection to be somebody in the world with others who presents herself with a personal face and perhaps a more or less constant personality. In this section we want to begin our discussion of “person” which will be resumed in Chapter V and then sustained for the rest of this work.

The history of the term “person” in the history of philosophy in the West is long and complicated. Discussions usually begin within the parameters set by the Greeks and Latin “Fathers.” Here the Latin persona rendered the Greek πρόσωπον, but this latter word only meant “person” in later usage. Here the sense of these terms for what eventually became what we refer to with “person” is not first-personal meaning but that determined in the third-person referent of an onlooker. Whereas there is reason to think of the root meaning of the Latin persona, through personare, as the mask through which actors made sounds and spoke, the Greek prosopon first of all meant “face,” “visage,” or “countenance”; or as a second meaning, “someone’s look.” A third meaning was that of a mask. But sometime this third use of prosopon was opposed explicitly as when an ancient writer, Clement, “inveighs against women who by painting their countenances made their prosopa into prosopeia.”

Subsequent to the early Greek philosophy and then later through Greek and Latin theology, the medievals, and moderns (Boethius, Locke, Kant et alii) and contemporary thinkers inherit a notion such as: A free uniquely individual substance of a rational nature that is characterized by self-awareness of its numerical identity across time; this unique individual is the bearer of rights and accountable for her acts; she is never an article or thing but always an end in itself. In the tradition we do not confine person to human nature but rather to a “rational nature.”

Much depends on how “rational” is understood. Typically it is tied to logos as the capacity to think in accord with evident norms and to apophansis or language as the vehicle for displaying things truly. This generally is regarded as inseparable from self-reflection. Similarly the notion of the person is inseparable from the notion of the ethical person or personality.

A further development is the twentieth century interest in “personality theory.” The word personalitas in medieval Latin usually signified “person.” In personality theory “personality” could be studied with apparent indifference to the person. Thus consider the definition of “personality” as it appears in the fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV): “Enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself.” The final two words of the definition seem to be an afterthought; in any case, “oneself” is in the accusative and, in this case, it is not obvious that any nominative substantive is necessary or important for this understanding of “oneself” as “personality.” What is featured is “enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about” even though presumably these are the achievements of someone. The final two words, however, suggest that the
missing nominative substantive is capable of an identity synthesis in regard to itself as both subject and object. Yet here the focus is on the personality is focusing on the manifold of patterns which, presumably, are instantiable in any number of persons. Therefore “personality” itself is indifferent to the person having it, this person’s self-awareness; therefore “personality” knows no uniqueness. When in twentieth century psychology the field of personality theory emerged, the discipline was built on the common sense and scientific (empirical) knowledge that humans appear to us as both unique and yet as having typical features. Of course, in Aristotle’s notion of ἥξις or character we have adumbrations of “personality” in his delineations of the skills and habits required for his normative understanding of the good life. However, “personality theory” touches on the normative question of the good life primarily in view of psychological health. It further seeks to give a causal account of the uniqueness and commonness of the self-presentation of humans.

A useful definition of “personality” is that of Gordon Allport: “The dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic behavior and thought.” Here the “his” is admitted and perhaps a sense of person (“the individual”) being the bearer of “personality.” Further these systems are kinds (“psychophysical”) and these kinds determine his characteristic behavior and thought; there is no claim that the behavior and thought is unique, only that it has a kind of characteristic regularity. It seems clear that “the individual” as the substrate is not an individual per se (see below). Of interest also is the notion of a psychophysical system and the assumption that such a system is inherently intelligible. This way of talking, for all of its obviousness and important legitimation in first-person experience, has problems which will be addressed in Chapter VI. Allport presents a wholistic, organic understanding of personality that does justice not only to its being a center of activity but he also wants to insert it and its processes and agency in a wider milieu and context. Thus his description recognizes the merit of the hyphenated designation of persons as “being-in-the-world.”

For Allport, the key phrase, “within the individual,” rejects the interpretation that “individual” here means “self” or person as a kind of transcendent organizing principle. A fortiori a “transcendental I” is ruled out. For Allport such a substitution of a transcendent or transcendental “self” makes it sound like the dynamic organization of “personality” is an external effect of the “self” when, in fact, the individual dynamic organization lies within the skin of the organism as this extends itself into its surrounding milieu. For Allport the individuality of the human, as a “dynamic organization,” is the effect of the interplay of the various inner and outer factors of this organism. The individual is such through being individuated in great part by factors outside the “self.”

Allport acknowledges the existence of “ownness” with his reference to the “proprium.” He regards this as an encompassing direct “feeling of self-relevance” through out all of one’s life. This direct feeling is described as an “object” (of both feeling and knowledge) and thus faces the problem of an endless regress in establishing criterial identifications. Clearly the sense in which the organism is an “individual” for Allport is that it is an instance or a particular of a general kind and this individuality has nothing or little to do with the “proprium.”
A theory such as Allport’s not only leaves the person open to being a product of the organism’s systemic forces, but, and inseparably tied to this, it does not do justice to the first-person experience of “myself.” Certainly we are present to ourselves and one another, and others are present to us and presumably to themselves in the ways Allport’s definition suggests. Clearly each is present to herself and others as the complex organic unity determined by life’s experiences as they affect one another, and as they affect the body, and as the body’s own fate affects the person’s conscious life. Again, the sense of each’s being present to herself is bound up with how present experiences interact with prior experiences, how these experiences affect the relation with other people, and how the relation with other people affect the body, and how the experiences of the affected body and with the others affect one another, and how all these complex interacting experiences affect the direction and quality of the flow of experiences. Sorting these matters out is a matter for both psychology as well as phenomenology. Yet the distinctive self-presence of “I myself” and its unique uniqueness are overlooked in Allport’s psychological presentation of personality. Furthermore, the entire discussion involves third-person reference, and first-person experiences are considered only marginal to what is essential. But from our phenomenological standpoint, I-agency doubtlessly presupposes sensibility or soul, i.e., the way the “psychophysical” is present to us, and its apperceived and reciprocal involvement with the others, but it is not reducible to these.

A systematic and theoretical psychiatric presentation congenial to the one defended in this work is that of Karl Jaspers. He holds that we may think of person in terms of “personality,” which he sometimes equates with character, as the “totality of the intelligible contexts of the life of the soul which is different in individuals even though it has common characteristics”; personality is what is “constituted by all the psychical processes and expressions in so far as they point beyond themselves to an individual and thoroughly intelligible context (Zusammenhang) which is experienced by an individual with the consciousness of his particular self.” For Jaspers personality or character, although thoroughly structured and enjoying a normal and abnormal typicality, is in flux. Further its intelligibility or psychiatric understandability is grounded in what is not intelligible, i.e., the single individual in her freedom or as “Existenz” (cf. our discussion in Book 2). What psychology studies properly is the personality as intelligible with its distinguishable properties. But its basis in Existenz is not an object of knowledge or research. Yet if this is not intuitively taken into account there is no psychological or psychotherapeutic understanding of humans.

A thesis of this work is that persons acquire and change their personalities, in a way similar to the way they change their characters. Whatever classification we use to arrange personalities, it is the person who moves in and out of these, just as it is the person who becomes vain-glory, cowardly, etc. But we are also holding that the “I myself,” which becomes a theme in transcendental phenomenological reflection as “the transcendental I,” “constitutes” the person. “Person” is the relatively stable intersubjective entity that emerges out of the transcendental I’s self-formation through its flow of experience and what we will call “position-taking” acts. Further the transcendental I is that for which or for whom the person is a kind of object and
theme of reflection. The transcendental I is that to which and by which the “person”
appears in the world with others – and “to” itself first-personally. That is, the
person as who one knows oneself to be as someone in the world with others is the
incarnate “I myself” or, transcendentally speaking, “the transcendental I.” Yet this
is a strict identity only in the non-reflective “myself” or “I myself.” It is manifest
as the same and not a strict identity in the phenomenological reflection. In this
reflection there is displayed that I come to light not only through the position-taking
acts, i.e., acts by which I determine my display of the world for the foreseeable
future but also my own stance toward the world and my own habitualities and dis-
positions toward the world, but also in the acts thematizing these position-taking
acts. This theme of the emphatic coming into play of I is one to which we will
repeatedly return. (In Book 2 we will argue that more basic to the person [qua per-
son] than the transcendental I is Existenz as the “inmost I.”)

If we were to take the notion of the person to encompass the whole of soul with
its layers of sensibility that are lived by the I but where the I itself is not active, the
I may then be considered the center of the person. But there is reason to be uncom-
fortable with this proposal in part because “person” traditionally in classical phe-

omenology (e.g., Scheler and Pfänder) has been regarded as the spiritual act-center
and not merely the periphery and what the spiritual act-center works on. Our persist-
ent claim will be that the person is what is constituted by the “I myself” in its actu-
alization of itself through what Husserl calls “position-taking acts.” As Husserl says
in The Paris Lectures, and as we noted above in our discussion of Ingarden’s chal-
lenge to the propertyless empty I-pole, the I is not merely an empty pole and not only
an I-pole of objectivities but also, as a person and monad, an I-pole of stances or
attitudes that accrue to it through its position-taking acts.58

A person is the constituted incarnate intersubjective historical ipseity through
which the “myself” strives to realize itself as oneself in the world with others.59 This
necessary involvement with others and intersubjective meanings immerses the
unique ipseity in the realm of what is universal and repeatable. This immersion is a
kind of subversion of the unique ipseity in so far as the ipseity is not disclosed by
any such universal or intersubjective features. The truth of one’s being in the world
with others is necessarily pervaded with universals, from phonemes to logical forms,
from basic instinctual needs to culturally fostered ones. The unique “I myself” is a
person in the world only by being a single individual who appropriates and thus
reproduces the universality of the world in and through his uniqueness. This appro-
priation and reproduction occurs in the employment and application of these univer-
sal forms as the vehicles of living his life.60 This is the phenomenon of style.

“I myself” or ipseity is first of all the self-presence of oneself to oneself as an
individual essence. Considered merely as one’s self-manifestation, it is abstracted
from the person. There is an abstraction from the person because the personal
agency and will are not of immediate interest in bringing to light “I myself”. But
“I myself” or ipseity, we will argue, may be seen to be an “entelechy” of oneself
as person having a personal and interpersonal ideal. This is merely to say that
“I myself” without moral self-determination is ontologically incomplete – and yet
the source of the self-determination is the “I myself.” This means that the “I
myself” as person is incarnate will. The person lives facing an emergent ideal of a
*total act* by which she would will herself completely, and thereby there would be
realized an adequation between the ipseity and the ideal person-constitution. This
is where the person actualizes herself as Existenz. But in fact, the ideal remains
always such and always leaves us unequal to ourselves. Thus as ipseities constitut-
ing ourselves as persons we are always in advance of ourselves in as much as the
ideal is that toward which we are already launched. When we discuss “vocation”
(in Book 2) we will put flesh on these very abstract formulations.

Here we wish to state the thesis that the unique ipseity is there from the start as
much as, and even more fundamentally, than instincts, drives, inherited tempera-
ments, proclivities, and talents, all of which latter, although conceivably the same
in numerous persons, are present to me and bear the stamp of ownness. In spite of
the universality, stability and constancy of the style of one’s way of being in the
world, there is typically the recognizable uniqueness of the person. We all recog-
nize people as having a “characteristic” presence in terms of comportment and
thought. This manifests itself in gait, sound of the voice, speech patterns, handwriting, writing-style, intonation of voice, laughter, style of dress and speech,
life-style, life-themes, patterns of choice, etc. In a person each of these might
appear unique, and the total integration might appear as a unique unified Gestalt.
The philosophical question here is whether the “style” that pervades the personal
presence is like “Art Nouveaux,” or “Gothic,” or “Baroque,” or “Byzantine,” i.e., one
that pervades an epoch and is endlessly repeatable, or whether there is indeed a
unique style of a person which is not sayable or repeatable or communicable. Thus
we might think: That is Peter’s voice, his walk, his carriage, his repartée, etc., and
not possibly anyone else’s. In so far as the latter interpretation is true we find our-
selves hard-put to say what precisely, e.g., Peter’s style is. It is not yet, even if on
the verge, capable of caricature. As the unique application of the universality of
the cultural and interpersonal universals it, at least initially, seems to be “unsayable.”
“Baroque” is something we today can, after the appropriate enrichment of experience,
readily define, but Peter’s style seems to elude us in terms of its communicable
properties, at least at the moment. But eventually the style of Peter, like that of
Charlie Chaplin’s tramp, itself can approach being “stylized,” and reproduced and
defined. This stylizing of a style suggests that even the apparently unique and
incommunicable style is a result of individuation: it stands in relation to a universal,
e.g., “intonation” or “gait,” and has its sense by reason of its contrast with the style
of others. The stylizing helps us to get a sense that the tramp, and Charlie himself
in real life, are more and other than the style, and that the individual who one is,
is not captured by the individualized signature. (The disclosure of who one is,
primarily a form of first-person evidence, will occupy us throughout these two
books. But in this book, Chapter VIII, §6 we wrestle with imaginative variation
that strives to uncover the parameters of one’s personal self.)

We all achieve a remarkable complex perception when we discern the “char-
acteristic” or “signature” presence of a person in his or her gait, writing, posture,
gesturing, intonation, style of dress, etc. Is the signature presence the expression
of what we earlier called the personality? If the personality changes so does the
signature presence. And if the signature presence is capable of being repeated, is the personality also able to be duplicated? We have said that the person has the personality, and that this is changeable. And we are positing that much of a person’s style in this more basic sense of personality would seem to be a result of the sculpted personal hexis that emerges out of the constitution of the world-life through position-taking acts. This approaches the Aristotelian notion of character. Conversion of character poses a special problem, as when one might be tempted to say, “I didn’t recognize you; you have changed so much that you are completely different.” Typically the speaker in such a situation discerns a “you” that has persisted throughout the change; but if it is a change in character or moral personality, we face the difficulty of deciding in what sense the person has the character or is the character, just as we want to say of the person who always behaves justly and manifests a just character: He is just. In extreme and radical changes, e.g., in severe accidents, or illness, or near death, where the place-holders by which we identified the person, i.e., the traits of character or underlying signature traits, are gone, it is as if the ipseity itself vanishes as the frame of the perceptual presence; all that is left is perhaps the friend’s belief in her presence. (See our discussion of love, below.) Of course, the anomalous cases of the seeming presence of “someone else,” as in multiple personalities, demons, zombies, or automatons, etc. need special attention which we here will postpone. We have already stated our reasons for rejecting ontological clones or doubles; but perhaps “persons” as signature presences of ipseities which have settled into styles may be cloned. But can we say that such signature presences as presences of ipseities be so settled or mere sediments? Or rather are they not always suffused with the instability of the unique ipseity?

Conversion in the first-person involves no such problems. One is keenly aware of oneself as having undergone a massive transformation, i.e., of being the same before and after, even though one might want to say: “I have nothing in common with who I was before I was converted (rehabilitated, treated for drugs, started taking medicine, etc.).” That is, I have nothing in common except I am the one converted from being A to B. Thus by “person” we refer to the ipseity as it is embodied, and as it takes shape in the world, i.e., in a life, community, society, and culture, regardless as how difficult it is to single out what makes up the identifiable uniqueness of the person.

Radical shifts in the make-up of the person can be imagined when the person is displaced to another context, as in the stories of reincarnation, time-travel or cultural displacement. (See this book, Chapter VII.) There might even ensue deterioration of the personality because the coping skills, i.e., the attitudes, position-takings, habitualities, etc. no longer are relevant to the actual world. One may well wonder who in the world one is, especially if, because of one’s basic, e.g., linguistic and vocational, competencies are inapplicable in this world of strangers and the required ones are practically inaccessible. Nevertheless the sense of oneself as uniquely “myself” remains in tact – even when one’s personal identity begins to unravel because the actual correlate world of my present experience is no longer the world one has constituted in one’s earlier or former life. As we have seen, even the amnesiac,
who is able to read and hear all there is to know about her- or himself without
recognizing that that one is he himself, still has a sense of himself; he still refers to
himself with “I” and does so innerrantly, even if he mistakenly thinks he is someone
other than who he actually has been in the historical life-world. Even such a
one who does not know who in the world she is still retains a sense of “I myself.”
These are matters to which we return with more justice when we deal with the
speculative matter of life after death as well as the existential matter of vocation.
Let us now attend to how the “I myself” can be present in the second- and third-person
and what difference love makes.

Notes

1 This theme is ubiquitous in Husserl; see also H.D. Lewis, The Elusive Self, 41ff.
2 See Walter Ong, S.J. Hopkins, the Self, and God, 30.
3 See Eugen Fink, Grundphänomene des menschlichen Daseins (Freiburg: Alber, 1995b), 95.
4 Husserliana XV, 351.
5 Husserliana XIV, 24 (1927). Gabriel Marcel has made these themes famous. In his Being and
Having: An Existentialist Diary (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969), 157–158, which cov-
ers entries between 1929–1933, he refers to Gunther Stern’s Über das Haben (Bonn: Cohen,
1928). Stern wrote a dissertation under Husserl in 1924. See Karl Schuhmann, Husserl-
Chronik (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), 278. It is safe to say that Husserl was working on this
theme since at least 1918. Husserliana XIV is very rich in this regard. See, e.g., 77, 158, 195,
379, 428–437. See also the earlier (1910–1911) remarks in Husserliana XIII, 112–113. There
is a fine later discussion on having and ownness in Husserliana XV, 350–357. And, of course,
in Cartesian Meditations (Husserliana I, §§44–47).
6 See the lovely presentation by Robert Sokolowski of the relevant texts in Husserliana X in
Husserlian Meditations (Evanston: Northwestern, 1974), 147–158. We will dwell at some length
on this important topic in Chapter VIII, §8.
7 Roderick Chisholm, “The Loose and Popular and the Strict and Philosophical Senses of
Identity,” in Perception and Personal Identity. Eds. Norman S. Care and Robert H. Grimm
(Cleveland, OH: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1969), 82–106; cited in
Gerald E. Myers essay in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, op. cit., 175. A reworked
version of this essay appears in Chisholm’s On Metaphysics. We will return to the example in
Chapter VIII.
Person and Object, 200.
9 H.D. Lewis, The Elusive Self, 86.
10 In what preceded I have summarized and paraphrased, with considerable liberty, the discus-
sion in Husserliana XIV, 31–33. For the poet (Dichter), cf. n. 13 below.
11 See especially Erich Klawonn, “The ‘I’: On the Ontology of the First Personal Identity,”
Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 24 (1987), 43–76. It is to this essay that we will refer in the
following discussions. But see also “On Personal Identity: Defense of a Form of Non-reduc-
tionism,” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 25 (1990), 41–59; “A Reply to Lübke and Collin,”
Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 25 (1990), 89–105; “The Ontological Concept of
Consciousness,” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 33 (1998), 55–69. I am aware that Klawonn
might well be dependent on Parfit, Chisholm, and perhaps, H.D. Lewis, in working out his
position. But it was Klawonn who, I believe, saw best what was essential. Derek Parfit’s
inaugural discussion may be found most amply in his Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986), Part III. Our debt to Klawonn and Chisholm on this theme is passim
in this volume.
In Fyodor Dostoevsky’s *The Double*. Trans. Constance Garnett (Doylestown, PA: Wildside Press, n.d.), 115–116, the hero, Golyadhin, is persecuted by the sudden appearance of a double who threatens to rob him of his life by robbing him of his identity, and, along the way, to besmirch his already dubious reputation. The hero shifts between, on the one hand, first-personal and, on the other hand, second- and third-personal points of view, finds some consolation in the first-personal, but then falters when he takes account of Others’ perceptions: “But, after all, what of it? It doesn’t matter. Granted, he’s a scoundrel, well, let him be a scoundrel, but to make up for it, the other one’s honest; so he will be a scoundrel and I’ll be honest, and they’ll say that this Golyadkin’s a rascal, don’t take any notice of him, and don’t mix him up with the other, but the other one’s honest, virtuous, mild, free from malice, always to be relied upon in the service, and worthy of promotion; that’s how it is, very good… but what if…what if they get us mixed up…!”
Ipseity’s Ownness and Uniqueness

individuo and reveals to the soul that it is a soul per actus suos and here Aquinas paraphrases Aristotle’s rich formulations of these matters in Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics (at 1170a 26ff.).


See, e.g., Husserliana XXXVI, 177. Husserliana XIII, 159–170, has a fine discussion of the senses in which kinds of transcendence are included in the indubitable immanence of the absolutely momentary Now of the cogito, foremost retention and protention. See the translation in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910–1911), 53–66.


39 Husserl, E III 2, 29a, p. 54 of the transcription.


41 J.G. Fichte, Die Tatsachen des Bewusstseins in Fichtes Werke. Vol. II (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971b), 603–611. In this same work there is a strong statement of the doctrine of the unique individual calling. See 664ff.

42 Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Schriften zur Philosophie. Vol. III (Munich: Kösel, 1965), 298–299. This paragraph is an interpretive paraphrase of these extremely difficult passages.

43 Husserl, E III 2, 29a, p. 54 of the transcription.

44 For the philosophical-theological aspects of this cf. “A Precis of a Husserlian Phenomenological Theology,” in Essays in Phenomenological Theology. Eds. Steven C. Laycock and James G. Hart (Albany: SUNY, 1986). Further, as we shall see in Chapter VI, the beginninglessness of the transcendental I can be claimed precisely by reason of the ineluctable hyletic temporalization or animation, i.e., my beginning is present for me only as already having begun. In the conclusion of Book 2, we will sketch a revival of the Plotinian view that the origin of each I-principle, each “myself,” as an individual essence is to be found in the divine mind as imitable and as able to be participated in. This obviously does not eliminate the need for a principle of soul in either the story of human origins or the actual functioning of humans, but it does not easily accommodate itself to a subordination of the I- or spiritual-principle to the soul-principle in the account of origins.

45 See, e.g., Husserliana XIII, 245–248. Husserl learned how to see an individuation from the start, as in the 1918 formulation: “Each empirical I begins as a primal I….In each case the I is born with the form which is the first individualized I, I and its Having; to the primal Having there belongs one’s own body at the beginning of the development and there belongs also to the primal Having the bodily surrounding.” Ibid., 407.

46 Husserliana XIV, 30.

At least on one occasion Husserl, however, claimed that the essence of the other consciousness is brought to adequate givenness in empathic perception. See Husserliana XXXVI, 105. We take this to mean possibly that “you” is present non-ascriptively and therefore adequately, or perhaps that in comparison with the thing-apperception which has an essential inadequacy (analogous to the person apperception) the essence of the other consciousness as such is there, like one’s own I-experience, there all at once, and not in profiles. This is quite different from the presence of oneself and the Other in the full richness of persons where there are endless profiles.
48 Husserl, *Husserliana* IV, 104–105; also *Husserliana* III (Ideen I), §§57 and 80.

49 See Husserl, *Husserliana* III (Ideen I), §46.

50 *Husserliana* III (Ideen I), §80.

51 See Husserl, E III 2, 29a, 54–57 of the transcription.


53 *Husserliana* XXXVII, 162–165.


58 *Husserliana* I, 26, 28–29.

59 These common Husserlian themes are discussed in my *The Person and the Common Life*.


61 This is a thesis of Sartre; see the texts assembled by Frank, *Das Sagbare und das Unsagbare*, 330–331.
Chapter IV
Love as the Fulfillment of the Second-Person Perspective

Part One: The Second-Person Perspective

José Ortega y Gasset claimed that when we have another completely “youified” before us, “then happens the most dramatic thing in life.” Similarly, Hector-Neri Castañeda found perhaps a less “existential” and more purely theoretical delight when he noted that “the most complex and exciting English indicator is you.” Unfortunately he never submitted this topic to a systematic analysis. What follows purports to be initial steps in the direction of a phenomenological analysis of you with the basic interests and questions of this work in mind.

§1 General Problems of Reducibility of “You” to Another Personal Form

Like any referent of an indexical, the aspect under which the indexical renders it present is ephemeral. Thus as nothing is eternally or intrinsically a this or that, so nothing is “an enduring you – except perhaps God for the abiding mystic.” “A you goes away and is replaced by another….”

Further, the second-person reference is not readily reducible to the third-person reference. Thus my saying of someone to my friends, “She is a stunning looking person” not knowing that that person is my wife, is not the same as saying to my wife, “You look stunning.” And if I demonstratively refer to the person, e.g., by pointing to her, and utter my appreciation of her appearance, when in fact I unwittingly am looking at a mirrored reflection of my wife who is next to me, it becomes clear that the second-person reference is not reducible to a third-person demonstrative reference. If this reducibility were possible the speaker could presume that his wife would be equally pleased no matter whether the reference was in the second-or third-person. Of course, she might take pleasure in both cases, but we would need to know the story which would account for the different reasons.

We saw that I am capable of making both an internal and external reflexive reference to myself. In the latter case I refer to myself as anyone else does or can, e.g., as when I am asked to fill in information by a governmental agent about my “identity,” my appearance, my address, etc. “I” here can be replaced by a definite description which would involve this kind of information. In the internal reflexive reference I refer to
myself in a unique way and what I refer to is what is essentially incommunicable and unique. Is there a parallel with “you”? We will later attempt to show that in love there is just such a parallel. But even in presencing you ascriptively there would seem to be senses in which my speaking to you ascriptively addresses you as unique and incommunicable. Consider when I say “you did a wonderful thing this evening,” or, “you are a stunning looking person.” Here the referent of “you” does not seem bound to either the deed or the person’s present appearance.

Of course, when said as a compliment and not merely as an objective description, the truth of the description’s objectivity can have a special value for the person to whom it is addressed. Although the properties upon which the statement are based are publicly true the communication from me to you of my awareness of this truth is what gives the observation its special quality, and this might be of more importance to the listener than the communication of the objective truth. Thus here the property ascribed to “you” has a special context that preserves the uniqueness of the reference to “you.” This contrasts with a case as when the drill sergeant singles out for a special duty, “you,” “you,” “you,” and “you.” The second-person here is used but it might be replaced by “the first four soldiers in this squad,” or “those in front of me who are over six feet tall,” etc. In such a case, the common publicly evident properties, which the addressees have, become the sole basis for the address. In §7 below, we will have occasion to note a sense in which “you” refers in a unique way, foremost in love, where the properties of the person that are publicly evident are subordinated to the ipseity that transcends them. This kind of second-person reference has especial symmetry with the internal reflexive reference of “I.”

§2 The Presence and Absence of “You” in Speech and Writing

Are all speech and writing implicitly aimed at someone whom I can address as “you”? There is an important sense in which the answer is No, but we will first consider those in which it is Yes. As “I” and “I think (say/believe/write) that…” are implied and often “anonymous” in all second- and third-person forms of intentionality and address, so “you” as the addressee is similarly implied and often anonymous. But whereas the “you” may in fact be unknown and undifferentiated and even aspire to a kind of universality (as in declarations of universal human rights by the UN or native peoples or in the US declaration of independence), “I” is necessarily known and individual.

Much speaking and writing takes place in the third person; it is about issues, topics, states of affairs, and persons who are absent in some respect or other to the reader. Indeed, much of it can occur without the use of “you.” A scientific treatise rarely shows interest in the “kindly reader” or even in the particular listener. Oftentimes it is fashioned in such a way that the present listeners or actual readers are overlooked in favor of an ideal reader and listener. As the speaker/writer assumes a viewpoint from nowhere, so the addressee is no one in particular. Yet if this ideal Other were such that it could not in principle be embodied in an actual
“you,” the speech or text would no longer be what it is, i.e., in fact, an address to someone about something, but rather the speaker or writer would be speaking to and for himself. Then one might ask why it takes on the appearance of an address to someone else.

One hears, on occasion, writers saying that they write for themselves because they have to write. There is a strong sense in which this is true, and we wish to attend to it. But of course this could be a narcissistic compulsion. In which case it would seem to require the marginal apperception of the others reading the text and thinking well of the writer because of what she has written.

One might think of such writing (or speaking or thinking) as Kant thinks of prayer, i.e., placing oneself in the presence of an ideal Other whose presence is such as to enable one to be most truly one’s own true self. Yet if this were indeed writing (or thinking or speaking) and not Kantian meditative “prayer” why would one undertake the public ritual of writing to publish unless one was addressing one’s fellows? Further, it would seem that in so far as this was a mere as-if presence it would be malleable to one’s egocentric indulgence and desires and would become therefore a contrived device for self-deception. This would mean that the alleged moral imperative of self-clarification through the presence of an ideal Other would be deflated to a merely contrived Other. Of course, the ideal Other could present herself as an ideal, inviting or beckoning, and in this respect the ideal Other would resemble or be indistinguishable from one’s self-ideal (cf. our later discussions). This ideal Other/self could demand honesty but unless she were an actual Other and not merely ideal Other her capacity to require honesty would be vulnerable to one’s own, i.e., the author’s, self-indulgence. When writing for an ideal, idea, or a concept one writes for what does not actually, but only imaginatively, reads what I write; the idea is not a self-aware ipseity who talks back to us and calls us on our self-indulgence or carelessness. Of course, in some cases the ideal might well be enough to generate the appropriate veneration and honesty, but the writer in this case would have to be a person of extraordinary integrity with an admirable capacity for self-detachment.

In the displays of declarative sentences, especially in scientific discourse, where the intention is directed at that which one wants to talk about, the You can fall back into increasing anonymity, and the speaker be absorbed in “den Sachen selbst,” oblivious of the addressee. The view that one writes because one has to write finds a strong argument in the consideration that unless we explicitly say it or write it we do not know what we think or mean by it. As Gendlin and Husserl have taught us, in the wanting to say in the face of the darkness of the implicit and merely felt meaning, we are relatively ignorant of our thoughts and of ourselves as persons with views. It is a relative ignorance because, after all, it is this felt-meaning which is our referent and to which we have recourse when we say “it” appropriately or when we say “it” wrongly, and, knowing this, back up and take another run at saying “it.” Getting “it,” “ein dunkles etwas” (Husserl’s phrase), out, expressing it in an expression, makes us and what it is we really mean to say themes or objects for ourselves.

Prior to this we do not know what we mean or want to say. Not until the words are out, expressed, I do not know properly what I wanted to say. This focusing
or “meaning to say” and “saying what one means” is not an intention of wordless thoughts, nor is it an attending to something given by a kind of looking or interior intuition, but an intentionality proper to making statements, and these statements take shape with the flow of words. It is not as if I first had a clear and articulated judgment in mind and then part by part, member after member, express it. No! first comes the “dark something,” the felt meaning of what I mean to say, and then the flow of words accompanied by their meaning and in this process the speaking intention is fulfilled.

In thinking alone in one’s solitude and giving expression to what I mean, I am not addressing myself, as if I were You, an Other. I do not listen to myself as if I was both the ignorant one listening and I myself as the one speaking who understands the matter. Rather I am focused on trusting the process of letting the right word come to light. I am intending the expression, for the moment emptily, as what can fill the intention of what I mean.

In writing something out to get clear on it there is a kind of initial listening to oneself as the one whose felt-meaning it is. I am listening to the felt-meaning which is one’s wanting to saying what one means, without any form of addressing oneself and playing the role of speaker and listener. And when I afterwards read what I said I am more clearly a listener to what I have written, perhaps having the occasion to say, “What did I have in mind in writing this nonsense?” or more felicitously, “That’s pretty good!”

In the case of saying what one means, whether in speaking or writing there is achieved the elementary process which all communication of self-generated displays of the world presuppose. In this elementary filling of the wanting to say with words we are not explicitly speaking or addressing any one, not even ourselves. Here one may not be only oblivious of the addressee but may be exclusively taken up with filling the intention of wanting to say by means of statements. Consider the example of trying to remember the name of a tool, when this name is present to us in a “tip of the tongue” experience. In this case, I simply want to fill in the elusive gap clearly present in its absence and in my ability to exclude false candidates for the name. Here it is a matter of indifference whether I communicate it. In this way the thinker may be absorbed in the quest for what is essential, and the original interest in communication may fall away.5

But if this takes the form of fulfilling the rituals of writing for publication, then one can assume that one is indeed thinking and writing for or with Others, and that one believes that it is through their responses that the ultimate form of self-clarification and legitimation will be realized. If “writing for oneself” takes this public form of going through the rituals of publication, and if, furthermore, any form of an other addressee is denied, then the activity, which is essentially one of address without an addressee, seems inherently self-contradictory.

First-person thinking, i.e., thinking which is directed back to the one doing the thinking, as in taking stock or reflecting with an eye toward self-determination, is, as we shall see, essential for the moral and personal I. Yet, as we have seen, it need not involve the radical self-othering by which one addresses oneself as “you.” In fact, because of the irreducibility of you to I, it is not possible, strictly speaking, that
I become for me a you. Further one can reflect on oneself as oneself and not even as he or she, i.e., as gendered. Yet often enough our ruminations and taking stock verges on regarding ourselves in the second- and third-person, especially in reference to that self who we are as perceived by Others. Our streaming everyday passive awareness is often filled with the chatter with apperceived Others that makes us present before ourselves as a more or less painful, more or less pleasant, object of discussion. In such cases we may find occasion to identify with various participants in the chatter, and thereby may come to regard ourselves not merely in the third-, but also in the second-person.

Scientific reflection can take on the form of a lonely monologue and what was initially a public address can become, from the point of view of listeners, boorish and the very presence, to say nothing of the interjections, of the addressee are perceived to be of no account. Long books can be clear exemplification of the disdain by the writer of the essential connection of the addressee to the communicative situation. Yet the reader has the liberty to comment in the margins to the monologue. But again this commentary may be either for the reader’s self-clarification, for future readers of the gloss, or for the author of the book the reader is reviewing. Thus almost all forms of speech and writing imply the second-person, yet there are occasions when this implication gives way to the mere filling of empty intentions in the first-person. Of course, in the apperceived background there is the adumbration of Others and the publicity of the truth of the filled intention and the legitimacy for us all of the distinctions being brought to light.

Meeting many strangers at a meeting requires that I go through ritual formalities. But in hearing their names and seeing their faces I am aware of them as other I’s, other self-awarenesses, and other persons, but here the you approaches being utterly empty in its intention. It approaches what we earlier called the “external reference” of “you” analogous to the external reflexive reference to oneself. In such external reference to “you” you are present as you are initially present to the whole world. Typically, in order for you, the other I, to emerge as incarnate, time and the affection that permits the display of your person and character are required. Yet we all have had experiences where “sparks” occurred, and not merely erotic ones, where contact with the other seemed to dispense with the typical array of ciphers and we seemed to “lock into” the ipseity of the other immediately and without filtering the Other by way of reference to any explicit qualities – though the common qualities, interests, etc., may have facilitated the sense of having made contact. Today we describe this event with the metaphor of there being “the right chemistry between us.” In fictional or religious contexts the habitual ability for such an exceptional context is assigned to a seer or a “godly person” or a “divine human.”

The form of reference by which a “You” is targeted is called address. The familiar forms of address are the direct, vocative or allocutive form as when we direct our attention to someone and greet her or call her name. We may do this and supplement it with a variety of linguistic and non-linguistic forms of expression. The latter might be a wave, a handshake, a hug, a kiss, a smile, etc. The former might be an exhortation, interrogation, interpellation, promise, command, etc. Or we may want
to display something and want the one addressed to attend to something through our declarative sentence.

§ 3 Illocutions

Quite in contrast to the thoughtful activity of making declarative statements, there are forms of making statements or sentences that directly intend the You and require that you intend me or recognize me as intending you in a certain way. Husserl and Reinach anticipated what today philosophers call illocutionary acts or social-communicative acts whereby persons recognize each other’s speech and forms of agency as it was meant to be taken. The display of the Other as an Other, i.e., as a self-aware “myself,” requires the further moment of attending to the Other, addressing her, and thereby having her attend to me as addressing her. Unless she is aware of me so intending her, my intending her in this precise way cannot succeed. Thereby she is for me a “you” with whom I am hoping to communicate. Thus I cannot promise “her” or “him” something or command “her” or “him,” i.e., in the third-person. To be promised or commanded he must first be invoked in the second-person and be present to me as one addressing him. Prior to and apart from this he does not know we are in a dialogical situation. Thus he might have occasion to ask “Are you speaking to me?” upon hearing “Hello!” or “Hey, you there!” or “Stop!” In the third-person he may be apperceived as “he himself,” i.e., self-experiencing, but not as turned towards me as addressing him.

I cannot call, address or command “her,” unless I first awaken her to my being present to her as addressing her. In addressing someone I assume she is one capable of addressing and responding to me. I assume she is self-aware and capable of sharing her display of the world and sharing the secrets of her heart and, as well, of sharing in my communication or self-display. In the address or attending I do what is necessary to enable her to be aware that I am aware of her aware of me. I transform “her” into “you.”

This holds true for some non-human persons: I cannot call or command my dog unless I have his attention, i.e., unless he knows I am addressing him. I can call and command my dog, and in this sense he can become a You with a face for me and I someone with a face for him, but I cannot communicate to him with sentences that display aspects of the world that are not present to him. Further, I can display very few of those aspects that are present to him and me; my singling them out is taken within his horizon of interests which are eminently “vital” and only loosely “practical.” This means basically that I cannot evoke for him something for display or as a substrate of predication. Some indications that verge on display seem to be possible, e.g., through pointing, gesturing, and intonation. But these are not making something present in a way that is indifferent to its presence and absence, it is not something named that gets articulated by grammatical constructions. The displayed is not there as a theme or topic of analysis and predication. (He perhaps understands that I want him to attend to the squirrel and give it a chase off the porch, or that we
will go for a walk later when I consistently respond to his present urging to take the walk by saying “No, we will go *later*” and consistently keep my “promise” which he perhaps understands as a mere deferral of a present gratification.)

Philosophers today, in the wake of distinctions made by John Austin, speak of the illocutionary character of some speech acts. They are not mere “locutions,” not merely declarative sentences that describe or display the world. They rather are primarily actions, and the speaking is a doing, a performing. These speech acts are “performatives”; they are doings not displays; their primary function is to effect something rather than being “apophantic,” displays, or what Austin called constatives. Thus commands, promises, commiserations, oaths, etc. function primarily not as displays of the world but rather as deeds by the speaker in regard to the one addressed.

“I promise,” for example creates a responsibility on the side of the speaker and a right on the side of the promisseree. “I order you” said by someone who, e.g., is in a position of authority *ex officio*, has nestled within it the legitimating reason for compliance or obedience. “I forgive you” is less a description of a state of soul than a mending of breach and a beginning anew. “I love you” is less a description of a position-taking than an act of celebration and affirmation of the beloved (see §§13 ff.). Etc. In all such acts, the speaker, having obtained the recognition by the Other of his intending her as the addressee of his act, undertakes through the appropriate behavioral and speech practices and rituals the determination of the kind of interaction, i.e., whether it is a “locution” or display of some aspect of the world or whether it is an “illocution,” e.g., a promise, an oath, a command, etc.

The clean separation of illocutions from locutions or declaratives comes undone when one attends to the transcendental pre-fix or declarative “I” that stands behind all displays of the world. “He has delivered the money” is a display of the world. But when it is preceded by “I swear to you it is true that he has delivered the money,” the sense of the statement (here the subordinate clause) changes. Just as the sense changes when the sentence, “He has delivered the money,” as used as an example in grammar of the past perfect tense, is instead used as a display of a recent past event. The speaker (or writer) typically has at his disposal the means to structure the sense of the sentence, but without the reciprocal recognition by the listener of the speaker’s intentions, the structuring will not be successful, and the speech-act will fail.

“He has delivered the money” may be said by me to you when we both are watching the same transaction and I am helping you to see by articulating what we both see on the basis, e.g., of my greater experience in these matters. Here my statement has an auxiliary function in bringing to light what we both presumably see. But even in the sentences which are displays through declarative sentences there is a kind of illocutionary force. Consider how you may not be present at all and I am reporting to you my knowing this state of affairs. In this case, I am sharing with you information I have through my direct or indirect experience, but which experience you do not have. In this latter case I could have said “It seems to me that…” “I heard that…” or “I believe that…” or “I have inferred that….” But instead I have said without qualification what the state of affairs is. And therefore
I have given reason for you to trust that I am in a position to know. The speaker here makes a declarative sentence and thus an epistemic claim; it is a third-personal display of the world, a locution. But at the same time by choosing to use the strong epistemic word “know” he freely creates from his side a kind of implicit witnessing in second-person that he is in a position to know and creates in the listener the right to expect that the display has evidential foundations and therefore is trustworthy.

Of course, typically proper epistemic achievements are in the third-person: “The tree is diseased.” “He has delivered the money.” “Tomorrow there is a lunar eclipse.” But here always there is an implicit transcendental pre-fix or the declarative use of “I” which can be made explicit, as in “I know he delivered the money.” This transcendental pre-fix or declarative use of I (see Chapter II, §4) may be unsaid in these examples. But in spite of its being tacit its illocutionary force is louder and clearer when the declarative sentence is not qualified with the agent of manifestation’s disclaimers, such as “I was told that…” or “I have a hunch that….” The bald utterance of the declarative implies that the speaker is ascribing an epistemic achievement to himself and we may count on him. Yet in the absence of the ritual of an explicit “I know,” which approaches the illocutions of “I promise” or “I hereby swear,” with the explicit or implicit second-personal address: “and you can count on me,” there is not the explicit declaring myself responsible and the explicit creating in the listener rights to count on me in this regard. Nevertheless, there is an implicit “trust me.”

In power structures having large anonymous organizations, the manner of address and the kind of interpersonal consciousness undergoes a modification. Thus, e.g., in states and corporations promises or commands may be given to persons indirectly and those commanded are not actually present but rather invisible to the one commanding; the commanded person may be known only as a statistic. The City Council may promulgate a law, and each citizen will be indirectly addressed only in so far as she is a citizen. A CEO or manager does not intend any you in particular but each is addressed under the description of shop worker, office worker, maintenance worker, etc. Thus although the command is experienced as directed to me coming from the city law-makers, the law-makers address and command me by referring to me in the third-person under a general category of citizen. Similarly the boss commands me because I fit the description of those sentenced to be a victim of the downsizing, e.g., “all the employees nearing the fulfillment of the requirements of pension will have their jobs terminated next month!” “Don’t take it personally!” is conceptually, if not morally, appropriate because it reflects the truth of the situation. Yet unless somewhere along the chain of command I am addressed as “you” by someone representing the boss, e.g., the police when I refuse to leave the factory floor, the command is ineffective because it is interpreted to be addressed only to an abstraction or “them” that need not include me. I may infer because it applies to a description under which I fall that it therefore applies to me; but I might say to myself, they cannot really mean to fire me who has a baby on the way and an invalid wife. Only if I fail to make this inference or question it, do I have the opportunity to meet someone saying to me: “You, get out, your’re fired.”
This gets at the heart of the essence of a law. Laws are ideal objects in the form of an assumed legitimate authority’s constitution of an imperative in the form of objective spirit on behalf of the common good. They are precepts or commands which lay claim on those who are subject to them to obey them. I am addressed by them but there is no one commanding me. Of course there are surrogates, police, judges, soldiers, etc. who embody the command, and foremost embody the enforcing of obedience to it. Thus the police car’s blaring horn and siren and flashing lights coming up behind me “say”: “Pull over to the side, get out of my way.” Yet the police officer has undertaken a ritual and my being certified with a driver’s license means I have indicated my knowledge of this ritual. Yet, of course, the police officer is not commanding me as JG Hart, but only as a citizen driver. Similarly the state laws were not passed with JG Hart in mind. But as commands the will of the ruler or authority are present in the command, whatever shape the command may take; and in the objective spirit of laws, the will of the authority is in them. This suffices, presupposing it is a just law, as a claim on my obedience.

Thus the you is implicit in the general command or general promise. The CEO has your attention when he issues a bulletin by reason of his power over you; you yourself do not have to be present to him, nor need he himself as an individual be present to you. Indeed, meeting in the flesh a person with such power has the effect of “making him human,” and perhaps also has the effect of empowering the subordinate and weakening the superior.

§4 Proper Names and the Non-ascriptive Reference of “You”

When we address someone in the vocative form, as “Hello,” “You there!,” or “Peter!” we do not ascribe any properties to him. Here there is symmetry with “I.” In each case the person is made present non-ascriptively. The other’s non-ascriptive presence through the vocative address is founded in the apperception of her self-experience of herself. The other is present as another “I myself” thus transcendent and resistant to an adequate apprehension by any worldly categorial display.

This transcendence to such categorial display comes to light when we consider how we can, with sufficient imaginative setting up of a situation, believe that one is sensing the presence of a “ghost.” The presence may repeatedly announce itself through an endless variety of different eerie clues, such that none of these become, strictly speaking, necessary properties of this presence. Unless the “ghost” were to have exhibited some personal traits it would not be evident as the same one. In any case, in the initial encounter, however, we address an Other whom we do not know anything about. “You, whoever you are, I’ve got this to say to you…” In such an utterance, we target “someone” whose worldly categorial display is “invisible” or not evident, even though the empathic perception would need some perceptual substrate (“eerie clues,” like knockings, dancing curtains, high-pitched sounds, etc.) for the “communication.” In such a case we target one who is self-experiencing and
182 IV Love as the Fulfillment of the Second-Person Perspective

in whose presence one is – and nothing else. (“Self-experiencing,” of course is a category, but tautological in regard to what we mean by You, the Other, I, etc.; further it is not, properly speaking, in the world.)

Here it is important to note that “Hello” and “You, whoever you are…” intend the Other non-ascriptively and indeterminately, whereas “Hello, Peter” intends the Other also non-ascriptively but uniquely. The former “You, hello,” in effect says, “Whoever you are!” In this respect, “Peter” is a more intimate and targeted form of address than just you. Proper names enable us to present something singular as unrepeatable and indivisible without characterizing it. Proper names are not descriptions, not even definite descriptions, and what they intend is beyond all proper descriptions. They themselves do not refer to anything by themselves but do so through their being used by a speaker or thinker.

In general we have suggested that a proper name, such as “Peter,” in contrast to “this person” or “this human” or this individual of this kind is not an individual by reason of its being an instance of this kind. All of the latter references imply that the one referred to is a member of a plurality. In these cases, to be legitimately referred to as an individual, the one referred to must first manifestly belong to and be part of the manifold. In this sense in referring to the “individual” one refers to one but of necessity co-refers to the multiplicity of others. In contrast, the proper name refers to what is an individual in itself and through itself and not by reason of its being implicitly or explicitly part of the plurality. This has symmetry with the first-person use of “I” as in the humorous exchange in Moliere already referred to: “Who is there?” Some one answers, “It is I.” To which the questioner asks “which I?” The first-person response is to oneself as an individuality which is such not by being implicitly or explicitly part of a plurality.

A reflection by Husserl affords us some clarifying precision. Husserl makes a distinction between proper names that intend the object (“Freiburg”) or person (“Malvine”) directly, and proper names that intend the object or person through the attributes or properties. We will attend to the second case first. The historical “Socrates” is made present through recalling what the historians have said, e.g., “the poor sculptor of fifth century Athens who challenged the Sophists,” “the husband of Xanthippe,” “the teacher of Plato,” “the legendary wine drinker,” etc. Husserl leaves it open whether we could reach a “definite description” such that we would have established predicates that would apply to one object exclusively and uniquely. But regardless of this question of the possibility of a definite description, the proper name “Socrates,” refers to the bearer of the predicates and is thought of as an individual through the determinations of the predicates. The concept of “Socrates” here of course takes its origin in the predicative judgments even though what it properly refers to is not any one of these. And even though it does not precede the predicative judgments, it is a new form of presentation which remains different from the judgments upon which it rests. Further, knowing that “Socrates” is not exhausted by any of his predicates means that we apperceive “Socrates” to be more than any of the definite descriptions, and further, that this more implies that “Socrates” is not properly individuated by the historical predicates, even though no one we know in fact knows this.
The second sense of proper names belongs to deictic or demonstrative references and the meaning is not rooted in the predicates, such as in the historical object. Rather the sense of the proper names is in the “identical subject” of these predicates. Of course, it is an individual determined by the predicates but the meaning of the proper name of my friend, “Peter,” does not change no matter how much the knowledge of him is enhanced through predicative knowledge – and this contrasts with a historical presentation of a proper name (“Socrates”) and, of course, with an experiential, perceptual presentation, where there might well be dramatic, perhaps essential, changes in the meaning of the object presented. The “meaning” here (“Peter”) is tied to an intentional directedness to the identity and unity that pervades all the new predicative presentations or profilings. In this respect the proper name has to do with the presented object as such and this is a deictic meaning. And this, once again, contrasts with the ascriptive or attributive meaning where we mean “this” as at the same time determined by x, y, and z.10

Similarly Saul Kripke thinks it is wrong to hold that when we use proper names we come up with properties which enable us to qualitatively pick out the unique object. “It is in general not the case that the reference of a name is determined by some uniquely identifying marks, some unique properties satisfied by the referent and known or believed to be true of that referent by the speaker.” He goes on to note that such properties need not be uniquely specifying and they may not be uniquely true of the actual referent the speaker has in mind but of something else or nothing. If in some cases a referent is determined by a description or some unique identifying property,

what that property is doing in many cases of designation is not giving a synonym, giving something for which the name is an abbreviation; rather it is fixing a reference… by some contingent marks of the object. The name denoting the object is then used to refer to that object, even in referring to counterfactual situations where the object doesn’t have the properties in question.

As an example, he gives the case of a meter.11

Although typically I cannot think the referent of a proper name without thinking of some properties or identifying attributes that may be assigned to the referent, I am not necessarily thinking of the properties in using the proper name. (This holds also for one’s reference to the historical “Socrates.”) Even though certain properties stand out as the way I would identify someone in a communicative situation, when I, e.g., discover that Peter was born on a certain date in a certain place, I am not thinking of him as having these distinctive properties. Or if the distinguishing marks would have been destroyed or disfigured, I might say, “Peter, is that you?” intending thereby Peter without the distinguishing properties.

Proper names make present as resolved and integrally whole what eludes characterization not only by reason of its unfinished sense but also because of its non-propriety. They make communicable and provide a kind of repeatability for what in itself is unique, not universal or communicable. In so far as the proper name contains a description it still intends the person even when those descriptions are no longer applicable. If I take “Peter” to stand for the description: “the one who is as reliable and sturdy as a rock,” then when Peter comes to exhibit
vascillation, infidelity, and cowardice, he would no longer be “Peter” (the reliable rock-like foundation). But, of course, Peter is precisely the one known as the rock and the traitor, as well as the impetuous, hot-headed blustering disciple of Jesus. Yet “Peter” intends Peter as beyond these attributes. The act of forgiveness of Peter was an act intending someone who was weak and treacherous, but who was also loved in spite of these attributes and was intended as beyond them. He was forgiven not merely because he had other “saving” attributes, but Peter was intended in the forgiving as beyond and in spite of these. We will argue (especially at §17) below that love is the appropriate epistemic act for properly presencing another because it intends the Other through but as beyond her distinguishing attributes.

Proper names of course may refer opaquely: There are numerous people named “Peter.” Yet when we begin to clarify by using demonstrative pronouns, as that Peter, this Peter, the Peter, we are not in fact reducing proper names to demonstrative pronouns. This holds true even if the plurality of Peters all have common properties, like “the university professor, married to Mary Smith, who owns a Labrador Retriever,” etc. “Peter,” used as a proper name aims at the unique individual and not at instances of a kind or a class with a specific set of properties. An improper use, deriving from the extension of the properties of one person to a class, like the “The Adolf Hitlers of this world,” aims at members of a class and not unique individuals.12

We wish to note again that the proper name can refer in a way that is both ascriptive and yet reflects the trans-ascriptive referent of the proper name. Consider how we hear it said that “nothing is more dear to someone than his name.” Or one hears of tragic stories of persons spending their lives trying “to clear their names” of a miscarriage of justice. Here clearly the name is “one’s good name.” Prior to one’s being, e.g., accused of a reprehensible deed, one’s name was not so lost or in need of being cleared of the blemish. One’s name was “good,” i.e., the person to whom it referred did not carry the baggage of the attribute of “murderer,” “rapist,” etc. In so far as one is oneself prior and subsequent to the accusation or even wrongful judgment by the legal system one still is oneself and one’s self, and in this sense, one’s proper name, has not changed. Yet here “one’s name” as “one’s good name” is one’s interpersonal identity, and because what is at stake is one’s personal identity in the world with Others, when one has lost one’s good name one’s name is inseparably saddled with the ugly attributes. One is, i.e., who one is, is the sort of person one is in the eyes of the public; one is what one has done. This is the sense in which it is true that there is nothing dearer than one’s (good) name.

Here the proper name has an ascriptive sense because it refers to one’s personal identity in the world with Others. But here the name still has the feature of the proper name in the sense that it is not an ascriptive name, like “Eagle Eye,” “Ace,” etc., where the name is bestowed because the so-named person exhibited for the name-giver certain qualities. The loss of these qualities might well mean the loss of the name. But in such a case of a given name this is not an occasion of shame. One simply no longer has the admirable attribute one once had: One is older, or one suffers
from an illness, etc. Now there may be fond memories, like “we used to call him Ace because he was such a good scorer.”

But consider how the innocent person knows that his besmirched name, his sullied personal identity before others, is still his name and is still “good” in his own eyes regardless of what “they” think. He is still, e.g., Steven Truscott, even after he changed his name after his doing time in prison in order to begin a new life. And he is still Steven Truscott fifty years later when a Court of Appeals acquits him of the murder charge. The sense of loss of personal identity as it is embodied in one’s name is evident in the undeniable joy Steven Truscott felt when his two children changed their surname to Truscott. Now, upon acquittal, he can announce to the world: “This is my name which my children bear.” In a basic sense it was always his name in so far as it referred to him non-ascriptively, but now, after the acquittal he gets his name back, a name which as a valued property refers ascriptively to him, and he need not find reason to hide his having this name before his community.13

Here we see that having one’s good name is being able to face Others. The name has symmetry with one’s face and like the face concentrates one’s interpersonal being in the world. It is presentable if it does not have evil ascribed to it. If it does have this ascription it is metaphorically disfigured. This is worse than the physical disfigurement, which is most often a grievous affliction. But in any case, whether guilty or not, whether the disfigurement is moral or physical, the person has occasion to become aware that as an “I myself” she is more than her face, her good name, her appearance, etc. Who she is is more than what she has done and more than what she is taken to be. She may appreciate, even if guilty, that her proper name and who she is refers to what transcends ascriptive reference. Later (in Chapter VI, §7) we will discuss the original dignity of persons prior to rights and values, and (in Book 2, Chapter V, §8.) we will have occasion to speak of an original self-esteem that is more of an ontological order than an ascription of value to oneself. This is hinted at perhaps in the equivalence of “one’s name” and “one’s good name.” It comes to light when one’s identity or the face of one’s personal being in the world with others is sullied or blemished by the notoriety of a public accusation. Now one is called before oneself to appreciate the difference between who one is, what Others say who one is, what one has done, or what sort of person one is. This theme will busy us for the rest of this work.

§5 The Referent of “You” and the Face

“You,” in contrast to the one intended with a proper name, must intend someone who is present to me attending to me. When I ask of someone facing me, “Who are you?,” I do, of course, as a rule, want a “what”-answer. I am asking “as what” are you here present? Yet the Other, even if a mugger, is there self-experiencing himself, quite apart from providing any answers to my query. His presence in the flesh,
perhaps in spite of himself, is itself not a manner of a quiddity, an answer to a What question. Rather the Other facing me is present non-ascriptively without referring to anything else. In this sense the face and presence in the flesh is a correlation of what is prior to every “what”- or “why”-question.14

Reference with proper names of course need in no way involve someone who is present attending to me. With proper names someone may be referred to in their absence. When through speaking (not writing) I address someone with “you,” the one addressed is typically present in the flesh focally for me within the visual field through the face. If I am blind, or if the presence is through the sensory fields of touch, smelling, or hearing, I focus on the other’s ipseity, the other “I myself,” through her voice, smell, skin texture, etc. In invoking “you” I intend someone beyond her properties and apart from any conceptual or generic unity, i.e., purely as someone self-experiencing; yet she is present to me only through her propertied bodily presence and especially, if I am sighted, through her face foremost her eyes.

The face for sighted people usually focuses on the looks of the eyes which have, as Ortega has noted, an entire vocabulary. Even though the eye as the surface of the look looking at us, when we are locked into its gaze, becomes diaphanous and thereby hidden to us because we are taken up with the one looking at us, nevertheless, there are other occasions when we find ourselves less immediately present to the Other and find ourselves to be observers in the second- and third-person of someone’s expressivity as concentrated in the eyes. In such a case we find that the motions in the eye socket, along with the movement of the eyelids, iris, and pupil, are “the equivalent of a whole theater with its stage and its actors.”15 One’s looks or appearings appear through especially the eyes. Thereby someone appears to look “superciliously,” or furtively, or out of the corner of one’s eye; one looks glassy-eyed, dazed, ashamed, worried, withdrawn, concentrated; one gives a look that kills, melts hardened hearts, bores a hole, undresses, provocatively or arrogantly stares, that covets or that is lewd, is menacing, etc. The non-sighted person does not enjoy this precise theater, but cultivates an analogous one in the presence of the voice and the sensed or felt bodily movements.

Of course we may think of the face as other than the side of the head where the animated presence of the person in the eyes, mouth and nose is visible. Statements about someone referred to with a proper name do not presuppose the special configuration of eyes, nose, mouth, etc., we call the face. Indeed we may conceive persons as present and able to be addressed who do not have heads or faces in this familiar sense. (We can imagine creatures with appendages we call “faces” but which for them are an unwanted evolutionary left-over and who communicate with one another through, e.g., a field or atmosphere of heat and feeling, i.e., facelessly.) Then our intention of the ipseities would be directed at the manifest but non-localized medium of the source of the other’s self-experiences through which I am apprehended along with the world. In this sense we can conceive of “faceless” ipseities. Such would not be the same as zombie-like ipseities or bodily presences where “no one is there.”

The face is typically what each of us focuses on in order to be “in touch with” the Other. It is the focal medium of the source of the Other’s non-reflexive and intentional consciousness as these are disclosed in expression and agency. We “read”
faces before we read or interpret anything else – and some of us are, for a variety of reasons, better at this than others. Because we read faces we say of Others that they make or made faces; and in play we make faces, thereby indicating apperceived changes in a person’s emotions, attitudes, perceptions, etc. The plastic surgeon “makes faces” in a quite different way than someone does who expresses, e.g., repugnance at something. Only someone whose face it is can make a face in terms of revealing her state of soul; but the plastic surgeon “makes a face” in a way that approaches making a persona, a mask, through which a person, who before this had another face, regardless of how disfigured, now is to be and reveal herself. If the new face is recalcitrant to expression or somehow frozen the person has a permanent mask behind which she is forced to be hidden and which she must strive to undermine. This can be true if parts of the face are immobilized. For example, I once knew a man whose face appeared to have a permanent sneer because of frostbite he suffered as a child.

The person afflicted with a disfigured face is greeted generally with repugnance. Someone who is not only not “easy on the eyes” but hideous finds no welcoming gaze and can come to experience himself as belonging nowhere in the common and public spaces of social life. As a result, whether one reacts rebelliously or shuns others out of shame, the sense of who one is as more than this contingent “window to the world” is, in such cases of disfigurement, stronger than in most of us. Indeed, the person with the beautiful face is more likely to identify herself with her looks and not to have a sense of herself as more and other than her appearances. As we shall propose later, the essential ontological beauty and dignity of the ipseity finds a cipher in the wonder of being loved in one’s being in love, especially the first time around. Here there is occasioned the seeming miracle of seeing one’s true beauty reflected in the gaze of the other, a true beauty that one perhaps before was reluctant to acknowledge. (Cf. our discussions in §§13 ff. below.)

Making present the ipseity through the face is ambiguous because it is not a making present the ipseity or making exterior the self-experiencing; these remain essentially absent and interior. The spatial metaphorical term, “interior” also misleads in so far as it suggests something inside the physical body. Body here is the lived body as the vehicle of expression and will. The expressing agent is also “beyond” or transcendent to the lived body, but this does not mean outside the physical body. As the referent of “you” you remain interior and transcendent to your face, even though it is the primary vehicle of your being present to me and you are neither outside nor within your body.

When I intend you through your face and foremost your eyes, the mind and heart are directed “inwards” but here the metaphorical character of this description leaps out. Our gaze may directed into the interior of a cave; we might peer 50 or 10 feet. But it makes no sense to say how far within our mind is directed in looking “into someone’s soul.” We would not say that our gaze went through her eyes and reached three inches into her skull. That would be a horrible category mistake. The use of the metaphor of the “abyss” by the psalmist and Augustine helps us to avoid this mistake. But the abyss too may mislead us into the sense of an endless empty space, where as the ipseity is in fact an individual essence.
§6  Some More Problems Regarding the Presence and the Referent of “You”

As we can be mistaken in external reflexive references to ourselves but cannot misfire in terms of our internal reflexive reference to ourselves, so each may indeed be mistaken about whom one has rendered present in their second- and third-person presentations. In any case, the person before me whom I am addressing as aware of being addressed by me is “you,” but I, in using the second-person singular, always mean a unique ipseity. But “you” may well turn out to be someone else, e.g., a clone, a twin, someone else in the dark whom I took for you, etc.

Even the intention of someone through the face may misfire, as in the case of imagined impersonators, “clones,” Doppelgänger, etc. It is precisely because the intention of “you” is not identical with the intention of the face and the specific bodily presence but rather goes to the ipseity beyond this expressive presence, that we are disappointed when we took this person to be “you” even though the “clone” might perfectly have resembled you. On this basis we would want “you” back and want our intentions of you back in order to redirect to you, even if, for whatever reason “you” no longer had the same face and bodily presence. Indeed, your being “back” would not entail of necessity that you had the same face. The attachment of the “you” to the face becomes even more ambivalent when one is drawn to the bodily beauty of how the “you” is present. Here one may well regret the possibility that “you” may be you yourself and be ugly. This results in the situation noted by Simone Weil: “A beautiful woman looking at the image in the mirror may very well believe the image is herself. An ugly woman knows it is not.”16 We will later have occasion to meditate at greater length on the difficult connection between ipseity and personality and personal embodiment.

Although we are discussing the second-person in conjunction with the appellative “you,” we need not be using the appellation to enjoy the Other in the second-person. I don’t have to sing/say “Drink to me only with thine eyes” for that to happen. In Casablanca, the heroine could address Rick merely by requesting that Sam “play it (the favorite song) again,” provided, of course, that Rick was in earshot. Thus the invocation may take a variety of forms. This resembles cases of self-reference where I make myself present as myself with “I,” yet here we have in mind a case where I might be occasioned to be aware of myself as myself simply through you addressing me as “you.” In your so addressing me you may evoke in me a keen sense of myself as myself, far more concrete than what the indexical self-reference achieves. Thus I am present to myself as myself without invoking “I.” But you are not present to me as you without my somehow invoking you, and you, in turn, attending to me. Again, it might not be necessary that I say “you,” because, e.g., eyes can “speak.” Yet you must respond by attending to me, otherwise the appellation is unfulfilled and the “you”-intention is empty. You, although addressed as “you,” remain indifferent to me and keep me at bay as “he,” and you persist in remaining “she” and not “you.”

Further, it might be the case that you are thinking of me apart from my invoking you or your invoking me. But thinking about me is thinking about JG Hart, it is
not attending to me as one attending to you; it is not attending to me as a You. If I ask you what you are doing and you say, “Thinking about you,” the “you” here is a way of identifying (or establishing a sameness relation of) the one who before was present to you as “he” or JG Hart, i.e., a substrate of predication, with the one now talking to you who is not present to you as a substrate of predication but rather non-ascriptively. Thinking about me is not addressing me or responding to my address of you. But you are not present to me as you, i.e., as whom I attend to as attending to me, unless there is the equivalent expression of the address by which I catch your attention.

How are you present when I am scolding you in your presence, e.g., listing for you the qualities I believe you have that I find repugnant? Clearly you are present, but at the same time I am turning away from you in your uniqueness and displaying you as a substrate of predication and an instance, e.g., of cowardice. You are transformed into a substrate of predication, and thus verging toward he or even it, as in the case of reification or demonization. Thereby you are less of interest as you yourself than as being subsumed under this property. Indeed, if I am nasty, I verge on wanting to making you appear to yourself as nothing but this instantiation of a deficiency. In doing this the speaker appears to have the power to contaminate you by reducing you to the property and denying that you are transcendent to the properties you have. You verges on becoming he or she or it, where these themselves are present not as ipseities but as substrates of predications and instantiations of types or kinds.

Praising someone or listing positive attributes may also have this effect, as in a neutral job application. On the other hand, praising someone may be a way of sustaining and celebrating the uniqueness of the one present as you. This raises the question of the possibility of a loving critique of you that does not degrade the person present to the undesirable property. All these matters suggest that there is an exemplary form of the presencing of Others which admits of deviations. A fortiori presencing in the second-person someone as a unique you, we will argue, requires the proper intentionality of love. We will look at these matters in Part Two of this chapter.

To make present her or him requires the recognition of the otherness of the Other and this transcendence is a unique intentionality which contrasts with the presence of things or concepts. The recognition of the Other is a recognition of someone, a him or a her. This contrasts with the concept of the Other. As Jankélévitch has noted, the concept of “the Other” is no one in particular. It is a peculiar third-person referent that never has or never will become a second-person, precisely because it refers to a concept of the Other and not a recognized Other. In contrast, the third-person form of “him” or “her” targets a person, someone, an individual incarnate being. The third-person, furthermore, is a virtual second-person. Or it is a second-person who has become absent, or whom I no longer address, or someone who has never been a You, but might become one. The realm of the third-person is the enormous field of those whom I might address as You.

Addressing someone is always a privileging of someone. I always address a “you” out of an endless manifold of “he’s” and “she’s.” Prior to “you” someone is always a “he” or a “she,” or perhaps some gender-neutral personal form that one day gains currency in English. Clearly the gender identity here is not essential for
the presencing of the other ipseity in the third-person.) The Other may be conceived or imagined to be known without a known gender or without a gender. Doubtless we could come forth with few, if any, factual candidates to serve as instances, just as “you” is present typically only in humankind and in certain animals. Finding a “you” that was not animal or human is conceivable but surely hard to experientially instantiate. This is in part the thrust of Sokolowski’s question of whether intelligence could be artificial in the way light, not a flower, is artificial.

“You” is uttered in the presence of someone. We may address someone in her absence as in writing, but in such a case there is the anticipation of the time when the reader will be present to what I am saying to her now, e.g., when the letter arrives, or when she will read her email, or listen to her voicemail. Writing “you,” here anticipates her being mediately present to me and my mediate presence to her. I will be present to her and she to me not when I am writing to her nor when she is in the presence of the letter as a physical thing, but when she reads my letter. The letter as a physical thing embodies my address to her; her anticipated reading of it is her presence to me. I cannot address “you” or write to “you” knowing that you will never be in the presence of this address. In this sense your being present to my saying/writing “you” (e.g., in writing a letter or leaving a message on voicemail) is the telos and perfection (entelechy) of this address.

“He” or “she” is precisely someone I can address as “you.” If I cannot address him as you, he is not “a he,” not an Other, not one who experiences himself as “I myself” and who I can address as one attending to me. “He” would thus be one I do not address because “he” is not capable of being addressed and addressing. “He” is perhaps a zombie where “no one” is there or he is a being for whom the a priori frame is exclusively living tissue and warm blood, and nothing else.

When the Other is known truly in the third-person as existing actually now it is a matter of necessity that she is present as capable of being known in the second-person. (We thereby mean to exclude knowing fictional as well as deceased persons.) As “she” this one presents herself as present to herself and as one capable of saying “I myself.” The way I most directly experience such a one is as “you.” Apart from “you” I am absent to you and you are absent to me as you, but perhaps present in the flesh as “she.” That is, in the absence of your response to my address, you may be present in third-person perception as he or she. In the empty intention of memory and imagination, even though these might present “you” in a re-presentation or “presentification” “you” are not truly present in the flesh. Nevertheless a memorial re-presentation of you does not transform the remembered You into a She.

§7 “You” as Importunity and Invocation

The address of “you” is an invocation in the sense that it is always a request of someone that they permit themselves to be addressed. To say “you” I assume you are not necessarily actually, but capable of, attending to me. In addressing you I take the initiative and I am not merely the “you” who before was a he or she.
“Holding” or “catching” someone’s attention verges on violence if there is not this deference to her freedom. The “you” invokes because someone may not wish to be addressed and may choose to be alone with her solitude or to ignore the address. The presence of you through your bestowing your attention on me in response to “you” is properly a gracious act on your side; otherwise your presence is exacted. Such an exaction is always an imposition of will, and in the normal relationship between equals if my addressing “you” is not gracious and deferential it is an imposition bordering on rudeness, if not violence, on my side.

Commands are always properly in the second-person, i.e., addressed to a “you.” Because “you,” or the equivalent form of address, is always a presumption that the Other wills to be addressed its invocation may appear as inappropriate, e.g., as an intrusion, if not a command. One form of command may presuppose a setting in which not only this presumption of willingness is justified but also there is presupposed a willingness to subordinate one’s will to the one addressing. But in the context of pure power, the command presupposes nothing but the right or capacity to compel the listener to receive the address. In the cases of amorality, the command does not even presuppose the right to compel the listener to attend, but it simply forces attention. Thus when a command is delivered in the context where there exists the power of sanctions for not heeding a command, there is the presumption that it is permissible to violate the subordinate’s freedom. Such is the context of commands in a jail, prison, or conscripted army. A command like “Stop!” to an aggression where the power for sanctions does not exist but where the one commanding has only the power of the dignity of her personhood, is, at the same time, an appeal for respect. The only sanction she perhaps has is the withholding of her respect for the character of the person, which, as we shall see, is difficult to separate from the person and the ipseity itself.

The position we want to develop is that the inherent dignity of persons is manifest in the third-person and we may even show respect and be respectful to “Others,” to “them” by regulating our conduct toward them in a non-second-personal way. But we further wish to say that there is a more precise sense of “respecting someone” that occurs only in the second-person. Here we do not merely regulate our conduct towards someone but we make ourselves accountable to this person, i.e., to one whom I address as “you.” In this sense the proper sense of being respectful toward the dignity of persons is respect toward the unique ipseity and this can happen only in the person’s being present as “you” and therefore in the second-person. (See our discussion below of “ontological value” in §21 but especially in Chapter VI, §7.)

“Authorities” and “powers” whose “legitimacy” is only their lethal sanction merit no respect in their capacity as agents of force even though it might well be prudent not to be disrespectful. Such a semblance of respect would not seem to be dissembling, but merely the prudence of the powerless. Not just anyone can command another by issuing a command or by saying “you ought to….” Someone, like the one being aggressed against, who cries “Stop!”, commands by reminding the other of what he himself ought to do.

We must distinguish the moral authority from the authority of the expert. The latter does not have the power to command, yet when one is ignorant it is foolish to dismiss the expert. The moral authority (someone we revere), a parent, or teacher, or
a leader (determined by “us” or legitimate authority), may command obedience and
the command creates the Ought in the command. But the person being commanded
has to recognize that this Other bears this authority and that the command, “Do X!”
here has the same meaning for the hearer as “I ought to do X.”

In a democracy authority comes “from below.” It becomes authoritative by reason
of the general will to which each has submitted herself, even when its expressions
are hostile to the individual citizens’ aims. “All authority is ‘from above’” means at
least that it is given to the commanding persons by reason of their station or office,
which in a democracy, at least in theory, is created from below. Authority might also
be bestowed by us on someone by reason of an authority we respect. Typically, no
one is of herself a moral authority. Yet “leaders,” through the manifestation of certain
qualities, may appear as “one who speaks with authority” and those who know her
may come to invest her with authority. To invest another with this power of authority
is investing her with the power to establish an Ought by reason of her commands.
Such commands are always issued in the second-person, singular and plural.

We perhaps can understand how the beloved’s wish may become our command
in the sense of becoming our own desires. However what is not clear is how the
qualities of someone may motivate us to take her commands as the source of our
own obligations. This basic issue of religion and politics, i.e., how an Other’s “You
must…” becomes my “I ought,” will not be pursued here.

§8 Speaking About You in Your Presence and “We”

When I speak to others about you in your presence, there is a presumption of your
permission. The presumption may be complicated by numerous factors, e.g., the
justified belief that the particular relevant persons, e.g., children, would, if they
understood the situation, want the parents to speak and act on their behalf. If the
presumption is not founded or legitimate there is an insult, i.e., a denial of your
ability and right to speak for yourself. But the meaning of “you” is precisely that I
am in the presence of one who alone manifests herself freely and regulates her
self-manifestation. My arrogation of your self-manifestation is an insult, if there is
no reason to presume your permission.

When I narrate to Others something we have done and you are among the listen-
ers and presumptive agents of the narrative, “we” is a way I may speak about you in
your presence. The proper, communitarian use of “we,” if it is not to be a violation
of you yourself, presupposes I apperceive you both as one experiencing yourself as
“I myself” and as “one of us” and as one who has granted me permission to speak
about you in your presence or absence. This permission may not be an “in person”
communication with you but there has to be a basis for my presumption of your
permission. If either of these conditions is unfulfilled, “we” has a measure of improp-
riety, even if tolerated by reason of convention. Thus any proper form of “we”
presupposes “you” as a member of one of us and co-referent at last implicitly granting
the speaker permission to speak on her behalf. Let us dwell briefly on this.
You makes another present in the way my simply being aware of Others as part of my environment does not: With you, you are invoked as intending me with self-awareness. Those making up the numerous members of “us” at rush hour are not intended as you. Communitarian senses of we presuppose that the speaker of “we” apprises you, as one of the “we,” as “one of us,” on the basis of her (the speaker) legitimately assuming or actually obtaining your permission to be included in this “we.”

This contrasts with the imperial, royal, authoritarian, and editorial senses of “we.”18 There are numerous forms of “we,” such as the royal, editorial, and parental, that are conventional modifications of this proper form. In this book there is very often used a kind of editorial we where I, the author, express my viewpoint. Sometimes it is simply that. But often I presume your assent because of the presumption of the persuasiveness of the presentation. In this case you are explicitly included in “we” by reason of my hope that you would go along. Because writing typically involves a you who of necessity is absent at the time of writing, there need not be disingenuousness or inappropriate arrogation of power, although doubtless it might be an instance of self-deception.

Note that as with “we” and “you,” one can misfire, i.e., err in one’s reference. I can say “we” and mean to include you, when you in fact cannot properly be included or when you refuse to be included or believe differently than I about what I am saying we experienced. Similarly I can say “you” and refer errantly because I might mean Peter when in fact I am addressing his twin, Simon. Or I might mean “you” singular when in fact I ought to mean “you” plural. Not so with the first-person singular: I cannot fail to hit the intended target when I achieve “I.”

§9 Problems of Talking About “You” and “Me”

Like all indexicals and the direct use of proper names, the invocation of “you” is a non-ascriptive presencing. Yet, as we have noted, “you” may become the subject of predication, as in my observation that “You look tired.” I may reveal to you the fruits of my reflections about you as you are manifest in your speech and deeds. As we have seen, sustaining “you” here is difficult because “you” verges on becoming “it” or “she” or “he” as a substrate of predication. Such a revelation on the speaker’s part of the addressee’s character is not properly an adequate reflection on you nor even a reflection on the “you” as you are in yourself, i.e. as the source of the speech and deeds; it is not a reflection on you as beyond these attributes. I have no competence for this, even though I can non-ascriptively render you present.

What we call intimate or personal conversations occurs where each reveals something about himself to the Other, as in a disclosure of secrets or hidden feelings or suppressed perceptions. But this by no means exhausts the nature of an exchange between persons. Not only is there the non-ascriptive, non-properiety depth of each, about which there is at once everything (and, as we shall continue to claim, nothing) to say, but also friendship is having a life in common, and life is bigger than just the two friends in their unique ipseities sharing intimate details or reflecting the unspeakable abyss that each is to herself and the Other.
In invoking “you” one typically calls attention to something else that we may attend to in either an empty or filled intention. Indeed, much if not most conversations are about something other than one another and to which we both may attend in the third-person. Most clearly, it is in the silent gaze and gestures of love that we attend one another non-ascriptively, i.e., we intend the ipseity beyond the properties. (See our discussion below in §§14 ff.)

In the third-person we use anaphora or “quasi-indexicals,” like “he himself,” to avoid confusion about reference. Thus we say, “The editor of *Nous* believes that he *himself* is a millionaire,” instead of “The editor of *Nous* believes that he is a millionaire.” In the second case the “he” might be understood to mean that the editor *Nous* believes that someone else, a colleague, and not he himself, the very same editor, is a millionaire. In which case, the “he” would not be, as grammarians and linguists say, “anaphoric,” i.e., a repetition of the word with the same referent. But such a precision is superfluous in the second-person. “You, who are presently the editor of *Nous*, believe that you are a millionaire” is quite sufficient because each “you” refers unambiguously to the (same) one I am now addressing. Of course, there might appear to be confusion if the above sentence were a written protocol of a speech and in its written form it failed to reveal that the speaker looked dramatically at one person while saying “you, who are presently the editor of *Nous*,” and, with equal emphasis after a significant pause, looked and pointed at another person (implying “you”) while saying “believe that you are a millionaire.” But because the written form has not the conjunction, “and,” and uses the indexical “you” in succession, it clearly excludes that there is a reference to two distinct persons. Clearly in such a case, the transcriber of the speech was not looking at the original speaker’s body language and, focused on the transcription, missed the sense of the spoken statement.

§10 Substitutes for “You”

“One” is an intriguing, if stylistically controversial, English word. It seems to be a way all the personal perspectives can be in play. If done adroitly, even though perhaps “fraudently,” they can perhaps all be in play at once. The well-known arbiter of style in the English language, Fowler, permits “one” to serve as a “numeral pronoun” (as in “One of them escaped”) and an “indefinite pronoun” (as in “One hates his enemies”). In the latter case it refers to the average person or a sort of person, it does not mean a particular person. “It names someone who is no one” (Ortega y Gasset). But when it is used as “One hates one’s enemies,” we have, says Fowler, the “false first-personal pronoun” because, as an invention of the self-conscious writer, it ought to be suppressed. In this use “one” is usually simply an alternative to “I.”

But, *pace* Fowler, whether stylistically desirable or not, one is also often a substitute for “you.” “One” may also be a way of referring to “you” *and* “I,” *and* the royal, authoritarian “we” or exemplary “they,” as when a parent says “One does not behave in this way.” It is common to use “one” for a generic sense of “you”
as when a university says to a prospective student “One needs extraordinarily high qualifications to be admitted to Dunbar College.” Whereas “you” typically is a demonstrative and “deictic,” i.e., displaying the referent in relationship to the speaker, here “one” functioning as “you” may be minimally or not at all “deictic.”

This last is made clear also in the cases of, e.g., a brochure or automated recorded voice at an airport shuttle door, where it generically can refer to any addressee and the display of the situation of the “speaker” seems close to null.

People address one another in the second-person with third-person terms of endearment, like “buddy,” “sweetheart,” “dearest,” etc. or through terms defining a relationship or titles. Similarly terms of opprobrium may substitute for forms of address. The function of terms of endearment or opprobrium is to identify the one addressed with a property that expresses the positive or negative evaluating disposition of the speaker. It inserts this property between the speaker and the addressee and perhaps reveals that the relationship is about how the person is of value or disvalue for the speaker. This holds true for terms like “Mom,” “Dad,” and “Coach.” This contrasts with the proper name which goes to the person in herself, beyond her value for the speaker. As Robert Sokolowski has remarked, a term like “Sweetie,” could never be a name for someone, in the sense that it would be a way of referring that was not bound to the person referring. It is always a humorous situation when someone, e.g., who does not understand well the language, mistakes a term of endearment for proper name, and takes it upon himself to address the beloved person, who in fact is a stranger, with the term of endearment.

Yet these special terms of endearment, opprobrium, and terms of relationship are ways the speaker may profess the special regard or contempt she has for the one addressed and what is, of course, invisible in the proper name. (Of course, it might gain visibility in how the proper name is enunciated.) We can appreciate someone wanting to be addressed by the proper name and not by the term of endearment precisely because the person being addressed may appreciate that the proper name is the way others refer to the person in herself, and not merely as she stands perhaps only occasionally in relationship to the lover.

For a child or subordinate to use the proper name could be a sign of disrespect by way of denying the special importance of the relationship for speaker. By contrast, withholding of the proper name reaches its extreme form of disrespect and becomes a denial of the ipseity of the other when it is substituted for by epithets of disdain, opprobrium and hatred. However, in order for the proper name to function in the second person, the “you” must be expressed or implied. “Peter, feed my sheep,” is in the second person because it is a command and the verb implies you. One might witness the one commanding saying, “Peter will feed my sheep” while the speaker is looking at Peter. Here what linguistically is a third-person intentionality functions equivalently as second-person.

In modern times people of high judicial rank are referred to always by way of a property, signifying their superior or exalted rank; one never simply addresses them with “you” or directly, but always with, e.g., “your honor,” “your worship.” This reference to status doubtless is a ritual of deference and subordination to the office held by the person addressed. (This is the lawyers’ or barristers’ use;
the intimidated witness or angry accused often refers directly to the official with “you” or by her name and can expect to be admonished.) In such contexts the use of “you” or the use of the addressee’s proper name is taken to be presumptuous, i.e., it smacks of a lack of respect for and deference towards the exalted office or function of the official. It suggests an equality in a situation where there is none. “Take off your shoes (and don’t presume to address me with ‘You’), for you are on holy ground!” This hearkens back to the delicacy of invocation of “you” which is always a plea for permission to take the liberty of addressing someone and intruding on their personal space – except perhaps when God addresses a creature.

Liturgical prayers are occasionally forms of address where God is directly addressed with You or Thou but intermingled with God being referred to by way of titles, deeds and attributes. “Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of Hosts.” The mind is directed to the attributes directly and then to Godself as the most proper way of honoring and respecting God. But it is not as if God is spoken of as if God were absent. And surely it is not God who needs reminding of these attributes, but the ones praying remind themselves, make present to themselves, what is intentionally absent and what requires to be made present. Thus such invocations are ways of disposing the faithful to open their hearts, soften their wills, and focus or perhaps even dismantle their intentionality in so far as it is an intending of something definite in the world. (We return to the intentionality of prayer in the final chapter of Book 2.) Here the second-person reference is achieved by the means of a congregation’s third-person reference to aspects of the divine. One prays to God in the second-person by making God a substrate of predication in the third-person. Yet the function of this move to the third-person is not to submit God to analysis or articulation through predication, but rather it enables the believer to provide conceptually and imaginatively a placeholder for this essential and insurmountable transcendence which is essentially perceptually absent. The presence of the one addressed is mediated by faith’s (empty) intention of a narrative of deeds and attributes. Indeed, the direct address or immediate presence without this invocation of properties (as in addressing the king in the third-person as “His Majesty,” and not even “Your Majesty”) is not merely a presumptuous intrusion of personal space but, in some religious contexts, a blasphemy which, it is believed, has dire consequences.

§11 The Possibility of the Dissipation of the Pronominal Relata by the Relations

Some languages, e.g., Vietnamese, tend to avoid the personal pronouns as absolute pronouns and instead refer to the speaker and one spoken to by way of a relation. The speaker may refer to himself by way of the one addressed and the spoken to may be referred to by way of the relation to the speaker. Of course, in English “I” is
Inseparably tied to the other pronouns and demonstratives. Thus “I” stands in correlation with “you.” But in some languages this correlation is not merely one of the seeming monadic referents of the pronouns but rather one of the familial and social relationships. These are the basic way one refers to oneself and to others. Intersubjectivity and the social fabric are given a kind of priority over the more isolated ipseities of other languages; the relations have a priority over the relata. One refers to “you” and to “oneself” only through the mediation of the relationship that defines each referent. Thus the speaker might refer to himself as “the unworthy eldest son of the exalted father,” and to the addressee, “exalted father of the unworthy eldest son.” Here the case might be made that “self” is only a term of relationships and there is no ownness, I-ness, ipseity. These latter would be social constructs. The speaker presenting himself or another as the substrate receiving the predications, as “father of unworthy eldest son,” “loving husband of the mother of four splendid sons,” “faithful union member and worker in the local shipyards,” etc., would be presenting external forms of reference which happen to bundle together.

This raises the question of whether when the speaker would refer to “himself” or to another he would in any way be referring to someone who is the bearer or substrate of the various predications, i.e., the one who is the father, husband, and worker, or do we have a thorough-going bundle theory or society of such bundles, i.e., a referent is the constellation of clusters of qualities and not a substance who has them and who transcends them. It also raises the question whether there was a form of self-awareness of this “one who” has these properties. Or would he be unconscious of the unity of the “roles”? The phenomenological conditions for their being references to himself or another, so that the subject of the predications could say they are my roles and properties, would seem to be missing if these were merely external forms of reference as in a bundle theory of substance. Because there would be no ownness or self-awareness as the foundation for the use of the descriptive terms functioning as forms of address, the context alone would thus have to determine whether the speaker was speaking about “himself,” or someone present or absent, or whether he wasn’t “there” but totally absorbed in the person in his presence.

All the issues we have raised about the ineluctability of self-awareness and the ownness that is therein embedded would have to be raised here. For example, would the addressee and addressor be aware of themselves as such, or would that best be captured by a third-person description, like “the one in the east part of the room speaking/listening now.” Would the addressing through attending and speaking themselves be a form of self-awareness or would they themselves be the term of a series of relations of unowned acts?21

§12 The Problem of “You” as Another “I”

In Husserlian phenomenology the empathic perceiving of “you” or “he/she” is said to reveal “another I.” The Other or “You” is said to be “another I.” (Note that talk of “the Other” includes “you” as well as third-person references to persons
or quasi-persons or non-human persons.) This, of course, is nonsense if “I” refers to what is absolutely irreducible and a unique individual essence and if the Other too is absolutely unique as well as essentially transcendent to my stream of consciousness. There is no instantiation, no “another” of what is uniquely unique. Doubtless the Other is not ganz anders in so far as she too is uniquely self-experiencing, refers to herself with “I,” is confronted with the limitations of her freedom by the multiplicity of Others, is present as a moral person in the flesh, necessarily incorporates the perspectives of others into her agency and perception, etc. But all these formal and analytic descriptions of the essence of I-ness and You-ness (cf. our discussion above in Chapter III, §2) may not be excuses for reducing the otherness of the Other to something familiar in the world or an instantiable universal. These descriptions, as the result of the awakening of the category of the Other through the passive analogizing or pairing (Husserl), frame the kind of presence that the Other is, even though, strictly speaking, the Other is not a kind. The framing merely gives us a frame or place-holder to which we may direct our mind and heart, and as such our mind is directed to a category valid in the world’s display, an incarnate personal presence with properties. But because there is the appresentation of that self-experiencing to which the world is displayed the Other as Other always explodes the totalizing project of the mind and presents us with what is trans-categorial.

The reason why “another I” appears nonsensical is the unique uniqueness of the referent of “I,” wherein what is referred to admits no second. (See Chapter V, §4 below.) Even though “I” is a token reflexive or indexical term, a demonstrative pronoun with a common significance, it means something different in each case. Yet this difference of what “I” refers to is not “an I,” an instance of a kind, or a universal type or form. The matter is similar with “you.”

“I,” like “you, thus carries an enormous burden: “I,” although a token reflexive pronoun used in common refers to what is unique; and its referent is inerrantly targeted without targeting or aiming. (“You” has the same first two features, i.e., it is commonly used to refer to what is unique, but its referent is not inerrantly targeted and its specific use can require the identification or aiming. It may also be indifferent toward its target, as the Good Samaritan might have been appealed to by the wounded assaulted Jew in spite of his having been so identified as a Samaritan, just as the Samaritan seems to have been indifferent to the Jewish identity of the victim.)

Because “I” inerrantly targets me uniquely and likewise targets the Other when used by her it would seem that we should find another word, as when we find, e.g., that “nectarine,” which has been taken for “peach” really is distinct. Yet because here what we have is distinct per se and not through its properties, we might want to use the emphatic form of “this I,” instead a demonstrative pronoun. Yet, as we have seen, what “I” refers to is not captured by “this” because “this” is always “this” for an I and awaits predication by this I for its fullness of meaning; “this” by itself lacks the rich, albeit propertyless intelligibility of what “I” refers to. Further, “this I,” as we shall see has the difficulty of bleaching out the unique essence and making of each referent of “I” merely an instance of I-ness.
However, the great wonder of “I” meeting “you” is not merely that I apperceive you to be uniquely unique, but this very sense awakened by “you” is inseparable from my own self-experiencing. There is nothing in the world’s categoriality that can awaken the framework of “you” – except “I myself” which similarly is not in the world. This means both that “you” is necessarily a correlate of “I” and that for “you” to be constituted the “I” must be awake to itself and recognize “there” the analogous framework of itself. The “here” with which I am ineluctably familiar is transformed into a “here-there”; “my lived Now” transformed into “your lived Now”; “ownness” as an absolute interiority is exploded in favor of an absolute exteriority which has its own interiority and ownness. “Your consciousness is for my consciousness absolute exteriority as is my consciousness for you.”

The great wonder, whether one feels it emotionally or not, is that, with the Other, the sense of “you” is “I myself” intentionally “othered.” “I myself” am de-centered and de-presenced, and “my” ineluctable unique “here” and “now” and “I” appear analogously present “there.” This occurrence of intentional “othering” is the condition for the presencing of the sense of the Other as an Other in the world, i.e., an Other present before me who also experiences herself uniquely as herself and refers to herself with “I.” This happens both for infants and for adults in their endless process of maturing and learning how to love. But at each phase in life’s unfolding it is a declension of the same presencing.

If I am permitted to use the expression, “the other I,” in regard to the presencing of the Other, I designate as one of the moments of the meaning of the expression myself in my own being and thus the Other of necessity refers back to or mirrors myself. Thereby the sense of the Other as another who refers of necessity to herself with “I” appears ineluctably as an analogue of my own self-appearance. But it is an easily misleading analogue as it is an improper “reflection” because the Other is an I who is not I and who is separated from me by an unbridgeable abyss. The presencing of the Other is of necessity an “othering” of me myself, i.e., of necessity I transcend myself. This “othering” may be materially regarded as reducing the Other to the same, and thus the epistemology of other minds is regarded as necessarily a form of moral-psychological egotism. But this is a misunderstanding. What is meant by referring to the empathic perceiving as “othering” is that there is set up the formal or essential condition and framework for this unique kind of display and for meeting the amazing sameness of the Other; it by no means undermines the otherness of the Other and reduces, e.g., you to me. Rather it is what accounts for the thereness of the Other as another person. Otherness of the Other is not a reference to just anything whatsoever or even das ganz Anders so that anything whatsoever is targeted, but to the unique kind intentionality which makes present in the world a person or another who self-experiences occasionally what I refer to with “myself” and which self-experiencing individual essence is completely different from what I presence in the world. And here the kind of intentionality does not refer merely, e.g., to humankind, but to the unique kind of absence, depresencing, and displacement proper to personal presence.

The Husserlian position presented here does not deny but merely professes itself to be phenomenologically ignorant regarding the speculative Levinasian claim that the Other is prior to “I myself” and that “myself” is an accusative or dative out of
which “I myself” am generated. (See §13 below.) That there might well be theological reasons for such a position will occupy us in the final two chapters of Book 2.

Because the Other cannot be truly another “I myself” and because the Other is incommensurate with any other being in the world, the de-presencing and self-othering through which the Other is presenced displace the orientation of the I that prevails in its dealing with things or meanings. Such a self-displacing is of a more imperative nature when the Other is present as “you.” Now I am not only present to another as another is present to me, but I am called to avail myself and assume a position of readiness and responsiveness to her requests, assertions, demands, desires, etc. Of course, these may, as in the Good Samaritan story, be emitted by the stranger over there who perhaps is unconscious and speechless. But for this to be so, much more has to be said about how I understand or ought to understand this Other to have claims on me. Yet by the nature of the intersubjective mutual involvement, the Others who are within my circle of family, friends, neighbors, and compatriots can make demands on me. I am addressed and this means that my I-can and freedom must face up to and accommodate themselves to another “I myself” which is absolutely exterior to them. The initial demand is respect and listening; the subsequent demand is my taking a position towards the Other’s requests, assertions, etc.

With the presencing of the Other I have the possibility of saying both “you” and “I,” and, we have seen, neither can occur in the total absence of the other. In the first-person singular case I am present to myself as myself; in the second-person singular case I am de-centered and de-presenced, i.e., “I myself as myself” is transformed into being available to and for the Other because in invoking “you” I announce my readiness to be addressed by you. It is not as if I cease to be myself as myself, but rather now I myself as myself am not only “for myself” but also “for the Other.”

§13 Some More Marcelian-Buberian-Levinasian-Ortegian Reflections

Ortega y Gasset would agree with the position we are advocating, namely, that the pre-reflective living of life is a sense of oneself as radically one’s own and “radical solitude.” Yet he refuses to grant any sense of “I” to this dimension and implicitly denies any first-person status to what here is being called the non-reflective “myself” prior to the meeting of the “you.” Apparently, according to Ortega, I is the last character to appear in the tragi-comedy of life. According to Ortega this appearance is the result of the full “youifying” of someone from out of the distant fellow human he or she, and then from out of the greater proximity of another, e.g., the neighbor, to perhaps surprisingly the intimacy of the unique individual, “you.” We have acknowledged both the latency and the “lateness” of the emergence of the nominative and agent first-person singular: It is a result of the mediation of an act of self-reference that would seem to have its transcendental phenomenological genetic pre-condition in another regarding me as a You. (This is a speculative reconstruction, not a first-personal datum.) But Ortega overstates the egoic deficiency
or anonymity in what we are calling the "myself" (his "radical solitude") when he says that it is more proper "to speak of X who lives, of someone who lives, or of the living being." This indifference to the first-person and first-personal aspects fails to see that when we attempt to make the proposed substitutes, the original meaning is lost and, in terms of genesis, becomes impossible. As we earlier noted, there is no third-person special characteristic that one has to think that enables me to think of myself as myself, that there is no token-reflexive free description of myself, a fortiori of myself as X, from which it would follow that this person is myself; and, further, I am aware of myself as myself without being aware of myself as anything except myself. Starting off as an indeterminate anonymous X or "someone" is never going to lead to me myself, even though it may lead a computer or zombie to learn the skill of identifying this computer or zombie. Even if we consider the matter from the point of view of an infant, for whom self-reference of "I" is not yet possible, who is in excruciating pain, the attempt to capture the infant's experience in language (which she does not yet have) with "Someone (or the living being) is in excruciating pain" would seem to be less successful than "I am in excruciating pain," even though the infant is incapable of first-person reference. (Think of Wittgenstein's claim that "I" resembles more a groan than an identifying reference.) Further, Ortega's own description of the radical solitude as what "I have to do for myself, by myself, I alone in my solitude," and as what cannot be transferred to another nor can there be a surrogate for this original living one's life, etc., indicate similarly the inadequacy of such substitutions.

Because, Ortega believes, "I" was hijacked by a transcendental universal ego, he is concerned to make sure that its uniqueness and concreteness are brought to light. And yet because the I, which he identifies in every respect with the personal I, is brought about by intersubjectivity and because it is a history in the making, he states that the I is not something "that we possess and know from the outset but something that gradually appears to us exactly as other things do, that is, step by step, by virtue of a series of experience that have their fixed order."

Throughout this work we make claims for an original ownness and "myself." There is no development of an autobiography or normative and intersubjective person in the absence of this because there is no experiencing subject in its absence. More basically for Ortega's position, there is no perception of the Other with the resultant perception of oneself as the Other to the Other in the absence of this original ownness and "myself." At each phase of the Myself's unfolding there is a declension of itself. This may be said to be, insofar as it always involves empathic perceiving, an "other."23

Doubtless the Other's addressing me, i.e., becoming "you" for me as I become "you" for her, awakens me to myself in a way that does not occur when I am attending to something else or when the Other attends me in a functional-pragmatic way. (If I am addressed in a hostile way, my indignation reveals my self-awareness of being more than what the insulting or hostile address indicates, even though it may also reveal my fatal identification with the person so insulted. See below §14.) This address by "you" can be a great awakening and period of self-discovery or it may be merely another occasion of my being called, once again, to give an account of
myself. In so far as the Other’s turning to me empowers me, we may say the Other authors me, as, on occasion, I author her. But this in no way means that “I myself” am authored by “You,” but rather the shape of my personal life and the quality of my self-reflection is owed to the engagement with Others and their works and deeds with whom and with which I have to do. As we shall see, the unique form of intentionality of love, by which an ipseity is directly intended, awakens, by reason of an essential necessity within the beloved, depths of herself that typically remain concealed underneath layers of properties of her person. But this being loved, or merely being addressed, not only awakens the I to herself’s hidden riches but also may summons the I to de-center her life and be with and for the Other, just as she de-centers the life of the one loving. Of course, this power of the Other is neither a substitute for “myself” nor does the Other, by reason of the power of her presence to displace the “I myself” from its place as the center of the agency of one’s life, become more intimately and truly I myself than I am; I remain always “myself” and as such the dative and agent of manifestation and world-transformation, even at the elemental primordial level at which I, as an infant, first presence Others. Nevertheless the Other present as “you” moves the I from the nominative and dative of manifestation and agent of world-transformation into a stance of being the “moral dative,” i.e., a disposition to be “for the Other,” without which I myself would not be in the world with Others. Similarly “myself” becomes an accusative, in so far as I am addressed and the recipient of the Other’s agency. But it is impossible that I be the mere creature of the Other’s agency. This is because the dative and accusative are declensions of the non-reflexive “myself”; if “myself” is not there from the start such declensions are not possible.

We will not wrestle here with the philosophical-theological claim that there is a more fundamental sense of the Other or Thou that immemorially constitutes “myself” and makes me “for the Other” prior to any experience. We provide one possible context for such a position at the concluding chapter of Book 2 of this work. Yet we may even here take exception to the position that there is a philosophical-phenomenological justification for “a secret responsibility” tied to a command which affects me and which is prior to my awareness of it.24 But having said this we do not intend to deny absolutely the possibility of a sense of calling or command which is creative of the one called and thus, in a theologically mysterious sense, is prior to one’s awareness of it. Again, we wrestle with these matters in the concluding chapter of Book 2.

Husserl observes that the Other is the first person one meets.25 In doing so he wishes to point out that the emergent person finds her proper sense of herself as self-determining and self-referring in the Other’s regarding her and referring to her as one capable of self-reference and self-determination. In this sense it cannot be said that the Other is the first “I” because a sense of “myself” is a necessary condition for my presencing the Other as the first person in my life. Prior to being addressed by the other person the emergent person is of course self-experiencing (“myself”) but not yet self-determining and capable of the achievement of the indexical “I” and referring to herself as herself. Further in regard to Others she is merely open to and for the Other. Over and above the occasional actual and
habitual horizontal presence of the Others, particular Others come intermittently along and summon her. Put in the first-person, we can say: Here a “you” addresses me in my core ipseity and the moral dative, i.e., my availing myself for others, which before had a general potential undifferentiated status becomes actual in regard to special tasks and responsibilities.

And finally when I am loved by you I am awakened to my unique ipseity and summoned to a life with you, a summoning which can awaken within me endless reservoirs of power for good. (See Chapter V, §§3–6 of Book 2.) The sheer fact that there is another who needs me, makes demands on me, contempt me or finds fault with me can be a way of alienating me or rendering me outside myself in the sense that my I-can, my freedom to act, can be hampered by the Other. My sense of myself as a moral agent faces a serious obstacle when Others reduce me to one who is “incapable,” “incompetent,” etc. or when I am there for the Other only as a source of relief to her complaint or need. This is one of the complexities of aiding the enemy or the stranger in need. In these cases the aid giver can find herself reduced to a substrate of disvaluing predication or just a function of the Other’s needs; but vice-versa the one in need may find herself reduced to a helpless subject or an abstraction like a “homeless person.” Here only a faith in the needy person’s otherness is what sustains the one giving aid in her will to assist – and perhaps in some cases this faith is equally necessary in the recipient.

Such a situation of need and/or hostility contrasts sharply with how the presence of an Other, e.g., your presence to me, can awaken me to a unique sense of who I am. As Gabriel Marcel put it: “The more my interlocutor is exterior to me the more I am by the same token exterior to myself; the more I am conscious not of what I am but of my qualities and my faults, my particular characteristics.”26 Your presencing me with “You,” i.e., as I myself, means you are present in an interior way to me. When you presencing me as an instance of annoyance, repugnance, incompetence, ugliness, etc. you presencing me as exterior to myself because you displace me myself to my attributes and, to the extent I go along with this, I am alienated from myself. When you presencing me in the second-person as “You,” you presencing me in such a way that I am myself for myself, i.e., you presencing me as transcendent to you and as interior to me and beyond my qualitative presence to you. (Perhaps Marcel would have made his point better if he said: The more the interlocutor is exterior to me, the more I am conscious not of who I am. But he says: I am not conscious of what I am. Yet, this too is accurate if we think of who one is as an individual essence.) When you presencing me as transcendent, and you do not presencing what is alien to me and who I am, you presencing not only me myself as transcendent to my qualities but you also foster my apperception of you as you yourself – precisely as lovingly and respectfully attending to me myself because your presencing of me does not focus me on my qualities in comparison with you and others but liberates me to attend to you as you are for yourself. You facilitate that I presencing you and not your qualities and not my qualities in relationship to me and you, and therefore you foster my presencing you as interior to yourself by welcoming my being interior to myself. This kind of respectful presencing enables each person to come into her ownmost.
Part Two: Love, Person, and Ipseity

§14 Introductory Remarks on Love

Husserl once noted that “love, in the genuine sense, is one of the chief problems of phenomenology.” The word “love” has a multitude of referents and is used in many contexts where many other words would do just as well. The common thread is that in almost all these instances there is a delight in what we are drawn to. Love is, at least, a tendency toward what attracts and is cherished. Thus it has been tied to elemental impulses and instincts. What we call eros or lust may, at least in terms of this obvious aspect, be placed here. In this sense love is always at least a valuing of something. Thus we use “love” where we might also use “like” or “fond of” or “attracted to,” “turned on by,” etc. Clearly in most such cases love of what is other and distinct from the lover is always also self-referential; indeed, the motive for the movement toward what is other may well be that it gives pleasure to oneself.

Further “love,” as either a noun or verb, often has an emphatic sense where it is contrasted to some of these other previously-mentioned senses. (“I do not like or admire you, nor am I merely attracted to you; I love you.”) In this emphatic sense what is stressed is the duration and strength of the attraction or the valuing: love is claimed to be longer than in the former cases. Love in this emphatic sense generally is used only in the context of persons, even if not always human persons. In this respect there is often affixed to it the adjective “true.” And connected to this one hears that true love is not merely something ephemeral: I cannot say “I love you at 5:30 P.M. today but I can’t speak for two minutes or two hours from now.”

Further “true love” always is thought to be in a certain respect a surmounting of one’s own self-love. That is, the beloved is not loved for oneself, even though loving the beloved brings joy to oneself. The joy is not the purpose of the loving but is a consequence. Doubtless love as striving after something is essentially connected to the pleasure taken in the possession or presence of the beloved. In such a loving-striving it is not only the thing itself but the thing as desired or loved that is given to us. But Husserl has taught us to separate the act and what the act aims at, the valuing, the value, and the valued object or person.

The special joy in attaining what one strives for requires that we distinguish the goal as what is appreciated and striven for from the appreciating and valuing which themselves are not the object (as what has value) striven for. If one makes the joy itself the goal, and this one may do, this then becomes a different matter. Then I strive for joy and the joy itself is valued and the valued thing is valued only as a
means to the joy. In which case my self as having the property, “enjoying,” is what is striven for, not the Other as valuable, e.g., beautiful. When the possession of the sought for thing (and not the joy the thing brings) results in a transformation of the striving into joy, it remains true that it was the valued thing or person that one strove to “possess” or “attain” and the joy was not what one strove for and was not the valued person or thing.28

When love is thought of as an overcoming of loving the Other for one’s own sake, i.e., overcoming self-love, it may be that it is regarded as the same as admiration, sympathy, pity, and compassion. If this sense of “true love” is a renunciation of self-love then it stands clearly in contradiction to some other senses of love where love of oneself is both the beginning motive as well as the final resting point of the act of “love.” These senses characterize much of what goes for mere erotic or sexual love.

Leibniz, whose view is proximate to the one we will defend, believes he can handle the problem of pure or true love versus selfish love by thinking of love as a species of joy and or delight. Loving is appropriating the happiness of the Other or adopting as one’s own the Other’s happiness. Simply put, it is rejoicing in the blessedness of the Other. Here love reflects and perhaps fulfills what we following Sokolowski are calling moral categoriality: Taking the other’s good as one’s own (or in the case of evil: taking as one’s own good the other’s evil or the other’s evils as one’s own good.) What is missing in this Leibnizian account is the coming to light or display of the Other’s beauty which occasions one’s delight in the Other and in the Other’s well-being.

If this delight, joy or pleasure is not in the other or Other’s happiness for his own sake and in himself, but rather is for one’s own advantage, this would be disqualified as genuine love.29 In the Platonic tradition the issue of delighting in the Other for one’s own sake is discussed by the consideration that what is loved may be seen within a hierarchy, and the life of loving is an ascent to ever higher goods. In this theory, all love is pervaded by an indeterminate desire for the absolute good. This draws the person upward and, with axiological necessity, toward what is good in every respect and not good in relation to something beyond itself. Here also ultimately there is a forgetting and/or renunciation of oneself. At the extremes of the ladder of love, recognition of the same genus pervading the differing kinds of love may be impossible. Yet they all share the feature of the incapacity to deliver the satisfaction they promised.

Husserl himself holds a version of this sense of love when he ties it to what he calls the “one thing necessary” and the absolute Ought which is the single individual’s unique calling. The Absolute Ought which orders all of life analogous to the way a vocational decision orders a huge segment of life. When a person so self-determines herself what she does is not merely decent, good and genuine but what she is “called” to do. (Book 2 will wrestle with this theme of one’s vocation.) In such a case the one loving is devoted to her goals as well as to the troubles this devotion brings about; the lover is devoted as well to the concerns of the ones she loves. This “call” makes a total demand on the one loving and what it demands is what the lover loves in the deepest sense and what the lover in the deepest sense truly wants. “Love is the I’s turning of itself to that which draws this I in a totally
individual way and which, when it would be attained, would count as its fulfillment.”

(We will return to the act or noetic side of love as related to the individual essence in Book 2; here our focus will be on what the act aims it in regard to the Other. Love is related to ipseity in two fundamental ways. In Book 2 we will show that it reveals the innermost center of the I of the one loving. In this sense it is a gathering act. Here in this section we wish to dwell on how it reveals the ipseity of the beloved other.)

As true love may be opposed to some forms of desire that promote only one’s own well-being, so a sense of love as perspicacious may be opposed to eros or cupid as blind. Thus in *Midsummer Night’s Dream* (Act I., Sc. 1, L. 132) we hear that

> Love looks not with the eyes, but with the mind;  
And therefore is winged Cupid painted blind.

In this view the blindness caused by Cupid is presumably not absolute because there are perceived stunning qualities which attract the lover but which hide what “the mind” may display. Yet some philosophers regard love and all other emotions as without epistemic value and, perhaps further, a hindrance and distraction to any disclosure of the world. As is well known, this is not the position of Husserl and most thinkers connected with phenomenology.

In this regard we may note that Kant regarded love with suspicion in regard to moral agency in so far as it was characterized by *Neigung* (or passive inclination and passion). As such it saps the properly practical or moral will and interferes with rational clarity. As such it cannot be commanded (as in the Bible) because it is not characterized by a will informed by the Ought or obligation made manifest by reason and reflection. Kant’s views clearly side with those who doubt whether an absolutely unselfish love is possible – given the familiar and preponderant force of self-love in human life.

Our primary focus in the discussion in this Part Two will be on the way love, even sexual love, may have in view the essential ipseity, i.e., an individual essence. Thus we will not proceed as if sex is *of necessity* not love or bereft of the capacity to display the essential ipseity. Further we assume much of the background discussion for the phenomenological thesis that feelings and emotions are the way values and disvalues are disclosed and without them there would not be evident the major motivating forces of life.

§15 Love, Empathic Perception and Emotion

Love is an emotion that becomes a stance or position-taking but which itself is founded on the position-taking of empathic perception. It is true of course that because all emotions contain implicit judgments and policies they are not utterly bereft of propositions. Yet the purely epistemic or theoretical position-takings, which empathic perceptions are not, prescind from what we usually regard as emotions, even though intellectual eros is often in play in the life of the mind.
Nevertheless the distinction between a position-taking and an emotion seems useful, especially in so far as typically the position-taking act requires the I to be engaged, whereas emotions may involve the I, but often enough are something the I under-goes. But empathic perception, i.e., the way we presence Others as other self-experi-enccings and persons in the world, itself typically has a kind of automatic quality, i.e., it resembles a perception as a “seeing-as...,” and typically lacks the I-involve-ment of making a distinction, a judgment, a promise, etc. (Determining that the one I am addressing is a person and not a robot would be a case where empathic percep-tion clearly is inseparable from a cognitive I-involving act.) Empathic perception, nevertheless, in spite of this spontaneous framing by way of its recognition of what is in our perceptual field, is a position-taking. It frames for the indefinite future how we are towards this “object” in the world; it also determines ourselves, our habitual-ities, in this matter. Further, as we shall argue, empathic perception is always on the verge of a valuation of respect. Thus the position-taking of empathic perception, i.e., the presencing of the Other as an other self-experiencing, has the seed of love there at the start. This founds and frames the subsequent emotion, and, as burgeon-ing respect, fosters the emotion; but the subsequent emotion, in turn, nurtures the framing empathic position-taking as well as subsequent ones which have to do with being in the world with this person. But love most properly generates position-tak-ings, like promises, which in turn shape the nature and direction of the love for the definite or indefinite future. These subsequent position-takings build a common life and cement the love in a communal epistemic and volitional We. Thus love is a complex emotion because it of necessity, as both an emotion and a position-taking, is not adequately accounted for by either alone and yet each consideration needs the other to supplement the account. Position-takings have already been referred to in Chapter III, §5, but will be thematized in Book 2, Chapter IV.

An emotion values or disvalues “something” or “someone.” Emotions presup-pose this something or someone and in this sense are founded on the cognition or apprehension and categorical display of someone or something. This apprehension brings out basic or founding categorical features. This is not to be thought of as a purely intellectual display which then “founds” in the sense of logically or conceptually justifying the emotions and their display of values. Nor do we have a two-faced object, a “fact” with a more or less externally attached value, e.g., a refrain from Mahler and the laminated value of “hauntingly beautiful.” The world comes to us already soaked with valued things. But nevertheless this one sustained act of, e.g., hearing Mahler, is complex not only because of its temporal synthesis but also because it is made up of founding sensuous experiences which are informed by cognitive acts. This two-in-one as a concentration of the temporal synthesis presences the refrain and it itself is the basis for the feeling or valuing act which presences the quality of “hauntingly beautiful.” The three moments of a valuing, i.e., the valuing as founded upon the apprehension which informs the sensuous experi-ences resulting in this valued thing, are inseparably together in the presentation of most ordinary things in the world. The Swiss army knife is there not only as a gleaming smooth red and silver engineering achievement with eight functions but also it is there inseparably as “compact,” “neat” and “useful.”
The cognitive or apprehending act “founds” in the sense that without this act of displaying something the valuing would hang in the air and make no sense because it would be valuing nothing at all. “Founds” does not mean that the displayed something implies with logical necessity the emotions’ valuing or disvaluing. Nevertheless the emotional response is not a magical creatio ex nihilo of the value qualities, as if just any emotion was applicable to the displayed something or as if there was nothing in the something to motivate the emotion. The transcendental phenomenological view of emotions holds that without the founding, cognitive, “object-giving” acts the emotions are in a certain respect blind and mute. Thus if the term “constituted” has to do with the categorical display of some being, the emotions do not constitute. Yet the view we wish to propound, Husserl’s view, is that the emotions bring to light, let appear, not mere objects that have values but they bring to light the values objects have and as such. If we delight in something there does not only appear that in which we delight (which would appear as it does if there were no delight, but only the founding object-giving cognitive act); but we also have in and through the delight that which delights as delightful or the lovely as lovely, etc.

Thus Husserl urges an analogy between perception as Wahr-nehmung, or taking something in the world in a certain way, and emotion or feeling as Wert-nehmung or bestowing valences, werten, upon what we perceptually take in a certain way; Wertnehmung opens up the new and different dimension of value in the world of perception analogous to the way perception’s categorial display opens up the articulateness of the world. The “dimension of value” cannot without further ado be rendered bereft of ontological status unless we are prepared to separate absolutely “being” from “the good.” Indeed, there might be good reasons to think of the priority of “the good” over “being,” but that topic is beyond our scope here. In any case, “the value dimension” is constituted by the Wertnehmung, even if it is not at the founding level of categorical display of some being.

We said that there is something in the founding minimal categorical display that motivates the emotion. The categorical display by the cognitive apprehension is bound up with the founded emotive display because it itself is within the context or horizon of the person’s life-will. This life-will itself is informed by the person’s sedimented emotions and position-takings which go in advance of the particular emotional display and which constitute the horizon of the person’s life. It is this horizon riding on the life-will that permits things to appear categorially and value-laden in the precise way they do. Think of the well-known example of the Coca-Cola bottle appearing in the African Bush at a time prior to the universal expansion of colonialism. The individual thing is given as within the world and the world is both an epistemic and valuational achievement that stands in correlation with the general life-will. (The general “life-will” will be discussed at length in Book 2.) This life-will, informed by and informing the life-horizon, motivates both the selection of what gets apprehended and how it is displayed as well as the emotions’ informing with value that which the apprehension delineates. The emotion is a fit to the cognitive founding display because this display is not merely a cognitive one but one within the person’s world, which is comprised of both cognitive apprehensions and affective-emotive valuings. The apprehension, die Auffassung, whether
the merely cognitive one or a cognitive one informed by a valuing, is always a part of the apprehension of world; the thing is always contextualized by the larger intentionality of world. As Heidegger taught us, we are always already “attuned” or gestimmt by reason of our being in the world.

Husserl often equates emotions with feelings, in so far as he regards the latter as intentional valuing acts. However, an emotion like love may be contrasted to a “mere feeling,” e.g., of being comfortable and relaxed in a hot tub, where there is no intentional object but only immersion in one’s bodiliness. This raises the question to what extent pain and pleasure themselves are simply “raw feels” or the extent to which they resemble emotions which reflect the historical life-world of the person. Clearly to the extent that they are bereft of an intentional object and therefore of any interpreting act they would seem to be “raw,” and not a reflection of the person’s being in the world with Others.

Thus immersion in one’s bodiliness as in feeling pleasure or pain approaches a raw hyletic datum, i.e., a sensation without any interpretation. Yet we typically distinguish the types of pains and pleasures. Further, they often enough have distinguishing aspects over and above what pleases or what displeases or gives “pain.”

The extent to which pleasures and pains are embedded in the personal life-world is difficult to tease out. We know of “spartan” regimes which belittle what others regard as painful and uncomfortable. We have heard of the ascetical practices where extraordinary capacities for pain tolerance seem to be developed. We all are familiar with the cases, only some of which are context-dependent, where a pleasure verges on or spills into pain (tickling and excessive sexual stimulation) and even pains that verge on or spill into pleasure (masochism). Most important is that there is much pain in the very fear of pain and in the resistance to pain, and this has been learned and can be unlearned. Thus there are bio-feedback and/or meditation techniques which enable us to relax and greet, as well as investigate or embrace, the pain – and these have the power, by overcoming our resistance to and fear of the pain, to transform much of the paining of the pain. Such considerations can move the reflection into the consideration that what pleases and displeases is tied to the personal life-world the person has constituted in the course of her history. We will return to this theme later in this chapter and in Book 2. Let us return to our initial reflections on love as such.

Love, as an emotion is an intentional act, based on an act of “empathic perception” that renders someone “there.” We said the appresented “someone there” bears, or is the substrate for, the emotional affect in the sense of providing a categorical framework, i.e., the personal bodily presence. One does not hate or love something with no delineated features, indeed, “somebody” or at least “some thing” is presupposed. And, as we have insisted, this empathic intention itself heads toward what is beyond the categorical framework. This apprehension of someone is the founding act for the emotion of love – even though empathic perception already burgeons with respect and the seeds of love. In this sense empathic perception is never merely cognitive. For some extraordinary persons that are often referred to as “saints” the presencing of Others in empathic perception, even of strangers in the third-person, may verge on love. (Doestoevski’s *The Idiot* thematizes this.)
It is of interest here to note that Fichte thought of the presence of other persons in the world to involve an immediate recognition of their freedom. This he thought of as an appearing of the Other informed by a determinate concept. The appearing and the concept were necessarily joined and in this (empathic) perception of the Other there was no room for freedom of interpretation. In this respect empathic perception was quite different from the typically ambiguous perceptual situations where there is a latitude for “seeing as…” Of course, even in the perception of other persons there are ambiguities, i.e., we find mannequins, robots, virtual presences, etc. But Fichte’s point is aimed at highlighting Kant’s point that persons are not present as things (Sachen). He goes on to note that if this apperception of the other persons as persons, as free agents, in the world would categorically determine all other properties that our perceptions of persons would elicit, we could not ever want to apply physical force to others. Obviously this is not the case. The presence of Others is suffused with their materiality and this presentation lends to our subsuming persons under the concepts that are proper to physical materiality.33

We may note that there is a subtle complex layering in the value perceptions (such as love) that resemble the subtle complex layering in empathic perception which itself resembles the subtle complex layering of signitive intentionality. In intending words or signs we do not rest in or “posit” with a distinctive thesis or belief-act the sounds or the marks on the page, but rather we “live in,” and move beyond to, the intended sense itself and the sounds or marks are diaphanous or transparent to the sense. Similarly in empathic perception we apprehend the person herself and do not rest or posit with a distinctive thesis the body that is present before us. Rather as we “live in” the sense in listening or reading so we “live in” the presence of the Other in facing the bodily presence of the Other.34 When we value someone or something, we similarly do not rest or posit with a distinctive thesis the categorially displayed entity before us, e.g., the human being or the human person, but rather we live in the person’s value-suffused presence. She is present as, e.g., beautiful or provocative, kind or aggressive, etc. That is, she is present as beautiful, not the quality of beauty is present there attached to a personal substrate.

We want to propose that with love even these qualities enjoy a transparency in favor of the ipseity, even though without the “living in” the bodily presence and personal qualities, there could be no intention of the unique ipseity. Here again we can note that the empathic perception itself already burgeons with this in the form of an elemental “respect.” But more about that soon.

Further a feeling may be something that pleases us but as such it is typically on the periphery of our lives, i.e., our selves, in terms of what matters. By its nature love is always at the center, not margin, of what matters most to us. Love presupposes the empathetic perception of Others, whether they are perceptually present or not. It is well-known and celebrated how love can be kept alive in spite of the perceptual absence of the beloved. “Others” as used here properly refers to persons whom we may loosely consider as self-aware Others. Many of us love non-human Others, e.g., our pets. We will not attend here to the complexity of loving a community or grouping of Others, what Husserl calls a “personality of a higher order.”35

In the course of the general flow of everyday life with its pragmatic exigencies one does not usually permit oneself to enter into the Other’s life. One refrains from
becoming seriously involved in how the present situation is affecting the Other for the same reason, as Aristotle noted, that it is impossible to have many true friends. Rather, through empathic perception, the Other is typically present in an empty way. Indeed right now this stranger here, e.g., the clerk, might well be a nuisance for me and the very fact of her presence in my life might be repugnant for me. Yet, even the person who appears almost exclusively as a nuisance can, with appropriate acts of kindness, etc., be seen as like oneself, e.g., burdened, stressed, etc. Indeed, given that we as persons are immersed in circles of “We,” the move toward the Other in sympathy, benevolence, and even in love is not necessarily an abrupt leap into the absolutely Other. In short, empathy, compassion, sympathy, love, etc. are acts of self-displacing ourselves more deeply into the life of the Other whom empathic perception and our normal intersubjective intercourse has already rendered present but toward whom we keep a distance.

There is no love without some actual, imagined, or mediated empathic perception, but clearly there is empathic perception without sympathy, pity, compassion, and love. Further we may distinguish love from sympathy, pity, and compassion which presuppose empathic perception and where our “heart” goes out to another in such a way that we, as it were, transport or displace ourselves to the stranger’s situation as analogous to our own. Thereby we are enabled, at a distance, to feel what the other feels. Thus we can sympathize with those, e.g., strangers, whom we do not love. But when, e.g., the pitiable circumstance is removed, then it is appropriate that the pity itself discontinue. Similarly love is not benevolence which is an act of will directed at the well-being of others. This can be done without love, as in almsgiving to strangers.

Dostoevski’s Prince Myshkin (in The Idiot) realizes that his pity for a woman whom a friend loves is deeper than the deep self-destructive jealous love the friend has for the lady. In this case, such a profound pity approaches the most exalted heights of love. For the Prince, the young woman suffers deeply from a form of mental disorder, an illness that leads her into destructive games and liaisons. The Prince’s deep pity disposes him to do more for her and to go to greater lengths to aid her than does the love of the friend who is the lover. Yet the Prince would not permit himself to be so implicated in this woman’s life were it not for his pity. It is true, of course, that the Prince is on the verge of loving everyone, i.e., is on the verge of delighting in the ipseity of everyone and in this sense in sharing in their lives, but the distinctive sense of the kind of love which is suffused with eros, where a conjugal life together is the essence, is not in play. If and when the woman would become strong his attention toward her would become less intense. It would also become less intense if the lover’s love would be less mad and possessive.

The distinction comes out in the novel when the Prince is drawn to a young woman in the more classical sense of an erotic love and where there is even talk of marriage. Yet here too the Prince’s profound compassion, deep pity, and, in this sense, exalted love, dominate and inform the relationship. In the Prince’s case, there is a sense that the sheer empathic perception is so on the verge of the love of the ipseity for its own sake, that the personal qualities modulate that deep affection, and nothing seems quite able to destroy it. But it takes on intensity when his acquaintances are unhappy and loses intensity when they are able to get on top of their lives.
As we shall show, love reveres the otherness of the beloved Other, i.e., what makes him a unique essence, and reveals the ownmost depths of the beloved. Thereby it reveals as well possibilities for an ever richer life for the beloved. But it does this in a way pure cognition cannot. For this reason love may be said not merely to have symmetry with the implicit respect of empathic perception but to fulfill it. Empathic perception goes to the Other as Other, and in doing so it does not posit any qualities of the ipseity even though it builds on and presupposes such categorical determination of bodily personal presence; yet it, as such, does not rejoice in the being of the Other. In contrast, it is precisely a feature of love to rejoice in the very existence of the Other.

Because empathic perception is of necessity an empty intention of the ipseity as the Other’s self-experiencing it creates a space for the imagination to fill in this emptiness. But this filling in of the hidden absence may be merely imaginative and in response merely to our own interests or self-indulgence. Empathic perception itself is not an emphatic affirmation of the filled-in as real. Yet we may emphatically affirm what we have imaginatively filled in although, it can turn out that, in fact, greater caution and restraint was called for. In contrast love is precisely the emphatic affirmation of the reality of the lover. In mere empathic intention such an emphatic affirmation is not yet or not ever to be found. Only the ipseities of those we love are fully appreciated and affirmed. Without love they are unaffirmed and lacking the positive attitude of reality. This, we take it, is the gist of the claim by Simone Weil that love is the affirmation of the reality of the Other. As she observes, love has to do essentially with reality. This is why the awakening to the fact that up until now we have been loving only an imaginary being, as in the self-delusion so often in play in “falling in love,” is such a terrible discovery.37

Of course, those who thwart us are really real for us in so far as they confront us, smash our delusions, etc. But as mere obstacles, as hindrances to our projects, they are not really affirmed and celebrated in their own ipseity. They are there merely as negations of our own.

Empathic perception would seem of necessity to involve something like respect and deference for the Other, but these, as present in empathy, are only feebly analogous because in empathy the respect and deference are merely burgeoning, empty, implicit, and passive. This elemental respect of empathy is a recognition of and deference toward the Otherness of the Other which awakens in our freedom a restraint which is not yet the active restraint and valuing of respect and it is even more remote from the active affirmation and celebration of love.38 Spaemann describes respect in its full emergence as it is based on empathy as a renunciation of the drive to control and have power over whatever it is we have to deal with. Instead there is a movement of “letting be” which acknowledges the actuality of another ipseity.39 Love, in turn, builds on and endlessly enriches and magnifies the respect and deference inherent in empathic perception. Clearly although the inherent respect implicit in empathic perception’s presencing of the other is not yet love, it is its necessary condition.

Love is not merely an emphatic affirmation but rather in addition it is a believing affirmation. Belief is relevant here because it is a way we make present what
presently eludes being present in the flesh through a perception. For Husserl even something perceived in a filled, in-the-flesh, intention has a kind of believing, i.e., “doxastic” positing or thesis. But belief proper has to do with empty intentions, i.e., what is perceptually absent, and what we can make present through re-presenting acts (Vergegenwärtigungen, “presentifications”) like inference, imagination, remembering, picturing, hearing a report, etc. The Other, even the “you,” although present bodily in the flesh, nevertheless is presented with an essential absence, namely her first-person experience. The “you” is a “second first-person” made present by analogizing first-person experience. You as yourself for yourself, what you refer to with “I,” is absent to me and thus present through but not reduced to my self-familiarity. You are an “another I” not as a duplication or extension of me but as the miracle of “you,” i.e., one who refers to herself with “I.” You as you are for yourself, i.e., in your first-person experience, are absent to me of necessity and the belief of love is a unique way in which this absence is surmounted.

But it is not belief as a merely cognitive, doxastic act. I do not believe that you are self-present in the way the fresh tracks in the sand lead me to posit that a coyote was here not too long ago. Rather it is more like belief-in, a matter of “the heart.” Believing-in is less cognitive and rather more like a valuing-feeling of trust in regard to someone. It is an act that, of course, presupposes believing-that something is or is the case. For example, my believing in you or trusting you that is generated by my love of you presupposes my believing (-that) you exist and are self-present. But this latter belief is not a distinct doxastic thesis. It is analogous to the way my belief in your innocence presupposes my belief in your existing or that you exist. But, in addition, belief-in counts on and trusts in that in which it believes in spite of the essential absence of evidence.

In contrast, in the case of love the belief is celebratory and emphatically affirming and this is the basis for the belief-in as trusting. Thus love, like belief-in, is a feeling-valuing that believes in what it loves, yet the act of love’s belief-in involves affirmation, celebration and joy in a way that belief-in need not. Here we may follow Leibniz: Amare est gaudere esse alterius. Love is to rejoice in the being of the Other. The motion of desire that often is part of love, especially erotic love, presupposes this primary doxastic, celebratory delight in the actuality or being of the Other because desire, we shall see, aspires to union. Love, of course, desires the bodily proximity as the occasion for the presencing of the other ipseity, but doubtless it is capable of sustaining itself in the absence of this bodily proximity in the way erotic love cannot. Nevertheless to the extent that the love requires communion with the Other some mediating forms through which the Other is made present are necessary. A love without communion is impossible and to the extent the communion requires some form of bodily proximity a love without some form of bodily proximity is impossible.

This peculiar celebration and affirmation that love is appears fundamentally contradictory because it is inseparable from a belief-in that which is essentially absent and elusive. Here the belief might seem to be a postulation for what might not be there and the whole description based on nothing. If indeed the sought-for something refers to something present in a filled intention, and thus something in
the flesh with properties, then indeed love is based on nothing. But consider again what is at stake. The beloved ipseity, like the “myself” of the lover, is not present in a filled intention, in the flesh with properties, but rather transcends what is present in the flesh with properties, but she still is present in and through what is present in the flesh with properties. Yet unlike the “myself” of the lover, the beloved is not non-reflexively, non-intentionally present, but present precisely only through the complex intentional act of love. Already with empathic perception we present in an intentional act non-ascriptively what is non-sortal; love is the celebratory delight in and affirmation of this. But we are calling this a belief-in because the other ipseity and self-experiencing remains absent for us as an essential transcendent abyss. But that density of meaning and transcendent pole of our affections is no more a postulation than is the meaning of a word a postulation on top of the physical marks or sounds that make up the word, or my experience of your pain in your grimace an inference or lamination on top of the perception of your bodily expression. Of course it does not have the apodictic inerrancy of the “myself” but that is in part what love celebrates. Vive la différence! Vive l’abime! It is the other side of the discovery of oneself as a unique essence, the unique taste of oneself, that Hopkins evokes for us (see above, Chapter III, §2).

All of these acts, i.e., of affirmation, belief, joy, celebration, delight, which have their proper sense elsewhere and which we are using analogously to tease out love, may be thought of as ephemeral emotions or disclosures of what is of ephemeral value. The valuing acts of admiration or delighting in someone (neither of which is the equivalent of love), an admiration or delight founded in the person’s special qualities, presuppose the life-will’s establishing a horizon which enables these particular features which I value to be highlighted in this particular way. They reflect the person I have constituted myself to be. When these features are no longer present in the esteemed person, or when it turns out that I was wrong in my estimation of the person’s character, these emotions or valuings themselves are cancelled or nullified. If not, I may be rightfully questioned about why I honor what is dishonorable, admire what is commonplace, etc.

With love the matter stands differently. Although love is an emotion it is not ephemeral and rather resembles more a disposition, even a virtue. Indeed, as we have urged, it has aspects which enable us to think of it as a stance or “position-taking” act resembling in kind a decision. A decision is not a mere inclination or desire, however much these may be moving forces in the decision. Nor is it merely the fulfillment of the desire in the “possession” and “enjoyment” of the beloved. Thus Husserl once stated that it can be understood as “absolutely deciding for the Other.” The lover decides for the beloved and ultimately “in her beauty.”41 (We will soon pause over what “in her beauty” might mean.)

Positive emotions, like delighting, venerating, honoring, finding charming, finding sexy, etc., correlate to value-qualities which they constitute. Thus, for example, the feeling-valuing called esteeming correlates with and constitutes the value quality of some form of excellence. These forms of excellence, these qualities, may come and go; if they go, so also does the valuing, e.g., the esteeming. Even if they persist as features of someone or something, they need not be always highlighted in someone’s
being related to this someone or something. Love is different from such emotions in that love frames all the other qualities the beloved has because, we will argue, it aims at the person himself as transcendent to the displayed manifold of qualities or properties. Our central thesis is that love’s primary intentional target is another person’s ipseity or her “myself,” not these properties. Love not only aims at the other ipseity but is a belief in, celebration of, and rejoicing in the other ipseity.

We could say that the target is the other person herself. However, in this work “person” has to do with how the ipseity is made distinctively present and identified through the numerous properties; person is how the unique ipseity is incarnately present, i.e., the unique personal presence, personality, and character. The ipseity in this sense transcends the person, even though we never make present the ipseity apart from the person. Yet to love the ipseity as beyond the personal properties does not mean we may dispense with this propertied ipseity, i.e., the ipseity as incarnated and “personified.” Even though the beloved is aware of herself as herself without being aware of herself as anything except herself, this awareness of herself, if it does not include third-person characteristics and token-reflexive free descriptions of her person, does not do justice to who she is as this person in the world. Loving only this “herself as herself bereft of anything but herself” would face the epistemological problem of how the beloved would ever be presenced for the lover, but further it would be to not love this ipseity as she is concretely for herself, e.g., as a human person in the world with others. In so far as love opens us up to the ipseity of the Other, the absolute deciding for the Other means we are opened up to her in her center or core, i.e., as she is most properly for herself without being aware of herself as anything except herself. This means we are opened up to her “myself” and “I myself.” But this token reflexive-free and third-person free self-presence surely is not the whole story of how she is for herself. Therefore love requires that we are, or aspire to be, attuned to her “ownmost” as it reveals itself to her not only in her token reflexive and non-reflexive first-person self-awareness, but also how she is for herself in her self-reflection and self-having. This means we are open not only to what is uppermost on her mind and what weighs most heavily on her heart, but we are attuned to her I-can, her horizon of possibilities. This would mean that we would be sensitive to what obstacles would lie in the way of her actualizing her potentialities. Love would therefore be a form of making-room for the beloved to be her truest self. (These are all central themes to which we will have occasion to return.)

In sum: love, as an emotion builds on the empathic perceptual-epistemic achievement by which someone is present. This foundational knowing is the placeholder for all esteeming-valuing acts directed to the person. When achieved without love, it is relatively empty compared to the richness revealed by other emotions, foremost love.

§16 Does Love Aim at Union with the Other?

Love is revelation of the Other through affirming actively and joyfully the reality of what remains essentially absent to us in our presencing of others, i.e., their self-being, the actuality of their self-awareness, the reality of the other ipseity for her-
self. Here “revelation” is not cognitive disclosure but a disclosure inseparable from this distinctive emotion that involves a distinctive belief and rejoicing in the reality of the Other. This view of love involving an essential absence stands in tension with a familiar notion of love, namely that it is both the recognition of an already existing unity with the beloved (e.g., as the other half of one’s soul, as one’s destiny predetermined by fate, etc.). It also conflicts with the view that love is the desire to be more intimately and completely united to the beloved. In what follows we will see that in human love the feature of union is less basic than the “wonder” of the presence of the Other. The other familiar view might well be of utmost importance for a metaphysical or theological theory which holds that the ipseity partakes in an essential way in the divine. Such a theory might hold that this partaking in the divine from which one is separated is the source of all longing for whatever is in the world, including persons. And this worldly longing itself may be envisaged as a refraction of the longing to be one with the divine in a “filled intention” that is impossible to imagine or conceive.43 We postpone until later such theological speculations. Rather in what immediately follows we will attempt to address the sense in which one aims at the union with the Other apart from this speculative framework.

The other ipseity, as pervaded by the rejoiced in and believed in self-presence—a self-presence that separates us by an unbridgeable abyss—awakens in us a contemplative delight that gives birth to a variety of modes of intentionality, e.g., devotion, reverence, passionate desire, self-abnegation, etc. Through love, the essentially secret self-presence is not merely “there” but is revealed as containing unsearchable riches which call forth in the lover an incomparable response. This is a way to understand Husserl’s description of love as requiring an absolute decision for the beloved “in her beauty.” If our main thesis is correct, everyone has this secret inexhaustible depth of unique essence; but it shows itself evidently with the appropriate splendor only in love.

McTaggart, in his excellent discussion of love, claims that “love is an emotion that springs from a sense of union with another self.”44 This “sense of union” is the beginning of love, even if it is not required. The union thus appears as an already existing state of affairs and this may be thought of as the source of the contemplative delight in the sheer existence of the Other. (This echoes Plotinus’ view of love awakening the memory of our prior existence as essentially inseparable from the divine intellect [Nous].) But love’s “sense of union” also allegedly anticipates a deeper union where there is a more direct knowledge of the beloved that is free of all mediation and concealment. This striven-for deeper union would occur when the lover would know the beloved as the beloved knows himself. McTaggart envisages as a goal in his metaphysical Heaven, or “the absolute reality,” a kind of presencing of the Other that dispenses with empathic perception.

McTaggart quotes Swinburne to make a point to which we will return in Chapter IV, §2 in Book 2, namely, that we are essentially inadequate to ourselves. Swinburne speaks of the lovers’ desire as their “doom and blessing.”

To desire, and have always above
A possession beyond their possessing,
A love beyond reach of their love.45
McTaggart’s position on the telos of the love “beyond reach of their love” and a “possession beyond their possessing” does not mean that I, as a lover, want to know you, my beloved, in my non-reflective self-awareness or be known by you in your non-reflective self-awareness. First of all, he does not recognize any such self-awareness. For McTaggart, we know ourselves only reflectively through what Husserl would, on occasion, call an inner perception. Secondly, McTaggart envisions the goal of the lovers to be a relationship which approximates a knowledge by me of the Other’s states that is as intimate as the Other’s reflective knowledge of her states. For McTaggart this does not result in an identity of lover and beloved because such would be “suicide.” Rather the lover will know the beloved as he knows himself, i.e., self-reflectively or in inner perception. For McTaggart this perception is not a “cognition” mediated by sensa and properties but rather is apart from sensa and properties. Love of the Other in the absolute reality, his metaphysical heaven, would be a love absolutely apart from the Other’s qualities.

McTaggart perhaps implicitly recognizes that if the other were indeed known as I know myself in my non-reflective self-awareness love, as involving distinct ipseities, would be impossible. He, however, fails to recognize that even if I know the Other reflectively as my stream of consciousness, the Other would be pervaded by the “ownness” which is mine and I myself, and would thus indeed be part of my stream of consciousness or be I myself. Nevertheless his efforts to describe the union aimed at and achieved by love are food for thought. They may be compared with Aristotle’s attempt to characterize the ideal intimacy of the most noble friendship as a kind of common consciousness through a common life which, nevertheless keeps distinct the individual consciousnesses.

McTaggart describes the aspired-to bond to be one of maximal strength and intimacy. For him love is not merely the revelation of the Other in herself but rather he thinks that eo ipso the consciousness of this bond of unity with the Other is love, whether the relations and qualities which factually were operative in bringing it about are in play or not. (We will return to this last point in the next section. Indeed, whether these relations and qualities are known or unknown, vital or trivial, is insignificant.) McTaggart helps us see the distinction between how in love we intend persons in ways that appreciatively dwell on their properties, and how we, nevertheless, in so far as we are intending persons, go beyond the properties and thereby ineluctably have not merely an epistemic attitude but in addition an attitude of respect. In the course of this discussion he brings to light the distinctive intention of love. This latter does not eliminate the respect and the essential distance. His position appreciates that love’s union cannot eliminate the absolute immanence and inwardness of the ipseities. But the unique intentionality of love has a clarity regarding both the absolute transcendence and unbridgeable inwardness and that there is a bond of inwardnesses. When this is reciprocated we may speak of a communion of inwardnesses. Indeed, as we shall see, in sexual love, there is the effort to “commingle” the inwardnesses.

Love is always amazing because that one who in her unique splendid essence is not in the world, freely deigns to enter my life and unite herself to me. Yet whereas
the beloved’s gracious gesture toward the lover is her doing, the splendor and beauty themselves of the beloved are not of her doing. Dante brings this out repeatedly when he speaks of the humility of Beatrice and of the grace (gentil, gentile) that attends every aspect of her presence. And this humility and grace create in the ones beholding them a similar humility and grace. “Love and the gracious heart are a single thing.../ one can no more be without the other than the reasoning mind without its reason.” In the lover of such splendid beauty, who, of necessity, is or becomes a poet, there comes forth the need to sing the praises of the beloved so that all mankind would fall in love with the beloved.48

And even if the love is not requited, indeed if this reciprocity is out of the question, love reveals itself as capable of bringing to light the unique essence’s radiance and splendor even though the lover is willing to adore the beloved forever from afar. The awareness of the bond of unity with the Other here takes the form of centering and defining the loving person’s life; the unity is not dependent on physical proximity or even acknowledgement; it is purely intentional. Here Aristotle, the mystics, and the lyric poetic tradition are united in their testimony. (We return to this theme of radiance and splendor below in Book 1, Chapter VI, §7 and Book 2, Chapter V, §3.)

Nevertheless, love at its beginnings, begins typically as a desire with adumbrations of a possible unity of some kind. Can we further account for why it is regarded as the most exalted of life’s blessings?

If we may assume that life involves a tacit self-affirmation and self-love (see Book 2 Chapter V, §6), the prospect of another entering one’s life is the prospect of what at first appears to be impossible, i.e., the unity with what is another inwardness and what is essentially and insurmountably transcendent. Unrequited love may content itself not with the prospect of unity but with revering the splendid radiance of the insurmountably transcendent Other. But typically a prospect of union is nurtured which is a prospect of the richness of one’s own life, which is ineluctably transcendentally “affirmed” and “loved,” being transcendently affirmed and loved in a free gracious way. It is a prospect of one’s own lived life being doubled in richness. This prospect of the indwelling of the Other in one’s life and one’s own partaking in the life of the Other is not the prospect of a loss of identity but rather the promise, whether ever realized or not, of an enrichment which, at the moment of promise, is pervaded by a rich portentous ambiguity as to the nature of the promised enrichment.

Perhaps the most basic requirement for insight into the wonder of the union of love is the appreciation of one’s being as a being given to oneself as oneself. The wonder at the unmerited grace of being and being what and who one is reverberates in the wonder at the possibility of my giving myself to another and another giving himself to me. The odd gift, grace, or chance of being and being free and the odd gift, grace, or chance of I myself being I myself is echoed in the gift of myself to another and of another to myself.

This unity brought about by giving oneself is called intimacy because the Other is not merely the absolute non-accessible abyss, but by reason of his freely making himself available and vulnerable to the lover’s will. But the wonder of the intimacy and union is inseparable from the wonder of the other transcendent unique ipseity.
The complex wonder of love is thus inseparable from one’s absolute deciding for the Other and the Other for me. Such an absolute deciding means that one embarks on an adventure where there is no reservation, a free-fall trust, a dismantling of one’s defenses, etc. This means that love is inseparably a making oneself vulnerable in a way that no other relationship does. But in the full maturity of love this happens in such a way that one is so trusting that the notion of risk recedes. The Other’s capacity to have power over oneself is itself not a theme, even if it is undeniably an implicit possibility. Love here is conjoined with a kind of self-abandonment and self-donation and approaches a state of unconditionality. This enrichment of the self through selflessness provides it with its incomparable joy and pleasure. And yet risk is always marginalized, i.e., it is always a potential theme, and love is always in the proximity of danger, and thus love is frequently also incomparably thrilling. The danger is not only one of idolatry but also of the most nightmarish treachery and betrayal.

Although risk and danger accompany all forms of love they are notorious in the case of the intimacy of sexual love. In the form of love that we call “being in love” there is an encompassing enthrallment that may occur quite suddenly. When it becomes suffused with erotic love, which appears to be inevitable, it has the unique property of enabling the transcendent ipseity of the Other to be pervasively present throughout the Other’s bodily presence. Sex here, as inseparable from gender, may well be nothing essentially specific and such essential specification may be dissipated when we are confronted with the endless details of erotic life by comparative cultural studies. Indeed, it may rather be best thought of a product of our individual and cultural imagination creatively reworking in a particular instance something like a literary genre that has been handed down to us. What does seem essential is that in erotic love, and especially in “being-in-love,” the transcendent ipseity is loved precisely in loving the beloved’s body, and this, of course, distinguishes erotic love from other forms of love. Lust may indeed involve an abstraction from or repression of the ipseity, but “being in love” involves loving the Other in every aspect of her or his body, and, indeed, of his or her life. One simply loves everything “about” the beloved. Loving the body and its properties is loving the transcendent ipseity. The Other’s inwardness irradiates outwards to the totality of the body and one loves the Other in loving the body.

In sexual love spirit/soul or unique ipseity penetrates and suffuses the body in a way that does not characterize non-sexual love relations. Indeed, other forms of love and friendship are marked off precisely as not involving expressions where love is through such a love of the body. Their distinctive quality is such as to have integrity without this love of the body. As Ortega y Gasset puts it, the erotic attraction “that a woman produces in a man is not… aroused by the feminine body as body; rather we desire a woman because her body is a soul.” We take this to mean that the ipseity is inseparably the body and the splendor of the ipseity is the radiance of the body.

But even in sexual “being-in-love” the love intends the unique ipseity which properly transcends all properties. Yet the love is directed at the unique ipseity as irradiated throughout the body. In this respect gendered sexual embodiment is the
condition for the possibility for the distinctive kind of love we find in sexual being in love. What gendered sexual attraction in this case means is precisely how another transcendent ipseity appears immediately throughout his or her bodiliness. That this love, as a form of love, and therefore something enduring, intends the transcendent ipseity is indicated by two considerations. In its initial stages of being “helplessly in love,” although the beloved’s body is radiant with the ipseity and for this reason desired, there is a hesitation to enter into the explicitly sexual ritual, for fear of breaking the spell. Analogous to a sacrilege, the explicit sexual ritual approaches desecrating the charm that the ipseity irradiates throughout the beloved’s body. Whereas we are deferential to the bodiliness of our dearest friends and even strangers, this deference is to be distinguished from that reverence of the lovers, especially in the early moments of their state of fascination.

Secondly, after the passion has climaxed there is the phenomenon known as post coitum triste (or tristitia) est. Of course the merits of this precise articulation of the aftermath, post coitum, may be challenged in terms of whether it is indeed a sadness (triste, tristitia). Indeed, tenderness (tenere or teneritas) is typically no less in evidence. In any case, now the Other’s transcendence reinstates itself as transcendent to the embodiment and properties, and it is less diffusely immanent throughout the entire body. As the ecstatic unity of the ipseities through the contact of their bodies recedes the lovers are present to one another through the opacity of the flesh. Prior to the coitus the beloved’s body was suffused with the ipseity, now, post coitum, the absolute transcendence of the other’s ipseity is mediated by the opacity of the flesh. Thus there is reawakened the sense of the infinite abyss that separates them. In short, the lovers return to a “normal” or everyday mode of making one another present. Perhaps this return accounts for the exquisite emotional pitch which blends the tristitia and teneritas.

Another consideration is that in the intimacy of sexual love there is the Ineinander or commingling of “flesh.” We may think of “flesh” in eros, as contrasted with a butcher shop, as especially bound up with the tactile display. Flesh contrasts with a touching wherein there is contact with a touched which itself appears as non-conscious or non-sentient, e.g., touching a slab of suspended meat or a stone. In flesh there is a touching which touches a touched which is itself a touching. This obviously takes place when my right index finger touches my left index finger, which as touched is also a “touched-touching” because it is on the verge of becoming the touching by the left index finger of the right index finger. But in the commingling of “flesh,” especially in sexual love, the touched is also of an Other who otherwise is not immediately perceived to be a touched-touching, as in my left index finger touching my right one, but “apperceived” to be such. Even though there is not the immediate perception of the Other as a touched-touching, in the case of touching, e.g., the Other’s index finger, there is here a stark contrast to the stone and yet also a contrast to touching oneself. Here in touching the Other there is the apperception of another as a touched who is also a touching, and yet separated from one’s own touching and touched-touching by an infinite abyss.
The caresses in sexual love have the feature that the clear distinctions between the touching and the touched, as well as the ownness of the touching and touched merge in such a way that there is a commingling, however short-lived, of the inwardnesses. In the sexual touching of the Other there is a well-known “chemistry,” “electricity,” or “spark.” We suggest that this is because of the amazing likeness and difference to the touched touching of one’s own flesh: The Other is touched but the touched is a touching which is both I and the Other. Apart from the comfort and pleasure that can be afforded by flesh’s contact with flesh (cf. the soothing power of a massage from even a stranger or even in, e.g., massaging oneself), the distinctive excitement of the sexual touching lies in the apperception that the unique ipseity is immanent in the touched touching, even though this immanence, although approaching the immediacy of touching a touched-touching as in one’s own case, does not surmount the infinite distance. In spite of the intimacy or fusion of sensibilities, one is touching, and being touched by, an Other. The short-livedness of the phenomenon of post coitum bring this home especially.

The other ipseity whose presence “commands” respect and infinite distance, and who is not capable of being something in the world, freely, in the commingling of the flesh, makes himself something vulnerable in the world at the disposal of our freedom. The trans-ascendence of the ipseity to its fleshly involvement is here willingly becomes a de-scendence by the embrace and the caress, or even in the handshake. In the embrace one’s touching and touched-touching becomes entwined with the Other’s. He submits to our power and freedom in order to pledge his trust in our power and to give to us the power to give back to him the appropriate veneration and respect. Often enough this submission of his occurs at the same time as, or shortly after, one’s own submission to him.

We call an aspect of this commingling “caressing.” With Levinas we may say of the caress that it is a movement into the essentially invisible where there is no perspective or anything to be grasped, i.e., it moves toward the absolutely propertyless ipseity. In this sense the secret it strives to reveal does not amount to a decisive revelation of something hidden, i.e., something that could be brought into the light like a hidden aspect of a body in space or disclosed in the form of a proposition. Rather the caress of “love-making” is animated by the continuance of the desire moving it and sustained by the dance of “suffering without suffering,” i.e., an exquisite undergoing of pleasure that borders on pain and a pain that verges on pleasure. At the same time, because the Other has entrusted herself to us and our power, and suffers this exquisite pain verging on pleasure and pleasure verging on pain there is appropriately, on the side of the lover, a compassion toward the frailty and vulnerability of the ipseity present in the fleshly commingling.

Of course, contact with the Other who despises me or whom I despise may provoke revulsion. Forced intimacy with such an ipseity commingles a transcendence with one’s “retroscendence” or transcendence in immanence that one wants to disentangle. Of course the repugnance may arise merely from the filth and odor of the Other’s body. Yet even here the prospect of the immanent commingling of the
transcendent ipseities can magically transfigure even this setting that normally would be regarded as ugly.

Sexual love is often on the edge of violence in so far as this trust in making oneself vulnerable makes possible the subordination and submission of one ipseity to another. The motor of this submission is to be found in how one’s own touching a touched-touching aspires to become immediately one with the Other’s touching a touched-touching. In the dance of eros, each is frail not only because the desire may tip into the direction of subordination and violence, but also because the moment of desire and its pleasure involves each’s being wholly dependent on the Other’s attentiveness, an attentiveness that patiently suffers the Other’s attention and patiently attends the Other’s suffering. This requires a selflessness and self-displacement whereby each is merged with the flesh of the Other.

A sense of “the love beyond the reach of their love” may be tied to the short-livedness of the reach of the joy of intimacy. The pleasure of one’s own touching a touched-touching is inseparable from the pleasure of being the touched touching of the other’s touching. Sexual intimacy is the mutual welcoming of the interiority of the mutually apperceived essential exteriority. Here each’s touching is an apperceived touched-touching – but of what remains essentially beyond reach and insurmountably the Other. In sexual intimacy the boundaries of ownness are no longer clearly distinct – and yet part of the wonder of it all is that they are never absolutely dissolved. As Levinas has put it, although there is a coinciding of the lover and beloved, this intimacy or voluptuosity “is charged by their duality.” In sexual intimacy, the lived non-objective ipseity, the “subject,” is revealed to himself as “the self of another and not only the self of himself.”51 I take this to mean that the commingling is more than the loving apperception which is utterly bereft of a reification, but which indeed appreciates the Other in her non-objectifiability. Rather there is a momentary unparalleled intermingling of the subjectivities where one’s subjectivity is bound up with the Other’s and the Other’s with one’s own. In short, there is a sense of “we” and “us” that is not mediated by visual perception or position-taking acts which establish the “we” for the indefinite future. The “we” of intense intimate union is, in the absence of the “we” of genuine community, dramatically ephemeral, and subsequent to its climax and in contrast to the prior intensity, the return to “normalcy” bears but an echo of it and a sense that it is almost as if it had never been.

This last consideration suggests that another sense of “the love beyond the reach of their love” is precisely the way the Other, with whom one aspires to a unity, is present across an abyss of transcendence and exteriority that can never be bridged. Love is what heads toward the Other as beyond all properties and who, as such, eludes all conceptual knowing and erotic probing through the caress. Love transforms the bodily presence of the beloved into a “cipher” of an essential transcendence which infinitely eludes one’s efforts to comprehend and have charge over her. (We will soon turn to this theme.)

The interpretation that the telos of love is that lovers’ share in the non-reflective self-awareness, seems on occasion that to which McTaggart is inclined even though it also is an implication he wants to avoid because it would be the death of the otherness which is the condition for love. Even in the heavenly realm of the McTaggartian absolute
where we know Others as we know ourselves we would never have first-person experiences of each other’s first-person experiences! And thus even in the McTaggartian heavenly absolute realm the tantalizing absence of the other would persist and the sense of a union would still be such as require the essential absence and thus generate the emotion of love which strives to overcome the essential absence.

What brings love about and what the lovers want in their wanting another love transcendent to their own love has earlier been connected to the amazement at sheer existence and amazement that we are who we are. Although such wonder does not “explain” anything, it is perhaps of philosophical importance. It seems to be something like what we, following Jankélévitch, will call in connection with our discussion (in Book 2) of death the “I know not what” and “mystery.” And perhaps, as many, especially in the Platonic tradition, have thought, what love wants essentially transcends the love of the lovers and that this love is only a springboard for this self-transcending. Most of us celebrate love in at least some of its forms, even if we do not honor it as a god as did some ancients. And most of us gratefully acknowledge that we have experienced love and its pull to something beyond, but the appropriate articulation of love and what it reveals is elusive, and this for essential reasons: the non-sortal or non-propertied presence of the other “myself” known in and through the properties and the essential absence or secret of the Other’s self-presence.

The first moment of love’s delight and complacency is toward this unbridgeable secret which itself is revealed as an essential secret. This is what is first of all what love reveals and delights in – in contrast to empathic perfection which merely establishes its factuality. Because of the unbridgeable transcendence and essential secret the lover awaits the grace of the beloved’s revelation and invitation to participate in her life. Doubtless love can surface as a mere delight in the essential secret and complacency in this immediate presence of what cannot be experienced. But by reason of the hiddenness of the unique essence as well as by reason of its being incarnated and personified, love awaits the further revelation and the invitation to participate in the beloved’s life. Eventually this can take the form of a resolve or an absolute decision for the Other. The lover vows to live with the Other and live a life in the life of the Other. This movement toward the Other, this decision for the Other, as who is present through and beyond all her properties is itself only the second step in the movement of love, the first being the delight in the presence of the essential secret. The beloved, after all is precisely a person in the world. The beloved as I-source of a life has a life in the world with Others. In loving her I must love her life. My enthrallment pulls me into her herself – where I cannot gain access because of the essential otherness. But she is an incarnate personal ipseity and thus has a life in the world with Others. The original moment of love as complacent delight and enthrallment is not renounced, but is subsumed in life’s activity and projects. Thus in the course of the life of love there is often enough silent union and communion but no less often there is conversation and communication about the world the lovers have in common.

In love, living my life is living with and in the life of the Other and the Other’s life is her’s and, if reciprocated, her life is also that of mine. In love the Other’s life
becomes fused with the horizon of the totality of my life. She is there in my life-horizon as I am there for myself, and thus she is there in the presence of all that affects me and all that I am busy with. The Other is “present” to me in a way analogous to how I myself am present to myself implicitly in my retention of my past. As my past is always “present” to me in retention so the beloved is habitually horizontally present. Of course she is present not merely as a retained habit. Rather in love the totality of my future life-will is conjoined with the beloved. Every approaching event is framed by her presence.

Love is not merely something that happens when another person occasionally enters into my life. Rather it is a case of my living, indeed, ex-sisting, in the Other and bearing the Other in myself, in my life, in a completely concrete way. In love, the ipseity is defined by a habitual willing of the Other and an ex-sisting in her willing. If the love is reciprocal we may speak of the life and projects of the willing, and the willing itself as ours.

Thus in loving, “my life” is ours and in my living we live. Each of course does not replace the ownness of the Other, for she is “present” only on the basis of empathic perceiving and the modification of this empathic perception which love is. However, in so far as possible, there is a voluntary union of wills which constitutes common goals and goods. My life is thoroughly with the Other, for the Other, and in opposition to the Other, as we sort out our differences and conflicts, e.g., where one or both of us “forgets herself,” “is not herself,” where one of us simply “cannot go along” or “get along” with the Other.

Love as the unique revelation of the other can never be collapsed into the necessity of need. Although lovers may speak of their necessity for one another, how each is the other half of one’s soul, how the life in common is such that each may say that life is impossible without the Other, etc., nevertheless, the identity that is bound up with the Other is such that the integrity of the individuals is kept in tact. The “We” never replaces or obliterates the “I’s” because love creates a unity which is sustained incessantly “from below” by the wonder, desire and celebration of each for each. It is sustained also by a pursuit of the common good which is precisely a good wherein each’s good is realized and wherein the common agency towards this good involves the mutual participation in and honoring of the Other’s agency.

When sheer need prevails the unique We of love gives way to a bond where the one partner exists to supply the deficiencies in the life of the Other. One of the partners becomes a vital function for the Other. Doubtless this inevitably happens in terms of one’s bodiliness in the event of illness, old age, accidents, etc. The challenge is for the invalid partner to foster an atmosphere where the healthy partner does not become simply this function. Here for lovers the challenges are extraordinary. It is hard to say which is the greater challenge: For the needy suffering partner both to adjust to not being an equal and to permit the lover to take care of her or for the healthy partner both to see beyond the declining, increasingly invisible bodily presence of the unique person to the ipseity and create a new kind of life together where there is a redefinition of the partnership. In any case, when through the surds of life one of the partners becomes totally dependent on the other, the evidence for the
equality of the infinite value of the ipseities that love presupposes can be sustained only through a love borne by an increasingly pure faith in the reality of the Other.

Here we may return to our earlier meditation on “the love beyond the reach of their love.” Does this really mean, as McTaggart thinks it does, that I want to know you as I know myself, as when I am an Other to myself in my acts of self-knowledge through reflection, recollection, etc.? This latter is approximated between old friends, e.g., where each knows what the friend is going to say before he says it, where each is thinking the same as the Other, and this for a great part of the waking life. Here one’s life-habits and the patterns of one’s stream of consciousness are similar to those of the friend. Further the friend’s love is such that there is an identification of wills and projects. Yet in these cases there is a “we” arising from distinct streams of uniquely individual consciousnesses; there is neither the momentary commingling of touched-touchings, nor any evidence of there being but one stream of consciousness in spite of the mutuality of minds and hearts. This therefore contrasts sharply with a theory of the unity of love whose exemplar is my knowledge of myself.

Clearly in love each’s own life is doubled, enhanced by the life and love of the Other. Because love is this ecstatic living in the live of the other, it is a kind of absorption, a being-entranced, in a life which is our life. This happens especially if it is reciprocated so that what I will is what the Other wills and what she wills is precisely what I will. This absorption and identification of the lover with the beloved and the life together is brought out in death and divorce where, with the death or absence of the beloved, one’s own life appears as a one of the living dead. Of course it is an exaggeration to say that in love one’s life has been annihilated because not only is there the ineluctable ownness of one’s ipseity but also there remains duties toward Others which one may not renounce.53

In sum, love reveals how love is beyond the qualities or properties of the Other and aims at the other ipseity’s life. The act of love does not rest in the qualities of the Other but goes through the qualities to the Other’s life because the Other does not remain a person whose qualities are to be contemplated, esteemed, etc., a person present in the third- or second-person. The You of course persists but it is taken up into a We, and this transforms the sense of You as given in the second-person or even You as a “second-first-person.”

This directedness toward the Other’s life comes out in Husserl’s thoughts on love. Husserl does not thematize the propertylessness of what love’s intention aims at. Yet we have earlier shown that the I as transcendental I-pole is non-ascriptively lived and that which or whom empathic perception reveals is the Other I as living herself immediately and non-ascriptively as I. But in Husserl’s description of love as living in the life of the beloved there is no discussion of a contemplative resting in the beloved as transcendent to her qualities. Rather love is considered as ecstatically propelling the lover into the being and life of the Other and as establishing a co-subjectivity, a common life for a We. In love there is a living of one’s own life in the life of the Other, bearing the Other in one’s life as one’s own life just as I bear within my own life my own life-horizon. Love thus is a personal being with-one-another and living with-one-another within the horizon of a total common life.54
As the subject is non-ascriptively present to herself, so the life of loving is non-ascriptive in the sense that it is not a dwelling on the characteristics but is an ecstatic living in the newly constituted co-subjectivity. This in turn, when a matter of reciprocity, is a doubling of the life of each and even a doubling of this doubling because the “we” is not a summing of the I’s.55

Yet even if Husserl’s accounts of love leave out the moments of contemplative delight and celebration in the Other’s presence, this is no reason for us to consider these moments of no importance, but they are that which nourish and sustain this common life.

Let us look at the non-ascriptive presence of the Other in love through some other considerations.

§17 Love Is Not in Respect of the Qualities of the Other

“The mystery of the other’s ipseity” is already our theme here when we state, following McTaggart, that love is directed at the other’s unique ipseity, not in respect of any of the characteristics the person might have. Although it is true that empathic perception brings to light the other “I myself,” whom we refer to with “you” and “he” or “she,” and therefore is a manner of non-ascriptive reference, love goes further and presences the beloved’s ipseity in a unique affirmation which celebrates her as resplendent in herself and as transcendent to all ascriptions.

Recall that for Aristotle friendship in its ideal form is founded on the good character of the friends. Although Aristotle thinks of this as a life in common, and he thinks of this life as a form of sharing in the consciousness, and even the reflective self-consciousness of the other, nevertheless its foundation is the good character of the friend. Therefore when the friend no longer displays these excellent qualities, the friendship dissolves. When the friend witnesses the friend’s moral decline, reason and one’s friends exhort the friend to cease befriending and break off the friendship. The deeper argument for Aristotle seems to be that the no-longer-virtuous friend is no longer truly himself precisely because he no longer loves his better self, i.e., his intellectual part; rather he is alienated from himself, and therefore is no longer “what he is in himself.” One cannot be a friend, i.e., share a life in common, with one who has given up the condition of having anything in common with himself and who has, in fact, repudiated himself.56

Even if this were a voluntary self-alienation it highlights the consideration that love has come to mean, certainly after Christ, something other than befriending. And it becomes a peculiarly pressing question for the Aristotelian whether one would or should befriend the one-time friend who has involuntarily been estranged from himself, e.g., through mental illness. Here again, the distinction between befriending and love presses upon us. That is, one wants to say that given that certain qualities are the conditions for friendship, when they vanish, so does the befriending.

Although Aristotle singles out the special form of friendship where friends are bound together by reason of an appreciation of their excellent qualities this also is
described as a loving of the other for his own sake. Aristotle’s expression of loving
or befriending someone for kath’auto is translatable both as “what he is in him-
self,” as well as befriending him in regard to what he is “in virtue of himself.” Is
loving (or befriending) that which someone is in virtue of himself the same as lov-
ing what the other most truly is, or is loving someone in virtue of himself the same
as loving someone in virtue of who he most truly is? If one’s excellences are what
one becomes by reason of one’s essential perfection and if these excellences make
transparent this essence, then do we love the person in loving these excellences? Do
the excellent properties render not merely a basis for admiration of what the person
has accomplished but in a special way who the person is?
To answer this we must anticipate Book 2. What Aristotle has called our
attention to is fundamental: The beauty of persons comes forth in the display of
beautiful and admirable qualities. Through these one is able to love the person
“in virtue of herself” not merely the qualities. The beloved ipseity is inseparable
from the loved and admired qualities. But in the befriended ipseity the qualities
are necessary conditions for the affection for the friend which is a love (proper
to friendship) “in virtue of herself.” Our proposal is that in love proper, i.e., not
in the case of Aristotle’s “befriending love,” the qualities are appreciated more
precisely as qualities of the beloved and it is the love “in virtue of herself” that
enables us to appreciate the qualities the way we do. Yet in each case, i.e., of
love and befriending, the affection targets the person “in virtue of herself.” We
want to dwell briefly on this.
Aristotle has shown us that we can enrich our sense of our I-can by acquiring
appropriate strengths or dispositions that serve us best in living the best life. His
description makes clear that this transformation of one’s power and agency is first
of all first-personally evident in our modification of our habitual ways of being in
the world. But clearly this is also a display evident to Others in the second- and
third-person. In our living from out of these acquired strengths (or weaknesses) we
display to friends and neighbors the sort of person we are. For Aristotle the princi-
ple of these strengths is a life lived foremost under the sway of reason.
We resist the Aristotelian view that Reason is one’s true self. One ground for this
is Reason may be considered as some universal capacity, and this universal, as “the
true self,” would nullify the unique essence. Another is that because reason and
intellect are I-acts these are powers the person has. Yet clearly the person who is
indifferent to “being reasonable,” at least in the sense of being responsive to what
is evident and who fails to listen to her “conscience,” repudiates herself. This is a
theme we will develop especially in Book 2, Chapter III. Clearly we are most ugly
for ourselves, and Others are most ugly for us, when we are heedless of this “better
part” of ourselves. Vicious qualities displayed by ourselves and others are ugly or
repugnant precisely because they have an enormous capacity to occlude the beauty
of the “myself” of the person. The ugliness is more pronounced in so far as the
person herself seems indifferent to this self-alienation. Evidence of the person’s
struggle with a weakness itself is a revelation of her beauty. Thus the person who
continues carelessly to incapacitate herself through drugs or alcohol, or who never
addresses her propensity to be self-indulgent or to control her temper, or who
shows no care for her self-destructive life-style, eating habits, etc. is typically what we regard as repugnant in a person.

In the terminology of Book 2, we can put it the following way: Although the "myself" is who we always are, nevertheless, because we are persons in the making, i.e., in the making of ourselves, we are called to become what or who we are not yet. The "myself" establishes not only our "form" or our individual essence it also constitutes the telos or ideal of the person we are to constitute. In this sense we are called to be who we are. I myself am called to be myself; myself and my self-ideal are not two different selves, but the latter is the proper fulfillment of the former. To use Aristotle’s neologism: The "myself" is the entelechy of the self.

Thus our version of Aristotle’s position is that who we most properly are as "persons," not as the "myself," requires of us to have excellent qualities that fit our perfection, our telos or our calling. Having precisely such excellences facilitates Others befriending, and in this sense loving, us for ourselves and explains why there is such a difficulty in separating out the love of the qualities from the person and why there is a special place to be assigned to the love that obtains among friends who have excellent qualities. Our beautiful attributes are inseparable from who we most basically are. This means who one is called to be normatively is an excellent sort of person. There is a coincidence with the propertyless myself, who we ineluctably are, and the sort of person we are called to be – which is a person with the qualities or properties that enable us to fulfill ourselves, to be our “true selves.” These properties or dispositions, we shall say, reveal best who we are because they are not only what we ought to have but further they are what we have most identified ourselves with as the most proper way we are to be in the world with Others. Who one is is profoundly (i.e., in our center or core, what we will call Existenz) invested in being in this way in the sense that we cannot live with ourselves if we repudiate this way.

For this reason, it is through these qualities that the beauty of ourselves is made manifest, i.e., it is removed in some measure from its utterly transcendent and secret status. And, conversely, we regard ourselves as ugly, and Others find us no less so, when we live in a way that prevents the coincidence of who we are with the sort of person we have become. We are repugnant to ourselves and Others through our choosing to be in ways which estrange us from ourselves and from other more appropriate ways of being in the world with Others. (The senses of appropriate, suitable, etc. will occupy us in Book 2, Chapters III–V.)

Thus we take Aristotle’s view on the beauty of the friend being tied to his excellent qualities to enjoy an evidence in first-personal agency by which we wholeheartedly identify ourselves with certain ways of being in the world. But this clearly is also evident in the second- and third-person, i.e., in the way we display ourselves and are displayed to friends and neighbors. In each case of personal reference there is revealed the sort of person we are. One becomes this sort of person through the founding acts by which the agent identifies with the actions that engender these properties. Because this results in the person becoming “this sort of person” which “sort” is approximate with the telos of the “myself,” there is revealed both to the agent but also to his acquaintances an approximation if not coincidence between
who one is, the “myself,” with being this sort of person. Thus we hold that we do not love and admire merely the excellences. Rather it is preferable to say that we do not love and admire the person in loving the excellences, but we love and admire the person realizing the excellences.

In befriending, in contrast to loving, the excellences are necessary conditions for the display of the beauty of the ipseity. Love reveals the beauty of the ipseity more immediately and the positive qualities of the person are rendered lovely because they belong to the beloved ipseity. For the one who loves, the intrinsic dignity or the “ontological value” (see §21 below) of the Other’s ipseity is manifest, even in spite of the repugnant qualities she might have. Apart from the perspicacity love provides this original dignity typically does not, of course, awaken the affection and admiration that lovely qualities evoke, but it does “command” or “require” a non-negotiable respect. In what we are calling ugly persons, the dignity still stands out, even though the proper beauty is occluded. (See below, e.g., §21 and Chapter VI, §7.)

In the excellent form of friendship that Aristotle celebrates, namely how the person is loved and admired for her own sake, the excellent qualities are the necessary condition of this friendship. Some of these themes are exemplified in Charles Dickens’s novel, *David Copperfield*. David’s love for Dora transforms all of her qualities, even the dubious ones, into splendid loveable aspects; but his affection for Agnes, at least initially, is sustained by her clearly admirable qualities. She is his “dear sister” who brings out his better self. David may not have loved or befriended her on account of or because she has this beneficent effect on him, but he turns to her always knowing that he will benefit from her warm welcome and counsel. Dora herself, on the other hand, is his consuming passion, even though she is the last one from whom he can expect wisdom and a renewal of his self-confidence. At the end, after Dora dies, David realizes that Agnes, his dearest friend, not only is the person he most admires, but she has loved him for himself from their childhood and he has perhaps has let her wonderful qualities mean more to him than she herself.

At the same time, the unmentioned and not explicitly noted likeness of Dora to David’s own much loved and early deceased mother is not lost on the reader, even if it is unnoticed by David. Here the suspicion arises of whether the love for Dora is not inseparably an associated love, in this sense a “projection,” of the deep resentment which is the core of his being was the result of the brutal class
structures of his society. The position we are urging is that the dignity of every person, even those we find repugnant because of their qualities, is immediately transparent in love – which is not to say that love is naturally forthcoming. Indeed, the reader following the narrative recounting David Copperfield’s perceptions of the treacherous, fawning, hate-filled Uriah Heep, would find any act of love by David directed at Uriah an unintelligible and incomprehensible miracle. Uriah Heep “personifies” resentment paraded in a feigned humility that evokes in David serpentine images. David is good at befriending because he is compassionate and appreciates excellences, but because in friendship the love is conditioned by the Other’s excellences, David is understandably incapable of love or friendship toward Uriah and can only be repelled by every aspect of Uriah.

St. Thomas generally follows Aristotle and models his reflection on the most perfect form of love as it flourishes in the most perfect form of friendship. Thereby, a sense of love that transcends the befriending that is conditioned by admirable qualities surfaces. (This is perhaps hinted at also in Aristotle.) The love found in the perfect form of friendship wills to abide in the presence of that one whom one loves, to be in her presence for herself and not because of what delights may be derived from her. The person is loved “in herself,” secundum seipsum. What delights or what goods may accrue to me may be considered properties the beloved has. But she herself is beyond these and loved for herself. This serves as a kind of criterion in one’s loving the good of the other for her sake: I love her even if no good accrues to me. But meeting this latter criterion is not identical with the pure love itself. Here we see the difference emerging between love properly regarded and the love of friendship.

For Plotinus, it would seem – although as we shall see, in the Chapter VI of Book 2, there is some ambiguity – what we most properly love in others and ourselves is who one most properly is. Although, of course, we may delight and find beautiful the qualities of the Other, yet even these are beautiful because they embody or point in a variety of ways to “soul.” For Plotinus, in the case of Others, her beauty awakens me, the one thrilled by her beauty, to the transcendent beauty of who she and I most properly are. Plotinus, who wrote of the soul (psyche) yet used the personal pronouns to single out what precisely he meant, taught that “you yourself,” although perhaps occluded from yourself by reason of forms of moral ugliness, nevertheless, “are not measured by dimension, or bounded by shape into littleness, or expanded to size by unboundedness, but everywhere unmeasured, because greater than all measure…” For Plotinus the thrill of beauty, and our meeting it with love, is always an adumbration of the beauty of the subsisting beauty of the forms, foremost the form of the trans-propertied true self. Again, it is this which lovers truly love and it is the source of their delight. Ultimately, however, what lovers love is this invisible beauty that is transcendent to the beauties it, as soul, shapes in the world. Ultimately it is only by a disciplined turning within and developing an inner vision that we ascend to this proper subsisting trans-propertied beauty that we are in search of.

In discussions inspired by the Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, there is an ongoing acknowledgement even among those thinkers for whom love aims at the unique
ipseity that nevertheless in love what is loved is the universal and indeed the form of the beautiful. This is not the same as saying that the individual cannot be loved, but that the love of the individual is suffused with form and universality. In Plotinus this seems to be decisively surmounted with the position that there is a form of the individual person, Socrates, and thus form may not be the equivalent of universality, e.g., of humanity. Yet because this trans-propertied form is inseparably joined to Nous or the One and the Beautiful, it is clear that the love of the individual is inseparably a love of the form and the Beautiful. It is a love of what universally encompasses all beauties.

Simone Weil similarly urges us to think of friendship as having something of the universal in that it consists of loving a human being as we should like to be able to love each particular soul of all those who make up the human race. What she has in mind is that there is a kind of form of love, as in the description: It is necessarily and universally the case that the lover affirms the reality of the beloved and this love is or aspires to be a pure selfless detached attention and respect for the beloved and the autonomy of both. For phenomenology this immersion of form in the concrete and particular is, of course, a given. The emphasis on the unique ipseity is an emphasis on an individual form or essence. Love, as the especial disclosure of this unique form, has a distinctive form – even though love is directed at a singularity and, as we will argue (in Book 2), the love will be unique in each case. But of course that itself is a formal consideration.

Pascal raised the issue of the proper noema of love in a way which explicitly focuses the issues we have been raising. He asks: “If one loves me for my judgment, for my memory, does he love me myself? No, for I am able to lose these qualities without losing myself.” Pascal then puzzles where this “moi” is if it is not available through the qualities of the body or the soul. Yet do we not love the soul because of the qualities? Yet these do not constitute the moi in as much as they are perishable and it is not. Loving these abstract qualities would be loving the person abstractly because “one would not love the person but only the qualities.”

The view we are proposing is that in fact we love the ipseity, the moi, only through the qualities of soul and body. We love the substance “accidentalized.” And our love of the ipseity may be suffused with admiration because of the qualities, and doubtless we find it easier to love someone with “loveable” qualities, and especially when they, through their virtue and love, become what we will name in Book 2 the sort of person they are called to be. To the extent that the qualities are perishable there is, as Pascal suggests, reason to doubt that we love the person for the sake of the qualities, even if the qualities are those displaying the beloved’s centering of herself in love. Pascal is on the right path when he hesitates to say that love is because of the qualities, because of the suggestion that we are prescinding from the ipseity in favor of the qualities.

In a similar vein Robert Browning wrote to Elizabeth Barrett that he loved her with a love which appears to separate her from her properties, the essential from the “accidental.” We shall see that this is precisely the love that she asked of him.

Following McTaggart we propose that love is an emotion directed at a person not in respect of her characteristics, even though it might be because of them.
Love does not have as its direct target the characteristics and the person only incidentally in view of them. Yet doubtless there are “causes” or “reasons” that have drawn us to the person we love. McTaggart acknowledges that love may be “because of the qualities,” that is they may be a motivating force, as in the genesis of the love. But these loveable or admirable qualities do not render them, as in Pascal’s formulations, the focus, or final cause, or that for the sake of which, we love the person. For example, “I fell in love with him because he reminded me of my father” or because “He was the only person who listened to me.” Clearly here we have reasons accounting for the subsequent or present love. But is this to say that the subsequent or present love is a love of someone in respect to his characteristics and that the person is not loved for his own sake? Further, perhaps, these distinguishing characteristics are not uniquely determining the person himself, but rather they have relevance as making the person of value, e.g., they occasion delight and pleasure, in relationship to the lover. In which case, doubts can be raised whether the person herself is really loved at all.

The description of love as having to do only with the qualities of the person that please the “lover” characterizes only some cases of “love.” Indeed, we have given reason earlier to doubt that such in every case is properly called love. Doubtless, lovers also sing the praises of the myriad virtues the beloved has in herself, and not merely as they please the lover and in this respect serve the lover’s self-love. One loves the qualities like integrity, generosity, the quick wit, courage, etc. which reveal the quality of the person’s mind and heart, but one loves also the qualities that reveal her signature bodily presence, like the sound of her voice, the way she walks, talks, etc. Yet does one love her and not just her properties? What does this “not just her properties” mean here? Is she indeed present as beyond and apart from her properties? Hardly! But might there not be envisioned a competition between the love of her properties and her herself, as in the cases Aristotle singles out. Aristotle not only distinguished the cases of befriending someone because of the pleasure they give or their usefulness, but also “because of themselves” or for their own sakes. But this latter consideration, we have suggested, is unclear. It might be the equivalent of because of “what” (not who) they are. That is, one befriends them because of their moral excellence. And in this latter case we may think of the instance where the friend decides no longer to befriend because the Other has fallen from or renounced her prior high aspirations and standards. In such a case the admirable friend was admired because of a quality intrinsically admirable. This would differ from more superficial relationships: “She became fat and I no longer loved her.” “Ever since the illness, the things for which I loved her have been missing; thus I am leaving her.” And yet there would be the similarity that with the disappearance of the qualities the valuing also vanished.

Thus, in many cases, the “not just her properties” clearly suggests that the person was loved in respect of her properties. These instances must be seen over against the important cases of the love that persists when the initial properties generating the “because” have vanished. In such cases, it might appear regrettable from an outsider’s perspective, but we find that it belongs to love that it persist in such cases. We may not agree, but still find it “natural,” if regrettable from our perspective,
because it belongs to the “nature” or “essence” of love that the lover persists when the person turns out to have other qualities than those the beloved was thought to have or no longer has the qualities she originally had. It belongs to the essence of love to continue in spite of the fact that what motivated an initial interest has vanished and where the lover presently loves no less, perhaps even more, and perhaps is even disinterested in those initial attractive qualities. Further, there are cases where the properties that once attracted have fallen in the background, and the reasons for staying together have receded – and yet, in spite of the “split” or separation of the one-time partners, love continues from the side of at least one of the partners. Would one say that here there is no love?

And what are we to say of the love of parents toward their infant children? Do they not love the children themselves, now in their burgeoning personalities, neither knowing what will be the distinguishing properties they will have as adults nor what will be the signature identifying marks and qualities of their mature personal presence and what will distinguish them in the world? Of course, now they have already loveable properties, but the parents know that they will change profoundly. The parent thus loves the child without these or any identifying properties – except, in most cases, the property that the child is their child. Again, saintly persons seem able to approach dispensing with any such property, as perhaps in the case of a Mother Teresa.63

It seems that what is often called the “romantic view of love in the Western world” is a belief in the capacity that one loves forever someone, “come rain or come shine,” i.e., for her own sake and not for the blossom of youth, her being hale and hearty, etc. Marriage vows seem to imply, whether the vow-makers appreciate this fully or not, that the people involved have uncovered the unique ipseity in all its splendor and that this beauty will be enough for them when the going gets tough. Young people “in love,” as we have had occasion to say, find it miraculous that another person loves them for themselves and awakens them to themselves, and this miracle is simultaneous with the their discovery of another whose beauty is revealed through and beyond his or her qualities, and that all of life can be predelineated as centered around this beauty.

Let us return to love’s intentionality. As love clearly does not stop at the surface of the body – any more than the directedness of one’s mind or heart attending to someone with whom one is conversing stops at the surface of their face and eyes – so it does not stop at their personal qualities. Rather it heads toward who it is who is there having these properties. Clearly the telos of this love does not aim at the distinguishing properties the beloved has but at her herself.

How does it aim at the “herself” who has these properties? Does it aim at the whole comprised by these properties rather than the one who has the properties? The answer seems clearly No. We cannot say that love aims at the whole which may be said to “have” the properties – as we may say of a bundled whole such as The Great Dipper, The US government, or Indiana University that it has such and such features. Similarly we may not say that rather than loving her ideas, her mind, her face, her hands, etc. we love “all of her” which is precisely the whole either made up of the parts or a whole which is more than and other than the sum of the
parts. Of course it is clear that if we love only part of her we do not love her. But are we therefore to say that when we love we love the whole which comprises the parts which constitute it, i.e., her? Could we not love the person without loving all her parts, e.g., the cancer eating away at her, her inclination toward jealousy, her temptation to revenge, etc.? We will soon turn to the issue of whether in loving her we must love her parts.

In our view the self is not even an “organic whole” which, like a unique jazz combo, may be said to have “emergent properties” and be more than merely the sum of the parts, i.e., the various musicians that comprise the combo. The combo, like an authentic bottom-up community, may be seen as a “personality of a higher order” founded in the members and metaphorically the subject of the members and their agency. But this is a loose analogy which presupposes for its elucidating power the genuine case of a subjectivity, the conscious one who has the parts, is a self-conscious agent, etc.

We have in the previous two chapters attempted to bring to light a sense in which what we mean by the person must include the ipseity which essentially is an awareness of oneself as oneself which is not dependent on being aware of anything else besides oneself. Here the unique status of the self as the one who has the parts, i.e., has all that may be said, in some sense, to belong to the person whatever its ontological status, is brought to light as not simply one of the parts but as the subject, indeed, we will argue, the substance. Further, in love we have claimed we are enabled to target this self through and beyond the parts/properties, and typically we love these parts/properties precisely because we love the one who has these and is transcendent to and independent, in some sense, of them.

And this is the basic issue and basis of philosophical wonder: There is no “thing” there that may be singled out which I love and yet this no-thing enjoys a kind of compelling evidence. As we have often said, it is not a nihil negativum. Just as my attending to you in a conversation is not merely attending to what you say or to the motions on the surface of your face or your eyes, but to you who is other than and transcendent to these, who is not their sum or even their organic unity, so love does not aim at any inner or external bodily or mental properties or bundle, whole, or unique organic whole of these. Love’s penetrating gaze may go to the core of the person but it does not need to cut through flesh or tear down mental walls or arrange Gestalten. Love intends non-ascriptively and what it intends, like what “I” intends, is non-sortal.

It is a mistaken view founded on an ontology of things that in every instance what is known requires the presencing of properties. In fact the view of love spelled out here reveals the difficulties of such a view. It reveals that love brings to light that which foremost delights us and around which we arrange our lives, but which is loved precisely as transcendent to the properties it has.

Love clearly is not a cognitive stance toward the Other. Consider the following statement: “When one penetrates deeper into a man..., one finds at bottom pure universal human features. The circumstances and actions that are over and above this could just as well belong to another as to this one.” Clearly what is called here a deeper penetration into a person is an analytic-cognitive attitude. We might say we
are “figuring the person out.” It is a progressive knowledge of features, aspects, properties, qualities, patterns, etc. which leads to a “profile” of the person so that one can come to predict, control, anticipate, etc. the person’s thought and behavior. To discover in the one we have come to know ever more “deeply” a foundation of instincts, passions, drives that are universal, and then to come upon circumstances and actions that could belong to anyone reveals that at the heart of the person is not a unique essence at all, indeed we may be said to come upon a nothingness that might just as well reveal itself in an unprovoked explosion of passion or caprice. There is no basis here for the emergence of a unique essence or single individual. This is a dilemma which is inevitable if we think that knowing persons begins and ends in knowing their properties. But these properties are always framed by the appresentation of what is non-ascriptively presented and non-sortally present, i.e., the ipseity. And the act of empathy apperceives not merely the disjointed and discrete string of features that may or may not be universal or incidental, but it aspires to apperceive the interior motivational logic of this world of the other. One strives to apperceive her apperceived world. With love this aspiration is habituated and facilitated by reason of its faith-filled celebration and veneration of the “myself” that is evident in and through the properties.

One way we can think of how the properties of the Other become diaphanous, if not utterly invisible, through love is to think of love, as Husserl on one occasion does, as a being entranced in the Other and her life. Being entranced in the other through the display brought about by the believing celebratory affirmation of the Other is delighting in the Other as present for me. Love presences what is non-sortal or propertyless and is always a revelation of what remains essentially a secret. Indeed the “singularity” that love presences is non-sortal and a unique essence precisely because it requires the appresentation of the other “myself” as an essential secret. It is this appresentation that founds the sense of the unique uniqueness and what irradiates its singularity to the personal presence.

Although love displays what is through and beyond properties I never have displayed for me the Other’s “myself” or interiority as it is for her. There is always the abyssal transcendence; there is always the possibility of error in love’s understanding; there is always the essential difference, pace Scheler, between my self-experiencing and the Other’s self-experiencing. Of course I directly experience her in her smile, in her frown, in her gait. But I do not immediately experience her joy or anger, which is to say I do not experience her self-experiencing. The display of the presence of the Other is always direct and “immediate” in the sense that there is no inference from the personal presence and expression to the ipseity. But in experiencing directly her anger and her joy, I do not experience her anger, even though I experience the anger as belonging to her and her anger being directed at such and such. In this sense I do not experience her self-experiencing immediately. Her self-experiencing is always for me a belief, always an empty intention filled with a faith-filled affirmation.

Thus the depth of the personal presence is a non-sortal presence through love’s non-ascriptive presencing, but this itself has its foundation in the appresentation of what is an essential secret. The presence of the Other, the telos of love’s complacent
delight in the Other, is indeed a direct presencing of the Other ipseity, a disclosure of a unique unpropertied essence, and this is directly revealed in her personal presence. But because the personal presence is constituted by my affirming her own self-experiencing my direct presencing of her is always only through the affirming faith, and for me her self-experiencing is always not-experienced, always an absence, a secret, which she alone can reveal. But even in the disclosure there remains the infinite abyssal difference. If “immediate” is understood to mean my presencing her self-presence as she lives it, then, of course, my presencing is not immediate. Yet it is direct. That is, it is not inferred but she is appresented “directly” in and through her incarnate propertied presence. Love, as we shall see, is always necessarily, delight in an essential mystery.

Can we say that love is pure only when it is not contaminated by being dependent on the person’s properties? But would this mean that love requires that we not love the person’s properties and that we could love the person without loving her qualities? Would this not be the same as saying we could love the ipseity but not the person whose ipseity it is? Whatever the merits of the separation of ipseity from the person in the first-person, the phenomenon of love makes such a dualism quite out of the question. When we love the person herself we love her in the concrete albeit problematic “signature” presence we discussed earlier. But how are we to envisage the connection of the loveable characteristics and the one loved? And if the personal presentation is not completely identical with the ipseity or “myself,” in so far as the personal presentation too is alterable and even present in a way capable of stylization (and therefore repeatable) does love really aim at what is beyond the personal presentation?

We can sharpen our thesis with the help of a distinction (brought to light by Barry Miller) between, on the one hand, the ideal limit which resembles the Kantian infinite ideal that, in turn, occasions an “endless task,” what Miller calls the “limit simpliciter,” and, on the other hand, the “limit concept” which is, in a special sense the telos of the ideal limit, yet of a completely different order than what orders the endless task.67

In our loving knowledge of Others the personal qualities reveal endlessly and often progressively the infinitely loveable person. These serve as the vehicles for both our being drawn to the person as well as the media for the revelation of the person. In such a case, the love is suffused with our admiration, rapture, entrallment, esteeming, honoring, being attracted to, etc., the person, and over the time of the love relationship these aspects may be thought of as approaching an infinite limit, a “limit simpliciter,” in the revelation of the person. Of course, the person’s revelation to the partner is typically at the same time a self-revelation through a process of growth and self-discovery.

We may think of these properties of increasing revelation of the person as an ordered series, analogous to an ever shorter line or an increasingly-sided polygon. Each of these ordered series is of the same order, e.g. each member is a line or a polygon. But we may say that the ordered series aims at the “limit concept” that is not of the same order as the members of the series. That at which they aim is different in kind or heterogeneous to the ordered series even though it is precisely that at which the ordered series heads and what gives it its direction. This is the
relation the point has to the series of ever shorter lines or the circle has to the ever more sided polygon. We may say that when, per impossibile, any member of the ordered series would become that toward which it heads it would be extinguished in its kind, e.g., the line would cease to be a line or the polygon would cease to be a polygon.

Something similar happens with our affective relations to people when there is a transformation into love. We see that it is not the properties or qualities as such which we intend but the ipseity or the Other’s “myself,” and, in this intentionality of love, we intend the Other, not in respect to the properties, even though these serve as contingent place-holders and identifying markers for targeting our ever increasing appreciation and knowledge of the Other. Thus the person who loves the beloved comes to love her no less when she has no longer the beautiful bodily appearance or when her mind is no longer as witty or acute, etc., which attributes were the causal occasions for the inauguration of the relationship. In such a case the lover’s relationship to the beloved parallels the relation of the limit simpliciter to the limit concept, i.e., the lover’s love uncovers the ipseity, and not merely the person who is revealed only in her endless qualities and which served as the limit simpliciter of the personal relationship.

This application of Miller’s distinction of course is deficient in several respects. The most obvious is that what is properly loved, the “myself,” is not a limit-concept but a unique individual and it is this to which the properties, as ever more revelatory, point. Further, it maintains, contrary to any reigning ethos of achievement, reification and violence, that the value-essence of the “myself” of the person is incommensurately superior to all the value-properties of the person. Furthermore, one rarely if ever has a sustained relationship bereft of the endless revelation of the ideal limit simpliciter of the person. Rather this latter of necessity feeds and sustains the love relationship, and when there is little or next to nothing left of the display of attractive and revealing qualities the love relationship, which we have claimed is already suffused with an affirming faith, is sustained by a pure, perhaps blind, faith. Indeed, unless we postulate the possibility of something like a purely spiritual or “angelic” relationship, we have no idea what such a love relationship bereft of personal properties could mean. This points to the danger of “angelism” in the thesis of this work and how ipseity can never be properly separated from the person – even though we believe there are good reasons for thinking of it as a pure substrate or substance. (See the next chapter.) But Miller’s distinction is useful especially in thinking about how the ipseity (as analogous to the limit-concept) is apperceived in and through the advance of the ordered series of revelatory properties, even though the incommensurability or heterogeneity of the limit-concept to the ordered series of the ideal “limit simpliciter” may not be explicitly evident.

Our thesis is that love indeed aims beyond the personal presentation in so far as it targets the ipseity as more than the properties and signature style of the person. But even though there is evidence for a distinction in both the first- and second- and third-person, there is no basis, phenomenologically speaking, for separating the second-personal or third-personal presence of the person and the ipseity, even if there is a basis for entertaining the possibility for such a separation.
in the first-person (as in the teletransportation example). In the second- and third-person, the problem at hand is somewhat captured by the peculiarity of proper names and the way pronouns refer non-ascriptively. Similarly the issue is indicated in the way we may, on occasion, intend the person by looking into her eyes without looking at the eyes, and subsequently not even being able to say anything about the person’s eyes, e.g., their color, shape, etc. Yet we could not intend the person without looking at her face and into her eyes. We would never say, having looked into the eyes, and not at the eyes, that she was present without a face or eyes. The indifference to the latter does not mean that the ipseity was separable from the latter.

The beloved “You” is available only in the concrete form of the personal presence, and never available apart from this. As Husserl noted, even the presence of “ghosts” requires some kind of material basis for the appresentation. Intending in the manner of empathic perception the ghost without any material substrate whatsoever is unthinkable. Yet there is some symmetry between the first-person “I myself” as propertyless and non-ascriptively referred to and the way the other indexical personal pronouns may refer non-ascriptively. And there is further symmetry with the beloved “You” who contrasts with the “You” by which one refers to the stranger, e.g., present merely through bare indexical reference (as when in the dark a sentry might ask, “Who [are you who] goes there?”) or by email or on the phone. The stranger is present relatively abstractly, i.e., with only the barest hint of properties, e.g., the voice may suggest gender, and the grammar, cadence, accent, diction, and syntax may suggest native tongue, region, ethnicity, class, etc.

§18  The Affirmation of the Reality of the Other Ipseity in Love and Hate

The familiar “You,” of course, is present by being pervaded with qualities, and we apperceive him to be self-present. But the beloved “You” is not merely present with a rich treasury of highly nuanced signature properties but furthermore her unique self-presence is affirmed, even if not lived. And further this affirmation is a celebration, not merely an acknowledgement, as in the case of the stranger and acquaintance. And celebrating this unique self-presence is celebrating what is beyond properties and celebrates the properties precisely as belonging to the unique ipseity. Love does not surmount the essential absence that all forms of empathy make present, i.e., the essential self-presence of the other to himself, yet it affirms resoundingly in faith the self-presence to the Other.

In all non-loving forms of presencing of the Other we passively apperceive her to be present to herself as an individual essence. Yet these are empty and abstract forms of presencing; there is no rejoicing in the Other’s self-affirming of her individual essence, as is the case with love.

Love therefore does not make present something which is a mere cognitive intentional object, or something from which we may disengage ourselves while
remaining fond, as we may disengage ourselves from the belief in the perceived apple tree and still remain perceiving the apple tree, or disengage ourselves from the puppy’s charm while still remaining aware of the charm of the puppy. The beloved’s ontological status is not something able to be neutralized by a change of cognitive stance on my part. It contrasts thus, e.g., with Dickens’s David Copperfield, whose being for me is indifferent to its being real, imagined, or fictional. While loving, as while praying, the practice of the transcendental reduction poses a unique problem, to which we will have occasion to return in Book 2.

We have said that in love there is an affirmation of the unique reality of the beloved, even though she is present to us, of necessity, with an insurmountable absence. The intentional act is not merely unfilled, but further a filled intention simply does not make any sense. Yet love is a way of acknowledging that necessary absence, emptiness, and transcendence through a believing affirmation. The affirmation of belief in the self-presence of the Other does not make what is essentially absent and transcendent present, but the believing affirmation *eo ipso* renders the beloved incomparable in value with what we experience in a filled intention. The beloved is incomparable in value precisely because the beloved is not a value as a property of something. Rather who she is, is posited as beyond all properties including alleged comparable values; she is posited as uniquely good in herself. In love, not in the philosophical reflection on love, she is not even turned into a substrate of values in the sense that this would turn the lover away from the You and transform the You to something receiving predication.

To the extent that love is a contemplative beholding of the beloved, and not the ecstatic existing in the beloved and her life, love holds the You and uniquely presences the unique individual ipseity. Thus the ipseity is not properly speaking “given” as an aspect or quality of an object. But neither is it “given” in the way the intended thing, e.g., the tree, is given and present in and through all of its present and absent sides and aspects. The thing, the tree, is co-meant, co-presented, apperceived throughout all the presentations of its sides and aspects. The thing itself is always given, but always given inadequately; there are always unseen but co-meant aspects and sides.

The person, in contrast to the ipseity, may be said to be given inadequately in the same way a physical thing is given inadequately because both to herself and to other observers each presentation requires to be further supplemented by endless other ones. However, because the Other is apperceived to be one who refers to herself with “I,” she is appresented as present to herself all at once. Here the distinction between adequate and inadequate presentation is inappropriate because we do not have to do with empty and filled intentions. In this respect, persons as *ipseities* are never able to be given even inadequately as how they are for themselves in non-reflective self-awareness: the other I myself which is nonascriptively self-present, remains essentially unavailable to us in presentations in the second- and third-person – just as the non-ascriptive self-presence is such that she is not present to herself, in this sense unavailable to herself, in ascriptive presentations. This unavailability, however, is different from the essential inadequate presence of the *person* – no matter in what personal form of presentation, i.e., first-, second- or third-person – as a being in the world with Others. This
essentially inadequate presence is an infinite ideal regardless of whether it is present in the first-, second-, and third-person. But the non-ascriptive self-presence in the first-person of each ipseity for itself is an adequacy of presence. To use Barry Miller’s terms, the essential self-presence is the limit-concept, it is not, as the person, a limit-sim-pliciter. Nevertheless this odd essential fullness may not be equated with a perfect kind of self-knowledge that issues forth in comprehensive and true propositions about oneself.

And as “I” may be teased out or brought to light, e.g., in phenomenological reflection, in thought experiments, and in transcendental reflection, as qualityless and propertyless and in no way a mere nihil negativum, a pure nothing whatsoever, but rather as what is present (in its presencing) as the richness of the individual essence which is non-reflectively present and affirmed in my living, so love affirms the “I myself” of the Other’s individual essence, and thus provides a believed-in essential fullness by way of its faith-filled affirmation.

In this regard we can compare love with the pure case of hate. At first glance, hate would seem to be symmetrical with love. One may say that both love and hate aim at the other ipseity through, but as beyond, the properties; the properties are subordinated to the ipseity. Indeed it would appear that both love and hate can be absorbed in the ipseity to the point where each is unmindful of the person’s qualities. That hate is not in respect to the Other’s properties seems evident in the consideration that it is notoriously blind in regard to the good properties someone might have. Anger aims at someone in respect to certain properties or qualities, e.g., his arrogance, his willfulness, etc. We are angry with this person because of this or that. Anger may become rage and in this way indifferent to qualities. Being blind with rage one may indiscriminately want to destroy everything within one’s field of perception. But hate is more discriminate in its indifference to someone’s good qualities. Regardless of how evident these are the one hating does not appreciate these because hate aims at the negation, if not the annihilation, of the other ipseity and wants only that; the good or bad qualities are of no interest.

But surely hate is preoccupied with the negative qualities of the Other – and to this we must now turn. Whereas love is a positive affirmation of the other ipseity, hate appears to aim at the negation or annihilation of the other ipseity. But hate cannot seek to negate the other ipseity without first knowing it through a belief in what exists beyond the qualities. The ipseity is properly revealed only in love’s affirmation of it, and hate is not compatible with this. In order for hate to aspire to the annihilation of the other ipseity, it is not the case that this ipseity has been allowed to reveal itself through a founding act of love. Rather hate is in actuality a projection on to the Other the capacity to be the pure source of properties that the one hating finds repugnant and despises. In this respect true hate involves believing in the pure eidos of The Devil. But hate is not really aimed at the other ipseity in itself but only at the Other as the unknown source of the despicable qualities. Indeed, it wants to know nothing else than this and suppresses any surfacing of this source as another “myself.” Hate would seem to be possible and laudable if the other ipseity would prove to be the sort of thing that is worthy of annihilation; but what is worthy or not worthy is a matter of
laudable or reprehensible qualities someone has, and hate as the desire for the annihilation of the other ipseity would move beyond these – but in reality it does move beyond these only by assigning to the other ipseity, who is not allowed to appear, the status of the embodiment of the hateful properties by being their source. If this is true, hate only appears to be the polar opposite to love. It is in fact of necessity ignorant of the Other in herself and knows her only as the postulated source upon which is laminated the vile properties and with which/whom she identifies these properties.

It is noteworthy that ideological-political discourse in regard to enemies is sustained precisely by not getting to know the other person in herself. On the other hand, as we shall repeatedly see, distinguishing the ipseity from the deeds and character of the person is a dance few are capable of. And this difficulty is intelligible precisely because we cannot presence the ipseity apart from the person who is manifest in the character produced by her deeds. Indeed, in Book 2 we shall argue that who one is as a person is essentially tied to the sort of person one has become – even though the non-sortal “myself” always transcends this sortal self-constitution. We will argue that ultimately only the person who approximately embodies what the non-sortal “myself” points to as the “true self” of the concrete person in the world may be said to fulfill the ancient mandate to “become who (or what) you are.” Hate would appear to recognize this possibility and it presumes to know who one is, i.e., what sort of person one is in the sense of the essence of the person as determined by “the true self,” i.e., it presumes to recognize that the hated ipseity is to be absolutely identified with the hated properties, and in this respect the hated person is the source of all evil.

§19 More on the Relation of the Qualities of the Person to the Ipseity

Love aims at, reveals, and rejoices in an unfathomable “more” that transcends these qualities, even if this plus itself is not “given” as are the qualities and properties of the person. Still there is unclarity regarding what the relation of the “more,” the ipseity, is to the properties. The “truth” of the beloved’s beauty and loveableness, i.e., the beloved’s remarkable and endearing properties, can be made more readily manifest in love whereas this “truth” is hidden from one incapable of such love. It is true both that love uncovers the beloved’s loveable properties, and that typically it is the properties which are the way the radiant loveableness of the person is manifest.

Thus whereas qualities doubtless may promote and lead to love and the discovery of the Other’s unique essential ipseity, once one loves, this very ipseity itself recasts these same qualities in a new light. The love for the ipseity redounds upon the personal qualities. At the same time this love does not permit the Other’s negative qualities ever to obliterate the transcendent incomparable splendor of the essential fullness of the ipseity. These shortcomings and weaknesses are always balanced by what is regarded as the incommensurate good of the other ipseity.
The properties themselves may be thought of as the sources of splendor in as much as they are the rays or looks of the beauty of the beloved. But if this is so, then, again, are these not the reasons for one’s love, and cannot the lover explain why she loves by appealing to these properties?

Let us once again turn to this matter. Let us suppose that the properties are what we love and are that in respect to which we love someone. If this be so, then, when we find ourselves in a position of being bereft of a beloved, as through death or a painful voluntary separation, we can undertake a reflection on our past loves and what most stirred us in these lovers. From this we might be moved to devise a list of the desirable properties and perhaps place a personal ad on the web or in the “Personals” column of an appropriate magazine or newspaper.

As Martha Nussbaum has pointed out, such a list would most probably reflect not merely the excellence of the repeatable properties independent of anyone but rather reflect the person(s) I loved who had the properties. In which case, these persons would be the basis for the choice of properties rather than the properties being the basis for the choice of the persons. And, she adds, if my present lover had properties that were not concordant with the list, “I’d change the list.” Thus what we love about the beloved are not merely the properties, but we love them as his or her properties. Indeed, the properties, as “his way of telling jokes,” “his way of playfully leading one on,” etc., are intrinsic to the unique person and the unique love. Neither the person nor the love would seem to be able to be extricated, i.e., turned into an ideality, by extricating the properties, as if these properties would hold the same value by being conjoined with just anyone. Nussbaum concludes that within the radiance of the beloved there is no clear way to separate out the repeatable value properties and the idiosyncratic accidents. All seems to be part of the seamless “perfectness” and part of the mystery of love. Perhaps it would be better to say that the Gestalt of the Other when constituted especially by love makes of the properties “moments” and not “pieces” in Husserl’s sense. That is, the ipseity can never be made present apart from all the properties that comprise her, and the parts can never be made present without presencing the ipseity. But if this were strictly true, we could never be fooled – and yet we are. Further, as we have earlier seen, what we love is not a whole which is to be thought of as the sum or as greater than all the parts.

This conception of finding one’s lover by advertising on the internet or in a personal ad where one lists desirable properties hearkens back to the thought-experiment of cloning where we admitted the possibility in the second- and third-person of finding one’s Doppelgänger. There, however, it became evident that, in the first-person, someone would still have the right to insist that “whoever you are, and with whatever right you have to calling yourself (e.g.) JG Hart, you are not me and I am not you.” Similarly we can consider the lover who faces the science fiction anomaly of a plurality of claimants to be the beloved, each of whose differences are indiscernible because each has the identical properties, and each therefore has the apparent title to be the one she loves and the one she has loved. Here there is an analogy to the teleportation case as it is rehearsed in the first-person where the clone of JG Hart won’t do for being me. The clone of the beloved present
in the second-person won’t do. The lover will be outraged and believe herself deceived if she realizes that the one she was loving was not the beloved person whom she believed in fact to be loving. She will be outraged because her love was not directed at the unique self-aware individual essence but at somebody who looks just like the beloved but who is not this unique essence but a different one whose self-awareness is of another unique essence. The lover will not tolerate the substitution of someone who has all the desirable qualities that one’s beloved has, even if one were to duplicate exactly the circumstances in which one has loved one’s beloved.72

This consideration demonstrates the earlier one that love essentially is an affirmation of the real existence of the Other. We already noted that there is a bitter awakening when one learns that what or whom one loved in “being-in-love” was a merely imagined version projected on the Other.73

Similarly, if it were so that what we loved was in fact not the unique essence but the qualities of the person, her intellect, her attainments, her peculiar signature features, character, etc., then, upon her death the beloved would be more or less easy to replace. Her disappearance could be compensated for because these qualities are, at least conceptually, replaceable or able to be duplicated. One meets a version of this view in efforts to console the grieving person by reminding him that death is part of life, a part of the human condition; the grieving person may hear that he is still relatively young and will meet someone new. Or the parent may be reminded that he is not the only father in the world to have lost a child, and he can still have another one, no less beautiful, etc. It is clear that, as Jankélévitch says, the one grieving is not persuaded and his heart is insensible to such lucid reasons and is convinced that in such matters being unreasonable is right and reason wrong. The disconsolate person who suffers the loss of the irreplaceable loved one is to some extent reasonably despairing. The grieving parent does not want a tiny infant just like the tiny one she lost, but rather precisely the little one that is dead. One sees from this that the proper true basis for love turns away all justification and motivation and that its source is in what is beyond what is perceptually experienced (métempsypirie).74 And at the other end of the life-cycle, we can recall Arnold Burms’ example of the parents loving their children in themselves not knowing what properties they will have that will be their signature qualities and knowing that the loveable qualities they now have will be gone in the not too distant future. The parent also knows in advance that she will love the positive qualities her child will have as an adult because they are her child’s, and that she will have to wrestle with being objective in dealing with the negative ones.

Again, as “I” refers non-ascriptively to oneself as propertyless, so the “You” of love aims at the other beyond properties, and the values of the properties lie precisely in their being that of the beloved. We saw earlier that this cannot mean that love is more pure the more it is not “contaminated” by being taken up with the beloved person’s properties, if this were to imply that the other were to be loved and present apart from any qualities. As in first-person reference of “I” there is a non-ascriptive self-reference which is richly even though oddly meaningful, so love is awakened to what embodies endless riches, even though it is beyond all
IV Love as the Fulfillment of the Second-Person Perspective

ascribable properties. This again anticipates our discussion of the “mystery” of ipseity. The non-reflective self-awareness which is the referent of “I” is undeniably familiar and rich but also something that stops me in my effort to say what I “know” in “knowing” it, if knowing is taken to mean a categorial display of the referent of “I”; rather, it is a Je ne sais quoi. As I, in non-reflective self-awareness, do not “know” or “live” myself in this way except through the absence of predication, as I in this awareness know myself as myself without being aware of myself as anything except myself, so similarly in love I do not make present the other’s otherness unless I presence the other as present in but beyond all qualities and properties. And in both cases there is no proper case of knowledge, whether of the self or of the other, in the absence of qualities or properties.

We have been claiming that the lover is precisely the one who cannot give “reasons” for his or her love in the sense of providing a list of qualities. But nevertheless, as Robert Spaemann has noted, when there is a radical change in the properties of the person it is “as if the beloved person were to become invisible.” We take this to mean not that the beloved becomes a ghost, but with the vanishing of the familiar properties as the placeholders for the loving empathic perception, the easy familiar associative apperception cannot occur. The other indications motivating this loving empathic perception of the unique Other will be sustained as properties of the same beloved by something resembling faith.

Thus, when in the course of time the “reasons” for our originally loving someone have entirely passed away through the ravages of time, or when the person becomes, e.g., disfigured and transformed through injury or illness, whether mental or physical, then the beloved person approaches invisibility and love’s bodily medium is on the verge of dissolving because of the uncertainty whether there is any sense in which she is still “there” (as in the case when she is in a coma). Or, in the less drastic cases, as in extreme old age, the presence through love of the Other is sustained by a kind of fidelity to and believing-in the other’s actuality in spite of infirmities, altered appearance, the fading of the signature qualities, etc.

As is clear from what has preceded, we do not share the view that it is love alone which brings to light the unique ipseity in the second- and third-person. The unique ipseity is implicitly and emptily targeted and brought to light in any intention of the Other in empathic perception. But apart from love there is not the affirmation and lived experiential fullness of the ipseity. In the various forms of empathic perception this ipseity is inseparably bound up with the properties displayed by the Other, because they determine the reasons for our interest. In the initial phase it is not yet determined what emotional stance or position-taking will unfold. Typically it is our interests and needs in respect to certain qualities that draws our attention. The Other is present in respect to her qualities as highlighted by our horizon of interest. But in love we go beyond the properties to the Other in her own unique self-awareness of her individual essence, and we delight and affirm this. And we do this while aspiring to delight and affirm this in terms of a common life, a new sphere of ownness. Love binds together the I’s in their unique self-affirmation in terms of a common will and life.

We are assigning to love, understood both in the very broad sense of empathic perception as well as in the more particular sense of affirming and delighting in
the reality of the transcendent ipseity of the Other, the power to fill in the gap that we sense in the widely accepted very Aristotelian position that individuals, at least those unique singularities we call persons, although indefinable, are not therefore unknowable. Rather they are known in a kind of intuition. The gap, however, is what precisely this intuition is because doubtless the forms, e.g., the specific kind, the personality type, etc., that accompany the individual do not account for what we know nor, pace Leibniz, can what we know be accounted for by a set of universal propositions.

Even though empathic perception presents the ipseity of the Other, this presence typically is subordinated to the interests in the qualities of the person as they emerge out of one’s situational horizon. At a basketball game such and such qualities are highlighted, whereas in a political debate quite others come to the fore; in an erotic context or a social gathering or wilderness area others will dominate. It is properly love which sustains the Other as beyond the qualities and it is love which casts the properties in the appropriate light, i.e., as belonging to the unique Other and as incommensurate with the unique essential fullness which is the Other as a good in herself.

Attending to the properties apart from this appropriate light is perhaps what the biblical injunction against “judging one another” is about. As Marcel put it, “The Thou shalt not judge of Christian morality must be viewed as one of the most important metaphysical formulae on earth. And it is in that sense that love necessarily places the being himself above all determinations of merit or lack of it.”

The question surfaces whether the person loved is beyond or above all determinations of merit or whether in love the presencing of the person makes the person’s presence unreasonable, unjustified, and a grace. We have earlier shown that ipseity is a unique essence lived non-ascriptively and therefore “present” as above all determinations of merit or lack of it. Therefore its presence is in this sense unreasonable, unjustified, and a grace.

Jankélévitch observes that it is in the non-reciprocal love for the enemy and for the one who is hateful where there appears the most acute form the surplus, the element “beyond measure,” referred to in “The Sermon on the Mount.” There is here something of an ambiguity, however. In the passages cited by Jankélévitch in Matthew 5: 38 ff., the norm for Jesus and his followers which effects a love for the enemy would seem to be the Father’s creative, gracious non-discriminating love (who “makes his sun rise on the evil and the good and sends rain on the just and on the unjust”). If this surplus refers to love’s creative generosity and exuberance and indifference to the unique ipseity beyond all qualities, then it does not illustrate love revealing the “beauty” of the ipseity beyond the ugly hatefulness. For the followers of Jesus the love which is charity will be often faith-filled, i.e., one acts lovingly in spite of charity’s inability to see more than the hatefulness and in this respect it will most resemble the Father’s creative, gracious, non-discriminating love. It is clear, however, that Jankélévitch does not want to suppress the unique ipseity as the target of love because he immediately moves his discussion in the direction of the familiar inability of the lover to give reasons for his love. (We will look at this soon in §19 below.) We must distinguish, on the one hand, an inability to give reasons because

§19 More on the Relation of the Qualities of the Person to the Ipseity

245
the ipseity is beyond properties or qualities (this sense of “reasons”) and, on the other, the inability to give reasons because of the irrelevance of reasons.

In either case love is a purely gracious, perhaps, on occasion, gratuitous, act for which the transcendence of the ipseity provides no antecedent sufficient intrinsic motive or reason for the love, i.e., the love is not for the sake of the loveable properties. In the latter case, where there is an irrelevance of reasons, the transcendent “beauty” of the ipseity is not revealed in the love but rather it is the creative love that brings about the beauty, perhaps by projecting it upon the Other or at least by blindly believing in its reality. In the former case of an inability to give reasons because the ipseity is beyond reasons it is this ipseity which both awakens and sustains the love. It might well be that in most cases of facing hatefulness the faith-based virtue of love called charity best emulates divine creative love in that it is creative and independent of any prior revelation of the ipseity, and it is this to which the Gospel passage (cited by Jankélévitch) refers to. But the philosophical consideration that the Other is loved not in respect to her properties offers the prospect that the enemy might be loved if the agent of love could get beyond the identification of the Other with the hateful properties. This always seemed the path of Gandhi.

The properties, of course, are not a matter of indifference for the many forms of social interaction, e.g., admiration, moral approbation, aesthetic delight, political endorsement, government and military screening, scholarly appraisal, beauty contests, body-building contests, athletic contests, etc. Yet often in such contexts there is an indifference to who has the qualities, i.e., generally, for the ones’ judging, whether in an official capacity or not, the qualities are of importance abstracted from whose properties they are. Thus, if there is a racial-ethnic profiling by the police, who fits this profile is not of consequence. If it is a matter of who is swiftest to be able to cross the one-hundred meter dash line first, it is a matter of indifference who this is. The matter is different with love. As we have said, the properties are not the target of love’s intention and typically they are loved precisely because they belong to the beloved.

Again, as McTaggart put it, “love may be because of qualities, it is never in respect of qualities.” Because the prior qualities have ceased to exist or have faded, love, in contrast to, e.g., admiration, justifies itself apart from that respective quality. The determining causal qualities which were perhaps decisive in my coming to love someone are not, when love has been established, the justification of love, but rather were only the means by which love came into being. Similarly, the love is not made unworthy because the “reason” I fell in love was seen eventually to be trivial.

In contrast, admiration or my stance of honoring someone becomes suspect if the grounds for which one admires or honors no longer obtain or are shown to be false. This is because most emotions, as valuing acts, like admiration or a stance of honoring, according to their essence are tied to specific characteristics. Similarly, my approving endorsement of someone is in respect of, e.g., her intelligence or courage; if these prove to be unfounded, and I know this, then my approving endorsement is reprehensible.

Husserl’s notion of profiles enables us to see how the target of what is appresented in love requires certain qualities (profiles) at least as an initial support (analogous to
the way the “cube” is present only through its sides and aspects of the sides). But, in contrast to the perceptual model of the cube, love’s target or “noema” is not dependent on the specific profiles remaining the same. The cube model holds for admiration of someone. If one reprehensible “side” of his character reveals itself it can call into question my apperception of the person as having integrity and can be the reason for the vanishing of my admiration; but in the case of love, if the beloved loses her beauty or if she loses her eloquence through an aneurism, and if these were “grounds of my love,” the love will not collapse. With the loss of certain qualities the admired person becomes no longer admired, but with the loss of distinctive qualities the beloved may still be loved. This is especially evident in the friend’s, lover’s or parent’s love when the beloved displays reprehensible qualities.

I believe it is misleading to say, in response to Pascal’s dilemma, that because the human being will never be devoid of qualities one might still love the person. Or that “under the worst of circumstances, the excellence of human nature, considered in actual existence and in relation to its end, would still be a perfect ground for loving a person without measure.” This seems in the first case to reduce love to admiration for qualities and, in the second case, to admiration of the specific-essential ground of the qualities, i.e., admiration for the excellence of human nature. Admiration for “human nature” cannot be the basis of or substituted for the love of someone. In such a case, the target of love would be, instead of the unique ipseity, collapsed to the universal form or essence. In this case of “under the worst of circumstances” there may still be a kind of admiration but it is not love. Consider how we may admire a beast or perhaps even a superhuman being because of the excellence of its kind, but this in no way amounts to the love of an ipseity. In the case of the human person, as we noted, with the vanishing of these qualities that served as the basis for admiration and the occasion for love, indeed the person seems to vanish, but love converges to a form of “pure” belief in and faithfulness to the unique essence that tenuously clings to this barely recognizable body.

The distinction made by McTaggart in regard to love’s target and the properties, i.e., that it is not in respect of the properties but may be because of them, helps us see how love in the proper sense evolves out of being attracted to certain properties which eventually may no longer be present. But the position verges on claiming that we love the other quite independently of the qualities or properties. Nussbaum shows the mystery or at least the messiness and obscurity of the matter in that some properties themselves seem to embody the unique ipseity and although the lover does not love the properties themselves abstracted from the person as if they were instantiable and repeatable quite from the ipseity, these unrepeatable properties nevertheless are so suffused with the unique person that one is tempted to name them “unique essential properties of the unique individual essence.” But does this mean then that with the beloved’s losing these properties the love also goes? The power of the McTaggart distinction is in its capacity to show that the answer must de facto and de jure be No.

If it is true that love is not essentially tied to characteristics but aims at the ipseity, it is not inappropriate for someone to continue to love someone who no longer has these features that originally were a cause for his being attracted to her or him.
Indeed, we might chide him for loving her when her failings are well known, i.e., for being blinded by his love, but his continuing to love her does not jeopardize the essential reality of the love. Further, it cannot be said that the love is for the sake of the reciprocal love or for happiness. It is notoriously the case that love persists when it both is unrequited and brings unhappiness. “The blues,” of course, may serve as evidence for this. Of course they perhaps also are evidence for a pathology like masochism. But they may often also be a witness to love’s intending what is beyond the qualities of the beloved, because often one “has the blues” precisely because the beloved has qualities that are harmful to the lover.

§20 Why One Loves, Why One Is Loved

Why persons love and fall in love is baffling. The least that can be said is that they, as when encountering great works of art or natural wonders, are fascinated, overwhelmed, and awed. At least initially there is a delight in what exists for itself and as an end in itself. In this connection, Abraham Maslow shares with us a text of St. Bernard of Clairvaux: “Love seeks no cause beyond itself and no limit; it is its own fruit, its own enjoyment. I love because I love; I love in order that I may love…”

The noema of love as well as the agency of loving have an intrinsic value, self-validation, and self-justification. Because this is so, we have an account of why lovers celebrate love (see our discussion of the Brownings below), and are moved to personify it as a god. This alone does not fully account for its “divine” effect in the lovers, i.e., its capacity to transform them so profoundly. But surely the experience of and participation in what has such obvious intrinsic value, given the instrumental and accidental values that pervade most of life, is bound to effect a change in the I-can of the persons so fortunate. St. Paul’s account in 1 Corinthians 13 of how love transforms and enlarges human capacities of course has a theological framework, but doubtless his readers can recognize in “earthly” love many of the same properties. Perhaps St. Bernard’s claim also accounts for how there surfaces occasionally the pathology whereby even those who have every reason to be wary can be hooked on love and falling in love. (See Iris Murdoch’s novel, The Black Prince.) Such a deviation is different from the kind of loving that arises from the deprivation of love and basic unmet needs. Having said this, it is doubtless true that in practice distinguishing the non-neurotic from the neurotic or pathological cases might be difficult from both the inner first-person perspective as well as the outer second- and third-person one. As we earlier noted, the purer love is, the more ready it is to let the Other flourish, even if this means absenting oneself from the scene. Further, if the beloved in no way awakens in one the wonder of one’s own ipseity, in no way energizes one morally and makes the pursuit of the all that is good and just a matter of course, but just the opposite, i.e., it depletes one’s moral energy and occasions the degradation of one’s self-esteem, the felt need to continue the “love” may be pathological. Indeed, in such a case we have good reason to doubt that what persists is love.
We are urging that love in the proper sense arises from the amazement at the
discovery of the unique ipseity of the Other. But what is there about this affirmation
of the Other that makes it this uniquely poignant and encompassing emotion? In
some cases this is to ask why is the ipseity of the other now present in a register of
superlatives, e.g., as magnificent, splendid, loveliest, dearest, most beautiful, etc.
Yet this is not always so, because often one loves “hopelessly,” as one says, someone
who, objectively regarded, is without these superlatives. One can think of nothing
else but the loved person, even though, on a reflective level, one recognizes that
the beloved is not exceptionally noble or beautiful. The answer we propose is
that love uncovers in a special way the incommensurate richness and depth of
the essence which each ipseity is. Thus while it is true to say that we do not love
people for the qualities they might possess, it is not always or necessarily true
that we love them “because we are living with them through a happy relation-
ship that we want to maintain,”84 as obviously important as this is. Without love,
e.g., when pulled by other emotions, the ipseity remains occluded. But why does an
individual essence or ipseity merit these superlatives?

There is no answer to this Why, if we are seeking reasons, qualities or
properties. For the lover the answer is simply the You, i.e., the other ipseity’s being is
transparently loveable and, basta!, that is that. Love is most appropriately carried out
in a silence in regard to the justification of the love. “If love were justifiable, it would
be prescribable.”85 A lover rejected in favor of another, might well say, “What do you
see in him that I haven’t got?” If she answers with a list of reasons, they are, as
Francis Jacques says, “more akin to hymns than to an explanatory narrative.” We have
said, and here too we are in agreement with Jacques, that love enables us to believe
in the existence of the other ipseity in all her otherness. Furthermore, as Jacques also
says, it indeed beautifies both the beloved and the lover.86 As we wish to put it, the
presence of the Other awakens in the core of the loving I a centering and gathering
act. (See Book 2, Chapter V §3.) However it does so, it would seem, because it
reveals the unique essence of each to each. Why this unique essence becomes
revealed, which is the correlate of why love happens, in some instances and not in
others remains a mystery. A phenomenon of interest in this regard is one which we
find in the world’s religions in regard to the extraordinary ability to love that charac-
terizes some “saints” and how this saintly love appears to be revelatory of the unique
splendor of everyone’s ipseity. Here for the saint, love and its unique revelations
are a commonplace event not a rarity, even though, to the outsider, this is tied to the rare
personage of the saint. This is expressed in Christian theology’s exhortation to make
of love, (caritas, agape), an abiding disposition, a virtue, and that this is, as the New
Testament taught, the root, form, heart and sine qua non of the Christian life. This is
all brought out nicely in Dostoevsky especially in his presentation of Prince Myshkin
in The Idiot. Perhaps we may say with Bakhkin that the saintly Prince’s deep compas-
sion and love is such that he cannot enter into the fleshliness of life which permits
him to occupy a specific place, have specific fleshly relations, and thereby crowd
others out of that place. In this sense the saint remains tangential to what the rest of
us regard as real life, in this sense “idiotic.” “But precisely for that reason is he able
to ‘penetrate’ through the life-flesh of other people and reach their deepest ‘I’.”87
But apart from the context of the problem or mystery of religious faith and apart from what we must, in any case, regard as the anomalous if not mysterious phenomenon of the saint, why the splendor of the unique ipseity is revealed only in some instances and not in others remains a problem if not a mystery.

Our basic “explanation” is that it is love that reveals the unique incomparably estimable ipseity. This accounts for both the thrill of being loved, being in love, and even the addiction to falling in love. Can it be that the first time someone, besides our parents and siblings, loves us, we believe we are loved for no other reason than because the person has perceived something of the essential beauty of our ipseity? Do we see in the eyes of the one we believe to truly love us not only a wondrous love that is not for the sake of anything else than ourselves but also we see something of the essential beauty of our essences which even we manage to keep hidden from us? Is there not here a parallel to what indexical self-reference and non-reflexive self-awareness achieve, i.e., an awareness of oneself as oneself without being aware of oneself as anything except oneself, but a parallel wherein the ipseity is moved to rejoice in herself as herself without having to take account of anything else but herself? We thus approach the conviction that it is only in the presence of one who can see the full beauty of ourselves that we can come to discover who we truly are.88

This circle of issues is suggested in a poem by W.B. Yeats, “Before the World Began.” Here a woman is cosmetically sculpting her facial appearance before a mirror, explaining that “I’m looking for the face I had/ Before the world was made.” She then asks the reader to imagine if she were to look on a man “as though my beloved,” but in such a way that her blood would be cold and heart unmoved. She reasons that although it might seem reasonable for him to think that she is cruel or that she has betrayed him, yet her purpose would be to “have him love the thing that was/ Before the world was made.”89 Here we might see buried an insight into oneself as having a core self bereft of properties and that she, looking upon the man as her beloved, would have him love her similarly, i.e., quite apart from her contingent features. Or she would have him love the face or person she herself is looking for that is not identical with and in some way transcendent to the features she presently has. When one thinks of Yeats’ affinity for Plotinus and Neo-Platonism, this interpretation perhaps becomes more plausible.

But why this splendor of the ipseity is brought to light so rarely, as in the cases of the lover and the saint, why it is not always and everywhere manifest then becomes the question. To this we answer it is the work of the moral constitution of the person to bring to light the irrefutable radiance of ipseity by transforming herself into the sort of person that coincides with her intrinsic essential dignity and true self. To show this is the burden of Book 2. But even here it is clear that there are epistemic presuppositions for recognizing the inherent beauty of the ipseity in the manifest coincidence of the intrinsic essential dignity of the ipseity with the person as this beautiful sort of person. The basic presupposition again is love. Love alone reveals who one truly is. Yet in this latter case the love in question is not the more spontaneous love that is inseparable from eros; it is one in which self-interest is not in play.
This is merely to repeat that why one loves is puzzling. Why one loves, as Yves Simon has proposed, is “best answered – if this can be called an answer – by pointing to what is unique and unutterable about a person.” Simon cites Montaigne: “Beyond all my discourse and whatever I can say distinctly about it, I do not know what unexplainable and overwhelming force is instrumental in such a union.”

Montaigne stated further: “If I am entreated to say why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed except by answering ‘Because it was he, because it was I.’” This point of Montaigne captures the sense of exquisiteness and poignancy. It further suggests that there is symmetry between the basic if usually unexpressed wonder at being who one is and the amazement at loving this other Who. As one cannot give an answer to the question, Why am I who I am (a different question than Why am I what I am), so when pressed why I love this person, the lover is a priori certain that no inventory of qualities will give him his love or account for his love.

The wonder at being who one is compounds the difficulty of answering why one would be loved at all. Further, who one is, over and above these properties, itself is not something one has merited or created. My individual essence is not at all of my doing and nothing I can do enhances or detracts from it. Here is a deeper sense in which being loved seems to be miraculous. Not only is there, strictly speaking, no reason to be loved as the “I myself” who exists as transcendent to these reasons or properties, but, furthermore, inherent within oneself there is no agency evident that accounts for either one’s being or who one is, and no justification for one’s being or one’s being who one is: we are given to ourselves pure and simply. Who we are is a fact; that is the datum which is given to us.

A persistent feature of love narratives is that the one who is loved is astonished at the grace of being loved. The beloved may ask repeatedly, “Do you love me?” “Why do you love me?” in part because she finds it incredible and wants to be reassured. That is, the beloved is keenly aware of herself as being more than her qualities, more than her achievements. Further she usually has a sense of these not only being small enough in her own eyes and probably in the eyes of others, but her qualities are far less than what she desires to have or have accomplished. She further is aware that most appreciative emotional stances are founded on qualities and that these are ephemeral and that the comparisons with the qualities of Others are invidious. To be loved for these alone, as fleeting and dubious as they are, may well mean that one is not loved at all. And yet being loved only for oneself, given the predilection to show affection only on the basis of one’s qualities or merits, seems incredible. (“Neurosis” may be thought of as the wound left for never having been loved for oneself except on condition of having certain qualities; it is the festering sore of all members of an “achievement society” who are “somebody” if and only if they achieve and produce.)

Thus love’s justification is not dependent on any properties in the beloved. The beloved himself is “the reason.” At least initially, this is not a teleological structure in the sense that the beloved himself is that on account of which the person is loved. Yet when one seeks to give a reason for one’s love one does not rest among the properties, but rather the properties appear eventually the way they do because they
are the properties of the beloved. In this sense, as we have noted, the beloved becomes that on account of which the properties are appreciated.

Again, it is baffling why people love and fall in love. In any other emotion, if the quality in respect to which the person is so regarded is found to be missing, the emotion loses its justification. But sometimes the lover cannot find even any cause for the love. He babbles: “Because it was he, because it was I.” In this case we do not condemn the love, as we would condemn, e.g., an esteem or admiration which would be sustained in the absence of the founding qualities.92

Elizabeth Barrett Browning grasps that to be loved for one’s qualities means that, in an essential sense, the lover may not love the beloved herself. Yet she is astonished that Robert loves her for no qualities and thus for no reason, i.e., for no reason other than “because” he loves her. What does this “because” mean here? What seems undeniable is that here love is a fact that includes its own ground or cause, and as long as it does this, it lays claim to an immortal existence.93 And after wrestling with the question of what is reasonable here she states that she and Robert are in agreement that he loves her in respect of nothing at all, and his having no reason to love her is the only way for him not to appear unreasonable.94

This interpretation seems to evacuate love of its intentional object, i.e., the other ipseity, in so far as love itself seems to be a self-grounding and to be itself what is loved. Yet the Brownings’ celebration of love is not meant to detract from one another as if love were a substance in itself for which the lovers were accidents or properties and which, as itself a non-personal substance, was indifferent to the lovers – a position to which Karl Jaspers and Francis Jacques implicitly seem to incline. Rather love is elevated to its station as self-grounding precisely because the activity of love is intrinsically valuable or loveable and because the lovers find nothing, i.e., no reasons in terms of qualities or properties in the beloved, to found their love on. In this sense the ipseties appear as “nothing at all.” But, again, clearly the non-ascriptive feature of the ipseties is not a nihil negativum. Who could say that, having read the exchanges and love poetry of the Brownings?

The situations of the sinner participating in the sacrament of penance and the client in psychotherapy share some similarity with that of the beloved. The sinner needing forgiveness and the typical client in an experiential, client-centered psychotherapeutic situation both believe themselves to be affirmed not in respect to anything that they have achieved or any quality they display. Rather there is no respect in which they have merited such an affirmation and they thus are affirmed and welcomed without regard to merit or qualities as conditions. They are met with an “unconditional positive regard.” (Obviously this is a “manner of speaking” in therapy compared to the theological situation.) This unconditional affirmation itself is the condition for their finding a new beginning and new space in which to appear to themselves.

The infant’s smiling gracious expectation and acceptance of the love of the parents, family, and friends, perhaps adumbrates the adult beloved’s self-discovery in being loved: a delight in the sheer being oneself and being given to oneself without meriting one’s being or meriting the others’ rejoicing in one’s being.
§21 “Ontological Value” of Ipseity

We have been proposing that the personal beauty or dignity is inseparable from and not properly a property of the ipseity. We can pursue this seemingly odd claim with the help of Dietrich von Hildebrand in his distinction between “qualitative value” and “ontological value.”5 Values typically are regarded as properties of things. They may be divided into the value-qualities that are proper to a common field or family of values, like the domains of the moral, the intellectual or the aesthetic. These values are to be distinguished from “ontological value” which is foremost to be assigned to the human person.

The first distinction is that in the qualitative, e.g., moral, values, we find a negative counterpart, a disvalue, to the positive value. Thus, to humility we find the opposite of pride. But in regard to the dignitas of the person there is no such antithetical disvalue. “There is no contrary antithesis to a person, but only a contradictory one, such as the non-existence of a person.” The non-existence is not the equivalent of a disvalue.

The second distinction is to be found in the consideration that the qualitative values of the person, e.g., her being just or humble, are clearly properties or essences which, as such, can be participated in by many and in this respect enjoy a kind of independence from the one who bears them. The very fact that we have proper names for the persons and a common name for these values suggests these latter have a kind of communicability and in this sense we may consider them as something existing on their own apart from the person who has them. In contrast, what we intend in regard to the dignitas or preciousness of the person has no such common name; rather our mind is directed to the person herself whom we refer to with a proper name, and here we do not have in mind a communicable eidos but the unique person herself. The “ontological value” is inseparable from the person, and we cannot be tempted to say that the person participates in the dignitas in the way we might be tempted to say that she participates in the moral values of justice or mercy.

A third distinction is to be found in relationship to humility. There is a sense in which the beauty of virtues requires that they be not a matter of the person’s own regard and self-reflection. In fact, most often such a reflexivity corrodes their beauty and corrupts the virtue. In the case of the ontological value of one’s dignity such oblivion is uncalled for, indeed, it is out of place. Indeed, we will point to a kind of ineluctable love of one’s “ontological value” (in Book 2, Chapter V, §§8). Von Hildebrand relates this (as we will also do later in the final two chapters of Book 2) to the theological theme of imago dei.

A fourth consideration is that the qualitative values come and go; they are not necessary to the being of the person, not even her dignitas. But the ontological value of the dignitas is necessary and permanent: As long as the person exists she has this “ontological value” and there is no possibility of losing it. Even her having pernicious moral disvalues cannot efface this “ontological value.”

A fifth distinction is to be found between the qualitative values, where there are degrees of perfection, i.e., degrees of wit, humility, patience, etc. displayed by
persons; but in the case of the ontological value, there is no such gradation; there is no higher ontological dignity in one person than another.

A sixth distinction is that the qualitative values are typically, as in the moral, intellectual, and aesthetic values – along with those of body culture and achievement – a result of the free agency of the person. In contrast the “ontological value,” what we have called the \textit{dignitas} or beauty of the person, is realized simply in the existence of the person – quite apart from any achievement.

Von Hildebrand insists that the ontological value may not be reduced to what we are calling the ipseity; values always remain properties of things. Yet he notes that “the ontological value is so much embodied in a being, so much included in it, that we are tempted to form one concept embracing the whole – the specific being as well as its value – while the transcendence of moral [qualitative] values [to the ipseity], on the contrary, presses us to form a concept of the objective importance as such [i.e., regard them as eidetic properties].”

Given our basic theses that in empathic presencing and its fulfillment in love we have a non-ascriptive presencing of the ipseity of the Others, we have insisted on regarding the “being as well as its value” as “the whole” and not to see the splendor or \textit{dignitas} of the person as a property. Rather the \textit{dignitas} or “ontological value,” as we see it is not an aspect of the ipseity, not a part at all, but is wholly pervasive of the person. Further, the ipseity is what is targeted by love and thus we enjoy the non-sortal presence of the beloved, who it is who bears and receives the value qualities. The ipseity is targeted beyond the qualities, and her unique splendor is what gives to the properties or qualities the beloved has the unique loveableness they enjoy. As the beloved can affirm her “ontological value” as intrinsically important in herself – an importance that is inseparable from her being – so the lover’s love reveals and affirms this. This non-ascriptive self-affirmation as well as its belief-filled affirmation in the lover, of course, found the distinctive value ascriptions. As one ought to rejoice in one’s being oneself so the lover necessarily rejoices in this beloved’s self and in her rejoicing in herself. We return to this matter of the “ontological value” or \textit{dignitas} of the person below in Chapter VI, §7 and in Book 2, Chapter V, §8.

§22 Love and Politics

As Hannah Arendt has taught, forgiveness was introduced into politics by Jesus of Nazareth. It is what breaks the cycle of violence and enables a new beginning. Yet Arendt also seemed to think that forgiveness was a kind of political pragmatics, and therefore separable from love. Let us review some of the issues.

Forgiveness may appear as an amnesty or as a peace treaty. In this respect it may permit a new beginning. Here one acts as if the past crimes no longer mattered in terms of the present and future relations. They are “forgotten” and one lets “bygones be bygones.” But in such cases it is not clear at all that forgiveness really happens. On the contrary, we propose that forgiveness itself is rooted in love’s insight into the Other’s
It is the appreciation of this “ontological value” that enables us both to rejoice in the Other’s change of heart as well as not belittle what he might have done.

It would seem that in so far as forgiveness is aimed at beginning anew with the guilty party, the latter must express recognition of his reprehensible acts and seek forgiveness. He may not ask that the past be obliterated from the Other’s memory, but he can hope that it not undermine the new beginning. The one forgiving may remind herself that she too has stood in need of forgiveness and that she wants to be forgiven even as she forgives. She may even forgive because she knows that her life will continue to be crippled spiritually unless she forgives. But if forgiveness aims at a new beginning with the offender it makes little sense to forgive someone who at that very moment continues to brutalize and is only disdainful of forgiveness. Forgiveness here makes little sense, but it still might be not merely the best strategy given certain circumstances, but the noblest act that could be performed at the moment.

“Father, forgive them for they know not what they do” is a difficult saying of Jesus, quoted of him just before he died of a crucifixion for actions and teachings which were perceived by authorities as seditious. Did Jesus really believe that the mob and the executioners, both of which were contemptuous of him and his forgiveness, were acting out of ignorance of what they were doing? Yet to the extent that the offensive activity is truly done out of inculpable ignorance the issue of forgiveness becomes irrelevant. Our typical moral judgment teaches us that it is fitting, even in some cases a duty, to pardon or excuse someone who does something inadvertently, even if this be difficult. Retribution for an accident certainly seems inappropriate precisely if the person neither knew what he was doing nor was there any question of intent. If there was inculpable ignorance, then anyone in his shoes would have done it, including those tempted to condemn him.

 Forgiveness does not seem to be of the same order as the convention or duty to excuse; it is more of a miracle or grace, and has to do with an evil act that was done responsibly, i.e., knowingly. The Gospel authors seemed to think of those responsible for Jesus’ death as guilty of slaying an innocent person. But did Jesus? Perhaps Jesus’ cry for forgiveness is his adopting the best attitude under the circumstances. That is, it may be Jesus practicing what he preached: Do not judge. In which case, it would be basically a resolve not to judge what appears as sinful, and simply leaving up to God to judge such matters. But then it becomes hard to assume that the Father would need to be counseled on this matter. This raises the question of whether there are acts where there is no question of exculpating ignorance, inadvertence, etc., perhaps like raping children and mass murder, which typically can never only appear to be sinful. Then clearly the issue becomes again whether anyone is in a position to judge the person on the basis of his being responsible for his hardness of heart, ignorance, dullness of perception, etc.

In any case, if forgiveness occurs in the wake of a horrendous brutal deed to oneself or a loved one, and if one really is prepared to embrace a new beginning with this person, the person must be perceived as more than this deed. This, we are claiming, is precisely what love achieves. It displays the “ontological value,” the
inherent dignity. And if one forgives the person who continues to violate one’s person or that of a loved one, as Jesus did, there would seem to have to be some “eschatological” framework where such forgiveness would make sense, i.e., a radically different setting in which one could begin anew with that person or in which one could see into the hearts in a way that humans cannot. This is because, given the present circumstances, there appears to be no way in which, at the present, such a common life living toward the future could be formed.

The gratitude and amazement at being loved for oneself in one’s unique ipseity and not for any properties one has, means that, in the course of the life of love, love paradoxically fosters solitude. One can nurture and, to a certain extent, fulfill this apparently most communal of things, which love is, only when the solitude of each of the lovers is nurtured.98 This solitude, of course, is founded in and a cherishing of one’s ownness. Love confirms and celebrates us in our single individuality and ownness and can only be sustained if this essential solitude flourishes in the life together. Precisely because love’s unfolding communion has its condition in a mutual and unbridgeable solitude, it brings an incomparable danger, joy, urgency, intimacy and strangeness. When a relationship’s breakdowns and breakups occur, one’s solitude can be so disturbed that one is tempted to generalize and believe that each is unapproachable and unknowable except through self-deceiving fantasies and projections.99

As Hannah Arendt has taught, love is to be regarded as apolitical if we take the polis to be the space that is held open by our civic virtue by which we make room for every one to appear. The polis is made possible by a basic civic readiness to clear the space in which the excellences of the fellow citizens and the excellences of their viewpoints can become manifest. The medium is speech which gives good reasons and is well-crafted to move to act for the common good; the medium also is the exemplarity of the way these citizens act in ways which promote the common good.

Love as such moves beyond the public personal excellences and common goods to the ipseity which transcends these. This, of course, is not to say that there is no affection, compassion, or benevolence in politics. Nor, pace Arendt, is it to say that love belongs in a private sphere tied to biological necessity which is bereft of freedom and grace. Nor does it belong to a private sphere in the same sense as non-intentional feelings and pains do. The non-publicity of feeling, e.g., pain, removes us from one another and the world; the non-publicity and essential solitude of love establishes a union of the radically distinct ipseities. This union has its basis the ipseities that are beyond properties and the properties that are tied to the unique ipseity; both the unique ipseities and the unique properties are revealed only in the non-public disclosure of love. This disclosure is quite different from the sunlight of “for us all” of reason giving, whether scientific or political or commonsensical.

The power of love, especially that of “being in love,” is such that it may create an alternative world of significance that is not in sync with that of the world shared by us all, especially in matters of public reasons for one’s agency. In this case, the reasons for one’s actions are to be found in one’s love which has to do with a special world of lovers (a sub-world or a special province of meaning) not shared with others. This becomes dramatic in the tension between moral matters and love. For example, the beloved’s weakness of character, as in acts of injustice that he
may perpetrate, do not appear in the sunlight of what appears for us all but rather they appear without these sharp contours because they appear in the world of moonshine and shadows created by love. Thus in this lovers’ world there may be a suspension of the ethical, analogous to the suspension of the ethical in religion (as in Abraham of *Genesis* and Arjuna in the *Bhagavad-Gita*). Both suspensions have their justifications from within their perspectives or worlds. But by definition, the romantic suspension of the ethical knows or apperceives a perspective where remorse about the love-world is possible and critique justified.

Another way of putting this is to say that the world of the lovers is within the World as the ultimate horizon of experience. The religious suspension of the ethical by definition establishes itself in such a way that actually inhabiting a perspective transcendent to it is impossible. It defines itself in terms of inhabiting the absolutely ultimate horizon of experience which of necessity frames all other worlds, and therefore it frames the ethical by casting it in a new light.

Like the religious person, the lover too may confess to having no regrets at participating in the unique world, i.e., in his case the one created by love, even though now, after the spell has past and the cloud lifted, he may regret his blindness. If Abraham or Arjuna, who exemplarily suspended the ethical for the religious, were subsequently to have remorse, either one, it seems, would regret absolutely his having participated in the enchantment that suspended the ethical. His new found commitment to “atheism” would not permit him to find any saving beauty or grace; he would judge it all to have been a regrettable hideous delusion, at least as unacceptable as having loved and devoted oneself to a clone, instead of to one’s true love.

As Nussbaum has pointed out, love is subversive because it removes us from the basic forms of give and take of our public life in common; and in so far as these are brought to light by reason, love seems “inappropriate to our highest humanity.” Yet love’s subversiveness is precisely that it highlights the unique inviolability of the person in a way that typical political, i.e., statist, forms of the common life, which it seems are the zenith in the political arrangements to which our modern “highest humanity” has been able to reach, do not. The modern liberal state officially celebrates pluralism within the context of corporate capitalism and economic oligarchy. In such a framework the basis for respect and dignity is measurable merit, achievement, and power. As a result genuine pluralism is in great danger. The secret ipseity who each is, is the foundation of any pluralism and any theory of human rights founded on intrinsic human dignity. The reverence for each that is implicit in the empathic presencing of the other is the foundation of this. But love is the distinctive stance that foremost secures this reverence. Founding the social arrangement in rights is eo ipso adversarial, and community and a political “we” is a possible but not essential development. This is true whether the rights are proclaimed to be founded in human nature or bestowed by the fiat of the state. The “we” of love is founded on the unique inviolable ipseities that create a common will from below which itself becomes the source of the life together in terms of common and public goods. Such a life is free of what is imposed from above. For participants in such a social setting love and its “we” are thought to be anything but “inappropriate to our highest humanity.”
Rightly or wrongly there seems to be a broad consensus that such “eupotopian” social arrangements are, although conceptually possible, pragmatically impossible. Further, given the difficulty of genuinely loving anyone and a fortiori the difficulty of loving strangers, it seems that the consensus is the best we can hope for, in indefinitely large political arrangements of large populations, is the establishment and inculcation through laws, as the illumination and definition of rights, of the basic, relatively abstract, respect for the neighbors and strangers which empathic presencing itself begins to awaken. Thereafter, competition in the free market of commodities, where merit and value inevitably are thought to rise to the top. Yet if this be so, it is worth noting that this respect, and in this sense political friendship, is quite independent of the rational public realm of reasons and its give and take, and its criteria of fairness and equity. This is because the very presence of the face of the other requires that the respect be bestowed without the person having merited it. The dignity of the other ipseity goes in advance and is independent of any achievement of anyone’s “higher humanity.”

Yet there is increasingly in large swaths of the nations of the world evidence of a personal and institutional incapacity to acknowledge this dignity and to feel this basic respect, as basic as the respect for reason, in part because of the present primacy of the rights to compete within the free market and to be free from concerns of the common good and community. Such prioritizing has resulted in the most extreme forms of commodification of persons, i.e., massive economic slavery. One thinks immediately of the sweatshops throughout the world which enable the “developed countries” to buy the fruits of slave labor at “bargain” prices.

Further, I think in particular of the chaos called forth by the hope of enormous wealth through the ravenous pursuit of energy sources (as in good parts of Africa) and the risky investment policies made with loopholes in the world stockmarkets, such as the prime mortgage rate lending practices. Such forms of gambling and piracy are old, and as a rule it is the poor who suffer most from such practices, even when they do not result immediately in economic crises. Yet we find in the “cradles of democracy” massively punitive criminal justice systems, unparalleled class hierarchy, and a thoroughly entrenched economic oligarchy. In the USA, such domestic policies go hand in hand with a religious patriotic zeal and quest for empire carried out for the most part by tax system that does very little for individual safety and security nets for the most vulnerable. Rather the greater part of the public treasury goes to the pursuit of the imperial interests of the oligarchy through development of weapons systems, bribes and extortions from the underclasses to do the military work of empire, and through the establishment of lavishly rewarded private mercenary armies. That this is increasingly the norm after a few generations or so is alarming for only a surprisingly small number of citizens.

§23 Conclusion with the Help of a Foil

The theory of love proposed here, which follows closely that of McTaggart, is tied to a phenomenology of oneself and the Other. It has a helpful foil in the theory of Irving Singer which takes issue with McTaggart. If one holds that love loves the
person “as the unique combination of his properties,” as does Singer, then love must love the other not only “because of the qualities,” but also “in respect of all his qualities.” For Singer such a view would have surely more merit than the view which he ascribes to McTaggart which would think of love as “a bare union of selves who are conscious only of each other’s abstract personhood.”

The view we are proposing in this work does not hold love to entail a consciousness of exclusively the bare particular which each ipseity is even though, as we shall see in Chapter V, §3, because the basic sense of what “you” and “I” refer to is myself as myself apart from knowing anything else about myself, this referent is a bare particular substance. Love, we have insisted is always directed at the ipseity through the personal qualities. And the “through” here is not meant to suggest that there is no delight in the qualities, only that they are not the terminal target.

We have distinguished the pure “bare” ipseity from the person who indeed is the totality made of properties and that through which one loves the ipseity who has these properties. But therefore we cannot simply say with Singer that the one whom one loves is “a unique combination of his properties,” regardless of how one determines the relations of the parts to the whole and the wholes to the parts. Yet if this foil merely states that one loves someone’s qualities and achievements as they belong to the unique person, not as if they might just as well belong to someone else, the positions draw near. But to the extent that the uniqueness of this person is the equivalent of the unique bundle or cluster of properties, it appears to imply that if the “unique” combination were able to find a substitute or be duplicated I would indeed love without hesitation or a sense of having been deceived the substitute person, i.e., I would love the cluster of qualities regardless of to whom they belong because this “to whom” is nothing but this unique combination of properties.

Irving Singer agrees with McTaggart that love may well be because of the qualities of another, or as he puts it, because we “appraise one another affirmatively.” Yet the act of love is distinguished by being also an “act of bestowal,” a valuation whereby we create value which supplements and sometimes overrides our attitudes of appraisal. The beloved acquires this value by the gratuitous act of the lover’s bestowal of value. Singer here touches on what is the core aspect in our theory as well as his. He says the beloved acquires this value by virtue not of anything he has merited but by virtue of “being whatever he is.” (He does not say “whoever he is.”) To “bestow” love on persons themselves is to give them a value that “goes beyond their ability to satisfy any individual or objective need (apart from the need to love, which may be the basis to the rest).”

We thus see here the point where Irving comes close to McTaggart’s theory. Singer too holds that love requires more than the “appraisal” or the attractive properties even though these may well be the cause or occasion for the bestowal of that value which is more than the esteeming of the properties. In this sense the qualities may be a necessary condition but are never the necessary and sufficient condition of love. Yet Singer believes that McTaggart errs by sacrificing the appraisal to the bestowal and by holding that the strength of the love is independent of the qualities – it is “the bare union of selves conscious only of their abstract personhood.” McTaggart, and by implication any work, like the present one, which follows him in this respect, errs by holding that love’s own justification can never be condemned whatever qualities the person may have.
Singer therefore holds that it is wrong to say that love never aims at the qualities. Indeed he argues that they are of necessity aimed at as the qualities belonging to the loved person. Whether or not McTaggart agrees, we certainly agree with such a formulation. But we must distinguish between the claim that love aims at the qualities alone and love aims at the qualities as belonging to the person. This goes back to whether the person is a bundle of properties, a view which neither I nor McTaggart hold – nor does Singer necessarily if we may move him to distinguish the personal core having the properties from the constellation of properties themselves, a move which he, however, would resist.

Singer’s view that love can be condemned is correct if “whom” (i.e., “what”) one loves is a bundle of properties and if these negative qualities are harmful for the parties involved. But we have argued and will continue to argue against the bundle theory of the person. Further Singer is correct that it is wrong to say that love can never be condemned if what love is, over and above the appraisal or positive attitude toward the qualities of the person, is a mere creative bestowal of value on the beloved. Singer is clearly right that in what we call love, as in “falling in love” and the early stages of “being in love,” there is the lamination of one’s creative imagined ideals on the beloved. But, as we noted, to the extent that we have love in its essence here in play there is of necessity a doxastic thesis, i.e., love posits the reality of the otherness of the Other, and this accounts for the bitterness in the subsequent realization that one has deceived oneself in such narcissistic states as “being in love.”

We can agree with the criticism made of Singer that if the gratuitous creative bestowal of value on the beloved is the essential feature of love, then it is hard to see how love would ever be a loving of the person herself. In fact, the theme of love as having the capacity to reveal the unique ipseity of the other appears both to be affirmed and denied in Singer’s account. It is affirmed in so far as love has to do with more than the attractive properties which one uncovers and indeed the bestowal of values is said to have to do with the person in herself (see below). It is denied in so far as love as mere gratuitous bestowal is a mere lamination of imagined value on top of the unique constellation of values. As such it is a surplus value that moves the beloved into a category of special preference. And this special preference is what makes of the person the beloved – but as a sheer bestowal of the surplus value it is a preference of the imagined values one prefers, and is thus a preference of oneself, a love of oneself.

Singer explicitly rejects the view that the individual ipseity or soul has infinite value regardless of what anyone thinks of it. This, he believes is a claim not open to “empirical verification.” Throughout this work we make a claim proximate to the view that the soul has infinite value regardless of what anyone thinks of it and we attempt to muster phenomenological support for the transcendental dimension of the ipseity and urge the proposal that this transcendental dimension gives to the “myself” a status which is incommensurable with whatever is open to “empirical verification.” Yet we also attempt more specific discussions of the dignity of the persons we encounter in the second- and third-person. (See, e.g., §21 above and below, Book 1, Chapter VI, §7.)
Singer’s own position serves as a good foil for our discussion of love because it acknowledges the love goes beyond the positive qualities and wrestles with what there is in addition to the “appraisal” of the attractive qualities. We have ourselves wrestled with this surplus which we claimed is tied to a kind of believing celebratory affirmation of the ipseity. He further sees that there is something gratuitous, if not gracious, in the act of love which accounts for how it goes beyond the positive estimation of the qualities and how both the beloved and lover can find love to be wonderful, if not miraculous. He rightly points out that the person with “loveable” qualities makes love easier, even though he has difficulty making sense of love persisting in the absence of these qualities or how we might admire its presence in, e.g., saints, who love in the face of what is ugly and repugnant, and find “something” else “there,” i.e., they find someone there who is not inherently ugly and repugnant. In short, Singer’s important discussions of love as “bestowal” tend to suppress love’s power to be revelatory.

Nevertheless, we cannot leave the matter in simply this way because he insists that “the person acquires this gratuitous value by being whatever he is.” If he said “whoever he is” we would agree completely. But even as it stands love appears to display the being of the person regardless of the qualities. Singer also claims that love as bestowal is an “acceptance of the beloved in herself,” i.e., a disclosure of the person who has the qualities in herself. This admission surely draws our positions together. It points to what we also called the moment of “complacency” or delight in the beloved that is presupposed by all eros and which founds the contemplative aspects of love. Acceptance of the beloved in herself cannot be a mere gratuitous creative bestowal of value laminated on top of the ipseity but a revelation of her as loveable in herself. This we have said is part of the affirmation of love: It is a celebration of the other’s inherent dignity. It is this which accounts, among other things, for another phenomenon that he acknowledges in spite of his bundle theory of the person, namely that we can love personal qualities precisely because they belong to the person.

Singer’s theme of gratuitous bestowal indirectly confirms the view here argued for, namely that the beloved ipseity is disclosed in her beauty, albeit through the mediation of the personal qualities, but only as what is “metaempirical” (Jankélévitch). That is so because what founds the non-sortal singularity, namely the Other person’s self-presence, is not given to us in a filled intention, but rather the appresenting empty intention can only be filled with a unique kind of faith, one that at the same time is celebratory.

Our discussion with Singer makes clear the inseparability of the phenomenology of love from the phenomenology of subjectivity. His formulations seem to depart from the points of agreement where his theory of subjectivity slides toward a bundle theory of being or substance and where valuation slides into a gratuitous bestowal of value and not a display of what is valuable.

Let us conclude by recalling that love is self-sustaining and self-justifying and seems to have a perpetuity attached to it, even when the original “reasons” have vanished. Therefore one can desire, especially if one knows oneself to be growing
increasingly removed from the original grounds of attraction, indeed as one approaches the vulnerability of illness and old age and the customary ugliness of death, not only that one not be loved for any characteristics one might have or have had, but that one be loved for the sake of the love which both the lover and the beloved have for one another and which reveals the unique one each is to each. Here again is Elizabeth Barrett Browning:

If thou must love me, let it be for nought
Except for love’s sake only. Do not say
‘I love her for her smile – her look – her way
Of speaking gently, – for a trick of thought
That falls in well with mine, and certes brought
A sense of pleasant ease on such a day’ –
For these things in themselves, Belovèd, may
Be changed, or change for thee, – and love so wrought,
May be unwrought so. Neither love me for
Thine own dear pity’s wiping my cheeks dry, –
A creature might forget to weep, who bore
Thy comfort long, and lose thy love thereby!
But love me for love’s sake, that evermore
Thou mayst love on, through love’s eternity.110

Love is the revelation of the beloved as affirmable in her- or himself. It is this which leads the lover to see and say that she is incomparably lovely and beautiful. Regardless of whatever “causes” or “occasions” that launch the emotion, love aims at the unique ipseity which appears sufficient in itself and not in need of any justification. Love involves a rich apperception of the other which aspires to be a generous encompassing apprehension of the other in her or his total concretion. Because of the richness of the revelation achieved by love, love itself can be apperceptually loved and celebrated – as in the Brownings. Nevertheless, the Other is essentially transcendent to all the manifest evident qualities that make up this concretion. For the lover, the beloved’s ipseity is essentially a disclosure of a presence that is pervaded by absence. In spite of the baffling embodiment in some perhaps trivial “reasons” invented perhaps by imagination fired by eros the beloved’s presence remains essentially transcendent. Whereas this bedazzlement may seem to be in fact an enormous encompassing concretion, time may show the alleged “reason” for one’s love in fact to be a blinding and perhaps detracting abstraction.

In Book 2, Chapter V, §§3–4 we will round out this sketch of love by attending to how it brings to light the core of the I-ness of the lover, what we will name Existenz.
Notes

3. Castañeda, *Thinking, Language, and Experience*, 69. As transcendental phenomenology extends "I" beyond the aspect "myself as myself," and in this respect denies the ephemerality of "I" and gives to it a wider scope, so Levinas appears to extend a sense of the second-person beyond the indexical you and conceives it to be an a priori constituent ingredient of I-consciousness. (We will not wrestle explicitly with this important topic in this work.)
5. See Eugene Gendlin, e.g., “A Theory of Personality Change,” in *Personality Change*. Ed. P. Worchel and D. Byrne (New York: Wiley, 1964); and *Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1962). Also, Husserl, *Husserliana* XX/II, especially 74–77, but all of Nr. 2 and the appendices; cf. also *Husserliana* XX/I, 85ff. As is well known Husserl wrote reams of working papers in short-hand, and only in the later years did he envisage that someone would read these. Life for him was philosophy and philosophy was doing phenomenology. And this was foremost first-person reflection on bringing the phenomenon to light by saying what one means through writing it down and checking it against *das dunkle Etwas*, and occasionally against the reactions of his students and colleagues. Doing the checking against *das dunkle Etwas* was less addressing an interlocutor than it might seem for those standing around, even though they themselves might have thought the situation was obviously and appropriately one of dialogue. One cannot say that Husserl's phenomenology was anti-dialogical, but the basic process of reflection on the bringing to light of what one means to say was reflection on what genuine communication presupposed. This viewpoint leaves undecided whether dialogue may not well be a superior means of explicating *das dunkle Etwas* than monologue. Even it if is superior, it is so because it better facilitates the explication *des dunklen Etwas*.
6. Some "interlocutors" of Husserl complained that they eventually seemed to become invisible for him.
7. See Adolf Reinach, *Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts* (Munich: Kösel, 1913/1953), especially 37ff. Cf. my discussion in *The Person and the Common Life*, 247–252. See John Austin was a pioneer, and in his wake numerous distinguished thinkers such as Grice and Dennett made elaborations. Today Stephen Darwall and Richard Moran have made important contributions. What follows owes much to a lecture by Richard Moran at Indiana University, in April, 2008.
12. We have but touched the surface of the problems of the reference of proper names. See *Husserliana* XX/II, Part VI, 343–380. For Castañeda’s critical survey of the theories, see *Thinking, Language, and Experience*, 43–60. See also Kripke, op. cit.
13. See Toronto’s *Globe and Mail*, August 29, 2007, A12 for an account of Steven Truscott’s battle with the Ontario Justice System.
264 IV Love as the Fulfillment of the Second-Person Perspective


20. Sokolowski has made the further interesting point that these names are expressions that are closer to cooings rather than proper names. It would seem one differentiating mark is that when someone has a new lover, the cooing term often changes precisely because there is recognized a unique ipseity. I am not sure that holds for, e.g., pigeons.

21. I am indebted here to my friend Steven Laycock, “Vietnamese Mode of Self-Reference: A Model of Buddhist Egology,” Asian Philosophy 4 (1994), 53–70, even though on many theoretical issues as well as on the interpretation of Husserl we will need more time to reach agreement.


23. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Man and the People, 46, 48, 148. and 166


25. This position is hinted at and worked out in numerous places. See, e.g., Husserliana I, 137 and 157; IV, 253, XIII, 6, 243–247; XIV, 170–176; 416–423; XV, 107, 204, 546, 551; for texts and a discussion, cf. The Person and the Common Life, 279ff.


27. See the Nachlass MS, E III 2, 36b; transcription, p. 61. A paraphrase of what continues in the cited text is the following: And that holds not merely in the abstract particularity and individuality but as a universal problem. It is a problem in its intentional foundational sources as well as in its concealed forms – a problem of a driving intentionality that makes itself felt in the depths and in the heights and in the universal expanses of intentionality.


29. See L. Le Chevalier, La Morale de Leibniz (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1933), Chapter XV. A particularly good discussion is on 176–178, where we find the formulation: Amare sive diligere est felicitate alterius delectari, vel quod eodem reedit, felicitatem alienam asciscere in suam. Or more simply: Amare est gaudere felicitate alterius.

30. See A V 21, 87b–90b.

31. See Husserl, Husserliana XXVII and XXXVII; see also especially Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Works of Nicolai Hartmann, Dietrich Von Hildebrand, and J.N. Findlay may also be mentioned.


34. See, e.g., Husserl, Ideen II, Husserliana IV, §56b.

35. Cf. my The Person and the Common Good.

36. See The Person and the Common Life, Chapters III–IV.


40. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters. Ed. Leroy E. Loemeker (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), 424. Leibniz actually stated “To love or to cherish is to be delighted by the happiness of the beloved and his perfections.” We will have reason to pause over “the happiness of the beloved and his perfections.”

41. Husserl, A V 21, 18a–18b; transcription, 26–27.

42. Husserl never explicitly makes this point but we will soon give reasons why it is implied in his position on love.
43. This is of course to be found in Plato, Augustine, and in Plotinus. For the latter, cf. *Enneads* VI.7.31. Cf. also the conclusion of this work, Book 2, the final chapters.
46. McTaggart, 157.
49. Ortega y Gasset, *Man and People*, 138. Ortega’s discussion of sexual love, here, 128–138, is worth studying for reasons I indicate in the body of the text, in spite of his characterization of the “féminine” as the human gender which is essentially confused and weak.
51. Levinas, ibid., 270.
52. Cf. the texts of Simon and Montaigne cited below in the body of the text and taken from Yves Simon, *A General Theory of Authority* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 78 which capture this difficulty of “giving reasons” for one’s love.
53. These paragraphs are indebted to an unpublished Nachlass MSS of Husserl, labeled at the Husserl Archives as E III 8, 8bff.
54. See the Nachlass MSS, E III 8, 8b–9b.
56. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1166bff. For friends being friends for “what they are in themselves,” see 1157a18. For the grounds of the dissolution of friendships, see 1165bff.
62. McTaggart, ibid., 151ff.
63. I owe this paragraph to a discussion with Professor Arthur Burms of the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium.
65. For what follows here, see Husserl, E III, 7b–10b, pp. 8–10 of the transcriptions.
66. I have been helped here by Johannes Volkelt’s critique of Scheler in his *Das ästhetische Bewusstsein* (Munich: Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1920), 137ff.
70. Martha Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 325–326. See Evelyn Waugh, *Brideshead Revisited* (London: Chapman & Hall, 3rd edition, 1960), 265, where the artist, Ryder, upon rediscovering Julia, observes: “the head that I used to think quartracentro, which sat a little oddly on her, was now part of herself and not at all Florentine; not connected in any way with painting or the arts or with anything except herself,
so that it would be idle to itemize and dissect her beauty, which was her own essence, and could only be known in her and by her authority and in the love I was soon to have for her.”

71. Nussbaum, 332.

72. See Robert Spaemann, Personen, 85. The thought-experiment is not so far-fetched. I know of a case where a twin presented himself to the beloved of his brother as if he were the brother; he succeeded up to a point, but when the beloved uncovered the deception she was furious. Spaemann says that love holds not for the “qualitative identity” but for the “numerical identity” of the one loved. In Chapter V, §4, we will see that such a characterization does not seem totally appropriate.


74. Vladimir Jankélévitch, Les vertus et l’amour, op. cit., 227–228. Incidentally, as a dog “owner” I rebel at the proposal that when my dog, Bounder, dies in the next few years (he is already old) I can get another Lab “just like him” and this will obliterate my sense of loss.

75. I am indebted to Robert Spaemann, ibid., 86, also.

76. See my The Person and the Common Life, especially Chapters III–IV.

77. Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, 64.


79. This would be the position of thinkers who hold, e.g., only those believing in the God of the Jewish and Christian traditions can hold for the inviolable dignity of the person. Their belief instructs them that each is made in God’s image, and this is the basis for holding for the inviolable dignity of persons. There is no other evidence for the essential dignity.

80. See Max Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, 191–193.

81. John McT. E. McTaggart, op. cit., 152ff. See also the discussion of P.T. Geach, Truth, Love, and Immortality: An Introduction to McTaggart’s Philosophy, 165ff. which introduced me to this theme in McTaggart.


83. Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 198; Maslow cites as his source for this text of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Aldoux Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1944). I have not been able to track down this precise passage which adumbrates Elizabeth Barrett Browning. Yet I found him holding that love “is not a transaction…True love is content with itself; it has its reward, the object of its love. Whatever you seem to love because of something else you do not really love; you really love the end pursued and not that by which it is pursued.” See Bernard of Clairvaux, Treatises II: Steps of Humility and Pride and Loving God (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1980), 110. We will return to Bernard’s degrees of the love of God in the final chapter of Book 2.

84. Francis Jacques, Difference and Subjectivity. Trans. Andrew Rothwell (New Haven, CT: Yale, 1991), 77, but see all of Chapter 2. I agree with Jacques that the assymetrical forms of love, especially the celebrated unrequited love of literature and The Blues do not represent the fullness of a love relationship; but that is a tautology. For Jacques true love is only in a relation because love is reciprocal and inter-relational in the sense that the relation enjoys a priority over the relata. (We touch on a similar theory in Chapter IV, §10.) It is thus impossible to love without being loved. This seems to leave numerous forms of what most of us would call “love” out of the picture, e.g., the love of parents for infants, the love of enemies, the love of one’s suffering declining, perhaps unconscious partner, the love of God, etc. We can agree with Jacques that both the egocentric and allocentric views of love, i.e., both the theory that reduces the Other to the desires and projections of the lover and the theory that requires the beloved to be the cause and center of the lover (by way of intentional acts, not by becoming the ontological center), miss the inter-relational nature of the ideal love relationship. But it is not at all clear that the allocentric form of love does not indeed have the capacity to intend the other ipseity lovingly and beyond all qualities. And even the morass of a unilateral “being in love” with all of its madness and blindness may still be an intention of the other ipseity.
Even in its “consummated” form of love through the fleshly communication of sexuality, whether or not reciprocal, it may display the transcendent ipseity of the Other. Further, on occasion, it may see something in the beloved which others are unable to see. For Jacque, if “love” is not fundamentally reciprocal, where each term of the relationship is fully constituted by the other, the love is pathological, mad, and inauthentic. Jacques would find much of our discussion in error because of our substantial view of the “myself” which does not subordinate the ipseities to the relationship. Yet much of what he says surely does apply to the person and what we will call Existenz. In our view the person indeed thrives through the reciprocity, but the “myself” in no way is constituted by this relationship. Yet Jacques’s own view, which negates the independent intentionality of a lover, makes love an even greater, and even more unintelligible, miracle because the dyadic relationship of the lovers seems to be assigned a kind of prior ontological status that brings about, independently of the lovers, the relating of the lovers and the lovers’ intentionalities of love. (We may note, however, that there are passages in both Kierkegaard, the Brownings, and Jaspers which assign to the love-relationship of the lovers a more fundamental status than love as rooted in the agency of the lovers; see the discussion in the text below.) Further the compelling power of the theme of unrequited love is surely not merely the creation ex nihilo of artists, as Jacques suggests, but reflects something familiar and recurrent in life. Perhaps we may think as paradigmatic Aristotle’s god as the final cause of the universe and the unmoved mover who could not care less about the universe which is in love with him. Further the unique phenomenon of love’s capacity to give what it does not have or receive is manifest not only in the ideal reciprocal love relationship but it is evident in unrequited love as well – unless, of course, one dogmatically proclaims every instance of such love, whether egocentric or allocentric, pathological. For a continuation of these themes, cf. our discussion of Jaspers’ theory of communication in Book 2, Chapter V, §4.

Notes

85. Ibid., 76.
86. Ibid., 77 and 85.
90. M. Montaigne, Essays, Bk. I, ch. 27; cited in Simon, 76.
92. McTaggart, ibid., 153.
93. Kierkegaard observes that lovers, in the effort to secure that their love is forever, swear by their love itself rather than swearing their love for one another by the eternal. See Works of Love. Trans. Hong and Hong (New York: Harper Torch, 1964), 45–46.
94. See the letters of Elizabeth Barrett Browning of Nov. 15, 1845, and February 26, 1846, cited in Binswanger, op. cit., 116.
96. Von Hildebrand, ibid., 138.
97. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 238ff. I want to thank Gregory Desjardins for awakening my interest in this topic over forty years ago.
98. See the texts assembled by Otto Friederich Bollnow, Rilke (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1951), 204.
100. Nussbaum, 350; and my “Mythic World as World,” International Philosophical Quarterly XV (1976), 55–58.
103. Cf. The Person and the Common Life, Chapters IV–VI.
105. Ibid., 393–394.
106. Ibid., 398.
108. Ibid., 402.
109. Ibid., 396.
110. Elizabeth Barrett Browning, “Sonnets from the Portuguese, XIV (The Complete Poetical Works of Elizabeth Barrett Browning (Boston, MA/New York: Houghton Mifflin/Cambridge, 1900), 217. I am indebted to Ludwig Binswanger, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins, for the references to Browning and Pascal. Binswanger’s book is a mine of literary and historical references and analyses having to do with, among other philosophical things, love.
Chapter V
Ontology and Meontology of I-ness

The I [as identical center, the pole, to which the entire content of the stream of experience is related] is "trans"-temporal. It is the I for which time is constituted, that for which there is temporality, that is, that for which there is the individually singular objectivity in the intentionality of the sphere of experience; but the I itself is not temporal. In this sense it also is not "being," but the opposite to all being, not an object over against (Gegenstück), but the primal carrier (Urstand) for all objectivity. The I should properly not be called I; it should not be named at all, because then it is already something objective. It is the nameless, beyond all not as standing over everything, nor is it hovering, nor being, but rather ‘functioning,” as conceiving, as valuing, etc.

(Husserl, Husserliana, XXXIII, 277–278)

Consciousness is Dasein in a radical sense, radical in the genuine sense of the word: It is the root, or to use another picture, it is the source of all that which may still be called being (Sein) and can be called being It is the root; It bears every other being whether it be immanent or transcendent individual being. If being is individual being which has duration and in its duration undergoes change and persistence, i.e., is temporal being, then consciousness is not being. It is the bearer of time but not itself and in itself existing temporally.

(Husserl, MS B IV 6, transcription p. 165)

The universe of pre-given being (Seins) is the universe of what is given to me in the form of the final validation, i.e., of the abiding “relevance” of what is constituted being for me. What goes beyond that, in the manner of constituting anonymity, in latency, is a meon; it is not a thesis, but rather a "presupposition" of being from out of a forgotten temporalization which is not yet the temporalization of an on. Thus it is something to be subsequently uncovered and recognized as necessary to the knowing function and as necessary for the very possibility of there being something existing (and thereby it is something to be made evident through a subsequent temporalization).

(Husserl, MS B III 3 (1931?), 30b, transcription p. 7)
§1 On Knowing Who I Am and Who Knows Who I Am

We outline here some of the ontological issues connected with the “meontology” of “myself” and how this relates to the themes of the person and the single individual. ¹ Because being is the venerable title for what is present before us awaiting our essential explication into necessary properties, we use the term “meontology” for the study of what we refer to with “myself” which we are claiming is not something present before us and to which we have access in a non-ascriptive way (cf. Chapter II, §5), i.e. it comes to light in contrast to the way in which being is displayed through features or properties.

Kant argued that it is completely certain that I am: I feel me myself and thereby know that I am in a way that is free of the ascription of predicates. If “I” were a concept through which something could be thought, then it would serve as a predicate for other things or would contain such predicates in itself. (It is perfectly evident for Kant that “I” cannot be the predicate of anything else or contain properties which are predicates of something else.) But this apperception of the I is without any concept and is merely that to which all thinking stands in a relation.² Descartes confessed that in the cogito he uncovered that the soul was but he did not know what it was. This perhaps is echoed in Rousseau’s “I feel my soul; I know it by the feeling and by thought; I know what it is without knowing what its essence is.”³ Yet holding I know that I am but not what I am hides that knowing that I am is knowing in some sense who I am. It is good to note, first of all, there is no propositional judgment in this self-awareness as saying “I know that I am” suggests. Further to say “I know that I am” is to say, that this that is not merely the fact of something but the fact of I myself knowing. I do not merely have the certainty that something is, rather the is or is-ing is that of me, I myself, aware of myself knowing. Of course, in the ongoing (pre- and non-reflective) self-awareness of myself I as agent and nominative is not yet in play. Here the gerund as a verbal noun would be, if possible in English, convenient: am-ing.

To say I know that I am, but not what I am is correct in so far as the non-ascriptive self-awareness is not a quidditative cognition of myself, as in when I ask the ontological and moral question, what kind of being am I? or what sort of person am I? – here hoping to come to a moral and value judgment. But it hardly can mean that what I am aware of is merely a blank facticity, as in “something is.” The sheer demonstrative “that” or the subjectless “is” says too little. Similarly “It thinks” says too little, as if the first-person ought to succumb to a third-person hegemony. Again, the “that” is inseparably “I,” the “is” is that of an am. There is no pure quodditas (that-ness or facticity); and the quidditas, if such be permitted as the “qualification” of the facticity, is not of what but of who. It simply is false that the “fact” of thatness is bereft of all quiddity, if we may take quiddity to be the individual essence or haecceitas. “Haecceity” or individual essence does justice to Kant’s and Rousseau’s view that I know that I am but have not cognitive quidditative grasp of what I am because that is the unique singularity of “I.”

Hannah Arendt’s political thought has at its center the distinction between “who,” in contrast to “what,” somebody is. The latter refers to qualities, gifts,
virtues, vices, talents, etc. These may be hidden or displayed at will by the person. “Who” one is, is implicit in everything the person does and can be hidden only “in complete silence and perfect passivity,” but almost never as a result of a willful purpose, “as though one possessed and could dispose of this ‘who’ in the same manner he has and can dispose of his qualities.” Arendt goes on to say that it is more likely that “who” one is appears clearly and unmistakably to others, and can very well remain “hidden from the person himself, like the daimónion in Greek religion which accompanies each man throughout his life, always looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters.”

Arendt does not make clear in what sense all of our qualities are at our disposal to hide or dispossess. Nor does she seem to have ever gotten clear on whether there is something like non-reflective self-awareness. In any case, in the above cited texts she seems to offer three not readily harmonized views of one’s knowledge of oneself as “who” one is: it is an ever-present first-person awareness which is constitutive of us; it is a matter of a kind of self-reflective self-knowledge, and therefore something we may be ignorant of; it might best be known by others, in spite of ourselves.

Arendt herself notes that prior to being situated and enmeshed in the individuating factors of community and culture, prior to my first saying “I,” and thereby prior to referring to and being individuated by You, and implicitly He, She, It and They, I am already individuated, already who I am. Presumably this involves some kind of “knowledge” of oneself, rather than a mere ontological claim bereft of self-experience. I think we best see “knowledge” in these texts as usually referring to both the improper knowledge of the non-reflective awareness of ourselves which is inescapable and which also can take the form of “conscience,” and the proper sense of reflective syntactic acts. In this latter case what is at stake is, it seems to me, less the elemental sense of who as what we are calling the “myself,” than the sort of person one is, the kind of moral person one is, the character one has; it is this which we can hide from ourselves better than from others. Although we want to distinguish the basic sense of who one is in terms of the “myself,” it will be a major theme in Book 2 to relate this sense of who one is to the intriguing sense Arendt is pointing to and which is also enmeshed in our speech habits, i.e., we speak of who one is in reference to the kind of person one is or has become. Here moral character (hexis) makes a special claim to being regarded as who one is. Surely one sense of the inquiry into “what kind of person one is” is looking to the moral characteristics quite apart from who the person is. Yet on occasion there is equivalence in the self-query to “what kind of person am I,” and who am I? And it is conceivable that others might also come to know this better than we ourselves. But surely our moral character is something we might hide from ourselves and yet be evident to others, but it is not conceivable that the “myself” be hidden from oneself.

In regard to the “knowledge of oneself” that determines “who” one is in the context of character and morality we will have occasion to study “conscience.” Conscience here (as in French) also serves as both the ineluctable self-awareness as well as the kind of self-awareness that we can keep at bay, and which can be experienced from a distance as if it were looking over our shoulder. (See our later discussions of conscience in Book 2, Chapter III.)
In this section we want to begin to sort through some of these matters with Arendt’s claims in mind. Yet the point of view will be more that of metaphysics than through the questions surrounding the moral person. To help us do this we will begin some initial reflections on the metaphysics of the unique individual to which we will return in the next section.

We can start by asking whether the awareness of myself is a result of an individuating awareness or is it the awareness of myself as already an individual, as Arendt implies. If it is an individuating awareness what would it be like? When we individuate things we relate them to other things, e.g., we pick them out from within the pre-given context of a kind or a class. And that kind or class is itself distinguished, and therefore, in some sense an “individual,” by being placed in relation to other things and kinds of things. Thus we typically individuate things by relating them to what they are not. Something is now by being not then, here by being not there. A monarch butterfly is not a bee or a bird or another kind of butterfly; further it is this Monarch butterfly that regularly visits my garden and has a slight blemish on her left wing.

But is this how I am present to myself as a unique individual, i.e., by relating myself to different kinds and singling myself out from a You, She, He, and They? It would seem not. Nevertheless it has been argued that if there is any sense of knowing or awareness to be attached to “I” it will be because we identify ourselves like any other thing in the world. In this view, roughly that of Tugendhat, because all knowing is at least an implicit propositional attitude, i.e., we never merely intend an object like “the ball,” but always the object in a certain respect, i.e., ascriptively, categorically and syntactically determined as a state of affairs, and thus we intend, “the ball is blue” or the being round and small of the ball. Tugendhat acknowledges that when I say “I” I do not explicitly identify myself any more than I perceive myself. But because “I” is necessarily co-implicated in the intersubjective network of other indexicals, when I say “I” I refer to myself as able to assume the other indexical positions, and as able to make myself present as others make me present in their propositional attitudes. It is this possibility of referring to myself as others refer to me and of singling me out and identifying me in a certain respect which gives to me my individuation. The non-ascriptive self-reference is really only a postponed implicit ascriptive reference.

As Manfred Frank has pointed out, this position holds that prior to the self-reference of the propositional attitude I am not conscious of myself, unless it admits that one’s “I can” (i.e., my sense of my ability to take up the points of view of the other indexicals) is pre-propositionally experienced, which seems to be denied by Tugendhat. Further, my experiencing myself as an individual and as identically the same would seem to be ultimately reduced to my being identified in space and time like any other indexical. I am neither identified or nor am I manifestly an individual from out of my first-person perspective, but rather, according to this view, I experience myself as identical and individualized from out of the apperceived perspective of the others. There is no priority to be assigned to my prior acquaintance with myself but rather all my knowledge of myself as an individual is to be ultimately reduced to the apperception of the propositional knowledge comprising others’ points of view on me.
Clearly this position is tied to the problems of a “reflection theory” of self-awareness. It also “forgets” that apperception of the other perspective itself is a first-person experiencing which appresents an Other’s first-person experiencing. It further translates individuality, self-awareness and first-person experience into a second- and third-person perspective and it leans toward a behaviorist account of consciousness, i.e., one which infers consciousness from bodies given in the third-person. Its reduction of all knowing to a propositional attitude and all intentionality to intentions of propositions and all individuality to an identification out of a network of perspectives makes both this attitude and intentionality unconscious. This is because these as lived achievements, in order to be conscious, i.e., known in any sense, would have to be so on the basis of a propositional attitude; but clearly they are not such and therefore eo ipso are declared to be not self-luminous. It also renders the individuality of “I” a matter of an identification and process of individuation and therefore dependent on something outside of itself.

Our position is that I am not my unique I myself, or present to myself or self-aware, by way of taking up another’s point of view toward myself. Rather I am not ever not already present to myself. The chief obstacle always is thinking of self-awareness as a kind of identifying perception, even if it be that of the perception of one’s being perceived by someone. In all these perception models, even in the introspective version of it, one identifies something by picking out its distinguishing properties. (In the “intersubjective” self-awareness model I identify or single an Other out who singles me out.) In all understandings of self-awareness based on perception I can in principle misidentify what I perceive. And this can be initially or subsequently through a reidentification of that which is present and then absent. I can identify some things by a continuous observation by which I “track” the continuous same properties. But for the view proposed here, in contrast to that of Tugendhat, in the case of “myself” there is never the possibility of misidentification or a need for such “tracking” because I am not ever not already present to myself. And this non-identifying self-presence is non-sortal: I am inerrantly self-aware prior to and independent of any communicable, participatable, properties.

Thus my non-sortal self-awareness, i.e., my being self-present independent of any identifying properties, means I am I myself for myself without being individuated from others or through identifying properties. Not only is it true that nothing becomes an individual for me without my being already myself for myself but I myself am an individual for myself quite apart from any process of individuation from out of the world. Thus we may say that I myself am “individuated” per se, by myself, in the sense that there is an “individuation” without reference to anything beyond my self, per accidens, whether an event, individual or imposed ordering structure or kind.

To say I myself am individuated per se (or that the “I” is individuated per se) is to say two things: (a) Because here esse est percipi, i.e., what is meant here by “myself” is my non-reflective self-awareness, my being-self-aware and my being “myself” are the same thing. (b) It is my being “myself,” an individual self-aware essence, that “founds” what is manifest in the self-awareness; it is this individual essence as essentially self-aware that “individuates” me.
Yet is it not true that the examples brought forth for the *per se* individuation are always an example of the “myself” being itself by not being the Other? Is it not itself by lacking being the Other, by being limited by the Other. When JG Hart Bloomington says to JG Hart Manitoulin, “Whoever you are, I am not you,” is he not saying I am uniquely who I am by *not* being you? Therefore one’s being uniquely one’s own self is constituted by not being the Other.

This position holds that I am individuated by taking up toward myself and the Other and all the Others a reflective attitude and see that each is the same in so far as each refers to herself as uniquely unique. Here I see that each unique essence is indeed itself by not being the Others and lacking the perfection of the Others. But prior to this reflective attitude the “myself” is identical with itself prior to being placed in opposition with what is other. Of course my personal being JG Hart is individuated by endless considerations beyond myself and your lovingly regarding me as transcendent to my properties may awaken me to myself in such a way that I may be said to discover myself for the first time through your love. But the “myself” is prior to all such ways in which the same is constituted by what is other. And this comes to light especially in the consideration that properly speaking there is not a multiplicity of “I’s” and only I can say “I” and refer to myself, and I cannot refer to anyone else with “I.” It also comes to light when we (unsuccessfully) attempt to make of what “I” refers to, i.e., “myself,” a plurality. (See §4 below.) The distinction of the multiple JG Harts in the third-person thought-experiment is a mere numerical difference. In the first-person there is a difference of a unique essence that lives itself as not being able to be pluralized.

To say *I myself* am individuated *per se* and not *per accidens* has its corollary in the claim that *I myself* am a unity or united *per se* and not *per accidens*. What is *per accidens* one or united contains an actual plurality even though it may be considered a unity from a certain perspective. Thus a pile of rocks, a library, a house, etc. clearly have to do with a plurality, but there is a perspective which brings the plurality into a distinctive unity. What is *per se* united is in itself simple through and through, not divisible, and not comprised of an actual plurality. In our view the “myself” as a unique essence is just such a unity. The plurality of tautological properties do not, we have claimed, weaken this claim.

Of course we may think of an essence which we entertain in the third-person as a *formal* unity. It is neither able to be divided, augmented, nor diminished; nor can its defining properties be removed. It is indifferent in its unity to whether it is joined to an instantiation or whether it is in its pure universal form. In contrast, the unity of the *singularity* or the unique individual is one where there cannot be such an instantiation into a plurality and where it is absolutely incommunicable. It is the “myself” which exemplarily displays this. Even though its distinctive richness moves us to refer to it as an essence, nevertheless it is also a unique individual, a haecceity, which, for all its richness, is absolutely tied to this individual which is not an instance of its essence but rather is its essence.

In my non-reflective self-awareness I am directly aware of my “individual essence.” “Individual essence” for most philosophical traditions is a *contradictio in adjecto*. In the next section we will attempt to further argue for its legitimacy.
Here we state that what we mean is not primarily or merely a “property” I cannot fail to have, but rather, the “individual essence,” is “myself.” In my non-reflective presence I am self-aware without assigning any property to myself; similarly in saying “I” I am present to myself without assigning any property to myself. Further, in both cases the sense of my propertyless “myself” is unique, in the sense brought to light especially by the teletransportation example. It is also adumbrated, however feebly, in our knowing one another as persons. (We wrestled with this in Chapters III–IV and return to it below.)

In my non-reflective self-awareness and in my achieving “I,” I can be said solely and uniquely to know who I am. To say I am non-reflectively aware of myself, and that with “I” I make myself present as myself, is not to say that I pick myself out as having distinguishing properties. This is the way I am usually known by Others and the way I initially know Others as individual persons in the world. By extension to the second- and third-person, we can say that one does not really know who someone is if one does not know the individual essence or haecceity. However, as we have seen especially in the case of love, we know the other “who” or unique essence through the person. This is not directly and immediately a knowing of “who” the person is in the way the first-person self-awareness of this person is. Yet knowing the person as such, i.e., meeting a You “in person,” opens up the path for knowing who it is we are knowing. In our knowing Others we ineluctably know who they are through their “whats,” through their properties or qualities. But it remains true that if one does not “know” the individual essence or haecceity one may have reason to doubt that one is perceiving a person; in any case one does not know who the other person is.

The sense of “know” here is obviously as problematic as we suggested it was in the Arendt passages. Typically we come to know who someone is only through knowing the person through her properties. But we may perhaps acknowledge rare occasions when we have persuaded ourselves that we “knew” very early who someone was even though we had not yet known, in the stronger sense, anything at all about her, i.e., any of her properties. This resembles the anomalous situation that I “know” who I am, even if I have forgotten who I am, i.e., forgotten my personal identity. In this case others may well know, in a strong sense, more about me as this person than I know about myself. The entire position rests not on these speculations in regard to the rare second- and third-person encounters but, as we have said, on the first-person experience. But in both the second and third-person we have indications of this matter. And, as we saw, in love there is a unique evidence also for this claim.

In the knowing of Others, regardless of whether in the second- or third-person, we have the phenomenon of the possibility of an endless series of “who”-questions. Thus, e.g., at a meeting, we might have asked, who gave that speech? For an answer we might have learned a name, Mohandas Gandhi. We might have asked further, who is he? And we might have gotten the answer, a lawyer. But we could have further asked, but who is this lawyer? And by this we might mean, what kind of lawyer? Or, what sort of practice does he have? Or we might have wanted simply more information, and, when we learned that he was a (South Asian) Indian attorney who represented blacks in the apartheid struggle in South Africa, we might
further have pressed, but who is this person you so describe? And our informant might have begun to talk about satyagraha, militant non-violence, about the beatings and jailings this lawyer suffered. Perhaps we might stop there, but we might just as easily find this interesting and want to meet this person “in person” and learn “who he really is,” which will be inseparable from knowing more about him. To know what someone is we need not meet the person. But knowing who someone is not fulfilled in third- but in second-person knowing. We say, “I feel like I know him, I have heard so much about him, but I have never met him; thus I can’t say I really know him.”

This meeting begins what Jaspers called the “loving battle” to communicate, where the unique Who-ness or ipseity, and what we shall call Existenz, of the other is revealed to someone. But it is revealed only to one who is disposed to enlist him-or herself in this struggle and not hide out. Surely love becomes an essential condition for the revelation, but it is not sufficient, and the revelation is always partial, if not ephemeral, and further revelations must be won again and again. We will have occasion to return often to this theme.

Here we wish to state that the position we are sketching opposes the view that non-reflective self-awareness and what “I” presences must necessarily be properties or essences that can be exemplified by many. The view we are espousing holds that the full concretion of “myself” and what you refer to with “I” analyze into the property and concept “personhood,” with the attendant properties that individuate this person, and along with this “something else” that is unanalyzable. But we do not accept Chisholm’s own conclusion (cf. our discussion of Scotus above, Chapter III, §2) that we know only when we know something ascriptively or property-laden or something analyzable into properties. According to Chisholm, we must reject any claim for an essential unanalyzable “component.” For Chisholm it is precisely because of the unanalyzability and the impossibility of reducibility into properties of this something else of “myself,” that he states, “I haven’t the faintest idea of what the something else might be.”

But that is precisely the point, as far as we are concerned. There is an essential sense of “who I am” which is captured in the non-reflective singular first-person experience of ourselves, and it is to this which “I” refers and makes present “myself as myself.” This is essentially propertyless and elusive of analysis. Indeed, it is the condition for the achievement of “I.”

What can be said about this which has the properties, has these experiences, these pains, but which is the self or I immanently transcending them by way of having them and being involved with them, but not dependent on any one of them for it to be? There is nothing to say about it, no description to be given, except it is “me” or “myself.” And this uniqueness and distinctiveness is unmistakable and evident. Yet, by way of negation I can say I am not unique like a rare work of art or a rare species where there are distinguishing properties. Rather I am unique, and first-personally recognizably so in simply being me, just as each other is presumptively unique in just being herself. The evidence is simply (yet strangely from the third-person perspective, and the “non-loving” second-person perspective) in my being me in any experience.
The claim for one’s being sui generis thus is an odd one, namely, it is unmistakably evident and the one making it one is inerrantly recognizably oneself, even though there is no content, no description, no property, etc. which makes this claim possible. One might therefore conclude that this is an absolutely unintelligible claim to knowing. At best it can be only a merely logical, formal claim, like the one we looked at earlier in Chapter III, §2. Yet it is surely wrong to say that my awareness of my being me is a claim in the sense that there is a proposition about the world proposed for one’s assent and which awaits evidence in the form of a filling of this empty intention. And it is no less in error to say that it is unintelligible because it does not submit to the canons of intelligibility of worldly things. Just the opposite is the case. There is nothing in regard to which I am more clear, and there is nothing which is more evident. Thus it is unintelligible only in the sense that there is nothing more that I can say beyond the affirmation that I am myself – and evidently so, and no one else.

Similarly one may object that this claim forces me to say that I recognize Others as uniquely distinct, but it compels me to say that what I mean by their uniqueness is unintelligible to me because I cannot point to any distinguishing properties and I do not have any direct experience of them being sui generis. In response we can say, of course, it is true that we do not experience the Other’s first-person knowing of her uniqueness, of her being herself. But is the force of the objection such that it denies that what I know in knowing the ipseity of persons is what is non-sortal? Does it deny that in meeting a person my intention goes beyond not merely the bodily features but I am even capable of going beyond the personal features to the one who has these features? Is it not in fact true that I no more posit or rest in the bodily features and then infer or posit the person than I rest in the marks on the page and then infer the meanings? Now we may grant that the ultimate referent of the intention of the person may, for reasons of selfishness or because of the dazzle of the person’s properties or aspects, be very hazy and that our intentionality does not in fact get beyond the properties. However, we have attempted to show that it is foremost love that enables a kind of affirming belief in the otherness of the Other that goes decisively beyond properties and this enables an “appresentation” of the Other as a unique self-experiencing. This indeed is “unintelligible” if this merely means that what we lovingly know is bereft of properties. But in the case of love this seems likewise to be a feeble objection.

Nevertheless, it is because we are necessarily also embodied, enworlded, and intersubjective that personal properties define us as beings-in-the-world. But these properties that are essential to our personal being do not exhaust the sense of who we are. The prior acquaintance with ourselves reveals each of us to ourselves as “myself.” This is not the work of reason in its familiar sense of disclosing, uncovering, and assigning properties. As in the case of the nonascriptive presence of the referent of indexicals, the particular is revealed apart from reason or thinking in the sense of assigning and articulating properties. In this sense what is made present in both the case of “myself” as well as in, e.g., “this,” is non-rational. In this sense what is so made present is irrational, i.e., it is not disclosed through the element of thought, concepts, the universal, and properties. Yet our thesis is that ipseity’s unintelligibility or non-rationality is rich, even a hyper-intelligibility or hyper-rationality.
in so far as it reveals our unique essence. We hope in the course of this book to dissipate the appearance of scandal or absurdity that this position seems to present.

There seems to be an egregious paradox: the unfortunate amnesiac or two year old has the pure awareness of himself whereas the fully wakeful adult person who is attentive to the full horizon of life, and who inevitably thinks of who she is exclusively in terms of this fullness will tend to miss her individual essence. But “pure awareness” here is not the phenomenological desideratum of detachment from doxastic engagements, nor is it as if the amnesiac is bereft of the natural attitude; further, it is not the case that normal adults are not ever aware of their haecceity or individual essence. Indeed, what here is at issue does not come readily to light in amnesia or infancy. For both the amnesiac and infant, the telos is necessarily being a person-in-the-world. We will be dealing with this matter throughout much of this work. Our point is that “who” we are is inseparable from our self-awareness which itself is a “knowledge” of our individual essence. Each of us is such that she herself, in this respect, alone holds the secret as to who she is, and this “known” haecceity is essentially non-objective and propertyless. This is the heart of what we will call “mystery.” But because it apparently resembles the notorious “I know not what” of the empiricist critique of substance, we will have to include “substance” in our meditation on ontology (in §3 below).

§2 Individuality and Individual Essence

We have given reasons to think of “myself” or ipseity as a sphere of I-ness, mine-ness, and ownness. This gives an aspect of what we mean by an individual. The individual ipseity is a realm of ownness as havings pervaded by I-ness. What is individual is indi-dividuum, i.e., it is what is not divided or divisible. This holds generally for the actual stream of consciousness of the person in as much as it is not made up of separable parts. In anomalous cases parts get separated off. Traumas occasion the inability to recall periods of one’s life, and science fiction supplies numerous examples, of lives picked up after some section of life has been “deleted.” But that is not typically the sense of the lived and living stream, even often of the amnesiac victim himself. We reach the conclusion of the presence of discontinuity subsequently in reflection. But does this mean that the stream is only illusorily continuous and made up of discrete separable parts and radical beginnings and ends?

On the one hand, the very sense of memory’s dependence on the lived sense of retention contends with the assumption that the stream is comprised of separable parts, at least for normal cases. On the other hand, the cases are extremely puzzling where we have accounts of persons whose first-person account seems to be of a continuous same stream of one’s own throughout life, but who in fact have had their lives interrupted by a trauma which hinders them from, e.g., giving an account of their lives beyond this trauma into the present time of the narrator. Thus such a person, who is in fact forty-nine years old, can only relate his life up until the time
of the trauma thirty years ago, and the flow of present experiences is not able to be
recalled as a subsequent continuity with this trauma. Yet such a person will have
no doubt about whom he refers to with “I” in the time of the narrative past or even
in the subsequent time which is not able to be narrated or made part of the life
narrative.14

The individuality we wish to call attention to is connected less to the question of
the sameness throughout her life that a person is aware of through identifying acts,
and a sameness established through what she has experienced and through the dis-
tinctive experiences, and a sameness established through her memorial recognition
of her agency, all of which can be put into sentences and regarded as propositions,
but rather we wish to focus primarily on the I-experience. Of course, the I-experience
is inseparable from the stream, i.e., the stream is always lived or undergone by
the I, even if the I is not active. That which I think, have thought, have willed, etc.
can be lost from the purview of present consciousness, but that does not mean the
“I myself” is lost.

As we noted in the last section, ordinarily the individual, as some thing, is what
we presence in connection with the common and universal: This Monarch butterfly,
this ball-bearing, this oak tree, this hydrogen atom, this lion. Further, the individual
is what gets individuated by reason of determining factors, e.g., such as where it is,
when it is, how long it has been, what has happened to it through external causes
and by way of interacting with its surroundings. In this regard there is the well-
known scenario where, e.g., two ball bearings might be absolutely the same except
for their spot in space and perhaps their origin in time. They might be distinguished
by nothing else whatsoever.

When we begin to think of the person as what is distinct and individual, we find
ourselves pressed to think in different terms. Not only are persons typically distinct
by unique constellations of properties, there is a more basic matter of individuality.
Even though we commonly say, e.g., “this person,” “that person,” as if we were
saying “this human,” and “that human,” there is reason to hold that “person” is not
a “sortal term.”15 Because sortal terms refer to kinds or universal properties, we
ought not to think of the being of persons as a certain kind of being in the way ani-
mal-s, humans, and plants are – or even in the way the specific difference of the
lowest species is or in the way that is to which a definite description refers. Persons
would seem to have a sheer numerical identity that is not the same as being an
instance of a kind. (But cf. our discussion of numerical identity in §4 of this
chapter.) Of course, being a person is connected with being an instance of, e.g.,
humankind, but being a person is not exhausted by being such an instantiation of
humankind or the species human. Of course, we count persons very much like we
count humans or people, e.g., when we count the number of citizens, the number of
patients, the number of people of this sex or gender, etc. The embodied enworlded
presence of persons can be counted and regarded as instances not only of humans
but of other things that humans are or that are properties of persons, as being citi-
zens, male, female, etc. Person makes up for a whole that encompasses more than
“I”, but the person himself must be regarded as non-sortal by reason of being
embued with and grounded in “I.”
When we say that “person” is a non-sortal term, we have to ask what the obstacle is to our making a sortal reference in this case. In the third-person, we say “This/He/She is a person.” Note that often enough someone might just as well say, “This is a human being.” But whether “person” or “human being” such a mode of referring would seem to be an appropriate reference when, as in the case of what appears to be a mannequin or robot, there would seem to be an ambiguity about the nature of the bodily presence. Thus in the dawning realization this body is singled out as the bearer of the “property” person. What the third-person indexical singles out (this, he, she, etc.) as the bearer of properties, the substance, is what receives this determination.

However, if “person” is not a kind or a property, if what we refer to with “person” is not sortal, then the person we refer to is the individual “supposit” who bears properties. But in the third-person we only “appresent” or “apperceive” what this “bearer of properties” is, i.e., one who non-reflectively lives her life and refers to herself with “I.” Husserl even speaks of an association of “pairing” whereby we “transfer” from ourselves, from our ownness sphere, to the Other an analogous ownness sphere. In our familiar dealings with Others, especially those whom we love, such an associative transfer of analogous properties is not in evidence, i.e., totally imperceptible. It has legitimacy in the ambiguous cases of apparent robots or mannequins where the theme of what it is that bears the property of “human” or “person” surfaces. “You” are immediately present as foremost one who, while attending to me, non-reflectively experiences herself as “I myself.” In the intentionality of love, “you,” we have said, does not attend to the Other as a substrate of properties because this shifts the intention from the ascriptionless ipseity to that (“it”) which bears properties. Even in most unambiguous third-person experiences (i.e., those where there little or no doubt whether we are observing a human person) we experience that the Other living her life is not, first of all, present as a bearer of properties which contingently permit her to be “she herself.” First and foremost who she is, is what is essential.

“Who” she is, is what is essential. Our thesis is that Who is “super-essential” in so far as “essence” is the category of essential delimitation and meaning, and Who is beyond properties not by being bereft of meaning and delimitation but of a different order. Who here clearly refers to the referent of “I” and what exemplarily love targets. Nevertheless it is implicit in all referrings to persons. But Who is not to be confused with the identifications of persons which requires the recognition of distinctive properties.

“Who’s” differ from “Who’s” to the same degree as “What’s” or essences do, but, unlike essences, and unlike persons in the world with Others, their differences are not identifiable by distinctive properties. For our thesis it is important that this sense of Who not be relegated to the ontological realm of deficient “What’s.” That is, in the third-person, meaning is tied to assigning properties, essences, “What’s,” sortal determinations. These “forms” are communicable and instantiable by individuals. Individuals are meaning-full only by reason of “what’s” or properties. Yet Who is of a different order, and we want to secure this by claiming that the distinction among “Who’s” is as “essential” or fundamental as that between essences and genera.
But whereas these are universals that are instantiable and communicable, Who refers to an uninstantiable and incommunicable “individual essence.”

Only in the ambiguous encounters and only within the third-person ontology of things does the claim that “person” is a non-sortal term puzzle us. Thus, when we say that “person,” or the being who refers to herself with “I,” is not a kind, we mean to imply that, from a second- and third-person perspective, it is a unique individual essence, sui generis, that itself is not a category, a kind, or admitting a definition, even though, like everything else we meet in the world, the person is manifest to us necessarily in conjunction with sortal properties, e.g., species, bodiliness, gender, character, personality, etc. In the first-person singular pronoun, we have insisted, one refers to oneself non-ascriptively, and therefore non-sortally. This is what “I” refers to and in as much as this is what we analogously apperceive or appresent in the second- and third-person, there is no puzzlement in saying that “person” is a non-sortal term. We appresent the other as not being first a thing to which the category of person or the self-experiencing accrues. Rather appresentation is precisely the presentation of the Other as a non-ascriptive self-experiencing and possible self-referring.

The things in the world admit definitions and arrangement into kinds. We may regard the categories making up the world as falling into the extremes of those heading toward maximum generality, e.g., moving from Labrador Retriever, to dog, to animal, to sentient, to living, to being, and those heading from generality to most specific difference, i.e., from being to living to sentient to animal to dog, to Labrador Retriever to “the black, over-weight, eleven-year-old, people-pleasing, treat-loving, Labrador Retriever [living since 1996 at JG Hart’s house on Dunn Street in Bloomington, Indiana], who answers best to the name of ‘Bounder.’” The lowest specific differences that cannot be essentially determined by anything more specific are called by Husserl “eidetic singularities.” They are “essences” which have necessarily more general essences or genera above them, but they do not have anything else below them in terms of particularization in relation to which they themselves would be species or a higher genus. Thus the eidetic singularity resembles what today is called a “definite description” of a particular existing thing.

In contrast to an abstractum, like “bright,” which cannot be conceived to exist without inhering in something, like a colored extended spatial thing, an eidetic singularity does not need any further specifiable substrate; it needs only the “this-here” which it informs – or the “this-here” in this sense has an autonomous independent concretum or eidetic singularity informing it.16 As close as the concretum and individual (or “this-here”) is, in the realm of a thing-ontology they must be kept distinct. In the thing-ontology it is the ultimate substrate of the “this-here” which renders the eidetic singularity an existing individual essence; it is this which most basically individuates because it “individuates itself” and even though it is without any material content it is the ultimate principle of individuation. We will soon see why this is important for the thing ontology and why it, however, is exploded in regard to ipseities or persons.

Thus an eidetic singularity is autonomous, not dependent, as is something abstract (“bright” and “color” are relatively abstract because in order to think/imagine/
conceive “bright” one needs to think/imagine “color,” just as “color” to be thought/imagined needs an extended shape or substance, e.g., lamp shade, for it to be thought/imagined). What can be conceived/imagined to exist by itself autonomously is a concretum. Thus a non-autonomous or non-self-sufficient essence is an abstractum, and an essence which is able to be thought of as autonomous or self-sufficient is a concretum.

“A this-here, whose material-contentual (sachhaltiges) essence is a concretum is called an individual.”17 (This contrasts with other kinds of “this-here” which have not the concretum of a material essence, such as numbers, syntactical or predicative ties, disjunctives, quantifiers, i.e., the stuff of ideal objects as those of pure mathematics, grammar, and logic.) And because species and genera are of necessity not able to be thought of as autonomous, the eidetic singularities, which are the lowest specific differences or definite descriptions, are concreta. These as informing a “this-here” constitute individuals.

The “this-here” as informed by its concretum or eidetic singularity is an individual. As a concrete individual it can be thought/imagined to exist independently; but the more or less definite descriptions and concepts that comprise the eidetic singularity cannot be thought to exist independently in themselves apart from a “principle” of individuation, the “this-here” as the substrate for the eidetic singularity. The question of importance is whether the eidetic singularities are tied to precisely this individuating “this-here” or whether they may be found to be repeated in other “this-here’s.”

Husserl thus distinguishes the abstractum, the concretum, and the individual. Thus “red” is abstract because it cannot be thought of without its inhering in something spatial, like a lampshade. Thus the metal red lampshade next to the computer in the SE corner of my study on Dunn Street in Bloomington, Indiana, USA, during November 2007 is a definite description, a concretum. Such a concretum or eidetic singularity informs a “this-here.” Again, the individual is a “this-here” to whose essence a definite description or eidetic singularity belongs; both the “this-here” and the eidetic singularity are necessary for the actuality of the concretum.

Now of especial interest for us is the consideration whether the eidetic singularity is separable in thought from the individual as “this-here.” Definite descriptions typically evoke the view that the answer is No: that is their purpose. They nail down existing things with their defining unique properties to the definite individual. Indeed the definite description, if not equivalent to the individual, aspires to be at least inseparable from the individual. For our theme it is of great importance, however, to note that for Husserl, it is thinkable that every individual whose essence is a concretum (i.e., is a lowest specific difference or definite description) is repeatable; i.e., there could be a second completely like to it and next to it. Every individual is an individual particular of its concretum; it is a concrete individual. The concretum or eidetic singularity is an eidos and thus universal. This eidos or universal of the concretum is in principle an ideality that is repeatable.

But Husserl goes on to note that what is thinkable in terms of things is not thinkable in terms of “I.” The I has the distinctive property that it does not have this lowest universal or species-concept (or definite description) as does the absolute
concretum in the sense that Husserl earlier defined. (Indeed, as we saw, we refer to it non-ascriptively precisely because it is non-sortal, not comprised of properties.) That is, the I cannot be repeated as a chain of purely possible coexistent and absolutely similar I’s. Whereas the individual and the eidetic singularity are united in a particular worldly being or thing they are not identical and their distinction is such that they can be separable, and thus the eidetic singularity can be endlessly repeated in other substrate “this-here’s.” In contrast, in the case of the “I” there is a coincidence of the absolute concretum, the eidos, and the individual. Here the unity of concretum and individual is of a different order because the eidetic singularity of the referent of “I” cannot be separated from the individual or substrate of the “this-here.” In “I” the lowest concrete universality of the I or eidetic singularity (what we may think of in modern thing-ontology as the counterpart to the definite description, but which here is non-sortal and thus not a definite description!) individuates itself. And even though the individual moments that belong to it as this concrete personal I are repeatable, e.g., it has memories, protentions, perceptions, etc., which have identical repeatable essential structures, and these moments are distributed among individually distinct I’s, nevertheless the total complex of the corresponding essential moments which characterizes an I is not repeatable.18

Here in this text Husserl does not spell out what this total complex is, but we may assume its uniqueness is not tied to its being a complexity which is a totality but rather the unrepeatability has to do with what “I” refers to as uniquely unique. (A singular complexity could well be an individual per accidens and not per se. But as Husserl himself says here: “The Ego is ‘substance’; a substance individuates itself,”19 i.e., it is an individual per se and not per accidens.) Here the most specific concrete essential determination individuates itself into an existing unrepeatable, incommunicable I. If we see that what “I” refers to as an eidos or eidetic singularity is not properly a definite description as it is in the realm of worldly things, we may say that in this discussion we have Husserl’s ontological case for what is phenomenologically revealed in the teletransportation example. As worked out by Klawonn, this example brings out the eidetic necessity for why the eidetic singularity to which “I” refers is of a non-sortal, and why our references to ourselves in sortal terms permits raising the question of the ontological clone.

It thus is a basic teaching of Husserl that spirit (or the I, these terms are often used interchangeably), in contrast to the general realm of “things,” has its own essential being (Eigenwesen) and its individuality in and through itself. And this “absolute individuation” pervades the personal I. The individuality of the person and personality are rooted in the absolute individuation of the I. The same I cannot exist twice. Thus spirits are not unities of appearing manifolds, which in principle are able to be duplicated, but the unities of the absolute contexts (Zusammenhänge) of consciousness are best thought of as the unities belonging to unique I’s.20 To the extent the appearing manifolds may be tied essentially to the unique I’s they are not able to be duplicated.

We must further distinguish the logical-conceptual individual or singular from the individual or singular as the identifiable concretum, i.e., the concrete individual. The former, the logical conceptual individual or singular, refers to the “individuality”
of an identical substrate for predications and syntactical operations. Thus “4,” “justice,” “humanity” or “hydrogen” can serve as the substrate for such predications even though they are universal essences that are abstract and do not exist independently in themselves, they are not actual subsisting concreta. As a substrate of predication such a property gets determined, and in this function it itself, e.g., “4” or “justice,” is not regarded as a property or universal class determining something else. But this is different from the concrete identifiable individual in the world that serves also as a substrate of predications, e.g., “this sycamore tree in my yard,” which is not abstract and which does not have a merely ideal existence as a number, which cannot be a property or predicate of something else, and which exists independently by itself.

The person, it would seem, involves a third sense of individuality (beyond that of ideal objects and real things in the world) in so far as there is the singularization of the extension of an essence and an essentialization of the individual. Again: “The I has the remarkable feature that for it the absolute concretum and the individual coincide, that the lowest concrete universality [JGH: “the eidetic singularity”] individuates itself.” The individual, i.e., “this-here,” or rather, “I-here-now” as the concretum, is one with the eidetic singularity and the eidetic singularity is one with the concretum, “I-here-now.” The I is at once individual, the concretum, and the eidetic singularity or essence. This is why “lowest concrete universality” or “definite description” here are anomalous in so far as they are precisely what are not communicable and repeatable. Here it is inaccurate to say that the essence is “essence of the concretum” in so far as that, as in the case of the eidetic singularities, permits its being duplicatable or extended to other concreta. Such duplicatability or extension is not possible with “I.” Again, here the eidetic singularity is inseparable from the this-here or I-here-now.

This provides another motivation for thinking of the Who as hyper-essence. Whereas “humanity” and “tree” have the extension of all the instances of it, the extension of the individual person, JG Hart, in so far as we have to do with the referent of “I myself,” is singularized, i.e., it is exhausted by me and extended to none beyond me. If we may think of “eidetic singularity” in relation to what “I” (non-ascriptively) refers, and not as the end term of the movement to the lowest specific difference, we may think of it as the singularization of an eidos, or as an individual essence or haecceity. We approach this in the third-person when we move from human being to “Peter,” this human who has these individuating features, but more decisively whom I apperceive to have this distinctive self-awareness and sphere of ownness.

Following a suggested image of Jankélévitch, we may think of ipseity’s unique essentiality as a point situated in the middle between the essential extension of the whatness or quiddity and the narrow and concrete depth of the this-ness or haecceity. From the perspective of this point the haecceity and quiddity are but one. Here the quiddity is as richly individualized as only a person or ipseity can be and haecceity is as general as an essence.

We return here to the difficult question discussed in the last chapter of how we make present the persons, and whether this of necessity is a matter of making present the ipseity of the persons. Our view is that persons are radical particulars, what
Robert Sokolowski calls “singularities,” and in this sense they resemble what philosophers call “bare particulars.” We refer to bare particulars that are not persons typically with demonstrative pronouns. However, when we treat persons as sortal terms, as kinds, e.g., like humans or patients, we can count them, and the bare particular, the “This” is always inseparably a “This-What.” Thus we can count the persons taken as humans or patients, in the room. But it would be odd to attempt to count how many “This’s” there were in the room. We could count the This-What’s, the instances of humans, but how do we count what is uniquely unique and without properties? As what are we counting them? What are they enumerations of? How would we know if we already counted it, i.e., if one was different from the other? For these reasons and others, some philosophers maintain that radical particulars are not only unanalyzable but unknowable because unintelligible. In such a view we know only what we grasp through insight into forms or intelligible quiddities and properties. Yet this would not seem to do justice to the This-What, even assuming the This is never given apart from the What. Consider the famous example of the two absolutely identical red discs or ball bearings. If they are in every respect identical except one is now₁ here₁, while the other is now₁ there₁, and if we shift them, the one which is now₁ here₁ is the one which then (now₂) was there (here₁) and the same holds for the other which is now₁ here₁ but before (now₂) was there (here₁). If we disregard these relativizing and individuating differences, which negate themselves by changing the positions, we find that we still “know” or are acquainted with not merely the What’s or forms of red disc or ball bearing, but also the This’s in the This-What’s. The bare particular as the radical individual is precisely that “which grounds the numerical difference of the two things which are the same in all (non-relational) respects.” Thus it is not precise to say that the radical individuality is absolutely unknowable or irrational. In “knowing” it, and it seems we “know” it as immediately as we know the red disc or the sphere, we have the basis for the numerical difference. (We come back to numerical difference in §4 below.)

Let us transpose this to our knowledge of persons. In one possible view, in our knowledge of persons, Peter, the bare particular, is this body. It is the bearer of both material or physical predicates as well as mental ones. In this view the body is the bare particular to which we, on the basis of an apperception, ascribe the incompatible properties. (This view, which is proximate to that of Peter Strawson, will be revisited in Chapter VI.) But clearly we, in first-person self-experiencing, do not apperceive the body as the substrate of “I” or my experiencing. The body is indeed the substrate of endless properties, but not that of our self-experiencings. Further, in properly perceiving another as “another I” we do not apperceive the body as the bearer of the ipseity but it is the ipseity which is apperceived as the bearer of the body and the mind. (Saying or thinking, “Her thoughts are in her head” may render a common expression, but they do not render what the speaker apperceives the other to experience or what she experiences.)

Here we may propose an analogy. Doubtless there is a sense in which the bodiliness founds the presencing of the person, but is it not analogous to the way the marks on a page found the sense or meanings we read? What really founds the predicates or properties is that which the meanings we read about refer to – or for
the subjective idealist that which is the bearer of the meaning acts we call reading. But the flow of predicates and syntactical functions in regard to that about which we read do not find their bearer in the marks on the pages, but in that which we are reading about, thinking about, etc. Analogously, the appresented ipseity is the bearer of the properties; it is the bare particular, even though its presencing is founded, in the second- and third-person forms of presencing, on the body – which, of course, for a thing ontology may serve as the bare substrate.

In meeting bodies as pure particulars or bare substrates we invest them with kinds or essences. Thus we perceive this red disc, this shiny ball bearing, etc. But must we not contrast the presencing of this enemy combatant, which has, given an appropriate story, similarities with, e.g., the red disc, with the presencing of “Peter?” I might say, “Come, I want to show you an Iraqi soldier,” but we would not properly say, “Come, I want to show you a Peter.” “Peter” refers to a radical particular or singularity. Of course, presencing Peter is presencing a This-What, but making present “a Peter” suggests that Peter is made present as an instance of a kind, and thus we do not make present Peter properly if we call attention to his being an instance of his species, “Peterness,” or if we single out a typical being or one of his properties, e.g., a human being, a long-distance swimmer, or a professor. In these cases we do not directly make present Peter the person, the ipseity. And thus similarly, if we think of referring to persons in the third- and second person, we refer to what each refers to with “I” and who is for herself a unique individual. The third-person referent of “person” is necessarily to what is a first-person experiencing and self-referring. And even though each human refers to herself with this same term, “I,” the sense of the referent is different in each case and it is missed if one understand this to mean “an I,” as one refers to oneself as “a human,” an Iraqi, etc.

Further, we noted in Chapter II, following Castañeda, that “this” is an indexical that always also co-refers to situated speaker and listeners, and “thisness” is not an inherent natural property of the thing singled out. If “thisness” is not a natural property does it have no more significance than being just an indicator of its being present to the speaker? The bare particular captured by “this” and which serves as the substrate for the thing’s predications, obviously must be, if a component or substrate of the thing, more than a mere phenomenal property. Indeed as the substrate it is not at all of necessity an indexical or something singled out in the speaker’s field of perception, nor is it necessarily the property of something. In this respect, “this” can refer to what is an ontological and not merely phenomenal constituent principle of something. It is the tode ti. Of course, the bare substrate of “this” comes to light in the presence of the mind’s use of demonstrative pronouns, but the speaker’s singling it out may be such that the bare substrate as the bearer of forms is not meant at all, but rather just the entire concrete object, as “this soldier,” “this lion,” “this smudge.” A fortiori, the “this” of the person as the bare substrate is an haecceity which is an individual essence in itself and not by reason of anything else. Its being “this” is not dependent on the performance of the indexical, “this,” but it would be dependent on what a person using “I” refers to, whether linguistically performed actually or not.
These considerations do not negate the claim that “this” as an indexical is always an indicator of the speaker’s situation (nor do they negate that for transcendental phenomenology all indexicality merely indexes the present speaker whereas all that appears indexes the transcendental I). It merely means that the sense of the referent of “this” extends beyond the actual achievement of the demonstrative pronoun. The power of the display of the indexical is not exhausted in co-presencing the speaker’s situation and the presencing of things in relation to the speaker by assigning to them the non-natural relational property of “this.” The indexical “this” may indeed bring to light the supposit or bare substrate, as in this red disc while at the same time bringing to light the essential constituents of something in terms of being both a “this” and a “what.” But the sense of the “this” as the individual essence of ipseity is actualized in self-awareness whether or not brought to light by the indexical “I.” And the transcendental attitude guarantees this beyond question because the entire realm of discourse indexes the transcendental I and its irrepressible non-reflective awareness of its unique essence. (See §4 below.)

In the teletransportation experiment we followed Klawonn in the claim that the unique “myself” or ipseity is most evident in first-person experience. Now we are claiming that it also brings forth our acquaintance with ourselves as bare substrates which we know in a nonascriptive manner. That is, in first-person experience, the non-properitied sense of “I myself” is evident. In our discussions in the previous chapter we attempted to show how it is evident in second-person experience, especially when it moves toward love. Third-person experience of Others more easily veers toward the ascriptive identity in so far as the other is present merely within one’s pragmatic everyday framework, which can require our instrumentalizing the Other or framing her in terms of lists of attributes that everyday life evokes, i.e., we encounter the Other only in so far as she does or does not have certain properties, e.g., is the waiter, the sales clerk, the policeman, etc. As we saw, in the second-person encounter, this likelihood is lessened. And in the unfolding of the second-person presencing of others, the unique ipseity enjoys a distinctive kind of non-sortal evidence.

To the extent persons are present and appreciated exclusively in terms of their qualities (properties) the ipseity not only eludes us, which as the other “myself” it does in any case, but it verges on being absent. (The simulations in forms such as a machine-person, target dummies, a robot, and a sex-mannequin aspire to embody the presence of the pure qualities of a person without permitting or fostering the appresentation the person.) For the appresentation to be absolutely missing requires discipline and the inculcation of perceptual habits, as in some procedures of boot camp where one practices the dismantling of empathic perception so that Others (named enemies) are made to appear as non-persons. The ipseity is present in the transcendence of the Other which always is present as an unbridgeable abyss. The epistemic achievement here implies the extra-epistemic achievement of respect, i.e., deference, making room for, not intruding on, or being presumptuous. The epistemic achievement of “empathic presencing” verges on respects for the essential reason that the Other is not merely something in the world, and not reducible to the qualitative display of the properties.
Further, the unique ipseity is not a qualitative identity which is indifferent to whether it is an ideal object and communicable or rather something real and singular. As such the unique ipseity is not substitutable or able to be duplicated and insists on being so regarded. To the extent the empathic presencing of the other is an affirmation of this radical transcendence that cannot be made present through the qualitative features it not only affirms the transcendence but is a kind of faith in what is beyond what is perceptually evident. This clearly is the distinction between the first-person indubitable evidence and the second-person evidence.

As we have seen, the telos of the empathic presencing of the other as “you” is actualized in love. Love is this affirmation of and making space for the other foreign sphere of ownness and I-ness. By its nature this love is veneration and rejoicing in the person. The mind moves beyond the, however admirable, qualities to what is presenced through and beyond them. The presence of the You and the beloved which are beyond properties confront us with something that is not a nihil negativum even though it is a “I know not what.” Let us resume this theme, which is a philosophical embarrassment for a third-person thing-ontology.

“I myselfness,” “ipseity,” “the I,” “I-ness,” etc. all are ways of expressing in terms of form or eidos what itself is not the specification of a genus or essence. The world comes to us as particulars pervaded by whatness or categorical forms. The ultimate “eidetic singularity” is the “this here,” Diesda, tode ti, informed by the definite description of lowest specific difference. “I,” although a concretum, is not strictly something indexed by “this here” nor is it a lowest specification of a form, or a “definite description.” Yet we are urging reasons to think of it as in and of itself a super-form precisely because it does not admit of the separability of the eidos, and thus the duplication, of the eidetic singularity. And neither of these principles are separable from the dies-da or consideration of individuality or singularity.

This is perhaps the basis for the Plotinian notion of the “form of Socrates” and the Thomist notion of angelic or purely spiritual substances such as Raphael, Michael, or Gabriel, where there is posited super-rationally conscious individuals who are conceived to be so rich in essence that their individuality exhausts what it means to be this essence, i.e., Raphael exhausts the species Raphaelness in a way no instantiation of human can possibly exhaust humanity, and in such a way that Raphael is as different from Michael and Gabriel as a fly from an elephant and a fish. Thus we refer to the same when we say Raphael as when we say Raphaelness. (We return to this in our discussions of Plotinus and Aquinas in Book 2, Chapter VI.) Similarly, what I refer to with “I” exhausts the essentiality of who I am in such a way that no other instance can add to or enrich my essentially being me myself. This contrasts with the way this person who I am may well enrich (or impoverish) the sense attached to “humanity.” In effect what we mean by person is not exhausted by or the equivalent of instantiation of humanity or human individual.

“I” is not a bare particular bereft of an “essence” and “essential meaning,” even though it is propertyless. In our view there is a coincidence of the bare particular/bare substrate and the essential “myself.”
What we have in mind here foremost in the first-person self-awareness and self-reference is approximated by the Scotist notion of *haecceitas*. Scotus found in the presentedness of anything whatsoever a *thisness* to which the demonstrative directly refers. As Castañeda notes, the Scotist doctrine does three things: (a) it believes that the demonstrative “harpoons the individual in its own reality” as a *thisness*, and (b) this *thisness* is thought to constitute the individual present to us, and (c) the *haecceitas* or *thisness* is posited, through a hypostatization, to be the principle of the individuality. For most moderns, especially Neo-Kantians like Castañeda, such a doctrine is alien. For such a Neo-Kantian this is an alien move even in the case of what “I” refers to. In this Husserlian work, we do not deal with the general theory of *haecceitas*, but hold, in part thanks to phenomenological considerations of Castañeda which prescind from his Kantianism, that the indexical/demonstrative “I” does get at the thing in itself in its unique individual essence. Perhaps Castañeda’s reading of Scotus as positing a principle of individuality as a “hypostatization” draws near to saying that the “This” is a unique essence. In any case, it seems to us, there are two reasons Castañeda cannot agree with Husserl’s own view that the I is a substance and a substance individuates itself. The first is Castañeda’s bundle- or guise-theory of perception. “The I” is not given except as a manifold of guises, e.g., in external reflexive reference and internal reflexive reference, and as such exists only in the achieved reference, i.e., the I is ephemeral. No experience, even self-awareness, gets at any “thing in itself” but only at phenomenal guises. This relates to the second reason: There is no doctrine of non-reflective self-awareness where one experiences oneself precisely as what we are calling “myself” and which is the abiding bearer of all one’s acts, experiences, habits, etc. Because, for Castañeda, “I” is in each and every case a phenomenal ephemeral guise it cannot be a unique individual essence.

“Essence” as we are using it here echoes also para- and non-philosophical dictionary meanings, e.g., of what is most intrinsic, what is the true inwardness, the distinctive quality, etc. Here we also approach a para-philosophical understanding of essence as the hidden secret of something that yet must be revealed, and perhaps can never be fully revealed without being destroyed, and can never be said without betraying itself. Kierkegaard made the distinction between essential and accidental secrets. The latter are such that they are not made public, but could very well be made public and communicated directly. The essential secret cannot be made public and communicated directly. What Kierkegaard calls subjectivity and inwardness, proximate to what we are calling ipseity, an essential secret. The “myself,” i.e., how I am for myself in the first-person non-reflective self-awareness, cannot be communicated directly. Indeed, if communication is most basically a matter of displaying a property of something, and if the “myself” is a non-ascriptive self-presence, there cannot properly be a communication of this “secret.” Your knowledge of me myself through love is always a revelation in the second-person of the ipseity which is present through but as beyond the properties; it is not, nor can it be, a making public through statements of the “myself.” There is thus a tension between the publicity and universality of communication and language and the “myself” as an absolute singularity.
Derrida nicely points out this tension: “Once I speak I am never and no longer myself, alone and unique.” Yet keeping silent, keeping myself secret, betrays me as a person in the world with others no less than does speaking betray me by depriving me of my absolute singularity. As silent I am the one who is taciturn, reserved, secretive, incommunicative, etc. The assignment to myself of the “property” of “individual essence” or hyper-essence itself is no less a betrayal of myself.

The problem to which Derrida alludes is the familiar one of how demonstratives that are universal signs in a language, e.g., the words “this” and “I,” may refer to what is not a universal, i.e., this concrete individual thing or ipseity, myself. The sense in which speaking “betray” that about which one speaks itself is an unmasking or a disclosure of the “unbridgeable abyss,” and therefore, at least partially, an undoing of the damage of the “betrayal”. But this unmasking requires constant vigilance and Derrida’s point is an important one. It is especially useful for our point that the individual essence is the “myself.” Using the token betrays the secret in the sense that the singular individual’s unique essence is brought to mind by sign designs, even if they are token reflexives, which may be, and have been, taken for what they are not. The doctrine that essence and definiteness are present only in the presencing of properties and definitions may lead one to think that what we have in mind is essentially vague so that an effort to put it in language is out of the question. But what we have in mind here quite the opposite. With C.S. Lewis we may say in contrast to the situation where what we experience is too vague for the precision language affords: “On the contrary, [in this case], it is words that are vague. The reason why the thing can’t be expressed is that it’s too definite for language.”

Ipseity as uniquely individual is essentially a positive notion, not merely individuum, i.e., something not divisible. Its not being decomposable, analyzable, dividable is not a deficiency. It expresses the concretum as a whole that exists by and in itself and not in another. But when we say whole we usually mean what has a clear boundary, in this sense has a definite look (eidos). But the eidos of “I myself,” although distinctive, is, as we said earlier, an individual per se and not an eidos of an individual individuated from without; nor is it an individual whole per accidens, i.e., it is not individual by reference to some contingent external thing else, e.g., what limits, frames, or negates it. Thus it is able to be thought of as the singularization of an eidos (or essentialization of an individual) which is complete and positive in itself, and not merely by reason of it excluding any other that might challenge it, i.e., a metaphysical clone.

Further, we may here recall that eidos in early Greek meant not merely essence as essential but more originally and concretely “look” and even “face.” Obviously “myself” is not given to me nor is it present as the look of something. Clearly it is neither given as a result of a thoughtful intention nor a fortiori through free imaginative variation. But its so-called givenness is analogous to the way the Other’s face (eidos) is given all at once, in a Gestalt, a rich whole which is “essentially” individual.

As a concrete individual, the “I myself” exists in and by itself. Thus a person cannot be a property inhering in or belonging to something else. A specification of
a genus and a definite description are precisely what are predicated categorically of the concrete individual. The concrete individuals that are present in the third-person as things (or where the ipseity is prescinded from, as in physiological descriptions) are indefinable only in the sense of the infinity of the properties that may be assigned to them. This does not mean that a genus and specific difference cannot be determined. In the case of “I’s”, as Hopkins says, we have something “more highly pitched, selved, and distinctive.” The individuality is primarily present not through the presencing of the concrete individual as what gets categorically articulated or displayed, but in the lived, first-person experience of the concrete individual.

What is distinctive in the presencing of persons is that in the second- and third-person there is “appresented” first-person experience, i.e., there is a knowing of the other’s first-person experience not through a direct presencing as in one’s own case but indirectly and through an empty intention of the “more” that is indicated in presencing of the face, bodily presence, deeds, words, etc. Thus the individuality, the “thisness” of the concrete individual thing, will be a result of the unique constellation of properties as well as its spatial and temporal location. But the individuation of “I myself” is not one determined by such a constellation or spatial and temporal location.

As we noted, “I myself,” as the dative and genitive of manifestation, i.e., as that to which and by which all that appears appears, is not an object with a unique constellation of properties and is not in space and time. Furthermore, the “thisness” of any body singled out in the world is, as a display of this body, not an inherent natural property of the body, like a tail, but rather it is what is determined in relationship to the consciousness highlighting the body in this way. Every individuating “here” and “now” refers back to an agent of manifestation that itself is not here and now as something in the world. All individuation here and now of what appears, depends on the displaying agent whose individuation is absolute, i.e., not related to anything outside itself.30 Again, as we have insisted, “I myself” is individuated per se, and not per accidens, i.e., by reason of something external to itself.

We have said that from even the second- or third-person perspective, persons differ from one another not merely through a quality or property that others could have and which, when possessed, would render the ipseity the same. Of course, I’s or persons have the same properties, such as being short-tempered or just; and they intentionally are or become the same things by way of knowing the same thing i.e., given the Aristotelian-phenomenological thesis that knower and known are idem, the same, in the act of knowing, persons knowing/displaying something, e.g., someone’s just behavior, renders the persons in this respect the same. But this sharing in properties does not affect the unique ipseity. Aside from the consideration that the properties shared receive a kind of individuation by belonging to the unique person’s signature style, the persons remain, in a problematic sense distinct in spite of all this sharing. (See our discussion of numerical identity and distinctiveness below.) Further, the sharing of the properties does not, in principle, exclude the unique arrangement of the qualities, because that itself, the unique arrangement, would be a quality that in principle could be shared. (Recall the thought experiment by which one gets teletransported by the imagined ability to reconfigure identically
the unique chemical, physical, and psychological properties that comprise someone.) Just as the loved ipseity tends to become invisible when there is a radical qualitative change in the person, a fortiori does it tend to become invisible if one finds oneself confronted with a double of the loved one.

The possible identically unique constellation of properties, we have seen, is the problem of the metaphysical clone. It is able to be entertained in the second- and third-person perspective where one can entertain two identical JG Hart’s. But when I shift to the first-person perspective and I see my double as having the total replication of qualities that make up for “me,” JG Hart, I still must say that I am not he and he is not I myself.

What is it that accounts for this “numerical” distinctiveness? What accounts for the individuality? Why is this “I” distinct from that one? The answer is precisely the tautology of “I myself”: I am this consciousness, this individual, and not that one. What makes this one different from that one is that the I-consciousness of this one is such that it is not the one that that one has. In this sense the individuality of its I-ness or essence is essentially incommunicable. The *principium individuationis* is not to be found in anything apart from the I-consciousness itself, i.e., not in space-time, not in *prima materia signata*, not in genetic structure, not in any accruing quality. “I” has not any general content-like peculiarity; it is in itself completely empty of qualitative properties. Its contents and qualities derive from the acts by which it is in the world. But again, these negations do not amount to a *nihil negativum* but rather point to an ontologically unique positivity.

Admittedly we face a difficult distinction here. The “ipseity” or “myselfness” is indeed free of a content and in this sense empty. It thus appears as a mere form that is also a numerical identity: each is an I and *eo ipso* each is different from everyone else and each shares this in common with everyone. Of course, the proper sense of individuation, i.e., the individuation by which we can say how this one differs from that one, and thereby single out distinguishing properties, is only through there being present someone who lives out her life in all of its conative, practical and theoretic aspects. But this consideration alone does not do justice to the matter. There is a positivity in my saying, e.g., of the alleged clone, “whoever he is he is not me and I myself am not him.” Although I am affirming that I am not him, the basis for this is my prior ‘positive’ sense of me myself. In this case the I is of course the quality-free “apperceived” pole of a stream and is individuated by the stream, but the stream always already is mine and bears the stamp of ownness, uniqueness, identity, etc.

This positivity, although not able to be explicated by anything we know beyond the immediate sense of ourselves, is to be contrasted with other forms of emptiness and inexplicable. Something may be empty and therefore unspeakable because of its poverty of meaning. We thus as a rule have little to say about our times of dreamless sleep. Similarly we speak of stretches in life as uneventful, or dead time, or times “needing to be killed” and as such they merit little explication or comment for that reason. Or a sentence or argument or comment might be so obvious or tautological that it merits no comment.

But in the case of “I myself” we have something quite different. Words may fail us not only because the tokens of the personal pronouns are universals but also
because of the distinctive unique richness of “meaning” even though no content or category is appropriate to bring it to light. It is similar to and different from the felt-meaning or empty intention of “meaning to say” where we start with the felt-meaning or empty intention and where we do not in advance know precisely what we are going to say and yet where we, in a sense, know what we want to say, and when we mis-speak we will want to back up and have another go at it.31 By way of contrast, in the case of ipseity there is no empty intention because one is always completely present to oneself. I am always I. That means I do not become “myself” or “I.” Yet, we will propose (in Book 2), that the “I myself” is always a person in the making and in pursuit of the true self; we will argue that the true self is a realization of the personalized “myself”; it is properly a realization of the “myself,” which itself, however, is always identically the same.

This raises the question of one’s “calling” or what is involved in being a person and how we are to understand the essential inadequation of one’s actual self (as a person) with the ideal self (person); is this analogous to the explication of a felt meaning? The personal being unfolds the “myself” in properties and qualities that the “myself” always transcends immanently. That is, they cannot be without it, but it is always more and other than they. But the very act of saying what we mean is “transcended” by the felt-meaning too, in the sense that it itself is not sentences or propositions but is that to which we refer in our saying and meaning sentences and propositions. Because the felt-meaning already contains in potentia everything I mean to say, and what I come to say takes its bearings from it, and I, even in my being stuck, and not knowing what I want to say, am never absolutely ignorant of what I want to say because of the empty intending of it, there would seem to be in our personal self-formation an analogy to saying what we mean. Thus, we propose, whereas it never makes sense to ask ourselves whether we are who we are, it does make sense to ask ourselves whether we are now who we want or ought to be. “Who we want to be” and “who we ought to be” refer to us as full self-determining persons in the world with Others, i.e., moral persons. The question whether one is who one wants to be or is misunderstood if by this it suggests that one might want to be or ought to be someone else. This question, we shall urge, really means: Are we the sort of person we want to be, or are we living up to what we take to be our self-ideal?

What I refer to with “I,” i.e., “myself” and what I bring to light with “I,” i.e., “myself as myself,” is self-contained richness without teleology. But this self-contained, non-teleological individual hyper-essence is an abstraction, albeit a legitimate one, from what I as this person refer to with I, i.e., the teleological I in the world with Others. We get at the former, as the transcendental “I.” through the transcendental reduction which suspends my doxastic allegiance to my being me, this person in the world with Others and through considering how the entire stream of consciousness gathers around the I like iron filings gather around a magnetic pole. I also get at it with the non-ascriptive indexical “I” as well as in the declarative use of “I” as the agent of manifestation. These are not only legitimate but necessary philosophical considerations that abstract from the personal teleological I.
Further, there is the difficult matter of in what sense freedom is the equivalent of the propertyless I, in what sense it is a property of this I, and in what sense does it itself get qualified with properties. Freedom is the equivalent of “I myself” in so far as I alone actualize me and in so far as the “I myself” is free from properties. My freedom is me in act and is not bounded by any necessity apart from my being me myself. Of course my freedom is framed by the necessities and properties of my human nature and my personal history. But we are distinguishing the nature which the person necessarily as a condition of its actual existence and the person herself, whose basis is the “myself.” Further, these necessities of nature that frame or condition the person do not affect my freedom as such, i.e., as an uncaused agency. There are no prior properties or qualities that affect my freedom as such. Finally, when I act, I act from out of necessities that accrue to my agency, e.g., my range of knowing, habits, retentions, etc., but these necessities are mine as this person JG Hart, i.e., emergent from my personal motivational frame, and not imposed from without. But again these are odd necessities precisely because they are the inner necessities of being me, this person in the world with Others, and of what I alone have imposed on myself. We will return to some of these matters in Book 2, especially when we take up the question of Existenz.

We have already touched on some of these matters in talking about how we take note of the universal distinguishing ownness and mineness, the distinguishing “signature feature” that is proper to someone in the course of her action and speech and in the course of her life. In each phase and content there is to be found the absolute uniqueness. And this uniqueness can be observed “in spite of the universal form, the universal essence, through which the I is precisely an I.” In this problematic formulation by Husserl I myself am seen to have the essence of “I,” i.e., a form. But this I-ness is not the uniqueness of “I” and the lived “I myself” even though the essence of I-ness has the properties of ownness, uniqueness, etc. In this passage we have to sort out: (a) the sense in which the “I” is not a form and I am radically unique; (b) the sense in which “the I” is an essence or form; (c) the sense in which “the I” as the lived “I myself” itself may lay claim to being a kind of form or “essentiality.”

(a) is the familiar point of the unique uniqueness and non-instantiability – and that need not be rehearsed again. Another text of Husserl touches the essential points of (a), (b), and (c):

Each I, considered purely as I, considered purely in the life of consciousness that it therein lives, has its individuality. Each is an I and nevertheless each I is an Other, in such a way that complete similarity is necessarily excluded. In the content of each I there is to be found the absolute uniqueness, in spite of the universal form, the universal essence, through which the I is precisely I.

(b) This at first seems to be a kind of aberration in so far as it renders as a form what most typically for Husserl is not a form. The existing “I” is not “the I” or “an I.” “The I,” or “an I,” are grammatical barbarisms that enable the philosophical convenience of abstract reference, i.e., a focus on formal features. That is, the barbarism of “the I” enables what is essentially first-person and what is
never in its concretion in life merely an object for itself to become a referent and substrate of predication in the third-person for the non-objective predicating “I.” But what is a convenience for thematizing that which essential can also obscure the essential, i.e., that I cannot be an essence if that means that I exist as kind that can be individuated or exemplified or that has instances. Yet it is precisely the phenomenological egology that thematizes the I as what holds for any I whatsoever. It has to do not only with the concrete factual “I myself” but any possible I whatsoever. Few phenomenologists at least would deny that there is a form of I insofar as we think of consciousness as such having a center founded in the primal presencing with its retaining and protending around which acts and sensa cluster. And if we think of the eidetic singularity as a singularization of essence, “the I” may serve as shorthand for this. Yet Husserl himself, as we have noted, holds that the absolute concretum as the lowest specific difference and individual coincide; that strictly speaking there is not possible a plurality of distinct absolute singularities or I’s. In this sense “the I” always misleads because its proper “home” is the unique incommunicable “myself”. (See our discussions in §4 below.) Everything is distinctly itself by standing in opposition to what is other than it. Each individual is itself by not being, and standing in contrast to, what is other than itself. Thus an individual has its individuality displayed by reference to what the thing itself is not. But in the case of the “myself,” as we have seen, I am aware of myself without being aware of myself as anything other than myself and my awareness of myself is the condition for my being aware of any Other presenting herself as self-experiencing herself. We will return to this in §4 below.

Let us turn to (c) with help from Jacques Maritain. With “I” there is the “content” of absolute uniqueness (see the text at (a) cited above), but there is no third-person token-reflexive-free characteristic of which we have to be aware to be aware of ourselves, and therefore there is no quality, no essence that can be participated in or communicated. Maritain insists that our “intuition” of ourselves, “surrenders no essence.” As subjectivity it is, he observes, inconceptualisable, essentially unobjectifiable, “an unknowable abyss.” Further, he follows St. Thomas that there is for consciousness an incommunicable knowing of oneself, that one is a self, and this is a knowing of “the singular existence of this subjectivity.”

These observations of Maritain are enough for what we have in mind here by “individual essence” for the knowing of the singular existence of this subjectivity is surely not a knowing of the phenomenological communicable eidos wherein reflective free imaginative variation spells out the necessary properties. Further it makes room for the point of Hopkins, that we each have this unique sense or “taste” of ourselves, “more distinctive than alum.” Is this incomparable distinctiveness not itself an essence? Is the “ownness” that is inseparable from one’s self-awareness and which is not derived from any other consideration, e.g., by contrast with the Others, by which I am myself apodictically and adequately not entitled to the acknowledgement that it has the specific rich density of meaning that we reserve for “essence?” Hopkins already suggests it is like an “essence” in the
French sense of an incomparable smell or taste! But this very essence is the principle of the uniqueness or individuation. On the one hand, we have something essentially non-participatable, contentless, non-instantiable, not individuated; on the other hand, we have an incomparable distinctiveness, analogous to a taste, that is a radical uniqueness more palpable, but in a non-reflexive, non-intentional, non-categorial way, than any distinctive taste. “Myself,” like a taste, color, or sound, is something simple. In the non-reflective self-awareness, analogous to the perception of such a taste or color, we do not intuit any parts or elements that compose it. Any talk of parts here, as the ingredients of the awareness of inner time which Husserl brings to light, all presuppose the “myself” and are pervaded by its ownness.

Although from the original positioning of our being-in-the-world with Others the person can well appear as the whole of which the I is the part as substratum, the consideration of the unique taste or essence of the “myself,” especially when brought out by the teletransportation thought-experiment, enables the “myself” to appear as enjoying an integrity as an independent whole unto itself. Yet we here move into a most difficult matter. First of all, all such tastes, scents, etc., like colors with which we are familiar – and which may serve as analogues to the unique “myself” – are themselves qualities which inhere in something else and are not independent wholes unto themselves. Further they are distinctive only by way of implicitly co-referring to what they are not. But Hopkins (echoing a theme in Husserl) makes a point of the amazement that there are others who “to themselves have the same feeling.” But important for the suggestion of a kind of integrity and independent wholeness for the “myself,” this discovery is not the condition for his own taste of himself. “I taste self but at one tankard, that of my own being.” This point is decisive. Of course, Others reveal the plurality of selves or I’s, but properly speaking, there is only one “I” and one ownness, and that is enjoyed only in the first-person, and not by comparison with anything else. As you cannot refer to me with “I” so I cannot refer to you with “I.” What you are for yourself remains forever “you” for me; what I am for myself remains forever “you” for you.

“I myself,” “ipseity,” “I-ness,” lose their sense if there is not posited uniqueness, concretion, once-and-for-all-ness, individuality. Yet this cannot be the sense of something in the world that becomes uniquely this, here, and now by reason of the display by the agent of manifestation through an indexical reference. Again, the “essence” of “I myself” lies in its individuality and the principle of its individuation lies in this very “essence” of “I myself.”37 The individuality does not derive from anything outside itself, like its being individuated by causality, time and space, or its being an instance of a kind, or its being singled out or displayed indexically by an agent of manifestation. Thus the I involves a sense of individual, a “this,” that is not individuated by any quality, or by being in space and time. “The I is ‘this’ and has individuality in itself and out of itself; it does not have individuality by reason of causality,”38 nor by way even of a prior contrast with Others, nor by way of the indexical achievement of some agent of manifestation other than itself.
Again, what I refer to with “I” is not something appearing to me as an individual in the way “this tree” appears to me so that my uniqueness is a result of my appearing now and there through this display of myself to me. “I,” prior to any reflection, am essentially “myself” as uniquely unique. The principle of my individuation lies only in me in my immediate non-reflexive self-awareness. If “essence” signifies what is essential and necessary for me to be me in the universality of my life then this immediate non-reflexive self-awareness is a non-intentional “presencing of” an essence. If *eidos* is the essential look of something to someone, then “myself” is not an *eidos*. But if we may extend *eidos* to the “ontological face” of myself non-reflectively present to myself, after the fashion Sartre has proposed, namely, we cross out the “of” (in presence of myself, as we cross it out in awareness of myself in favor of self-awareness) then we have an exemplary *eidos*. Of course, “presencing of” must be placed in scare quotes because it suggests a presencing in which there is a genitive and dative of manifestation. My self-presencing is the presence of a singularized *eidos*; it is proper to my essence to be absolutely individual and distinct from every other.

One’s ipseity is not something one ever has in advance in the sense of pre-thematic, pre-given and determinable awaiting determination. This is not because it lacks the priority of the pre-givenness but because it is always prior to this priority, always “this side of” and “too soon” in relation to such determinations which presuppose felt-meanings founded in empty intentions. Similarly one never has it in advance as if it was pre-given awaiting an appropriate and adequate determination, not merely because it is too much to seize or to apprehend, but because it, considered apart from its personal concretion, is without properties. Nor does one ever have it afterward, subsequent to reflection and analysis, because there is in fact no determination to take hold of, nothing abiding to seize, no thing or property to explicate. (For a theological contrast, cf. our discussion of Leibniz’s view [Book 2, Chapter VI] where God is held to know selves only through an advance knowledge of all the properties that accrue to them in time.)

In proposing this we seem to tread near, with the claim of a non-reflective awareness of the “myself” as a “super-essence” or an “individual essence,” Husserl’s critical remarks regarding the mysticism of “intellectual intuition” to which initiated adepts have access in order to have supernatural illuminations.39 For Husserl “intellectual intuition” referred doubtless to what, for the phenomenologist, must be regarded as the speculative excesses of Fichte and Schelling.40 Yet the case can be made that often both of these thinkers had in mind with the term, “intellectual intuition,” the problem of the self-awareness of the I prior to reflection, prior to the constitution of oneself as oneself and prior to the conceptual application of the concept of “I.” They used the term “intuition” analogously. As “intuition” it calls to mind what enjoys an immediate non-reflective, non-mediated presence; but because it was not of anything sensible, it, in this respect, resembled the presence of something ideal or immaterial or formal, like a mathematical object or form or essential property, and therefore could be thought of an intuition tied to “intellect.” But, most important, because it was presupposed in all knowing, it was not of any thing and therefore not an object of sense or
intellect. Therefore, it is most decisively removed from being considered as either properly a sense intuition or intellectual intuition. Yet the feature of immediacy of “intuition” was welcomed, and because the “I” is distinctively present to itself in its unique form as the innermost ownmost experience upon which everything depends in regard to what we know of the trans-sensible world, and because it is that which indubitably is and to which everything that appears appears, regarding it as an intellectual intuition rather than a mere sensing, feeling, or living-through of an experience seemed to be appropriate. And if consciousness is always intentional, i.e., “consciousness of...” then what “intellectual intuition” reveals about the I or about freedom, both of which are only brought to light properly in their lived actuality, reveals nothing of the I or freedom properly, but only subsequently upon reflection is it displayed as an object of the anonymous I in its freedom.

Yet we may recall that Husserl is a defender of intuition as the basic principle of all philosophical knowing because for him it has to do with the self-givenness of whatever we have to deal with cognitively. Phenomenology regards any articulation that is not founded in self-givenness, whether a sense-presentation or an intellectual presencing of something formal, as empty and theoretically deficient. Nothing can be more originally-originatingly self-“given,” i.e., never originated, than the I to itself which is originally-originatingly “given” both apodictically and adequately, i.e., “given” indubitably all at once and free of perspectives. Furthermore for our purposes here, it is of great importance that Husserl acknowledges that the non-reflective self-presence of the I in its ownness is present in its wakefulness as the I-centering of the stream of consciousness. And this ownness of the I is manifest in its self, in its “own ownness,” and “not through a contrast with the Others which are constituted by me.”

The unique essence of myself in my ownness is enriched through this contrast, and the proper sense of the presenced Other requires my own sense of ownness; yet my ownness is given unmediated from the start. Of course, that the I is self-given non-ascriptively, that its ownness is original with the original self-givenness, that this self-givenness is diaphanous, the “From Which” or zero point of the natural attitude and intentional consciousness, that it is self-present in its passive and foremost in its active vitality and freedom (“acts”) – all this is not given as such to the pre- or non-reflective self-awareness. It is only through the work of acts of transcendental reflection that all this comes to light. It is not given to us, as such, as a passive revelation of supernatural truths. But the original presence of onself to oneself serves as the basis for the articulating work of transcendental reflection.

In sum: Because “myself” is not a quality, content, property, an instantiable universal, etc. in any sense that intentionality brings to light, and because it is “essentially” a unique individual essence, it resists being considered a form or an essence as they apply to categorical displays of what appears in the world. “Myself” or ipseity brings together essence and individuality or haecceity in the singularization of the extension of the essence and in the essentialization of the concrete thinness. Here the quiddity is individualized and the individual essentialized.
position goes against the grain of the tradition which, for good reason, has wanted to keep separate individuality and universality, the “this” from the form, the haecceitas from the essence. The good reason is that this separation receives a strong case when being is examined in the third-person. Another good reason is that essence or form, as the fruit of eidetic analysis, leaves us with essential defining moments or properties which as such are participable and communicable and thus “freed” of the restrictions of being bound to “this” and “here.”

Of course, bundle theory contests any such understanding of essence. At least one form of this theory, e.g., that of Castañeda, has a strong doctrine of first-person reference while, at the same time, it denies that there is a non-reflexive self-presence and therefore holds that “I” is present in the form of a guise, a presencing of…, to —. The self is this concatenation of guises, i.e., of genitives of manifestation, and there is no sense of I without a guise. But we have maintained that ipseity is first of all an abiding non-reflexive self-awareness that is not an appearing of…, to —. This self-awareness takes the emphatic form (e.g., “myself as myself”) when there occurs self-reference and in the constitution of the person with self-referential agency. Further that which always already is present/presenced is oneself and this is neither an individual as an instance of a kind nor is it sheer form bereft of haecceity. Rather in our view the principle of individuation is the hyper-essential unique ipseity which is originally non-reflexively present, and thus the single individual is an individual essence; the eidos is singularized and the individual is essentialized.

The non-ascriptive self-presence of “I myself,” as an individual essence, raises the metaphysical problem of where its ultimate ontological home is. As an individual essence its death or vanishing raises special problems about the meaning of what is essential. In ancient thought, in Plotinus and after him (see Book 2, Chapter VI), the individual essence was seen to have a more fundamental existence in the eternal intellect or Nous, or in Christianity, in God’s eternal essence. It thus has a multiple modal status, e.g., as existing actually in the historical person and as existing actually in the eternal essence of the divine or Nous as divine essence and existing potentially in the divine mind as participable by creation. As such it is both uncreated and created, necessary and contingent, imitable possible exemplar and exemplification. In each mode this same eidos or individual essence, would be referred to with the non-ascriptive “myself.” In the human referring as well as in the divine referring there is no distinction between sense and referent; the sense collapses into the referent and the referent is identical with the sense. But for speculative theology there is reason to maintain the sense-referent distinction in order to claim that the referent of the creaturely “myself” cannot be simply the same as the divine, even though the “sense” of the individual essence is the same in both cases. Yet we can maintain a sameness but not identity of reference if we say that in the one case it is to God’s own essence and in the other case it refers to God’s own essence as imitable, created, “othered.” These themes will occupy us in Chapters VI–VII, Book 2.

Hopkins called this “myself” which is capable of these different modes a “bare self.” “Now a bare self, to which no nature has yet been added, which is not yet
clothed or overlaid with a nature, is indeed nothing, a zero, in the score or account of existence; but as possible it is positive, like a positive infinitesimal, and intrinsically different from every other self.”

§3 “I Myself” as Substance

This notion of the “bare self” heralds the proposal in theories of substance of a “bare substrate.” In this section we wish to show how “I myself,” as the presence of one’s own individual essence, can be elucidated by considering it as a “substance.” The position we will present is already indicated in Husserl’s statement: “The Ego is a ‘substance’; a substance individuates itself.” “Substance” is an anglicized Latin term which is the more traditional candidate for translating Aristotle’s *ousia*. When thinking about these matters, it is good to keep in mind Joseph Owens’ proposal of “entity because of the connection of *ousia* with *einai*, the infinitive “to be.” Richard Hope’s translation of “primary being” is also helpful to keep in mind because Aristotle’s *ousia* refers always also to what pre-eminently exists, i.e., by itself, and does not inhere in something else.

The basic phenomenological task is always to describe what appears in relationship to how it appears to the viewer. Typically discussions of substance have their home in third-person discussions. Even when they use persons as examples the persons are not considered from a first-person perspective. The phenomenological procedure is to begin with what is originally given. But what is given is notoriously misleading because of our naivety. “World,” *pace* Kant and some positivists, is given, i.e. co-given, and the transcendental viewer is both non-reflexively given as well as marginally “given”; but these manners of “givenness” are typically a theme only for phenomenologists. We have reason to dismantle what presents itself with a claim to original givenness in favor of its constituent components when we can show (a) the components are necessary to account for the complex structure of the originally given, and/or (b) when by assuming an appropriate attitude we are led to see that the constituents are given equally or more originally than what the beginning naive attitude revealed as originally given. Aristotelians hold that originally given are “concrete particulars” or “things” like particular persons, dogs, and trees. In contrast to bundle-theorists, who hold that what is originally and exclusively given is what substance-theory calls the attributes or properties, substance-theoreticians hold that the clusters or bundles of attributes or properties have of necessity something that underlies (*substans, hypokeimenon*) the attributes or properties. For phenomenology, the *hypo* of *hypokeimenon* may be taken to mean not only that which “lies under” but also “that which is always co-given or which accompanies.” And this “underlying” of substance may also, in certain kinds of beings, be taken as that which actualizes (*entelechein*) and formally-finally (teleologically) brings about some of the attributes. Bundle-theory and substance-theory both hold that the “thing” must be described in terms of the way the attributes are accompanied by what glues
them together. We will not discuss the elaborate efforts by bundle-theory to account for “things” in terms of devices which enable the attributes to connect or accompany one another and to account for the whole Gestalt of the thing. We merely note that a central issue for guise theory (a kind of bundle-theory) also is in what sense the “thing” itself (which for substance-theory is alleged to “underlie” and “accompany” the given attributes) itself is given.

Clearly in the third-person presentation what is given is given through the profiles or perspectives or senses. These serve as an analogy for attributes, as when we say of a tree that it is leafed, bare, drooping, upright, fresh, then short, now tall, now diseased, then healthy, etc. As Aristotle says, the substance, although numerically one, can receive contrary qualities: It can be at one time cold, another time warm; it can be at one time young, at another time old.

Substance means not only “accompanying” but also “underlying” because the attributes belong to or inhere in and are borne, says the Aristotelian, by the “thing” or concrete particular. The “being diseased” or “being droopy” does not exist in itself but rather characterizes the tree. This is to say that the attribute inheres in the tree and does not exist by itself. Attributes are precisely what are predicated of things or substances which exist by themselves. Whereas a “primary being” or “thing” cannot be predicated of something else (we cannot say “Peter is Paul” or “This oak tree is Tom”), the thing or substance is the bearer of attributes which are predicated of it.

We do not take “the tree” as an independent attribute, but we see each of the attributes as belonging to the tree. As Husserl would say, any spatial-temporal thing is apperceived, co-meant, and co-given precisely as that of which the series of perspectives or attributes are perspectives or attributes. Perceiving a side, seeing a color, witnessing courage – all these involve experiencing aspects of that which “bears” or “has” these aspects, even if we do not know what or who this is. A stage prop is an illusion precisely because we took a two-dimensional surface for three-dimensional perspective, i.e., a view of a real spatial thing with hidden sides.

Further, while admitting contrary attributes, and while admitting contraries that are more or less, the concrete particular thing, the substance, does not admit being more or less itself. Aristotle uses the example of “a man” who cannot really be more or less a man as compared with himself or another. (A fortiori, we can add, this is true of a person and “myself.”)

Implicit in all this is that substances, which admit of contraries, continue in spite of changing attributes. Further they continue in time as identical with themselves and as unique or particular. (We return to this soon.)

The phenomenological analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius supports the Aristotelian discomfort with bundle theory for two reasons: Bundle theory typically regards substances as bundles of properties and properties as such are given indifferently as actual or possible. But what makes the property of the being before us to be different from a possible attribute is that the being having it is real and the property is real. Like Aristotelians, Conrad-Martius wants to tie substance to einai or being. She wants to show that Aristotle was on the right track in tying the exemplary sense of being to substance as what exists in itself and not in another.
This can be done by showing that this substantial being in its exemplary form corresponds to the mode of givenness of what we regard as real.

“Real” is the distinctive way actual being is perceived or is present to consciousness. What is real is present “in itself” in a filled perceptual intention. What is present “in itself,” or “in person,” or “in the flesh,” stands in contrast to what is merely emptyly intended in imaginations, percepts, memories, expectations, or through concepts. Something’s being present “in itself” refers to its being present “itself” and not merely through percepts, or empty representations or intentions, as in a picture or story or theoretical concept. Because it is present itself it stands in itself and by itself. (If substances were merely bundles of properties, i.e., of what does not stand in itself, such a distinction would make no sense.) Let us elaborate on this.

Consider how I may hear the report, “There is a lion in the hallway.” The implausible report moves me to intend by way of imagination and expectation the hallway and the presence therein of a lion. In such a case I would not only have an empty intention, but, furthermore, I would withhold my assent in regard to the truth of the report. If, however, I were to peek out in the hall and find indeed a lion, the lion would be a filling of the empty and skeptical intention. The lion would be there “in fact,” “indeed,” “in person,” “in the flesh” and not “there” merely as an empty intention or a figment of someone’s imagination. “There is indeed really a lion in the hallway.” My assent is given without conditions to the proposition of the report. I affirm the state of affairs not in terms of real or logical possibility or probability but as actual and real. In affirming it I come upon what is truly stubbornly there, a fact, that cannot be whisked away by my will. It is there “in itself” whether or not I like it or want it to be.

The lion itself is present now, as we say, “substantially” – expressed by the emphatic is – because it is present as standing in itself and by itself and not a mere intentional object like an ideal object, hallucination, or a proposition meant in a report. And this “itself” is what has the properties, what stands in relationship to the properties. The core of my reference to the lion is the “lion itself” and it is to this which “itself stands in itself” that I refer to as the “bearer of its properties.” And when I describe “its” features, the features which it “has,” I refer to this “itself” whose features they are.

The merely intended lion in the hall or the concept of the lion may be said also “to be” or “have being” in so far as it “presents itself.” In this respect images, numbers, Hobbits, and sprites also are. And of course all these are bearers of properties, and in this sense relate to the properties. In German, this feature nicely comes out in the term in which English gets translated often as “state of affairs,” i.e., Sachverhalt. Merely conceptual or ideal objects (any Sache), in being the bearer of properties, relates to itself (sich verhalten) and thus is a Sachverhalt. However, the fully in-the-flesh present lion is the bearer of its properties not only in so far as it itself is present as a mere possible state of affairs or an essence or concept with properties but as being “really” present; it is there as having being in itself and by itself. As Husserl himself said (perhaps in the presence of Conrad-Martius) the real presents itself through an outward self-disclosure of what is self-present and standing in itself. “The phenomenological presence is not a presence through appearing but a
self-presence in an absolute sense.”45 The real is present outwards or to the dative of manifestation as self-standing and self-present. Here in the case of real and not merely the emptily intended conceptual or notional being, being is present itself. In itself the present being is the bearer of its properties. This means that it itself is self-grounding; its givenness as real is not due to its being an object of intentionality or being possible or standing in a conceptual relation to other conceptual spaces; rather its givenness is due to it itself being the ground of itself. And this is a phenomenological claim available in a filled intention, not an a priori conceptual axiom. Indeed the filled intention as the matter given “in itself,” “in the flesh” or “in person” is precisely the revelation of the substantiality of the real. For this reason, Conrad-Martius was moved to say that the “itself,” and in this sense the substance, was deeper than mere being (as what inheres in the “itself” or as what is given or presents “itself,” regardless of the modality of being).46

Let us turn to other aspects of the problem of the way substances are given and what this “itself” is that underlies or accompanies its attributes.

If it is held that we directly see only the perspectives, but as perspectives of the thing, or know directly only the attributes of the thing; and we further claim that the attributes are not independent or self-standing but rather inhere in the substance; and if we further say that the substance has these properties; and if we further say substance is something enduring, unique and identical which underlies and which is not directly perceived, it seems that we are no longer talking about the “given” whole concrete particular, but about something which is a component, along with the attributes, of the concrete particular. And this component now appears to be more basic than the whole concrete particular thing – which clearly is co-intended in the presentation of the perspectives and attributes – even though it is not directly given in the way the perspectives or properties are.

Yet, when we distinguish the attribute from what has it, are we saying that we can apprehend the possessor independently from the attribute it possesses and that there is something independent there to apprehend? Are we saying that the being of the bearer of the attributes exists independently of the attributes? Yes, at least in some respect, for the bare substrate theory; No, for the Aristotelians.

It seems to us that the Aristotelian position has its strength in its description of the perception of things: Perspectives/attributes are of the thing, and the thing or concrete particular is evident as that which is apperceived and co-meant in the perception of the things and it is “given” as that to which the perspectives/attributes belong and of which they are perspectives/attributes. Substance and attribute are in a kind of whole-part relationship. They are, as basic principles of a being, to use Husserl’s terms, moments and not pieces. The Aristotelian articulates this by stating that in which the moments which are the attributes inhere is the concrete whole of the particular thing. It is the “eidetic singularity.” This analysis holds for things present in the third-person perspective; whether it holds for the first-person perspective is less clear.

The typical bare substrate or bare particular theory contrasts both with bundle-theory and the Aristotelian theory of substance. It holds that the whole-part relationship does not account for the twoness of the bearer and what it carries. It holds that the substance as substrate exists in some respect independently of its being the
bearer of the attributes, and as such it is numerically different but not intrinsically different from other substances, if this means having distinguishing properties. (Our version of the theory is atypical because we hold the bare substrate is a unique propertyless essence.)\textsuperscript{47} In contrast to the concrete particular thing being the substance as the concrete whole (the Aristotelian view), the bare substrate itself is held to be the substance and it enjoys the independence of an independent part, perhaps a piece and not a moment, with regard to the whole and the attributes that inhere in it. The attributes as parts/moments cannot exist independently by themselves and they can inhere in many other substrates. The bare particular, as the substance of the concrete thing, e.g., a ball which is red, spherical, of such and such a size and weight, will have an identity independent of the red, spherical, size and weight, and presumably it, as a bare substrate, will be also independent of being a ball.\textsuperscript{48} As the “bare” subject of the attributes it will not have any of the attributes. This prospect of being independent even of being a ball, as we shall see, causes legitimate concerns from the side of the Aristotelian critics.

Whereas the example of the substrate’s independence of the attributes does not work very well in the case of something like the ball, it seems to work if we give the ball a proper name, e.g., “Sam,” and then list the properties upon which “Sam” is not dependent. But this works because “Sam” holds our reference like an analogous ipseity. Further we would not say that the bare substrate “Sam” is independent of being “Sam.” If the substrate is not so named, but is referred to as “the ball,” then the substrate is not a bare particular but rather the whole concrete thing; if “ball,” rather than “Sam,” stands for the bare substrate, then we have the odd claim that “ball” is independent of being a ball.

In this bare substrate view the concrete particular thing which seemed to be given originally in experience is now seen to be not original but rather it is seen to be derived from more basic considerations or components, namely the bare substrate and the attributes. Because the bare substrate is admittedly not perceived, at least in the way the properties are, both its proponents and critics have professed that it is, in this respect, “I know not what.”

The Aristotelians are not comfortable with this move away from the concrete particular thing (e.g., the ball or the person) to the bare substrate. For them the concrete particular thing is an irreducible entity. For this reason it itself is the substance or substrate. What we have is a part-whole relationship and the wholes are given, or co-given, in the presentation of the parts. Essential to this account is the widen- ing of properties to include not only what is contingent or adventitious but also the essential form or kind, which is an “existence-condition” for the core being of the concrete particular thing.

Some versions of this theory of basic kinds or essences identify the essence itself with the whole concrete particular thing. This is the “radical essence” position. Further they will claim that such an essence entails formal properties as the individuating existence-conditions of the core being of this particular thing. (The strict Aristotelian would not hold this.) These formal properties are more basic than the contingent properties which the being acquires and which externally condition it.\textsuperscript{49} This view differs from the more common Aristotelian one in so far as for the common Aristotelian view the form or kind is common to all the beings that instantiate it. In
contrast, the “radical essence” view holds the essence to be identical with the concrete particular thing, and therefore it is an individual. In both cases a claim is made for basic kinds which divide up the world and for the basic kind/essence or core which has definite essential properties, even though in the case of the “radical essence” the form contains individuating properties (what Husserl called the “eidetic singularity”), that constitute the individuality of the particular being. For both the radical essence theory as well as the more common Aristotelian one, no concrete particular exists as a substance unless it be of a certain kind, i.e., unless its being is informed by an essence. Of course, for both these views the concrete being is informed not only by its kind but also by essential attributes as well as by the merely “accidental” or adventitious ones. But for the “radical essence” view the formal properties individuate the essence or form. This approximates the view that an eidetic singularity, itself a formal kind of definite description, is all there is needed for something to be an individual. The white oak tree need not have this branch to exist, but it cannot exist without being a species of oak, being deciduous, having such and such a soil, living in such and such a climate range of temperature, sun, and rain, etc. along with the properties which account for it being this white oak, its parentage, the history of its seeding, nurture, etc. Its haecceity would be constituted by these defining properties – not by the “this-here” as the additional individuating matter.

From the point of view of this work it is clear that the position of “radical essence” verges on regarding the Who as a What that is an infima species, an individual established by an ultimate propertied determination or definite description. It does not capture the Who, what some medievals called the Socratitas or the unique haecceity and essence of the man, “Socrates” if, indeed, this is, as we have proposed, non-sortal.

Of interest to the point of view presented here, Aristotle illustrates substance or “primary being” as the form and existence-condition for the entities in question occasionally by examples of persons in the second- and third-person. Likewise of interest is how Joseph Owens’ translation renders Aristotle’s texts because it brings together substance as form, as well as substrate, as well as the full sense of being as what exists by itself.50 Owens renders “substance” (ousia) as “the what-IS-Being that belongs per se to each thing.” He cites Aristotle in the Metaphysics, 1028a24: “And first let us say some things about it from the viewpoint of definition. The what-IS-Being of each thing is what it is said to be per se. For the being of ‘you’ is not the being of ‘musical,’ since you are not musical by your own proper nature.” And, in another place: “Callias is per se Callias and the what-IS-Being of Callias.” Such texts suggest for us that Aristotle on occasion sees the exemplary substance as an individual essence evident in the unique ipseity of persons, even as they are present in the second- and third-person.

But does the kind of being that Callias is mark out what Callias as Callias, i.e., who Callias is? Does the kind of being you are mark out who you are as you yourself? Granted being musical does not exhaust being you; does being human do the job? And is it true that if we take away from Callias man there is nothing left that could be the subject for anything?51 The answer to all of these questions is No if self-awareness reveals to us a sense of ourselves that is without properties. We will return to this shortly.
For the typical Aristotelian, “person” poses special categorical problems. Because it is taken for granted that the person is an individual, and individuals are typically regarded as instances of kinds, “person” is regarded as an individual human, i.e., an instance of the form “human.” The person then would be constituted by the individuating considerations (properties) of quantity and quality and relation of the instantiated form. (Cf. our remarks below on how Thomism’s notion of supposit departs from its typical Aristotelian lineage; see Book 2, Chapter VI, §2.) For such a view, “person,” although a radical individual, a “this,” verges at the same time toward being a “sortal term,” the equivalent of human. Therefore the essences of concrete particulars are inherently universal and shared by all the other members of humankind. In this view, what distinguishes persons is what individuates the human forms, i.e., the accidental properties.

Yet Aristotle has passages (along with those just cited regarding “you” and “Callias”) that work against these readings. Often in the middle of his presentation of his dominant theory that what individuates one being from another are the distinctive properties informing the matter attached to or qualifying the substance, there was a nagging doubt whether such “qualified matter,” the material signata, as the Scholastics put it, adequately distinguished, e.g., Socrates and Callias. The focus was the principle that substance or “primary being” is not a property, not an attribute of a subject, but rather a subject which could not belong to another subject. (Cf. Metaphysics, 1038 b10 ff.) If Socrates’ being an individual primary being or substance was not due to qualified matter, which in principle could be the same, then it would have to be due to form. This would mean that an individual essence or form would then individuate Socrates from Callias. Socrates and Callias of course agree in their specific form of being human, but they then would have to differ in terms of the very form of their matter. That is, the form-substance would have to be self-individuating. In this case, here the issue would be different from those cases where there were forms with only one instance or representative – because, here, in principle there could always be a plurality, and if so, we would be back to looking for what distinguished them.

The most intriguing text is perhaps Metaphysics (Lambda, 1071a) where Aristotle states: “And even the explanatory factors of things in the same kind are different, not in kind, but because those of different individuals are different: your matter and mover and form differ from mine; but they are the same in so far as they have a common logos.” We take this to mean that even the properties that we would assign as individuating would be already individuated, and the principle of individuation is not a property, which in principle is communicable, but what we have been calling “mineness,” which is not communicable. And, again, the key point is illustrated by first-person reference. Does Aristotle here get close to Plotinus’ view that there is a form of Socrates?

Now let us take advantage of Aristotle’s shift to the first-person. Let us revisit all these matters in the first-person which we have sketched from a third-person perspective.

First of all it is worth noting that such a move breaks with both the Lockean and Kantian hold on the philosophy of consciousness and subjectivity. Although one
might have a strong phenomenological doctrine of consciousness as non-reflective self-awareness which pervades the life of the mind, e.g., I cannot desire without, in some sense, knowing that I desire, still one might want to say that with which we have to do here is merely an adjective or perhaps an adverb, a feature that pervades the life of the mind. Acts and sensa are “conscious” or one performs them “consciously.” Thus even though consciousness is best understood as a “condition” that pervades the life of the mind, we may still hold the Lockean-Kantian view in regard to the subject or substance that is conscious or what “underlies” consciousness that even though consciousness is a “condition of all internal phaenomena, still it is itself only a phaenomenon; and therefore, supposes a subject that underlies the consciousness” – and for the Lockean-Kantian tradition, that may, but does not of necessity, display itself as consciousness. In a good part of the philosophical world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the subject/substance of mental acts and consciousness is the unknown basis of phenomenal or displayed being. It is of itself unknown, unconscious, and an “I know not what.” In the twentieth century up to our day it appears that the topic of substance/subject is forfeited to some heir of Hume’s bundle-theory or it is simply consigned to oblivion. But Husserl, along with others – of course, in the wake of Descartes – broke the hold of this tradition and said the subject/substance of the life of the mind as what was pervaded by consciousness was “the I” and this precisely is what cannot conceive of itself not to be conscious or not to be.

Clearly one of the motives for our meditations on “I myself” was the bundle-theory that who I am is tied to my distinctive properties. Ontological clones occur when we have numerically two who have identical properties. Some substance-theories are motivated by this prospect of there possibly being numerically different objects which, in terms of their attributes, are not discernibly different from one another. The teletransportation thought experiments as laid out by Klawonn were designed to bring this out in a phenomenological way. In the third-person, because we cannot determine any qualitative distinction, we are moved to posit the identity of those with the same properties. In the first-person it is evident that my being me is not tied to these properties precisely because you may have them as completely and legitimately as I.

As we have said, the typical Aristotelian view makes it difficult to appreciate how “person” is a non-sortal term. The Aristotelian position helps us see the person as the concrete particular whole which bears the attributes. But because “person” is collapsed into the kind with its attributes, the “myself” eludes the typical Aristotelian description. What we are calling the “myself,” which we make approximate to the “bare self” of Hopkins, resembles the substance-theory which posits a “bare substrate” or “bare particular” in so far as we are present to ourselves non-ascriptively in our non-reflexive self-awareness. This self-presence, we have claimed, is “essential” in so far as it is thick with intelligibility, i.e., that of “myself.”

One objection to the “bare substrate” view is that this is unfounded because by definition the bare substrate, as bare, cannot be picked out as an identifiable object of reference. There is nothing in the bare substratum, taken by itself, that would
enable us to pick it out from other things. Yet that is precisely what the self-awareness of “I myself” is: it is a non-ascriptive self-presence that is known prior to and as a condition for all identifying forms of reference. In this sense the “I know not what” of Locke takes on new meaning, but not one which causes the substrate to bleed to death by way of a fatal philosophical wound, i.e., its being a gratuitous assumption, but rather it points to a new sense of non-referential, non-ascriptive intelligibility or meaning. The substrate of “I myself,” as a bare substrate, is not absolutely bare in the sense of being bereft of meaning and being merely numerically distinct but is per se, “intrinsically,” distinct from others because it is dense with the intelligibility of being oneself. Yet as Klawonn has said, what we have to do with here is not “existence in and for itself, since it can be separated from any ‘itself’ and only exists in and for and by myself as myself for myself – devoid of existence at any other level or in any other sense.” Again, this being “devoid of existence” is not a nihil negativum but rather refers to the unique essence which cannot be referred to by a direct characterization which depends on objective reference to something in the world.55

Furthermore, it is evident and manifest, not postulated. In this sense it is more the French “Je ne sais quoi” which refers to something experienced but for which the appropriate words fail, rather than the Lockean “I know not what” which is said to be not experienced but gratuitously postulated. We have insisted that the “myself” is not something that is outside the range of our knowing which we must invoke in order to account for some matters that would otherwise be puzzling. Rather it is what we know, albeit in an odd sense, better than everything and everyone else by simply being awake and having experiences.

The stream of experiences is incessant and continuous. That which we experience is ever changing as are the acts and sensa. Yet, for all the changing of temporal modes, for all the changes in acts and contents, there persists the self-awareness of the “myself” and the “mineness” that pervades the stream, acts, sensa, and contents. I remain identically the same without any act of identification or singling out. Even though it is a matter of essential necessity that “mineness” pervade the stream, the continued existence of the pervasive “mineness” is not necessary but it is a matter of fact. There is nothing in my knowledge of the things in the world which I know or the things I know through reflection which provides evidence dictating that the “myself” must be and must be continuous and identical. The necessity is merely that if there is a streaming consciousness I must be and the streaming must be is mine. (See Chapter VI, especially §9.) Further, it is through no achievement of mine that this happens, and certainly not through any act of identification in the proper sense of distinctive acts, e.g., of memory, imagination, and perception. All identifying acts, as in perception, memory and imagination, presuppose this prior self-awareness of the “myself.” (We will return to the specific issues of memory as connected to identity in Chapter VIII, §§6–8.)

The “myself” may be said to be “static,” “inert,” and unchanged by the flux in the sense that it remains identically the same throughout the flux. Yet the “myself” is an abstraction from the whole which is the person. In the accretion or loss of properties, JG Hart, who is the fuller sense of what “I” refers to, changes. In this
sense the person changes when it takes on new qualities or loses qualities. But because it is always “myself” who changes, one can say I myself change not substantially but accidentally. But when we say changing circumstances and novel agency bring it about that I change accidentally we do not mean that the “myself” undergoes change but that the person I am undergoes change. And, as we have suggested, there can be “substantial” changes in the person in the sense that the person in the world one has constituted can suffer major changes, conversions, dissolutions, revolutions, dissociations, etc. As we shall see, most beliefs in an afterlife posit such “essential” changes in one’s personal being in the world.

“I” and the “myself” are not attached to the flow of experiences as a necessary inference, postulate or “philosophical move.” The experiences are of eidetic necessity “mine.” Pains, pleasures, recollections, imaginings, picturings, perceivings, acts of anger, surprise, etc. are all “mine,” they belong to me, I “have” them, I “inhabit” them, and am involved in them. But “I myself” or the “myself” is not among the flow of what is experienced, unless it becomes an object of reflection. Similarly it is not any one of the experiences or acts; nor is it an ingredient or feature in the sense that it is an aspect or part of any one experience or act. Thus even though “the I” or the “myself” is lived in and through the experiences, and in this sense is present to us only in and through them, “the I” or the “myself” is not coincident with them. In this sense it transcends the experiences. It does not transcend them in the sense that it is bereft of some sense of experience or is not experienced itself. Thus it stands sharply in contrast to the way the aspects of another are present to me, e.g., her being angry. Whereas I do directly experience her being angry I do not properly experience her being angry in the sense of her own anger. To experience her own anger her anger would have to be experienced immediately as part of my stream of consciousness and experienced with the immediacy of my anger. She in her experiencing remains transcendent in a way in which there is an unbridgeable abyss.

When we say I have the experiences or that they are “mine” we must be wary of conceiving the relation between the self and its experiences after some worldly example. Worldly analogies can be treacherous in this matter. For example, regarding the relation as one of property rights would lead to absurdities. Similarly using familiar spatial senses or familiar senses of occupancy could mislead what is meant when we say we “live in” or “are in” the experiences or “inhabit” them. Here we come upon the question of whether this lived transcendence, oneness, and separateness of the “myself” can be considered a bare substrate. The bare substrate view requires that the “myself” enjoy a measure of independence. We have already established this minimally when we note that the “myself” is not any of the experiences or acts, nor is it a part or aspect of any of the experiences or acts, nor is it dependent on any one experience or act. It is identically the same throughout all the experiences and acts. But is it independent of experience as such? We have seen that it surely is not independent of self-experiencing or self-awareness. Is it conceivable without the flux of temporalization? Husserl, we have seen and will have occasion to see again, says, No. Surely it can be bereft of acts. But this is not to say it is independent of any experience whatsoever. And in the thought-experiment of tele-transportation, we were able, with the help of Klawonn, to see how the “myself”
was not coincident with the personal identity as one’s signature presence through properties. In the second- and third-person finding a measure of independence for the substrate “myself” is much more difficult. We will postpone a detailed discussion of this question at this junction. Here we merely wish to say that if it is true that the “myself” cannot exist when it is without experience, then either it never sleeps a dreamless (experience-free) sleep or when it has a dreamless sleep it ceases to be. See our discussions in Chapter VII, especially §§2–4. Even if the “myself” requires experiences in order to be, its being other than and transcendent to the experiences entitles it to being a feeble version of bare substrate. Further, if the “myself” may be understood to enjoy a measure of independence from particular experiences then its candidacy for being a bare substrate is strengthened. It seems, however, that it may lay claim to candidacy for a minimalist dualist position whether or not this independence is established. See our discussion in Chapter VI, §1.

Any substrate or subject of attribution can bear an endless number of attributes, and those that it is actually the bearer of are only some of its possible attributes. Further any substrate or subject is always different from and beyond its attributes. However, in the case of the substrate or subject which is the “myself,” in contrast to those which are confined to a consideration in the third-person, and which themselves can have no first-person perspective, the substrate or subject is bereft of attributes. We propose that this is a way to think of what has been called “mystery.” We will dwell on this term in Book 2. Here we may say that “mystery” does not refer to what is beyond our knowledge absolutely. Rather here we have a “knowledge” of what we are calling an “essence” whose intelligibility is not of the same order of the intelligibility of considerations in the third-person and which are rich in properties. If intelligibility is grasping properties, then the “myself” and the “you” elude our grasp. Thus we have the contrast with the essence of any substrate which we consider in the third-person, and which itself has no first-person perspective: It of necessity has defineable properties. But the essence which is the “myself” is present in the first-person without properties. This is in part connected to what we mean when we say its being is unique. This essence joins at the other extreme of logical extension the uniqueness of the haecceity. In the unique essence and the essential haecceity there is a singular realization in the ipseity of what cannot be expressed and what is best referred to with proper names and the personal pronouns. Yet the proper manifestation of this matter is only in the first-person. In the second-person, it comes to light especially in the intentionality of love. In the third-person we typically intend Others with an eye to displaying properties. Nevertheless, the intention of that person there whom I know to be named Peter aims at a unique essence, a haecceity, which appears in the world in a way that resists definition and definite descriptions because Peter is an individual per se and appears in the world in a way that can never be repeated.57

Peter Geach believes that the bare substrate theory, foremost when it is applied to “the I,” always involves the implementation of either meaningless jargon or it involves contradiction. He finds it unproblematic to say that I have my mental states, but it is pure jargon to say I own them. This is perhaps because he thinks that “have” is indifferently used in the third-person and first-person whereas “own”
has its proper home in an economic or legal realm. In Chapter III we have attempted to give legitimacy to a more basic, first-person, sense of “ownness” and tied it to a sense of having – neither of which find their proper residences in an economic, legal, or political realm.

For Geach, it is unproblematic to say I undergo change, but it is problematic to say I am presupposed for change. Surely Geach is correct to say that language is bewitching here, i.e., to say “it undergoes change” suggests precisely that the substance changes, whereas to slide into the “jargon” that the substrate is “presupposed for change” suggests it exists prior to and independent of the changing qualities. Whereas it is doubtless true that the “myself” as embodied person undergoes change, it is less clear in what sense “the myself” as such changes or develops or undergoes change. We have given reasons for thinking it does not develop or change. Whether it in any sense is prior to or independent of the qualities is the question that we are working on; the answer it not pellucidly evident in advance, if all the questions have not yet been formulated.

Although Geach refers to the transcendental ego, his example does not have any philosophical detail, and brings out no difference between third- and first-person reference. Further, for Geach, to refer to oneself with “I” one can fall into an idle and superfluous use stemming from a soliloquy or conversation with oneself. Thus in asking oneself a question like, Who am I? there seems to be a separate referent from the only legitimate one, i.e., the person, e.g., Rene Descartes. Consider the example, “Who is it who thinks the cogito?” Geach think that in this use he could have used impersonal forms which did not use the first-person pronoun at all. Like, “This is a dreadful muddle.” He further seems to think that “I” refers to what the proper name perfectly substitutes for. Thus in saying, “I am in a muddle,” the use of the name of the speaker serves perfectly, as in “William James is in a muddle.”

Yet clearly to say that I am in a muddle refers to my cognitive agency in a way that “This is a dreadful muddle” or “William James is in a muddle” does not. And if I were to quote someone, “This is a dreadful muddle,” I would not be correctly rendering the situation either by saying “William James is in a muddle” or by saying “I am in a muddle.”

Further, to say that “I am puzzled with this problem” can be fairly well rendered with “This problem is puzzling,” or “I have a dreadful pain” can be fairly well rendered by “The pain is dreadful.” But the important point is that the second statements of necessity require the first-person reference of the first statements. To attempt to conceive them without any reference to oneself or someone else’s first-person experience is not possible. Yet the second statements can very well be understood not to be the equivalent of the first. I may assent to “the pain is dreadful” without myself assenting to my having a dreadful pain; I may be referring to someone else’s pain. Similarly I may assent to the problem being puzzling, e.g., on the basis of your trusted report, but not be in a position to say for myself that I am puzzled, even though I acknowledge that the problem is puzzling, i.e., you have found it so, and there is the presumption that were I to involve myself I most likely would find it puzzling too.
Proper names of course are the way we answer who it is that uses “I,” but they do not adequately substitute for “I.” We have already seen some reasons. The amnesiac or young child might very well use “I” innately and yet not know who is being referred to by his proper name. Or one may be unaccustomed to being referred to by William, and one might very well ask, Do you mean me (the one accustomed to being called Billy), and do you mean to say that I am puzzled?

For Geach all philosophical uses of “I,” and presumably all thematizations of “myself,” “the self,” etc., are derivative, degenerate, misleading and, because parasitic upon speaking with others, have their sole legitimate context in dialogue with others. Not only the proper name but “this human being” seems for him to be an adequate substitute for “I.” Why and how “this human being” refers to me is not a problem for Geach. This means that the third-person perspective apparently has a hegemony for Geach in fleshing out the meaning of first-person references.

Nevertheless, as we have earlier noted, although Geach shows no sympathy here for the point of view of this work, he finds McTaggart’s view, that love aims at the person beyond all attributes, congenial. Thus he seems to acknowledge a sense or aspect of person which is propertyless and transcendent to the properties and which presently is the substrate of the identifiable characteristics of the person.

Geach’s own example of how we are to understand a substance and its characteristics is an ideal object, a triangle and its sides. A triangle is delimited by its periphery and is nothing apart from this; but it cannot be identified with its sides, “severally or jointly.” And as there could not be any triangle with the same three sides, so there could not be two substances with just the same set of characteristics.

The triangle here is the whole, even though it is not merely the sides taken “severally or jointly” – because it is how the sides are joined to form a triangle. It is not clear that this example deals with the difficult matter of whether the substance does or does not in some sense exist prior to its properties by making the issue nonsensical, i.e., the example requires that we see at once “the triangle” as a whole made up of its essential parts. But surely empirical “things” are not present in this way and “the thing” is not given with the given parts and the given parts are not all the parts. The example surely does not address the issue of in what sense the substance changes (and remains the same) with the changes in the properties. Further this example takes as a substrate an ideal object and makes it a substrate of predication. Are not substances properly understood to be existing particulars? Aside from the difficulty of determining what makes two triangles that are qualitatively identical individuated from one another, does this kind of utterly empty principle of individuation serve us well for thinking about material substances, persons, selves, etc.? Further, this example of a substance is an example of what can be predicated of other substances, as in “The star is a triangle.” This, for Aristotle at least, is precisely what a substance is not. But whereas many ideal objects may serve as both predicates and subjects of predication presumably persons are never predicates.

Further the example does not make “triangle as such” a substrate of predication, but a particular triangle which is distinguished by its properties. It postulates that all
individuation is through properties, and, as we noted, such a view does not account for the numerical differences of what is qualitatively identical. (Cf. the discussion of “numerical identity” in §4 below.) What are the properties that distinguish this triangle from that identically same one? What makes one “this-here” different from another one? Further, in postulating that all individuation is through properties justice is not done to the first-person sense of one’s having properties in the sense that, by the having of the properties, they are suffused with ownness. Nor does it touch the non-ascriptive sense of first-person non-reflective experience and first-person reference of “I” which brings to light “something” that is not propertied. And, as noted, he forgets what seems to be his appropriation of the view that the intentionality of love targets the person-substance that is beyond properties.

The “myself” is not to be thought of as an “abstract entity” like an ideal object (e.g., “just war theory,” the number 4, an equilateral triangle, or the square root of 144) which can be a place marker or identity-pole that is ever the same for many concrete particulars. Rather “myself” is a real unique individual essence that cannot be instantiated or communicated. Yet, of course, the “myself” is a theme which is abstracted from our concrete personal life of being in the world with Others. When we say “I” we typically have in mind the whole rich concretion of our personal life. But, as we have insisted, we can prescind from this in philosophical reflection and more basically we do prescind from this in our non-ascriptive modes of reference.

Let us leave off here Peter Geach’s discussion of the unsuitability of thinking of the I as substance. Let us now dwell on “the radical essence view” as it relates to our transposition of the classical discussion of substance to the first-person context. Here the issue is whether there are properties implicit in referring to “I myself” as the presence of an “individual essence.” Other non-Aristotelian views of substance as “individual essence” have held that these essences indeed have properties and are not bare substrates. Examples of such properties are “being identical with Callias” or “being the unique bearer of Callias’ properties,” etc. These properties are unique to the essence and essential to it as substrate and bearer of attributes. Yet are they properties of “myself” or is this merely a way of re-saying “I myself am I myself?” These properties of being identical with oneself which are purely tautological may be distinguished from those which are analytic properties belonging to the eidos of the “myself,” i.e., the myself as such, as the eidos of the myself or the I. A fortiori these tautological properties of being identical with oneself must be distinguished from the “myself” as a person in the world. In this sense the properties explicating the eidos “myself” are a priori properties which explicate an eidos, the eidos of the “myself,” which has been transformed from the essentially non-objective, non-reflective subject of all predication to itself a substrate of predications that come forth in a reflective third-person attitude. They are analytic or tautological in the sense that they explicate what was already there implicitly and initially in the intelligibility. But they are synthetically a priori in the sense that the explications, although universal and necessary, are not mere repetitions of the concept of “myself.” Something different from “myself is myself” is brought to mind in saying that the “myself” is consciousness,
self-awareness, intellect, will, spirit, etc. This is true even if it could be shown that each of these explications implicitly were essentially implicated in one another. For example, there is no will without a form of intellection, know intellection without self-awareness, etc. Indeed they bring out not only that the property of the “myself” is identical with itself and therefore the “myselfness” is itself and only itself and not by way of something else, but they bring out the properties of myself as a self, as an I, and that it necessarily has these properties.

Nevertheless, however it may be with unique properties of the eidos that the individual essence of the “myself” bears, in the non-ascriptive reference the property of identity with myself is not brought about nor is it the relationship of a substrate to attributes. This is a subsequent reflection or analysis.

Similarly, the “myself” as non-sortal, non-reflective self-awareness pervasive of the stream of experiences – as it comes to light in the transcendental reduction – is the transcendental I-pole or agency of manifestation. As such “myself” is not within the field of manifestation but the nominative and dative of manifestation. As uniquely myself it is the unique I-agent of manifestation. As such, i.e., in a reflective eidetic analysis, the “myself” as agent of manifestation has the essential properties of, e.g., spirit, intellect, will, etc. Whether to call these analytic or synthetic a priori properties is not easy to decide. For Kant analytic judgments increase our knowledge only “formally” but the synthetic judgments increase our knowledge “materially.” The former are “explications” but the latter extend our knowledge because the predicate adds to what is contained in the subject whereas the merely formal judgments break down the whole which is the subject into one of its constituent conceptual parts (KrV A10 ff.). For Kant the synthetic a priori judgments are exemplified in mathematics where, e.g., 12 adds something new to our grasp of 7 + 5. But are eidetic claims regarding the essence of I-ness synthetic a priori? Are self-awareness, freedom, spirit, will, etc., mere explications of “I” or “myself?” It seems to me that for the seasoned philosopher the reflection will proceed “analytically” but for the beginner there will be synthetic a priori insights. In any case we will here call these elaborations “analytic” or “synthetic a priori” even though we are aware that a case might be made for their status as one or the other. But such are not what the non-ascriptive reference of the indexical “I,” or self-awareness, or the lived transcendental I-pole targets. In each case we have a thick intelligibility transcendent to all properties.

We can make this clear by contrasting the intelligible as the determinable substrate awaiting the determination of properties and the actual intelligibility of “I myself” that is without properties in this sense. We have said that the “myself,” as the individual essence and substrate, resembles the referent of the demonstrative pronouns, the “This-Here,” which is present non-ascriptively waiting for predication. As such it is present perceptually as a bare particular, yet it is soaked with determinability, i.e., not yet having determination. The determinability is a pre-conceptual field or horizon, delimited by the “this-here” which is not absolutely indeterminate, because only certain predications will do, not just any. In the case of what is indeterminate any predication will do; there is no determinable frame. With the “this-here” we are dealing with the implicit and potential determinable frame.
In the case of “I myself” as the non-ascriptive sense of self-awareness prior to the achievement of “I,” there is an intelligibility that no predication does justice to, not because, like the person, it necessarily has an infinite idea or horizon of determinability, but because it is all there, intelligible by itself from the start. Yet, as we have often noted, this is an odd intelligibility because all proper senses of knowing are ruled out as inappropriate.

Nevertheless, the “radical essence” view and/or Scotist position of the form having formal and individuating features seems inherently part of the position we are advocating. The formal sense of “I myself,” i.e., the essence which is available for us upon reflection and which prescinds from the concrete referent of self-awareness or “I,” does “entail” of necessity such formal features as “self-awareness,” ownness, I-ness, will, wakefulness, manifestness, etc. We may even permit mind or spirit, if these are regarded not as parts of the world, e.g., as the “psychophysical,” but as inseparable from, but not the sufficient condition for the sense of “myself.” All of these are inseparable a priori synthetic moments of the eidos “myself” and differ from properties which accrue by way of explicating a determinable bare substrate of “this-here” which has potential, but no actual intrinsic, intelligibility. That is, the referent of the bare “this-here” awaits explication and presently is a determinate indeterminateness or a determinate determinability. And surely these inseparable a priori moments differ from a posteriori attributes which accrue to “I myself” by the temporal unfolding of the personal life in the world. But these essential properties or radical essence do not amount to a propertied version of “myself” or the Leibnizian position which denies an individual essence which is propertyless. Rather our concession to the radical essence view merely acknowledges that “myself” may be analytically (or a priori synthetically, depending on the philosophical maturity of the analyst) talked about in its formal-essential and tautological features because the “myself” bears an eidos and is capable of being formally thematized, e.g., as necessarily having the properties of being an I, having self-awareness, having a will and intellect, being free, etc. We take these all to be analytic properties of the eidos “myself” and each to analytically imply the other. Again, the bareness of the “myself” which is the carrier of this eidos is not merely a numerical but also an intrinsic distinctiveness, an inherent intelligibility which is not totally nihil negativum, not an absolute Je ne sais quoi. Nevertheless, these “properties” are precisely how we explicate (analytically) the formal feature of “myself as myself” and they themselves, because they have to do with the eidos and not that to which we non-ascriptively refer, do not contradict our claim that the essential “myself” has intrinsically non-sortal intelligibility. They are all analytic (or synthetic a priori) explications of the eidos or what is formal in the individual essence of each “myself” as well as being essential explications of each of the other analytic properties. All this is implicit in permitting “I” to be tendered as “the I.”

May we say that these essential properties of “spirit” or the “agent of manifestation” as the transcendental terms for the eidos of the transcendental “myself”/I are “existence conditions” for the “myself.” The notion of “existence condition” has to do primarily with the natural kinds in which we find individuals, e.g., oak, butterfly, fish, cow, human, etc. In the case of “spirit” and the other analytic or synthetic a
priori properties like intellect, will, freedom self-awareness, etc., we are dealing with essential properties of the essence of the “myself” as inseparably bound up with the I as agent of manifestation. The “existence condition,” human, is within its field of manifestation not analytic or synthetic a priori explicanons of the agent of manifestation. Nevertheless such analytic (tautological) “properties” reveal what the necessary essential conditions of the Who which is “myself”; they reveal how who one is bears the eidos of myself as myself and that this eidos has essential Whats; but they do not amount to a revelation that the Who itself, as non-ascriptively lived, is propertied.

This concession to the radical essence view does not reduce Who to What, but only shows that for Who to appear it must be framed by certain existence conditions or essences. They reveal how the intrinsic dignitas, the form of the Who, is manifest; they do not reveal the Who as a form or a What. In every case the non-ascriptive reference to the “this-here” is inseparable from a What. In the case of persons, the “this-here” is not the bare abstract potential substratum of predication but a Who. The “this-here” can be prescinded from, as can the Who, and the What or existence condition attended to as a substrate for eidetic analysis and predication. But in the case of persons the Who never becomes a property or predicate of the What or the “this-here” but rather of necessity is the substrate of the predication. In many other instances the “this-here” may be fleshed out with a kind of eidetic singularity, and this may serve both as a substrate of predication as well as a communicable property embodied in other “this-here’s.”

Of course the sense of the presence of others in the world is bound to an apperceived “I myself” and this binds a sense of “I myself,” e.g., the sense contained in “you,” to embodied persons in the world with others. Yet we have engaged in a thought-experiment that permits the loosening of the proper sense of “myself” from my embodiment and my appearing to myself in the world as I appear to others. In this sense “myself” keeps its controversial home apart from persons as propertied selves.

Let us consider with Klawonn that all the properties of a person, or perhaps of all possible persons, are factors α, β, γ, δ, ε, etc. But let us also consider another “factor,” Ψ, which is “being me myself,” that can be varied, e.g., change its position, or even be eliminated, without any change in the factors α, β, γ, δ, ε, etc. or in the sum of these factors. Then, by reason of the hypothesis, Ψ is not a member of this class of factors and has an independent existence in relation to it. We separate Ψ out and deny that it has any of the features belonging to persons in the world with others. This is the sense of its being propertyless and a pure substrate. The evidence evinced by the thought experiments of teletransportation, alleged metaphysical clones, the disappointment of the lover at having loved the clone, the amnesiac who does not know “who in the world she is,” the inconsolable mother facing the prospect of having a child just like the one who just died, etc., etc., all show that no matter what values are inserted for α, β, γ, δ, ε, …, Ψ “can in principle be varied without any change in this class being implied.” Again, the conclusion is that this “myself-ness” is not something that characterizes a person in terms of her properties. It is not anything physical, nor does it characterize anything in the
world. Yet, again, clearly the “myself” enjoys an “essential” formal richness in spite of its necessary singularity and personal propertylessness. And this propertylessness is not absolute because there are analytic and/or synthetic a priori ontological features which are inherent in the manifestation of the eidos of “I myself.”

Duns Scotus, in his doctrine of haecceity, extended this doctrine of individual essence to all “individuals.” Individuality is something positive, not a mere limitation, instantiation, or particularization of a form or essence. It is unique to the individual and other than what is unique to the other individual. Leibniz followed Scotus in holding the forms to be individual and the source of individuation, but thereby held that no two things could have identical properties and be different. The Scotist, G.M. Hopkins, seemed to hold for a sense of soul that resembled the bare substrate. He further believed he was able to see, by way of his remarkable empathic perception, non-human, and perhaps non-personal things to have this core being or “inscape” and so he ascribed to each thing a radical individuality and perhaps “bare self”:

Each mortal thing does one thing and the same;  
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;  
Selves – goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,  
Crying: What I do is me: for that I came.

We, following Hopkins, believe the evidence is exemplarily clear in the case of human persons, but leave undecided the question of the extension of “selving.” Further, Hopkins makes the phenomenological point that the bare substrate of self is not to be thought of as a part which is numerically distinct from how it “selves” in the world. Its embodiment, its expression, is not an other different thing from the self expressing; the self expressing is not another thing apart from its embodied expression.

Francisco Suarez thought of the essence of something proximate to our proposal of “myself” as substance. Essence for Suarez was “that which is first and radical and the intimate principle of all actions and properties which belong to the thing.” (Cf. the first-person version of this by Aristotle at *Metaphysics*, 1071a25-29.) Here the “myself” is pointed to in relation to the person’s being in the world. As the radical and intimate principle of all actions and properties it is not of the same order as these. Further, Suarez thought of the substantial *form* as inherently a “this” and as individuated by itself, not by anything extrinsic. In particular the soul is a “this” intrinsically, i.e., by itself, and quite apart from any other considerations. Further, for Suarez, individuality has to do primarily with incommunicability, i.e., it is not able to be shared with or able to be communicated to other entities.

Such ontologies are friendly to the one we are proposing, even though they all, with the exception, of course, of Husserl and Klawonn, but also Hopkins, Jankelavitch, and the occasional remarks by Aristotle, are conducted in the third-person, with little or no interest in the first-person perspective as having something of decisive value for philosophical reflection.

Complications, but not essentially different problems, accrue for the thesis of the “myself” as bare substrate when we consider the Husserlian theses in regard to temporality and persistence through time. As that which admits contraries we must
also say “myself” as substance is that which continues in spite of the temporal change: Substances which are I’s are always Now, but Now is both continuously abiding as well as continuously changing. This Now is the negation of the prior one, and the approaching not-yet Now negates the present Now. Nevertheless for the I it is always now, even in its remembering and expecting. Furthermore, the view proposed here is that even though “myself” or “I” is always changing, the myself in its individual essence does not change. What follows immediately here is a Husserlian version of these matters.

At the foundation of the transcendental “I myself” in my primordial ownness there is the primal flow as the primal presencing of the stream. “I myself” am the center and inform and pervade this lived life. (For all this cf. our earlier discussion in Chapter II, §3 on the reduction of “I” to “it.”) In focusing on the primal temporalizing we might put it this way: Inseparable from the primal presencing and primal temporalization is the moment “myself.” (“Myself” can be read as “I myself” depending on whether we wish to emphasize “myself” as agent of manifestation and pole of reflection.) Yet “myself” is not a property of the “substance,” primal presencing. Yet at the foundational level of the transcendental “myself” – which is the phenomenological foundation of “I” – we do not find merely a finished underlying being-in-itself (the “myself”), but we also find something which is as much an event as a being. Indeed the “transcendental myself” has inseparably joined to it this primal hyletic streaming or happening. As we will have occasion to discuss in detail, this event is not properly “in time” – we cannot say that it is now and no longer and not yet. This primal process, as accompanying moment of the anonymous “I myself,” the “functioning I-pole” of all phenomenality, in its pre-propositional passive proto-doxastic incessant positing or elemental “is-ing,” is not as such a phenomenon (an appearing of…), but through transcendental reflection becomes evident as the primal presencing of now, no longer, and not yet.

The transcendental I, as comprised by both the “myself” and primal streaming-presencing, constitutes for typical phenomenological analysis the substrate for all predication and is the base-substrate of the “world.” This constituted substrate, which the world is, is not the ultimate substrate uncovered by the reduction. The transcendental I in its anonymous non-reflective functioning itself is a substrate from the transcendental phenomenological perspective of the ultimate reduction. This is because all time and all that we call “world” rests “in it” as a subject of inherence. In this sense the absolute substrate of all phenomenality is the “myself’s” “absolute temporalization.” Neither the “myself” nor its temporalization are in time. This absolute temporalization is always constituted by me in the sense of for me and out of me and this happens in the realm of transcendentality where the I am never elapses but is always the “essence” or “form.” Thus thinking of the absolute as absolute temporalization may never neglect that it is always my temporalization.65 Thus because the temporalization is always “mine” we may say that the “myself” is the bare substrate of even this absolute temporalization. “Now” and “temporalizing” (as the irrepressible primal presencing) are not conceivable without the “I myself” but “I myself” enjoys or presences the Now and presences the temporalizing without itself being Now or temporalizing.
As “functioning” and “temporalization,” the transcendental “I myself” is, at its roots and most basic sense, constituting the time of which we are aware in the modes of Now, No Longer, and Not Yet. Yet the “myself” as a moment of the transcendental I is a “finished” essence. The “myself” is not itself coming into being or passing away but a primal co-moment with the primal hyletic streaming of the transcendental I. But, again, because this streaming is “mine” and the temporalization of the I or “myself,” the “myself” may be conceived as the “bare substrate” of even this primal streaming. Similarly as the substrate of the incessantly changing person the “myself” is affected and, we shall say, effecting. But it is improper to say that it itself is developing and being transformed. Its integrity as the “myself” does not owe anything to its temporalization. (We will return to this some detail in Chapters VI–VII, and in much of Book 2.)

The insight that the “myself” persists throughout the radical changes that occur to one’s person, e.g., not merely throughout the significant change of acquiring a prosthesis, having a heart transplant, etc., but further growing from a few inches long and a few pounds long to 6 ft long and 200 lb; changing from being naively religious to finding it necessary to have a second-order naivety, from being a Franco-fascist to a communitarian anarchist, etc., may tempt us to place the whole weight of our identical sameness on the continuity of the sense of our identity. And we may find that because change happens gradually, there is an imperceptibility in the changes that may account for my having a sense being the same one who believed X and now no longer believes X, or who was once a few inches long and now am 6 ft tall.

There is surely truth in this description but how are we best to think of it? Is it in fact a matter of continuous self-redefinition, so that what we have here is something like a “family resemblance” where the beginnings in fact no way resemble the eventual outcome, and the only “resemblance” is to be seen through tying the end up with the beginning by the mediating features? (Think of how the physiognomy of a great grandson, who at first glance, does not resemble his great grandfather, may be “shown” to resemble the great grandfather by following an imagined or created sequence of visages. This sequence would be comprised of pieced-together features of the siblings, parents, uncles and aunts over time.) If continuity of necessity involves difference at the heart of the sameness, what accounts for the identical sameness in its being other? Or is it really not the recognizably same but something else which has gradually emerged out of the “form” (or different moment) that was before?

If we think of this in the third-person there is a strong case to be made for the position of “imperceptible continuity” and mere family resemblance. And even in the first-personal case in regard to one’s identifiable person and personality, the case seems to enjoy a measure of probability. Reflecting back at a distant point in time upon a remote earlier phase of oneself and one’s life, who has not wondered about how one could have been moved by what one knows moved one, and how one could have believed what one knows one once believed? Yet one has a sense of having grown imperceptibly into that later stage. Therefore there is both the radical difference and the sense of sameness based on the “imperceptibility” of the
metamorphosis. Yet here, of course, the sense of identity is tied to perceptual criteria and it does not take account of the non-perceptual criteria of first-person non-reflexive self-awareness. The “myself” as such is bereft of states, fluxes, etc. And it is of this that we are non-reflexively self-aware.

Doubtless transcendental phenomenology asserts that at the heart of the heart of the transcendental subjectivity is the ongoing “event” of temporalization and the flux of the primal presencing with the continuous upsurging of ever new Nows. This is the foundation for our finished world of durations upon which all our cognitive-catégorial-syntactic agency of manifestation builds. If this were all there was to say, then a case might be made that temporal continuity would be ultimate. Yet if the “myself” were accounted for by a continual self-redefinition, how would I know the definition to be one applying to me myself? The primal presencing is always a self-awareness. It is continuously aware of an upsurge of novel Nows, i.e., it is aware of a flux of differentials. But as self-aware it does not become aware of itself by reason of its awareness of what is different in the form of its protention of the not yet and retention of the no longer. It is always self-present in its presencing the differentials in the form of Now. We, in Chapter VI, will discuss the difficulty involved in the two claims that the primal presencing itself is not now and that the primal presencing is a primal “flow.” Our position is that it is because the “myself” informs the primal presencing that there is a self-sameness that transcends the flux.

If there were no “self-sameness” there would be perhaps similarity, likeness, approximation but there would not be a continuity of me myself. The “myself” would be only a “society of occasions” (Whitehead) and each moment would be more or less different in “form” even though the unification through transformation would occur “imperceptibly.” One would have occasion to regard the multiplicity of events as a unity (“society”) linking the multiplicity by some consideration exterior to the events or moments, e.g., an interest, a point of view of the observer, etc.

We face here the issue discussed earlier in Book I, Chapter II, namely how the present myself knows in its self-awareness and self-reference that it is indeed knowing and referring to itself, and how it would recognize in what is other than itself what was its own, if there was not a prior non-identifying sense of oneself. In our present context of separating off the “myself” from the continuity of the temporal flux, it is important to restate that this prior non-reflective, non-identifying sense of itself could not be made up of different moments which were other to one another because we would face the problem of how they would themselves be the one same myself by which it would identify its own among the differentials.

Our position therefore is that the original myself is not founded in an identity synthesis constituting a duration. The lived identity of me myself would have to go in advance of any kind of identifying of what is mine and me among a flux of differentials.

None of this detracts, so it seems to this writer, from the claim that the primal hyletic presencing and primal temporalization, along with the I, constitutes transcendental subjectivity. Our thesis, and we believe it to be Husserl’s, is that although we must do justice to the ultimate status of temporalization, this is not merely a
continuity of a Now point but is always a primal presencing to me and mine. The myself and mine are there from the start because I am there from the start and the primal presencing is of necessity always someone's.

This continuous happening of the primal streaming which Husserl thinks of as a kind of proto-doxastic thesis, an Urfuβe enacting an “is-ing,” not only constitutes but informs the unity of “my life” and it is what “I myself” live and have. Without it my “personalization” or the identity I give myself through position-taking acts would not be possible. Thus the pervasive “form” of “I myself” of the streaming happening must itself be regarded as substance. In thinking about this matter, the basic temptations to avoid are, on the one hand, conceiving the primal transcendental I as a sheer event of primal presencing wherein the “myself” becomes an ephemeral being within the stream or as a continuously the same enduring family-resemblance like sameness; or, on the other hand, thinking of the “myself” as an actual being cut of from the primal temporalization in such a way that the co-ultimacy of temporalization is denied. We believe that we must see the “myself” and the primal “hyletic” presencing as moments, not pieces, of the whole “myself” or the transcendental I, even though we have found reason to posit the “I” or “myself” as the substrate of the primal hyle.

Even primal temporalization itself, in contrast to what is temporalized, is not to be thought of as having proper temporal properties. The temporalizing is no more now, no longer, and not yet than the “myself” has inherently the properties of being human, embodied, short or tall. The substrate-moment, “myself,” we have said, is the bearer of its eidos which has its analytic properties of being identical with “myself” as well as the properties of being conscious, a will, intellect, self-manifest, etc., but these are not properties ascribed to the “myself” but rather analytic or synthetic a priori explanations of the form of “myself,” and may be regarded as the eidetic or essential existence-condition for my self-disclosure and my agency of manifestation.

It, furthermore, has inhering in it its temporalization as the condition for its personhood. Personhood is constituted of necessity in time through acts. Without the temporalization, “myself” as person would not be conceivable and what “I” refers to would remain impoverished. It would be limited to being the pure ipseity (“myself”) and I-pole. Yet this way of putting it is misleading because it suggests that we have the “myself” or “I myself” as an integral entity all at once at the start, a kind of stripped down person in disguise, existing independently of its temporalization and personalization, and then find ourselves wondering how it can become a full-fledged person in the world.

Such a formulation forgets that phenomenology begins in the natural attitude where “I” refers to the richness of personal identity through the temporalization bound to embodiment and enworldment facing infinite ideals. “I myself,” like any bare substrate, comes to light through the appropriate philosophical consideration. Although it is a constitutive part of the person it would be a mistake to regard it as the person. Rather this constitutive sense of “myself” is distorted if regarded as capable of substituting for the original beginning rich personal sense of oneself which is the place of departure for the transcendental phenomenological reflection. Much of this work attempts to tease out this constitutive core sense of oneself that
is at the basis of one’s personhood but which is not to be identified with personhood. We would have egregiously failed in our description if we permitted the conclusion that the “myself” could substitute adequately for oneself as a person. Basic to our view is that the “myself” as the bare substrate is not the person but a component consideration of the person.

For the view proposed here I myself exist wholly and completely in the Now because I am always “myself” and with self-reference and reflection, “I myself” and “myself as myself.” At the same time my personal life is always elapsing and there is an irretrievable loss of my life. This loss of one’s life in terms of the elapsing of the present is typically not described as a loss of one’s person, and certainly not a loss of the “myself.” But at the same time my personal life is always advancing and partaking of a novel richness that never before happened – even as it advances toward my non-being in the world with Others, i.e., my death. This advance and increase in one’s life is not described typically as an increase in the person or the “myself.” In both cases the difficulty of speaking of a loss or increase in one’s person or oneself (the “myself”) is because we have difficulty separating the core of the person from “myself.”

An analogy between one’s personal life and one’s body is possible, so that one finds reason to think of the life as an aggregate of temporal parts, where there is the coming and going of parts. In an imaginative futurological perspective we might conceive acquiring an entire new body like we might acquire a “new bicycle” by gradually replacing every one of the parts of the bike, so that one can doubt whether this bicycle is “identical with” my old one. Similarly we can imagine all the bones and organs and even parts of the brain to have been gradually replaced. As a thing in space my body is just as questionably the same as the old one as my new bicycle is. So in some cases of trauma, amnesia or perhaps profound conversions in one’s way of life, there are discontinuities in the personal life. Yet in as much as the body is lived as mine and the stream of consciousness is mine and has as its substrate “myself” the proposal that the self is a mere aggregate of temporal parts misses the mark. There are doubtless analogies between, on the one hand, the appropriation of the bicycle so that it becomes “my bicycle” and, on the other hand, new limbs and organs so that they become “mine.” In this learning process they become the “from-to” of my life rather than the “to which” which they, as the prostheses, were, and which as such served as obstacles to my life. But, as we have often insisted, my personal life is a different matter. No matter how discontinuous from the third-person point of view, and no matter how traumatized from the first-person point of view, all parts of my life are pervaded by mineness.

A brief discussion of Kant is necessary here because he inaugurated an era that wrestled with conceiving substance in the first-person self-experiencing. Kant clearly saw reasons to assign the status of substance to the I of transcendental apperception. But in the KrV he shied away from it for several reasons. “Substance” was a term reserved for beings (if there were such) that were “known” through conceptually informed sense-intuition as real things in themselves. But Kant believed because substances properly should be envisaged as eternal or trans-temporal beings present to informed sense-intuition, the likelihood of their reality was to be doubted. In as
much as we cannot know in terms of representation through conceptually informed sense-intuition any thing in itself, this robust sense of substance is ruled out.

Further, if we momentarily yield to the temptation to think of the I as a substance, we may acknowledge that the I for itself neither begins nor passes away.67 But for Kant this kind of appearing to oneself does not permit the conclusion that the I enjoys the substantiality that makes one trans-temporally abiding or eternal, especially in the sense that what is posited there has an abiding sense that is tied to our perception of something that is known, in a robust sense, through conceptually informed sense intuition. Kant clearly assigns a strong sense of substance only, per impossibile (because this cannot be said legitimately to be known), to an object of perception. (Later we will note that late Nachlass lectures of Kant seem to stand in opposition to this well-known position.)

Further, Kant insists that the I is present in all thoughts. But the presentation (Vorstellung) of the I is not bound to any intuition which would distinguish it from other objects of intuition. Thus although the I ineluctably makes itself present in all thinking, we cannot conclude that it itself is a permanent and abiding intuition within which the flux of thoughts change. Later Kant made this point more clear when he insisted that I know something only when I determine an object in an intuition within the unity of consciousness; obviously the I is not known as a determinate or determinable object in this way; rather it is present as the determining self (KrV, B40768).

We do not have any real disagreement on this last Kantian point, if it has been properly understood. There is a good phenomenological sense in which the I is never present as a distinct conceptually-informed intuited object that underlies as a substrate the flux of thoughts. Kant acknowledges that I am aware of myself not as something determined but as determining subject, and not what can be merely attached to thinking as a predicate. This is for Kant an identical and apodictic proposition. But this does not mean that the I is therefore for me an object which is an abiding being or substance knowable in conceptually informed sense-intuitions (KrV, B408-408). Later, we shall see that there is reason to believe that Kant had intimations of a fundamentally non-reflective sense of self-awareness. But ultimately even this self-awareness, along with its seeming substantiality, in spite of a few texts to the contrary, seems to be but a “representation,” and, as an appearing (of me) to me, reveals nothing about what is truly real. The dogmatic gap between display and being has its most dramatic consequences here.

§4 The Uniqueness of the Transcendental I and Numerical Identity

The transcendental I, as the ultimate dative and agent of manifestation that transcendental phenomenology thematizes, is not individuated by spatiality or temporality or any other worldly involvement, but rather all forms of individuation presuppose it. All “this’s” and “that’s”, all “now’s” and “then’s,” all the displays that involve indexicality,
presuppose the lived anonymous I as indicating and inseparably they presuppose the
lived anonymous the transcendental I as that to which these are indicated. Thus the
sense of the I’s indicating is not exhaustively indicated in its own indexicality as an
embodied speaker in the world with others.69

With the transcendental reduction to the dative and agent of manifestation, a
sense of the first person singular is brought to light that is not only the lived
presupposition for all that is sayable about the world, and that is the “bearer” of
the validity for all that “holds,” “is true,” “has value,” etc. with regard to the
world, but it is also the lived presupposition and bearer of validity of all that is
in the world for others who are present as such in so far as they are appresented
to be agents and datives of manifestation of the world as the same for us all.
Further, and what is more basic for our present consideration, the transcendental
I in its first-person singularity is the bearer of the validity of the present, dis-
played and presumed Others who are appresented to experience themselves
pre-reflectively as “I.”

As a result of moving to this level of transcendental reflection Husserl is led
to say: “I am not an I which has always still its Thou and its We and its universal
community of co-subjects that hold for me in the validity of the natural atti-
uide.”70 At this level of the reduction, where there is highlighted both I-ness and
the “myself” as bearer of the validity of all that appears, it is I myself who alone
experiences I in the first person sense of me “myself.” That which Others refer to
with “I” is not my experience, nor is my I-ness something Others can experience.
All presumed and appresented senses of “I” are derivative from me myself. In
this sense there is only “I” and references such as “an I” are bogus. There is none
next to me of whom I could say, “Not only is this one I, but that one also is I,” in
the way I can say “I am a human, that is a human, there is another human, and
there is another.” We noted earlier the problem of saying that “person” is not a
sortal term. Of course we can say, “I am a person, that one is a person, there is
another person,” etc. We can do this because when we refer to persons in the nat-
ural attitude we refer to self-aware concrete wholes that encompass more than
“I.” Thus in meeting persons I encounter spatial-temporal embodied presences
that instantiate a kind (person, human, animal, etc.) that itself has properties. But,
as we already noted, being a person requires that we are taken with the Other as
one who refers to herself with “I” and, in this respect, the Other is present non-
sortally. Further, in philosophical reflection, as in the thought-experiments
regarding metaphysical clones, or in transcendental reflection, I am evidently
self-aware as the ultimate reflecting I-pole and the I becomes evident without all
the predications and propositions that hold in regard to me as a person in the
world. All that determines me categorically, my being a human, an embodied
person in the world with others, all the distinguishing properties, all the validities
about me as enworlded, etc., are disengaged. We focus on the I simpliciter
wherein the knowledge of myself as I is independent of knowing anything else
about myself and where I am aware of myself without being aware of myself as
anything except: myself.71 But what I refer to with “I” in this radical disengage-
ment is absolutely individual and others are not “I.” The referent of “I” is not a
single instance of a specific essence that we might name I-ness with the instantiations of $I_1$, $I_2$, $I_3$, etc. where each instance would be filled with the contents referred to by proper names, e.g., of Peter, Paul, Mary, etc.

None of this contradicts a Husserlian “likely story” of the originating gracious presence of the other which is the necessary condition for the child’s ability to self-refer, say “I”, etc. Husserl held that the other person is the first person for the child. The child appears first of all to itself as Other to the Other, i.e., in developing a contrast with “you.” This does not deny that the infant has a self-awareness pervaded by a unique ownness, but it does suggest that the infant is not capable of the kind of self-reference that “I” requires. Admittedly Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological analysis of the absolute solitary I may seem to suggest that Others are irrelevant to the transcendental philosopher, as if the human person as transcendental I is full blown in the absence of others. But that omits the consideration that a full personal I carries out the transcendental reduction and analyses; it omits the fact that the personal I is the way the transcendental I comes to light. There is no doubt that we are first of all in the natural attitude, and there is little doubt that we are first of all persons in the world who have come to be personal I’s through the gracious presence of others. The transcendental I has a transcendental philosopher who is a human person as its necessary condition. The philosopher is a person in the world with others before she is a philosopher. Persons are not thinkable without Others. But it still is true that the transcendental I myself is essentially alone. “I,” in its original meaningfulness, is solus ipse. That is, the transcendental I, in its reference to the original non-reflexive self-presence, and therefore to what is essentially prior to and the basis of the transcendental use of “I” as well as the indexical sense (“I” = “myself as myself”), does not admit a plurality. “I” is uniquely unique. But this priority is what is first in itself for the transcendental phenomenologist, i.e., quoad nos qua philosophi, not what is first quoad nos qua persons in the world with Others. That is, for this philosophical insight to occur there must be constituted a person intentionally immersed with Others in the world who is capable of self-reflection and self-reference. There are no transcendental philosophers who grew up as feral children. But of course this priority of the uniquely unique I must be first quoad nos and quoad se if reflection is to reveal subsequently that it is the self-presence of the individual essence.

Richard Höningswald has a similar position on the “solitude” of the transcendental I. He reaches the position with a transcendental reflection without a transcendental reduction. At the heart of his discussion is the question of “numerical identity.” Before we turn to his discussion we best prepare for his remarks by noting that a numerical identity is usually contrasted with qualitative identity. Thus a big square and a small square may be said to have the same qualitative identity but not the same numerical identity. The big square is numerically different from the small square, even though, as squares, they are qualitatively the same. We earlier discussed numerical identity in regard to, e.g., red squares, where we have things that are absolutely qualitatively the same but which are not each other and therefore numerically different.
Leibniz disputed that there are any real existing things that are merely numerically distinct. He holds that if there would be two things absolutely indiscernible from each other in terms of properties or qualities, they would be one. If there is no discernible difference then there is none and the two are not two but one. The criterion for the identity of the two objects is that any proposition whatsoever would be applicable to either one; or any list of properties could be substituted for either of the objects. Identity is the equivalent of substitutability of one subject term or object with another in regard to whatsoever determination of properties. But for Leibniz this is not possible; if they had this substitutability they would be the same being, not different. For evidence he cites empirical observation and for the logic or conceptuality of the matter he cites Aquinas’s position that each angel or separated intelligence is an infima species, or lowest species, i.e., one that is the limit of individuation of a genus. Such an infima species is self-individuating and does not receive individuation from any materiality or accidents that are not intrinsic to it. Leibniz interprets Aquinas to hold that the angel Michael differs from Raphael in his being essentially distinct, i.e., it is the distinct properties that distinguish Michaelness from Raphaelness.

Leibniz’s position is problematic for us. On the one hand he draws near to the Husserlian one we are advocating (see our fuller discussion in the context of theology, in Book 2, Chapter VI), in so far as he posits that I-substances or I-monads enjoy a simplicity and uniqueness. But in formulating the individuality and essence of these I-monads as persons he thinks of them in sortal terms, as in the case of Michael being distinct from Raphael by reason of distinct properties. Our position, in contrast to that of Leibniz, sees in the Thomist position a candidate for an essence that is singularized, an individual essence. But the difference, pace Leibniz, is not a matter of distinguishing properties.

This is not a matter of a love of paradox, but rather derives from the insight that Who one is not captured by being a kind and having distinguishing properties. Of course, for Aquinas angels are and are not kinds. They are kinds because he speaks of the individuals, Gabriel, Raphael, Michael, etc., as belonging to the kind, “angel.” Yet they are not kinds if this is taken to mean that their individuality is that of an instance of their angelness. Further, we would have him say what he does not: the angel as pure spirit is the kind of ipseity who permits its ipseity or its being a Who to be more transparent than is the case with a human being. The angel thus would not be an individual of a species and not share a nature in common. In our revised Thomist view the unique essence who is the angel Raphael is to be thought of as an essence which is not instantiable or communicable and Raphael’s being exhaustive of “his” essential kind is a way of saying that “he” is a purer expression of a Who than is the individual human person whose unique essence is tied to the more extrinsic existence condition or essence of being human. The individual Who that is each of us exists necessarily as a human person, and as we shall attempt to show, the “myself” or Who is ontologically incomplete until there is an actualization of this Who in and through the human personhood. Thus the full expression of Who requires the existence conditions of the human person and therefore each human individual of necessity does not exhaust the expression of her species.
Raphael (rather than the instantiation of an angel named Raphael) perhaps is purer because Raphael’s ipseity is, for those who have eyes to see, more transparent in her self-presentations. This is, of course, dependent on the view that angels are incorporeal and are pure ipseities not bound to a kind – or rather they belong to the set of ipseities which are not bound to the existence condition of being a kind. There furthermore might be the speculative assumption that there is no difference between the personal self-presentation and the ipseity. Of course, if the ipseity of those which we here loosely refer to as angels is conceived to have changing personalities and to have analogous bodies, as some recent theologians have proposed, then there is not an essential difference with human ipseities in “purity of self-presentation” but rather only one of degree. Of course, given the classical (Thomist) creationist framework, the angel may be said to have a kind and other properties as its existence conditions because, like all creatures, the angels have essence as a specific form as a way of “limiting” the gift of their esse. But perhaps being a singular individual or individual essence is another way to think of the limitation of esse, and this would be a different limitation than that of a kind or specific form.

Let us return to Leibniz who further maintains that the difference between the I-monads must be in every respect qualitative, not merely quantitative or numerical. Our position on the unique individual essence agrees with this – at least in the first-person perspective of the “myself.” In our view, the second- and third-person perspective, the ontological clone’s distinctiveness from me would surely approach being a mere numerical difference. Leibniz draws near to this with some formulations regarding the monadic substance, yet backs away from it. For Leibniz this means each I-monad is distinct of necessity because it has distinguishing properties. For Leibniz there is no non-ascriptive knowing of “I myself” and no property-less sense of “I myself.” Rather I myself am able to be considered only as a person, and “person,” for Leibniz, would seem (cf. our discussion in Book 2, Chapter VI) to be primarily a sortal term comprising all the attributes that belong to this unique substance as it lives its life over time.

For Leibniz, persons have only intrinsic attributes. He holds this because of his view that in spite of the persons being essentially comprised of the properties that accrue to them in their lives, they are absolutely simple. As absolutely simple they are not affected by anything in the world that is extrinsic to them. (Whereas our position in this work is proximate to that of Leibniz in so far as we claim that the essence of the “myself” – not the person – is uniquely individual per se, i.e., intrinsically determined, and not per accidens, i.e., extrinsically and contingently determined, for Leibniz, all predication or “denomination” of persons in their full embodied enworldedness with all the properties that this entails is intrinsic, not contingent or accidental. This is ultimately a theological position based on divine predestination. Again, cf. our more ample discussion in Book 2, Chapter VI where we discuss Leibniz in the theological context of vocation.)

Here we can note that the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity may appear to be implicitly functioning in the everyday way we respond to the question “who are you?” In the context of vocational choices, ideal selves,
careers, shifting roles, social settings, etc., we seem to have to do with a qualitative identity. If some official asks me, “Who are you?” in the setting of a school, government building, scholarly conference, courtroom, etc., we will best answer by saying, e.g., “I am a lobbyist,” “I am a speaker,” “I am a parent,” “I am a lawyer representing so-and-so.” Just as the question, “Who is there?” might well be a request by the homeowner for the person to identify him-herself in terms of the official capacity or properties, e.g., the porter, the TV repair person, the plumber, etc. In none of these situations is the proper answer, “I myself.” (Cf. our earlier discussion of the humor in the exchange in Molière’s play.) Yet if, and here we agree with Leibniz, we think of the individuality of what is referred to in the response, “I myself,” as merely numerical and without any qualitative sense or essence then we seem to have the response of a zombie or a computer, and not a person or a “myself.”

“Who am I?” understood as, What kind of person am I?, What kind of career choice have I made?, What is my societal role for most of my waking hours?, What kind of person do I want to be, etc., is not a question of my numerical identity. Aside from our focal issue on whether “numerical identity” is the most appropriate way to talk about the uniqueness of the individual essence of the “myself,” to say that “I myself” am numerically the same throughout my life is not something that is left up to me to realize. Thus what the problem of numerical identity refers to is the identity that our discussion of Klawonn brought to light, foremost in the second- and third-person. But our thesis here is that in the first-person, i.e., when I say: “Whoever you are who call yourself JG Hart, you are not me,” there is brought to light a bare particular that is more than the bare particular of the mere numerical identity which we grasp in the second- or third-person, whether it be that differentiating the perfectly qualitatively same red squares or JG Harts. Our position thus agrees with Leibniz in so far as a mere numerical identity, as in what differentiates the perfectly similar red squares or JG Harts, does not do justice to the qualitative referent which is the first-person “myself.” (Later we will discuss, under one’s vocation or calling, the sense in which one’s eternal “numerical identity” might be said to have qualitative aspects in so far as it makes sense to be exhorted “to be what you are.”) Similarly “Who is there?” answered with “I myself” affirms more than a mere identity of the possessor of qualities, and in this sense my numerical identity. But even though it does not really answer the question the person asked, the person could well be answering more than she was asked by claiming to be more than a mere numerical identity. The ipseity, the Je ne sais quoi, the bare substrate of the “myself” beyond ascription, etc., must be said to be “qualitative,” i.e., essential, in contrast to the view that it is “merely” numerical or quantitative.

Kant’s thinking on numerical identity has veins worth mining. For Kant, I relate all the successive elements of the stream of experience throughout time to the numerically identical self. And this for him means that the feature of the soul which constitutes its being a person (Persönlichkeit der Seele) is not inferred but inseparably bound up with self-awareness in time. He finds an equivalence between, “this whole time is in me, as individual unity,” and “I am to be found numerically
identical throughout time” (KrV A362). This clearly is to be contrasted to an Other’s perception of me where I am posited to persist in the temporality of what is given in perceptual sensibility, and of necessity the outside observer does not experience my own temporality, the awareness of which is the equivalent of the awareness of my identity as a person. And this awareness of my own temporality is the source of my experiencing myself as a numerical identity throughout time (KrV A363). Because for Kant only the perception in sensibility amounts to true knowledge, my apperception of my numerical identity in time has no ontological significance, but rather is only a (postulated) formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence. Whereas we must of necessity judge ourselves to be one and the same throughout the whole of time, from the standpoint of the outside observer, which counts the most for Kant in ontological matters, this judgment has no validity (KrV A364). For Kant the ultimate philosophical account requires that first-person self-experiencing and transcendental reflection on it give way to the third-person perspective of something in the world.

Bertrand Russell denies that one must necessarily posit a numerical identity when one reflects on one’s experience. Let us acknowledge that a subject (S) has, in her experience of something, a non-explicit, pre-reflective acquaintance (A) with herself experiencing the object (O). Thus we have S-A-O. When she makes present in reflection (R) the original experience, we have S’-R-(S-A-O). But Russell observes that “there is no good reason why S and S’ should be numerically the same; the one ‘self’ or ‘mind’ which embraces both may be a construction.” Russell says this in spite of the fact that he calls the relation of S’ through R to S-A-O a case of self-awareness. But with Manfred Frank, we may state that “to justify the reflexive term ‘self’, consciousness must be numerically identical with itself; otherwise there could perhaps be the presence of S’ to S, but there could not be guaranteed the sameness of both (the fact that S’ is S itself).” If there were not this numerical identity my reflection on my self could never amount to a knowing that I was reflecting on me and not on someone else. If there were not this numerical identity how could I return to my prior experiences in order to recall them as mine? How could I reflect on prior judgments I had made, realize that I made a mistake, amend them, and take responsibility for them? Etc.

More recently, Robert Spaemann likewise assigns numerical identity to what approximates what we call the “myself,” or ipseity. He refers to the cases of imaginative metamorphoses where the ‘I’ may take up “incarnations” in other bodies or animals and can be transformed back again. Or when we dream that we meet someone whom we know, e.g., that this is, we are convinced, indeed Peter, but Peter is somehow present in a manner that in no way resembles how we formerly knew him. The numerical identity here is such that we can abstract it from every qualitative property. “Who we are is clearly not simply identical with what we are.” This is clearly the same position that we have been proposing. But granting that the numerical identity is opposed to a merely qualitative identity, the designation of the identity as merely numerical (which I do not believe is necessarily Spaemann’s position) does not capture the individual essence as holding a richness of meaning beyond properties.
Richard Hönigswald offers an important consideration for why we should not use the concept of numerical identity to clarify the identity of “I myself,” even though he argues for the radical uniqueness and solitude of “I.” If, regarded according to the (first-person) lived experience, am not “one” in the same sense as a chair or table is one. (Hönigswald does not refer to “the first-person” or first-person reference, nor does he develop the notion of ownness and privacy, but the effect of his discussion is to open up precisely these themes.) The chair or table or “Peter” can be a numerical identity if it is meaningful to deny its being two. But this (pace numerous contemporary philosophers) is precisely what must be denied in regard to “the I” when regarded in its first-person lived experience. Its “one-ness” or “unity” is never a “not-twoness.” Its unity and self-sameness or identity is such that we cannot begin to think of it as two and therefore in this sense it is not meaningful to deny its being two. What follows is an interpretation of Hönigswald’s position.

Hönigswald’s point is closely tied to whether “the I” is individuated by reference to another I and whether it can be “counted.” For things to be counted they have to be a discrete manifold or plurality, and they have to be counted within a pre-arranged mediated generic or essential context, e.g., of “squares,” “Republicans,” “humans,” “thoughts,” “cells,” “atoms,” “cars,” “things,” etc. Thus I am an individual American, husband, professor, father, etc. by reasons of such and such individuating features that distinguish me from the others in the relevant grouping. And I can be counted among Americans, professors, fathers, etc. As radically singular, what I refer to with “I” resembles more a “this-here.” As “this-here” there is no answer to “what” is being counted, and even if we say “everything” or “every thing” we do not know how “things” are being carved up. Thus we might ask, are there being counted all the standardly measurable places? The endless continua of ever smaller or more definite “here’s”? That which is available to visual perception? The colors? The things colored? The shades of coloring? The sounds? The sounds having a certain pitch? All pitched sounds? The spaces between the pitches one is accustomed to hearing? All the smellable and touchable spaces? And the gradations in between? All these together?

The point here is in order to count there must be something to count, but we must be clear antecedently on what sort of things we are counting. The radical singularity of the “this-here” eludes its being counted. We can count “things,” whether relations, properties, substances, parts that are moments, parts that are pieces, abstracta, concreta, continua, moments in a continuum, events, phases of events, etc. But in what sense am I, as the unique essence and agent of manifestation, even of other “I’s” and agents of manifestation, able to be lined up among countable things, as if there is I, there again is I, and once again, etc.? In the case of, e.g., “thoughts,” as in the stream of thoughts, we have a clear problem of their discreteness, and the carving up of the flow of experience by the nouns and verbs often mislead us into thinking we have discretion where there is none. But in regard to “the I,” “every kind of relation, no matter how mediated, to the meaning and function of countability is absent here.” What we refer to with “I” is not “one” that could be joined to another possible other “one” or still another “one.” In this it resembles the
elusiveness of countable “this-here’s.” But what “I” refers to eludes, not only because of its non-sortal character, but also because all counting, as all naming, are achievements of the unique one achieving displaying. If this unique one is not uniquely one, none of the achieving happens.

What “I” refers to enjoys a uniqueness that is not comparable with what we know in the third-person in regard to well-circumscribed objective historical events in the world with their “singular” properties. Rather what we refer to with “I” is unique by reason of its antecedent “determinateness of dimension” that is prior to all realms of objectness or objectivity where the “this’s” have kinds and properties for existence-conditions. This “antecedent determinateness of dimension” we have called the “myself” or “individual essence.” We thus can say that as the presupposition for all objectness as the condition for countability, the I-dimension is not itself a countable object. The one counting is not the sort of thing to be counted – not merely because while counting the I is not among the counted, but primarily because it is not the sort of thing that admits of being counted. Indeed, it is not a sort of thing at all. Of course, here it has the property of “being a counter” or “one counting”; but this is to say that it is an agent of manifestation, a wakeful rational consciousness, a mind – all “tautological properties” of the “myself” or “I.”

Thus for Hönigswald because I am present non-objectively as the presupposition for the display of objects which alone are countable, I as the radically unique and non-objectifiable subject displaying the world am “one” for myself in a way that what is manifested as well as I as the agent of manifestation would be annihilated in the consideration that I would be two. Only in the case where we have an object that we can reasonably discount as “not being two,” i.e., where its appearing to be two is not inherently impossible, is there a numerical identity. “The I” is precisely that whose appearing to be two is an impossibility and therefore that which we cannot reasonably discount as “not being two.” The reason “I” in the lived first-person, non-objectifiable sense cannot possibly appear as two is because “I,” in an important sense does not “appear” at all, it is never a genitive of appearing. As self-aware agent and dative of manifestation it is not an appearing of–, to…, and therefore, in this sense, does not appear at all in a way that can be framed or counted.

Yet, we can ask, how is it evident, how is it manifest, that the “I” cannot possibly be two, but rather is of necessity and uniquely one? The evidence must be in the prior non-reflective, non-objectifiable sense that undergirds all counting or discounting something as being two: This is uniquely and irrevocably one, and it is not meaningful to deny its being two – as in the cases of what appears as qualitatively identical, as the two rocking chairs or even the two JG Harts. In these latter cases denying that they are two is meaningful, i.e., it makes sense to say that this rocking chair in Manitoulin cannot be exactly like my favorite rocking chair in Bloomington, or that this Manitoulin JG Hart cannot be the Bloomington JG Hart. But in each case because it is meaningful to deny that they are two, it is possible to affirm that they are two. If they are two then we have a case of numerical identity. But, in the first-person, I as the one entertaining whether it is meaningful to deny that there are
two cannot myself be two. Here in this case it is not meaningful at all to deny there are two, acknowledging the possibility that there might be two, because the very entertaining and acknowledging require that I be uniquely one. “Entertaining” and “acknowledging” not only require the same agent for each act and for both acts together but it is inconceivable of what these acts would mean if there were a plurality of I’s or agents and datives of manifestation.

The difference between Hönigswald and Spaemann is that the latter’s “numerical identity” is a matter of second- and third-person reference, whereas the former’s denial of numerical identity has to do with the peculiarities first-person experience and reference. For both Husserl and Hönigswald, the uniqueness of “I myself” has to do with precisely the essentially non-objectifiable first-person lived sense of “myself.” Russell seems to hold this to be true in regard to the reflecting “I” but because for him there is no prior non-reflective familiarity with oneself when the I objectifies “myself” I am not in a position to say that there is a numerical identity of I’ and I. Tugendhat, and implicitly Klauwonn, hold for a first-person sense of numerical identity. This would seem to be appropriate if “I” is an indexical or one of a series of reflections, where necessarily the countability of selves is a possibility and where it is meaningful to speak of the not-tweness of “I.” But Hönigswald and Husserl are not discussing primarily the indexical “I” but rather the transcendental I. Husserl also (along with Klauwonn), we believe, highlights the “myself” that is the basis for all senses of “I” as achievements by me.

Therefore Hönigswald, similarly to Husserl, can say that there is a linguistic infelicity when we speak of a plurality of “I’s.” But more important it is simply not possible in regard to what “I” refers to. What is at stake is the particular and unique sense in which “the I” is one. This is to be distinguished in a basic way from every numerical determinateness. In other words there are not many “I’s” in the same sense in which there is one “I.”

But what of the others? Hönigswald dramatically makes his point by saying that only when we presuppose the “postulate” that there is given to the one unique I analogous experiential center points, do these Others have validity. For Hönigswald, regardless of how compelling and founded “this postulate” may appear to be, in contrast to the one, unique I, i.e., the I, which is lived self-experiencing and never a postulate, the lived I is an absolutely essential different kind of power (Potenz) than that which we make present in “the others.”

And these others are, by way of analogy, other I’s. If, on the one hand, one adds to the other I’s one’s own, one removes the specific determinateness of the I-dimension and one renders oneself bereft of one’s ineliminable sense. But if, on the other hand, one does not count one’s I among the other I’s, then the plural itself, as a plural of I’s, loses its clear sense. What then become of “them” and “you” (plural) and “we?” This seeming dilemma highlights the way others are present to us, i.e., the great abyss of transcendence that the other “myself” presents to us in the form of “you” and in the third-personal forms of reference.

Here we may insist that for the phenomenologist practicing the phenomenological reduction the Others are more than a hypothesis or postulate. But such a designation,
like the disengagement brought about by the reduction, testifies to the extraordinary event of the presence of the Other – and it brings home to us the oddness of our self-presence.  

§5 A Kantian Foil

Our chief ontological claim has been, and will be, that what “I” refers to is an individual essence, and thus is a richness, which our personal concrete being cannot exhaust. Foils to this position are many. For example, one foil would be a Buddhist view that holds that I-ness is derived or even inferior to pure consciousness which is absolutely I-free. Or an “Externus” view that holds that intentional consciousness does not require non-reflective self-awareness. Another associated one would be that the reflective reference of “I” is what constitutes self-awareness. That is, all forms of self-awareness are the result of objective guises or displays of the self, and they all have no more legitimacy than a perception of objects. We have, in this and the two preceding chapters, addressed some of the issues connected with these foils. The foil which we will discuss now is a Kantian one that need not be construed to hold all of the positions of the aforementioned foils.

The foil we here present is especially worthy because it shares the interest in a transcendental analysis and a theory of constitution. Further we take it to agree that there is a non-referential, non-intentional, pre- or non-reflective, awareness of the self. It also recognizes that there is a non-ascriptive way of referring to the I or I-pole. Yet the foil’s Kantian phenomenalism thwarts us at almost every turn, and what it decisively rejects in our position is that this non-ascriptive knowing has any ontological significance. Non-ascriptive knowing has to do with merely a deficient mode of knowing something and this deficiency can only result in something deficient in philosophical significance.

For the foil, the non-reflective awareness must be distinguished from empirical self-awareness. This latter refers to the awareness of ourselves, e.g., in weariness and pain; but the foil also assigns empirical awareness to the awareness of our intentional acts. It is not important that we elaborate on the full spectrum of these acts, except to say that there is always ineluctably synthesis involved. The chief point of the foil is that we are “empirically” aware of ourselves with a kind of quasi-objective phenomenality in our cognitive, emotive, conative and volitional agency. Each act or each series of acts is “phenomenally” experienced. And this is always only a knowledge “as I appear to myself, not as I am” (KrV B155).

But there is another non-phenomenal awareness of ourselves in the synthesizing agency. (This recalls Husserl’s view of the “I” coming into play to inform the deliverances of passive synthesis.) The “I” as the subject of thinking and its thoughtful categorial informing of the perceptual world does not, in its thinking and categorial informing, enjoy itself as an object. Rather its pure self-awareness is presupposed in the activity of its informing categorically the perceptual world (cf. KrV B422). This non-phenomenal awareness of ourselves is experienced
within an ongoing massive synthesizing and categorical display such that all acts are my acts and their referents, in so far as they have referents, are for me. But there is no necessity that the phenomenal empirical aspects of my self are “in themselves,” i.e., there is no necessity that the manifest acts, feelings, pains, etc., appear as mine. To use Castañeda’s terms, even these acts may appear as externally self-reflexive. Thus my awareness of myself in a mirror or hearing my voice or seeing/feeling my foot are all self-presentations in which I need not appear as me myself; and these are self-presentations which are phenomena that can deceive. Thus this immediate awareness of my acts involves a co-awareness, an “apperception,” of the “I” as what unites all the lived acts as mine, but “mine” seems here bereft of any ownness; the acts may be said to be mine by an act of external identification, as “my car.”

Yet the foil seems to agree that I am not aware of I as a genitive of appearing, but only as a dative and subject of all phenomenal acts and intentional objects. The awareness of myself as subject is not through the presentation of myself as an object. Further the awareness of myself as subject is always of what is numerically one, even though it is the “pole” of a manifold.

The awareness of the I is not knowledge of the I. However, this awareness too is a kind of representation, and as such it is never of “the thing in itself” but only of the appearance. Therefore it is problematic whether even here we have anything resembling knowledge of ourselves as we are. The apperception of the I is a non-ascriptive referential awareness that happens without identification or property-assignment. It however is not like a demonstrative pronoun which might confront us with a pure “this.” It is not a phenomenal appearing of me to me, but it is the awareness that I am rather than a knowing of what, who, or how I am. This is a knowledge of how I appear to myself, not a knowledge of how I am (KrV B152-153).

Again, this self-consciousness is not at all a knowledge of oneself. It is, as Kant put it, a way by which we “attached” (anhängte) the “I” to our thoughts and in so doing we designate transcendentally (transzendental bezeichnet) “the subject of inherence, without noting in it any quality whatsoever – in fact, without knowing anything of it either by direct acquaintance or otherwise (oder überhaupt etwas von ihm zu kennen, oder zu wissen)” (KrV A355). (Here, of course, is the problem of reference and the reflection theory of self-awareness: How could I attach “I” to my thoughts if I in no way were not already self-present, already “I myself”; the foil does not address this issue.)

Here we come to the central thrust of the foil for our thesis. According to the foil, because the apperceived I is not a result of a knowing but really the quality-less unifying pole, the “I” that I (!) have attached to my “thoughts,” and which informs the acts and syntheses with “mine,” it would be a mistake to take this “non-ascriptive” designation (or “attaching”) to be a reference to or a discovery of a special interest to ontological or metaphysical considerations. Or, in another formulation, our view, i.e., the view of the work the reader is reading, like the rational psychologist foil of Kant himself, expects “to find an intuition of the self and so mistake the absence of any intuition for the intuition of something with remarkable properties [JGH: i.e., the property of being an individual essence without properties].” Rather the property-less, quality-less “I” is merely a result of our feeble pre- or non-reflective
awareness of our intellectual determining activity. Because it is not a knowing of anything ontologically significant, it supports the contemporary view that our experience of ourselves leaves us in the dark in terms of knowing something ultimate about ourselves. On the one hand, we have the negligible factual and highly corrigeable empirical self-awareness where we are phenomenally present to ourselves bodily and in our states of mind; on the other hand, we have the transcen-
dental apperceptive self-awareness that is too feeble to qualify as a knowing and what it reveals is utterly bereft of properties, perhaps analogous to the reference to a raw particular of a demonstrative pronoun. The empirical and transcendental forms of self-awareness tell us nothing about ourselves. Therefore they provide motivations to seek knowledge of ourselves in third-person objective scientific investigations, such as those of neurophysiology, which perhaps provide much more promise.

This foil of course is burdened by the noumenal-phenomenal distinction, but it seeks to overcome it with the non-reflective apperceptive knowing. Unfortunately it holds that the awareness of our acts is the equivalent of the empirical introspec-
tive knowledge of our mental states. The foil offers the example, “I am puzzled by your comments.” Here we learn that there are the following ingredients of which one is aware: (1) the intentional object, your comments; (2) the experience of hearing the comments and puzzlement, both of which become phenomenal, empirical objects of awareness, objects of inner perception; and (3) I myself.

In the foil’s view, “I think that…”, “I am puzzled that…”, “I hear,” etc., are all objects of the inner reflection of inner perception. “I myself” is known by attaching or “transcendental designation.” This is how I am aware of myself as myself. It emerges in the massive synthetic agency. But, we may ask, is this agency always functioning? If not, then the I is ephemeral and tied to the discrete acts of synthesis. If it is always functioning then the more passive (what some call “egoless”) atti-
tudes of the stream of consciousness are not accounted for.

This latter point is important because of the claim that the “transcendental designation” or “attaching” is a reference to myself as myself. Am I always present to myself as myself? This seems false, because “I” is an occasional achievement. But am I not always self-present (rather than present to myself)? Our answer has been: Not as myself, but by informing the stream of passivity and activity. It is this which makes the indexical “I” possible and what it explicates.

Little is said in the foil’s view about the mineness or the ownness that pervades the stream of synthesis belonging to the I. How is it that the stream as well as the I are inseparable from mineness and ownness? Kant himself considered (KrV B409) the ownness (eigene Existenz) of oneself (or I) as a thinking being, as an “analytic proposition,” i.e., essential and necessary. Indeed one’s own person, as that to which, with complete identity, the stream of presentations appears, is to be distingui-
ished from the empirical appearing of oneself (KrV A362-363). Here Kant ties together the ownness and identity of I and separates these from that of the personal identity as it appears in the world. For Kant, simplicity is said to be both analytic to “I” or “I think” (KrV A354-355) and synthetic a priori (KrV B410). In any case, Kant makes no ontological claims for simplicity because (for Kant) it, like identity,
is the logical condition for the possibility for thinking’s display of the world and as such says nothing about the world displayed or about the ontological reality of the thinking subject.

But if our acts themselves are what we are immediately non-reflectively aware of, along with the I-center/pole, then there is reason to assign to both the acts and the I-center/pole a more than phenomenal status precisely because they are not appearings of... to-. But the foil insists on the phenomenal character of all manifestation. Therefore it holds for the ontological emptiness of the I and the absolutely non-epistemic character of our awareness of it and reference to it. Such positions are decisive for ontologically devaluing the I and its acts.

Our view, of course, is that “I,” as the disclosure of myself as myself, has to do with what is without qualities and/or properties and this is revealed in this mode of indexical (non-ascriptive) reference. But this mode of reference does not create or make what “I” refers to what it is. It is not something non-ascriptive merely because I so refer to it. The antecedent of “I” in non-reflective self-awareness of me myself is propertyless. And here we add that it is propertyless because of its being an individual essence known already in a non-intentional self-awareness wherein there is no syntactic or categorical agency. But, nevertheless, the explicit sense of propertylessness emerges in reflection on the ownness of the I as person vis-à-vis others and the world; it is not part of the non-reflective sense of “myself.” This latter awaits subsequent reflection (e.g., such as the thought-experiment conducted by Klawonn, the evocations of Hopkins, what “I” means for the amnesiac, etc.) in order for the richness that is its propertylessness to emerge.

In this section we have used a rich presentation of Kant, well supported by Kantian texts, as a foil to our position. Yet in Nachlass texts, published in English as Lectures on Metaphysics, which are destabilizing for Kantian scholarship aiming at an orthodoxy, the view I am urging in regard to substance finds surprising support. Indeed, these Lectures sound on occasion like the published earlier Kant is a foil to the later one. In one passage Kant speaks of “the concept of the I” as “substance” and as “the first subject of all inhering accidents” and which cannot be a predicate of another thing. “I” is said to “express the substantial” and to be “the only case where we can immediately intuit the substance.” In any other case we cannot intuit the substrate, “but in myself I intuit the substance immediately.”

Further he notes that the “soul which thinks in me” constitutes an absolute unity. He calls this also a *singulare in sensu absoluto*, a singularity. It is also a simplicity because a plurality of substances cannot constitute such an absolutely unified soul: “A many can indeed not say: I; this is thus the strictest *singularis* [or singularity].”

Finally we may wonder whether room is not made for a non-reflective self-awareness of the I (or I-substance/substrate) of itself, when Kant distinguishes the “logical consciousness,” where one is said not to be aware at all of his subject during
the time that he is reckoning numbers, and the psychological consciousness where one is preoccupied with only one’s subject. The discussion is not decisive, but the logical consciousness is, in spite of the “anonymity” still called “consciousness.” (It might, of course, also refer to what Castañeda named the “externus consciousness”; see our discussion above, Chapter II, §6.) Further, all consciousness is pervaded by “ownness”: “it is a knowledge of that which belongs to me.”

§6  Da Capo

The person manifestly has properties. Nevertheless, even as “another I,” e.g., the person meant as “you,” the person is referred to as “you” in a non-sortal way. In first-person reflection this leads to a sense of propertylessness which is inseparable from who-ness, mineness, ownness, identity, uniqueness, etc. Indeed, reflection on the eidos or essence of I-ness leads to reflection on these as properties of I-ness. To claim that the explication of the I-eidos is possible is not the same as saying that this explication leads to the properties of what “myself” or what “I” refers to.

This reflection on the I-essence is not a performative achievement or bringing about of “I” (after the fashion of the “illocutionary act” of saying the formula “I promise” creates the effect of specific claims and duties that previously did not exist) nor a fortiori does it achieve “myself.”

Further this reflection on the I-essence is far from a non-ascriptive reference to I, because I-ness as such is thematized and “the I” is made something ready for attributes. As “I” brings to light myself as myself, so reflection on the I and on “myself as myself” brings to light the eidos or essential nature of I-ness as a substrate for its properties. Again, none of this essence-analysis of I-ness affects the thesis that “I” refers in a non-ascriptive way and what “I” refers to itself is propertyless. What “I” refers to is myself, who I am; but “I” can become an object of reflection, a form, a What, and thus not Who I am.

Explicating “myself” or Who one is in terms of the essential nature of the I-essence hearkens back to our discussion of whether the “I” as a bare particular does not have the property of identity with itself or other tautological properties. We have made a distinction between the tautological properties, and the analytic- or synthetic a priori ones (recall that we did not decide the matter here). The tautological properties are those that cling to the self-affirmation implicit in the “myself’s” self-awareness; thus “myself” has the tautological property of being identical with itself. But in the case of the analytic or synthetic a priori properties we claimed that the “myself” is the carrier of the eidos “myself as such” and this could be thematized and thus shown to have properties that explicate it, e.g., “mineness,” “ownness” “self,” “I,” “consciousness,” “will,” etc. These we said were part of the analytic-eidetic sense of “myself as myself,” the I as an I or I as eidos I. We must distinguish the analytic-synthetic a priori properties of ipseity or I-ness or myselfness from the tautological
properties and the tautological “feature” of the unique essence of “myself,” i.e., that it is without properties. In so far as the “myself” always is also a self, as I is always the bearer of the eidos I, it has these tautological-analytic properties. But they do not elucidate the unique Who of the “myself” as “myself” but rather myself as a self, as an eidos I. They do not capture the unique individual essence that “myself” is, though they explicate the essence of the “myself” or I-ness. Nor does merely claiming it is a bare particular, as a demonstrative “This-Here,” capture the individual essence of “myself”; the demonstrative at best singles out a numerical identity bereft of qualities. It does not do justice to the individual essence glimpsed by Plotinus when he contemplated the form of Socrates (see our discussion in Book 2, Chapter VI) and by St. Thomas when he held that angels were such extraordinary creatures that the individual person, Raphael, was an incommunicable essence unto himself different from Gabriel and Michael in the way one natural kind differs from another. Another way of saying this for Thomas is that Raphael’s individual essence is of such a richness that there can be collapsed into Raphael the total extension of all possible instantiations without adding to Raphael’s essential richness. But, in our view, Raphael is an individual essence which is in principle not instantiable and not individuated by anything outside himself, even possible instantiations.

To claim the “myself” is a bare particular like “This-Here” does not do justice to how I myself (as brought to light in the thought-experiment of “teletransportation”) resist being collapsed into or identified with another person who has all the properties that comprise the person I am. The I-essence, in contrast to any other essence of something, reflects the individual essence which is propertyless, even though the I-essence has properties. The individual essence of “myself” as a bare particular itself is without properties, even though it is the bearer of properties in its personal being. Any other particular, even if it is a bare particular, awaits determination; not so the bare particular of “myself.” It is already manifestly essentially what, i.e., who, it is prior to and beyond all determinations. Further anything else is individuated by reason of its properties, which in principle can be duplicated. That is, everything else is the individual it is through the unique constellation of “Whats.” The bare particular of “myself” is a Who not captured by the Whats. Apart perhaps from “pure personal spirits,” if such exist, the Who cannot appear apart from Whats; there is no pure revelation of Who apart from a kind of being. Even the medieval scholastic angels are conceived to be Who’s which are coincident with their being sui generis, or a kind to themselves. But there are revelations of kinds of being bereft of any Who. One of the merits of the ancient definition of a person (cf. Boethius and St. Thomas) was not merely to tie it to an individual, i.e., a suppositum that existed radically in itself and not in another, but to tie this uniqueness and subsistence to a kind of being, i.e., a rational being. But this work attempts to tease out the essential individuality and uniqueness and not let it be totally absorbed by the connection to the kind of being. St. Thomas glimpsed this when he said “person” signifies an individual substance pertaining to its dignitas, and as such is to be found by philosophers or those using reason only in an intellectual nature.

Further “myself” or “I myself” is never a mere substrate of predication, never an object, because it is always that to whom or to which the predicate adheres or is
given. Thus the bare particular I am never is absolutely identical with the kind of being I am or with the person I am as the substrate of predications. The kind of being I am and the person I am habitually are always borne by the bare particular I am.

The foil asserts that because of the epistemically deficient mode of non-reflective non-ascriptive reference of “I,” what this reference displays, i.e., the qualityless I, is not anything of special ontological significance. Qualitylessness is a *modus deficiens*, a kind of privation of meaning and value. Our position is quite the contrary to the foil here. We perhaps can make a comparison in regard to a Kantian position. Kant holds that being aware of existence (which is to be distinguished from the foil’s view on the non-reflective apperceptive “reference” to the I) is not to be aware of any quality (KrV B626). This work is analogously claiming that being aware of oneself is something over and above being aware of qualities of oneself or of oneself as an I. Being aware of existence, i.e., *that* things are, not “what” or “how” they are, or being aware that there is something rather than nothing, is a precondition for any predications regarding a real actual being. (For Husserl, evidence for this occurs through reflection on the pre-predicative primal doxastic proto-thesis that generates the prepropositional pre-being that founds all establishing of subjects or substrates for predication.) Of course I can make ideal, essential, and non-fictional predications where there is no necessary positing of being. And I can imagine a fictional universe parallel to the actual real one where the positing of existence adds nothing new in terms of information regarding properties. In this sense being is not a property of something in the way, e.g., a natural property (“green”) or moral property (“just”) is. And all subjects and their predicates or properties presuppose and determine being. Being escapes our qualifications by always being “more” than and presupposed by any determination of real being.

Similarly, “myself,” as what “I” presupposes and what “I” refers to, is not commensurate with or adequately defined by any qualities or properties. In both the cases of “being” and “myself” we have something that essentially eludes us not by being unintelligible but rather by being superintelligible and excessive in meaning. (In the next Chapter VI, §7, we will see how the “essence” of “I myself” requires its actual being.) This is part of the sense we will reserve for “mystery.”

**Notes**


6. See Ernst Tugendhat, Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), Lecture IV; I am here helped by Manfred Frank’s critique, Die Unhintergehbarkeit von Individualität (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), especially 70–92.


8. We are dependent on Chisholm’s attempts (in Person and Object) to formulate a position which he later gave up. But our position, as will become clear, is not identical with that of early Chisholm for whom “I” and first-personal intentions and agency involve a kind of reflective self-objectification, all of which assign the unique meaning or Sinn or individual essence to me myself as the referent or Bedeutung. Our position is that this Fregean distinction does not hold here because we are non-reflectively present to ourselves in a non-ascriptive way, i.e., there is no distinction of what appears and how it appears.


10. Roderick Chisholm, The First Person (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 16. Yet, see our discussion below in Chapter VII, §8, E. where Chisholm admits to a sense of oneself that is bereft of all one’s memories. At least in this sense there are no properties characterizing who one is and in this sense who one is unanalyzable.

11. I have been helped in these last paragraphs by the discussion of H.D. Lewis in The Elusive Self, 55–57. One persistent quibble I have with Lewis is that he thinks of our knowledge of Others as a matter of analogous inference from their bodies. He fails to see the unique intentionality of what Husserl calls “empathic perception.” The latter is also thought of as meaning-giving which is an analogous meaning-transfer; but it is not strictly an inference or “transfer” to what is absent. The person is present in the bodily expressions just as the meaning is involved in the marks on the page for the intelligent linguistically-competent reader, and just as I am involved with my experiences. But the former is a result of empathic perception’s appresentation of the Other’s non-reflective self-awareness; the case of reading is but an analogous appresentation that he calls apperception. Here too there is an implicit appresentation of the author’s or speaker’s self-awareness. However, the latter self-involvement in one’s own experiences is a matter of one’s own non-reflective self-awareness.


15. Robert Spaemann, Personen: Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen “etwas” und “jemand” (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998), 14, and passim, but especially Chapters I–III. Cf. St. Thomas where he speaks of the nomen personae (either the proper name of a person or the term “person”) as not being used to signify an individual as a part of nature, as “some man,” but rather as a “subsisting thing in a rational nature.” Summa Theologiae, I, q. 30, art. 4. Also “person signifies a particular substance pertaining to its dignity (dignitas: worth?), and such is only to be found in an intellectual nature.” If person is to be found only in an intellectual nature, this “to be found” must refer to our experience not faith or speculation, e.g., on God and angels. What is noteworthy, in both these texts, is that “person” is distinguished from the kind of being the person is.

16. In Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie I, Husserliana III (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950), §14, Husserl speaks of the “this-here” both as a material ultimate essential substrate and as a pure formless individual singularity or empty substrate. This latter seems to be the realm of mathematics, arithmetic, logic, axioms, etc. Here the “this-here” as “principle of individuation” and substrate is what makes this 4 differ from that 4. The other has to do with a “this-here” as a principle of individuation which is the substrate whose essence is a concretum; for this the term “individual” seems to be reserved. We spell these matters out in an abbreviated fashion in the text.
Notes 341

18. *Husserliana* XXXV, 261–262; see also, 215–216.
25. I have been helped here by Robert Spaemann, *Personen*, 14–15. See Sokolowski, *Christian Faith and Human Understanding*, e.g., 166. I recall when I was a child, upon first meeting people with the same name, I attempted to see what properties these new acquaintances had that were in common with the old familiar “Peter” or “Ruth.” I would develop theories or conceptual schemes which, of course, eventually were shattered.
26. See Thinking and the Structure of the World/Das Denken und die Struktur der Welt. Eds. Klaus Jakobi and Helmut Pape (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990), 68, n. 10. I touch on some of these differences that Kantianism makes in §5 below and in my Editor’s Introduction to Castañeda’s *The Phenomeno-logic of the I*.
33. I have lost the exact source of this citation. *Husserliana* XIV, 20–26, *Husserliana* XXXV, 261–262 and *Husserliana* IV, 300–302 approximate the sense. I believe the body of the text legitimates the claim that the “problematic” sketched here is genuinely Husserlian.
36. *Husserliana* XV, 351; this is an important point to which we will return.
37. See Johannes Volkelt, *Das Problem der Individualität* 33ff., and 98ff. Volkelt saw many of the issues in his thesis that the principle of individuation of the I was to be found in its essence.
38. *Husserliana* VI, 222.
40. Cf., e.g., *Husserliana* VII, 408–409.
41. *Husserliana* XV, 351.
43. *Husserliana* XXXV, 262.
45. Husserliana XIII, 175.
orchestration of this theme. At the conclusion we will soon return to how this relates to “spirit.” This mode of thinking was not foreign to Husserl. His own term i.e., *leibhaftig*, *Leibhaftigkeit*, for the filling of an intention or the making present of what before was emptily intended and experiencing this as precisely the presencing of what before was only merely intended, was perhaps an inspiration for Conrad-Martius’ analyses. In any case, Husserl very likely used in Conrad-Martius’ presence the phrase congenial to her “*Realontologie,*” “self-presenting outwards as self-present” to describe a phenomenon of a real being. He later, to characterize “absolute consciousness” used phrases like what exists in itself and does not need anything else to exist. And: “The being of the I is continuously being-for-itself, is continuously being and being-for-itself through self-manifesation, through absolute manifestation wherein what is manifested necessarily is.” (See *Husserliana* XIII, §32; and VIII, 412.)

48. I have been helped here by Michael Loux, Chapter III.
49. Ingarden, *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, II/1, 419–420, 426. Ingarden’s discussion takes place completely in the third-person and for him the person necessarily has acquired and externally conditioned properties, and there is no sense of “myself” apart from these.
51. See Loux, 127.
52. See Loux, 131, where persons are listed along with Aristotelian kinds.
54. This paragraph quotes and is indebted to Sir William Hamilton in Sir William Hamilton’s *Lectures*. Vol. I, *Metaphysics*. Eds. Henry L. Mansel and John Veitch (New York: Sheldon and Company, 1883), 107–116. Bernard Bolzano also argues for the “I” as a substance of the “states” or “properties” (*Beschaffenheiten*) which adhere to it. It is not to be regarded as an aggregate (*Inbegriff*) or bundle of substances. Further it is “not only simple and indivisible but also continuously one and the same.” See his *Athanasia oder Gründe für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* (Sulzbach: J. E.v. Seidelchen Buchhandlung, 1838), 51; see especially 21–68.
56. In these last paragraphs I merely rehearse standard Husserlian analyses. But I have also been helped by H.D. Lewis, *The Elusive Self*, 41ff., 91–92, and 99. On 161 Lewis acknowledges the affinity of his position to that of Husserl.
59. Klawonn, *op.cit.*, 52–53. When Klawonn says that “myself for myself” is not something that characterizes a person (53), we take him to mean that the unique reference of “myself” is not captured by my reflective experience of myself as a person in the world with others. Nor is it captured by my “external reflexive reference” (Castañeda) whereby I refer to myself but as anyone else would. Nor is the “myself” brought to light by experience of persons in second-or third-person reference. He thus also means that “myself” is not a sortal term. Yet experiencing you typically requires, besides and along with an appresentation of your being yourself for yourself, my experiencing formal “existence-conditions” that have to do with your personhood, your being human, etc. I say “typically” because there are the thought-experiments and reported paranormal, “telepathic,” experiences which confront us with anomalies.
63. Cited in Ingarden, *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt* II/1, 386: “Essentia rei est id, quod est primum et radicale ac intimum principium omnium actionum et proprietatum, quae rei conveniunt.” Ingarden gives no citation for Suarez.


66. See *Husserliana Materialien* VIII, 196–199.

67. See Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1956), A349. This work, known in English as *The Critique of Pure Reason*, will be cited in the body of the text hereafter as *KrV*. See our later discussion of this topic in Chapter VI, §4 where we, following Husserl, take this *percipi* to equate with *esse*.

68. This abbreviates Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, followed by the standard pagination of the A and B editions.


70. Husserl, *Husserliana* VI, 188.


73. See my *The Person and the Common Life*, 198–208 for some of these themes.


76. I am dependent here on Manfred Frank’s discussion in *Die Unhintergebarkeit von Individualität*, 104–106.

77. There is further agreement between Husserl and Leibniz in that the I-substances neither begin nor cease to be, and, of course, that they are unique perspectives on the world (see below, Chapters VI and VII).

78. I am helped here by Ernst Tugendhat, *Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung*, 234, 284.


81. Höningwald, 111.

82. At 318 Höningwald summarizes his view on the non-numerical identity of the ‘I’ when he states: ‘As paradoxical as it may sound, the ‘I’ is one precisely because it never can add to itself a possible other ‘one’ as ‘another one again.’” Höningwald’s discussion of the different senses to be found in the analogized plural “I’s” and “I” as a reference uniquely to myself (111–113) is to be integrated into his discussion at 317ff. that I can say “I” to myself, give my self this “determination,” only under the presupposition of my being able to communicate with Others. The determinateness of determinations is a constitution of “validity” and the determinateness of validity stands in correlation with the assumption of a plurality of I’s (321). Here there are reverberations of Husserl’s theme that the publicity of what gets constituted as true, foremost in propositions, presupposes intersubjectivity. Here also there is touched upon the enormously complex and difficult Wittgensteinian theme, now resuscitated with the publications of Husserl’s later commentary on the VI. Logical Investigation (edited by Ullrich Melle, *Husserliana* XX/I and XX/II) as well as Levinas’s and Sokolowski’s analyses, of the primordial nature of language and intersubjectivity in the articulation of the world.
83. Andrew Brook, in the article already cited, as well as in his fine book, *Kant and the Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), is the inspiration for this foil. What follows is an approximation and simplification of Brook’s Kant.


86. Kant, ibid., 46.

87. Idem.


89. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I., q. 30, a. 4. Cf. our discussion of dignitas in the next chapter, §5. We take dignitas to be the manifestation of the Who, and our emphasis is on the individual substance in this regard. But doubtless it is true that the ipseity has as its existence condition an “intellectual nature” in the cases we are most familiar with.

Chapter VI
The Paradoxes of the Transcendental Person

The subjective part of the world swallows up, so to speak, the whole world and thus itself too. What an absurdity! Or is this a paradox which can be sensibly resolved, even a necessary one, arising necessarily out of the constant tension between the power of what is taken for granted in the natural objective attitude (the power of "common sense") and the opposed attitude of the "disinterested spectator?"

(Husserl, Husserliana VI, 183)

§1 General Remarks About Paradox in Phenomenology

In this chapter we continue our meditation on how, in spite of the sameness of the referent, e.g., of JG Hart, there is, nevertheless, a difference between the transcendental I of JG Hart and the person, JG Hart. The concretion of the transcendental “realm” in the ineluctable life lived in the natural attitude raises difficult questions regarding the necessity to conjoin in the one same human being the distinctive aspects uncovered by the transcendental and natural attitudes. The problems come together with Husserl’s notion of “transcendental person.” This is one of Husserl’s ways of thinking about, if not resolving, the paradoxes of transcendental phenomenology. Husserlian phenomenology generally has little patience with paradox. Although Husserl, at least in the theme of “the transcendental person,” was forced to acknowledge paradox, it is not clear that we ever reach a completely satisfactory resolution.¹

For a philosopher, facing a paradox typically means being confronted, either in a new filled intention or in an empty intention such as an implication of which one has just become aware, with believing an invalid proposition whose validity up to and through this moment is immediately or without reflection believed; or it is being faced with believing, through either a new filled intention or in an empty intention as in an implication of which one has just become aware, a valid proposition whose invalidity up to and through this moment is immediately or without reflection believed. In which case one finds oneself obliged to hold (invalidly) P,
but believes immediately non-P; or one finds oneself obliged to hold (validly) P but believes immediately non-P. This is to say that for philosophy typically a paradox is merely apparent because one is faced with a reasonable or evidential belief that conflicts with another spontaneous belief in need of correction. Correcting the false belief, whichever it is, eliminates the paradox.

But here in the case of the beliefs stemming from the transcendental and natural attitudes we have not false beliefs but beliefs that are true within their respective standpoints. That is, the respective standpoints both compel our respect and neither standpoint may claim a privilege that subsumes or supersedes the other. Neither is intelligible without the other, and each is dependent on the other for its distinctive intelligibility. However, these beliefs contradict or are difficult to reconcile when someone, from one standpoint, regards the claims made from the other standpoint, or when the beliefs are placed along side of one another and judged merely in terms of their compatibility. In this respect the difference between the transcendental and natural standpoints resembles the familiar one of the stick looking bent in the water and looking straight outside the water. This, we would say, is not a paradox because we can assume a theoretical standpoint (which is not itself a perception) that assents and does justice to both (perceptual) perspectives.

Thus it appears that a solution would be to find a “perspective” or standpoint which encompasses both the “perspectives” of the natural and transcendental attitudes. Such a “perspective” as the desideratum in phenomenological reflection on the transcendental person has kinship with the dual-aspect theory in contemporary philosophy. Dual aspect theory holds that there is one visible entity manifest in the third-person which is designated as “the person” to which the first-person properties of mind and third-person properties of physicality, incompatible as these two sets of properties may be, may be assigned. We will turn to the dual-aspect theory in the next section. Here we merely note that many contemporary philosophers have raised doubts about whether this theory is anything more than a hope. In this very limited respect this skepticism resembles that directed toward the “transcendental person” as a solution to the paradoxes that surface from the two different attitudes. It is not clear that a unifying phenomenological perspective is possible, especially if the work of the transcendental reflection is primarily and originally in the first-person, and that of the natural attitude is in the third-person. But, of course, the natural attitude is not confined to the third-person and we have insisted that transcendental reflection permits the pre-reflective in the first-person to emerge for a kind of objectifying, third-person analysis. In addition, a question we must address is how sufficient the first-person perspective is for dealing with some of the most fundamental issues of transcendental reflection.

One solution for some of the paradoxes is that the natural attitude is not without some “intimation” of the transcendental attitude. But the intimations are not so forceful as to be strong conceptual implications. That is, it is not the case that within the natural attitude there is a necessary logical implication of the transcendental attitude and that being is inseparable from display, even though, when seen full-blown in the transcendental attitude, these claims enjoy a (tautological) kind of necessity. Thus, once a thinker is moved to hold that being is inseparable from
display, the theme of the interplay of appearing and being is revealed to be already implicitly in play within the natural attitude. For example, errors, mistakes, deceptions, etc., generate in the natural attitude the themes of “seeing-as…” interpretation, and the distinction between appearance and being. Similarly we earlier noted how “the transcendental pre-fix” (Castañeda) or the “declarative sense of the I” (Sokolowski) is tacitly in play in all propositions about the world, such as “The tree is diseased.” That is, the epistemic pre-fix, such as “I see that…” or “I believe that…” is always anonymously functioning in these articulations in the natural attitude, and this pre-fix oddly adds nothing to what is displayed and yet it can be shown to reveal itself as necessarily part of the whole show (as something shown). Further, the natural attitude, we will show, has within it ambiguities that are amenable to possible transcendental interpretations. For example, there are ineliminable ambiguities that surround the natural attitude’s understanding of consciousness, meaning, person, death and birth, that a transcendental position helps to clarify. Nevertheless, the necessities in the natural attitude, such as sickness, are sometimes such as to nullify the transcendental by way of incapacitating it. Further, often enough these necessities offer a recalcitrance that is not completely illuminated and a persistence that is not easily overcome by the disclosures of the transcendental attitude. Furthermore, in Book 2 we will consider senses in which overriding obligations in the natural attitude render the transcendental attitude irrelevant. Further, facts, events, and states of affairs that we interpret as having to do with, e.g., holiness, beauty, evil and tragedy are not easily elucidated or accommodated by the transcendental attitude. (Book 2 will address some of these issues, but the themes of theology and religion will not be our explicit focus until the two final chapters of Book 2 of this work.) Further, we have seen already that although the trans-ascriptive dimension of love finds support in transcendental considerations it surely does not have its necessary condition there. Finally, as we shall see, birth and death remain recalcitrant even after a transcendental perspective is introduced. (See the next two chapters, and the first three chapters in Book 2.)

For Husserl, there seems to be a further prospect of reconciliation. Not only are there intimations of the transcendental attitude in the natural attitude, but he believed there was possible a kind of more or less permanent transcendental phenomenological habitus that the philosopher could acquire. Indeed, he believed it was something that provided hope for contemporary struggling humanity. This is a topic to which we will return in §4 below as well as in Book 2.³

Both the natural and transcendental attitudes may suffer from a temptation to obliterate the legitimacy of the other attitude and set up a kind of blindness for the claims of the other. On the one hand, there is a temptation to a kind of transcendental monistic idealism that absorbs the transcendent natural world into the creative voluntary achievements of the agency of manifestation or which favors the transcendental propertyless I at the expense of the embodied person. This is a distortion grounded in the error which holds the transcendental attitude to be a more real or appropriate attitude. (It is also fueled by failing to recognize the limits of first-person perspective for a full-blown transcendental philosophy.) On the other hand, naturalism, which makes hegemonic and absolute certain senses of
nature and which reduces all elucidation or explanation to subsumption under a physical cause is a distortion when it purports to be the exclusive stance of the natural attitude. Both temptations can come wrapped with their own forms of stubbornness and militancy.

Finally, naturalism’s credibility has given birth to what David Chalmers has called “the paradox of phenomenal judgment.” This paradox is adumbrated in Husserl’s discussions of “psychologism” in the Prolegomena to *The Logical Investigations*. If our judgments about consciousness are basically handled by “psychology,” and “psychology” elucidates by way of a physical or functional causal explanation, “then it follows that our claims and judgments about consciousness can be explained in terms quite independent of consciousness. More strongly, it seems that consciousness is *explanatorily irrelevant* to our claims and judgments about consciousness.” Of course, for a thorough-going epiphenomenalism or eliminativism, this is a paradox because one mistakenly believes that there is anything real over and above the neuro-physiological realm. And this is only a paradox because of the false belief about “psychology,” i.e., the belief that it has to do with something or spook called the *psyche*. The truth of the matter (for such reductionisms) is that “psychology” does not have to do with the *psyche* but with non-conscious neural processes. In the following discussions of “regional ontology” (in §§1–2) we will briefly discuss some aspects of this paradoxical position.

### §2  The First-Person and Phenomenological Regional Ontology

Regional ontology, an enterprise carried out typically in the third-person, of necessity raises the question regarding the connectedness of the “mental” and the “physical.” But because “the mental” has its home in first-person experience, the respective authority of first- and third-person perspectives becomes an issue. Very few thinkers are comfortable with a miraculous occasionalism which denies an essential connection. We will claim that first-person experience lives a kind of necessary connection, as in the experience of the necessity of saying or writing what we mean in order to find out what we mean. Yet transcendental phenomenology stands in tension with a regional ontology because transcendental phenomenology privileges the first-person perspective whereas in regional ontology the third-person perspective tends to guide in an authoritative way the first-person reflection on oneself and one’s lived bodiliness and expressivity. Yet in our understanding of the unity of the person the first- and second-person perspectives serve typically, there are noteworthy exceptions, as counterpoises to the regional ontological split of mind and body.

We can best begin this matter by briefly discussing Peter Strawson’s well-known “dual-aspect” theory of the person. In this theory, “person” is a substrate which Strawson calls a *primitive datum*. For Strawson this means that what we mean by “person” is a “type of entity” such that both the predicates having to do
with consciousness as well as those having to do with bodily characteristics are equally applicable to it. We take it to be “primitive” in the sense that it canonizes the third-person perspective and, like the Aristotelian substance or the Husserlian “thing” (as an identity synthesis), the person as the “thing” with this double-aspect is what we willy-nilly perceive and our theorizing builds on this. But for Strawson it is “logically primitive” because it takes “logical” precedence over assigning the mental predicates to one subject and the physical ones to another subject; it also takes precedence over the notion of a pure subject or pure consciousness, which, by force of the natural attitude, has no credibility whatsoever.

Even though it is likely that for Strawson “person” is not in itself a “bare substrate,” nevertheless it seems to be a “I know not what” in as much as we learn nothing about this substance itself and neither the mentalist or physicalist properties are explicitly given an ontological priority. For Strawson, “if we are honest,” by which he means, so it seems to this reader, if we cling to the dogma of the natural attitude, even though there “could never be any question of assigning an experience, as such, to any subject other than oneself,” there could never be any “question of assigning it to oneself either…[T]he pure ego – is a concept that cannot exist; or, at least, cannot exist as a primary concept in terms of which the concept of a person can be explained or analyzed.”

For Strawson, why we ascribe states of consciousness to another is very much a matter of the same nature as why we ascribe to the same thing certain bodily characteristics. The chief caution is that we must avoid giving any special explanatory status to one’s speaking of his experiences or his body as “mine,” if this means we are to privilege first-person experiences. “There is no sense in the idea of ascribing states of consciousness to oneself, or at all, unless the ascriber already knows how to ascribe at least some states of consciousness to others.” The very notion of “mineness” is not possible unless one has learned to ascribe states of consciousness to another first. As H.D. Lewis put it, for Strawson, “there is no sense in which an experience is mine unless this expressly involves the contrast with those of others.”

My self-experiencing of myself and my “mineness” is a result of identifying myself first of all from out of the world and in contrast to others. This is why Strawson opposes a view such as the one pervading this work and can dismiss any view of privileged first-person experience by saying: “All private experiences, all states of consciousness will be mine, i.e., no one’s.” In regard to a “person” we necessarily ascribe incompatible propositions to the substrate which he calls the “person”: “He is bald.” “He is in pain.” “He weighs two-hundred pounds.” “He is grief-stricken.” Strawson says we do it also in the first-person: “I am bald.” “I am in pain.” Etc.

Strawson’s position here stands in opposition to some of the basic theses of this book. The chief one is that there is significant philosophical advantage in distinguishing the subject (or what we are calling the “I myself” or “myself”) from the person. Further “mineness” gets into the discussion on the basis of the ineluctable self-awareness; it is not a result of intersubjective constitution. Strawson’s view seems to be that any sense of “mineness” cannot be allowed independently of a special relationship to our bodies as a public entity in the world. This is a view which we have argued against earlier and will return to again.
Further, is it not true that in the first-person it becomes clear that the reference of “he” is analogous to what I refer to as “I”? And is it not clear that there is an important respect in which what I refer to as “I” is not fat, bald, 200lb, etc.? Similarly the referent of the “declarative” sense of “I” (or the “transcendental prefix”; cf. Chapter II, §4), where the agent of manifestation functions anonymously in the display of the world, is not to be taken without important distinctions as the same substrate as, e.g., for my being fat. Thus, once again, the claim for “person” being a primitive datum in the sense that it is the substrate of incompatible properties appears to have its foundation in the dogma of the natural attitude.

For Strawson there is no “logical wedge” between our knowledge of ourselves in the first-person and our knowledge of Others, i.e., we know their and our experiences essentially through the expressed behavior. We can agree with Strawson in a qualified way when he holds that “X’s depression is something, one and the same thing, which is felt, but not observed, by X, and observed, but not felt by others than X.”13 The qualification is that what I intend in observing X is X’s feelings, but which he alone has. And I intend them precisely as what he alone has and what of necessity eludes my observation. That is, although what I observe and what he experiences in his first-person experiences can, on occasion, be the same as what I observe in regard to him, what I observe can never be identical with his experiences. The senses, i.e., the first-person and third-person perspectives, in contrast to the referents, are different in each case. Further, it is not a condition of his being depressed that I be able to know through his expression that he is depressed.

This problem of a “logical wedge” is an important theme in phenomenology that we must briefly dwell on. There have been persuasive analyses (e.g., by Max Scheler and M. Merleau-Ponty) showing that one knows the mental states of one another with a kind of immediacy, e.g., we experience the anger in the Other’s countenance and in the demeanor of the body. The question is, with what sort of immediacy? If immediacy implies no distinction between second- and third-person perception, on the one hand, and first-person on the other, then the position seems wrong. In our view, it is better to say that we know the mental states of the other directly but not immediately.

Further, the claim is unsatisfactory that we infer the anger or depression as something “within” the Other. It seems quite wrong to hold that we deduce the anger or depression from the facial and bodily attitude. This is the flawed argument H.D. Lewis uses in his critique of Strawson. Yet to say that “the gesture does not make me think of anger, it is anger itself” is misleading in so far as it implies an identity of both sense and referent. The anger which the observer intends or refers to is the same referent of what another experiences in the first-person. The senses are different in each case, but for different reasons there is always an interpretation of data. In the one case we have perceptual data, in the other case we have one’s own stream of consciousness. Similarly the interpretations can each be mistaken but for different reasons.

Further, to claim that the observed anger is identical with the lived anger makes impossible cases of acting and dissembling. This position implies that the gesture is the sufficient condition of “anger” and it would be impossible to imagine
acting out or gesticulating anger without there being anger. This view furthermore perhaps works with the presumption of a universality of cultural expressions. In addition, it suggests that if someone else is angry then of necessity it is evident to an observer.

Another example that works against or at least weakens the “logical wedge” is that when we observe someone making and keeping a promise by reason of the formulaic speech-act and, further, the person’s doing what she said she would – and we find no need to infer something interior over and above and different from what we observe, i.e., what we name “promising” and “keeping a promise.” The promising and keeping the promise are fully evident in the speech-act and the behavior that is in accord with the speech-act. Yet, clearly significant moral data, like the agreement between the intention of the agent and the expression of the promise, the prick of conscience that surfaces with reluctance and the resistance to fulfill the promise, or the enthusiasm with which the fulfillment is carried out, etc. can well be missing in the observational perspective.

Such third-person evidence for first-person experience has, of course, its clearest evidence in the first-person evidence of the same. In such cases the agent finds a natural completion or fulfillment of his act when he can provide for others or take up for himself a third-person perspective on it. Although one does not have to express one’s feelings, there are many cases in which feeling is logically or essentially connected with the ways one would express them if one did express them. Being thankful, penitent, forgiving, wonder-struck, thrilled, etc., are all examples of the basic claim: “The expression of feeling-F is often part of the meaning of ‘feeling-F’, but a report of feeling-F is not. For example, laughing is part of the meaning of ‘amused’, but saying ‘I am amused’ is not.”14

Note that the claim here is that the expression (rather than the report) is often part of the meaning of the feeling. It is not at all clear that this is true of every feeling. Because of the evident intrinsic connection between (some) feelings and expressions, philosophers like Gilbert Ryle, and on occasion, Strawson, have been inclined to argue not merely that the third-person behavior is sufficient to the meaning of the action or the feeling, but that all first-person experiences likewise have their appropriate objectivity. This is even extended to the claim that all first-person senses of experience and identity (even that of the “myself”) by and large are to be correlated to objective third-person identifications. There is but a small additional step needed before there is undermined any unique authority and legitimacy for the first-person perspective in the ontological matters having to do with the person. Clearly we have been working against a slide down this slope.

The view that all first-person experiences have of necessity their appropriate objectivity and must be correlated to third-person identifications is a step towards what has been known as “behaviorism” wherein any sense of “inwardness” is eliminated. Consciousness is thereby eliminated as something accessible properly in the first-person and subsumed not only under forms of detectable recessive invisible phenomena known only to the neurophysiologist, but also under surface bodily behavior and movement. Often philosophers who have moved in this direction have held back because they were aware that the position they espoused,
i.e., that there is typically awareness of Others directly (and in this sense “immediately”) and not through inference, was not the equivalent of saying that they were aware merely of the external behavior. In prior discussions, especially Chapter IV, we have proposed that Others present in the second- and third-person are present as more than and other than their expressivity. Even if we grant that Others are directly present in their gestures, and that even the absence or restraint of gestures means always for us a kind of gesture requiring interpretation, the second- and third-person sense of expression, gesture – as a bodily striving to express/say – reflects what it always means in the first-person, i.e., a process of “meaning to say” by way of giving external intersubjective expression to an intention, a verbal sense of “meaning.” Of course there are public gestures, but they are inseparably tied to the user’s “meaning” to say or signify. Even if it is universally true that the expression is part of the meaning of a feeling, then if the expression is accompanied by another meaning or meaning-to-signify than the one which is appropriate, then we have the problem of miscommunication, whether or not deliberate, or we have the one signifying “acting out” or playing a role.

The etymology as well as the common usage of the term *expression* or *Ausdruck* suggests the interplay of the interior and the exterior. Indeed awareness of an “expression,” in contrast to the signs of nature (thunder) or the indications of a machine (squeaks) seems to be an interplay between the non-observed, hidden, experiencing and the exterior display – even if the latter seems necessary for the former’s actualization. The metaphors of “interiority” or “absolute immanence” and the Other’s absolute “exteriority” or “transcendence” (“appresented” as a transcendent “absolute immanence”) are best understood in the transcendental attitude. Intentionality, when entertained in the natural attitude, requires of us some such metaphors as eccentricity (i.e., ex-centricity), ecstasy, and projection to account for how what is over there can be brought to light by what is here. Husserl, we may recall, was fond of the metaphor of the “intentional ray.” In the transcendental attitude being “in” the world is what we mean in part by intentional consciousness. This is tied to the claim that the person is both the agent of manifestation and *Dasein*. Further in this attitude the agency of display and moral agency are lived in the first-person, and the display of the Other is given a distinctive name, like, “appresentation.” If we take the agent of display, expression, and moral agency in the natural attitude, the metaphor of immanence and interiority seem to compel us to look inside the body for the one displaying, expressing, and acting. Because all insides themselves are containers for other insides, and here, with an alleged absolute immanence, we are compelled to posit, to use another metaphor, a spiritual black hole that constantly eludes being plumbed or contained. As this holds for oneself we may then ask, where do we find the absolute exteriority (or appresented interiority) of the Other? There must be similarly another black hole posited in her world, which might be thought of as another absolutely remote galaxy. From the transcendental perspective, the I enjoys an absolute immanence precisely because there is nothing in the world that can get to it or behind it; and similarly the Other remains for me absolutely elusive because I can never “inhabit” or make present what the Other refers to with “I.” The “interior space” of ownness, just like the
“transcendence” of intentionality and display simply are not commensurate with the space of physical things. (We will return to the paradoxes of spatiality soon.) Yet the thesis of commensurability seems to motivate the identification of “deep psychology” with neuralphysiology and brain science.

The privileging of the natural attitude and the third-person naturalistic perspective must of necessity challenge the phenomenological legitimacy of the spatial metaphors of immanence, interiority, intentionality’s transcendence, etc. Furthermore, such a privileging, when a philosophical dogma, has moved philosophers to undermine the unique authority and legitimacy of the first-person perspective – which would be the extreme consequence of the claim that all first-person experiences have their appropriate objectivity in third-person perspectives. Let us here consider some arguments along these lines provided by Sydney Shoemaker.

According to him, what is at stake for the regional ontology are the relations between the mental and the physical and the causal relations between them. “The first-person point of view does not provide a perspective from which, starting with no assumptions about the relations between mental and physical state of affairs” we can investigate such matters empirically. This means that for Shoemaker, the phenomenological essence-analysis of spirit and body does not provide us anything which empowers us to extrapolate inductively from one’s own case to the case of others. He holds this is true for three related reasons. (a) He regards any knowledge one has about a body to be a result of the assumption of veridicality of sense experience and such an assumption is about the relation between mental and physical states of affairs. “The truth of this assumption is certainly not something one can straightforwardly discover empirically from the first-person perspective.” (b) Second, the rationality in play in reflecting on the causal relations operative among mental states requires, in phenomenological language, publicity and intersubjectivity as a condition for the proper sense of one’s knowing anything at all, and this rationality can by its nature not be evident merely by empirical introspection of whether the rational relations hold in one’s own case. (c) The final objection is to the assumption of protagonists for the first-person point of view that one is the sole inhabitant of one’s body. For Shoemaker one cannot resolve that question without other non-first-personal assumptions about how the mental and physical realms are related.

Let us first attend to

(a) There is an ambiguity in saying that knowledge of my body depends on sense experience. It is precisely the essence of the lived body to be lived, as well as to have both a subjective and objective aspect. I fail to see where such manifestations of the body have anything to do with “sense experience” as Shoemaker seems to be using it, or with assumptions about the mental and the physical. Lived bodily experience, the extensive sense of one’s ownness and I-can is prior to the abstraction, “sense experience.”

Further, there is an ambiguity in holding the fact that my sense-experiences are veridical is not a fact I know “from the inside” through first-person living out of these experiences. I do not know, e.g., that I am veridically
seeing *a diseased sycamore tree* in the way that I “know” or am non-reflectively aware of my seeing the object I take to be a diseased sycamore. I have “first-person authority” for my awareness of seeing the tree, that the tree is not the seeing, that the seen tree is not the remembered tree, etc. However, that what I take to be a diseased sycamore tree is truly such is not something I know in the first-personal lived experiencing of my seeing the tree. But, of course, it is precisely the first-person experience of, e.g., hearing and understanding the horticulturalist’s expert testimony or my own filled intention which counts for the verification and establishing its veridicality.

But for a phenomenology of the body and for the interrelations of I-ness or spirit and body, no such assumptions about the veridicality of sense perception are necessary. Shoemaker defines the mental and physical or bodily completely in terms of third-person “empirical” investigations, and phenomenological first-personal accounts are thereby made impossible because they do not fit this definition. Yet one wonders if the rich third-person accounts would not benefit from knowing what precisely the rich phenomenological first-person sense of mind and body is to which the physicalist data are alleged to be either correlates or explanations. But having said this, it surely is true that finding out whether acts of the mind are identical with, correlated to, or necessarily expressed in brain states is not something that first-person experience alone can decide.16

(b) This gets at the heart of the transcendental-phenomenological notion of rationality. Phenomenological reflection is not introspection as an empirical and anecdotal undertaking by turning within to the private sphere of individual consciousness. Its interest in “essences” has to do with the very nature of appearing and givenness and the kinds of necessity and contingency that pervade them. This interest also has to do with the emergence of the givenness in terms of its publicity and intersubjectivity. When Shoemaker elegantly shows us in numerous places that a necessary and essential feature of what we mean by mind is that each mind has special non-criterial and non-identifying “first-person” access to itself and its states, we have precisely an exemplary display of what phenomenology is up to. Here no empirical third-person data is decisive in making the case for this most important matter. Further, the sense of philosophical reflection (not “introspection”) and rationality, and the senses in which such a claim enjoys publicity and intersubjectivity, are, it seems to me, the same for phenomenology and Shoemaker. An independent study of Shoemaker’s implicit critique of phenomenology would be fruitful precisely because he sees far better than most some of the most important features of the first-person perspective.

(c) In the final chapter (of this Book 1) we will deal with some of the issues of identity, and Shoemaker’s theory of “quasi-memory” which is also a further restriction, if not assault, on the first-person perspective. The dispute is about whether this relative impotence and incompetence of the transcendental phenomenological first-person perspective is such as to force it to concede to the third-person perspective equal, to say nothing of hegemonic, status in the articulation of the
relation of the spirit to bodiliness and physicality. Obviously the disposition of this work is against this equality and hegemony, yet no illusions are nurtured that we have done justice to the issues.

A final consideration made with the help of distinctions borrowed from Shoemaker helps us place our position in the context of a regional ontology. This hearkens back to our earlier (Chapters III and V) ontological-meontological discussions of “myself” and ipseity as well as forwards to the later sections in this chapter as well as the final Chapters VI and VII of this Book. “Dualism” in its most traditional form is a theory that the human being is composed of two more or less distinct principles or parts. Whether these parts can exist independently apart from one another depends on the type of dualist theory. The most elemental impulse toward dualism is in our distance from ourselves in our having of ourselves as well as in our capacity to reflect on ourselves. Most of us at some time in our lives have found motivations that support some kind of dualism, as, e.g., the moral dualism of the necessity for the “self” to struggle with its passions, instincts, inclinations, etc. Or when sickness and illness beset us the body’s life seems at odds with our ownmost life and projects. Although what we refer to as the body seems to have at all stages of life a kind of “mind of its own” it is perhaps in old age that the temptation to dualism comes most readily.

Let us think of “dualism” in our immediate context as a theory holding for the possibility of a disembodied existence of ipseity or “myself.” Let us further posit at the same time that the “myself” is an “immaterial substance.” This latter is a “continuant,” i.e., something that persists through time and which, in conjunction with the person of which it is the bare substrate, takes on indirectly the properties of the person. The person has both properties of the body and the mind. The person is tall and also has courage. Although the person has mental properties that are not commensurate with physical properties, nevertheless the person is a unity of these and thus the person by reason of this unity can, as the embodiment of the non-material substrate, act in the world of bodies. The relationship between the “immaterial substance” and the body in this case places the members of the regional ontology not in an analogous relation as between copper and iron (entities of the same genus) but rather more like that between iron and non-material substance (entities having different genera). The immaterial kind of substance is not a species among natural physical species but, in terms of a physical or natural or even world-regional ontology, it is not in the same physical or logical space or region. This need not be surprising in so far as the “myself” is also the transcendental I.

The dualism I am proposing in this Book holds:

(1) That the mental states of the person depend on the immaterial substance, the “myself,” but it is not at all evident that the immaterial substance has these or any states in the absence of its being incarnated as a person. Why we are moved to name the “myself” immaterial will become evident in part in the course of this chapter. In short, it has to do with the transcendental status of the “myself.”
All bodily causal connections which have correlative mental states and behavioral expressions are mediated both by the personal identity and most basically by the pervasive presence of the immaterial substance or the “myself” or “I myself.” I, although ultimately the immaterial substrate of my embodied person, move things in the world by reason of my being inseparably “soul” or “rational form” which besouls or animates my body. This animation engenders a form over a sphere of physical nature. This informed sphere of physical nature establishes a continuity between “myself” as immaterial substance and material substances.

The person as the subject of the mental states is able to exist without a body as long as the immaterial substance (the “myself”) exists; but in the absence of some sense of the body this is a deficient existence. In so far as the states of the “myself” or immaterial substance are embodied and embedded in the person, and the person’s states are embodied and expressed in the body, and in so far as the immaterial substance itself is without properties unless it is the substance of the person, it is hard to conceive what such a disembodied person would be like, unless there were also some strange kind of disembodied embodiment and disembodied embeddedness. (See our Chapters VII–VIII for some of these matters.)

The principle of the individuation of the immaterial substance does not conform to the requirement of fulfilling identity conditions such as enable the identification of persons or the material substances. This topic was discussed at length in Chapters III–V. It is surprising that it poses a problem for Shoemaker19 because it is he who has most eloquently shown that self-awareness is not a matter of a criterial and identifying mode of knowing.

In the view we here propose, somewhat proximate to Shoemaker’s “minimal dualism,” there is not asserted an identity between the person and the immaterial substance, although a strong sameness-relation or identity-synthesis is affirmed. Shoemaker thinks of the minimal dualist position as positing a substrate upon which the person’s mental states and personhood depend. This postulated immaterial substance would serve the function analogous to the brain for the materialist position: It is foundational for the person understood as the unity of mental states. But, because minimal dualism is a dualist position that holds for an immaterial substrate, he speculates that this immaterial substance would be a gratuitously postulated “ghostly brain.” Yet, Shoemaker notes, typically for minimal dualism there is no evidence brought forth for the existence of such an analogous entity.

Cartesian dualism, in Shoemaker’s view, would hold that the persons are the immaterial substance. Cartesian dualism faces the well-known difficulties of accounting for the interaction with the body and the material world. It also classically has posited that the mental (immaterial) substance was simple or without parts. This poses difficulty because the embodied person is in some sense made up of parts, e.g., the “recessive” bodily parts that bear no clear relationship to consciousness and the bodily states that correlate with conscious events; consciousness is comprised of endless acts and impressions; a unified personal consciousness is
constituted out of stances and conscious acts; these form the more or less stable personal essence which is comprised of innumerable qualities or properties; these combine to make up a person’s personalities which have a variety of more or less stable traits. Whereas the Cartesian dualism identifies the immaterial substance with the person, the non-Cartesian or minimal dualism denies that the persons are identical with the immaterial substances (and that the immaterial substances are identical with the persons). Thus if (the Shoemakerian) minimal dualism holds that the description of the person and her mental states are dependent on or at least require a description of embodiment and the bodily states, but if this minimal dualism also denies that the person is the immaterial substance, what is the candidate for this immaterial substance? For Shoemaker, there is none forthcoming except the impossible “ghostly brain.” However, for the version of minimal dualism we are proposing, the person (with her mental states) is not a purely immaterial substance but is a richly propertied Gestalt which is immersed in bodiliness and nature but has for its proper substrate the immaterial substance or the “myself.” This position comes to light in reflection on first-person experiences; it seems gratuitous if the matter is examined only in the third-person. Kant at least flirted with this position. (See Chapter V, §§3 and 5.)

Shoemaker’s minimal dualism further holds that the person is not identical with the body, and the physical states belonging to the body belong to the person derivatively. We can subscribe to this by saying that the “myself” has genomic structure, weight, virtue, and color derivatively by virtue of being a person, and the person has genomic structure, weight and color derivatively in virtue of its being embodied. Thus it holds that the particular mental states belong to the person non-derivatively but to the immaterial substance derivatively. In our proposed version, this also holds true, except that the sense of “derivatively” needs amplification. The “myself” is the ultimate source of the agency of the person and the mental states, at least in the sense that “ownness” pervades them. (Ownness clearly does not pervade most recessive bodily, e.g., brain, states.) But in as much as the “myself” is a bare substrate without properties, it may also be said that the mental states belong “derivatively” to the “myself.”

A basic issue here is what is called “functionalism,” i.e., the view that what is referred to in a description of “a mental state” is identical with (what is referred to by a description of) one of the mechanical, chemical-neurological, or organic processes or events relevant to that description. If the person’s states, e.g., pains, pleasures, and thoughts, are thought of as functions of or causally derived from neurophysiological processes or bodily behavior, then the person cannot exist without the body. Yet it is false that “mental states” may be regarded simply as such functions. Pain, e.g., may not be identified with the physical conditions of pain nor with pain behavior. One can have pain without knowing anything of the physical accompaniments or the accompanying behavior or the causes that induce it. It is not an essential or conceptual truth that our experiences be accompanied by the neural processes or that the neural processes be accompanied by the experiences. Nevertheless just such an accompaniment is a truth about the world we live in and
therefore the pressure to bind them ontologically is understandable. In so far as there is this truth about the world we live in it seems rash to hold that mental states have no connection to the embodiment – which is not to say that they are the same, to say nothing of their being identical, or that the neurophysiological event is the cause of the experience. But given the undeniable if obscure connection we must think of the “myself” and a fortiori personal existence as requiring at least in a contingent way embodiment. Given the nature of the evidence of how we are in the world this contingency gives way to the necessity we assign to the empirical world’s necessities. That is, the world is laced with “empirical essences” or those which reflect our collective scientific wisdom about how nature is. These necessities are not a priori even though the sciences aim at strict necessities and often presume to have reached what is eidetically necessary and universal when in fact they have reached only the empirical necessity of the world of experience. It is not merely eidetically, logically or conceptually impossible that things be other than they are, but the kinds of necessities binding mental events to neurophysiological ones lack the underlying unifying framework that characterizes the empirical necessities of much of nature, i.e., the one which would, like molecular theory, provide a way of seeing causal relationships between, e.g., the qualitatively distinct phenomena of heat, fire, combustion, on the one hand, and the qualitatively distinct phenomena of behavior of bodies and gases, on the other. Clearly the desideratum of “brain science” is just such a framework that unites the incommensurate properties of the physical and mental – and almost yearly, if not monthly, we hear of some discovery that promises to lead to a breakthrough towards that goal. Yet it is not at all evident that the hope for a breakthrough in “brain science” analogous to that of molecular theory is intelligible.

A view, such as that of John Searle, that urges us to reject the alternatives of materialism or dualism, holds that although consciousness is a property of the brain it is not reducible to neural activity. But if, as Searle claims, the lived subjectivity of consciousness is ontologically distinct from the neural activity of the brain which enjoys an essential “ontological objectivity,” how can what is ontologically distinct be a property of that from which it is ontologically distinct?

In this chapter as well as Chapters VII–VIII we continue to make the case that the “myself” is entitled to be thought of as quite other than a physical worldly substance. This is a transcendental, but also regional-ontological, sense in which it may be called an “immaterial substance.” Whether the immaterial substance of the “myself” can have an existence apart from a stream of consciousness, mental states, and being an embodied person is a question which will continue to occupy us (most explicitly in Chapters VII–VIII). The position we are advocating holds that the “myself” as an “immaterial substance” has mental states derivatively by being a person in the world and the person has these states at least partially non-derivatively by being embodied in the world with Others. At least this much seems clear: What we call the “myself,” can exist without being this particular person. For whatever reason, e.g., amnesia, she may lose her personal identity and still be “herself” and aware of “herself.”
§3 Aporiae and Paradoxes Within Regional Ontology

In this section we continue a discussion of the aporetic view of the human person that emerges through the lens of what phenomenology has called “regional ontology.”

A The Contemporary Scene

Regional ontology, a discipline carried out in the natural attitude, has to do with the positive, doxastically posited, being in its essential and generic or regional divisions. Because in the natural attitude the regions are given as independent of display, regional ontology abstracts from the transcendental standpoint. Further, spirit for regional ontology is considered to be one region among others and not the primal consideration that it is for transcendental phenomenology. Thus here we do not have to do with the paradox of subjectivity (see the next section) or spirit as being both a region of the world and that for which all regions appear. In regional ontology the latter sense of spirit as transcendental subjectivity is prescinded from. We rather begin with the paradox we are confronted with in the reflection on the regions of body and spirit and soul in terms of their distinctive properties. For this reflection we consider, in the natural attitude, the “psycho-physical” unity of the person’s mind or soul and body, i.e., the law-like connections between the mental and physical states. We begin here because it would seem that even in the natural attitude, the paradoxes that come to light in the transcendental attitude receive an adumbration. Of great interest is the phenomenon of death. But in order to prepare for reflection on death it is to our advantage to consider how paradoxes having to do with the unity of soul and body from the standpoint of the natural attitude point to some of the paradoxes or at least perplexities that surround the “transcendental person.” For our immediate purposes here we will not distinguish between consciousness, soul, I, spirit, and mind. (For a beginning clarification, see Chapter III, §3.) Here these considerations, although having to do with what is appresented as having an unbridgeable transcendence because of the appresented immanence of the self-experiencing, nevertheless may be taken as parts of an essential objective worldly region that is juxtaposed to “physical body” as another worldly region. Both of these regions are understood to be given in the natural attitude. These two regions, as incompatible as they might seem, make up the one human person as present in the natural attitude. This we saw was the basis for Strawson’s “dual aspect” theory.

“As incompatible as they might seem” recalls the contemporary philosophical scene, which we can only point to without entering, given the scope of this work. Many participating thinkers in this scene seem for the most part convinced that mental states are states of the brain and that consciousness, if it is not an epiphenomenon, arises from physical-chemical-neural activity. The term “epiphenomenon” (epi-phainomenon; appearing-with) typically refers to a phenomenon that accompanies in an incidental way the physical process in which properly the scientific and philosophical subject matter is to be found. Thus for those for whom consciousness is an epiphenomenon what is of
scientific or philosophical interest is best thought of in terms of physical-chemical-neural processes. And yet many, if not most, of the major voices are at a loss to say how this phenomenon or epiphenomenon arises from the physical base. “The mind after all is a biological product.”25 There prevails the conviction that just as our ancestors, and even we moderns (when we confine ourselves to our perceptual world), see no connection between the rise in temperature and the pressure of gas at a constant volume, so we today do not see or grasp any connection between neural process and consciousness. But as today the modern has reason to move beyond the perceptual givens and turn to the interpretation of the phenomena through a theory of molecular motion which finds heat to be caused through the increased molecular activity, so too someday, according to this prevalent conviction, we will be able to get below the surface description of today’s neural science and uncover the foundational causal connection between neural events and consciousness. Indeed we will acquire the disposition to think of and describe the stream of consciousness in terms of brain science.

For many contemporaries, the choice seems less to be between materialism or dualism than to find a way to reject this alternative. A condition of materialism, especially in the form of “eliminativism,” is a dogmatic commitment to the natural attitude as well as to naturalism and “scientism.” Eliminativism holds that because the lived first-person experience, as well as its reflective objectification, resists, because of corrigible mental habits, being described by the categories of the world that physics uses, the mental must be assigned the status of “folk psychology,” like ghosts and magic rituals. “Functionalism,” one may recall, does not reduce the realm of consciousness to such a disreputable status; it merely holds that what one describes when describing consciousness is identical with correlate referents of a physical description.

Dualism holds that at least in some respect consciousness or mind is independent of the body or the referents of physical descriptions. There are a few dualists in the contemporary scene,26 but they have not had the following, it would seem even, of the bizarre theory of the eliminativists. This theory is hinted at in popular applications of natural scientific (third-person) claims to first-person experience. For example we hear: Consider that you remember your childhood. If so, presumably that must have been you then, i.e., the same one who is now remembering his childhood. Yet clearly that cannot be. All that you are, i.e., who you are now, is comprised of totally different physical-chemical-biological units. None of them is the same now. So you who remembers “your” childhood is a completely different person than the remembered child.

The conclusion drawn from this scenario need not be and often is not the eliminativist one, i.e., that one is not the physical components, but rather something else, and then there begins the search for a metaphor. Thus it is sometimes proposed that one is to think of oneself as something resembling a wave passing through the ever changing physical substrate. If, of course, the wave can be totally accounted for in terms of the physical substrate then we have an eliminativist theory; if it is of a different order, we approach a functionalism or, at the extremes, a dualism.

The basic objection to dualism is that it summons up a mysterious substance in order to house or be the bearer of neural-physiological events which most believe
are the origin of the mental ones. Further, the positing of an independent spiritual substance makes the physical agency of the person in the world as mysterious as the postulated spiritual substance that owns or supports the physical properties without having any of them.

A well-known alternative then to dualism is the already-discussed dual-aspect position which holds that one entity, “the person” (or “the brain”) has two sets of irreducible properties. Two considerations of transcendental phenomenology lend support to the dual-aspect position: (a) the third-person regional ontology which prescinds from the transcendental realm and provides substrates for the two sorts of predications; (b) the teleology of expression and self-objectification of first-person experience where again a substrate is brought in which “in itself” is indifferent to being the bearer of mental or spiritual properties. Yet in (a) what it is that bears the irreducible properties and to which one’s empathic intentional act is directed is only short-sightedly regarded as the physical object in the world we call the person. In fact our intentionality is directed to the other person who as a self-experiencing other “myself” is the proper substrate of the various properties. As such this other self-experiencing, not the allegedly neutral physical object in the world, is the bearer of the various properties. Similarly in (b) the expressive physical objectification is lived as belonging to the I and this is not identical with the Strawsonian person in the world nor, as an expression, is it indifferent to its “spiritual” signification. Such considerations occasion phenomenological hesitation, if not resistance, to the dual-aspect theory. The dual-aspect theory tends to subordinate the first-person to the third-person perspective and take the natural attitude for the norm. But even in the natural attitude third-person, to say nothing of the second-person perspective, there is an appresentation of the self-experiencing other subject as the substrate of the various properties.

Our proposal to take the “myself” as the substance of the person as well as the bodily properties has found few advocates perhaps because for most philosophers (a) the natural attitude prevails and (b) the first-person perspective for most has no claims on a priority over the third-person perspective and (c) there is a kind of suppression of what the appresentation of other persons as persons brings to light. Another consideration is (d) because the “myself” as the self-experiencing of persons appears occasionally to be swallowed up by forces that are non-conscious, e.g., when persons sleep, when they digest, etc., the “myself” cannot be considered as the “primary substance.” There is no question of a second-person presencing of such forces or processes; what we have before us is the person as a living body among bodies in the world. Thus we are motivated to assume something like a dual-aspect theory. For this reason the question of the nature of the “sleep” of the transcendental I is of considerable significance for our theory. See Chapters VII and VIII, especially §§1–4.

### B Bodiliness and Mentality

In the natural attitude and prior to or apart from metaphysical theories, the realm of physical bodies presents itself as something to be contrasted with living and
sentient things. That is, the realm of bodies consists of things, like rocks, whose parts are outside of one another in a non-conscious, non-sentient and not organically organized way. “Organically organized” means that the parts are internally related to one another towards the good of the whole. In the case of some organisms, like microbes and plants, it may be doubted whether this internal relationship is sentient or felt. The basis of this doubt is that the avenues for knowing another’s experience in familiar cases do not here seem to be open. When we have reason to believe that the internal relating is indeed felt we apperceive the sentient or feeling aspect (whether centralized or distributed throughout the body surface) and regard the organism as animated or besouled. In any case, physical body-things contrast with the bodies of plants, animals, and human persons because their parts exist outside of one another.

Doubtless in an experiential encounter with everything the lived body has a quasi-ubiquity, i.e., the body of the one observing and acting functions as an emphatic transcendental pre-fix. This is obvious in the common forms of agency whereby we move ourselves through space. Or when we work with materials in order to transform them to our purposes the contact is always a lived contact, a touched touching. But even in my still, silent effort to think in a sustained way about an abstract matter or to concentrate on an event happening before me it is a fact that my lived bodiliness, if not intrusive, is often at least marginally present, as in neck, eye, and back sensations. Thus experience, as we typically know it, is embodied. Here the lived body is present not as just any body or as a body but always as mine.

Further the body has the evident phenomenological “double-aspect” of being both subjectively lived by us and an object for us. In so far as I am my lived body, the body is me. Yet because I am inseparable from my possibilities that I have and which are dependent on myself as a body in the world I am also always othered and enmeshed in the natural physical world. As such I am for myself not merely a subject for myself and that to which the world is manifest but also I am an object and inextricably part of the natural web of causes and effects. Thus as incarnate person I am both first-person lived body and third-person body in the world’s nexus of causality. As such, I can intervene in my body’s natural causality and nexus in the world, just as I can intervene in other bodies’ natural causality and world-nexus.

Furthermore, when we think of such bodies as rocks or buildings we are in no way immediately motivated to think of them as having experiences as a matter of eidetic necessity, i.e., to think of them as being conscious or having thoughts and/or feelings. Similarly in entertaining experience, we are not motivated immediately to think of it as necessarily belonging to a body or even this body as a body in space. As we noted, the relation of our thinking and feeling to a neural-physiological correlate is not a logical-essential connection. Yet the philosopher has reason to take it as a contingently necessary relationship. Thus I can imagine an act of thinking without taking account of this fact of a physiological correlate. I can conceive myself exploring cognitively the world and the natural laws to which this world is subject without affirming the essential necessity that there is a regular connection
between that consciousness and the neural-physiological correlate.\textsuperscript{27} This is heresy for the hegemonic naturalistic attitude, but it is philosophically uncontroversial for a phenomenologist.

The custom in the natural attitude, perhaps especially because of today’s prominent naturalistic attitude, is to think about experiences as something inside the head or brain and therefore implicitly as existing in space. Thus we hear “thinking is done inside the head” even though we may equally think of intentionality as carrying us “outside our heads.” In general our experiences are typically that through which the world is manifest – but how this gets formulated in the natural naturalistic attitude is not easy to predict.

The lived body and the lived-parts of the body, e.g., the hand and feet, as that through which the world is manifest and through which we have agency in the world, are less easy to integrate into something inside our heads or bodies because they are \textit{that from which} we act, move, arrange the world or play an instrument. Typically the lived body is a transparent medium. It is \textit{not to which} but that \textit{through which} we have our relationship to the world.

Upon reflection, and quite apart from the transcendental attitude, we may see that all experiences are lived and more or less diaphanous media for our engagement with the world. As such we do not experience them as brain events, nor do they have the properties of a substance in space, like color, shape, tactility, sound, etc. Nor do they have the more abstract properties of mass, quantifiability, measurability, localizability, etc.; nor can they be factored, fractioned, fractured, pulverized, atomized, oxidized, evaporated, etc. Thus even though we must separate the properties of what we experience in the physical world from the properties of the experiences of the physical world, nevertheless the lived body is able to become a quasi-object of this world.

Yet it is a very different kind of object, and the strangeness is brought to light when we let there be an interplay between the double-aspect of the body, its lived and its objective worldly object. Consider the following. It is the most intimate and most strange object, while being the most cordial and most hostile one too. Whereas it is known by me in its entirety in its being lived, it is known publicly to me and others through only a few mobile parts that can be seen. At the same time it has vast numbers of parts that neither I nor anyone else will ever come to know in a public way. The distances of the parts of the lived body, the “interior distances,” are not the same kind as ordinary public distances: I have no conception of the spatial relation between my forehead and my foot or between my knee and my back. For any two points of the lived body taken at random, distance has no lived meaning; for two points that never come into contact naturally and that have no lived relation, distance does not exist; far and near are likewise odd: a distant limb, say my foot, as it stands in relation to my hand or my face, obeys without intermediary; yet for that reason it may seem to be nearer than a non-mobile and non-tractable, spot, like a recessive, inner part of my skull or my hand.\textsuperscript{28}

Furthermore one’s body is lived as the zero-point of orientation of the objects in the world in terms of their being here or there, up or down, fast or slow, approaching or withdrawing, smooth or rough, bright or dark, dry or wet, hard or soft, etc.
Here is a different sense in which the phenomenologist claims that all experiences of physical bodies, as a matter of logical or eidetic necessity, are connected to and in a relationship of dependence to a (lived) body.

The speculative belief that the properties of bodies and those of experience are identical is founded on hypothetical positing motivated by the empirical necessity of their connection. Yet it is obvious that the brain, as the central focus of the reflection on the connection between the body and the soul or consciousness, weighs but a few pounds, is grey in color, somewhat hemispherical, etc. And what “I” refers to, or consciousness, or even the person is obviously not able to be characterized with these properties and therefore is not identical with the brain.

Granting this kind of non-identity, and even logical or essential incommensurability, the “psychophysical” questions of regional ontology have to do with the nature of the unity and connectedness. The human person is doubtless made up of parts, material or bodily, on the one hand, and “soul” or experience or consciousness, on the other. Typically we never experience the body without the “soul” or the “soul” without the body. But what is the nature of the relation of the parts to the whole? A Husserlian approach to this matter would be to determine whether the parts comprise the whole as pieces that may be thought of separately from the whole and one another as, e.g., notes of a melody; or whether they should be thought of as moments where the parts cannot be thought of independently of one another or the whole as, e.g., the inflexion of the finger and the finger, or the pitch and timbre of the sound. Thus some of the questions we may ask are the following: Because we clearly see that the human person has the parts of mind and body, are they such that we can conceive or imagine these parts existing independently, or is the human person such a unity that these parts are moments such that we cannot conceive of them existing independently?29 Clearly the person we experience is embodied and there is no access to the person apart from her expressivity. Is the same true for the first-person experience of oneself? And what of the disembodied phantasy figures of soulless or mindless bodies, zombies, etc.?

Although in this section we dwell primarily on the natural attitude and especially what is presentable in the third-person, it is important to recall what is evident in the first-person in the natural attitude, i.e., lived experience, lived bodiliness. Further, essential to this is the sense of “ownness” which is also proper to all senses of “consciousness” and “experience.” In the first-personal experience of being a person, lived bodiliness is not able to be easily mentally eliminated. One reason for the qualification is that I can be so enthralled or lost in contemplation that my bodiliness is totally non-thematic or anonymous. How philosophically significant such an instance of an experience bereft of lived bodiliness is, is not clear even though it facilitates conceiving forms of consciousness that are not dependent on the lived body. “Out of the body” experiences in dreams or under the influence of drugs usually can be shown to involve the perspective of the one hovering, e.g., on the ceiling, and therefore they show the implicit functioning of the lived body. In contemplating a purely formal matter, such a perspectival clue would be missing. In any case, some sense of bodiliness, some sense of “medium of spirit,” seems
necessary for the experience, in the second- and third-person, of Others as Others, and not as parts of one’s own dissociated personality.

C Panpsychism

In modernity, and especially in the wake of Leibniz, there has been dissatisfaction with sharp distinctions between body and soul. For some metaphysical theories indebted to Leibniz, and even for some newer theories of physics, that which we call nature is best understood not after the model of the naïve view of coarse, bodily, dead things bereft of all sentiency, intentionality, and purpose, but rather after the mode of a rich metaphorical theory of feeling or intentionality that does not require reflective self-awareness or “consciousness,” as in Whitehead. Usually such a theory is called “panpsychist.” The opposition between, on the one hand, the materialist/naturalist and, on the other hand, those holding for spirit’s independence is, in this framework, not absolute. Nature herself is “spiritual” in so far as all of nature is pervaded by an analogical sense of organ, or feeling, or intentionality. The hegemony of the efficient causality of bodies gives way to notions of causality where in analogous feeling or intentionality gives rise, thus we find in theoretical biology forms of interaction wherein there are analogous forms of memory, communication, or information transfer. This is an important hypothesis which seems frequently to lure speculative physics and biology – and for good reason, i.e., nature keeps offering challenges to finished categorical schemes and metaphors.

Yet it would seem that the natural attitude’s everyday practical stance towards, e.g., a stone or a hammer, is essentially distinct from the attitude toward a plant, dog, and human person. And this attitude still functions in the panpsychist speculation as what must be negated (i.e., precisely this difference of stance). Typically, the panpsychist has to apply an “over-belief,” i.e., she has to have a developed metaphysics, to take perceptually the stone or atom as living or sentient. An over-belief is an apperception richly laden with non-evidential beliefs-that and beliefs-in which enable the perceiver to frame perceptions somewhat differently than most others. In some cases this might result in the “over-believer” claiming that she has perceptions that would not be regarded by the typical members of the community as public in nature. The over-belief thus makes possible what for most fellow onlookers is an anomalous way of seeing-as or a perception. If the panpsychist claims that for her there is the same kind of intuitive evidence in perceiving stones to be sentient as there is in perceiving animals to be sentient, then, of course, we have an anomaly that poses an important challenge to the claim being made here. As an empathic appresentation is always of what cannot be given except in an empty intention it opens the space for different interpretations, and thus makes more room for illusions and self-deceptions. Similarly a believer in panpsychism, i.e., one for whom empathy with stones is as necessary as with animals and persons, there is an appresentation. For the disbeliever the panpsychist appears to deluded, as does the phenomenologist for the eliminativist.
Further, the panpsychist metaphysical theory (perhaps not its intuition pervaded by its over-belief) acknowledges the natural attitude’s legitimacy in so far as it presupposes for its foil the spontaneous, not merely inherited, view of bodily things as inanimate and essentially pervaded by exteriority (parts outside of parts), as being without a “self,” without self-animation, or consciousness. For this speculative view, this “prejudicial understanding” of the natural attitude must be overcome, just as phenomenology overcomes the indifference of being to display.

Thomas Nagel thinks panpsychism is a promising alternative to psycho-physical reductionism as well as any radical theory of emergence, for which the incompatible properties of the mental are said to emerge abruptly out of the physical. If any two-hundred or so pound chunk of the universe, like one’s body, contains the material to construct a person, and if we want to deny the reductionism and radical emergence theory, then “everything, reduced to its elements, must have proto-mental properties.” Here Nagel says more than that these elements have potentialities to be informed in a way that results in “mind.” Rather the elements are already actually mini-minds or Leibnizian monads. One of the chief problems Nagel singles out is how to conceive of the elementary mentality in terms of its indivisibility or divisibility. As constituted by temporality the elemental panpsychic units would seem to be divisible, but special problems arise if they, as incarnated in matter, are to be conceived as divisible in space. Clearly a project such as this resembles those of Leibniz and Whitehead in searching for appropriate analogies for conceiving materiality in terms of mentality.

Within the phenomenological movement, the most robust attempt to deal with the origins of spirit within a framework that wrestles philosophically with the data of evolutionary theory is the philosophy of nature of Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Panpsychism for her would resemble “pre-formism” in that it, like biological pre-formist theory, would obscure the regional ontological categories and deny the essential features of the phenomenon of development, i.e., where there was novel emergence of form. Nevertheless, the evolutionary materialist hypotheses which account for spirit in terms of primitive elements that are essentially incommensurate with spirit are also rejected by her. To do justice both to the eidetic regional differences as well as to the data of evolution and development she rehabilitates the notion of entelechy as a basic ontological and transphysical foundation of the “finished world.”

This transphysical realm of potentiality, what she also calls “the aeonic world-periphery,” which is the hidden foundation of what is manifestly “finished” nature for us, may be thought of as her cosmological application and development of Husserl’s view that all actual visible beings emerge out of and are encompassed by a horizon of potential indeterminate determinable being. For Conrad-Martius, this world-periphery is a realm of real possibility constituted by potentialities that are both formal and final causes as well as the elemental stuff or hyle of the finished universe. Thus clearly this realm of real possibility is not constituted merely in the transcendental I-can, but rather is comprised of an actual trans-physical realm of potentiality transcendent to all of being, including, and constitutive of, my I-can. This “realm” or “dimension” is hinted at in the philosophical question of physics: what sort of “beings” are the “proto-physical entities” at the foundation of atoms, given their status as “singularities” having anomalous spatial-temporal properties?
The questions of development and emergence are dealt with by the schema of the “finished” world providing occasional causes for the triggering of the actuation of the trans-physical world-peripheral entelechies. They come into play when their necessary but not sufficient conditions are met.

In Conrad-Martius’ system there is not properly a problem of the mental- or spirit-principle itself being divisible in space. The principles are not properly in space or time. Further, the abyss (the Untiefe and the Ungrund) of spirit’s freedom and initiative which she acknowledges belongs to the I has its antecedents in the (created) trans-physical, trans-spatial, trans-temporal realm. The unique human person, in this view, to put it simply, would be the result of a synthesis of essence-entelechy of spirit with the quantitative-hyletic ingredients as they take on a Gestalt in what she calls the principle of the origin of the self, das Ursprungsselbst – the synthesis of the trans-physical and the concrete finished physical. “The qualitative uniqueness of the total human person stems always from the factually given biological situation hic et nunc.”32 The factually given concrete finished physical-biological situation, as the fertilization of an egg, triggers off the coming into play of the transphysical principle of the origin of the self or person which principle is the same in every triggered-off biological situation. Only the biological situation here and now in all its vast complexity individuates the person. She acknowledges that her position will be unsatisfactory for those who hold views like those presented in this work because it does not rule out the Doppelgänger.

Both Conrad-Martius as well as panpsychists such as Whitehead account for the radical abyss of spirit in terms of essential constituent principles. For Whitehead the foundational principles are located in the constituents of any actual occasion or event whatsoever – these themselves always being quasi-psychic or occasions of feeling – even though the abstract metaphysical principles, i.e., creativity and the eternal forms, are not strictly speaking anywhere and are transphysical. Similarly for Conrad-Martius the foundational principles are located in the pre-actual worldPeripheral transphysical essence-entelechies and hyletic principles, even though they inform each and every event. But for both thinkers there is the difficulty of accounting for who one is in terms of what one is. Even if spirit could be accounted for in terms of such transphysical principles, the core thesis of this book is that who one is cannot be accounted for by what one is.

D Individuation from the Regional-Ontological Perspective

In the natural attitude we know that animated beings are bodies in space and time like any other bodies. Everything is present as an event that is individuated by its being somewhere and sometime within the world. In this respect, i.e., in so far as things cannot be simultaneously at the same time in the same place, they cannot be absolutely identically the same. They might be identically the same in content or essence, but even so they are still individuated by being at different times and places. Further, the person is individuated by the content of her surroundings and
the experiences which present these surroundings for the person. As we have seen, this contrasts with the individuality of the “myself” of the person. Of course the “myself” as “personified” is bodily in space time and individuated by this fact as well as by her place in society and history, yet her unique presence is not to be accounted for merely by this kind of individuation.

The temptation of the human sciences to find their principles in natural sciences and to think of the flow of experience and the individuality of the person in terms of physiological, psychological, sociological, political causes – all understood as analogous efficient causes – is understandable, given the suspicion toward a science of experience and the widespread belief that only the third-person perspective is legitimate. Thus one can find a senior scientist and professor of genetics and genomics (at a Toronto hospital) claiming that by knowing our genomes, “we will begin to know ourselves for the first time.” Such a naturalistic perspective of the human sciences typically makes impossible the distinction between the person’s individuation essentially through herself, per se, and through other extrinsic contingent factors, per accidens. We have attempted to show that the per se/per accidens distinction, although evident in the second- and third-person perspectives is most compelling in the first-person.

Thus it is typical of regional dualist ontologies to be at a loss to account for the individuation of “immortal substances.” For such ontologies, immortal substances would surely be particulars, and not ideal objects or abstract entities. As particulars they are individuals; but as non-spatial, they cannot be individuated by their being in relationship to bodies. Further, the notion of an individuality tied to spatial-temporal continuity is in jeopardy when there are no spatial relations. A purely temporal individuality would have to enjoy an identifiable feature which would presumably take the form of a content. The content of the duration, if spatial relations are eliminated, could only be the identity of ideal or trans-temporal objects. But such objects would not properly be individuated because they essentially are the same for all. Even their instantiation, like musical performances of the same melody, would only establish their happening at this temporal spot and would not assure any intrinsic per se individuality and would be insufficient to account for the identity of a spiritual or immaterial substance. Yet our earlier chapters have attempted to offer a sense of individual that is an alternative to these standard senses of individuation.

E Spiritual Causality

Unless the human sciences take account of the distinction between motivation as the form of “spiritual causality” and physical causality, there appears little reason for entertaining another perspective besides that of physical causality. Typically the scientific approach to understanding the person’s behavior is to a kind of “Behavior-to-Mental” inference which has, as its more basic framework, a “Physical-to-Mental” inference. If of course “mental” is understood as “brain” then we have a case of “Behavior-to-Mental/Physical”) and if behavior itself is basically physical we then have “Physical,
to Physical.” Indeed “Mental” often means identical with a brain state accompanied
by the epiphenomenon of the “Mental.” Therefore the proper scientific (scientistic)
understanding of behavior is “Physical-to-(so-called ‘Mental’-to)-Physical.”

The capacity to bring a phenomenon under a manifest physical cause is the basic
move of natural science. Often this is a move from the “mere appearing” to the
really real physical entity or process that truly underlies the mere appearing. The
whole point of the modern suspension of “secondary-qualities” (experienced
colors, surfaces, odors, etc.) in favor of the “primary qualities” was a move to what
is able to be understood by prescinding from the “subjective” experiences and
entertaining what is intersubjectively measurable in the physical realm, i.e., it was
precisely a move of the “Mental-to-Physical.”

Yet phenomenology surfaces precisely because the appearances of things and
the mind’s agency are ineliminable and non-reducible conditions for science.
Furthermore, in the case of consciousness, phenomenality, or appearings the reduc-
tion to the physical simply will not do. Phenomena or any appearings whatsoever,
as pains, pleasures, perceivings, etc., are their reality and the distinction between
reality and (mere) appearance does not hold. In general, consciousness itself is not
reducible because it too consists in its self-appearings and in its life of being
appeared to. Even hallucinations and delusions are not simply reducible to physical
causes. “Where appearance [JGH: simpliciter] is concerned we cannot make the
appearance-reality distinction because the appearance is reality.”

Further, the phenomenological approach holds that there is a spiritual causality,
a “Mental-to-Mental” connection, evident in the first-, second- and third-person,
which is not a reduction. And this may or may not be interwoven with behavior.
Thus experiencing X’s joke through X’s presentation of the joke may delight me,
but the delight will be inseparably tied up with X’s presentation and my response
in smiling and laughing. And the second- or third-person experience of my delight
in my smile and laughter will be directly perceived by the Other in her presenta-
tion of me in my expressiveness. This is not a Physical-to-Mental connection
because there will not be an inference from the merely “physical” (“behavior” =
smiling and laughing as merely bodily motions) to the mental state. The telling and
hearing of the joke are physical causes of the mental state only in the sense that the
sound waves, etc., are the bearers of the meaning conveyed by X and apprehended
by me. That this apprehension itself is borne by neural pathways does not mean
either that they are the ontological substance of what we call the “meaning” or that
they cause the apprehension as an efficient cause – any more than that the joke
itself is caused by the sound waves.

F The Problem of the Natural Scientific
Account of Animated Beings

All bodies can be measured at least in their physical aspect by the same instruments,
e.g., devices that measure heat, velocity, mass, radiation, weight, volume, etc. Thus
in important respects all bodies are the same, even the living and besouled or ani-
mated bodies. But clearly these measuring instruments tell us little or nothing about
the soul or spirit-life that animates these bodies. In the articulation and measure-
ment of the world by natural sciences the play of emotions that crosses a face do
not appear as something to study with these natural scientific measuring devices.
Further scientific measurement does not tell us that people live ecstatically in a
milieu and ex-centrically to and concentrically toward themselves by reflexive self-
reference and self-formation. It does not tell us how they are in their surroundings
or, in the case of at least human persons, how they are in the world as meaning-
makers. Furthermore, scientific investigation and measurement of nature can, on
the basis of understanding explanation or illumination as bringing the explanandum
under a physical cause, tell us nothing about scientific investigation and measure-
ment. It defies understanding to believe that the warm excitement deriving from the
insight into the relationship between the increased pressure on gases and the rise in
temperature is itself simply a result in the increased pressure on gases occasioning
a rise in the thinker’s temperature. Similarly it defies understanding that “the sub-
junctive conditional” or the claim that “The essay X is a good interpretation of War
and Peace” could be reduced to physics, let alone the thesis that the question,
whether either of these matters (the subjective conditional or the claim about the
merits of the essay X in regard to War and Peace) could be reduced to physics, itself
could be reduced to physics.36

Animated beings or besouled beings, even those that are merely objectified
spirit, like books, instruments, words, computers, sentences, artworks, etc. are not
mere physical realities nor are they as such objects of natural sciences. For one
thing, they are not simply in space and time like physical things are. War and Peace
is not merely in the world like a stone is, no matter how dramatic the narra-
tive might be of how this stone came to be here looking like it does, e.g., cast on
the shores of Lake Huron from hundreds of miles away by a glacier. Of course,
this copy of War and Peace is a mere thing here and now with these physical
properties, but the novel exists as identically the same in all the exemplars, even
in certain respects in the exemplars that are translations and dramatic and film
presentations. Therefore what happens to this physical thing, this copy, does not
affect the novel any more than the fate of this stone affects the idea of the stone.
But the novel is embedded in the material world differently than the idea of the
stone is within the stone: the novel inhabits the artifact through human agency; the
referent of the essential idea of the stone is not resident in the stone as a result of
human agency. And it is this human agency, as embodied in the matter, that speaks
to other minds in the case of objectified spirit. The stone speaks of itself, just as
the wood pulp comprising the pages of the novel speaks of itself; the stone, as such
and not as a tablet or stele, is not a passive vehicle for another spirit’s agency, even
though it might well be also that. For the geologist and physicist the stone has a
story to tell but this narrative belongs to the stone itself. It is not carved or lami-
nated on top of the stone as it might be in the case of a stele or tablet. But even the
properties of this stone as displayed by this geological narrative are not identical
with the properties belonging to the scientific narrative or account of the stone –
just as the properties of the essence of the stone are not identical with the properties of the stone.

The novel’s spatiality in a fictional nineteenth century Russia is not coincident with the place on the shelf where its embodiment in a book rests. And its temporality is that of a fictional version of Russian society during the war between Russian troops and Napoleon’s troops that not only does not coincide with now, it does not properly coincide with that historical period of the nineteenth century. And because it is a fictional nineteenth century Russia, it cannot be said to precede the present in the same way the real nineteenth century Russia precedes the present. The representational account of Napoleon never happened actually and most of the protagonists never actually existed. This raises the question of when did the novel by Tolstoy come into being and how would it be destroyed? The referent of a novel, a Platonic dialogue, Shakespearean play, Euclid’s Geometry, or a simple proposition expressed in a sentence, like “In 2007 the polar icecaps are melting at an unprecedented rate in recorded history,” raise similar questions about where, when, and how they exist, and how they come to be and pass out of being. If we destroy the material substrate, e.g., of the sentence, how does it effect the proposition? Does this destruction matter differently dependently on whether it is a fictional declarative or a real, apophatic proposition? Is the proposition (or artwork) gone if there were destroyed not only all material substrates that might express the proposition or artwork but also the consciousnesses that once articulated or perceived it and are now capable of perceiving it? Can natural science determine whether merontological, logical, or mathematical theorems are annihilated with consciousness? Can the natural sciences decide the answer to the question of when the (truth of the) following theorem came to be, and when will it be extinct: “If A is greater than B, and B is greater than C, therefore A is greater than C”? Surely the standpoint of one who is prepared to give an answer to these questions is not that of the natural sciences.

As puzzling as such matters are, no less remarkable is the conjoining in the living-sentient being or person of body and soul. It seems a clear law of the world that the soul vanishes when the organism dies. Without a vivifying or an animating, whether or not traceable to a soul-principle or spiritual principle, the physical entity cannot “die.” Mere “physical” bodies, like stones, do not die, even if they are largely comprised of fossils of living organisms. What we ambiguously call “nature” or “the natural world” is a remarkable “whole” where one essential part may be studied exclusively and inexhaustibly unto infinity, while the other parts are abstracted from. It is intriguing that at the very same time of this abstraction the intensive study which abstracts from the other parts sometimes believes itself empowered to insinuate the part it is studying as the whole, and to situate it so that it appears to be the study of all of Nature.

Yet, although it is obvious enough that the physical body that embodies the soul is immersed totally in the causal network of nature, the soul or I-subjects besouling these bodies exist with their own time, their own space, and their own form of intersubjective causality, i.e., “motivation.” And none of this is studied when the physical bodiliness is being studied. The world, as a meaning-context, in which the animal and person are immersed, is not coincident with the whole causal matrix of
Nature in which they are immersed. Of course, this causal matrix itself only comes
to light by the agency of manifestation. And when the two wholes or contexts are
juxtaposed, does the non-identity or non-coincidence become evident, and this in
part is what has given birth to theories of parallelism.

G Again: The Problem of the Psycho-Physical Connection

It is empirically evident that “mental events” do not occur without the physical
events occurring in nature, and most specifically those occurring within the physi-
cal bodiliness, specifically the brain, of the one having these mental events. But in
studying the former one does not study the latter. Yet, e.g., abnormalities in the
former can be illuminated by the latter. And more profoundly, we do not know
what we are studying when we study, e.g., the brain and the neurophysiological
system, unless we have access to the “mental events.” Even though they are not
identical there are important connections and correlations. In studying physical
objects and events I study what is in space, time, and physical causality. The mental
events are not in physical space, time, and nature’s network of causality. Consider
the time during which a mother awaits news of her lost child. The chronological
time measuring the period of waiting the firing of neural synapses, or the accompa-
nying chemical changes is not identical with the consciousness of time of the await-
ing mother. Further, the times of all events in the world, e.g., the time measured by
the scientific instruments, the time of clocks, the time of games, etc., are not identi-
cal with the foundational consideration of so-called inner time-consciousness. (See
the next chapter.) This latter is not properly within the time that is measured.

One of the problems with a kind of isomorphic parallelism is the neuroplasticity
of the brain. Although it is generally true that certain parts of the brain seem to be
the physical condition for certain conscious functions, it is also true that the older
view that the brain was “hard wired” in regard to these functions is now less tena-
ble. When injuries or diseases occur in certain parts of the brain, the mental activity
or functions are indeed impaired or brought to a halt. Yet, in some cases, with
proper therapy, the mental activity may be restored and this seems to be through
these specific functions of the brain being taken over by other parts of the brain. It
is not clear what the limitations on this plasticity of the brain’s functions are. Here
as elsewhere in the organism, the whole has a remarkable causal efficacy over the
parts – and this not merely in terms of the actual present arrangement but also in
terms of the temporally developmental unfolding of the organism from an egg to a
mature organism. In traditional theory the soul as the formal organizing principle
of the whole shapes matter into specialized materials which serve the whole as a
part. It is not properly the case that the parts, e.g., neurons, affect one another, and
that is how the whole of mental life is accounted for. Rather in the brain and in all
living matter the vitality or animation is precisely the holding sway of the whole
over the parts informing the materiality in an ongoing self-maintaining and self-
renewing. With spirit or with the “I” the central animating principle is of necessity
self-experiencing and a self-experiencing of the whole that is functionally relevant to a life in the world – not as if the “I” had a choice in deciding about the awareness of which aspects of its organic life were relevant for its life in the world. The autobiography of the self is less relevant to this story of how certain aspects of organic life have become relevant for spirit’s being in the world than the biography of the human species and its fellow travelers.

Further, the part of the brain that is determined to be precisely connected with my pain is not in pain. No part of the brain as such will reveal my passion for finding the relation between mind and brain. The thought, “Neural Fibers Alpha to Gamma are necessary for acts of memory,” has properties, e.g., of being true or false, that are not to be found in that very specific part of the brain, i.e., neural fibers Alpha to Gamma. Neural fibers are neither true nor false, nor are they part of every memory. Only disclosures of neural fibers in propositions are true or false. Consider that the amazing discovery of a neural process that corresponded precisely to what happens when the truth of a proposition is displayed could not entail that that process was the equivalent of the display of the truth of a proposition nor would that process, qua neurological process, contain the truth of its being the correlate to the display of the truth of a proposition, e.g., the proposition about this precise correlation. Further, the thought of a square root will never be discovered to be what I am thinking about by the neurosurgeon’s study of my brain unless he asks me what I am thinking about.39 This means the students of the brain need what is other than the physical dimension of study in order to know what it is of which they are studying the physiological foundations or conditions. They need to acknowledge the realm of consciousness and experience as the ineluctable framework for their neurophysiological research, otherwise they have no idea of what they are doing. A neurophysiological account of the mind apart from experience and consciousness is impossible. An account of experience that studies the causes of experience or the mind in brain states does not know what it is studying if it posits that experience is merely a myth and ultimately something able to be dispensed with. It might as well be studying melons in a garden or pumpkins in a window.

Some define mental events as any event “connected with the mind” and therefore posit unexperienced or unconscious “mental events” because obviously numerous neurophysiological correlations are “connected with the mind.” Thereby there is singled out, e.g., neurological processes that affect memory or perception. In contrast, for phenomenology the sense of mind has to do precisely with experienced mental events, and as such their being experienced is necessary in order for them to exist (e.g., there is no pain without the experience of pain, no acts of promising that are not experienced; cf. our earlier discussion of non-reflexive awareness).

The physical conditions of these events, on the other hand, do not have this necessary property that they be experienced. For a neural synapse to fire, there is no need that the neural synapse experience itself, nor need the person, whose neural synapse it is, experience the synapse to be behaving or misbehaving; for a chemical reaction in the brain to occur there is no need for the chemical reaction to experience itself nor need the person, whose molecules it is (i.e., they belong to this
person’s body), experience the reaction. Therefore, again, material processes are not identical with the mental event. As a brain state they are physical states that accompany or “cause” or “condition,” e.g., the experience of pain. The nerve damage causing or correlated to the pain is there for the physiologist as a postulated necessary condition. But the nerve damage, as a physiological event, is not an experienced event as such.

We mentioned “eliminativism” as a doctrine teaching that what we mean by “experience” itself is a kind of myth. For this doctrine, the myth of experience is to be demythologized in favor of the physical or neurological cause present in the third-person. This goes hand-in-hand with the disinterest, if not disdain, toward the first-person perspective. Yet this seems to be fundamentally wrong because of the difficulty involved in actually denying the reality of experience, e.g., the scientific experience of the brain or the scientific experience of the pain, upon which eliminativist theory is built. And if one were to say that there merely seems or appears to be pain but in reality there is no pain, one acknowledges the reality of the first-person experience in the seeming. (The denial of scientific experience has obviously even more serious consequences for the science.) The appearing painful is the experiencing of pain and that itself is the reality of pain. Pain is necessarily connected to its being experienced.

Similarly suppose someone were to hold that experiences do not exist and there are only zombies. Then someone else might say of this thinker, “Denny believes that he himself is a zombie.” But this statement would be paradoxical. If the statement of the speaker is true, i.e., if this statement reflects accurately Denny’s belief, then curiously it is also shows itself to be false in terms of the merits of Denny’s belief because Denny could not have such a belief without his being aware of the act of believing which gives birth to the sentences which found the speaker’s statement. Further, the speaker’s statement is about Denny being self-aware of his beliefs: That is the function of the quasi-indicator “he himself.” The speaker ascribes self-awareness to Denny. Yet this contradicts Denny’s view about what he, as a zombie, is capable of.40

Chemicals and neurons as such do not experience. If we say they do, as does the panpsychist, we have not accounted physically for experience but only restated the issues, i.e., raised the questions: What is there about experience that makes it necessary for the natural world’s intelligibility and makes it to be dependent upon the natural world’s support? What is there about physical processes that enable them to result in experiences when in fact they admit a description bereft of experience and experiences admit a description bereft of physical processes?41 For any given brain-state that is a candidate for being identical with pain or anger one can imagine both being in pain and anger without one’s brain being in that state, and also not being in pain and anger when one’s brain is in that state. Or: one can imagine being in pain or anger without one’s having that brain state and one can imagine one’s having that brain state without one’s being in pain or anger. Clearly, the question is whether the contingent relations here are because of the essence of experiences and the essence of natural empirical events or whether we have to do with merely empirical essences and contingent relations. It seems to me the former is the case.
Someone might think that the claim about the non-necessity of the experience’s connection with the brain state is a truth accessible completely in the third-person. But in spite of the powerful reasons for holding that we have third-person access to others’ first-person experiences, if someone were in a quite different culture it is not obvious that the third-person evidence for pain and anger would have the same meaning for oneself as it does for the strange culture wherein one finds oneself. Further it is not evident that the third-person evidence for these could stand for or a fortiori substitute for the first-person experience in establishing the correlate to a brain-state. Not only is there the matter of different cultural expressions but there is the issue of dissembling one’s emotions – which is not to say that the dissembling of emotions would not have as its condition neurological processes.

Again, what is there about experience that it has for its conditions physical processes? Because the brain events do not have the same essential properties as the mental events they are not identical, nor is the way the brain events are connected identical to the way mental events are connected. As we suggested earlier, even the panpsychist faces this problem in postulating experiences as inherent in, e.g., subatomic events or cell-division. Even for the panpsychist, as for the natural attitude in general, it seems that different aspects of the same event, its physical and psychological features, are described in two different ways such that the properties inherent in these different descriptions seem incommensurate.

But how are they to be related? We have good reason to believe, from the second-person encounter and the third-person observation, that there is a kind of dependence of each upon each, but what joins them? There is typically no doubt that there are I-subjects or souls besides ourselves. This disclosure of the Others through “empathic perception” is tied to their bodies. Because the Other is present as immediately self-aware and this self-awareness itself is not a body we say that the Other is present “in” or “through” the body. This is what we mean when we say the Others are embodied in the world. And we know of one another as unique through the bodily gait, physiognomy, tone of the voice, etc. Here, in the context of the second- and third-person, talk of a dualism of subsisting entities seems most out of place because the Other is known only in and through the bodily expressiveness. The body is never present as anything but a lived expressive body and the Other is never present apart from this bodily expressiveness. The Other is not something present independent of what is present to me in the flesh. Yet she may fall ill, be struck by a bullet, become comatose. She is then for me like my arm is for me when it has fallen asleep, i.e., a body-thing in the world.

Similarly all of our first-person experiences of ourselves are pervaded by the kinaestheses of our sense of bodily capacity, one’s “I-can.” For example, my field of vision as well as the quality of vision is conditioned by my eyes and their location in the body. Simply “seeing something” typically requires the felt-sense that I can turn the eyes in their sockets, turn my neck and head to what is to be seen. When thinking about something my I-can is pervaded by a sense of being fresh and strong enough to think through these matters. One’s successful agency, especially after a period of illness, can often be accompanied by the joy of not being hindered by weariness, pain, or disability. Here again there is no sense of two entities inci-
dentally conjoined. “I” live throughout this body as very much my own organ for being in the world with others; “I” is not confined merely to the head, heart or stomach, even though in the natural attitude there is a natural pull to locate “myself” in one of those places, depending on the cultural background.

A source of reflection on these matters is J. H. Schultz’s “autogenic training.” Here one learns a technique for hypnotizing oneself into a trance by inducing the assumption of bodily states proximate to sleep. This demonstrates the two-in-one-ness of the person as mind and body. It reveals how every directive of the mind itself is always a bodily expression, indeed, a bodily movement, even if imperceptible or barely perceptible. Here is a thought-provoking example provided by Schultz of the embodiment of thought and how it effects imperceptible motions, or how the mind effects motions in the brain which in turn are transmitted throughout the body. In the experiment one rests both elbows on a table and takes between the tips of both forefingers a 15 in. long thread, at the bottom of which hangs a heavy object, e.g., a ring or a nut for a bolt. It turns out that this “pendulum” moves in whatever direction (on the plane horizontal to the table) the person holding it wants it to move, without the person being aware that his bodily motion is the source of the movement. Thus if I will that it move up and down, as in the clock direction of VI and XII, or in the clock direction sidewards between III and IX, it does so “on its own.” This experience may be contrasted with the one in which I deliberately move the ring or nut on the string by moving my fingers. In this latter case there is a completely different feeling of being active, e.g., by moving my fingers in the appropriate direction; or there is a feeling of “tightening up.”

In the experiential therapy developed by Eugene Gendlin called “focusing,” the unity of body and soul is dramatic: The client is urged, in the first-person, to become aware of herself, i.e., to feel how she most fundamentally is. This may be in response to the general vague question, “How are you?” – in response to which she has to attend at first to the general tenor of her life (cf., Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit) and then perhaps to specific worries or concerns. She then is encouraged to let this sense of herself take the form of felt-meanings as they seem to take up residence in the body. Who she is in her core is inseparably her process of bodily self-experiencing self-expression. The person is an ongoing cauldron of self-experiencing bodily self-expressing of felt meanings. The bodily felt-meanings become present for the client eventually in the third-person and often appear to be lodged locally (in the stomach, chest, heart, throat, etc.). The client is urged to become aware of these and urged to give them space by letting them take shape as images or associations and, eventually, work themselves into the explicating words. This process of explication of the objectification of one’s self in the felt, often very local bodily, meaning happens first by the client’s giving verbal expression to these felt-meanings and then by way of the client’s listening to the suitability and appropriateness to the therapist’s second- and third-person mirroring the felt-meaning by quoting or paraphrasing the client’s explication. The client in turn listens and attends to this mirroring and sees whether it fits her felt-meaning as lodged somewhere in her body; and if not, she attempts a more accurate explication, to which the therapist reacts with a further kind of mirroring.
The client is encouraged to be kind to “it,” i.e., the localized felt-meaning struggling to find expression. She is even encouraged to trust in it and an unconditional positive regard toward it. This attending to such an objectification and embodiment is also always one’s first-person listening to oneself in the ongoing life-process of explication of the felt-meaning and bodily objectifications of the felt-meaning.

In the present felt-meaning there is present the present core meaning of life which accompanies us and enables to give a response to the massive general question, “How are you?” or “How are you doing?” This felt-meaning, or as Heidegger would put it, Sich-Befinden, which is the referent attended to in response to such questions is effected by what Husserl calls passive synthesis and may be found to locate itself below or at the edge of categorial feelings and thoughts (and a fortiori verbal articulations), and yet in an appropriate sense it takes a bodily form, albeit one that usually undergoes a constant metamorphosis or “shift” when we find appropriate novel formulations in the verbal articulations.

But this “in the body” meaning is still the lived, felt body, even if on occasion it is more or less localized. Here we have an enriched phenomenological sense of “soul and body” that is not, strictly speaking, “psychophysical,” if this suggests two contesting regional-ontological worldly dimensions with heterogeneous properties somehow interacting. Rather such a dualistic theme interferes with the clear sense of unity of body and soul as it is evident in the explication of the felt-meaning. This is perhaps dramatized when we ask what the neurophysiologist might have to say to us about the physiological events accompanying the therapeutic process. Doubtless intriguing information about the nervous system would come to light, but it is doubtful that this would shed light on the experienced soul-body unity of the therapeutic process or on the felt-meaning seeking explication.

We have on several occasions pointed to Husserl’s claim that language is inherent to the fuller sense of meaning (understood both as a noun and as a verbal noun or gerund). This is obvious in the effective thinking that has to do with wanting to say what we mean. Here we do not know what we want to say, even what we really mean, until we say it. Here there is a unique filling of an empty intention – which intention itself is already a linguistic one, i.e., one which presupposes language and finds fulfillment in language. If we take being thoughtful to be tied to language, and language not only to be the ideal objects of syntax, lexicality, parts of speech, etc. but also and inseparably, tied to muscular motions of the mouth, tongue, larynx, by which we form sound-units or to the kinaesthetic motions by which we make and apprehend visual marks in space, etc., being thoughtful immerses us of necessity in the physical world. In this unfolding of meaning, to say what we mean requires that the objective physical world be integrated into subjectivity’s self-realization and any sense of a dualism of spirit and matter seems quite foreign.

No less evident is the unity of body in soul in the surfacing of what we will call “Existenz,” as the core of “I myself” as I deal with my destiny. The “limit-situations” of death, illness, guilt, chance, and struggle cannot be described in merely “mental” or “spiritual” terms or in merely physical ones. Our dread, horror and grief, our powerlessness and our strength all are unified experiences of our embodied selves and parceling them out dualistically distorts what we experience as the
basic situations and conditions of human life. We associate “anguish,” “dread,” “grief,” “repentance” etc., with manifest bodily expression, and conceiving them apart from this expression requires positing an anomalous situation.

Nevertheless, the dualist position surfaces, as we saw, when we raise traditional metaphysical questions (as earlier in this chapter as well as in Chapters II and V; see also Chapters VII–VIII) like those regarding substance and accidents, bare particulars, etc. In this work, we have been urging that mere third-person discussions typically miss an angle that first-person considerations provide both in metaphysical as well as in ontological questions. We have seen that dualism also surfaces in regional ontological questions when we, in the third-person, are compelled to think essentially about consciousness and bodiliness as regions of the world, i.e., when we have occasion to thematize the objective properties of experience in contrast to the objective properties of mere (experienced) physical bodiliness. It, of course, also arises when we face religious-metaphysical questions such as the “meaning” of life and death, whether there is an afterlife, etc.

A perennially puzzling issue is how that which appears in the first-person to be bereft of the properties of the physicality of the body, e.g., what is not-spatial, interacts with what is essentially spatial. In the lived experience of one’s causal intervention in nature, e.g., by shoveling dirt in order to add topsoil for a garden, the natural scientific account (of a Physical-to-Physical, connection), leaves the intention, imagination, the design, and the will act out. Yet the lived experience of removing the rich topsoil to another more suitable place, because where I want the garden presently has poor soil, is a fairly continuous act: I see that the soil needs enrichment; I decide to make the garden; I find a place with rich soil that I can transport; I set in motion the shovel and experience the resistance of the soil, its weight, etc., scoop it into the wheelbarrow, wheel it to the garden spot; I empty the wheelbarrow; I work the new soil in the old, and thereby change the ecology of this patch of the earth. But how does that which is “immaterial,” e.g., my judgment and desire and will, not only take up local residence in this local body in locomotion, but how does that which is immaterial put what is material in motion or at its disposal? Again, in the first-person there is no doubt about the lived body being the organ of our perceptual and practical life. But in the regional ontology the question of how the “immaterial” I can effect spatial-temporal organs so as to make them causal agents in the world is uppermost, and when discussed in these terms seems hopelessly perplexing.

A strong notion of dualism might hold that embodiment as the union of body and soul is impossible, and that the relation to the body or materiality is always contingent, “occasional,” and extrinsic. This view has its basis in the incommensurability of the properties of the mental or spiritual and the bodily or physical. It must, of necessity, abstract from the manifest unified whole of the person, whether present in the first-person or not.

Yet the in-the-flesh presence of the person makes evident that the person and her ipseity are present “in-the-flesh,” i.e., of necessity through her expressivity and embodiment. We know of no other personal presence except the embodied, expressive one. Two points may be made here. (a) When we refer to the body as the organ
or vehicle of spirit’s expressiveness, we are not referring to the body primarily as a material thing with physical properties. Rather we are referring to it as the display or expression of spirit. The action or gesture is imbued with spirit and not separable into spirit and body-thing. This of course motivates some panpsychist speculation. (b) If we acknowledge that the expression has bodily-physical properties and that spirit is available only through this kind of display, we verge on claiming that a disembodied state is impossible and therefore that mental states require absolutely embodiment and behavior. Yet in so far as the spiritual-mental aspect has non-material or non-bodily properties, a crack is left open for something like disembodiment. (In the next two chapters we will wrestle with this issue without pretending to have turned the crack into a doorway.)

Even though the body is the vehicle of expression and will, all of it is not always expressive of spirit. Further even if we hold spirit is always expressive, as we have suggested (Chapter III, §3), its actualization of soul does not necessarily result in spirit’s revelation through soul’s expressivity, as in sleep or a coma. When spirit or “I” as animating soul is absent through death, the expressivity is gone. The smile on the face of the corpse is not a smiling dead body or corpse. No one is smiling there. With the I’s absence through death the soul’s animation is gone and so is the expressivity. Furthermore, because the mental or spiritual and the bodily are typically connected and because the mental always is expressing and the body expressive, it still may remain true that they are logically or essentially disconnected – given the distinction and incompatibility of the properties of the two regions. That is, this does not decide whether it is inherently logically and conceptually impossible that a wakeful I-consciousness, e.g., thinking and willing, be bodiless. For example, is a volition of necessity always a volition to perform a bodily action? It surely seems true for almost all the volitions we de facto perform. Yet are there not come volitions free of a willing of a bodily action? For example I might will to concentrate, to think about some matter, e.g., of whether all volitions are willing bodily actions. Such second-order volitions, where we will to think or will to will do not seem to be directly willing of bodily actions, even though I might close my eyes or focus my attention in such a way that I am directed to a part of my head. Similarly one’s refusal to acknowledge to oneself something (a proposition) as true might involve marginal bodily and head motions, and in so far as it requires the generation of a proposition it involves the embodiment and materiality that saying what we mean requires. Yet the refusal can be conceived to be a willing bereft of a bodily action.

H Consciousness and Meaning as Epiphenomena

Of course natural science can study the body with total indifference to the facial gesture, gait, etc., just as it can give a chemical analysis of a particular exemplar of War and Peace without taking notice of the story and its drama. It may proceed as if only one “universe” existed or may simply posit that there are parallel “spiritual” universes within “Nature” working together by a “pre-established harmony.” Or
one might hold that nature’s processes give birth naturally or utterly randomly to consciousness with all of its ensuing “froth,” e.g., science, art, technology, society, politics, ethics, etc. and now we face the irony that these in turn are shaping nature’s processes for better or for worse. Yet the natural science is conducted by the individual scientist’s experience, i.e., her observing, forming hypotheses, judging, confirming, etc., all of which lived agencies of manifestation cannot be accounted for by her natural scientific categories.

The notion that consciousness, display, manifestation, etc., are epiphenomena is a radical formulation of a theory that is mesmerized by the basic thesis that there is a contingent relationship between being and manifestation. The thesis that for philosophical reflection being and display are necessarily connected, but that this necessary connection is nevertheless not an absolutely necessary connection, e.g., there could be no agents of manifestation, could be taken to the extreme form that all manifestation is not only contingent but also irrelevant. In this view manifestation would be of no philosophical interest because the really real forces of natural non-conscious being determine everything. Further the anthropic claims of the significance of consciousness as the telos of physical nature would be regarded as illusory as the claim that human intentionality was genuinely causal within nature.

Unfortunately for this view, if it wishes to be philosophical, and if it would wish to publish its views, it would have to make use of consciousness and display in ways that would undermine it, just as it would have to undertake the transformation of nature for the purposes of publication – and this too would undermine its views.

Further, there is no possibility of rationally establishing a cosmic or psychological determining force or principle that could be postulated as something ontologically prior to rational consciousness. This is because this would mean that its priority would be such that it would hold sway over consciousness’s rational self-determination. For if it is regarded as evidently a cosmic or psychological force or principle, it presupposes its being displayed by reflective consciousness as evidently so and that this evidence moves to rational assent, which is not a response to physical force. If a cosmic or psychological force or principle is posited as determining my Existenz or my will, it, to be effective in my will, would have to be present as an evident possibility among preferences that I entertain. Otherwise this positing is a mere speculative speculation with no foundation.

As we noted, the contemporary philosophical scene enjoys something approaching a consensus that consciousness or mind, and therefore ipseity, have their roots, i.e., sufficient conditions, in nature, i.e., nature is in a profound sense the cause of mind. Nevertheless, there also is widespread confusion and disagreement what precisely this means. Indeed some hold that it is impossible for essential reasons for us to know what this causal connection is; it is an insurmountable essential mystery because knowing something in the strong sense is bringing something perceivable under its perceivable physical cause. Mind is essentially unperceivable, for reasons a good regional ontology gives, and therefore eludes this subsumption.45

In this connection, notice must be taken of views that are non-reductionistic and make room for a kind of integral understanding of mind but which want to appeal
to the basic sciences of physics and biology to explain how consciousness emerges. As Putnam puts it, and we find numerous almost verbatim passages in Husserl, this view errs to the extent that it suggests that the positions of these so-called basic sciences “might have been true without there being consciousness or intentionality.”

What is most problematic for any notion of a causal relation of body and soul (mind) is the implication that “cause” can have meaning in relation to manifestation and display. But causality is a relationship that comes to light in the display of things within the world. Can the display of the world itself be conceived in terms of being caused by something within the world? Causality happens between beings and events or parts of beings and events. But manifestation of things is not a being, event, or part of a being.

The phenomenological position is not “spiritualism,” if this means a doctrinal devaluation or denial of the physical as an essential aspect of the world. It does not deny physicality or the integrity of natural processes and causes, but it claims that “spirit” is essential to the display of what we know as physis, and a full picture of this cannot neglect the agent of manifestation. Further, all manifestation itself, except that of non-reflective self-awareness, appears to be steeped in natural or physical objective dimensions, as bodiliness and language. That is, this phenomenological position is an opponent of a physicalist account of the display and interpretation of what gets displayed, even though it acknowledges that display, properly understood, is pervaded by physicality and finds therein its own necessary condition.

I Hilary Putnam on the Unintelligibility of the Mental

Hilary Putnam poses a special problem for the transcendental phenomenologist. On the one hand, transcendental phenomenological philosophers, especially those for whom Robert Sokolowski’s exorcism of mental concepts as necessary media of knowing has been a watershed, resonate to Hilary Putnam’s similar effort to rid intentionality of intervening mental entities. For Putnam, experience presents the world, we do not experience representations. Further for Putnam, talk of mind is talk of “world-involving capabilities that we have and activities we engage in.” “Mind” is primarily a verb (as in “to mind” or “minding” and “intending”) and not an independent entity. Thus we best think of “mind” in terms of seeing, hearing, thinking, remembering, desiring, fearing, etc. Our intentionality, pervaded as it is with language, is not to be thought of as an inner psychological state going on in the mind or head. Rather, our meanings (verbal and nominal) are embedded in the world or environment and to be defined by this, i.e., “externally” not “internally” by events inside a mental theater.

For our purposes, it is important to note that for Putnam, talk of consciousness, as something over above these activities by which we are in the world or involved in the world, immediately gets us into the myth of an inner theater and inner
representations. Any such move to “consciousness” catapults us into the realm of interior psychological events and intervening mental entities. This is a short way from further theorizing about an underlying interior substance. Putnam sides with William James that there is no “problem of consciousness” over and above the activities of world-involvement through seeing, hearing, imagining, etc. To look for something else is to look for “a mysterious sort of paint that has to be added to the brain lest we have only an Automatic Sweetheart.” This last refers to James’ discussion of “a soulless body absolutely indistinguishable from a spiritually animated maiden.” Unless we add the “paint” of the mythic “consciousness” we seem to be left with a zombie or automaton.

It seems to me that Putnam is committed to what Michel Henry has called the monist theory of manifestation. Whereas we must agree with Putnam that experience presents the world and it is not an experience of a representation of the world, we must interject that experience’s presentation of the world is lived, it is, e.g., non-reflectively experienced seeing, hearing, judging, etc. It appears that for Putnam, there is no such thing as non-reflective self-awareness and therefore the “mind” is nothing but the activity of world-involvement. Mind and the modes of intentionality are themselves a blind spot, unconscious, unknown ways we are hooked to the world. And for Putnam the notion that there is a kind of disclosure apart from “mind” minding something, i.e., what we are calling the self-manifestation of the mind’s self-luminosity as the condition for intentional display, appears to be a grave error. It seems that for Putnam the non-reflective self-manifestation that for us makes of world-involvement a cognitive achievement or even the distinctive kind of “pattern recognition” that distinguishes human perception from that of a computer, leads us down the treacherous garden path of the philosophical problems of regional ontology, dualism, mind-body interaction, inner-outer, etc.

Putnam’s view is objectionable because there is the important fact that mind’s minding is not unconscious and its being conscious non-reflectively is why the mind’s activity is disclosive, and as such is always of something to someone, and this someone’s being alive or awake to herself disclosing is itself not a disclosure of… to—. (See above Chapter II.) Putnam finds most of the mind-body problems fundamentally unintelligible for two reasons. The first one is the same one that phenomenology also proposes: the hegemony of the vocabulary and conceptual apparatus of the exact sciences distort what is at stake in the matter of intentionality. Here the argument is from the side of the intersubjective public nature of artifacts: We cannot understand something as simple as a clock by merely analyzing it in terms of its physical microstructure but rather must take account of the context of particular practices, purposes and uses – all of which involve intentionality. “Not all our ways of conceptualizing are scientific, but it does not follow that our common sense ways are one and all superstitious.”

The second reason for Putnam’s anti-reductionism makes this phenomenologist, at least, uncomfortable, because it is based on his (implicit) dismissal of non-reflective self-awareness. When dealing with the problem of “the Automatic Sweetheart” or the zombie, i.e., those postulated “people” “who do not have any mental properties, but all of their physical properties are the same as if they did and their physical
environment is the same,” Putnam generates a kind of linguistic-contextual analysis. Religious people and earlier philosophers came up with the notion of the soul as independent of the body primarily as an exegesis of religious doctrines and hopes. Study of the religious use of the word soul leaves one “completely free to accept or reject philosophical talk of the soul as ‘completely immaterial.’” Thus, on the one hand, when he encounters a philosopher’s discussion of zombies or automata (which is part of a refutation of the position that mental events are physical) he understands the words but he is not convinced that there is a philosophical problem. On the other hand, he understands Wittgenstein, when he offered the consideration that the colonial government officials might proclaim that we think of aborigines as soulless, and therefore reducible to our will as slaves. Wittgenstein went on to say that “if anyone among us voices the idea that something must be going on in these beings, something mental, this is laughed at like a stupid superstition.” Putnam understands what soulless means in that context proposed by Wittgenstein, i.e., it is one of effective propaganda. But when a philosopher, like Jaegwon Kim, tries to talk about internal or psychological states to explicate his theory of supervenience, Putnam confesses to drawing a blank. The reason is because there is no such thing as internal states and the reason there is no such thing is that when there are such things we are not able to do justice to intentionality and are joined immediately to the untenable positions regarding the inner theater and a representationalist theory of perception (which Kim “swallows”).

Aside from the merits of Putnam’s critique of Kim, and Kim surely does have a kind of inner theater and representationalist theory of perception, is not Kim’s temptation in both cases due precisely to what Putnam ignores, i.e., the odd “inwardness” of intentionality’s self-luminosity in its display of the world? Acts of judgment, making distinctions, resolves, imaginings, of which no one was aware, would not be such. This non-reflective self-awareness is not “paint” on top of the what is real, e.g., intentionality or the brain, but rather is precisely what is involved in seeing, distinguishing, judging. It is not a matter of perceiving the tree and perceiving oneself perceiving the tree; nor is it a matter of the perceiving perceiving the perceiving. Nor is it a matter of an act of seeing being at once a looking outwards and a looking within. But when we are faced with the thought-experiment of a zombie we rightly say something is missing, i.e., we are not able to achieve an empathic apperception which leads naturally to the metaphor of “something inside.” When the apperception fails, we say “there’s no one there ‘inside the body.’” Pace Wittgenstein and Putnam, that is not simply a misleading metaphor. Of course, it is misleading if it is taken literally to refer to a space within the world.

Yet this inwardness of non-reflective self-awareness, in fact, is absolutely necessary to understand Putnam’s rich theory of the mind as the ability to involve us in the world. Without the self-luminosity there would be no cognitive world-involvement. The involvement in the “world” here is not involvement in nature, as a tissue might be inserted in a foreign body. Rather it is world as a phenomenological datum, and therefore world as displayed, brought to light. The ability of mind is its power of disclosure of... to—. If we think of intentionality merely as the way we are hooked to the world or involved in the world and not the way the world is
brought to light then we might be tempted to think of intentionality as merely an unconscious action conjoining us to the world and as such is psycho-physically neutral – and this I take to be Putnam’s temptation.

Finally, the sense of oneself that is effected by the non-reflective self-awareness, i.e., the sense of the “myself,” a sense that is non-ascriptive and which transcends all personal, mental, and physical features, is ineluctable. That one would “naturally” be inclined to refer to it as “within” is understandable, if misguided, because, on the one hand it is not precisely the same as our bodies, selves, etc.; on the other hand, it is “nearer” than these. We typically look for a spatial topos for our references and when it comes to that which is nearer to us than our bodies of which we are aware, we say it’s “within.” But this is the natural attitude speaking. The dative and agent of manifestation is not in the world; even the lived body is not properly in the world (see §4 below).

We are by no means finished with these issues, but this will suffice for our present purposes for beginning our aporetic understanding of the human person. This puts us on the way to understanding the “paradoxes of the transcendental person.” The next step is to review some of the paradoxes of the transcendental attitude vis-à-vis the person we are in the natural attitude.

§4 Some Paradoxes of Human Subjectivity in Regard to Nature and World

We have seen the temptation of naturalism to hold that physical nature is the whole and mind is an incidental offshoot of nature’s processes. Or it may be construed as a puzzling function of nature’s evolution as it has culminated in the brain. In which case, spirit, consciousness, mind, etc. are, at best or strongest, parts; at worst or in their weakest interpretation, they are epiphenomena or illusions. They may or may not play a role in the realm of “reality,” i.e., physical nature. If they do it is that of a part influencing or modifying what is more basic and more encompassing. In any case mind is a tiny event within the natural world and, speaking from the time-frame of the standpoint of evolutionary naturalism, no more than a bubble of foam on the surface of the ocean.

Transcendental phenomenology’s reduction sets a scene in which the community of transcendental I’s may be considered the whole, and the all of the display of nature is now correlated to and founded in this agency of display of the transcendental community – as this correlation and community are displayed ultimately to the transcendental phenomenologizing I, solus ipse, the ultimate philosophical whole and concretum. This is a far cry from the spiritual monist view that claims that nature is an illusion or creation of spirit. “Founded” for transcendental phenomenology refers to the way parts that are phenomenologically dependent on one another and that are dependent on the concrete whole in which they come to light, cannot be made present apart from the other parts and the whole to which they belong. Thus the parts of a sound (taken as a whole), like pitch and timbre, cannot
be brought to light, i.e., made present to our minds, except that one also bring to light the other parts and the whole. (This is quite different from saying that the mind creates sound, pitch, or timbre.) Thus I cannot make present or imagine a pitch unless I make present a sound and its timbre. In this case pitch may be said to be co-dependent on timbre and founded on sound as the concrete whole. Similarly, I cannot make present a promise without making present its expression and, at least in an empty intention, its author and the promisee. The promise is the concrete whole present to mind in which the parts that are the promisor, promisee, and the achieving expression or illocutionary act are co-dependent. What founds is that in which the founded parts inhere of necessity in the presentation to the mind of the matter at hand. I can’t make present the just action without making present the act, the recipient, and the agent of the act. The action is the concrete whole that founds the justness of the act, the agent, and the recipient.

Similarly, in the transcendental attitude the world, whether the world as constituted by human intersubjectivity or world as the natural substrate of such apperceptive acts is “founded” in the sense that the world as it is present in the reduction, i.e., the world as articulated and displayed, cannot be brought to light without this agency and agent of display. In this sense, the world as articulated, perceived, emotively engaged, in short, displayed, inheres in or is founded in the agent of manifestation. This is the absolute concretum, as Husserl would say. That is, it is a whole that does not inhere in or depend on anything else and everything else inheres in (phenomenologically) and depends (phenomenologically) on it. In the natural attitude, of course, everything is in some way “founded” in the world, i.e., rooted, caused, contained, etc., but not phenomenologically founded. The world of the natural attitude, again, whether one has in mind the intersubjectively constituted social-historical world or world as the natural substrate – which in its pre-scientific and scientific articulation also is intersubjectively constituted – appears to be the whole, the absolute concretum, because the transcendental dimension remains anonymous.

Phenomenology disengages its spontaneous belief-allegiance to the world as the whole show, i.e., including not only the natural world as lived, but also as described by science, as well as by the social and cultural worlds within which we live. Therefore the transcendental I cannot be said to be simply a part constituted by the forces of nature or society or culture. In so far as these are articulated aspects of the world it is the dative and agent of manifestation by which these appear. We, of course, may postulate these as prior to the agent of manifestation, but this postulation becomes philosophically of interest when the evidence for this being prior to manifestation is displayed and not merely postulated.

Properly speaking this agent of manifestation is “many-headed,” i.e., it is not merely the transcendental I but the transcendental community of I’s. This is because persons, nature, society, and culture themselves are laced with publicity and the mutual involvement of a plurality of I’s. As we cannot have common-sense claims without the assumption of the world being present to Others as it is to me, so a fortiori we cannot have the presence of natural scientific and cultural objects or institutions without the presence of a community of I’s for which things appear as the same and which are the result of the reciprocal engagement of the plurality
of I’s. Thus the world has as its correlate a transcendental community; the agent of manifestation is the I and the Others. The Others become an explicit theme when I have occasion to reflect on their presence to me, i.e., when I reflect on how the world as “the same for us all” presupposes the often anonymous others are implicated in my life and I am implicated in theirs. In this case the theme becomes: In what way I, in spite of my uniqueness and ownness, am always already “othered” and communalized, i.e., immersed in the lives of Others and incorporating the Others in mine. In spite of this intricate implication and historical inextricability the others become displayed to me by my agency of manifestation.

But is the agent who manifests the world through, e.g., declarative sentences, any one else, in my case, than this besouled body, JG Hart, or, in the case of intersubjectivity, the relevant social, political, economic, or scientific community, and ultimately the human species or “humanity?” And we who live in the midst of the natural, social, and cultural worlds can hardly deny that each of us, as well as humanity as a whole, is part of the larger natural and social world that we are necessarily dependent on. Thus the natural and social-historical world occasions exigencies with which we must deal. These importune and compel our return to the natural attitude.

Thus we face the persistent question, How can a part or piece of the world, the human species, or this person, JG Hart, not be in the world as a part but rather be the agency of manifestation of the whole world? Is it not perfectly clear and basic common sense that the whole world encompasses subjectivity and that the subject as a tiny corner of the world, even the extended piece that is all of humanity, cannot encompass the universe? The world, as the universal container of what is obvious, evident, and, equally of what is not evident or obvious, and what is there from the start and will be there after each of us is gone, remains for the transcendental phenomenologist puzzling: How can that which is dependent on the agency of manifestation for its appearing the way it does, appear, as it does in the natural attitude, as if it were indifferent to this agency? Yet from the other side, i.e., the standpoint of the natural attitude, the transcendental position appears to take that which is the basis for everything and make it depend on an insubstantial ghostly affair by evacuating it of its status of being the basis. The basic paradox we wish to highlight here lies in the phenomenological consideration that I am or we are that to whom and by which the world appears, and I am and we are at the same time something in and emergent out of this world like any other thing or body or event. We have already had several occasions to refer to this ambiguity of world as phenomenologically given to the transcendental I and world as the natural substrate and source of everything. As the former I am not in this natural web nor am I properly to be thought of as in space and time and the causal network (cf. our later discussions in this and the next chapter). As the latter I am utterly immersed in these matrices of history and nature. But is the former anything, anyone else than JG Hart who is like everything else in the world, i.e., naturally caused and objectively temporal and spatial? As we have been seeing, the answer is both Yes and No. JG Hart is part of the natural and social world and individuated and effected by the forces at work there. But what JG Hart refers to with “I” is not only JG Hart as part of the natural and social world. This is already indicated by themes from “regional ontology” in so far as
conscience and mind resist integration into nature’s causal network. They become full-blown in the transcendental reflection which, to be true to itself, must not obliterate or ignore the delineation or definition of “JG Hart” as he emerges in common sense as well as the natural and social sciences. But this mutual openness and struggle against one attitude absorbing the other does not answer the questions either of regional ontology or the paradox of human subjectivity as both that for which there is a world and that which is in the world.

Husserl once noted in reference to attempts to describe the achievements of the mind or spirit by founding them in basic mental laws that were indistinguishable from natural physical laws:

This is pure nonsense. It is the most absurd generatio aequivoca that has ever been conceived. Only from spirit can there be spirit, only out of elementary consciousness can there be higher consciousness, only from sense can there become novel sense.58

Although Husserl is here addressing the view which posits natural laws, and therefore, presumably, natural causes to account for rational achievements within the one single spirit or person, there is an analogous question in regard to the natural causes set in motion in the procreation of other persons or spirits. In procreation there is an apparently merely physical-biological act resulting in another consciousness which, from a transcendental standpoint, is unintelligible in so far as spirit is incommensurate with any natural or biological causality. A purely physical-biological exercise of causality is heterogeneous to, in the sense of being not equal to, the production of a person or ipseity.

How can “making love,” an activity that inserts the human agents in the world of natural causality and which sets off a series of biological events, bring about another unique person for whom there is a world and for whom even this very causal activity, by which it brought this Other into the world, can become present through a report or imagination? Husserl himself notes that in “making love” an intersubjective process is set into play and from this emerges a lengthy drama of the development of a lower consciousness into a higher one. But, he asks, what is the source of the consciousness itself? Can the consciousness of the parents bond and then divide itself? Is there a dissolution of pieces of consciousness and a fusion of pieces of consciousness through the transmission of these into a new body? Of course we find the coming to be and passing away of bodies. But do we want to assume that suddenly all at once after the maturing of the egg to a certain stage of development there kicks in a besouled life in the proper sense? If we do not grant this we would have to conclude that psychic beings (“Animalien”) enter on the scene quite apart from any communicative situation. Husserl does not intend to offer here any conclusive reflections, but it is clear that the procreation or propagation of humans and animals is a philosophically puzzling matter.59

There is no doubt that “making love” inaugurates the formation of cells through the fertilization of an egg and that this involves a passing on of genetic material from the sperm and the egg. But even if one could map personality traits with genes and manipulate the genes in such a way that one could bring about desired personality traits, this would still not account for the creation of the unique ipseity.
If that is all that one would have, it is not clear that one would have a person but perhaps an I-less zombie-like clone of a person.

One is led by phenomenology to believe that persons are inseparably spirits and unique individual essences and datives and agents of manifestation and as such they are not effects of the network of physical causality. Yet spirits are of necessity incarnate persons and as incarnate we face the commonsensical view that the very physical activities of sexual intercourse are the sufficient conditions for the procreation of incarnate persons. Yet in as much as persons, as transcendental ipseities, are not able to be accounted for by any form of physical causality, the commonsensical view is paradoxical from the transcendental perspective.

Of course we communicate with Others through bodiliness; materiality is a vehicle of meaning and thus is a condition for the communication of minds or spirits. But in procreation we have to do with bodily activities creating spirit. Further, of course, spirits as incarnate persons are immersed in the world by reason of their expressive bodiliness and by reason of bodies being the organs of will. Again, we here need not construe the matter to be exclusively the problem of how the realm of pure spirit can ever be conjoined with materiality or bodiliness. Our beginning situation is expressivity and personal agency and therefore bodiliness and materiality. But here we have to do with how it is possible that any clearly physical activity, even if pervaded by spirit’s intentions, can bring about another spirit.

The paradox seems to be invisible in our culture where we are inclined to think of procreation in terms of a complex “physical” or “biological” act. Such an act is not completely unconscious as is the autonomic nervous system or digestive process. That is, everyone associates procreation with conscious activity of sex, intercourse, or “love-making” which most of us believe to be connected with biological changes in our body brought about by the love-making. But that of which the agents are conscious may well have no connection for them with procreation. The connection of “love-making” with procreation, i.e., the production of a baby, is a form of statistical probability, but this is not necessarily a conscious connection. There is clearly no essential connection, even though few mature adults doubt there is a connection. Yet the evidence for even an empirical necessity is not part of the life-world as such, (Some ancient cultures apparently saw no necessity whatsoever.) Sexual acts can happen quite independently of any purposeful agency, like wanting to make a baby.

This is to say that procreation, wherein another subjective spirit is brought about, happens quite in contrast to the production of objective spirit, as a poem or a painting, which almost always requires purposeful conscious agency. We thus may contrast procreation with the creation of objective spirit where the agent confers (“besouls”) on a body or material vehicle a meaning. This meaning then comes to light when it, in the presence of another spirit or mind, is appropriately intended. In procreation, the “besouling” is not an objectification of spirit by way of a bestowal of meaning that can be brought to light only by another mind properly intending it. Rather there appears to be, quite apart from the agent’s intention, a “besouling” in the sense of a begetting or soul generation. This is not a begetting of “objective spirit” but of a “subjective spirit” whose meaning is intrinsic to this new subjective spirit and independent of the begetting spirit or any other spirit’s appropriately presencing it.
Further, even the intersubjective conscious activities of love, love-making, or lust are no longer necessary conditions for the production of the baby. The sperm and the eggs may be “gathered” and joined together (perhaps after having been frozen) in an artificial womb. It is ironical that these technological acts of harvesting, preserving, and providing sperm and egg to the technicians bear witness to a more explicit purpose of procreation than do the typical acts of “love-making.”

Furthermore, one can easily discern procreation as the telos in terms of a third-person description of, e.g., glandular secretion and the actual physical activity of copulation. However, in terms of the first-person psychological conscious states accompanying the physical activity, it is typically not evident at all that the telos in the activity of making-love is procreation. Modern contraceptives, of course, facilitate this disconnection by occluding or obfuscating the consequences of “love-making” while purporting to liberate “love-making” from these consequences. This does not deny the ancient contention that from a certain (“natural law”) perspective “the nature of the act,” taken in its physical-biological aspect and abstracted from the intentions of the lovers, has an inherent teleology toward procreation. It rather merely states the obvious, i.e., that the act is able to be done without heeding this teleology and even done in spite of it for other reasons.

Sexual activity, not merely the biological activity as described in the third-person, runs from a lust which aims at the pleasures of the sexual agent, to a form of love which aims at mutual pleasure and reverence. One can claim that procreation is the telos of these activities not only by focusing on the physical-biological aspects of these activities but also on the basis of more general considerations regarding family and love. Such is Maurice Blondel’s view that love in each case is a doubling of one’s own life that creates a new common life, but as this love merges into sexual love it creates a unique whole and single more perfect and fruitful being which “engenders work common to those whose union it consecrates, justifies and seals.”* That is, the baby is implicit in the lovers’ love as its fruit and common work and consecration. Yet, even if we grant this, it is clear that this child-person is not intended and here there is no explicit intention or strict necessity, and the common life could well be fruitful in other ways.

Regardless of whether on occasion the sexual acts bear witness to the intention to make babies or whether they are typically moments of lust or love-making, the paradox is equally striking. Here is an intense activity of a lived bodily nature between two persons, typically disconnected from the intention to create another third person, which in fact brings about another third person. Indeed the parents, even if Ph.D.’s in biology, do not know what it means to bring about another spirit, another subjectivity. They do not know how to bring about a third person and a future someone who will be present in the second-person. They know about the hormonal secretions that were functioning in the love-making; they know what the mechanics of the sperm’s dance to the egg is; they know about fertilization, gestation, the embryo’s developmental stages, etc. But they do not know what this has to do with the bringing about of the unique ipseity that will soon be in their midst.

The realization that sexual activity has resulted in pregnancy heightens the paradox. The parents may well wonder how they could have initiated this amazing
biological process. And they may worry not only whether the baby will be whole and healthy; they may also wonder what its gender/sex is and what it will look like. These are all forms of appropriate amazement at the intricacy of life. But the greatest wonder is the one rooted in the paradox of how a unique Someone is made to be and be present by this distinctive kind of activity. One can well ask in retrospect, looking at the young person one has procreated and the activity that brought about the pregnancy, what is the connection? How did I do this? – knowing full well what the biological causality is. The parents will typically love the baby in her core ipseity in spite of not knowing what sort of personal qualities she will have. The parents awaiting the birth might even wonder if they will love the sort of person this baby will become; and perhaps in the background is the lingering question of what this burgeoning person will eventually think of the parents who are responsible for its appearing in the world and nurturing and guiding it through the world. In any case, no parent, regardless of how purposeful in wanting to make a baby, can want this person who is about to appear on the scene, simply because the parent has no idea who this is. My parents perhaps wanted a boy or a girl or some sort of person who would bring joy to them. But they could not have wanted me. The unsettling feelings regarding the coming baby are perfectly intelligible given that not only is an Other who is a total stranger about to make an appearance, but will establish her presence right on one’s lap and in one’s house for a long period of time.

Of course the child who is “the fruit of the love-making” may wonder about the unique genetic inheritance which accounts for him as this unique instance and configuration of the DNA molecules and genomic material. But, as we have insisted throughout, as miraculous as is the process by which this event unfolds and as amazing are the odds that it would unfold in just this way, this does not amount to an account of the unique ipseity.

Indeed, the account of this evolutionary “process” is an “objectivist” account through the lens of a centerless view from nowhere. My coming to be is part of an account of the random probability within the perhaps infinite spatial-temporal immensity of the universe of the event that is the coming to be of humans. This is an event of indifference to the universe sketched in this objectivistic naturalist account: humans, and a fortiori individual persons, are not necessary to the universal process and the process would be self-sufficient quite apart from them. The particular part of the account relevant to the matter at hand is the event of the immensely unlikely event that is identified with my body and therefore with JG Hart as part of this physical-biological narrative. Not only is this event of little or no consequence to this objectivistic account of the universe but it hardly produces a ripple. Indeed, this is in part for basic ontological reasons: the unique ipseity of JG Hart, as such, eludes any characterization by features and properties and this is a new beginning without any causal antecedents that can be described in terms of features and properties. Granted the physical-biological account of what makes up JG Hart, nothing in this account explains what makes JG Hart I myself. If there were a list of humans meeting this description, e.g., a plurality of JG Harts, I still must ask of this account which of these is I myself and what in the story accounts for the coming to be of me myself.61
If a baby is an emergent person, and if being a person involves what is irreducibly subjective and a unique essence, and if the typical “centerless,” or natural-scientific, accounts purport to be explanations of the emergence of persons, then they miss what is essential in what is being accounted for. Likewise, the activity of making-love or making a baby results in something that is not manifestly commensurate with the activity, analogous to the way the modern believes that a rain dance is not commensurate with effecting rain. Because of the common sense convention, of course, one does this activity and one makes a baby. But from a transcendental perspective, it is deeply puzzling how the unique person, the spirit, can be a result of this activity, even if the description of this activity is articulately “biological.” The biological causality resulting in this unique instance of a human being may indeed involve astonishing improbabilities and analogous miracles, but these do not add up to the production of the unique ipseity.

But much hinges here on how we understand “mere biology.” We have been taking it in a way similar to body-thing or mere body as contrasted with organism, and organism or animate body in contrast to consciousness. Perhaps the meditation on procreation motivates us to give more serious attention to the Leibnizian-Whiteheadian position that there is no mere materiality or physicality or no “mere” biology. Further, the fertilized egg is the person in potentia, analogous to the way the person is “there” in the body that is “there” asleep, in a coma, “blanked out,” “passed out,” etc. Is the “sleeping monad” a clue, as Leibniz and Husserl seemed on occasion to believe, to the theory of materiality and its relation to spirit?

The advantage of the “sleeping monad” is that it enables us to think of how spirit can be present as a body-thing. The person who is asleep resembles the corpse, where spirit has now vanished and is absolutely absent and where we have only a body-thing in the world, i.e., “the remains” of the person. This corpse now is obviously to be exhaustively accounted for by the physical laws of the universe, where before, as the embodiment of a person, resisted such an account. Similarly to the corpse, the sleeping person presents us with a spirit that is absent and all we have is what remains after the personal presence has been absent. In both cases we have continued growth and decline of tissue; we have the “detritus” of a personal conscious life that now is absent. Of course the body of the sleeping monad or person is still animated by the monad or soul-spirit of the ipseity, and the corpse is precisely the state of affairs we have when this animation has ceased and the ipseity vanished. The corpse thus resembles more a rock which has embedded within it an animal fossil, i.e., it makes present the body of a soul, perhaps an ipseity, that once was. But in the case of the fossil, the spirit-soul is not actual or even potentially “there,” even though features of the “remains” are actual. The sleeping person’s bodily presence is a suspended animation of the spirit-soul who, during this period, is absent by reason of being asleep and unconscious; as we may say, her presence is there “dormantly.” In this case, the spirit-soul or ipseity is “there” as a possibility in spite of the absence in a way she is not in the corpse or the fossil. In between is the case of the artificially sustained living body of a seemingly permanently absent spirit or person, as in different cases of, on the one hand, what mythmakers and philosophers call “zombies” and, on the other, what physicians call “brain death.” In these cases, inspite of the animation of the
body, the ipseity or person, by all the available criteria and reckoning, is permanently absent and not there potentially at all.

To return more directly to the Leibnizian panpsychist theme we can ask: May we not think of the so-called body-things of the universe as possible detritus or debris of not merely once living things, as in the case of fossils, but of a larger organism, something like a Gaia, or a world-soul, that is either a sleeping or wakeful soul that happens to be consciously absent to us because beyond our ken, but unconsciously uniting and affecting all things, including ourselves, in spite of our being not explicitly aware of this influence? If this were so, our perception of body-things as mere body-things bereft of the appresentation of soul would be a mistake due to the limitations of our perceptions. Minerals, rocks, etc. might be analogous to the hair and nails of a living body before us, i.e., parts of the body of a wakeful or sleeping or an unconscious soul-principle.

An analogous deep-ecological consideration is that we best think of consciousness and ipseity not as discrete forms but rather part of an endlessly shaded continuity of forms or zoological types and kinds. In this view we may either think of the rectangle, octagon, and circle as either discrete Euclidian forms with properties essentially exclusive of one another, or we may, with the prompting of the imagination and a graphic design program think of how the latter evolves from the former. Thus we may think, with the proper prompting, e.g., through a Darwinian narrative or computer graphics of the way a fish shades off into a frog and a frog into a primate and a primate into a human. So, similarly, we may think of consciousness, with the proper prompting, to have evolved out of thingly physical conditions in space-time. Thus we may think of the evolution of consciousness as an objective genitive of the substrate of “nature,” i.e., a coming to be of consciousness out of nature’s forces and consciousness’ own endless adumbrations in organisms and what the organisms emerged out of. Or we may think of the evolution of consciousness as a subjective genitive of consciousness itself wherein the world-soul as the cosmic collective universal consciousness is the cosmic substrate producing ever more fine forms in which to embody itself and eventually to be fully self-conscious, something which, for some reason, it lacks prior to this evolution.

As we have obvious trouble discerning when a fertilized egg is a personal consciousness, even though we have clear third-person evidence that the personal consciousness derives from the fertilized egg, and in as much as the personal consciousness, for all of its richness, clearly has its pre-conditions in both the sperm and the egg, and all that comprises them, may we not posit a proto-consciousness in not only the sperm and egg but in all that comprise them and in all the conditions of which they are the result?

These sweeping speculations have the obvious merit of offering resistance to the massive onslaught against the wholesale commodification of nature and the wanton extermination of forms of sentience. They also, given numerous other assumptions, all admit of degrees of plausibility. Nevertheless, they go against some of the basic proposals of this work. We will see in Chapter VII considerations that argue against regarding any view which holds that the transcendental “myself,” as lived in the first-person, can be thought of as emerging out of something prior to it. Further, it
is our contention throughout this work that the first-person point of view cannot be subsumed under a third-person point of view which typically is the point of view of these grand pictures. As we have insisted, the third-person point of view has its legitimacy and has to be part of the total picture, but it may not subordinate the first-person perspective.

In the first-person, and this, of course, is the great paradox, we do not experience our selves as having antecedents or causes in the world in the way we clearly can say that molecules have the conditions for their possibility in atoms, and cells have the conditions for their possibility in molecules and acids, and social institutions have the necessary conditions in persons and personal agency, etc. However obvious the habit is in our natural attitude of taking ourselves as parts of the natural evolutionary process, however warranted it is from the standpoints of natural, social, and historical studies, it has no applicability in our transcendental first-person awareness of ourselves and in the farther reaches of our appresentation of one another, e.g., in love. Given the naturalness of the natural attitude and given the hegemony of the third-person perspective – as well as the creeping hegemony of a scientistic perspective – it is not surprising that the transcendence of the transcendental seems so odd that it is all but banished from philosophy. We have often made this point in this chapter and elsewhere, and will return to it throughout both Books of this work.

Furthermore, all talk of the evolution of form, even the form of personal consciousness, is a talk of what and not who. Aside from the fact that such theories present problems for at least some philosophical biologies they reduce the matter of the unique ipseity to a form or what with distinctive properties. Yet I can no more say I derive from such and such antecedent worldly causal determinations than I can say that what “I” refers to evolves from what you, e.g., my mother, refer to when you say “I.” In this sense the “evolved person” is an oxymoron in the way the “evolved human” is not – prescinding from the difficulties that a philosophical biology may have with even the latter.

The tensions immanent in the paradoxical position that the subjectivity of the person is both that for which there is a world and that which is in the world become greater when we face the question of the meaning of death. But before we get to that we must further pursue the issues of the transcendental person and further paradoxes.

§5 The Spatiality and Bodiliness of the Transcendental Person

Here we confine our discussion to the paradoxical spatiality of the transcendental person. In the natural attitude we are bodies and have bodies. These bodies, at least in so far as we can make them to be objects present to us, are in spaces like rooms and houses, towns and states, skies and galaxies. Space is always arranged in relation to our situation and orientation. When the familiar forms of orientation are undone we ourselves become unsettled. We are on earth, which we take to be in
space. “Outer space” is the name for the space in which other “heavenly bodies” are. We move in and out of the containing spaces to wider spaces. When we get to “open spaces” we do not see any enclosing parameters. When we find ourselves on huge bodies of water, flying in the sky, or traveling in a desert we gain senses of open spaces. We can become anxious when the space is too confining and can acquire vertigo when it is causes us to lose perspective precisely because there are no limitations and no points of orientation. Empty space is not perceptible in the way confining spaces are. Empty space is apperceived as that which surrounds everything and is surrounded by nothing.

In the natural attitude we think of ourselves as living both in empty space and enclosed spaces. Whether or not the self itself is identical with the body, it too somehow lends itself to being thought of as associated with or inhabiting the body as a kind of spatial container. Whatever one’s theory of the relation of the soul and the body, one has experiences of oneself and one’s having a body. Again, it is natural to think of consciousness or the mind as somehow in the head or inhabiting the brain. As we suggested earlier, regional ontological reflection can raise questions about this corporalizing of consciousness, but that does not affect our typical pre-philosophical sense of our selves as somehow inhabiting space through our bodies.

Our bodies are clearly ourselves in so far as what happens to them happens to us. Further we have them in a way that enables us to think of ourselves as owners or possessors. We cannot have anything in the world unless we have bodies. If we do not attend to the body’s well being we have no life. And whereas we can get rid of all the things we have by way of the body we cannot get rid of our bodies without our bodies and without causing ourselves to vanish from the world. Therefore thinking of the body after the fashion of an instrument or tool, that is thinking about the body after the fashion of something else we have only through having the body, although a common temptation of the natural attitude, becomes puzzling when we become reflective. This hammer cannot be used without this “instrument,” i.e., one’s body; and if the body is an instrument for using instruments, then we need another instrument to use this instrument that uses the instrument that uses the instruments, etc. In short there is no using anything, including the body, without the body.63

Such reflections adumbrate issues that arise when we disengage our belief in the world and our bodiliness as a thing in the world. Here the senses in which we both are and have our bodies becomes more pronounced. We now bracket our practical belief-involvement with bodies and attend to how they appear. Bodies as things in space appear to us datives of manifestation; even our own body as something in space appears as “there.” Subsequent to the reduction, all bodies appear “there” to me, to me who am here and now. Bodies further are displayed typically as near or far, up or down, to the left or to the right, moving this way or that way, slow or fast, etc. Bodies in this sense are all attached to indexical tails, i.e., there, near, far, up, down, left, right. There is no reason to think of bodies as having these indexical tails or properties as a natural constituent feature. There is nothing about this body that makes it in and of itself “there” or “this” or “far away.” As manifest bodies they all relate to the perceiving standpoint “here.” All of space as “there” is
arranged in relationship to me “here.” As Husserl says, this sense of body is not among the “there’s” but is the zero-point of the coordinates of all the “there’s” in terms of their being “there,” “near,” “far,” “up,” “down,” etc. Of course “here” can be relativized; I can regard my body’s extremities as “there” and the eyes in my eye-sockets as “here.”

This sense of the body, i.e., as lived “here,” and what I am and not merely have, is generally absent or de-presented in our preoccupation with bodies in the natural attitude. Yet it is distinctively self-manifesting and this kind of manifestation is essential to our experiences of bodies. Husserl talked about this primarily under the heading of “kinaestheses.” For example, when I reach for something, its sense of its being far, heavy, moving away, moving towards, etc., is tied to the lived experiences in my arm and shoulders. As I, perched on a ladder, reach for “those apples way up there” the very sense of their being remote and up there is tied not to any map or spatial diagram but rather to the tension in my back, legs, shoulders and arms. (And perhaps their delicious appearance is tied to my hunger and thirst.) But in the reaching, the back, legs, shoulders, and arms are not in space for me in the way the apples are. They are not parallel objects that I might also reach for simultaneously. They are not the “toward-which” I am directed but rather the “through-which.”

The vector of my attention or intentionality is through my bodiliness toward what I am desiring or wanting to accomplish. Of course, my body itself can appear in this light too, e.g., when I attend to a wound or an itch. In this case my body is in space with other bodies. This body in space is the focus of medicine. But then the hand or arm attending to the part of the body needing attention itself is not in space in the way the needy part is. The German word Husserl uses for body as body-thing in space is Körper; for the non-objective lived subtle presence of body by which we are aware of bodies in space Husserl uses the German word Leib. In English we use the one word, “body,” and this hides the distinction. Therefore the term “lived body” has been proposed for Leib. In Chapter IV, §15 we discussed the lived body as flesh and “the touched touching.” The body as flesh is a unique form of intentionality where the immanence and transcendence of the lived body to itself are brought to light.

An animist or panpsychist could be thought of as someone who would, through her theory, transform theoretically inanimate objects, like stones, into flesh. It would be surprising, however, if the animist would not be able to make the distinctions between (a) the touched touching in the first-person, (b) the touching of a thing, and the touching of another (in the case of the second- or third-person). But even if she claimed to be unable to make these distinctions, even if the power of her belief in her theory were such that it would inform her perceptions of bodies “animatingly,” one might still wonder if the origin of this theory were not in the “discovery” of the “falseness” of the original phenomenological evidence.

Drew Leder, creatively employing insights of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, has elegantly brought to light how bodily intentionality typically is a “from-to directedness” or “ecstasy,” i.e., heading beyond itself. In being preoccupied with a task “there,” there is concomitantly the disappearance of the body as that through which
we act and move. Besides the disappearance, e.g., of the eye in my searching or reading, or my hip, legs and feet in approaching someone I have longed to see, there is another kind of disappearance, i.e., the recessive or depth disappearance. This has to do with the “viscera,” e.g., the liver and intestines, which are not part of the intentional arc that carries attention outward and away from the bodily points of origin. Generally this aspect of the body is not conscious but it may become so in a “dysappearing,” e.g., when a gall bladder infection painfully announces itself.

The gall bladder or intestine as a recessive or depth disappearance is a part of the body which we might well never come to know. In any case we do not use it directly in perceiving or acting upon the world. Further it is typically devoid of sensation and its disappearance is not a function of the “from-to” ecstasies of typical intentionality. The recessive bodily dimension can, e.g., in illness, “dysappear,” by taking initiatives apart from me. In which case it is not measured by what I can do but it spills over and is measured by what it can do and the initiatives it undertakes apart from me. This appearing/dysappearing of the recessive can transform my “I can” into a sense of “it can,” and this “it can” can be transformed into “it must” which perforce transforms the “I can” into “I cannot.”

For Leder, the brain belongs to the depth or recessive body. Further, he thinks it is phenomenologically evident that the brain “grounds my experience” and “lies at the seat of embodied thought, sensory experience and voluntary movement.” He thinks recessive absence is comparable to the absence/disappearance of a surface perceptual organ like the eye which is not seen in what it sees. Indeed, for Leder, the brain becomes what the transcendental I is for Husserl, the primal source of self-awareness and the display of the world. But there are distinctions. Where, for Husserl, the transcendental I is self-luminous and capable of a kind of articulate self-elucidation through reflection, the brain remains unconscious and its functioning is what the neurological experts tell us about it. Further, the brain is like any other measurable physical object in space and time: it is colored, its parts tend to have a uniform location and reach a typical size, it weighs several pounds, it is located in some room perhaps on a table, etc. It is an individual by reason of all the per accidens properties, both measurable and qualitative. The transcendental I, as we have seen, has quite different properties, and its core, the “myself,” has no properties and is individuated per se. Leder ultimately asserts a primacy for what is absent and other and unconscious in accounting for the wakeful presencing of consciousness. Ultimately his position veers toward a reductionism when he assigns ultimate metaphysical status to the brain as the ground and seat of consciousness. We implicitly return to Leder’s position when we face the issue (in Chapter VI) of the beginning and ending of the transcendental I. Let us return to our discussion of the spatiality of the transcendental I.

In moving through space in the natural attitude, it is perfectly clear that I am in the space that is being moved through. I perceive my body as a body-thing, and see it, as it were, from the outside, as if I were “there,” passing by this tree, then that one, and then that one. I find myself here, then there, then there, etc. But as the “here” of orientation of all the “there’s” I am always “here.” In order for me to take myself as moving through space, I have to shift my perspective on my self, i.e., I
have to de-center myself, and see myself (a first-person achievement) as a “there” among others, and thus “in the third-person.” From this perspective of an anonymous “here” “this side” of all here’s and there’s, I apperceive myself as first at that place, then at that one, and then at that one. Yet I am not simply there and there, but also always ineluctably “here” and the zero-point of orientation. As such I am not accessible as a changing place or as a movement among the “there’s.”

Were it not for my being in this “inaccessible place” I would not experience myself as changing places. In this position “here” I am present to myself as a total body at rest in regard to the motion of bodies occurring in oriented space. Of course, my limbs may be in motion and therefore I am like a tree trunk whose branches are moving. But when I myself am moving in space there is a mixture of motion and rest. In such a case, I am never for myself merely in motion nor merely at rest. In so far as the “there’s” describe me in relation to other “there’s” and other “here’s”, I am in motion. But for that apperception of myself as “there” I must be “here” and at rest. Husserl says that the lived body, because it finds itself both zero-point and an oriented point, at rest and in motion, touching and touched, it is dissimilar to all other objects.65

The paradox of the transcendental person’s spatiality comes to light in the respect and love we can have toward others, even for others who are not human. This comes out in Rilke’s theory of “intimate space” or the interiority of the heart or subjectivity. Rilke thinks of subjectivity as having a spatiality that is not commensurate with the space of parts outside of parts or contemporaneous space-points that are exterior to one another. The metaphorical intimate space is the space wherein the experienced forms of things intentionally in-exist in other than in their natural informing of real things in real space. This is the space of the mind which can intentionally house the natural forms or kinds and in this respect of display enhance or intensify these forms. (Cf. the medieval Thomist view of intentionality as providing natural forms with another mode of being, that of in-existence which Rilke appropriates and yet synthesizes with one proximate to the phenomenological one of directedness toward things or forms.) Further, here is where experiences are arranged as central and peripheral.

A translation of Rilke runs: “What birds plunge through is not the intimate space/in which you see all forms intensified.” Our perception of birds flying is that they are up and out there going to other “theres” by flying through the air. He then observes that we ought not to construe all space as the already given space of air and sky where contemporaneous parts exist outside of one another. Rather we may think of how space reaches “from us and construes the world.” In our intentional beholding and organization of space, things are displayed in accord with our horizons of interest. This “intensification” of the forms is their display as correlated with the mind and heart. A translation of the poem might read:

To know a tree, in its true element,
Throw inner space around it, from that pure
Space present in you. Surround it with restraint.
It does not limit itself. Not till it is held
In your renouncing is it truly there.66
Here Rilke makes several moves of interest to phenomenology. The first is the recognition that in Others there is a “here” that itself lives its life in relation to things in the world “there” by the transcending of consciousness which is inseparable from its interiority. Because this is so, Others, perhaps even some other things, may not be taken as merely surface and without a kind of inner depth or inner space. We do not experience Others as living lives unless we make an analogous transfer of our first-person experiencing and ownness onto that which is present before us. That being done, we, by way of the logic of the presencing of Others as Others, must renounce ourselves in the sense of exercising restraint in our being with them. That is, we must refrain from infringing on the inner space of ownness that our acknowledgement of them as Others has brought to light. Indeed, the restraint itself is part of the epistemic achievement of acknowledgment. (Cf. our discussion of love and empathic perceiving in Chapter IV.) Further this intentional embrace, which is not merely cognitive and which shows restraint, allows things to appear, to be “truly there” for us. In arranging things within world things receive their proper limits and true being. Again, this display of being enhances being not in the sense that it adds to the measurable physicality of things, but by inserting things into the world they receive the luminosity of form, sense, meaning — all of which presuppose the restraint. Without the restraint there is desecration.

Secondly, Rilke reminds us that our lived spatiality is something we display through our living our lives; it is not something that goes in advance of living our lives. The root of the lived pre-given sense of space is, as we shall say below, correlated with our sense of our own possibility. But the spatiality of our lives itself reflects the ordo amoris, the hierarchy of our preferences. Projects are pressing, they weigh heavily on us, some are more important than others right now because of the fundamental way we live in the world. This one (which is removed in space and time) appears as closest to our hearts while that one which is here and now appears as what we must suffer because it is removed from our heart’s desire and is but a means to that which I foremost want. The one I care about and with whom my thoughts are will seem nearer, even though a continent away, than those with whom I live. Yet the pain of separation can occasion that the smallest distance from the beloved appears great. These focal points of valuation imply a space-like field of value and action which we have opened up by the intentionality of the horizon of our desires. This opened-up space is not there in advance of our desires, ideals, valuing and planning. The space of our living in the world is constituted by the horizon of our will and desire which has the capacity to make room, let in, clear out and clear away, etc., as Heidegger taught.

Thus our way of being in the world opens up a field in which persons, things and projects appear as near and far. And, as we say, we must make space for things in our lives, we must create elbow room for ourselves in order to pursue these projects and in loving Others we must also give them space and elbow room. Space here then is nothing apart from this clearing away and making room in order that something may thrive. Respect and love of others is always at least giving them such elbow room by surrounding them with our restraint. The respected and loved things thrive only if provided such space.
Thus this ineluctable relationship of being to display is not to be thought of as a mere subjectivism, even though it can be that. Rilke’s whole point is the respect and reverence to be shown toward things so that they may come into the space that is proper to them in their own essential being, not what I, impelled by my will to power, distortingly laminate on top of them. “Not until it is held/ in your renouncing is it truly there.” Therefore it is a matter of the pure inner space pervaded by restraint. Self-discipline and restraint is the ethics of realism, of not letting one’s own idiosyncratic, prejudicial, selfish, and capricious impulses get in the way of letting things appear as truly themselves. These impulses interfere with letting things come into their own. Clearing away and making room is both projecting and restraining.

At an elementary level we may also say that space is not the already given system of points in relationship to one another into which we move and which we acknowledge as already there. Rather “empty space” and the space of the “exact essence” of non-privileged internally related points (like the points upon which a map or geometric figure is drawn) do not exist in advance of our projects and our being in the world as persons with wills. Indeed, such a system of points itself is founded on the elemental I-can and its actualization. Let us dwell briefly on this basic point.

Space is the transcendental I’s capacity for objects, which means for their being the same while here and there, near and far, sharp and vague, visible and invisible, in a sequence or at the same time (by way of an empathic or imaginative taking up other points of view). Such an apprehension of objects requires one’s being-able, i.e., I can empathically or imaginatively self-displace myself from here to there, I can move, I can remember, I can anticipate, etc.69

The I-can is based on the fundamental capacity of retention. Retention is how I, in experiencing Now, experience it has having followed upon Now, and Now, as having followed upon Now,; at Now, I experience together without remembering but merely by an automatic hanging on or retention, Now, Retaining we have said is also one’s elementary having of ourselves and the source of all sense of one’s own possibility, i.e., the “I can.”70

The kinaesthetic system of capacities, i.e., the power to move, feel, look here-there, up-down, etc. also builds on this I-can founded on retentions. Space as the systematic arrangement of the spots or places of geometric or arithmetic space is not given independently and in advance of this basic sense of my being able or “I can.” Rather space is given as that to which I can turn my attention or move myself and is not given independently of my sense of myself as being-able to move, e.g., able to move my eyes, neck, head, shoulders, legs, etc. Space as the objective system is the external or outer side of the inner side of the kinaesthetic system. It is the idealization of the foci emergent out of the subjective kinaesthetic system. We establish objective space as the plenum of possible points that I may attend to. But prior to the appearing of this ideality of objective geometric points independent of subjectivity, there is the lived sense of possibility and focus of attention. This objective system of spatial points thus always presupposes the space displayed in our everyday life of perception and action, i.e., the space of possible action tied to
our kinaesthetic system. Action precedes and founds the points of geometric space. And this sense of possible action itself is founded in the elementary familiarity of senses of one’s I-can. The abstract essence of “empty space” with its geometric space of points indifferent to the agent of manifestation in her original and space-originating bodily being in the world, is originally rooted in the lived bodily sense of the I-can which, in turn, creates elbow room in order to move and act. Space, most basically, is pragmatic space-making, making room, clearing out and away.

What does this all mean in regard to our basic topic of the paradox of the transcendental person? It means that in perceiving ourselves or others we perceive ourselves as both spatial or within space and not spatial or not within space. We obviously “occupy” space, are comprised of parts outside of one another, are capable of being measured in strict quantitative terms. At the same time each is a space-maker, the point of origin for spatiality as the creative making room. Each is in the world by this creation of a space in which to live. Each experiences herself and apprises Others as an I-can out of which the space “that birds plunge through” comes into being. Of course, the birds themselves experience space as correlated with their sense of power, but we experience the space “that birds plunge through” by our sense of our own power (or powerlessness) vis-à-vis this space and by reason of our empathic perception of the experience of the birds. If lived bodies were not creating a space in which to live, if there were not this projection of a horizon of possibilities, there would not come to light space as the mathematical empty space as that within which each body has its spot.

When I presence the transcendental person who you are, I presence you “there” within the space opened by my horizon of concerns and projects. But at the same time I must presence one who also is the zero-point of orientation and who experiences himself as “here.” I apperceive that you are experiencing yourself as a dative and agent of manifestation for whom all bodies are “there,” including the body I am, and I apperceive you as experiencing me and the other bodies as “there” within the framework of your projection of your possibilities. This is part of the sense of each experiencing the Other as an absolute exteriority to herself. I experience myself and apperceive you as a “space-maker” and as this requires surrounding things with restraint, so the mutual presencing of one another requires the even deeper restraint of respect. (See §6 below.)

§6 The Transcendental Person

The “transcendental person” refers to the full concretion of what each refers to with “I,” “you,” “she,” and “he” as brought to light by transcendental phenomenology. Therefore it is the way the transcendental phenomenologist thinks about the person. This means that what we are holding in view is more than the transcendental living I-pole and the “myself” as the ipseity which pervades the stream with “ownness.” It means also that what we have to do with is not merely the person as she is for us in
the natural “personalist” attitude that engages Others as Others through the appropriate empathic perception. And certainly she is not there merely as she is for us in the naturalistic attitude where first- and second-person experience is irrelevant and third-person presentations stunted by way of reducing the Other to the categories of, e.g., economics, psychology, biology, or physics. In the natural attitude the person is present as in the world, and this being in the world is being within a network of relations that also are in the world. The person is present as an Other, but the nature of that alterity is not examined in the light of the distinctive display and agency of manifestation of either the one perceiving or the one perceived.

In the natural attitude the comprehensive whole is the world. The person is taken up with that of which it is conscious; and even if that with which she is taken is a state of affairs, a proposition, or a theme there is a tendency to place these in the world in a way that is homogenous with the bodies of which she is conscious. For good reason, from the standpoint of the natural attitude, the alleged transcendental subjectivity, with its considerations of the I as subject, as center of acts, as the concrete totality of my I-can as my capacities for all acts, as the primal streaming, shining present (themes to which we will soon turn), etc., appear as unmotivated abstractions from the concrete whole that the person is. In contrast, for the transcendental attitude, the natural attitude’s understanding of the person resembles that of the “Flatlanders,” i.e., people whose lives are spent living within a geometrical plane, and who have no idea of the dimension of depth which undergirds them and of which they, qua Flatlanders, are merely a surface projection.

In the transcendental attitude that which is anonymous in the life of the person in the world in the natural attitude is brought to light. For the transcendental attitude, the embodied personal being-in-the-world immersed in its striving for self-preservation and the preservation of the layers of We to which it belongs, itself is abstract if it is not inserted in the absolute whole of transcendental subjectivity. It is abstract because the concrete whole of the full agency of manifestation, brought to light by the total disengagement from the doxastic allegiance to the world and by the disengagement of the validations, values and habitualities of the I that found the personal life in the world, is neglected.

But the transcendental attitude cannot rest content in this polarity. It may not forget that the natural attitude is its source of departure and ineluctable non-substitutable attitude for sustaining the natural basis of transcendental life. But neither may the philosophizing person forget what has been brought to light nor the agency by which things are brought to light. On the one hand, the transcendental I may never be entertained as absolutely cut off from its enworldment and involvement in the network of intersubjectivity. On the other hand, in its second-order naivety of the return to the natural attitude, the transcendental I, as well as its unique “myself,” its status as the dative and agent of manifestation of the world through its act-life and the founding gossamer of passive synthesis and temporality, must latently and habitually suffuse one’s understanding of the sense of the, the presence of the personal life in the world. The transcendental reduction’s display of the ultimate transcendental dimensions of being a person enriches the phenomenon “person.” In the second-order naivety, there is now “more there” to
person than prior to the transcendental display. Now in the objective appearing of the person what before was anonymous and neglected becomes manifest, namely the transcendental I and its functioning in the presence of the person.

Similarly one can say there is a new sense of the “world” uncovered by humanity. It is no longer the world of the natural attitude as the whole that subsumed exhaustively the sense of persons. Rather now world appears as it did before, as the true world, lived in and uncovered by people striving to make their way and make sense out of things; but it appears as relative to constituting subjectivity (and intersubjectivity). World is not simply “there” bereft of its display by subjectivity, but now is “there” as correlated to subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

Thus the new sense of the transcendental person and the world is a new epoch in humanity in so far as it raises, but does not necessarily answer, new questions about the world and “nature,” the history of the world, and the evolution of nature. These questions are inseparable from the fact that the new sense of world and transcendental person engenders a new mode of presencing persons. It also means that there is a new manner of being in the world for the transcendental phenomenologist. Even in her everyday praxis she does not simply return to the natural attitude, forgetting and repressing what has been uncovered by phenomenological reflection. Of course, the pressures and exigencies of the natural attitude remain that with which we must ineluctably deal if we are to survive and advance in our knowledge of the world. But, at the same time, the phenomenological attitude does not simply vanish in our meeting these interests.

This is not a skeptical attitude: the beliefs and pressures of the natural attitude are not changed to disbeliefs or mirages. But the new senses of world and person uncovered in the phenomenological attitude still hold; they still are in play in my “return” to the natural attitude – even though they are marginal or peripheral to my meeting the importunities of my life in the natural attitude. In other words, for the transcendental phenomenologist the phenomenological attitude becomes a habitus, a permanent disposition. But it is a “thematic habit” in the sense it is always in play in the display of the world. Things are not merely “given” absolutely bereft of their correlation with their display and the agencies of manifestation. How effective this habit is or ought to be in the pressing exigencies and importunities of daily life is not immediately clear. We will return to this question in connection with the themes of death and Existenz. It would seem that this habitus must itself be disengaged when obligations as well as the vital importunities of life demand full practical attention. But for the transcendental phenomenologist, it kicks back in whenever these pressures relax and permit theoretical attention for its own sake. When there is a freedom from the pressures of immediate praxis and its practical deliberations the transcendental disposition returns.

The notion of the transcendental person necessarily presents paradoxes in so far as we are compelled to live in the natural attitude and interpret our life in the world on the basis of both the natural as well as transcendental attitude. Do the paradoxes appear only because the transcendental phenomenological position is viewed from the natural attitude which confronts the transcendental claims from the natural attitude? No, they are prompted equally by the transcendental reflection on the natural
attitude, e.g., on the phenomenon of procreation. The assuming of a “second
naivety” results in the transcendental philosopher’s greeting the world of the natural
attitude with a new amazement and puzzlement. The dogmatism of the natural atti-
itude and its modern naturalistic-scientistic versions compound the wonder and
challenge the transcendental habitus.

The “new world” and new “transcendental person” bring to light questions that
are implicit in certain aspects of life in the natural attitude, e.g., the artistic and the
religious. But there are also questions that are raised by traditional metaphysics and
philosophy of religion that receive a distinctive treatment by phenomenological
philosophy. In much of the life returned to in the natural attitude, the transcendental
habit us permits a transforming enrichment to come to light. This is especially in
regard to the bodily in-the-flesh presence of the person. That of which we have a
mere inkling of in the natural attitude now is permitted to surface. Part of this
enrichment is the persistent problem of understanding how that which is in a phe-
nomenological respect not in the world, i.e., for whom and by whom the world
comes to light, is to be understood when it is embodied and therefore in the world.
And similarly we have the problem of understanding the nature of the career of the
transcendental person, whose embodiment in the world gives to her the same des-
tiny as every other body in the world. Key for this enterprise is not collapsing the
transcendental to the natural attitude. On the other hand, the “transcendental per-
son” points to the task of synthesizing these standpoints and not let the seeming
dualism hang in the air. It is also points to the task of not permitting the ultimate
positions of transcendental phenomenology seem otiose for questions that press
upon us because of the ineluctable nature of the natural attitude.

But again, any temptation to a “spiritualism” which devalues the natural attitude
in favor of the transcendental or, worse, which believes that the proper human life
is in the “pure” transcendental attitude is not only philosophically in error; it is a
form of madness. The transcendental attitude is essentially parasitic on the natural
attitude, and moral and physical necessities require that we, at least on occasion, let
go of it.

§7 Inalienable Dignity and the Transcendental Person

Following tips from Kant, philosophers have long noted the paradox of the tran-
scendental person in the following regard: Although persons are bodily in the world
exercising causal force of often a violent nature on the natural surrounding, includ-
ing their fellows, they are also as transcendental persons incommensurate with this
network of causality and this kind of agency. The paradox surfaces strikingly when
we consider that the effort to found rights, respect, and the required non-violence
towards persons struggles to bring to light the distinctive essential presence of per-
sons in the natural attitude. The language of these struggles is pervaded both by the
claims of the inalienability of rights and the seemingly irrepressible Realpolitik
with its typical deprivation and alienation of rights. We propose that we think of
politically bestowed or granted rights as founded in an improper sense of “claim” or “right” which itself is not founded in a political constitution, social contract, authority, or a promise. The bestowed rights function as safeguards of the unbestowed a priori “claim” or “right.” This latter we prefer to call the ineliminable “dignity” of the person, rather than a “claim” or “right” – both of which we typically take to be negotiable as well as conditioned by and dependent on historical circumstances. We further propose that we think of this “dignity” as correlated with the recognition that Others are transcendental ipseities, and as such have a capacity to make claims. This transcendent capacity is the inseparability of their ontological status (or, as Von Hildebrand put it, their “ontological value”) as ipseities. In a prior context we called this original dignity “the radiance of spirit.” We thus distinguish rights and the original ontological “claim,” “right” or dignity which founds them. This distinction parallels the distinction between the person and the “myself” in so far as the former is changeable and conditioned whereas the later is not. Yet we exist as “transcendental persons.” And as the rights are the protective “walls” of persons, and thus are inseparable from persons, and as persons are inseparable, even if distinguished, from the dignity of the transcendental I or “myself,” so a disregard of rights approaches a disrespect of the ontological dignity.

This distinction between rights and dignity functions, for example, in the German Constitution, Article 1, Section 1. Here we read that the dignity (Würde) of the human being is unantastbar: unimpeachable, ineliminable, inviolable, sacrosanct, ineradicable. Rights are to be acknowledged not primarily for themselves but because of the person who is the bearer of rights. It is the person herself who has qualities and is the possessor of rights. The person in her Würde is more basic than rights. Such challenges to moral order as the questionable legitimacy of nation states, Realpolitik, the absence of virtue, madness, etc. raise the issue of the violability of rights. One may freely renounce one’s rights, or one may be deprived of them, or one may forfeit them. Rights in this sense are bestowed with conditions and not absolute. But the “dignity” of the person herself is not forfeitable or negotiable or able to be in question in the way her qualities and even her rights are.

What is this Würde? Clearly we have a sense of someone carrying herself with dignity. Or the person may, because of her official capacity, necessarily be a “dignitary.” Or someone may be held to be laden with dignity because of her unimpeachable character. Or someone may be “dignified” because of the style of self-presentation in speech and bearing. All these forms of dignity are antastbar, i.e., able to be called into question, attacked, doubted, and criticized. They may eventually, through circumstances, vanish altogether. What then is this invisible yet inviolable dignity? Of course, it is inseparable from the person herself. She in her inviolable dignity is not simply in the world, rather one for whom the world is; she is a free agent whose lived agency is incommensurate with the worldly valuable things and thingy causality. “Dignity” and “radiance of spirit” are ways persons stand out from nature’s necessity and causality and are present in such a way that a restraint is placed on any inclination by their fellows to make them commensurate with the natural necessity and causality. Our view is that the dignity of persons is...
manifest and is to be observed scrupulously quite apart one’s accepting any authorities, laws or claims that one do so.

Our position here is close to but not identical with Kant’s notion of dignity (Würde). For Kant dignity or what we, with Simone Weil, are also calling the “radiance of spirit,” is rooted in our apperception that persons are such beings as to act correctly only if they see the moral correctness of acting so. For Kant this means that they are to act only if they follow laws which they themselves gave to themselves. We might say: if they follow laws freely on the basis of recognizing their legitimacy. In any case our apperception of the transcendence of the person, our recognition of her autonomy, in regard to any natural causal nexus is the intentional correlate of the radiance of spirit or its dignity.

The apperception of human autonomy, i.e., that the self is transcendent to any causality in the world and that she is thus self-retroscending in her freedom, is the foundation of the luminous quality of dignity or radiance which is inseparable from the perception of persons. It is this which is the moral fortress that prohibits coercion and transgression of this inviolable subjectivity. In this sense we, as Others to the Others, ought not to violate that inner space and abyss by and through which this self-determination is realized. This basic dignity or worth, Kant urges, is to be contrasted with the everyday capitalist or mercantile world wherein everything is capable of being substituted with axiological equivalence for something else in terms of a price. Dignity has to do with what essentially has no such equivalence, has no price. And it is this dignity of the person which elevates persons beyond all relative value, i.e., to what has no price, but which is a transcendent non-negotiable value and end in itself. In another place Kant speaks of respect (Achtung) in terms of what I have for another or what another can require of me (observantia aliis prestanda); respect is therefore the recognition of the worth (dignitas) of other humans, i.e., of a value that has no price, no equivalent in regard to which an object of value-estimation could be exchanged.

This apperception of the transcendence of the person, we have proposed (see Chapter IV, especially §14), awakens a burgeoning notion of respect. Here we differ from Kant. For Kant respect is indeed for persons not things. And persons are to be made present to us as ends in themselves and not means. But for Kant the respect is not due the individual person who is “unholy enough” but due this person embodying in herself “humanity” and this person’s being “the subject of the moral law by reason of his freedom” – and it is this which is holy and deserving of our respect. Contempt of others (Verachten) is always reprehensible because it goes against the basic respect which is due every one, “for all are humans.” Again, the tension in Kant is whether to place the target of the respect in the person herself or rather in her having the property of being human and having capacity for respect of the moral law. Does this displacement of the target of respect to the person’s “humanity” not threaten Kant’s view that respect is for persons and not Sachen, i.e., are not “humanity” and being “the subject of the moral law by reason of his freedom” properties (in this sense, Sachen) that are targeted and not the person herself? Yet Kant, perhaps in spite of himself, also notes that the presence of the person as an end her itself awakens in us the awareness of the sublimity of our own
nature and its exalted “calling” (Bestimmung) and makes us aware of how far we fall short in our action of the sublimity of our calling. And, contrariwise, when we have performed our duty in spite of the attractive opportunities that would have come our way if we had not done our duty, we may hold our head high, aware that we have preserved humanity in our own person and in its dignity.79

Here again the dignity is tied to our having been faithful to the calling to embody an honorific sense of humanity, even though it also suggests that there is a prior knowledge of this dignity in our own person that is preserved precisely because of having done our duty. This sense of humanity is suffused, it appears to this reader, with a first-person sense of person as free and transcendental, and not merely a member of a natural kind, called human. It is also suffused with a sense of rationality tied to first-person agency that is not of necessity connected with the natural kind, called human. Like St. Thomas (see below) Kant ties the dignity to persons and yet this dignity is only found in “intellectual (or rational) natures.” “Human” is subordinate to a first-person sense of agency of manifestation and responsibility, not the other way around.

Kant notes that we may bow or give a sign of great deference out of a desire to appear in good form to a person of eminence or prominence when in fact our spirits do not bow, just as we may bow in spirit to a person of inferior position even if we do not bow and rather snootily keep our head high (in order to keep her in her proper lower class position) when we perceive in her decency and integrity.80 Here again, the examples purport to suggest, at least prima facie, that respect and dignity have to do with merit. Yet the examples also suggest that dignity and its corresponding respect are not merely something that accrues as a result of moral excellence, but something that persons already have, and which their moral behavior may either betray or reveal. (Cf. our discussion in Chapter IV, §21, of “Ontological Value.”) Indeed, for Kant, both the inner satisfaction in doing what one ought to do, and the edification in seeing Others act with integrity and in response to their conscience reveal a prior awareness of what is quite different from ordinary life’s pursuit of pleasures and enjoyment. That is, through such moments of personal integrity in our selves and others we gain a hint of our own “supersensuous existence” which is not ours by reason of any meritorious agency. Further in such moments there is a revelation of and a respect for our higher determination or vocation (Bestimmung).81 Again, for Kant this is first of all an awareness of “humanity” or “the moral law,” i.e., of reason for its own sake and not in response to any sensuous inclinations on our part. But clearly what we have foremost to do with here is not an awareness merely of a Sache but rather it is an awareness of ourselves as someone. This is an awareness of who we are. But it is also an awareness of what we are, e.g., agents of manifestation, and sources of free agency and responsibility. It is an awareness of the exalted dignity of our being who and what we are, and what sort of persons we are called to be.

No less important for our future discussions is Kant’s view that this awareness of the dignity of our ownmost transcendent “supersensuous existence” and higher vocation is the Triebfeder, i.e., the mainspring or dynamism or decisive motive at the heart of our moral agency, i.e., practical reason.
For us this dignity is the basic “worth” or dignitas of persons, and this is more fundamental than considerations of the moral law, especially if this is to be thought of as reason activating itself in terms of a principle of universalizability. It is thus also the basis of an original equal worth of persons. This is the original “radiance of spirit” that persons have quite apart from their natural or acquired beauty or virtue. The particular person in her original dignity is not among the things in the world which, from my standpoint, are framed by their being in my spatial-temporal-meaning horizon, i.e., she contrasts with those things that are next to one another, near or far from me, judged exclusively in terms of their value-qualities of being-precious or being-worthless, being means or ends, lovely or ugly, etc.

We can take advantage of a description by Jean-Paul Sartre to give a concrete sense to dignity as the radiance of spirit. It is interesting that in this account the Other is present third-personally, but in the engagement with the world, her presence verges on being second-personal. The Other is there for me not merely as a part of the world but as a part that refused to be taken as a part, indeed, as one for whom I myself with my apperception of the world might not meet an accommodation with which I am comfortable. The person is there “radiantly” because the lines or rays and highlighting of my meaning horizon become fraught with tension by reason of her presence not submitting passively to being part of the whole which is the world as I have arranged it. By reason of my apperception of her, customary comfortable lines and highlighting of my meaning horizon become taut through being polarized like a magnetic pole vis-à-vis her own meaning horizon. Her being “there” de-centers the intentional rays in my arrangement of the world; she changes the equilibrium in my display, arrangement, and highlighting of the world. With the awareness of another person on the scene, it is as if the lines by which I have delineated the world are unsettled by the draw of a magnet which pulls my delineation into another alien perspective of which I “ought” (in an original sense) to take account.

This is the sense we may give to her making an original “claim.” Her very presence makes this claim. Thus she is not simply spatially in the world but her presence is like a force-field of meaning, a center of radiation that causes a tension within mine. And whether or not she looks at me and addresses me, whether or not we are second-personally in communication, I am still called to take account of and make room for her being there as a point of view. When she does address me then the last residue of her being an object in my world is surmounted because her face, her eyes in particular, vanish, or rather become completely diaphanous as that surface on which her look rests. In seeing her looking at me my perception does not rest on her eyes. They are no longer at a distance from the place where I am observing, but rather “the look is upon me without distance but holds me at a distance.” This immediate presence explodes her being merely something in the world and, further, it removes me from an awareness of myself as being an object there for her. Now I am absorbed with her presence and her presencing me in a way that makes a claim on me and requires my being present to her and her presencing. Of course, I apperceive an analogous tension in her own field of perception as it encompasses me.

How each of us with our life-world or meaning horizon is permitted to be placed within our mutual meaning-horizon is up to each of us. Whether or not we respond
to the original claims, hers on me and mine on her, and our mutual adjustments in
the course of this dialectic, whether or not we appropriately defer, make space,
exercise restraint, etc. is up to us. But the original situation is one of original
“claims,” original “rights,” an original “radiance of spirit.” As Kant put it, the mod-
eration in the demands, the free limitation of self-love of a person through the self-
love of another is modesty. The lack of this moderation through demanding to be
loved and esteemed by others is conceit and arrogance.83

Here is the basis for the claim that one might accept “the first-order norms that
structure the dignity of the persons and regulate himself scrupulously by them
without yet accepting anyone’s authority to demand that he do so. He might even
accept these as mandatory norms without accepting any claim to his compliance.”84
The very presence of the Other, properly recognized, is the basis for the first-order
norms, and is quite independent of there being, or my accepting, an authority’s
demand that I regulate myself according to such norms.

In this very common and endlessly repeated event there is the drama of the dig-
num et justum est, i.e., the challenge of or call to render an original act of balance
and giving due. It is the original dignitas that St. Thomas appears to equate with the
person when he says “person signifies an individual substance pertaining to its dig-
nitas [which we perhaps may render with “dignity” or “inherent worth”] and such
is only to be found in an intellectual nature.”85

The “radiance of spirit” is manifest in the third-person and we may even show
respect and be respectful to “Others,” to “them” by regulating our conduct toward
them. Thus we may observe a people’s customs and mores by not doing certain
things that we know would be offensive to them. But there is doubtless a more pre-
cise sense of “respecting someone” that occurs in the second-person. In which case
I am not respecting “persons” or “someone” but respecting someone I address with
“you.” Here we do not merely regulate our conduct towards someone but we may
further acknowledge that we are accountable to the person and make ourselves
accountable to this person. Here may well act respectfully toward this person in our
dealings with her in our speech and conduct. We may ask permission, make apolo-
gies, make amends, etc. Here clearly the proper fuller sense of respect is only
achievable in the second-personal relation.86

In accord with such teachings, as those of Aquinas, Kant, Sartre, and Husserl,
the person cannot be placed among the things in the world, and certainly never
regarded absolutely as a means for something or for anyone else, even though we
inevitably find one another in certain respects useful and of service in the course of
living our lives. The essential dignity manifest by reason of someone’s having the
ontological status of a person is of a different order than all the other worthy and
dignified aspects of people and things in the world. And as the person is a non-sor-
tal, non-ascriptive term, i.e., beyond all properties, so this sense of dignity cannot
be in the proper sense a manifest value-quality had by the person (as she may be
said to have dignity, gravitas, courage, and wit), but rather is the disclosure of
essential ipseity of the person which founds the dignity and is the bearer of all the
manifest value-qualities. (Again, this is an “ontological value” if we may under-
stand this to be not a property but inseparable from the personal being or ipseity.)
Again, nothing the person does or acquires removes this dignity. Hate as we have proposed takes the repugnant property of the person for the whole of the person in an effort to suppress the other’s ipseity. Violence is the expression of this suppression of the Other’s incommensurate dignity and eo ipso relegates the person to a physical thing in the world worthy of being maimed or annihilated on behalf of one’s own ends. Most ancient justifications of self-defense against aggressors have seemingly had an intimation of the non-negotiable worth or dignity of persons because they have always enjoined prohibitions of violence and killing. These were never permitted to be willed directly.

Thus we may appropriate Aquinas’ joining the essence of the person with the dignity of an individual substance of a rational nature. Similarly it is no wonder then that for the person who loves, i.e., one for whom the ipseity of the other person is supremely manifest as beyond all qualities, there is no question of the violability of the person’s dignity.87

§8 Transcendental Person as Microcosm

It is likely that Aristotle played a role in the Renaissance and Leibnizian theme of “microcosm” when he noted that intellect, in its mode of possibility for actuation by the agency of manifestation, is “in a certain sense all things.” “All things” that come to light through the agency of intellect, even the presently unknown things, lie within the scope of intellect because its desire to know leaves nothing out and this eros of mind constitutes, through its leaning into the future and through hopeful expectations, horizons of the meant but not-given unknown. The unknown is intended by us as the horizon of the known. As this horizon it is present as the penumbra of the knowable surrounding the known. The *eros* of mind is to bring all there is into a unifying insight or under an encompassing point of view.

Husserl found congenial Leibniz’s notion of monad because it captured the insight that individual consciousness was not constituted or individuated by anything in the world.88 But this does not mean that the Husserlian monad is not involved in the world and with Others, that it is bereft of “windows.” Rather Husserl, holds that the monad has, through its intentionality, a necessary complex reciprocal relation with Others and the world, i.e., it “has windows.” We interpret Husserl’s monad, which is the way transcendental phenomenology considers the transcendental I in its full concretion of a life in the world with others, to be the equivalent of the transcendental person.

Leibniz’s term of “microcosm” was developed because of his position that the “monads,” which by definition are unique individuals, are characterized essentially as being a unique perspective on the world (cosmos) as all there is. (See our discussion of Leibniz’s theory of individuality in Book 2, Chapter VI.) He called this perspective a “mirroring.” Monads exist by being perceivers of the world from a certain situation. They are essentially correlated intentionally to the world. Because they are not the world but essentially correlated to the world they are mini-worlds
or microcosms. Further, in so far as the person or monad was unique and a unique perspective on or display of the world, monads were, through intentionality, contracted worlds unto themselves which were incommensurable with one another.

Within the transcendental phenomenological framework of this work this does not mean that the world is bereft of commonality, e.g., ideal objects and common goods which are the same for us all. Rather these themselves find a kind of unique allocation and serve as distinctive markers within world as the unique synthesis of the synthesises (which constitute these ideal objects and common goods). World as this unique synthesis reflects the unique monad or ipseity as the individual essence or “myself.” For phenomenology intentionality is properly of something within the world. All things are articulated as within the world. And this articulation is also always and inseparably from out of the ultimate context of world. For example, this thing here and now is presented as from out of the spatial and temporal horizon; and this word you are now reading has the sense it does because of the prior contexts and expected contexts with which you instill it, and these include not merely the prior words and sentences but all aspects of your unique life that are relevant and as they are present in this Now.

The I is the exemplary monad in its “I myself-ness.” World is both the same for us all, with various layers of “our” world, as well as “my” world, i.e., an achievement of I myself in my unique ipseity. Again, we will have occasion to return to the details of this later. In the course of perceiving the things in our world, every thing fits in as a part of a whole or a text of a larger context. In coming across it we arrange it categorically in the overarching framework of the world as the ultimate horizon. However, the persons we meet are ipseities, uniquely unique individual essences, and therefore not as such exhaustively individuated by the world. Independent of their being in the world and having properties their individuation derives from themselves as I’s or unique consciousnesses. Thus they are an interruption in the flow of one’s more or less casual arrangement of things as all falling within the world because they are unique wholes that are both outside the whole and within the whole. As unique individuals apart from the world’s individuation, as wholes resisting integration into my world arrangement, and as being intentionally the whole world from their unique perspectives, they, as we noted, create “force-fields” of tension in my delimitation of the world.

We perceive them as unique persons, but we also are capable of seeing them as datives and agents of manifestation, that for whom and by whom the whole world appears. Therefore although they are there for us like any other thing, i.e., bodily and subject to the contingencies and dangers of any physical body in the world, and at the mercy of how they will be treated, perceived and judged by us, they are not simply there, mute and passive to our gaze. In perceiving them, we are looked back at, and we, through their gaze at us, are more keenly aware of ourselves as also contingent, vulnerable, and mortal bodies in the world.

It is important to see that the presencing of the person is an appresentation of a dative of manifestation. With this there is a presence in the world not only of Da-Sein, but also Da-Wesen, i.e., here is where there comes to light the eternal essences and truths of the world. Husserl was fond of the term, “bearer of the validity of the
world,” *Geltungsträger der Welt.* To exist is to be in the world, and this is to exist as part of the weave of the world. As such it is to be there as true, valid, and evident. Such judgments may be a result of our own assessment or as a result of our believing that of others. Further, things are there in some mode, e.g., as actual, possible, contingent or necessary. For example, the world is pervaded by various kinds of necessities, e.g., logical necessities, natural necessities, and moral necessities. And things are there as types, universals, natural kinds, essences – all with their necessary and contingent properties. For example there are cultural universals, like “shortstop” or “the president of the United States” that have their “necessary” properties within our social culture. There are also empirical essences that are uncovered by everyday and scientific observation, e.g., the properties of West Nile Virus; and there is the *eidos* of a “promise” with its defining necessary and universal properties that can be brought to light through free imaginative variation, e.g., that promises are instituted by speech acts that not only commit the speaker to a specific future deed, but bestow certain rights on the person receiving the promise. The world of individual things is pervaded by such necessities and essences that “hold” or “are valid” for the I.

Thus the thesis of the transcendental person permits us to claim that the entire world’s display, as having these distinctive necessary and contingent features that are woven together in the ongoing basic belief, is founded on transcendental persons who are always also contingent bodily things in the world. These, as the agents of display of the validity of eternal and contingent truths that compose the texture of the world, are the “bearers” of all such eternal and contingent truths. And in so far as we suffuse the bodily personal presence before us with the results of the transcendental attitude, we have before us in this contingent, vulnerable ephemeral being the locus, the *Da*, of the display of the world’s eternal and contingent truths, its *Wesen*.

To summarize: Within the world we find ourselves in the presence of persons who are unintelligible unless we correlate their whole lives with the world. Further in the bodily presence of persons we find the distinct individual essences that are incommensurable wholes or worlds unto themselves even though they are there in the flesh and inserted in the matrix of the world. Finally these “individual essences,” these “ipseities,” are the bearers of the eternal significances and essences of the world, but they are present to us as such “in earthen vessels” that are contingent, vulnerable, and ephemeral.

§9 Transcendental Person as Necessary Being and Essence

Not only is the transcendental I a unique essence and the bearer of the eternal and temporal validities of the world, but it enjoys a unique necessity that stands in tension with the clearly evident contingency of the person. Let us return to an earlier consideration. We said that I can entertain that not only my experiences might be different than the ones I have or have had, but also that my life, my
position-takings, my engagements, my personal identity etc. could be, and could have been, different from the ones that are presently mine. Here clearly a sense of I remains in tact even though, through a blow of fate, I would not know “who in the world” I am. Can I then turn to me myself, and ask whether I could have been someone different and not me? To entertain this I would have to imagine me in my life-stream objectified before me and this I myself being replaced by another or placed in the other’s life-stream – and yet somehow I still would be imagining me not being me! These are impossible phenomenological acrobatics.

We must distinguish here between the clear possibility that JG Hart, by which I mean what everyone else, at least in principle, means or may mean by this reference, not exist, and the problematic task of I myself imagining my not being me. In the former case all the facts that are true about this person and which can be known by everyone in principle are contingent and there is obviously no problem about thinking that this person might not have existed. In the latter case, my being not being able to imagine or conceive my not being me appears to have a kind of necessity. But there is an ambiguity that requires a distinction. To conceive my not being me might be construed to be conceiving my not being. (We will discuss conceiving one’s own non-being in the next chapter as well as in Book 2, Chapters I–II.) Or it might be conceived to mean my not being me and no one else at all. Or it might be the task of conceiving my not being me but rather someone else. Our position for all three possibilities is that they all presuppose necessarily my being me in the conceiving/imagining, and this may become anonymous in being taken up with what is conceived/imagined, whether this be “nothing at all” or one’s being dead, or one’s being someone else.

As we shall see my imagining my not having all the distinguishing properties of JG Hart, e.g., being of a different race or gender, is by no means impossible and my imagining my not being the identifiable person JG Hart itself affords a measure of possibility. That is to say that such a task is quite different from my imagining or conceiving my not being me but rather someone else.

Castañeda leads us through a third-person reflection on one’s own necessity: If there is known somebody who is JG Hart, and JG Hart exists, the first-person propositions belonging to JG Hart have a contingent existence: They exist if and only if JG Hart exists. But given the existence of JG Hart and given these propositions, “I exist,” said by JG Hart, even though JG Hart and these propositions are contingently existing, is necessarily true.

Here we, in reflection, displace the first-person propositions to a third-person context so that they are tied to the person, JG Hart, who contingently exists. But JG Hart necessarily exists in saying, “I exist.” Is there a philosophical loss or disadvantage with this move? Clearly there is the simplicity of seeing an aspect of the transcendental claim from the standpoint of the natural attitude. One disadvantage is that it appears to give to the natural attitude a philosophical priority and to subordinate display to existing real bodies and to subordinate “I” to these same bodies. In the natural attitude there is clearly no problem with this. But it is problematic in so far as transcendental phenomenology finds paradoxes in the natural and transcendental attitudes in the senses of “I” and “person.” And this transcendental dimension is hinted at in the consideration that although the first-person proposi-
tions about JG Hart are contingent, “I exist,” said by JG Hart, is true necessarily.
For transcendental phenomenology, as well as for Castañeda’s own phenomeno-
logical, albeit Kantian, ontology, first-person disclosure is not simply or primarily
a property of pre-existing bodies.

Of interest for us here is there are matters of necessity in Castañeda’s transcenden-
tal pre-fix, i.e., his view that the declarative use of “I” (e.g., “I believe that…”
“I think that…”) as in “I believe (here now) that the tree is diseased” is necessarily
functioning in all worldly propositions (like “The tree is diseased” or “I am going to
die”), whether these propositions themselves are contingent or necessary. Further, the
implicit proposition itself of the transcendental pre-fix (“I believe”) itself seems to be
necessarily true – even though this transcendental-prefix as such, i.e., *in exercitu*, is
not in the world of phenomena. (See Chapter II, §4.) In the transcendental attitude the
transcendental I myself is not at all part of the world.

Let us return to the earlier thought experiment of conceiving or imagining
whether I could have been someone else. Here there are two aspects. The first is
that in order to properly imagine this, I myself must exist or be (imagining). “I
don’t exist now” is different than “JG Hart does not exist now.” The latter, at the
time of this writing/spearking, is false, but is not internally contradictory. The
speaker could be JG Hart and he could be lying, but his statement would not be
internally contradictory. Or the amnesiac, who JG Hart is, could say this, not know-
ing that he is JG Hart, and having reason to believe that someone named JG Hart
died. In which case he too would be in error, but not lying, nor would his statement
be internally contradictory. But “I don’t exist now” is internally contradictory. This is similar to the internal contradiction when I imagine that I could have been
not me but someone else. Here the “I imagine” requires that I be while imagining
me to be otherwise.

Secondly, to imagine that I am someone else I would have to bestow on “myself”
another life-stream or on another life-stream my “myself.” But again, this imagina-
tive elimination of me in favor of another life-stream requires that I think or imag-
ine I do not exist, or I think myself as not being, and this is not possible while I am
doing the thinking. When I attempt to think myself displaced to another life stream,
I myself persist in the conceiving or imagining.

At the same time the other imagined version of the other one who I am but who
is different from me and not me is still a declension of me myself (after all, the task
is to conceive or imagine my not being me and my being someone else; it was not
to conceive or imagine someone else). Thus, in all the possible variations of me
myself being someone else an apodictical core of me myself persists. Granted that
“myself” here is not able to be identified by any properties in the world; neverthe-
less the basic sense of I myself persists not only in the imaginative variations of
myself that I might entertain, but also in the attempt to imagine myself as not being
me but being someone else.

What about when I imagine the possibility of my not having been? I can cer-
tainly imagine that this and that thing not be, that this and that person or even the
identifiable person I am, JG Hart, not be or not have been. But, again, I cannot
imagine or conceive that I have not been in so far as this is an immediate
implication of my not being able to think that I am not. The fact that now is passing
and always a retention of a no longer Now means typically that I cannot both be
now and not ever have been. (Whether I can think my having become or ceasing to
be, will occupy us in the next chapter.) Whereas I can think that others not be
(although I apperceive that they cannot think themselves as not being while think-
ing) I can only think that I might be other than I am, not that I am not or that I am
someone else. In the transcendental attitude, everything that I entertain or think
about need not be; but in my own case only how I am need not be. Only this is con-
tingent. It cannot be thought that I am not or have never been.

Of course, how I am is necessary for the context that includes my personal life,
the others with whom I stand in formative relationships, just as how others are is
necessary for the particular context of my life. But all these contexts and relation-
ships are contingently necessary. None of them exist as a matter of absolute neces-
sity. George W. Bush is necessary for what we call “US politics and foreign policy
at the beginning of the twenty-first century” but George W. Bush can be thought as
not being or not having been, just as the US politics and foreign policy at the begin-
nning of the twenty-first century may be thought of as not being or not having been.
But the one in the White House, who is George W. Bush, the husband of Laura
Bush, and who refers to himself with “I,” can think that he, George W. Bush, need
not be but he cannot think that he himself is not.

Of course, to think the world without George W. Bush requires that we rethink
numerous events that he has set in motion as well as numerous events that resulted
specifically in his coming to be. This is perhaps a practical impossibility but it does
not seem to be an essential one. What doubtless is practically possible is thinking
of the world in the absence of the presidency of George W. Bush along typical lines
from, say, a left- or right-leaning geo-political perspective.

For the transcendental agent of manifestation, e.g., George W. Bush, none of the
presidential or foreign policy politics must be thought as necessarily having to be
or having to have been. Only the transcendental I and unique agent of manifestation
that George W. Bush points to with the implicit or explicit transcendental pre-fix
in his making declarative statements must be or have been. The positing of things
being different or of their not being at all presupposes the “positing” of the agent
of manifestation’s being. All this may be generalized: An I’s (or a monad’s) positing
of things being different or not being at all presupposes the positing of the I (or
the monad) as tacitly posited (as being).

I therefore can totally transform the world in my imagination by changing (in
more or less definite contours) all the events and inhabitants in the world, I can
even think the non-being of everything I entertain, but I cannot think away my
being in this imaginative transforming or annihilating of the all of other beings. Of
course when I think of the other I’s who refer to themselves with “I” and who too
can vary the world and entertain the non-being of me and whatever else is within
the world, I intend them as experiencing themselves apodictically. But their I-apo-
dicticity is not what I experience. I cannot experience the “myself” of any other.

We earlier noted the recalcitrance of “myself” being equated with the essence,
form or eidos of “the I”: Whereas the latter is the communicable form displayable
for us all, “myself” is uniquely unique and incommunicable. Yet in order to refer to others or perceive them I must transfer onto them the form of “the I” even though I cannot make them present as I. Thus I “appresent” them as uniquely unique, with a life-stream informed by immanent temporality, with a pole of affectivity, passivity and activity, i.e., I appresent that they are co-agents of manifestation, that they are persons and therefore substrates of habits, position-taking acts, etc. I thus extend to them the “eidos I-ness.”

However, when we do this we then have, as Husserl points out, a remarkable case in the relation of eidos to fact. Typically the being of an eidos, the being proper to eidetic possibility of some possible real being in the world, is free of the being or non-being of the actual realization of these possibilities. (Here we are not talking about the eidos of an ideal object like a “number,” “quantifier,” or “quotient,” whose conception is equivalent with their [ideal] existence.) In entertaining an eidos, e.g., of a martian, vampire, promise, nation-state, etc., the actual being of these is not necessary and the eidos is being-independent. I can conceive the essence of “nation state” or “just society” without there being any such actual thing or even without there ever having been such. But this is not the case of the transcendental I. The eidos of the transcendental I is not thinkable without the transcendental I being factual. There is no possibility of entertaining a merely possible eidos “I” without a factual I – and this contrasts not only with empirical essences such as “nation state” but also with abstract entities such as “number.”

This is not merely saying that nothing can be present without one to whom and by whom it is present. Nor is it merely saying that the essence of whatever matter or state of affairs cannot be present without the one presencing, without someone displaying properties. No, the point here is a different one. Here we have something proximate to the Anselmian ontological argument in so far as in the entertaining of an essence, the eidos I, we cannot entertain this eidos as essential possibility without positing an (one’s own) actual, factual I because the essence can only emerge out of the lived first-personal experiencing I. The eidos “I” necessarily is a construal and positing of an actual I in the way the eidos “nation state” (or even “human being”) is not a necessary construal and positing of an actual nation state (or human being) because this essence of “I” is only available for eidetic reflection in an actual existing I. In contrast with all other essences, what is entertained when it is presented cannot be essentially different from what is entertaining it; similarly it cannot be entertained by what is not I.93

An essentially connected “ontological argument” can be made with regard to the “essence” of I myself as the unique individual essence. As we noted, here one cannot distinguish the form or essence and the unique individuality. The eidos here includes the individuality and the individuality is inseparably a form. The eidos that I myself am cannot be conceived without affirming my existence.

But is this not true also of the third- and second-person? Let us examine this. If one could entertain “Peter” in his unique essence one necessarily includes in this essence the actual unique individual “Peter.” What is so absolutely uniquely unique, this uniqueness being its “essence,” cannot be entertained without entertaining its existence. The “principle of individuation” of the “myself” does not lie
outside of itself, e.g., in space-time, but rather within self-awareness itself. In being aware of my “myself” as more “distinctive than the taste of camphor,” I am aware of it as an existing individual.

But can a concrete uniquely unique individual, Peter, known in the second- or third-person conceivably not exist or never have existed? Everything here depends on whether I can present “Peter” analogously to the way I live or “taste” “I myself,” which is, we have maintained, what love is.

It might seem we here are saying something hypothetical: If I am, or Peter is, present as an individual essence, then I or Peter would have to exist and have to exist as this unique individual. But the comparison fails. In the first-person there is nothing hypothetical. The eidos “I myself” cannot be entertained without my actual being.

But is it true that in the second- and third-person we cannot entertain the unique individual “Peter” without believing in his actual existence? Two remarks at least belong here. Doubtless the presencing of the individual essence “Peter” is inseparable from the belief that he exists. But what about my friend Dan’s regular eloquent reporting to me, throughout our forty-year friendship, about Peter; would that quasi-in-the-flesh representation of Peter not lead to an analogous positing of his existence? But what if it turned out that my friend’s representation was a fiction? In this case, I would negate the positing of, and having posited, the existence of the “individual essence” of Peter. Thus the essence which I would still retain as vividly as before would in no way imply the existence. (Cf. a Dickens’s character such as Uriah Heep; on encountering these fictional characters, they become ways in which we describe the real personal essences of people we meet in real life.)

Secondly, even my in-the-flesh experience of Peter’s essence, i.e., his unique person and personality known in love, would not guarantee that the essential Peter was absolutely unique or that he existed – even though love essentially is reality-affirming. In the second- and third-person, it is not inconceivable that there be the metaphysical clone of Peter, or a robotic simulacrum of an incarnate ipseity present in the guise of a rich constellation of properties and whom I came to know as Peter. It could be that Peter whom I truly loved is no longer living, and I am directing my love at the clone or the robot. The love-filled experience of Peter does not require that Peter necessarily exists in the way the first-person experience requires my existence. Of course, there is much to say about how the presence of the Other in love may be endlessly more important than my ineluctable affirmation of my own first-person existence. But that we postpone in this book.

In short, the belief in the second- and third-person can lead us to the point where we would be willing to die for the (possibly non-existing) essential individual Peter, but this love or belief could be in error. In my own case the knowledge or conviction of, or belief in, my own existence is not of the same nature as my belief in Peter’s existence. Even though I might be disposed to cancel out my own (JG Hart’s) life, and thus my existence, through suicide, my awareness of my own existence as the possessor of this miserable life, regardless of the validity from an intersubjective standpoint of my perception of the quality of my life, is not capable
of being doubted. The individual essence, in this sense the eidos, “Peter” is simply not available with the apodictic certainty of I myself.

Let us consider one more and final consideration from Husserl. We have said that with the eidos or essence the fact of one’s own existence is necessarily given. This is true of the whole universe of transcendental persons and monads: The eidos of the universe as the essential disclosure of the all of monads (transcendental persons), or transcendental subjectivities, or the universe of I’s, necessarily presupposes the existence of I myself as the agent of manifestation. How are we to understand this fact of the existence of I myself? As Husserl insists, this fact cannot be understood as one of the possibilities which could just as well not exist, as if another could have existed just as well. Of course, I, as JG Hart, exist contingently in a particular time and place, and JG Hart might have existed elsewhere and at another time or not at all. But I as the transcendental I presencing the universe of monads, and perhaps imaginatively varying this universe in myriad ways, am not contingent in the way JG Hart is. I, as the transcendental I, am factually, and we will have to attend to this facticity in later discussions in more detail; but this is not the facticity of a contingent being that has a horizon of possibility in which the factual transcendental being is one of the possibilities in the world that must be entertained. Rather this fact of transcendental being is precisely the absolute fact, the fact of manifesting and entertaining the contingent and necessary, not the fact of something manifested and entertained within the web of the world’s contingencies. But neither may it be thought of as necessary, if that means as a necessity within the horizon of the world’s possibilities and necessities. The facticity and necessity of the transcendental I is not measured by the horizon of worldly contingency and necessity which emerges out of our experience of things in the world.

(We here are referring to the world’s necessities and possibilities. “Possible worlds” are included only in so far as they are understood to be correlates of the transcendental I’s agency of manifestation. Cf. Chapter I, §2.)

Thus the transcendental I has not mathematical or logical necessity because these are all necessities having to do with what is displayed. The necessity of the transcendental I makes sense only within transcendental discourse where we have to do with the agent of manifestation manifesting what is displayed. Yet given that the transcendental reduction makes being inseparable from display, within the reduction there is a kind of tautology that establishes display not as a natural logical part of being but as the articulation of being. But this is of a different order than the logical-mathematical necessity which emerges primarily by analysis of emptily intended concepts. Formally, transcendental discourse approaches the logic of merontological necessity because the transcendental reduction establishes the transcendental I as the concrete whole. Such necessities may further resemble the necessity of the transcendental I in so far as they are not merely formal but involve synthetic a priori intuition. Yet such merontological necessities are typically noematic, if not “mundane,” and they do not reflect the unique necessity of the agency of manifestation to what is displayed. Subsequently, of course, the transcendental I may be named a concrete whole, but as such it is never merely displayed but also of necessity displaying.
Again, the necessity of the transcendental I is not of the same order as the necessities that are displayed in the world, e.g., the empirical necessities of hydrogen or carbon for life, of judges in a nation of laws where there are disputes regarding private property. Nor does the contingency of the transcendental I (which we must distinguish from the contingency of the person) have the contingency of any worldly event, as an emergent new evolved species, or an anomalous deviation from a natural law. Neither the logical necessities nor the “mundane” senses of necessity and contingency appropriately apply to the sense in which the transcendental I is necessary or factual. Nevertheless the transcendental I and the All of transcendental I’s are absolutely necessary as the basis of the manifestation of all the world’s necessities and contingencies.95

Once again we meet a paradoxical feature of the transcendental person. She is undeniably a contingent being in the world. She is vulnerable to all the chance, accidents, and necessities that pervade the world. A world is quite imaginable as having existed without her as this evolved hominoid, or this historical person; yet from the transcendental perspective, i.e., as agent of manifestation, she is not present to herself as contingent in these senses but rather she enjoys a unique non-contingency. She exists for herself necessarily even though this existing necessarily itself is an odd kind of facticity that we will continue to study.

Notes
1. See, e.g., *Husserliana* VI, §§52–54 and XXIX, 332.
3. For some discussions in Husserl, see *Husserliana* XIII, 206ff.; also *Husserliana* XXXIV, 43ff.; cf. also 462ff. See my *The Person and the Common Life*, 35–40 and review of *Husserliana* XXXVII, in *Husserl Studies* (2006). We return to this in §4 below.
6. Ibid., 103.
7. Ibid., 102.
8. Ibid., 106.
10. Strawson, ibid., 100.
11. Castañeda has shown the necessity for this distinction often enough. See also Dieter Henrich, *Bewusstes Leben* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999), Chapter 1 and p. 199.
12. H.D. Lewis, *The Elusive Mind*, 156.
17. See Shoemaker, *Identity, Cause, and Mind*, 40–145. Shoemaker believes ultimately minimal dualism is incoherent; needless to say our version would perhaps meet with similar disfavor.
18. The eighty-year old heroine in Margaret Atwood’s *The Blind Assassin* (Seal: Random House of Canada, 2000), 392–393, is enraged at herself after falling, but then says: “Or not at myself – at this bad turn my body has done me. After having imposed itself on us like the egomaniac it is, clamouring about its own need, foisting upon us its own sordid and perilous desires, the body’s final trick is simply to absent itself. Just when you need it, just when you could use an arm or a leg, suddenly the body has other things to do. It falters, it buckled under you; it melts away as if made of snow, leaving nothing much…. It’s an affront, all of that. Weak knees, arthritic knuckles, varicose veins, infirmities, indignities – they aren’t ours, we never wanted or claimed them. Inside our heads we carry ourselves perfected – ourselves at the best age, and in the best light as well: never caught awkwardly, one leg out of a car, one still in…” In this passage the body clearly is both lived and then unpredictably “other” and alien, at least in its initiatives. This text recalls the important distinction Sean Gallagher makes in regard to the schizophrenic’s experience between there being the sense of ownership in the intrusions in one’s consciousness even if there is not a sense of initiative or agency. The body of the aging person is still one’s own even in its playing its final tricks in decrepitude. Yet it absents itself from one’s initiative and has “other things to do” “just when you need it” even though there is no doubt as to whose body it is.

19. See Shoemaker, *Identity, Cause and Mind*, 145–147; cf. H.D. Lewis’ remarks on this position of Shoemaker in *Persons and Life After Death* (London: Macmillan), 137. Lewis himself, because of the direction of Shoemaker’s argument, does not here find occasion to appreciate the more friendly aspect of Shoemaker’s thought, i.e., the non-criterial knowledge by acquaintance of self-awareness, as he did in *The Elusive Mind*, 214–225.


21. This is a repeated theme in *Husserliana* XIII, “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.”

22. David J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*, 17–18. At 274ff. and elsewhere Chalmers argues for a non-reductive functionalism in which conscious experience is determined by functional organization, “but it need not be reducible to functional organization.” This is a rich nuanced discussion which we cannot pursue here. Suffice it to say that Chalmers (357) concludes that in spite of his having struggled against mind-body dualism he now accepts it.


24. Husserl studies these matters at length in *Husserliana* IV; for another brief clear discussion, see *Husserliana* VI, Beilage XXII; also there are good early formulations in *Husserliana* XIII, especially Number 6.


26. H.D. Lewis described his position as dualist. See his *The Elusive Mind*; also see his *The Self and Immortality* (London: Macmillan, 1973); and *Persons and Life After Death*, op. cit. A more recent effort is that of John Foster, *The Immaterial Self* (London: Routledge, 1991) and, as we noted in n. 22 above, David J. Chalmers has described his view as dualist.

27. *Husserliana* XIII, 216. Husserl adds: “A world is possible, indeed a physical world – without there being psycho-physics in the here given sense.”


29. Cf. for all of this Husserl, e.g., *Husserliana* XIII, 142–143.


31. Conrad-Martius’ most thorough treatment of “entelechy” is to be found in her *Der Selbstaufbau der Natur* (Munich: Kösel, 1961).


37. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, *Train Your Mind, Change Your Brain*; interview by Barbara Lewis on “Sound Medicine” (Bloomington, IN: WFIU, Indiana University School of Medicine, April 15, 2007).
41. Cf. Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 145ff.; also the discussions of Sokolowski, mentioned in the n. 39.
42. Sydney Shoemaker, *The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays*, 159–160.
47. Putnam, ibid., 156.
48. Ibid., 170.
49. Ibid., 175.
50. Ibid., 104–106.
51. Ibid., 175.
52. Ibid., 165. In my thinking about Putnam, I have been helped by Dan Zahavi’s “Natural Realism, Anti-reductionism, and Intentionality. The ‘Phenomenology’ of Hilary Putnam” *op. cit.*
53. Putnam, ibid., 97.
54. For Kim, according to Putnam, the supervenience thesis is: “Every internal psychological state of an organism is supervenient on its synchronous internal physical state.” It has a “dependence thesis”: “Each mental property depends on the corresponding physical property.” And an “explanatory thesis”: Internal psychological states are the only psychological states that psychological theory needs to invoke in explaining human behavior – the only states needed for psychology.” Ibid., 103 and 109.
55. Ibid., 105.
56. For the relevance of animals to the constitution of the world see my “Transcendental Phenomenology and the Eco-Community,” in *Animal Others*. Ed. H. Peter Steeves (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1999), 178–195. The entire volume is relevant to this matter.
57. See Husserl, *Husserliana* VI, 183ff. for this.
58. *Husserliana* XXXVII, 178.
59. Husserl, Nachlass MSS, A V 21, 49a–51b. These manuscripts on metaphysics or the ultimate questions of philosophy are being prepared for publication by the Leuven Husserl Archives.

61. See the fine discussion of Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, op. cit., Chapter IV and the beginning of Chapter IX.

62. They do not wrestle with the problem of how higher-level forms (i.e., those which are more complex and which display a greater ontological richness, e.g., by their capacity to be conscious and participate in the life of the milieu around them) differ from lower ones, i.e., they dismiss all theories of entelechy as naïve “vitalism” and with a wave of a disdaining-wand treat these matters as obviously settled while, at the same time, they create a doctrine that dictates that the miraculous or scarcely intelligible, i.e., the random emergence of new forms and problems of “supervenience,” are starting points and themselves not in need of ontological analysis. See the works of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, especially Der Selbstaufbau der Natur, op. cit. Cf. my reservations about Conrad-Martius’ account of the origins of the unique person in “The Archaeology of Spirit and the Unique Person: A Husserlian reading of Hedwig Conrad-Martius,” op. cit.


64. Drew Leder, The Absent Body (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990). Cf. my review of Leder’s book, “Transcendental Phenomenology and the Brain: A Husserlian Meditation on Drew Leder’s The Absent Body,” in SPBP (Study Project in Phenomenology of the Body) News Letter 7:2 (1994), 5–18. When Sartre says “consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself,” he is faulting Husserl whom he understands to hold that consciousness requires a transcendent object for it to be (all consciousness is consciousness of something). Neither Sartre nor Husserl in fact hold that consciousness “is born supported by a being which is not itself,” if by “consciousness” we are referring to the non-reflexive self-awareness. See J-P Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), ix. And, as is well known, Husserl claimed often that the dissolution of the world and everything else did not necessitate at all the dissolution of consciousness.

65. Husserliana XV, 269ff.


67. For sake of brevity, we are using this poem of Rilke to make the point that Martin Heidegger orchestrated in Sein und Zeit, especially §§22–24.

68. For an attempt to work out of this position within the philosophy of nature or philosophical cosmology, see Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Der Raum (Munich: Kösel, 1958), passim, but especially 70–91.


70. See the Husserliana Materialien VIII, 26 and 36. Cf. original transcription, C 3 IV, 4–5.

71. Husserliana II (Ideas II), §49.

72. Husserl, Husserliana VI, §32.

73. See Husserliana XXIV, 200ff., 240ff., et passim.


75. See my discussion of rights in The Person and the Common Good, 446–452.

76. See Simone Weil, Anthology, 61.

77. See the helpful collation of passages from Kant under Würde in R. Eisler’s Kant Lexicon (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964/1916), 612–613.


81. Kant, ibid., 103; trans., 91
82. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op. cit., 347.
83. Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, 320.
   My attention was called to this text by a lecture given by Professor Richard Moran at IU in the Spring of 2008.
85. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 2. This equivalence between person and dignity is not explicit here, yet it is perhaps implicit. St. Thomas comments on Boethius’ claim that persona comes from an actor’s impersonating, as in a comedy or tragedy. Here he notes that those who are represented in the drama are (typically) personages who have dignity. And in church assemblies places of prominence are assigned to “persons” (we might say “personages”) who have a measure of dignity. To this he adds that some say that “person” is a hypostasis or subsistent with a distinct property pertaining to dignity. And because it is an exceedingly great dignity to subsist in a rational nature, it is said that a person is an individual of a rational nature. (We will return the matter of the “radiance of spirit” in connection with love in Book 2, Chapter V, §§3–4.)
86. I have been helped here by Prof. Richard Moran’s talk, “Speech, Testimony and the Second-Person.” The precise aid has been a quote from Stephen Darwall’s, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 142.
87. I have been helped much here by Robert Spaemann’s essay, “Über den Begriff der Menschenwürde,” in his Grenzen: Zur ethischen Dimension des Handelns (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2001), especially 112–118.
88. See, e.g., Husserliana XIV, passim.
89. Castañeda, The Phenomeno-Logic of the I, 94.
91. Husserliana XIV, 152.
92. Husserliana XIV, 159.
94. See Johannes Vokelt, Das Problem der Individualität, 33ff. and 98ff.
95. Husserliana XXIX, 88–89; Husserliana XV, 668–669.
Chapter VII
The Death of the Transcendental Person

When we think of dying, we think of losing who we are. We think we will no longer be able to be this or that which we imagine ourselves to be. Yet if we pay close attention, we notice that whenever we say “I am this,” or “I am that,” there is to some degree a feeling of being an imposter... It is because you believe you are born that you fear death. Who is it that was born? Who is it that dies?... What was your face before you were born? When you examine the sense of presence, of simply being, does it seem to have a beginning or end? Or does it have a quality of constant presence, of just being, dependent upon nothing, self-existing? What can affect it? Though consciousness is constantly perceiving change in the body and mind, it does not mistake these changes for the light by which change is perceived. Follow “I am” to its root. Experience consciousness itself. Don’t identify with the reflection. Let “Who am I?” become unanswerable, beyond definition. Become that space out of which all things originate and into which all things recede.

Stephen Levine

In this chapter we continue our meditation on the paradoxes of the transcendental person by turning to the problem of death. From the viewpoint of the transcendental phenomenologist death as a phenomenon in the world is a unique problem. At the start we will not attend to how death may give birth to the phenomenon of mystery. Later, by turning to this possibility of death as a mystery we find a segue to the phenomenology of Existenz in Book 2. Our approach here remains that of the “disinterested observer” and how death is a paradox within and for the transcendental person.

§1 Death and Birth in the Natural Attitude

In our dealing with one another we focus primarily on the ups and downs of life. When times are good and especially when we are young, we have ways of suppressing the conviction that we will not live forever. Even in youth, however, our illnesses, injuries and disappointments remind us of our frailty, indeed our contingency.
Even in the best of times, death and birth so accompany our experience of life that we see everyone as born of people who are Approaching death or who are now dead and we expect those who are now alive to someday be dead. We experience people as part of a generational connectedness. The categories of “generation” and “generational connectedness” are essentially inherent in any life-world of any people. People are not simply there but they are offspring of mortals, and they themselves are regarded as mortals, and all their offspring are so regarded.

The world itself with its social, cultural and natural aspects, presents itself as not merely the same for us contemporaries now, but it is present as the same world that was for our forebearers and the same world that will be for our children after we are gone – even if the contours and themes of these aspects of the world undergo enormous transformations, e.g., the loss of civil liberties or the melting of the polar ice caps.

Birth is an event in which a radical new beginning occurs, i.e., when an ipseity or a Who, makes an unprecedented entrance on the scene. At the Conclusion to Book 2 we will consider the theological doctrine that each individual essence is known by God from all eternity. But consider the following dialogue between a mother and her son.

Mother: I named you before you were born.
Son: Did you know I was Robert before I was born?
Mother: Yes, I was fond of this name, and I wanted to name you, my son, “Robert.”
Son: But, Mother, you did not want to name me “Robert”; rather you assigned to the baby to whom you gave birth the name, “Robert.”
Mother: Yes, I wanted to name you “Robert,” because I always liked the name. And I now want to say that it fits you and you have grown into the name. Earlier when you were small you were just “Bobby.”
Son: But, Mother, there are millions of Roberts; in fact you still call me “Bobby,” sometimes.
Mother: That happens whenever you are acting like you are now!

We can appreciate the frustration on both sides. For the mother the son can only have been her beloved Robert whom she loved before he was and in spite of his having become “Robert.” And for the son his mother could not have known him before he was conceived, or at least was born, and even then, at this early stage, the sense of knowing him remains obscure. Yet both are paying tribute to the unique ipseity of who Robert is. Although we may agree that the mother loved him apart form his being and becoming “Robert,” we may well incline toward siding with the son in his conviction that his entry on the scene is without precedence. The antecedents are endless in terms of biology and generations, yet they are all only necessary conditions for the generational context. If I say: “There is nothing in that antecedent change that establishes the necessity of Mary as this uniquely unique person being born,” I am introducing a perspective that joins the first-personal transcendent with the third-personal and second-personal natural attitude. The unique Who, we have proposed, is present in both the second- and third-person. But neither of these presentations have the inescapable
individual-essential presence and ineluctable inerrancy of first-person experience and reflection.

Birth, as the appearance of what is an unprecedented novelty, is always a break in the continuity of the world because nothing in the world prepares for this. And “this,” as we have seen, is not merely the individuated event as unique in space time or a unique constellation of myriad causes; no, the individual here is not individuated by something outside itself but by the self itself, by the unique I-consciousness itself.

We first learn of birth and death in the third-person, not typically in the first-person; and, for essential reasons which we will discuss, never in the first-person experience. Birth is a public event in the sense that the baby comes out of the darkness and privacy of the womb into a world that exists for us all and, hopefully, into a world where a significant “we” welcomes the baby. This contrasts with dying where one must be wrenched from any “we” and go by herself into the impenetrable dark and leave the common world. Death, in this respect, resembles pain, and the dream world, where each retires to a private world and leaves the common world.

All of her life this child, let’s call her Mary, will be disclosing herself to others and discovering herself for herself. Even though relatives will typically have no difficulty seeing Mary as continuing, in ways which are often difficult to define and describe, characteristics that clearly marked her forbearers, neither the relatives nor Mary will typically (at least in our Western, European culture) be tempted to interpret this as a continuation of one or all the forbearers.

One can initially experience “Mary” in meeting the mother who is pregnant with the infant who will be addressed with “Mary.” The mother, on the other hand, experiences the fetus at first as a part of herself, of her lived body. Eventually the fetus becomes a touched-touching for the mother. Although inside the mother’s body, and manifest as inseparably intertwined with part of both the recessive not conscious aspects of the mother’s body and eventually part of the lived kinaesthesia of the mother, the fetus is outside the self-awareness of the mother. The parts of her body that are “growing” Mary are, to a great extent, parts that are “recessive,” i.e., inaccessible to touch and feeling by the mother, therefore comparable to the chemical and physiological processes and autonomic systems that sustain each lived body. While typically and previously “disappeared” in the recesses of the mother’s womb, the fetus eventually discloses itself in touching the mother’s stomach with, e.g., an extended foot. Prior to this disclosure of the fetus in the womb the fetus was essentially recessive, like, e.g., the liver. Of course the mother had the sense of being bigger inside. But this increasing bigness lacked differentiation. Now the infant reveals itself to the mother’s inside, e.g., the stomach. The stomach is touched and even though the infant is within her body, this is not like the pressure of, e.g., gas, where the mother might caress her stomach and touch it in order to soothe it. In the case of the poking of the stomach by the fetus, the mother touches her stomach as touched, and the stomach itself is capable of feeling, touching, the tiny body touching it. The touched and touching are the same, just as when I touch with my left index finger the right one. Now, with the baby’s kick, the mother
touches herself, her stomach, as a touched touching, but she senses, apperceives, that this touching is more than and other than, e.g., her stomach responding to her caress. That is, she is aware of an other touched touching that is not her own. In contrast to touching oneself, where the touched and touching have a unique identity, it is more like touching her friend’s index finger where she does not experience the touched as touching but apperceives the touched to be a touching. But in this case the Other is within the mother and coming into maturity with the joint collaboration of the maternal body’s and her own body’s creative agency – which itself is inseparable from a diffuse identity of touched touching.

When Mary reaches an age when she can think about herself, she will not remember the moment that she began to be in the womb or even when she began to be in the world with the rest of us. Each of us has a past horizon that extends indefinitely into our already having begun; but the beginning is not something we can remember. In the first-person we perceive ourselves with this horizon of the past that is indeterminate but not infinite. And just as we perceive children as having a determinate beginning, we perceive others taking us for having a definite beginning, even though that definite beginning is not available to us as it is for them. Rather, in our efforts to retrieve it, it fades off into a haze of obscurity. Even with this obscurity no one has any evidence that would lead her to believe that she did anything to bring about her being conceived, born, etc. The story of my origins received from my parents and friends may be doubted, but not because of an unshakable evidence that I authored my own being and orchestrated the conditions of my being born. By their testimony, and presupposing the incapacity of my memory, I come upon my coming to be ex post facto; by believing them I can displace myself to their perspective and acquire a perspective that bears witness to what appears to have happened in the absence of my first-person experience.

As with birth, so we seem to know death most clearly in the third-person. As I do not know the commencement of my being in the world so neither do I know its cessation. As I know about my birth only in witnessing Others be born or hearing the story about myself and Others being born, so I know about my death primarily through witnessing others dying or hearing of their passing. As in regard to my birth, I experience only my already having been trailing off into indeterminacy that I interpret, on the basis of the third- and second-person experience of birth, as my beginning, so in regard to my death I experience the horizon of the future as open with real possibility for life; but I interpret this horizon as ultimately closed because of the overwhelming witness to my mortality in the life around me. Every year, in this part of the world, life manifestly has a dramatic cycle of seasons. Within these cycles life begins and ends. Further, within these cycles each takes part in an economy that raises and harvests living things in order to sell the harvest (fruit and corpses) for food. This economy and these cycles may be seen in a wider natural context where each of us, as bodies in nature, eventually will return to the soil, and, if we are not too full of morticians’ poisons, will enrich the soil.

As one grows older, funerals, obituaries, and memorial services are increasingly in the center and not on the periphery of one’s daily routine. One’s contemporaries
begin to look wrinkled and shriveled (features also of oneself from which one deftly hides). Furthermore they are increasingly less visible in the world of common agency and display. Further one experiences in oneself a dramatic loss of energy and mental sharpness, as well as a frailty throughout one's body that has symmetry with the decline of plants, animals, and the older people in one's surroundings.

In contrast, typically (setting aside cases of horrible traumas) a child or a young person feels herself little burdened by or preoccupied with her past, but rather launched toward the future, so she typically senses that she can do almost anything. By the time she is a young adult this horizon is considerably narrowed because of the more clearly delineated awareness of her capacities and the increasing proximity of death. In terms of a spatial image, the child's future horizon may be represented by close to a 180° angle; the young adult's by perhaps 90°. As a young adult one realizes that one will never be a, e.g., an Indian chief or a cosmonaut. By the time she is in “middle age,” (imagine a 45° angle) she knows most probably how things are going to play out and she knows quite precisely what she is capable of and that she can not do better than she is doing. By the time she is in her sixties her horizon is quite constricted (picture it as much less than a 45° angle). Whereas once the I-can opened up onto almost unlimited horizons, now the sense of the futural I-can is limited to attending to one's failing vital functions and eventually perhaps the drift of one's wakeful intentions is increasingly pulled toward what has been. This is, in part, because much of the future that is adumbrated as still really possible meets with an inertia that can be articulated as “It must” therefore “I-can-not” or “I-can-no-longer.”

Soon we will study death in conjunction with some major topics of the phenomenology of religion. Here the focus is on the more or less neutral fact of death. That death is essentially “existential,” i.e., that, when it is a question of “my death,” I cannot be neutral in regard to it, will be postponed for the moment. Death is a fact for me in the third-person that I can observe from endless perspectives, e.g., medical, societal, demographical, physiological, psychological, etc. In the third-person, I can witness someone who just before was there become now no longer there in a way that I do not understand. Before I was observing him, even sympathizing with him, but then suddenly or gradually there is no conversation, no sharing, no communion between us. Then perhaps he writhes and is still. I wait. He is still, motionless, except for a few tremors. Then, finally, he is no longer there, no longer alive. The absence is odd and usually unsettling.

The moment of death is even less evident in the second-person. When I am with you who are dying, I can be in communion with you. You are looking at me and perhaps speaking to me. We are sharing our love and sharing your dying; but then I begin to see that you are beginning to lose contact with me; I believe you are being overtaken with the body's final convulsions; I call to you, you do not answer, you do not hear me. This communion is interrupted. We were perhaps able to share the dying but not the moment of death. I see that you are finally dying, that the moment of death is approaching, but this is no longer our event. It is yours, and I am the witness, the spectator. The second-person contact, the contact with you, is gone at
the time of death. Immediately or eventually all that is present is your dead body. You are gone irretrievably. If I were to close your eyelids I could imagine that you were asleep. I accompanied you up until the final moment of death. I cannot readily say to you: “This moment was yours alone” because you are no longer there to be spoken to. At the end I was a witness to his or her dying. (I cannot say: “I was a witness to your or our dying.”) We were not together. You did not share that final moment with me nor was I able to be with you “then.”

I, you, and she can observe the same one dying, who herself may well be aware of the same event, her dying. All or only one of us can be with that one dying in the second-person, and she, the one dying can be with us, and, at the last moment, the “we” evaporates in as much as the dying person dies alone and the others participation is excluded. The living cannot define the “we” of sharing in someone’s death, even though it may be consoling to share in the last hours. We all have perspectives on the same and ultimately for all of us observers her moment of death is the third-person one, “she dies.” None of us is witness to her “experience” of dying. In so far as for the dying person the “myself,” as given in the first-person, is not available to anyone but to her herself, it is not one perspective among others. What you apprehend in apprehending me dying is not “myself” but what you intend with “you” and “he.” What you experience in “he dies” or “he is dying,” when said at the time of death is not the same as what the one dying “experiences.” In reflection I make myself me and achieve an identity synthesis that is not the equivalent of the identity syntheses you achieve in thinking about me from a variety of perspectives, because none of these disclose me myself but always “him” or “you yourself.” This remains true in witnessing someone dying.

I can share with you the fact that I am terminally ill and am in the final stages, and others can see it for themselves with varying degrees of evidence. Given the advanced technology there is little doubt that someone might be in a position of witnessing the clock time of someone’s death and be able to say precisely the time that “he dies” or “he is dying” or “at that moment he was no longer.” Perhaps in the second-person also, especially when I, as the executioner, say “you die” as I pull the switch or the trigger or insert the death-bringing poison. But in the first-person the objective time or clock-time need not be relevant. The third- or second-person observation may, on the basis of a solid theory regarding neural-physiological processes, determine when you died, but such observation does not tell me when or how you died or what dying was for you.

This is true even if we assume the appropriateness of the formula of the ancient Stoic dilemma: If it (death) is, I am not; if I am it is not. This assumes that death is for me the radical absence of self-being or being myself consciously, just as death in the third-person is the radical absence of “he himself” (whereby we have the “quasi-indexical” where the speaker intends someone as self-aware), or “you” (whereby I intend the one I am addressing as self-aware). But we do not really know if this Stoic analogy is applicable precisely because of the difference in points of view. We will return to this.

Thus although others can edify me and be exemplary for me by dying in a way that teaches me how I should be in my last hours, they cannot teach me about the
moment of death by sharing with me how they died finally. Each must, without a possible alibi, do it alone and no one can do it for the Other.

Thus, as Jankélévitch has pointed out, the verb, “to die,” is a deficient conjugation. There is no (intelligible use in the natural attitude of the) form of the verb “to die” in the first-person indicative singular or first-person indicative past. “I die” has only a futural sense and cannot refer to the moment of death. “I die,” or “I am dying” refers to the process of decline – and, although this is a description proper to manuals of asceticism and not its usual sense, there are senses in which it can be extended over most of one’s life. For example, think of Socrates’ notion that philosophy is the preparation for death, melete thanatou. (See our discussion of this sense of philosophy in Book 2, Chapter II, §7.)

Of course, it may be determined that this current phase is a final, terminal one. In this case “I am dying” has a special personal and interpersonal significance. But strictly it does not apply to the moment of death but always to what is penultimate. “To die” conjugates meaningfully in the first-person singular indicative for the speaker only in the future. “I die” means “I am about to die,” “I will die” or “I will die very soon”; it always means there is still an indefinite future in which I live, however short-lived that may be. Again, clock time seems quite irrelevant here. Even the person condemned to death, who, while receiving her lethal injection or facing the firing of the firing squad, etc. says “I die,” has still a futural horizon while saying those words. Even at this time, it remains true that “death is certain, but we do not know when.” The moment of death is still outstanding, at least for the moment.

Obviously one can use the third-person past indicative for others: He died. Only in anomalous, spiritualist senses is the second-person, “You died,” permitted. “You died” only makes sense if the one spoken to is being addressed and is not dead in the sense of being absolutely absent. Obviously one cannot use the first-person past indicative of oneself, except in the situation of comedy. “I am dead” is funny precisely because the speaker saying this must be alive to say this and does not seem to know it.

We will return to many of these matters when we think about death as tied to Existenz. Now let us look at death from a transcendental phenomenological perspective.

In order to do that, we must first attend to the ultimate sense of the transcendental I.
we are aware of things in motion that take time. We are also aware of time passing when (in a relative sense) “nothing is happening,” e.g., as when we are, as American slang has it, “watching paint dry.” Of course, even if nothing is happening within our field of vision we are still aware of the minutes passing away, of our heart beating, etc. The time of the world is measured by measuring instruments, e.g., the constellation of the heavenly bodies, the change of seasons, clocks, hourglasses, etc. In the reduction we disengage our belief-allegiance to these real worldly objects and standards of measurement. The reduction enables us to get at the deeper sense of time which comes to light even if we were staring at something or listening at something, e.g., a long rest of a musical piece, during which there was absolutely no motion anywhere of which we were aware. We could still attend to the duration of “nothing happening” or we could attend to the duration of the staring or listening, i.e., we can attend to the phases, during which “nothing was happening” or we could attend to the duration of our awareness, in our staring or listening, of “nothing happening.”

In the reduction we are interested not in what appears with regard to time, like real events, moving hands on a dial, the motion of the sun in conjunction with the clock or the seasons, but how temporal things appear, even the temporality of our awareness of things, e.g., of our perceptions and memories, the temporality of which is not coincident with the objective time of things in the world. The way temporal things appear as temporal involves the modes of something being present, past, and future. Thus in the reduction, the actual event of the race as something in the world is not our focus but how the temporality of the event appears to us in the modes of something being present, past and future. Now the race begins, now we are at the first-quarter, now we are half way through, now three-quarters through, now the runners are crossing the finish line. At the finish line we are not experiencing actually the phase of being three-quarters through, nor are we experiencing the half-way mark or the beginning. Nor at any phase are we presencing only what is now. After all it is a race, and from the start each Now is presenced as it stands in relation to the start and to the finish. And we could not experience the runners as at the finish unless the prior presents were suffusing the present experience of the finish. We always experience present Nows in the light of former Nows and Not-Yet Nows. At the three-quarter mark we are capable of recalling how our favorite started out strong, how we were hopeful he would be the first to cross the finish line, but now he has fallen behind; that was then, and that not yet was not yet, but now is now, and without all of these there would not be any event we call a race.

Something being present to us in these modes is inseparable from our presencing, i.e., our act-life. Upon reflection we can observe that there is not only the temporality of worldly events, but that our acts by which we make present such events themselves “take time.” Thus although the time of the act of perception of the race is not the same as the time of the race, it nevertheless runs parallel to it without being earlier or later, “at the same time,” etc. The perception, like anything worldly, also has its phases of past, present and future. In our awareness of the race we are not aware of the temporality of our perceiving the race. We are aware properly of the race. Yet, of course, we are non-reflectively self-aware of ourselves as
perceivers, and this is the basis of our ability to reflect on our acts and attend to their distinctive temporality. In our attending to the worldly event, e.g., a discussion, a race, a dance, etc., we do not distinguish between the passing of the phases of the worldly event and that of our act of intending it. And yet it is the mind’s engagement of the worldly event that brings about the display of things appearing now, no longer, and not yet.

We are non-reflectively aware of our acts in our attending to the world and its durations. Upon reflection that of which we were unreflectively aware appears as having a duration of its own. For example, perceptions and memories take time. We say, “Give me time to remember!” or “Give me time to think!” or “Give me time to take a look!” And indeed there is a beginning, middle, and end of these acts. Inextricably intertwined therefore are the temporality of the events, the perceptual awareness of the world’s events or time, the non-reflective awareness of the act of perception of the events, the temporality of the act, and the (subsequent) reflective act of awareness of the act’s temporality.

But it seems quite misleading to say that we are aware of the world’s durations through our being aware of the temporality of the stream of consciousness, i.e., the stream of the enduring acts and sensa. The world’s durations are immediately evident through our attending to the world. The durations of the stream of acts and sensa become a theme in reflection in a way they are not in the pre-reflective engagement or display of the world. The I is immediately and inseparably tied to the primal temporalizing/presencing which itself suffuses both the stream of acts and sensa and the hyle of the world.

The phenomenological reduction enables us to shift our interest from the worldly event, e.g., of the violin playing part of one of Beethoven’s pieces for string quartets, to the temporal display of the melody through the temporal modes in which the sounds (notes) are present to us. Each sound, even the most brief staccato one, “lasts” and therefore has phases of now, no longer, and not yet. Each note, as well as each rest carves up and punctuates the continuum of silence, which itself is a continuous temporal flow. In bracketing the real source of the temporal object, e.g., the violin playing the melody, our interest rests now on the modes in which the sound is heard, which is inseparably the hearing of the sound, i.e., how it is now, and how it elapses and no longer now, and how it is now, and how it is not yet the Now which is to come.

In hearing a sequence of sounds, we make present (hear) Now1, Now2, Now3, etc. These Now-phases are how we carve up the continuum. A note/sound may be now, or the Now, e.g., a four-count note/sound/rest, may be divided up into phases, e.g., the four clear ones established by the conventional tachometer, or the phases confusedly established by, e.g., the anxiety of the cymbalist waiting for her cue. We hear Now1 in the light of what went before, if anything at all, and we hear Now3 in the light of Now1... What is this “in the light of”? Husserl calls it retention. We are not hearing Now1...; they are past. Yet they are presently hung onto as the horizon of Now3. Each Now passes out of view leaving a trace of itself, “like a comet’s tail,” without our actively doing anything. This, along with what Husserl calls protention (see below) is the most fundamental achievement of
“temporalization” and the foundation for passive synthesis. Nows$_{\gamma-4}$ are present to us as what just happened through the retention at phase Now$_{\gamma}$. Of course at Now$_{2}$, Now$_{1}$ is retained as what just went before; and at Now$_{3}$, Now$_{2}$ is retained which itself is a retention of Now$_{1}$, i.e., at each phase there is not only a retention but a retention of retentions.

It is essential to note that this passive hanging onto of the just past, that is always a hanging onto all the prior hangings onto of the just past is not itself a “memory” or a “remembering” (re-membering). Remembering is something I do; it is an act, whereas retention is something that happens with my being awake. Further, in retention the past is present not as past, but rather it is present as the actual horizon of the present now-phase. Retention is what makes remembering or memory possible. Remembering is the act of presencing of the past as past. In being so taken up with the past I must remove myself from, de-presence, the perceptual present and re-present a former present. I can not remember anything if I have not retained it and I cannot retain it unless I once experienced it, i.e. when then was now.

It is because of retention that we exist pastly or “in” the past. Therefore we are able spontaneously to make sense of statements using the past tense and artifacts as “something from the past.” There is no property of a present thing, e.g., an utterance, a fossil, a relic, etc., called pastness. Ciphers present to us in the thing enable us to interpret it as from such and such a time. All we have of it is present, now. When we learn, e.g., that it is an ancient papyrus, having a certain script, was transcribed by a certain scribe, or when we learn of the data of the carbon readings, we make space for it within a time before our own appearance in the world. And we can do this because we always already suffice each present with the retention of retentions which trails off into an indeterminate past wherein one’s worldly beginnings and what was prior to one’s worldly beginnings vaguely find their places. The thing present there Now can tell us about the past because we are already existing “pastly.”

There is a similar kind of passive synthesizing that holds for the way we experience the present Now in terms of its being a prelude to a not-yet occurrent Now. That is, as we willy-nilly hang on to the former Nows in such a way that they are enabled to suffuse the sense of the actual present Now, so we, whether we want to or not, lean into or are tipped toward the future anticipatorily. We are automatically launched toward what is about to occur on the basis of the retained experiences of what has already happened (Vorerinnerung). This protention gives to intentionality its most elemental sense of tendency and drive that opens consciousness to the future. Retention, on the other hand, is not intentionality in this sense, i.e., not a directedness toward something ahead, i.e., whose sense is to be displayed in what is to come. Of course retentions retain acts that are intentional, i.e., that are directed ahead toward an object, but the retentions themselves are not directed towards anything to come. And remembering itself intends an event that unfolded in time, had a future. And even though to remember I must undertake an act that takes time and leans into the future of its achievement, i.e., its display of the remembered, the remembering is of an event or act that is no longer now, and remembering its immediate future is remembering what is now past. And
even remembering what was then the event’s remote anticipated future horizon is perhaps a remembering of what is now past.

Because protentions reveal consciousness as elemental drive and tendency ahead toward what is not yet, there is founded in the ongoing temporal flux elemental senses of satisfaction, surprise and disappointment that determine the most elemental tenor of life.

As retention is not properly a memorial having of the past as past so protention is not an imaginative anticipation of the future as future. The willy-nilly tendency toward the future is not a self-displacing from the perceptual present to an imaginative entertaining of, e.g., the notes or events that will happen five minutes from now. Expectation properly is this presencing of the future as future whereby we de-presence ourselves from the perceptual present and more or less sketch in what is to happen. All deliberate planning, all imaginative filling in of the emptily intended space of what is to come so as to make prudential decisions, presupposes that we (also) always already live tilted toward the Not-Yet and, whether we want to or not, wrap the present Now with this spontaneous horizon of expectation.

It is thus clear that the experience of something now is not of a discrete atomic punctual pulse (a “specious present”); rather what is now is distended to include what has just happened and what is about to happen. Further it cannot be measured by some abstract chronometer or clock so that there could be determined that the Now lasts, e.g., one-quarter of a second. Nor is it to be shrunk to the merely abstract limit-point between retention and protention. Such a view fails to do justice to Now and its presencing. This presencing, as how Now is displayed, is always the center pulse; retention and protention are actual only through it as its horizon. The presencing of the Now itself, what Husserl calls *primal impression*, or *primal presencing*, is therefore always wrapped around with retention and protention. Because it includes in its presencing a synthesis, a bonding, with what it retains and what it protends, the Now is always in a horizon of what is just past and what is about to come. As each Now elapses with the presencing of the new Now, it is retained. As each new Now emerges from out of a prior Now’s opening out into the future, the primal presencing is always also inseparably a protention. And as an actual Now is inseparably a retaining of former Nows through retentions, the Not-Yet, through protention, is always a vague prolepsis of the determinable framework established by the past horizon.

§3 The Non-temporal Character of the Awareness of Time

The primal presencing with its inseparable retaining and protending creates the original field of presence of the transcendental I. The basic meaning of being consciously alive and awake is this original synthetic achievement of consciousness. Husserl, on occasion, chooses the language of the heart (*das Gemüt*) in his descriptions of this most basic and most central consideration of what “I” refers to. In this ultimate founding consideration of the primal presencing, the “heart,” always
pervaded by the “myself,” is the primal presencing thickened out, distended with attachments, affections, habitualities. Our act-life occurs on the basis of the present Now “affecting” us in a particular way that calls forth a response of recognition, interpretation, remembering, imagining, attention, willing, flight, horror, desire, etc. Each of which kind of act, which is always also a display, depends on the ongoing synthetic presence of one’s life as retained and as disposed to come into play to make sense out of what is present now. Of course, this is more basic than the heart as something that we can thematize, wrestle with, inhibit, be mortified by, etc. Rather it is the most basic sense of oneself and the foundation of all that one has. We will have ample opportunity to dwell on its foundational character later.

What is of immediate concern here is our awareness of the elemental duration of things, including the stream of consciousness, i.e., of our acts and sensa or impressions, the temporality of which becomes explicit to us upon reflection. The awareness of this flow is always of an “identity synthesis” by which the present Now appears, in the respect of being Now, as the same as what was not yet and the same as what just was. The Now appears inseparably both as nunc fluens and nunc stans. The awareness of the duration of events, i.e., of their being the same throughout the elapsing of Now phases, is an awareness of a stream of Nows which are protended, elapsing, and retained, i.e., a stream of what is not yet, then now, and then no longer. These phases, by which the whole world has the form of temporality, is not something that is grasped marginally as pre-given for the primal presencing or primal impression, retention and protention, but rather these phases come to be through the primal presencing itself, along with, of course, its retaining and protending.

We come here to a basic question. If all durations that come to light in perception (or reflection) are Now (with the phases of no longer or not yet), is the original bringing to light that is primal presencing, retaining, and protending itself now, no longer or not yet? This is an original bringing to light because it founds the duration of whatsoever comes to light, not only things in the world, the whole world itself, but also our acts and sensa/impressions by which we have things and things in the world. Is this original bringing to light of any duration whatsoever itself something having a duration and temporal phases? Or is it itself something dark and unconscious? Husserl’s position, which we here adopt, is that the answer is No to both these questions. Here we have the most original sense of non-reflective self-awareness. Even the primal presencing or primal impression is self-shining, self-luminous and not such by reason of its being reflected in its retention or protention. This original primal presencing is self-manifesting prior to and independent of any presencing of it. Indeed the originary constituting of the primal modes of past, present and future, the original retaining, protending and presencing are not temporal. My primal presencing of the present or now is not itself now. My retention of the just past is neither past nor now. My protention of the just about to be is neither now nor not yet. This most original awareness of time is not in time. This original primal presencing, “is a being-in-itself through its being-for-itself… through a self-appearing, through an absolute appearing, in which that which appears necessarily is.”

The primal presencing is not a genitive of appearing to another dative of appearing; it is not an appearing of oneself to oneself. There is no need to posit that to which the primal presencing presences as if the primal presencing was an appearing of — to…. The primal presencing, in contrast to what it presences, cannot be said to flow as if it were something that appeared in phases that elapsed and had to be retained. Obviously the sense in which there is affixed to the primal presencing the “I myself” is an equivocal sense of “I” in as much as it founds all senses of an act-center, an egological agency, and a source of responsibility. (Cf. also our discussions in Chapter II, §3, Chapter III, §§1 and 4.)

Yet one might be tempted to say with Husserl that the primal presencing as the primal impression/retention/protention too is a “flow,” given that that of which it is aware, e.g., Now, itself flows and changes, and, as an abiding Now, is a synthesis of what went before and what is protended. Therefore one might assume that because Now, involves a different presencing than what preceded it, and the retention Now, at Now, and the protention of Now, at Now, can be retrospectively envisaged as each being different, therefore we can assume the awareness involves an odd flow. Yet it is not one that we experience as a flow, because what we experience as flowing, i.e., the flowing of which we are aware, is what this alleged or postulated “flow” brings to light.

Another way of thinking about this is asking whether the awareness of change itself is a changing awareness. Here is a difficult problem. On the one hand there is the claim, “It is evident that the perception of a temporal object itself has temporality, that the perception itself of duration presupposes the duration of the perception.” On the other hand we hear a seemingly different claim, “The consciousness of the modes of being conscious is not a process; the Now-consciousness is not itself now. That being ‘together’ with the Now-consciousness of retention is not ‘now,’ is not ‘at the same time’ as Now…. “

More formally and perhaps speculatively, one might say: To relate things with a before and after I must be so present to myself that I am not absorbed by any one phase, but each phase should be present together in my self-consciousness. Relating A and B in a temporal sequence of before and after requires that I be absorbed by neither A nor B but that A and B themselves be present to me in such a way that I, as what synthesizes, am not a temporal plurality but absolutely one throughout the temporal diversity.

But what is the way in which A and B are “present in my self-consciousness” so that I am neither absorbed by A and B, thus a plurality, but absolutely one as an identity in the temporal diversity? We give here Husserl’s answer: “If consciousness would flow and not be able to be in its ownmost essence consciousness of this flow, then we would never know something of this flowing.” Thus the I may be considered here as a pole that is trans-temporal or non-temporal, and is uniquely individual without having its individuality connected to any point(s) or place(s) in time. Yet, in spite of the I not being anywhere in the flow of temporal events and the identical pole for all experiences, Husserl still claims that it is a primal process, “functioning,” and in a strange sense a flow. Otherwise we make A and B timelessly the same and have the absolutely timelessness accounting for the constituting
of time. Yet the intuitive phenomenological evidence for this is not strong. What is strong is evidence for the temporality of the stream and the non-temporality of the awareness of the stream. Yet, for reasons we have given, Husserl is moved to at least postulate “something going on” even if he has no way of describing it.

The fundamental non-reflective self-awareness as it is inseparably tied to the fundamental awareness or presencing of the duration of whatsoever thing, i.e., of something exhibiting a flow of Nows elapsing and being “born” again in new Nows, is not itself in time; it is not now. This means that the most elemental sense of our ipseity is not one of temporality but of what is not in time. We must hesitate to say that it is now because this places it as a nunc fluens, i.e., a Now that elapses. It surely is a nunc stans but it is not this as the ideality, the same identified objective form, that persists throughout each evanescent elapsing renascent new Now. Rather as the here of the lived body resists ever becoming absolutely a there, so the awareness of now is not itself now. Thus it must be thought of as neither coincident with an objective perduring form persisting throughout the passing individual moments nor with a blind upsurging source interior to and more fundamental than the “myself.”

Note that this sense of not being in time, this timeless present and presence, this sense of “eternity,” is not an achievement of some act that itself is temporal, and in some sense within or able to be correlated with the temporality of an act or the “time of the world.” Nor is it an “eternity” reached by some act of excision from the world, e.g., self-abnegation, death, and leaving the world-time. This “eternity” as this timeless Now, this timeless present and presence, is not something that awaits us in the “afterlife.” Rather it is constitutive “always” of “myself” as I ineluctably exist in the constitution or display of the world and time.

It perhaps goes without saying that we do not have here eternity as we find it in the Bible, e.g., the Gospel of John, where “eternal life” (ζωὴ αἰώνιος) is not everlasting life but the very life of God in which persons may participate. This theological eternal life is essentially different from any natural life, even one the duration of which is interminable, because, as a participation in God’s life nothing, not even death, can destroy it.14 Similarly the phenomenological timeless presence differs from the medieval theological explication of Boethius’s theory where we find a saturated intention, “the full and perfect possession of eternal life,” where seemingly the nunc fluens gives way absolutely to a nunc stans. Nevertheless we have a timeless presence, the transcendental I, as the identical center and pole, that is not in the stream, and in this sense it is a nunc stans. As such it is that for which the temporalizing constitutes itself, and as such it is not coming and going, beginning or ending, but rather trans-temporal.15 Thus although we here are far from Spinoza’s understanding of eternity as “existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing,” or “the infinite enjoyment of existing”; nevertheless this understanding approximates Spinoza’s view that “We experience and feel ourselves to be eternal.” (sentimus expermurque nos aeternos esse.)16

Doubtless I, this transcendental person, am incarnate and in the world. I experience myself through and through as temporal: I age, regret, hope, get ill, experience weariness and rejuvenation, await death, etc. I can even watch my bodily parts
deteriorate and heal; I can even, with the help of technology, watch the eventful recessive aspects of my bodiliness that never come to consciousness, but which are of special interest to medical doctors who do not need my self-awareness to study these temporal phenomena. None of this contradicts this timeless self-presence that is also the presencing of temporality that we have here sketched.

Louis Lavelle has a similar understanding of the perception of time as requiring spirit’s timelessness. He notes that the awareness of the act which achieves itself “surpasses time, not because it escapes to a mysterious world where time does not find a place, but because it exercises itself in a present from which it does not go out.” The timelessness is in the consciousness of the act “which renders time possible, without this consciousness itself being submitted to it.” And he says that it is in this consciousness of the act “that we have an experience of eternity.” Thus for Lavelle our experience of time is “together and indivisibly an experience of eternity.”

My chief objection to Lavelle’s account here is equating our trans-temporal experience of time with the metaphysical-theological notion of time. There is no doubt that both Lavelle and Husserl have hit upon some sense of “eternity” or “timelessness” in the awareness of the temporal stream of consciousness. But our inclination is to say that it provides an analogy for thinking about what the metaphysical-theological sense of eternity might be, and itself may not be equated with the metaphysical-theological sense of eternity.

Three reasons require that we make this distinction. We may presume that the theological notion of eternity has to do with God’s own essential being and the “eternal life” proper to God. To say that our experience of time is indivisibly an experience of God’s eternity or eternal life is to say we either are indivisibly knowing or experiencing God’s knowing and essential subjectivity and essence or are participating somehow in this divine life. The former prospect seems to be unwarranted and we will have occasion to spell out our reasons in the final chapter of Book 2. The later claim that we essentially are participants in the divine life by reason of the nature of our awareness of time is theologically questionable and philosophically unwarranted. Of course, if this is merely to hold that our timeless experiencing of time is an ontological condition for a person’s possible participation in the eternity of God, then we have no objections.

Secondly, our experience of temporality time as timelessly experiencing the flow of events or stream of consciousness is an experience of the non-temporality of our constitution of time. But this is merely to say that we constitute the modes of the display of temporal objects. The display is the work of our constitution but neither the temporal modes nor the temporal objects are created in this display. But this is quite different from Lavelle’s rich discussion of the metaphysical-theological notion of eternity as inseparable from the creation of being. For Lavelle this sense of eternity is at once the source and sustenance of time, “the indivisible point from whence creation never ceases to flow.” But it is not at all evident that our lived experience of the eternal is one with such a divine agency (cf. “the still-point of the turning world” of T.S. Eliot), even though this lived experience is a helpful analogy for thinking about theological eternity. At the end of Book 2 in Chapter VII, we will have occasion to look again briefly at the notion of eternity.
Thirdly, for Lavelle as there is no temporality without the eternal awareness of temporality so there is no eternity without time. But if, as in our first point above, there is a sense of eternity that belongs to God’s own life, and if creation is a gift of incomparable generosity, then there is a sense in which eternity does not require time. This again will occupy us in the final chapter of Book 2.

§4 Freedom and Love’s Contest with Temporality and Death

We have been discussing whether the experience of time is temporal. Here we wish to add brief considerations regarding the sense in which freedom and love contend with nature, death, and temporality.

Kant called attention to the antinomy where our first-person experience of ourselves is of an agency that is not part of the causality and conditions of what appears. The natural world, of which we are a part, may be envisaged as a system of universal causality and conditions that unfold in time. Each experiences herself as having this double aspect where, on the one hand, she is a determined and determining body in the world and part of this network of causes and effects in temporal sequences. In so far as one would experience oneself only in this way then one may say that freedom is not experienced. On the other hand, there is the first-person “self-experience” of oneself as the unique initiator of one’s acts, i.e., as free. This is not a knowledge in the proper sense of something known through an intentional act but something prior to and the condition for even the initiation of or reflection on this act. Therefore each has a sense of oneself as not part of this network of causes and effects in temporal sequences. We are the sources of our actions that appear in the natural world, e.g., as movements of the body, and which appearings themselves are subject to the universal causality, but our agency as the source of the appearings itself is not part of this realm of worldly appearings. In this respect one experiences oneself as outside this temporal unfolding; one experiences that in one’s agency the “myself” is, as Conrad-Martius put it, archonal, i.e., a radical beginning and not a result of a prior causal and temporal sequence, and that this agency of the myself is not part of the causality of the laws of the natural world.

In Book 2, especially Chapter IV, especially with the help of Blondel and Nabert, we want to argue that the very notion of normative personhood requires a belief in our capacity to be the authors of our own moral character and thus to shape our fate. This requires a belief not only in freedom from the network of material causality, but also a freedom to shape ourselves in a determinate direction by our choices for the rest of our lives. It further requires a belief in a freedom to undo this shaping of ourselves and the determinate direction we have given ourselves because the root sense of our freedom is based on our lived experience of our inadequation of ourselves to ourselves. Any self-determination, any direction, we give ourselves is inadequate to the scope of ourselves, and this basic root sense of our freedom involves the possibility of sacrificing what we treasure, even ourselves, the very personal selves, we have spent our lives constituting and sacrificing for. Thus, in this view, a view which we
shall later develop, the experience of freedom is a belief at once in the capacity to shape oneself and transcend oneself. In this respect, the exercise of freedom on behalf of becoming the sort of person we both want and ought to become is an exercise in the preparation for self-sacrifice through self-transcendence, and in this sense, material causality and death itself have no purchase on freedom.

In this view, the “true self” which I want and ought to become is palpably more than all that I will. We will attempt to make the case that in at the profoundest level of my willing there is a sense in which in all my explicit willingings I will nothing of what I experience around me and I will nothing of what I am because I will more than all that is and all that I am. There is thus a sense of “I myself” which transcends all that I will and am and to be “true to myself” I, in my willing, must, and willy-nilly do, heed this transcendent aspect of myself which is beyond all that I experience and all that I am. At the heart of freedom there is revealed through lived experience a belief both in a radical independence from the natural causal network as well as a call to a radical renunciation of adopted versions of myself that do not do justice to my profoundest will. But there is also opened up the question of whether this profound will is nothing but a futile passion or whether it reveals a larger horizon beyond that of death.

Death in the lived first-person as well as in the case of loved ones is not simply an empirical fact. (See our discussion in Book 2, Chapters I–II.) It is lived as a negation, a deprivation, of the élan of life toward filling, albeit inadequately, always novel empty intentions. The awareness of the empirical fact of death is always framed and sustained by the awareness of the inadequation of life to one’s will which at once precedes the knowledge of death and tacitly affirms its opposite. Life is lived with this energy toward ever wider horizons with the constant sense of the insufficiency of any filled intention to be commensurate with this wider horizon of the basic will. From the first-person perspective of one living, there is as Spinoza remarked a curious first person sense of one’s perpetuity, if not eternity. “At nihilo-minus sentimus, experimurque, nos aeternos esse.” What is “natural” is, as Kant himself suggested, this ineradicable sense in which the Angemessenheit, the adequation of our explicit acts of will to the infinite horizon opened up by “the infinite ideal,” eludes us and only an unending life in progressive pursuit of this always elusive horizon would provide the adequation which we seek. Blondel has his own version of this line of thought: “It is not immortality, therefore, but death itself which goes against nature and whose notion has to be explained.”

This lived experience of freedom does not equate with the view that free agency is absolutely unconditioned, gratuitous, and lawless. Rather, although one’s agency is not caused by mechanisms of the natural world, it is conditioned by them: I may choose to perform a certain activity, e.g., leap over the stream, but there are endless factors that limit how this activity unfolds. Even the acts that are lived as independent of any observable bodily motion, such as a resolve or an act of reflection, are conditioned by endless factors in their achievement and completion. Furthermore, agency faces the immanent lawfulness of motivations, values, and ideals. One’s free agency as characterizing one’s “I do” or fiat (“let it be done”) occurs necessarily within a horizon of a motivating field. In this infinite
horizon and at the foundation of our self-inadequation, more or less adequate values loom in a more or less synthesized fashion. There is no willing in the absence of values being present in both the foreground and background of the horizon of will. Whereas the values that are present have their own kind of temporality or trans-temporality, the temporality of my I-can and *fiat* or my “let it be done” are themselves not absolutely coincident with the temporality of this motivational framework. For example, the “I do” or “moment of execution” (as in “I promise”) has the initial phase but it persists, sometimes even without acts of renewal, throughout all the ulterior temporally extended phases until the action is complete. This is often the case in what we call creating a work of art or writing a book or taking part in a political action. In its turn a value has a different temporality than the act. For example, the value of that to which one commits oneself whole-heartedly, e.g., “the sort of person one believes one ought to become” or “the peaceable kingdom” is different from the value attached to the act of committing oneself irrevocably to such a noble cause. But these life-encompassing trans-temporal values can only be realized by targeting finite and temporal values in finite temporal acts, and in this case we may distinguish the value as the goal of the act, e.g., a shelter for this homeless person, and the value of the act, i.e., the work of getting this person into such a shelter. Then there is the value of the delight in having succeeded in doing this. All these values are different and have a different temporality.

Connected to the matter of the awareness non-temporal awareness of time is the awareness of the non-temporal or trans-temporal values, like “the peaceable kingdom,” “a noble character,” “the classless society,” “the beloved community,” “the kingdom of God,” etc. Or, in the light of our earlier discussions we may name the ipseity of the beloved, i.e., the intrinsic *dignitas* beyond all qualities of what she refers to with “I.” Similarly there is the value of commitments or position-takings, whose very essence is that they have a binding validity “from now on.” As saying something is true, X is Y, holds from now on, i.e., has validity for the indefinite future until revoked, so my commitment to someone or to a trans-temporal cause holds for the indefinite future until revoked, and it is sustained by the trans-temporality of that to which one is committed.

The life of human persons is one with all the natural things in the world in so far as human persons too are “in time” and ephemeral. Yet at the same time they live in a world whose formal explication involves values and necessary truths of an abiding, or trans-temporal, or timeless nature. Thus, in spite of the mortality of the human as embodied, antiquity described the soul as the place or residence of the forms – recall our discussion of Husserl’s notion of der Geltungsträger der Welt, the bearer of validity of the world with all of its eternal essences – thereby suggesting that death did not necessarily have the last word. But because there always remains the obscurity of whether soul, as “the place of the forms,” was not some impersonal or trans-personal transcendental mind whose life was constituted by or commensurate with the universality, necessity, and eternity of the forms, the suspicion remained in much of ancient Greek philosophy that soul’s continued existence would not be that of the unique person, Socrates. (But see our discussion of Socrates’ *Daimonion* in Book 2, Chapter III, §7 and of Plotinus, Book 2, Chapter VI, §1.)
There is a shift in emphasis away from the soul as the place of the forms when one asks, could the unique individual person be mortal who of necessity experiences herself as transcendent to all that is temporal, who, further has ineluctably to do with what was trans-temporal, and who honors, indeed, perhaps loves and even worships and reveres unconditionally, what is trans-temporal. Whereas the answer seems, at least from the third-person modern or post-modern point of view, readily, Yes, the matter is not so obvious from the first-person point of view. If the valuing-esteeming of something “eternal” is of its nature without conditions and “for ever” then not only what is valued but also the act of valuing is deathless in terms of its intentionality. It has essentially as part of itself its own perpetuity. This seems to be especially the case with certain acts of love, honor, and reverence. They do not admit of any termination, self-destruction or self-retraction, even though the agent has no doubts that she, from all reliable third-person points of view, will die as will most of the worldly targets of such valuing acts.

“I will never stop loving you,” means either the love will not cease even though I will die; or it means that even though I will die, and even though the worldly conditions of my effectively willing my will shall perish, my love will never be withdrawn while I am alive. But this latter interpretation does not always seem to be necessarily the first-person sense of the act of love. Are we to say: Because all acts of valuing must “die” with the death of the agent, in the sense of ceasing because the person is no longer “there” to will the acts, then any act, which purports of its nature never to be renounced, retracted, or know its demise, must be a self-deception or perhaps essentially delusional? Much depends here on whether the third-person point of view trumps of necessity the first-person one.

We said that “you die” is problematical to the extent that it purports to capture the precise moment of death and what this means for the one dying. “You died” is odd because it presupposes the presence of the addressee, i.e., the one who, if dead, is absent absolutely from the world, except in the anomalous spiritualist contexts. Yet recall that love does not have any intrinsic temporal termination: I cannot say I love, or loved you, at 8:30 p.m., December 20, 2007, with the sense that love’s tenure is finite and the conclusion is inevitable. The commitment of the act of love does not foresee any futural limits. Similarly love discloses the beloved as beyond all properties by way of an affirmation and celebration of the Other’s transcendent ipseity. Love targets what is beyond even the signature bodily presence.

Does the destruction of the bodily presence require of necessity the destruction of what love intends? We insist on holding that the ipseity is present only in the embodied person, yet we also claim that love affirms and celebrates what this embodied person expresses and what, somehow, transcends this expression. Does death’s reduction of the body to the corpse and the manifest absence of the embodied person demand the belief that the Other is absolutely annihilated and in this sense absent? Clearly the Other’s first-person experience eludes us, i.e., we are not in a position to say that the “myself” has ceased to exist even though all “the vital signs” have indicated that she is no longer. Must we interpret this profound silence and absence as non-being?
Gabriel Marcel holds that love inherently is a hope and a pledge of fidelity to the Other's continued existence. It is to say to an Other, “You shall not die.” However, the death of the Other does not permit the facile automatic assertion of her being in "the Hereafter" or "the Beyond." Rather Marcel insists that one must face the stark darkness, silence, and absence that death undeniably brings. My love of the Other in her transcendent ipseity implies my belief in her which is inseparably a belief that she shall not die; and the strength of my love implies a pledge of fidelity to the beloved forever. And, when death occurs, to renounce this belief in the transcendence of what “you” refers to in love in favor of a belief in her being identical with her personal bodily presence, is to deny her in her transcendent ipseity and to deny my bond to her in this regard; it further is to relinquish her to death. Thus this prophetic stance, “you shall not die,” is analytically implied in love bonding with the Other as transcendent to all of her properties and natural entanglements. My love of her is a love of her in her transcendent ipseity and freedom, and thus my love implies a belief in her indestructibility in the face of the forces of nature. My not believing this after her death is denying my belief in her transcendent ipseity in life.19

This is not a demonstration for the “immortality” of the person or of “life after death.” It is primarily a doubt raised about the dogmatism of third-person evidence. Marcel’s position is strongest when it is seen as an analysis of inherent implicit or potential features in the love of another. It seems weakest when the sense of love of the transcendent ipseity is said to require explicitly both a belief in her indestructibility and an unending fidelity to her continuing to be. These might well be essential, necessary implications but they are by no means necessary explicit beliefs of the lover. Would we deny the possibility of genuine love to someone who was not able to believe in the beloved’s indestructibility and not able to believe that believing in her eventual non-being was a form of contamination of his love? Yet love is remarkable enough when it happens among the living; that it should have amazing implications in regard to our love of those who have died need not surprise us. (See Book 2, Chapter I.) Love’s capacity to presence the living loved one as beyond the contingencies of nature has implications for any dogmatism about death’s bringing about the absolute non-being of the beloved. It is precisely this challenge to such dogmatism that is reflected in the poignancy accompanying the blessedness of love, namely the awareness that the beloved is mortal and that this “moment” between the lovers is ephemeral. Marcel’s reflection at least raises the possibility that the third-person perspective on the finality of death, as powerful as it is, is not decisive. Let us attend to Husserl’s view of these matters.

§5 The Beginninglessness and Endlessness of the Transcendental I

All cessation or ending is, and is appreciated as, that which is preceded by everything relevant to this whole that is, e.g., a being, event, or process. Furthermore, it is followed by nothing intrinsically necessary to the independent integrity of this
whole being, event, or process. Similarly all beginnings are, and are appreciated as, that from which or after which everything follows that is relevant to the integral whole being, event, or process, and are preceded by nothing intrinsically necessary to the independent integrity of the whole being, event, or process. It is because the mind can experience the “nothing before” and the “nothing afterwards” that we can experience beginnings and endings as such. That is, it is because retentions and protensions are intrinsic parts of the present experiencing, or because, in the ongoing present perception, prior and subsequent expected experiences actually function and frame what we call the present, that we enjoy the phenomena of starts and finishes.

The stream of wakeful self-consciousness, the stream that is inseparably bound up with the “myself,” has a temporal continuity even though there is discontinuity in what appears and in the discrete beginnings and cessation of acts. (We will soon discuss the unique discontinuity which sleep is.) Thus, in spite of the continuity of the self-experiencing presencing, the things that are present in the stream are distinguishable, if not absolutely discrete, entities, events, and processes. Thus the experience of the end, e.g., of a musical piece (our exemplary case throughout here), is an experience of the silence which follows the last note. This experience of silence is (also) a retention of the last note, and (also), a protention of “no more” that is relevant to the whole under consideration (e.g., the musical piece). That is, the silence or “no more” is not experienced as a pause or rest. Rather it too is followed by the experience of “no more” or the further silence which retains the concluding silence (which retains the last note) and this silence is a filling of the protention of “no more.” If it is not mistaken it indeed is experience of an ending. (Of course, the neighbor’s coughing may well ruin the aesthetically significant nothingness of the silence that determines the end.)

Similarly the experiencing of the beginning, e.g., a note of a musical piece, involves the retention of the silence or “nothing relevant going on” which preceded; it also typically involves the retaining of the protention of the notes that were to follow. Without the retained experience of the silence or absence of sounding notes there is no experience of the beginning as the beginning, i.e., as that from which everything relevant is to flow and which itself is preceded by nothing relevant to the whole matter of interest. Of course, there need not be a protention of the beginning in the experience of the actual silence or “nothing going on.” The beginning can very well appear as a surprise or an unexpected novelty.

What is of interest in our present context is the question of the presentability, conceivability or imaginability of the end or beginning of our transcendental self-awareness by and through which we make present all beginnings and endings of whole events, processes or beings. Granted the difficulty in the natural attitude of having first-personal accounts of our birth and death, what can we say about the phenomena of birth and death in the transcendental attitude? Husserl has said of this consciousness of the change involved in beginning and ending that it too is a “process” (Prozess) and a “while” or “whiling” (Währen, währende; these latter are usually in scare quotes, as were the references to the “flow” that we noted earlier). He makes an equivalence between the most basic sense of non-reflective self-awareness and the temporal terms of “process” and “while” or “whiling” because
of his conviction that even though this awareness, as the wakefulness of the I-moment, is not in time, nevertheless it is inseparable from the primal presencing or temporalizing. Thus it is inseparable from the primal syntheses of primal impression, retention, and protention in regard to the ongoing flow of the stream of conscious and any worldly duration. Therefore it must, in some strange sense, be a “process” or a “flow.” It is strange because we do not experience it as temporal, i.e., as having the modes of now, not-yet, or no longer. (Cf. our earlier discussion of the “flow” in §3 above.)

If the “while” of the world should cease to be, the “flow” or “whiling” or the continuous “process” of the “whiling away” itself, i.e., the “whiling” of the basic awareness of this cessation, comprised of primal impression, retention and protention, cannot be said to cease – as long as it is aware of the cessation of the world. Because all beginnings and ends presuppose this “process” by which we are aware of beginnings and ends, we cannot be aware of its beginning or end, i.e., the beginning or end of the so-called “flow” or “process” that is the awareness of the beginning or end.20

This is the general point; let us tend to some specifics. The “I,” in a fundamental respect, i.e., because it, as the co-constitutive moment of the whole which is the transcendental I, is inseparable from the primal flow or “process,” i.e., the presencing, retaining and protending, by which durations come to light. To experience the end of this primal presencing, retaining, and protending, a possible understanding of death, one would have to experience the “last pulse” of the presencing as such, i.e., in the manner resembling our experience of any final phase of an event or ending, e.g., as followed by the nothingness/silence at the conclusion of a musical piece. But then we would be experiencing/presencing now the silent nothingness as the end. This would involve not only the retention of our “last moment” but also a protention of “more of the same nothingness.” But this, in turn, would necessarily involve that the primal presencing, in presencing the nothingness after the last moment, along with the retaining of the last moment, and proleptically protending more of the same nothingness, would exist after its ending.

With Husserl we may explain the tendency to believe we can conceive or imagine the experience of the end of the primal presencing in the following way: In order to presence the end of the primal presencing we would have to presence “and then nothing” which would be (also) a retention of the prior (“ultimate” or “last”) presencing and (also) a protention of what is to follow. But the presencing of “and then nothing,” in this case foists upon the primal presencing the particular “nothings” (silence, mute dumb haziness, absence of light or motion, etc.) which are always experienced “somethings.” The experience of any cessation always presupposes the non-ceasing of the consciousness aware of the cessation, i.e., aware of the “nothingness,” whereby the ending is experienced as such, i.e., as the last, which fulfills the protention that proleptically is based on the retention of the last moment prior to the nothingness.

An additional point with respect to the unthinkability of the cessation of the primal presencing is that unthinkable here really means not able to be thought in the sense of made present; it is unvorstellbar. This means in fact that it cannot be made
a possible experience. This is not merely to say, as one would in the natural attitude, I do not know in advance while I live and as long as I live whether and how long I will live or when I will die. Rather the transcendental point here is quite different. It can be said of any future expected or protended event, like someone’s or my own death as a worldly event, that it is not absolutely necessary that it occur or that it occur at another time. It is always possible that something other occurs that conflicts with what was anticipated. Indeed the very form of the world itself within which all events find their place may itself come undone. Yet it is not thinkable, not presentable, that the transcendental I cease in its display of this apocalypse.

Whereas it is true that the passive “automatic” expectation of protention has never an apodictic character in terms of what will be anticipated or filled, nevertheless it is apodictically certain in its form. Each Now presenced by the primal presencing is inseparable from the protended futural horizon which cannot be eliminated; the protentional form cannot be eliminated from the primal presencing. Each Now necessarily leans toward and passes over into a new Now and is itself a filling of the protention of Now. Thus I (as transcendental I) continue and have always and necessarily before me a transcendental future. This future is that toward which I am always pre-directed. Thus, as Husserl insists, it is apodictically certain that there belongs to every wakeful primal present and presencing a horizon of the future. Indeed, given that this is the most elemental form of intentionality as a tending, he describes it as a pre-belief in and a predelineation of the future. In this sense cessation of this living present is not able to be thought of as an empirical fact or a being or as something experienceable; it is a priori necessary in our wakefulness to the world and any experience in the world. Recall our earlier remarks in the previous section on Spinoza’s claim that we feel and experience ourselves to be aeternos, and the view of Kant and Blondel that in the first-person it is death that is problematic, not our anticipation of uninterrupted continuous existence.

To establish the cessation I would have to establish it, the cessation, as an identity in a manifold, therefore as something that appeared as the same, something to which I could return, and something that, after the cessation, itself had a past, etc. “This is pure nonsense,” Husserl observes. We thus face the paradox that meeting my cessation now must not only coexist with my protention of my not-yet being, i.e., my having a future, but also that I exist as experiencing my cessation and my no longer being. Thus I ineluctably must believe that I cannot experience my cessation when I nevertheless know from third-person experience that my death awaits me. It is nonsense that in the presencing of, e.g., the cessation of the world, the abiding presencing of this presented being (of the annihilation) be nothing or have ceased.

Similarly the primal presencing cannot be conceived or imagined to begin or have begun. “It is evident with an absolute necessity that each present comes forth as a fulfillment of a past...” and it is no less evident that retention and the retentional form cannot be deleted. Each Now leaves retentions behind and no Now is conceivable that does not have retentions. A beginning is only thinkable within the ongoing process or duration of something in the world but it is not thinkable as the beginning of the so-called “process” or “flow” of the primal presencing. The begin-
ving requires as its context the presencing of that nothingness with which it stands in contrast, just as the “nothingness before the beginning” presupposes something with which it could stand in contrast, the beginning. Before the beginning there might be envisaged or construed the presence of an undifferentiated, monotonous mute dawning; but this itself is something past and does not bespeak the awareness of a beginning of the primal presencing. As transcendental I, not I as JG Hart, I was, and will be, “forever.”

Here we may recall our discussion in Chapter II, §3 on the ineluctability of the I in awareness. There we adopted Husserl’s position that although it is true to say that the transcendental I is a primal temporalizing, it is also true that an aspect of the I is not temporalizing but that for which this primal happening happens. The primal temporalizing or streaming goes in advance, but the I-moment also always goes in advance. The primal streaming brings about my original “having” and what I can count on in my synthesizing, retaining, remembering, protending, imagining, and self-reflecting, self-regarding acts; yet I am always in advance as that to which the streaming appears. The primal presencing is indeed an elemental sourcing, synthesizing, presencing, and absencing; but inseparably it is an I-affection, an undergoing by the I. Even though this primal sourcing occurs without the agency of I, the I is always dabei, present, taking part by undergoing and being affected; to the hyletic inexorable streaming there is wedded I-ness. The I as the pole for all streaming temporalization is that to which temporalizing is present; the temporalizing is a streaming out of and away, das Entströmende, and becomes immediately the surrounding of the I, and this I-surrounding de-subjectivizes itself and loses its vitality as I-life and ownness which it has exemplarily only in the primal impressing of the I. Thus the “immanent time” is the constant and necessary form of the surrounding of the I and it remains the a priori form of the I’s surrounding. The I is the pole of the I’s surrounding in its comportment toward the temporalization therefore it itself is trans-temporal, not what becomes or passes away. Husserl also says here and elsewhere, that the I is not to be thought of as a standing or abiding object or being, but a Urstand in contrast all objective temporal being (see our discussion of “substance” in Chapter V, §3) “functioning,” “appreciating,” “apprehending,” etc. “Functioning” might be taken (misleadingly) to mean that “I am” is merely the ongoing joining of the modes of temporalization, the Now, No Longer, and Not Yet in the primal presencing. If the intention is merely to say that the I, as a living present or primal presencing itself is ever both change and persistence, and the continuity of the I is inseparably tied to change and the change is never independent of this persisting continuity of presence/presencing, we still must face the question of whether this can dispense with a sense in which the I-moment is indeed trans-temporally substantial, a sub-stans that in no way flows. Is who one is constantly changing in the sense that there are only family resemblances between the phases and ultimately who one is can dissipate into “one” becoming a stranger to “oneself”? Or is there not an individual essence in question here, as we have argued, and as many passages in Husserl propose. Such a position need not deny the claim that the I is “wedded” to the flux as an inseparable moment. In one formulation the flux or primal temporalization provides the basic egological surrounding, the field of
ownness emanating from the I-pole. Obviously we must not think of this I-moment-substance as an objective being; it is essentially non-objective, always the source-pole of meaning-determinations, most immediately in this context, the temporal modes of the primal temporalizings.

We must here face a decisive question regarding the evidence for the ontological beginninglessness and endlessness of the transcendental I. We have said that the transcendental I as the primal presencing cannot experience its beginning or ending. Again: Because the experience or primal presencing of the end would require an experience or presencing of “nothing afterwards” and the presencing of the beginning requires the experience of “nothing before” it would be neither at its end nor at its beginning, but would be after its “ending” and before its “beginning.” Now we may ask: Is this not merely to say that the end of experience is not an experienced end and the beginning of experience is not an experienced beginning? If this is so, then the beginning and end of the transcendental “I” would be real but not experienced. Thus the transcendental I would be ephemeral like everything else but it would have the deficient characteristic of its beginning or end not being able to known in the first-person. (This is reflected in the common expression of someone dying from a violent accident: “He never knew what hit him.”) In which case it would belong to the essence of the “I myself” to have the defective property that it begin and end, and yet be ignorant of its beginning and ending.

Is it therefore not possible that I begin and end, something that seems more than obvious from the standpoint of the natural attitude, but that for essential reasons, that we have just reviewed, I am not able to experience the beginning and ending? Clearly for Husserl the being of the primal presencing is the exemplary instance of “to be is to be perceived.” There is no third-person evidence able to be brought forth that the “I myself” as essentially a first-person self-experiencing begin and end and yet be ignorant of its beginning and ending. What we may doubtlessly say is that so long as the primal presencing functions it must exist. Further, that whose mode of appearing is most fundamentally what “I” refers to, and whose mode of manifestation is presupposed by all the other modes of manifestation, and which manifestation itself can in no way be modalized or invalidated, etc., cannot not exist while it itself or something is displayed to it. The transcendental I exists in an apodictic way “as long as” and “while” it functions as the primal presencing. (The scare-quotes are necessary here because I myself as transcendental I am not among the durations that properly can be described with such phrases as those signaled by the scare-quotes.) If there is this original non-reflective mode of self-manifestation, then I necessarily exist. But must this self-experiencing of the primal presencing necessarily exist? Can I, qua primal presencing or ultimate transcendental I, cease to be or at one time not have been?28 Recall that we earlier noted that it is a contingency that JG Hart exists and in as much as I am JG Hart it is a contingency that I exist. But it is a matter of necessity that I exist in my agency of manifestation in the declarative sentence, “I exist” and my saying “I don’t exist” is internally contradictory in the way “JG Hart does not exist” is not.

The answer leaves us with the paradox with which we are familiar. There is no doubt about the second- and third-person evidence that before birth I was nothing
and after death I will not be, that my life “sometime” will no longer be one of falling asleep and again waking up in the world with others and for others. There is no doubt that eventually this life will be “nothing.” There is no doubt that if “‘being something’ is being in the world and its spatial-temporality, then after death I am nothing. But is this the exhaustive valid sense of ‘being something?’”29 In the natural attitude there is no doubt about our having begun or our ending. It is in the best sense “common sense” even though it is always clearly manifest in the third- and second-person, and this knowledge is applied to our own case as a matter of inference. Yet in the transcendental attitude, for which being and display are inseparable, the transcendental I appears to be necessarily unbegun and unending. Even if it is conceptually possible that I begin and end without knowing it, transcendental phenomenology must deny that phenomenological evidence for this is possible.

If the transcendental attitude’s claim about the essential connection between being and appearing holds, e.g., that the “being” of death is inseparable from its display, then so do the transcendental I’s elucidations regarding its unique status in terms of its necessity as well as its beginninglessness and unendingness. The position is tautological from the point of view of the primary axiom of the inseparability of display and being in the phenomenological attitude. Of course, inseparably connected to this is the unique self-display of the primal presencing. In this case, the being perceived or the being manifest requires necessarily the being of what (i.e., of who) is manifesting.

The connection between being and display of what comes to light in the world does not enjoy this necessary connection. Displays qua displays, of course necessarily exist in so far as they require the existence of the dative and agent of manifestation, whose existence is indubitable in the displaying of whatsoever and certainly itself. But displays as genitives of manifestation of transcendent objects do not require that that of which the display is a display exists. Error, illusion, delusion, etc. is possible. But the self-presence of the primal presencing is not to be characterized as involving an appearing of… to-, a genitive and dative of manifestation, wherein error and illusion are possible. There is no I that is not immediate non-reflexive apodictic self-experiencing; there is no self-experiencing that is not lived by some sense of “I.”

Thus as long as there is this inherent self-manifestation of oneself to oneself as an I one exists. And in as much as the transcendental attitude merely makes this inherent self-manifestation a theme, one may say that in the transcendental attitude it is not possible that the transcendental person not be. And this basic aspect of the transcendental attitude, i.e., one’s ineluctable self-awareness, the self-presence of the “myself,” is always implicit in the natural attitude. In this sense as long as the “myself” is, whether in the natural or transcendental attitude, the transcendental person is.

But in what sense is the “myself” necessary and in what sense is it contingent? We touched on this matter in regard to the peculiar contingency and facticity of the transcendental I (in Chapter VI, §9). The transcendental I cannot be said to be contingent or factual in any sense that we may find in our manifestation of the world. We cannot properly say that the transcendental I exists “as long as” primal presenc-
ing “lasts.” Nor can we properly say that “at some time” the transcendental I might no longer be. Nor can we say that the transcendental I at one time was not. The senses of necessity, temporality, possibility, and contingency here tend to reflect the senses that are embedded in the manifestation of the world. To this extent they are inappropriate.

Yet the transcendental person is present to us also as someone in the world who has begun and who will die, who is as ephemeral as anything else. When we say to someone that the transcendental I appears necessarily as unbegun and unending and if the listener remains in the natural attitude, then this “appearing” of necessity becomes suspicious. But no less problematic is when the transcendental I hears the proclamation from the natural attitude, whether in the second or third person perspective, “You,” (inevitably targeting the myself or transcendental I), “are as ephemeral as anything else in the world.” Each perspective urges scare quotes (or quotation marks) on the disclosure of what appears from the different standpoints. Not that the appearings are denied or simply transcended, but rather their sense is disturbed by the other perspective. And there is no clear standpoint that can harmoniously unify them.

The paradox of the discrepancy of the competing perspectives on death will dog the meditation on death in the rest of this book and the next.

Notes

5. Peter Geach questions the claim that there is any temporality to acts. See his *God and Immortality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 35–37. We agree with Geach that there is not perfect symmetry between acts and the time modes and relations of physical events. Yet it seems to me that with Geach there is a temptation to take acts, called “thoughts,” for propositions that are thought. Therefore he maintains that thoughts occur “as a series in which thought-contents successively occur, with no succession within any one thought and no gradual transition from one thought to another.” Whereas “pains and other sensory processes may be long or short, continuous or intermittent” the thought, e.g., “Geach’s arguments are fallacious” cannot “be significantly long or short; nor are we obliged to say that in that case every thought must be strictly instantaneous” (35–36). It is unclear whether such a view would want to extend itself to all of what phenomenology calls acts, e.g., perceptions, imaginings, rememberings, empathic perception, valuing, etc. In any case, it would seem that such a view could not handle the fact that one remembers oneself thinking or that one can reflect on oneself thinking or even the act of thinking. Thus one may report, in response to, What were you
I was thinking about whether thinking has a kind of temporality.” Upon reflection one would be disposed to say that that stretch of time of “thinking about,” which by no means need be said to have any correlation to the temporal unfolding physical events in one’s surroundings, had a beginning, middle, and end. Of course because one was taken up with what one was thinking about in the acts of puzzling, judging, distinguishing, etc., the acts of thinking were anonymous, and in this sense the thoughts would be without any temporality. But even if in such a case we could not give an answer to, “How long were you thinking about this problem?” or “How long did the emergence of this distinction take?” in terms of any worldly measure, we still, it would seem, have a sense of its having a duration of its own. In spite of our disagreement with Geach here, we draw near to agreement on the point that the act in so far as it is anonymous is not lived as temporal, and further, the basic awareness of the temporality of the act itself is not temporal. See §3 below.
7. There are durations brought to light otherwise than in perception, e.g., in remembering the game yesterday afternoon that I watched. As to the question at hand in the text I can ask: Was the earlier non-reflective awareness of the former perception of the game experienced as now?
9. Husserliana X, 22; cf. also Husserliana XXXIII, 97ff.
12. Husserliana XXXIII, 103.
16. I discovered this text in Schopenhauer, Sämmtliche Werke. Vol. II. Ed. Frauenstädt (Leipzig: Borckhaus, 1891), 487. A translation of Spinoza’s original text runs: “we feel that our mind, insofar as it involves the essence of the body under a species of eternity, is eternal and that this existence it has cannot be defined by time or explained through duration.” Spinoza implies that what we refer to in the first-person is the mind (mens) and the mind is I myself for which the body is a theme; but he does not explicitly say this. Nevertheless he does say we feel and experience ourselves to be eternal. “At nihilominus sentimus, experimurque, nos aeternos esse.” Ethics, Bk. V, Prop. 23, schol., P23 in Benedict Spinoza, Die Ethik: Lateinisch und Deutsch (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1977), 664–667; also see, A Spinoza Reader. Ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 256. Nevertheless the weight of Spinoza’s reflection is on “mind” and not “ourselves.” Consonance between the theme of the unique individual essence as it is presented in this work and Spinoza’s view of the mind’s experiencing its eternal being would require sorting out the problems of the individuation of Spinozan “mind.” In Spinoza we are modes of the unique divine substance and therefore do not exist in ourselves. Further it appears that what would come closest to this work’s doctrine of the unique ipseity would be the mind’s awareness or idea of its body. “The mind” has no individuality apart from that of which it is aware and there is no I-substance individuated in itself which has experiences or ideas. Because God’s knowledge of the idea of the modes is the source of the modes, such as the extension which is one’s body, my individuality as tied to the idea of my body would have its origin in God’s idea of a mind’s body, and it is this which would be one with the divine essence. God’s eternal idea of us, i.e., God’s knowledge of “the essence of the body under a species of eternity,” is what gives to the mind its kind of immortality. This returns to the theme that was of interest to us at the start, i.e., “we,” i.e., each of us, “feeling and experiencing ourselves to be eternal.” Even if we assume his problematic position that mind and body are two aspects of the one same mode, i.e., in some sense in knowing the
essence of my body. God knows my mind (and me myself). Spinoza does not find the first-person singular or plural here problematic for his position. That is, we may ask: How am I aware of my being eternal if (a) I am fundamentally the idea God has of my body and (b) How am I in my ownness, as such, an idea of God, and how am I in my ownness one with the divine essence? We will wrestle with these matters in a Thomist framework in Chapter VII of Book 2.

21. Husserliana XXXV, 140–41 and 419–420; also Husserliana Materialien VIII (C-Manuskripte), 96ff.
22. See Husserliana Materialien VIII (C-Manuskripte), 96.
23. Husserliana XXXV, 141.
25. Cf. Husserliana XXXV, 143. Husserl uses the term ewig, which often gets translated as “eternal.” We, however, avoid the classical theological ring of eternity as an absolute fullness of life that is proper to God’s own essence and “life.”
27. The problem here is not only in Husserl, see also Richard Höningwald, Die Grundlagen der Denkpsychologie, 322–323.
29. Husserliana XXIX, 333.
Chapter VIII
The Afterlife and the Transcendental I

The dauntingness of the change, and the strangeness of anticipations of life in some quite different mode, are not the root cause of the fear of death, but rather the thought of our total extinction. To pass out into the black night of total oblivion is a fate which is peculiarly dreaded, to the extent that the prospect makes a real impact even with the further thought that we shall have no cognizance of it. The latter thought affords little mitigation of it. The latter thought affords little mitigation of it: One’s experience of this life must be peculiarly jaded for us to take consolation in the thought that there is nothing beyond it.

H. D. Lewis

From the transcendental phenomenological standpoint the transcendental I has no beginning or ending. It cannot think, make present, or imagine its non-being. Furthermore, in principle, the only transcendental phenomenological evidence for my non-ending resides with me after I am dead, who then am no longer part of the philosophical community. As for my beginning (see § 1 below) I have no proper recollection of my self-presence to myself prior to being born.

Yet death and birth are facts for us all. It is a fundamental philosophical task to grasp how the unthinkability and unpresentability of death (for transcendental phenomenological reflection) is compatible with that with which we are familiar in the natural attitude and that we know awaits us. From the transcendental standpoint we have reason to hesitate pronouncing that the transcendental life of a person has absolutely discontinued with her death, i.e., her being absolutely absent from the world says nothing to us about her self-presence to herself. Nevertheless, we have reasonable inferential evidence for believing that she and the rest of us die and were born – “inferential” because of our thesis that the first-personal evidence eludes us, whereas the second- and third-personal evidence is compelling. It is of interest that we have the intermittent periods of sleep, and this poses analogous issues for us to birth and death. Because sleep is close at hand as a field for reflection, if often enough not a field of reflection, we may use it as a proximate occasion for phenomenological reflection on these important matters. After looking at sleep we will examine briefly the kinship between the transcendental phenomenological position and that of Vedanta on these issues. Then we will look at some other possible senses of life after death.
§1 Wordsworth and Schopenhauer on Ignorance of Pre-existence

Before we turn to the analogy between sleep and death, another consideration merits our attention. We typically dread the dark unknown of what awaits us with death and rarely do otherwise than take for granted the dark unknown that preceded birth. We seldom raise the question: “Why this abject terror of the unknown [of death], without ever stopping to wonder with the same terror where she had come from? Wasn’t she heading for the same darkness or light, she had emerged from sixty-four years ago?”

Although we may acknowledge exceptions, people, as a rule, claim total ignorance about a life prior to birth. Yet there are noteworthy exceptions and the odd experience of nostalgia merits philosophical attention. Marcel Proust has given a famous articulation of this phenomenon in a secular setting quite apart from its more familiar mythic-religious settings. But for our purposes here Wordsworth’s “Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood” is especially useful. This is a “shadowy recollection,” where Wordsworth claims that there was a time when all of life and nature in particular were “apparelled in celestial light” that he had seen but he now can see no more. There has “past away a glory from the earth” yet, for those graced with the appropriate sensibility and still uncrushed hearts, there are echoes and ciphers of this splendor in much of life and many natural phenomena.

This faded memory serves as an a priori framework for meeting much of life; it is a “Presence which is not to be put by” that frames instinctually the subsequent adult experiences, enabling these echoes and ciphers to awaken a sense of loss that “the visionary gleam” is gone. Yet this lost radiance which is awakened by the echoes and ciphers is a source of strength and faith.

Wordsworth is convinced that as a child each of us has an amazing capacity for the intuition of the ontological-metaphysical truth that “birth is but a sleep and a forgetting” and that the soul, “our life’s Star,” “had elsewhere its setting/And cometh from afar/Not in entire forgetfulness…/ But trailing clouds of glory.” Wordsworth claims that as a child he had these memories of this prior existence, and as memories they were founded on perceptions. The child is “Nature’s priest” and the powerful memory is inseparable from the vision upon which it is based.

But at length the adult, burdened by care, convention, and the noise of the world, “perceives it die away,/and fade into the light of common day.” In the present tense of the reflective adult, the “visionary gleam” has fled and Wordsworth is not able to recall, even in a shadowy fashion, his having lived his immortal condition in an intuition, perception, or filled intention. He can only remember his childhood memory of the original ontological intuition. Yet “this memory of a memory is the source of consolation and ground of faith articulated in the concluding sections of the Ode.”

Even though Wordsworth has no doubt that the child with that memory was he himself, that the child’s memories are his, the freshness of the child’s memory, which of necessity is founded on the ontological vision, is removed from him and
only dimly awakened by the echoes and ciphers. Although Wordsworth does not say he cannot recall ever having the child’s perceptions or intuitions, as the condition for the child’s remembering, he comes close to saying this in claiming that he only remembers the child’s having remembered or that, as a child, he had such memories.

This distancing approaches a state of dissociation of himself from himself as this child. For this reason it appears that he postulates that he as a child, and every child, is the “best Philosopher,” an “Eye among the blind,” “Mighty Prophet! Seer blest! On whom those truths do rest.” Wordsworth thus believes, by way of inference, that the child has an amazing ontological capacity, which the adult gains access to, not through a memory of his prior childhood experience or intuitions, but unfortunately through only the memory of a childhood memory. It is only when the echoes and ciphers are effective that there is awakened the intimation that these memories of his childhood were once founded in his, the one who is now the adult Wordsworth, own perceptions. The intimations occasioned by the ciphers have a sense of familiarity that Wordsworth interprets as reminders of the intuition that founded his childhood memories.

We may presume that Wordsworth could not so esteem childhood memories if they were not lived as his and therefore founded on Wordsworth’s own perceptions or ontological intuitions. They could not hold such power for him if they were merely memories of memories dissociated from his founding perceptions or ontological intuitions. (Compare our discussion of Shoemaker’s “quasi-memory” in §8 below.) Yet there seems to be an ambiguity in Wordsworth’s presentation of the matter. One might be led to believe that he holds that the intimations are nothing but memories of childhood memories, remembering that he remembered, dissociated from the childhood experiences that founded the memories. The complex experiences externally awakened by associations occasioned by the echoes and ciphers are then associated with the experiences that must have founded the childhood memories. The advantage of this interpretation is that it effectively weakens the claim by Wordsworth, which doubtless would provoke suspicion, that he himself knew or he himself experienced a life prior to birth. However, at the same time, it vaporizes memory of the childhood experience to a mere memory that this child had memories, but which are not lived by Wordsworth as his own prior memories founded in his own original ontological intuitions. Such an interpretation, while more acceptable to the skeptic, concedes too much and robs the Ode of what seems to be its unique epistemic claims. The weakened claim moves in the direction of saying that it is logically or ‘essentially’ possible that we can have knowledge of past events that is in most respects like memory but of which we ourselves did not have a prior experience. We will study this matter in some detail in §8.8 below.

Schopenhauer is a foil to Wordsworth in as much as he takes it as a consensus that the nostalgia that pervades Wordsworth is anomalous and what is typical is the confession of a total ignorance of any life prior to birth. Schopenhauer observes that we seem typically to accept the absence of ourselves from the world prior to birth in a way we do not accept our absence after death. The fact of one’s absence
prior to birth generates nothing of the anxiety or philosophical reflection that one’s absence after death occasions. What are we to make of this asymmetry?

Whereas in the transcendental attitude we have difficulty presencing or conceiving our non-being and the world bereft of our death – and this is reflected even in the natural attitude – we readily accept the world as having existed prior to our having been born into the world. Thus the transcendental position appears to have no consequences for our experience in the natural attitude. Even though the first-person transcendental experience is of ourselves as unbegun, the experience of a kind of ontological homesickness or nostalgia usually, pace Wordsworth et alii, is, at least for most modern people, at best infrequent and anomalous. Such a sporadic longing to return “home” would be aimed at a future which would return us to what we enjoyed in the past and presume to continue in the present. While nostalgia pervades much religious and mythic literature (see the works of Mircea Eliade), and has been the center of Proust’s modern “secular” literary classic, the task of demonstrating the sense in which it is an a priori frame or one of the basic ineluctable ways persons are in the world will not tempt us here. A chief difficulty would be to separate the existential issues from the massive interpretive cultural-religious grid which typically shape the experience of “nostalgia.” Nevertheless, the fact that the theme of a longing to return to the primal beginning has lured thinkers so disparate as Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, Wordsworth, and Proust, to say nothing of the way the theme plays itself out in the religious “Western” and “Non-Western” traditions, invites reflection.

In any case, nostalgia is not symmetrical to the fear of our absence of being from the world that we associate with death but rather a pain of loss at being absent from what we once possessed or once were; a sadness at being “Here” rather than “There.” Ontological nostalgia is not terror that one will lose what one has but a sadness that one has already lost what one had by being in the world and no longer “home.” Because for the person for whom ontological nostalgia prevails, life in the world is already a kind of loss, not a possession, death is more easily conceived to bring a cessation of this loss, an absence to this absence and the possibility of going “home.” The life in the world is not “being home” but an alienation or pilgrimage. (In a Chapter VI of Book 2, we will consider a Plotinian and classical Christian theological variation on these themes.)

The fear of non-being or fear of loss presupposes an actual possession of being; we cannot be terrorized by fear of loss of what we have already lost. Death is dreadful because it appears that we lose everything including our lives and ourselves; but if birth is seen as absolutely coming to be we cannot find the distance between the time of birth and the time prior to this an occasion for sadness or dread. Because I only come to be at $T_1$, there is no meaningful loss of any real possibility of mine in regard to what was prior to $T_1$.

In regard to the absence of terror at our not having been we can say: In the transcendental phenomenological first-person perspective there cannot be terror or sadness at the prospective loss of what we continue to have and cannot lose; in the third-person experience of the natural attitude, we cannot be terrorized by the loss of what we never knew ourselves to have or have experienced.
Further, our life as a life of desire and hope projects us into the future. The intention of the future as the direction of the will and desire is an intention of what is absent and only present in the intention of aiming, desiring, choosing, etc. Effective desiring rests on the sense of one’s present capability in regard to bringing about in the present what is now only futural. In this sense the place of effective desire and of the fear of loss is the present realization of the future as one’s own future possibility. Of course I can recall the past, but I cannot recall the past as something that I now can bring about as present. I can wistfully wish that the past were not past and that those remembered precious times were imminently future; but this is not to desire that the past was not the past but something else and the future was not the future but something else. This distinction of the modalities of time is presupposed in every aspect of wakeful life. Neither Proustian nor Wordsworthian nostalgia is a wish that the past were future and that memory was hope. The insight that I cannot effectively make what was my past my future is an awakening to what is impossible. While not wanting to rule out the possible metaphysical anguish that might come into play here, it seems evident that not facing up to this is a clear form of unreasonableness and perhaps eventual madness. Minimally rational desire therefore is a desire of what is futural and not what is past as if it were futural.

Death, however, is precisely taken to be the negation of the possibility of the desired future in which we live by way of anticipation and imagination. Therefore it is experienced as a loss of one’s life as continuous with the future. Our not having been born earlier and therefore the negation of the possibilities that would have been ours if we existed in earlier times are not experienced as a loss because the vector of one’s life as a life of desire is for what has not yet been made present. The negation of what has always already been made present by oneself by way of its receding into the past is a negation of a possibility. But it is not a negation of a possibility one desires or hopes for. It, as something past, is not what is desired or hoped for, but it is desired or hoped for only as not being past but a possible future. Similarly the negation of a possibility of what one’s ancestors made present, i.e., what historically preceded one’s own biographical past, appears as a negation of a possibility but not a negation of a real possibility one desires or hopes for. This resembles our not feeling the loss of possibility of what another desires and realizes but which holds no interest for us. We might say, “that is not my cup of tea,” meaning, among other things, that the other person is Other and her possibilities are not mine, and that is fine. Desirable possibilities are tied to my I-can and my desires; it is in regard to these that one has the possibility of dread of loss. The infinity of past possibilities simply do not correlate with a person’s I-can and horizon of desires precisely because they were Others’ possibilities and not one’s own.

Of course, good history and good historical fiction may enable one to imaginatively project oneself into a past situation in such a way that precisely the past possibilities become for the moment one’s own future ones. But this is an imaginative reliving of the past as if it were one’s own past and future in which we appropriate Others’ possibilities as if they were our own. It is not the experience we have in mind when we say we do not dread the loss of possibilities in our not having
existed prior to our birth in the way we dread our death. The reason is that the latter has to do with our real, not imagined fictional, possibilities.

Yet another issue here is that when thinking about the world prior to our birth we inevitably ascribe to the manifestation that we give to it now a kind of necessity, i.e., it is simply assumed that the manifestation of the world that now greets the new wakeful consciousness trails off into the immemorial past, and in this sense never began, and my being born is not the beginning of this manifestation. We take for granted that the world is the same for us all, and that this sameness held prior to my being on the scene. As a child I must adapt myself to this appearing to us all or be left in the darkness. Indeed, my coming to be a person requires that I am raised into this manifestation of the world through the elemental display brought about through language.

Thus a reason why I am not able to accept easily my ceasing to be and yet readily accept my not having been is that in coming to wakeful life I have not experienced in the first-person the novel event of my being born; I am always present to myself as having been and the novelty of my birth is first of all something invisible to me and eventually made visible to me through Others’ having experienced it and relating it to me. I take the word of the adults who are “older than me,” i.e., who were here before me, that I have come into the world lately. Thus I in fact posit “the” world as there even before it is my world and as there prior to my being born. The first-person present experiencing of oneself, always at its most basic level an experience of oneself as unbegun, is suppressed and the person comes to appreciate herself as having once made an entrance into the world in the presence of already-existing Others.

The first-person event of birth is not a phenomenon for me of either expectation or recollection. It is not something I alone must do, in the way that I must die alone. In facing death, as we shall see, I am presented to myself uniquely; death uniquely singularizes me. Not so with birth; from the start the world is for us all and my birth is present to me as an oddly public event, i.e., present for others, but present least and last of all for me through the witness of others. From the start the world is there as public, the same for all who were born prior to me; and the validity it has for all is what is to be validated and appropriated by me. This is not to deny that with birth something radically new enters the world; it is only that for the one being born this novelty is not appreciated in any perception, belief, or recollection, and for the others witnessing the event, the novelty of the one who is there is more a pledge and expectation, because the actual revelation of the unique ipseity in the infant’s face typically is not yet actually evident the way it one day will be.

Eventually for the mature adult the world’s display is present as tied to her own manifestation. “The” world is inseparably “my” world; the perspective of Others is tied to my manifestation of their perspectives. “The” world enjoys its genuine validity only pursuant to my validation of what purports to be “the same for us all.” Thus, as we have seen, there are transcendental motivations, patent and latent, that move one to regard herself as not merely something public in the world but precisely the Geltungsträger der Welt, the bearer of the validity of the claims of “the same for us all.” In birth and one’s recollection of one’s birth and infancy, not only
§2 Sleep as a Transcendental Phenomenological Theme

At the outset it must be said that the phenomenological discussion of sleep is not an effort to uncover a hidden dimension which has an “in-itselfness” experienceable as such but which we, from our disadvantaged position as wakeful reflective agents, cannot well investigate. This is the view of those who hold that one can study sleep itself by, e.g., observation of certain electronic brain impulses, or brainwaves of a certain length or by the presence/absence of REM (Rapid Eye Movements). (This resembles the view that we could study what death is by studying such brain pulsations or physiological changes, etc.) This view of sleep as a being in itself, e.g., a neural-physiological process, and apart from display, as we have seen, is not of interest to transcendental phenomenology. (Of phenomenological interest is the display of sleeping to the non-sleeping observer as the same as what it is to the one sleeping.) This phenomenological stance is not a cavalier dismissal of natural science; it is only the caution that the neural-physiological process purporting to shed light on “sleep,” must not leave out of the investigation how sleep is displayed and experienced. To think of it a priori as something physical in itself is too hasty. Indeed, from the phenomenological standpoint sleep and death are not anything original in themselves but rather a modification of our intentional wakeful being. Sleep is a latent mode of being patent and wakeful. This means that it is only from the wakeful transcendental standpoint that we may determine what
it means. But because we cannot be asleep and do a phenomenology of sleep we must reconstruct what it means from the waking standpoint.

First a word is necessary about phenomenological reconstruction. Phenomenological reflection does not have direct first-person or even second- or third-person access to developing, deficient or anomalous forms of consciousness, e.g., that of infants, the mentally ill, and non-human forms of awareness, or forms of human oblivion and unconsciousness. These are to be understood as variations from the consciousness that transcendental phenomenology studies directly in the first-person. Therefore we must construe what these forms of consciousness mean first on the basis of our own reflection. Dreamless sleep and death evade our direct reflection and require a kind of speculation. (Whereas we might have phenomenological monographs on sleep, falling asleep, waking from sleep, etc., we have none on death, because the “researcher” is dead! This would be an utterly trivial observation were it not for the consideration that for phenomenology the definitive meaning of death eludes us in the first-person, and therefore also its sense in the second- and third-person is elusive.)

Of course we recollect, e.g., that we were infants and that we have slept “deeply” and that we have been deliriously ill. Yet the deficient modes of wakefulness (of illness, infancy, and sleep) elude us and the remembering-that is usually not sufficient to permit a phenomenological reflection. The deficiency is due perhaps either to the fact that we have no memory whatsoever and are relying on the testimony of others, or our past intentional consciousness was undelineated and therefore there is nothing with categorial delineation to recall. We furthermore can, with practice, acquire the skill to communicate, albeit with great difficulty, with infants, the ill, animals, etc. The otherness of these Others is great and what Husserl calls the analogical pairing of empathic perception is strained once it attempts to move beyond the recognition that “there” too is a “here” for itself, an analogous “I,” for whom I am there and an Other. We are not dolphins, eagles or dogs and have no recollection of ever being such nor do we expect to be such. And our reconstructive answering the question, “What would it be like to be, e.g., a bat?” is even more difficult than in the case of reconstructing the consciousness of an infant or someone mentally ill.

The analogical reconstruction of first-person experience from the third-person perspective is not valueless, but because of the absence or difficulty of communication it remains often very speculative. Obviously the reconstruction is not the same in all instances. Generalizations about the lived experiences of individuals of one species to individuals of the same species seem valid, especially in some species; broad inductions from one species to another species are obviously risky but sometimes valid. In general such generalizations find resistance when our attention is drawn to the self-consciousness of the conscious others. Then there surfaces the prospect of evidence for the kind of individuality that we perceive in humans, i.e., the aspect of person and or personality. Doubtless, e.g., Labrador Retrievers have endless features in common, even that they are generally desirous to please and of a sweet temperament; but that they are, for all that, quite individual and experience themselves as such, seems also evident. (Key for our meditation in Book 2 is whether such wonderful creatures are present to themselves in a way that enables
them to determine themselves and their lives for all eternity or whether such a self-
determination is impossible and/or unnecessary. To use our later language, can they
be said to be Existenzien? What does their intentionality target in their “love”? Do
they have a “vocation”?)

As we may undertake the reconstruction of how we are or were in anomalous
states, how infants, animal Others, etc. are, so we can undertake a reconstruction of
how we are to envisage our being “before conception or birth” and “after death.” If
there is anything at all to be said this will be because these too are only accessible
as modifications of waking consciousness. Because what we have access to in the
third- and second-person leaves us next to nothing to work with, it is left to the
first-person transcendental analysis to pursue this claim. A venerable route for
thinking about these matters is through the analogy of sleep.

§3 Sleep as the Brother of Death

“Wakefulness” refers to consciousness within the context of its possible modifica-
tions in the familiar forms of sleep, weariness, illness, etc. Wakefulness thus is syn-
onymous with consciousness as the luminosity of I myself and of being’s diaphanous
display. As such it is the medium and necessary condition for intentional acts. But
in itself it is not an intentional act. Of course, it might be named an “act” if by act
we mean a perfection, but then this act would not be something I bring about through
an intentional act. Recall our earlier discussion of a general passive synthetic will
that serves as the basis for wakefulness and all explicit and proper will acts. If we
take this general will or act to be identical with me “myself,” it surely is not some-
thing that I myself have brought about by a specific act of will. In this case the most
fundamental act would be, in some sense, received because constituting; but strictly
speaking “I” would not be there to receive it; rather its being actual or actuated is
the act of my being. Although I have not brought it about, neither am I there to receive
it. Similarly sleep is, although a modification of wakefulness, a medium and neces-
sary condition for the acts within the dream. Sleep also is not a specific intentional
act, but the condition for such acts. Waking consciousness or wakefulness, as radici-
ally presupposed by all acts and displays, is therefore very difficult to define
because everything that we might use as explanatory is not available without it and
thus presupposes it. As presupposed by everything it does not seem to have a proxi-
mate or specific differentiating genus that permits its delineation. Yet it does offer
something approaching a contradictory, namely its intentional modifications in
forms of unconsciousness, as dreamless sleep, etc.

Thus waking and sleeping are not specific acts to which we can be exhorted or
which take intentional objects. In this context “to wake” and “to sleep” are
intransitive verbs and resemble “to appear” (or “appearing”) and an activity, cap-
tured by verbal nouns, like “walking” (“to walk”) and “running” (“to run”) that do
not take grammatical objects. “Waking someone” is an agency directed by one
awake to another who is asleep with the purpose of waking her. “To awaken” or
“to wake” (in the first-person) refers to someone’s experience of moving from sleep to wakefulness. ("Walking dogs" and “running scams,” just like “to grow an economy,” are novel developments or metaphors that evolve out of and require the first-level, non-transitive sense for their rhetorical and stylistic effect.)

“To wake” and “to sleep” in the first-person do not express purposes either. Waking sets the scene for acts expressing purposes; sleeping does this also in regard to the acts taking place in dreams. If asked, “What are you doing?” and we gave the answer, “I am waking” (not “waking up” or “awakening”) the questioner would have a right to be puzzled with our answer because he had the right (a) to presuppose that we were already awake, and (b) he would be at a loss to know what specific activity our answer involved. Thus, whereas the walker may say “I walk” there is a sense in which the one waking may not say “I wake.” One may, in response to the question, “What are you doing?” answer “I am waking up.” But here there is a sense in which the person is already (more or less) awake or conscious and “I am waking” (or “I am becoming conscious”) comes too late.

Of course, waking is tied to attentiveness and will and in this sense there is an ideal of wakefulness. In this respect we can make sense of the exhortation to “be wakeful” (“be mindful”) or “wake up” when we are already awake. Here there is an ideal of wakefulness that ethical teachings and religious traditions address under doctrines of wakefulness, mindfulness, vigilance, self-collectedness, etc. Connected to this is the fresh vital nature of the sense of I-can: The more this sense of capacity is alive, the more we are receptive to the world’s challenge and invitation to us. This fresh capacity is clearly a matter of both discipline and rest. Without the replenishment of one’s energy (one “has energy”), without the quickening of the lived I-can that comes from rest and sleep the world loses its lure and power to move us to have projects. Without the rest that comes from sleep what good are all the riches and possessions in the world? Yet, in the first-person, the connection between rest and energy is totally hidden to us – more so than is the connection between eating and energy.

One way we have of talking about being awake is being “concentrated.” “Being concentrated” means that I am awake and alert to a greater degree than usual. The felt-meaning of my I-can (in contrast to my I-can as inseparably one with I myself in my non-reflective, non-intentional, self-awareness) is a rich empty intention in the way it is not when I am taking drugs or am ill or exhausted. We can be concentrated by focusing on the matter at hand and keeping at bay what is not relevant to the matter at hand. But we are also concentrated in our being vigilant to the wider recesses and resources of what has been passive-synthetically retained and which are my lived sense of “I can.” But that means that we are vigilant to what is and is not relevant; we grasp what is essential and not the adventitious. In being concentrated the matter at hand is evident to us in terms of what matters we have to plumb as it is related to the entire horizon of possible significances lived in the felt-meaning of “I can.”

One cannot be concentrated unless one’s being is to have been in the world and unless each act of articulation and decision is a synthesis in which the entire world’s relevance is reflected. Although the person “immersed” in something can well appear oblivious to the world – and she might well indeed be oblivious to the
importunities of the immediate world around her – as concentrated she in fact can
be presencing the entire world in a unique and highly delineated way. Indeed, those
attuned and excited by their surrounding world may well be oblivious of the fuller
sense of world of the person who is “lost” in a theme. (Think of the story of the
milkmaid amused at Thales’ falling into the well.)

With sleep we have the opposite of concentration. There is not that energetic
aliveness to one’s sense of capacity or I-can; one is precisely shut down, inactive,
collapsed. In the approach of sleep the exigency of one’s exhaustion dictates itself.
“It must,” therefore “I cannot” and “I must.” One might be tempted to say the I-can
is “collapsed into oneself,” but that neglects that the proper sense of the ideally
wakeful self is alert to the world, and where there is a coincidence of I myself and
I can. (In some forms of wakefulness, as in extraordinary achievements in politics,
art, poetry, philosophy, and religion, there appear to be forms of concentrated pres-
encing or awareness which leave nothing of importance out.) Yet with the dimming
of the being in the world in becoming weary, it might seem as if the subjective pole
swallows up the world pole. Yet in sleep, the I-pole, where I am fully there, cen-
tered and active and awake to I-can, is also being disengaged and I am dissolving
into “It must.” There is no highlighting from out of the world, no prioritizing of
interests, no voluntary holding at bay the importunities of the world and other
spheres of meaning. Rather one’s willing engagement in the world is disengaged
and let go of. And in death as a departure or excision from the world, one also lets
go of the world’s relevance even though one does not necessarily renounce one’s
own achievements and loyalties in regard to the world. (See below.)

When asleep someone might command or exhort us, “Wake up!” Is this really a
command or exhortation implying that we hear it when we are asleep, and thus
implying that when we are asleep we are enough awake that we can still hear?
Often this seems to be the belief of the increasingly impatient person waking us up.
Or is it rather a way of initially making a disturbance, like shaking us, so that once
awake, we may hear the command or exhortation? The answer seems to depend on
the “depth” of our sleep. If we are sleeping “lightly” we hear the exhortation. If in
a deep sleep, we might need the loud yell and a nudge before we can hear the
exhortation. In any case, as there is no making promises to non-conscious beings,
so there are no commands of or exhortations to them.

Because of the absolute loss and absence of death, it surely seems perverse to
one riveted in the natural attitude to compare death, with its irretrievable loss and
absence, with sleep where the other person is temporarily not there for us.8
Nevertheless there exists the venerable analogy of sleep and death as in the meta-
phor of “sleep as the brother of death.”9

“Falling asleep in the bosom of Abraham,” or “at rest in the Lord,” or even
“returning home to the womb of mother Gaia” are ancient interpretations of death.
We may note that St. Paul (1 Corinthians 15:3–8) tells his listeners what he has
been told: “that Christ woke up, egegertai,” which usually gets translated as “rose.”
St. Paul also contrasts the living with those who have “fallen asleep.” Dying is
referred to as sleeping and those who are “dead in Christ” are described as “fallen
asleep in Christ.” On the “last day” they will be awakened/raised with the blast of

§3 Sleep as the Brother of Death 463
an angel’s trumpet. (See 1 Thessalonians 4:13–15 and 1 Corinthians 15.) Here we find hints in Paul’s thinking that there is a sense of a unique form of unworldly consciousness even in death. The angel’s trumpet is an eschatological alarm clock with special powers to awaken those who have died, i.e., “fallen asleep.”

Of course, for the waking person, sleep is but an episode in life. When one relents to its pull, one gives in to the seeming extinction of one’s self-awareness and the importunities of the world, with the confidence that one will wake up again – to oneself and to the world. Further, comparing death to sleep is a taming of the untamable, a rendering innocuous what is incomparably unsettling. In the case of our experience of grief over deceased loved ones, it borders on the obscene. Yet such an analogical comparison clearly makes sense when there is belief in some form of afterlife. But even without this belief, the idea of laying down life’s burdens and oneself burdened by life or the idea that the death brings “peace” and “relief” from excruciating suffering offers consolation, even if one cannot logically hold that indeed peace and relief are experienced or believe that there will be a waking up in the “hereafter.” Pain can appear so severe that its cessation seems to be a value even if the cessation is not experienced by the deceased! Further, the sleep of death itself may be conceived as the reward for bearing life’s burdens. As sleep for the weary is not merely a privation but rejuvenation, so death may be thought of as affording at least the cessation of suffering, if not a transition to the rejuvenation and renascence of the afterlife.

Granted that in retrospect in sleep one’s life seems to continue in an often creative, if not obviously connected way, and that some necessary sense of one’s life or some condition of life is realized in sleep, what is this sense of life? From the point of view of joyful, healthy, conscious awareness sleep seems always a privation of life and meaning because it is disengagement, oblivion, absence of determination and discrimination of the common life with Others.

It is not the time spent sleeping but our wakeful life which counts for us as our life. When we awake from sleep we begin our life anew from where we left off when last awake. The interim “night-time” hours of sleep do not count as part of “my life.” Typically I resume where I let off before I went to sleep, I return to my life and its features as the same as what I was doing before I went to sleep. The particular person I am remains the same; the beliefs I held, the resolutions, decisions, and promises I made, etc. keep their validity. Similarly my surroundings typically maintain their same basic features. In short, my world is my waking world and the fact that there are more or less huge gaps comprising one-third of one’s life does not mean that the world’s unity is repeatedly marred by these gaps. No, typically, at least in modern Western culture, the gaps do not count in the ongoing synthesis, nor do the dreams. They do not form part of the waking world.

Of course there are persons afflicted with recurrent nightmares with the same setting and personages which once haunted the person’s waking life. This, thankfully, is unusual for most of us. If they were the pattern, waking life would perhaps begin to be but a slight respite and refuge from the horrors of the reality of the time of sleep.
A question arises here. If it be true that my waking life is interrupted by sleep and that when I awake my mind makes a leap over the interim "night time" and makes connection with the time just before I fell asleep, then are not sleep and waking absolutely discontinuous? And if there is a discontinuity, and if sleep and being unconscious are the cessation of my conscious life and of any sense of an awareness of a flow of Nows, do I not have here a phenomenon which challenges Husserl’s basic claim regarding the beginninglessness and endlessness of transcendental self-awareness? Is not the awakening from a dreamless sleep an experience of a truly first Now, a Now for which there is no retention of an experience of "nothing before?" And similarly is the falling into a dreamless sleep not similarly an experience of an ultimate final Now for which there is no filled impression of the protention, "and nothing afterwards?" And if both these be true do we not have a phenomenological evidence for the presentability and conceivability of the beginning and ending of the transcendental I as well as time itself. Two issues to discuss here are (1) in what sense is a first Now experienced when waking and a last Now experienced when falling asleep? And (2) is there absolutely no experience of the stream of time when dreamlessly asleep?

As to (1) there does not seem to be any first-person evidence of a “first” or “last” Now. Thus, on the one hand, we seem to have a confirmation of the theory that the end of experience is not experienced, and the beginning of experience is not experienced. We only know the end and beginning from the standpoint subsequent to waking or learning later that we fell asleep. Yet, on the other hand, if there is an experience of the stream of time when dreamlessly asleep, then it is not absolutely true that there is no absolute discontinuity and that the beginning and ending are absolutely unexperienced. See (2) below.

Further, although when we “fall asleep,” what we know we know “this side” of the “state of oblivion” and when awakening what we know we know “the other side” of sleeping, no one ever finds herself in a position to say when waking began or ceased. And this is not merely because of an experience first of all of the undeniable continuity of the homogeneous field of wakefulness and then of the discontinuity of the homogeneous field of sleep, or vice-versa, but further because of the fuzziness of the beginning and ending of wakefulness. In the one case I gradually wake up and come again to myself and to the world, and there is a resumption and activation of the world-interest; in the other case I gradually fall away from the world, and there is a releasing and letting go of my being-in-the-world. In the one case I find no beginning and in the other no ending. There is no sense of radical discontinuity.

This leads to (2): if there is no clear discontinuity, then do we have an experience of a fuzzy continuity between sleep and wakefulness? What would this continuity be? By the nature of what it is we are talking about we can only postulate or reconstruct. And this would amount to positing a kind of “self-experiencing” even when one is unconscious and asleep that would account for both the experience of continuity as well as the way our surroundings can play into our dreams, e.g., as a noise heard by the sleeper will be integrated into her dreams. How could we be utterly unconscious and perform this integration? May we say that a kind of muted
lived self-awareness, Erleben, persists even in states of sleep, stupor, and unconsciousness? This seemed to be Husserl’s position: *Im Zustand der Dumpfheit wird auch erlebt.*11 We will wrestle with it in more detail soon.

Another consideration that may be conjoined to this one is more ontological and speculative. Persons live a monadic life such that the substrate or Urstand, the “myself,” although not something specifiable with properties and content beyond the “myself,” pervades the life of the person. The pieces and moments comprising the life of the person which are informed by the “myself” are parts of this absolute concretum of the personal life in the world with Others. Clearly the pieces and moments comprising the life of the person are not absolutely non-independent, because many, if not most, come and go. Thus whereas the “myself,” as we have proposed, is simple and in-dividual, and of necessity self-aware and identically the same, the personal I would seem to be able to be rent asunder, as in dissolution or dissociation of the personality, and have gaps, as in deep sleep, amnesia, hypnosis, etc. This metaphysical claim would support conceptually but not demonstrate phenomenologically the notion of a radical underlying continuity between sleeping and waking.

We have been proposing throughout a thesis which is explicitly developed in Book 2, Chapter IV, namely, that all intentionality is informed by a general encompassing will analogous to the way a career choice informs the myriad of subordinate tasks. This general will is identical with the “myself” and accounts, in personal life, for not only the ongoing passive achievements and their modalizations, by which the world comes forth as a more or less harmonious unity, but is the basis for the explicit acts of will. Here in these explicit acts position-takings are achieved that punctuate this life with I-acts. I-acts may well be of a cognitive order, like the position-takings of categorial intuitions, distinctions and judgments. But they also may be position-takings in the affective sense of emotions and the clear volitional sense of decisions, promises, oaths, vows, resolves, etc. All these rest on the general will of the life of I myself, but the I-acts embody this will in its aspiration to an ideal of personal life. Later we will take time to spell out this ideal as a kind of calling. Here we merely propose that the will pervades waking life and it undergoes a modification in falling asleep and dying, and perhaps also in sleep and death.

Sleep involves a kind of epoché or relinquishment of our active engagement in the world. When sleep is desired effectively one wills to be unhooked from the world’s claims. One wills to be “gone” and in “being gone” the explicit willing to be “gone” is also gone. The key to “falling asleep” is that the will to be asleep is “effective to the extent that it vanishes or to the extent that it also ‘is gone’.12 This means that within the general willing the specific act of willing to sleep is a willing that is also necessarily a willing of its own nullification – in so far as this explicit willing undermines what is willed, i.e., to disengage one’s world-involvement and get rest. To do this and stop the cascade of thoughts, worries or other emotions rooted in one’s will, one may have to resort to other techniques, e.g., involving oneself in cognitive activity about which one cares little except as precisely a device for beguiling oneself into sleep and bringing about distraction from one’s
volitional-emotional life – like subtracting sevens starting at 1,000. Involving oneself in such a purposeless cognitive behavior distracts from and thus suspends the urgency of immediate projects of will and desire.

Dying has some parallel features. In dying authentically we must relinquish all future achievements and acts of one’s own effective will. But we need not relinquish, disengage, or say No to what we have achieved and believed nor need we detach ourselves from their being accomplished by other wills. In the case of my approaching death, because I will “soon” not be in the world with others this future is properly the future of Others. As a future involving my continued active participation it is relinquished. Although I may be dying I may still be willing, in the form of hoping, that such and such will continue, but my actual volition will not be part of the actual collective will, as it was prior to my death when I did such and such with all the others.

Thus we need not relinquish beliefs that we have, and accomplishments that we have achieved up until the time of our death. Thus, e.g., the beliefs in the merits of the Bill of Rights and in the merits of the struggle to protect it imply a continuing future – at least as a matter of hope in regard to Others’ beliefs and actions. To die actively means that I face my future definitive non-engagement in the actual effective social will that sustains the values of the world I cherish while I am alive. Consciously dying is a mode of being awake. It is a mode of transition to universal inactivity vis-à-vis the world. This is different from the quasi-activity of dreaming while asleep and the quasi-being-awake of many forms of sleep. It is also different from the losing hold, “being gone” or the falling away of sleep during which we do not renounce the future tasks and goals.

Although there are reasons for not holding for an equivalence of the general will and wakefulness, one case for the equivalence is that I typically regard my waking life as interrupted by sleep and not the other way around. Further, when I awake my mind makes a leap over the interim “night time” and makes connection with the time just before I fell asleep. We earlier discussed why interpreting this as absolute discontinuity seems wrong. Certainly in the dream-sleep there is, usually in retrospect, a sense in which my willing directed toward the life-world is disengaged. What holds and enjoys a kind of necessity in the waking life does not always hold for the dream world. Yet it appears feasible that in letting go of the horizon of wakeful interests I am able in sleep to fall into a wider horizon of my life. Here retentions and latent intentions, which are beyond the actuality of my wakeful will, may come into play. Because of the effort of concentration required by wakefulness I prescind from wide expanses of latent intentions. The wakeful centering and focusing required by a specific task marginalizes and renders latent if not indeterminate wider horizons. Thus, on the one hand, wakefulness is informed by a definite habitual will which focuses me and prescinds from wider reaches of my life. On the other hand, this focusing and narrowing of attention can also mean that there are unfinished, repressed and potential willings awaiting the opportunity to come into play. The release of the present habitual will of wakeful life opens me up to postponed or segregated segments of my life to which I am not attending in my present habitual will. It is often these that become active in dreaming.13
It seems fairly uncontroversial to acknowledge the pervasive sway of will in waking life and that sleep is a kind of bracketing or disengagement of our engagement with the world. But because in dreaming we have reason to believe a layer of will is active that was not active when awake, then we have reason to hold that there is not perfect equivalence between wakefulness and the willing. That the will, what we will later call the willing will and the willed will, is effective even though we are asleep is evident in the consideration that sleep does not annihilate our habitual orientations. Our will is temporarily disengaged in the sense that our actual projects are postponed, the dispositions are temporarily dormant, our long-term willings taken out of gear; but when we awake or “resume our life” these willings are back in play. Thus although it is true that when we awaken we reconnect with where we left off in sleep, it is not as if the willing ceased or the will is annihilated but rather it is “modalized” (becomes latent or possible). It is disengaged and rendered inactual in regard to the life-world of waking consciousness, at least for the interim period while sleeping. Thus the will, foremost what we are calling the general willing will, may be thought to encompass also the sleep time in its modality of dream life, and thus to be effective not merely in waking life.

When we speak here of will as apart from me myself, apart from wakeful I-acts, we do not intend to say that there is an autonomous unconscious agent at work. Rather, it is I myself at a distance from myself. The “I myself,” as actively displaying the world and taking a position toward the world as it meets me in my waking moments, is disengaged or shut down. In welcoming sleep I will that the I-can is incapacitated in favor of the I-cannot and It-must. That is, the imperiousness of my incarnate being is permitted to assert itself – or if I am exhausted or drugged it asserts itself apart from my welcoming will. In welcoming or “going to” sleep I myself detach myself from self-experiencingly articulating the world. Rather I relinquish this interaction by welcoming disengagement of myself from my life-world. I permit myself to be given over to my somatic resources of replenishment and rejuvenation. In doing this I have turned myself over to myself as “soul” as primal passive presencing and synthesizing. But because I am disengaged from the importunities of wakeful life, I am at a distance from me myself insofar as I am relinquished to myself as ongoing primal temporalization and somatic functioning. Here I am still present but residually on the basis of my wakeful acts having continuing validity “from now on” and these dispositions are continued in the ongoing besouling and passive synthesis of myself as primal temporalizing. I am not dabei in the way I am in wakeful consciousness, I am not self-experiencingly displaying the world, not a dative of manifestation who is of necessity an agent of manifestation. I am not interacting with the felt-meanings, the hyletic stuff of the world’s presentations, but rather I let myself be disengaged or shut down and carried along by the primal streaming that goes on, in any case, without my doing anything. “It,” i.e., myself at a distance from myself, takes over, and in its taking over I am not there present in wakeful responsible interaction with the world’s presentation by sorting things out through interpreting, distinguishing, judging, deciding, etc. (See our discussion of “soul” in Chapter III, §3.)
The relinquishment of the claim the world has on us in our relenting to sleep creates a space for both the general will and particular projects to be still in place, albeit in a modified manner because of the disengagement from the life-world of the wakeful consciousness. Again, here I am at a distance from myself, i.e., because the will and the particular projects are disengaged for the sleep period, this is only a respite. It is not an annihilation of them; they still are willed, but now for the interim disengaged from the wakeful life-world.

Because the waking will is informed by the relevant retained prior experiences and anticipated ones brought about by its wakeful cognitive-intentional engagement with the world-projects, the actual fulfillment of the waking will awaits the wakeful intentional engagement with its interplay of empty and filled intentions. But the projects, as willed by the will, are not themselves absolutely disengaged in sleep. Wakeful willing of worldly projects is suspended, yet, again, this is not annulling of the will. I still will them and there is unfinished business, but now, for this finite period, I am resting, going asleep, putting it all on hold. But I have not at all given up, lost resolve or desire. These are still alive even though “on hold,” just as in waking life, I may have to attend to an importunity, and thus suspend what I was doing – but if I am wakeful and not forgetful or distracted it returns demanding its completion. Perhaps we can say, not on the basis of filled intentions but on the basis of reconstructive speculation, that in dreaming will mobilizes the disengaged manifesting agency in its service toward filling its empty intentions. “Imagination” is the way we can have waking filled and empty intentions apart from an actual (waking) engagement with the world. In dream, will takes advantage of this ersatz quasi-real form of world-engagement. Again, will here is not implementing imagination and cognition in the service of the real world as displayed by wakeful perceptual agency centered in the I. Rather it finds a substitute for the wakeful cognitive agency and wakeful will. Thereby there is played out the unfinished drama that still engages the disengaged will, albeit in the quasi-reality of dreaming. This working out of the unfinished drama is not pure imagination because there is no sense of a suspension of disbelief or an “as if it were so” world. Yet even though the dream world can lay claim to being an encompassing world, typically we awaken out of it to world as the horizon of wakeful perception. In this sense the world of waking life encompasses and frames the world of dreams.14

The effective desire for sleep is for a disengagement of will that wills at once to be refreshed, to be free of the importunities of the world around us, and to be free of the wakeful willing that wills this. As peripheral events do not affect or allure me when I am concentrating on something before me, so, as I begin to dose off, the world before me loses its hold on me and I begin to slip away from it. As being awake is for the I to be affected by the worldly affections that make a dent within the stream of consciousness, that is, being awake for the I is to give in to the allure of these impressions as they enter into the stream of consciousness, so to be asleep is at once to be without these impressions and therefore it is a state of not being allured by them. There is no allure if there is no desire or will to be allured. And in
as much as will and desire are tied to my I-can, and my I-can wills to relent to I-cannot-any-longer and It-must, there is a suspension of will and desire.

Let us dwell on this by an analogy with the way the surrounding fields of awareness fail to make a dent when we are preoccupied, e.g., caught up in a present reverie or are presently immersed in a task. The surrounding fields “sleep” in regard to the foregrounded fields. We, as it were, slumber in regard to them and they are asleep in regard to us. This analogy, Husserl believes, can help us think about how we in fact live, even in our waking life, an adumbration of absolute sleep and death.

In experiencing (let us call it E) a temporally extended event, e.g., a tennis match, a movie, or a symphony, I appreciate it as the same across a flow of phases or Nows, a, b, c, d, etc. When b is present, a is not actually present but retained as a; when c is present b is not actually present but is retained as b, and a as a. That is, past presencings sink into the past, and simultaneously are profiled in the present and enjoy a delineated discernible unity. Thus functions in my appreciation of a as a phase of E; but the profilings of c at b, d at c, etc. are also different ways of appreciating a. In this incessant transformation, former presencings move in the direction of a zero point of relief, where they begin to fuse into an area of non-discriminability. Thus a at h has lost the vividness of a at e, and a at z is perhaps indiscernible. The former discernible unities pass into a circumstance of becoming residual layers where their individual delineations become increasingly obscure. Again at phase z of E, a will function as part of the massive retentional horizon of E, but not in a clearly discernible way. At z, a will not be appreciated as enjoying a distinctly new aspect or profile as it did at c and the phases following shortly thereafter. We may think of these remote phases as becoming relatively unconscious and as approaching a zero-degree affection or relevance in regard to the ongoing present source-point that is increasingly remote from them. The events of an adult’s fourth birthday party may serve as an example from life for most of us. They typically exercise no associative pull on the present but rather are part of a past train of past moments that, because of their remoteness, are fused together as indiscernibly indistinct. Yet they are “there” and in an odd sense conscious because they comprise the past horizon. But they have fallen into an undifferentiated mass and as long as they remain such they cannot be recalled.

One finds here a parallel with the spatial horizon. While remaining focused on the center of one’s perceptual field, one can let one’s awareness of the surrounding of the center come to light. And while remaining still focused on this center one notices that the things which are away from the central things get increasingly indistinct and eventually they are all fused together. Yet it is not as if there is nothing there; rather they are there in this undifferentiated mass of background.

In both the cases of temporal and spatial horizons we have a phenomenological example of an awareness of nothing, i.e., nothing discrete, but an awareness that is still self-aware and aware of its consciousness of this form of nothingness. But, of course, this is just an analogy because in fact it requires that we be awake and centered for the consciousness of the peculiar nothingness of the temporal and spatial horizons to be brought to light.
Sleep admits of degrees, wherein the intensity of the affections from the surround-
ings is inversely proportionate to the imperturbability of the sleeper. The
deeper the sleep, the greater is the ineffectiveness of the excitation of the surround-
ings. But sleep also differs from the “sleeping” peripheral fields of the wakeful but
entranced or absorbed I. While awake the will is implicitly attuned to the non-
explicit folds of “the world” in reference to the explicit section to which one is
attending. The absolute ideal of wakefulness would be an attunement with all sur-
rounding horizons where the synthesis of the whole of one’s life would be profiled
or apperceptually intended in each phase of our life and thought. As Gene Gendlin
says of the present felt-meaning upon which one focuses in the therapeutic situation
and which approximates Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit: Everything is there.16 But in
sleep we have, for the time being, put aside all active worldly interests. With the
disengaging of these active worldly interests, there might well be horizons that we
nevertheless have been forced in waking life to neglect; and perhaps these come to
light in dreams.

To be awake is to be affected by and to notice, the presence, impact, or impres-
sions of the present perceptual parts of the world. When asleep, we might speculate,
there could be the awareness of a flow of impressions, hyle, that have lost all deline-
eation and that, in the absence of dreams, involve little more than a very muted
sense of a flow of time. This merely speculative reconstruction is important enough
to merit the following considerations.

To be affected by worldly impressions, impressions must be there, sufficiently
differentiated, to be responded to; they must have a measure of delineation and
contrast from out of the continuous flux that never ceases. When awake the world
appears to us as a stream of identity syntheses, even at the passive level, where
things appear across temporal and spatial differences. Even though at this level
there is no act establishing this now perceived house as the same as what I yester-
day perceived, there is still an elemental recognition, just as there is an elemental
recognition of the other hidden side of some thing, e.g., a house, as the same when
I, by walking around, see the novel side. In this elemental faith (cf. Husserl’s
Vorglaube an die Zukunft) we count on, hang on to, and trust that we are able to
return to things as the same. In the more active presencing of things that character-
izes the naming, predication, and syntax, things are presented articulately, and to
the extent that there is the explicit linguistic expression and this is focused on, their
sense is indifferent to their being perceptually present or absent. “Mama” and
“Mama is in the other room,” enable the child to enjoy her mother without her
mother being absent or present. It, of course, presupposes an appreciation of the
mother as the same whether she is present or absent, and therefore her sense is not
merely in her being present and meeting the infant’s needs.17

In deep dreamless sleep there is not anything which gains relief within the tem-
poral flow. There is nothing discriminate, nothing with a sameness which is evident
throughout a flux of differentials. Rather discriminating awareness dissolves into
fusion, where there is no sameness as such or difference as such. But what of the
awareness of the primal impression as a filling of a protention and the retention of
the just past Now as what before was actually now and protended? Are these
missing in dreamless sleep or absolute sleep? It would seem Yes and No. Yes, they are missing in so far as the protentions and the filling Nows have no worldly content (i.e., are not allured or impressed by transcendent *hyle*) and give rise to no worldly anticipation and satisfaction. No, they are not missing because ongoing “whiling” of the living present is irrepressible and never ceases. And because in absolute sleep there are no world-based impressions, then there would not be an ongoing passive association of what is the same and different; there is nothing to associate. And with nothing to associate temporal duration would seem to be bereft of its modes. Let us dwell on this.

Are the Nows that are presently occurring not to be integrated in the total synthesis of life so that Now\textsubscript{100} that occurs just prior to the initial falling asleep will be integrated, along with all the intervening Nows, at the time of wakefulness, e.g., Now\textsubscript{156}, so that what is Now upon waking will be Now\textsubscript{156} and not Now\textsubscript{101}? Allowing for the qualifications we made in our earlier discussion of the artificiality of establishing an absolute discontinuity between waking and sleeping, it would seem that upon awakening the sense of the matter is that Now\textsubscript{101} is the waking Now. Of course, if we had an impressive dream-filled sleep we might well have the sense that the waking Now was around Now\textsubscript{156}. This perhaps is more likely to be the case in cultures where there is the belief that it is of paramount importance to remember one’s dreams. But in the deeper dreamless sleep we wake up each time making connection not with the time elapsed during sleep, but with the time just before we went to sleep. “The time of our lives” leaves out the slept-through third of our lives. This suggests not that the ongoing temporal syntheses are not functioning absolutely but rather because there is nothing distinctive to integrate into the flux or process there is nothing to notice in the flow of the Nows. T.S. Eliot seemed to be thinking along these lines when he wrote of a state “when under ether, the mind is conscious but conscious of nothing.”\textsuperscript{18} The reconstructed speculation is that we are in some sense conscious when in this deep sleep and there is the primal “flow” or process.

In one text to which we already called attention, Husserl seems to speak of this as an *Erleben* or non-reflexive lived-experiencing that occurs even in a dreamless sleep or stupor: *Im Zustand der Dumpfheit wird auch erlebt*. This would mean that even in the deepest sleep we are not absolutely unconscious. The consideration called to my attention by Dan Zahavi and Steve Arnold, that we can, on occasion, will ourselves to wake up at specific times (and therefore seem to have a muted sense of the passage of time), or, when even in deep sleep, respond to external sounds that we have been anticipating (and therefore are not absolutely excised from the worldly *hyle*), supports this view.

In contrast, H.D. Lewis reflects on these matters from the core position that we share in common with him, namely that the self is essentially self-aware, i.e., in this case without the *percipi* there is no *esse*. But from this Lewis draws the conclusion: In dreamless sleep we simply cease to be because dreamless sleep means being unconscious: Without the self-awareness there is no existing self. He does not say that this state is the equivalent of death for the obvious reason that one’s body continues its functioning and the health is not impaired in any way. In this case,
“death” is to be distinguished from the cessation or annihilation, where the self ceases but the body remains in tact. In this view it is clear that nothing in our lives is lost, except for a few minutes or hours; we simply pass out of existence for this period, and then we resume our lives in dreams or waking states. However, if we identify the I with the non-reflectively self-aware pole of conscious activities, and if the I is not necessarily and essentially connected with the body, then “we must be pronounced dead on the present assumptions in dreamless sleep, whatever may be appropriate to say for clinical purposes… If death merely means missing out on some minutes of low-grade awareness, then it is not disconcerting to suppose that we have been dead for a period during which the conditions of our revival and continued existence were maintained.”19 (Yet, it seems to us, if Lewis is convinced that there is “low-grade awareness” then because there is percipi there is esse. See our discussion below.)

We may note here that Kant early on in his life offered a theory of “deep sleep” which was quite in contrast to Lewis and Husserl. Whereas for Husserl there is indeed “low-grade” awareness and for Lewis, if there is no awareness, then we cease to exist, for Kant, because the external senses are “in a state of perfect rest” we may speculate spirit is especially active and there is an extraordinary lucidity that befits the spirit unhampered by sensibility. Upon waking we do not recall these states precisely because our waking discourse is suffused with the habits of the condition of sensibility. Kant thinks that even sleep-walkers may count as evidence in so far as they display greater understanding in this state than usual.20 This position echoes the Vedanta view (see below): In both views we enter into the transcendent noumenal realm in deep sleep. But because there are so many other metaphysical assumptions in play and so little evidence, we will not follow this hypothesis. Already Husserl’s that In Zustand der Dampfheit wird auch elebt poses sufficient problems.

If we think of our personal identity or the identity of the self in terms of a temporal continuity of experience and attitudes, then clearly there is a problem of the identical same self for Lewis’ theory. But Lewis does not see this as a decisive problem, because the proper sense of identity of who one is, is not rooted in the identity tied to memories and times of which we are aware but to the “myself” who has or “lives” these memories and times. (Later in this chapter, especially §8 we will return to the Lewis’s thesis, to which we subscribe, that not every sense of self-identity is tied to our memories.) It is not necessary that these memories which are given to me be non-interrupted, nor is it necessary that the rememberings be inerrant and continuous. But in the midst of the discontinuities, mistakes, and errors the “I myself” is aware of itself as itself and as identical with itself, but not by way of an act of identification.

If I am “unconscious” for (what I am told is) a half-hour and then “come to,” there is no doubt that I myself am the same one I was after this interim of unconsciousness even though I have no grasp of how this is possible. Normally I have the continuity of my memories and my surroundings – but it is clearly not necessary that there be this continuity, and certainly it is not necessary for my sense of my being I myself that there be this continuity. Lewis compares the fact that our
existence is identically the same after a period of suspension of awareness and self-awareness with the way our identical same self-awareness is given to us from moment to moment. “Our being the persons we are, after a possible period of annulment of suspension of being, and of our having ways of being aware of this, is no more remarkable, in the last resort, and no more amenable to an explanation explicitly within our grasp, than the fact of our existence in any respect whatever.”

Key to Lewis’s position is that “in some way of which we can give no explicit account ourselves, we do find ourselves, as distinct entities, maintained in existence from one moment to the next.” But his position suggests both that we are not maintained in existence and that we are maintained in existence. He accepts the third-person perspective that our body’s continuing to function is a clear sense in which we are maintained in existence; yet in so far as we are unconscious we are not sustained in existence. But it is not clear whether in fact his account of the first-person experience in absolutely dreamless sleep is valid, i.e., it is not evident, and not even possible that there be evidence, that we cease to be, in dreamless sleep. Recall our earlier discussions in Chapter VII where we followed Husserl in claiming that there can be no evidence for either our ceasing or beginning to be.

Further, if we cease to be with dreamless sleep and then begin to be, there would seem to be a positing of a distinct miraculous intervention or metaphysical surd every time we fell into a dreamless sleep and awakened. Further, it is not only the “myself” that is identical before and after, but also the personal resolve and the personal world typically is there on awakening. According to H.D. Lewis the personal will have persisted without the one willing. As a result of such conundrums we have hypotheses such as Husserl’s that even in dreamless sleep and stupor there is still at least the ongoing flow of experiencing, and typically the person’s esse persists even though the percipi is modified.

But do we know there is even the temporal flow in sleep? We, strictly speaking, do not know it. In the cases just mentioned, we have inferred or postulated it. And if this was acceptable then the case for positing it in death would be made easier. We know that there is no question of presencing our ending or our beginning. Both absolutely dreamless sleep and the speculative “death” of the transcendental I, involve zero-degree discrimination where nothing stands in relief or is differentiated; where nothing novel appears or is expected. But if the “process” or “flow” continues, and we may maintain this as an hypothesis because there is no first-person evidence for its cessation or beginning, and if there is no differentiation but only fusion, not even confusion, because that implies contrast, in the flow, can we give any “sense” to this “life?”

All of the problems of the transcendental life of the sleeper are magnified when it comes to death. What can it mean to “exist” or “be” for the transcendental I when, bereft of its insertion into the natural world, when bereft of its bodiliness, it loses the consciousness of the world? Is not every sense of self-awareness inseparably bound up with awareness of what is transcendent to consciousness, even if it only be the awareness of one’s heart or pulse? What is its life when bereft of the perceptual and kinaesthetic flux of impressions or hyle that keep the world as a
more or less harmonious unity alive and which give the passive syntheses something to synthesize? What is the I-life when not only are there no distinctive contrasting impressions from the world, but, in the absence of these, there is no possible synthesis of associations that open up a field of awareness? If memory and association require both the worldly present to be an affecting, and this is what awakens the sense of a retaining, and therefore what awakens the I-can at the basis of memory, must we not say that memory itself is not possible, and therefore any sense of personal identity is not possible? (We earlier claimed, and will return to the thesis, that the identity of ipseity or “myself” does not require memory in the way personal identity does.) In contrast, the spiritualist hypothesis (which we will soon consider) of a disembodied and solipsistic life of dreaming and telepathic communion requires that there be no connection between memory, associations, perception, and the affections of the world Now. This is one of the major difficulties of this hypothesis.

In summary we can say that the attempts at reconstruction on the basis of sleep shed some, but not much, light on the nature of the speculated “life” of the transcendent I prior to its birth and after its death – should it be the case that it does not die without knowing it and is not born without knowing it. Very much hangs on the nature of the facticity of the transcendent I. Again, it may be that I cannot experience my beginning or ending, but that, in and of itself, does not mean that the beginning and ending do not happen. But it also may be that the display of the world requires a kind of necessity for the transcendent I that is not of the same order of the necessities within the world. But that too does not rule out the fact that the transcendent I, as a transcendental person, appears to die and to be contingent from a second- and third-person perspective.

It would seem that ultimately there is a paradox and obscurity. The natural attitude provides us with evidence that we are not disposed to deny because it is pervaded by an empirical necessity. The transcendental attitude provides us also with a perspective that we may not deny. We at once exist both naturally and transcendentally, i.e., we begin and die, and our beginnings and endings are not only not evident to us, but we are at a loss to make sense of them. That being said, we are beckoned to the task of a reflection on some of the alternative understandings of life after death in the light of the transcendental phenomenological standpoint. We begin by continuing where we left off by relating Husserl’s reflections to Vedanta thought.

§4 Vedanta and Husserl on Consciousness, Sleep, and Death

For the present context it is important to note that transcendental phenomenology at bottom has two theses about the ultimate basement out of which there occurs the constitution of the transcendental I. The first is that it is a radical “flow” that gives birth to a “primal presence” which inseparably is a primal individual I. Thus this primal “event” is inseparably a primal flow and an original unique “I” or
“myself.” This living present/primal I is inseparably the ongoing event of the primal impression, retention and protention which presences the temporality of the stream of consciousness. This primal I, upon being lured into action by the affections of the transcendences in the world, brings about an I-pole as a center of acts. Through the agency of this act-center the world is brought about.

The second thesis states that the transcendental I is not in time, is unbegun and unending, and its awareness of the stream or flow of time is not in time, that its awareness of the stream or the flow itself is not streaming or flowing.

It thus appears that there is a tension between accounts of a primal I that is temporality and a primal transcendental I that is not in time. As we have seen on several occasions (Chapter II, §3 and Chapter VI, §§2–3), we can best think of Husserl as regarding the transcendental I as a whole comprised of the I-moment and the hyletic moment. This means both that temporalization is essential to the being of the transcendental I and that the transcendental I is not absolutely temporal, and certainly not part of what flows. The chief question before us here is whether the transcendental I’s hyletic flow, as what constitutes temporality itself, itself is temporal or whether, as the flow that constitutes time, itself is essentially intemporal. But this flow as essentially affecting the unique I-moment with different phases requires that an aspect of it have some genuinely temporal features. The I-moment is most dramatically brought to light in considering that the awareness of the stream of temporality itself is not streaming, is “eternal” in the sense that it is inescapably actual always (a nunc stans) and not in the time-stream. The hyletic moment is also brought to light when we consider the incessant affecting of the I-moment by the ebullient irrepressible streaming “hyletic” temporality. The I-moment is incessantly aware of time in its primal preserving, retaining, and protending, but it itself does not flow. Here the I is to be thought of as the primal pole of its streaming life “wherein all the unities, which one calls being, as persisting unities, show themselves.” The hyletic moment, as the streaming, the “phenomenon of all phenomena” which in the whole that is the transcendental I stands over against the I-moment or pole and displays itself to it, not as a transcendent object but as that through which it lives. The incessant creativity has the form of time, i.e., it has the form of the ever novel Now, No Longer, and Not Yet. And this hyletic moment is not merely what affects the I but is the medium of the world’s affections. All affections are now, and they are thereby integrated into the primary synthesis and form of temporality. Thus the transcendental I is not absolutely timeless because it is essentially and necessarily also affected by the primal hyletic-temporal moment, or primal temporalizing.

In the hypothesis that death is excision from the world all we have is the pure transcendental I or ipseity which of its nature is bereft of any worldly properties. As excised from the world, the transcendental I suffers the hyletic-streaming which is itself deworlde and incapacitated as the form of world and life. This would be the way to think of the “timelessness” of sleep. As excised from the world, the transcendental I is not nothing, not absolutely annihilated (cf. H.D. Lewis’s view), but it does not have in any proper sense a life.
The Vedanta school developed some roughly similar positions that we will now sketch. Vedanta takes its orientation from themes in the Upanishads, especially the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad and the teachings therein of the sage, Yajnavalkya. The basic theological-metaphysical claim is that the absolute and unconditioned, Brahman, is in some sense what each refers to with “I.” This self is Self and yet the Self is oneself; it also enjoys ownness or mineness. “The self within all is this self of yours.” Ontologically there is sameness and difference in that to which each “I” properly refers. Each who is different from the other refers with “I” to him- or herself, but with “I” each also refers to Brahman.

The philosophical perplexities of knowing the self, who is metaphysically one with the absolute Self, especially because the self is not an object and is that by which all is known, yet “known” in knowing everything, including itself, were spelled out in paradoxes in the Chapters 2 and 6 of the Kena Upanishad. We will look at two translations. Here is the first one:

I do not think that I know it well; but I know not that I do not know. Who of us knows that he does know that; but he knows not that he does not know. It’s envisioned by one who envisions it not; but who envisions it knows it not. And those who perceive it perceive it not; but it is perceived by those who perceive it not… This translation perhaps reveals the paradox involved in regarding non-reflective self-awareness as a form of knowing.

Another rendition is (2): “[He] is known by one who does not know him; he who is certain to know him does not know him; those who rightly know, do not think they know him; those who do not have right knowledge, think that they know.” This translation, (2), may be said to be more theological in as much as it interprets the non-reflective self-awareness as pointing to the Vedanta doctrine of “witness consciousness.”

In this doctrine the self-luminosity of non-reflective self-awareness is the divine self-presence or dative of manifestation at the heart of all acts; it is that “Self” by which and for which these acts are self-luminous. My acts are self-aware because they are Self-aware, i.e., witnessed by the divine dative of manifestation. The author of the latter translation, (2), Bina Gupta, also renders a verse from Chapter VI of the Katha Upanishad in this way: “[The self] is not to be reached by words, nor by the mind, and not by the eyes. How can it be experienced by those who are other than those who say ‘the self exists’.” This translation suggests an argument that the evidence for self, ipseity or I-ness can only be properly reached in first-person experience. The uniqueness of I-ness and self-luminosity is only evident in first-person experience. Of course, the sentence, “The self exists,” is in the third person. But if “the self” may be taken as a third-person way of referring to first-person experience, as the quasi-indexical “he himself,” then the necessity of the self-luminousness of the experiencer in his experiencing may be the point of the text. Patrick Olivelle’s translation of the same passage, “How else can that be perceived than by saying ‘He is,’ ” leaves it a matter of indifference as to the standpoint for understanding the unique nature of Brahman described by the Katha Upanishad. “He is” reveals nothing of the distinctive self-experiencing nature of the self. Apart from the essential question of what the ancient Sanskrit text “actu-
ally says,” if the necessary diaphanous existence of the ipseity and paradoxical epistemic access to the self-presence of the self can be known properly only by oneself in the first-person, then the Gupta translation may be taken to be closer to making this point.

A basic question, then, is what is involved in “knowing” that by which all comes to light and of which we are never absolutely ignorant? The Vedanta teaching revolves around both a doctrine of liberation from the “natural attitude’s” conviction that salvation is to be found in the realm brought to light by intentional experience and an appreciation that the knowing of the self/Self is not consciousness in the normal sense. “After death there is no awareness.” Here we learn that “awareness” has to do with an intentional knowing where there is the other, the known, as the correlate of the knower. If the absolute or Whole has become one with one’s very self, “who is there for one to see and by what means?... By what means can one perceive him by means of whom one perceives this whole world?”

For Vedanta, as for transcendental phenomenology, birth and death have to do with the phenomenality of appearance and disappearance. Someone comes to be, becomes manifest, who before was not. Someone who was manifest becomes unmanifest. Their manifestness as well as their unmanifestness is, in the second-and third-person, through their bodies revealing their presence and absence. For Vedanta, as for transcendental phenomenology, it is because of the unique first-person experience of oneself that the teaching comes about that the self has neither beginning nor ending.

This unique kind of “unaware” or unknowing consciousness, the world-engagement of which is suspended subsequent to death, is compared to sleep. It is likened to the state of one who is in a deep sleep and who has no desires or dreams. Analogously, when enlightenment is reached and when there is the liberating insight that the self is Self, and that objective knowing is a kind of illusion, then the self “consisting of [true enlightened: JGH] knowledge is oblivious to everything within or without.” “This is the aspect of his where all desires are fulfilled, where the self is the only desire, and which is free from desires and far from sorrows.” Thus this blissful state of “knowledge” has some parallels with sleep.

In Vedanta these themes, which one finds adumbrated in the sacred Vedic scriptures, are commented on and developed systematically. Advaita Vedanta, like Husserl, seeks to understand sleep, both in itself, i.e., as a modification of wakefulness, as well as a way for thinking about death. When one says, “I slept well, and was not aware of anything” one can ask: Does this “not being aware of anything” reflect a memory of a kind of pure non-reflective consciousness excised from the world? In which case one remembers that one experienced nothing; it does not reflect or imply that one was in no way self-aware. (As we noted, in such an interpretation we find symmetry with an opinion expressed by Kant early on in his career.) Or does it reflect that absolutely nothing “was going on” (cf. H.D. Lewis’s postulate of the extinction of the self) and one postulates this because one has no memory? For some Advaita Vedantans, the former is the case. Others deny that it is a memory. Thus one says: “I was aware of nothing,” or “I did not know anything” because the self is not in any respect in time during sleep. Or the self that is
experienced is in such an indeterminate state of "nescience" or ignorance that the "I" that is normally experienced in waking life itself vanishes. It is this anomalous state that is reported in "I was aware of nothing." Here we will not follow Bina Gupta's analysis of these theories in detail. It suffices to say that the proximity to phenomenology's circle of problems is obvious and that there is no decisive philosophical position reached, but only speculative reconstructions, in part because only the waking self is in a position to reconstructively speculate with concepts (empty intentions) about the sleeping self.

For Shankara the first-person perspective is central. "It is not possible to refute the self, for he who is doing the refutation is the self." Implied here is a sense of self-awareness that the refuter is bent on neglecting. But for Shankara, the use of the first-person singular nominative pronoun, as also the possessive pronouns, is already a form of an individuation and thus a distortion of original absolute consciousness by reason of its immersion in the world. "I" (as for Sartre) is already the constituted, objectified person in the world. This, of course, is true of "I" in some indexical uses (see especially Chapter II, §1); further, such a use of "I" makes no sense except as part of the network of indexicals. The basic senses of possession or ownership as tied to "my" and "mine" similarly tie us to our immersion in things we own, foremost our stream of consciousness, our bodies and our worldly identities. Thus even though each implicitly apprehends Brahman when she utters "I" (the Absolute Self "is apprehended as the content of the concept of 'I,'"32) the third-person term, atman, is preferred to "I." This resembles our use of "ipseity" and "myselfness." It also resembles a "quasi-indexical," i.e., how, in the third-person, a speaker can refer to another's self-awareness with "he himself," as in "He, the editor of The Weekly Standard, believes that he himself is the principle thinker in the Neo-Conservative movement." Shankara will even take advantage of the fact that second-person reference is always to that which experiences itself non-reflectively in the first-person: "The thou is the consciousness which is the nature of the witness. The property of being the witness is the property of being the knower on the part of the self while the self remains unchanging."33 Atman, translated in our modern English as self, is today at risk, in so far as the self in modern parlance is generally regarded as intersubjective, embodied, acculturated, etc.

For Shankara, the fundamental tendency to mistake the essentially non-objectifiable sense of I myself is a result of a projecting superimposition or lamination of the non-objectifiable on the objective or the objective on the non-objectifiable. This results from a kind of fall into "nescience."

The key is the notion of "witness consciousness," sāksin, by which an essentially non-objectifiable form of self-luminosity of consciousness or selfness is meant. As self-luminous it not only does not receive its manifestness from a source extrinsic to the self, as in (my apperception of) the Other perceiving me, but it does not even receive it by a reflection or intending of itself. "That is the highest light, not manifested by an other, self shining...."34

Shankara holds that witness consciousness is "witness to itself, because it is experienced by itself. The directly experienced self is this, and nothing other than it."35 Here we see that the witness consciousness is that by which the stream of
consciousness is known as an object, but how is it itself known? The answer is that it is a witness to itself and experienced by itself. We may thus perhaps assume that this self-experiencing is not of an object whereas all else that is witnessed is “for it,” i.e., because in some sense everything is an object for it, it is a universal dative of manifestation that is self-luminous itself, and not by being an appearing of—, to….

We come here to both a central controversy in which Vedanta was engaged with the Vijnavadins, who were contemporary Mahayana Buddhists. Although Shankara holds that what we know as long as we are immersed in nescience is illusion, there is still within the realm of maya a correct and false knowledge of the world. In other words, although all knowledge is of the merely phenomenal within this realm of maya, Shankara holds, foreshadowing Kant and early and contemporary Neo-Kantians, that we can distinguish the illusory and the real. In this phenomenal realm consciousness functions to reveal the world that is transcendent to it, and this is not a creation or imagination of the world. Of course, this transcendent world ultimately must be renounced as the realm of salvation, because ultimately it is merely phenomenal and intentionality’s display ultimately is not of absolute being and therefore without ontological and soteriological significance.

For the Vijnavadins there is no transcendent reality, not even the phenomenal realm of maya, but only cognitions, mental states, and ideas exist. Shankara criticizes them for holding this view because within the phenomenal world there is genuine transcendence. Intentionality, he would say, displays the penultimate realm of maya and is not merely a revelation of mental acts or states. But the Vijnavadins also hold there is no witness consciousness which is a universal self that is a transcendence immanent in the of phenomenal selves and their experiences. Instead, they hold that the cognitions themselves are self-aware, immanently self-luminous, and do not need a self in the form of another “witness” consciousness in order for them to be conscious. On the one hand, the Shankaran Vedantans hold that cognitions (or we might say “intentional acts”) are themselves objects, in an extended sense, that need to be illumined from without in order that they be luminous. Thus we may think of them as luminous through pre-reflective or reflective awareness. Their luminosity, their manifestation, comes from the witness consciousness that transcends them and which itself is self-luminous, i.e., not needing an witness for itself in order that it is self-aware. For Shankara the question is how can the Vijnavadins hold that there is a manifestation of—, i.e., a showing of the objects that the cognitions are, without that dative of manifestation by which the cognitions as genitives of manifestation come to light. All objects necessarily require the witness consciousness or dative of manifestation for them to come to light. In contrast, the Vijnavadins hold that we do not need that other entity, the witness consciousness. In fact, if we do not posit that the acts or cognitions themselves are self-aware, self-luminous, and if we posit that we need another light to illumine them, why not ask of that light itself what luminates it, and if it itself is lighted up, what luminates it, etc.? Another consideration from Paul Hacker, a commentator on Shankara, complicates the matter. Hacker earlier claimed that the “self’s luminosity is the presupposition for any objects’s being known” and this status renders it oddly better “known” than any object. This may be taken as a defense of witness consciousness.
But another text from Hacker (also cited by Gupta) seems to give just as much support to the Vijnavadin position as the position of Shankara:

At the root of all our experiences and all our reflections, we find, then, a being which immediately recognizes itself, because it is its knowledge both of itself and of all things, and which knows its own existence, not by observation and as a given fact, nor by interference from any idea of itself, but through direct contact with that existence. Self-consciousness is the very being of mind in action. The act whereby I am conscious of something must itself be apprehended at the very moment at which it is carried out, otherwise it would collapse.

If “self-consciousness is the very being of mind in action,” if acts must “be apprehended at the very moment they occur,” is there need for the witness consciousness as something transcendent in immanence to the acts themselves? Indeed, this same question is disputed in transcendental phenomenology. For Husserlian phenomenology, there are three “layers” in the discussion of time-consciousness. There is the worldly time of races and other events; there is the temporality of the stream of acts and sensa which observe these events, and there is, finally, the absolute consciousness that is the awareness of the stream of act and sensa. This third level corresponds somewhat to witness consciousness, if we allow, as seems to be the case, that this level is also “self-luminous,” i.e., not in need of another “witness.” The controversial matter is whether the awareness of the stream of acts and sensa is identical with non-reflective self-awareness. Numerous passages from Husserl suggest that we are aware of the stream of acts, as Shankara suggests, in a quasi-objective manner. We are aware of the temporality of the world but on the margin, as it were, we are aware of our acts and sensa that themselves have their own temporality. This stream of which we are aware is not itself self-luminous, but requires the third-level, absolute consciousness, the parallel to Shankara’s “witness consciousness,” in order that it itself be luminous.

But this reading of Husserl, somewhat consonant with Shankara, faces a very Vijnavadin challenge from Dan Zahavi who asks, why do we not acknowledge that the acts and sensa are self-aware, self-luminous? Why do we need to introduce a third level for their self-luminosity? Is this not an excessive duplication of levels of awareness, and a reifying of consciousness? Is not the original phenomenological claim confined to how our intentionality is indeed self-luminous and not something of which we are concomitantly aware?

We have seen that perhaps a chief motivation for the more Shankaran position is the theme of the nature of the awareness of the temporality of the stream of acts and sensa or the awareness of the elemental duration of anything. The awareness of the passing Now, No Longer, and Not Yet is not itself now, now longer, or not yet. Similarly our knowledge of our and the world’s spatiality is not in space. If the original awareness is not only an awareness of acts but of also of ipseity’s non-beingness (meontology), unique uniqueness, non-temporality and non-spatiality then we have a motive to not permit self-awareness be collapsed into the acts. The acts come and go, but the awareness of them, which is always a self-awareness pervaded by ownness, i.e., inseparable from the “myself,” does not. As Zahavi
himself would say, the non-reflective self-luminosity of the acts is always a manifestation of a core self as an essential aspect of this self-luminosity.

The awareness, moreover, of duration is not confined to the awareness of the stream of acts and sensa. If that were so we would not have any knowledge of the durations in the world, but would have to infer them through the stream of acts and sensa. But it is clear that our knowledge of worldly durations is direct and immediate. Thus the original awareness that is itself unchanging, and is always in this sense now, is not merely of acts and sensa but also of the world, and this awareness has neither a presentable beginning or ending. Thus the elemental awareness of duration is not only an awareness of the stream of consciousness, not only an awareness of acts and sensa.

For Shankara and some other Vedantins, the witness consciousness is divine; it is Brahman, the ultimate, most basic and absolutely encompassing consideration. For transcendental phenomenology, the theme of non-reflective self-awareness (what approximates witness consciousness), is but an essential feature of transcendental life and is not in and of itself the basis and sufficient consideration which absorbs all transcendental life. When it is regarded as all of transcendental life there is a neglect of the fuller sense of the transcendental I as articulating, distinguishing, critically reflecting. Indeed, non-reflective self-awareness itself, as the condition for intentionality’s displaying agency, does not display anything other than itself and this displaying agency (with the exception of the elemental duration of the world’s impressiveness). And this is precisely to what witness consciousness is confined in Shankara. Witness consciousness is not the agent of manifestation through acts. Indeed, the world does not have a being in itself to manifest. And because for Shankara the world is ultimately illusory (even though one can distinguish realms of immanence and transcendence within it), all that is connected to the transcendental person itself is depreciated.

For Husserl, absolute I-consciousness is an inseparable moment of the transcendental person. As the paramount instance of esse est percipi it is inseparable from the substance of the transcendental person, the “I myself.” It itself is not divine, even though unbegun and unending. Further even the non-temporal, non-spatial aspect of the transcendental person is pervaded by a curious facticity to which we earlier called attention and to which we will return. Further, in spite of the Upanishads claiming that “the self within all is the self of yours,” thereby suggesting that there is something rock bottom about one’s ownness, ultimately for many Vedantins this ownness is reduced to a kind of egocentrism that is melted away with ultimate unity with the one Atman that is Brahman. If I-ness is always a projecting superimposition, then all individuality is due to ignorance.

However, one finds among Vedantins resistance both to identifying witness consciousness with Brahman as well as to making it absolutely one. This is based, among other things, on the consideration that not only do we have access to Brahman only through the I, (“Self… is apprehended as the content of the concept of ‘I’”) but also there is an ineluctable sense of “I” that is sustained in the experience of the pure self and this cannot be reduced to the I of self-reflection and egocentricism.
It appears that for Shankara himself, upon ultimate release or salvation, all traces of the individual are extinguished. This, of course, becomes a problem if there is a robust sense in which \textit{I} am saved and \textit{I} am liberated from the bondage of illusion. The Vedanta proposal that deep sleep itself, understood as the “brother of death,” is a phenomenological proving ground or key analogy for the ultimate ontological position, suggests an utter extinguishing of “\textit{I} myself.” Yet witness consciousness is also asserted to be inseparably one’s own consciousness. Upon ultimate release one has only consciousness of oneself – who is indistinguishable from Brahman.

Ultimate release therefore is not properly an experience of something other than oneself, but rather the conditions under which one experiences oneself have changed. If we were talking about something \textit{of which} we were conscious we might be tempted, as was Kant, to say the content is the same but the form has changed. It would seem that for Shankara, as for Kant, the spiritually advanced and virtuous person “on earth” is now in “heaven” but does not know it. With the ultimate release such a person enters the noumenal world of the things in themselves without the distortions that we had when alive. Both Shankara and Kant have their own version of the ancient view that waking life is really a somnolent world, and death is the gateway to an awakened life. But if all senses of the individual are to be extinguished in the ultimate release, then the individual might as well be absolutely asleep in the state of ultimate liberation.

§5 The Conservationist Optic

Another position we wish to study is similarly very ancient. However, it has currency today because of the imperatives to be mindful of the intricacy and fragility of nature when engaged by our capitalist and consumer growth ethos. There further is a suspicion that a robust doctrine of spirit that teaches a measure of independence from physical nature necessarily depreciates or disdains non-human nature. Therefore what is proposed is a de-spiritualizing of human nature and integrating persons totally into third-person accounts of the natural world.

One form this position takes emerges out of reflection on the kinship between sleep and death and it has given rise to the following analogy: As the individual’s sleep plunges her into the absence, night, and emptiness of unconsciousness, thereby permitting an energetic rebound and rebirth in awakening, so death is a beneficent annihilation of one’s illusory worldly individual being that not only restores to the absolute its proper hegemony by absorbing the alienation of our individual consciousness, but it also enriches the totality of worldly being. This latter enrichment is achieved by each individual’s not only not resisting or mourning his inevitable demise and thereby making room for other subsequent posterior individuals, thereby returning to earth what she has given us of our physical inheritance, but also by transmitting into the “collective Unconscious” of the species or World-Soul the wisdom our individual adventure has acquired. Here too death is
the gateway to a kind of liberation and enlightenment. But the enlightenment is liberation, i.e., deliverance, from a first-person perspective, because this first-person perspective is annihilated in favor of one or the All-Encompassing, to which there are reasons to defer, i.e., that of Nature, Gaia or the Soul of the World. Let us now turn briefly to this “conservationist” perspective.

First we may note that this perspective does not coincide necessarily with the “naturalist” one, nor need either of these correspond with the one proper to “natural” or aboriginal peoples. In the latter case, “nature” does not coincide with “ecology.” Further to apply to death the category of “natural event,” understood as “a matter of ‘natural necessity,’” is to understand it in a way that goes counter to a prevalent ancient understanding of death. Indeed, the general fact of mortality of the members of this tribe (“humans”) most often was accounted for by a story of a “fall,” and “premature” deaths required often a “non-natural” or magical explanation.

Further, the evidence and significance of the annihilation of the unique individual and the evidence and significance of the survival of the abiding natural and social context of this individual stand in sharp contradiction to one another, and yet they explicate the paradox of becoming.45 Consider a version of the paradox of becoming which is to be found in what Jankélévitch calls “the optic of conservation.” This optic, as we shall see, may be one which assigns to the third-person an absolute hegemony even when it formulates this absolute as an “I.”

Think of becoming as the continual renewal of being as a whole (we may think of “world” as the ultimate horizon of the whole or of being) that, in its particular detail (i.e., all that is within the world), perpetually ceases to be. Analogously we may think of the positing of an immortal absolute transcendental Self or I that continues to be after death and never has begun. In this view, analogous to World as the absolute unchanging substance, the absolute Self subsumes into Itself at their death the manifold unique ipseities or persons, who are unique phases, instances or mirrorings of Itself. In the conservationist optic all events, all individuals, are moments, aspects, phases of a perennial substance, e.g., that of the absolute I, nature, world, or life, or the Great Mother, etc.

In this view the meaning of an individual’s death is placed within the wider framework of ceasing to be at one moment while continuing in some other realm, e.g., through the Absolute I, or the persisting species, or through the abiding frameworks of “matter and energy,” or “nature,” etc.

Even time or temporality may be envisaged as the Ultimate Substance: Clearly each Now is ephemeral: it passes away forever, never to return. But each Now’s passing is also coincident with the birth of a new Now: The loss is “atoned for” by the novel Now that replaces the old one. The continuum of present Nows is a plenum or fullness of an ideality that is never undermined by the passing Now. In spite of the fleetingness of Nows as present moments they constitute an abiding presence of the ever-present Now, that of an ineluctable ideality that supports the flux and holds steady throughout the flux.

Similarly there is a “deep ecological” understanding of death as a metamorphosis that holds that “Life” is changed, but not taken away. “Life” or whatever is the
preferred ecological-metaphysical equivalent, e.g., being, nature or the cosmos, is immortal and always. But living beings are mortal. Death is not the destiny of Life; it does not await Life; annihilation does not await Being or the World; it is only the destiny of a particular living being or something in the World. Death is not the non-being of Being but only of an individual living being. It is not a tragedy but rather only a snag or scratch on the surface of Being. The little glitch of someone’s death is immediately filled in by something else, e.g., a baby’s being born, or the spouse of the deceased meeting someone new. All disappearance is compensated for by an appearance; all absence is only the depresenting within an abiding ample presence and re-presencing. Death is the continual repelling of Life and Life the perennial compensating for death.

As forgetfulness erodes all grief, as time annihilates all unhappiness and consoles all desolation, so the sorrow in regard to someone’s death will pass away. The individual death will eventually take on the status, whether for those who are now grieving or for those who come after them, of the death of an ancient traveling merchant of Baghdad who was accidentally killed in a foreign city by a tile falling from a roof three-thousand years ago this very day.

One might push this perspective further and hold that our true work as humans is to deny the annihilation of death and to affirm the continuity underlying all cessation. True life is getting over the provisional interruptions occasioned by death. We are called to struggle relentlessly to restore the plenitude dismantled by the relative emptiness of death. Culture itself as objective spirit that survives the time of its creation and creator is the work that denies any permanent significance to death. All ideality is an effort to conquer the ephemerality of time. In particular, religion might be envisaged as enabling the affirmation that the sting of death is not permanent.

A famous version of the conservationist optic is that of Schopenhauer. The ultimate category is will. Life is will, the will to live. There are two aspects of will: (A) the general metaphysical category and (B) the phenomenological base for this. Both play a role in Schopenhauer’s dealing with the problem of death. (A) is a resounding affirmation of the conservationist optic where there is the analogy: death of the individual is for the species what sleep is for the individual in regard to its total waking life. In order to bring to light the absurdity of the individual’s dread of death when seen against the light of the conservationist optic Schopenhauer creates a personification of a leaf and finds it in the autumn lamenting its extinction and unwilling to be consoled by the fresh green that will clothe the tree in the spring. “I am not these! These are quite different leaves.” The leaf is chided by the narrator for its selfishness, its unwillingness to make room for the new leaves. Its chief error is not knowing that its inner being (will), which longs for existence, is in fact the same inner mysterious force that pervades the tree. The will is coextensive with life and the world. Schopenhauer quotes a passage to be found over the entrance to an immense castle. This text captures nicely a theory of nature/world as the maternal substance of us all: “I belong to no one, and I belong to all the world; you were in it before you entered it, and you will still be in it when you have gone out of it.”

(B) For Schopenhauer the ultimate category of will is the thing-in-itself of which we are non-reflectively self-aware; from out of will the world is constituted by us as
the field in which we live. Will is not primarily the occasional acts of will but the ongoing willing-will, the ongoing will to live that is pervaded by desire. Because we are most properly and intimately this deep will and because we ineluctably know this will non-reflexively, we therefore know, pace Kant, the thing itself. Schopenhauer invites us to a thought experiment. Think of the time in the not too-distant future of your death. While thinking of the world continuing, you must make the discovery that in the presencing of the world continuing without you, you discover that you did not cease to exist because the presenced world could not be without your presencing of it. You cannot imagine or conceive the world without you yourself existing, i.e., as the one imagining and presencing it. But if this is true, can one truly believe in one’s heart what one cannot conceive? Schopenhauer, the sworn enemy of individual I-ness and the great preacher of the conservationist optic, asks: Is not one’s own death at bottom, the most incredible thing in the world?

These are rich meditations to which we will return. But we must notice that Schopenhauer here moves into a sense of “myself” and “ownness” which he will repudiate soon with a sense of I-less will. He, however, tries to synthesize the third-person ontological-ecological conservationist perspective with his phenomenological insights. The deep conviction that “we feel and experience that we are eternal” (sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse), as Spinoza put it, stems from not only our not being able to conceive of ourselves as having begun or able to end, but also from the consideration that in some respect we are timeless. (Cf. our earlier discussion in Chapter VII, §§3–5.)

Yet according to Schopenhauer the eternity of our innermost nature of which we are non-reflexively aware and which death cannot destroy “is not really the individual.” Each can say of this unbegun and unending existence, “I have always been,” “I shall always be.” But because, according to Schopenhauer, we experience this fundamental aspect of ourselves only through the “dark point” of I-consciousness the fear of losing this I-framed consciousness is difficult to extirpate. If the person were able to take up the correct point of view she would say: What does this loss of individuality mean to me? I carry within myself, i.e., there exists within the eternal essence of the will to live, the possibility of innumerable individualities. To desire “my” immortality as this individual is really the same as wanting to perpetuate an error for ever.

Schopenhauer does not distinguish therefore the individual personal identity from the unique ipseity or “myself” that is inseparable from each transcendental I. The transcendental will of Schopenhauer, out of which the world is construed through intellect, has symmetry with a transcendental theoretic consciousness that reveals the same for us all. This consciousness is universal and hides any sense of “I myself.” But this fails to see what both Husserl and Klavon have called our attention to: Even at the most abstract level of consideration of the transcendental self there is a uniqueness that in no way coincides with a purely universal theoretic consciousness that is no one’s. When this distinction is made we have quite another possible understanding of these matters. Further, if I-consciousness has a “dark point” it is only because it essentially eludes reflection, not because it is essentially unknown, i.e., not lived; the I is non-reflexively self-aware.
A beautiful statement of this entire matter is to be found in much of the poetry of Mary Oliver, especially in her poems, *When Death Comes* and *The Black Snake*. Oliver lets us be drawn by the motivations to feel our continuity as human persons with all of nature and yet she sees in ipseity, in self-awareness, a legitimate protest to the claim that nature rightfully obliterates the “myself.” Thus in these poems as well as many others she celebrates our deep levels of unity with nature and nature’s encompassing embrace, and the exalted nature of the experience finding “myself so near/that porous line/ where my own body was done with/ and the roots and the stems and the flowers/ began.” There are numerous occasions to wonder at nature’s intricacy as well as one’s smallness in the face of her infinity. Oliver also wrestles honestly with death, how in the case of the beautiful black snake killed by a truck on the road she is jolted by “its [death’s] suddenness,/ its terrible weight.” She faces the stark contrast of how the snake now “lies looped and useless/ as an old bicycle tire,” and yet how it is for her as she carries it off the road “as beautiful and quiet/ as a dead brother.” Yet death’s suddenness, certainty, and “terrible weight” are not the last story because underneath

reason burns a brighter fire, which the bones
have always preferred.
It is the story of endless good fortune.
It says to oblivion: not me!
It is the light at the center of every cell.
It is what sent the snake coiling and flowing forward
happily all spring through the green leaves before
he came to the road.

Mary Oliver here inserts into the snake as the representative perhaps of all of nature what we have called ownness and assigns to it a resistance to oblivion and she further endows it with the capacity for endless hope and amazement. She furthermore (“reconstructively”) ascribes this mineness, will and hope to “every cell.” Here as elsewhere in her poetry she endorses the letting go of oneself into a blessed oblivion through merging with nature’s encompassing beneficent power – and perhaps even inadvertently affirming the ultimate priority and triumph of the third-person perspective; but here and elsewhere there is also the resistance offered by the first-person perspective (“which the bones have always preferred”): “not me!” Even if we know not the time or the hour, when death comes, “like an iceberg between the shoulder blade,” Mary Oliver, in keeping with her desire to want to live as “a bride married to amazement,” wants to “step through the door full of curiosity, wondering: what is it going to be like, that cottage of darkness.” Thus, even in the face of the certain necessity that we must enter that “cottage of darkness” she vows to do it with eyes wide open expecting to be no less amazed than she is in life.50

In summary, the conservationist optic would seem to stand in tension with ipseity. In a version such as that of Schopenhauer it both employs the ownness of non-reflexive awareness and disowns it. In his view will is non-reflexively self-aware but it is best thought of in the third-person as a natural force or Nature herself for which individual self-awareness among nature’s productions is irrelevant and distracting to the ultimate grand third-person narrative. Yet for Schopenhauer this third-person panoramic narrative is transformed into a speculated first-person one,
i.e., a postulated one that the Absolute Will or I beholds, one of which the finite I’s have only a feeble emptily intended speculated grasp: Will = Nature = Brahman or absolute I-ness.

§6 Conceiving Personal Immortality and Resurrection: A Stranger in a Strange Land?

A Personal Immortality and Free Imaginative Variation of the Person

In this section we first will reflect on some aspects of what is at stake in theories of personal immortality. The focus here is not on anything like a proof of personal immortality. Rather we discuss the “conditions for its possibility” in terms of what is essential and necessary for this particular person to continue to be herself even though she exists with radically changed properties and in radically different conditions. Because personal existence in the “afterlife” would presumably require an enormous change in one’s personal being, we will meditate on what it means to be the same person when the conditions proper to this personhood are changed. We do this by considering the possibilities and necessities that emerge in the imaginative variation of one’s personal being within the parameters encompassing one’s personal identity. These senses of necessity and possibility need not be brought to light by only positive or ameliorating changes; they also may emerge through entertaining deteriorating ones.

As we approach what appear as necessary conditions for personal identity we uncover the zones of discomfort at their removal and zones of comfort with their maintenance and enhancement. What is intolerable or comfortable is not a matter of physical or bodily pain, nor is it merely “psychological” pain in the sense of anxieties and fears. And surely it is not the “discomfort” or “comfort” of logical inconsistency or consistency. Rather the comfort and discomfort has to do with the peculiar “logic” of being the person one is.

Thus what we are doing here is not primarily an exercise in the logic of concepts, although doubtless logical necessity is in play in our being consistent with our commitments, whether they are of a cognitive or moral nature. This first-person and third-person reflection enables unique determinable parameters to emerge within which necessities and possibilities are evident. What we have to do with is of necessity vague and elusive. The ontological reason for this is that “person,” in so far as it is linked with ipseity or the “myself,” is not properly a sortal term. (If it were we would be involved in a clean logical exercise.) We have proposed that the “myself” is properly “known” or we are acquainted with it not through, in a proper sense, acts of recognition and identification. Yet we recognize and identify the personified unique “myself” only through the “properties” she has through her being a person in the world. This holds equally but in different measures for the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives.
In the first-person free imaginative variation one finds what may and what may not be (easily) varied, which conditions are closest to one’s self-understanding and which are marginal and dispensable, what are the conditions for one’s being the person one is and which ones are dispensable. These are possibilities adumbrated in the determinability of one’s life-horizon. Analogously in the third-person we have to do with the possibility and necessity which we appresent in our imaginative “othering” of Others.

A basic underlying thesis regarding the essence of the personal I is that there is a firm habituality of will which encompasses all of life. All of life is an ongoing passive synthesis in the making and it is in the wake of this as well as within the axiological horizon that this will opens that the position-taking acts are performed. This habitual will announces itself periodically, and is reaffirmed periodically.51 We shall claim, in Book 2, that this general will is analogous to the way, e.g., a vocational decision encompasses an endless manifold of willings. Only periodically does the totality come to light or get called into question. It need not, but ideally it does, emerge out of a position-taking that informs life in the direction of the best possible life. More typically the direction it takes is more or less happenstance and laden with position-takings that are difficult to harmonize, and rarely does the direction reach explicit consciousness. The free imaginative variation of the personal I will always bump up against this encompassing personal life will. We return to this especially in E. below.

Another caveat of Husserl which we have already seen, but one echoed also by Shoemaker, may be mentioned. We must distinguish senses in which imaginability bears on possibility in regard to the first-person perspective. In one case we might be imagining “from the inside,” with “empathy,” some aspect of some person or the life of some person, e.g., how it would be like to be George W. Bush facing a news conference. In another quite different sense I might attempt to imagine myself being President Bush at a news conference. In the extreme limit-cases of imaginability, e.g., in cases of profoundly enhanced or diminished consciousness, there can well be the problem of not merely consistency in the point of view, but whether the imagined circumstance permits any coincidence between the imagining and imagined perspective, between the one imagining and the one imagined. If my imagining myself to be Bush is, in fact, an imagining of what makes impossible me as the one imagining, then I really am only saying I am so imagining because I really cannot imagine myself being Bush. But this is surely not to say I cannot imagine what it would be like to be Bush at a news conference.

However, consider the following statement by Shoemaker:

If I stipulate that I am the imagined person who initially agrees to submit to the series of operations [whereby my brain-parts are replaced by silicon chips], then I cannot, without begging the question [regarding the kind of mind that ensues from this operation], stipulate also that I am the imagined person who experiences the final stages of the extinction of his consciousness while observing the external behavior of the body to go on as before. And if I stipulate that the latter person is myself, then I cannot stipulate that the former person is.

This appears to reiterate the position we just stated. Yet we can ask, is the silicon chip transplant going to negate me myself in the way total amnesia does? Is it like transplanting me to my second birthday party? Or is it, as Shoemaker suggests, less
a radical transformation of my personal habitus than a transformation of me myself? If, as we are arguing, being me myself is not dependent on my having any specific properties, then it is not clear that it would be dependent on my having precisely the same chemical or neurological composition of my present brain. In any case, the sense of Shoemaker’s text is that I cannot imagine myself being someone else in so far as that would involve that the one imagined would not possibly be the one imagining.

In the first-person a lived sense of possibility and necessity comes to light in terms of an “I can” or “I cannot.” This builds on the depth of one’s present lived, mostly pre-reflective self-apperception. It also, of course depends on one’s ability to imagine in one’s own case. Similarly for the appresented third-personal possibility and necessity which take the forms of “he can,” “he cannot,” e.g., be Martin Luther King and have lived in such a context, or have been of such a race, or have been addicted to such and such a vice. In any case, the free imaginative variation of one’s person teases out possibilities that are real by way of the lived adumbration of the determinable life-horizon. At issue is not a meditation on a possible world version of, e.g., JG Hart, who, in this world, has configuration X of properties, but in another possible world, may have configuration Y of properties. The imaginative teasing out of possible versions of me, who am JG Hart, is a teasing out of what is possible and what is necessary on the basis of the lived habitualities which inform my I can as this person. Again, it is not an exercise in a third-person logic of: There exists a person JG Hart, who has such and such properties in this world, but in another possible world, given the differences of that world, he would not have precisely these properties, but these other ones instead. This latter is merely empty possibility and offers no foothold for phenomenological essence-analysis.

Numerous difficulties having to do with personal integrity, e.g., the deceptions occasioned by charm, flattery, wishful thinking, etc., may form obstacles to the unique kind of self-love and self-detachment that such an imaginative first-person self-displacement requires. But not all failures of imagination are moral ones. The capacities for imagination, the power to displace oneself from the present and dwell in the empty intentions of possibilities in all their details, are not equally distributed in all of us. For our present purposes what is essential is seeing that the imaginative variations of oneself in “othering” contexts brings out quasi-necessary properties of one’s personal identity that have a kind of trans-temporal first-person validity, i.e., one that abides in spite of the imaginative variations. Yet these are quasi-necessities because ultimately the person is non-sortal and non-ascriptively present because of its rootedness in the ipseity.

Persons with a strong character, for whom the sense of oneself is pronounced and whose integrity is clearly manifest to their neighbors, need not be persons for whom imaginative variation is more limited. Rather, the freedom to bracket in imagination the demands of one’s commitments would be a decisive factor. She might well be someone who could not conceive disavowing the duties of her station in life but who, nevertheless, could conceive real possible wild variations of herself and her life possibilities in imagination.
Again, the necessities and possibilities that we seek here to make palpable are *sui generis*. This is so not only because of their proximity to what is non-ascriptive but also because they emerge first of all in one’s own *authentic* imaginative self-displacement to the other setting, i.e., other ways of being in the world or ways in which the world can be otherwise and place different demands on us. “Authentic,” i.e., veracity with oneself and one’s ideal self, is a key consideration. The life-long addict may more easily displace himself to a future clean setting and life than he can displace himself to a future of repeated failings of resolve. The high-achieving neurotic may more easily envisage himself failing and being punished rather than doing something very well for which he receives deserved recognition. Whether moving imaginatively in the direction of overestimating or underestimating oneself, the person is, of course, himself, but the deficiencies of character or disorders of personality dispose him to be more inclined to one distortion rather than the other.

The necessities and possibilities are *sui generis* also in so far as they are a third-person effort to re-enact such a first-person exercise, i.e., on behalf of someone actually absent whom one loves. Thus, I might try, unsuccessfully, to imagine my deceased St. Francis-like grandmother working for Blackwater as a mercenary assassin.

If there is granted a distinction between “oneself” (as the “myself”) and one’s personal identity, we may conceive of variations not only in one’s own life as a unique person but also variations of the person and personal life that an ipseity may embody. Neither of these are the equivalent of an attempt to think of oneself as other than oneself. This last, we insist with Husserl, is an impossible undertaking.

We begin with a meditation on variations in embodiment and how these may affect the personal identity. To this we will briefly adjoin variations of one’s intelligence and then one’s gender. Finally we will point to the ontological importance of the moral personal identity and then briefly meditate on variations in the personal world.

### B Bodiliness as a Determining Factor

Because personal being is necessarily embodied we wish to pause briefly to consider how bodiliness figures into this matter. Here we may remind ourselves of the Christian belief in a resurrection of the body from the dead and the gift of a “glorified body” as the culmination of the believer’s faith adventure. Whatever this might mean from a third-person perspective, we may assume that the belief posits that the I-can of the individual is enormously enhanced with such a body. Among the things that this enhancement of I-can might refer to is the capacity for self-manifestation and self-realization, presuming that this still makes sense in “Heaven.” In so far as the body is the expression of the person which, in turn, is the signature of the ipseity or “oneself,” the well-known hindrances of the body as a vehicle for communicating
and achieving who one is are presumably significantly lessened if not surmounted. Further if being fully a person requires community as subjectivity requires intersubjectivity, then we may assume that the enhanced I-can of the glorified body is an enhancement of the conditions for community and intersubjectivity. An allied consideration here is the possibility of a community with all “the saints” who have ever lived. Community as we know it is of necessity very finite. How one could have community in such a presumably densely populated “Heaven” perhaps could be addressed by some theory of the glorified body (cf. our discussion of Price below), but we will prescind for the most part from all such considerations.

First let us summarize some earlier points. We have already addressed why being a person is not identical with being a body. We have already suggested that although Others’ second-person references to oneself, which are of necessity references to oneself as embodied, may not replace first-person references, and they cannot be said to constitute first-person experience of oneself or the “myself,” they nevertheless are necessary for the coming to be of first-personal acts of reference and one’s formation of oneself for oneself as a person. Further, we have noted that first-person references cannot be reduced to third-person references and first-person references to oneself cannot be substituted for by third-person references to one’s body, especially the references of the natural sciences. Indeed, it is conceivable that one know nothing about one’s body in this sense and still have a strong sense of oneself as a person. Further, being the same person does not require having the identical same body as this body is evident in the third-person or natural scientific perspective. One’s body is constantly undergoing change in a third-person perspective even when there are no significant changes in one’s person. And even though a radical bodily change, e.g., in plastic surgery or a sex change, can change one’s personality, it is not clear that it changes who one is as this person. A fortiori it does not change one’s myself or ipseity.

It is evident that a change in the person can accompany a change in the lived sense of the body. A body that feels old, tired, fragile and wracked with pain, clearly will modify the person’s life, even if the person, from a third-person perspective, is young, refreshed, robust and free of pain. Such a lived experience of the body need not affect whether the person is courageous or just, witty and intelligent, but it will obviously affect the I-can and as a result one might expect the brilliance of the sparkle of these virtues in the person’s life to diminish. When these virtues sparkle in spite of the bodily deterioration we have reason to be surprised.

Thus the lived body experience enters into one’s being in the world, e.g., effortlessly or with great struggle. It effects how one is perceived and how one perceives oneself to be perceived. The person who perceives himself to be perceived as a freak doubtless faces a different kind of struggle than one who is endowed with extraordinary natural beauty and knows that Others know this. For example, an exceptionally beautiful woman or man in certain social settings can face a social-psychological struggle comparable to the person who is considered monstrous in appearance. A person whose body is deficient in terms of the demands of the typical intersubjective world, e.g., someone blind or crippled, will have a different sense of himself as an agent in the common world, and the handicap might well
determine almost all aspects of his life. It remains always a difficult matter to judge in what sense one would have been the same person or have had the same personality if one’s bodiliness would have been radically different. Similarly imagine someone who was sighted having parents and an extended community who were blind or deaf; to what extent would these circumstances pervade the formation of the person? And, to what extent could we, the one’s imagining, recognize ourselves as being the same in such circumstances? The question is analogous to whether one would have been the same person or had the same personality if one were born, e.g., black in a white supremacist society. Or think of the following dialogue: “Did you know X who was a fantastic high jumper?” “No, the person named X whom I knew was crippled from birth.” Does this exchange indicate that the person, X, could not possibly have been the same person regardless of whether he was physically gifted or a cripple or does it express merely a matter of difficulty in believing the state of affairs? If X were the high jumper and became crippled or a high jumper after having recovered from the illness or injury, we would expect to see a continuity of person – as well as the prospect of sorting out the conflicting claims that occurred in the dialogue.

But can we think of bodily differences where the sameness of the person would be in doubt? For example, does being blind from birth pervade the personal being of someone such that this personal being is not conceivable apart from being blind? In which case we could never imagine her to say, “When I used to be blind…” This probably indicates that our relationship to the non-sighted person is superficial, even if it is understandable. But what if we turned this around and asked these questions of ourselves in the first-person? Would we not have a sense of ourselves as the same person with radical shifts in our bodiliness?

Kafka was able to pull off a presentation of his hero’s transformation into a beetle. Many readers find themselves reliving this fictional person’s first-person descriptions of this incarnation. They are helped by witnessing the parents, in spite of their struggle with their repugnance, treating the beetle as a person, indeed their son, throughout a series of episodes. This consideration moves us too quickly into the issue of metempsychosis where the question of identity is raised in regard to the assumption of non-human bodies. (See especially §7 below.) We mention it here only to suggest that the first-person senses of possibility may not always be identical with the second- and third-person ones. For example, rightly or wrongly, a person who has a bad past record in regard to some form of behavior might see the prospect of change as a real possibility where others, e.g., a prosecutor, probation officer, or judge, might have already “written him off.”

**C Variations in Intelligence**

In constituting myself through my position-taking acts, i.e., my judgments, distinctions, resolves, plans, commitments, etc., I have constituted the world. I have also established my way of living with Others. What if I, as this person of unexceptional
integrity and moderate intelligence, found myself transplanted to a world where everyone’s character was exaltedly noble or even saintly and their cognitive position-taking was perspicacious to the point of what we ordinary folks would call genius. Of course, their saintliness might accommodate itself to my mediocrity, but what about my conversation and the social interaction and common life? Would it not be like an essential child among essential adults? Could I still be me, JG Hart, in such a setting, where all my beliefs and cherished theories and insights were greeted with either incomprehension or the patience of a kind parent or wise therapist and where I not only came to know that this was an appropriate response, but, at the same time, I realized I was incapable of understanding the most significant aspects of the “world for us all” that this superior community constituted? Assuming that the future course for me was a trusting, blind faith, could I still be me if I could only live in this world by a purely blind faith and by following procedures blindly, thereby renouncing what I regarded as my mind? In short, how would this human person fare in a society of angels or gods? Doubtless he would still be he himself, but would he be, e.g., this professor of philosophy who had devoted himself to the ideal of an autonomous life of the mind?

The person whose capacity for cognitive position-taking acts is less than normal or handicapped for whatever reason will be less bound by propositional disclosures of the world, and her person will not be shaped and bound by clearly delineated articulations of the world “from now on.” If she were to announce that “I am an Al Qaeda fan,” her loving parents would not attach the typically full gamut of implicit propositions to her statement because they would assume she would not be aware of them.

Whereas it is true that for all of us many declarative statements that we enunciate are bound to certain emotional allegiances, typically there would be other propositions that would be more purely intellectually or cognitively based and for which we would offer reasons or evidence. Perhaps what we mean in part by “being retarded” is that there is less of a capacity to move beyond the emotional allegiances in one’s use of declarative sentences. To the extent that this is true, reflection on oneself and the articulation of one’s personal parameters, are more restricted in scope.

Considering oneself in the first-person as “mentally retarded” would thus seem to be difficult. But consider in the second- or third-person Peter whom we believe to be “mentally retarded.” Would we want to say that we could not conceive this one to be Peter whom we know to be otherwise than retarded? And if someone were to refer to Peter as this brilliant person, would we resist acknowledging that he is the same person? Or if Peter were, prior to becoming retarded, typically or exceptionally bright, would we recognize Peter in his new state? Friends and relatives face this question, of course, often when a loved one survives a serious brain injury.

Such questions have an ancient history in speculations about the afterlife when it is assumed that not only will the handicapped or afflicted persons not have their disadvantages in the afterlife, but the “community of saints” will recognize them now in this healed or whole mode of existence. What will have to have been in play for us to be capable of such a recognition?
It seems that intelligence is intrinsic to the display of one’s person and we might be hard put to say whether such radical transformations revealed whether the person was the same or not. Although we might well have no doubt that the person before us was still himself for himself, whether he was Peter (with such and such more or less distinctive traits) for himself would be unclear, precisely because of the difficulty we have in recognizing Peter as the same if there is this transformation of intellectual capacity. This recalls our earlier discussions of whether ipseity is the seat of intellect or intellect the seat of ipseity. Whereas the position here in this work inclines toward the former position, we see here how basic the “agency of manifestation” is for our identifying the person in the second- and third-person.

D Variations in Gender

Imagining oneself being of a different gender is a handy phenomenological experimental field for our present purposes of reflecting on the conceivability of the “afterlife” in terms, e.g., of reincarnation or resurrection. Gender transformation, in so far as it is a public event, is inseparable from a change of bodily presentation. Yet it is a difficult question of whether gender difference is conceivable without sexual difference and eros. Those whom we know who are “eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven” typically are recognizable gendered. But need there be the sexual differentiation and eros as a condition of gender? Granted that there is a kind of gender differentiation in the same sex, is it not conceivable that there be a gender differentiation apart from sex. Old and older hetero- and homosexual couples seem to embody precisely that state of affairs.

Imagining a world wherein sex and gender will be of no account, as in “there will be neither marrying nor giving in marriage,” is not tantamount to imagining a world where embodiment and deep love are of no account. For example, imagining a world wherein sex and gender are of no account is not difficult perhaps for the contented celibate or very old person. But even such persons will typically find imagining a gender change difficult. Here one comes upon palpable senses of possibility, impossibility, and necessity. Surely what comes to light, even in those of us with little imaginative powers, is the keen sense of zones of discomfort and comfort. These translate readily into senses of practical possibility and impossibility. We must remember we are not talking about the impersonation of another gender, but a real gender change. We laugh at “Tootsie” because Dustin Hoffman is impersonating a female character and we empathize with his discomfort in the situations where his impersonation has been too successful, e.g., in terms of arousing sexual interest. But it is much more complicated when the person “pretending” to be female is indeed comfortable with this gender role because of his sexual orientation. (Cf. *Les Cages folie.* Here the person is vulnerable both to the contempt of the straight culture upon his unmasking as well as the macho abuse of the male culture.

In our imaginative variation, not impersonation, for example, the transgendered male who was raised in and succumbed to the “macho” ethos must face himself,
i.e., “herself,” because he is now imaginatively transformed. Now he needs to find his, i.e., “her,” strength in the ethos that stresses feminine sensibilities, power, interests, and assets.

In spite of these radical shifts of personality, it still is unclear whether the person is changed. Clearly with radical changes in personality the distinction between a change in the person and the change undergone by an ipseity becomes increasingly thin.

### E The Moral-Personal Identity

How helpful are the imaginative experiments here? We acknowledge that they do not lead to any decisive conclusions. And it is clear that they do not bring forth any unequivocal necessity regarding the eidos of one’s personhood or the personhood of the Other about whom we are meditating. Rather they often force us to consider the ipseity or “myself” as more basic than the person, and yet force us also to sense the vague, albeit real, parameters that “define” the person as the embodiment of the ipseity. In our present context such reflections are aimed at the conditions for the possibility of the continuation of one’s moral-personal identity in an afterlife, which itself, of course, is going to be specified by one’s theological convictions. Clearly we are looking for criteria of sameness in a framework where we are also aware of both change or development and freedom. Further, we seem easily, and treacherously, to be drawn toward focusing on identifying characteristics apart from whose they are. Yet to the extent that this is true what we are undertaking is not much different from identifying a corpse in the morgue. Nevertheless, as we earlier noted, the personal I has an encompassing habitual life-will punctuated and expressed in position-taking stances that have a validity “from now on” until revoked. These provide some guidelines for identifying the parameters for the personal-moral I.

In the first-person such criteria are irrelevant in regard to the “myself” because one is always oneself; but still there are times when one acknowledges the need for forgiveness, for not having been himself, where someone confesses to not knowing “what came over me,” etc. Further, we have said that when we address someone in the second-person, and even more so when we know someone through love, we intend the person through but also beyond the attributes. If this is so, what is it we are intending? And what is the target of our intentional acts? We are not intending the “myself” as non-historical, disembodied and worldless, but rather we are searching for precisely how the “myself” is revealed to itself and for others as a distinguishable person, i.e., the signature way of being in the world with Others.

We have said that we seem to recognize the signature presence of the person analogous to the way we recognize the gait, the handwriting, the style, the voice. Like a physical object in space there is an identifiable sameness throughout the manifold perspectives. Yet the issue has remained undecided (cf. Chapter III, §5) whether we have “signature traits” of the person or whether these traits are
signature” of the person’s “personality.” If the personality presents the person who, in turn, is the incarnate ipseity, and this ipseity is without properties and is the root of freedom, are the signature traits of the person’s personality more stable than the person herself? The answer would seem to be affirmative if the person undergoes a moral transformation or is mentally unstable. Thus I might well be someone who has a list of signature traits tied to my background, psychological history, profession, etc., e.g., my solipsistic manner of speaking, my tendency to act aggressively in an academic setting, my pompous writing style, etc. But consider how, over the years, I might have overcome the sense of vulnerability and low self-esteem that accounted in part for these characteristic forms of self-presentation. But is it not possible that these styles might have gained an autonomy from the neurosis, just as my rigid walking gait reflects my athletic background, even though I have long since repudiated, at least at some obvious level, the macho, competitive ethos of my youth? The signature traits could thus persist in a way such that they mask as much as reveal the person. An important question, which we do not address here, is: Does the masking or revelation have to do with who or what the person is? We will show in Book 2, Chapter IV that there is a unique revelation of who someone is in the sort of moral character she has.

Further, these signature traits might well be more evident in the second- and third-person than in the first-person. The “myself” is ineluctably self-evident and identifying “myself” as something within the flow of life is nonsensical. Yet each faces the task of “knowing herself” where she is called to do more than merely be conscious, and where her integrity and responsibility are issues. Fidelity to one’s position-takings, e.g., one’s promises, vows, commitments, judgments, etc., is the gauge of conscience. It is the standard and necessity to which one has bound oneself and is the measure of one’s being true to oneself. (See Book 2, Chapter III.) However, as we have also mentioned, the evidence for necessities might be stronger in the first-person imaginative exercise than in the third-person one. There might be a great discrepancy between my imagining Gandhi to join forces with the Nazi SS or some African colonialist mercenary army and Gandhi’s own effort to imagine himself doing this. First-person reflection might well know what is not available in third-person observation. Thus, I myself, if I am honest, might be aware of weaknesses or strengths in my character and dispositions that are very well hidden from others. But the contrary might also be true, i.e., the Others might see clearly aspects of myself that are hidden to me. But the necessities that arise for me might be evident only to me. Here we approach the “existential” theme of the truth of will and the unique truths that are proper to us as unique persons and which are not true unless we know them. (See Book 2, Chapter V.)

In any case we can only judge the other personal I’s own essence or necessities in a common life of living with the other by taking positions that she takes by taking them along with her. When we do this, Husserl says, we get into the position of approximating an understanding the core of the personal I or her own version of Luther’s “Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise, God help me!”53 In any case, when undertaking a free imaginative variation of our personal selves we must similarly bring to light the necessities and constraints that define our moral
core. In my imaginative variation I start with my sense of my personal self, with its living palpable history and its stock of motivational fields which are built up not only out of the social-historical circumstances but also out of my position-taking acts, my desires, my convictions, etc. I imagine myself in a new situation, making decisions, pursuing goals, performing acts which I, myself, as I factually am, cannot do. I am weak, a sinner, have seemingly inveterate bad habits, etc. But I can imagine myself to be better, to even be a saint or moral hero. Such a musing may awaken me to be this better version of myself. In my imagining myself to be such I am not this improved version of myself, and yet I am this variation of myself, as it were. This is a declension of me, it is not I myself becoming someone else. And here, in the recognition of the distance between myself and the imagined better version of myself, I recognize the “necessities” that I bear in my being me as I actually am.54

Position-takings, i.e., I-me acts by which I shape myself in shaping the world, are not all equally formative of the core personal sense of myself. For example, the cognitive achievements, by which I as a child appropriate the validities of the world of those who have gone in advance of me, clearly shape me profoundly, yet they are not of the same order as those by which I shape my self at my core, as in a marital or other vocational decision. This latter self-determination may lead us to think of another sense of self-revelation of oneself. In the Book 2 we attempt to relate the personal self to the unique ipseity in such a way that the person may be said to be “called” to be what the ipseity pre-delineates by way of a “true self.” If this reflection has plausibility then those acts, which of course can be characterize-able by certain properties, by which one self-determines oneself wholeheartedly, i.e., those acts with which one wholly identifies, are acts revelatory of Who one is. This corresponds to our common conviction that virtuous acts can reveal who one is even though, as such, they have universal properties. It has parallels also with the conviction that may surface when beholding a portrait that an artist may capture who someone is in the how of her presentation of the person. In some reflections on a resurrected body (cf. our discussion of Price below) this transparency of who one is in one’s bodily self-presentation or in one’s personal presence is often a theme. St. Paul speaks of the resurrection from the dead in terms of the body’s being “sown in dishonor,” yet “it shall rise in glory” just as “star differs from star in glory.” (1 Cor. 15: 42) “Glory” here presumably refers to not just the radiance and splendor of the body but the beauty of the ipseity rendered transparent in this “new body.”

F Variations in the Social-Historical World

But we cannot really grasp the identity of the person if we leave out the cognitive position-takings. It is this mix of cognitive, volitional, and moral position-takings as they are correlated to the personal world that we must look at in order to grasp the identity of the totality of the person. And this mix of position-takings with its
woven complex of “world” is of utmost relevance in the first-person reflection on ourselves; and it is something implicit in our appresenting appreciation of one another as persons. Let us think more concretely about this — and we do this with the question in mind of what kind of conditions would have to be fulfilled, what kind of infra-structures would have to be realized, in the “afterlife” if there was to be the survival of one’s own person.

An obvious way to bring these matters to light is at hand when we think about what is at stake in understanding strangers or ourselves in a strange land. The “afterlife,” after all, would of necessity be a strange land in many respects precisely because it is believed to be “home” to all peoples in all their historical and cultural differences or precisely because it is “home” in spite of all these differences.

The world “for us all” has such and such validities, values, possibilities, necessities, etc. through my interactive agency with Others. We have noted that the explication of our actual personal being in the world, i.e., the bringing to light our “second nature” and thereby the coming to know our most familiar and thus invisible personal selves, is a difficult matter. This aspect of ourselves can be brought to light when we find ourselves in a critical situation, as in a temptation to betray ourselves and/or someone else. We may, on such an occasion be surprised by ourselves. But the imaginative work required of us to place ourselves in a radically different culture may also reveal very subtle strata about ourselves. The difficulty of this imaginative work is easily underestimated.

This task before us of understanding the defining parameters of the persons we are would seem not to be essentially different from that of understanding our friends and neighbors. Breakdowns in communication and friendships most often happen because of the failure of relevant parties to put themselves in the Others’ shoes or to self-displace themselves to the Other’s personal otherness that contradicts one’s own realm of the obvious and what is to be taken for granted. Each’s gaining familiarity with her own way of perceiving by way of a disagreement with an Other in regard to a common topic is a way of bringing to speech one’s “second nature.” One’s own invisible habits in articulating the world and responding to the world come to light. Thus communication involves, if what is at stake is not merely what is of no importance, a “loving battle,” as Jaspers was fond of putting it.

Thus communication is especially a loving battle when we engage others who do not belong to our social-cultural world. Aside from our differences from our neighbors and friends, we take for granted huge expanses of the common life-world that comprise our life together in a particular nation and culture. So deeply engrained and familiar are our position-takings, the ensuing habitualities, and the contours of the landscape of the world we have constituted by participating in the social world, that we easily overlook them.

Thus we are reminded of the things we take for granted when we begin to live in a foreign country. We get a glimmer of the deep-seated habitualities when we think of the way the economic and technological infrastructures instigate habits of life-style that often result in the incapacity of people in the “developed world” and the “third-world” to understand one another. In the case of the former, the task is to understand the way of life of those for whom there is an absence of a mass food...
industry, supermarkets, electricity, running water, motorized transportation, public transportation, medical facilities, power tools, etc. We get a glimpse of the deep-seated habitualities in learning another language or coming to appreciate the differences not only between the language’s (phonemic) sounds but also between the Western musical tone-scale of, e.g., Native American, Mid-Eastern or South-, South-East, or East-Asian peoples. Similarly we have mere inklings of what the first-person spiritual life of others is about even after years of studying other religions. Again, the world we live in is inseparable from our personal identities and these are inseparable from the world we constitute individually and collectively. Participating in the life of Others and the life of those Others belonging to different cultures is a “loving battle.”

Most of us know how unsettled some, e.g., refugees, can become when compelled to make do in novel settings where prior habits of perception and agency are no longer relevant and where prior circles of family and friends are, for whatever reason, absent. When, likewise, prior accomplishments and levels of competence, the bases for personal self-esteem, are totally invisible to both the fellow refugees and the host strangers, one feels oneself to be “nobody” and “of no account.” Because the refugees often neither can speak the language, nor know the most familiar things, nor perform correctly the most obvious tasks required by the culture, the host strangers might tend to talk very loudly and slowly to them, often using baby talk. And the refugees themselves may, at least for a while, tend to think of themselves as lost, retarded, or pariahs, eventually wondering, in an obvious sense, who or what they are. Here doubtless becoming confused about who one is, is inseparably tied up to being confused about what one is, i.e., in terms of one’s ancestors and family, one’s place, status, abilities, competencies, role, etc. in the new surroundings and new expectations of the Others.

Doubtless the fundamental feature of every personal world or life-world constituted through whatsoever position-takings involves other persons who guide us in our display of the world, with whom and to whom we articulate the world. They are those who provide light to our path and are a source of nurture, who become our friends and to whom we commit ourselves, who provide us with exemplary ways of being persons, etc. Even when we live in other social-cultural worlds cut off from the significant persons of our beginnings, the abiding presence through memories and retained influence of our parents, teachers, exemplars, and friends are basic in our continuing to be ourselves, both in the sense that they are the foundation and, as well, that they continue to inform pervasively all of our lives. In so far as they have shaped us they are part of our souls and bodies. The way we speak and write, the way we talk, walk, run, and laugh, what we find attractive and repulsive, are often, to a great extent embodiments of significant Others in our past.

Therefore essential to this world is the presence to us of Others in that part of nature that we call their bodies. They are at least initially present in their bodily expressions, not least of which is their speech, and their works in the surroundings. Physical things are the natural physical base upon or out of which culture and bodies are formed. Yet the self-presentations of persons as well as the worlds differ over time, and once they differed much more profoundly over space.
In our free imaginative variation of possible worlds there become evident typically massive identity or sameness syntheses which comprise the realm of the invisible taken-for-granted common background which spans huge cultural differences. Similarly there is the continuity of conceptual spaces in these fictional temporal displacements which remain unchanged, e.g., the logic of wholes and part, the experience of Others in contrast to things, the experience of the distinction between living, or animate, and non-living things, the distinction between typical continuity of bodily extension and the play of colors and shades of colors that inhere in the substrate of the extended body, the typicality of sky, earth, air, and water, the distinction between heavy and light, warm and cold, the four basic directions, the typical topography and geography of hills and valleys, the typicality of animals, foul, and fish, the typicality of kinds of plants, the experience of Others as sexed and gendered, the differences between the genders/sexes, etc. All these typicalities are correlated with the lived body and its experiences of kinaesthesis and its other sensations such as heaviness, pleasure and pain. Pervasive of the life world is the unchallenged distinction between the conventional and the natural, the conventional and the morally binding, the various kinds of necessity and contingency, the relationship of means and ends, etc. The free imaginative variation of “possible worlds” tinkers with these pervasive underlying bases or framing grids, and the question arises to what extent personal identity could persist in the course of this tinkering with these typicalities, or these massive identity syntheses, and conceptual spaces that we always assume. If we can count on nothing being the same, if all our retained position-takings are invalidated three hours after they are taken, if our character which disposes us to be in the future in a certain way counts for nothing tomorrow, how can we continue to be ourselves?

In as much as personal identity is not merely founded on cognitive position-takings, we may think of the analogous massive sameness syntheses, typicalities, and conceptual spaces in terms of the world-views punctuated by ideals and values which emerge out of one’s life world. It is toward these that one lives and to which the person has committed herself in constituting herself and in relating to the Others in the social and natural world. Thus we may think of the underlying attitude that pervades a technological society in terms of the instrumentalization of nature and people; or a capitalist society’s conviction of the substitutability of values of utility for intrinsic values and market values for values of utility; or the ever-recurrent axiological arrangement of Others by reason of race, gender, status, or class. Although the collective or individual revolution or transformation of these might amount to a “conversion” in the individual person, the personal identity seems to be in tact. A good witness for this is the radical transformation of millions to the ideal and principle of non-violence; although this has brought about enormous personal changes, the personal identity never seems to have been in doubt subsequent to such changes.

Can we imagine ourselves being ourselves, i.e., the persons we experience ourselves to be as persons in the world with others, if we were raised by other persons than those who in fact raised us? This imagining of ourselves is not easy precisely because of the invisibility of our debt to our significant Others even when they
themselves are present to us later in life as our elders. Similarly, what if we were transplanted to five-hundred years ago to an African jungle and adopted by and raised by affectionate chimpanzees at the age of three months, à la Tarzan? Is it possible that I, JG Hart, the one imagining, could tease out senses in which I would recognizably still be me for myself and for others who had the unique vantage point of knowing me under both sets of circumstances? The records on the few feral children we know suggest that neither Tarzan nor we ourselves would ever have been able to enter into any human society, including that of upper class Britain. For someone who participates fully in the twenty-first century, imagining her beginnings as a feral child would seem to be an impossible task.

Aside from the metaphysical questions surrounding time-travel, its fictional presentations often make light of the phenomenological-psychological problems of identity of the traveler. That is, the time-traveler simply cannot function easily or at all if her habits of perception and functioning abilities are not applicable to her new surroundings. The fictional representations of such time-travels typically portray differences of a superficial nature, i.e., they scarcely wrestle with the heterogeneity of the worlds, personal dispositions, and capacities.

A central difficulty with many theories of personal immortality, as with portrayals of time-travel, the story of Tarzan, the Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s court and Rip Van Winkle, is that the personal identity’s correlation with the enironing world’s ongoing beliefs and values, as well as the attachments to cherished family, friends, and associates, styles of life, social institutions and structures and infra-structures, exemplary figures, etc., etc., is made incidental or of no account. Rip or Tarzan is said to be transplanted, but the question of what would it mean to live in these new settings as this person, Rip or Tarzan, is not raised. How can I be resurrected, wake up or be inserted in this world as JG Hart, if my social-historical world no longer is valid nor are the correlate validities of my personal identity as living in this world. Would I still go on being me, this person, JG Hart, if I am transplanted into a life-world constituted by Others whose history and culture are radically different from mine, and if the Others who have constituted my life-world and me, JG Hart, with and through me are now absent?55 It seems safe to say that, if I am in this milieu long enough and from a time where my learning abilities are still flexible, I would be for Others, who knew the “old me,” unrecognizably the same JG Hart.

In regard to our religious-philosophical context, what would the afterlife’s social-world have to be like to both sustain and enrich the personal identity which is to continue in it? Clearly, the cognitive abilities that would be required to overcome the obstacles to the sustenance of personal survival in a place where the social-cultural infra-structures would be presumably utterly transformed pose a great challenge to the most eutopian of imaginations. Assuming our personal being in the world is somehow continued, we find ourselves very much in the dark about how the conditions are fulfilled for intersubjectivity and communication in terms of a common physical-material substrate as well as common linguistic, cultural, and historical backgrounds. What doubtless seems clear is that the compatriots that would surround such surviving persons would have to be friends for whom the
enormous obstacles that separate, even under the best of circumstances in “this life,” would be surmounted by a love and genius that would give rise to institutions and infra-structures of community that themselves would be suffused with an incomparable love and genius. Whereas fleshing this out is hard enough in the best of utopian fiction, most of which leaves us unconvinced because it does not sufficiently respect the difficulties surrounding what necessities are to be honored, in the project of imagining the afterlife we seem even more likely to fail.

**G H.H. Price’s Spiritualist Afterlife**

For this reason H.H. Price’s bold efforts at precisely such an undertaking merit our attention. His speculative proposal about the afterlife affirms what we want to affirm, namely that post-mortem personal identity has for its conditions memories, a co-constituted world as the correlate of persons, and bodiliness. Needless to say, the theory makes extraordinary assumptions, but this can hardly be surprising given the nature of the project, which has always been a scandal for philosophers.

H.H. Price’s spiritualist speculation about life after death is based on a dualist hypothesis, i.e., he is convinced that the spirit is an integral substance existing independently from its body and materiality. Nevertheless he holds that if there is sustained the personal identity after death it can only be in correlation with a semblance of one’s personal world. Furthermore, Price’s theory of the afterlife attempts to argue for the continuity of one’s personal life-world and he argues for a kind of bodiliness. In this hypothesis, the individual spirit or a mental entity continues after death to live its life through memory of his personal life in the world with others (for Price there is no personal survival, i.e., survival of the person, as this identical person, without memory). However, now the active life in the world is carried out through an analogous form of dreaming life (from which one does not “awaken”) and through living out one’s desires in the dreams.

One attractive feature of this proposal is that it takes advantage of the fact that in dreaming we do enter into a world. Indeed, it is a world wherein the present waking world is transformed. And while dreaming, typically we are not aware that we are dreaming, and therefore the dream world appears as the encompassing true world. This is to say that the dream-world is not an imagined world. Except in the cases of the “lucid dream,” where we are aware that we are dreaming, the dream-world is not lived “as-if-it-were-real” but as real, even though it has its own laws and spatiality and temporality, often quite heterogeneous to the real waking world. From the waking perspective, however, we can say that the familiar Griffey Lake in Bloomington, which appears in the dream, is in its own dream-world space. The real Griffey Lake is a mile from my home; not so the dreamed Griffey Lake. Not only might it be contiguous with somewhere in another continent, but its location, as an item in the dreamed world, cannot be measured in terms of real distance from anything in the waking world any more than the distance of the Land of Oz from Bloomington can be measured in miles.\(^5\)
Whereas the dream world is indeed a product of, among many things, our desires and fears, it is not so experienced by the dreamer. Price, who uses dreams as an analogue for the afterlife, posits that the dream world is a result foremost of our desires. “The next world,” on this hypothesis, could be many worlds, depending on the nature of our desires and the communities we form in terms of our desires and our characters. What keeps this world from being absolutely solipsistic is the theory of telepathy. By this hypothesis we can intersubjectively influence one another and together live in a common world through a means other than a material bodily mediation. Telepathy is the communication of one mind’s conscious life, whether it be volitions, ideas, propositions, emotions, etc. to another, independent of “the recognized channels of sense,” i.e., independent of what is encompassed by many under bodiliness. Telepathy is as basic to Price’s theory as is the theory that post-mortem waking life is analogous dreaming.

Price asserts that dreaming may serve as the fundamental analogue for interpersonal communication in the afterlife. Because here spirit seems to be at the mercy of its non-rational life, the claim that persons are correlated to worlds does not preclude that some people’s “next world” be a nightmare for others or even for themselves. When dreaming, worlds are conjured up even though we might well be bereft of all sense impressions from the world that surrounds us sleepers. The dreaming we do while alive “in this life” is thus a kind of adumbration of “what we might expect to have after death.” In the postulated afterlife, which is an analogous dreaming, we do not communicate through our bodiliness, because physical bodies do not exist. Rather, according to Price, we assign to Others and perhaps ourselves dreamed bodies. Further, we may assume that we keep our significant Others and enjoy new ones through telepathy.

The communication is by an agent, who may not be conscious of being a communicator, to a recipient who receives it as from “nowhere,” i.e., it need not be part of her immediate stream of consciousness in such a way that she can identify the source of the communication. In this view, telepathy, the “best established” of all parapsychological phenomena, would be more common because the “inhibiting influence” of being embodied would be removed. And perhaps there could be a common “image-world” created by these telepathic spirits and perhaps like-minded spirits would find one another and share a common world.

Price’s own account of the telepathic presence requires the postulation of a “common unconscious.” Each’s stream of consciousness, as well as the marginal or subconscious awareness, belongs exclusively to herself. We know one another’s thoughts typically, i.e., while alive in “this world,” only through the medium of our bodies. And much of the workings of what is called “the unconscious,” as when we say, “I can’t give you an answer now, let me mull it over” (or “I must sleep on it”) seems to be a mixture of realms of ownness and “it thinks.” Here Price endorses the image of Friederic Myers and William James of our being islands sharing a continuous landmass beneath the surface-sea of consciousness. The image of surfaces of islands is misleading in so far as the islands lend themselves to being taken as separate.

Note that in this hypothesis the surviving spirit still has the character and personality constituted during the earthly lifetime. It further has a dream body, i.e., one
constituted by the imagination in something resembling the activity of dreaming. The body, it would seem, is not for the revelation of oneself to Others – who know one through telepathy and participation in the common unconscious – but rather it is for oneself and one’s sense of oneself. Further, the spirit would still have a personal world as a correlation of this personal hexis of character and bodiliness although one cannot say in advance how wildly modified it will be. The hypothetical wildness of the future life is tied to the analogous unpredictability of how our desires and fears function in the dream worlds. Thus the soul surviving death still has continuity with the world she enjoyed during her living waking life because post-mortem life is a hyper-dream life. Significant Others, Price suggests, even though often wildly modified, are still very much part of the scene. For Price, pace Kant, the afterlife is not a noumenal world but a radically phenomenalistic one.

We agree with Price’s view that personal identity, and therefore a personal immortality, would be tied to memory. But as we have also argued, the “myself” is not equivalent to the person, JG Hart, and therefore the identity and continuity of “myself” is not dependent on memory. This raises the difficult question of whether I myself could be other than JG Hart. And it raises necessarily the other question: Just as I remain “I myself” when I am not uniquely JG Hart, and therefore, in this sense, other than JG Hart, so is it not possible that significant Others might be other than who they are as the familiar persons I once took them to be? This is not Price’s problem because the person is a sortal term and there is no reason to distinguish the “myself” from the person.

A connected query has to do with whether there is genuine presencing of the otherness of the Other and whether there is love (as we have defined it in Chapter III), in the afterlife. If love is the way we presence Others as beyond their personalities and properties, and if love is necessarily self-transcending and not self-projecting, then Price’s next world would be bereft of love. Indeed, as we saw, it could be a nightmare.

Price’s theory seems to require that others are still “there,” i.e., transcendent to and not inhabiting my stream of dreaming consciousness as a competing I. Yet this being “other to the Other,” this plurality of numerically distinct I’s, is jeopardized by the collective unconsciousness which seems to be the paradigmatic way spirits in the “afterlife” communicate. The transcendence of the Other and each person to each other is endangered in favor of each being already united in the sameness of the collective unconsciousness.

In Price’s theory of the afterlife, knowledge of the Other is reduced to knowledge of the same, i.e., our common collective unconsciousness with which each lives her life in an undifferentiated way. Yet there is a kind of associative pairing between the other person’s appearing as Other and the knowledge which arises out of our common collective unconsciousness. In Price’s presentation, you may be experienced other than as wish-fulfillment through your telepathic communication with me. Whether you do this consciously or not, you resort to our common unconsciousness. In each case it seems to be Us or It communicating with Us or It, at first unconsciously. (Why the common unconsciousness must communicate with itself is not clear.) Then, through a kind of associative pairing of the communication from
Us/It, I associate the communication of your imaginatively dreamt body with my imaginatively dreamt presence of you. But to interpret these associative pairings of the communication of you with me or me with you would seem to be an error if it is really between Us and Us or It and It or Us and It or It and Us – “Us” offering the possibility of a measure of awareness and “It” indicating no such awareness or self-awareness but rather something intruding from outside on “our” awareness and “each’s” awareness.

There is another difficulty in Price’s account of the post-mortem body as the medium of present communications. On the one hand, the presence of the imaged dream bodies as the presence of another is the presence of the Other’s body as imaged by the Other’s dreaming. The presence of the imaged dream body as the presence of another I becomes “paired” with communication from the common unconsciousness. Her self-expression of herself bodily (Price compares this with an artistic self-expression) is communicated to me telepathically by route of the collective unconsciousness which gives me her version of herself. In the “next life” we would be present for one another not through the body as conceived by the anatomist or physiologist but rather more like the aesthetically imaged body, i.e., the body as conceived by the dreamer who has become a painter or dramatist.60 (Images are of something spatial but are not to be located in physical space.)

But, on the other hand, in as much as the common world, to which her body belongs, is jointly created by all of our imaginative dreaming projections, her body is also whatever we all want it to mean. The common world as “the same for us all,” in this case foremost a value in herself manifesting intrinsic dignity, especially to the powers of a loving perception, can find little room in Price’s afterlife.

The common unconscious will be “made flesh” by the person imaging forth her version of her own body. And we live with one another through the countenance and bodies that our desire, anxiety, fear, and hate sculpt, e.g., bodies and faces are present to us as radiant, dark, beaming, seething, awesome, etc. The bodies and faces of the Other would be present through images which her memories, desires, and dreams would render present. Price’s distinction between the natural scientific and aesthetic imagined body, however much it liberates us from the hegemony of the natural scientific understanding of the body, and however suggestive it might be in enabling us to think about embodied personal immortality, does not insure that your self-presentation will not be different from my self-presentation of you, i.e., that is you as you want to appear. The intrinsic dignity of the ipseity as what love targets, and the space-making for this appresented life of the Other, cannot be themes in Price’s phenomenalistic afterlife. The signature traits of your body, its peculiar radiance, etc., are your doing but also my doing, and there is no certainty that I am picking up your telepathic communication and not confusing yours with someone else’s. It would seem that the work of “clarifying” the communication and who the author of the clarification is in a network of phenomenalistic projections is an impossible task.

Of course, already in “this” life thinking of communication as a form of projection is also a problem. But in Price’s “afterlife” there is no common physical natural or worldly substrate like the body, sound, or ink marks bearing the meaning which
gets interpreted and appropriated. Rather there is telepathic projection which effects
the transference of meanings, and somehow this telepathic signal is able to be falli-
bly singled out as “hers” in distinction from all the others. H.D. Lewis makes the
important point that Price’s dream world is supposed to be public, but the publicity
of the world as such requires the necessities that go to make up a world, not least of
which are the necessities described by the laws governing the physical substrates of
objective spirit. But this is undermined if the dreams are totally at the mercy of capri-
cious desires. “If there is no necessity about the world I am to enter, how can there
be any correlation between it and the worlds of other subjects? There must be some
common restraints if communication is to be possible.”

It is true that for the Husserlian all senses of the presence of Others depends on
empathic perceiving that is a unique meaning-giving bestowed on a bodily presence
which is self-expressing. But that meaning-giving is precisely a presencing of you
there, self-expressing now as a self-presencing. You self-present what is an essen-
tial absence for me, and therefore the analogous “I” is necessarily in its sense your
expressive self-presenting. And because it is analogously “I’/”here”/”now” your
presence is also a de-presencing of me/here/now, i.e., there is a pull to displace me
from my standpoint as the zero-point of orientation of my field of perception. You
in your self-experiencing and self-expressing remain not only present but also
essentially absent and affirmed by me, and resoundingly so in love. This chasm
creates a reserve in me for your self-revelation on your own terms. The infinite
distance in regard to you, the securing your revelation as yours by my presencing
you, and the deference toward your own disclosure of you apart from my interfer-
ence would all seem to be jeopardized profoundly in Price’s afterlife.

Further Price’s post-mortem intersubjective world and the persons in it seem to
be as robust as what we now experience even though nature will not really be there
as something independent in itself but only as a projection and others will be there
as both projections and associations tied to our common unconsciousness. If we
would ever awaken from the dream in the sense of realizing it as nothing more than
doing from which we will never awaken, would the personal identity remain
robust? How much of our sense of ourselves and our world is tied to the trust in the
identity syntheses of the natural and social world as holding “in themselves” and
not through our capricious projection. Is not the natural and social world consti-
tuted as having a validity in itself from now on, and is this not quite apart from the
“validity” of a caprice which of necessity is at the mercy of my whim? The identity
syntheses of our “this-life” natural and social world are the base of our world and
our sense of ourselves. If they are taken to be nothing but imagings founded in
desire, would we not find ourselves faced with the problems of a purely private
language, i.e., something is so merely because I want it to be so, even though now
I am not sure I really want or wanted it to be so then? If the common unconscious’s
telepathic communication is anything like language which presupposes identity
syntheses tied to material substrates, like sounds and print marks, then this tele-
pathic communication too presupposes the validity of massive objective underlying
samenesses in our world in order for the communication to take place. These can-
not be tied to the caprice of the moment. Would the “enlightened” post-mortem
dreamer not find herself of necessity in a setting where a bottomless, and therefore “well-founded,” anxiety (Angst vor dem Nichts) would prevail? Would this afterlife be something to believe in and hope for?

**H The Resurrection of the Body**

Let us move on to the traditional Christian beliefs in the resurrection of the body. These beliefs are in a new spiritual and heavenly, not earthly, body whereby the blessed enjoy in the communion of saints the presence of those whom they have loved but from whom they have been separated. (These bodies are, we also learn, tied to a “New Heaven and New Earth,” about which the scriptures and tradition offer very little information.) The saints also enjoy the company of those whom they never knew during their lives. The problem of the separation between the time of “falling asleep” and being “awakened” at the end of time in the general resurrection was perhaps uncontroversial for the early Christians because of either the expectation of an imminent awakening or because of the insight that the time between falling asleep and waking up is the “blinking of an eye,” i.e., a “time” without a worldly duration. We might wonder whether Sheol or the place to which Jesus, in the Apostles’ Creed, descended after his death and before his resurrection, was a realm of dreamless sleep or non-existence (as Lewis would have it) and whether this “place” was transformed or abolished.

In these ancient scriptural accounts of being awakened from being “asleep in the Lord” there is no problematizing of the continuity of one’s identity with the new circumstances and environment. These beliefs generally assert a rejoining of the Others in an odd bodily presence. It is odd at least in the sense that the resurrected body of Jesus seems to have properties that are beyond our ken. Ancient theologians explained the “glorified body” by saying that it enjoyed, among other attributes, “clarity.” This meant that the body manifested clearly and transparently the intrinsic dignitas or beauty of the self or soul. Striving for glory or being vain-glory is striving to appear with a light which one does not have, and which striving betrays a failure to appreciate one’s intrinsic dignity. The condition for the possibility of this striving may well be a desire for power, but it indicates also the requirement that the basic dignity or intrinsic worth, which each ipseity is, receive its appropriate recognition.

The Greek root of verb for the word glory, doxeuo, has to do with what one takes in with one’s eyes, what shines, or appears. Doxa, the Greek word usually translated with glory, can refer as well to one’s reputation, the opinion people have of someone, as well as fame. It is the shine we have in the eyes of others. The Latin verb, glorior, as in “to boast,” suggests that one can shine a light on oneself or put oneself in such a light that one appears either as who or what one is, or who or what one wants to be seen as. We have suggested (in Chapter IV, passim, but see §§5, 7, 17–21 and Chapter VI, §7) that the ipseity has an intrinsic dignity which comes to light not only in the elementary appreciation of appresentation and the
loving gaze, but also we will attempt to show (Book 2, Chapter V, §8) that there is an elementary appreciation of this in a basic self-esteem in the first-person. The often-repeated claim we make is that in the presence of persons one meets an intrinsic good, a radically singular substance possessing what Aquinas referred to as \textit{dignitas}. Because this verges on being invisible to oneself and others there is, as Fichte insisted, an ineluctable drive for respect and a striving to be recognized. The \textit{sui cuique}, or giving to each what is her due, i.e., the appropriate “just” relation of each to each, merely explicates the reverence due to the dignity of ipseity. This it is of necessity \textit{ut det uncuique secundum dignus est}. That is, “to each her own” is always tied to the respect to be given to each on the basis of what is ontologically required as her due. This is so basic that one can be well tempted to prefer to be recognized, to be “someone,” at any cost. This demand to be recognized as someone can become so desperate that one is disposed to being respected and recognized as other than who one is or one is desirous of being recognized for what one perhaps should be ashamed of. Being comfortable with being “myself” in solitude, and in the absence of recognition, is inevitably a painful loneliness in the absence of extraordinary moral insight and strength, or religious faith. Later in Book 2 we will propose that perhaps the “glory” of which the scriptures speaks is a state of affairs where the intrinsic dignity of the original ontological status, what “the Abrahamic tradition” calls the status of being a “child of God” or “made in the image of God,” is manifest.

In the view of St. Paul a resurrection of “glorified bodies” is a state of affairs where who one is and what sort of person one is, is manifest. Ancient theologians listed as attributes of the “glorified” and resurrected body, besides clarity, “agility” and “subtility,” i.e., properties which enabled it to not be burdened by heaviness or the opacity and impenetrability of material bodies. Thus Jesus’ body goes in defiance of gravity upwards to heaven; it is able to go through locked doors; it seems to be present unpredictably in terms of effort and geography, etc. (We will return to this.) Furthermore, there is an extended metaphysical sense of the “body of Jesus.” It refers also to whomever “the Spirit of Jesus” animates. This Spirit is not completely coincident with Jesus or with the followers of Jesus.

The body of Jesus also refers to all persons but especially those who need our compassion and love. Jesus’ bodily presence is such that it does not stand in competition with the bodily presence of those whom his Spirit animates, whether among the most vulnerable or not. This understanding of the body of Jesus of which each is a member transforms the understanding of one’s own body.

In spite of the strangeness of the narrative of the “post-Resurrection” appearances and the complex metaphysics of “the body of Christ” (in feeding the hungry one feeds not only the hungry but also Jesus) scripture does not easily support the view that the resurrected body involves a telepathic presence, which is Price’s view. Price believes that Paul’s emphasis on the merely visual character of the resurrection appearances stands in tension with the Gospels where Jesus is handled, touched, etc. In this last case the handling and touching, Price suggests, was possible only to “loving hands,” i.e., it was a matter of a tactile sensation stem-
ming from a loving projection. Price believes that the testimony at Emmaus in Luke 24:13–35 is the most credible for “the psychic researcher” because the phenomena are purely visual and auditory; nothing is said about whether Jesus is able to be touched. Thus, Price observes, we may take here the breaking of the bread for a mere apparition.

Price’s exegesis of these difficult texts is guided by the belief that dualist-spiritualist principles best makes sense out of these obscure texts. Clearly the New Testament account is of an anomalous bodily appearance that is both material (grasped, touched, handled, seen and heard) and oddly material or “immaterial” in that it is not always easily recognizable (e.g., by the male disciples on the way to Emmaus and Mary Magdalene who takes Jesus for a gardener). Here we may suppose that either Jesus’s appearances were not through the medium of a “glorified body” or that the transfiguration and transparency are evident only to a glorified body, of which the disciples were not in possession. But still the body’s properties are different because Jesus can appear in a room in spite of the doors being locked shut. Often Price’s interpretation seems a willful one driven by his spiritualist hypothesis. It rides roughshod over the very realist and physical, albeit unclear, descriptions of the Gospels. Of course, given the perennially scandalous nature (acknowledged by St. Paul and other early Christians) of this belief and these texts, Price may be appreciated as attempting to salvage a central doctrine of the tradition that for most moderns is disdained.

As we have suggested, the phenomenological sense of lived body, whatever its connection to the physical body-thing, is a constant in representations of the identity of the person in life and in the afterlife. It would seem a reasonable assumption to hold that a eutopian, “glorified” body would enhance the I-can, especially in terms of one’s self-revelation and self-actualization within a community. Representations of “glorified” or “astral” bodies find adumbrations in anomalous experiences of the body that we find in mystical, parapsychological, and religious literature, as well as anomalies in everyday life. Thus, e.g., we may recall familiar narratives of extraordinarily insightful empathy where one believes oneself understood better by this stranger than by one’s closest associates. We find also instances of super-human strength and endurance, telepathy, telekinesis, levitation. All these suggest bodily capacities far exceeding the normal. Yet these remarkable events are not absolutely heterogeneous to those with which we are familiar, even if they be rare.

We may think of acts of heroism where someone faces incredible odds or menacing opposition and yet has a presence of mind and resolve which accomplish precisely what almost anyone would have wanted, but would have failed to have accomplished because of a failure of nerve, cowardice, ineptness, murkiness of thought, etc. We may think also of the unique experiences of artists and writers (or speakers) who feel inspired in the sense that not only do they find themselves in the grips of powerful, insightful, clearly evident, and enthralling intuitions of what is to be expressed or achieved, but also find incomparable facility and ease of expression, bodily agency, and, further, the materials of the medium of expression appear exquisitely appropriate and lend themselves to receiving the form of surpassing
beauty and elegance with an unparalleled effortlessness. Gamblers similarly sense
themselves to be the favored of the gods when the dice to be rolled seem subordi-
nate to their will. Likewise erotic phantasies and literature evoke the imagination
of sexual attraction, potency, energy, and ecstasy that impose themselves as discon-
tinuous with the beauty and intensity of ordinary sexuality. Finally, athletes know
unique times when they are “hot,” “on their game,” “in a zone,” “on a run,” where
all the difficult goals of the athlete are achieved with miraculous simplicity, iner-
ancy, and effortlessness. In all these cases there is a remarkable coincidence of
enhanced cognitive-perceptual powers (e.g., the baseball appears as big as a melon,
the basketball rim as wide as a well) as well as a radically transformed sense of
one’s lived bodily I-can.64 If this paranormal enhanced perception and body became
the norm we may assume that one’s personality, if not one’s person, would undergo
significant changes.

Finally, we may think of the greatest transformative power that believers
believe pervades the resurrected person and that is already familiar to most of us,
and yet typically it is marginalized because it is appears both as too easy and too
difficult, too tied to sentimental feeling and not feeling enough because it transc-
scends desire, too removed from the everyday and yet exceedingly quotidian, i.e.,
love. Love melts away much of that which appeared, prior to love, to be “neces-
sary” and “impossible” in moral or personal identity contexts. The changes that
before were intolerable and unacceptable are subsequently embraced by love with
fiery enthusiasm. It has the power to transform not only the world of the lovers but
those whom love targets perhaps beyond recognition. Love enables an integration
of the loving person, a facing of one’s self-deceptions, a readiness to forgive one-
self and others, a resolve to begin anew. It is the most stubborn miracle we know
and it throws a wrench into our free imaginative variation of the necessities and
possibilities of personhood because it pushes back the parameters of what is nec-
nessary and what is possible. In this regard we may think of what for the writer
Luke of The Acts of the Apostles was the central miracle of Pentecost (Chapters
2–5), the love-communism of the early church. (We will return to some of these
themes in Book 2.)

The life of the glorified body, as a heavenly body, is at the least a bodily life in
which gravity and its absence is extended metaphorically to the moral-spiritual life,
so that one may say that “the gravity of spirit enables us to fall upwards,” and
“grace is a climbing notion.”65 The realm of the heavenly or grace is one which is
essentially out of reach of the mortals, i.e., it is the realm of the endlessly remote
and inaccessible for the earthbound. Earthbound mortals are weighed down by the
heaviness and burdens of earthly life, but when “resurrected” or made heavenly,
they find that what before was essentially out of reach is placed within reach and
made accessible as an abiding ontological possibility.66 Whether this means an
essentially different lived spatiality and temporality which might be shown to have
metaphysical moorings, as Hedwig Conrad-Martius proposes, is a good question
which we will not pursue here. Surely there are forms of temporality and spatiality
that move us in a “hellish” as well as a “heavenly” direction. There is the time of
boredom and pain which seems to move so slowly that one seems even to be pulled
into the past as if one no longer had a future with novelty, and as if every moment is the same or a reversion to the past. These times where the flow comes to stand still may be contrasted with times which pass by so fast that it seems there was no passage at all, and in its extreme form it appears as if there were an endlessly rich non-flowing standing Now where all the moments of one’s life are gathered together and one seems to be beyond the passage of time. In the one case what we desire seems necessarily inaccessible and endlessly removed; in the other there is a fullness and accessibility to what the heart desires, and yet there is always an outstanding promise of an ever more blessed future and never the absolute wall of “and no more.” These two extremes of our axiological experience of time perhaps point to possible worst- and best-case scenarios. Perhaps in both cases, the decisive differences can be accounted for in terms of the presence or absence of love.

I Conclusion

All the considerations in this section point to the difficulties of thinking about the sufficient conditions for the maintenance of “personal identity” in an afterlife. I do not think it is possible to come up with “criteria of sufficient conditions” that would allow the person, e.g., Peter, to be recognizably the same to Others in an afterlife. But, on the other hand, the first-person experience of merely the “myself” of Peter would no more suffice for Peter to experience his personal immortality than it would for the amnesiac. Further, it is obvious that the work of the imagination does not seem to have the power of the revelation that the harsh truth emergent from a real transplantation to the foreign environment has. Clearly none of the imaginative experiments we have undertaken bring any conclusive well-defined results. And they all point to a typical shortfall in our efforts to know in any criterial way what is involved in being and remaining the person we are. And yet we come upon palpable limits, parameters, and conditions that frame us for ourselves and serve as the framework for identifying those we know. The extent to which these parameters can be stretched is obscure even if it is clear that they may not be obliterated.

If, as some religious traditions maintain, the afterlife will be different primarily because it will have conditions that only a “spiritual person” can tolerate or enjoy, then the imaginative variation of the parameters of one’s person may be a dead-end investigation to the extent that it prescinds from the “spiritual person.” Our brief observations on love gave some support for this view. Yet the “spiritual person” is usually held to enjoy a kind of continuity with the historical person and love’s “miracle” is always within identifiable personal parameters. This view further seems to posit that a profound moral conversion is the true condition for the next life. And if the properly moral self has as much to do with who we are and not only with what properties we have or what kind of person we are, and presupposing that who we are as this person is not utterly bereft of signature identifying traits, we may assume important continuity in terms of necessities and possibilities in the person
apart from those she acquires in becoming a “spiritual person.” The nature of the moral person and its relation to ipseity, the “myself,” and the person is a basic theme in Book 2.

§7 Aristotelianism, Resurrection, and Reincarnation: The Problem of Being a Stranger to Oneself in a Strange Land

We may distinguish between personal immortality whereby the person is alleged to have an afterlife as the same person in similar or radically transformed surroundings and personal conditions, e.g., in a “glorified body,” from reincarnation, whereby the person, or mind, or soul or “myself” is alleged to indwell or animate different human bodies. And we may distinguish these from metempsychosis or metamorphosis where the person, or mind, or soul, or “myself” animates or indwells different bodies including non-human or super-human ones. It is our view that none of these versions of an afterlife may dispense with a sameness of the “myself.” However, in so far as there is accepted a strong connection between the person, her body, and the life-world, there seems to be a great difficulty in thinking of persons as able to participate in reincarnation or metempsychosis. Such transformations would typically seem to require a change of, not merely in the person. A strong case for the possibility of either reincarnation or metempsychosis need not demonstrate its reality; but it does have the bonus of making stronger cases for most theories of the afterlife. If reincarnation and metempsychosis are possible, then a fortiori are forms of immortality and resurrection possible in so far as these too require conceiving how someone can continue to be the same in radically different settings, e.g., different bodies, life-worlds, spaces, and times. Of course, in the cases of personal immortality and resurrection we have strong instances of personal survival, whereas in reincarnation and metempsychosis we have merely the continuation of the “myself.”

Further, if it is conceded that some sense of “myself” might survive radical shifts in world contexts where the person might not survive, there still might be reason to posit a continuity of the person as well as the body if it is also posited that the body’s publicity is the only way to secure the continuity of a post-mortem community: We know one another through our bodily presentations. In this sense a reason for “myself” being incarnate in the after-world would be the necessity of a communitarian life wherein there was recognition and communication. This would not be the traditional Aristotelian position which has a different reason for positing the necessity of the body in the afterlife. For the Aristotelian the soul is incomplete without the body because the soul is precisely the principle of animation, actuation, and organization of the materiality that we call the body.

One might make the case that Aristotle’s view of the relation of soul to body is the most phenomenologically acceptable because of the ineluctable experience of the lived body in the first-, second- and third-person. However, Aristotle’s own category of the soul, as the form and entelechy of the material it organizes,
generally is an articulation in the third-person focusing on phenomena that are biological and ontological. For the most part, and there are significant exceptions, in Aristotle’s account, the soul’s functioning is not arrived at through a description from first-person experiences. As the organizing principle of the material at hand, soul is a non-physical principle part, because it is the form of the whole living thing that we make present before us, and it cannot be thought of apart from the material. And similarly the material, the animated organized body, cannot be thought of apart from the particular soul’s actualizing achievement. Thus, in Husserlian terms, the soul and body are parts which are moments rather than pieces. This being the case, we best think of the soul-principle not as a substantive or noun as if it were an existing independent entity, but rather as a verbal noun, as animation.

Aristotle understands the theory of metempsychosis (meta-em-psychosis) as one which posits the possibility of the soul’s residing in different bodies, including non-human ones. For Aristotle, the reincarnationists and metempsychosists, like Pythagoras, erred in thinking they could explain what the nature of the soul is without attending to the details of the body that “receives” the soul, as if it were possible for any soul to find its way into any body whatsoever, as if the connection of this body and this soul were extrinsic and adventitious. “Sub-lunar” souls, i.e., the ones we are familiar with on earth, must be distinguished from bodies but they are not subsisting entities; they are rather principles by which particular subsisting entities exist. Here is an important but difficult sentence that summarizes his position. “Such a theory [i.e., such as reincarnation] is like suggesting that carpentry can find its way into flutes; each must employ its own tools, and each soul its own body.”

In spite of the ambiguity of the simile, Aristotle’s basic point is perhaps this: The body bears the impress of the soul and expresses the soul as much as the instruments bear the impress of the artisans or artists; and these instruments reveal by their nature the skill required to employ them, just as the bodies reveal the kind of soul that animates them. The hammer and saw reflect carpentry, they do not suggest the skills of the flautist. Flutes bespeak skills of the flautist, not that of the carpenter. The flute is an unsuitable instrument for the carpenter as is the hammer for the flautist. The complex, highly articulated skill or habituality, whether theoretical or practical, is not simply something hovering above bodies but indwells a particular body. The particular soul, as the form of the forms of the skills and habitualities, intricately informs the body, and not just any body can support such a soul and not any particular soul can “reside” or inform just any particular body.

But the analogy of the skill/instrument and soul/body poses a question of how the soul gets informed or individuated so that it can inform or individuate the body. It appears to be self-informing, self-individuating through its informing and individuating its body. The questions of whether and how the body in any way informs or individuates the soul here in this passage is not addressed nor is the possibility of the compatibility of certain types of souls to certain types of bodies. We may assume that a slug’s brain is not suited to what the polyglot or formal logician
requires. We further are led to believe that for Aristotle, the body of the individual, Einstein, especially Einstein’s brain, is not incidental to Einstein’s soul, i.e., his mind, its powers, and its achievements. But is it really inconceivable that the soul be apart from the body and the body from the soul just as parts which are moments cannot be separated from one another? Is it inconceivable that they be not separable as parts that are pieces? Must the Aristotelian absolutely deny the possibility of entertaining that Einstein’s soul could be more at home in Mozart’s body than in that of someone like Forest Gump, or that Michael Jordan’s soul would not be at home in Mozart’s body? This much is clear: For Aristotle one cannot simply plunk down a soul with its richly complicated habitualities, cultivated through its expressing itself in this body and shaping itself through this body, into another contemporary body to which these cultivated habitualities are foreign; nor is the body indifferent to just any kind of animation, as if the body were “at home” with any kind of soul.

A feeble analogy perhaps is when an older retired professional who has not practiced her trade or skill returns to it and challenges his body’s memory after a long pause. Consider, e.g., the rude awakening for an old retired athlete who enters a game with younger players and tries to make the same moves she did in her youth. Whereas it appears to her, on the one hand, that she has a different, strange, i.e., old, unresponsive body, the other players, on the other hand, appear to have, as it were, her youthful body because this youthful body is what she remembers through her body the last time she was in this similar context. Therefore the temptation is great for the body to “automatically” move as it would have thirty years ago.

The considerations that bodies are not interchangeable with other persons’ souls and that souls are at least as specific as skills, draw near to, but do not equate, with thinking of souls as individual persons with their own histories, plans, and projects. First-person experience of ourselves in the formation of our historical personalities is typically a lived-bodily affair. (Moments when one is rapt in contemplation or enthralled with a subject matter would seem to be exceptions.) One’s agency, whether it be in a cognitive or practical sphere, is always a lived-bodily experience and the body’s participation in one’s “capacity” or “I can” has a dynamic sense, changing in accord with the aspects of life that further growth or decline. The writer, dancer, potter, weight-lifter, and visual artist all experience senses of capacity that are intimately tied to the patterned transformations of their own lived body according to repetition, growth, decline, weariness, rest, health, sickness, etc.

Aristotle’s point is dramatically made in his example of the possibility of the reincarnation of human souls into a frog bodies. The frog’s body reveals a soul-life where leaping, swimming, and catching insects with its tongue are at the center. Whereas the design of the human body manifests some possible proficiency at swimming and leaping and catching insects with its mouth, its body is clearly more geared to other activities. And although the upright posture, the prehensile hands and opposing fingers, the arrangement of the teeth in terms, e.g., of canines, incisors, bicuspids, etc., suggest contours of its life-world and mode of life, it is only the recessive, i.e., neither lived nor evident in the first-person, organs, especially the brain, that might hint, given familiarity of course with the wider historical
setting, that the human, among all the animals, is geared most properly to technology, politics, theory, and perhaps fellowship and worship, and not merely to predation, food-gathering, and procreation.

Aristotle has no doctrine of the unique ipseity of souls. (In spite of some indications in Aristotle to which we already called attention, we must wait until Plotinus opens this path; see our discussion in Book 2, Chapter VI.) Human individuals for Aristotle are instantiations of the essential form (of “humanness”). This is specifically the intellectual form and as such soul or entelechy of the human being. The individuation of humans comes not from the soul which is a universal form capable of participation, but from, first of all, the contingent and accidental elementary stuff organized by soul. Over and above this, humans would be distinguished by reason of the characteristics, the habitualities, they acquire in the course of their living. They are individuals by reason of the contingent given matter at birth and the “second nature” of habitualities. There does not seem to be any necessary principle that a priori excludes humans from being the same in regard to these. Thus Aristotle cannot envisage the reincarnation of individual souls, i.e., of souls which are individuated by virtue of the qualities they have acquired by living out their embodied lives. That is, he cannot envisage the reincarnation of what we are calling “persons.” He appears to leave the door open to “ontological clones” but a clone is not a reincarnated person.

If the individuality of souls is that of persons and therefore is inseparable from their organized bodies, then the unique excellences distinguishing such persons—the uniqueness would not be something transcendent to or incommensurate with these qualities—are inseparable from their embodiment. Being a unique human is not merely a spiritual or “psychic” event; indeed, there are no such events. All human agency and processes are at once and inseparably the work of soul and its dependency on and organization of what it is besouling, i.e., the material substrate.

In contrast, as we have seen (in Chapter III), the Aristotelian, Thomas Aquinas, thinks of the “soul’s knowing itself” in first-person terms. Similarly when arguing for the individual “intellectual soul” (in contrast to the theory of a universal agent intellect) to be the form of the body he will occasionally claim that this is the only way to establish the cognition is the action of a particular human being. And he offers first-person evidence: “For each one of us experiences that it is oneself who intellectually cognizes.” Further St. Thomas was moved, in his reflections on the resurrection of the body to make a distinction between what “I” refers to and the soul. “My soul is not I myself.” (Anima mea non est ego.) If only souls are saved I am not saved. Peter Geach elaborates on this: If only the soul survives I do not survive but only a mental remnant, however immaterial or spiritual it may be. Indeed it is harder to believe in this kind of immortality of the disembodied human soul than in the resurrection of the person as embodied. The soul is not anything individual unless united with one human body. Immortality of the soul means continuing to exist forever without its capacity to be united to a body, and therefore to exist with its capacity to be an individual unrealized.

If what “I” refers to is properly, if not exclusively, the whole person, e.g., JG Hart, who of necessity is embodied, then I have not survived unless I have a body...
subsequent to my survival or salvation. A fortiori I have not survived if only my body is saved. But have I survived if my soul and body are rejoined but the “myself” is not included?

For this work, and I think it is the position of Husserl, it is conceptually-eidetically impossible that I survive if my soul and body are rejoined but the “myself” is missing. The insertion of “myself” here may seem unimportant because, it may be alleged, with soul and body we have all that I am. But consider that in Aristotelianism, it is conceptually possible for the soul to survive but not “myself” (which we are calling one’s individual essence). It is taken for granted often that the rational soul conjoined to the body is the equivalent of what “I” refers to even though the rational soul is a communicable, participatable form. If this is so, then any individuality is derived not from the form but from the accidents of time, space, and the materiality or the body. For the Aristotelian, “I” can be substituted for with “human intellectual form plus this body.” Furthermore, we know that for Aristotle the immortal agent intellect (of De Anima III, 5) was, in all likelihood, not necessarily “I myself.” Indeed, neither the I nor the person received any explicit treatment. Therefore at least for Aristotle, the soul as rational principle or form was conceivable bereft of the I.

For some, among whom are some philosophers inspired by Aristotle, it is all the same whether we speak of “the same mind” or “the same person.” If we mean by “mind” merely intellect or reason, and we stipulate that it has no connection or necessary relation with what “I” refers to because “I” refers to the person or body, then it seems odd to maintain that reincarnation is the same mind animating successively different bodies, precisely because we have no clue as to what it is that makes this mind the unique one that persists as the same. The oddness stems from the impersonal or transpersonal nature of mind. A transpersonal mind would inform as a form any incarnation or reincarnation, but it would not be a repetition or renascence of an individual.

In contrast to this view which substitutes mind for person, Husserl holds all properly rational or intellectual acts are I acts, acts where I am in play and where I surface from out of the state of being a passive dative of manifestation and witness to the passive synthetic streaming of my life, i.e., the realm of soul. (See Chapter III, §3.) An agent intellect without an I is an Unding. The agent of manifestation is always a responsible “I.” For Husserl, reason is essentially conjoined to, if not identified with, I-acts. Of course, in the state of absorption in intellectual contemplation the I is not a theme but rather anonymous and in this sense capable of being labeled “impersonal,” even though each act, e.g., distinction, is an I-act, an act achieved by this I.

If this is true, then what is to be made of the claim that there are soul-less, I-less, disembodied thoughts and thoughtless thinking machines? Thinking as the work of calculating and logic machines would be unthoughtful and for no one in the absence of consciousness witnessing their work and in the absence of the consciousness of the maker of the machine. What would the quantifiers and implications be or what would they signify as the staggered motions of marks by reason of staggered electronic impulses, i.e., in the absence of consciousness? An automated
computation of the “truth tables,” just like a student parroting the formalities of syllogisms, would not be truthful disclosures of being by a truth-telling agent of manifestation. Similarly a roulette wheel, which strangely began to spin out numbers 1 to 26 that could be decoded as intelligible English sentences, could be called a form of thinking that was not based in an organism. But even if these were perfectly formed declarative sentences, and even if they happened to be revelatory of the world, one might still ask whether this roulette wheel would be really achieving declarative sentences that reveal the world. However, if the roulette wheel’s deliveries proved itself to be a source of revelation of important truths, i.e., that it really was displaying the world in a significant way, and further, that it indeed passed some sort of “Turing test” (which would satisfy in some measure us that it could think and take responsibility for its claims) would one not want to assign self-consciousness and I-acts to it, whether or not it was organically based? Would we not want to say something like: This is not a mere “roulette wheel” but rather an intelligent responsible consciousness manifesting itself through the roulette wheel, even though it is unintelligible to us how this is possible, given what we know of psychophysics?

Logical machines as such would not be thinking if thinking requires I-acts and the self-awareness of a thinker, which is quite different from a reflective knowing that she is thinking. Machines do not “mean” or “intend” or “enjoy meaning” and “have evidence.” The machines would not be thinking if thinking necessarily is by someone who is responsible for the various forms of intending, such as distinguishing, inferring, analogizing, and judging. Because there is an ethical aspect of the I-acts in thinking’s truthfulness, consistency, honesty, and carefulness, the performance of a calculating machine would perhaps, if it were properly programmed, entice the observer to attribute such virtues even though this would be a mistake.

Along this line of soulless thinking machines, what are we to think of a form of “personal immortality” through the aid of a science-fictional computer program? Such an advanced computer scientific engineering would not only be able to capture all of a person’s signature intellectual habits and styles of thinking, acting, emoting, i.e., all the features of the character and personality – but further, it would be able to do this in such a way that one’s personality would be enjoyed by others for ever. Thus, in regard to appearances, the presence of the historical JG Hart and the presence of computer program, as configured or embodied in the appropriate organic substrate, would be indistinguishable. (Such an assumption seems part of the hidden background of the teletransportation thought-experiments to which we have often alluded; see especially, Book 1, Chapters III and V.) But furthermore, consider that the computer program of the personality of JG Hart would be able to govern and hold sway over a “thinking-perceiving” organic-based computer that acted in the world “for all practical purposes” just like JG Hart used to when he was alive. Because JG Hart’s unique personality and signature properties would be implanted as the executive function into the organic-based computer, would not he himself, JG Hart, be implanted? And if the so-constructed computer were mass-produced would not I, JG Hart, have immortality in spades?
For reasons given throughout this book we would have to say that if JG Hart is understood as an ideal entity capable of being replicated and communicated, then the answer is Yes. The answer is No if I myself am not conceivably all of the JG Harts so reproduced. In the third-, and perhaps second-person, it may appear as if I were duplicated and immortalized in the organically based computer program called JG Hart. But we here have the obstacles of the earlier discussed problem of whether computer events are I-acts. And we have the more fundamental issue of whether the traits of JG Hart actually coincide or are identical with “I myself.” In both matters we think the answer is No.

Let us return to more traditional questions connected with Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle’s view of individuation through the materiality of the body has penetrated the modern philosophers of religion, Maurice Blondel and Louis Lavelle. Blondel follows Aristotle and Thomas and argues for an inseparable connection between the self’s individuality and embodiment and further holds that unless the person were embodied, unique self-consciousness would be obliterated in the post-mortem vision of God. Without the conditioning principle of materiality there is no distinct spiritual being. Being forced to remain embodied keeps the blessed person’s individuality from being melted away.

Further, Blondel holds a reflexive theory of self-awareness,76 and this works its way into his thinking about the afterlife and individuation by the body and helps him to elaborate on the necessity of the body for the person in the presence of God. He offers an image to help clarify what is at stake. After death, the soul’s relation to the body is as the silvering of a mirror. As the latter enables what appears to appear as a reflected Other, so the body prevents the evanescence of a consciousness in the beatific presence of God from losing itself in the divine infinity and thus becoming without form and charm; the relation to the body is what saves our personal consciousness from an obliteration of self-awareness or a state of total unconsciousness and therefore keeps our individuality from evaporating into the indefinite.77 Seemingly for Blondel, and in contrast to the major thesis of this work, we would have no sense whatsoever of our individual uniqueness apart from our reflective knowledge of our selves as embodied. Here we see how the phenomenology of self-consciousness and its “ownness” works its way into major speculative theological matters. In the final chapter of Book 2 we will address some of these theological matters.

Louis Lavelle also argues for embodiment as a condition for the individual soul’s existence after death. Embodiment and consciousness are understood primarily from a first-person perspective. Yet Lavelle, who also succumbs to the reflection theory of self-awareness, holds that individuality is only realized by the external limits that limit the self. We become individuals by becoming objects for ourselves by way of exercising our freedom. Yet Lavelle speaks of this exercise of our freedom as a priori what I myself do. That is, he seems to assume that the I myself of necessity is already individualized in a non-embodied, and non-personal sense.78 Therefore in spite of Lavelle’s explicit doctrine, the individuality achieved in exercising our freedom against what limits the self assumes a more basic sense of individual, i.e., it assumes I myself being free and in this freedom further individuating myself as a person.
We agree with Lavelle and Blondel that no personal individuality is conceivable without one’s immersion in an intersubjective world by which we become objectively present to ourselves. But that does not touch the most basic issue of the individuality of “myself” and how this is tied to the intersubjective appearance in the afterlife.

Georg Simmel offers a quasi-Aristotelian theory of metempsychosis.79 He appreciates Aristotle’s thesis of the human individual being a whole whose component parts are soul and body and that the latter bears thoroughly the impress of the former. At the same time, Simmel holds that there is a sense of “myself” that is not absolutely coincident with my individual human being, my body, and my world. This latter position, one which we have urged throughout this book, leads him to entertain a theory of reincarnation.

For Simmel, reincarnation has ethical merits over a doctrine of purgatory which, in some of its more simple presentations, makes the soul (or I) passive to the purgative “fires.” In contrast, reincarnation is a cleansing that involves the cooperative freedom of the individual I.80 (The film, Groundhog Day, starring Bill Murray, nicely brings this out, even though we do not here have properly reincarnation in another body but a repeated return to the same day in one’s own body and person.) Simmel believes that we may think of the I as a unique form (cf. eidos) that has a kind of persistence that would be the same throughout the incarnations. This form bestows on a human life a unique “individual law” that may be compared analogously with how the distinctive voice of someone is manifest in a way that that does not change regardless of how the contexts or the words change. This law a priori persists throughout all of the life’s experiences and outlives perhaps each individual life. It is evident in both one’s own self-experience as well as in Others’ experience of oneself and in one’s experience of Others, i.e., it is evident in the first-person as well as second- and third-person.

To appreciate this possibility of metempsychosis it is useful to think of how the entirety of our individual lives requires a kind transmigration or “soul travel” in miniature. First we may think of how life is filled with not only contradictions but massive irrelevances and indifferent matters, i.e., ones removed from the core focus of one’s own life, which one holds together within “one’s” life only by a merely numerical identity of their being in some very weak sense “one’s experiences” or “mine.” They, because so seemingly peripheral to one’s own, might well be at the core of someone else’s life, and in this sense one is possibly living (also) someone else’s life or one’s life is numerically the same as someone else’s. Thus in my life there are numerous marginal pre-thematic experiences or merely instrumental experiences, e.g., conversations I have vaguely overheard, the stairs I have walked on, the doorknobs and devices I have used, the meeting of bodily functions in my everyday life, the noise of the refrigerator, etc. Yet, even though they could very well be someone else’s experiences, they are “mine.” Many of these experiences approach the status of my night-time or sleep-time: They simply are not what I have in mind when I speak of “my life” as the life of JG Hart. Indeed, there are long stretches and aspects of my life that I need not have lived or they could just as well have been lived by someone else and this absence or substitution would not make
any difference in how I perceive what is properly my life. In this respect my journey
involves going through experiences that could just have well been part of someone
else’s life – even though they in fact were mine.

Next we may think of the sharp contrast within one’s life of oneself as an infant,
of oneself in puberty, of oneself at the height of one’s powers, of oneself when
severely ill or “out of one’s mind” with rage, oneself as an old person beset with
various forms of frailty, dementia, and an increasing number of moments where
one is collapsed into one’s declining body. Likewise, it is commonplace to view old
films and photos, read one’s old letters or essays, or hear recordings or see videos
of oneself and wonder, at least for a moment, whether that one is really I myself.
Similarly we have the massive changes in life brought about by traumas or conver-
sions or major decisions where the directions and surroundings of our lives undergo
enormous changes and where the earlier times of our lives seem like “earlier lives,”
because they seem remote and unreal and almost as if they were lived by someone
else. Of course, this journey through the phases of the life is not really a form of
“soul-travel”; yet there is clearly often such a pronounced difference in the phases
that the estrangement of me from my life is poignant.

In many respects contemporary culture facilitates the dissociation from the past.
In some cases it is personal inauthenticity and ungraciousness toward the past that
play a role in the dissociation. “Persons of character,” i.e., those with a strong sense
of fidelity to their position-takings, friends, and traditions, might well struggle
against what is so easy for many of their contemporaries. Nevertheless, the exam-
pies provide a sense of how within one’s own life there are analogies, if not adum-
brations, of what “transmigration” might mean, i.e., what it might mean for
someone to live a life subsequent to the present one.

Simmel gives a thin but suggestive sketch of the ways the “individual law” of
the unique person might manifest itself in different personal lives and incarnations,
where there would be different personal lives but where nevertheless the “individ-
ual” would still have a personal incarnation with the same unique signature.
Seemingly this would be recognizable more clearly in the first-person but would be
also faintly evident in the second- or third-person. In doing this, he does not focus
on what we did earlier in this chapter, i.e., on the body, the intelligence, the moral
self, and the social world. Rather he focuses on the deep-stratum traits of the person
or personality. Thus one might think of the various core elements that comprise the
person, e.g., propensities to contemplate or to create, to be theoretical or practical,
to be analytic or intuitive or synthetic. Then we might think of which of these ele-
ments might assume dominance. Then we might imagine with what tempo the
dominance changes; whether the other elements of the soul are flattened out by this
dominance or whether a complex harmony develops, or whether there is increasing
unification, or whether there is increasing differentiation, or whether the develop-
ment is determined by the antagonism of the elements; how the rhythm of the con-
centration and emptiness in the flow of contexts alternates; to what degree each
element is, as it were, determined by the values surrounding it.

The I-form here is the unique Gestalt of these elements, the unique style, the “indi-
vidual law.” These sketched elements are not definitions or necessary properties of a
person but rather a sketch of possible formal relations among the elements of an I-form and how the individual law expresses the I-form and guides the way the elements take shape. The I-form is the source of the distinctive personal and bodily signature which itself is amenable to a kind of formula or formalization. (Cf. our earlier discussion of a software program of the person, JG Hart.)

Perhaps good novelists work with a theory somewhat resembling Simmel’s. But often they are more concerned to get at what we, following Husserl, will call the moral self. John Irving has said: “It seems the best way to understand someone is to recognize how they recover, or can’t recover, from what’s hurt them.” He went on to say that this is “one of the measures of someone’s character, that’s where sympathy for people often comes from.” What is clear here is that what we typically call understanding someone is understanding properties in unique constellations and patterns. It also suggests a hierarchy of virtues in so far as the saving strength is something like the cardinal virtue of courage. It is that around which a life hinges and which determines whether or not the person recovers from fate’s blows.

Is this grasping the “ipseity” of the person? Yes, in the sense of the personal moral essence. But does personal moral essence exhaust the sense of the person? No, if, e.g., courage has numerous exemplifications. Yes, if the courage of necessity is manifest as uniquely bound to this person. (This will occupy us in Book 2.) Furthermore, cannot such a person surprise us and, in spite of predictable behavior, recover from what has hurt her? This was always Luther’s question to the Aristotelian Scholastics’ emphasis on character. We have been arguing that the person ultimately is not a “what” and is more than even the most distinctive moral properties. John Irving’s insight into character may indeed point to what is more than character, for what holds our interest is precisely whether the agent’s character is indeed his or her destiny, or whether there is something transcendent to this determination that will come into play. The sympathy Irving mentions that we have for the character is precisely our sense that he or she has the character and is being called upon to deal with it. Although character is a “second nature,” it still does not render freedom and the unique “myself” superfluous; character does not exhaust what we refer to with “I” or “you” or “he” or “she.” And perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this is that we cannot say what it is that is not captured.

In any case, recognizing how people recover or can’t recover from what has hurt them can very well capture this personal moral essence; but this sense of essence would seem to be in practice capable of duplication and therefore be inadequate for “knowing someone” as a unique essence even though it might well be a necessary and sufficient condition for a restricted, albeit important, sense of “understanding someone.” Again, merely knowing the character, if this means grasping the core virtues and vices, does not put us in a position to say what “knowing” this person entails. Compare our discussions earlier of ipseity in Chapters III–V.

It is clear that the views of Simmel move in the Aristotelian direction. But Simmel focuses more than does Aristotle on the soul’s uniqueness. He does this by emphasizing the unique way ipseity, as the unique “myself,” is incarnate. But in Simmel too we have to do here with alleged properties of “myself” that, in principle, could find clones when appropriately duplicated. We, following Klawonn and
§8 The “Myself,” Memory and the Afterlife

A Critical Passage of Husserl

Husserl, at least on one occasion, seemed to reject the possibility of reincarnation. His meditation takes this form: If such possible personal incarnations were to happen, they would happen for me, who phantasizes such a life for myself. How could I, leaping out of the generational unity with humanity, be born in a situation where this unity and connectedness with my humanity would be absolutely forgotten? How could I now, having become a new human, remember myself as another human, finding thereby access to another I-existence and I-life? Husserl observes that this case of reincarnation would have to be distinguished from the psychiatric phenomenon of “depersonalization,” i.e., the case where someone suffers a change in his character and loses the personal memories of his childhood, career, etc., and so becomes a different human person in this world. Reincarnation is a case of someone who changes altogether the habituality of personhood in such a way that he no longer experiences himself as a human of this same world, is no longer therefore this same person as strongly correlated with his personal world, but rather finds “himself,” in a completely different world. In the case of “depersonalization” there is massive continuity in terms of the bodily experiences, the milieu, certain childhood experiences, etc., even though some layers of experience have suffered a rupture and dissociation. In the case of reincarnation there is no such a continuity, and yet it is argued that it makes sense to say that “I” have become so and so!

Husserl is clearly skeptical about this and concludes this particular discussion by reminding us that the possibilities we are entertaining belong to the transcendental subjectivity that I am “in the usual sense” and that the phenomenological reduction gives us no other transcendental subjectivity than our own, and first of all mine as it is evident in the living present, and then that of others that are constituted for me.

Yet that is precisely the issue, i.e., I myself qua living present am bereft of, i.e., abstracted from, any such personal incarnation. He continues: “The primal
source of the ‘intuition’ for all possibilities of a transcendental subject are always to be found in me myself, in the declensions of my own interiority. Possibilities, through declensions, can be brought forth also in higher-level ‘intuition’ as limit-cases. Here for Husserl, the declensions of one’s own interiority are restricted to oneself as the person one has constituted oneself to be. But, we may ask, what is this ownness, mineness, as it is evident in the living-I-pole of the living present, which comes to light in the reduction as bereft of personal properties and whose content is only one’s unique uniqueness, i.e., which is at once a pure form of I-ness and at the same time uniquely “I myself” that serves as the basis for the imagined variations? Have we not repeatedly seen that this, although identifiably the same in transcendental reflection, is not identical with the incarnate person in his or her personal world? Have we not seen that for Husserl I must distinguish imagining my self “othered” or radically altered, and imagining that I am an other than I myself. But what is in question is the I, that Husserl himself has teased out on other occasions, which is uniquely unique, i.e., the sense in which “I myself” knows no plural. (See our earlier discussions in Chapters III–IV.)

We are familiar with Erich Klawonn’s thought experiments, e.g., of “teletransportation,” that lead to a view of “incarnational contingency,” i.e., I can be me myself without being identical with the person I am, JG Hart. If I need not be JG Hart and can still be “myself” it is contingent that I be JG Hart or any particular personal being or personal I. This means, as we have said, I can be “myself” apart from any individuating personal properties. The “myself,” in this sense, is bereft of content. My non-reflective sense of myself does not identify me with anything in the world. Does this mean that I could be attached to whatever objective complex of properties and succession of objective features or properties? Could I be me without being human? Could I just as well be a frog or a plant?

This goes back to our earlier wrestle with the propertylessness of “myself” in terms of the tautological properties that surface in our thinking about “myself.” We can appropriate the ancient definition of a person as an individual subsistent being in a rational nature in the following way: What “myself” refers to requires, tautologically, individuality, subsistence, and rationality (reflection, self-awareness, I acts, freedom, and openness to what is essential). There are good reasons, especially from a third-person perspective, for thinking that “myself” is not compatible with all forms of bodiliness. But the claim that a “myself” be joined with a human body or this human body seems to be not an essential and necessary claim, but an empirical one. That an existing “myself” must live and make itself present uniquely, and therefore in a particular body, is an essential claim. That it had to be present and incarnate in this way alone, e.g., humanly and in this particular body, is not evident as a matter of necessity. I myself as “myself” and not JG Hart could be me myself even if I did not share the sex, gender, kind and degree of intelligence, race, character, historical life-world, etc. of JG Hart.

The teletransportation Gedankenexperiment also established the point that I can be JG Hart/Bloominton or JG Hart/Manitoulin without adding anything to, or subtracting from, the incarnate person of either of these JG Hart’s. These incarnate persons retain all of their third-person reality, quite apart from which one
happens to be I myself. And I myself clearly am manifest as not existing necessarily with any third-personal aspects. The “tautological properties” may be considered the exception here, i.e., I myself require of necessity these “tautological properties.”

If all that really exists is what exists in the third-person sense, then I myself do not exist. Given that it is not possible for one to say truly “I do not exist,” and given that there is no display, apart from the non-reflexively self-aware transcendental I as agent of manifestation, of, e.g., “all that really exists is what exists in the third-person sense” or “I do not exist,” then I myself exist in distinction to, and with a measure of independence from, what exists in the third-person. All this is a far cry from saying that third-personal reality does not exist or that I create it by thinking about it.

B Some Problems of Memory in Regard to Personal Reincarnation

The tendency to think of “myself” exclusively as the personal I is understandably recalcitrant, and the transcendental reduction gives us a way to undermine this tendency without reducing it to something incidental to our lives. We can make this clear also by some glosses on a story made famous by Leibniz. Someone is given the opportunity to become “the King of China.” The condition is that he would forget “what he previously had been.” Therefore he would have to submit to the condition of his personal identity being annihilated and in the same moment “in his place” the King of China would be created. Leibniz claims that this person would, however, have no reason to wish for this. And, of course, this position is understandable, even if “in his place” were taken to mean, which Leibniz does not explicitly do, “in his body”: The personal I, with these traits, habitualities, position-takings, memories, etc. are all founded on the primal having and association of retention without which there is no me, no JG Hart. How could I, JG Hart, want to be the King of China, if the one becoming the King of China is not me, JG Hart?

At issue here, in part, is the question of the identity of the person and whether memories are necessary for personal identity. Often the question here involves precisely the confusion of the “myself” and the person. Accepting the necessity of memories for personal identity, and rejecting the view that memories are constitutive of a “self’s” identity need not result in denying that “the myself” exhibits a unique identity quite apart from memories. Consider that if memories are essential to personal identity, then someone would have to remember her prior existence if reincarnation of the person is to have happened. When the alleged reincarnated person has no memories of the prior existence, there seems to be no basis for the theory of reincarnation. Yet if reincarnation is not about personal identity but about the ipseity, which is not in every respect identical with the person, this argument against reincarnation is weakened. In this case, she herself would be reincarnated,
but given the loss of memory she could not recall who she was in the prior life, even though she would be aware that she was still herself.

Consider also that one might argue against memory as essential to personal identity and reincarnation in the following way. If I do not remember my prior life, then I never had it. But such a position holds that the memories create *ex nihilo* (which is quite different from “constitute” or display) the reality of the past. To remember what happened at a certain time, presupposes that it already happened before I turned my mind to it. Remembering involves that the one who did what he previously experienced himself doing, recalls what he did. “It cannot possibly be the case that the memory makes the person remembering to be the doer of the remembered deed.” Therefore the fact that one is not able to remember is not a demonstration that I did not do or live such and such. Therefore it is not of necessity false that when someone says, “I am the one who crossed the Rubicon, even if I can’t remember it.”

Much depends on what the scope of the reference of “I” here. If it refers to the person in his identity as Peter Jones, my neighbor, we have good reason to be skeptical of it and the claim could probably be refuted at least in terms of third-person forms of evidence. But if we recall that “I” is used of necessity non-ascriptively, the claim by the speaker about whom we know nothing at all, that he himself crossed the Rubicon need not be regarded as the ravings of a madman. The madness is to be found in this person, who thinks of himself as my contemporary Peter Jones, thinking that his life, as Peter Jones, is continuous or identical with the life of Julius Caesar.

Consider the case where a remarkable omniscient observer were to witness that the one we know as Peter Jones and who refers non-ascriptively to himself with “I” to have been at an earlier time Julius Caesar or with Julius Caesar at the crossing of the Rubicon. This remarkable observer then conveys to Peter Jones that he, Peter Jones, crossed the Rubicon, but now he has forgotten it. Peter Jones, like the amnesiac, could say, “I am the one who crossed the Rubicon, even if I can’t remember it.” That is, contrary to the enormous third-person common sense evidence, as the amnesiac might say, on the witness of a trusted witness, “I am president of the United States, but I don’t remember ever being such,” so Peter Jones, trusting the far more extraordinary witness of the omniscient observer of his ancient Roman adventure, might say, “I am the one who crossed the Rubicon, even if I can’t remember it.”

On the other hand, Peter Geach (some of whose thoughts have been guiding us here) argues that because of the fallibility of memory, even someone claiming to remember episodes in Julius Caesar’s life as episodes in his own “would not give us the least reason to believe that he was the same person as Julius Caesar.” The chief reason is that the truth of memories is tied to their provenance. As recollections they are re-presentations of actual experiences. Geach dismisses the consideration that we do not say “I remember” unless there is the implication that something really happened. He notes that memories are often false, e.g., by reason of suggestion. Or perhaps a mad ruthless surgeon could have implanted memories by way of some advanced technique and device.
It is time to turn to some of such recent reflections which the promise of modern technology, along with perhaps some confusion in the analysis, seems in part to motivate.

C Shoemaker and “Quasi-Memory”

Here the issue of the “previous awareness condition” is raised. When someone properly remembers truly a past event that same person must have experienced the event at the time of its occurrence. This is of the essence of the first-person experience of memory. I remember on the basis of the retention of a prior experiencing. This “previous awareness condition” is related to what Shoemaker calls the “immunity to error through misidentification.” This thesis on immunity to error holds for a certain class of memory claims and allows for the uncontroversial claim that memories may be mistaken. Consider how I might state, “I then shouted that Bush should be impeached.” Contrast this with the memory, “John shouted that Bush should be impeached.” In this second case, I might have been mistaken and really it was not John, but rather someone looking like him, whom I saw and took to be John. Here clearly my memory claim is false, but it would not be a mistake of my memory but of a mistaken perception. In the prior case this sort of mistake or misidentification is not possible. If I have an accurate memory of the past incident, it is not possible that I be mistaken in thinking that the person I remember shouting was myself – although I might be mistaken in regard to what I shouted or that I spoke loudly rather than shouted. And even in the second case of the person I took to be John, the recollection of John shouting requires the memory of the prior experience of the at least tacit prefix “(I perceive that) John is shouting” as the basis for “I remember that (I perceived that) John shouted.” Recollection is precisely the representing of “John shouting” as my prior perception. Thus in both cases of memory, even in the case of a misidentification regarding John, it is not possible that I be mistaken in thinking that the person I remember shouting or perceiving (the person shouting) was myself. Shoemaker, whom we have been roughly following here, summarized the matter so: “Where the present-tense version of a judgment is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns contained in it, this immunity is preserved in memory.” “I see John shouting” contains a reference to me myself that is immune to error through misidentification. If I claim on the basis of the memory of the event, which in the former present was reported as “I see John shouting,” and the memory is accurate, it cannot be the case that I remember someone seeing John but have been mistaken in identifying that that person to be myself. It could be that in saying “I saw John shouting,” I misidentified John, but there is no such possible misidentification with regard to “I” or “I saw.”

Thus one ought not to think of having memories as merely having mental “contents” somehow marked with “past” or “former event” to which we are privy by “representation” of them. We must distinguish in the term “memories” what is remembered and the act of remembering. The past event is always recalled as
something I formerly experienced. For this reason a memory, both as what is remembered and the act of remembering, is pervaded by ownness. It goes against the first-person sense of remembering to think of a memory (i.e., something “remembered”) as simply being implanted in or plunked into one’s stream of consciousness, so that we would experience them like ideas popping into our minds coming from nowhere and not tied to one’s prior perceptions or as if they were the content of someone else’s experiences. If memories are to happen they have to appear as recollections of my prior experiencing them. If the science-fictional mad surgeon is to implant memories they still have to appear in this way for us to call them memories. We know what it means to suggest or “implant” an idea or experience as something presently experienced, but to “implant” an experience as having been experienced earlier without its having been earlier experienced seems to me to assign this “surgeon” not merely extraordinary technological capacity but implausible metaphysical power.

There are no memories apart from prior perceptions of mine and that is why we may pause over someone saying that he remembers episodes in Julius Caesar’s life as “episodes in his own life.” How do his remembered experiences (not what it is that he experienced) become such that he regards them as his? In first-personal (philosophical-phenomenological) reflection, there is no memory for me as a past event apart from my having been on the scene as the one who experienced the past event. Memories are based on the ongoing flow of retentions and passive syntheses which are at the basis of my personal life. If there is a memory it is because what is remembered is present as something I have retained, i.e., as the prior experiencing of the event.

It is unclear to me how it would be possible that my remembering might have been somehow induced by suggestion, hypnosis, or some futuristic surgery or chemistry such that the alien remembering and the remembered event appear as integrated in the prior stream of consciousness. An imaginative speculation in regard to the “transplanted memory” would be that it appears to the person as surrounded in mist and vagueness. Memories of necessity are allocated in their temporal spot surrounded by the appropriate horizons based on the arrangements constituted by passive synthesis; sometimes there is a fuzziness and seeming dislocation because of the distance of time and forgetfulness. All of this is pervaded by ownness or mine-ness. The unscrupulous hypnotist doing the suggesting would have to appeal to something that would be the occasion for my being “reminded” of what I, in fact did not experience. The motivating factor would not be the actual associative link between the suggested something and my own prior experience (for by hypothesis there is in this case no such link), but rather something else that would enjoy kinship with my prior experience but which I could superimpose on top of this. Further the suggested something would have to be such that I would be disposed to let it be decisive in spite of there not being the intrinsic connection. This seems to be able to happen, but the reconstruction of the phenomenological account of this “memory” would always seem to have of necessity unsatisfactory puzzling features.

Of course if I am capable of completely forgetting something and if I can fail to remember it even when prompted, then it seems possible that I be “induced” to remember something which I never experienced. In which case the “memory,” like the report of something I must have experienced but have now forgotten, attaches
to my memory as part of the past, but it attaches oddly because I am not in a position to remember the prior experiencing of it. As when a parent says, “Don’t you remember what happened at your tenth birthday party?” This event reported by the parent may eventually become part of my narrative past but I, for some reason was focused on something else going on, e.g., X, while my parent was directed to something else, e.g., Y, which she assumed wrongly I also was perceiving. But her report of her memory may become appropriated by me in recalling my tenth birthday party. And after several such retellings over the course of the years I may surreptitiously incorporate her report as a memory.

Thus, if there is alleged a reincarnation of the person and no memories whatsoever, then the claim should provoke doubt, just as serious questions about the possibility of the provenance of the memory should raise doubt about this person claiming to have the experiences of Julius Caesar within his stream of consciousness. But the reincarnation of the “myself” does not require such memories. And the absolute lack of memories might well mean that I as this person have vanished, but not I myself. Sydney Shoemaker, whom we have engaged and upon whom we have depended at crucial stages of this book, affirmatively responds to the question of whether it is logically or (we would say) essentially possible that I could have knowledge of past events which I myself did not experience, knowledge that is in all important respects like knowledge we have of past events, experiences and actions in remembering them. To distinguish this possibility he coined the term of a “quasi-memory.” We may assume that memory requires a kind of correspondence or coincidence between the rememberer’s present cognitive state and a past cognitive and sensory state that was of the event. In actual first-person memory in this actual world, and not in any possible world, “this past cognitive and sensory state is always a past state of the rememberer himself.” Let us suppose that with quasi-memory there is a coincidence between the present cognitive state (act) and the past cognitive state (act) that was of the event, but that such a correspondence “does not necessarily involve that past state’s having been a state of the very same person who subsequently has the knowledge.”

In the “possible world” of quasi-remembering, (which is not what we in “our world” call remembering) there is not the easy contrast between recalling oneself do an action and watching someone else do an action. This is because our direct access to the past would dispense with the condition that one’s genuine remembering presupposes one’s having experienced the remembered at an earlier time (the “previous awareness condition”). It also would eliminate “the immunity from error through misidentification.” Because it is not properly a remembering, in this quasi-remembering “it is not true that any action one quasi-remembers from the inside [analogous to first-person access in memory in ‘this world’] is thereby an action he himself did.” This opens the door to speculations on causal connections of streams of consciousness, brain and body exchanges, fissions, implants, etc., whereby others, who exist and are “identically themselves” through quasi-remembering fuse with one another, split off into other streams of consciousness, as creeks flow into larger rivers and larger rivers flow into creeks.

In the possible world of quasi-remembering, the special access to one’s own stream of consciousness now means something much weaker than it does in “this
world.” In such a speculated allegedly possible “remembering,” “mineness” and “ownness” are eliminated as is even memory as a basis for personal identity, even though apparently the point of quasi-remembering is to make it seem as if the non-criterial and non-ascriptive self-awareness as well as the first-person reflection on one’s person were actual and valid. This being so it resembles our earlier discussion of death: As it is true that I might die without my knowing or experiencing it, so it is possible that I be a plurality or offshoot of numerous streams of consciousness, without my knowing it in the first-person. In John Perry’s dialogue on these matters, the philosopher Weirob says in this regard:

\[ ...the thought of some person at some far place and some distant time seeming to remember this conversation I am having with you would not give me the sort of comfort that the prospect of survival is supposed to provide. I would have no reason to anticipate future experiences of this person, simply because she is to seem to remember my experiences. The experiences of such a deluded imposter are not ones I can look forward to having.\]

As an antidote to this possible world quasi-memory, let us pause over Husserl’s description of what is essential to “this world” remembering. For Husserl, it is of the essence of an act of remembering (R) that it be a re-presencing not merely of a prior experienced event or object (O) but that of necessity it be a re-presencing of the lived prior act which was lived through in the prior presencing of the earlier event or object. Thus prior to memory or the act of remembering we have an act (A) of perception of an object, A→O. But because acts are always lived through in non-reflective self-aware experience we may symbolize this as E(A→O). Thus remembering is always an act encompassing a prior act; it is always is always R(A→O). But because the act of remembering is also non-reflectively experienced or lived through any act of memory can, (following Sokolowski’s modification of Husserl’s own symbolism), be rendered as E₂{R[E₁(A₁→O)]}. Thus one’s remembering oneself to have made a promise to Peter, is never just a memory of Peter, or of Peter having received a promise, but a remembering of oneself promising Peter.

Now consider that E is always inseparably “myself,” (M) and therefore E is always ME. Remembering is always a re-presencing of a prior E i.e., it is an ME₂. Thus ME₂{R[ME₁(A₁→O)]}. It is of the essence of remembering acts to represence the prior ME without which the A could not be an A, i.e., a wakeful, conscious act. But for Shoemaker’s quasi-memory this phenomenological essence with its necessity is merely apparent because it is only contingent, i.e., only necessary in “this world.” In some possible world ME₂ could be really a case of someone else’s non-reflective, first-person experiencing, e.g., yours (Y), even though it would still seem to me (“ME”) that it was my experiencing of the prior experience. We may represent this in the following way: ME₂{R[“ME₁”/Y(A₁→O)]}. In this case, I would not have any immunity from misperception in my first-person experiences of remembering, but rather “I perceived Bush doing such and such” could very well be something you or a stranger did.

But why not dissolve all eidetic necessities in this way? Why not say this alleged possibility (i.e., this possible world hypothesis) could extend to all first-person experiences. Just because it “seems” that I refer inerrantly to “myself” is it not conceivable that I be in error and, I, through some evil genius surgeon, hypnotist,
or strange neurological “loop,” be in effect experiencing someone else or a plethora of others when I say “I.” “But presumably, if it is just a matter of contingent fact that there are not non-loopy channels connecting our minds to other minds, it is likewise a matter of contingent fact that there are loopy channels connecting our minds to themselves.”95

In Shoemaker’s rich extended meditation there is a major concession to the dominant philosophical tradition of privileging the third-person. His proposal that the first-person access, where immunity to error through misidentification by the perceiver and rememberer hold in “this world” gives way to a mere “seeming” to remember and presumably “seeming” to perceive, resembles Descartes’ evil genius in so far as it ascribes to what is outside and other than first-person experience a capacity to appear as if it were “on the inside,” i.e., first-person experience. (The “as-if” is not the phenomenological imaginative modified doxastic thesis, but rather the as-if of the speculative position; by definition there is no evidence for this in the first-person.) Here it is especially malignant because it proposes that what is undeniable in all “seeming,” i.e., the dative of manifestation and ownness, are conceived not to obtain but to be replaced by other “myselfs” and therefore the ownness of others.96

But does this amount to anything more than a self-destructive skepticism? If first-person access or non-reflective, non-criterial self-awareness is able merely to seem to be such, then does not the “veridicality” (of course this, we have insisted, is pre-propositional and therefore all senses of veridicality are improper since the proper work of verification is that of the interplay of empty and filled intentions of propositions) of the non-reflective lived experiencing of any intentional act (here we are assuming the fallibility of any intentional act) not itself fall under the shadow of the possible evil genius. If consciousness may be infested with “quasi-memory”, then so may self-awareness become “quasi-self-awareness,” where the non-criterial self-access no longer is the rock-bottom fundamentum inconcussum of self-manifesting, but where the whole life of the mind is infested with the possibility of any number of I’s laying equal claim to occupancy in any one of the lived-experiences of its acts. If “quasi-memory” is indeed intelligible, is not also intelligible the notion of “quasi-perception” and, indeed, “quasi-reflection,” e.g., on any perception or remembering, even the reflection of the philosopher on the intelligibility of quasi-memory?97 Does not the possibility of any confirmation of even entertaining the hypothetical possibility of the theory of quasi-memory get called into question because it is possible that “I” who entertain this theory am really not the same one as the one just before, but rather perhaps someone else who really only “entertains” it in brackets but actually finds it absurd?

In Shoemaker’s theory, first-person perspective gives way to the possible-world considerations and the perspective which sees the person as only a material entity. This consideration makes many of the essential claims of the phenomenology of the person merely de facto truths, i.e., holding for “this world.” One effect of this is to make dim any prospect of personal immortality or even continuance of ipseity because, after all, any identity of “I” or ipseity gives way to the possible-world consideration that the identity of the self is founded in a “seeming to remember;” a
quasi-remembering, which is at loggerheads with the eidetic sense of “I remember” as it happens in “this” world. Further, the logic of this position is that it can be extended to the ipseity or what we have called the “myself” as present in all experience so that even this rock-bottom identity which is prior to identification is able, in a possible world, to be called into question, and therefore a shadow of suspicion is cast over the “myself” in “this world.”

**D Possible-World Speculation and the Death of Phenomenological Philosophy**

In this particular discussion a major disagreement with Shoemaker emerges on the nature of philosophical reflection. For Shoemaker memory means necessarily that the “previous awareness condition” is fulfilled and when this is so I have immunity from error through misidentification in my rememberings being mine. But in another possible world, need this be the case? In what sense is essential possibility and free imaginative variation governed by the framework of the experienced world? In what sense is possibility established by stating, “that holds of essential necessity in this world but it need not hold in some other possible world.” Here, possibility has no synthetic a priori base or any filling intuitions of what is necessary and essential; it is merely empty, and functions by way of the negation of experienced necessities. The only imperative is that of the consistency of merely analytic propositions; one need only be consistent in setting up the alternative hypothesis – but even this latter, in so far as it has material synthetic a priori content knows no necessities except merely stipulated ones. And given his own assumptions the one stipulating may only quasi-remember these, which is to say they are not his but rather someone else’s.

Sometimes this possible world thinking betrays itself as simply a neglect of the work of essence-analysis. Thus we hear that “the reason why our reports of our memories of experiences and actions are spontaneously first-personal is that this is how we were brought up, trained, to report them by our elders.” In this view, that one’s experiencing is one’s own is merely a cultural or anthropological fact. They might just as well belong to no one or someone else.

Or, “one can imagine seeing a tree without imagining that one is seeing a tree or one’s seeing a tree, and in general one can imagine a situation from a point of view which, if the situation were actual, would be that of a participant in it, without imagining oneself to be a participant in the situation.” If this means that one is not explicitly aware of one’s seeing a tree, of course there is no problem. The implicitness or anonymity of the I or “myself” has been often touched on in this work. As to whether one is or is not a participant, again, depends on the level of reflection and/or whether the transcendental reduction is in play. In reflecting on my awareness of typing, the act of reflecting is not participating in the awareness of the typing directly, and in this sense is not participating. In the phenomenology of prayer or making love I am not praying or making love. But, on the other hand, what are we to make of the implication...
that I am not even participating in the act of reflecting on the first-level act? This seems to me an error due to a failure of phenomenological imagination.98 Yet, as Shoemaker himself makes clear, in the world where quasi-remembering prevailed, personal identity would not matter the way it does in the actual world. Indeed the person, as constituted by position-taking acts and allegiance to these position-takings, would be extinguished. How could a person be remorseful and proud in the absence of the retention and remembering of her past? The person bereft of her own proper memories and retentions, and not the “beneficiary” of quasi-memories could not properly and appropriately be fearful, expectant and hopeful with regard to her future. Indeed the person would approach being a ghost of herself or even a zombie because “no one” would be there but at best a corporate plurality – itself made of up “no ones.” If one only quasi-remembers, and if I accept the philosophic truth of quasi-remembering (something which, we suggest, is hard to do even if indeed we have the equivalent of the maneuver of an evil genius), i.e., that the stream of consciousness that I erroneously call mine is in a constant flux of fission, splitting off, merger, etc., with other streams of consciousness, how can I feel remorse or be proud? Who is acting, who is responsible, if there is a quasi-corporate bureaucratic chain of streams of consciousness which I call mine, because I quasi-remember, i.e., do not really remember, i.e., do not really have a case where there obtains the “previous awareness condition” and “the immunity to error through misidentification.”

For this work an especially weird feature of quasi-remembering is how it has symmetry and contrasts with the problems involved in the experience of one’s death. In this world of real remembering where there is the sense of self-experience immune from the error of misidentification, we do not know, in the first-person, what death is, i.e., we do not know whether we live through it even though it is clear that in the third-person each dies, i.e., ceases to live, to function, to be “there” as one experiencing. I may die without my knowing it, which is not the same as saying I might be dead without my knowing it. But in quasi-remembering which continually overlaps the fissions and mergers that (conceivably) comprise any stream of consciousness, the first-person experience of the fission is conceived by Shoemaker as something one “lives through,” even though “one” could be a sequence of different “myselfs” or a bureaucratic corporation (not a genuine “we”) of them.99 But this again, it seems to me, is only a speculative claim from the standpoint of the third-person, possible-world analysis. It has no “this world” motivation or first-person evidence, except, of course, that provided by interpretations of some cases in psychopathology, neural science, and brain studies.100 Most important, it tends to make any analysis of “this-worldly” essential necessities, especially first-person ones, vacuous or superficial in favor of the skepticism of possible-world speculation where these necessities are held, through the positing of empty intentions, to be possible. This holds of course for Shoemaker’s own exemplary demonstration that “it is of the essence of mind that each mind has a special access to its own contents, or more soberly expressed, that each person has special access to his own mental states.”101

And clearly for Shoemaker the possible-world extension of quasi-memory into quasi-perception is out of the question. And by implication, its extension to a quasi-non-criterial, quasi-non-reflective, quasi-non-identifying self-awareness is out of the
question. For Shoemaker, who has richly instructed us in these matters, self-awareness, as an immediate, non-identifying, non-ascriptive self-presence, is the condition for any identifying perception, especially any identification of oneself. The possible-world view of an essential "self-blindness," i.e., an Externus consciousness (see above, Chapter II), is convincingly argued against.

Only if self-blindness were a conceptual possibility would it be appropriate to think of the capacity for self-acquaintance as a quasi-perceptual capacity, which is something over and above the capacity to have and conceive the mental states in question. And it is the appropriateness of so thinking of it that I am anxious to deny.102

But if we can through possible-world theorizing extend memory to quasi-memory, why can we not extend it to a quasi-non-reflective self-awareness? And if we cannot do this and we cannot, then so it would seem that we have reason to believe that we cannot give credence to a quasi-memory.

**E  More on One’s Being Reborn Without Remembering Who One Is**

Let us return to Leibniz’s less skeptical theory of personal identity as elaborated on by McTaggart. Leibniz, we have noted, held that the loss of memory of one’s previous life is equivalent to the annihilation of that person. We can agree that the personal identity dissolves, but not all senses of selfhood are eliminated. Closer to our view is that of H.D. Lewis for whom there is maintained a distinction between personal identity and the self. Yet for Lewis dreamless sleep is the annihilation of the self because the self is essentially self-aware or of necessity first-personally wakeful to itself. We have not only expressed discomfort with this notion of dreamless sleep effecting annihilation, but we have wondered whether what counts for dreamless sleep is really absolute unconsciousness. Lewis’s view echoes that of Leibniz who held that the rebirth of that person (without memories) would be equivalent to the creation of a new person who is exactly similar to the old one in the sense that he is identical to “what the old person would have been if he had undergone the process of re-birth.”

McTaggart enters into this discussion framed by Leibniz by proposing that we consider the following argument: I would not believe in my immortality if I knew that I was to be annihilated at death through a complete loss of memory, even if I knew that my exact double were to be continued or created after my death. This position for McTaggart involves the *impossible* supposition of the “identity of indiscernibles.” If my double had the exact same properties that I have then we would not be two but one. If there is numerical difference then there has to be a difference in the properties.103

But let us consider some other thought experiments that do not employ Leibniz’s (and McTaggart’s) assumption that loss of every sense of self-identity and memory loss are equivalent – which assumption itself might lead one to hold that death and memory loss are also equivalent. Further it does not make use of the assumption that it is I as JG Hart with these distinguishing properties that is the ultimate principle of my being. Rather, we may assume, the thinkers upon whom we are chiefly
dependent, e.g., Husserl and Klawonn, would not put it this way. Rather we wish
to maintain that it is I myself as the transcendental unique I and I-pole that has these
personal habitualities.

Chisholm, who does not refer to Leibniz but rather says he is inspired by C.S.
Peirce, offers the following example. (Chisholm uses the second-person form
throughout thereby asking the reader to imagine that he or she were the addressee,
and thus to imagine in the first-person the sequences of the adventure of the
thought-experiment Chisholm is conducting.) Consider how you may be facing an
operation and you have to make some decisions regarding the advantages of one
procedure over against another. In the one case there is an expensive procedure
requiring total anaesthesia where no pain will be felt. The other case is very inex-
pensive and requires no anaesthesia. Therefore it will involve excruciating pain.
But prior to the operation you can receive a drug which obliterates your memory of
your present life; and after the operation you will receive another drug which will
obliterate your memory of the operation. Given the advantages of the lowered
expense and the avoidance of the pain you, Jones, would feel, we ask you: Would
it not be reasonable for you to opt for the less expensive operation?

Chisholm’s answer is that it would not be reasonable, even if one could be cer-
tain that both injections would be successful. “I think that you are the one who
would undergo that pain, even though you, Jones, would not know at the time that
it is Jones who is undergoing it, and even though you would never remember it.”
Klawonn has his own elaboration of this matter and his use of the first-person per-
haps makes the matter more evident.

Would I, in this situation be reassured if I could only be certain that I would lose my memory
tomorrow? Would I then face the situation with the relatively relaxed attitude which I have
to the fact that there are numerous people, with whom I am not personally acquainted, who
are exposed to suffering? The answer is no. I presume that when the pain is there, it will be
completely indifferent to me, whether I can remember who I was the day before. And I
further presume that when the time comes, I will be in no doubt as to who is in pain.

One might, of course, say: But Chisholm and Klawonn have set it up as a personal
trait that one has a dread of pain, and then argued that having such a personal trait
is a matter of indifference to the question of who will be having the pain in spite
of the memory loss. But there is no inconsistency here. The point is that whoever
I am I will have no doubt as to who is suffering the pain. Even if I, JG Hart, do
not dread the pain, I will not have any doubt who will have the pain or who is in
pain. It is only because this person does have the dread of pain that the narrative
is able to make the possible dramatic turn that he will perhaps decide not to
undergo the procedure. And if he decides for the inexpensive procedure the pain
surely will be “his” regardless of who he remembers that he is, whether he remem-
bers that he was the one who dreads pain, and whether he remembers that he had
this pain. It is only because this person dreads the pain, however, that he is likely
to be extremely apprehensive about the procedure.

The hypothesis that it would not be you raises interesting questions: What would
your status, Jones, be after the first injection? Would you have ceased to be or
would you be sort of waiting in the wings for the second injection? Would you
believe that you had the guarantee that after you ceased to be, “you – you, yourself – would come into being once again when the agony was over? During the time of the operation, who would be feeling the pain, who would this person be? 

Chisholm pursues the issue by thickening the plot. Suppose that before the operation you are inundated with friends and trusted counselors who urge you to take the cheaper operation and they will make it clear to the world that the person on the operating table is Smith and not Jones, and they promise to commit themselves to eliminating any trace of Jones in the world and in their hearts and will henceforth say in their hearts, during the operation, “poor Smith,” and not even in their hearts “poor Jones.” Chisholm’s answer is: “What ought to be obvious to you, it seems to me is that the laying down of this convention should have no effect at all upon your decision. For you may still ask, ‘But won’t that person be I?’ and, it seems to me the question has the answer.”

Consider another thought-experiment proposed by Chisholm. This one is closer to our interest in metempsychosis and personal life after death and is also reminiscent of our appropriation of Klawonn’s example of teletransportation. Consider that you learn that your body, like that of an amoeba, one day will “undergo fission” and split off in two different directions, the desirable direction going to the right and the dreaded one to the left. Chisholm urges us to think of this as a split of someone into two persons. Yet he also stipulates that there is no possibility whatever that you would be both the person on the right and the one on the left, but there is a possibility that you would be one or the other of those two persons. And, the final supposition is that you would be one of those persons and have no memory at all of your present existence.

Here Chisholm states his agreement with Shoemaker, that this sense of knowing oneself in the first-person which enables someone to make true statements about himself requires a knowledge of herself that is free from any criterion. In the present example, therefore, it makes sense to suppose that should I be in fact the half that goes off to the left and not the one that goes off to the right there would be no criterion at all by means of which anyone else could decide which one was I myself.

Following Klawonn we can say: The difference is between this JG Hart being himself and his being myself and there is not evident any necessary connection between these two aspects. The difference does not exist as an objective worldly identifiable feature of one or the other fissioned amoeba-persons; it “therefore exists for me and only for me.” “It cannot, however, be emphasized often enough, that the level or the dimension in which the difference exists, is also that which makes the difference, or what the difference consists in. If it is sought for elsewhere it will not be found.”

Here we might add something which Chisholm does not, even though he would seem here to be, in spite of his theory of “self-presenting acts” which he develops elsewhere, open to this suggestion. Namely, it is precisely the non-criterial, non-reflective, self-awareness which provides us with a form of evidence for a non-identified, criterionless, propertyless and unanalyzable sense of oneself. Such a view stands in contrast not only with Chisholm’s view of self-presenting acts but also his view, expressed on another occasion, that such an unanalyzable notion of the self is unintelligible (cf. above, Chapter V, §1).
Of course, Chisholm might well say that this self is analyzable in terms of the tautological properties and the recent acts of individuation, e.g., wishing that he were to go right rather than left, wishing for bliss with no pain, etc. (See below for more detail.) But this is still to acknowledge that there is a sense of one’s self which is known non-ascriptively and which is non-sortal, i.e., free of the identifiable properties, e.g., memories. Furthermore, this aspect of oneself, we have said (Chapter V), has of necessity the “tautological properties.” And, further, as incarnated in the recent (post-amoeba-fission) history, is individuated (only) by these recent experiences, desires, etc. All this is, I believe, compatible with the view we have been arguing that there is a non-sortal aspect of the self referred to in the non-ascriptive acts. We have never said that this aspect of oneself was available apart from one’s historical personal incarnation.

Let us continue with the thought experiment and further imagine, following Chisholm, that the one split-off amoeba self going down the left path will eventually in the course of the journey experience the most miserable of lives and the one who goes to the right will experience a life of great happiness and value.

It follows that it would be reasonable of you, if you are concerned with your future pleasures and pains, to hope that you will be the one on the right and not the one on the left – also that it would be reasonable of you, given such self-concern, to have this hope even if you know that the one on the right would have no memory of your present existence. Indeed, it would be reasonable of you to have it even if you know that the one on the left thought he remembered the facts of your present existence [i.e., even if he had Shoemakerian quasi-memories: JGH]. And it seems to me to be absolutely certain that no fears that you might have, about being the half on the left, could reasonably be allayed by the adoption of a convention, or by the formulation of a criterion, even if our procedure were endorsed by the highest authorities.”

By such an authoritative convention perhaps we may assume, as an example, a religious doctrine that suffering was a sign of the promise of eternal life. Regardless of the proper interpretation of Chisholm’s last sentence, the reader can perhaps agree that these analyses are harmonious with the basic theses of this book on the separability of ipseity or the “myself’ from personal identity.

If the measure of being “myself” is not totally coincident with my personal I, then we may assume that there can be personal incarnational variations of being me, or being “I myself,” that are completely different from the individual person I am at present. Recall the amazement expressed by Hopkins when he thought of what it would be like to be another person. This could mean the amazement about what would it be like to be “her” in the sense that, given the unique uniqueness, the distinctive “taste” of being me, how marvelous that there is someone else who is uniquely unique and has a completely different taste of being herself. I think this is what Hopkins had in mind. But it could also refer to the amazement – and this need not contradict the first one – that my self-reference to me as the uniquely unique “myself” would be re-enacted when the Other says “I.” This is an astonishment because it meets this possibility head on, but then retreats to a doubling which is “analogous,” i.e., her saying “I” was not a reference to me myself but mirabile dictu to the “myself” which is herself.
Yet we earlier in this chapter have dwelt on a sense of wondering what it would be like to have a completely different life and yet be oneself. Or what it would be like even to be another person and yet, of course, ineluctably be oneself in the imagining oneself to be so altered. In the latter case I wonder what it would be like for me to “be in her shoes” as this person with this habitus and style of being in the world – and yet necessarily yet be I myself. We here have to do with odd necessities and possibilities, compatibilities and incompatibilities, that one faces in contexts which affect my being me, this person. Such a self-othering already happens in a less radical way in everyday life when thoughtfully making major decisions that will assign one to live a distinct style of life, spend one’s life with a particular other person, take on a new career, etc.

These everyday necessities and possibilities are analogous to what I, JG Hart, face when I undertake the free imaginative variation of my personal identity, wondering about what if I were “in other shoes,” e.g., born and raised in a very different situation. A quite different question and different imaginative exercise is when I attempt to conceive whether I myself could be another person than JG Hart, and yet be I myself?

In spite of the difficulties posed by the wakeful free imaginative variation, dreams offer a kind of evidence for this difference. Have we not found ourselves “incarnated” in “impossible” roles and persons, i.e., roles and persons which for waking life’s rules are not possible? And, Klawonn asks further, do we not remember having been awakened from a dream as someone who is without any knowledge of the person that I am when awake? In such cases of having dreamed I was someone else, I clearly have a kind of evidence of knowing what it is like to be me, I myself, without any knowledge of JG Hart! In this connection we may remember William James’s report of having once awakened with the distinct impression that someone else’s stream of experiences had just been his. This perhaps makes first-person sense, pace Shoemaker, only if it may be interpreted to mean that he, for the moment, had not been WJ, but rather someone else; but “he himself” had successively both experiences. This resembles the person who might awake from amnesia or a coma-like state, now recalling that he once didn’t know who he was; or the person with amnesia recalling that he once knew who he was. Similarly the person with the dissociated personality who experiences intrusions and invasions by way of thoughts and personae, “is aware that it is he himself rather than somebody else who experiences these foreign thoughts.” As Gallagher has pointed out, it would seem that the schizophrenic’s reports that certain thoughts are not his still refer to thoughts within his own stream of consciousness, i.e., one for which he claims “ownership,” but he also appears to be acknowledging that he is no longer the agent of his thoughts. They belong to “his own stream” yet their agency is beyond him. Phenomena like forms of inspiration, an athlete’s “being in a zone,” automatic writing, etc., perhaps belong here.

Or if one claims that these intrusions lack the peculiar character of mineness or ownness one may well ask if this refers to the personal, situated, individuated I that one is most comfortable with, or whether it refers to “the first-personal mode of the givenness of our experiences.” If the latter, then we have phenomenological
material that lends some support to the possibility of “incarnational-personal contingency,” the conceivable of which is necessary presumably for any doctrine of the afterlife, but especially for that of reincarnation.

F Conclusion

We may say that the thesis that “myself” is what makes possible all forms of afterlife rather than the person with her characteristics recalls Husserl’s argument for the immortality of the transcendental I. This I which is in a sameness relation with the personal I is not absolutely identical with the personal I or the personal essence or the person who says “I.” It is the ascription-free I-pole of transcendental reflection and the transcendental I of the primal streaming whose beginning and ending are unthinkable. Its death could be thought of as an excision from the world’s hyletic impact and allure, and thus it would best be thought of after the analogy of sleep. Clearly this post-mortem existence is hardly a life but rather a kind of dormancy because excised from the world. (We nevertheless resist assent to H.D. Lewis’ theory that such a state, like dreamless sleep, would require the annihilation of the essentially self-aware self.) As such it could not be desired in the way a personal life in a heavenly community and eutopian surroundings would be; nor would it even offer the sense of adventure of reincarnation and metempsychosis. Yet the claim of this work is that the “myself” is the strongest, if not the preferred, candidate for all forms of survival after death. In making this claim I am not proposing that this survival is beyond a doubt. (The transcendental I could be mortal and not be in a position to know it.) Nor am I claiming that this state of excision is the preferred form or the only form in which the survival occurs. If there is survival, the “myself” is the condition for any form of survival, and therefore also of the eutopian ones as in personal survival and the “New Heaven and New Earth.” We have attempted to show the difficulties of conceiving what the survival of the person might mean. This is far from having shown that it is impossible.

With this chapter we conclude our strictly transcendental phenomenology and meontology. In the next book we will return to some of these matters in the light of a “transcendental-existential phenomenology.”

Notes

1. Persons and Life After Death, 39.
2. From the fine Quaker novel by Jan de Hartog, The Peaceable Kingdom (New York: Athenaeum, 1972), 452.


6. The exception, of course, is the Irish Catholic commemorative honoring of someone prior to burial. Here “to wake” is transitive and third-person. Its sense is captured also in the expression to “hold a wake” (proximate to “holding a party”).

7. Cf. Husserl, Husserliana Materialien VIII (C-Manuscripts), 199

8. Children of alcoholics are known to experience not only dread when witnessing the onset of the parents’ mental murkiness and absence through the drinking, but they also develop keen sensibilities for detecting when the parents have had a drink, i.e., when they are beginning to be absent, even when there is no clear evidence that the parents have drunk anything or when they have gone to great pains to hide the fact that they have drunk anything.


13. Cf. my “Mythic World as World,” 52–55. Eugene Gendlin takes the occasional sense of dreams as not alien, not being one’s own, where one is aghast at them, as an indication that the explication of the felt-meaning wherein we are at our ownmost, self-experiencing, and where each can say I am “there,” is not fully occurring. “In dreams what we perceive is beyond the control, interpretation, ownership of the self (or ego).” Here the interaction between felt-presence and articulation, felt-meaning and events, is curtailed and often enough dreams (and hallucinations) contain “decomposed pieces,” and a rigidity of content, often reflecting our universal somatic condition, e.g. the themes of the oral, anal, and genetic. See his “A Theory of Personality Change.” Yet dreams are the great metaphorical revelations of our Befindlichkeit and everything is here related to everything else through the network of metaphors. This is because the past is inside the present and any present moment includes many past experiences “crossing” or explicating it [and, we might add, the present includes adumbrated experiences which explicate or cross it]. Gendlin sees dreams as having to do chiefly with “unfinished events” which are open to more interaction with other experiences (and experienced events) than are ordinary wakeful experiences. In unfinished events where, we have proposed, will-projects are temporarily disengaged, but not nullified, the world’s categoriality, as tied to the wakeful agency of manifestation, is suspended along with the agency of manifestation. What is relevant to an event or thing is determined more by the will-projects and the general feeling tone of one’s life, one’s Befindlichkeit, rather than merely by the wakeful agency’s categorial display of the world. Things can take on significances that they would not have with the finished things of the wakeful world. If you are angry with a person who gave you a chair, in the dream a chair can take on aspects in order to embody your anger or it may change its aspect to fit one’s need or mood. In any case, they function in the quest to be adequate to oneself, to be whole. For this reason the project of interpreting dreams is, if at all possible, always to go back to the dream as it was felt at the time of one’s dreaming it and from this felt-meaning focus on how the dream narrative wrestles with the project of one’s self-adequation or one’s wholeness. See especially Appendix A to Gendlin’s Let Your Body Interpret Your Dreams (Wilmette, IL: Chiron Publications, 1986).


17. See Sokolowski, Presence and Absence, especially Chapter III.


21. Ibid., 91.

22. Ibid.

23. See, e.g., Husserliana Materialien, VIII (C Manuscripts), 1–3.


26. From Chapter II from Upanishads, 228


30. From Chapter II from Upanishads, 26-4:12; Gupta, p. 30.


33. Gupta, 38.

34. Gupta, 39.

35. Gupta, 38.


37. See Gupta, 47.


39. See Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity, Chapter V and the endnotes.

40. Cf. my review of Zahavi, op. cit., 344–346. Discussion of Gupta’s interpretation of Husserl and her comparison with Shankara would take us too far afield. Suffice it to say that in her The Disinterested Witness she did not see any proximity to Shankara’s witness consciousness. In a more recent and nuanced discussion, “Advaita and Husserl’s Phenomenology,” Husserl Studies 20 (2004), she asks whether Husserl “would accept any witness-consciousness which merely manifests but does not constitute” (130). I think it is safe to say the non-reflective self-awareness in Husserl is an exception to the slogan that all consciousness is consciousness of…, in as much as this self-awareness is non-intentional, and therefore all non-reflective self-awareness is not strictly speaking constituting. But this is too simple when we remember the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski: Is not the ultimate basement of time consciousness (cf. witness-consciousness) constitutive of the temporality of the stream? Is the “flow,” as our awareness of inner time, indeed constitutive of the temporality of this stream? But, as Zahavi has shown, the ultimate consideration, “the primal presencing,” or “primal impression,” is itself self-luminous, quite apart from anything else, e.g., retentions. Cf. the body of the text and, again, our review of Zahavi, as well as Chapter VI, §3 for our own effort to negotiate these problems.

41. J.N. Mohanty, Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought, 51–52. Yet the religious-meta-physical impulse of Vedanta is reminiscent of themes in Christian Theology. If God is absolute in the sense that all that is proceeds from God, the creator of all there is, out of
nothing, then the divine knowledge in its foundational sense is self-knowledge, perhaps an
analogous non-intentional self-awareness, in which all there is is known eminenter. See
Book 2, Chapter VII; we return to Shakara at Book 2, Chapter VII, §9. But transcendental
phenomenology as such has less to say about this than it does even about the reconstructive
speculated realm of sleep and death.
42. See Gupta, 129–144.
43. See Gupta, 181, n. 50.
44. I am indebted to Mr. Seungpil Im’s not yet published work on Kant and mysticism which
served as the basis for his dissertation on “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer.” The cited texts are taken
from the Lectures on Metaphysics, Trans. and Ed. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon (New
47. Ibid., II, Chapter XLI, 486–487.
48. Ibid. II, Chapter XLI, 491.
49. Whereas my debt to Michel Henry is ubiquitous in this work, I am especially happy to refer
here to his commentary on Schopenhauer in his Geneology of Psychoanalysis, Chapters 5 and 6.
51. See, e.g., Nachlass MSS, AV 1 (1931), 5.
52. Sydney Shoemaker, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays, 171.
54. Ibid., 34–35; transcription, 31–32.
56. Cf. my “Mythic World as World,” 51–69; and H.D. Lewis, “The Self and Immortality,”
143–145.
58. Price, 105.
60. Price, 112.
62. St. Thomas, in Librum beati Dionysii de divinis nominibus (Turin: Marietti: 1950), Ch. VIII,
L. IV, par. 775, p. 291.
63. Price, see the entire appendix.
64. For a near encyclopedia of paranormal, supranormal, and eutopian accounts of embodiment,
65. See Simone Weil, La Pesantuer de la Grace (Paris: Plon, 1948); quote taken from the German
translation, Schwerkraft und Gnade (Munich: Koesel, 1952), 63.
66. Cf. the last chapter of my dissertation, Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Ontological Phenomenology
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Divinity School, 1972), “Phenomenology and the
Unearthing of Heaven,” 577ff.
67. Cf. Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Die Zeit (Munich: Koesel, 1954), 286–288, but also all of Part II.
for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, III (2003), 53–72.
69. This is the proposal of Robert Sokolowski. See his Christian Faith and Human Understanding
70. The translations are from On the Soul. Trans. W.S. Hett, Loeb, Vol. VIII (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1986a), 43; and De Anima. Trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred
(Harmondsworth, Middelsex: Penguin, 1986b) 143.
71. For the text, “For each one of us experience that it is oneself who intellectively cognizes,” I
have only notes from a lecture by Robert Pasnau, with the reference, 76. lc. For “my soul is
not I myself;” See St. Thomas, Commentary on 1 Corinthians, 15.
72. Geach, God and the Soul, 28.
73. Cf. Geach, God and the Soul, 22.
74. See, e.g., *Husserliana* XXXVII, 108 and 233.
75. The example of the roulette wheel is taken from Peter Geach.
80. The movie, “Groundhog Day,” starring Bill Murray, wonderfully illustrates this point. Although not about reincarnation as such, the hero is prevented from having a genuine tomorrow after today by repeatedly being wrenched back into the time of today (in all of its phases or twenty-four hours) until he gets it right, i.e., lives the day appropriately.
82. Simmel, 144–145.
84. Husserl, *Husserliana Materialien* VIII (C-Manuscripts), 105.
85. A good statement with the appropriate nuances is in the Nachlass MSS A V 5 (1933), p. 2 where we learn that when I say I am in the reflection proper to the natural attitude we mean: “I am this man, I am this body, this thing among things existing in this room.” But when we move to the epoché one’s natural I-am becomes a phenomenon, one’s being human along with one’s human modes of awareness. And then I find that my transcendental I is identical with the natural I in an encompassing apperception. And then we come upon the anonymous living functioning pole which is never in the field of temporality and herein is the point of actuality, the standing I, wherein temporal passage, my having been and my “I think” are “conscious”
91. Husserl discusses the phenomenology of memory in numerous places. There are fewer discussions of the phenomenology of mistaken memory. See, e.g., *Husserliana* XXXV, 412–418; *Husserliana* XI, 371–377.
95. Shoemaker, *The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays*, 196.
96. Michel Henry emphasizes the importance of the “seeming” in Descartes’ at certe videre videor, audire, calescere, “Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed.” The seeing, no matter how radical the epoché, still seems, still appears; and this is the radical ineradicable self-manifestation. See Michel Henry, “The Soul According to Descartes,” in *Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes*. Ed. Stephen Voss (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993b), 42–43. Is Shoemaker’s quasi-memory a version of the “evil genius”? By robbing the “seeming” memory of its being mine and to me, it is indeed “malignant” but it does not eliminate the indubitability of my being because “to be deceived is to be.” It will not “bring it about that I am nothing so long as I shall [appear to] think I am something.” Yet it is exceedingly “evil” because the foundation of phenomenology, first-person access, is, if conceivable, undermined because I can seem to have first-person access, when in fact it is someone else who does. Indeed, the malignancy is so profound that the “seeming” of oneself to oneself in Shoemaker’s non-criterial self-access, in so far as it admits talk of a dative of
manifestation, could really be an appearing to someone else which I “seemingly” take to be me. Cf. the discussion in the body of the text.


98. For both of these texts, see Noonan, *Personal Identity*, 183–184.

99. Shoemaker, *Identity, Cause, and Mind*, 47–48. But if the theory of quasi-memory makes it likely that my non-reflective, non-identifying self-awareness itself become “quasi-”, then this corporation of “myselfs” is, as we suggested, endangered because “no one” will be there in each case of the corporate members.

100. My abbreviated reference to this huge topic, which motivates many of the most creative and extravagant thought-experiments of the philosophy of mind in the past sixty years, is not meant to underestimate its importance. Rather our focus is in a different, if even though clearly related, direction. Further, it is an occasion to signal the beginning serious encounter of phenomenology with these studies, as in the writers for *The Journal of Consciousness Studies*. Most recently at the time of this writing, see Zahavi’s last chapter in *Subjectivity and Selfhood*.


105. Klawonn, 67

106. Here Chisholm refers to Locke: “One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence.”

107. Ibid.


111. See Gallagher, “Self-Reference in Schizophrenia, 230–231; also Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, 235, n.18, as well as the body of the text wherein the note is embedded.


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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index

A

afterlife,
H.D. Lewis on jaded view toward, 453
and transcendental phenomenology, 453
“myself” as strongest if not most desirable philosophical candidate for, Chapter VIII

dating: immortality

dating: resurrection of the body

dating: metempsychosis

dating: transcendental I, beginninglessness and unendingness of

dating: memory and personal immortality

agent of manifestation, 6, 34, 93 ff.
dating: appearing

dating: transcendental “I”
dating: pure I, 156 ff.
Allaire, Edwin B., 341
Allport, Gordon, 163–164, 170
Ameriks, Karl, 344

angels,
as unique essences (St. Thomas Aquinas), 326–327, 330, 340
as ipseities, 338
Leibniz on, 326
can intuit haecceity directly (Scotus), 149
appearing (appearings, phenomena, display, looks, eidos, manifestation, givenness)
senses of, 2 ff.
and being, 3 ff., 38 ff.
God and, 4 ff.
and agent of manifestation, 6
relation of, 8 ff.
not in the mind, 11 ff., 34 ff., 381 ff.
genitive of appearing/manifestation, 34, 98
dative and agent of appearing/manifestation, 34, 93ff.

fact of, 36

monist theory of, 70, 132, 382
dating: bundle theory

Aquinas, St. Thomas, 1, 63, 150, 152, 169,
169, 170, 230, 265, 288, 295, 326,
338, 340, 344, 406, 408, 409, 422,
509, 516, 542
Arendt, Hannah, 254, 256, 267, 270, 271, 272,
275, 339, 340
Aristotle, 8, 9, 137–138, 265, 267, 300–306,
312, 317, 341, 342, 409, 513–517, 519,
520, 522, 523, 542
and hylemorphism in humans, 513–520
on reincarnation, 515 ff.
attitude (Stellungnahme, Einstellung)
position-taking, 40–44
dating: transcendental

dating: natural

Atwood, Margaret, 419
Augustine, St., 4, 44, 79, 80, 127, 129, 130,
187, 265
Aumann, Anthony, 341
Austin, John, 263

B

Bakhtin, Mikhail, 267
Balthasar, N.-J.-J., 343
Barth, Heinrich, 7
Baumann, Gerhart, 265
Begley, Sharon, 430

beginning and ending, experience of, 442 ff.

being
and Dasein’s “is-ing,” 101–102, 110, 131
and appearing (display), 3 ff. 12
and verification through filled intentions, 6, 10 f
and truth, 3, 5–8, 10

relation to appearing, 8 ff.

555
being (cont.)
  inseparability from display, 3 ff., 38 ff.
  and intentionality, 8
  and natural attitude, 12
  and having, 134 ff.
Bergmann, Gustav, 341
Bergson, Henri, 540
Biemel, Walter, 131
Binswanger, Ludwig, 265
birth,
  new beginning of an ipseity, 424 ff
  third-person access to, 425
my, not first-person experience, 425, 458
experience of pre-natal person, 425 ff
claim for a transcendental first-personal
  awareness of, 445 ff.,
  vide transcendental I, beginninglessness of
  vide pre-existence
Block, Ned, 11
Blondel, Maurice, 389, 421, 438, 439, 445,
  451, 519, 520, 543
body,
  Hobbes on, 9–10
  organic body-thing, 39, 94, 100, 151, 152,
    164, 187, 352, 396, 410
  lived body, 44, 124, 164, 187, 353–355,
    362, 363, 364, 394 ff., 425, 501
  lived, as through-which, not toward-which,
    395–396
  lived, as zero-point of orientation,
    394–397, 436
  lived, and fetus, 425 ff.
  exigencies of 47, 100, 419, 426, 427
  “this” body as alleged substitute for “I,”
    71–72, 92, 93
  double-aspect of, 362, 363, 438
  and mineness and ownness, 73, 76, 97, 136
  ff., 170, 348–350
  embodiment of presence of Other, 187,
    210, 219, 287
  of beloved in love’s intentionality, 219 ff.,
    231, 233, 243, 247
  of beloved in sexual love, 219 ff.
  commingling of in sexual love, 221 ff.
  as substrate of property of “person,” theory
  of, 280, 285 ff.
  analogy of one’s life with one’s
    own, 332
  ontological regions of body and mind, 10,
    348, 353, 355, 356, 357, 359, 362, 364,
  and corpse, 441
  Spinoza on, 450–451
  and spatiality, 393
  in dreamless sleep and death, 472–474
  and dualism, 359, 394
  porousness of boundaries of, 487
  as ingredient in personal identity,
    491–493
  and gender, 494–496
  transparency of, to ipseity, 210, 227, 239,
    249, 326, 327, 363, 498, 504 ff.
  as medium of communication, 186, 244,
    256, 364, 476, 504, 506, 510, 513
  and resurrected body, 498, 508–511
  dream body of afterlife (Price),
    504–508
  eutopian, 510–511
  in Aristotelianism, 513 ff.
  vide psychophysical
  vide panpsychism
  vide recreation
Bollnow, Otto, 421
  brain, 9, 20, 35, 82, 102, 119, 222, 353–364,
    368, 369, 373–376, 382–384, 394,
    396, 459, 488, 490, 499, 490, 514,
    515, 529, 533
  as ground of experience (Leder), 396
  vide psychophysical
Bruenstädt, Friedrich, 169
Brook, Andrew; 144, 169, 333 ff., 343, 344
Brough, John, 449, 481–482, 581–582
Brown, Ramond E., 450
Browning, Elizabeth Barrett, 231, 238, 248,
  252, 262, 265, 266, 268
Browning, Robert, vide Browning, Elizabeth
Buddhist no-ownership theory of self,
  82–89, 114
bundle theory (of appearing, of self, etc.),
  33, 114, 197, 260, 261, 290, 300,
  301, 307
Burns Arthur, 263
Daimon, 271, 339, 440
Darwall, Stephen, 263, 422
Dasein (Heidegger), 100 ff.
and transcendental I, 103–105
Davidson, Donald, 10, 61
death and dying
and natural attitude, 347, 423 ff.
going apperception of, 424, 429
and horizon of life and possibility, 427
and transcendental attitude, 402
moment of, 427 ff.
first-personal sense of one’s own, 426 ff., 431, 439, 447 ff.
problem of transcendental first-person awareness of one’s own, 445 ff.
second-person sense of, 427 ff.
third-person sense of, 426 ff.
sharing experience of, 426 ff.
Stoic interpretation of, 428
as unconscious cessation, 427
philosophy as preparation for, 429
fear of, 423 (Levine), 453 (H.D. Lewis), 456, 457, 486
problem versus mystery of, 423
deficient conjugation of verb “to die” (Jankélévitch), 429
meaning of, 377, 378, 393, 439, 445
and absence of ipseity, 379, 427, 428, 441, 442, 453
and brain, 391
paradox of, in the case of transcendental person, 447 ff.
and conservationist-deep ecological optic, 483 ff.
as natural event, 383 ff.
Mary Oliver on, 487
Decoqs, S.J., Pedro, 340
Dehmel, Richard, 169
definite descriptions, vide
eidetic singularities (under: essence)
Derrida, Jacques, 290, 341
Descartes, 81, 156, 543
dignity (dignitas),
as eliminable or ineliminable, 404 ff.
and ontological value (von Hildebrand), 253–254, 403–409
as inherent radiance of person, spirit, or ipseity (dignitas, Aquinas), 252, 253, 254, 340, 404–409, 422
what love targets, 249, 506
and transcendental person, 403 ff.
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 169, 249
double (Doppelgänger) of oneself, 141 ff.
dream,
dream-world a quasi-world, 42, 50, 425, 504
and sleep, 292, 310, 460, 461
and reincarnation, 329
out of body experiences in, 364
dream body of afterlife (Price), 504 ff.
and will, 540
personal identity in, 538
dual-aspect, double aspect
theory of person (Strawson), 346, 348 ff., 359–361.
of body, 362–363
of being within world and transcendental I, ix, 438
vide paradox of transcendental person
dualism, 355, 360, 378
Shoemaker’s minimal, 355–357
of this book, 355 ff.
basic objection to (see also “I know not what”), 360–361
and problem of individuation, 367–368
vide regional ontology
vide psychophysical
Dubislav, W., 418
Duns Scotus, 149 ff., 169, 276, 289, 317, 342
vide haecceitas, individual essence

E
Eisler, R., 421
eliminativism and epiphenomenalism, 348, 360, 374, 379 ff.
vide functionalism
vide psychophysical
vide regional ontology
emotion, 206 ff.
empathic perception (Husserl’s Einfühlung, appresentation),
necessary condition for all personal presencings and perspectives, 206 ff.
presences Other’s ownness, 145, 157
and ghosts, 181
not merely epistemic-cognitive act, 207 ff.
burgeons with respect, 207, 209, 210
necessary basis for love, 209
may verge on love, 209
love and, 206 ff.
emotion and, 206 ff.
entelechy, ix, 88, 155, 165, 190, 228, 366, 367, 419, 420, 421, 513, 516
Erleben and Durchleben, vide self-awareness
error, 6–7
essence
and *eidos* or essential look (face), 14–16, 19–20, 290
and ideas and ideals, 20 ff.
and kinds, 15 ff.
and possibility 18 ff.
and possible-world theory, 21–32
and science, 15 ff.
as formal feature, 17
and essentiality or Whatness, 17–19
as instantiable, 17
and free imaginative variation, 17 ff., 488 ff.
and ultimate substrates of predication, 20 ff.
and Who one is, 16, 144 ff.
individual, unique essence or haecceity, 75, 144 ff.
eidetic singularities, 281 ff.
hyper-essence, 280, 284, 288, 290, 293
of Socrates, Raphael (Plotinus and St. Thomas), etc., 288, 326
as secret, 289–290
theory of radical, 304–305, 313, 315, 316
and free imaginative variation of personal, 488–503.
eternity, timelessness,
of unique essence, 81, 440, 450, 486
of I or spirit, 424, 431, 434–436
theological notion of, 436–438, 451, 461
of acts of devotion and love, 440–441
vide transcendental I, beginninglessness
and endlessness
externus hypothesis, 112 ff.

**F**
face, 59–60, 185–187
Ferrier, J.F., 62, 132
Fichte, J.G., 103, 131, 154, 170, 210, 264, 297, 509, 547
Fink, Eugen, 131, 168
first-person and first-personal (see “I” and indexicality)
grammatical vs. perspectival sense, 65 ff.
perspective, 118
as lived, 118
referrings as, 119
transcendental phenomenology as, 121
perspective on myself as unique essence
(vide Klauonn), 283 ff., 292 ff.
and theory of substance, 283

allegedly reducible to a form of third-
person objectivity or expression, 351 ff.
Shoemaker on insufficiency of, 353 ff.
vide “I can”
Foster, John, 419
Frauwallner, Erich, 130
freedom of I and person, experiences of points to archonal nature of I, 438
as implying belief of transcendence to natural causality, 438–40
Frege, Gottlob, 132, 137
Functionalism, 357–358, 360

**G**
Gallagher, Shaun, 97, 131, 544
Geach, Peter, 74, 75, 127–129, 132, 266, 310–313, 342, 449, 450, 516, 526, 542, 543
Gendlin, Eugene, 45 ff., 63, 175, 263, 341, 376, 420, 471, 540, 542
Gracia, Jorge J.E., 169, 342, 343
Green, T.H., 450
Gupta, Bina, 477–479, 481, 541

**H**
haecceity, unique essence
general ontological position, 317
of “myself” or referent of “I”, 144
Duns Scotus on knowing of, 149–151
appréhended properly only in first-person, 149, 289
Hopkins on, 151
Hacker, Paul, 541
Hakuin, 88
Hamilton, Sir William, 342
hate, vide love and
Heidegger, Martin, 61, 100–103, 131, 209, 376, 377, 398, 421, 429, 471
Henry, Michel, 70, 81, 129, 542, 543
Herbart, J.H., 11
Hering, Jean, 62
Hirsch, Rudolf, 64
Hobbes, Thomas, 8–9, 36, 61
Hodgson, John A., 539
Hönigswald, Richard, 325, 330–333, 343, 451
Hofmannthal, Hugo von, 64
Holdrege, Craig, 62
I

“I,” Chapter II et passim
vide myself as myself
indexical achievement, 65 ff.
first-personal pronoun, 65 ff.
and demonstratives, 67 ff.
deictic expression, 67 ff.
in oratio recta et obliqua, 69
eidos I and indexical, 67, 104
eidos and universal I, 147 ff., 294–295, 324
ff., 337–338
indexical in contrast with transcendental I,
67, 94
inerrancy of reference, 69 et passim
in reference necessary existence of, 412
ephermerality of “I” as myself as myself, 79
existential negation incoherent, 75
non-identifying, non-criterial reference, 71
ff., 142 ff.
and non-ascriptive reference, 68 ff., 142 ff.
non-substitutability of other indexicals or
of third-person reference as in definite
descriptions, 70 ff., 142 ff.
and amnesiac, 70, 140
and my body, 71 ff.
internal and external reference
of, 76 ff., 93
and primal temporalizing, 89 ff.
transcendental, 93 ff.
vide time, temporalizing, primal
declarative use contrasted with informative
(Sokolowski), 95 ff.
transcendental pre-fix, 95 ff.
anonymous functioning, 97 ff.
center of I and myself, 99–100
degenerate use of (Geach), 127 ff.
referred to, not an I, 325
referred to is unique, 140 ff.
“pure” I, 156 ff., 165
alleged eliminability because of linguistic
contingency of pronoun, 196–197
not derived from “you,” 201 ff., 349 ff.
a coincidence of absolute concretum. eidetic
singularity, and individual, 283 ff.
as substance, 322–333, 283, 336, 342
individualized quiddity and generalized
haecceity, 284
I’s teleology, 293. vide true self
necessity of, in achievement, 412 ff.
essence of includes existence, 413–415
“I can,”
lived power, possibility, having and
embodiment, 26, 138, 272, 396, 490,
515 et passim
identity.
strict versus sameness relation (identity
synthesis, identity in manifold), 77, 99,
115, 116, 121, 123, 139, 161–162, 165,
217, 224
data numerical identity
vide “I”
vide “myself” and unique essence
of “myself”
identity synthesis, identity in manifold,
39, 57, 96, 98, 99, 107, 140, 156,
163, 169
identity of indiscernibles (Leibniz), 28,
143, 169
person identity and identification, 45,
52–54, 70, 72, 85, 87, 133, 139, 144,
149, 167, 173, 183–185, 189
personal identity tied to memory, 139 ff.,
505, 523 ff., 534 ff.
and quasi-memory (Shoemaker), 527 ff.
personal identity as tied to body, 491–493
personal identity as tied to gender,
495–496
personal identity as tied to moral character,
496–498
personal identity as tied to intelligence,
493–495
personal identity as tied to social world,
498–503
first-personal non-reflective sense of I
myself not properly numerical, 328 ff.
as archonal, 439
imagining changes in one’s personal
identity, 488–503
imagining oneself being someone else in
contrast to imagining myself being
differently, 412 ff. 489 ff.
illocutions (performative, illocutionary acts),
178–181
Im, Seungpil, 541, 542
immortality
vide afterlife
of transcendental I, vide Chapter VII.
of person and free imaginative variation
of the person, 488–503
immortality (cont.)
personal, tied to memory, 505
and H.H. Price’s spiritualist theory of
dream world, 503 ff.
indexicality and indexicals, (occasional
[Husserl], token reflexives, indicators)
vide non-ascriptive reference
13, 22, 27, 28, 29, 31, 36, 37, 48, 49, 51,
52, 65–71, 73, 75, 76, 89, 92, 94, 105,
106, 108, 114, 116, 121, 123, 125, 127,
129, 144, 161, 173, 188, 193, 194, 198,
202, 238, 250, 263, 272, 277, 280, 286,
287, 289, 293, 296, 314, 323–325, 332,
335, 336, 394, 428, 479
and Husserlian index, 27–29, 37, 48–51,
54–55, 65, 70, 73, 323
in contrast to transcendental I, 67, 94
and possible worlds, 26 ff.
deictic function of, 49, 65
and non-ascriptive reference, 68 ff.
foundational for non-indexical reference,
53, 70
quasi-indexical, 74 ff.
individual, individuation,
vide unique,
principle of, 292
and identicals (doubles), 143 ff., 292
per accidens and per se, 273 ff., 279 ff.,
283, 296, 327
and unity, 274
and particulars or instances, 279 ff.
eidetic singularities (Husserl), (lowest
specific difference and definite
descriptions), 281 ff.
and absolute concretum, 281
and ideal objects, 283 ff.
and numerical distinction, 292, 28, 258,
308, 317, 326, 505
of persons in Aristotle, 513–520
of persons in Simmel, 520–523
individual essence, vide haecceity, 274 ff.
awareness of, 159–160 (ownness), 274 ff.,
295–299
individualized quiddity and generalized
haecceity, 284
hyper-essence, 280, 284, 288, 290, 293,
297–298
Ingarden, Roman, 17, 62, 159 ff., 165, 171, 342
Intentionality,
vide appearing
vide agency of manifestation
intentional relation, 8
and display, 8, 399
medieval notion of, 34–35, 397
and intervening mental entities, 381 ff.
through bodiliness, 394–395, 396 ff.
and respect, 398 ff.
ipseity, vide “myself”

J
Jacoby, Klaus, 341
James, William, 10, 97
Jankélévitch, Vladimir, 189, 223, 243, 245,
246, 261, 263, 266, 284, 317, 341, 342,
429, 449, 484, 542
Jaspers, Karl, 36, 61, 103, 120, 164, 171, 252,
267, 276, 499
Jespersen, Otto, 64
Je ne sais quoi, 244, 308, 315, 328
Johnston, Kennith, 539

K
Kant, Immanuel, 3, 4, 20, 21, 61, 71, 92, 128,
156, 169, 175, 206, 210, 236, 270, 289,
300, 306, 307, 314, 323, 328, 329,
333–337, 339, 341, 343, 344, 357,
403, 405, 406, 408, 413, 421, 422, 438,
439, 445, 451, 473, 478, 480, 483, 486,
505, 542
Kapitan, Tomis, 130
Kim, Jaegwon, 383, 420
Kitcher, Patricia, 344
Kierkegaard, S?ren, 100, 267, 289, 341
Klawonn, Erich, 82, 130, 141–143, 168, 169,
283, 287, 307, 308, 309, 316, 317, 328,
332, 336, 342, 486, 522, 524, 535, 536,
538, 543, 544
Kosky, Jeffrey, 264
Kripke, Saul, 183, 263

L
Lavelle, Louis, 437, 438, 519, 520, 543
Laycock, Steven, 264
Le Chevalier, L., 264
Leder, Drew, 395, 396, 421
Leibniz, G., 14, 27, 28, 30, 143, 149, 169, 205,
213, 245, 264, 292, 315, 317, 326, 327,
328, 329, 343, 365, 366, 391, 392, 409,
525, 534, 535, 543
Levinas, Emmanuel, 57, 59, 60, 64,
80–81, 129, 199, 221, 222, 263,
264, 265, 343
Levine, Stephen, 423, 449
Lewis, Barbara, 420
Lewis, David, 26 ff.
Index

Lichtenberg, Georg, 81, 91
limit-situation, 43
Locke, John, 162, 306, 307, 308, 544
Loux, Michael, 24–29, 62, 341, 342
love
  problem of pure versus selfish, 204–206
  and emotion, 206 ff.
  and empathic perception, 206 ff.
  intends ipseity, not qualities or properties, 210, 215, 226 ff., 231–238, 241–248, 258–261
  intends ipseity through but as beyond the properties, 215, 226 ff., 231–238, 241–248, 258–261
  and union, 215 ff.
  and sexual love, 219 ff.
  and absolute exteriority, 222
  and sympathy, compassion, pity, 211
  emphatic believing celebratory affirmation, 212 ff.
  and deciding absolutely for the Other (Husserl), 214, 223
  and common life, 233 ff.
  doubling of one’s own life, 225
  and mystery, 223, 226, 236, 242, 244, 247, 249, 250
  and friendship, 226–231
  deathlessness of, 440–442
  and hate, 238 ff.
  and problem of beloved’s double, and being in love, 187, 219, 220, 229, 243, 250, 256, 260, 266
  vide, dignity problem of reason for, 226 ff., 248 ff.
  for the sake of love, 252, 258–261
  symmetrical and assymetrical, 266–267
Lusthaus, Dan, 129
Melle, Ullrich, 264, 341, 343
memory,
  passim
  and retention, 432, 475
  and personal identity, 139, 144, 278, 503, 505, 515, 525–527, 534
  quasi-memory (Shoemaker), 527–534
meontology.
  viii, 89, 104–105, 131, 132, 269, 270, 339, 481
  vide, Je ne sais quoi
  vide, non-ascriptive, non-sortal referent metempsychosis, 493, 513–514, 520, 536, 523–532
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 132
Miller, Barry, 236, 237, 240, 265
Mohanty, Jiendra Nath, 61, 541
Montaigne, Michel de, 251, 265
Moran, Richard, 263, 422
Moore, G.E., 343
mineness, vide ownness
  “myself” (central notion of this work), passim
  precise determination of term, 124 ff.
  equivalent of anonymous functioning I, passim
  not ephemeral, 79
  not achievement of indexical “I”, 77 ff.
  ineluctable self-awareness of, 81 ff.
  propertyless, non-sortal, 142 ff.
  unique essence or haecceity, 144, 146 ff.
  as abstracted from person, 165
  manifest in personal individuality of Other that love reveals, aims at and celebrates, vide love
  as what respect reveals of Other, vide respect
  as hyper-essence, 280, 284, 290, 293, 315
  as simple, 296
  as immaterial substance, 355–358
  ontological origin of, 299, 454 ff.
  problem of physical origin of, 387 ff.
  and tautological properties, 313 ff.
  and duration and temporal continuity, 319 ff.
  and temporality, vide temporalization
  and Chapter VII
  essence of includes existence, eidos
  includes fact, 415 ff.
“myself” (central notion of this work), passim (cont.)

Wordsworth’s theory of pre-existence of, 454 ff.
identity of not tied to memory, 523–559

myself as myself, vide "I"
unique guise of “I”, 76 and internal reflexive reference, 76 ephemeral, 79
mystery, 36, 223, 226, 236, 242, 247, 249, 250, 278, 310, 339, 380, 423

N
Nabert, Jean, 132, 438
Nagel, Thomas, 61, 366, 419, 421
Naragon, Steve, 344

natural attitude (see also transcendental attitude), 3, 6, 9–13, 26, 36 ff., 41 ff., 345 ff.

privileging of, 353

Nicolas of Cusa, 14

non-ascriptive self-reference, 68, 69, 71, 74, 88, 92, 117, 121, 126, 127, 128, 134, 142, 147, 149, 150, 160–161, et passim
alleged deficient mode of knowing, 333–336
vide indexicals
vide "I"
vide self-awareness

vide proper names

non-ascriptive presence and self-presence, 126, 181, 226, 239, 240, 277, 277, 289, 299, 308, 534, vide non-reflective self-awareness

non-sortal referent, 88, 121, 127, 128, 149, 150, 151, 164, 169, 235
what love intends, 214, 223, 235, 241, 254, 261, 273

vide self-awareness
vide "myself"
vide “I”’s referent
vide Je ne sais quoi
vide non-ascriptive presence and self-presence

Noonan, Harold, 544
nostalgia, 454 ff.

Nozick, Robert, 130

numerical identity (numerical difference and distinctiveness), 28, 69, 89, 144, 158, 162, 169, 266, 279, 291, 292, 308, 313, 317, 323–333, 326, 328, 329, 343, 505, 520
Kant on, 328 ff.

Russell on 329
Späemann on, 329, 332
Hönigswald on, 330 ff.

qualitative in contrast to numerical, 266, 288, 325, 327–329

vide identity

Nussbaum, Martha, 242, 247, 257, 265, 266, 267

O
Oldenski, Andrew, 129

Oliver, Mary, 487

one, (odd pronoun), 194 ff.

ontological value (von Hildebrand), 253–255
ontological argument, 48, 414–417

Ortega y Gasset, José., 148, 169, 173, 263, 264, 265

Owen, Joseph, 341

ownness, Chapter III

inseparable feature of “myself” and ipseity, 133 ff.
and possessive pronouns “own” and “my,” 134
pervasiveness of I’s being what it has, 134 ff.
objective sense presupposes non-objective, 138
other ownness, 145

vide “I can”

P

panpsychism, 365–367, 395

paradox,

general phenomenology of (Kläuber and Dubislav), 345 ff.
of the transcendental and natural attitudes, 346 ff., 384 ff.
of transcendental person, 346 ff., 384 ff.
solutions to, 345 ff.
of epiphenomenalism or eliminativism, 348, 379–380
of being in the world and transcendental subjectivity, 384 ff.
of procreation, 387 ff.
of one’s birth, 392–393
of bodily spatiality, 393 ff.
of death of transcendental person, 447–449

Parfit, Derek, 129, 141, 169

Pascal, Blaise, 231, 232, 247, 265

Pasnau, Robert, 542

Pape, Helmut, 341

Pennington, A. Basil, 267

performatives, see illocutions
person, vide “I”, “myself,” etc.
history and etymology, 161–162
and “personality,” 163 ff.
distinguished from ipseity or “myself,”
161 ff.
whether a sortal term, 149 ff., 164 ff.,
280 ff.
DSM IV on, 162
Allport on, 163–164
Jaspers on, 164
especially historical and intersubjective,
166 ff.
signature features and uniqueness of,
165–168
problem of a double, 166–168
constituted by intersubjectivity, 202 ff., 225
and inherent radiance or dignity, vide
dignity
as alleged immaterial substance, 356
identity of and free imaginative variation
of one’s personal essence, 488–491
identity of as tied to body, intelligence,
gender, character, and social world,
488–503
identity of tied to memory, 523 ff., 534 ff.
teleology of, 293, vide entelechy
and true self
perspective (viewpoint, standpoint),
must be first-personal if lived, 118–121
second- and third-personal tied to first-
personal, 14
perspectival guise inseparable from
standpoint, 32
always of something, 32 ff.
referent of perspectival guises not inferred,
32 ff.
presenced being enriched by 12
Plantinga, Alvin, 28 ff.
phenomenology, Chapter I and passim, vide
transcendental reduction,
Plotinus, 151, 152, 265
possible world
theory and phenomenology, 15, 17, 19,
22–32, 49, 417, 501
and indexicality, 26 ff.
and quasi-memory, 529–534
Prall, D.W., 64
pre-existence of ipseity
contrast with dread of post-existence,
454 ff.
Wordsworth on, 454 ff.
and nostalgia, 454
Schopenhauer on, 455
Prestige, G.L., 170
Price, H.H., 503–508
procreation, 387 ff.
proper names,
not an instance of a kind, 182
refers to unique individual in herself,
182 ff.
Husserl on, 182 ff.
Kripke on, 183
reference can be both ascriptive
and non-ascriptive, 184
and one’s good name, 185
Proust, Marcel, 454, 456, 457
Pruefer, Thomas, 4, 34, 61, 91, 92, 130
psychophysical, vide regional ontology
physical explanations of soul, mental, etc.,
369 ff., 372 ff.
transphysical (Conrad-Martius), 366–367
procreation, 387 ff.
Putnam, Hilary, 10, 41, 381 ff., 420
Q
quasi-memory, vide memory
R
reflection, 125
first-personal act, 19
presupposes non- and pre-reflective,
passin
not to be equated with phenomenological
reflection, 37–38
reflection theory of self-awareness, 9, 273,
334, 519
regional ontology
as typically third-person enterprise, 348 ff.
Strawson’s, 348 ff.
problem of psychophysical relations,
individualization within, 167–168
and procreation, 387 ff.
Reinach, Adolf, 263
reincarnation, 513–518, 520–527, 534–539
respect, 257–259, 287, 397, 398, 399, 404–
409, 509
resurrection of body,
vide after life
vide immortality
Christian view, 508 ff.
Properties of resurrected body, 509
Price’s spiritualist interpretation of, 510
Ricoeur, Paul, 129, 263
Rilke, Rainer Maria, 267, 397–399, 421
Rogers, Carl, 45
S

Sacks, Oliver, 340
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 89, 90, 114, 115, 117, 130, 131, 171, 297, 395, 407, 408, 421, 422, 479
Scary, Elaine, 64
Scheler, Max, 165, 235, 264, 265, 266, 350, 449
Scotus, vide Duns Scotus
Schöttle, John, 358, 419, 420
self, vide “myself,” person, “I,” true self
prior non-reflective acquaintance with, 77 ff.
etymological root of, 77
bundle theory of, 114
(Buddhist) no ownership theory of, 82–89, 114
self-awareness
non-reflective, non-intentional,
non-identifying, vide “myself,” and viii,
problematic sense of knowing, 275 ff.
and prior acquaintance, 77 ff., 272 ff.
vide appearing, monist theory of
vide non-sortal referent
vide non-ascriptive reference
pre-reflective, 13, 92, 94, 107, 109, 111, 127, 134, 135, 159, 169, 200, 324, 329, 346, 431, 480, 490
ineluctable, 81 ff., 109 ff.
self-luminosity, 105 ff., 478–481

sleep,
as problematic phenomenalistic theme, 459–460
not intentional act, 461
not transitive verb, 461
opposite of concentration, 463, 466
as “brother of death,” 463 ff.
and one’s life, 464
problems in awareness of its beginning, duration, and ending, 464 ff.
and willing, 466–469
analogy with death, 467
Husserlian analogy with dormant horizons, 470
Husserl’s claim that even in deepest sleep there is still an ongoing Erleben 466, 472
H.D. Lewis on deep sleep as equivalent to death and annihilation, 472–474, 476 and primal “flow,” 473–476
proximity to state of ultimate liberation in Vedanta, 478, 479, 483
Sokolowski, Robert, 6, 34, 35, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 91, 129, 130, 131, 149, 154, 168, 169, 170, 195, 205, 264, 266, 285, 341, 343, 347, 381, 420, 449, 481–482, 530, 541, 542, 543
soul
and psyche, 151
senses in Husserl, 152 ff.
and levels of sensibility the I has, 153
whether the source of spirit, 154 ff.
origin of, 155
space, spatiality, 393–400
Spaemann, Robert, 149, 150, 212, 244, 264, 266, 329, 332, 340, 341, 343, 422
Index

Spinoza, Benedict, 436, 439, 445, 450
Steeves, H. Peter, 420
Strachey, James, 128
Strawson, Peter, 285, 341, 348–351, 359, 361, 418
Suarez, S.J., Francisco, 317, 342, 343
substance, substrate,
  general notion of, 300 ff.
  and Aristotle, 300 ff.
  “this-here” as, 340
typically conceived from a third-person
  perspective, 301–307
typically a thing-ontology, 301–306
  and second-person, 306
  and first-person, 307 ff.
  Kant on I as, 322–323, 336
  Bolzano on I as, 342
  and “I know not what,” 307–308
  and “the thing itself in itself in the flesh,” 301 ff.
  as whole concrete thing, 303 ff.
  and radical essence theory, 304 ff.
  and attributes/perspectives, 303
  and bundles, 197, 300–302
  and bare particulars, 285, 286, 303, 338
  bare, 303 ff.
  person’s body as, 285
  Strawson on person as, 348 ff.
  as target of demonstratives, 286
  Swinburne, 216, 265

T
Talbott, Steve, 61
tautological properties (of unique essence
  of “myself”), 313 ff., 337
teleology of person, 293
vide entelechy,
  vide true self
telepathy,
  mode of communication in afterlife,
  (Price), 504
  and postulate of a common
  unconsciousness, 504
  Husserlian critique of Price’s view,
  505 ff.
teletransportation (thought-experiment, Parfit
  and Klawonn), 141 ff.
vide substrate, individual, non-ascriptive
  third-person, see empathic presencing
  virtual second person, 189

Thoma, Heather, 62
Tillich, Paul, 88, 130
time,
  awareness of in natural attitude, 429 ff.
  of acts, 430 ff. 449–450
  awareness of in transcendental attitude,
  429 ff.
  awareness constituted by passive synthesis,
  43, 56, 57, 69, 80, 97, 121, 140, 153,
  157, 333, 377, 401, 432, 468, 489, 528
  problem of the temporality of the
  awareness of now, 434 ff., vide eternity
  problem of the awareness and temporality
  of “the flow” (Husserl), 435 ff.,
  473–476
temporizing, primal, 89 ff., 135–136,
  155, 308–309, 318–321, 432, 446–47,
  473–474
beginninglessness and endlessness of
  transcendental I as primal presencing,
  446–449
Traheme, Thomas, 2, 61, 65, 128
transcendental I, Chapter II,
  vide “I”
  agent and dative of manifestation, 93
  unique essence as referent, 104
  contrast with indexical “I,” 67, 94
  and person, vide person and 157–161,
  et passim
  necessity of its being, 411–418
  essence of includes fact, 415 ff.
  necessity of its being itself and not
  someone else, 413 ff.
  ineliminability of, 70, 78, 78, 332, 369,
  413 ff.
  temporality and, Chapter VII
  beginninglessness and unendingness of,
  Chapter VII
  problem of unconscious death of, 447 ff.
  transcendental person, 400–403
  as microcosm, 409 ff.
  necessity of its being, 411 ff.
  paradox of birth and death of, 442–449
  transcendental or phenomenological
  attitude
  12, 96, 287, 345 ff.
  bracketing the world, 37–41
  epoché 41 ff.
  reduction, 36 ff., 403–405
  parallels in natural attitude toward
  art, 46 ff.
  and sleep, 42
  and psychotherapy, 44 ff.
  and play and fiction, 43 ff.
  motive for, 52 ff.
transcendental or phenomenological attitude (cont.)
dialogue in the solitude of, 55 ff.
and paradox, 345 ff.
Troisfontaines, Roger, 421
true self, 21, 88, 175, 227, 230, 241, 250, 293,
439, 498
Truscott, Stephen, 185, 263
Tugendhat, Ernst, 340

U
unique uniqueness of I, its singularity, passim
vide individual, individuation
displayed before one’s “double,” 143 ff.
paradox of the universality of, 146 ff.
awareness of, vide also ownness, 158–160
vide self-awareness
vide “myself”
vide haecceity

V
Valéry, Paul, 419
value,
   general, 11, 117, 185, 204–208, 243, 254,
   258–261
   and ipseity, 210, 214, 225, 229, 237, 239,
   242, 405 ff.
   ontological value (von Hildebrand),
   253–255
vide dignity
Vannoy, Russell, 267
Vedanta, vide Shankara
on witness consciousness, 477 ff.
equivalence of non-reflective self-awareness or witness consciousness
and Brahma, 477-479
deep sleep as return to pure state of
on-reflective awareness, 478, 479, 483
Vijnavadin critique of Vedanta witness-consciousness, 480 ff.
and Zahavi’s critique of Brough-Sokolowski position, 481–482
Volkelt, Johannes, 265, 340, 341, 422
Von Hildebrand, Dietrich, 253–255, 267
Von Hoffmannsthal, Hugo, 265

W
Waddington, C.H., 420
waking, 461 ff.
Waugh, Evelyn, 265
Weil, Simone, 82 ff., 129, 154, 263, 264, 266

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 68, 69, 76, 78, 94,
128, 564
“who” one is
not exhausted by or reducible to
identifiable person or “what” one is,
passim, 96, 140 ff., 270 ff., 275 ff, 316,
338
knowing who one is, 270 ff., 275 ff., 238
problem of its “irrationality,” 277 (vide
mystery)
not a deficient “what,” 280
a hyper-essence, 280, 284
vide person, “myself,” unique essence
Wolter, Allen B., 149
Wordsworth, William, 454–457, 539
world
as ground and horizon, 42
and fictional world, 44
as target of reduction, 49 ff.
compare to reference of “I”, 78
being-in-the world and Dasein, 100 ff.

Y
Yeats, William Butler, 267
“you”
most exciting and dramatic indexical, 173
problem of reducibility to another personal
form, 173–174
presence/absence of, 174 ff.
a form of presencing, 174–190
in scientific discourse, 177 ff.
in vocative form, non-ascriptive,
181–182
when substrate of predication, 192–194
addresses Other directly through but
beyond properties, 181 ff.
and proper names, 181 ff.
and the face, 185
and one’s double, 188 ff.
ways of suppressing, 180 ff.
and “he” and “she”, 189
as importunity and invocation, 190 ff.
“one” as substitute for, 194 ff.
senses in which other “myself,” “another
I,” 197 ff.
second first-person, 213
“authors” me as person, not as “myself,”
202 ff.

Z
Zahavi, Dan, 61, 129, 131, 132, 146, 169, 420,
481–482, 541