Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/77150
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dc.contributor.authorBland, Steven-
dc.contributor.editorSteven Bland,Huron University College at Western Universityen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-29T08:34:52Z-
dc.date.available2019-07-29T08:34:52Z-
dc.date.issued2018-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-319-94673-3-
dc.identifier.urihttp://10.6.20.12:80/handle/123456789/77150-
dc.descriptionThis book is a study of twin threats that strike at the heart of analytic philosophy: Pyrrhonian scepticism and epistemic relativism. Scepticism and relativism are often understood as epistemic doctrines whose main purpose is to undermine philosophers’ views about knowledge and justifcation. Sceptics claim that none of our beliefs can be properly justifed, and therefore knowledge of any kind is unattainable. Relativists maintain that knowledge and justifcation can be attained, but only within systems of presuppositions and methods whose epistemic authority is unavoidably local. In either case, philosophers cannot possess the kind of absolute knowledge they think of themselves as having or striving towards.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherPalgrave Macmillanen_US
dc.subjectEpistemic Relativismen_US
dc.titleEpistemic Relativism and Scepticismen_US
dc.typeBooken_US
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