Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/76305
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dc.contributor.authorSchulting, Dennis-
dc.contributor.editorDennis Schultingen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-23T08:42:24Z-
dc.date.available2019-07-23T08:42:24Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-137-53517-7-
dc.identifier.urihttp://10.6.20.12:80/handle/123456789/76305-
dc.descriptionOne of the most frequently quoted statements from Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is that “thoughts without content are empty, [and] intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B75). Ever since John McDowell’s seminal book based on his Locke lectures, Mind and World, first published in 1994, this dictum, which can be taken as exemplifying the salient point of Kant’s epistemological argument in the Critique, has been associated with a general Kantian approach to solving issues in the theory of knowledge that concern the justification of our beliefs about the world and the possibility of perceptual knowledge. In particular, McDowell referred to it as an apt metaphor for seeing a solution to bridging any supposed gap between our mental states or beliefs and the world of sensible objects to which our beliefs must be answerable. The intertwinement of sense content (Kant’s “intuition”) and conceptuality, of which this dictum appears to speak, gives us a sense of how objects constrain our judgements, thoughts and beliefs about them, without resorting to explanations that either succumb to the Myth of the Given or rest content with a form of coherentism.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherPalgrave Macmillanen_US
dc.subjectNonconceptualismen_US
dc.titleKantian Nonconceptualismen_US
dc.typeBooken_US
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