Title:	Fair Queueing
Authors:	Youngsub Chun B. Dutta, W. Gaertner, C. Herrero B. Klaus, P.K. Pattanaik, K. Suzumura, W. Thomson,
Keywords:	Fair
Issue Date:	2016
Publisher:	Springer
Description:	Consider a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs. The queueing problem is concerned with finding the order in which to serve agents and the (positive or negative) monetary transfers they should receive. We assume that an agent’s waiting cost is constant per unit of time, but that agents differ in their waiting costs. Each agent’s utility is equal to the amount of her monetary transfer minus her total waiting cost. An allocation consists of each agent’s position in the queue and the monetary transfer to her. An allocation is feasible if no two agents are assigned to the same position and the sum of transfers is not positive. An allocation rule, or simply a rule, associates with each problem a nonempty subset of feasible allocations. A queueing problem arises when agents cannot coordinate on the time when they want to have a service (long queues at the grocery store, ATM machines, etc). Even if they can coordinate, all of them might have the same preferences, that is, all wants to have earlier service than later. The examples can easily be found in real life. Due to an ice storm, many business firms want to repair their electrical systems at the same time. All faculty members in the economics department want to move a new building at the same time. Many consumers want to implement a new computer program in their computers. Many researchers want to use a supercomputer or an expensive research facility.1
URI:	http://10.6.20.12:80/handle/123456789/54162
ISBN:	978-3-319-33771-5
Appears in Collections:	Population Studies

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