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192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/53669
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Leonid Grinin Andrey Korotayev | - |
dc.contributor.editor | Sheying Chen Jason L. Powell | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-03-14T06:11:39Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-03-14T06:11:39Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-3-319-17780-9 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://10.6.20.12:80/handle/123456789/53669 | - |
dc.description | Since man fi rst forged metal tools and started farming for his food, thus emerging from the stone age, no event in human history has had a greater impact than the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During that span, Europeans increased their use of fossil fuel energy by several orders of magnitude, began to use that fossil fuel energy to produce motive power as well as heat, and developed a host of high-effi ciency industrial processes and new modes of transportation, with spillovers into military technology as well. As a result, Europeans went from “underdeveloped” nations, who mainly traded raw materials and bullion for the manufactured and plantation goods of the “developed” world of Asia (cotton and silk textiles; ceramics and lacquer ware and tropical woods; coffee, tea, indigo, nuts, and spices), and who were allowed limited trading roles on the suffrage of India, China, and Japan, to the world’s center of manufacturing and manufactured exports, with military dominance and the ability to dictate terms of trade to the major Asian societies. The shorthand summary of this process for the last two centuries has been the “Rise of the West” and explaining it has been one of the central questions of the social sciences. The traditional view since the time of Karl Marx and Max Weber, extended by twentieth century scholars such as William McNeil (1963, 1990) and David Landes (1998), was that since the middle ages, Europe was a uniquely creative society that advanced in agriculture, accounting, use of wind and water power, and craftsmanship, while Asian societies reached their peak of development in the medieval period, and thereafter simply maintained themselves in a kind of “frozen” state of development or even declined. While in the medieval period the societies of Abbasid Islam and Song China might have started at a higher level of economic productivity and technology than Europe, the “rise” of European productivity and technology over the succeeding centuries led to European global domination by the nineteenth century. | - |
dc.language | en | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
dc.subject | Great Divergence | en_US |
dc.title | Great Divergence and Great Convergence | en_US |
dc.type | Book | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Population Studies |
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