Does Game Theory Work? : The Bargaining Challenge

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/5005

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Ken, Binmore	-
dc.date.accessioned	2018-09-26T09:06:33Z	-
dc.date.available	2018-09-26T09:06:33Z	-
dc.date.issued	2007	-
dc.identifier.isbn	978-0-262-02607-9	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://10.6.20.12:80/handle/123456789/5005	-
dc.description	The case of bargaining is a particularly challenging case for game theory—perhaps the most challenging case of all. Everyone agrees that human behavior in real-life bargaining situations is governed at least partly by fairness considerations that we don’t understand very well. But what happens when such fairness considerations conflict with gametheoretic predictions in the laboratory? Will people adapt their behavior so that they end up playing a novel bargaining game strategically? Or must we expect them simply to play fair?	-
dc.language	en	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.publisher	Massachusetts Institute	en_US
dc.subject	Game theory	en_US
dc.title	Does Game Theory Work? : The Bargaining Challenge	en_US
dc.type	Book	en_US
Appears in Collections:	Social Work

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