Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/105211
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dc.contributor.authorROBERT M. BOWEN, SHIVARAM RAJGOPAL, MOHAN VENKATACHALAM-
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-10T06:33:51Z-
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-15T23:01:46Z-
dc.date.available2020-02-10T06:33:51Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-15T23:01:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://196.189.45.87:8080/handle/123456789/105211-
dc.descriptionIn this paper, we explicitly consider efficient contracting as a plausible alternative hypothesis and investigate whether accounting discretion is explained largely by efficient contracting or by managerial opportunism. In the first-stage tests, we assess the relation between an index of accounting discretion (composed of absolute abnormal accruals, earnings smoothing through accruals, reporting small positive surprises) and proxies for efficient contracting and governance variables. Similar to prior research, we find associations between poor governance quality and accounting discretion.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectAccounting Discretion, Corporate Governanceen_US
dc.titleAccounting Discretion, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performanceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
Appears in Collections:Accounting and Finance

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