Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/105209
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dc.contributor.authorNaser M. AbuGhazaleh, Osama M. Al-Hares, Clare Roberts-
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-10T06:31:05Z-
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-15T23:01:47Z-
dc.date.available2020-02-10T06:31:05Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-15T23:01:47Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://196.189.45.87:8080/handle/123456789/105209-
dc.descriptionThis study examines managers’ use of discretion in determining goodwill impairment losses following the mandatory adoption of IFRS 3 “Business Combinations,” and whether this discretion reflects opportunistic reporting by managers or the provision of their private information. Although IFRS 3 was issued to improve the accounting treatment for goodwill and provide users with more useful and value-relevant information regarding the underlying economic value of goodwill, it has been criticized on the grounds of the managerial discretion inherent in impairment testing.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing-
dc.subjectAccounting Discretion in GoodwillImpairmentsen_US
dc.titleAccounting Discretion in GoodwillImpairments: UK Evidenceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
Appears in Collections:Accounting and Finance

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