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192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/105191
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | FRANK GIGLER, CHANDRA KANODIA, HARESH SAPRA, AND RAGHU VENUGOPALAN | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-02-10T06:16:48Z | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-05-15T23:01:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-02-10T06:16:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-05-15T23:01:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://196.189.45.87:8080/handle/123456789/105191 | - |
dc.description | In this paper we examine how accounting conservatism affects the efficiency of debt contracting. We develop the statistical and informational properties of accounting reports under varying degrees of conditional and unconditional accounting conservatism, consistent with Basu’s [1997] description of differential verifiability standards. Optimal debt covenants and interest rates on debt are derived from a natural tension between debt holders and equity claimants. | en_US |
dc.language | English | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | University of Chicago | - |
dc.subject | Accounting Conservatism | en_US |
dc.title | Accounting Conservatism and theEfficiency of Debt Contracts | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Accounting and Finance |
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