Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/105191
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dc.contributor.authorFRANK GIGLER, CHANDRA KANODIA, HARESH SAPRA, AND RAGHU VENUGOPALAN-
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-10T06:16:48Z-
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-15T23:01:45Z-
dc.date.available2020-02-10T06:16:48Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-15T23:01:45Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://196.189.45.87:8080/handle/123456789/105191-
dc.descriptionIn this paper we examine how accounting conservatism affects the efficiency of debt contracting. We develop the statistical and informational properties of accounting reports under varying degrees of conditional and unconditional accounting conservatism, consistent with Basu’s [1997] description of differential verifiability standards. Optimal debt covenants and interest rates on debt are derived from a natural tension between debt holders and equity claimants.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago-
dc.subjectAccounting Conservatismen_US
dc.titleAccounting Conservatism and theEfficiency of Debt Contractsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
Appears in Collections:Accounting and Finance

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