Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/105187
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dc.contributor.authorMICHAEL J. SMITH-
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-10T06:13:48Z-
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-15T23:01:46Z-
dc.date.available2020-02-10T06:13:48Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-15T23:01:46Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://196.189.45.87:8080/handle/123456789/105187-
dc.descriptionThis study addresses conservatism in financial reporting. Conservatism is usually defined in terms of accounting regulations requiring higher verification standards for profits than for losses. Empirical researchers have documented conservatism in returns-based approaches (see Basu 1997), in which conservatism is measured as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings to bad and good news, and in balance sheet approaches (see Penman and Zhang 2002), in which conservatism is measured as the degree of understatement of assets and income.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectAccounting Conservatismen_US
dc.titleAccounting Conservatism and the Efficient Provisionof Capital to Privately Informed Firmsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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