Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 192.168.6.56/handle/123456789/10099
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dc.contributor.authorKwame ., Akonor-
dc.contributor.editorMolefi Asante-
dc.contributor.editorMolefi Asante-
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-12T14:23:50Z-
dc.date.available2018-10-12T14:23:50Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.isbn0-415-97947-1-
dc.identifier.urihttp://10.6.20.12:80/handle/123456789/10099-
dc.descriptionTo reverse economic stagnation and decline of the 1980s, a majority of countries in sub Saharan Africa (SSA) turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, or Fund) and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for loans.1 The IMF, which lends to member countries for balance-of-payment support, generally requires borrowing governments to make explicit commitments to implement remedial policies that the IMF deems essential to the amelioration of the borrowing country’s external payments problems.The linking of the disbursement of a loan to “actions, or promises of actions, made by recipient governments only at the insistence of aid providers;measures that would not otherwise be undertaken, or not within the time frame desired by the providers” is referred to as conditionality2 (Killick, 1998: 6; Mosley, 1992: 129).en_US
dc.languageenen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherRoutledgeen_US
dc.subjectStructural adjustment (Economic policy)--Ghanaen_US
dc.titleAfrica and IMF conditionality :en_US
dc.title.alternativeThe Unevenness of Compliance, 1983-2000en_US
dc.typeBooken_US
Appears in Collections:African Studies

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