



G.H. MEAD A READER

EDITED BY
FILIPE CARREIRA DA SILVA

ROUTLEDGE 

G. H. Mead

This book introduces social scientists to the ideas of George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) – one of the most original yet neglected thinkers of early twentieth-century sociology.

Mead is an exceptional case among sociological classics in that, until now, there has been no comprehensive reader of his work. As the first one-volume, comprehensive edited collection of Mead's published and unpublished writing, this book fills this gap. It is the first to critically assess all of Mead's writings and draw out the aspects that are central to his system of thought. The book is divided into three parts (social psychology, science and epistemology, and democratic politics), comprising a total of 30 chapters – a third of which are published here for the first time.

G. H. Mead: A Reader provides a unique and timely contribution to the understanding of this key theorist. It is essential reading for both undergraduate and postgraduate students in the fields of sociology, social psychology, philosophy of social science, social and cultural anthropology, and social and political theory.

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A Reader

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*Edited by
Filipe Carreira da Silva*

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Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	viii
<i>Introduction</i>	ix
<i>Biographical summary</i>	xxiii
PART I	
Mead on the social self	1
I. The statement of the problem	1
1 The definition of the psychical	3
2 Social psychology as counterpart to physiological psychology	15
3 On the self and teleological behavior	21
II. The “I” and the “me” as phases of the self	45
4 What social objects must psychology presuppose?	47
5 The mechanism of social consciousness	53
6 The social self	58

III. The self and the social order	63
7 A behavioristic account of the significant symbol	65
8 The genesis of the self and social control	70
9 On the state and social control	86
10 Cooley's contribution to American social thought	89
PART II	
Mead on science and epistemology	99
I. The statement of the problem	99
11 Suggestions toward a theory of the philosophical disciplines	101
12 On Darwin's Theory of Evolution	112
13 The nature of scientific knowledge	122
II. Philosophy and history of science	133
14 The origins of Greek philosophy	135
15 The dualism of representational consciousness and a mechanical world	144
16 A pragmatic theory of truth	156
III. Science applied	171
17 Science in social practice	173
18 On social consciousness and social science	183
IV. Time and social order	193
19 The objective reality of perspectives	195
20 The nature of the past	204

PART III	
Mead, a radical democrat	211
I. Moral and political philosophy	211
21 The philosophical basis of ethics	213
22 Natural rights and the theory of the political institution	221
23 Scientific method and the moral sciences	233
II. Crime, social reform and labour relations	245
24 On the role of social settlements	247
25 Social bearings of industrial education	254
26 The psychology of punitive justice	264
III. War, national identity and citizenship	281
27 The psychological basis of internationalism	283
28 On nationalism, industrial rights, and social conflict	293
29 How can a sense of citizenship be secured?	303
30 National-mindedness and international-mindedness	310
<i>G. H. Mead works</i>	324

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Introduction

The problems of social theory must be research problems.

G. H. Mead

George Herbert Mead is the only sociological classic who never wrote a book. In 1911, he came close to publishing his first book. But at the last minute, with the galley proofs already in his hands, he changed his mind. He kept writing regularly for scientific journals, for edited books and newspapers, but he never himself wrote a book. Neither did he collect his numerous writings into book form. The implications of this circumstance were serious. For the most part, the texts that granted Mead a place next to Marx, Durkheim and Weber in the sociological canon were not written by Mead himself. Consider the famous *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934). The transcript that would later be used by Charles Morris to construct this volume is the work of a professional stenographer, W.T. Lillie, who was hired to record Mead's offering of his popular social psychology course in the winter of 1928. The same is true of *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (1936), based upon stenographic notes from a course with the same title. *The Philosophy of the Act* (1938) is not much different either. Only the *Philosophy of the Present*, based upon Mead's Carus Lectures of 1930, can be safely attributed to Mead. These books, in particular *Mind, Self, and Society*, have been the entry-point to Mead's ideas for every generation ever since. In a recent social theory reader, which included selections from over a dozen authors from Marx to Foucault, the only classic whose writings were not his own was Mead.¹ It is nothing short of remarkable that almost 80 years after Mead's death social scientists still lack a comprehensive volume that convey his ideas in the first person. This is what this anthology sets out to accomplish.

Let me begin with what this volume is *not*. This is not a complete edition of Mead's writings. His writings span over half a century (1881–1931) and include over 100 items, from short book reviews and fragments to longer pieces like articles, book chapters

and hand-written manuscripts. His personal correspondence is also substantial. The complete edition of Mead's work would encompass several volumes and require considerable editorial effort. This book has a different aim: to provide the reader with a selection of Mead's writings on the several topics which interested him. This brings me to the second thing this anthology does not offer. I have not included in this collection any text whose authorial status is questionable. More specifically, I have kept out the numerous transcriptions of Mead's lectures taken by either students or professional stenographers. Over the years these have played an important role in making Mead's ideas known to social scientists. But at what cost, one may ask. There are plenty of good reasons not to rely on such materials as the basic introduction to Mead's work: just consider the omissions and possible mistakes of interpretation students may have made in their notes. More importantly, consider the consequences of poor editorial work. In Morris's creative edition of *Mind, Self, and Society* this goes as far as preventing the reader from knowing what were Mead's words and what were Morris's additions – "social behaviorism", the label that later generations came to associate with Mead's social psychology, is actually Morris's term.² Mead never used this concept to describe his position.

As a consequence, this volume includes only texts whose authorial status has been established beyond any doubt. The selection criteria of these texts, the order by which they are presented, and the overall logic of the volume are discussed in the following section. The history of the reception of Mead's ideas in sociology is the topic of the next section. Finally, in the last section I discuss why we should read Mead today. My answer is twofold. First, Mead should be read in his own terms: only in this way will we learn the most from his work. Second, from the vantage point of today's social sciences, Mead's work offers a social theoretical foundation for a dialogical conception of action and rationality. Contrary to individualist models (say, rational choice models), Mead's conception of human action and rationality is thoroughly social – without social, cooperative life, there would be no selves. Language is but a product of this social experience, thousands of years old. Upon this foundation, Mead erects a dialogical social theory that he applies to numerous phenomena, from human thought processes and small-scale social interactions to large-scale processes typical of societies' shift to modernity, in the realms of science, politics, warfare, and social issues.

How this volume is organized

The first criterion I followed in selecting these texts refers to their authorship. This is an important question insofar as there are three main categories of written materials available for the Mead scholar. First, there are those texts that were published by Mead. Journal articles and book chapters fill this category in the most obvious way. Other texts, like notes written by Mead in preparation for his lectures, were never published but there is no doubt that they were penned by Mead (sometimes, literally so: a sizeable portion of the texts being published here for the first time are hand-written). These unpublished manuscripts, which include Mead's correspondence, constitute a second category. A third category is constituted by texts that have not been written by Mead but nevertheless provide us with access to his ideas. I refer to

the transcripts of Mead's lectures written either by students or professional stenographers. Texts from all three categories can and have been used to study Mead's ideas. But, as explained above, I find it hard to accept that Mead is the only sociological classic who does not speak to us directly. Hence my decision to circumscribe the texts considered for selection in this volume to only the first two categories, i.e. texts that have been written by Mead.

With this material to hand, I applied a relevance criterion to choose which texts to include. Given the amount of texts in question, this was arguably the most difficult part of my work and an unavoidably subjective one. The texts presented here are what I consider to be the most relevant of Mead's contributions to contemporary social sciences. Two other criteria were followed in selecting these texts. First, they are presented in chronological order. This allows one to appreciate the evolution in time of Mead's treatment of a certain topic. Second, this selection of Mead's writings covers the three main areas around which Mead's thinking developed: (1) the human self, (2) science and epistemology and (3) radical democratic politics. By bringing together these three key aspects of Mead's philosophical inquiry, the volume will allow the reader to appreciate the webbed quality of Mead's work, and search out commonalities and connections across the different areas it covers.

In short, this anthology offers three things. First, around a third of the texts included here have never been published before. The importance of this fact needs no further justification beyond the observation that Mead is generally considered to be one of the most neglected figures in American social thought. I am certain that the publication of these texts will make a decisive contribution to changing this situation. Second, the way this volume is organized will shed completely new light on the previously published articles. I refer to their relative location in the development of Mead's ideas over time, the conceptual links relating them to each other, and their relevance from the point of view of Mead's system of thinking. Third, students and academics will no longer have to resort to multiple volumes, sometimes poorly edited, in order to grasp the whole range of Mead's interests. By covering all major aspects of his work, this anthology provides a comprehensive presentation of Mead's thinking.

My aim has been to arrange the materials so that this volume reads like a book; a book on the social origins and nature of the human self, which can only be adequately studied from a scientific approach that does not reduce mental phenomena to externally observable behaviour. But this book also discusses how this scientific approach should be extended to the realm of morals and politics. The objectivity Mead praises in the experimental scientist, for instance, can be found in his depiction of the statesman as well as in his discussion of the "generalized other" in his social psychological writings. This is, of course, my reading of Mead (e.g. Silva 2007b, 2008). Readers are most welcome to interpret Mead in other ways. Individual chapters can thus be read on their own, and connections can be established between them as well as with other texts by Mead or by other authors. The main aim of this anthology is not so much to provide definite answers as to stimulate new questions. The study of Mead's ideas is a cooperative effort, made from a plurality of perspectives, and my selection of his writings has no other aim but to contribute to this cooperative enterprise.

The making of a sociological classic

The history of the reception of Mead's ideas in sociology is a multi-generational dialogue over the merits and relative positioning of his contributions (e.g. Jacobs 2009). Under certain conditions, this dialogue can become a heated discussion. On other occasions, these conversations are interrupted by more or less long periods of silence. In this regard, Mead is no different from other sociological classics. A case in point is Émile Durkheim. Long considered a conservative thinker, accused by many of ignoring social conflict in favour of order and social stability, there has been recently a re-appreciation of his legacy suggesting a more progressive positioning (see, for example, Turner 1992: xxiv–xxxv). The reception of Max Weber's ideas in sociology has been no less eventful. From Talcott Parsons's *The Structure of Social Action* (1937) in which Weber is depicted as a major sociological thinker alongside Marx, Pareto and Durkheim, to Raymond Aron and Robert Nisbet, who, in the 1960s, were pivotal in including the Weberian themes of rationalization, values and culture side by side with Marxist concerns with class struggle and the critique of capitalism as the great foundational sociological narratives, the history of the reception of Weber's work is inseparable from the history of sociology itself (Aron 1965–67; Nisbet 1967). These processes of canonization play an important role in the discipline's self-understanding and institutional affirmation. No less important, one cannot understand what "Weber" or "Durkheim" mean as significant symbols without a reference to such processes of disciplinary canonization. These refer to, among other things, the inclusion of the corpus of these authors in university curricula and the recurrent reference to their work as inspirational for contemporary research. Such processes of canonization are the material, institutional means by which, for instance, Max Weber became "Weber", the sociological classic. What sets the canonization of Mead apart from any other sociological classic is the textual basis upon which it was undertaken, something that is ultimately related to the peculiar and distinctive nature of his thinking – problem-driven, processual and always in a state of flux.

Let me briefly discuss the process by which Mead attained a classical status in sociological circles (see, for example, Silva 2006, 2007a). Herbert Blumer played a pivotal role in the earlier stages of this process. Mead's former assistant in Chicago in the early 1930s, Blumer soon occupied the position of "official interpreter" of Mead. In the ensuing decades, it was Blumer who established what was sociologically relevant in Mead's work and what was not (e.g. Blumer 1966). Of course, Blumer's reading of Mead cannot be easily separated from Blumer's symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1937: 171). Created as an alternative to Parsons's highly general and abstract structural functionalism, Blumer's symbolic interactionist approach focused instead on symbolically dense, face-to-face interactions (Blumer 1986). It was this particular school of sociological thought that first claimed Mead as a founding father, a process that unfolded gradually from the late 1930s through to the 1960s. The fact that during this period the basic introduction to Mead's work was *Mind, Self, and Society*, a transcript from a social psychology course, has certainly contributed to this situation. Since the 1970s, however, other interpretations of the sociological relevance of Mead's ideas have emerged. Two are worth noting here: Jürgen Habermas and Hans Joas.

Habermas, with his monumental *Theory of Communicative Action*, can be credited for having definitely established Mead as a sociological classic. Until the publication of this two-volume sociological treatise, Mead was the first of the symbolic interactionists. From now on, Mead's contributions to sociology are comparable to those of Marx, Weber, Simmel or Durkheim. In his treatise, Habermas argues that the central sociological theme of rationalization (of institutions such as the state or the economy, but also at the level of groups and individuals) can only be adequately analysed by reference to the work of Mead. It is in Mead's analysis of language as the primary mechanism of socialization and coordination of action³ that Habermas finds the conceptual elements he needs for the paradigm shift from instrumental to communicative action (Habermas 1987: 27). This does not prevent Habermas from accusing Mead of "idealism", that is, of systematically neglecting large-scale, structural social processes such as warfare, economics and politics. This is a harsh and unfair criticism of Mead. It is explained both by Habermas's presentist strategy (he tends to read Mead in light of his own interests, not in Mead's terms) and the poor editorial situation of Mead's writings. Joas did not fall victim to either of these problems. His long and often path-breaking years of archival research allowed him to carefully reconstruct the contexts in which Mead's thinking was developed (Joas 1985). In addition, this historically sensitive reading of Mead's work allowed Joas to develop his own social theory (Joas 1996).

Many other names besides those of Habermas and Joas could be cited here as Mead's work has kept attracting the attention of scholars around the world. With no pretension to completeness, I could indicate the names of Dmitri Shalin (1988), Andrew Feffer (1993), Gary Alan Cook (1993) or Axel Honneth (1996) as social scientists whose work has dealt directly with Mead's ideas in these last few decades. Still a far cry from other sociological classics, Mead scholarship is nonetheless a well-established and growing research area, with new applications of his ideas being found regularly (e.g. Konings 2010).

Why read Mead today

Different authors read Mead for different reasons. They also find in Mead different things. Yet behind this plurality of reasons and perspectives one finds something common to all of them. The shared element of this conversation with Mead is, of course, Mead's oeuvre. This set of texts contains a number of seminal ideas that have caught the interest of readers over the years. The portion of Mead's writings selected for this anthology includes what I consider to be his most brilliant ideas. My aim has been to give readers more reasons to read Mead and make use of his ideas. In what follows I summarize some of these reasons.

One reason why we should read Mead today is related to the modern problematic of selfhood, his most important contribution to sociology. Mead's conception of the social self, with the phases of the "I" and the "me", the attitude of the "generalized other", as well as the crucial mechanism of putting oneself in someone else's shoes, have served as inspiration for many of those unhappy with narrow instrumental

models of action and rationality. Part I includes Mead's most important writings on the subject. Turning to William James and John Dewey for inspiration, Mead dedicated most of his career to developing an alternative to the mechanical stimulus–response model of action. In particular, Mead rejected two things: the dualism between body and soul present in psychophysical parallelism, and introspectionism, against which he insisted on the social character of self-consciousness. One of the earliest instances of this continued effort can be found in 1903 “The Definition of the Psychological”, in which human subjectivity is identified with that phase of experience

within which we are immediately conscious of conflicting impulses which rob the object of its character as object-stimulus, leaving us in so far in an attitude of subjectivity; but during which a new object-stimulus appears due to the reconstructive activity which is identified with the subject “I” as, distinct from the object “me.”

In this definition, the distinction between the subject “I” and the object “me” (first introduced by James in his 1890 *Principles of Psychology*) allows Mead to clarify the relation between the psychological and the individual. To the former, Mead attributed the function of cognitive reconstruction of problematic situations. But what happened if it was the individual that was the object of such a reconstruction – could he still perform the reconstructive function responsible for his identity? No, if by the individual one means the empirical self, the “me”; only the “I”, the “self of unneccessitated choice, of undreamt hypotheses” can perform such a function. “On the self and teleological behavior” (Chapter 3) is being published here for the first time. Together with “The definition of the psychological” and “Social psychology as counterpart to physiological psychology” (Chapter 2), this text provides a good illustration of Mead's earlier attempts to define human subjectivity so as to avoid the dualism between inner experience and external conduct. Such attempts would prove nonetheless, as Mead would later concede, ineffectual (see Chapter 6). For one simple reason: whereas until the early 1900s Mead argued that one could access the “I” without the mediation of social experience, he would gradually abandon this position in favour of a more thoroughly social conception of the self.⁴

Chapters 4–6 show this development in Mead's thinking. In these chapters we can see Mead openly rejecting his earlier identification of the “I” with a pre-social, immediate flow of experience. His alternative, here developed in detail, points to an “I” that is no less socially constituted than the “me”. Both phases of the self are socially constituted, he now emphasizes. From the viewpoint of Mead's contributions to contemporary social theory, these texts are among his most complete statements on the social nature of the self. The last four chapters of Part I belong to a later phase of Mead's social psychology. One finds in them several themes of great sociological relevance. To begin with, there is the notion of “taking the attitude (or role) of the other”. Unlike Erving Goffman's dramaturgical approach (1959), one of the most innovative proposals to be developed within symbolic interactionism, Mead's notion has no theatrical implications. Mead is concerned not with social roles, but with

behavioural dispositions to respond in a similar way to other individuals responding to a given type of stimulus. With this social psychological mechanism Mead believes he is able to explain the social nature of thinking: by importing the attitudes of other individuals into our conduct, we are able to see the world from their perspective – thinking is then but a sort of “inner conversation”. Closely associated with Mead’s analysis of reflective intelligence are his notions of meaning and of the significant symbol. Consider a word as a significant symbol. For Mead, a word becomes a significant symbol when its carrier provokes, both in the individual uttering it and in the individual listening to it, a stimulus that is simultaneously a response. The meaning of a word emerges from social interaction, it is not something intrinsic to it. The sociological implications of this idea are far reaching. Consider the relation between the individual and society. Social order emerges from Mead’s account as a symbolically constructed reality, not as something natural or imposed on human beings by external institutions or conventions. Individuals are able to import the social attitudes of the community through what Mead terms the “generalized other”; only by doing so do they develop a complete self. There is no passive internalization of externally imposed social roles in Mead’s account. On the contrary, social actors actively interpret and reformulate in their minds the attitudes that are common to the group. From this insight Mead develops a highly original conception of social control. Society influences individual conduct in the form of the “generalized other”, who is internalized through the “me”. Social control, according to Mead, does not crush human individuality; rather, social control actually constitutes and is inextricably associated with that individuality (see Chapters 8 and 9). Taken together, these articles constitute the latest expression of Mead’s evolutionary, naturalistic and cooperative approach to the relation between the self and society – as he put it, his “scientific social psychology”.

This brings me to the second reason why one should read Mead today. I refer to his pragmatist understanding of science and epistemology. Contrary to what is generally believed, Mead taught and wrote extensively on this subject. Three of four of Mead’s posthumously published books are on history and philosophy of science – *The Philosophy of the Present* (1932), *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (1936) and *The Philosophy of the Act* (1938) – as well as numerous papers he published during his lifetime. Although less original than the epistemological writings by Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, Mead’s work nonetheless provides contemporary social scientists with a non-positivist yet non-relativistic answer to the question of how to study the social character of human consciousness in a scientific manner. In my view, he does so in a way unparalleled by any other classical pragmatist.

The selection of texts presented here is organized as follows. In the first three chapters one can see the basic tenets of Mead’s philosophy of science. In the 1900 “Suggestions Toward a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines” we have an early and important statement of his pragmatist epistemology: science is equated with the resolution of problems and the resulting conflicts between different lines of action by means of a specific method. This conception of science as a problem-solving procedure is a central feature of Mead’s thinking. Another essential element is evolutionary theory. In a paper published for the first time here, we can see Mead engaging directly with Charles

Darwin's ideas on the occasion of Darwin's centenary in 1909 (Chapter 12). Yet another important element of Mead's epistemology is the way in which he conceives of the problematizing attitude characteristic of modern experimental science as a logical extension of the emergence of the rational self. This is discussed in "The Nature of Scientific Knowledge", a paper probably written in the early 1920s (Chapter 13).

Chapters 14–18 are some of Mead's best writings on the history of science and on how science should be applied to concrete social problems. The first two have never been published before.⁵ In them one can see Mead analysing the historical origins of the philosophical disciplines discussed above, from Ancient Greece through the Renaissance all the way to the modern era. The protagonist of these narratives is reflective thinking, the social nature of which Mead never ceases to emphasize. "A Pragmatic Theory of Truth" is perhaps Mead's most important analysis on scientific knowledge and truth (Chapter 16). His point, similar to Dewey's, is that a correspondence theory of knowledge should be rejected in favour of a conception of science that does not separate knowledge from action. In the specific case of truth, Mead identifies it with a hypothesis that successfully reconstructs a problematic situation. As he puts it, there is no "such thing as Truth at large. It is always relative to the problematic situation". Moving beyond Dewey, Mead makes use of this social psychological theory to analyse science as a social reconstructive activity (Chapters 17 and 18). The last decade of Mead's career was devoted to the reconciliation of his social theory of human consciousness and the relativistic theory of the British philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. Mead and Whitehead's theories share the same emphasis on the "objectivity of perspectives" (Chapter 19): "mind as it appears in the mechanism of social conduct", Mead explains, "is the organization of perspectives in nature and at least a phase of the creative advance of nature". The last article I selected to illustrate Mead's philosophy of science is concerned with his ideas on time.⁶ Although relatively neglected by social theorists, a social scientific understanding of time remains hugely important. "The Nature of the Past" (Chapter 20) provides an accessible presentation of Mead's social theory of temporality.⁷ In a nutshell, Mead conceives of science as a problem-solving activity, the experimental scientific method is but a more complex form of human intelligence, and the internal organization and mode of operation of science are radically democratic.

This last remark ties in with the third reason why contemporary readers still have a lot to gain from reading Mead's work. I refer to his moral and political writings. In my view, this aspect of Mead's life and work deserves more attention than is usually granted in social theory textbooks. That Mead was a committed citizen during his time in Chicago is sometimes rightly acknowledged. But the recognition that his radical democratic views are indispensable for the understanding of the actual scope and nature of his contributions is still uncommon, at least outside the restricted field of Mead specialists. I hope my selection of Mead's political writings will help remedy this problem and renew interest in this somewhat neglected facet of his thinking.

The first three chapters of Part III are on Mead's political and moral philosophy. Mead develops his position as a critical response to the main ethical proposals of his time, Kantian ethics and utilitarian ethics. Ethics revolve around the question of "how should one live in society?". Utilitarianism typically claims that moral action is an

action that results in the greatest possible happiness to the largest possible number of individuals. Self-interest would become the basis of altruism. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are two major exponents of this view. On the other hand, there is Kant's ethics of conviction. For Kant, the moral quality of action cannot be identified with its results; rather, Kantian ethics point to the motives or intentions of action – hence Kant's categorical imperative according to which one should act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. In the 1908 “The Philosophical Basis of Ethics” (Chapter 21), one of his earliest systematic writings on moral philosophy, we can see Mead positioning himself critically towards these two ethical doctrines. Mead writes:

It is because the man must recognize the public good in the exercise of his powers, and state the public good in terms of his own outgoing activities that his ends are moral. But it is not the public good which comes in from outside himself and lays a moral necessity upon him, nor is it a selfish propensity that drives him on to conduct.

Mead's ethics are based upon his social theory of the self and his conception of science as a problem-solving activity. This is the topic of “The Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences” (Chapter 23). Mead's basic contention is that the content of moral acts can be universalized insofar as one recognizes their eminent social character. A moral end is reached only when an individual is able to identify his motive with the common good of the community in which he lives. The difference between good and evil stems from the social character of the self since a moral end is good when it leads to the realization of the individual as a social being. Furthermore, by granting the perspective of the scientist the status of a model of impartiality, impersonality and objectivity, Mead suggests that moral conflicts can be resolved insofar as all values and interests are taken into consideration. In other words, the application of the scientific method can be extended beyond the selection of means to the analysis of conflicting social ends or values. This implies a process of reconstruction of the self, which becomes a larger self by assuming the attitude of the ‘generalized other’, which is also a moral reconstruction (see also Chapter 6). The final paragraph of this article, where he sums up his position, is among Mead's most eloquent writings:

The order of the universe that we live in is the moral order. It has become the moral order by becoming the self-conscious method of the members of a human society. We are not pilgrims and strangers. We are at home in our own world, but it is not ours by inheritance but by conquest. The world that comes to us from the past possesses and controls us. We possess and control the world that we discover and invent. And this is the world of the moral order. It is a splendid adventure if we can rise to it.

Science and democracy, sustained by universal education and intelligent social reform, are, in a clear pragmatist fashion, the sources of inspiration for Mead's proposed

solutions for the problems of modern industrial society. Consider “Natural Rights and the Theory of the Political Institution” (Chapter 22). In this text, Mead criticizes the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau for conceiving of “the individual citizen existing before the community, in the possession of rights which afterwards the society undertakes to protect”. Mead contends that, on the contrary, a social scientific theory of the human species shows that the individual citizens are a product of life in society: without social life there would be no individual minds. Political theory should, then, incorporate this scientific fact and elaborate on its democratic implications. In particular, Mead suggests that, in the case of property, there is no “natural right” that a given individual can appeal to if the common good is at stake. In such cases, the individual’s abstract right to property can be legitimately overruled by social legislation oriented to the establishment of the social conditions for individual material autonomy. Hence Mead’s interest in the “social settlement” as a scientific way of solving social problems through the attitude of neighbourhood shared by social workers and the deprived populations (see Chapters 24 and 25). By conceiving of democracy as an “institutionalized revolution”, Mead is emphasizing not only the gradualist nature of his political creed, but also the logical priority of concrete social democratic practices over abstract legal provisions.

Mead’s response to the major political challenges of his time lies in a programme of radical democratic social reform that rejects both revolutionary and technocratic solutions. This can be considered one of the central contentions of Mead’s political thought. The 1918 “The Psychology of Punitive Justice” (Chapter 26) revolves around this idea. In this article, Mead ascertains that most social and political institutions are defined by reference to an abstract theory of natural rights. Mead rejects the abstract individualism and negative conception of liberty that are associated with this conception of natural rights, and argues for a different conception of justice. Such an alternative conception of justice would be based not on the “attitude of hostility” against the criminal who trespassed our individual rights to property, but based on the friendly attitude that “reveals common, universal values which underlie like a bedrock the divergent structures of individual ends that are mutually closed and hostile to each other”. Both of these instincts show the social nature of the self for “his speech is their speech”, i.e. human rationality and linguistic communication are products of life in society. The moral implication of this social psychological thesis is, at a time when the First World War was being fought across the Atlantic, that “advance takes place in bringing to consciousness the larger social whole within which hostile attitudes pass over into self-assertions that are functional instead of destructive”, i.e. the “escape from selfishness is not by the Kantian road of an emotional response to the abstract universal, but by the recognition of the genuinely social character of human nature”.

The last four chapters are on Mead’s ideas on warfare, national identities and citizenship. Arguably, the experience of the Great War of 1914–18 shaped Mead’s mature political thinking (e.g. Deegan 2008). Consider the 1915 “The Psychological Basis of Internationalism” (Chapter 27). What is a purely theoretical account of the process of fusion of the two phases of the human self in *Mind, Self, and Society*, can be seen here being applied to the concrete example of patriotism, curiously enough an alluded

example that Morris's editorial activity did not give us the chance of reading,⁸ Mead starts his analysis of the war in Europe by taking note of its "great spiritual dividends". Arguing along similar lines as Simmel and Durkheim, Mead asserts that individual members of societies can fuse into self-conscious nations in moments of exceptional emotional intensity. Like a tide of national consciousness that sweeps across the body of citizens, these emotional moments are as intense as they are brief. When these moments occur, Mead contends, there is a fusion of the "I" and the "me": there is an absolute identification between the individual self and the social group. The fusion of the individual and the group is so complete that the individual can even lose himself "in the whole group in some sense, and may attain the attitude in which he undergoes suffering and death for the common cause". When this happens, when individual existence is sacrificed for the sake of the community, then the social fusion is complete and absolute. Mead, however, is far from endorsing the irrationalist implications suggested by this psychological phenomenon. His proposal is, on the contrary, resolutely rational and historically sensitive as we can see in the next two chapters on nationalism and citizenship.

Mead did not consider these texts for publication as they were written as lecture notes. But they are important documents as they complement in several regards the posthumously published *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. Both revolve around the relation between the individual citizen and the state during wartime. Wartime periods are particularly suitable to appreciate this relation for two different reasons. First, Mead discusses these exceptional periods by reference to long-term, structural historical processes. His point is that the understanding of the nature and implications of the First World War for the relation between individual citizens and the state requires an analysis of two crucial transformations in political modernity: the rise of the social state, which also occupies a central position in Weber's political sociology, and the rise of nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century (Chapter 28). Second, Mead conceives of wartime periods as problematic, disrupting episodes in a country's history that impose a reassessment of the relation between the individual citizen and the state and a subsequent reconstruction of the self (Chapter 29). Faced with the possibility of annihilation of the nation-state to which one belongs, the individual's relationship with the community is brought to consciousness – he becomes suddenly aware of his rights and obligations as citizen. But has he no choice but to sacrifice his individuality, and ultimately his life, for the community if he is to experience the highest "emotional realization of the supreme value of citizenship"? Mead believes there is an alternative, one which does not involve the sacrifice of the individual. His alternative is premised upon the idea that some social institutions – say, property or the family – express the fundamental organization of society and its values. These need not be in danger of destruction from an external enemy for us to appreciate our attachment to them; we can become deeply identified with the fundamental social norms that govern our community by applying the scientific method to the resolution of social problems. Mead's proposed alternative, based upon the belief in the possibilities of science to solve social and political problems, would be crushed by the realities of the Great War.⁹ By 1918, the era of stability, certainty and progress in

which Mead's generation lived came suddenly and without notice to an end. A new age of uncertainty was about to begin, but Mead remained faithful to the basic tenets of his Era of Progressivism.

Mead's faith in the progress of science is reiterated a decade later, in "National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness" (Chapter 30). Drawing on his conception of the self as a composite or interaction of two distinct parts, Mead argues that "national-mindedness and international-mindedness are inextricably involved in each other". On the one hand, the hostile impulse is responsible for "the spiritual exaltation of wartime patriotism"; on the other hand, there is "the power which language has conferred upon us, of not only seeing ourselves as others see us but also of addressing ourselves in terms of the common ideas and functions which an organized society makes possible". Again, Mead uses history to illustrate his claims. The late nineteenth-century tide of nationalism is interpreted as a phenomenon which allowed individuals to realize that they belonged to national communities that transcended narrower groups, such as families and clans. In this sense, "national mindedness" is but a conversation with a "generalized other", more general than previous forms of human association, but still less general than the form idealized by Mead – a conversation carried on in international terms. In short, Mead's "moral equivalent of war" is to be found in the socially acquired capacity for rational linguistic expression of ideas, rather than in some fundamental social impulse. It is still a cognitivist and internationalist solution that Mead proposes.

This anthology has no intention of fixing once and for all the meaning of Mead's work. On the contrary, it was done with the explicit aim of sparking new ideas, new avenues of research, and of establishing contact points between Mead and other authors. Most important, behind this volume is the intention of respecting the processual, fluid nature of Mead's thinking, and of doing so by letting Mead convey his ideas to us directly. I cannot think of a better tribute to a theorist like Mead than to offer his readers yet another incentive to keep dealing with his ideas and, by doing so, give them meaning and life. I believe this to be the best way to keep Mead, the sociological classic, alive.

Notes

- 1 Instead, a selection of *Mind, Self, and Society* was included. I refer to Farganis (2007).
- 2 Although he admits as much in the Introduction to that volume (Morris 1934: xvi), the term appears not only as the title of Part I, but in the text itself (Mead 1934: 6, 91).
- 3 These refer, respectively, to language as related to the emergence of norms and identities and as allowing for the perception and manipulation of objects.
- 4 On this "social turn" in Mead's conception of the self, see Silva (2008: 116).
- 5 The 1917 "Scientific Method and Individual Thinker" covers very much the same ground as these two and is also an excellent text.
- 6 The adequate understanding of this aspect of Mead's thinking requires the reading of a much wider array of materials, including *The Philosophy of the Present* and *The Philosophy of the Act*.
- 7 For a discussion of the importance of historicity and temporality in classical American pragmatism, see Koopman (2009).

- 8 Mead announces the discussion of the “attitudes of religion, patriotism, and team work”, but the selection of the student notes made by Morris includes only his discussion of the other two attitudes. See Mead (1934: 273). For an account of Mead’s views on patriotism in that book, one has either to go back to an earlier section, namely to the analysis of the function performed by the sense of superiority for the realization of the self (see Mead 1934: 207–9), or to the discussion of social conflict where Mead asserts that “It is upon these war-time expressions of the self-protective impulse in all the individual members of the state or nation that the general efficacy of national appeals to patriotism is based” (Mead 1934: 306).
- 9 Mead’s support of America’s involvement in the First World War should not be confused with the endorsement of militarism or any related sort of bellicose thinking. Mead gave his support to what he believed to be a just war, in the name of principles such as democracy and international cooperation. He did question these arguments later on and became deeply disillusioned with political affairs. But he never abandoned a rational, internationalist approach to morals and politics.

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Biographical summary

- 1863 Born at South Hadley, Massachusetts.
- 1869 Family moves to Oberlin, Ohio, following the appointment of his father as professor of homiletics at Oberlin College.
- 1877–83 Student at Oberlin College. Father dies in 1881.
- 1884–85 Works as a surveyor for the Wisconsin Central Railroad and later for the Minneapolis and Pacific Railroad.
- 1885 Works as private tutor in Minneapolis.
- 1887–88 Student at Harvard University.
- 1888 Works as private tutor for William James's son during summer.
- 1888–89 Student at University of Leipzig, Germany.
- 1889 Student at Humboldt University, Germany.
- 1891–94 Marries Helen Castle. Joins the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, by invitation of John Dewey. Henry Castle Mead, his first and only son, is born. Dewey moves to University of Chicago.
- 1894 Follows Dewey to Chicago, as Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy. Delivers paper on a theory of emotions from a physiological standpoint at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association.
- 1900 Publishes article on a theory of the philosophical disciplines.
- 1902 Associate Professor at the University of Chicago.
- 1903 Publishes article on the definition of the psychical.
- 1904 Dewey leaves the University of Chicago.
- 1906 Joins City Club of Chicago.
- 1907 Full Professor at the University of Chicago.
- 1908 Helps to found Immigrants' Protective League. Chairman of the City Club committee on public education (until 1914). Publishes article on the philosophical basis of ethics.

- 1910 Joins citizen's committee to mediate the so-called 'garment strike'. Publishes article on social consciousness and the consciousness of meaning. William James dies.
- 1912 Elected to the Board of Directors of the City Club of Chicago. Publishes article on the mechanism of social consciousness. Co-author, with Ernest A. Wreidt and William J. Bogan, of City Club's *A Report on Vocational Training in Chicago and in other Cities*.
- 1913 Publishes article on the social self.
- 1915 Publishes article on natural rights and political institutions. Reviews *Report Upon the Survey of the University of Wisconsin*.
- 1917 Chairman of the Board of Directors of the City Club of Chicago. Mother dies. Publishes chapter in the book *Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude*. Publishes series of newspaper essays in the *Chicago Herald*.
- 1918 President of the City Club of Chicago (until 1920). Publishes article on the psychology of punitive justice.
- 1922 Publishes article on behaviourist account of significant symbol.
- 1923 Publishes article on scientific method and the moral sciences.
- 1925 Publishes article on the genesis of the self and social control.
- 1926 Presents paper on the objective reality of perspectives at the Sixth International Congress in Philosophy, Harvard University.
- 1928 Delivers lectures on social psychology, later published as *Mind, Self, and Society*. Gives undergraduate course on the 'movements of thought in the nineteenth century', later published under that title.
- 1929 Publishes articles on a pragmatic theory of truth, national-mindedness and international-mindedness. Publishes chapter on the nature of the past in the book *Essays in Honor of John Dewey*.
- 1930 Delivers Carus Lectures in Berkeley, California. Chairman of the department of philosophy at the University of Chicago. Controversy with President Robert Maynard Hutchins.
- 1931 Dies at sixty-eight of heart failure in Chicago.

Part I
Mead on the human self
I. The early days

1

THE DEFINITION OF THE PSYCHICAL (1903)*

(...) This is the position taken by Dewey in the article on “The Reflex Arc Concept.” [1896]¹ He approaches the position from the discussion of the reflex-arc concept, but his quarrel with the psychologists he criticises is in the end the same as that which I have endeavored to present as inevitable – the quarrel with the doctrine that sensation is an isolated content analyzed out through its correspondence to an outside element.

The result is that the reflex-arc idea leaves us with a disjointed psychology, (...) Failing to see the unity of activity, no matter how much it may prate of unity, it still leaves us with sensation or peripheral stimulus; idea or central process (the equivalent of attention); and motor response, or act, as three disconnected existences, having somehow to be adjusted to each other, whether through the intervention of an extra-experimental soul, or by mechanical push and pull.²

And his proof of the futility of this psychology is that no such psychical elements answering to physical counterparts exist. Instead of a psychical state which is dependent upon a physical excitation, investigation shows in every case an activity which in advance must determine where attention is directed and give the psychical state the very content which is used in identifying it. In the simplest cases it is the direction of the sense-organs and their co-ordination in larger acts that is responsible for the actual contents of color, sound, odor, etc., which the psychologist treats as dependent only upon external physical conditions. To a reply that the psychologist assembles a complex co-ordinated nervous mechanism, with its inherited adaptations, over against which the outer physical stimulus is the only variable that needs to be taken into account, Dewey responds that either the physical mechanism must be taken as a bare system of motions, whose procedure is nothing but a shifting of stresses, in which case there is no such thing as stimulus and response at all, or else we must make our statement of the physiological system in terms of the same activity as those demanded for the psychological process. In the end what we see, hear, feel, taste, and smell depends upon what we are doing, and not the reverse. In our purposively organized life we

4 Mead on the social self

inevitably come back upon previous conduct as the determining condition of what we sense at any one moment, and the so-called external stimulus is the occasion for this and not its cause. If we ask now for the results which such a disjointed psychology is actually able to present, the answer is that, just as the physical stimulus is reduced to nothing but a system of masses in motion in which the stimulus as such completely disappears, so the so-called psychical elements reduce to nothing but a series of sensations in which the character of response is as effectually destroyed as was that stimulus in the abstract physical world. We have sensations of motions as well as of colors, and nothing but sensations. Putting, then, the two parts of the argument together, in the first place, this disjointed psychology gives us nothing but sensations which cannot even be got into a sensory-motor arc, but are doomed to remain forever in their own abstract world of registration; and, in the second place, no such elements of sensations are found to exist, and what we have been pleased to call such leave in them the whole content of the act of which we were supposed to make them a part.

The author concludes that the distinction between stimulus, whether psychologically or physiologically investigated, and response is not one between pre-existent elements; that any phase of the act which could be obtained by analysis may be regarded as stimulus or response. The decision between the two predicates depends upon the direction in which the attention shifts. A type of analysis which follows in the wake of logical and physical sciences, gleaning that which they have dropped, harvests only unreal abstractions. Instead of attempting to identify elements, it is the duty of psychology to look upon these predicates as tools of interpretation. Which is another way of saying that sensation does not serve as a stimulus because of what it is as an independent content, but that it is a sensation because it serves as a stimulus. It is evident, then, that the definition must be made in terms of the act, not in terms of a content; and the following are the definitions given:

Generalized, the sensation as stimulus is always that phase of activity requiring to be defined in order that a co-ordination may be completed. What the sensation will be in particular at a given time, therefore, will depend entirely upon the way in which an activity is being used. It has no fixed quality of its own. The search for the stimulus is the search for the exact conditions of action; that is, for the state of things which decides how a beginning co-ordination should be completed. Similarly, motion, as response, has only functional value. It is whatever will serve to complete the disintegrating co-ordination. Just as the discovery of the sensation marks the establishing of the problem, so the constitution of the response marks the solution of this problem.³

And a little farther on:

The circle is a co-ordination, some of whose members have come into conflict with each other. It is the temporary disintegration and need of reconstitution which occasions, which affords the genesis of, the conscious distinction into sensory stimulus on the one side and motor respond on the other. The stimulus is that phase of the forming co-ordination which represents the conditions which have to be met in bringing it to a successful issue; the response is that phase of one and the same forming co-ordination which gives the key to meeting these conditions, which serves as an instrument in effecting the successful co-ordination. They are therefore, strictly correlative and

contemporaneous. The stimulus is something to be discovered; to be made out; if the activity affords its own adequate stimulation, there is no stimulus save in the objective sense already referred to. As soon as it is adequately determined, then and then only is the response also complete. To attain either means that the co-ordination has completed itself.⁴

There are two situations suggested here – that in which the co-ordination is broken up by conflict between its members, and the other that in which the activity in its original form determines its own adequate stimulation. In the first case we have the presentation and solution of a problem, in terms of sensation and response. In the second instance, the author states that “there is no stimulus save in the objective sense.” These so-called stimuli are further defined “as minor acts serving by their respective positions to the maintenance of some organized co-ordination.”

Although the author has definitely postponed the application of this doctrine to the distinction between sensational and rational consciousness, and to the nature of the judgement, there seem to be some fairly evident conclusions that may be drawn. In the first place, there are presented here certain situations in which the psychical is the nature of consciousness, not because any analysis, or even introspection, produces or, catching our thought as it disappears, reveals a phase of which we were not conscious before, but because the inevitable conflicts of conduct deprive us of the stimuli which further action requires; in other words, deprive us of the objective character of some part of our world. If we compare this position with Wundt’s, the following distinction appears at once: Wundt assumes that the logical criticism arises when our anticipations are not satisfied and the interpretations of former experiences are contradicted. The result of this logical criticism, however, is simply to dislodge our objects from their objective position and relegate them to a subjective world, just as they are, deprived only of their validity. And their places are filled by the conceptual objects which a scientific imagination fashions out of figments light as air. That is, Wundt assumes that the criticised object may retain its organized content and yet lose its validity. He denies the mutual dependence of the validity and the form of the content. Dewey assumes that the object or stimulus loses its form in losing its validity. Furthermore, during this state the whole effort is toward a constitution of the object or stimulus again. The object loses its validity and organization as object at the same moment, and at the same moment it becomes psychical, but not as the shade of an object done to logical death, and doomed henceforth to haunt the shadows of a subjective Sheol. The illustration which is given in the article on the reflex arc is of the child of our modern psychology – not the child of the associational period, that meditative *Bambino* of the Milanese school with, the orange in his hand; but that somewhat ponderously curious child with the candle, who seems to be taken out of a Dutch interior. Of this child and his candle the author says: “The question whether to reach or abstain from reaching is the question: What sort of a bright light have we here? Is it one which means playing with one’s hands, eating milk, or burning one’s fingers? The stimulus must be constituted for the response to occur.”⁵ Now, if these questions are the stuff that the psychical is made of, we are dealing with states which do not have to be caught from behind, as they whisk around the corner, and studied in the faint aromas

which they leave behind them. We are very frankly conscious of our problems and the hypotheses which they call forth, and the problems are not coy visitors that will not remain to be interrogated. We are not dealing with images that have to be cautiously dissected out of our objects, nor even with fancies that vanish as soon as we show an interest in their pedigree and visible means of support. Other theories of the psychical imply an analysis which preserves the content of the criticised object as subjective experience. But at once the difficulty arises of presenting this content. What the psychologist has actual recourse to is the abstraction of qualities from objects which have not been criticised. For example, in dealing with color as psychical we assume at first that, if we had not to distinguish the colored object as it appears to us from that object as our physical theory defines it, it might never have been possible to separate the color from the so-called real thing. But, in the second place, when we ask for the color which has been stripped off from the object, and which has in the process become psychical and subjective, what is offered to us is the logical abstraction of color from objects that remain objects for all the abstraction, under the assumption that it must be the same as that which this critical experience found on its hands when the object evanesced; while the reject itself would be most difficult to reproduce, and only the professional gymnastics of the trained introspectionist would be at all equal to the task, and he comes off with aromas and suggestions, fearfully avoiding the Jabberwock of the psychological fallacy. We deal with substitutes and correspondents in the place of the psychical material which is too subtle for our grasp. And this holds not only for the psychical derived from criticism of physical experience, but also for that which comes to us from the criticism of thought and imagination. Thought maintains its objectivity as proudly as does sense-perception and the analyst who tries to separate thought from the thing is apt to come off with all the object or nothing according to the school that he patronizes. But it is not difficult, of course, to abstract thought in logic, and it is easy to set up these abstractions as the psychical content, or, more correctly, the same thing as the psychical content which an epistemology has shown must be subjective purely.

The position taken by Dewey is that in this psychical situation the object is gone, and the psychical character of the situation consists in the disintegration and reconstruction. The question then arises: In what form do these contents appear when this disintegration and reconstitution takes place? It does not appear in the form of an object, for it is just this character that it has lost, and consciousness here certainly does not consist in the presentation of copies of objects that will not serve as stimuli, but in their analysis and reconstruction. An answer may be found in that classical description of psychical consciousness, James's chapter on "The Stream of Thought." Are there any of the characteristics of the stream which are not unmistakably present when we face any problem and really construct any hypothesis? The kaleidoscopic flash of suggestion, and intrusion of the inapt, the unceasing flow of odds and ends of possible objects that will not fit, together with the continuous collision with the hard, unshakable objective conditions of the problem, the transitive feelings of effort and anticipation when we feel that we are on the right track and substantive points of rest, as the idea becomes definite, the welcoming and rejecting, especially the identification

of the meaning of the whole idea with the different steps in its coming to consciousness – there are none of these that are not almost oppressively present on the surface of consciousness during just the periods which Dewey describes as those of disintegration and reconstitution of the stimulus – the object. No person who bemoans insupportable difficulties in front of him that does not paint the same picture, though with no such brilliant brush. No scientist who describes the steps of a dawning and solidifying hypothesis who does not follow in the same channel, with the same swirl and eddy of current, and the same dissolving views upon the shores. If there is ever a psychical feeling of relation, it is when the related object has not yet risen from the underworld. It is under these circumstances that identities and differences come with thrills and shocks. Most of the persons who bore us with themselves, and the novelists who bore us with others, are but dilating upon the evident traits of such phases of our life, and they need lay no claim to professional skill of the trained introspectionist to recognize these traits. Let me add also that James's account of the hunt for the middle term in the reasoning process, and much that he writes of the concept, fit perfectly into this phase of experience, and that here as well the psychologist's fallacy seems to have become perfectly innocuous. Consciousness here cannot help being psychical in its most evident form, and the recognition of it is unavoidable under whatever terminology, technical, or non-technical, we may cover it.

The real crux of the situation is to be found in the feelings of activity. Are they reduced to simple sensations of motion and effort, or may the activity appear directly, without representation? Can we psychically be consciously active, or is psychical consciousness confined to the results of activity? As long as the analysis is logical, i.e., as long as we simply abstract various characteristics of the objects and ascribe to the self assumed psychical elements corresponding to these, changes or motions will be inevitably translated into answering bodily changes or motions, and the only psychical elements that can be attained will be those presumed to accompany them. When psychology attempts to present these elements, it refers to certain feels, as we indicated above. We are now in a position to see where these contents come from. They cannot be the rejects, for reasons already adduced, but they may be the really psychical states forced into an integral act for purposes of interpretation. A successfully thrown ball means to us distance covered, weight of the ball, momentum attained, an entire objective situation. A mistake in the weight of the ball will give rise to a disorganized phase of consciousness, which will be subjective or psychical until it is readjusted. Here the efforts in their inhibition of each other provide us with states of feeling which we assume to be those which accompanied the co-ordinated process, though we could not detect them. This I take to be the real psychologist's fallacy, the attempt to introject a psychical state into a process which is not psychical. We assume that the individual who did move had an unanalyzed consciousness which contained the motion and this feeling of effort, whereas the feeling of effort belongs to a state in which the individual is not able to move, or in which at least the effort and the motion are in inverse proportion to each other. It is not the individual who could build up a world of masses and momentums, of carrying distances and varying velocities, that has feelings of effort. He has a universe of life and motion instead. Force these elements however,

into this universe by a reflective process, and the only statement you can make about them is that they are feelings *of* those motions. To generalize this statement: the psychical contents which belong to these phases of disintegration and reconstitution, if referred to physical or logical objects that belong to other phases of consciousness, can be only representative, can be only sensations *of* something. They inevitably lose their immediacy. To present a concrete instance: the man who hesitates before a ditch, which he is not sure that he can jump, is conscious of inhibited activity. If he were sure of his ability to jump it, in the place of that consciousness he would have an estimate of the width of the ditch and the spring as an objective motion. If now we say that the sense of effort which comes with the inhibition is the subjective side of that which is objectively expressed as motion, we introduce into the original process a complexity which was not there for our consciousness. We were consciously moving. But we are told that beside this conscious motion there was this feeling of effort which has been borrowed from the subjective phase. This is not the motion. At most it can be but a feeling of motion. We carry over as an element a content whose peculiar quality depends upon its functional value in one phase of consciousness into another, and insist that it exists there as the subjectivity of this second phase. Under these circumstances it is reduced to the position of standing for something, and this so-called subjective consciousness is made of nothing but sensations of registrations.

I should add that the experimental psychologist is apt to trouble himself comparatively little about this or any other content of subjectivity. He assumes its existence answering to the physical situation, and confines himself to determining these physical situations with reference to the conditions under which this subjectivity is supposed to appear.

If we do not confuse these two phases of consciousness, I see no more difficulty in the immediate consciousness of activity in the subjective situations than of the motion in the objective. It appears primarily in the shifting of attention in the adaptation of habitual tendencies to each other, when they have come into conflict within the co-ordination. They involve effort in the stresses and strains of these different activities over against each other. I cannot go into the discussion of the interpretation of attention in terms of the innervation of the muscles of the sense-organs and of the head and chest. I must confine myself to the demand that we leave different stages of conscious processes to themselves – to their immediacy – and to the assertion that, when we do this, no one phase can be made merely cognitive of another, whether we have reference to contents or activities. The conclusion was reached above that psychical consciousness could be immediate only in so far as it was functional. We may go a step farther and add that, in so far as the psychical state is functional, it cannot be a sensation of something else that is not in that state. Its functional character confines its reference to this function, which is that of reconstruction of the disintegrated co-ordination.

The discussion so far has considered the immediate characteristic of the psychical. The other element in the definition is its identification with the experience of the individual *qua* individual. The implication of the functional conception of the psychical is very interesting. If the psychical is functional and the consciousness of the individual at the same time, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this phase of our consciousness – or, in other words, the individual *qua* individual – is functional in the

same sense. This individual cannot be the empirical “me” that exists in such profusion in the modern genetic and pathological psychologies; nor yet can it be the transcendental self that is nothing but the function of unity; nor the self whose realization is the goal of the ethics of Green and his ilk; nor the individual whose whole content is the other way of stating the knowable universe. For this individual cannot be an object; and yet it must have a content, but that content cannot be an ideal either of conduct or of knowledge. It cannot be an object, because, for many reasons, some of which will be developed later, it belongs to the subject end of the polarized process of cognitive experience; it must have or be a content, because psychical consciousness does not belong to the normative phase of reflection, and deals therefore with relations and laws only in their appearance within certain fields of experience; it cannot be an ideal, because it must be immediate, and therefore its reference, so far as it is psychical, must lie within its own phase of consciousness.

There is nothing that has suffered more through loss of dignity of content in modern positivistic psychology than the “I.” The “me” has been most honorably dealt with. It has waxed in diameter and interest, not to speak of number, with continued analysis, while the “I” has been forced from its metaphysical throne, and robbed of all its ontological garments; and the rags of “feelings of effort about the head and chest,” of the “focalization of sense-organs,” the “furling of the eye-brows” seem but a sorry return for the antique dogmas. But the greatest loss is the constant drain from the “I” to the “me.” No sooner is a content of subjectivity made out than it is at once projected into the object world. This is the peculiar theme of our social psychology.⁶ The recognition of the social character of the self, that the *alii* of our experience are not secondary inferred objects with which our reason endows directly perceived physical things, but construct whose content is derived from subjective consciousness – this recognition involves the objectifying of a content which used to belong to the subject. In Baldwin’s address before the Yale Philosophical Club, upon “Mind and Body from the Genetic Point of View,”⁷ this exhaustion of the subjective content in socially organized and therefore objective, minds is shown in a series of “progressions.” Starting with a presumed “protoplasmic” condition of consciousness, out of which arise first the “projections,” answering to persons and things, there appear next the “progression” of persons into selves, the *ego* and *alii*; and finally the recognition of the body, answering to the mind of the other and the corresponding relation of mind and body in the *ego*. In the final reflective attitude there is left nothing but mind and body. The subjectivity is entirely exhausted. The author is strictly logical in demanding that we recognize the completely correlative positions of mind and body in this position. Attempted reduction of the one to the other is a denial of their mutual dependence not only in their genesis, but in their functions in the reflective process. But this striking application of the results of genetic and social psychology to the epistemological problem leaves the same irreducible parallelism which we have discussed, and surrenders the problem of transcending this dualism to some other philosophic discipline.

The interesting situation suggested here is that, if we do accept this dualism for psychology, we do it at the sacrifice of a subject that is anything more than an

assumption – possibly an assumption of some particular psychical processes such as attention, apperception, but still a subject that can never appear *in persona* within the domain of psychology. It is all very well to send a sergeant-at-arms into the fields of the transcendental *ego* after him. If it actually appeared, its presence would, according to Baldwin, act like the nymph's magic kiss and reduce the whole experience to "protoplasmic" babyhood. That is, from this genetic standpoint the subject as a conscious stage must disappear before the reflective stage can arise. It must disappear in order that the contents of mind and body may arise. It is as much a presupposition here as it is over against the processes of attention or the activities in general; which is tantamount to saying that the relation of the psychical to the subject cannot be made a characteristic in the definition of the psychical. For the relation to an empirical "me" cannot be made particular. We inevitably generalize the experiences of these "me's" so that what belongs to one may belong to another. To say, with Wundt, that our concepts are used merely for the purposes of classification and arrangement, implies that we can present the material outside of the conceptual formulation. We have already seen that this is Wundt's assumption, but that it is an assumption which is hopelessly unproductive of any psychical content. These contents turn out to be nothing but the rejected elements of the object when it is subjected to logical analysis, and therefore stated in terms of the conceptual object in whose interest the abstraction is made. We have also seen that there is a phase that is not stated in terms of such an analysis, one that arises in the period of disintegration and reconstitution of the stimulus-object; that the content in this period is not what is abstracted from the former object when the conceptual object is erected in its place, but the content that appears when experience has lost its objectivity because of the conflicting tendencies to react, and that, instead of its being a reject, for the time being it includes all that is given at all. Not only this, but it is characterized by the consciousness of the reconstruction, of activities of attention and organization. We have seen that, as long as the activities of experience are present only in terms of their results, they can only appear in the form of sensations of the activities, but that in this stage the directing attention is immediately given. Thus, in the theories we have criticised the subject is represented in two aspects, neither of which can presumably be present in the material with which the science deals; first as a content, the original subjectivity out of whose "projection" or "imitative introjection" arise not only the others' selves, but reactively our own, and second the "activities" that answer to attention or apperception but in this phase of disintegration and reconstruction both these aspects are immediately given. The disintegration of the object means a return, with reference to a certain field, to the original phase of protoplasmic consciousness and within these limits there is neither mind nor body, only subjectivity. The reconstruction is the immediate process of attention and apperception, of choice, of consciously directed conduct.

This stage of disintegration and reconstruction requires a more detailed description and analysis. The characteristics which identify it with the reflective consciousness are the sharp definition of the problem within one field of consciousness and the forms which the other contents of consciousness take in the statement and solution of the problem. The assumptions made in this description are: (1) that consciousness is so

reorganized with reference to conduct that the objects in cognitive experience may all be regarded as means to the accomplishment of the end involved in that conduct; (2) that this end may be stated in psychological terms as the expression of an impulse; (3) that when the co-ordination is unbroken the stimulus is the object determined by the preceding processes of the act; and (4) that the rest of the field of consciousness is organized with reference to this object, and may be stated either in positive or negative terms of it; (5) that, in so far as the co-ordination is unbroken, the end is for the time being adequately expressed in terms of the means, i.e., the object and its background which provide an adequate stimulus for continuance of the activity, and thus the distinction between the act and the conditions of the act does not appear; (6) that when the coordination is broken up – or, in other words, when an adequate stimulus for the expression of the impulse is not given, but the conflicting tendencies to act deprive the object of its power as a stimulus – then consciousness is divided into two fields: that within which the new stimulus or object must be constructed, and the rest of experience which with reference to the new possible object can have no other content than that of conditions of its formation. An illustration of these characteristics can be found in social experiences in which we are forced to reconstruct our ideas of the character of our acquaintances. As long as we can act with reference to them successfully that which we later consider our ideas of them constitute their characters as persons. That the organization of these characters springs from our mutual relations, and that the psychological statement of these relations would be found in our social impulses or activities, the analysis of social objects since Hegel, and the results of genetic and social psychology have, I think, abundantly demonstrated. It would also be admitted that the particular form which that character took on, in any instance, depends upon what particular social activity we are engaged in, and that the whole social environment would be more or less definitely organized as the background and sustaining whole of the individual or individuals who were the immediate stimuli of our conduct. If we assume now that some experience should run quite counter to the nature of an acquaintance as we have known him, the immediate result would be that we would be nonplused and quite unable to act with reference to him for the time being. The immediate result would be a state of consciousness within which would appear mutually contradictory attitudes toward the acquaintance which would inevitably formulate themselves in a problem as to what the real nature of the man was, and over against this a mass of data drawn from our experience of him and of others that would constitute the conditions for the solution of the problem. The contradictory attitudes of approval and abhorrence include in their sweep not only the man in question, but also ourselves in so far as mutual interrelationship has helped to form our selves over against his. Or, in other words, we should be as uncertain of our own capacity of judging him as of the man himself. In so far the subject and object relation, the *ego* and *alter*, would have disappeared temporarily within this field. The situation may be of such hopeless perplexity that consciousness in this regard could be well called protoplasmic; or at least would be of the same nature as the original subjectivity due to checks and inhibitions out of which is projected the other selves of a social consciousness.

There follows the definition of the problem, the delineation of which would be a task for logic. But there is a phase of the process with which logic does not deal or has not dealt; not because logic is a normative, while psychology is an explanatory and descriptive science simply, but because in that phase the content and the procedure cannot be distinguished. It is the hunt for a hypothesis, when the consciousness is more or less incoherent or, in other terms, the distinction between subject and predicate cannot be made. To return to the illustration, we are uncertain whether the conduct of our acquaintance is abhorrent, being logically a predicate and psychologically a stimulus to action, that of repulsion; or whether this possible predicate is not a prejudice of our own, being therefore subject. Given either alternative, and it takes its logical position, but for the time being it is actually neither, and cannot become such but by a further reconstruction in which there will emerge subjects and predicates which were never there before. Modern logic is ready enough to admit that the judgment is a process of reconstruction, by which through ideal interpretation of our world, it becomes another world, but what it does not seem to me to recognize is that the idea has to arise, and that while it is arising it is not idea and cannot function as such; that the ideas we have are abstracted from our old world and cannot reconstruct it; and that we must allow for the situation in which what is essentially novel emerges before it even takes on the form of a hypothetical predicate. What I wish to insist upon is that, while we have not as yet a predicate, we also have no subject; that, while the negative statement of the problem clears the ground for its solution, it does not give that solution; and that the statement of the rest of experience in terms of the conditions of the solution of the problem, the gathering of data, does not give the positive touch of reconstruction which is involved in the presentation of a hypothesis, however slight and vague it may be; that this step takes place within the field of subjectivity, which in so far is neither me nor other, neither mind nor body. And it is in this phase of subjectivity, with its activities of attention in the solution of the problem, i.e., in the construction of the hypothesis of the new world, that the individual *qua* individual has his functional expression or rather is that function.

To appreciate this we need to consider this situation in consciousness from another point of view – that of the relation of the conditions for the solution, reflectively presented, to the problem itself. From the standpoint of science, these conditions are the data of investigation. They are abstractions which arise through the conflict. In the illustration used above the conduct is abstracted from the particular person and particular situation within which it appeared. This abstraction is due to our inability to treat the person as an acquaintance and continue our relations with him, or, on the other hand, to surrender him and pass judgment upon his conduct as we would but for our past knowledge of his character. This datum is therefore strictly correlative to the psychical consciousness of the conflicting tendencies and the disintegration of the object, but the ability to present this reflective content is due to the integral character of the rest of our world. This forms the basis upon which the reconstruction can take place. Not that this world will not eventually be brought within the reconstruction, at least by implication, but that for the time being the world and the individual have sufficient coherence to give the conditions under which the problem may be solved,

representing, as they do, the organized system which remains the criterion of the reality of the result. The individual corresponding to the world of data or conditions is that given in the state of subjectivity. But it is evident that, as the function of the world is to provide the data for the solution, so it is the function of the individual to provide the hypothesis for that solution. It is equally evident that it is not the individual as a "me" that can perform this function. Such an empirical self belongs to the world which it is the function of this phase of consciousness to reconstruct. The selves of our scientific theory are part of the data which reflection presents to us. We have already seen that the content which is ascribed to them cannot be immediate. Furthermore, one of the results of the reconstruction will be a new individual as well as a new social environment. The reference which is made of this state of subjectivity to the presented self is therefore only in the sense of a statement of the conditions under which the new self is to be organized. In the meantime the experience in this psychical phase is not a presentation, but an immediate and direct experience. That is, this is the self in the disintegration and reconstruction of its universe, the self functioning, the point of immediacy that must exist within a mediate process. It is the act that makes use of all the data that reflection can present, but uses them merely as the conditions of a new world that cannot possibly be foretold from them. It is the self of unecessitated choice, of undreamt hypotheses. Of inventions that change the whole face of nature.

If we ask now what sort of scientific treatment this phase of consciousness may receive, we find the reply already given. It cannot be a presentation of contents. These presentations all take their place among the data or conditions of this activity. On the other hand, there is nothing mysterious about its flow. It may be as vividly and definitely described as any immediate experience, but it is not the content as content that constitutes the scientific character of the description, but its definition in terms of the laws of analysis and construction. It will not be a statement of the laws of these processes. This statement would belong to general logic, but the formulation of psychical experience in terms of those laws. The theory of the conflict within an organized universal whole is logical, but the statement of the conflict of an impulse with a co-ordination of impulses and the inhibition of these impulses will be a scientific treatment of the psychical. The theory of the reconstruction of a given world as, subject through the interpretation of a hypothetical idea or predicate lies in the sphere of logic, but the shifting of attention in the re-coordination of the impulses, the control of the outgoing activities by the sense-processes during this co-ordination, and the like, will fall within the science of the psychical.

There appears to be, therefore, a field of immediate experience within reflection that is open to direct observation, that does not have to be approached from the standpoint of parallelism, but which is a presupposition of that parallelism, as it is of all presentation of data, which voluntaristic psychology presupposes, but does not directly deal with, and for which there is arising the modern discipline of functional psychology. Over against this would still stand the parallelistic psychology as presenting the conditions under which empirical bodies and minds must act in the reconstructions arising within the field of the psychical. For this functional psychology an explicit

definition of its subject-matter seems highly important. That suggested in this paper is as follows: that phase of experience within which we are immediately conscious of conflicting impulses which rob the object of its character as object-stimulus, leaving us in so far in an attitude of subjectivity; but during which a new object-stimulus appears due to the reconstructive activity which is identified with the subject "I" as, distinct from the object "me."

(...)

Notes

- * Selection of article originally published in *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, First Series, 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), 77–112.
- 1 *Psychological Review*, Vol. III, p. 358.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 360.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 368.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 370.
- 5 *Psychological Review*, Vol. III, p. 367.
- 6 See Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, chap. 11, and *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chap 1.
- 7 Published in the May, 1903, number of the *Psychological Review*.

2

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS COUNTERPART TO PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1909)*

There is the widest divergence among psychologists as to the nature of Social Psychology. The most recent text-book under this title – the *Social Psychology* of Professor Ross – opens with this sentence: “Social Psychology, as the writer conceives it, studies the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association.” That is, it must confine itself to the “uniformities in feeling, belief, or volition – and hence in action – which are due to the interaction of human beings.” Here we find a certain field of human experience cut off from the rest, because men and women influence each other within that field. There result certain uniformities from this interaction and this makes the subject matter of the science of social psychology. In the same manner one might investigate the psychology of mountain tribes because they are subject to the influence of high altitudes and rugged landscape. Sociality is for Professor Ross no fundamental feature of human consciousness, no determining form of its structure.

In the *Social Psychology* of McDougall, which appeared but a few months before the treatise we have just mentioned, human consciousness is conceived of as determined by social instincts, whose study reveals sociality not as the result of interaction but as the medium within which intelligence and human emotion must arise.

If we turn to standard treatises on Psychology, we find the social aspect of human consciousness dealt with in very varying fashion. Royce, both in his psychology and in the volume, *Studies in Good and Evil*, makes out of the consciousness of one self over against other selves the source of all reflection. Thought, according to Professor Royce, in its dependence upon symbolic means of expression, has arisen out of intercourse, and presupposes, not only in the forms of language, but in the meanings of language, social consciousness. Only through imitation and opposition to others could one’s own conduct and expression gain any meaning for oneself, not to speak of the interpretation of the conduct of others through one’s own imitative responses to their acts. Here we stand upon the familiar ground of Professor Baldwin’s studies of social

consciousness. The *ego* and the *socius* are inseparable, and the medium of alternative differentiation and identification is imitation. But from the point of view of their psychological treatises we feel that these writers have said too much or too little of the form of sociality. If we turn to the structural psychologists we find the social aspect of consciousness appearing only as one of the results of certain features of our affective nature and its bodily organism. The self arises in the individual consciousness through apperceptive organization and enters into relation with other selves to whom it is adapted by organic structure. In Professor James's treatise the self is brilliantly dealt with in a chapter by itself. Within that chapter we see that, as a self, it is completely knit into a social consciousness, that the diameter of the self waxes and wanes with the field of social activity, but what the value of this nature of the self is for the cognitive and emotional phases of consciousness we do not discover. In the genetic treatment given by Professor Angell, the last chapter deals with the self. Here indeed we feel the form of sociality is the culmination, and the treatment of attention, of the impulses, and the emotions, and finally of volition involves so definitely a social organization of consciousness, that in the light of the last chapter the reader feels that a rereading would give a new meaning to what has gone before. If we except Professor Cooley, in his *Human Nature and the Social Order*, and his *Social Organization*, the sociologists have no adequate social psychology with which to interpret their own science. The modern sociologists neither abjure psychology with Comte, nor determine what the value of the social character of human consciousness is for the psychology which they attempt to use.

To repeat the points of view we have noted, some see in social consciousness nothing but uniformities in conduct and feeling that result from the interaction of men and women, others recognize a consciousness that is organized through social instincts, others still find in the medium of communication and the thought that depends upon it, a social origin for reflective consciousness itself, still others find the social aspect of human nature to be only the product of an already organized intelligence responding to certain social impulses, while others find that an organized intelligence in the form of a self could arise only over against other selves that must exist in consciousness as immediately as the subject self, still others are content to recognize necessary social conditions in the genesis of volition and the self that expresses itself in volition.

Now it is evident that we cannot take both positions. We cannot assume that the self is both a product and a presupposition of human consciousness, that reflection has arisen through social consciousness and that social intercourse has arisen because human individuals had ideas and meanings to express.

I desire to call attention to the implications for psychology of the positions defended by McDougall, by Royce and Baldwin respectively, if they are consistently maintained. The positions I have in mind are the following: that human nature is endowed with and organized by social instincts and impulses; that the consciousness of meaning has arisen through social intercommunication; and finally that the ego, the self, that is implied in every act, in every volition, with reference to which our primary judgments of valuation are made, must exist in a social consciousness within which the *socii*, the other selves, are as immediately given as is the subject self.

McDougall lists eleven human instincts: flight, repulsion, curiosity pugnacity, subjection, self-display, the parental instinct, the instinct of reproduction, the gregarious instinct, the instinct of acquisition, and the instinct of construction. Six of these are social, without question: pugnacity, subjection, self-display, the parental instinct, the instinct of reproduction, and the gregarious instinct. These would probably be the instincts most widely accepted by those who are willing to accept human instincts at all. Four of the others, repulsion, curiosity, acquisition, and construction, would be questionable, or conceivably to be resolved into other instincts. The fact is that McDougall has his doctrine of instincts so essentially bound up with a doctrine of emotions and sentiments that he is evidently forced to somewhat strain his table of instincts to get in the proper number of corresponding emotions. But the fact that is of moment is that the psychologist who recognizes instincts and impulses will find among them a preponderating number that are social. By a social instinct is meant a well defined tendency to act under the stimulation of another individual of the same species. If self-conscious conduct arises out of controlled and organized impulse, and impulses arise out of social instincts, and the responses to these social stimulations become stimuli to corresponding social acts on the part of others, it is evident that human conduct was from the beginning of its development in a social medium. The implication is highly important for its bearing upon the theory of imitation, which, as is indicated above, plays a great part in current social psychology.

There are two implications of the theory that important social instincts lie behind developed human consciousness – two to which I wish to call attention. The first is that any such group of instincts inevitably provides the content and the form of a group of social objects. An instinct implies first of all a certain type of stimulus to which the organism is attuned. This sensuous content will attract the attention of the individual to the exclusion of other stimuli. And the organism will respond to it by a certain attitude that represents the group of responses for which such an instinct is responsible. These two are the characteristics of an object in our consciousness – a content toward which the individual is susceptible as a stimulus, and an attitude of response toward this peculiar type of content. In our consciousness of this sensuous content and of our attitude toward it we have both the content of the object as a thing and the meaning of it, both the perception and the concept of it, at least implicit in the experience. The implication of an organized group of social instincts is the implicit presence in undeveloped human consciousness of both the matter and the form of a social object.

The second implication has to do with the theory of imitation. Social instincts imply that certain attitudes and movements of one form are stimuli in other forms to certain types of response. In the instinct of fighting these responses will be of one sort, in that of parental care another. The responses will be adapted to the stimulus and may vary from it or may approach it in its own form or outward appearance. It may be that, as in the case of the gregarious instinct, the action of one form may be a stimulus to the other to do the same thing – to the member of the herd, for example, to run away in the direction in which another member of the herd is running. We have no evidence that such a reaction is any more an imitation than if the instinctive response were that

of running away from an enemy which threatened the animal. Furthermore, a group of well organized social instincts will frequently lead one form to place another under the influence of the same stimuli which are affecting it. Thus a parent form, taking a young form with it in its own hunting, subjects the instincts which the child form has inherited to the same stimuli as those which arouse the hunting reaction in the parent form. In various ways it is possible that the action of one form should serve directly or indirectly to mobilize a similar instinct in another form where there is no more question of imitation than there is in the case in which the action of one form calls out, for the protection of life, a diametrically opposite reaction. Another phase of the matter is also of importance for the interpretation of the so-called imitative processes, in lower animal forms and in the conduct of young children. I refer to what Professor Baldwin has been pleased to call the circular reaction, the instance in which, in his terminology, the individual imitates himself. One illustration of this, that of mastication, which sets free the stimuli which again arouse the masticating reflexes is a purely mechanical circle, similar to that which is responsible for the rhythmical processes of walking, but which has no important likeness to such processes as that of learning to talk. In the latter experiences the child repeats continually a sound which he has mastered, perhaps without being perceptibly influenced by the sounds about him – the da-da-da, the ma-ma-ma, of the earliest articulation. Here we have the child producing the stimulus which in a socially organized human animal calls for a response of another articulation. We see the same thing probably in a bird's insistent repetition of its own notes. The child is making the first uncertain efforts to speak – in this case to himself, that is, in response to an articulate sound which operates as a stimulus upon his auditory apparatus as inevitably as if the sound were made by another. The bird is responding to the note he sings himself as definitely as if he responded to a note uttered by another bird. In neither case is there any evidence that the sound which is the stimulus operates by its quality to induce the child or the bird to produce a sound which shall be like that which is heard. Under the influence of social instincts, animals and young children or primitive peoples may be stimulated to many reactions which are like those which directly or indirectly are responsible for them without there being any justification for the assumption that the process is one of imitation – in any sense which is connoted by that term in our own consciousness. When another self is present in consciousness doing something, then such a self may be imitated by the self that is conscious of him in his conduct, but by what possible mechanism, short of a miracle, the conduct of one form should act as a stimulus to another to do, not what the situation calls for, but something like that which the first form is doing, is beyond ordinary comprehension. Imitation becomes comprehensible when there is a consciousness of other selves, and not before. However, an organization of social instincts gives rise to many situations which have the outward appearance of imitation, but these situations – those in which, under the influence of social stimulation, one form does what others are doing – are no more responsible for the appearance in consciousness of other selves that answer to our own than are the situations which call out different and even opposed reactions. Social consciousness is the presupposition of imitation, and when Professor Royce, both in the eighth chapter of *Studies of Good and Evil*,

and in the twelfth chapter of his *Outlines of Psychology* makes imitation the means of getting the meaning of what others and we ourselves are doing, he seems to be either putting the cart before the horse, or else to be saying that the ideas which we have of the actions of others are ideo-motor in their character, but this does not make out of imitation the means of their becoming ideo-motor. The sight of a man pushing a stone registers itself as a meaning though a tendency in ourselves to push the stone, but it is a far call from this to the statement that it is first through imitation of him or some one else pushing stones that we have gained the motor-idea of stone-pushing.

The important character of social organization of conduct or behavior through instincts is not that one form in a social group does what the others do, but that the conduct of one form is a stimulus to another to a certain act, and that this act again becomes a stimulus to first to a certain reaction, and so on in ceaseless interaction. The likeness of the actions is of minimal importance compared with the fact that the actions of one form have the implicit meaning of a certain response to another form. The probable beginning of human communication was in cooperation, not in imitation, where conduct differed and yet where the act of the one answered to and called out the act of the other. The conception of imitation as it has functioned in social psychology needs to be developed into a theory of social stimulation and response and of the social situations which these stimulations and responses create. Here we have the matter and the form of the social object, and here we have also the medium of communication and reflection.

The second position to which I wish to call attention, and whose implications I wish to discuss, is that the consciousness of meaning is social in its origin. The dominant theory at present, that which is most elaborately stated by Wundt in the first volume of his *Volkerpsychologie*, regards language as the outgrowth of gesture, the vocal gesture. As a gesture, it is primarily an expression of emotion. But the gesture itself is a syncopated act, one that has been cut short, a torso which conveys the emotional import of the act. Out of the emotional signification has grown the intellectual signification. It is evident that but for the original situation of social interaction the bodily and vocal gestures could never have attained their signification. It is their reference to other individuals that has turned expression, as a mere outflow of nervous excitement, into meaning, and this meaning was the value of the act for the other individual and his response to the expression of the emotion, in terms of another syncopated act, with its social signification, gave the first basis for communication, for common understanding, for the recognition of the attitudes which men mutually held toward each other within a field of social interaction. Attitudes had meanings when they reflected possible acts. And the acts could have meanings when they called out definite reactions which call out still other appropriate responses; that is, when the common content of the act is reflected by the different parts played by individuals, through gestures – truncated acts. Here is the birth of the symbol and the possibility of thought. Still, thought remains in its abstractest form sublimated conversation. Thus reflective consciousness implies a social situation which has been its precondition. Antecedent to the reflective consciousness within which we exist, in the beginnings of the society of men and in the life of every child that arises to reflective consciousness, there must have been this condition of interrelation by acts springing from social instincts.

Finally, Professor Baldwin has abundantly exemplified the interdependence of the *ego* and the *socius*, of the self and the other. It is still truer to say the self and the others, the *ego* and the *socii*. If the self-form is an essential form of all our consciousness it necessarily carries with it the other-form. Whatever may be the metaphysical impossibilities or possibilities of solipsism, psychologically it is non-existent. There must be other selves if one's own is to exist. Psychological analysis, retrospection, and the study of children and primitive people give no inkling of situations in which a self could have existed in consciousness except as the counterpart of other selves. We even can recognize that in the definition of these selves in consciousness, the child and primitive man have defined the outlines and the character of the others earlier than they have defined their own selves. We may fairly say a social group is an implication of the structure of the only consciousness that we know.

If these positions are correct it is evident that we must be as much beholden to social science to present and analyze the social group with its objects, its interrelations, its selves, as a precondition of our reflective and self-consciousness, as we are beholden to physiological science to present and analyze the physical complex which is the precondition of our physical consciousness. In other words, a social psychology should be the counterpart of physiological psychology. In each case the conditions under which certain phases of consciousness arise must be studied by other sciences, because the consciousness which the psychologist analyzes presupposes objects and processes which are pre-conditions of itself and its processes. It is true that our reflection can sweep the very physical and social objects which the physical and social sciences have presented within itself, and regard then, as psychical presentations. But in doing this it is presupposing another brain that conditions its action, and whose defection would bring collapse to the very thought that reduced the brain to states of consciousness. In the same manner we may wipe the *alteri* out of existence and reduce our social world to our individual selves, regarding the others as constructions of our own, but we can only do it to some other audience with whom our thought holds converse, even if this self is only the I and the Me of actual thought, but behind these protagonists stand the chorus of others to whom we rehearse our reasonings by word of mouth or through the printed page.

The evolutionary social science which shall describe and explain the origins of human society, and the social sciences which shall finally determine what are the laws of social growth and organization, will be as essential for determining the objective conditions of social consciousness, as the biological sciences are to determine the conditions of consciousness in the biological world. By no possibility can psychology deal with the material with which physiology and the social sciences deal, because the consciousness of psychological science arises within a physical and a social world that are presuppositions of itself. From a logical point of view a social psychology is strictly parallel to a physiological psychology.

Note

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3

ON THE SELF AND TELEOLOGICAL BEHAVIOR (n. d.)*

The human individual has a part of his self, the physical organism in so far as it acts as a stimulus upon him and in so far as he responds to it. This is the case – that the organism is a part of his self – only when the individual takes the attitude, through gesture, of the other to himself. The physical object, on the other hand, in immediate experience is one which does not call out a social reaction. That it calls out any reaction at all and one which leads to a response is essential to its reality. When the reaction is one that involves no adjustment to expressions of pain or pleasure and which calls out no response of communication, the object is an inanimate object. From this standpoint the physical object is that which is not social. From the standpoint of the modern scientist's analysis it is a reality which has a positive content that can be defined in terms that are assumed to be the condition of the experience of a social being.

The reactions of social conduct are those which are directly adjusted to the actions and attitudes – gestures – of other forms of the group to which the individual belongs.

All acts, as such, are teleological. They move toward a result which is a success or a failure. Success is found in the completion of the response or the responses which the stimulus has initiated; failure in the incompleteness of the response. In so far as an object is a collapsed act – including the stimulation and the imagery of the results of the response – the object is an object teleological. Imagery, as a result of the reaction to a stimulus and in some senses the remains of past reactions, is a part of the objective world.

The object or percept is conditioned by the relation between the individual and the environment. What the object is depends both on that which is there and on the impulse, interest, and sensitivity of the individual. This does not make of the object simply an experience of the individual, for his relation is that of selection with elimination and the organization that answers to his act. On the other hand, the environment that is independent of the individual exists as the object of the generalized attitude assumed by all individuals, as they reflect the common attitudes of the community to

which they belong. If a man assumes the attitude of an object which anyone or everyone could assume, if he assumes the role of the generalized other there exists for him an object which answers only to reactions of all. What is responsive simply to his immediate interests or to the interests of others, whose roles he can take, disappears and that persists which any reaction of anyone toward the environment involves and implies. These reactions are necessarily but the common elements in all acts, such as orientation toward distant things, movement toward or away from them, and the contact reactions which the completion of these movements makes possible. The values which these actions will have for food, conflict, construction, protection, etc., are not in evidence, only common subsidiary steps and means in conduct. Such objects and such an environment is mechanical, but it is mechanical only in the sense that it presents objects which are means for any possible ends. Having abstracted from any particular ends we speak of them not as means but as conditions for the accomplishment of any end. This statement of them – objects in a generalized environment – as conditions of conduct, not as means, is the judgment of existence which posits objects as independent of the individual and the group. There seems to be no reason for denying reality to such a mechanical statement of the conditions of conduct, though it must be remembered that the statement is an abstraction made from a teleological world. The ground for affirming its reality as a world independent of teleology is found in the successful working of this hypothesis in all conduct. Furthermore the statement of the world from this standpoint reduces the individuals with their teleological objects to insignificant features of the whole mechanical world. But this mechanical conception – that is, in terms of elements which are independent of all the teleology involved in conduct – places the world of human experience over against a world of elements in motion, which by definition could not be parts of such an experience. In human experience there are not only the objects, selected as to their contents and changes with a view to successful conduct, but also the meanings and emotional values, the personal contents especially those attaching to the physical organism to which the individual reacts as a part of himself, not to mention other contents that are referred to the self, which cannot be directly stated in terms of the mechanism of physical corpuscles, but which have been uniformly referred to a consciousness or mind. In fact consciousness is that which is left over after a complete statement has been of the world in terms of a physical mechanism of corpuscles which cannot by definition themselves enter into immediate experience.

A natural suggestion is that objects and persons with all their contents arise when physical corpuscles are organized in such complexity and such types of systems as we find in the animate world. Just as qualities belong to things in combinations which do not belong to the separate elements, so to the organisms of living forms come characters which we call those of conscious experience, and to other objects such characters as those of color, sound, taste, and odor, when their component corpuscles have attained a certain organization. However, it is interesting to note that this has not been the attitude of either psychologists or of physical scientists in their interpretation of the findings of scientific analysis. It is perhaps true that the scientific imagination finds no immediate difficulty in pushing its analysis below the threshold of sense experience,

and still assuming that the body as it exists in our experience is there, though its constituent parts have none of the qualities which exist in our vision, hearing, taste, or smell. What does seem impossible to either identify our experiences of pleasure, and pain, of effort, etc., with the nervous processes which we state in terms of physical and chemical science, nor yet to assume that this physical mechanism of corpuscles has become in its organization the feeling, enjoying, suffering physical self which appears in our experience. On the contrary, both the psychologist and the physical scientist separate out a consciousness which parallels the physical changes in the mechanism, but it is not a character of the organism.

The actual reason for this separation seems to lie in a difference between the corpuscular mechanism and the body as a part of the self, which is more profound than that which lies between the object outside the organism and the corpuscular structure into which physical science resolves it. The latter can be readily imagined as the minute structure of that which in immediate experience is colored, felt, tasted, or smelt. These characters can still inhere in the object itself because of its corpuscular structure and the relation of the object to the sensitive organism of the individual, while the scientist with his fingers, eyes and tense physical system that is dissecting the organism and carrying the analysis farther with the apparatus of the physical and chemical laboratories is never identified with the object of his analysis, i.e. the physical corpuscular system. As long as there is an immediate experience of the felt object that answers to the experience of feeling, as long, for example, as one might conceivably dissect his own hand and be himself both subject and object, directing his own actions by the localizations and feels of his act in cutting, so long as there would be no tendency to distinguish between the individual who operates and the object operated upon. As soon as the dissection leaves the field of immediate experience, and the analysis becomes indirect, we find that what we are putting over against each other are the results of the analysis, a corpuscular structure which lies beneath a possible experience, and a bodily unanalysed individual who is carrying on the analysis. As long as the experimental method involves an analysing self using the apparatus that belongs to immediate experience and an analysed physical self that cannot be in the field of immediate experience, as long as the analysed object presupposes an analysing subject that cannot be analysed while it is analysing the object, so long as there may be correspondence, but there cannot be identity between the body that is analysed and the "consciousness" i.e. the self that carries on the analysis.

The relation is that of the self as a whole that analyses and a part of the self, the physical organism or its parts. However, since the self does appear as a whole the demand arises to present an equally complete organism. If the organism is that of our immediate experience we find it to our inner and outer sense the self, the "me". If its dissected elements are beneath the threshold of experience, even the whole of such a mechanism cannot be the self, and the observing self appearing in memory is qualitatively different from it, and cannot be identified with it. If we assume that attitude toward our own organism, which we take toward the physical object, we may see in its organization a living being, but only as a living whole. If the physical self is reduced to a central nervous system the observer can only parallel its activity. The

only parallelism is that which lies, then, between the action of the central nervous system and the behavior of the individual. Then this behavior is that of an individual who can be an other to himself; this attitude, at least in the memory of it, is the "consciousness" that is assumed to parallel the neural processes. This consciousness is evidently to be distinguished from what is termed "feeling" in the organism. The latter is a characteristic of the living organism. It amounts to the presence of a peculiar kind of object in the experience of the living individual, objects which are pleasurable and painful, tense and relaxed, the so-called feels of the body, but actually the characteristics of parts of the organism as they become objects in the living form's experience. That they are found entirely within the organism of the form does not change their nature as objects in the experience of the form. It is not until the living individual becomes an object to himself, and until this experience becomes identified with himself, through social conduct that the identification of these experiences with the self takes place. A pleased palate, or an aching tooth, is an object in experience just as a tree or a mountain is an object. A peculiar physiological structure enables the animal to perceive pleasurable and painful objects just as a peculiar physiological structure enables the animal to perceive objects which are colored or hot and cold. Certain experiences become those of a self, in that sense subjective, when through social conduct a self has arisen and these experiences which attach to the individual as an object to himself, both physical and social, are referred to this "self-conscious" being. The lack of these physiological structures is responsible for the fact that none of these objects exist for so-called vegetable and inanimate things. An aching tooth continues to exist though a temporary lesion deprives the individual of it as an object in his experience just as closing the eyes or severing the optic nerve deprives the individual of trees and mountains as objects in his experience. When the individual has become an object to himself, certain objects become a part of that object – the self. These include the objects which make up his physical organism. They include the social characters and properties that attach to the individual in the group within which this self has arisen. They include the so-called ideas and images which the individual indicates to himself by the use of gesture in talking to himself, that is in thinking, the ideas being only the values attaching to the symbolic gestures which the individual uses in his conversations with himself, as he uses them in his conversations with others in the group. In so far as the individual uses these conversations with himself for control over conduct, they become organized, and are spoken of as a mind.

Imagery, in particular, has been located in this mind; it has been taken out of the world where it constitutes part of the content of the objects of experience. Imagery presents therefore a very definite problem. Imagery also constitutes objects which enter into the experience of individuals because of their peculiar physiological structure. It is evident that these objects exist before mind comes into existence. They are referred to mind because of the mental uses to which we put them, that is, that part of them which do not make up parts of the objects in our experience. Two different men see the same tree as hard as they see its trunk as brown, and yet the hardness in the object as seen is imagery. There is no doubt that the hardness as it exists in the perceived tree for one man is different from that which exists in the same tree as perceived by

the other. But so are the other characters of the tree, such as its color and its spatial dimensions, or still more pertinently as was the hardness when the two men came into contact with the same tree in the past. It is necessary to recognize the fact that there is nothing more mental, more subjective, more private in imagery than in the other characters of objects in experience, in so far as these characters are dependent on the organism as well as on the objects for their presence or absence. Only in so far as the original perception can be regarded as a property of the perceiving individual can the image be so regarded. The image stands for a real relationship existing between the organism and objects which are absent, but have been stimuli for the organism. The difference between the content in the perception that answers to the present objects and that which answers to the absent objects, is then that in the case of the first a direct stimulus represents the relation between the organism and the object. In the case of the latter, that standing for the relation between the organism and object that are not present, there is no direct relation of stimulation. The current psychological expression, centrally excited experiences, brings out the fact that the image content in the object is a completion of the object from the standpoint of the conduct of the individual. The incitement to the appearance of the image is the tension of reactions which need characters in the object which are not there, but which arise out of so-called past experience, but the actual relation between the organism and the object, though it is no longer present, is not in essence different from that lying between the object, which is present, and the organism. The difference is only that of degree. No object that affects the eye is exactly the same at the moment at which the excitement has appeared in the living organism and the experience which we call the perception arises. Now between the sight of a friend a few yards away and that of a star several light-years distant from our solar system there is but a difference of degree. The object of perception is not the object that is there at the moment of perception. Indeed the object may not be there when it is perceived. A dark stellar body brought into collision with another lightless form may flame up in the heavens, send streams of light out into space, and these may reach the earth after the light that flamed out has failed and the body we perceive be no longer in existence. The difference between such a percept and an image lies only in the fact that the excitement which is the occasion of the perception in the one case is outside the organism when the perception takes place, while in the other case the occasion is presumably found in the inner demand for a character in the stimulation which is absent. The question of the length of time between the original excitement as it leaves the body and the corresponding activity within the organism cannot be of essential moment. The essential differences seem to be found in the incompleteness of the image, its ragged character, if observed from the standpoint of reaction toward or away from it, or its orientation in the neighboring landscape. It does not fit the immediate world except in so far as it is assimilated into it. So far as it is not so assimilated it does not call out the responses of approach and contact experience. This is tantamount to saying that we form the judgment of it that the object does not exist. Its relation, however, to the original stimulation finds its expression in the judgment that the percept has existed. But while the object of which the image is a representation does not exist, the image in its

function of filling out the percept, or in competition with other contents of immediate experience does exist, as an image. It has been termed mental in the sense that it is not material, i.e. extended and occupying space. It is, however, extended for it provides various elements in the percepts of extended objects. What does not belong to it, is the value of setting going the reactions which place its object among those which we can or could handle.

Abnormal conditions may lead individuals to find just this value in images in which case they become hallucinations. What makes the difference between the image and the percept is the absence or the presence of those values which lead us to react toward the experience by way of locating and coming into contact with it or avoiding contact. When the image does fit into the immediate percept the values of stimulation to the responses toward contact experiences which belong to these perceptual things carry over to the image the content of their reaction. If we can fit the face of an old acquaintance into the uncertain perception of the individual before us, we greet him. If this is not possible the image of the acquaintance calls out no immediate response toward recognition. The image, however, has a field within which it is active. As imagery it can be indicated to the individual himself, as things and characters of things can be indicated to others in the use of gesture. It cannot be directly indicated to others for it is dependent for its existence in experience upon the condition of the organism of the individual simply. In that experience the object of which the image is but a part is referred to the past – the memory image. This object is as real as in the perception of present objects though the liability to error is far greater than in immediate perception. Except in so far as the image can fill out the present field of perception, either in the content of what lies in perception or in the immediate extension of it just beyond this field, the image is impotent as a source of reaction. But in the field of conversation with the self it has the same value for this play of gesture, that objects in the perceptual field have for the conversation of different individuals with each other. One can indicate to himself. Images and phases of images, just as he can indicate to others objects and phases of objects. The immediate value of this in the most primitive conversation is that of shifting attention, with the result of bringing out values in the object which are otherwise ignored. Beside the value of reconstruction of the object it has now acquired the value of something indicated to others, that is something that calls out like reactions in different individuals, in so far as identifies himself with others in the gesture, and it acquires the association with the gesture in so far as this comes to refer to a specific character. One is able to deal with the images in one's own experience in the same fashion. They also can be reconstructed by shifting attention to different features, and they too can acquire the values both of universality and that of being indicated by specific gestures. The contents that arise in this fashion in the inner forum of conversation with one's self furnish the materials of so-called mind. These materials exist in present experience, but as parts of things that are not present, as lacking just those characters which make them immediately real. They refer to things that have been real. In so far as they are present as images, they may be assimilated to objects of immediate perception. In so far as they are not so assimilated they are too faint to obtrude themselves against the field of immediate perceptual stimulation,

except as they become under unusual circumstances hallucinations, but more particularly, except in so far as they enter into the perceptual objects, they lack the stimulation to reaction upon them, which is the mark of the reality of immediate objects. In other words, they lack any interest and are completely ignored over against the perceptual field. As images they are present in the sense that the past exists in the present. As acquired facility the past exists in our habits and habitual attitudes. These, however, stand for the responses in past actions, not for the stimulations. Images, as such, represent the stimulations, that is, some parts of the objects that called out the habitual responses. While they are there as images, potential parts of perceptual objects to which they can be assimilated, they are otherwise simply unlocalized faint experiences, referred to the past of the individual, the inner excitement of whose organism is the physiological condition of their existence. But in the inner forum, the conversation of the individual with himself, this material becomes the stuff of thought.

Experience is the term used for reality when the objects that make it up reflect not only the environment within which perceiving individuals are found but also the individuals themselves. The relation of the environment and the individuals is one of mutual determination. The influence of the environment upon the individuals has been the theme of all modern evolutionary science. What has not been generally recognized is that the individuals exercise a definite influence upon the environment. The evidence of this lies open to all eyes is found in the building of protections from enemies, for the young forms, for sleep, and against excessive temperatures, in the interweaving of insects and flowering plants, in the slight beginnings of cultivation of vegetation by ants, but most evidently in the transformation of their environment by groups of human individuals. A more subtle interrelationship is found in the peculiar sensitivities of animals that determine the environment within which their experience lies and upon which their reactions take place. A form that is endowed with fine discrimination in smell, or sight in so far determines the environment he is affected by and that which he will affect. This is true also of the affect of the reactions of the individuals upon the objects about them. The object upon which the animal reacts is determined by his abilities of approach and flight, and especially by those of contact. What the individual senses at distance is not only that which affects his distance organs of sense, but also what he tends to appropriate or to avoid, and especially that which he can lay hold upon and manipulate. Edible, movable, warm, injurious, brittle, tough, composite, bending, and resisting objects exist as such because of the nature of the individuals that find them within their experience. The characters are real because of this relation of the individuals and their environments. Without this relation these characters would not obtain. Because the individuals are there in their environments these characters are there. To say that the characters are relative is incorrect, if by this one assumes that the characters are subjective. The characters are due to the mutual interrelationship of the individuals and their environments, and given the existence of the individuals and their environments they are there in objective reality. The same may be said in regard to the meanings of things, their so-called sensuous characters, their colors, sounds, tastes, odors, warmth, pains pleasures, beauties, dangers, advantages, with the whole range of emotional characters. If either the

individuals or their environments were absent these characters would be absent also. When both are present these characters are present, and they are present in the things in their relationship to the individuals. They are not states of consciousness in the individuals. It is true that these characters vary with the sensitivities, motor and emotional attitudes of the individuals as they vary with the structure and characters of the things, but this is not more remarkable than that the weight of an object varies with the physical system within which it finds itself. This is the attitude of immediate experience. Over against this attitude of immediate experience is placed that of the existential judgements of a so-called scientific type. Such judgements place the reality of things in the corpuscular mechanisms into which scientific analysis resolves physical objects, both those of the environment and those of the individuals. It is the nature of this analysis that it reaches such elements as lie beyond the possible range of the experience of the world of immediate perception, for it is the goal of this analysis to determine the conditions under which the objects of immediate experience may be controlled. The conditions of the experience cannot be the experience itself.

It of course does not necessarily follow that the conditions of all experience should lie outside the field of experience. It is possible to bring within the range of vision the vibrations of a low toned fork and by appropriate treatment the waves of the air. It would, however, be impossible to hear the physical elements as the elements themselves which are the external phenomena, i.e. it would be impossible to explain an experience in terms of elements of the objects as they are experienced. Such elements would carry with them the same need of explanation as the objects themselves. An explanation of sound could not be found in phonetic elements, though such elements are the materials of the technique of an art, and of an "empiric" science as distinguished from an experimental science. Explanation implies that the object to be explained is a problem, and any element of the object which has the same nature as the object would constitute the same problem. It is by resolving the problematic object into other elements than those which constitute its problematic nature that we are able to find a field within which a solution may be reached. In this undertaking of explanation we resolve all objects of so-called sensuous experience into minute elements of mass in motion, elements which do not appear in any field of actual experience, and find there a field within which every problem of so-called sensation can be conceivably solved, because the elements belonging to this field do not appear in any experienced object. Such a field of elements can only be hypothetical. The elements cannot be experienced. Being assumed, one cannot predict consequences on the basis of their assumed characters and changes. If these predictions prove correct we have this experimental evidence for the existence of the elements. If we take the attitude of the scientist in his analysis and the formation of his hypothesis, we find two different situations, one relative to the analysis of physical bodies not including his own organism, and the other that is of the scientist's own organism. That which contemplates the breaking up of things not himself proceeds without serious complications. He can preserve the attitude of immediate experience with reference to what he can see and handle, and still assume that these objects are corpuscular mechanisms whose structure can become the objects of immediate experience when they enter into the

experience of sentient individuals like himself, when he contemplates the analysis of sentient individuals like himself, and which must include himself, he is obliged to divide himself into two individuals. As the analysing scientist he is an individual with the physical characteristics that go to make up a human social individual. Though he operates on himself only in imagination he still is in imagination an individual that includes the physique of immediate experience. That which he operates upon becomes a cadaver that cannot be identified with the physique of the operator, for if this is abstracted the operator ceases to be a possible scientific operator. What we do is to set up this dissected body with the emphasis upon its corpuscular nature, as the physique and to set up the analysing scientist as consciousness, reducing his physical characters to psychical states, sensations. The corpuscular mechanism which lies by definition below the level of possible experience is then presented as the physical reality at the expense of the organism of immediate experience, and the characters of the object of immediate experience, its color, sound, feel, etc. appear in this guise of consciousness. As long as the individual, even in imagination only dissects, we will say, his leg, and carries his analysis only as far as immediate experience admits, there is no complication. He is in the experience both as operator and operated. The situation is exactly the same as that of the man who rubs his hands or cuts his nails. It is only when the analysis is pushed so far that the individual of immediate experience cannot be both subject and object that the complication appears. This point is reached when the extent of the dissection deprives the body of its character as a living organism. It is no longer the same thing as the body which goes to make up the operator. If now our scientific judgement substitutes it for the physique of the operator, the physique of immediate experience becomes consciousness. The result is the parallelism of physiological psychology.

It may be objected that the analysis of dissection is an unnecessary operation. The analysing scientist can be endowed, in imagination, with the "telescopic eye" of Du Bois Reymond, which will simply observe the processes of the corpuscular mechanism of the physical organism without reducing it to a cadaver. Such an organism would be a living organism, and would be an object to the individual in the same manner as that in which his hand or another part of himself is an object to himself. In the field of immediate experience then the whole living body would be the object of the observing self, and, though its ultimate structure could be assumed to be that of a corpuscular mechanism, such a complex structure could be assumed to be not only living but also an object that has hedonic and other characteristics such as those which belong to portions of our physical organism when they are objects to us in experience. The difficulty in this assumption is that if the entire organism became an object to the self in immediate experience it could be the physique of the self. It would be an other than the self. An individual is a physical organism under all conceivable conditions. His physical organism cannot become an object to himself as a whole without its ceasing to be a part of himself, for in imagination even it is seen and felt, and it is only a part which could be seen and felt by the individual. A further nicety of supposition might be introduced, to wit, that one might with a vastly improved fluoroscope observe that which is going on in his whole physical mechanism. He would not be directly

observing himself but a picture of himself that could do without any contradiction rendered as minute and exhaustive as one wishes. In other words, there is no contradiction in one's obtaining an entirely adequate mirror image of the inside of one's self as well as such a mirror image of the outside of himself. With these he would have a complete presentation of his physical self, as seen by his observing self, in full functional activity. This would seemingly involve no parallelism.

It would be, however, a mirror image, first of the individual as he is for others, and so for one's self as he assumes the attitude of the other toward himself, but only of parts of himself such as he could conceivably observe and handle as physical things that come within the range of his experience of himself. The mirror enables him to see the back of his head which without this deflection of the rays of light he could not see, but the vision of the back of the head refers to his possible contact with the head with the hand as the full expression of its reality. But in the second place the physical object which he would see would go beyond the physique which is the physical object that belongs to our immediate experience of the self as an object, and takes in the self as subject – at least the physique of that self, and the physique which is essential to the observation which brings in parts of the self as a physical object. The situation remains the same as that which was found to obtain in the supposition of the telescopic eye, and in the assumed dissection of the individual by himself. In each case there is set up a physical mechanism whose existence as a product of analysis implies an analysing scientist who has a physique that must exist for the sake of the analysis, although the analysis is assumed to be so complete that even the physique of the subject who carries it on is also brought within its scope. An analysis took place by a thought process which operated through a unitary mind which in so far as it thinks is not a composite, analysis could be undertaken upon everything and carried to any limit. But if mind is actually the process of conversation of the individual with himself, he must be there as an individual to carry on the conversation.

This brings us to the question of just what is necessary to constitute an individual as an observer, and specifically as an observer of himself. The conversation takes place by means of gestures and predominantly vocal gestures. The gesture serves as a means of indication, directing attention to phases and elements in the objects which otherwise would not be attended to, and, when this takes place in the reflective process, phases and elements which are for the time being isolated in attention. The process involves the reference to the individual as an object, so that it is necessary to indicate the conditions under which this reference takes place, so that it is necessary to indicate the conditions under which this reference takes place, if we are to present the situation within which the individual indicates objects to himself, in other words under which the individual thinks.

The individual is an object to himself in so far as parts of his organism are objects, i.e. in so far as they exercise distance stimulation and call out contact responses, i.e. in so far as e.g. as one can see and feel with one hand the other hand or his leg. But these objects reflect themselves in the response of the individual to reactions which belong to them as objects to the individual. I refer to his readjustments of his motions of the parts of the body due to his vision of the parts of the body in their movements.

E.g. the individual drums on the table with his fingers, and sees the fingers moving rhythmically and feels them with the other hand, or finds the imagery of such feeling of them in his vision of the fingers. He notices certain marks on the table and is moved to touch these in the rhythmic play of the fingers. This involves stretching the fingers to reach the marks in question. His attitude as an active individual shows him to be ready to respond in the face of these various stimuli. This readiness appears in the feel of balanced tensions, that are localized. The relation between this tension localized in the fingers to the seen and externally felt movements is that which is reflected in the identification of the hand as a seen object with the body of the individual. By putting together the various parts of the body as objects and relating them as a composite object-whole to the movements of the individual as a whole, the organism becomes an essential part of the self.

This composite individual is made up of the acting individual and the individual as an object, the latter being given in the various parts of the body, which are organized as a whole, together with the imagery of what of the body is not seen and is not within the range of the hands or other tactual surfaces of the individual. Such an object individual is in general bounded by the epidermis, but traumatic invasions of the organism may bring other surfaces into this object individual. The imagination working with these and with the experiences of the dissections of other human forms carries these surfaces within the outer surfaces that constitute what may be called the normal object individual. However the acting individual, appearing in tensions and balances and the sense of readiness to respond to environmental stimulations, is always within this object individual. It is not that which we can see and that which we can handle in ourselves that acts, though these experiences of seeing the parts of the body and feeling them serve to correct and direct our action with reference to ourselves. This continuous interaction of the acting and object individuals in the control and direction of ourselves merges them in the single individual of immediate conduct, though the line of cleavage is there whenever there is reason for distinguishing between them. This is particularly true of the mirror images which we gain of our countenances. They are less the individual behind the face than are the surfaces which we can see and handle, but even the parts we can see are distinguished from the action within. The clenched hand which we can see is not the individual which strikes. The object individual is of central importance for he is located in the objective world as a physical being in the midst of the things which are of the greatest importance to the individual as a whole. The active individual finds in this object individual and its world the conditions under which its action may take place. It is this distinction which is made definite and the basis for important conduct by the gesture. The social act places the individual in a social relation to himself and so divides the active self from the object self, functionally.

In conversing with himself one addresses the self which can be seen and felt, that belongs to the world of the individuals who make up the group within which social conduct arises with its gestures. In the reply, however, the object individual speaks from within, i.e. it is the active individual that speaks, but speaks in the role of the object individual. This is a role that is determined by the social situation. The character

of the object individual is defined by his group. He sees himself as others see him, while he has an inner expression that is the source of his own uniqueness. The object individual is physically determined by the physical reactions to himself in his physical environment. He is socially determined by his social conduct in his group. As the self arises through social conduct, and the ability of the individual to affect himself by the gestures which he uses in influencing others, the beginning of so-called self-conscious conduct is in social conduct. Thus the earliest self-conscious conduct of the child is that of play, i.e. the conduct in which the child is acting as an other with actual or imaginary companions. It is when these different roles are organized together in the child's adjustments to his social environment that the internal self appears, speaking with the common voice of his group to which he replies with the voice that belongs to his own activity, expressing his own tendencies to action. Two conditions then are present in the appearance of the self. The first is the tendency to address one's self in the gesture language of social conduct, a tendency that arises with the individual's finding himself assuming the role of another; the second is the tendency to indicate to another some object or character of an object in a cooperative act. Taking the role of another and addressing himself, the individual indicates to himself objects and phases of objects. The importance of this lies in the fact that the role of another puts one in the attitude of recognizing objects and phases of objects which would be ignored from the standpoint of his own organized activity. This will take place only when the action is inhibited by conflicting tendencies and the consequent obstacle. Thinking then arises.

This thinking is at first predominantly social. I.e. the phases of objects that are pointed out by the self in addressing himself as an other, are the socially important objects and phases of objects. The earliest attitudes of children and of primitive men in control of the environment is that of magic, i.e. social conduct in attempted control of physical things. In this process the self as a whole is identified now with this role and now with that, but so far as a division takes place the "double" of primitive peoples is the active individual with a tenuous form, that can leave the body especially in sleep, that can be hurt or even killed, while the body is dull and relatively inactive, though each is a complete individual. It was not until the desocializing of physical objects had taken place or was taking place that the distinction between the active self as a social being, and of the body as a non-social, i.e. purely physical being, was made. Even Aristotle left the body a vegetative and a sensitive soul as distinguished from the rational soul, and these natures are dealt with by him much as are the natures of inanimate physical objects. The ancient world was loath to accept a physical object whose reality was reduced to the atoms of Democritus, elements which had no content but form, mass, and motion. With the sharp definition of the physical body by modern dynamics, the tenuous body of the social self, disappears, the non-extended contents of thought, the ideal contents of Post-Socratic thought, and even imagery were dealt with as having their habitat in this unembodied self, but the emphasis was laid upon the processes of this self rather than upon its contents. These mental processes then imply a self that points out to itself the important characteristics – important to the individual – as the self points them out to other individuals. Such a self appears in experience only after

other social objects exist for the individual – or in his experience. The self is not a precondition of experience, though it is of the so-called mental processes. Before discussing the function and import of these mental processes, it be well to rehearse the nature of the experience within which the self and its mental processes appear.

Objects in experience involve a definite relationship between the organism and the environment. It is a relationship that determines the environment as definitely as it does the organism. The reactions of the organism mark the outlines of the thing. The manipulation of the individual, the thing what it is, constitute its substance. The various qualities arise through the interrelationship of individual medium and structure of the object. When we speak of an object as colored we do not assume that it possesses color for an individual who has no vision, nor do we assume that the color is located in the individual who sees it. While we recognize that the object must have a certain structure in order that it may reflect light waves, we do not assume that this structure is the color but that this makes the color possible when other conditions of vision are met. The ultimate elements of things which a scientific hypothesis presents are accepted because the assumption of them is verified by experiment, but their existence as particles which by definition are incapable of the characters which they explain, does imply that the objects made up out of them have not the qualities which they have made possible. A portion of an object so small that cannot subtend a light wave cannot be colored, and the molecular elements whose motion is the condition of heat cannot themselves be hot, but the fact that bodies are made up of such elements which in themselves may not be colored nor hot, does not imply that the objects may not possess these qualities. It is legitimate to say that granted the conditions of structure of the object and of the media and light waves, the eye of the organism is a contributing cause to the color of the object. The presence of the color not only gives the object surfaces which it did not possess but puts it into an experience where it is defined with reference to the conduct of the individuals as it would not be if it were not a colored object. A landscape in the dark is not only a different landscape because its objects for the time being lack color, but also because it has lost the relations with seeing organisms within it who cannot now react to its colored and bright surfaces.

These relations are as real as are those of mass in any physical system. The presence of a seeing individual in a world bathed in light waves and provided with reflecting surfaces is responsible for a new definition of objects as well as the new characters of the objects which the relationship between the seer and the seen brings with it, i.e. the content of color. The mistake of the vitalists, as of the dualistic philosophers, is that they set up some sort of an entity, such as a life principle and a consciousness, as the explanation of the difference between the aetiology of the mechanical system and that of living forms in their environments and of the intelligent individuals with so-called minds. The difference between mechanical causation and that of living and so-called conscious forms, lies not in different principles such as that of final over against efficient causes, nor does it lie in the appearance of different entities such as life forces or substances, or souls or consciousnesses as *verae causae*. It lies in the different objects and their systems which appear as soon as individual objects attain a sensitivity and a power of reaction which marks out and organizes the interacting field of forms and

environment. The relation between forms and their environment is such that objects arise in causal relation to the living forms, which in this definition and outline do not exist but for this relationship. Food, a danger in the form of an enemy, or darkness, an individual of the other sex, or a child form, exist only in the relation of the living animal and its immediate world. Now, it is true that the changes that take place under the stimulation of these objects and the setting free of the reactions of the animal forms can be stated theoretically in terms of the mass system within which both forms and their environment have arisen as parts of another system. But in the realm of immediate experience these objects and living forms have these other characters. In this field the individuals are moved by food danger other forms (sic), while the statement in systems of mass corpuscles is merely an abstraction from the causal relations found in the field of immediate experience.

The question is at bottom this: do the biologic forms and the objects which exist because of the relationship involved in experience constitute the actual causes and effects in the world? If they do then what ever the system in which they are found, they are responsible for the changes that take place. If it is not the animal and the environment that are the actual causes and effects, but the system of electrons or other mass corpuscles in their changes, then whatever is done with the animal, plant and their environment, they will not be responsible for the changes which appear in their experience. The responsibility for the changes will be found in these subexperiential things and their motions, and the forms and their surrounding worlds will merely register what takes place in the world of mass and motion; as forms and objects they will not be responsible for that which takes place, it will be only the elements out of which they are assumed to consist and their motions which will constitute the *verae causae*. If animals and plants and their environments are the actual objects and their interrelations are genuine causal facts, then they are responsible for development. If human individuals are actual physical realities then they are responsible for the changes they bring about in their world. They are indeed influenced by the objects about them, but in their turns they influence them. If human individuals are to be reduced to corpuscular elements to find their true so-called physical reality, then the experience of the individuals will merely record what takes place by the laws of masses in motion, but the individuals as individuals will not be the causal factors. This is a consideration that we are more or less familiar with in moral conduct. The question of moral responsibility is not whether there exist in the conduct causal relations which account for and explain events, but whether we are as individuals ourselves such causes. It is only in a world in which there is an order, and an order which is predictable that there can be intelligent conduct, and only in an intelligent world can there be moral conduct. What we recognize is that we are responsible causes in this world, that the acts that take place are our acts.

From the point of view of the mechanical system there are no objects except the ultimate corpuscles and the system as a whole, as relations subsist between all elements in the system and there is no ground for distinguishing between relationships, so far as importance is concerned. Objects exist only in experience. Their definition is found in the mutual interaction of an individual and an environment. The corpuscles

cannot be in the experience, since by definition they comprise the ultimate so-called physical conditions of experience. It is because living individuals have arisen through the growing complexities of structures that objects are constituted by the relation of stimulation and response, and that the particular interaction of form and environment appears. To say that the positions and motions of the elements in the mechanical system, within which these individuals and surrounding objects appear and out of which they are built up, are all determined by previous positions and accelerations does not rob the living individual or the objects, which their interaction define, of their reality as objects, nor of their efficacy as causes. The statement in terms of elements in a mechanical system is an inadequate statement of the living individual and of the objects in the environment, i.e. in the experience of the form and its environment. These individuals and objects are productive of the realities of experience which are to be stated in terms of the mechanical system of sub-experiential elements, nor could the positions and accelerations of these elements determine what specific relations will be selected in perception, nor what specific impulses will be organized in the conduct of the individual. The mechanical system provides the system of transportation of the world of experience but it does not provide the content of that world which it is carrying. It is the interaction of living individuals and objects of experience that determine this. Any result would be a mechanically determined result, but which the result is to be cannot be revealed in the conditioning sub-experiential mechanism. This means, when elaborated, that we are always generalizing the hypothesis for the plan of our specific acts.

All of our reflective conduct is of the same logical character as that of the scientist in seeking the solution of a genuine problem. He states the conditions which the problem implicates. These conditions could be rendered necessary if all which they involve could be worked out, but they do not contain the solution of the problem; that has to come as a hypothesis from the mind of the scientist. It is his creative contribution to the world of immediate experience within which he finds himself, but it must conform to the conditions of this world – an agreement which the experiment indicates. Now it is evident that such conditions, as do not in themselves include or imply the solution, are open to different possible solutions. The necessity which belongs to the solution that is finally accepted and proved by experiment does not come from the statement of the conditions, as these can be formulated in the problem. It comes from the structure of the world in which the living individual, especially the individual with the social structure of a mind, is an active determining part. It is of the first importance to determine just what changes and new objects such beings as living forms, and more specifically the human living individual with his social mind can be responsible for in the world. The general nature of the new object has been indicated in the reference to the changes that are involved in the appearance of new species. In so far as a reorganization of the living form is responsible for a different environment, new objects have appeared. Among lower forms these new objects are largely foods, sex and parental individuals, places of refuge and feeding, fields of locomotion. The capacity of an animal to assimilate a new food makes that an object that was no object before, and the effect of this is the change in vegetation both its consumption

and its stimulus to its growth. The changes that result from the use and excavation of holes in the earth, the building of ant-hills or the building of a bird's nest, seem trivial but they are actual effects which the appearances of these new environments involve. The interdependence of insects and plants presents more considerable and impressive effects.

The implication of the position just taken is that the result which has arisen through the appearance of the new object could not have arisen without it, and that the operation of the forces at work under the earlier situation would have been inadequate to production of the results in question. For example, without the centering of attention upon the expansive power of steam, which made that a new object in human experience, the steam engine and all the corollaries drawn from it would not have come into existence. The mechanists' counter statement is that it has been the conditions which exist in the earlier situation that have forced the attention of the human individuals toward the work producing power of steam. The mechanist need not deny the import of the new object; he needs only to deduce the object from the mechanical conditions that preceded its appearance. He can go further and assert that every change that has taken place in this process is by the presupposition of the exact sciences is one that must have followed from the previous positions, velocities, inertias, and directions of motion of all the physical elements in the earlier situations. This latter statement carries with it the implication that the new objects which arise in experience are not, as objects, *verae causae* but only appear as such from the standpoint of experience, that the causes of all motions and changes lie in the subexperiential field. The problem then is to determine how far the situation as it appears in human discovery and invention is real, that situation in which the new object not only arises but arises through the interplay of the individual and the environment, in which in other words the objects which appear are *verae causae*. The legitimacy of this assumption would seem to turn upon the answer to the question whether science assumes a complete mechanical system that is continuously in operation determining the position of every particle in the universe. If this is the assumption of science, every position of every particle being determined and hence every position of every object made up of these particles being also determined, objects as objects would be only apparently causes of changes, the real causes being found in the positions and motions of the particles that compose these objects. Determination in the sense of the absence of origination in conduct depends upon the reply to this question. If new objects arise through the interrelation of individuals and their environments, then the novel may appear and man as an individual may become responsible, may be in his initiative a cause of change, as he seems to be in invention for example. But if the assumption of science is that these objects are determined in their positions and changes by the predetermined positions and changes of all their particles, then origination of new objects is but a seeming in so far as causation is concerned. Now the assumptions of science are always strictly ad hoc, that is they have reference to the problem with which the scientist is engaged, and this problem abstracts from the possible solutions which may suggest themselves. The mechanical statement comprises simply the conditions to which any solution must accord. This assumption implies that recombinations of

these elements of reality may be brought about which would produce different results, there is a field of indetermination within which the results depend upon the appearance of new objects, through the interrelation of individuals and their environments. Science indeed always generalizes its abstract statements of the conditions of the solutions of its problems, its ultimate elements and their laws of change, and in so far as these elements and laws of change, and in so far as these elements and laws are found to apply to whole groups of problems, such as those of the physical sciences, it obtains a mechanical system that is continually assumed and continually acted upon, but it is only in so far as these elements and laws present aspects of things, of objects, that they have validity. They never reach a validity that is independent of the problems that arise in immediate experience, nor of the immediate experience within which the final experimental proof must be found. The most that can be said is that things act as if there were electrons moving in accordance with assumed laws of motion, and they may not be substituted for the objects, for this robs the object of its full reality.

To estimate the value of these hypothetical systems it is necessary to follow out the process by which they arise in experience. This experience ante-dates mind and the self, and therefore the thought which takes place in the mind which is the inner process of the self. The intelligence which appears in lower forms, which finds expression in much of our unreflective conduct, and which achieves its most elementary expression in the appearance of new objects and consequently new organization of impulses within the forms within whose environments these objects have arisen, and even new species, when this organization leads to structural differences that become lasting, this intelligence is shown in the shifting of attention, when conduct is inhibited. The inhibition appears when conflicting tendencies hold each other in check. Certain objects have existed for the individual, answering to the impulses to which his conduct gives expression. The impulses which check these, which have constituted the flow of the individual's conduct, call into the field of attention other characters in the things about, in other words, make different objects of these things. If in the play of attention among these characters an object arises which allows the formerly conflicting tendencies to find expression without conflict, a new object has arisen in the experience of the individual, and corresponding to this there has arisen a new organization of impulses which may pass under the term of adaptation, either in the form of the individual or in the species, according as the reorganization is confined to the individual form, or is passed on by heredity to later generations. It is important to recognize that such expressions of intelligence in the adjustment of the conduct of living forms to exigencies of existence through the reorganization of the impulses of the forms always involve a corresponding appearance of a new object or new objects. Changes in forms and environments are always mutual and equivalent. New dangers, foods, defences, retreats, means, etc. answer to every change in the organization either of the individual forms or of the species. These changes are just as real as are those introduced through human so-called invention.

This does not imply that this is the only way in which changes and development in living forms has taken place. There may be in living organisms tendencies toward

growth, which appear in mutations and sports, that are not at all dependent on conditions growing out of the lack of adaptation of the individuals and the surrounding habitat, and even when such lack of adaptation does exist it may be the mutation which brings forward a form which is able to respond to the changed habitat. But even in these cases the organization of the new form is dependent upon the appearance of new objects to which they can answer. It is this relationship, which we understand by experience, that is essential to the existence of any form. In so far as new forms arise, new objects must appear also. Our interest is more particularly in the development of intelligence in the individual forms, in the readjustments in the organization of the conduct of these individuals, and in the appearance of the new objects which answer to these readjustments. The readjustments take place – when conflict of tendencies to act have caused inhibition – by such a shifting of attention that new characters are found which allow of rearrangements of acts, both spatially and temporally. The method is not that of rearrangement of coordinations, but the realizing of that in the object which makes it a different object, and one capable of calling out reactions which have inhibiting each other, but now can express themselves without such inhibition. Consider the well worn illustration of the child and the candle. The bright dancing flame is at first a plaything for the child, and then is a hot thing to be avoided. The lure of the dancing flame and the dread of the burning flame mean actions that inevitably inhibit each other. The shifting of attention, however, enables the child to see the candle stick which enables him to both handle the candle and to avoid the burn. That they had been invented to meet this situation ages before the modern child is true, but when they were so invented, they exactly expressed this advance by the appearance of the new object which allowed conflicting acts to find expression without conflict.

That such reorganization can take place implies that there are relations in things which make such new objects possible. The mutual achievement of the environment and the individual is that the content of particular meaning that goes to make up a particular object is marked out and differentiated so that in the conduct or behavior of that form and the others that belong to the group that object exists as a distinct entity where it did not so exist before, and that there exists a coordination in the structure of the organism of the individual which is also new – as new as the object. The primary mechanism of this sort of creative intelligence is the play of attention over the things as they have existed, for this may lead to the response to new characters which will make the coordination of conflicting activities possible. This meaning is a something that has to be divided between the environment and the individuals that answer to it. There is first of all a certain definite content of stimulation calling out a certain type of response, and this is by selective attention relatively isolated in the thing. It answers to the response in the individual which arises whenever that content of stimulation is operative. In its isolation or abstraction it is relatively identical in any one of the things within which it may be found. Its universality, however, consists in the capacity of response of the individual to this whenever it appears and the response of any other individual with the same coordinations. It is the interrelation of the coordination of impulses adjusted to a specific sort of object and the corresponding

cutting out of this sort of object, or combination of stimulations, which is what we understand by meaning. It is when in social conduct we find a symbol which takes the place in some sense for the content of the object, acting as a surrogate for the content, that we have what we understand as a concept, or general idea. This can take place only in a field of social conduct. Part of the content of such objects, as we have been indicating, is of a different nature. It is called imagery; that is, it is something as really existent as the other contents of the object but not in itself capable of calling out the responses or yielding the results of things.

In so far as the imagery is a part of the object, either a present object or a past object, it is no more private than is the so-called sensuous content of the object. In either case, the object is there for other individuals as genuinely as it is there for the individual who speaks of seeing or hearing it. The printed page, for example, is perceived largely by means of what we call imagery, and one assumes that the same words are there for others as those which he reads. There is to be sure considerably more individual variation in this content of the object than in that part of the object which answers to the relation of what actually strikes on the retina with the individual organism. This is, however, only a difference of degree. The imagery content is one that stands for a relation between the organism and an object that has been experienced. That object is as much as object for others as is that which is experienced at present. The apparent subjectivity of imagery is found in the fact that the past object not being present the experience of imagery in so far it is present is referred solely to the individual organism – as are the experiences of color-blind individuals if the reference to the characters of the object is lost. The emphasis is laid almost exclusively upon the individual organism end of the relationship between it and the object. The reasons for the appearance of the imagery are therefore not to be found in the organism, particularly in the processes by which the organism tends to secure the stimulus which will set off the impulses that are seeking expression. It is in this field that intelligence lies. It is in the analysis of imagery as in the analysis of the object that the possibility of new combinations is found. The process of analysis and synthesis of imagery and its meanings is that which belongs to the so-called thought activity, but the content that is analysed may be that of the object and the synthesis may be those of external objects. One may think with his hands. What is exclusively mental are the symbols, the various gestures, which have reference to all members of the group but are addressed to the self.

Reverting to the question of the efficacy of objects and individuals: can the appearance of new objects be accounted for by the changes in a mechanism of corpuscles? Under the mechanical theory, every movement is predetermined by the positions, inertias, velocities, and directions of the elementary corpuscles. Every change within which new objects appear is determined, and would on the basis of full knowledge of all the elements and their positions, inertias, velocities, and directions have been predictable. To have been able to deduce the position of each element of the object, and hence of the ensemble of elements, the object, would seem to be in a position to explain the appearance of the object. What is not given in this explanation is reason for the existence of the object, since an object implies the ignoring of various relations

which connect the elements of the object with other elements, and the confining of the attention to those which in experience constitute the object. From this standpoint, with its living forms and the objects that constitute their environments, would seem to be without any efficacy in changes that take place in experience, though the objects and living forms could not be given in their natures in terms of the mechanical system. What is of interest in this experience is that there is ignoring, which eliminates elements and relations from things. A current method of stating this has been in terms of consciousness. It is assumed that only certain phases of the world are within the scope of attention, and appear in a conscious experience as the effect of these characters to which attention is given. That to which attention is not given does not appear unless it forces itself upon our attention. In this conception the character of objects is found in consciousness. However, this attitude is not consistent for such thinkers still imply that back of these objects in conscious experience there lie objects which are real living forms and real objects in environments outside consciousness. It would help clear up the question if a somewhat more detailed analysis indicated just what efficacy could be found in experience.

An instance of such efficacy of individuals and objects in their environment in bringing about changes in these objects and in themselves, can be found in any discovery or in any invention. In every discovery as well as in every invention, the structure and nature of objects have changed, and that not because of changes which are the result of an order that is mechanical, but because a real problem has arisen in the conduct of those whose experience is involved, and because of the characters which are brought into conjunction through the conflicts which this problem involve. As an illustration, the appearance of the sun as the center of the solar system and diurnal revolution of the earth replacing the revolution of the heavens may be taken. The conflicts were those of the explanations of the aberrations of the planetary motions upon the theory of the geocentric universe. Certain of these brought the relative motions of Mercury and Venus with reference to the sun into such a conjunction that the heliocentric hypothesis suggested itself and the various positions of the heavenly bodies and the discoveries of the moons of Jupiter and the character of the surface of Moon all fitted well into the conception. The mechanical systems that stood as the condition of any solution were the recorded movements of the heavenly bodies. These were the data to which any hypothesis must conform. When the heliocentric doctrine fitted into these and the further observations made, the certainty which had attached to them passed to the new object. It was therefore dated back. Men assumed that the heliocentric order was that which had always obtained. But the new object – the heliocentric system – had far reaching effects which had obtained before. Certain of the effects were found in the stimulus to scientific research with the discovery of new facts which again took their place in the world as a part of the mechanical system that had been in existence. They were novelties for human science as they appeared but their existence was not due to their discovery. The new objects as part of the human environment, however, produced effects on men, their attitudes toward the world and each other, which had no place in that mechanical system. From the standpoint of religion, politics, education, and art there was a new world and a new society that

had not existed before, nor would the assumption of the ordered changes which belonged to the mechanical system so reconstructed account for these changes in men and their environment. The effort to make the processes of the mechanical system account also for the objects as they existed in human experience and for the new minds and attitudes in the individuals and their society came with the attempted mechanical explanation of life and intelligence which the development of physics, chemistry, and biology initiated. It seems, however, possible to state the logical problem without involving as yet the question of the relation of mind and body. Could the appearance of the Copernican hypothesis have been deduced from the necessary order of the world of the Renaissance, if we recognize that the real order of the period was not the Ptolemaic, but the Copernican? That is, does the recognition of the pre-existence of what is discovered imply the causal series by which the discovery is explained; or does the abstractness of the terms in which the conditions are stated, under which the solution of the problem may be made, render any formulation of the objects and their causes inadequate? The earlier objects were the earth at the center of the world, and the heavenly bodies moving by their own nature in circular orbits. The later objects were the sun at the center of a system of planets with the other objects in the system as having the momenta which our own bodies have in motion, the tendencies to move in straight lines and to deflect as some force pulls them centripetally which belong to the objects of our immediate experience. The mechanical system in which the data were stated which made the passage from the Copernican to the Ptolemaic theories possible was in terms of purely relative change of position of the heavenly bodies which fell under the observation of the astronomers of the Renaissance period with reference to the earth. This formulation of observation involved neither the natures of the earthly and heavenly bodies after Aristotle nor the momenta of bodies in motion as conceived of by dynamic theory from Galileo on, though either set of objects could have been stated in terms of relative change in position of the different bodies involved. In the nature of the case the new objects were presented simply in terms of these relative changes of position. The momenta were stated entirely in velocities and accelerations in velocities. Neither of these statements in terms of purely relative changes of position of the bodies nor in terms of velocities their changes and directions give the situation within which the new object arises in the experience of men. The motives which determined the formation and acceptance of the Copernican hypothesis or its earlier formulation by Aristarchus and rejection by ancient society lie outside of the mechanical doctrines in their abstract formulation. No deduction of these motives could be made from these mechanical statements. So far as these statements are concerned they could not be the causes of the changes which have resulted in human experience from the appearance of the new objects in the heavens, and the type of interest which has developed a dynamic theory of matter with its control the physical environment and the enormous changes which for man have followed upon the growth of modern science. The attempt to bring these motives and all the physical changes that have resulted from them within the scope of the mechanical statement belongs to the application of scientific explanation to biology, by way of physics and chemistry. Such an attempt does not undertake to state the motives that have led to

the formation of new hypothesis and the new objects that arise through them. These are left in the field of so-called consciousness. What such an attempt does undertake is to account for every movement of all living beings, of every change within the physical organisms of men in the same fashion in which the movements of the gross masses are accounted for. These would then account for every movement made in human conduct, and would state also all the physical conditions which seem to determine the "conscious experiences".

Thus, all discoveries and all inventions with all the changed conditions they involve, in so far as they are physical facts, would fall into the mechanical statement, leaving behind a shell of conscious experience within which all these objects would be found, which would not be mechanically stated. However, this shell would be a mere shell for the conduct itself would be determined, and could be conceivably deduced from the previous masses, velocities, accelerations, and directions if these could be known and computed. Such a doctrine as this, however, overlooks the fact that in human experience the mechanical system arose out of a problem which was solved under motives which could not have been stated in the mechanical statement which constituted the conditions for the solution of the problem. The solution we have reached carries with it no finality. At what point and under what circumstances another critical problem may arise no one can predict. When this problem does arise, supposing that it appears, it will abstract from some of the essential elements in the present mechanical system, and the new hypothesis will not be one which could be deduced either from the abstract statement of these conditions or from the new hypothesis, unless we assume that this hypothesis lays claim to finality. That is, the unchanged facts which every problem must recognize are never of a character to determine its solution. It can be, however, contended that scientific research does imply some existing determined order which would, if it were known to us or to minds capable of grasping it, determine every change that takes place so that we would be able to predict from the data of such a mechanical system all bodily changes and every change in the nervous system of every individual which presumably condition all thinking as well as all motor processes. The question then assumes this form: admitting that we cannot find any mechanical system which would enable us to predict the determining conditions of any discovery or invention, must we not assume the existence of such a system, that is, do not the presuppositions of scientific research themselves imply such a system?

The import of this question may be evident by discovering just what objects are discovered and invented by human intelligence when faced with difficulties. The discovery of the diphtheria bacillus will illustrate the first. Here was new object, that could be detected by the eye armed with the microscope, that occurred when the disease is present, that can be destroyed by stimulating the system to the production of the antibodies that counteract its poison, the disease passing with the departure of the germ. While it appears in a very high degree improbable, it is possible that later investigations may so materially change our hypothesis in regard to the diphtheria germ that it will become an entirely different object from what it is now. What we actually have is a definite technique for dealing with diphtheria which is based on the

belief in the germ as its cause and a germ of a fairly definite character. Later changes in scientific theory may change this bacillus into something different. What will remain unchanged will be the facts of our conduct with the actual stimuli of immediate experience which have called out this conduct, in the control of the disease and the success which has attended this control. Any future doctrine in regard to the aetiology of diphtheria must fit into and interpret these facts. The objects that lie back of and interpret the conduct change in varying degree with all scientific advance. Thus the discovery of anti-bodies has made of the bacillus a chemically different living form from what it once was. Unquestionably, the further advance of the doctrine of the chemistry and physics of the life process will make of these minute forms quite different objects from what they are now, as they will make different living forms of the higher metazoans. Some far more fundamental discovery may change living objects beyond recognition even though this seems almost unimaginable. Consider what entirely different objects the germ cells of mammals are today thanks to the doctrine of Mendelian inheritance. We do not postulate the continuance of any of these objects of science, but we assume the facts of so-called observation, and what we demand is that some object be found which will give the meaning to these observations which our conduct requires; but the changes in that conduct, especially the conflicts in our reactions, always imply the possibility of the reconstruction of these objects. If we consider this assumption more narrowly we remark the difference between what is called discovery and is called invention. In discovery we recognize objects of immediate experience which may be stated either in terms of earlier hypotheses or in terms of those which have been formulated more recently and have met the test of experiment or observation. The use of the term object here must be clearly defined. The Ptolemaic sun and the Copernican sun are in one sense the same, while in another they are vastly different. They are the same within the field of perception. For perception the sun rises and sets. For our larger field of interpretation the earth revolves on its axis. The sun so conceived is an utterly different object from that which the Ptolemaic conceived it to be. Within certain limits we assume that this field of perception has remained the same for all human experience. Scientific discovery gives us no new objects of perception, or only such as are assumed to have existed as objects of possible perception in immediate experience before they were discovered. Invention, on the other hand, produces perceptual objects which have not previously existed. From this standpoint a new food, that has become such through a definite change in the structure of animal forms would be an invention, while the coming upon new stores of what was being already eaten would be only discovery. Thus all objects in the environment of living forms have been invented. The light as distinguished from the ether waves, or streams of electrons, is an invention of the eye, while sound as distinguished from waves of air is an invention of the ear, and odor of the olfactory tract, and so on, but having been invented they and all objects in the environment are percepts.

So locomotives and aeroplanes and the telephones are inventions, have become objects of perception, or percepts, and are as essential parts of the environment of man in modern human society as is the light and sound as they appear in modern dwellings or modern speech. Discovery as commonly used in science has to do with subexperiential

or transexperiential structures which interpret changes and the nature of perceptual objects. They have to do frequently with unrecognized orders of changes among perceptual objects. These subexperiential and transexperiential objects are themselves definitely inventions of an imagination which presents to itself hypothetical objects which maybe considered plans or models which the scientist conceives, that is, it is assumed that there exists a one to one relation between the elements of the model or plan or map of the hypothetically imagined objects and the elements of the subexistential or transexistential objects. The scientist conceives that the subexistential objects work "just as if" they were organized after the structure of hypothetical models. While however these subexistential objects are inventions of the scientific imagination they are conceived to be invented to reveal to our imagination and thought an order of things and the nature of things that are there (and have been), while the creations of the inventors are what have never been on sea or land. The field of these inventions whether they are found in the creations of new objects in the environments of forms lower than man through changes in the structure of the living form, or whether they are found in the changes which man introduces into his environment, is the field within which living forms and their environments of objects actually affect each other as living individuals and objects. It is the field of the appearance of species, and the objects they imply, and it is the field of human initiative and freedom. The problem of the free will and of the appearance of new objects is the same problem looked at from different points of view.

Note

- * Unpublished manuscript. Mead Papers Archive, "On the self and teleological behavior", Box: 13, Folder: 25, 39 pp.

II. The “I” and the “me” as phases
of the self

4

WHAT SOCIAL OBJECTS MUST PSYCHOLOGY PRESUPPOSE? (1910)*

There is a persistent tendency among present-day psychologists to use consciousness as the older rationalistic psychology used the soul. It is spoken of as something that appears at a certain point, it is a something into which the object of knowledge in some sense enters from without. It is conceived to have certain functions – in the place of faculties. It is as completely separated from the physical body by the doctrine of parallelism as the metaphysical body was separated from the metaphysical soul by their opposite qualities.

Functional psychology has set itself the program of assimilating the purposive character of conscious processes – or of consciousness as it is termed – to the evolutionary conception of adaptation, but instead of making consciousness in human individuals a particular expression of a great process, as is demanded of a philosophy of nature, it comes in generally as a new and peculiar factor which even demands a new formula of evolution for its explanation; it involves a new evolution superinduced upon the old.

In spite of much philosophizing, consciousness is identified in current psychological practice with the field which is open to introspection, and the object of knowledge is placed within this field, and related to the physical world – spoken of as an external field of reality – by a parallelistic series. This psychological practice tends to accept the conceptual objects of science, the atoms, molecules, ether vortex rings, ions, and electrons, as the substantial realities of the physical world, and, by implication at least, to relegate the sensuous content of objects of direct physical experience to this separate field of consciousness. The old-fashioned idealist has then only to point out the thought structure of these hypothetical objects of science to sweep triumphantly, with one stroke of his wand, the whole world of nature within this limited field of the consciousness open to introspection. Whereupon the solipsistic spook arises again to reduce one's world to a nutshell.

The way out of these crude psychological conceptions, in my mind, lies in the recognition that psychical consciousness is a particular phase in development of reality, not

an islanded phase of reality connected with the rest of it by a one to one relationship of parallel series. This point of view I have elsewhere developed somewhat obscurely and ineffectually, I am afraid.¹

What I wish to call to your attention in the few moments at my disposal, is another phase of this situation which is itself psychological in its character;² the presupposition of selves as already in existence before the peculiar phase of consciousness can arise, which psychology studies.

Most of us admit the reality of the objects of direct physical experience until we are too deeply entangled in our psychological analyses of cognition. Unless we subject ourselves to the third degree of criticism, the parallelism of which we speak lies between the processes of brain tissues which can be seen and smelt and handled and the states of consciousness which are conditioned by them. While this admission guarantees the physical bodies of our fellows as equally real, the self is relegated to the restricted field of introspected consciousness and enjoys not the reality of a so-called external object, but only that of a combination of states of consciousness. Into the existence of those states of consciousness in another, we are solemnly told we can only inferentially enter by a process of analogy from the relations of our own introspected states and the movements of our bodies to the movements of other bodies and the hypothetical conscious states that should accompany them. If we approach the self from within, our analysis recognizes, to be sure, its close relationship to, if not its identity with, the organization of consciousness, especially as seen in conation, in apperception, in voluntary attention, in conduct, but what can be isolated as self-consciousness as such reduces to a peculiar feeling of intimacy in certain conscious states, and the self gathers, for some unexplained reason, about a core of certain vague and seemingly unimportant organic sensations – a feeling of contraction in the brow, or in the throat, or goes out to the muscular innervations all over the body which are not involved directly in what we are doing or perceiving. And yet when we proceed introspectively the whole field of consciousness is ascribed to this self, for it is only in so far as we are self-conscious that we can introspect at all.

But what I wish to emphasize is that the other selves disappear as given realities even when we are willing to admit the real objects of physical experience. The self arises within the introspected field. It has no existence outside that introspected field, and other selves are only projects and ejects of that field. Each self is an island, and each self is sure only of its own island, for who knows what mirages may arise above this analogical sea.

It is fair to assume that if we had exact social sciences which could define persons precisely and determine the laws of social change with mathematical exactness, we should accept selves, as there, in the same sense in which we accept physical objects. They would be guaranteed by their sciences. For in the practice of thought, we are as convinced as the Greeks that exact knowledge assures the existence of the object of knowledge.

It is evident that the assumption of the self as given by social science in advance of introspection would materially and fundamentally affect our psychological practice. Consciousness as present in selves would be given as there, outside the field of introspection. Psychological science would have to presuppose selves as the precondition

of consciousness in individuals just as it presupposes nervous systems and vascular changes. In actual psychological analysis we should condition the existence and process of states and streams of consciousness upon the normal presence and functioning of these selves, as we condition the appearance and functioning of consciousness upon the normal structure and operation of the physical mechanism, that our psychology presupposes.

In a manner we do this in treatises on mob-psychology, in such a treatise on social psychology as that of Cooley's "Human Nature and the Social Order." McDougall's "Social Psychology" prepares the way for it in carrying back the processes of consciousness to social impulses and instincts – to those terms in which, somewhat vaguely, selves are stated in an evolutionary theory of society.

The economic man of the dismal science was an attempt to state the self in terms of an objective and exact social science. But fortunately the economic man has proved spurious. He does not exist. The economic man is as little guaranteed by the orthodox political economy, as *realia* were by the metaphysics of scholasticism.

Social science in anthropology, in sociology pure and impure, dynamic and static, has not as yet found its scientific method. It is not able to satisfactorily define its objects, nor to formulate their laws of change and development. Until the social sciences are able to state the social individual in terms of social processes, as the physical sciences define their objects in terms of physical change, they will not have risen to the point at which they can force their object upon an introspective psychology. We can today foresee the possibility of this. Eugenics, education, even political and economic sciences, pass beyond the phase of description and look toward the formation of the social object. We recognize that we control the conditions which determine the individual. His errors and shortcomings can be conceivably corrected. His misery may be eliminated. His mental and moral defects corrected. His heredity, social and physical, may be perfected. His very moral self-consciousness through normal and healthful social conduct, through adequate consciousness of his relations to others, may be constituted and established. But without awaiting the development of the social sciences it is possible to indicate in the nature of the consciousness which psychology itself analyzes, the presupposition of social objects, whose objective reality is a condition of the consciousness of self.

The contribution that I wish to suggest toward the recognition of the given character of other selves is from psychology itself, and arises out of the psychological theory of the origin of language and its relation to meaning.

This theory, as you know, has been considerably advanced by Wundt's formulation of the relation of language to gesture. From this point of view language in its earliest form comes under that group of movements which, since Darwin, have been called expressions of the emotions. They fall into classes which have been regarded as without essential connection. Either they are elements – mainly preparatory – beginnings of acts – social acts, i.e., actions and reactions which arise under the stimulation of other individuals, such as clenching the fists, grinding the teeth, assuming an attitude of defense – or else they are regarded as outflows of nervous energy which sluice off the nervous excitement or reinforce and prepare indirectly for action. Such gestures,

if we may use the term in this generalized sense, act as stimuli to other forms which are already under social stimulation.

The phase of the subject which has not been sufficiently emphasized is the value which these truncated acts, these beginnings of inhibited movements, these gestures, have as appropriate stimulations for the conduct of other individuals. Inevitably, forms that act and react to and upon each other come to prepare for each other's reaction by the early movements in the act. The preliminaries of a dog or cock fight amply illustrate the sensitiveness of such individuals to the earliest perceptible indications of coming acts. To a large degree forms, which live in groups or in the relation of the animals of prey and those they prey upon, act upon their first signs of oncoming acts. All gestures, to whatever class they belong, whether they are the beginnings of the outgoing act itself or are only indications of the attitude and nervous tension which these acts involve, have this value of stimulating forms, socially organized, to reactions appropriate to the attack, or flight, or wooing, or suckling, of another form. Illustrations are to be found in human conduct, in such situations as fencing, where one combatant without reflection makes his parry from the direction of the eye and the infinitesimal change of attitude which are the prelude to the thrust.

Gestures then are already significant in the sense that they are stimuli to performed reactions, before they come to have significance of conscious meaning. Allow me to emphasize further the value of attitudes and the indications of organized preparation for conduct, especially in the change of the muscles of the countenance, the altered breathing, the quivering of tense muscles, the evidence of circulatory changes, in such minutely adapted social groups, because among these socially significant innervations will be found all these queer organic sensations about which the consciousness of the self is supposed to gather as a core.

Human conduct is distinguished primarily from animal conduct by that increase in inhibition which is an essential phase of voluntary attention, and increased inhibition means an increase in gesture in the signs of activities which are not carried out; in tile assumptions of attitudes whose values in conduct fail to get complete expression. If we recognize language as a differentiation of gesture, the conduct of no other form can compare with that of man in the abundance of gesture.

The fundamental importance of gesture lies in the development of the consciousness of meaning – in reflective consciousness. As long as one individual responds simply to the gesture of another by the appropriate response, there is no necessary consciousness of meaning. The situation is still on a level of that of two growling dogs walking around each other, with tense limbs, bristly hair, and uncovered teeth. It is not until an image arises of the response, which the gesture of one form will bring out in another, that a consciousness of meaning can attach to his own gesture. The meaning can appear only in imaging the consequences of the gesture. To cry out in fear is an immediate instinctive act, but to scream with an image of another individual turning an attentive ear, taking on sympathetic expression and an attitude of coming to help, is at least a favorable condition for the development of a consciousness of meaning.

Of course the mere influence of the image, stimulating to reaction, has no more meaning value than the effect of an external stimulus, but in this converse of gestures

there is also a consciousness of attitude, of readiness to act in the manner which the gesture implies. In the instance given the cry is part of the attitude of flight. The cry calls out the image of a friendly individual. This image is not merely a stimulus to run toward the friend, but is merged in the consciousness of inhibited flight. If meaning is consciousness of attitude, as Dewey, Royce, and Angell among others maintain, then consciousness of meaning arose only when some gesture that was part of an inhibited act itself called up the image of the gesture of another individual. Then the image of the gesture means the inhibited act to which the first gesture belonged. In a word, the response to the cry has the meaning of inhibited flight.

One's own gestures could not take on meaning directly. The gestures aroused by them in others would be that upon which attention is centered. And these gestures become identified with the content of one's own emotion and attitude. It is only through the response that consciousness of meaning appears, a response which involves the consciousness of another self as the presupposition of the meaning in one's own attitude. Other selves in a social environment logically antedate the consciousness of self which introspection analyzes. They must be admitted as there, as given, in the same sense in which psychology accepts the given reality of physical organisms as a condition of individual consciousness.

The importance for psychology of this recognition of others, if thus bound up with the psychology of meaning, may need another word of emphasis. Consciousness could no longer be regarded as an island to be studied through parallel relations with neuroses. It would be approached as experience which is socially as well as physically determined. Introspective self-consciousness would be recognized as a subjective phase, and this subjective phase could no longer be regarded as the source out of which the experience arose. Objective consciousness of selves must precede subjective consciousness, and must continually condition it, if consciousness of meaning itself presupposes the selves as there. Subjective self-consciousness must appear within experience, must have a function in the development of that experience, and must be studied from the point of view of that function, not as that in which self-consciousness arises and by which through analogical bridges and self-projections we slowly construct a hypothetically objective social world in which to live. Furthermore, meaning in the light of this recognition has its reference not to agglomerations of states of subjective consciousness, but to objects in a socially conditioned experience. When in the process revealed by introspection we reach the concept of self, we have attained an attitude which we assume not toward our inner feelings, but toward other individuals whose reality was implied even in the inhibitions and reorganizations which characterize this inner consciousness.

If we may assume, then, that meaning is consciousness of attitude, I would challenge any one to show an adequate motive for directing attention toward one's attitudes, in a consciousness of things that were merely physical; neither control over sense-perception nor over response would be directly forwarded by attention directed toward a consciousness of readiness to act in a given situation. It is only in the social situation of converse that these gestures, and the attitudes they express could become the object of attention and interest. Whatever our theory may be as to the history of things,

social consciousness must antedate physical consciousness. A more correct statement would be that experience in its original form became reflective in the recognition of selves, and only gradually was there differentiated a reflective experience of things which were purely physical.

Notes

- * Given at the meeting of the Psychological Association in Boston, December 31, 1909. As originally published in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 7 (1910), 174–80.
- 1 “The Definition of the Psychical,” University of Chicago Decennial Volumes. See Chapter 1 in this volume.
- 2 I have discussed the implications of this position from a somewhat different point of view in the *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. VI., No. 12, December 15, 1909.

5

THE MECHANISM OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS (1912)*

The organization of consciousness may be regarded from the standpoint of its objects and the relation of these objects to conduct. I have in mind to present somewhat schematically the relation of social objects or selves to the form of social conduct, and to introduce this by a statement of the relation of the physical object to the conduct within which it appears.

A physical object or percept is a construct in which the sensuous stimulation is merged with imagery which comes from past experience. This imagery on the cognitive side is that which the immediate sensuous quality stands for, and in so far satisfies the mind. The reason for this satisfaction is found in the fact that this imagery arises from past experience of the result of an act which this stimulus has set going. Thus the wall as a visual stimulus tends to set free the impulse to move toward it and push against it. The perception of the wall as distant and hard and rough is related to the visual experience as response to stimulation. A peculiar stimulus value stands for a certain response value. A percept is a collapsed act in which the result of the act to which the stimulus incites is represented by imagery of the experience of past acts of a like nature.

In so far as our physical conduct involves movements toward or away from distant objects and their being handled when we come into contact with them, we perceive all things in terms of distance sensation – color, sound, odor – which stand for hard or soft, big or little, objects of varying forms, which actual contact will reveal.

Our conduct in movement and manipulation, with its simulations and responses, gives the framework within which objects of perception arise and this conduct is in so far responsible for the organization of our physical world. Percepts – physical objects – are compounds of the experience of immediate stimulation and the imagery of the response to which this stimulation will lead. The object can be properly stated in terms of conduct.

I have referred to percepts as objects which arise in physical experience because it is a certain phase of conduct which, with its appropriate stimuli and responses, gives

rise to such products, i.e., movement under the influence of distant stimuli leading to contact experiences of manipulation.

Given a different type of conduct with distinguishable stimulations and responses, and different objects would arise – such a different field is that of social conduct. By social conduct I refer simply to that which is mediated by the stimulations of other animals belonging to the same group of living forms, which lead to responses which again affect these other forms – thus fighting, reproduction, parental care, much of animal play, hunting, etc., are the results of primitive instincts or impulses which are set going by the stimulation of one form by another, and these stimulations again lead to responses which affect other forms.

It is of course true that a man is a physical object to the perception of another man, and as really as is a tree or a stone. But a man is more than a physical object, and it is this more which constitutes him a social object or self, and it is this self which is related to that peculiar conduct which may be termed social conduct.

Most social stimulation is found in the beginnings or early stages of social acts which serve as stimuli to other forms whom these acts would affect. This is the field of gestures, which reveal the motor attitude of a form in its relation to others; an attitude which psychologists have conceived of as predominantly emotional, though it is emotional only in so far as an ongoing act is inhibited. That certain of these early indications of an incipient act have persisted, while the rest of the act has been largely suppressed or has lost its original value, e.g., the baring of the teeth or the lifting of the nostrils, is true, and the explanation can most readily be found in the social value which such indications have acquired. It is an error, however, to overlook the relation which these truncated acts have assumed toward other forms of reactions which complete them as really as the original acts, or to forget that they occupy but a small part of the whole field of gesture by means of which we are apprised of the reactions of others toward ourselves. The expressions of the face and attitudes of body have the same functional value for us that the beginnings of hostility have for two dogs, who are maneuvering for an opening to attack.

This field of gesture does not simply relate the individual to other individuals as physical objects, but puts him *en rapport* with their actions, which are as yet only indicated, and arouses instinctive reactions appropriate to these social activities. The social response of one individual, furthermore, introduces a further complication. The attitude assumed in response to the attitude of another becomes a stimulus to him to change his attitude, thus leading to that conversation of attitudes which is so vividly illustrated in the early stages of a dog fight. We see the same process in courting and mating, and in the fondling of young forms by the mother, and finally in much of the play of young animals.

It has been recognized for some time that speech belongs in its beginnings, at least, to this same field of gesture, so-called vocal gesture. Originally indicating the preparation for violent action, which arises from a sudden change of breathing and circulation rhythms, the articulate sounds have come to elaborate and immensely complicate this conversation of attitudes by which social forms so adjust themselves to each other's anticipated action that they may act appropriately with reference to each other.

Articulate sounds have still another most important result. While one feels but imperfectly the value of his own facial expression or bodily attitude for another, his ear reveals to him his own vocal gesture in the same form that it assumes to his neighbor. One shakes his fist primarily only at another, while he talks to himself as really as he talks to his *vis-à-vis*. The genetic import of this has long been recognized. The young child talks to himself, i.e., uses the elements of articulate speech in response to the sounds he hears himself make, more continuously and persistently than he does in response to the sounds he hears from those about him, and displays greater interest in the sounds he himself makes than in those of others. We know also that this fascination of one's own vocal gestures continues even after the child has learned to talk with others, and that the child will converse for hours with himself, even constructing imaginary companions, who function in the child's growing self-consciousness as the processes of inner speech – of thought and imagination – function in the consciousness the adult.

To return to the formula given above for the formation of an object in consciousness, we may define the social object in terms of social conduct as we defined the physical object in terms of our reactions to physical objects. The object was found to consist of the sensuous experience of the stimulation to an act plus the imagery from past experience of the final result of the act. The social object will then be the gestures, i.e., the early indications of an ongoing social act in another plus the imagery of our own response to that stimulation. To the young child the frowns and smiles of those about him, the attitude of body, the outstretched arms, are at first simply stimulations that call out instinctive responses of his own appropriate to these gestures. He cries or laughs, he moves toward his mother, or stretches out his arms. When these gestures in others bring back the images of his own responses and their results, the child has the material out of which he builds up the social objects that form the most important part of his environment. We are familiar with this phase of a baby's development, being confident that he recognizes the different members of the group about him. He acts then with confidence toward them since their gestures have come to have meaning for him. His own response to their stimulations and its consequences are there to interpret the facial expressions and attitudes of body and tones of voice. The awakening social intelligence of the child is evidenced not so much through his ready responses to the gestures of others, for these have been in evidence much earlier. It is the inner assurance of his own readiness to adjust himself to the attitudes of others that looks out of his eyes and appears in his own bodily attitudes.

If we assume that an object arises in consciousness through the merging of the imagery of experience of the response with that of the sensuous experience of the stimulation, it is evident that the child must merge the imagery of his past responses into the sensuous stimulation of what comes to him through distance senses. His contact and kinesthetic experiences must be lodged in the sensuous experiences that call them out if they are to achieve objective character in his consciousness.

It will be some time before he can successfully unite the different parts of his own body, such as his hands and feet, which he sees and feels, into a single object. Such a step must be later than the formation of the physical objects of his environment. The

form of the object is given in the experience of things, which are not his physical self. When he has synthesized his various bodily parts with the organic sensations and affective experiences, it will be upon the model of objects about him. The mere presence of experiences of pleasure and pain, together with organic sensations, will not form an object unless this material can fall into the scheme of an object – that of sensuous stimulation plus the imagery of the response.

In the organization of the baby's physical experience the appearance of his body as a unitary thing, as an object, will be relatively late, and must follow upon the structure of the objects of his environment. This is as true of the object that appears in social conduct, the self. The form of the social object must be found first of all in the experience of other selves. The earliest achievement of social consciousness will be the merging of the imagery of the baby's first responses and their results with the stimulations of the gestures of others. The child will not succeed in forming an object of himself – of putting the so-called subjective material of consciousness within such a self – until he has recognized about him social objects who have arisen in his experience through this process of filling out stimulations with past experiences of response. And this is indeed our uniform experience with children. The child's early social percepts are of others. After these arise incomplete and partial selves – or "me's" – which are quite analogous to the child's percepts of his hands and feet, which precede his perception of himself as a whole. The mere presence of affective experience, of imagery, of organic sensations, does not carry with it consciousness of a self to which these experiences belong. Nor does the unitary character of the response which tends to synthesize our objects of perception convey that same unitary character to the inner experience until the child is able to experience himself as he experiences other selves.

It is highly probable that lower animals never reach any such objective reference of what we term subjective experiences to selves, and the question presents itself – what is there in human social conduct that give rise to a "me," a self which is an object? Why doesn't the human animal transfer the form of a social object from his environment to an inner experience?

The answer to the question is already indicated in the statement of vocal gesture. Certainly the fact that the human animal can stimulate himself as he stimulates others and can respond to his stimulations as he responds to the stimulations of others, places in his conduct the form of a social object out of which may arise a "me" to which can be referred so-called subjective experiences.

Of course the mere capacity to talk to oneself is not the whole of self-consciousness, otherwise the talking birds would have souls or at least selves. What is lacking to the parrot are the social objects which can exist for the human baby. Part of the mechanism for transferring the social objects into an inner experience the parrot possesses, but he has nothing to import into such an inner world. Furthermore, the vocal gesture is not the only form which can serve for the building up of a "me," as is abundantly evident from the building-up gestures of the deaf mutes. Any gesture by which the individual can himself be affected as others are affected, and which therefore tends to call out in him a response as it would call it out in another, will serve as a mechanism for the construction of a self. That, however, a consciousness of a self as an object would

ever have arisen in man if he had not had the mechanism of talking to himself, I think there is every reason to doubt.

If this statement is correct the objective self of human consciousness is the merging of one's responses with the social stimulation by which he affects himself. The "me" is a man's reply to his own talk. Such a "me" is not then an early formation, which is then projected and ejected into the bodies of other people to give them the breadth of human life. It is rather an importation from the field of social objects into an amorphous, unorganized field of what we call inner experience. Through the organization of this object, the self, this material is itself organized and brought under the control of the individual in the form of so-called self-consciousness.

It is a commonplace of psychology that it is only the "me" – the empirical self – that can be brought into the focus of attention – that can be perceived. The "I" lies beyond the range of immediate experience. In terms of social conduct this is tantamount to saying that we can perceive our responses only as they appear as images from past experience, merging with the sensuous stimulation. We can not present the response while we are responding. We can not use our responses to others as the materials for construction of the self – this imagery goes to make up other selves. We must socially stimulate ourselves to place at our own disposal the material out of which our own selves as well as those of others must be made.

The "I" therefore never can exist as an object in consciousness, but the very conversational character of our inner experience, the very process of replying to one's own talk, implies an "I" behind the scenes who answers to the gestures, the symbols, that arise in consciousness. The "I" is the transcendental self of Kant, the soul that James conceived behind the scene holding on to the skirts of an idea to give it an added increment of emphasis.

The self-conscious, actual self in social intercourse is the objective "me" or "me's" with the process of response continually going on and implying a fictitious "I" always out of sight of himself.

Inner consciousness is socially organized by the importation of the social organization of the outer world.

Note

- * Read at the meeting of the Western Philosophical Association held in Chicago, April 5 and 6, 1912. As originally published in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 9 (1912), 401–6.

6

THE SOCIAL SELF (1913)

Recognizing that the self can not appear in consciousness as an “I,” that it is always an object, i.e., a “me,” I wish to suggest an answer to the question, What is involved in the self being an object? The first answer may be that an object involves a subject. Stated in other words, that a “me” is inconceivable without an “I.” And to this reply must be made that such an “I” is a presupposition, but never a presentation of conscious experience, for the moment it is presented it has passed into the objective case, presuming, if you like, an “I” that observes – but an “I” that can disclose himself only by ceasing to be the subject for whom the object “me” exists. It is, of course, not the Hegelism of a self that becomes another to himself in which I am interested, but the nature of the self as revealed by introspection and subject to our factual analysis. This analysis does reveal, then, in a memory process an attitude of observing oneself in which both the observer and the observed appear. To be concrete, one remembers asking himself how he could undertake to do this, that, or the other, chiding himself for his shortcomings or pluming himself upon his achievements. Thus, in the reintegrated self of the moment passed, one finds both a subject and an object, but it is a subject that is now an object of observation, and has the same nature as the object self whom we present as in intercourse with those about us. In quite the same fashion we remember the questions, admonitions, and approvals addressed to our fellows. But the subject attitude which we instinctively take can be presented only as something experienced – as we can be conscious of our acts only through the sensory processes set up after the act has begun.

The contents of this presented subject, who thus has become an object in being presented, but which still distinguish him as the subject of the passed experience from the “me” whom he addressed, are those images which initiated the conversation and the motor sensations which accompany the expression, plus the organic sensations and the response of the whole system to the activity initiated. In a word, just those contents which go to make up the self which is distinguished from the others whom

he addresses. The self appearing as "I" is the memory image self who acted toward himself and is the same self who acts toward other selves.

On the other hand, the stuff that goes to make up the "me" whom the "I" addresses and whom he observes, is the experience which is induced by this action of the "I." If the "I" speaks, the "me" hears. If the "I" strikes, the "me" feels the blow. Here again the "me" consciousness is of the same character as that which arises from the action of the other upon him. That is, it is only as the individual finds himself acting with reference to himself as he acts towards others, that he becomes a subject to himself rather than an object, and only as he is affected by his own social conduct in the manner in which he is affected by that of others, that he becomes an object to his own social conduct.

The differences in our memory presentations of the "I" and the "me" are those of the memory images of the initiated social conduct and those of the sensory responses thereto.

It is needless, in view of the analysis of Baldwin, of Royce and of Cooley and many others, to do more than indicate that these reactions arise earlier in our social conduct with others than in introspective self-consciousness, i.e., that the infant consciously calls the attention of others before he calls his own attention by affecting himself and that he is consciously affected by others before he is conscious of being affected by himself.

The "I" of introspection is the self which enters into social relations with other selves. It is not the "I" that is implied in the fact that one presents himself as a "me." And the "me" of introspection is the same "me" that is the object of the social conduct of others. One presents himself as acting toward others – in this presentation he is presented in indirect discourse as the subject of the action and is still an object – and the subject of this presentation can never appear immediately in conscious experience. It is the same self who is presented as observing himself, and he affects himself just in so far and only in so far as he can address himself by the means of social stimulation which affect others. The "me" whom he addresses is the "me," therefore, that is similarly affected by the social conduct of those about him.

This statement of the introspective situation, however, seems to overlook a more or less constant feature of our consciousness, and that is that running current of awareness of what we do which is distinguishable from the consciousness of the field of stimulation, whether that field be without or within. It is this "awareness" which has led many to assume that it is the nature of the self to be conscious both of subject and of object – to be subject of action toward an object world and at the same time to be directly conscious of this subject as subject, – "Thinking its own existence along with whatever else it thinks." Now, as Professor James pointed out, this consciousness is more logically conceived of as consciousness – the thinker being an implication rather than a content, while the "me" is but a bit of object content within the stream of consciousness. However, this logical statement does not do justice to the findings of consciousness. Besides the actual stimulations and responses and the memory images of these, within which lie perforce the organic sensations and responses which make up the "me," there accompanies a large part of our conscious experience, indeed all that

we call self-conscious, an inner response to what we may be doing, saying, or thinking. At the back of our heads we are a large part of the time more or less clearly conscious of our own replies to the remarks made to others, of innervations which would lead to attitudes and gestures answering our gestures and attitudes towards others.

The observer who accompanies all our self-conscious conduct is then not the actual "I" who is responsible for the conduct in *propria persona* – he is rather the response which one makes to his own conduct. The confusion of this response of ours, following upon our social stimulations of others with the implied subject of our action, is the psychological ground for the assumption that the self can be directly conscious of itself as acting and acted upon. The actual situation is this: The self acts with reference to others and is immediately conscious of the objects about it. In memory it also reintegrates the self acting as well as the others acted upon. But besides these contents, the action with reference to the others calls out responses in the individual himself – there is then another "me" criticizing approving, and suggesting, and consciously planning, i.e., the reflective self.

It is not to all our conduct toward the objective world that we thus respond. Where we are intensely preoccupied with the objective world, this accompanying awareness disappears. We have to recall the experience to become aware that we have been involved as selves, to produce the self-consciousness which is a constituent part of a large part of our experience. As I have indicated elsewhere, the mechanism for this reply to our own social stimulation of others follows as a natural result from the fact that the very sounds, gestures, especially vocal gestures, which man makes in addressing others, call out or tend to call out responses from himself. He cannot hear himself speak without assuming in a measure the attitude which he would have assumed if he had been addressed in the same words by others.

The self which consciously stands over against other selves thus becomes an object, an other to himself, through the very fact that he hears himself talk, and replies. The mechanism of introspection is therefore given in the social attitude which man necessarily assumes toward himself, and the mechanism of thought, in so far as thought uses symbols which are used in social intercourse, is but an inner conversation.

Now it is just this combination of the remembered self which acts and exists over against other selves with the inner response to his action which is essential to the self-conscious ego – the self in the full meaning of the term – although neither phase of self-consciousness, in so far as it appears as an object of our experience, is a subject.

It is also to be noted that this response to the social conduct of the self may be in the role of another – we present his arguments in imagination and do it with his intonations and gestures and event perhaps with his facial expression. In this way we play the roles of all our group; indeed, it is only in so far as we do this that they become part of our social environment – to be aware of another self as a self implies that we have played his role or that of another with whose type we identify him for purposes of intercourse. The inner response to our reaction to others is therefore as varied as is our social environment. Not that we assume the roles of others toward ourselves because we are subject to a mere imitative instinct, but because in responding to ourselves we are in the nature of the case taking the attitude of another than the

self that is directly acting, and into this reaction there naturally flows the memory images of the responses of those about us, the memory images of those responses of others which were in answer to like actions. Thus the child can think about his conduct as good or bad only as he reacts to his own acts in the remembered words of his parents. Until this process has been developed into the abstract process of thought, self-consciousness remains dramatic, and the self which is a fusion of the remembered actor and this accompanying chorus is somewhat loosely organized and very clearly social. Later the inner stage changes into the forum and workshop of thought. The features and intonations of the *dramatis personae* fade out and the emphasis falls upon the meaning of the inner speech, the imagery becomes merely the barely necessary cues. But the mechanism remains social, and at any moment the process may become personal.

It is fair to say that the modern western world has lately done much of its thinking in the form of the novel, while earlier the drama was a more effective but equally social mechanism of self-consciousness. And, in passing, I may refer to that need of filling out the bare spokesman of abstract thought, which even the most abstruse thinker feels, in seeking his audience. The import of this for religious self-consciousness is obvious.

There is one further implication of this nature of the self to which I wish to call attention. It is the manner of its reconstruction. I wish especially to refer to it, because the point is of importance in the psychology of ethics.

As a mere organization of habit the self is not self-conscious. It is this self which we refer to as character. When, however, an essential problem appears, there is some disintegration in this organization, and different tendencies appear in reflective thought as different voices in conflict with each other. In a sense the old self has disintegrated, and out of the moral process a new self arises. The specific question I wish to ask is whether the new self appears together with the new object or end. There is of course a reciprocal relation between the self and its object, the one implies the other and the interests and evaluations of the self answer exactly to content and values of the object. On the other hand, the consciousness of the new object, its values and meaning, seems to come earlier to consciousness than the new self that answers to the new object.

The man who has come to realize a new human value is more immediately aware of the new object in his conduct than of himself and his manner of reaction to it. This is due to the fact to which reference has already been made, that direct attention goes first to the object. When the self becomes an object, it appears in memory, and the attitude which it implied has already been taken. In fact, to distract attention from the object to the self implies just that lack of objectivity which we criticize not only in the moral agent, but in the scientist.

Assuming as I do the essentially social character of the ethical end, we find in moral reflection a conflict in which certain values find a spokesman in the old self or a dominant part of the old self, while other values answering to other tendencies and impulses arise in opposition and find other spokesmen to present their cases. To leave the field to the values represented by the old self is exactly what we term selfishness. The justification for the term is found in the habitual character of conduct with reference to these values. Attention is not claimed by the object and shifts to the

subjective field where the affective responses are identified with the old self. The result is that we state the other conflicting ends in subjective terms of other selves and the moral problem seems to take on the form of the sacrifice either of the self or of the others.

Where, however, the problem is objectively considered, although the conflict is a social one, it should not resolve itself into a struggle between selves, but into such a reconstruction of the situation that different and enlarged and more adequate personalities may emerge. A tension should be centered on the objective social field.

In the reflective analysis, the old self should enter upon the same terms with the selves whose roles are assumed, and the test of the reconstruction is found in the fact that all the personal interests are adequately recognized in a new social situation. The new self that answers to this new situation can appear in consciousness only after this new situation has been realized and accepted. The new self can not enter into the field as the determining factor because he is consciously present only after the new end has been formulated and accepted. The old self may enter only as an element over against the other personal interests involved. If he is the dominant factor it must be in defiance of the other selves whose interests are at stake. As the old self he is defined by his conflict with the others that assert themselves in his reflective analysis.

Solution is reached by the construction of a new world harmonizing the conflicting interests into which enters the new self.

The process is in its logic identical with the abandonment of the old theory with which the scientist has identified himself, his refusal to grant this old attitude any further weight than may be given to the other conflicting observations and hypotheses. Only when a successful hypothesis, which overcomes the conflicts, has been formulated and accepted, may the scientist again identify himself with this hypothesis as his own, and maintain it *contra mundum*. He may not state the scientific problem and solution in terms of his old personality. He may name his new hypothesis after himself and realize his enlarged scientific personality in its triumph.

The fundamental difference between the scientific and moral solution of a problem lies in the fact that the moral problem deals with concrete personal interests, in which the whole self is reconstructed in its relation to the other selves whose relations are essential to its personality.

The growth of the self arises out of a partial disintegration, – the appearance of the different interests in the forum of reflection, the reconstruction of the social world, and the consequent appearance of the new self that answers to the new object.

Note

- * Read at the Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, March, 1913. As originally published in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 10 (1913), 374–80.

III. The self and the social order

7

A BEHAVIORISTIC ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANT SYMBOL (1922)*

The statement I wish to present rests upon the following assumptions, which I can do no more than state: I assume, provisionally, the hypothesis of the physical sciences, that physical objects and the physical universe may be analysed into a complex of physical corpuscles. I assume that the objects of immediate experience exist in relationship to the biologic and social individuals whose environments they make up. This relationship involves on the one hand the selection through the sensitivities and reactions of the living forms of those elements that go to make up the object. On the other hand these objects affect the plants and animals, whose natures are responsible for them as objects, e.g. food exists as an immediate experience in its relation to the individuals that eat it. There is no such thing as food apart from such individuals. The selection of the characters which go to make up food is a function of living individuals. The effect of this food upon the living individuals is what we call adaptation of the form to the environment or its opposite. Whatever may be said of a mechanical universe of ultimate physical particles, the lines that are drawn about objects in experience are drawn by the attitudes and conduct of individual living forms. Apart from such an experience involving both the form and its environment, such objects do not exist.

On the other hand these objects exist objectively, as they are in immediate experience. The relation of objects making up an environment to the plants and the animals in no sense renders these objects subjective. What are termed the natures of objects are in the objects, as are their so-called sensuous qualities, but these natures are not in the objects either as external or internal relations, they are the very essence of the objects, and become relations only in the thought process. The so-called sensuous qualities exist also in the objects, but only in their relations to the sensitive organisms whose environments they form.

The causal effect of the living organisms on their environment in creating objects is as genuine as the effect of the environment upon the living organism. A digestive

tract creates food as truly as the advance of a glacial cap wipes out some animals or selects others which can grow warm coats of hair. An animal's sensitiveness to a particular character in an object gives the object in its relation to the animal a particular nature. Where there is sensitiveness to two or more different characters of the object, answering to reactions that conflict and thus inhibit each other, the object is in so far analyzed. Thus the width of the stream would be isolated from the other characters of the stream through the inhibition of the animal's tendency to jump over it. In the immediate experience in which the animal organism and its environment are involved, these characters of the objects and the inhibited reactions that answer to them are there or exist, as characters, though as yet they have no significance nor are they located in minds or consciousness.

Among objects in the immediate experience of animals are the different parts of their own organisms, which have different characters from those of other objects – especially hedonic characters, and those of stresses and excitements – but characters not referred to selves until selves arise in experience. They are only accidentally private, i.e., necessarily confined to the experience of single individuals. If – after the fashion of Siamese Twins – two organisms were so joined that the same organ were connected with the central nervous system of each, each would have the same painful or pleasurable object in experience. A toothache or a pleased palate are objects for a single individual for reasons that are not essentially different from those which make the flame of a match scratched in a room in which there is only one individual an object only for that individual. It is not the exclusion of an object from the experience in which others are involved which renders it subjective; it is rendered subjective by being referred by an individual to his self, when selves have arisen in the development of conduct. Exclusive experiences are peculiarly favorable for such reference, but characteristics of objects for every one may be so referred in mental processes.

Among objects that exist only for separate individuals are so-called images. They are *there*, but are not necessarily *located* in space. They do enter into the structure of things, as notably on the printed page, or in the hardness of a distant object; and in hallucinations they may be spatially located. They are dependent for their existence upon conditions in the organism – especially those of the central nervous system – as are other objects in experience such as mountains and chairs. When referred to the self they become memory images, or those of a creative imagination, but they are not mental or spiritual stuff.

Conduct is the sum of the reactions of living beings to their environments, especially to the objects which their relation to the environment has “cut out of it,” to use a Bergsonian phrase. Among these objects are certain ones which are of peculiar importance to which I wish to refer, viz., other living forms which belong to the same group. The attitudes and early indications of actions of these forms are peculiarly important stimuli, and to extend a Wundtian term may be called “gestures.” These other living forms in the group to which the organism belongs may be called social objects and exist as such before selves come into existence. These gestures call out definite, and in all highly organized forms, partially predetermined reactions, such as those of sex, of parenthood, of hostility, and possibly others, such as the so-called

herd instincts. In so far as these specialized reactions are present in the nature of individuals, they tend to arise whenever the appropriate stimulus, or gesture, calls them out. If an individual uses such a gesture, and he is affected by it as another individual is affected by it, he responds or tends to respond to his own social stimulus, as another individual would respond. A notable instance of this is in the song, or vocal gesture, of birds. The vocal gesture is of peculiar importance because it reacts upon another, but this is also true in a less degree of those of one's own gestures that he can see or feel.

The self arises in conduct, when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself. This takes place when the individual assumes the attitude or uses the gesture which another individual would use and responds to it himself, or tends so to respond. It is a development that arises gradually in the life of the infant and presumably arose gradually in the life of the race. It arises in the life of the infant through what is unfortunately called imitation, and finds its expression in the normal play life of young children. In the process the child gradually becomes a social being in his own experience, and he acts toward himself in a manner analogous to that in which he acts towards others. Especially he talks to himself as he talks to others and in keeping up this conversation in the inner forum constitutes the field which is called that of mind. Then those objects and experiences which belong to his own body, those images which belong to his own past, become part of this self.

In the behavior of forms lower than man, we find one individual indicating objects to other forms, though without what we term signification. The hen that pecks at the angleworm is directly though without intention indicating it to the chicks. The animal in a herd that scents danger, in moving away indicates to the other members of the herd the direction of safety and puts them in the attitude of scenting the same danger. The hunting dog points to the hidden bird. The lost lamb that bleats, and the child that cries each points himself out to his mother. All of these gestures, to the intelligent observer, are significant symbols, but they are none of them significant to the forms that make them.

In what does this significance consist in terms of a behavioristic psychology? A summary answer would be that the gesture not only actually brings the stimulus-object into the range of the reactions of other forms, but that the nature of the object is also indicated; especially do we imply in the term significance that the individual who points out indicates the nature to *himself*. But it is not enough that he should indicate this meaning – whatever meaning is – as it exists for himself alone, but that he should indicate that meaning as it exists for the other to whom he is pointing it out. The widest use of the term implies that he indicates the meaning to any other individual to whom it might be pointed out in the same situation. In so far then as the individual takes the attitude of another toward himself, and in some sense arouses in himself the tendency to the action, which his conduct calls out in the other individual, he will have indicated to himself the meaning of the gesture. This implies a defining of meaning – that it is an indicated reaction which the object may call out. When we find that we have adjusted ourselves to a comprehensive set of reactions toward an object we feel that the meaning of the object is ours. But that the meaning may be ours, it is necessary that we should be able to regard ourselves as taking this attitude of

adjustment to response. We must indicate to ourselves not only the object but also the readiness to respond in certain ways to the object, and this indication must be made in the attitude or role of the other individual to whom it is pointed out or to whom it may be pointed out. If this is not the case it has not the common property which is involved in significance. It is through the ability to be the other at the same time that he is himself that the symbol becomes significant. The common statement of this is that we have in mind, what we indicate to another that he shall do. In giving directions, we give the direction to ourselves at the same time that we give it to another. We assume also his attitude of response to our requests, as an individual to whom the direction has the same signification in his conduct that it has to ourselves.

But significance is not confined to the particular situation within which an indication is given. It acquires universal meaning. Even if the two are the only ones involved, the form in which it is given is universal – it would have the same meaning to any other who might find himself in the same position. How does this generalization arise? From the behavioristic standpoint it must take place through the individual generalizing himself in his attitude of the other. We are familiar enough with the undertaking, in social and moral instruction to children and to those who are not children. A child acquires the sense of property through taking what may be called the attitude of the generalized other. Those attitudes which all assume in given conditions and over against the same objects, become for him attitudes which everyone assumes. In taking the role which is common to all, he finds himself speaking to himself and to others with the authority of the group. These attitudes become axiomatic. The generalization is simply the result of the identity of responses. Indeed it is only as he has in some sense amalgamated the attitudes of the different roles in which he has addressed himself that he acquires the unity of personality. The “me” that he addresses is constantly varied. It answers to the changing play of impulse, but the group solidarity, especially in its uniform restrictions, gives him the unity of universality. This I take to be the sole source of the universal. It quickly passes the bounds of the specific group. It is the *vox populi, vox dei*, “the voice of men and of angels.” Education and varied experience refine out of it what is provincial, and leave “what is true for all men at all times.” From the first, its form is universal, for differences for the different attitudes of others wear their peculiarities away. In the play period, however, before the child has reached that of competitive games – in which he seeks to pit his own acquired self against others – in the play period this process is not fully carried out and the child is as varied as his varying moods; but in the game he sees himself in terms of the group or the gang and speaks with a passion for rules and standards. Its social advantage, and even necessity, makes this approach to himself imperative. He must see himself as the whole group sees him. This again has passed under the head of passive imitation. But it is not in uniform attitudes that universality appears as a recognized factor in either inner or outer behavior. It is found right in thought and thought is the conversation of this generalized other with the self.

The significant symbol is then the gesture, the sign, the word which is addressed to the self when it is addressed to another individual, and is addressed to another, in form to all other individuals, when it is addressed to the self.

Signification has, as we have seen, two references, one to the thing indicated, and the other to the response, to the instance and to the meaning or idea. It denotes and connotes. When the symbol is used for the one, it is a name. When it is used for the other, it is a concept. But it neither denotes nor connotes except, when in form at least, denotation and connotation are addressed both to a self and to others, when it is in a universe of discourse that is oriented with reference to a self. If the gesture simply indicates the object to another, it has no meaning to the individual who makes it, nor does the response which the other individual carries out become a meaning to him, unless he assumes the attitude of having his attention directed by an individual to whom it has a meaning. Then he takes his own response to be the meaning of the indication. Through this sympathetic placing of themselves in each other's roles, and finding thus in their own experiences the response of the others, what would otherwise be an unintelligent gesture, acquires just the value which is connoted by signification, both in its specific applications and in its universality.

It should be added that in so far as thought – that inner conversation in which objects as stimuli are both separated from and related to their responses – is identified with consciousness, that is in so far as consciousness is identified with awareness, it is the result of this development of the self in experience. The other prevalent signification of consciousness is found simply in the presence of objects in experience. With the eyes shut we can say we are no longer conscious of visual objects. If the conditions of the nervous system or certain tracts in it, cancels the relation of individual and his environment, he may be said to lose consciousness or some portion of it; i.e., some objects or all of them pass out of experience for this individual. Of particular interest is the disappearance of a painful object, e.g., an aching tooth under a local anesthetic. A general anesthetic shuts out all objects.

As above indicated analysis takes place through the conflict of responses which isolate separate features of the object and both separates them from and relates them to their responses, i.e., their meanings. The response becomes a meaning, when it is indicated by a generalized attitude both to the self and to others. Mind, which is a process within which this analysis and its indications takes place, lies in a field of conduct between a specific individual and the environment, in which the individual is able, through the generalized attitude he assumes, to make use of symbolic gestures, i.e., terms, which are significant to all including himself.

While the conflict of reactions takes place within the individual, the analysis takes place in the object. Mind is then a field that is not confined to the individual much less located in a brain. Significance belongs to things in their relations to individuals. It does not lie in mental processes which are enclosed within individuals.

Note

- * As originally published in *Journal of Philosophy*, 19 (1922), 157–63.

8

THE GENESIS OF THE SELF AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1925)

It is my desire to present an account of the appearance of the self in social behavior, and then to advert to some implications of such an account in their bearings upon social control.

The terms "behavior" indicates the standpoint of what follows is that of a behavioristic psychology. There is an aspect of this psychology that calls for an emphasis which I think has not been sufficiently given it. It is not simply the objectivity of this psychology which has commended it. All recent psychology, in so far as it lays claim to a scientific approach, considers itself objective. But behavioristic psychology, coming in by the door of the study of animals lower than man, has perforce shifted its interest from psychical states to external conduct. Even when this conduct is followed into the central nervous system, it is not to find the correlate of the neurosis in a psychosis, but to complete the act, however distant this may be in space and time. This doctrine finds itself in sympathetic accord with recent realism and pragmatism, which places the so-called sense and the significances of things in the object. While psychology has been turning to the act as a process, philosophic thought has been transferring constants that had been the subject-matter of earlier psychology from the field of states of consciousness to the objective world. Prebehavioristic psychology had a foot in two worlds. Its material was found in consciousness and in the world of physiology and physics. As long, however, as psychology was occupied with states of consciousness which constituted objects there was an inevitable duplication. The whole physiological and physical apparatus could be stated in terms of states of consciousness, and solipsism hovered in the background. A psychology that is called upon to analyze the object into the states of consciousness which it is studying may conceivably be an empirical science, but in so far its world is not the world of the other sciences. A behavioristic psychology, on the other hand, that is not responsible for the content of the object, becomes a science that is cognate with physiology and dynamics, and escapes the trail of the epistemological serpent.

I am not concerned with the philosophical justification of this attitude of behavioristic psychology; I merely wish to emphasize its inevitable tendency to deal with processes, that is, with acts, and to find its objects given in the world with which all science deals. From Descartes' time on, it has been a border state, lying between philosophy and the natural sciences, and has suffered the inconveniences which attend buffer states. Descartes' unambiguous and uncompromising division between an extended physical world, and an unextended world of thought, when it reached the pineal gland found itself in ambiguous territory, and only avoided compromise by leaving the relations of mind and body to the infinite power of his *deus ex machina*. The difficulties which have attended psychology's regulation of these relations have been only in part metaphysical. More fundamentally they have been logical. The natural sciences start pragmatically with a world that is there, within which a problem has arisen, and introduce hypothetical reconstructions only in so far as its solution demands them. They always have their feet upon the solid ground of unquestioned objects of observation and experiment, where Samuel Johnson placed his in his summary refutation of Berkeley's idealism. Speculative philosophy, beset with the problem of epistemology, found its problem in the nature and very existence of the world inside which the problems of the natural sciences appeared, and which furnished the test of its hypotheses. Thus psychology as a philosophic discipline carried the epistemological problem into the experience of the individual, but as a science located the problem in a given world which its epistemological problem could not accept as given. Between the two, its sympathies have always been with the presuppositions and method of the natural sciences. On the one hand, as empirical science it has sought to regard the so-called consciousness of the individual as merely given in the sense of the objects of the natural sciences, but as states of consciousness were still regarded as cognitive, they had inevitably inherited the epistemological diathesis. On the other hand, as experimental science it was forced to place states of consciousness within or without the processes it was studying. Placing them in interactionism within the natural processes ran counter to the presuppositions of its scientific procedure, so that the prevailing attitude has been that of epiphenomenalism, an adaptation of Leibnitz' pre-established harmony and Spinoza's parallel attributes. They ran as harmless conscious shadows beside the physical and physiological processes with which science could come to immediate terms. But this proved but an unstable compromise. The conscious streak that accompanied the neuroses could answer only to sensing and thinking as processes; as qualities and significance of things, states of consciousness became hardly tolerable reduplications of things, except in the case of the secondary qualities. The molecular structure of things seemed to remove these from the hypothetical objects of physical science, and consciousness proved a welcome dumping-ground for them. This bifurcation of nature proves equally unsatisfactory. The horns and the hoofs go with the hide. States of contact experience have no better right to objective existence than those of distance experience. Psychology, however, has not been interested in these epistemological and metaphysical riddles, it has been simply irritated by them. It has shifted its interest to the processes, where phenomenalism is most harmless, appearing as physiological psychology, as functional psychology, as dynamic psychology, and has

ignored the problems for which it had no care. The effect of this has been to give to the central nervous system a logical pre-eminence in the procedure and textbooks of psychology which is utterly unwarranted in the analysis of the experience the individual. The central nervous system has been unwittingly assimilated to the logical position of consciousness. It occupies only an important stage in the act, but we find ourselves locating the whole environment of the individual in its convolutions. It is small wonder, then, that behaviorism has been welcomed with unmistakable relief, for it has studied the conduct of animals in necessary ignorance of consciousness, and it has been occupied with the act as a whole, not as a nervous arc.

But the relief with which one turns to conduct and away from states of consciousness has not disposed of the problems involved in the ambiguous term "consciousness," even for the psychologist. Bergson's theory of perception was at least a step toward the clarification of this ambiguity. It recognizes that in so far as the content of the percept can be termed consciousness, it indicates a diminution of the reality of the object rather than an addition, and this diminution answers to the active interests of the organism, which are represented in the central nervous system by partly of possible response. These co-ordinated paths in some sense cut out the object of perception. The percept is relative to the perceiving individual, but relative to his active interest, not relative in the sense that its content is a state of his consciousness. It is at least meaningless to lodge the so-called sensuous characters of things in the cortex. When, however, Bergson suggests that certain of these qualities may be the condensation of vibrations, we seem again to be in the presence of qualities that are states of consciousness. Presumably the condensations, e.g., the actual quality of color, do not exist in the object, but in the condensing mind. However, Bergson's statement at least placed the central nervous system in the world of things, of percepts, on the one hand, and on the other placed the characters of things in pure perception in the things themselves; but the divorce of duration, as psychical, from a static intellectualized spatial world left a dichotomy which was functional only from the standpoint of a Bergsonian metaphysics. Neo-realism undertook to return all the qualities of things to the things, over against a mind which was simply aware of the sense. This simple, radical procedure left problems of a perception which was still cognitive in its nature, which a Critical Realism sought to solve by retreating to representative perception again. It remained for pragmatism to take the still more radical position that in immediate experience the percept stands over against the individual, not in a relation of awareness, but simply in that of conduct. Cognition is a process of finding out something that is problematical, not of entering into relation with a world that is there.

There is an ambiguity in the word "consciousness." We use it in the sense of "awareness" "consciousness of," and are apt to assume that in this sense it is coextensive with experience, that it covers the relation of the sentient organism to its environment in so far as the environment exists for the organism. We thus predicate of this existence of the environment for the organism the attitude of cognition on the part of the organism. The other use of consciousness to which I refer is in the sense of certain contents, to wit, the sense qualities of things, more especially the so-called secondary qualities, the affections of the body of the sentient organism, especially those that are pleasurable

and painful, the contents of the images of memory and imagination, and of the activities of the organism, so far as they appear in its experience. There is another field, that of self-consciousness, to which I am not as yet referring. There is a common character which in varying degree belongs to all of these contents, that is, that these contents could not appear at all, or exactly as they do appear, in the experience of any other organism. They are in this sense private, though this privacy does not imply necessarily anything more than difference of access or of perspective on the part of the different organisms. If we take the pragmatic attitude, referred to above, consciousness in the first sense, that of awareness, would disappear from immediate experience, while the world that is there for the organism would still be there. A particular organism would become conscious from this standpoint, that is, there would be a world that would exist for the organism, when the organism marked or plotted or, to use Bergson's term, canalized its environment in terms of its future conduct. For Bergson, a percept is an object of possible action for an organism, and it is the active relationship of the organism to the distant object that constitutes it an object. Bergson meets the difficulty that the organism can exercise no physical influence upon the distant object by his assumption that consciousness in this sense is in reality not an addition to the object, but an abstraction from all in the relation of the organism to the object which does not bear upon this action. There arises, then, a selected series of objects, determined by the active interests of the organism.

An environment thus arises for an organism through the selective power of an attention that is determined by its impulses that are seeking expression. This peculiar environment does not exist in the consciousness of the form as a separate milieu, but the consciousness of the organism consists in the fact that its future conduct outlines and defines its objects. In so far as the organization of one individual differs from that of others, it will have a private environment, though these differences may be called those of standpoint. They are objective differences. They exist in nature. The most fundamental phase of these differences is found in the determination of what the relativist calls a "consentient set," i.e., the selection of those objects which may all be considered as "here" with reference to the individual. It is this set, which is co-gradient with the individual, that constitutes an environment within which motion may take place. These perspectives of nature exist in nature, not in the consciousness of the organism as a stuff. In this relation of a peculiar environment for an individual, there is no implication of an awareness. All that is implied is that the ongoing activity of the individual form marks and defines its world for the form, which thus exists for it as it does not for any other form. If this is called consciousness, a behavioristic psychology can state it in terms of conduct.

Consciousness in the second sense, that of a peculiar content or contents, implies relativity in another sense, in the sense of emergence, as this has been defined by Alexander, in *Space Time and the Deity*, and accepted by Lloyd Morgan, in *Emergent Evolution*. In evolution not only have new forms appeared, but new qualities or contents in experience. It is the sensitivities of forms that are the occasions for the appearance, in the worlds of these forms, of new characters of things, answering to all the senses and new meanings answering to their new capacities for conduct. And these new

characters and new meanings exist in nature as do the forms of physical objects, though they are relative to the sensitivities and capacities of the individual forms. If we drop awareness from immediate experience, Alexander's distinction between perception and enjoyment maybe also dropped. This distinction lies between the awareness of perception of external objects and that of the experience of the individual in perception and his other processes. Pleased palates and irritated or suffering members are there in the same sense as other percepts or objects. And this is true also of straining muscles, of fearful objects, or a turned stomach, or an attractive thing, nor can we deny this sort of objectivity to imagery, because access to it is confined to the individual in whose world it appears. Part of this imagery fits into the world that is there, and is with great difficulty analyzed out. That which fill not fit in becomes located in our pasts or in futures of varying degrees of definiteness.

If my friend enters the room, and I catch a glimpse of his face, the imagery of his face fills out the countenance, and I see him with his whole complement of features. The same imagery might have figured in my memory of last meeting him. Or it might have figured in the plan I entertained of calling, on the following evening. It belongs either to the passing present, or to the irrevocable past, or to the contingent future. This imagery is for the percipient as objective as the so-called sense object. It may enter that object and be indistinguishable from it. Where it can be distinguished, however, it is recognized as having this private character; that is, while we assume that the color of the object perceived, even if it vary from eye to eye, is in some respects identical for all eyes in so far as the organs are alike, it is not assumed that the image which one has is there for other eyes, or imaginations. While this sole accessibility of imagery to the individual does not in itself render it less objective, it places it at the disposal of the individual, where he attains to a mind which it can furnish. The same is true of the other class of objects which in his experience is accessible only to him. I refer to the objects which the individual possesses from the inside, so to speak, the parts of his organism, especially as they are painful or pleasurable. In the so-called lower animals, there is no evidence that this private field is organized and used as the possession of a self. The passing present is neither extended into a memory series, nor into an anticipated future.

Imagery is but one phase of the presence of the past in the passing present. In the living form it appears as facility in the response, and in the selection of the stimulus, in selective discrimination, in the stimulus. Imagery emerges, in the sense of Alexander, as the content of the past in the stimulus, and as meaning in the response. Imagery and meaning are there in the objects as contents, before they become material for the mind, before the mind appears in conduct.

I have referred to the doctrine of relativity. More specifically, my reference was to the formulation of the doctrine given in Professor Whitehead's three books, *The Principles of Natural Knowledge*, *The Concept of Nature*, and *The Principle of Relativity*. What I have had particularly in mind is Whitehead's recognition, as over against current Einsteinian doctrine, that if motion is to be accepted as an objective fact, we must also accept the existence in nature of so-called consentient sets at rest, determined by their relation to so-called percipient events. The same events in nature appear in different

consentient sets as these events are ordered in different time systems, and this ordering in different time systems is dependent upon their relations to different percipient events. Motion in nature implies rest in nature. Rest in nature implies co-gredience, i.e., a persistent relation of here and there with reference to some individual, and it is this that determines the time system in accordance with which extents are ordered. If rest is a fact in nature, we must conceive of it as stratified, to use Whitehead's term, by the different temporal perspectives of different individuals, though a group of individuals may have the same perspective; we must, however, remember that this is a stratification of nature not in a static space, but a nature whose extension is affected with a time dimension.

It is this conception of the existence in nature of consentient sets determined by their relations to percipient events that I wish to generalize so that it will cover the environment in relation to the living form, and the experienced world with reference to the experiencing individual. This is evidently only possible if we conceive life as a process and not a series of static physicochemical situations and if we regard experience as conduct or behavior, not as a series of conscious states. This I take to be the essence of Bergson's philosophy of change, in accordance with which our perceptual world is determined by the actions that are taking place. Conduct does cut out and fashion the objects upon which action is directed. It is only with reference to life as an ongoing process that the animal determines his habitat. The most convincing illustration can be found in the different presentation of the life of a community, in terms of a social statics, the statistical data of population and occupations and the like, or in terms of the actual lives of the different individuals who make up the community. In the latter case we realize that each individual has a world that differs in some degree from that of any other member of the same community, that he slices the events of the community life that are common to all from a different angle from that of any other individual. In Whitehead's phrase, each individual stratifies the common life in a different manner, and the life of the community is the sum of all these stratifications, and all of these stratifications exist in nature. It is this recognition that takes psychology out of its isolation, as a science that deals with what is found in the mind of an individual, and makes of it the standpoint from which to approach reality as it is going on.

It is evident that a statement of the life of each individual in terms of the results of an analysis of that which is immediately experienced would offer a common plane of events, in which the experience of each would differ from the experiences of others only in their extent, and the completeness or incompleteness of their connections. These differences disappear in the generalized formulations of the social sciences. The experiences of the same individuals, in so far as each faces a world in which objects are plans of action, would implicate in each a different succession of events. In the simplest illustration, two persons approach a passing automobile. To one it is a moving object that he will pass before it reaches the portion of the street that is the meeting-place of their two paths. The other sees an object that will pass this meeting-point before he reaches it. Each slices the world from the standpoint of a different time system. Objects which in a thousand ways are identical for the two individuals, are yet fundamentally different through their location in one spatio-temporal plane, involving a

certain succession of events, or in another. Eliminate the temporal dimension, and bring all events back to an instant that is timeless, and the individuality of these objects which belongs to them in behavior is lost, except in so far as they can represent the results of past conduct. But taking time seriously, we realize that the seemingly timeless character of our spatial world and its permanent objects is due to the consentient set which each one of us selects. We abstract time from this space for the purposes of our conduct. Certain objects cease to be events, cease to pass as they are in reality passing and in their permanence become the conditions of our action, and events take place with reference to them. Because a whole community selects the same consentient set does not make the selection less the attitude of each one of them. The life-process takes place in individual organisms, so that the psychology which studies that process in its creative determining function becomes a science of the objective world.

Looked at from the standpoint of an evolutionary history, not only have new forms with their different spatio-temporal environments and their objects arisen, but new characters have arisen answering to the sensitivities and capacities for response. In the terms of Alexander, they have become differently qualified. It is as impossible to transfer these characters of the habitats to the consciousness of the forms as it is to transfer the spatio-temporal structure of the things to such a so-called consciousness. If we introduce a fictitious instantaneousness into a passing universe, things fall to pieces. Things that are spatio-temporally distant from us can be brought into this instant only in terms of our immediate contact experience. They are what they should be if we were there and had our hands upon them. They take on the character of tangible matter. This is the price of their being located at the moment of our bodies' existence. But this instantaneous view has the great advantage of giving to us a picture of what the contact experience will be when we reach the distant object, and of determining conditions under which the distance characters arise. If the world existed at an instant in experience, we should be forced to find some realm such as consciousness into which to transport the distance or so-called secondary qualities of things. If consciousness in evolutionary history, then, has an unambiguous significance, it refers to that stage in the development of life in which the conduct of the individual marks out and defines the future field and objects which make up its environment, and in which emerge characters in the objects and sensitivities in the individuals that answer to each other. There is a relativity of the living individual and its environment, both as to form and content.

What I wish to trace is the fashion in which self and the mind has arisen within this conduct.

It is the implication of this undertaking that only selves have minds, that is, that cognition only belongs to selves, even in the simplest expression of awareness. This, of course, does not imply that below the stage of self-consciousness sense characters and sensitivity do not exist. This obtains in our own immediate experience in so far as we are not self-conscious. It is further implied that this development has taken place only in a social group, for selves exist only in relation to other selves, as the organism as a physical object exists only in its relation to other physical objects. There have

been two fields within which social groups have arisen which have determined their environment together with that of their members, and the individuality of its members. These lie in the realm of the invertebrates and in that of the vertebrates. Among the Hymenoptera and termites there are societies whose interests determine for the individuals their stimuli and habitats, and so differentiate the individuals themselves, mainly through the sexual and alimentary processes, that the individual is what he is because of his membership within those societies. In the complex life of the group, the acts of the individuals are completed only through the acts of other individuals, but the mediation of this complex conduct is found in the physiological differentiation of the different members of the society. As Bergson has remarked of the instincts, the implements by which a complex act is carried out are found in the differentiated structure of the form. There is no convincing evidence that an ant or bee is obliged to anticipate the act of another ant or bee, by tending to respond in the fashion of the other, in order that it may integrate its activity into the common act. And by the same mark there is no evidence of the existence of any language in their societies. Nor do we need to go to the invertebrates to discover this type of social conduct. If one picks up a little child who has fallen, he adapts his arms and attitude to the attitude of the child, and the child adapts himself to the attitude of the other; or in boxing or fencing one responds to stimulation of the other, by acquired physiological adjustment.

Among the vertebrates, apart from the differentiation of the sexes and the nurture and care of infant forms, there is little or no inherited physiological differentiation to mediate the complexities of social conduct. If we are to co-operate successfully with others, we must in some manner get their ongoing acts into ourselves to make the common act come off. As I have just indicated, there is a small range of social activity in which this is not necessary. The suckling of an infant form, or a dog fight, if this may be called a social activity, does not call for more than inherited physiological adjustment. Perhaps the so-called herding instinct should be added, but it hardly comes to more than the tendency of the herd to stick together in their various activities. The wooing and mating of forms, the care of the infant form, the bunching of animals in migrations, and fighting, about exhaust vertebrate social conduct, and beyond these seasonal processes vertebrate societies hardly exist till we reach man. They exhaust the possibilities in vertebrate structure of the mediation of social conduct, for the vertebrate organism has shown no such astonishing plasticity in physiological differentiation as that which we can trace among the insects, from isolated forms to members of the societies of the termites, the ants, and the bees.

A social act may be defined as one in which the occasion or stimulus which sets free an impulse is found in the character or conduct of a living form that belongs to the proper environment of the living form whose impulse it is. I wish, however, to restrict the social act to the class of acts which involve the cooperation of more than one individual, and whose object as defined by the act, in the sense of Bergson, is a social object. I mean by a social object one that answers to all the parts of the complex act, though these parts are found in the conduct of different individuals. The objective of the act is then found in the life-process of the group, not in those of the separate individuals alone. The full social object would not exist in the environments

of the separate individuals of the societies of the Hymenoptera and termites, nor in the restricted societies of the vertebrates whose basis is found alone in physiological adjustment. A cow licks the skin of a calf stuffed with hay, until the skin is worn away, and then eats the hay, or a woman who expends her parental impulse upon a poodle, cannot be said to have the full social object involved in the entire act in their environments. It would be necessary to piece together the environments of the different individuals or superimpose them upon each other to reach the environment and objects of the societies in question.

Where forms such as those of the Hymenoptera and the termites exhibit great plasticity in development, social acts based on physiological adjustment, and corresponding societies, have reached astonishing complexity. But when the limit of that plasticity is reached, the limit of the social act and the society is reached also. Where, as among the vertebrates, that physiological adjustment which mediates a social act is limited and fixed, the societies of this type are correspondingly insignificant. But another type of social act, and its corresponding society and object, has been at least suggested by the description of the social act based upon physiological adjustment. Such an act would be one which the different parts of the act which belong to different individuals should appear in the act of each individual. This cannot mean, however, that the single individual could carry out the entire act, for then, even if it were possible, it would cease to be a social act, nor could the stimulus which calls out his own part of the complex act be that which calls out the other parts of the act in so far as they appear in his conduct. If the social object is to appear in his experience, it must be that the stimuli which set free the responses of the others involved in the act should be present in his experience, not as stimuli to his response, but as stimuli for the responses of others; and this implies that the social situation which arises after the completion of one phase of the act, which serves as the stimulus for the next participant in the complex procedure, shall in some sense be in the experience of the first actor, tending to call out, not his own response, but that of the succeeding actor. Let us make the impossible assumption that the wasp, in stinging a spider which it stores with its egg, finds in the spider a social object in the sense which I have specified. The spider would have to exist in the experience of the wasp as live but quiescent food for the larva when it emerges from the egg. In order that the paralyzed spider should so appear to the wasp, the wasp would need to be subject to the same stimulus as that which sets free the response of the larva; in other words the wasp would need to be able to respond in some degree as the larva. And of course the wasp would have to view the spider under the time dimension, grafting a hypothetical future onto its passing present, but the occasion for this would have to lie in the wasp's tending to respond in role of larva to the appropriate food which it is placing in storage. This, then, presents another possible principle of social organization, as distinguished from that of physiological differentiation. If the objects that answer to the complex social act can exist spatio-temporally in the experience of the different members of the society, as stimuli that set free not only their own responses, but also as stimuli to the responses of those who share in the composite act, a principle of coordination might be found which would not depend upon physiological differentiation. And one necessary psychological

condition for this would be that the individual should have in some fashion present in his organism the tendencies to respond as the other participants in the act will respond. Much more than this would be involved, but this at least would be a necessary precondition. A social object answering to the responses of different individuals in a society could be conceived of as existing in the experiences of individuals in that society, if the different responses of these individuals in the complex acts could be found in sufficient degree in the natures of separate individuals to render them sensitive to the different values of the object answering to the parts of the act.

The cortex of the vertebrate central nervous system provides at least a part of the mechanism which might make this possible. The nervous currents from the column and the stem of the brain to the cortex can there bring the acts that go out from these lower centers into relation with each other so that more complex processes and adjustments can arise. The centers and paths of the cortex represent an indefinite number of possible actions; particularly they represent acts which, being in competition with each other, inhibit each other, and present the problem of organization and adjustment so that overt conduct may proceed. In the currents and cross-currents in the gray matter and its association fibers, there exist the tendencies to an indefinite number of responses. Answering to these adjustments are the objects organized into a field of action, not only spatially but temporally; for the tendency to grasp the distant object, while already excited, is so linked with the processes of approach that it does not get its overt expression till the intervening stretch is passed. In this vertebrate apparatus of conduct, then, the already excited predispositions to thousands of acts, that far transcend the outward accomplishments, furnish the inner attitudes implicating objects that are not immediate objectives of the individual's act.

But the cortex is not simply a mechanism. It is an organ that exists in fulfilling its function. If these tendencies to action which do not get immediate expression appear and persist, it is because they belong to the act that is going on. If, for example, property is a social object in the experience of men, as distinguished from the nut which the squirrel stores, it is because features of the food that one buys innervate the whole complex of responses by which property is not only acquired, but respected and protected, and this complex so innervated is an essential part of the act by which the man buys and stores his food. The point is not that buying food is a more complicated affair than picking it up from the ground, but that exchange is an act in which a man excites himself to give by making an offer. An offer is what it is because the presentation is a stimulus to give. One cannot exchange otherwise than by putting one's self in the attitude of the other party to the bargain. Property becomes a tangible object, because all essential phases of property appear in the actions of all those involved in exchange, and appear as essential features of the individual's action.

The individual in such an act is a self. If the cortex has become an organ of social conduct, and has made possible the appearance of social objects, it is because the individual has become a self, that is, an individual who organizes his own response by the tendencies on the part of others to respond to his act. He can do this because the mechanism of the vertebrate brain enables the individual to take these different attitudes in the formation of the act. But selves have appeared late in vertebrate evolution. The

structure of the central nervous system is too minute to enable us to show the corresponding structural changes in the paths of the brain. It is only in the behavior of the human animal that we can trace this evolution. It has been customary to mark this stage in development by endowing man with a mind, or at least with a certain sort of mind. As long as consciousness is regarded as a sort of spiritual stuff out of which are fashioned sensations and affections and images and ideas or significances, a mind as a locus of these entities is an almost necessary assumption, but when these contents have been returned to things, the necessity of quarters for this furniture has disappeared also.

It lies beyond the bounds of this paper to follow out the implications of this shift for logic and epistemology, but there is one phase of all so-called mental processes which is central to this discussion, and that is self-consciousness. If the suggestions which I have made above should prove tenable, the self that is central to all so-called mental experience has appeared only in the social conduct of human vertebrates. It is just because the individual finds himself taking the attitudes of the others who are involved in his conduct that he becomes an object for himself. It is only by taking the roles of others that we have been able to come back to ourselves. We have seen above that the social object can exist for the individual only if the various parts of the whole social act carried out by other members of the society are in some fashion present in the conduct of the individual. It is further true that the self can exist for the individual only if he assumes the roles of the others. The presence in the conduct of the individual of the tendencies to act as others act may be, then, responsible for the appearance in the experience of the individual of a social object, i.e., an object answering to complex reactions of a number of individuals and also for the appearance of the self. Indeed, these two appearances are correlative. Property can appear as an object only in so far as the individual stimulates himself to buy by a prospective offer to sell. Buying and selling are involved in each other. Something that can be exchanged can exist in the experience of the individual only in so far as he has in his own make-up the tendency to sell when he has also the tendency to buy. And he becomes a self in his experience only in so far as one attitude on his own part calls out the corresponding attitude in the social undertaking.

This is just what we imply in "self-consciousness." We appear as selves in our conduct in so far as we ourselves take the attitude that others take toward us, in these correlative activities. Perhaps as good an illustration of this as can be found is in a "right." Over against the protection of our lives or property, we assume the attitude of assent of all members in the community. We take the role of what may be called the "generalized other." And in doing this we appear as social objects, as selves. It is interesting to note that in the development of the individual child, there are two stages which present the two essential steps in attaining self-consciousness. The first stage is that of play, and the second that of the game, where these two are distinguished from each other. In play in this sense, the child is continually acting as a parent, a teacher, a preacher, a grocery man, a policeman, a pirate, or an Indian. It is the period of childish existence which Wordsworth has described as that of "endless imitation." It is the period of Froebel's kindergarten plays. In it, as Froebel recognized, the child is

acquiring the roles of those who belong to his society. This takes place because the child is continually exciting in himself the responses to his own social acts. In his infant dependence upon the responses of others to his own social stimuli, he is peculiarly sensitive to this relation. Having in his own nature the beginning of the parental response, he calls it out by his own appeals. The doll is the universal type of this, but before he plays with a doll, he responds in tone of voice and in attitude as his parents respond to his own cries and chortles. This has been denominated imitation, but the psychologist now recognizes that one imitates only insofar as the so-called imitated act can be called out in the individual by his appropriate stimulation. That is, one calls or tends to call out in himself the same response that he calls out in the other.

The play antedates the game. For in a game there is a regulated procedure and rules. The child must not only take the role of the other, as he does in the play, but he must assume the various roles of all the participants in the game, and govern his action accordingly. If he plays first base, it is as the one to whom the ball will be thrown from the field or from the catcher. Their organized reactions to him he has imbedded in his own playing of the different positions, and this organized reaction becomes what I have called the "generalized other" that accompanies and controls his conduct. And it is this generalized other in his experience which provides him with a self. I can only refer to the bearing of this childish play attitude upon so-called sympathetic magic. Primitive men call out in their own activity some simulacrum of the response which they are seeking from the world about. They are children crying in the night.

The mechanism of this implies that the individual who is stimulating others to response is at the same time arousing in himself the tendencies to the same reactions. Now, that in a complex social act which serves as the stimulus to another individual through his response is not as a rule fitted to call out the tendency to the same response in the individual himself. The hostile demeanor of one animal does not frighten the animal himself, presumably. Especially in the complex social reactions of the ants or termites or the bees, the part of the act of one form which does call out the appropriate reaction of another can hardly be conceived of as arousing a like reaction in the form in question, for here the complex social act is dependent upon physiological differentiation, such an unlikeness in structure exists that the same stimulus could not call out like responses. For such a mechanism as has been suggested, it is necessary to find first of all some stimulus in the social conduct of the members of an authentic group that can call out in the individual, that is responsible for it, the same response that it calls out in the other; and in the second place, the individuals in the group must be of such like structure that the stimulus will have the same value for one form that it has for the other. Such a type of social stimulus is found in the vocal gesture in a human society. The term gesture I am using to refer to that part of the act or attitude of one individual engaged in a social act which serves as the stimulus to another individual to carry out his part of the whole act. Illustrations of gestures, so defined, may be found in the attitudes and movements of others to which we respond in passing them in a crowd, in the turning of the head toward the glance of another's eye, in the hostile attitude assumed over against a threatening gesture, in the thousand and one different attitudes which we assume toward different modulations

of the human voice, or in the attitudes and suggestions of movements in boxers or fencers, to which responses are so nicely adjusted. It is to be noted that the attitudes to which I have referred are but stages in the act as they appear to others, and include expressions of countenance, positions of the body, changes in breathing rhythm, outward evidence of circulatory changes, and vocal sounds. In general these so-called gestures belong to the beginning of the overt act, for the adjustments of others to the social process are best made early in the act. Gestures are, then, the early stages in the overt social act to which other forms involved in the same act respond. Our interest is in finding gestures which can affect the individual that is responsible for them in the same manner as that in which they affect other individuals. The vocal gesture is at least one that assails our ears who make it in the same physiological fashion as that in which it affects others. We hear our own vocal gestures as others hear them. We may see or feel movements of our hands as others see or feel them, and these sights and feels have served in the place of the vocal gestures in the case of those who are congenitally deaf or deaf and blind. But it has been the vocal gesture that has pre-eminently provided the medium of social organization in human society. It belongs historically to the beginning of the act, for it arises out of the change in breathing rhythm that accompanies the preparation for sudden action, those actions to which other forms must be nicely adjusted.

If, then, a vocal gesture arouses in the individual who makes it a tendency to the same response that it arouses in another, and this beginning of an act of the other in himself enters into his experience, he will find himself tending to act toward himself as the other acts toward him. In our self-conscious experience we understand what he does or says. The possibility of this entering into his experience we have found in the cortex of the human brain. There the co-ordinations answering to an indefinite number of acts may be excited, and while holding each other in check enter into the neural process of adjustment which leads to the final overt conduct. If one pronounces and hears himself pronounce the word "table," he has aroused in himself the organized attitudes of his response to that object, in the same fashion as that in which he has aroused it in another. We commonly call such an aroused organized attitude an idea, and the ideas of what we are saying accompany all of our significant speech. If we may trust to the statement in one of St. Paul's epistles, some of the saints spoke with tongues which had no significance to them. They made sounds which called out no response in those that made them. The sounds were without meaning. Where a vocal gesture uttered by one individual leads to a certain response in another, we may call it a symbol of that act; where it arouses in the man who makes it the tendency to the same response, we may call it a significant symbol. These organized attitudes which we arouse in ourselves when we talk to others are, then, the ideas which we say are in our minds, and insofar as they arouse the same attitudes in others, they are in their minds, insofar as they are self-conscious in the sense in which I have used that term. But it is not necessary that we should talk to another to have these ideas. We can talk to ourselves, and this we do in the inner forum of what we call thought. We are in possession of selves just insofar as we can and do take the attitudes of others toward ourselves and respond to those attitudes. We approve of ourselves and condemn

ourselves. We pat ourselves upon the back and in blind fury attack ourselves. We assume the generalized attitude of the group, in the censor that stands at the door of our imagery and inner conversations, and in the affirmation of the laws and axioms of the universe of discourse. *Quod semper, quod ubique*. Our thinking is an inner conversation in which we may be taking the roles of specific acquaintances over against ourselves, but usually it is with what I have termed the "generalized other" that we converse, and so attain to the levels of abstract thinking, and that impersonality, that so-called objectivity that we cherish. In this fashion, I conceive, have selves arisen in human behavior and with the selves their minds. It is an interesting study, that of the manner in which the self and its mind arises in every child, and the indications of the corresponding manner in which it arose in primitive man. I cannot enter into a discussion of this. I do wish, however, to refer to some of the implications of this conception of the self for the theory of social control.

I wish to recur to the position, taken earlier in this paper, that, if we recognize that experience is a process continually passing into the future, objects exist in nature as the patterns of our actions. If we reduce the world to a fictitious instantaneous present, all objects fall to pieces. There is no reason to be found, except in an equally fictitious mind, why any lines should be drawn about any group of physical particles, constituting them objects. However, no such knife-edge present exists. Even in the so-called specious present there is a passage, in which there is succession, and both past and future are there, and the present is only that section in which, from the standpoint of action, both are involved. When we take this passage of nature seriously, we see that the object of perception is the existent future of the act. The food is what the animal will eat, and his refuge is the burrow where he will escape from his pursuer. Of course the future is, as future, contingent. He may not escape, but in nature it exists there as the counterpart of his act. So far as there are fixed relations there, they are of the past, and the object involves both, but the form that it has arises from the ongoing act. Evolutionary biology, in so far as it is not mere physics and chemistry, proceeds perhaps unwittingly upon this assumption, and so does social science in so far as it is not static. Its objects are in terms of the habitat, the environment. They are fashioned by reactions. I am merely affirming the existence of these objects, affirming them as existent in a passing universe answering to acts.

Insofar as there are social acts, there are social objects, and I take it that social control is bringing the act of the individual into relation with this social object. With the control of the object over the act, we are abundantly familiar. Just because the object is the form of the act, in character it controls the expression of the act. The vision of the distant object is not only the stimulus to movement toward it. It is also, in its changing distance values, a continual control of the act of approach. The contours of the object determine the organization of the act of its seizure but in this case the whole act is in the individual and the object is in his field of experience. Barring a breakdown in the structure or function, the very existence of the object insures its control of the act. In the social act, however, the act is distributed among a number of individuals. While there is or may be an object answering to each part of the act, existing in the experience of each individual, in the case of societies dependent upon physiological differentiation

the whole object does not exist in the experience of any individual. The control may be exercised through the survival of those physiological differentiations that still carry out the life-process involved in the complex act. No complication of the act which did not mediate this could survive. Or we may take refuge in a controlling factor in the act, as does Bergson, but this is not the situation that interests us. The human societies in which we are interested are societies of selves. The human individual is a self only in so far as he takes the attitude of another toward himself. In so far as this attitude is that of a number of others, and in so far as he can assume the organized attitudes of a number that are co-operating in a common activity, he takes the attitudes of the group toward himself, and in taking this or these attitudes he is defining the object of the group, that which defines and controls the response. Social control, then, will depend upon the degree to which the individual does assume the attitudes of those in the group who are involved with him in his social activities. In the illustration already used, the man who buys controls his purchase from the standpoint of a value in the object that exists for him only insofar as he takes the attitude of a seller as well as a buyer. Value exists as an object only for individuals within whose acts in exchange are present those attitudes which belong to the acts of the others who are essential to the exchange.

The act of exchange becomes very complicated; the degree to which all the essential acts involved in it enter into the acts of all those engaged therein varies enormously, and the control which the object, i.e., the value, exercises over the acts varies proportionately. The Marxian theory of state ownership of capital, i.e., of exclusive state production, is a striking illustration of the breakdown of such control. The social object, successful economic production, as presented in this theory, fails to assume the attitudes of individual initiative which successful economic production implies. Democratic government, on the theory of action through universal interest in the issues of a campaign, breaks down as a control, and surrenders the government largely to the political machine, whose object more nearly answers to the attitudes of the voters and the non-voters.

Social control depends, then, upon the degree to which the individuals in society are able to assume the attitudes of the others who are involved with them in common endeavor. For the social object will always answer to the act developing itself in self-consciousness. Besides property, all of the institutions are such objects, and serve to control individuals who find in them the organization of their own social responses.

The individual does not, of course, assume the attitudes of the numberless others who are in one way or another implicated in his social conduct, except in so far as the attitudes of others are uniform under like circumstances. One assumes, as I have said, the attitudes of generalized others. But even with this advantage of the universal over the multiplicity of its numberless instances the number of different responses that enter into our social conduct seems to defy any capacity of any individual to assume the roles which would be essential to define our social objects. And yet, though modern life has become indefinitely more complex than it was in earlier periods of human history, it is far easier for the modern man than for his predecessor to put himself in the place of those who contribute to his necessities, who share with him the functions of government, or join with him in determining prices. It is not the

number of participants, or even the number of different functions, that is of primary importance. The important question is whether these various forms of activities belong so naturally to the member of a layman society that, in taking the role of another, his activities are found to belong to one's own nature. As long as the complexities of human society do not exceed those of the central nervous system, the problem of an adequate social object, which is identical with that of an adequate self-consciousness, is not that of becoming acquainted with the indefinite number of acts that are involved in social behavior, but that of so overcoming the distances in space and time, and the barriers of language anti convention and social status, that we can converse with ourselves in the roles of those who are involved with us in the common undertaking of life. A journalism that is insatiably curious about the human attitudes of all of us is the sign of the times. The other curiosities as to the conditions under which other people live, and work, and fight each other, and love each other, follow from the fundamental curiosity which is the passion of self-consciousness. We must be others if we are to be ourselves. The modern realistic novel has done more than technical education in fashioning the social object that spells social control. If we can bring people together so that they can enter into each other's lives, they will inevitably have a common object, which will control their common conduct.

The task, however, is enormous enough, for it involves not simply breaking down passive barriers such as those of distance in space and time and vernacular, but those fixed attitudes of custom and status in which our selves are imbedded. Any self is a social self, but it is restricted to the group whose roles it assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds itself entering into the larger society and maintaining itself there. The whole history of warfare between societies and within societies shows how much more readily and with how much greater emotional thrill we realize our selves in opposition to common enemies than in collaboration with them. All over Europe, and more specifically at Geneva, we see nationals with great distrust and constant rebounds trying to put themselves in each other's places and still preserve the selves that have existed upon enmities that they may reach the common ground where they may avoid the horror of war, and meliorate unendurable economic conditions. A Dawes Plan is such a social object, coming painfully into existence, that may control the conflicting interests of hostile communities, but only if each can in some degree put himself in the other's place in operating it. The World Court and the League of Nations are other such social objects that sketch out common plans of action if there are national selves that can realize themselves in the collaborating attitudes of others.

Note

- * As originally published in *International Journal of Ethics*, 35 (1925), 251–77.

9

ON THE STATE AND SOCIAL CONTROL (n. d.)*

The two sides of our emotional life upon which emphasis has been laid – the hate and the devotion – which are both called out by war indicate two aspects of the states which appear in the paradox – that the state, on the one hand, represents the highest values, while on the other it makes not only possible but almost legitimate all the wars. In the contest of the states with each other men pass beyond every standard which they had in peace. The only crime which is never forgiven is defeat, any conduct which organizes values is justified by its success.

The point of view has its own logic – that it is only through the state that all the values of society may exist. With the attack upon the state we pass beyond the causes of conduct within the state. Over against the state's enemy there is no law but his destruction.

The assumption that underlies this is that the state as the organized institutions of the community can be identified with society – an assumption that is false. Attention has already been drawn to the chasm existing between the societies of Europe and the governments of Europe. On the other hand, the states are not simply survivals, not simply vestiges of an older order of things which should drop away of themselves. This is the doctrine of philosophic anarchy. Unfortunately for this doctrine, institutions of society have not been decreasing either in numbers or in importance. Modern government involves more rather than less mechanism. It is of course true that it undertakes vastly more than government has ever undertaken in the past, and it is possible that could an actual comparison be made between the understandings of governments one hundred years ago and today, it might be found that present day governments make proportionally less use of institutional mechanisms than did those of our grandfathers, but this quantitative test must be beside the mark. The real question is not the amount, even the relative amount, of institutional mechanism; it is found rather in the relation of the state institution to the social organization.

In the first place, the institution simply facilitates and extends the social relations which have their ground for existence in the social nature of men. It does not create

relations nor has it any value apart from these relations which it mediates. It is further true that the control that is exercised by and through the institution becomes more effective as it becomes less institutional. In other words, the most effective government is through public opinion. Social control, in so far as it is institutional, involves friction and fails to carry with it that recognition of the identity of interests which must be the foundations of proper social control.

Social integration implies the continual transfer of control from governmental institutions to the quickened and enlarged consciousness of the community. What appeared first as governmental prescription becomes awareness of the new meaning of our interaction with others. Compulsory industrial insurance grows into a sense of the fuller responsibility of the industry to its employees and the community. The manufacturer comes to feel that it is an essential part of the economics of his enterprise, and looks back to the practice of fighting claims in court as not only barbarous but unintelligent. The normal citizen is not controlled by the police. To acquire and own private property carries him beyond the possibility of picking pockets. The increase of industrial, commercial, and biological supervision by the government does not contradict this. It is normal that the new relations in a society which is growing and developing should be at first largely external to the individuals, and it is normal that the healthfulness and integrity of these relations should be evidenced by their gradually becoming part of the individuals themselves. The number and extent of governmental prescriptions are simply coefficients of the new developments in the organization of the group, provided that there is no arrest in the passage from the less adequate to the more adequate form of social control, from the institution to public opinion.

So far, then, is the institutionalized state from being logically the highest phase of social development, that it stands for social organization that has not yet been fully realized. To fix and perpetuate this external authority of the state over the individual, and present it as the most adequate expression of the relation between the two is to substitute an arrested stage for a process of continuous growth. There are two phases of the authority of the community over its constituent individuals. In one case the individual through his participation in the larger life of the community becomes a part of the governing whole. The institutional control on the other hand represents relations which are not so completed that men can come to full consciousness of their social meaning. The institution serves as an external representative of the whole community which does not appear directly or fully in the consciousness of the individual.

Now, to my mind, it is important, at this moment, when states have appealed to the *ultima ratio* of states, to recognize that the organized institutions of a community which we call the state, are messy mechanisms that arise to trace out the field for further socialization. They tend to lapse as men come into more and more direct connections with each other. There is no prospect of their disappearance in any future which we can look forward, but we perceive that men are recognizing more and more that the institution is merely a means never to be mistaken as an end, a means to be constantly judged by its tendency to foster direct social control in the place of the external institutional control, a means that is to be at any time refashioned to meet changing social situations.

The flagrant crime of the western world and we are involved in it though not as deeply as Europe, thanks solely to our geographical position, has been that, while in many respects the true nature of the institution has been recognized in the inner life of nations, we have refused to recognize it in the international life of Christendom.

This I take to be the fundamental definition of militarism – that the state has the right to exist and to maintain itself against any judgment from within or without, not because of its functions in the community of nations but because it is the reality and meaning of the society it represents.

If the state is the end and not the means, militarism is logical and moral. If the state is the means and not the end, international legislation must take the place of war and [of] that diplomacy, the weight of whose arguments is found in the relative powers of destruction of the states which it represents.

Note

- * Unpublished manuscript. Mead Papers Archive, Box: 13, Folder: 26, 8 pp. (written after 6 April 1917).

10

COOLEY'S CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1930)*

"I have often thought that, in endowment, Goethe was almost the ideal sociologist, and that one who added to the more common traits his comprehension, his disinterestedness and his sense for organic unity and movement might accomplish almost anything." Cooley wrote this at almost the end of his third book, that on *Social Process*. It is indicative in a fundamental way of Cooley's conception of sociology and of the sort of mind which Cooley brought to his writings within this field. The men from whom he loves to quote are Thoreau, Emerson, Luther, Thomas à Kempis, and Charles Darwin. The style of his writing is that of Emerson, that is, the organization of his thought belonged rather to the felt unity of the structure that his thinking illuminated than to any closely knit concatenation of elements which analysis presented to thought. And Emersonian sentences stand out from his pages. For example, "The severely necessary can never be vulgar, while only nobleness can prevent the superfluous from being so."

It becomes then of peculiar importance to identify the living social reality which Cooley felt and upon which his thought throws light. It was, indeed, the society of which he was a part and which he could enter by way of his own human nature. No one could be less self-centered than Cooley, but it was by way of the discovery of what went on in his own living with other people that he discovered the community with which the sociologist is concerned. His approach was that of objective introspection. The community that he discovered, so to speak from the inside, was a democracy, and inevitably an American democracy. I call it a discovery, for what anyone finds for himself and by his own way of search must be a discovery. Finding it in living, it was a process. Its organization was a manner of living. Its institutions were the habits of individuals. In a sense Cooley says the same thing in his three books, that is, he illuminates the same reality in different ways.

Society, then, [says Cooley] in its immediate aspect, is a relation among personal ideas. In order to have a society it is evidently necessary that persons

should get together somewhere; and they get together only as personal ideas in the mind. Where else? What other possible *locus* can be assigned for the real contacts of persons, or in what other form can they come in contact except as impressions or ideas formed in this common *locus*? Society exists in my mind as the contact and reciprocal influence of certain ideas named "I," Thomas, Henry, Susan, Bridget, and so on. It exists in your mind as a similar group, and so in every mind.¹

I do not see how anyone can hold that we know persons directly except as imaginative ideas in the mind.²

I conclude, therefore, that the imaginations which people have of one another are the *solid facts* of society, and that to observe and interpret these must be a chief aim of sociology.³

In saying this I hope I do not seem to question the independent reality of persons or to confuse it with personal ideas. The man is one thing and the various ideas entertained about him are another; but the latter, the personal idea, is the immediate social reality, the thing in which men exist for one another, and work directly upon one another's lives.⁴

We may view social consciousness either in a particular mind or as a co-operative activity, of many minds. The social ideas that I have are closely connected with those that other people have, and act and react upon them to form a whole. This gives us public consciousness, or to use a more familiar term, public opinion, in the broad sense of a group state of mind which is more or less distinctly aware of itself. By this last phrase I mean such a mutual understanding of one another's points of view on the part of the individuals or groups concerned as naturally, results from discussion. (...)

In a congenial family life, for example, there may be a public consciousness which brings all the important thoughts and feelings of members into such a living and co-operative whole. In the mind of each member, also, this same thing exists as a social consciousness embracing a vivid sense of the personal traits and modes of thought and feeling of the other members. And finally quite inseparable from all this, is one's consciousness of himself, which is directly a reflection of the ideas about himself he attributes to the others, and is directly or indirectly altogether a product of social life. (...)

There are, then, at least three aspects of consciousness which we may usefully distinguish; self-consciousness, or what I think of myself; social consciousness (in its individual aspect), or what I think of other people; and public consciousness or a collective view of the foregoing as organized in a communicative group. And all three are phases of a single whole.⁵

From these passages I think we may form a definite conception of Cooley's doctrine of society. It is an affair of consciousness, and a consciousness that is necessarily social. One's consciousness of himself is directly a reflection of the ideas about himself which he attributes to the others. Others exist in his imagination of them, and only there do they affect him, and only in the imaginations which others have of him does he affect

them. These ideas differ from each other as they exist in the conscious experience of different people, but they also have cores of identical content, which in public consciousness act uniformly. This identity Cooley insists upon. It is as real as the differences. But its *locus* is found in the experience of the individuals. Furthermore its organization is that of the functional relations of the different members of the society, and its unity is that of organization, not that of a common stuff. As stuff it is psychical and as such the experience of different individuals. The advantage of this approach has been very considerable in the development of Cooley's social doctrine. The "other" lies in the same field as that of the "self." It can be recognized as quite as immediate as the self. The stream of consciousness is the carrier of both – the self and its society – and each can be seen to be dependent upon the other for its evolution in experience. The semi-metaphysical problems of the individual and society, of egotism and altruism, of freedom and determinism, either disappear or remain in the form of different phases in the organization of a consciousness that is fundamentally social.

The self is no longer a Cartesian presupposition of consciousness. In conduct it is a precipitate about a fundamental impulse or instinct of appropriation and power, while the primary content appears as a feeling or sentiment, the self-feeling which defies further analysis. Here Cooley follows James very closely. Its development is wholly dependent upon another or others who are necessarily as immediate as the self. Being a resultant in experience, those objects, through relationship to which it emerges, cannot be dependent upon it for their existence in experience. The other cannot appear first as an experience of my own self, if my own self appears through the reaction of the individual to others. "A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person, the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification."⁶ But the imagination cannot exist in experience as the imagination of a self, but must exist as an imagination within which both self and the other have their origin and development. Cooley thus leaves the "person" or the "man" as metaphysically antecedent to the self and the others. This problem is not, however, Cooley's problem. He is undertaking to locate and define the "solid facts of society," to observe and interpret which must be the chief aim of sociology. Ignoring the philosophical problem does give him elbowroom. On the one hand, the organic nature of society Cooley recognizes and emphasizes, and he can present it as the physical outside, so to speak, of the social consciousness which he regards as psychical, as the organization of personal ideas, which can get together only in the mind, it should be said in the *minds* of persons or men. If one were to push the analogy, there should be a public consciousness which is the psychical counterpart of the social organism.

But Cooley draws back from such a departure from direct experience. Public consciousness is the expression of communication, discussion, and resides in the common ideas of persons, and in their organization. On the other hand, Cooley can regard the relations of selves and others in this society in terms of mental processes. Ideas have definition and reality only in their relationship to other ideas. If selves and others are ideas in people's minds, then the relation of the individual to society is as little a problem as is the relation of any idea to the group of ideas that define it. Furthermore, the goods

or values that attach to any idea can only be defined in terms of the values that belong to the whole ideal structure to which the idea belongs. The beauty that belongs to your presentation of an arm of a statue could not possibly be stated apart from that of the beauty of the whole figure. The values that are the expression of an economist's theory of production cannot be presented except in terms of consumption. In the same fashion, if an individual consists of the ideas in his mind which he imagines that others entertain of him, and if the others exist as members of society as the ideas which he entertains in his imagination, it is evident that they will have common goods in so far as they are organized in his imagination into some social whole, such as a family.

That which distinguishes Luther from the vulgarly ambitious and aggressive people we know is not the quality of his self-feeling, but the fact that it was identified in his imagination and endeavors with sentiments and purposes that we look upon as noble, progressive and right. No one could be more ambitious than he was, or more determined to secure the social aggrandizement of his self; but in his case the self for which he was ambitious and resentful consisted largely of certain convictions regarding justification by faith, the sacrifice of the sale of indulgences, and, more generally, of an enfranchising spirit and mode of thought fit to awaken and lead the aspirations of the time.⁷

In the mind this identification of the values of the individual and of the society he imagines is complete. In defining the selfish man Cooley says, "There is some essential narrowness or vulgarity of imagination which prevents him from grasping what we feel to be the true social situation, and having the sentiments which should respond to it."⁸

If you fix your attention on the individual phase of things and see life as a theatre of personal action, then the corresponding ideas of private will, responsibility, praise and blame rise before you; if you regard its total aspect you see tendency, evolution, law, and impersonal grandeur. Each of these is a half truth needing to be completed by the other; the larger truth, including both, being that life is an organic whole, presenting itself with equal reality in individual and general aspects.⁹

The fact for Cooley is that these social ideas and their organization are not presentations of a reality lying outside but the "solid facts of society." The metaphysical question as to the freedom of will of the individual apart from the social situation that exists in his imagination has no sociological meaning. So the data of the scientist's problem as they lie in his mind cannot *compel* him to present the hypothesis which his imagination evolves. He is free over against the problem. Whether his mind, dependent upon a nervous system, is compelled to think as it does in forming his hypothesis by physical and chemical causes has no bearing upon the absence of compulsion in his statement of the problem.

Mind is an organic whole made up of co-operating individualities, in somewhat the same way that the music of an orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds. (...) When we study the social mind we merely fix our attention on larger aspects and relations rather than on the narrower ones of ordinary psychology.¹⁰

By communication is here meant the mechanism through which human relations exist and develop – all the symbols of mind, together with the means of conveying them through space and preserving them in time. (...) All these taken together, in the intricacy of their actual combination, make up an organic whole corresponding to the organic whole of human thought; and everything in the way of mental growth has an external existence therein. The more closely we consider this mechanism the more intimate will appear its relation to the inner life of mankind, and nothing will more help us to understand the latter than such consideration. (...) Without communication the mind does not develop a true human nature, but remains in an abnormal and nondescript state neither human nor properly brutal.¹¹

In these passages is presented Cooley's conception of the relation of social mind to the organic structure and process of society. It is a structure and process which is particularly found in the vehicles of communication, that is, everything that inter-relates the conduct of members of society, and which become therefore symbols in their minds. The structure and process are external, but they are the structure and process of a living reality, whose interrelationships make possible the social mind in the individuals. Just as the conscious processes of the mind of "ordinary psychology" correspond to the living processes of the physiological individual, so the social processes of the mind answer to the living processes of society. However, there is an essential difference between the two. Our physical and biological observation presents us with the objects that make up society and its mechanisms, which can be stated and defined without recourse to a living social process. It is in fact necessary to endue these physiological and physical objects with the meanings which, for Cooley, reside in the mind before life can be breathed into the social organism. I will recur to this later, but it is of first importance to recognize the value for social psychology which flows from Cooley's finding of the solid facts of sociology in the mind.

It can be most sharply stated in Cooley's recognition that the self is not an immediate character of the mind but arises through the imagination of the ideas which others entertain of the individual, which has as its counterpart the organization of our ideas of others into their selves. It is out of this bi-polar process that social individuals appear. We do not discover others as individuals like ourselves. The mind is not first individual and then social. The mind itself in the individual arises through communication. This places Cooley's doctrine in advance of Baldwin's and Tarde's and even of James's. Tarde looked for a psychological mechanism which determined the individual through the attitudes and manners of the community, and found this in imitation. As a mechanism, imitation proves hopelessly inadequate. It becomes simply a covering term for the likeness of the characters of the individual and of the group. Baldwin sought to

work out, in a so-called circular reaction that reinstated the favored impulse, a possible psychological mechanism, but without success. While James recognized early the influence of the social environment upon the individual in the formation of the personality, his psychological contribution to the social character of the self was rather in showing the spread of the self over its social environment than in the structure of the self through social interactions. The superiority of Cooley's position lies in his freedom to find in consciousness a social process going on, within which the self and the others arise. By placing both phases of this social process in the same consciousness, by regarding the self as the ideas entertained by others of the self, and the other as the ideas entertained of him by the self, the action of the others upon the self and of the self upon the others becomes simply the interaction of ideas upon each other within mind. In this process the oppositions as well as the accords can be recognized and both can be placed upon the same plane.

It is then to a process of social growth and integration, exhibited both in the individual consciousness and in society, that Cooley directs attention. The forming influence of the group takes place through the ideas which are aroused in mind, and these ideas are not primarily ideas that belong to a self. This study of the social growth of the self and the others Cooley carried out in the observation of his own children, and it was the same process which he could trace in the relation of the individual and society. It was the same social process that was going on, looked at now from the inside and now from the outside. Rivalries and conformity operating on the same level could be stated in terms of the interaction of ideas and in terms of social forces. It was Cooley's firm belief that the process was the same – the growth or decay of the social organism. He was peculiarly successful in analyzing the phase of social degeneration. He could show that unhealthful social conditions reflected themselves in degenerate selves, and he could indicate the responsibility of the environment for the degeneration, at the same time recognizing the responsibility that belonged to the self. He could study traits of character as they appeared in the personality and as they appeared in the social forces which these personalities embodied. He could exhibit the social habits within consciousness and in the institutions of the community. He could present the culture of the community as it informed and refined the mind of the individual and as it existed in the literature, art, and history of the nations. In general, just as Cooley, following a psycho-physical psychology, recognized the same life-process exhibiting itself in the sensitivity and motor process of the organism and in the consciousness of the organism, so he could relate the social consciousness of the same individual to the social organism to which it belonged. The social process was the same. It was viewed simply from two different standpoints, from without and from within. Such a view would have been impossible if all experience is lodged in a pre-existent self that must reach other selves through conscious or subconscious inference, and if the influence which selves exercise upon each other must take place through mechanisms which operate through the physiological and psychological apparatus of "ordinary psychology." These presupposed an individual that is in its experience preexistent, and attains acquaintance with other objects through its inner experience. Tarde and Baldwin were after all operating with such psychological mechanisms.

A self that can reach other selves only through the interpretation of states of consciousness that are primarily states of itself, can never be primarily a social self, no matter how social the group may be within which as a living organism it has its being. The question then arises, whether the consciousness that belongs to Cooley's "person" or "man" within which the self and the other arise can serve as the inside of the social process of which the life of society is the outside. I am not raising a metaphysical question. The question is whether the "solid facts of society" can be found in such a consciousness. I think that Cooley was Emersonian in finding the individual self in an overself, but he does not depend upon such a doctrine for his sociology. He comes back to what he calls "ordinary psychology" for his interpretation of what goes on in the mind.

I have already indicated a serious difficulty that arises if we carry over the method of psychophysical parallelism into social psychology, accepting Cooley's interpretation of psychophysical parallelism. His interpretation is that consciousness is an inside experience of the life of the external organism. In "ordinary psychology" this sets up a parallelism between sensations, percepts, emotions, volitions, and so forth, and physiological processes; and Cooley seems to be committed to this "ordinary psychology." This implies that we can give a scientific account of the physiological process without introducing the parallel states of consciousness. But for Cooley selves and others lie inside of the consciousness of "ordinary psychology," and yet they also are the "solid facts" of sociology, that is, they are the field of the external social organism. Now, I have no interest in pressing a point of logical or terminological conflict. Cooley has in a sense met such a criticism by his assurance that his parallelism connotes an outside and an inside view of the same reality, not a parallelism between states or processes in two different realms of metaphysical being. The only pertinent question is whether he succeeds in presenting adequately the "solid facts of society" by means of his apparatus of social psychology.

In the first place it follows from Cooley's lodging of the self and the others in consciousness, while he accepts the parallelism of ordinary psychology, that he cannot and does not wish to identify the self with the physical organism. Now, while Cooley slips out of this segregation of the animal organism from social and so moral experience by merging the life-process and the social process in a universal onward evolution in which he had a profound faith, the actual effect was to take the mental organization of society as it lay in his own liberal and wholesome view as the standard by which primitive impulses must be tested. What impresses one in reading his chapter on "The Social Aspects of Conscience" in *Human Nature and the Social Order*, is that it is an admirable ethical treatise rather than a scientific analysis of the situation within which lie moral judgments and the whole apparatus of impulses. The healthful social order is mental, not in the sense that there have appeared there the intellectual processes of reflection, but in the sense of a developing culture which carries all the values of society which are the standards and tests of social theory and conduct. Such a culture has a *locus* in minds. It is not true that Cooley conceived of the best culture of his time as the final culture of mankind. He recognized that it is in a constant process of evolution, but it was true that Cooley was prescribing for society in so far as it was sick in terms of processes and standards that were for the time being established in

minds, which could be distinguished from what was merely physical, animal, and brutal. He did not feel it to be his primary task to state the whole of human behavior in scientific terms which would be equally applicable to primitive impulses and to the so-called higher processes and cultural expressions. It followed that the beginnings of behavioristic and Freudian psychology did not attract him or suggest new avenues of approach.

In the second place, the problem of the application of scientific method to the study of society did not interest him. The importance of statistical methods he recognized, and those of community surveys, but the question as to the form in which social experience could be stated so as to be amenable to exact definition and formulation seemed to him unimportant. He rejected the economic interpretation of history, and presented his organic view of history in which all factors must be recognized as phases of a unitary life-process whose primary category was that of growth. In this sense evolution was for Cooley the conception that brought society within the realm of science, but evolution was for him a philosophy and a faith rather than a method. He made use of primitive society to illustrate his striking conception of primary groups and their face-to-face association and cooperation, but he made no attempt after the fashion of the French school to analyze primitive mind, nor did he undertake to understand human society through its development from its earlier forms. His method was that of an introspection which recognized the mind as the *locus* of the selves that act upon each other, but the methodological problem of the objectification of this mind he pushed aside as metaphysical. His method was therefore psychological. For him society was a psychical whole.¹²

The question that this method presents is this: Does Cooley's psychological account of the self lying in the mind serve as an adequate account of the social individual in the objective life of society? The crucial point, I think, is found in Cooley's assumption that the form which the self takes in the experience of the individual is that of the imaginative ideas which he finds in his mind that others have of him. And the others are the imaginative ideas which he entertains of them. Now we do make a distinction between selves – our own and those of others – and our ideas of ourselves and of others, and we assume that these selves and our ideas of them exist in our experience. Our ideas of others and of our own selves are frequently mistaken, while we assume that the real selves were there in experience. We correct our errors and reach the genuine personalities which were there all the time. The stuff of these selves social psychologists have found in impulses, fundamental wishes, and the like, especially as these appear in crises in social experience. The question which Cooley's approach raises is whether the form of a self belongs to this level of human experience, or whether this is reached only in the imagination or idea of the other and of the self. Are selves psychical, or do they belong to an objective phase of experience which we set off against a psychical phase? I think it can be shown that selves do belong to that objective experience, which, for example, we use to test all scientific hypotheses, and which we distinguish from our imaginations and our ideas, that is, from what we term psychical. The evidence for this is found in the fact that the human organism, in advance of the psychical experiences to which Cooley refers, assumes the attitude of another which

it addresses by vocal gesture, and in this attitude addresses itself, thus giving rise to its own self and to the other.¹³ In the process of communication there appears a social world of selves standing on the same level of immediate reality as that of the physical world that surrounds us. It is out of this social world that the inner experiences arise which we term psychical, and they serve largely in interpretation of this social world as psychical sensations and percepts serve to interpret the physical objects of our environment. If this is true, social groups are not psychical but are immediately given, though inner experiences are essential for their interpretation. The *locus* of society is not in the mind, in the sense in which Cooley uses the term, and the approach to it is not by introspection, though what goes on in the inner forum of our experience is essential to meaningful communication.

Whether this account of the appearance of selves be correct or not, it is evident that the acceptance by the sociologist of a society of selves in advance of inner experiences opens the door to an analysis which is behavioristic. I refer to such analyses as those of W. I. Thomas, Park and Burgess, and Faris. In many respects Cooley's analyses are of this type, but they always presuppose a certain normal social order and process as given. It is the organization and process which his introspection revealed. One misses perhaps the neutral attitude of the scientist, and one feels that the door is closed to a more profound analysis. In other words, Cooley did not find selves and society arising in primitive processes of communication, so that he could grasp their reality in early human behavior. He felt that he grasped this reality when he found them within what was for him the normal social process. His sociology was in a sense an account of the American community to which he belonged, and pre-supposed its normal healthful process. This process was that of the primary group with its face-to-face organization and co-operation. Given the process, its healthful growth and its degenerations could be identified and described. Institutions and valuations were implicit within it. The gospel of Jesus and democracy were of the essence of it, and more fundamentally still it was the life of the spirit. Cooley never sought for the reality of this in the dim beginnings of human behavior.

If we can carry back the social behavior within which selves and others arise to a situation that antedates the appearance of the psychical as distinguished from an outer world, it will be to this primitive behavior that we can trace back the origins of the social patterns which are responsible not only for the structure of society but also for the criticism of that structure and for its evolution. The social pattern is always larger than the group that it makes possible. It includes the enemy and the guest and the morale of behavior toward him. Its mechanism of communication carries with it the possibility of conversation with others who are not members of the group. It has in it the implication of the logical universe of discourse. If symbolization can be stated in terms of the behavior of primitive communication, then every distinctively human being belongs to a possibly larger society than that within which he actually finds himself. It is this, indeed, which is implied in the rational character of the human animal. And these larger patterns afford a basis for the criticism of existing conditions and in an even unconscious way tend to realize themselves in social conduct. For social theory a great deal hinges upon the answer to the question whether society is

itself psychical or whether the form of the psychical is a sort of communication which arises within primitive human behavior. Do the self and others lie within mind, or is mind itself, as psychical, a phase of experience that is an outgrowth of primitive human communication? Whether the question is stated in this form or not, it is evident that a great deal of recent social psychology has been occupied with an analysis of selves and their minds into more primitive forms of behavior. To this type of analysis Cooley's assumption of the psychical nature of society closes the door. And it commits him to a conception of society which is mental rather than scientific.

But I am unwilling to conclude a discussion of Cooley's social psychology upon a note of criticism. His successful establishment of the self and the others upon the same plane of reality in experience and his impressive study of society as the outgrowth of the association and cooperation of the primary group in its face-to-face organization are positive accomplishments for which we are profoundly indebted to his insight and constructive thought.

Notes

- * As originally published in *American Journal of Sociology*, 35 (1930), 693–706.
- 1 *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), p. 119.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 120.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 121.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 123.
- 5 *Social Organization* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), p. 10.
- 6 *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 184.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 212.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 214.
- 9 *Social Organization*, p. 20.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 11 *Ibid.*, pp. 61–62.
- 12 See *ibid.*, p. 31.
- 13 G. H. Mead, "The Genesis of Self and Social Control," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXXV, No. 3 (1925). See Chapter 8 in this volume.

Part II

Mead on science and epistemology

I. The statement of the problem

11

SUGGESTIONS TOWARD A THEORY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCIPLINES (1900)*

In the *Psychological Review* (Vol. III, pp. 357–70), Professor Dewey maintains in his discussion of the Reflex Arc that the sensation appears always in consciousness as a problem; that attention could not be centered upon a so-called element of consciousness unless the individual were abstracting from the former meaning of the object, and in his effort to reach a new meaning had fixed this feature of the former object as a problem to be solved. The illustration used is the well-worn one of the child and the candle. He has burned his fingers before in dealing with a moving bright object, and he has played with bright objects. There are then at least two tendencies to action, that of withdrawing the hand from the object that burns, and that of reaching out for a plaything. In the conflict between these two tendencies the bright yellow dancing something is shorn of its objective meaning in the child's former experience, and he is trying to learn what it is. While it is thus deprived of its objective value, while it is no longer a stimulus to action, it may become a sensation. But with knowledge of its real nature it ceases to appear in this form in consciousness. It can be sensation no longer until it again becomes the center of a problem episode in experience. I may have carried Mr. Dewey's doctrine beyond the statement given in the article on the Reflex Arc, but I think that the statement represents what Mr. Dewey would admit. At least such a statement is possible from the standpoint which Mr. Dewey takes, and admitting it for the sake of discussion, I wish to point out what its bearing upon the different philosophical disciplines may be.

The assumption made here is that all analytical thought commences with the presence of problems and the conflict between different lines of action. The further assumption is that it continues always to be an expression of such conflict and the solution of the problems involved; that all reflective thought arises out of real problems present in immediate experience, and is occupied entirely with the solution of these problems or their attempted solution; that this solution finally is found in the possibility of continuing the activity, that has been stopped, along new or old lines,

when such reflective thought ceases in the nature of the case. I shall not attempt to prove this to be true, but simply try to see where metaphysics, psychology, deductive and inductive logics (I refer here to the procedures of these sciences, not their general theories), ethics, aesthetics, and the general theory of logic would fall within a reflective process so stated.

The order of the disciplines stated above implies a dialectic within the act, which I wish to confess to at once. Metaphysics I wish to identify with the statement of the problem. It may take psychological form or not. If the result of the recognition of the problem is only to bring to consciousness the meaning of the object in terms of past experience, we get the universal – the ideal – and the use of the object thus defined can be systematized in a manner which is described in deductive logic. If, on the contrary, we abandon the old universals – the interpretations involved in the objects as we have constructed them – and frankly look forward to a new meaning, the immediate experience can claim only subjective validity, and we have the subject matter with which psychology deals. The use of this material to reach the new universal is evidently the procedure of inductive logic. The application of either of these methods to conduct as a whole, in their relation to the ideal or to the larger self to be attained, fulfils the function of ethics, while aesthetics deals with the artistic representations of the object either as ideal or as a phase in the process of development. Finally, the general theory of the intelligent act as a whole would fall within that of logic as treated in works such as that of Hegel.

Where our conscious activity finds itself unable to pass into an objective world on account of the clash between different tendencies to action, we are thrown back upon an analysis of these spontaneous acts and therefore upon the objects which get their content from them. I wish to emphasize this latter assumption which is indeed in accord with some of the best psychological analysis of the present time. It is otherwise stated as the teleological nature of the concept, and affirms that the meaning of the object is derived entirely from our reaction upon it, or, in other words, our use of it.¹

It would follow from this recognition of the nature of the known object that the conflict of two uses or reactions in the same instance would inevitably lead to an analysis of the activities themselves, if a complete abandonment of the action did not take place. However, the analysis would not at first be of the activity as a psychical state. The question would be what the real nature of the object is. A case of doubt as to the identity of a person just met, representing conflicting tendencies to greet him as an acquaintance and to treat him as a simple passer-by, does not at once suggest to us his form with its color and other qualities as a series of sensations, though this is implicitly involved. We are busy in the study of the object, finally perhaps placing him as one whom we have not met before, but who bears a striking resemblance to some one of our acquaintance. This involves the bringing to consciousness the idea of the friend, his form and features, gestures and bearing, while the more or less unsuccessful attempt to make this image coalesce with the form before us, tends to emphasize the points of contrast, that is to form another image which is not able to represent the object before us satisfactorily. While we do not question the objective validity either of our mental pictures of the friend, or yet of the reality of the

impression of the man whom we are in the presence of, there is little tendency to advance to the subjective character of the state of consciousness. Furthermore, if the image which is called up is one which represents fixed habits, especially those bearing pronounced moral sanction, we may affirm the reality of these ideas as over against the seeming contradiction before us. Such instances are found often enough in our lives. Every question of expediency is apt to lead to such a result. A moral line of conduct has become identified with certain objects. For example, the right to the use of what is termed property being once fixed, the expenditure of it in luxuries while others may be starving arouses, when the problem is felt, first of all the idea of property itself as it is represented in all the business transactions of life. This may be affirmed in spite of the contradiction between it and the tendencies to demand assistance for the suffering. The presence of such conflicts, between habitual interpretations of the meaning of the goods of life, and opposite lines of conduct with reference to them, tends to the conscious formulation by most of us of a moral code in more or less abstract terms. If we are able to live pretty consistently up to such a code, and to ignore the contradictions that persist, we have not yet reached the point of metaphysics.

A metaphysical situation implies that the problem persists and cannot be ignored. To affirm the reality of the idea, i.e., the meaning of the object in terms of past experience – our own or that of the community – we must deny to certain elements of experience, interpreted also in terms of the past activity, the like reality. A theological dogma may, for example, affirm the reality of our teleological interpretation of experience, and at the same time deny reality to the mechanical interpretation which the physical sciences suggest. Or, in the type of metaphysical thought found in Plato, the reality of the idea may be affirmed at the expense of that of our entire sensuous experience. Metaphysics is then a statement of an essential problem in permanent form, in terms of the reality of an idea or system of ideas and the unreality of that which conflicts with it. The solution of the problem carries with it the disappearance of the problem and the metaphysical system at the same time. The conception of an immanent deity, making possible, for example, the harmonizing of the teleological and mechanical interpretations of nature, up to that point solves the problem and banishes the metaphysical *deus ex machina* from the system of thought. Of course this change will not necessarily affect other metaphysical features of theology. But in case it is accepted, special providences would be no longer necessary to explain what happens. Our modern teleological psychology which finds the unity of the object and of the world in our own activity, dissipates the conflict between the one and the many which lies at the bottom of the problem with which Plato was struggling. A psychological interpretation of experience makes it possible to affirm both the reality of the one, and the reality of the multitudinous elements that go to make up the object, and in so doing deprives the metaphysical system of its *raison d'être*.

The presence of such an idea, whose reality is maintained over against conflicting elements in experience, requires that we should rigidly distinguish in experience what is real and what is to be ignored or denied. We must be able to apply the idea, and the dominance of the idea cannot but bring to consciousness the method by which this must be done. Deductive reasoning is nothing but the organization of one's

world upon the basis of certain ideas, implying that we either deny the existence of that which does not accord therewith, or else ignore it. When, however, the technique has in this manner been made conscious, it may be used to aid us in the application of universals which are not necessarily metaphysical. Thus while deductive logic had its rise as the organon of a metaphysical system, and served to separate the real from the unreal, it becomes a general organon that is applied universally, serving to separate not the real from the unreal but the known from that which is to be ignored for the time being only.

The next step in the dialectic of reflective consciousness is found in the conscious solution of the problems which are registered and systematized in metaphysics. A successful solution implies the recognition of the reality of all elements that enter into the experience. Such reality implies further, in logical terms, that all elements shall fall under universals whose validity is recognized; for all our knowledge is through universals and must be through universals. In psychological terms, it implies that the concepts of the object, representing the values of past reactions, though they are now in conflict, shall be so harmonized that the values of each may appear in a new concept, that each type of reaction shall be represented in the new activity. For example, if the problem, which is implied in the essentially metaphysical substance of imponderable ether, is to be solved, both the elements which are implied in the energy of mass (which should appear in any medium as physics has defined media, but which is denied in imponderable ether) and that of vibration must receive universal validity, or otherwise stated, and assuming that a theory of energy could solve the problem, a new method of treating all physical phenomena, a new reaction which involves all that is true in all our processes of physical measurement and determination must take the place of those which have come into conflict in this instance. If the conflict is not a mere mistake, and if it is necessary within our known world, it can be overcome only by the appearance of a new universal or habit of reaction. In the second place, the solution of a metaphysically stated problem can be achieved only by admitting, at least for the time being, the inadequacy of the old and so its lack of objective validity, and advancing toward a new universal whose objective validity cannot yet be recognized, with the hope that in this way a new known world shall arise in the place of the old. This, of course, holds only for the conscious solution of the problem. Countless necessary problems have arisen in the history of human society that have reached solution in the gradual appearance of new conceptions and the adaptation of old methods of action, which have thus become equal to situations in which irrepressible conflict first existed. The solution that we are referring to here is not this unconscious change by which one generation differs from the next with no historical sense of wherein this difference lies and with no anticipation of further fundamental change. It is the consciousness of the change that is the essential step in the dialectic of reflective consciousness. Furthermore, just as the metaphysical situation has given a technique in the statement of the problem, with the inestimable advantage that flows from it, so the consciousness of the process by which we change from the old universal to the new carries with it the acceleration which always accompanies the addition of reflection to any instinctive activity.

As indicated above, the necessary result of consciously advancing to the solution of an inevitable problem in human experience is the acceptance of a position midway between the old universals, whose validity is abandoned, and the new universal, which has not yet appeared. And this is a result that affects implicitly the whole world of knowledge; for that world is an organic whole in which no necessary part can be changed without involving all the rest. To assume the attitude, therefore, of solving a necessary problem, implies a willingness to completely invalidate one's known world. I am willing to admit that, even in an age of conscious progress, such an attitude is not explicitly taken by very many who are honestly attacking problems in a scientific spirit, that they not only make many reservations within which they do not expect scientific inquiry to reach, but also that they fail to recognize their known world as an organic whole which cannot be changed in essential parts without changing *in toto*. However, within the province where they do apply the scientific method they are ready to make the Cartesian clean sweep of all objective validity, and having adopted the method they cannot consistently hesitate to continue it as fast as they recognize that the province affects the whole.

In the third place, in the presence of the conflict we reach universals which are the result of abstraction from the immediate conflicting elements. The child has before him that which is neither the object which burned nor yet the plaything. It is something behind each and true of each – a bright moving object we will say. It carries with it a certain amount of the reality of each. It is in so far objectively valid. A primitive metaphysical attitude may maintain itself here as it did among the early Greek thinkers. It is that out of which they both or all spring, if the young child could only become metaphysical (and there is an early period within which the child is markedly so and is in search of pure being). But if he wishes to know, not that out of which they both spring, but which of the two it is, and if he insists on finding out how he can distinguish between the two, he makes the bright moving object merely the starting point of a scientific investigation. In doing this he must ascribe to it, hypothetically, different values for which he has as yet no sufficient objective validity. He knows that it is more than a bright moving object, but he is not sure that it is something that has burned him, nor yet that it is a possible plaything. If he could turn his attention upon it, he would have to own that it is for the time being simply an experience of his own that is confined to his consciousness, that represents experiences that have been objectively valid in the past and a possible future object. In a word, the result of consciously attempting to solve a necessary problem is to render one's world, in so far as it is affected by the problem, psychical, and the technique of the solution is psychology. I wish to insist that this consciousness does not become psychical with the mere abstraction resulting from the conflict of reactions. The bright moving object is objective. And it is conceivable that the analysis may stop here and go no further. It is only when the child refuses to accept the abstraction, and insists that his tendencies to action shall not be checked, but have the larger field for expression which will come with the new object, that the experience necessarily becomes psychical. And it becomes psychical, therefore, because the tendencies to action assert themselves, seeking to adjust themselves to each other. It is this process that falls peculiarly within the phase

of attention. There is the hesitating movement of the finger toward the flame representing both tendencies, that to grasp and that to withdraw, but it is more than either. There is involved the assumption that the hand can be used to deal with hot objects, not simply to get out of their way. It is a hypothesis tested with fear and trembling. It includes both elements, both the readiness to withdraw from danger and to manipulate the distant object revealed by the eye, reacting upon each other so as to produce the action of dealing with an object in an entirely new way, and thus producing for the child a new object. Here we have the characteristics of attention, not simply the absorption in the bright moving object, but the control of different reactions upon it by each other² in the production of a new type of activity including both. One finds in attention not only concentration, but that which concentration implies, control, and control can exist only where there is something definite to be done which is consciously involved in the whole doing of it. This does not take place through a statement of what the ultimate meaning of the act is to be. The child cannot say to himself, 'I must learn to handle a hot bright object.' For to him there has been no element of handling in his experience of hot objects whether bright or not. The hot object was one to be withdrawn from. And in his manipulation of playthings there had been nothing to be avoided. The two activities are here quite distinct, as therefore are the objects. The control lies in the fact that both reactions are excited at the same moment and must in some way both reach expression. The old world contained objects to be withdrawn from and those to be manipulated in play, the new world is to contain objects that are to be so manipulated that he does withdraw from the danger connected with them. Just what that object is to be, depends upon the result of the investigation. It cannot therefore serve as control. It is only the necessity of bringing both tendencies to expression in their interaction upon each other that does and can exercise such control. There is of course no place in this paper for an adequate analysis of attention. I wish only to point out that, in the attentive processes which arise at these problematic points in experience, the control which is an essential part of attention cannot be found in a world of objective validity – for, so to speak, the old is abandoned and the new is not yet in existence – but is found in the relation to each other of different tendencies to act which have been forcibly divorced from the old objects and can only find expression through the mediation of a new object. Both the subject matter of the experience and the process by which the new arises, are necessarily subjective.

We have identified the formation of the hypothesis with the psychical state. It is necessary to distinguish here between the psychical state, as it actually appears in the presence of problems, and the ghost of it which we deal with in psychological textbooks. In experimental psychology, for example, we generally deal with states of consciousness which do not appear as psychical to us in the slightest degree. What actually is taking place is the recognition of things whose objective reality we do not contest, and which we have no motive to state in terms of our own consciousness as distinct from a state of consciousness which is distinguished from every one that has taken place before. The peculiarity of a psychical state is that it is absolutely *sui generis* in our life. It has elements of the immediate present that mark it off from any that has gone before or will come after. From all these peculiarities we necessarily abstract in

objective knowledge. When, however, that objective knowledge is at fault and we are forced to correct and feel our way to something new, we bring out vividly the peculiar marks of the immediate experience and are in the presence of that which is psychical—as that of the individual and of a particular moment in his life to the complete distinction from every other moment present or past. It is evident that in the psychological experiment we are dealing with what is generally perfectly objective. It is only by an inference that we can go from this to the psychical, and that inference is too often one that rests upon an epistemological basis not distinguishable from Hume's or Berkeley's: to wit, that we can reduce all experience to states of individual consciousness in which form we may recognize their ultimate validity. To do this, however, is to objectify the psychical state, and deprive it of the very elements that have rendered it psychical.

The marks of the psychical state are not such that they can be universalized to form a concept in the sense here implied. The peculiar content of them resist all such generalization. What can be generalized is their position in the act, the when and the how of their appearance. What we generally refer to, when we are speaking of psychical states, as elements of the objects which are simply abstracted from the objects themselves. I speak of the color "red," and in so doing have in mind something that I have abstracted from red objects. To get a concrete picture of this I call to mind the visual picture of the object, if I do not look at the object itself. In either case the object is itself known as objective; for even the picture of the imagination is objective so long as it is dealing with the elements of an objective world, which is not questioned, however fantastically it is put together. What fascinates is the presence of such a picture in the midst of such an unquestioned world. The red of a sunset never seen on sea or land is not one that is necessarily psychical, but one that is replete with the emotional value which is absolutely merged in the outer world. Our world is at best one of consciousness, and no amount of analysis of this world into elements will get to the psychical state unless the conditions out of which the psychical arises are present. Elements of consciousness are not as such elements of a psychical character. Nor yet are those which can be definitely connected with particular nervous phenomena of the individual psychical states. It is not the identification of the state with the individual that makes it psychical, but it is his recognition of it as his own, his attention to those peculiarities which mark it off not only from the consciousness of any one else but also from any other state of his own life, that render it psychical. The parallelistic theory sets up the individual of experience and compares the world as he sees it with the world which our science assumes to exist free from all individual error, and tries to combine the two series. It is not denied that the individual's experience is entirely objective in its character. We are merely comparing the object of his perception with that which the scientist's methods of exact measurement reveal. I see a red house which is for me an object in a real world and in no sense psychical. The scientist measures the vibrations of light represented in that red, and shows that there is a complete gulf between the red of perception and the red of certain vibrations. He may call the one psychical and the other objective. But his observations are no more objective than is the original perception of the red house. He has taken a part of his

experience which is more reliable than another and has shown that the two stand in a certain relation to each other, though it is not possible to carry this relation throughout. That one set can be related to his nervous states, or at least that its errors are more completely stated in certain nervous conditions than in the other, throws no light upon the case. An engineer who estimates from a glance the grade of a hill and then corrects his judgment from the tracing of the leveler, is not entering into a distinction between a psychical and a physical world. He is comparing two elements of his conscious world together and selecting that which experience has shown to be more reliable. Parallelism is pure epistemology and does not get within the realm of the psychical. The distinction between the immediate content of the world of perception, and the physical theory of these perceptions, does not touch that distinction which lies between the world of unquestioned validity, and the state of consciousness which supervenes when it has lost that validity and there is nothing left but the subjectivity out of which a new world may arise. This seems to indicate that there are in reality two tasks which psychology has taken up, one that of analysis of the objective world in terms of the consciousness of the objective individual – suggested in Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit* – and the other, the analysis of the situation within which the subjective consciousness arises and the process by which it advances to the formation of the new universal. To the former class most of the psychological work that has been done belongs. It is indeed not different in purpose from that undertaken by Kant, being the study of the structure of experience as necessarily found within the consciousness of an objective individual. The other type is represented in James' chapter on the Stream of Consciousness and in some of the work that has gathered peculiarly around the process of attention.

The typical situation is found in the attitude of the inductive scientist in the presence of a problem. The conflict of given concepts has led to the abstraction, already described, in which what lies behind the conflict comes out as the fact of observation. I may refer again to the instance of ether, the fact of observation here being the actually given movements of heavenly bodies, with evidences of retardation or the opposite, and the transference of vibratory energy. The psychical phase appears when the scientist attempts to consciously solve the problem. This involves, first of all, the flexibility of movement by which he brings all his actual reactions into relation with each other. This freedom of movement, in which all the activities and tendencies to activity which have been confined by definite theory play without resistance into each other, seems to me the essence of subjectivity. A grouping takes place, now here and now there. To return to the illustration, the processes of exact determination of energy are stripped of the concepts of matter in terms of molecule and atom. There stands before the scientist only the multiple determinations. Energy of mass, vibration, etc., are represented only by the measurements that he undertakes to determine. Now the way in which these shall come together is not dependent upon any objective law. The only control lies in the necessity of bringing them all together. Only after they have been harmonized can the grouping take objective value. For the time being, the man is dependent upon the spontaneity of his own impulses—the genius for suggestion to which Whewell refers. This may lead, in this case, to the positing of our own

measuring processes as the substantial element about which all the facts of energy shall gather. As the result of physical science has been to state, not the movement in the terms of the body, but the body in terms of the movement, we may find the ultimate motions in which bodies are to be defined in our own reactions which we recognize as giving the content to the objective world. But the point which I wish to make clear is that we have here these various motions free from any bodies objectively determined, and are free to organize them at will if we only include them all. Another illustration may be found in the attitude of the inventor, who, facing a particular problem, is left to a constructive power proportional to the freedom with which the forces abstracted from their customary objects can be combined with each other into a new successful whole. It is the power of subjectivity that comes nearer answering to what we term genius than anything else.

The technique of the process, so far as it goes beyond this perfect freedom, lies in attention, in other words, in the control which arises through the interplay of the different activities. One must feel, in that which he does, not only the immediate action, but also all the others that are involved. In the case of the child he must grasp so as to avoid the burn. I am referring to so-called voluntary attention. In involuntary attention we have simply the process already become a habit and objectified. Perhaps the most primitive illustration can be found in the mutual control of the distance sense and the contact sense in the primal intelligent act. Here the fixing of the eye and its direction we continually determined by the process of locomotion and that of manipulation, while as obviously the manipulative and locomotive processes are controlled by the eye process. In this, as in the case of the child, we have not reached consciousness of what we are doing – not reflective consciousness. This statement also does justice to the modern psychological position that the stimulus, as psychology studies it, does not set off the activity, but is the sought occasion for activities that are demanding expression.

In this spontaneity and control we have the essential characteristics of the will, and when we pass beyond the limits of scientific investigation to conduct as a whole, we enter the field of ethics. Purely metaphysical ethics would carry us back to the promulgation of old universals with the ascetic demand that we ignore or suppress all tendencies to action, that do not fall under them, as interpreted by deductive logic. As in this situation we recognize the validity of only one set of impulses, and set them in hostile array against the other, there is no escape from a doctrine that action will be determined by the comparative strength of the two factions – determinism – unless we posit a will which is not represented in any of these impulses to action – an indeterminate will. Over against these positions, it becomes possible, from the standpoint taken above, to define freedom in terms of the identification of the self as a whole with the problem and its solution. The forces are not hostile if the aim is to represent all tendencies to action in the final act. The self is not identified with one tendency or any one set of tendencies more than with another, and the problem is recognized not as one that arises simply through the imperfect character of the self, but as one that springs from the essentially inadequate nature of the world of ends presented in knowledge. It is not a conflict between the good and bad elements of our nature, but between values and the impulses that these represent, meeting on a plane of absolute

equality. Obligation lies in the demand that all these values and impulses shall be recognized. The binding nature of obligation is found in the necessity for action, and in the claim made by the whole self for representation within the action; while the consequences of failure to meet the obligation are found in the sacrifice of certain parts of the self which carries with it the friction and sense of loss that is characteristic of the immoral attitude. The ideal can be defined, not in the old universal nor in attempted delineation of what the future situation should be, for in advance of the solution such a delineation is quite impossible, but in the method of meeting the problem, in the statement of all that must be recognized in the solution to be attained; as the ideal of the scientist is found in the complete statement of the various conditions that must be recognized and met in any possible hypothesis. Finally the motive, as distinguished from the mere impulse, is found in the tendency to action when brought into conscious relation with the other conflicting tendencies, striving to estimate itself over against all. As the solution is one that arises from an unpredictable suggestion from within, the spontaneity of the individual is preserved beyond all question. The so-called moral struggle is found in the identification of the self with one set of tendencies to the exclusion of others. I do not mean by this statement that the self is something standing apart from the tendencies to conduct, but that it arises through the organization of these tendencies or impulses. Such an organization as is one-sided, leaving parts of the nature unrepresented, naturally leaves behind the continuous conflict which thus becomes chronic and destructive instead of being a moment in a process of natural development. The moral struggle always implies that an organization has been in some sense accomplished; or, better, that a working hypothesis or line of conduct has been adopted which is felt to be inadequate. The struggle does not lie in the process of forming the hypothesis, but in the friction in acting upon it. If the step has been in some sense irrevocable, the feeling of loss remains in the so-called emotional state of remorse. The natural trend is, however, forward, and looks to the reconsideration of the line of conduct adopted. It is only from the deterministic standpoint that retribution is called for. For in this case there is a hostile force that must, so to speak, be reduced.

Within such a conflict, even if it is not brought clearly to consciousness, and whether the result is simply the recognition of the old universal, or the conscious organization of the new world through the psychical phase, the sensuous objects—answering to the facts of scientific observation—take on a new form or meaning. They are the stimuli to, or occasions for, activities, for the time being abstracted there from by the conflict itself. But they stand for those activities, are the repositories of their meaning and value. In scientific observation, they are simply the conditions for the formation of the new universal, and we lose sight of the inherent value of these objects. But, where we are unable to reach the new universal, and are obliged to remain with the elements of the problem and to express our feeling for that which is not yet attained through the statement of these objects, they gain again this representative value. This representative value of the object resulting from conflict seems to me to be aesthetic. The term “conflict” may seem to be at variance with many features of aesthetic consciousness, but we must notice that within the attempted solution the hostility has

ceased; for overt action has stopped and the state is preeminently one of calm, the absence of prejudice and rancorous feeling. We must remember also that it is by no means necessary that the conflict should take on the scientific form. The only element that comes above consciousness may be the new value of the object. This will depend upon the nature of the individual. The artist states the conditions for the solutions of his problems in terms of the sensuous objects of experience. The solution may be attained, supposing that it is attained, more or less unconsciously. Furthermore, there are certain problems that, like the poor, are always with us; for example, that between the mechanical and teleological statements of the world and its physical objects. Out of this springs decorative art and all the artistic representation of nature. In the utilitarian control of the world we lose sight of the end of this control. We fail to see the forest for the very trees. There are others connected with the primitive impulses of love and contest which are always with us; and, finally, the great moral problems never lose their eternal identity in whatever state of society they appear. The religious consciousness is preeminently one that recognizes in life a fundamental problem, while it clings to the reality of the great representative objects of conduct which the conflict has abstracted and act before us. In fact, it is allowable to define the religious object as one which, while transcending through its universality the particular situations of life, still is felt to be representative of its meaning and value. There is here indicated another characteristic of the object held in the abstraction of the unsolved problem. In so far as it carries the meaning and value of the activity which it represents in actual conduct, it calls forth as emotions the feelings that accompany such activity. The subject is much too complex to be dealt with adequately here. I wish merely to indicate that the object that stands out in the midst of the problem, not only as a condition of its solution, but also, for the time being, as representative of the meaning and value of the act, would naturally gather about itself the emotional content that is so characteristic of aesthetic and religious experience.

Finally, the dialectic of this whole process of conscious analysis and reconstruction may be passed in review and be reduced to a technique, or at least be so treated that it tends to become such eventually. This science – the general theory of logic – does not deal with the statement of the problem as does metaphysics, nor with the immediate application of the abstracted universal – deductive logic – nor with the immediate formation of the hypothesis and its verification – inductive logic – but with the whole appearance of the objective world in thought terms and its passage into unanalyzed reality again. It deals therefore with the judgment and the different moments in the development of the judgment.

Notes

* As originally published in *Philosophical Review*, 9 (1900), 1–17.

1 James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 332.

2 Contr. of the Phil. Dept. of the U. of C., Angell and Moore [“Reaction-time: A study in attention and habit”, 1 (1896)], p. 8.

12

ON DARWIN'S THEORY OF EVOLUTION (1909)*

The Origin of Species appeared in the year 1859. Charles Darwin had been occupied with the hypothesis which he presented under this title for twenty years. The hypothesis of natural selection as the cause of the origin of species had occurred to him after reading Malthus' studies and speculations concerning population. The mass of data which had presented the problem of the origin of the species had been gathered during the voyage of the Beagle upon which he was one of the scientific students and observers. In all, there lay thirty years of patient observation and study behind this treatise on the part of the author. It was study that lay entirely within the field of biology. It dealt with a problem with which the biologists of the time had been occupied in definite form for more than half a century. But while the problem itself was distinctively biological its development had been dependent upon the advance of other sciences. I have already indicated that the suggestion of his hypothesis came to Darwin after reading the discussion of an economist of the law of growth of human populations. The recent development of geology under the influence of the great Lyell unquestionably gave the problem of the origin of species a different form and one which was much more favourable for its scientific solution than earlier conceptions of the students of earth's crust had made possible. Thus even in the statement of the doctrine of evolution as the result of natural selection Darwin was profoundly influenced by lines of thought which lay outside that within his investigation lay. As we all recognize today the conception of evolution which Darwin's work made current has had an influence that is indefinitely greater upon other sciences than that which they exercised directly upon him. Probably no book since Newton's *Principia* has influenced human thought so immediately and so profoundly as have *The Origin of Species* and the following works from Darwin's pen. If he many times repaid to other sciences what he borrowed from them in suggestion and material, if the conception of evolution which he has made current has become perhaps the most important in the development of the recent thought the ground for this must be

found in the conditions which obtained at the time at which *The Origin of Species* appeared.

It is to these conditions that I desire to direct your attention this afternoon. It is first all appropriate that we consider the situation of the physical sciences, which has achieved so much, and which presented the ideal of secure results and accepted method toward which the biological and social sciences turned envious eyes.

The achievements of Newton and those who had prepared the way for his generalization belong to the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century. This generalization gave to man a system of bodies whose masses were determined, whose laws of motion were ascertained. The simple law of attraction which Newton formulated operated with uniformity and universality within this system. Its law was the same for the falling body upon the surface of the earth and for the revolution of the planets about the sun or for the revolution of their satellites about the planets. This has been achieved not only by observation of any astronomer and the careful study of their findings in the heavens, but the development of a new mathematical technique by which measurement was carried on in terms of motion, in which the units were accelerations of velocity. It was through this technique that it became possible to analyse processes in nature which had heretofore lain far beyond the control of the scientist, and for a long period the physicists were occupied in applying this method of analysis, increasing its power and conquering new fields of the heavens with the ken of the astronomer. The possibility of nice measurement of the positions of the fixed stars and the determination of parallaxes of certain stars, the recognition that there were systems among the stars, and that the ordering of the stars in the heavens suggested a system of the whole heavens, and especially the study of the nebulae brought the solar system into relation with the rest of the heavens. The question of the history of the solar system and later of the whole physical universe presented itself to men's minds where before they had studied only the motions of the bodies in the congery of bodies whose laws the genius of Galileo, of Kepler, and of Newton had deciphered. The change was of profound import.

The solar system, as it came to the Western world from the mind and calculations of Isaac Newton, was perfectly balanced. The very law which expressed all its motions had no infancy and looked forward to no old age. It was the law of the incorruptible heavens, and until some force majeure, the touch of the hand that had created it was laid upon it, until the heavens should roll up and vanish as a scroll, there could no change in the movements which we could see and study. What the world was to men's minds it always had been since the days of its creation, and always must remain till its last days doomed it to extinction. When first of all Immanuel Kant published his *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* in the middle of the eighteenth century, the publication served to indicate the change of attitude which was coming in science. His brilliant theory, which in many ways anticipates the hypothesis of Laplace, attempted to show that the same law which defines the movements of the bodies in the solar system would have given rise to such a system if the scientific speculator be allowed to begin with a chaos in which matter is distributed through space in finely divided particles. Kant was not able to appeal to the nebulae as

examples of the early stages of developing worlds, nor could he give to his doctrine the mathematical statement which later physical theory could use in developing the hypothesis of Laplace. Nonetheless, the historical standpoint appears to eventually supersede the point of view of a science that saw only an eternal present. But Kant's treatise fell dead from the press. It was forgotten and had to be resurrected later by the men who were admirers of his philosophical achievements. Laplace knew nothing of his theory. Laplace himself presents his nebular hypothesis only as a suggestion at the end of his *Mécanique Céleste*. For him also fifty years after Kant's book was written the eternal heavens are ever young are of interest mainly for the mechanical precision that never varies than for their history. But his hypothesis presented in the end of his volumes attracted in his day instant attention. The interest of mankind was turning from the present to the history of the past from which it came.

In geology there arose the problem of accounting not only for continental forms, but for the evident succession of continents, which rose above and sank beneath the sea. There appeared the problems of the fossil forms with novel species constantly appearing. These forms became identified with certain strata, and indicated earlier conditions which differed materially from what men saw about them. Geologists fought over the causes which were responsible for these changes. Had there been catastrophes in nature, or could the scientist find present causes whose operation would account for these mutations in the earth's surface, and in the types of fauna and flora that had inhabited it: Sir Charles Lyell stated that he saw indication neither of a beginning nor of an end, that there was no ground to assume that there had been other forces than those which were to be found at work at his time, still he and those who immediately preceded him were at work upon a history of the earth's surface and led men to see in the forms that they found about them the results of operations which persisted while the forms changed.

In the meantime there was developing in physics and chemistry a new world the molecular and atomic world, whose laws were being discovered and whose changes were being studied by the indirect methods of mathematical analysis and the combinations and analysis of chemistry. In the early years of the nineteenth century Dalton established the atomic doctrine in chemistry, and the studies of heat, electricity, and magnetism first conceived of as subtle fluid and later recognized as forms of motion carried thought into realms of the infinitely small as astronomy and the geological ages had carried it back and out into the indefinitely great. The field to be covered here was enormous. The harvest of data to be collated was too great even for the infinite industry of the research scientist of the German university, and even the great physicists and chemists of this period, men such as Cavendish, Davy, Dalton, Young, Joule, Faraday, Rumford, Clerk Maxwell, the Thompsons, in England, Lambert, Liebig, Berzelius, Mayer, Weber, Mach, Helmholtz, in the Teutonic world, Lavoisier, Fresnel, Berthollet, Carnot, in France, have not been able by their hypotheses to organize and control the whole body of their material.

One great conception has indeed arisen during this epoch that promised to accomplish this result, the conception of energy. It is curiously connected with the economic history of Europe in its origin, but the degree of its abstraction and the extent of its

generalization gave it at the time of its dominance an importance which places it on a par with that of evolution. It has seemed the most commanding conception of modern physical science because from its height it could overlook and formulate the phenomena of different sciences which could not be translated into terms of each other.

The conception can be traced to the study of the steam engine, the problem of economics, that of the transfer of the heat of fuel into steam and from steam to the operation of machines, is capable of becoming the formulation of the scientist. If the counting house can state these different elements which seemingly have no common denominator in common term of cost, of production, cannot science take as its common denominator the work that is accomplished by the different changes and conceive of a common energy which appears in these different forms, now as a latent heat, now as the elastic power of steam, now as the accelerations in velocity of the parts of the machine, indeed the conception being once presented it is evident that wherever one physical change follows upon and depends upon another preceding change we can conceive of a common energy which finds its expression in each, that is, if we have some result in terms of which this so-called energy can be measured. This common unit in which energy is measured is work done, the foot-pound, or the erg, a conception which as indicated before came into use in this relation in the economic statement of the steam engine. It was Carnot who first propounded the problem in the form which led to the formation of the conception of energy. In his attempt to conceive the effectiveness of the steam engine in its simplest form, he conceived of the steam as something that like a water fall poured down from one level to another doing work in the process. This conception of work does not require an analysis of the molecular processes of the particles of vapour, nor such a theory of their changes that the motion of the piston rod the machinery it drives are stated in the same terms. They can both be stated in terms of the work done, in terms of results rather than in terms of the changes actually going on in nature. Energy is the something that is assumed to exist in nature that answers to the work done. Wherever one change seems to pass into another and wherever each is capable of measurement it is possible to posit this energy.

The effectiveness of the idea is beyond all question. And there was great need of such a conception, for there were no common denominators between the object, the magnitudes of physics and those of chemistry. The atom in one was a different thing from the atom of the other and the molecule in the one domain was different from the molecule in the other. And yet the two fields conjoined not only but overlapped so largely that it was impossible to keep their facts separate. In each, electricity was not only present and responsible for the most important changes with which the scientists were occupied but its phenomena in each field were the crucial phenomena in the development of the doctrines of physics and chemistry. Thus a common conception such as energy which could state a change in terms of results and pass over the problem of what was actually taking place was most welcome and important.

As the value of the money which buys coal can be presented also in power of the steam and the effectiveness of the machinery which is set in motion by the steam and as this value which is a common denominator of all these different stages in economic

process is stated in terms of the product, so the energy which appears in all these different stages of the physical process is stated in terms of the work done its product, and becomes the common denominator of all these different physical changes.

It remained for Mayer to state the generalization that none of this energy is lost in the process. Not that it can all be recovered for use by the engineer, or even that it is available for nature, but that it is discoverable as existing in active or latent form. Thus appears the doctrine of the conservation of energy, by means of which the human mind is able to conceive all the multitudinous changes that are going on in nature, changes which we may be unable to state on terms of the other, as the expression of the single store of energy of the universe, which remains eternally unchanged though appearing in a thousand forms.

The conception is so tremendous, it affords so wonderful a sweep of the whole universe of physics and chemistry, that it is no wonder that men were almost intoxicated by it. As one dominates from an alpine peak horizons whose distances are hopelessly beyond the power of the human traverse, so the scientific mind seemed to suddenly dominate the infinite horizons of a nature whose intricacies laughed at its power of analysis and statement. But longer study of the fields of nature, thus brought within a single landscape, revealed the fact that there was a depressing phase of this view. This energy was never lost, but it was continually becoming more unavailable. The universe of energy was running down. The old analogy of Carnot was still true, and the old proverb that the mill could never use the water that is passed holds for this grandiose conception of energy. Nature energy is continually running down hill, and promises eventually to be all of it unavailable. The energetic physicist covers up this disagreeable and depressing implication by the term entropy.

However the real test of the conception of energy is not to found in the availability of the energy in nature but in the availability of the idea as a working and productive idea in scientific discovery. Has energy justified itself as the common denominator between processes in nature which could otherwise be translated the one into terms of the other? Has the research scientist, the man on the frontier of our knowledge of nature, found the conception one which has been an effective weapon in taking possession of new country: Have, for example, the new discoveries in the field of electricity, in those of radio-activity, been mediated by the common conception of energy? A moment's review of this literature, with its constant use of the ion, the electron, and the various bits of the older physical atom reveals the fact that the physicist and the chemist in latest discoveries has made no use of the vision given in the mountains of the philosophy of energy. On the contrary, the scientist is seeking for conception which will enable him to translate directly what he conceives to be going on in one physical operation into terms of the other. He is not satisfied with the measurement of the quantities of both in terms of the work done, he must see the actual process go on, and until he has conceptions which reveal the process of molecular nature in operation, he will never be satisfied with his statements. If I may revert to the analogy which has already been used, the energetic physicist answers to the captain of industry whose whole control of his industry is a financial control. He sees nothing but the cost of production and everything in the operation of his

manufacturing must be translated into terms of cost of production before he considers it. The physicist who has made the discoveries of the last half century in the field of light, of electricity, of radio-activity, has answered to the superintendent and engineer who sees machines at work, and can therefore invent better and more effective machines, who sees the process in terms of the very factors which go over the one into the other not simply in terms of results.

I have insisted upon this phase of the theory of energy because it presents it in its proper relation to the movement toward the historical point of view which we have seen had emerged in astronomy and geology. Energy has not given science the tools for discovery because it has not been able to so state the changes that are going on in nature that we can view the changes as actual processes. In order that this may be possible it must be possible, for example, that we should see the ion and the electron, by the mind's eye, in the process of electrolysis, or in the expression of radioactivity. In a historical statement one must see the change as it is going on, and a statement which is confined to results will not reveal the process. It is not from the theory of energy that the suggestion toward a history of chemical elements has come, nor the hypothesis of an ether in terms of which the atom could be stated. I would not imply that our physical sciences are far enough advanced so that we can present a history of physical processes, that we can for example see the physical universe arise out of ether and the different elements from combinations of one primitive substance, I would not imply that we have reached the point where we can speak of an evolution of physical and chemical substances, but I wish to insist that the doctrine of energy has not given us a possible historical point of view in the physical sciences, but that the first indications of the dawning of a historical day upon the universe of molecular physics and chemistry is to be found in conceptions which take into account the actual process that we conceive to be going on, and does not confine our view of the process to a balance sheet stated in terms of the results of the process.

It was very much at the same time that the conceptions of evolution and that of energy appeared in European thought. There could be no sharper contrast than that between the effectiveness of these conceptions as means of advance in science. Evolution has been the working tool not only in the biological sciences, but has given new vigor to the historical treatment of astronomy and geology. It has practically revolutionized the social sciences and has appeared in psychology and philosophy in new forms after it had been worked out as a conception in the *Logic* of Hegel and in Schelling's unfolding of the World spirit in nature, a conception with which we are most familiar in its wonderful poetical presentation in Goethe's *Faust*.

As I have stated earlier, Darwin's *Origin of Species* deals with a specific problem, that indicated by its title, whence to the forms of animals and plants come? As each animal and plant arise an individual in nature it carries within its structure the type so determined that whatever may be its individual peculiarities it still belongs to some species, and our knowledge of it is a knowledge of that species. What is the origin of this type? Darwin's answer to this question is that in natural selection is to be found a cause operative in nature which is equal to the task of producing the type. The problem is therefore narrowly a biological problem and the answer has definite reference to the

biological conditions which any solution, to present a *vera causa*, must recognize. And yet Darwin's statement of his hypothesis has been so effective outside biological fields because it has been so definitely confined in its statement to this biological field. This seems the more remarkable when we look to Europe, to both Germany and France. There we find speculations upon this problem which are much broader in their application, and have a much more definitely philosophical aspect than the hypothesis of natural selection which Darwin propounded. A glance at the development of this phase of the thought of the last century is necessary to comprehend this.

We must go back to Kant again. We found him making the first historical statement of the theory of the heavens. We find him somewhat later with his eyes turned from the skies to the inner world of the human spirit promulgating another doctrine which did not fall without response upon the ears of Europe. This doctrine was that the source of the necessary laws of nature can be found only in human intelligence itself. Man is himself the lawgiver to the physical universe, not an arbitrary lawgiver who may decree what his whim suggests, but one whose intelligence has such a structure that this structure is necessarily impressed upon his experience. It is the nature of our thought that gives the laws to the world. It is the way in which we sense and think the world that enables us to find those ways embodied in the world that we perceive and conceive. Kant called this a transcendental position, and meant by this term, that one had to go beyond the experience itself, to transcend it to find out the reason for our experience having such forms. His doctrine has been called also transcendental idealism, because it implies that the ideas, the meaning of the world is to be accounted for not by the world itself as it presents itself immediately to our senses and thought, but by running those forms of thought, those ideas and meanings back to the nature that knows them. There are many subtleties in this doctrine of Kant's, many more subtleties that are necessary because of the obscure manner in which Kant expressed himself, but one phase of doctrine is perfectly clear from its simplest statement, and that is that it turned attention from the object of thought to the thinker and the manner of his thinking, from the world that is perceived to the nature that perceives it, that it directed attention to the individual instead of the world and to his inner nature. It is readily to be seen that this doctrine had its natural place just in advance of the French Revolution. It was because men turned from outward given institutions to their own natures and found the rule of right and justice in their own manner of thinking and experiencing the world that they were able to put their ideas of right, especially their individual rights ever against the hoary institutions that went back to feudal antiquity. It was an abstract statement of the philosophy of an age that judged the world and its institutions and its rulers by the feelings and standards which lay in man's inner consciousness. Another characteristic which we can recognize in this philosophical doctrine is that it ushers in the modern individual, who has dominated the world during the nineteenth century, at least up to its last decades.

It may seem curious at first, but it is certainly a fact that this individualistic point of view in judging and feeling, was responsible in no small part for the interest which sprang up almost immediately in history and for the modern historical school and its method. It was responsible also for the Romantic school and that wild orgy of

sentiment and emotion which characterized the revolutionary period. This may help to understand why an individualistic attitude should be responsible for a historical revival. Turning one's attention to the recesses of the human spirit, especially setting up one's own standards against the world, and searching religiously for the fundamental realities of the universe in one's interior is surely the proper method to lead to romanticism and its outbursts of uncontrolled emotion. We can also recognize at once that there is that makes history so interesting as the ability to put oneself in the place of the characters whose experiences we are trying to comprehend, and also that there is nothing that is so essential to gaining this power of putting oneself in the place of others as the power of going into one's own self becoming at home within one own spirit. It is the man who has taken his own point of view consciously and critically who can take the point of view of others. In any case, one of Kant's first followers – Herder – was the inaugurator of the modern historical movement. Europe suddenly waked up to the wonderful content of medieval Europe. The Waverly Novels are the readiest illustration of that time and that attitude for us. And to many of us the Waverly novels have been the introduction to an interest in history. With the fall of Napoleon the historical movement was inaugurated in Europe and it meant more than a dry gathering of dates and recording of events. This movement meant finally the passing vividly into the experiences of those people whose experiences they were studying. The accomplishments of that movement are common knowledge of us all. The old world fell before the new historical school as the governments and political institutions of medieval Europe fell before the new consciousness ushered in by Rousseau and Kant. Niebuhr and Wolff meant a new Rome and a new Greece. The dry rod of the Roman Law blossomed anew in the hands of Savigny. Historical Criticism is still with us to attest the power with which this historical appeal to the judgement of the individual passed upon the dogmas and monuments of the past, no matter how sacred they had been.

As Kant had applied the individual point of view to the criticism of knowledge and the world as known so the new historical school applied the individual point of view with the appeal to the rational nature of man, to the institutions and literature, and monuments of the past. The immediate followers of Kant in the German philosophical schools were the so-called romantic philosophers, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. The peculiarity of this school was that they carried Kant's position beyond even Kant himself. Kant had stated that the forms of the world both of the sensibility and of the judgement were in the texture of human nature. The philosophers who followed Kant strove to find in the inner spirit not only the forms of things but the things-in-themselves there also. Fichte centered the human will in the divine will and boldly asserted that our wills create the very world with which we live. Schelling saw in nature but the Odyssey of the spirit which each one of us is. It remained for Hegel finally to give a logical statement to the implications of this school. He found that the ideas or meanings which constitute the things as we know rise through the operation of thought. If Fichte centered the individual in the divine will Hegel centered him in the divine reason. In any case, they found the nature of our experience to be constructive and creative. Hegel completed the movement because he presented the process out

of which the types of things arise. I shall not undertake to enter the subtleties of this doctrine, but I want to present its identity with the position of Darwin.

Darwin presented a natural process which he showed could be responsible for the forms of animals and plants. Species arose under the influence of natural selection because there was a natural process within which there must be adjustment of form and environment and it was the process of this adjustment that was responsible for the form which the animal and the plant took. The decisive character of Darwin's work lay in the fact that he proved that there are causes in nature which could lead to such a fashioning of the form the type in this process of adjustment. The statement of Hegel is from within from the analysis of the process of reason. The statement of Darwin is from without from the study of animal and vegetable nature and the struggle for existence that he saw so dominant but so creative. In a word, both recognized that the process of experience could create the form, or the type, or the species. Now this position is a step in advance of Kant and the revolution. For Kant and the apostles of the French Revolution, the laws of the forms of thought and conduct were in man's nature, and man could judge nature and society by appealing to these forms within him, but they conceived of the laws and forms a being stereotyped in that nature. So the biologists of this period still believed in great part that the form, the species, must have been created. Not otherwise could it exist even in nature, created in the mind of man or created in the natural world. It remained for Darwin to demonstrate the possibility of the form, the species being the product of the very process of life, a creation of the process of adjustment of life to its environment and of environment to the life process. Hegel presented the same doctrine by an analysis of the process of judging, but he was dealing with highly subtle abstractions. Darwin gave the statement in the living characters of the forest, the sea, the prairies and pampas, the mountains and the air. The doctrine was the same, though it must be confessed that Hegel's philosophy was an affair of thought for its own sake and failed to come out of the philosophical chamber into the living world where it should give man the method of living.

I have presented this contrast between the historical position which simply presents the past from the point of view of one's own experience, that simply opens the door to the past through the gates of one's own spirit and inner life, the history of the romantic and critical schools, and the historical position which contemplates the institution arising out of human experience, which can see the family, the church, the state and society in all its forms as the product of human living, the historical spirit which sees the experience which goes on within himself create out of its adjustments the very forms of society whose nature he is studying in the past. I have presented this contrast because it shows the limitations of one great movement in Darwin's time, the last that I am able to refer to. This movement we know in Bentham, and the two Mills, in England, and in Comte in France. At once these names suggest to us the social sciences in their earlier stages. John Stuart Mill presented in its modern garb the traditional political economy. The school of Bentham stood for reform in politics for the beginnings of modern political science. Comte and Mill together represent phases of what today we consider sociology. I might bring within this movement the socialist doctrine in Germany and the communist outbursts in France.

The achievements of these men have been great. It is perhaps difficult for us today to reproduce the enthusiasm with which the reform movement welcomed such dry doctrines as the greatest good of the greatest number, or the conception of a human nature which has moved solely by motives of pleasure and pain. But the actual reforms which took place in the English criminal law and procedure, in the English constitution, are evidence of the importance and value of these battle cries which today sound but hollow. Again when we turn to Comte and his positive philosophy we find what seem but dry husks, in the place of living human experience, and we wonder again how out of such material Comte could imagine that a religion could be built up around humanity.

I has seemed strange to many that John Stuart Mill who could enter into sympathetic relation with the Romantic movement in England, who was able to understand Coleridge and Carlyle could not sympathize with Darwin's work or appreciate the import of the doctrine of which he had given so convincing an illustration. The ground for this inability to comprehend evolution is to be found in the fact that this school if we may refer to it as such, came back to certain ultimate elements in human nature, and certain ultimate springs of conduct, and sought to explain all these elements and motives. They put the forms, the things before the process. In contrast with this attitude I may again refer to the attitude of our social sciences in so far they have been brought under evolutionary theory. Human living is found to be earlier and more primitive than any form of society or any idea or motive. The institutions and the ideas and motives are found to be products of the experience of man, the social animal. This positivistic or so-called empirical school were critical using the point of view of the revolution, the point of view of the individual who could stand in judgement upon the forms of society, because he had within him the ideas of those forms. But they had not yet reached the position which Darwin occupied in his doctrine, and this is that experience of the living form has given it its own structure. We must understand the process of living before we can understand the forms of life.

Thus we see that the Western world was ready for Darwin's presentation of an effective and convincing illustration of a consistent historical method. Men had turned in upon themselves and had stood upon their shoulders to look back at the past, and from this vantage point the past had become new and important where before it was dry and meaningless. But still they found reflected in themselves the forms of the past, the species of ideas, of human and religious institutions and dogmas, and these forms they could not understand until they could see them arising within the very life process of which they are expressions. It was the demonstration of the possibility of such a comprehension of the form in the process by Darwin that lay the tremendous import of his treatise for his time, and gave it such a reforming and vivifying influence in Europe and America.

Note

- * Address given at celebration of Charles Darwin's centenary, 1909. Mead Papers Archive, Box: 10, Folder: 10, typescript, 16 pp.

13

THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (n. d.)*

We have reached certain points in the implications of the method of experimental science which may be summarily restated. In the first place, the scientist's knowing is a search for the unknown, a discovery, but it is a search for what has disappeared in the conflicts of conduct, that is, for objects which will remove the antagonism – it is a search for the solution of a problem. This dissipates the Platonic puzzle of how we can seek to know what is unknown. It is interesting to note that Plato's solution of the puzzle is found in the form of ignorance as a problem, that of recollecting what has been forgotten. Unfortunately this theory could not apply to the discovery of new types of objects which were foreign to the world of past experience.

In the second place, experimental science implies a real world uninfected by the problem, which can be used to test the discoveries which science makes. If knowledge is discovery of the unknown, this world is not known – it is simply there.

In the third place, as the world that is there is not known and may not therefore as non-known have ascribed to it the sort of logical necessity that does obtain in the logical structure of hypotheses, experimental science finds nothing contradictory in the later appearance of a problem in any portion of the world which has been used to test the solution of a former problem. That a contradiction should appear in the hypothesis is proof of its faulty and, in that sense, unreal, character, but that the sun ceases to be an object revolving about the earth in no way invalidates the world by which we test the hypothesis of the revolution of the earth on its axis by the shifting of the path of the pendulum's swing. Logical necessity obtains in the field of reflective thinking. To transfer it to the world that is there, and within which thought is occupied in the solution of problems, would be to dismiss experimental science as a meaningless and pernicious discipline and to return to the science of dogma.

In the fourth place, in observation and in experiment, science finds a field that belongs both to the world that is there and to the reflective thought of discovery, that is, of knowledge. The problem does not exist in vacuum. It is in the world that is

there, but a certain portion of the world that is there has disappeared. The disease that is conveyed by contact disappears in the evidence of sporadic cases, notwithstanding its epidemic character. But the scourge is all the more tragically there. The instances of the disease are now observed and recorded by physicians and health officers who are seeking to discover the mechanism of the spread of the infection. These data embodied in various hypotheses exist in the minds of the investigators. As the observations of competent investigators of the actual epidemic, they are there as parts of the experiences of these individuals, and the records of them are parts of their biographies. The test case of the heroic scientist, who has remained immune to the fever after wearing the clothes of those who were sick of it and sleeping in their beds, and who succumbs to it when stung by the mosquito, begins in the field of scientific data and personal biographies and ends in the impersonal world to which belongs the two-chaptered history of the yellow fever parasite. In so far as these data are imbedded in the lives of these individuals, they are personal but hard facts. So long as they are tentatively suggestive of objects that would harmonize conflicting ways of cataloguing and treating the disease, they are in the minds of men as part of the structure of their ideas.

We must distinguish here between what belongs to the experience of the individual *qua* individual and what is in his mind and may be termed "subjective." In the former sense the observation may be called private because the investigator alone observes it. Indeed it may be such an instance that he alone can observe it, if, for example, it is his own ache or pain, or if no one else has seen it, and it is an instance that is not repeated. This circumstance does not abstract it from the world that is there, since these men are there in that world together with the events that take place in their lives. But, in so far as the experience suggests what is known of the relation of the mosquito to malaria and a possible parasitic organism that may be the cause of yellow fever, we are in the presence of an idea and of what we will call "subjective." Such an object is not as yet there and may never be there. It is an ideal object. Such objects, as before remarked, have the same locus as erroneous objects after the error has been detected and are not to be confused, because they are placed in individuals' minds, with individuals' experiences, which are peculiar to them, but are objects in the world that is there. I am not, of course, ignoring the problems involved in this distinction. I am for the time being merely insisting that experimental science never takes the position so common in philosophy, which confuses the two. To the experimental scientist the data of observation and experiment never lose the actuality of the unquestioned world because they can happen for the time being only in the lives of particular individuals, or because they are fitted to serve in the mental processes of discovery. They are solid realities that can bridge the gaps between discredited theories and the discoveries of science.

It is the position of the positivist that what is observed is, as a fact of experience, there in a sense in which it never can be false. He recognizes that there may be false inferences drawn from the observation or the experiment, but as a fact of immediate experience it simply is and therefore is not open to possible question. This assumption does not answer to the procedure of science, for whatever may be the theory of sensation, the scientist's observation always carries a content or character in what is

observed that may conceivably be shown under other conditions to be erroneous, though the probability of this be very slight. In psychological terms, an observation is never a mere determination of a sensation (if there is any such thing in adult experience) but is a perception, and, whether all perceptions involve judgments or not, they are frequently illusory, as, for example, in the perceptions of mirrored objects, and can never be free from the possibility of analogous errors.

What gives to the observation or experiment its validity is its position in the world that is there, that is not questioned. It is indeed carefully isolated from what has fallen into question, and this meticulous cleansing from all implications of the abandoned doctrine, and all as yet hypothetical interpretations, creates the impression of an experience which may not be subjected to any further question; but, as we know, there is no part or portion of the world that may not conceivably be the field of a scientific problem.

In the so-called exact sciences we seem to approach an object which is nearly free from all possibility of contingency – the physical particles. These particles are approximations to that which is unextended in space and time, but they carry a character – that of mass or of electrical energy – which does not approach zero, however minute it may become, and it is a character which is reached from numberless observations and not a little speculative theory. Furthermore, the procedures in our laboratories and observatories by which these characters are reached involve perceptual objects of the most complex nature, subject under other conditions to all sorts of conceivable questions. In other words, while the methods of mathematical analysis and extensive abstraction constitute a body of doctrines which in themselves are necessary, as long as the terms carry the same references, their applications are dependent upon their functioning within the problematic situations which arise in research science and appeal for their validity in practice to the court of observation and experiment.

The scientist's attitude is that of a man in a going concern which requires at various points readjustments and reconstructions. The success of the readjustments and reconstructions is found in the triumph over the difficulty, as evidenced by the fact that the concern continues to operate. He finds his tests in the parts of the whole which still operate. This does not imply that readjustments may not be called for later at these very points to which he now appeals for confirmation of the success of his solutions of the immediate problems before him. Surrounding the most profound analysis of the structure of matter, and the widest survey of the galaxies of the heavens, lies the field of things within which experiment and observation take place without question, and which gives its validity to cosmologies and electronic theories of matter. It may seem a misnomer to speak of the world within which lie the observation and experiment as surrounding such hypothetical constructions as the electrical theory of matter, or the galactic form of the universe, since these hypothetical constructions so far transcend, in the subatomic world or in the indefinite stretches of the heavens, all the world of objects which includes our observations and experiments. We seem rather to be islanded in a very minute region occupied by perceptual objects that are in their constitution vague, indeterminate, and incurably contingent, surrounded from within and from without by a universe, which science presents, that

is occupied by objects that approximate exactness of definition and necessity in their forms and changes. And yet the scientist, when he times microscopic oil drops as they move toward or away from charged plates, or when he measures the distances of photographed stars from one another before and during an eclipse, has not at all the attitude of a man perched insecurely upon obscure and adventitious data. The world that is there has taken up into itself all the order, definition, and necessity of earlier scientific advance. It is not there as hypothesis, in so far as the hypotheses have justified themselves in experiment, nor is it there as analyzed relations, events, and particles. These characters have passed into things, and for the time being at any rate, they are there unanalyzed, with the same authority as that of the so-called sensible experience. It is only necessary to emphasize again the distinction of the data as parts of the mental process of anticipating hypothetical objects, and as imbedded in the world of unquestioned reality in the experience of the individuals to whom the problem has come and who are trying to solve it, as well as in the impersonal world within which these individuals exist.

What renders such a statement of the world (not as known but as there) somewhat bizarre is that we enter the world of the scientist by the process of learning. In schools and institutions of higher learning we are taught the doctrines of modern science. Most of us take no part in the work of discovering what is there found out, but we acquire it by a process of learning, in which we may retrace some of the steps which research has followed, while in the main we accept it largely on faith in the men and their methods, especially faith in the checking-up of the results of certain individuals by all the others in the field. Scientific journalism as well as the daily press keeps us informed of the latest advances, and, having learned these facts, we say that we now know them. The world that stretches so far beyond our experience seems in this sense a world of knowledge.

It is true that all acquirement of information, in so far as it is more than a mere parrot-like facility in repeating what is read or heard, is a reflective process in which a problematic situation is met with discovery, though the hypotheses and their tests are those of others. Our own hypotheses and tests have to do largely with the competence of the sources upon which we draw. Admitting, however, all the criticism that the layman can bring to his education, this world of knowledge is evidently of quite a different character from the world that is there, the world that is seen and felt, whose reality is the touchstone of our discoveries and inventions, and very different from the discoveries and inventions themselves, which are the knowledge par excellence of research science.

It is in the acquirement of information that the copy theory finds its explanation. There, what is known must answer feature for feature to its prototype. This field of so-called knowledge is that of the assimilation of the experience of others to one's own experience. There may be involved in it the discovery of these other experiences by the individual, and it is in so far knowledge, but the content of that which is said to be learned is not discovered in the sense in which the other has discovered it.

In its simplest form what takes place here is the indication to one individual by another of an object which is of moment in their co-operative activity. This gesture

becomes symbolic when it arouses in the individuals the attitudes which reaction to the objects involves, together, generally, with some imagery of the result of that action. It becomes communication when the individual indicating the object takes also the attitude of the individual to whom he is indicating it plus that of his response, while the individual to whom the object is indicated takes the attitude of him who is indicating it. We call this taking of one another's attitudes consciousness of what we are doing and of what the other is doing, and we incorrectly apply the term "knowledge" to this. The mechanism and import of this social procedure will be discussed later. What I wish to point out at present is that this process in itself does not involve discovery, any more than does that of perception. When doubt and discrepancies arise in the process of communication, as they continually do arise, the necessity of establishing agreement between the symbols mutually used, and that which they symbolize and the results of the conduct they imply, calls for a one to one correspondence between the symbols and those things and characters symbolized in the experiences of the different individuals, and this gives rise to the theory of knowledge as an agreement between the state of mind and that which is known. Such a determination of mutual agreement in co-operative conduct is indeed essential not only to this conduct but to what is called "thinking" in the individual, but it is not a discovery of that which needs to be known. It is at most a part of the technique by which the discovery is made. When the discrepancy arises, we must discover what the import of the symbols is, and here real knowledge takes place. We find out what the other person is referring to – in common parlance, what he means but the process can go on without discrepancies. The other indicates to us what is there, and our so-called consciousness of this need not introduce any reflective attitude in our conduct. To call the correspondence between the attitudes involved in pointing out a savage dog and the conduct which takes place "knowledge," whether one points it out to one's self or to another, is to give to "knowledge" an entirely different value from that involved in discovery.

In any education that is worthy of the name, what is acquired does go toward the solution of the problems that we all carry with us, and is the subject of reflection, and leads to the fashioning of new hypotheses and the appearance of new objects; but this takes place after the communication which is the mutual indication of objects and characters by the use of gestures which are common symbols, that is, symbols with identical references. The correspondence theory of knowledge has grown up around the recognition of the relation between that which the symbol refers to in the object and the attitudes of response in others and in ourselves. There is here a one to one correspondence, but the relation of these objects and their characters to what we can infer from them in the discovery of the novel element which meets our problematic situations is of an entirely different sort.

In this "meeting of minds" which takes place in conversation, learning, reading, and thinking, there are generally present problematic situations and discovery, though this is by no means always the case. If someone informs us that an expected acquaintance has arrived, there is no more of a problem, or discovery in the sense of a solution, than would be involved in the friend's appearing around the corner. The varied

landscape and hurry of events that sweep us along in books of travel and adventure embrace no more of reflection than the travel and adventure in which we are involved. A great deal of learning is a direct following of indications, or a gradual taking-over of the form and technique of others that goes on without inference. A good deal of thinking even, notably much of reverie and also straight-away ordering of conduct in an unquestioned situation, may be free from dubitation and ratiocination. A field of concentrated inferential thought does include the common reference of symbols in conversation, writing, and thinking – in other words, that part of logic which has to do with the technique of communication either with others or with one's self-together with the epistemologies and metaphysics which have sprung from this and obscured it with their tangled and forest growth. Here lie the problems of successful reference to identical objects and characters through identical symbols mutually employed by different selves, and these problems are of peculiar interest and importance to those involved in the exact and mathematical sciences. These problems demand theories of definition and implication, in so far as this does not depend upon the concrete content of that to which reference is made.

The environment of living organisms is constantly changing, is constantly invaded with other and different things. The assimilation of what occurs and that which recurs with what is elapsing and what has elapsed is called "experience." Without anticipating a later discussion of the social nature of the self and of thinking, I shall claim that the analysis of experimental science, including experimental psychology, never operates in a mind or an experience that is not social, and by the term "social" I imply that in the thought of the scientist the supposition of his mind and his self always involves other minds and selves as presuppositions and as standing upon the same level of existence and evidence. It may be that the scientist, in a self-centered moment, might think away all else but his self and its thinking, but even if in imagination he succeeded in annihilating all save the dot on the *i*, its having any thoughts at all would depend entirely upon its preserving its previous habits of conversing with others and so with himself; and, as this precious hoard of past experience wore away under incessant use and decay, the dot would follow the *i* into nonentity. The dividend that I wish to see declared on this social nature of mind and the self is the equal immediacy that may attach to the assimilation of others' experience with that of our own. We so inevitably utilize the attitude of the other, which is involved in addressing ourselves and in attending to him, that we give the same logical validity to what he relates of his experience as that which we give to what we relate to ourselves of our own past experience, unless on other grounds we are occupying the seat of the critic. It has, of course, only the validity that attaches to a relation, and is one remove from the assurance that attaches to the so-called memory image. But this validity at this remove is all that we can claim for most of our memory. Memory images constitute but a minute part of the past that stretches out behind us. For most of it we depend upon records, which come back to one form or another of language, and we refresh our memory as really in inquiring of a companion what took place on a certain occasion as in questioning ourselves. His testimony may not be as trustworthy as our own because of difference of interest and possible prejudice, but on other occasions for the

same reason his testimony may outrank our own in reliability. While the actual image of the event has an evidential character that is peculiar, not infrequently it may be shown by the testimony of others to have been the product of imagination or to have been shifted from its proper place in the record. But still more fundamentally, the building-up of a memory record involves, in the first place, a social world as definitely as the physical world, within which the events took place, and involves, in the second place, experience which was actually or potentially social in its nature to the extent that whatever happens or has happened to us has its character over against actual or possible audiences or observers whose selves are essential to the existence of our own selves, the mechanism of whose conversation is not only as immediate as our replies but, when imported into the inner forum, constitutes the mechanism of our own thought.

I am anticipating the detailed presentation of this doctrine of mind to make clear my distinction between information and knowledge as discovery through inference. Information is the experience arising from the direction of attention through the gestures of others to objects and their characters, and cannot be called "knowledge" if that term is denied to perception as immediate experience under the direction of the attention springing from the organic interest of the individual. Perception is not itself to be distinguished from information, in so far as one uses a social mechanism in pointing out objects and characters to himself as another. The perceptions of a self may be already in the form of information. Logically stated they exist in a universe of discourse. Knowledge, on the other hand, deliberately fashions hypothetical objects whose reality it tests by observation and experiment. The justification for this is found in the actual disappearance of objects and their characters in the problems that arise in conduct.

Actually so much both of perception and of information is shot through with reflective construction and reconstruction that it is difficult to disentangle them from each other. It is, however, a part of scientific technique to accomplish this disentanglement. Observations and experiments are always in the form of information, even while they are being made, but they are scrupulously teased out from the web of inference and hypothesis. From this purity depart in varying degrees our perceptions as well as our information. It is a commonplace that one may be very well informed and do very little thinking, indeed be quite helpless over against a situation in which the information must be used to suggest or test hypotheses. The reliability itself of the observation or information, however, does call for a certain sort of verification, that of its repetition, either in the experience of the individual or in the mouths of other witnesses, and here, as above remarked, we find the source of the copy or correspondence theories of knowledge. Indeed, if information is knowledge, the copy theory of knowledge is entirely legitimate.

In presenting the world that is there as in some sense surrounding what is problematic, it was stated that what had in the past been approved by experiment and observation was taken up into this world and resided there as organized objects, things behaving toward one another in expected manners. Over against these unquestioned things lie the elements and relations of the working hypotheses of science. These are in a peculiar degree the objects of our knowledge. They are still lacking in complete

verification. They are received only provisionally, and the objects which we constitute by means of them are complex hypotheses anticipating further tests in the use which we make of them. While they work, they pass as objects, but always with a proviso attached, which keeps the scientist's attention alive to possible departures from the result which the hypothesis implies. He is looking for such departures and eager to find them. In such far-reaching speculations as those regarding the structure of matter this field of knowledge is enormously extended, though it does not actually include the world within which the observation and experiment themselves take place, though the analysis which the investigation involves extends into the world of unquestioned things. For the purposes of our calculations we state the apparatus of our laboratories, for example, in the same terms which we use in our hypothetical constructions and thus seem to bring them within the scope of the investigation. But the scientist is in no doubt in regard to the distinction between the finding of fact and the hypothetical form in which he has stated things which are there, irrespective of the validity of the expressions into which they have been translated. Such translations may be perhaps called "objects of knowledge," though with the recognition that the success or failure of the hypothesis, into the terms of which we have translated these unquestioned things and their processes, does not affect their reality in the observation or experiment. In this sense there is no limit to the field of knowledge, for we may state the whole universe in terms of such working hypotheses, if we only remember the limits of this formulation. But it is also necessary to recognize that the *raison d'être* for translation is found in the function of the apparatus of experimental science and not in the revelation of reality. What reveals this latter fact is the ineradicable difference between the immediate concrete event to which appeal is made in experiment and observation, and any formulation of this in terms of a current working hypothesis. The actual position of the spectral line, or of the photographic image on the plate, is the brute fact by which the hypothesis is tested, and there is no methodological relation between the exactly determined position of these and a resolution of them into, say, electrons. It is conceivable that this should be done. It would vastly confuse and delay the attainment of any knowledge from the measurement and would have no conceivable connection with getting that knowledge. To call such a translation "knowledge" is to depart from the significance which the term "knowledge" has in an experimental science.

The world, then, in which science operates has, at its core and in a certain sense surrounding its findings and speculations, the environment of immediate experience. At the point of its problems the immediate things are so analyzed that they may pass into the formulations of the scientist's hypothesis, while the finding of observation and experiment remains immediate experience, that is, is located in the surrounding borderland. It is these two aspects of the world of immediate experience that call for especial attention. From the standpoint of the discovery of the new, from the standpoint of research the world of immediate experience is a core and seems to be reduced to the island of vague, indeterminate, and contingent data that are contrasted with the clear-cut, sharply defined, and necessary elements and events of scientific theory; an apparently incongruous situation, for the acceptance of the clear-cut, sharply defined, and necessary world is dependent upon the findings in the island of vague, indeterminate,

and contingent data, the field of observation and experiment. It is an apparent incongruity that has given birth to much philosophic speculation.

That the incongruity is only apparent is fairly evident, since the scientist, out of whose method and its achievements it has arisen, is not aware of it. If it were presented to him in the terms just used, he would presumably reply that one cannot both have his cake and eat it; that, if one is in search of definition and certainty at a point in experience at which they have disappeared, it is but natural that the definition of the problem should exhibit this fact of their disappearance and that the very data which will serve in the verification of a hypothetical order of defined and necessary things must be themselves infected with indeterminateness and contingency; that the home of experimental medicine is in the hospital; that the gospel of science summons not the logically righteous but sinners to repentance. He would likely add, however, that because, before the discovery of the germ of yellow fever, the clinical picture of the disease was indeterminate and its incidence contingent, there would have been no justification in ascribing the same indeterminateness and contingency to the clinical picture of diphtheria – in other words, that the form in which the data appear in any one problem is pertinent to that problem alone.

But while the statement of the problem, together with the observation and experiment that are involved in verification, constitutes a core of immediate experience whose analyzed elements are indeterminate and contingent as compared with defined elements and necessary relations in a hypothetical scientific theory, these data do belong to objects in an immediate world that is a going concern, and as such is unquestioned. Such a world may be said to contain the problem within itself, and so to surround the problem. It has taken up into itself the solutions of past problems successfully solved. There is involved in it also a considerable apparatus of working hypothesis, which is not always distinguished from the world that is there. The distinction lies in the fact that back of the working hypothesis there is always a question mark, and in the back of the scientist's mind in using the working hypothesis lies the problem implied in its being only a working hypothesis. The world that is there is the common world within which the intelligent community lives and moves and has its being. In physical diameter it may be a small world as compared with the scope of physical hypotheses which in a logical sense it surrounds. Its logical compass of the hypothesis is shown in the data of observation and experiment that must be brought to bear upon the hypothesis before it can be established.

This compass of the problem, and the hypothetical solution of it, is logical in so far as the analysis involved in the problem, the inference involved in the formation of the hypothesis, and the sufficiency of evidence involved in observation and experiment all rest upon a world of things that is there, not as known but as containing conditions of knowledge. But the world that is there includes and surrounds the problem in the sense that the problem is also there within the field of conduct, for, as has been indicated, the problem arises in the conduct of individuals and out of the conflict of acts which inhibit one another because the same object calls out mutually antagonistic responses. When these problems pass into the field of reflection, they are so formulated that they would occur in any experience, that is, they take on a universal

form. Such a formulation is essential to the reflective process of their solution. Their actual occurrence, however, in the world that is there awaits the advent of the conflict of responses in the experience of some individual; and – the solution as well, inasmuch as it departs from the common or universal habits of the community, must be an individual achievement before it can become the attitude of all and be thus universalized. So located in its historical setting, the problem is evidently as completely surrounded by the world that is there as the hole left by a name that has been forgotten is surrounded by all the other names and things and happenings by which one attempts its recall. But while occurrence of the problem and of its solution must be in the field of conduct of some one individual, the things and events that constitute its border are matters of common and undisputed validity. The problem must happen to an individual, it can have no other locus than in his biography, but the terms in which he defines it and seeks its solution must be universal, that is, have common import.

This location of the problem in the experience of the individual in its historical setting dates not only the problem but also the world within which that problem arises. For a world within which an essential scientific problem has arisen is a different world from that within which this problem does not exist, that is, different from the world that is there when this problem has been solved. The world of Daltonian atoms and electricity (which was considered a form of motion), within which appeared the problem of the ion in electrolysis and the breakup of the atom in radioactive substances, is a different world from that whose ultimate elements are particles of electricity. Such worlds dated by the problems upon whose solutions they have appeared are social in the sense that they belong to the history of the human community, since reflective thought is a social undertaking, and since the individual in whose experience both the problem and its solution must arise presupposes the community out of which he springs.

It is the double aspect of these worlds that has been the occasion of so much philosophic speculation. On the one hand, they have provided the tests of reality for experimental science, and, on the other, they have successively lost their validity and have passed away into the realm of ideas. I have already indicated the scientist's rejoinder to this apparent assault upon his method. His method implies not that there has been, is, or will be any one authentic world that constitutes the core and envelope of his problems, but that there always have been, and are, and will be facts, or data, which, stated in terms of these different worlds by the individuals in whose experience they have appeared, can be recognized as identical; and that every world in which problems appear and are attacked by the experimental method is in such a sense a going concern that it can test hypothetical solutions. I have further insisted that as a scientist his goal in the pursuit of knowledge is not a final world but the solution of his problem in the world that is there.

There have existed two different attitudes toward these so-called facts or data. Because it has been assumed that the observations of the old watchers of the heavens in the valley of Mesopotamia, and of Hipparchus, and of Tycho Brahe, and present astronomers possessed a certain identity, there has arisen a picture of the world made up of that which can be regarded as common to all, a picture made of abstractions. It

is a picture through which we can look before and after, and determine the date of Thales when he predicted an eclipse, and what eclipses will take place a thousand years hence. If we assign a metaphysical reality to these facts, we reach a universe which has been the subject matter of popular and technical philosophies. If, on the other hand, we restrict ourselves to the determinations of experimental science, we have nothing but the common indication of things and characters in a world that is there, an indication that abstracts from all but that which is there when a problematic situation has robbed it of some object and concentrates attention upon those characters and things which are the stimuli to mutually inhibiting responses. As I have already insisted, it is only in the experience of the individual, at some moment in that experience, that such a conflict can take place. Non-problematic things are there for everyone. But while these observations took place in individual experiences, in the experiences of those individuals for whom these problems arose, it is the assumption of experimental science that a like experience would have arisen for any other individual whose experience had been infected with the same problem and that, in so far as successive problems have involved identical problematic elements, it is possible to identify the same observation in the experience of different individuals.

The Mesopotamian soothsayer who had hit upon the succession of the eclipses and enshrined it in the Great Saros, and the Greek astronomer who by a scientific explanation of the eclipses had worked out the same succession, and the modern Copernican astronomer who substitutes the motion of the earth in its orbit for that of the sun about the earth and dates these eclipses still more accurately, were all observing the same phenomenon. For each there was a different world that was there, but in these worlds there were actual or identical observations of individuals which connect these worlds with one another and enable the later thinker to take up into his own the worlds that have preceded his. The common content of these observations, by means of which different worlds are strung together in human history, depends upon the assumption that different individuals have had or would have the same experiences. So far as there is any universality in these contents, it goes back to an actual or implied indication of the same things and characters by different individuals, in the same or like situations, that is, it goes back to implications in regard to social behavior in inferential processes, especially to the social nature of the knowledge or evidential import of observation.

However, the experimental scientist, apart from some philosophic bias, is not a positivist. He has no inclination to build up a universe out of such scientific data, which in their abstraction can be identified as parts of many different worlds. The reference of his data is always to the solution of problems in the world that is there about him, the world that tests the validity of his hypothetical reconstructions. Nothing would more completely squeeze the interest out of his world than the resolution of it into the data of observation.

Note

- * Undated article posthumously published in *The Philosophy of the Act*, pp. 45–62 (early 1920s). Mead Papers Archive, Box: 4, Folder: 10.

II. Philosophy and history of science

14

THE ORIGINS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY (n. d.)*

(...) It is evident that if this chasm is to be bridged the control which is the most essential element in attention can be placed neither in the environment nor yet in the individual as distinguished from each other. To do the first destroys the personality of the thinker and to do the other places it quite outside the development that we are trying to trace.

We can state this psychologically by saying that the control cannot be lodged in the object as stimulus, for the object that calls forth the action which follows from the state of attention is the outcome of the state of attention. In the state of attention, the outer objects lose their objective value in so far as they bear upon the action that is to follow. The person giving attention to the obstacles in front of him in the endeavor to find a path that is not as yet evident, finds in the things about him no objective validity so far as the yet undiscovered path is concerned. They present to him only subjective indications of what this path may be. The whole locality must be reconstructed and no one of the things there so far as they have had validity in the past can control his action. Their past meaning cannot direct him at present. Out of the reconstructions arises a stimulus that assumes control of his act, but so far as his perception is concerned it has not been there before. The control cannot then be placed in the objective world for this leaves out the psychological individual whose activity lies between the old world of experience, which is inadequate to direct his present act, and the reconstructed world which now presents the adequate stimulus, just as the historical method which puts the control in the environment leaves out the personality that is trying to explain.

It is equally impossible psychologically and to put the control in the psychological individual it has been reached from its objective world. In such an individual that cannot be present that consciousness of what is about to do, i.e. of the path that he is to follow or he would not have to hunt for it. The process goes on within him and he has a most vivid consciousness of the process in its separate stages. But his consciousness before the act is nothing but the sum total of his past experience which is confessedly

inadequate to the present emergency. But his past experience in the form that it exists before this emergency arises represents the only possible control that he could possibly exercise over any following act. A psychological individual that could control, then, the process of attention in which the world have to exist quite independently of the experience which must make up the whole content of his experience; just as the historical method which lodges the control in the individual must for time make him independent of the past out of which he arises. The one method annihilates the individual in whom the reconstruction takes place while the other isolates him completely from the whole of experience of which he is yet a part.

There is only one escape from this dilemma. We must postulate the act as a reality within which the outer world, i.e. the past of experience so far as its meaning for us is concerned, and the process of reconstruction as taking place within the individual both lie as successive moments. To return to the former illustration, the formalism of the "Enlightenment" period, the English psychology and the French social theory form the objective world of thought out of which immediate reaction must follow for Kant or any other thinker. Kant's consciousness is the recognition of the inadequacy of these stimuli for further advance and the reconstruction of the world so that it may be a stimulus to adequate thought. In other words, the history of consciousness can neither put the world of experience outside the consciousness of the individual nor can it put the consciousness of the individual outside the world of experience. They must both in their immediate value find their places in the development of which they are but separate moments.

A legitimate method for the history of thought must then first of all dominate the movement which any period represents and then find the place of thinkers whose systems it studies in that movement – not treat their systems as independent reactions upon the forces represented in this movement but as moments within that movement.

There are two methods of presenting the history of philosophy since that science arose. The one follows the method suggested inadequately and the other which aims to present the contents of the systems studied as psychical reactions upon the conditions of their time more or less illustrated and interpreted by a statement of these conditions.

The great representative of the former is Hegel. The inadequacy of his work lay in his inability to state concretely the great social movements within which the philosophic systems fell as separate moments. It is but fair to him, however, to recognize that this inability was rather an expression of the infancy of the science of history than of his unwillingness to recognize the fullness of concrete detail that makes up the development of consciousness. There are no lack of representatives of the second class. They vary in their value all the way from Lewes to Zeller and Windelband. It is characteristic of all their statements, however, that they so isolate the consciousness of the different philosophers from the movement of which they were a part that they practically place themselves in the place of these thinkers with a varying appreciation of the conditions under which they lived. Now such a statement if carried out consistently gives an aesthetic rather than scientific result. An aesthetic view of the past is that which reproduces it within ourselves with the valuation which our own feelings set upon it. It inevitably follows that the criterion of consistency and adequacy of the statement

must lie in our own emotional valuation attuned to conditions under which we live. As examples we may offer the anachronisms of Jowett's English gentleman in the Platonic Academy or Zeller's German philosopher in the Schools of Miletus or Abdera.

It is the purpose of this paper to suggest the lines along which an adequate account may be given of the beginnings of Greek speculation. The life of the Greek race has been determined as has been early recognized by the physical character of their country. It broke them up in small communities largely situated upon the sea-coast with but slight possibility of spreading inland. The land itself except in a few localities was not capable of supporting a large population even from the standpoint of the relatively small communities that inhabited them. It followed that the natural increase in population flowed out almost constantly except in later periods of Greek history over the sea in small contingents. There were three circumstances that made these overflows the determining feature in Greek history: the intermediate position of Greece between the east and the west, the contact with old civilizations of the Orient and the easy succession of the Greeks to the commerce and factories of the Phoenicians.

So far as outer countries were concerned Greece had all the advantage indeed a greater advantage than her islands. In the periods of her earlier development, she could not be approached except from the sea, and it was an easy task for her to maintain even in recognizing the smallness of her separate communities a naval superiority over the land empires of Asia Minor and Egypt. Greece came therefore into contact with the civilizations of the east with no danger of being absorbed herself. Here relationship was therefore pre-eminently one of commerce. This made her familiar with the products, and following from these, the technique of these societies without entering into their political and social conditions. This relationship was of great importance in the evolution of Greek thought. She succeeded to the technique of other nations but not under the conditions which kept them mere techniques. She was at liberty to generalize upon the activities of other peoples without the fixed habits which belong to arts acquired in the struggle for existence. The Greeks without doubt had minds peculiarly adapted to generalization but that they had in this circumstance a strong stimulus to the process cannot be denied especially when we see how they took us the mass of practical acquirements in land-measuring from the Egyptians and of Astrological observation from the Assyrians and built up upon them the sciences of Geometry and Astronomy. (...)

The process of reorganization took place in the time of the tyrants. Later historians of Greece have commenced to do justice to the important work which the tyrants accomplished. The cruelty and arbitrary personal injustice and injury of which we read so constantly were but the expressions of the semi-barbaric conditions of the times and savage strife that they were forced to carry on against the nobles they were forced to carry on. On the other hand, we find that they earned the support of the mass of the population in very many instances and almost universally undertook and carried out public works of great importance to the health and development of their communities and immensely widened the commerce and trade relations abroad and built up industries at home. The nobles proved utterly unable to grasp the new situation. They were too much engrossed in their local ambitions and the pursuits of individual success and

pleasure which did not look beyond the old community to be able to stimulate the trade and industry which were essential to further growth. The tyrants represented, on the one hand, the small farmers and day laborers whom the new commercial relations had reduced to extreme misery and, on the other, the new industrial population that was springing up in the cities. What the tyrants of Corinth, of Athens, or of Syracuse accomplished was as essential to the development of Greece as the achievements of her great law-givers.

It is to the period of this great reorganization to which the earliest Greek philosophy belongs. It took place first in the colonies and it [is] there that we first meet Greek philosophers. What took the place of a conscious philosophic construction of the world for the mass of the people and for all before this period was the religious. In Ionia this was generally the Homeric cosmology and theology. As contrasted with the Hesiodic and the somewhat later Orphic cosmogonies and theologies, that developed on the Greek mainland principally, it was pre-eminently social in its motive. It was not the origin of the world that so much interested the Ionians as the immediate human relations that were the expression of their highly social communities. In these wealthy cities the struggle for existence of the small farmer, which is so vividly portrayed in Hesiod, did not come to expression, with the consequent endeavor to generalize their local cults and conditions in a statement that would give them the religious value of their struggles. The Homeric songs were literature of the wealthy families who heard in them the praise of the prowess of their ancestors. For the Greek mainland Homer was purely romantic. For Ionia the poems answered to social conditions near at hand and carried with them a sense of reality that could not have in Greece proper. On the other hand, the antique cosmogony of Homer left the world that was constantly widening without adequate explanation.

It is this difference that is most marked in the intellectual developments of the two societies. In Greece proper the explanation of the physical world and its origin is undertaken from the standpoint of the generalized local cults under the influence of the religious need. In Ionia the religious tradition at this period was still quite objective and was exhausted in the statement of the social relations of the older period. Ionia was then thrown back upon the older animism to account for the outer world so far as this demanded in the new discoveries in the west and the north became the subject of speculation. The influence of these voyages into the far north and especially the far west was of the greatest importance not only in the commercial growth of the people but also in the intellectual life that depended upon it. The daring triremes of Phocaea had gone even beyond the Pillars of Hercules had the colony of Massilia at the mouth of the Rhone and had connections with Sardinia and the modern Elba. The widening of the outlook that followed from these voyages must have been comparatively as great if not greater than that which expanded the world of Europe in the voyages of Columbus and his successors. For the statement of this new world the Greeks of Ionia had nothing to fall back upon except the animism which underlay the older mythology. The Homeric gods located upon Olympus could not easily be brought into relationship with the almost infinitely distant west and north. They had been fixed in types of the social relations corresponding to an older social order and there was nothing in the

very human characters which admitted of the physical expansion that marked this period. It is this condition that finds its expression in the living but impersonal substances of the Ionian philosophy. The attitude so far as it ascribed life to all things was the naive view of all peoples out of which mythology grows but what calls for explanation is that the Ionians should in a certain sense have reverted to it after the animistic stage had been past in the growth of the Greek theology. It is not difficult to give. The personalities that are represented in Homer are too socially fixed and defined to be made the carriers of the new world that had opened before them. So far as this came clearly to consciousness there resulted a necessary conflict between the two views of the world instead of the deepening of the older religious conceptions that is found in the cosmologies across the Aegean we find a scientific criticism of the mythology such as is best represented in Xenophanes. (...)

It was Pythagoras who carried to the west the profounder feeling for personality which had upon the Hesiodic and Orphic movement. These movements had as the chief moment the recognition of the deity in the individual. But it was not the deity of the Homeric theology. It was the enlarged conception of the divine which corresponded to fusing of local cults of the separate clans that had been welded into single communities such as Athens or Thebes, to the coming to consciousness of the mass of people over against the traditional gentile divisions at the head of which stood the noble, to feeling of the race unity with its representation at Delphi. It carried with it a host of crudities that betrayed its source in the local cult but it was the feeling of the larger social unity which could only arise in the mother country where there was a massive population that could come to the consciousness of itself as a whole over against the barbarians without losing the sense of their unity in the multitude of commercial and political relations which filled the consciousness of the Ionians. It was the new Greek individual that went to the west in the Pythagorean movement at much the same time than Xenophanes carried to the same locality the conception of objective world of being independent of human consciousness. It was an individual that felt its roots deep in the past and looked to a future of full self-realization, that took up into itself the consciousness of the past history of the race and felt within itself the divinity ordering its future growth. To bring this individual to consciousness and to so order the life in accordance within a divine harmony that it should become dominant and advance to full realization was the aim of the Pythagorean way of life. Empedocles expressed these two trends of thought in strange juxtaposition. On the one side, there is the scientific explanation of the objective world and, on the other, an aesthetic realization of a profound personality. But the ecstasy disappears, the way of life loses its religious enthusiasm and there arises out of the endless city feuds that shattered sense of the race-individual, the abstract political unit carried back from the west to the east by the sophists. Anaxagoras puts for the first time the two principles over against each other, in their abstract statement, while the Atomists take advantage of the standpoint of a purely abstract intelligence to develop the complementary conception of the purely abstract world of means.

We have then a series of reactions of the eastern colonies upon the mother country and Greater Greece in the west, of the Greek mainland upon the east and back again

upon the west and finally of the west upon the mother country again. And this corresponds to the great movement of Greek history. As we have seen, her problem was that of expansion. First, her surplus population flowed out in the early colonies and took up the commerce of the Phoenicians they drove out. Clinging to the edges of hostile territory it was only by commerce they could live and they felt their way to the grain fields of the north on whose products they could live while they traded and fought with their neighbors. In the meantime, in Euboea, Corinth and Aegina they had sprung up other commercial and especially colonizing powers with their western connections. It was in the political and commercial readjustment that arose at this time of conflict with forces within and without that the Greeks of the east first came to consciousness. It was in this readjustment especially toward the west that what had been a world of objective stimuli became for the time being but subjective indications of a great process that was going on without them in which they must find their place. Thales and his successors can be but examples of what was a less explicit form taking place among the fellow citizens. The necessity of adapting themselves to powers extending themselves into the far west toward which they had not thought of turning their galleys, must have expressed itself in an act of attention in which the whole outer world with its former values and meanings vanished. The west no longer ended with Kerkira beyond which could be located the hobgoblins of Greek mythology or the Happy Isles. As such it had disappeared and as yet there were present in consciousness only the formed habits of navigation and trade in known waters. These could, however, respond only to elements in the new world which had not been felt as a part of it before. Until the new object was formed these elements would have only subjective value. In other words, there stretched out before the Ionians a vast expanse of water that was not the sea they knew and yet could be only stated in terms of their past experience until they had reacted upon it and had become familiar with it. For a practical nature this phase has no interest in itself for the speculative mind it becomes the center of interest, but what needs to be noted is that there is and can be no qualitative difference between the attitude of the man of action facing the same world under the conditions and that of the philosopher. The shipmaster who stood before unknown waters of the west was forced to state them in terms of indications out of past experience that needed only amplification to become a world theory. Thales simply represents the essentially theoretical attitude of his times. But this disappearance of the objective value of the stimulus could not at first be interpreted as the substitution of a psychical state for an outer object. Such an interpretation would have involved the recognition of an individual abstracted from an environment, which as has been indicated did not arise till the time of the sophists. For the Greeks of this period the outer object disappeared under their fingers to be replaced by a generalization out of past experience which was still necessarily as objective as the former object. It differed from the former object only in not being a stimulus to action but to further reconstruction. The Greeks in their naive period had noticed the changes in which what was before their eyes disappeared and was succeeded by other objects.

But as long as each object remained individually intact and was simply replaced by another object equally defined there was no possibility of the conception of an

underlying substance different from the objects assuming successive forms. This could only come when such a process of analysis as that we have sketched had robbed the object of its fixed form and yet had left behind the recognition of a reality, which was undergoing restatement. The imagination in the child or in the naive period of race development delights in the substitution of one object for another or even with the assertion of the same social content and value as in the change of gods into animals or plants. But this is the substitution of one object for another with the maintenance of the same social relations and contents. It is not the analysis of the object into a something else that can appear in different forms. Such an analysis only takes place when attention holds in consciousness the elements of an object which has lost its objective value for us. Without such an analysis the object that is gone is necessarily replaced by the new object which fills the field of vision. Our sense of continuity may retain its social identity, but this is in no sense the scientific conception of the transformation of form while the object remains unchanged. Now the disappearance of the mythologically constructed world and the continued presence in attentive consciousness of the generic elements of a vast expanse of water surrounding a limited continent is the first recorded instance of such an analysis. On the Greek mainland in the great cosmogonies no such analysis took place. One object succeeded another. Only in the social content was deepened, widened and yet individualised. And such an analysis for a consciousness that was yet purely objective must have substituted the more generalised elements of past experience which remained after the dissolution of the object as the ultimate reality of which the former object was only a phase. And furthermore these Greeks must have just as inevitably have assumed an objective process for this change. It is the recognition of this which we have in the *Arche* (the beginning) of the Milesian school. It stamps their systems as scientific as distinct from mythological. What particular process they should have hit upon as the carrier for this analysis is a matter of little importance as far as the nature of the activity is concerned. It was seemingly natural that the ever present meteorological changes should have been taken. But the value of Heraclitus' profound grasp of this phase of our consciousness does not lie in the identification of the changes with fire, water, air and earth but in the thoroughgoing recognition that no object can possibly remain in consciousness unchanged. *Panta rhei*.¹ Here again we have but the vivid recognition and explicit statement of the phase of the common consciousness of the time. It probably found its popular expression in an animism which simply said that the world lives and passes through the changes of life. At least we find this conception entering in Anaximenes, potent in Anaximander, but most naively stated in Pythagoras who stood much nearer the popular consciousness than the Milesians.

The Persians on the east and the Carthaginians on the west effectively put a stop to further expansion. The Greek community became defined in its extent and there began the process of heightened inner organization that attended the commercial activity necessary to providing for the growing population without further colonization. The Greek community became from within and without more and more a unit. Such a determination of the sea routes and the geography of the Mediterranean as followed from the commercial interrelations of the new Greek society was the proximate

completion of the reconstruction of the objective world whose analysis brought forth the Ionian systems. The attitude of this reconstruction had been the recognition of the absence of limits. The old limits were gone and the generalized elements of past experience that filled the place of the old mythological world were activities that carried with themselves no inherent limits. The possibility of unending voyaging out from and around the central continent was the predominant feature of the consciousness of these men, until there arose the constructive content in the world which came with organized commercial relations. The Apeiron, the unlimited, was the necessary attribute of the world. The world as stimulus speculation is necessarily unlimited but as a stimulus to an organized activity it must be a unit or the activity cannot be normal or successful. For Ionia there was not much possibility of further development. The Persians had crushed the spontaneous life of the Greek communities. Their dependence upon the orient became a political and social one and the blighting influence of the east checked advance.

On the other hand, in the west we find two movements that brought to consciousness the social individual. The national reaction against the Carthaginians reinforced the race consciousness and gave thus the individual the content of the national life while the growing commercial connection with the east organized his activity – made of the objective world a stimulus that called forth a unified act. He was shut off on the west; in the east he came into contact with a perfectly well known and definitely valued complex of communities. The political development under the highly enlightened tyrannies of Acharna and Syracuse broke up the older traditional unconsciousness political bonds and those who were substituted represented the deliberate recognition of the meaning and value of the government to the individual and that of the individual to the government. It was from the west that the reconstructed mythology of the nation went out, with the consciousness of its value for the whole Greek community and its adaptation to the demands of the socially organized Greek city. The comedy with its criticism of the older theology and of social relations sprang up in Sicily, and as we have seen it was from Sicily that the emancipated Greek individual went to the mother country – the Sophist. It was in Elea that the Phocaeans settled after they had been driven from Asia Minor by the Persians and from their western colonial fields by the Carthaginians. They more than any other community had opened up to the Greeks an unlimited world in the west and they more than any other community had felt the insurmountable obstacles that hemmed in the Greeks from both sides. It was they therefore that would have the vivid consciousness of the limits that must govern their reactions upon the world. It was natural that Xenophanes coming with the religious and aesthetic realization of the oneness of the world that marked, as we have seen, the downfall of the Ionian communities after their unlimited theoretical world had been forcibly hemmed in should find in Elea appreciation and arouse profounder speculation. For here an alternative that set no limits to itself had been violently crushed by forces that bound them on all sides. The most vivid feature of the common consciousness must have been negation of what had been an unchecked movement. In a word the world that had invited them more and more distant voyages now meant nothing but cessation and helpless recognition

of the organization of the coasts of the Mediterranean that had broken the wings of their boundless adventure and left them only the homely activities of their quiet little city. They had been at the furthest eastern extremity of the Greek world and had built up colonies and a commerce in the far west beyond the rivalry of the most daring of the other Greek cities. They were in no position to enter into competition with the communities the channels of whose trade were all fixed and defended. The world on all sides possessed for them only stimuli to repression. Parmenides' system is but the generalization of this psychological attitude. While for Heraclitus feeling the unceasing disappearance of the old object in the new there was no unity except in the uniformity of this process, for Parmenides the new object disappeared completely in the whole which necessarily suppressed for the Eleians the very activity that the object as stimulus would have called forth.

Pythagoras brought with him, on the contrary, not only the social content of the popular religious movement in the Greek mother country but also the conception of an organized life that should have deepened and developed and transfigured it. He had his followers so order the social relations that this larger content which had become the common property of the whole Greek society should control their immediate individual actions. Pythagoreanism meant inner social organization. And Pythagoras also appealed to a sympathetic psychological attitude. In the cities of Greater Greece the problem of the relation of the individual and the whole community had become acute. It was not simply the contest of the mass of the small farmers and the trading class with the old traditional nobility that stage had been generally passed. It was the political individual and the whole of such individuals that must be brought into organic relations. We find a notable effort in this direction in the celebrated laws of Epidaurus. They face an entirely different problem than do those of Solon. It is, however, impossible to organize social relations except as the world of objects that as stimuli call forth human activities is all also organized. A sense of the harmonious interrelation of the different parts of the world was but the objectification of the inner harmony that was sought. The naive assertion that external objects were number was the affirmation that they were in their very nature harmoniously interrelated.

It is not necessary for the purposes of this paper to carry the analysis of the social conditions of the Greek world further. It is not assumed of course that it has given in any sense an adequate account of these conditions. I have only sought to make evident that every philosophic system represents the psychological attitude of the people of its time, and that it is impossible to do justice historically to it without reading it in terms [of the social conditions that gave rise to it].

Notes

- * Unpublished manuscript. Mead Papers Archive, Box: 10, Folder: 20, 29 pp.
- 1 "Everything flows".

15

THE DUALISM OF REPRESENTATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND A MECHANICAL WORLD (n.d.)*

St. Augustine, watching from his spiritual height the sack of Rome, formulated his philosophy of history, and composed his *Civitas Dei*. His philosophy of history was that of the Europe, the program of whose spiritual life Augustine fashioned. We are made familiar with the philosophy of history in Milton's *Paradise Lost and Regained*. It conceived of the history of man from Adam to the Christian era, as the Fall and the gradual preparation of mankind for the coming of Christ. The advent and crucifixion of Christ presented a way of salvation for those who by divine grace believed and were saved after probation and discipline on this earth into the New Jerusalem, the City of God. After the second coming of the Lord and the Judgment, all the earthly habitation of man would disappear as a scroll. The fallen angels and the lost souls of unregenerate men condemned forever now to have their lot in pain, while the saved and the blessed angels would enjoy God forever.

For this Fall of Man and Plan of Salvation the world was created by God out of nothing, exists for the execution of the drama and disappears when its historical events have been concluded. Though it has the perfection which must belong to a work of God, the serving of its purpose is its only reality. The senses of men perceive God's handiwork but its reality for knowledge lies in the ideas and purposes of the divine will, not in the scaffolding which the divine architect has erected for the accomplishment of his eternal counsels. The material world of our perception is indifferent. The reason turns from it to the realities of the spiritual world. It was not a world in which even an Aristotelian science could flourish.

But from the collapse and evanescence of this world emerged for the first time the unitary soul. No longer divided into logical strata, at no point bound up in its nature with the body, it appeared as a single self-consciousness organized about its will, the effort toward blessedness in the vision and knowledge of God. The modern world opens with the human soul with its inner life of consciousness, placed in a world that is alien to it in substance, in a body that deepens its divine ardors, and deflects its vision from the *fons et origo*¹ of its destiny. It is the opposition of soul and body.

The whole task of Scholasticism was the adaptation of doctrine of this soul within which took place the action of the divine drama to the theology that arose out of a decadent Neo-Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean Greek philosophy and an Aristotle that came later into European thought. When this task so far as it was possible had been accomplished in the *Summa Theologica* of Aquinas, and its impossibility had been demonstrated in the separation of theology and philosophy of Scotus, the constructive work of Scholasticism was finished. The political as well as the theological structure of the Church disintegrated. Slowly men brought the inner life of their souls to bear upon other fields of human experience beside that of religion. The outstanding mark of this inner experience was that men sought for the meaning of things in their own reactions to them rather than in the things themselves. In religion this appeared in the assumption that the meaning of the world and all its events lay in the attitude of men's souls toward God and the ecclesiastical order of things which he had ordained. Inevitably the attitude of the frail soul toward the supreme God was that of submission or revolt, obedience or disobedience, but it was the attitude of the whole soul, not simply an emotional state, nor a blind bowing before an irresistible power. The religious attitude demanded belief. The two characteristics that distinguish the cult of Christianity from the religious cults that preceded it were the credo and the confessional. Men had to believe to be saved, while the confessional provided the mechanism for bringing this inner experience into the outer ecclesiastical cult. The individualistic was the heretic, the man's whose belief departed from the order of the doctrine of the Church. The demand of the Church, on the other hand, was that there should be an intellectual assent accompanying all the religious practices of the individual. That this acceptance of this demand on the part of the Church disappeared in pure form in the experience of the mass of people during long periods is true, but whenever profounder movements took place they inevitably awakened the appeal to the belief of the individual that accompanied the conduct of the self. We are accustomed to denominate this as the self-consciousness that is characteristic of the modern world. It implied that men were called upon to recognize their own individual attitudes toward the world about them, and what meaning for themselves these attitudes involved. The cult of the Church had set up an involution in the response of men to outer things. Between the thing and the man lay his own experience of it, and the belief which that experience carried with it. In the whole range of the experience of the community this individual attitude of the untrained naive man, together with his vagrant utterly uncritical judgment upon it was, from the standpoint of competent knowledge, insignificant or perverse, but in the one situation of the salvation of his soul it was of decisive and infinite moment. It remains to be seen how far this attitude of cognitive self-consciousness passed into other fields of human experience.

For the theory of knowledge of Plato and Aristotle, sensuous experience was the interaction of the organism and the objects about it, and nothing more, save as it gave material for the insight of the reason into the essences of the things that inadequately reflected themselves through the senses. For medieval thought that was oriented with reference to "the soul" of St. Augustine, these experiences were not only such reflections of an outer world. They were also experiences of the soul, and the soul knew

them not only as such reflections but as its own experiences. Indeed, these sensuous and emotional experiences called in especial degree for this cognitive reference, for the soul was called upon to pass judgment upon them as sinful or holy. The objectors were not only good or bad, and the acts were not only right or wrong, but they were such as the soul believed them to be such and affirmed its acts as its own.

It was not only in the field of religious experience that the import of a man's experience as his own, apart from its universal value, plays a determining part in the history of Europe. Its monuments of art and its literature reflected not only the values of the community, but served to supply the expression for the individual aspiration and the individual feeling of the members of the communities. Medieval art had a subjective cast that is entirely absent from that of the ancient world in its great artistic periods. Furthermore when political movements reached into the deeper consciousness, the individual found that over against the political situation within which he found himself, he could always present himself regulated the social life of the community. He always had a situation of the self, which was in a sense outside the political situation, and situation reflected an inner attitude of the self. When the Holy Roman Empire had disintegrated the great political movements in Europe still took on the form of religious wars, for the self-conscious individual was primarily a religious self. In the slow development of the national states, while the individual gradually lost the religious background of his political feeling and thinking, he lost none of the subjectivity. The contract theory of the state truly reflected the attitude of political consciousness that a new order of the state had to be built up out of individuals whose self-conscious inner attitudes were logically prior to the new political structure. In both the aesthetics and political life of the medieval period inner attitudes, whose import lay in the fact that men were conscious of them as experiences of the self, play essential parts in the formation of the aesthetic and political judgments. Men estimated the outer objects in terms of the inner experience.

The philosophical realization of this new situation came very gradually. Stated in its simplest form the problem is this: knowledge of the external world is primarily a recognition by the individual of what goes on in himself under the influence of the outer world upon him. It is true that we can read of the wax tablet as the illustration of perception in Cicero, but here the theory of knowledge assumed that we perceived the impressed form as the nature of the outer object, not the self as being impressed. The state of the self-conscious self was not the immediate object of knowledge. It was during the quarrel over the universals that some of the implications of the new situation in the theory of knowledge appeared. The realists affirmed the reality of the universal. The universal house, the universal tree or rock existed as the nature of the individual objects of perception. The nominalists, on the other hand, denied the existence of the universal, asserting at first the universal was nothing but the name by which we refer to any one of a number of things. This extreme position gave way finally to the recognition of the similarity in the nature of things, which answered to concepts in the mind, to which the word or nomen referred. But it is interesting to see that the application of the different doctrines was not to the theory of perceptual knowledge but to the questions of transubstantiation, and to that of the Trinity. However, we find

even so early as John of Salisbury the recognition that our knowledge is actually of our states of sensation and not immediately of the outer objects, in other words that our perceptions are in reality only representations of the objects which we seem to perceive. He is here on the same ground as that of the later English empiricists, and has much the same philosophical apparatus, but he has not the same problem. His problem is that of the inner life and he hardly seems to be aware of the chasm which Berkeley first clearly pointed out between the representation and anything existing independently of it, and which Hume showed was quite impossible by the bridge which Berkeley undertook to throw across.

It remained for the period which we may roughly identify with that of the Renaissance to make a real problem out of the individual's knowledge of the presentations of things in his own mind and the outer things of which they were supposed to be representations. All philosophy that has been of importance in the world has arisen out of real problems in the experience of the community. The philosophy of Socrates arose out of the conflict between the individual and the conventions of the community. The philosophies of the post-Aristotelians sprang from the opposition of the principles of the rational life of the philosopher and those that governed life of the community under the Empire. The philosophy of the medieval period reflected the gulf fixed between the impotent self-conscious individual and the demands of the ideal community which he carried within him. But the mind of man could not be excited to hard strenuous thinking as to the manner in which one could get from his perceptions of things to the things themselves, as long as men assumed that the perceived house was to all intents and purposes quite like the house as it existed apart from perception, and there is no reason in the world for assuming anything else. After all, it was a universal assumption that God had created the world for the enacting of his purpose in the plan of salvation. He would hardly have set up a world to house man, and then have made a man who lived not in this world but in a world of inner states of consciousness. Even if the development of Augustine's inner self-consciousness through Nominalism into John of Salisbury's representationalism implied this very possibility, it would have been an idle speculation that could never have seriously engaged men's fundamental thinking. For the philosophies of history have been fashioned out hard painful thinking to which men have been driven by necessities of thought and the times. There have been idle speculations but they have never eventuated in systems of thought that have commanded the interest and attention of human communities.

It was not until men's most careful and rigorous thinking led them to conceive a physical world that had laws of its own which seemed to have no essential relations to man's sensations or perceptions, or to man's fortunes in this world or the next for that matter, and a world which was bound to be very different from any perception which we could have of it, that the statement of our direct knowledge of the world in terms of our representations of it could become a problem that was able to capture profound speculative attention and intrigue in men's thought.

This whole situation had arisen before though in a different speculative landscape. Democritus, with a marvelous capacity for following his ideas through to their uttermost limit, had presented to the Greek mind a picture of a universe made up of indivisible

atoms, with no qualities except those of weight, size, form, and motion swarming in an empty space. Things were mere collocations of these atoms. Thought was but the motion of these atoms that made up the soul, and as the soul was made up of material atoms its thought of weight, size, form, and motion was true thought exactly presenting these characters of things, while all else such as color, sound, taste, and odor were but effects produced in this soul by motions coming in through the sense organs. Thus the world of men's experience was made up of presentations which were necessarily unlike things except in their characters as extended and occupying and moving in space.

There was only one school of Greek thinkers that adopted this view of the world, and that was the school of the Epicureans. They adopted it advisedly because it seemed to them to rid the world of all the superstitions which so thickly overgrew all the popular religions. The soul dissipated with the body and if there were collocations of atoms which could be called gods, they could have no conceivable interest in men and their affairs. In other words, it was a doctrine that was felt to take all the meaning out of the world, and only a philosophy that was interested in such an attitude of mind could take up with such a doctrine.

There were two reasons why this atomistic conception of the world could exercise no compulsion upon the thought of the Greeks. One was that they did not picture the soul or mind as a unitary thing all of whose experiences possessed a substantial identity. The vision of the reason, was as immaterial as the essences that it contemplated, but the sensuous experiences of things were as material as these objects, and the movement of the animal passions belonged to the body in which they arose. In Greek thought speculation did not undertake to merge all these experiences so varied in their function and contents in a consciousness of them as their common stuff. When the Sophist made man the measure of the thing, and maintained that sugar could be sweet to the normal man and bitter to the sick, he was either denying the possibility of there being an object of observation in the experience of men or else he was undertaking, as did Protagoras, to select the standards that should govern our conduct, but he was not presenting the thing, the sugar, as an object, which was made up of states of consciousness. When Democritus presented what came to be called the secondary qualities of things as effects produced in the soul made up of fire atoms, he did not present these qualities as the consciousness of these effects. The distinction which Democritus makes between thought and sense-perception of these qualities is that of a gentle orderly movement of the atom of the soul in contrast with a violent disturbance, and advises men to turn from the senses to thought.

The result of this was that an atomistic account of the world, such as Democritus's, not only took every character out of the universe except those of extension, mass and motion, but it was unable to place what was left in any actual field of man's experience. Plato's world of opinion was out there, a world of evanescence and partial reality, but it was not a world of consciousness, an inner world. There was no place for this world of opinion in the universe of Democritus, nor could all else beside extension, mass and motion be put into the soul as representations to the soul of what lay outside it. The point is that such a consistent view of the physical world as that of Democritus which reduces it to mass and motion, is only possible where the experience of the

individual provides a field within which things can appear with all of their sensuous characters. Contents of actual experience can be variously explained, but they cannot be explained out of existence.

The other reason why the atomic view of the universe could not be carried through consistently in ancient thought is that ancient science was unable to make out of motion an object that could be analysed and determined. A physical universe that is made up of physical elements in motion, and elements that vary only in mass, size and motion will evidently have to depend largely upon differences in the motions of these particles and their conglomerates to account for the differences between the characters of things. The only differences in motions are those of direction and rate. A change in direction through impact ancient thought could present to itself. But the change in the rate of motion they could present only in terms of a motion that had covered a certain distance in a certain time. Whether the rate had changed during the time spent and the distance covered they had no means of determining. A uniformly increasing velocity was a magnitude they never undertook to measure. In other words, they could not analyse a motion while it was going on. In the field within which their exact science wrought its great achievements, that of astronomy, one of their fixed presuppositions was that heavenly bodies moved with uniform velocities. And the great problem of their astrophysics was that of analysing seemingly varying velocities into motions in different directions with uniform velocities. The only motion they could measure, and therefore know, while it was going on was a motion of uniform velocity. If one reflects for a moment upon the extent to which our dynamics is dependent upon the determinations of accelerations in velocity, he realizes how insignificant was the field that was open to the exact analysis of physical science. While our physical science has accepted the challenge of explaining in measurable magnitudes, whether they are the motions of molecular, atomic or electronic masses, or of media, or the potential motions of fields of force every character and difference in character of objects in our field of experience, ancient science could not even suggest ways in which these differences could be stated in terms of masses in motion.

It was in the period of the Renaissance that these two conditions for the statement of the world in terms of mass in motion were present in men's thought. In the first place, all the experience of the world that came into individuals could be stated not simply in their experiences, but in their consciousness of these experiences. The bell could be spoken of as golden brown in color, smooth, cool, sounding, and having a metallic taste, while the individual could be said to be conscious of all these characters, and this consciousness of himself as affected in all of these fashions, would lie not in the bell but in the individual mind or soul. The metaphysical or epistemological problems involved in any such a statement are profound enough and subtle enough to have occupied Europeans since that period, and it is not with these problems that we are now occupied, but with this stratum of the individual's consciousness of himself, which comes in between the object as it is in itself and the individual as he is affected by it. Theological doctrine had made this cognitive self-consciousness the very essence of the soul, not as an analysis of mind, but because the divine drama of salvation or damnation of the unitary soul demanded that this soul should be conscious of all of

his acts and experiences as according to or departing from the will of God within him, and should recognize all of them as the acts and experiences of this soul, a soul that did not pass away with the body, but it was spiritual in substance. Here then was a conscious spiritual experience within which could be placed all that could not be stated in terms of quantitative terms in the outer world.

In the second place, there was arising a new physical world. It also carried character characteristics which were due in part to medieval conceptions. The world of Aristotle was the more or less perfect realization of essences, or forms, which were the natures of things. His teleology was the tendency of the matter of the thing to realize its nature, not that of a mind that fashioned an indifferent matter to take on the shape and character that existed in a creator's thought. While Scholastic Realism sought to incorporate Aristotelian teleology into Christianity, with indifferent success Abelard's identification of the universal first with the concept in God's mind, then with the structure of the thing, and finally with the concept in the minds of men, expressed the resultant attitude of medieval thinking. For such thought matter had an indifference which did not belong to Aristotelian matter, nor to that of the Stoics or Epicureans even, whose cosmos was animated by a universal reason. It was impossible to embody in the physical natures of things, the purposes of the Plan of Salvation, except as things were inhabited by good or evil spirits, and of this type of superstition there was a luxuriant growth throughout the whole medieval period, and during in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, save where the new scientific and philosophical spirit drove it out. When it was driven out there was left a matter which had been hostile to man and was now indifferent to him and his fortunes. But more important still this physical nature was taking on a meaning and life of its own that lay quite outside the doctrine of the Church or the tradition of the past. It was not to be come at by the authoritative monuments of the Fathers, or of Aristotle. A new method was needed for its study, and new methods were being employed. Just because the whole meaning of man and his history had been taken up into the human soul, and his self-conscious experiences, the physical world became a terrain where were things that followed their own laws and operated in a fashion not in men's minds, but which their wits might discover. Men tuned to it in a spirit of adventure such as the one that took Columbus across the Atlantic and De Gama about the Cape of Good Hope to India. The same imagination led Copernicus to revive the hypothesis of Aristarchus and Kepler to look for new laws of planetary motion that were not involved in the presuppositions of ancient astronomers.

Again the self-conscious experience of man brought with it new apparatus to the investigation. The observation of the old world had depended upon identifying the universal nature of things and exemplifying this in what man saw. Men observed only what could be recognized, and the validity of the observation lay in finding what was to be expected rather than in the careful account of the individual's experience. In modern times, men came to depend upon the veracity of the observer rather than upon the rationality of what was observed. There was accruing a mass of observation of fauna and flora, of physical events, that were given out as pieces out of the biographies of man, and not simply as the statements of plants and animals and physical events. Men

found that in recounting their experiences of things, they could gather materials for knowledge of what, for the time being, they could not comprehend. Aristotelian observation consisted in seeing through the sense objects to the essential natures which constituted the realities of things. Modern observation consisted in the careful account of the experience of the individual in his perception of things, the meaning of which he did not yet know, but which he hoped to learn. It was the observation of discovery of what was not yet known, not the recognition of what was already known in the instances before the observer. This sort of observation found a place in the experience of the individual for data the ultimate value of which for scientific knowledge could not as yet be determined. The experiences of individuals as individuals opened up a new field of material for science. In other words, the world this new science approached was one which transcended not only the horizon of men's experience but also of men's ideas. It was not a world within which men could dogmatize, or pursue truth with the simple apparatus of the syllogism. The outstanding need was a method of approach and discovery.

The thinker who stated this need of a new method most impressively was Francis Bacon. His *Novum Organon*, or new method, displayed convincingly and eloquently the utter futility of the Scholastic method as a means of discovery in a world whose laws were as yet unknown, and the nature of whose things had yet to be learned. And then Bacon proceeded to present the new method, that of observation and induction. It is interesting, but perhaps not surprising, to find him frustrated in the development of this method by the very scholasticism whose impotence he had demonstrated. He still is looking for essences. He is still unable to utilize adequately the apparatus of observation. Especially he did not envisage this new science as an experimental science, although his statement calls for experiment. Fortunately, as we shall see, Europe did not have to depend upon the results of his method to be convinced that a new science had arisen. What Bacon did express most competently was the realization of a physical world, that could be and was quite independent of the world of his immediate presentation and his traditional ideas. And not only was there a universe that transcended that existing in experience, but when the laws and objects of this world were discovered they would be at the disposal of men's intelligence. Knowledge would be power. In his *New Atlantis* he drew fascinating, if highly imaginative picture, of uses to which society could put this control over nature which the new science would provide. Nor was Bacon the only one to quicken men's hopes that a world that lay about and beyond their present experience could offer means for solving social problems. There was Campanella's *City in the Sun*, and Thomas Moore's *Utopia* to testify that the very fact that the world was different from man's experience of it, opened the way to the conquest of it, if science could discover it. The gist of the matter is that the very statement of the world in terms of men's individual experience left a world that was independent of this experience and yet related to it, which was open to investigation and discovery.

It was the Italian Galileo who, by the competent formulation and use of the new scientific method and the fundamental results he obtained, decisively opened the door to the new science. His results were fundamental because they laid the foundation of

the new physical science of dynamics. He measured the velocity of a falling body, and in doing this found out the method by which it was possible to analyse a motion while was going on, and to express the acceleration of a constantly increasing velocity. He introduced a new unit by which the changing velocity of a moving body could be analysed, and the whole magnitude measured. Perhaps the most important phase of his achievement was that he exhibited in a quite perfect example the method of experimental science.

The problem of analysing the magnitudes involved in a body in motion was not of Galileo's creation. It belonged to the period. Years before Galileo, Leonardo da Vinci, who was by way of being almost as almost as original as engineer as he was a painter, had presented the problem of the falling body quite definitely, and approached its solution. Benedetti later had prepared the way for the mathematical formulation. In the development of the use of gunpowder appeared the necessity of determining the force that a projectile would exercise as well as the path it follows. In the building of the Cathedrals it had become necessary to regard the building stones in their positions s potentially moving, and to make guesses as to the force that they exercised. During the medieval period changes in the fashions of building and of fighting kept the problem of the moving body in the back of men's minds. It was the swinging of the lamps hung from different heights in the churches that had arrested the attention of Galileo almost as a boy.

But there was a definite doctrine as to the velocity of a falling body, fortified with all the authority of Aristotle. This doctrine grew logically out of Aristotle's theory that every object tended towards its own place in the cosmos. The heavy body tended toward the center of the earth, the light bodies had their places, and others between. It followed from this theory that the more there was of the heavy body the greater would be the tendency towards it own place, i.e. the center of the world. Its velocity would vary with its weight. Galileo had given evidence of his heterodoxical attitude by letting bodies of different weights drop from the top of the leaning tower of Pisa, and had perceived that their velocities did not seem to be proportional to their weights. Of peculiar interest is Galileo's approach to the problem. He observed in the falling body a seemingly uniformly increasing velocity. The question which he asks is not why does the body so fall, Aristotle's question, but at what rate does it fall, how does it fall: he was observing the actual motions as they took place in his experience, not a body that had a nature which expressed itself in a certain sort of motion. In the second place, he sought not in the nature of the object outside his experience, but in his experience itself the motions as it was going on, as its velocity even was changing. This character of the motion he found in what he called its "moment". What he came back to was an "impetus", which appeared in experience as an effort. The motion of the falling body had a certain velocity, and continually added this velocity, as an impetus, to the velocity already attained. It would be difficult to exaggerate the import of this analysis of experience on Galileo's part. He could present the motion in its minutest part as having a certain tendency to proceed at a certain rate and in a certain direction and as adding that rate to that already acquired. This part could be minimized, brought as close to the limit of zero as desired, and still in the sense of effort its retained its velocity and

the tendency to add that velocity to that which the motion already had. In other words, by the use of this element of sensuous experience, Galileo grasped the most powerful instrument of modern physical science, the infinitesimal. The instrument and its technique has been so rationalized in the mathematical calculus that it is necessary to go back to the celebrated dialogue of Galileo, to find this modern genius effecting the analysis of the uniformly increasing velocity, by means of what we would call his motor imagery. The new science of dynamics arose because Galileo could analyse his experience of the motion of a falling body, breaking it up into states of effort, which could represent for him the moments of a uniformly increasing velocity. To get the mathematical statement for this moment, he had to find the relation of time elapsed to space covered, as a constant, that would express any period of the fall however short. In reaching this, Galileo employed the hypothesis as, for example, Bacon could not apply it. The hypothesis that suggested itself was that the velocity increased as the times. The velocity of a body which had fallen a second would be half that which had fallen two seconds. The important consideration here is that Galileo's hypothesis bears simply upon the form which his experience will take, when he is able to observe the times and spaces involved in the fall. It is not a hypothesis in regard to the nature of a falling body neither in regard to a uniform force of attraction, nor as to the operation of forces. In the minds of other thinkers of the period, changes were the results of the action of forces which were conceived as spirits, or fluids, inhabiting things. Galileo's hypothesis has nothing to do with such natures or essences or spirits. It is solely a hypothesis as to the rate at which the observed body's velocity is accelerated. The supposition that the acceleration is proportional to the time enables him to direct his observation, to fashion its apparatus, and test the hypothesis. A legitimate scientific hypothesis must take on the form of the individual's experience, whose observation is to test it. Galileo's apparatus consisted of marbles rolling down inclined planes, which could be conceived of as falling down the height of the inclined planes. As accurate clocks only appeared as the later result of the investigations of Galileo, he had to devise a method of determining the times. He did this by weighing the amounts of water that escaped from a minute orifice in a large vessel, during the periods of the descent of the marble. These quantities of water must be proportional to the times. He could establish the relation assumed in his hypothesis and then determine the fact that the spaces passed over were proportional to the squares of the times, and he had discovered the constant he was seeking.

Here we find the whole method of modern science, the changes under investigation reduced to terms of the observable experiences of individuals, and for the time being abstracted from any objects or things, hypotheses as to the form of which these experiences will take, and an experiment devised to test it, and finally the statement of the form which the experiences take in the uniformities of what we call natural laws, in mathematical form just as far as this is possible. It is a mathematical rationalizing, or objectifying of the order and form of experiences that can be observed simply as experiences of individuals. The two conditions of such a science were individual experiences that could be observed simply as experiences abstracted from things as we have conceived them, and a mathematically ordered world, that is independent of

these experiences, but in terms of which these experiences can be rationalized and objectified. To have freed the physical world from the fixed conceptions and theories of a scholastic doctrine, on the one hand and yet to have left human experience as a field within which the discoveries in this world may be made, on the other, was the achievement of the period of the Renaissance.

For two reasons Galileo must remain the great dominant figure of this movement and its period. He it was that first, with a sure mastery, employed the experimental method, the new method that Bacon had demanded but had failed to formulate, the method that banished the logical forms, essences and nature of the scholastics, and the fantasies of Paracelsus and Bruno. And it was Galileo who advanced mathematical analysis so far into the processes of nature that not only the geometrical forms of things but also the inner structure and minutest changes could be subjected to the most exact mathematical statement. A complete mechanical statement of the world was rendered possible by the dynamics of Galileo, so that conceivably all human experiences could be presented in mechanical form.

But it was Descartes who drew the philosophical balance sheet of the revolution. Descartes was a creative mathematician, to whom we owe analytical geometry, and its Cartesian coordinates. He was no mean physicist though he failed to adequately appreciate the critical importance of Galileo's work. He had introduced the variable into the algebraic equation but he did not realize the stroke of genius by which Galileo had introduced it into physics, and so created dynamics. But his was a mind within which most of the physical discoveries and inventions of the period met and fell into place in a whole concept of a mechanical nature. In acoustics and optics, in hydrostatics and meteorology, in physiology and embryology, his thought travelled with the pioneers in these sciences. And finally he undertook to present a conceivable and imaginable picture of the physical universe as a mechanical whole, subject only to the laws of geometry and physics. He identified matter with extension, though he pushed surreptitiously into extension as a capacity to occupy space to the exclusion of anything else, or what may be called solidity. This matter he conceived of as divided into equal elements, and set whirling by a divine fiat. Out of this he undertook to show there would arise all the different elements of the world and all their combinations. He maintained that the motions of this universe would take on the form of planetary systems and account for the phenomena of light and heat, and all the sensuous character of things. It was a grandiose attempt that inevitably fell ludicrously short of fulfilling its promises. It was because scientific thought was still haunted by Cartesian vortices that Newton in irritation made the equally false statement "non fingo hypotheses".² But the import of Descartes' "Le Monde" does not lie in the success with which he could prophecy the form of later scientific discovery and its theories. It lies in the fact that for the first time men could realize that a purely mechanical presentation of the physical universe was feasible. Democritus had attempted it, but in doing it, he was obliged to actually place in the dance of his atoms the whole content of men's consciousness, with the result that most of it was lost in the interstices. Over against Descartes' mechanical world of extension, lay the world of men's experience in the form of what he called thought, what we may call consciousness. And the two worlds,

that of matter and that of consciousness were completely correlated. Everything that appeared in our conscious perception and scientific thinking was represented by physical phenomena, but the physical phenomena were the consciousness. For the correlation Descartes himself looked to the omnipotent God who had created both matter and mind, though he somewhat inconsequentially assumed that the human mind could be directly influenced by the physiological processes in the pineal gland. This correlation found its expression later in the occasionalism of Geulinx and the pre-established harmony of Leibniz, and became the fundamental problem of all philosophy since that day. We have become almost as impatient of this metaphysical dualism of Descartes as Isaac Newton was of Descartes' vortices. And the impatience is in each case justified, for in each case the Cartesian assumptions became unnecessary, and impediments to the very free thought which Descartes sought to achieve, but this impatience furnishes no excuse for failing to do justice to the man who definitely closed the door upon the misty, creaking, quacksalver apparatus of scholastic dogmatism, and opened the doors to the natural sciences on the one side, and to psychology and the social sciences on the other. His conspectus of the physical world and of the experiences of human minds belong now to the curiosities of history, but at the time they were the rough charts that Descartes could draw of dual continents for discovery and exploitation if men used only scientific analysis and method.

I have indicated the value for scientific method of this dualism of a representational consciousness and a mechanical world. I wish in closing to emphasize again the freedom for investigation which the dualism of these worlds offered. All that was found in the one was represented in the other. Explanation did not mean explaining away. What could not be stated in one could be stated in the other. In philosophy materialism and idealism sought to eliminate dualisms. But investigators went cheerfully their ways, free from the dangerous implications from which they could abstract.

Notes

* Unpublished manuscript. Mead Papers Archive, Box: 12, Folder: 23, 19 pp.

1 "source and origin".

2 "I do not feign hypotheses".

16

A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH (1929)*

As far back in time and in cultural epochs, as we can trace human society we can find there something that answers to philosophy and something that answers to science. They are the myth and the cult. In early social conditions they stand vaguely for theory and practice. In terms closer to the ideas and activities to which they refer they may be called “rationalizations” and habits. It is clear that the habit comes before the rationalization or explanation. The cult is not any habit. It is one that is social not only in its origin and expression but also in its function and valuation. It belongs to the group and it serves to relate this primitive society to its habitat and to a past and future. The myth supervenes upon the cult. The cult rapidly became archaic, not simply in the sense of old, but in the sense of having outlived the situations out of which it had arisen. Whatever reasons we find for this or however we label them, the fact made them strange as habits. They could not be understood entirely through the situations within which they were practiced, and the myth was the explanation. The myth gave preeminently the explanation that did not arise naturally out of the original situation. It was the explanation of a habit, that just as a habit was inexplicable. It is a reason for action when the reason does not lie in the actual situation within which the action is going on. This is, however, in one respect not a correct statement of what takes place, for it says that some *reason* existed in the situation before a reason had to be sought, whereas only things existed there. Our cautious ancestors, when yawning, blocked the way to the entrance of evil spirits by putting their hands before their mouths. *We* find a *reason* for the gesture in the delicacy of manner which forbids an indecent exposure. But evil spirits were spirits that one warded off. The parry is simply the obverse side of the thrust. If we insist on taking analysis into conduct in which it had no place, we must find the correlate to the later reason in the sufficient definition of earlier things. We do this when we replace the evil spirit by the microbe and form new and better habits instead of rationalizing the old ones.

Perhaps I am myself indecorous in suggesting an analogy between a certain sort of philosophic analysis and a guarded yawn, but I will venture it for it opens a door to a

distinction worth making. I refer to the distinction between a scientific approach to nature and that of a philosophy that has ensnared itself in a hopeless epistemological problem. While science has been discovering and hypothetically constructing things that lead to new and fortunate responses to the world, this philosophy has rationalized the discarded attitudes toward nature. Those discarded attitudes were the relations of a soul or mind to a world whose *raison d'être* was its being the habitat of man. The philosophic rationalizations of these attitudes have consisted in presenting the world in the guise of men's sensations and ideas, in a word, in his states of consciousness. The primary reference of nature to mind which obsessed Renaissance philosophy was the rationalization of the medieval cult. Treading close upon its heels came the task of getting, back to external things from a world described in states of mind. Science, Galileo like, cared for none of these things. It was occupied in replacing the furniture of earth and heaven with masses, velocities, accelerations, chemical elements, and living cells to which predictable responses could be secured. While science has been interested solely in getting new and reliable things, and in its mental processes only as means to this end, philosophy has not only made the thought process its field but has insisted on so analyzing it that new things and old can both be stated in the same mental terms. It has not given to the thing its value of a thing before the problem arose and after the solution, but has kept it in terms of logical and metaphysical speculation. It has not only explained the old and so rationalized it, but has as well forced the new into the same dress. My thesis is that the object that tells its own tale has no longer a place in the field of analysis, but is simply there, until it breaks down and propounds some other problem for thought.

Professor Whitehead in *Science and the Modern World* displays the entire adequacy of medieval doctrine in its explanation of all that happened. There was a reason to be found for everything either in Heaven or on Earth or if need be in Hell. But Professor Whitehead did not point out that this perfect fit between doctrine and the course of events in the world reflected rather the nice adjustment of the cult to men's needs. In the face of every exigency the cult presented men with something to do. They were not called upon to think. The cry was not, how shall I understand? But what shall I do to be saved? Granted the ineradicable guilt of man and the incomprehensibility of an infinite perfect God, and explanation was almost too easy. There was abundant occupation for scholastic thought in the adjustment of such incongruous ingredients, as Greek philosophy, the Pauline doctrine, and the administrative theory of the Roman hierarchy. But these speculations did not touch the world of things within which men lived and moved and had their being. Things were not analyzed. They were what they were, what aroused men to action and satisfied their needs or drove them to the refuge of the Church. I think Professor Whitehead is wrong in calling this a rationalistic mind. Rationalization set in with the Renaissance; and while Renaissance science set about the discovery of new things, philosophy set about the task of restating the new world in the terms of the old. Leibnitz' deity was not only the God of the Theodicy but the supreme mathematician as well. The world was a mechanism, but the work of a supreme mechanic to serve his ends. Descartes' anxious effort to avoid quarrels with the Holy Office was not simply an escape complex. However,

this attitude of philosophy must not be accounted to it for unrighteousness. Science was quite incompetent to present society with a complete new world. It offered only ultimate physical and dynamical elements and a powerful apparatus of analysis.

This may seem to some, perhaps in an invidious sense, a long way from truth. Its relation to my theme is this: Science set out from a world which was there but which presented new problems. Science analyzed the world and put it together again in a Newtonian system and left the material universe there. Problems fortunately continued to abound, but a system of masses moving according to Newton's laws was the presupposition of the solution of these problems. Truth had nothing to do with the world in so far as it was not involved in the problem. But philosophy's problem was to bring this world of science both in its analysis and synthesis into accord with the world men believed they were living in. It had to find a way of stating the world that was there for science – the mechanical world – in terms of the objects that men sense and want and fear. I mean that philosophy's task of rationalization compelled it to make a problem out of the world which for science was simply there, as the presupposition of the problem science was undertaking to solve. Rationalization, if I may repeat, is giving an explanation for attitudes and responses, when the situation which originally called them out has passed away. It provides another situation which will still arouse these responses. The Newtonian mechanical universe in a considerable measure removed the situations which called out naturally the responses due to man's central position in the world. Philosophy in rationalizing this new situation sought so to restate the world which science did not call in question that human experience would remain central. Philosophy had then to restate the world which for science was unshaken, and the success of science compelled it to use the results of scientific analysis. When it sought for its own, that world within which its problem lay, it could find it only in the mind of the individual – *cogito ergo sum* – and Hume shattered that. For science, truth is the accord of its hypothetical construction with the world within which the problem has appeared. For philosophy this world has also been made a problem, and we can therefore exclaim with Pontius Pilate, What is truth?

My proposition is that every problem presupposes what is not involved in that problem, and which is in so far valid. The truth of the judgment which the solution of the problem rests upon the harmony of its dictum with that whose validity is not problematic. There are various implications of this proposition. One is that there is no such thing as Truth at large. It is always relative to the problematic situation. What is not involved in the problem is not true nor is it false; it is simply there, though there is no suggestion that a problem may not break out anywhere within it. Confessedly the world of science presents the evident illustration of this. Research is ready to find a problem at any point in the structure of scientific doctrine, a problem which may invalidate any theory. Indeed it welcomes such outbreaks, and lives its exciting life in their midst. What arrests the philosopher's attention is that this attitude carries with it no sense of insecurity. The philosopher still has the Medievalist's yearning to rest in the arms of finality. Whether idealist or realist or neo-Kantian phenomenalist, he seeks repose for his perturbed spirit in the everlasting arms of an absolute of one sort or another. His philosophic mind is attuned to the present

French political mind; it cannot conceive of security of method, it must have security of structure.

It is true that the scientist philosophizes; and who does not? And then he is prone to lead a double life, to seek repose from the excitements of research in the restful arms of an ultimate assures doctrine that in some fashion envelopes him. He assures himself and us that Newton's laws were but first approximations; that however theories effloresce and wither, the data of science remain unchanged – or at least that it is always possible to so restate them that they take on the form of eternity, and with this view *sub specie aeternitatis* he is assured that his philosophic God is in his heaven. But this is not his scientific attitude. In this attitude, data do not implicate persistent structure. They appear first of all as exceptions – the phenomena of the heavens which Greek astronomy from the time of Pythagoras on sought to “save” – but when the saving theory has rescued them, they are no longer exceptions, they have become instances. In a sense we can identify, “sprinkled along the waste of years,” the observations of the Mesopotamian Magi, of Hipparchus, of Ptolemy, of Tycho Brahe, and of our own astronomical tables; but, when so isolated, they have no being in any system independent of those within which they have appeared. They are building stones which had their places in many “transitory structures high,” but “it nought avails their architects now to have built high in heaven towers” for they have no final place in any abiding edifice. The datum must seek its meaning either in its opposition to the doctrine which it invalidates, or in that which the genius of the scientist constructs to give it again a local habitation and a name, or in the theory of the historic process by which it has passed through many “fabrics huge” which have risen like exhalations and vanished like the cloud-capped towers of skyey landscapes, but there is no ultimate structure in which their final meaning reposes. Nor does the scientist, when he is not crowning his life-work with Gifford lectures, endow his data with the logical form of such final meanings. They are pertinent solely to the experiences within which they arise. Still less can the data be identified with the building material of the world within which the problem appears. The evidence for this is found in the presupposition of this world as the conditions for the appearance of the data. Whether the datum appears as an exception or as an experimental finding in support of an hypothesis, its existence involves things that cannot by definition be stated in terms of the given world. This speaks out of the very nature of the exception, and it is heard equally clearly in the nature of a conclusive experiment. The experimental finding must take place under conditions which rigorously exclude the theory which the findings will support – otherwise there is an *argumentum in circulo*. You must be able to prove that your guinea pig has the disease, which appears after inoculation with the hypothetical germ, by means of clinical evidence other than presence of the germ. You cannot by the same findings prove (a) that the guinea pig contracted the disease through the germ and (b) that the disease which the guinea pig contracted is the disease in question. Now it is of course true that we continue to talk about the disease in terms of the germ that was identified in the experiment, but it has become a very different affair. Then it was something foreign to the life-process of the guinea pig; now it has become a parasite that has a natural habitat within that process. You describe the life-process of host and parasite in a single biochemical formula.

The truth that your experiment establishes is that the world – an ongoing intelligible concern – within which a problem has arisen, continues to exhibit itself as the same ongoing intelligible concern under conditions which alone can be stated in terms of the hypothesis you have presented. The new predicate with which you are qualifying this subject cannot already be implied in the subject. The copula which triumphantly collects them is the experiment, so constructed as rigorously to exclude the new character from the subject that was there and at the same time to jockey the world into such a situation that it inevitably exhibits this character.

But how can it inevitably exhibit this character unless there was already present in the subject that which implies the predicate? That is, how can we make a universal proposition out of the mere juxtaposition of two experiences – unless there is in advance in the subject, as it appears in the judgment, the connection which the copula has merely exhibited? The answer is found in the form of the problem that appears in the subject of the judgment. Back of any such experiment as that to which I referred above, lies the breakdown of medical description and treatment of the disease. Instances appear which negate this description and practice. One cannot describe and treat the disease as the disease has been described and treated; which means that other characters which call out different responses, and which did not enter into the former picture of the disease, are now a part of the picture. The solution of the difficulty is found, if it is found, in its reconstruction of the picture that enables the conflicting tendencies to find expression – that is, which enables the inhibited action to go on. There is a meaning in the old accounts and methods and there is its meaning in the new experiences which invalidate them. Truth is found in such a formulation of meaning that the conduct which these meanings have implied may be made possible. We never simply throw away values which have been there. They are allotted to their proper spheres, within which they give rise to appropriate responses. The subject of the judgment, as distinct from that of the final proposition, is the situation within which this conflict lies, and the final predicate which the experiment justifies, is the reconstructed picture which gives to the conflicting values their own functions. We are not in the judgment simply associating two experiences with each other. We are making possible the experience which the conflicting elements in the subject situation call for. The reconstructed picture of the disease gives to the former conflicting characters of the subject an organization which admits of intelligent response. The subject so characterized is then in so far true, but the organization of meanings was not in the former subject. In so far as the reorganization is carried out consistently with these meanings, the result necessarily follows, but the reason for the connection between the reconstructed picture and the appropriate consequences was not present in the former subject.

But it was in nature, was it not? It was not in that phase of nature which appeared in the experience of the men who recognized the problem and solved it. The judgment is a natural process taking place in the experience of human organisms and its truth is a natural condition that attends upon the success of these organisms in solving their problem. The word, success, I do not entirely like, because of the implications which are apt to go with it. It is associated with satisfactions and the agreeable experiences which attend upon satisfactions. The test of truth which I have presented is the

ongoing of conduct, which has been stopped by a conflict of meanings – and in meanings I refer to responses or conduct which the characters of lead up to. The truth is not the achievement of the solution, still less the gratification of him who has achieved it. There is something of the old hedonistic fallacy in this. Pleasure undoubtedly attends upon the object of one's desire, but one does not therefore desire the pleasure. One is generally gratified by the solution of one's problem, but the test is the ability to act where action was formerly stopped. The action may be a very sorry affair and afflicted with gloom, but if the road now lies open to the meanings which had nullified each other, this road is the true road. I hope I have made evident that in this doctrine the data are not in the world out of which the problem has arisen, but belong to the statement of the problem; and that in the solution of the problem, they pass, in new forms into the reconstructed meanings which experiment shows to fit into the world, in so far as it was not involved in this problem.

Truth is then synonymous with the solution of the problem. But judgment must be either true or false, for the problem is either solved or is not solved. In this sense a judgment becomes a proposition. The proposition is a presentation in symbolic form of the copula stage of the judgment. In the subject stage lies the conflict between different responses. You call up James Brown by telephone at his office, and are informed that Mr. Brown is not in the city. This means to you the postponement of your interview. But a friend tells you that a short time ago he saw James Brown, and this means a possible holding of the interview. You may catch him before he leaves, and you call up his house. The subject of the judgment is a man whom you will meet later in the week and a man whom you will meet today. The undertakings inhibit each other. The predicate stage of the judgment, the hypothesis that he is leaving but has not yet left, presents a different James Brown, who so organizes your responses to see him later and to see him today, that they are no longer in conflict, and the reply from the house establishes the truth of the proposition that you can see him, if you can reach the house within an hour, and thus reports the copula stage of the judgment, which has tested the hypothesis. This lies within the field of conduct and the truth of the proposition characterizes that conduct, but it also sets up an affirmation which transcends that hastily accomplished interview. It is eternally true that James Brown was at his house on that day and on that hour. The established judgments precipitate propositions which seem to belong to another realm – “truths which wake to perish never.”

My guess is that we can best come to terms with these truths in their last retreat, the propositional function. If the telephonic conversation spoke truly, and if James Brown is a man of his word, it is to all eternity true that James Brown was at his house on that day and on that hour. But a truth that – only making and supposing – wakes to perish never is affected with an eternity that has lost its impressiveness. I do not mean that it has lost its usefulness. This propositional function may establish an alibi that will save James Brown from the electric chair. But its translation into a timeless realm has a string tied to it that must sadly disturb its enjoyment of that rarified atmosphere, and the shadowless landscapes of that Platonic heaven. What has happened to the judgment in its precipitation into a proposition is that it has so

purified itself from the empirical event out of which it arose that it can now enter into relational symbiosis with an indefinite number of other propositions. And the advantage of this is enormous. It connects James Brown's spatio-temporal location with the entire complex of his city's life and for that matter with all history and may in future time make it the firmly supporting datum of some historian's fabric of the past. But its truth is hypothetical, and draws its life-blood from the realm out of which it emerged into the realm "in which we never know what we are talking about nor whether what we are saying is true," if I may follow Professor Mackay in quoting Bertrand Russell, unless we can get some nourishment out of the insubstantial tissues of that logical symbiosis. But the number of those who can subsist on this subsistent diet becomes smaller and smaller as we climb up toward its infinite classes and the letters of the Hebraic alphabet. The fact is that we do not want the "all"; we want the "anys." We are interested in the possible combinations of propositions which will organize our conduct and the world within which that conduct takes its course and which gives to that conduct its interpretation and its import. The truth of any relational complex that inhabits this realm of eternal objects, or universals or ideals will be found in its effectual employment in the construction of working hypotheses. They must themselves be coherent to be effectually employed, but coherency is not truth. It is not the coherence of doctrine but its cogency that implicates truth and cogency resides ever in the field of activity.

In one aspect of Professor Loewenberg's paradox of the judgment, the judgment is shown to include in its description both the "what" within the judgment and the "that" which must inevitably transcend the judgment. My simple-minded escape from this paradox is found in regarding the truth of the judgment to lie in such a construction of the "what" that it becomes a "that"; and further in the assumption that when this takes place it is no longer a judgment, but something that is there. When the hypothesis works it ceases to be a hypothesis; it is reality, not eternal, indefensible reality, but the only reality with which we are acquainted, which we fear or hope will break down to be again reconstructed.

I am positing here moments of problematic reflection and moments of unreflective reality; but is not reflective experience coterminous with life, is not life a continuous solution of problems? Pragmatic doctrine identifies thought with the solution of problems, and thinking is what raises human experience above that of the beasts that perish. There is, of course, here an ambiguity in the word thought. It includes commonly our consummations, our aesthetic experiences, our possessions, our enjoyments and our sufferings, but I will for the moment put aside this ambiguity, and turn to the question of the relations of the different problems to one another. Have they not an essential connection among themselves, so essential a connection that a man's life seems to be the attempted solution of the single problem of his intelligent existence? Is not this the implication of the unity of his personality, and does it not become evident in the most thoroughgoing undertaking of life? Can we not fairly say, that what we call our conscious life turns out to be one concatenated enterprise of thought, within which we become now intermittently and now steadily aware of the interwoven tissue of our seemingly discrete problems? Especially is it not true that the solution of no one

problem can be achieved without that of many others and perhaps within the solution of all of them? This is beyond doubt what we are apt to imply when we undertake to grasp the world as a whole, and bring into vital unity the presentations of many sciences, and get out to our view the involvements of each in each other. It is genuine thinking because it leaves nothing out. It has the entire history of philosophy behind it and it is peculiarly the attitude of the religions. If we recognize such a genuine grappling with the universe as the problem of the mind, the problem of the whole self, and further recognize the present insolubility of the problem, except as partial solutions exhibit all approach toward the intelligibility of the universe, does not this pragmatic doctrine itself sweep us into the current of Idealism? What is the world but a continued working hypothesis, a thought structure which is continually completing itself, as the problem breaks out now here and now there? From this standpoint does not the coherency, not simply of ideas but of the problems among themselves, become the very test, not of a final truth, but of the approach toward truth? Is the universe in thought anything but the judgment in the process of ceaseless predication?

Now there are many points from which I could attack, however successfully, this account of experience, commencing with the ambiguity which I suggested above in the term thought, but there is, I think, an appeal in the idealistic doctrine that is of a more profound importance. It is found on the one side in the constructive and integrative character of scientific thought and on the other in the demand so insistently made that the world must be an intelligible whole. Our problem is the attainment of an intelligible universe, and we advance toward it by processes of scientific hypothesis, which are never out of the range of possible attack and which are generally but provisionally adopted; and this advance toward a goal at infinity, so far as our minute endeavors are concerned, takes place by continual reconstructions, in many fields that confessedly implicate one another. The goal of experience lies indefinitely beyond experience, and the method of approach is by a thought construction which can have no criterion but the growing coherency of their objectives and their partial attainments.

Now in so far as *scientific* procedure is concerned, a test of truth, to be found in the organic interrelation of problems and their partial solutions, we can without more ado incontinently dismiss. Both Schelling and Hegel were committed to it by their philosophies of nature, but their grandiose undertakings awakened no sympathetic interest in experimental science. I do not mean that the scientist does not recognize that the solution of one problem may wait upon the solution of another or of many other problems. I am calling attention to the fact that the experimental method can only be applied where a reality which is not called in question sets the conditions to which any hypothetical solution must conform. The scientist puts a question to nature, and so far as the answer to that question is concerned, nature cannot herself be problematical. The scientist's technique consists largely in distinguishing that which is in doubt from that which is indubitable. You may deny the truth of his solutions, but you cannot by any possibility persuade him to regard his problem as lying inside of another larger problem, for then he has nothing by which to test his own hypothesis. Survey the almost inextricable maze of scientific hypotheses which have been called out by Relativity, the quantum postulate, the seeming corpuscular nature of light, the Compton

shift, the evidences for different diameters and forms of the electron, the rate of radiation of the stars, and the presence of high voltage short rays reaching our atmosphere from stellar space, and note what, in all this confusion, is stable and unquestioned; what it is to which each hypothesis must accord if it is to enter into a scientific doctrine of nature. It is the experimental finding which has been obtained in complete abstraction from any and all hypotheses. These for the scientist are firm reality, and these findings are simply certain happenings, determined within the limit of the error of observation, in a world which is not involved in the problems which engage the intense interest of science. If the Pragmatic doctrine is a logical generalization of scientific method, it cannot merge the problem that engages thought with a larger problem which denies validity to the conditions that are the necessary tests of the solution which thought is seeking.

Realists and Pragmatists alike have agreed that the perceptual knowledge to which the expert in knowledge, I mean the scientist, ties up, must be recognized as valid, though they have fallen out sadly among themselves over the definition of the percept. In reference to these civil strifes, I should like to point out that the scientist's findings are always in terms of things, never in terms of *sensa* or percepts, and that the legitimate analysis of perception by scientific psychology also always presupposes things. The psychologist has his own laboratories, and comes back to his own indubitable findings in terms of his own apparatus and *Versuchstiere*.¹ It is by means of what happens to these things in observation that any theory of observation must be tested. To reverse the order of testing lands us in Bertrand Russell's world inside of his brain. In the nature of the case it is not an observable brain, but one which we can only adumbrate by the probable correspondences of logical patterns. It affords however an heroic example of "following the augment" even when it leads the dialectician not only into a hole, but also into pulling the hole in after him. One afflicted with claustrophobia may prefer the heroic leap of Santayana's *Animal Faith*.

There is, however, no question that there is a profound meaning in seeing the world whole, but the most enlightening approach to its meaning is to be found in bounding it, that is in discovering what it is not. We never mean by the expression, if we are using, it profitably, what the world is going to be. Seeing the world whole will include undoubtedly the sort of wisdom which carries us sagaciously from the past into the future; but this is wisdom, it is not knowledge. The future is really future, it is not merely what we do not see, and no acuity of prophetic vision could bring the morrow in its essential character into our experience. Every morrow emerges. Again, seeing the world whole does not connote any exhaustive resumption of the past. Every generation rewrites and so in a sense relives the past. The histories that we have transcribed would have been as impossible to the pens of our fathers as the world we live in would have been inaccessible to their eyes and to their minds – and that not because we have richer sources than they. History is the interpretation of the past in terms of the present as truly as it is the interpretation of the present in terms of the past. Another Socrates has fascinated Athenian youths, another Caesar has crossed the Rubicon, another Jesus has lived in Galilee since any of us were children. And we know that our children will inhabit a different world from ours and will inevitably rewrite

the annals we have so laboriously composed. But this does not disturb us, nor do we feel that seeing our world whole involves the vision of their future nor its attendant past. Past and future are actually oriented in the present. It is the import of the present that we desire, and we can find it only in the past that the present's own unique quality demands and in that future to which it alone can lead. In a sense every unexampled present creates the past that is logically demanded for its explanation. It is the fathomless wealth of the perceptual present that was veiled to Hegel's eyes. Seeing the world whole is gathering that import so far as in us lies. All experimental findings are lodged in perceptual presents and they are the final touchstones of all theories, and it is from the unpredictable solutions of its problems that the ineffable future flowers out. There is another sense in seeing the world whole that we have already touched upon, in the phrase, the logical symbiosis of propositions. But there abstraction lodged them in a subsistent world, where they had the bloodless being of unimaginable entities that could be characterized only by empty symbols. Symbols are in truth the appropriate stimuli of our attitudes. Attitudes are the responses which are present in our behavior either in advance of the stimulation of things, or, already aroused, yet await the occasion for their full expression. In the first case they may appear as ideas or concepts, in the second as the meanings which constitute things. The concept of a book is the organization of attitudes, which given the stimulus, will express themselves in reading, writing, borrowing, drawing, buying or selling the book. They are all there in the dispositions of men, as forms of conduct which await the appropriate spring to call them out. Given the symbolic stimulus whether in articulate speech or in imagery, and the responses are there in the conduct which is organized by them. In the second case the book is there as an adequate stimulus to the response and has the meaning which was implied in the so-called concept. The book can acquire that meaning only in a situation within which the implications of that which happens can be actually present in the happening. The rush of the torrent carries death to the man who rashly ventures into it. It has not that *meaning* unless in advance of his fatal plunge this outcome was present in its nature, and it is only in the organized conduct of men that the bare relatedness of events and things can pass over into meaning, that meaning can invest events and things. This investiture takes place through the value which the symbol attains when the indication to another becomes also an indication to him who gives it to his fellow. The torrent is not only the blind power which sweeps the victim to his death, but in the community of those who communicate with each other, the force of the torrent has taken on a meaning in so far as each is wont to indicate this to others and so to himself. It has become something more than the succession of masses of water with their overwhelming momentum. In the experience of the community this force is to be avoided or perhaps made use of for the production of industrial power. Entering into relation with the community, the torrent has acquired a meaning, which apart from that relationship it did not formerly possess. Through communication men have become able by symbols to organize their innumerable attitudes of possible conduct. The very relationship of the symbols to one another is the outward evidence of the relationship of possible acts which these attitudes express in conduct. Woven together into structures of symbols they excite in men the related processes

which they make possible; and things, becoming the world or environment of such a society, acquire meanings which this conduct connotes.

Now seeing the world whole is response in the widest scope of such common conduct. It means entering into the highly organized logical, ethical, and aesthetic attitudes of the community, those attitudes which involve all that organized thinking, acting, and artistic creation and appreciation imply. It involves being at home in the universe of discourse, in the kingdom of ends, and in the world of beauty and significance. Seeing the world whole is the recognition of the most extensive set of interwoven conditions that may determine thought, practice, and our fixation and enjoyment of values. The truth of such vision is found in its competent evocation of the meanings with which society has endowed its world, in so far as it successfully interprets our ends and our appreciations. Both the ideas and the meanings which they connote lie within conduct and are only pertinent to the exigencies within which they appear, but they bring to bear upon these incidents which make up our lives the full rational, social and cultured nature of citizens of an organized world. Coherency here spells applicability, but it does not spell truth. Seven nights ago, I followed, delightedly, Professor Adams as he led the way through the intricacies of the metaphysical landscape of existence and meaning. Thanks to his competence we did not finally come upon truth in a valley of dry bones of bare existence, nor in a tempting mirage of meanings, but we found truth in the content which meaning gives to existence and the reality which existence gives to meaning. The formula by which he infused life into these dry bones and concreted these values I cannot employ. Mine is not the master mind for which it will work.

Thought is indeed constructive in the hypothesis, but I cannot find that the structure of reality within which her reconstructive work goes on is also hers. She indeed presents this structure in her blue prints, but it has not arisen out of her thinking. Thinking pushes on this structure into the emergent future, but to my mind – she lays no claim to the world which she thinks and aids in building out.

Truth expresses a relationship between the judgment and reality. In the formula of this paper the relationship lies between the reconstruction, which enables conduct to continue, and the reality within which conduct advances. The judgment comes with healing in its wings. It might be called a reparations theory, for, as we all know, a reparations commission requires first of all a formula, a healing formula. Most reparations commissions are no sooner organized than they adjourn, to be called together when a committee, appointed to discover such a formula, can report. Such a formula is a judgment. Its relationship is not so much that of correspondence as of agreement. The judgmental reconstruction fits into organized reality. Of course a formula may fit and still be ineffectual. That is, many so-called truths are insignificant and trivial, but this overlooks the character of the judgment, which is one of reconstruction and does not attain truth until experience can proceed where it was inhibited. If coherence means such a dovetailing of the hypothetical reconstruction with given reality, we might call the relationship that of coherence. But coherence theories of truth have in view rather the coherence of the structure of the judgment, assuming that as a thought structure it must be consonant with a thought constructed universe, if only it

be correctly thought. That is coherence refers to the formation of the hypothesis rather than to its agreement with the given conditions of further conduct.

Now it is evident that theories of truths will vary with their corresponding theories of reality. As I have just indicated, an idealistic doctrine which sees in the universe a thought structure that is the product of a timeless judgment will find its criterion of truth in the adequacy of the thought process, an adequacy which will be revealed in the coherence of the judgment. For it is only in that inner coherence that a finite judgment can show its harmony with the infinite process of which it is a part. The whole universe is not there to enable the mind to estimate its coherence with its entire structure, but the process is identical with that of the absolute and in so far as this process reveals its identity by its inner coherence, it possesses the only standard of truth possible. All idealisms are not Hegelian nor neo-Hegelian, in the common usage of that term, but what I take to be common to them all is the approach to reality from the standpoint of thought. We can approach the noumenal nature of reality only through the noumenal nature of thought; the perceptual dress of nature is transient, contingent, and particular. It is only by thought that we can get inside of it to its uniformities, its abiding structure, and its inherent necessities. Such an approach will inevitably look for its test of truth in the competency of the thinking that reveals it.

A realism whose method is that of analysis sees in reality ultimate elements and the relations which they subtend. Having anatomized reality into relata and the relations, truth or the judgment is found in a correlation between these and the cognitions which answer to them in the mind. We find a new set of relations and relata, that lying between things and the awareness of the mind. If these relations offer the same pattern of structure as that which they answer to in nature, we have the test of the truth of the logical pattern as it appears in the judgment. It is confessedly a truth of logical correspondence. It becomes incumbent then upon any doctrine of the truth of the judgment to present so much of its view of reality as is involved in its own criterion.

So much of a doctrine of reality is, I think, evident from what has gone before in this paper; that the experience in which human beings are involved is a constituent part of the reality which they judge; that the problems do not arise in minds which regard nature from without but within nature itself, because these human beings are phases of nature. In other words the doctrine is behavioristic not only in a psychological sense but also in a metaphysical sense – using metaphysics as Professor Dewey has undertaken to present it in *Experience and Nature*. This implies in particular that the so-called triadic relation holds between organisms and nature; that nature exists in varied aspects in its relation to the organisms of which it is patient, in Professor Whitehead's phrase. I do not agree with what I take to be Professor Broad's interpretation of Professor Whitehead's doctrine, that the so-called *sensa* exist in the immediate proximity of the organisms and are, as it were, projected into an absolute space-time of events. I see no reason for questioning the adjectives of things as actually qualifying them where they are in experience in their relations with organisms endowed with sense processes. The crux of such a doctrine, of course, lies in the common world. There are dark hints of a theory of this common world in Professor Whitehead's publications, in exiguous phrases and appended notes. I presume it has been given in his Gifford Lectures, and will be accessible to us in their publication.

The logical extension of the view of nature existing in perspectives is that societies are organisms in Professor Whitehead's definition of an organism and that there is a common nature that is there in its relationship to such a social organism. The problem is then shifted to the nature of the experience of the members of these societies. For this experience is both private and public. I have my own doctrine for this social character of experience which I have elsewhere presented² and at which I have hinted above. What it amounts to in a very summary formulation is that society exists in the social nature of its members, and the social nature of its members exists in their assumption of the organized attitudes of others who are involved with them in cooperative activities, and that this assumption of organized attitudes has arisen through communication. That is communication makes participation possible, to use Professor Dewey's phrase. There are then aspects of nature which exist only for each organism. For example, the experience of what goes on within a man's body is accessible only to himself. He can share his experiences of his own headaches with others only by appealing to private experiences of their own, but he does immediately put himself in the place of others in their common undertakings in the world and observes things spatio-temporally and meaningfully as they observe them. Answering to these common experiences there lies before them a common world, the world of the group. This common world is continually breaking down. Problems arise in it and demand solution. They appear as the exceptions to which I have referred above. The exceptions appear first of all in the experience of individuals and while they have the form of common experiences they run counter to the structure of the common world. The experience of the individual is precious because it preserves these exceptions. But the individual preserves them in such form that others can experience them, that they may become common experience. They are the data of science. If they have been put in the form of common experiences, the task appears of reconstructing the common world so that they may have their place and become instances instead of exceptions. Now the only test that can be offered of the truth of the reconstruction lies in the fitting in of the hypothesis into the common world in so far as it is not affected by the problem, which appeared in the exception.

If experience must accord with a reality beyond itself, the test of truth will be a correspondence of its structure with the structure of external reality; or if reality is an absolute of which experience is an incomplete phase, then truth will be in the congruence of the process of experience with that of the absolute. In both these alternatives, experience itself constitutes an epistemological problem of which other problems are only separate instances, a problem which is given in the assumed cognitive reference of experience to something beyond itself. In the doctrine I have undertaken to present, experience is not itself a problem. It is simply there. The problems arise within it. The criterion of truth does not then transcend experience, but simply regards the conditions of ongoing experience which has become problematic through the inhibitions of the natural processes of men. The solution of the problem lies entirely within experience and is found in the resolution of the inhibitions. Furthermore, the rational solution of problems takes place through minds which have arisen in social evolution. The criterion, then, of the truth of the solutions will involve the aspect of

nature that answers to the society which is the habitat of these minds. The criterion calls for the continuance of a common world. It excludes for example a possible irrational or arational aspect of reality. But it does not exclude the appearance of the novel, the emergent. I take it that this is the negative reflection of the propositional function, and the field of modern logical theory. Our experience can only be open to that which is novel if the forms are empty. This is another way of saying that the problem can appear anywhere in experience. The view of reality which belongs to this statement of the doctrine does in a considerable degree determine the theory of truth and its criterion.

In conclusion allow me to recur to rationalization. We rationalize when we so restate and interpret a new order of things that old habits and attitudes find objects to arouse and sustain them. The familiar illustration is the aesthetic conservation of outworn religious cults. As another illustration, I suggested the conservation in Renaissance philosophy of the old central position of man in the universe by the resolution of the world into states of mind. Evidently the impelling but often unconscious motive is the salvation of the values which still attach to the old responses. Any successful formulation must excite consecrated emotional attitudes. Philosophically the salvation of mind replaced the salvation of the soul, but back of the epistemology lay the sense of the supreme value of human experience. I am entirely agreed that the conservation of the value of human experience lies as a liability upon philosophic doctrine, but I make bold to say that in the passage of time since Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz the preservation of these values through the cognitive relation of mind to the universe has become more and more precarious. Let me offer evidences such divergent findings as those of Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, Bertrand Russell's *Religion of a Free Man*, and Santayana's *Doctrine of Essences*. In the dominant philosophic current since the Renaissance lies the implication of some structure of reality which the structure of thought undertakes to reflect or sets up as a postulate, a structure, whatever it may be, that has the immutability and irrevocability of the past. And it is in this immutable and irrevocable order that philosophies have sought the firm foundation of their values, in so far as they have not despaired of them. Thus they have rationalized new orders to find in them the implications of the old. Science, in the meantime, in its practice, has cheerfully not to say joyfully scrapped its old structures and only preserved its method. Of course science has never accepted the responsibility for the preservation of values, though an honorable exception should be made in recognizing the responsibility which science is taking upon itself for the physiological and psychical health of the community. Philosophy, on the other hand, in its conspectus of reality and in its ethical doctrine, can never evade the responsibility for the values of the community.

Now I take it that the most distinctive mark of the Pragmatic movement is the frank acceptance of actual ongoing experience, experimentally controlled, as the standpoint from which to interpret the past and anticipate the future. So far as I can see this acceptance must recognize as ruled out any absolute order within which is to be placed a final concatenation of events past, present, and future. For in such an ultimate framework there is no place for an emergent future with its implicated new past, nor is there any allowance for different order of different aspects of the universe.

The problem, then, which Pragmatism faces is the maintenance of values by methods, in the place of structure. It is not the revival of emotional response by the assimilation of the new to the old, upon which we can depend. On the contrary it becomes necessary to recast the old as that which leads up to the new situation. This we readily carry out in our rapidly changing accounts of the past of the physical world and of its inhabitants. Can we as readily apply it to the pressing problems of social reconstruction with their profound implications of the values that are involved in possession, in national and personal rights, in the family and in the church?

Notes

* As originally published in "Studies in the Nature of Truth", *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, 11 (1929), 65–88.

1 Laboratory animals.

2 *Journal of Philosophy*, XIX, 157–163.

III. Science applied

17

SCIENCE IN SOCIAL PRACTICE (n.d.)*

There is no more striking difference between the ancient and the modern worlds than that revealed in their fashions of dress, of armor, and of building. Study the garb of men and women of Greece and Rome, of Persia, and of Egypt during the thousand years and more that are covered by the remains of their monuments, and then place beside these fashions, unchanged in their essentials during the whole period, the bewildering variety of dress which confronts one who turns to the repositories of medieval history, culture and custom. From the early centuries in which the modern world commenced to emerge from the old, uneasy change has characterized the fashion in, which men and women have clothed themselves at home, at court, and in the field.

The same stability of equipment marks the method in which armies were fitted for fighting by the nations and civilizations of the ancient world. The masses of ancient troops which conquered the world for Persia, the phalanxes which disputed the hegemony of Greece, the legions of Rome which presented the ultimate arm of ancient warfare, remained in their essentials unchanged throughout the histories of the empires which phalanx trampled down and scattered the masses of Persian troops and stood in their places until the short swords and flexible maniples of the Roman legions disintegrated them in turn and superseded them as the final victorious formation.

The same uniformity characterized the arms of offence and defence. They were perfected and fashioned of superior materials. They were superseded by the arms of other nations and other civilizations, but in their form and nature, while they were in fighting hands, they remained unmodified by theory or practice.

Turn to the treasures of our museums and follow the series of vases and vessels and mirrors, the pins and brooches, and see how persistent the types of articles were, how the great forms of ancient art and manufacture dominate the usage of centuries and more than centuries. See the ideas of Greek society embodied in the series of representations of Greek divinities. Study the growth in perfection, the increasing intellectual

content in the same form, and still the steady reforming and restating of the same figure and the same meaning in a Zeus or a Pallas Athena.

Turn to the house and note the same form in the structure of the home of the citizen and in the house of the god. The temple is wonderful in the perfection of its lines and the balance of its proportions, but it is the perfected home of the city's greatest citizen. The palace of the Roman emperor but multiplies the house. The unit is the same and the form of the unit unchanged as were the ideas in Plato's World beyond the Heavens.

The forms of thing remained. The Aristotelian essences which are Platonic ideas embodied in individual things represent in their finality the fashion that was slowly brought to perfection by art and artisanship, to self-consciousness by philosophy, but which existed *sub specie aeternitatis*; not as the fashion of our world which passes away.

It is quite in accordance with this attitude of the ancient world that practice remained largely unaffected by physical theory. It would be difficult to point to any phase of practice in war, in the arts and manufacture, in engineering or agriculture in which the practice of the ancients was transformed by their science. Archimedes created the science of Statics, but it was as a field within which to carry further the mathematics of his time and that mathematics was geometry. Physical science in Greece reached its climax in cosmology, its statement of the movements of the heavenly bodies, and the final statement made by Ptolemy met the demands of the observations of the times. Its distinction between the heavenly spheres and the sub-lunar sphere, its distinction between the solid earth with its quality of weight and the substances of water, air, fire, and ether, satisfied the problems which suggested themselves to the physicists. Medicine advanced in its surgery and the consequent study of anatomy to considerable results of the scientific character. But the therapeutic treatment of disease never rose above an empirical practice that was largely controlled by tradition and was too confined by ignorance of physiology and the chemistry of its *materia medica* to become scientific.

Even when geometry had acquainted educated men with the theory of measurement of surfaces and solids we find that in Egypt, where was the center of ancient science, surveying for the government of the Ptolemy's clung to ancient rules of thumb which were palpably incorrect. Apart from the mythical tales of the achievements of Archimedes in the defence of Syracuse there is no evidence that ancient physics modified in any material degree their practice in war. Their architecture presented no problems that aroused men to consider the nature of physical forces. Their whole conduct lay so completely within the traditional practice that men felt no inclination to invention. Indeed throughout the entire history of the ancient world it would be impossible to point to a single invention which had reconstructed any form of physical practice. Advance consisted in the realization of the ideas that lay behind the traditional methods and customs and operations, and their perfection, and even this perfection was conceived of largely from the standpoint of the aesthetic judgment.

If we turn now to the beginnings of the modern world we find in the most universal and essential fields of physical practice, problems which inevitably forced upon the consciousness of Europe the study of subjects which were without interest for the

ancients or were even beyond their ken. Note the rapid changes which took place in warfare. See the development of the defensive armor of the knight and his castle pushed to such extremes that new forms of tactics and new forms of weapons of offence were invented to overthrow the iron encased cavalry and their impregnable castles. The light armored bowman unhorsed the knight, the demand for an adequate weapon with which to attack the castle led to the invention of gunpowder and the cannon, and the whole field of warfare became the field of physical problems, that invited the study of the physicist, and forced dynamics upon the consciousness of the fourteenth century mathematicians of Italy. The restless change in the manners of fighting carried with it an inevitable curiosity as to the power which new weapons promised. It carried with it the question whether the offence would be equal to the defence, and these were problems that could not be stated except in terms of dynamics.

The ancient temple, being but the idealization of the ancient house carried no other problems with it than those of bringing the building materials to the positions which a simple architecture demanded. The achievement of the Parthenon was the glory of the artist not an engineer. If the stone could be brought and placed in its proper course there was no need to question whether it would crush its foundations. The sides of the temples of the noblest dimensions never reached a height in comparison with its width which raised doubts as to it toppling over with the weight it bore. There were no problems of the side thrust which awakened the anxiety of medieval architects and led to the buttressing of the walls of medieval cathedrals. The cathedral was not the house of the divinity who was also a citizen of the city. It was the house of the God of otherworldliness. It strove to overpower by its contrast with the mean dimensions of the houses of the city. Its nave, narrow in proportion to its height, gave that sense of upward striving which should carry religious devotion away from the city which the Grecian temple idealized. Its enormous and towering spires directed attention to heaven. Its walls shut in from the world its worshippers by impressive masses. Every motive in its structure set itself in opposition to the daily life and practice of the inhabitants of the medieval city. Thus while the building of the Greek temple carried with it no physical problems that were not involved in the building of the house of the ordinary citizen, the cathedral by the very infinity it sought to symbolize brought with it problems of stresses and strains, of the crushing weight of piled up walls and towers, which could be solved only by a science which recognized that the stones in place were still forces which must be conceived of as in motion.

Literature in Greece and Rome was for a literary class and the copyist was equal to the task of its dissemination. Where the drama or the epic poem or the historic tale or pamphlet sought a wider audience, the theater or the concourse at the Games provided the audience; and information, and opinion, and emotional appreciation, attended upon the art of the reader, the rhapsodist, and the actor. Greek and Roman religions were religions of cults and custom and not of monuments and books. Medieval heresies were changing fashions in religion and demanded that the divine oracles should be at the disposal of every troubled mind, and out of this demand arose the art of printing.

I have said enough to indicate, and I can do no more tonight, that out of the restless changing practice of the modern world sprang the modern theory that sought to solve the problems which this changing practice brought with it. I have suggested this, because I wish to call your attention to the manner in which modern science has solved these problems. I think that the method which has been successful in conquering the obstacles which physical practice has faced, may well be employed in dealing with the difficulties with which social practice is confronted.

I will state by way of preface just what I take physical practice to be. It is first of all approach toward or flight from objects which are distinguished directly by the eye or other distance sense, or are presented by the eye or other distance sense, or are presented by imagination or thought, upon some implication, that carries the mind beyond the field of vision. In the second place it is a coming to close quarters with the objects toward which man has moved, a manipulation covers all animal practice. It is specialized in the pursuit and flight of the beast of prey and his victim processes of reproduction, in the parental care and dependence of infant forms; and in man this behavior is only complicated, raised to a higher power, by the development of manipulation.

Man is the animal with hands that finds or makes and uses tools. The processes of manipulation concentrate many acts into one. Every act is at bottom but approach and manipulation, but this manipulation may result in covering indefinite distances, and give us a capacity which raises the force of a man's hand to the n th power. When we travel with the locomotive, the steamship, or the aeroplane, and talk with the telephone and the telegraph, and crush with the hydraulic hammer, and transport overwhelming weights with electric cranes, we have but complicated the simple processes of approach and manipulation by the structure of tools, and these tools have arisen through manipulation. Man increases the diameter of his habitat by the radius of the tool he uses, or he may contract and reduce that diameter to the realm of a molecule, and be king of the infinite space within the domain of a nutshell. Thus tools either contract or expand distances or multiply or refine the power of the human hand.

If we glance again at the history of the ancient civilizations we see that the tools which man used during these centuries were hardly different in principle from those which primitive man used since he first hurled the missile, pried with a lever, crushed with a club, and spit with a sharp stone, dissipated matter with fire and changed its inner nature by cooking, subdued the wild animal to carry and pull, and served himself upon the water with the sustaining buoyancy of wood. Ancient mechanism departed from these types in surprisingly few instances. That their tools of industry and war were more refined and of better stuff, and conquered wider horizons and added more power to the arm and more nicety to the touch than the tools of the savage is not in question, nor that with typical tools of early man these societies accomplished marvels by the organization of men in groups and the selection of high capacities in their artisans and artists. Social organization raised the tools with which the ancients worked to a vastly higher power, but the nature of the tools set definite limits beyond which ancient society could not go. With few exceptions the ancients merely modified and perfected tools, the prototypes of which were to be found in the hands of the savage Teuton in the forests of Germany. Ancient technology like

the descriptive science of the ancients, defined and perfected *its* objects; it did not create them.

The problems of warfare, of building, of the multiplication of books, led to the invention of weapons and forms of forts and bastions, and finally to gunpowder with all the revolution that has followed in its house, was not a temple, that was typical of all that other human structures were not, the cathedral, to the printing press, to the book. It led to the telescope and the microscope, to the compass, to the pendulum, to the clock that was a function of the pendulum, and to the scientific apparatus which has arisen out of the problems of which a modern science has grown constantly more conscious. These were all of them new objects, novel things that had not existed before even in prototype, if we examine their nature. But while the appearance of such new tools with which the medieval world with slowly increasing velocity reconstructed the world in which it lived, built even a new physical universe, and laid the foundations for a new type of industrial democracy the like of which had not been found among the city states of the old world, while these new tools and the achievements they made possible are startling and absorbing to those who can read history aright, there lies back of them and is to be found instinct within them a new method which is even more important, and even more startling, when we are able to grasp its import.

It is more important because it is the method by which science in the physical world is constantly constructing new tools and new objects that did not exist before. This new method which makes the greatest difference between the consciousness of the old world and the new, is that which gets its first recognized expression in the scientific work of Galileo. It appears here as dynamics, a new science which enters fields closed to Archimedes, and its characteristic is that it starts with a law of change as its fundamental reality and defines its objects in terms of the uniformities in these changes. The *Analysis* of Descartes and the *Calculus* of Leibnitz and the *Fluxions* of Newton were developments of this new method in dealing with physical objects. Its permanent elements were by finding a system within which these changes take place, as Newton finally did, it became possible to define physical things in terms of the changes which arose within the system, until now the ultimate terms in which our physical science defines all its objects are velocities and changes in velocity. The biologic sciences waited long before the doctrine of evolution stated the animals and plants in terms of change. Darwin at last could formulate a hypothesis which showed how the species of animals and plants could have arisen out of the living processes. The animal became a product of the biologic changes which we call life. We define the animal or plant in terms of the live processes. We do not conceive of life as a quality with which animals and plants are endowed.

To repeat: the modern in its restlessness has adopted a new point of view. Change has become the fundamental fact. The only permanencies are ways in which changes take place. This not only gives us new terms in which to describe the world but it makes incumbent upon science that it should construct its objects out of these elements, these velocities and changes in velocity. Where the Aristotelian scientist but described what his perception presented to his mind, while he but abstracted the essential qualities from this perceived object and gathered these together as the nature

of the object, the modern scientist describes his object as of such a nature that it never could be perceived. Molecules and their constituent atoms would defy any conceivable perception. Molecules and atoms are but conceptual objects which enable us to state the laws of change within which the physical object must be constructed, and for that reason they are quite independent of the meaning and value which human experience gives to them at any one time. The molecular structure of matter is indifferent to the character of the living organism in which we conceive it to appear. It is just as indifferent to the passing inanimate textures through which we conceive it to have passed from the primordial stardust out of which solar systems have arisen. For science an object is not what we perceive it to be, but a series of processes by which we account for our perceived world coming into being. The fact that Aristotelian science accepted the world of perceptual experience as the essence of objects, as the reality of things, fixed the objects of human experience in the form which this science found them.

There are, then, two striking characteristics of the modern scientific object. First that it is constructed out of changes whose laws are known or to be known, and therefore subject to a high degree of control, for a change whose law is known can be used, can be employed, can become a tool. The second characteristic is that the structure of the scientific object is itself quite indifferent to the values and meanings which our experience endows it with. It is therefore material out of which new objects of experience can be constructed. From it can be made the tools by means of which the world can be made anew. In a word, physical science does not recognize any metaphysical nature in the world of physical practice. It presents hypothetical structures such as molecules, vortex atoms, ions and electrons, which enable it to state the laws of the changes that incessantly go on about us; and by those laws we are able to control this world, by the structure of new tools or what is the same thing, new physical objects.

It is on this account that physical practice has been revolutionized within two centuries. The laboratories of modern physical science are workshops in which to construct the tools which will make us equal to the tasks which our practice presents to us. It is because we can look upon life and death as the same in the view of physical science that we have been able to accomplish so much for the conservation of life. It is because for the laboratory the process of disease and health are alike that we can make health to abound where sickness was dominant. It is because science has been able to abstract from the metaphysical essences of things that invention has been able to conceive of the new tools which have brought million into close relations who would otherwise been ignorant of each other's existence.

The scientific hypothesis is a construct which goes beneath the former import of things. It knows only one test, that of experiment. If this is satisfied, the scientist or inventor may state matter in any form that his hypothesis demands. It recognizes only the problem which arises in practice, the conditions which the solution of the problem set, the hypothetical object, and the final test of trial. Thus science has conceived of electricity as a fluid and again as a vibration, and now it conceives of ions and electrons, subatomic elements of electricity. The former physical atom, the supposedly irreducible minimum of matter, has been shattered into a thousand particles because the study of electrolysis, x-rays, and radioactivity are most conveniently stated in terms

of these fragments of that which physics had before defined as the ultimate particle. At no barrier can the metaphysician stand and say "thus far and no farther." There is no ultimate being guaranteed by philosophic doctrine that may not be resolved by the scientific imagination, if only the scientist will make of his new conceptual object a better medium for the construction of the tools of thought and practice.

Who will attempt to say what hypotheses will govern the thought of our grandchildren? How shall we conceive of the strange phenomena of disease following upon the activity of micro-organisms in the human system, or the still stranger phenomena of immunity to their attacks? A brilliant German scientist imagines these micro-organisms set with protuberances and hooks with which corresponding excrescences upon the particles of chemical substances introduced into the blood interlock. He finds this the easiest method of conceiving the results he reaches, and who will say him nay. Perhaps another decade will find these excrescences securely lodged in the textbooks of organic chemistry. Whatever image will best enable man to gain readiest control over the disease and achieve the immunity is welcome. Whether the conception is fantastic or is at variance with former doctrine are questions that will never be asked. With such complete freedom does the physical scientist enter upon his task of making our world more comprehensible and our practice, therefore, more successful.

What is the situation in social practice? Is the same freedom allowed to science in controlling the social conduct? From one point of view this question seems ill advised, and that is the standpoint of science itself. How can we demand freedom for science in the construction of social objects in testing new social hypotheses, when social science has not as yet become exact? Until we have isolated the uniformities of social change and can show acknowledged laws of social processes, it would seem idle to seek for greater freedom for the scientist; to encourage him to form and test hypotheses when he is unable to define these in terms of fixed ratios of social movement. To make the question more concrete, can we establish a science of Eugenics when we do not understand the changes which are responsible for variation of children from the parent stocks, when we are still unable to present a theory of heredity which can be brought to the final test of experiment? Have statistics revealed to us laws of social change which can lay claim to the exactness of the laws of the physical sciences? Social scientists have for example studied suicide, birth rates, and pauperism in the light of changing social conditions, but while they recognize that uniformities are there they cannot so isolate them that they can use them as the physical scientist employs his laws of motion. The conditions which affect these phenomena are so terribly intricate and so far beyond the reach of laboratory control that the prospect of an exact social science seems as far from realization at the meeting of parallel lines at infinity. Shall we say then that social science must remain in the metaphysical period, that we must satisfy ourselves with the definition of men and women and children as these are given to us in our books of statutes, in our political handbooks, and in the doctrinal theology, because we cannot state in terms of exact laws the social processes out of which arise personalities, characters, good and evil, standards of conduct or the content of social justice?

It is certainly true that our social objects are still largely metaphysical. To begin with, while the psychologist in his experimental science has abandoned the soul and

substituted for this entity the self, and while he is somewhat tardily studying the processes by which this self arises in consciousness, our education still conceives the mind as a container into which information is to be poured, into whose fibre the associations of ideas are to be drilled. We talk vaguely of the education of the child being the life of the soul, but our practice belies our talk. It is the child's soul which is instructed. School life is not the development of the child's self. In fact the pedagogue has carried over something of the metaphysical nature of the soul into the brain, and conceives of images as stored up in brain cells and rules of arithmetic and speech drilled into brain fibre. Our psychology has in no small degree separated the brain, or let us say the central nervous system, from the rest of the organism and given it as a sensorium something of the metaphysical character of the soul. It would be easy to extend this criticism to other phases of our school room psychology. I know of nothing that interfered more with a healthful application of the psychology of attention than the attitude which our school discipline takes toward the wandering of attention. We are back here in the metaphysical dogma of an indifferent will. The child can attend if he will.

But let us change the field of illustration to that of politics and see how completely our practice and our would be scientific theory are at odds with each other. Social theory recognizes that the political self arises out of social control. Whether we conceive of this in terms of imitation or of social instincts or both, we are well aware that only in the consciousness of others we have attained to a consciousness of our own social selves with their rights and obligations. It is the activity of social control within social conduct that has built up the political individual, who maintains his own rights and recognizes those of others. He changes as that social consciousness changes. His whole political selfhood is a social endowment that comes to him from the community of which he became a part. And yet our political theory remains individualistic. Final control lies in that expression of the common social consciousness which we call public sentiment. The central fact in government is the relation of the individual to this public sentiment. The great desideratum of political reform lies in bringing this public sentiment to expression. But how inadequately is this done! How little care have we for the publicity which is the condition of the existence of the modern democratic state. On the contrary, our attention is still centered upon preserving the rights of metaphysical individuals who belong to the 18th century. We see that the operation of the courts in maintaining these rights frequently leads to such a travesty of social justice that the same courts are compelled to reverse their positions, as they have in the matter of the right of a laborer to make a contract – as they have in the question of contributory negligence and the fellow servant.

What is startling in these situations is that we are so committed to a fixed individualistic political theory, that we cannot adjust our practice to meet a situation that stares us in the face. We lack the scientific method that fashions new objectives to answer new problems. The laborer who in the face of starvation accepts an inadequate wage for work to be done under unhealthful conditions, is in no sense of the word the individual who enters freely into a contract, assuming rights which can be considered his own. This individual is a metaphysical entity belonging to a doctrinaire political theory. The social scientist is able to describe him as he is, handicapped economically,

with no means of carrying his labor to the best market, hungry and with a family to maintain, with instincts of workmanship, a sense of fellowship for his fellow worker, ignorant of the conditions under which he labors, of the subtle dangers to which he may be exposed, with a yearning for human response and some perception of a common good. Every one of these elements goes to determine and control his conduct in the community. No one of them does the strict political theory recognize – and there is no such interplay between social theory and social practice that we are able to give another and more adequate definition to this member of our society. Physical science has given twenty different definitions to the atom because each new one has answered to the demands of new conditions; but our courts in construing men's conduct must abide by an outworn definition because as yet the method of social practice is not scientific.

Consider a still more flagrant instance of this lack of scientific method in social control. No one who is at all conversant with the conditions under which most of our criminal class grow up, has any doubt that it is the conditions out of which these boys and girls arise plus the practice of the courts and the police that are responsible for these criminals. The earliest so-called crimes which the child commits are the expressions of the mischievous impulses of childhood. We know that children have not the knowledge nor the maturity of character which are implied in the very conception of crime. But we send them to the bars of justice. We convict them for that which has the same moral quality as robbing an orchard or pummeling a schoolmate. We send them to an institution where they become members of the fraternity of outlaws and when they leave the jail it is with a stamp upon them that keeps most of them within the class. Society is breeding, training, and preserving most of its so-called criminal class. And we stand almost helpless before this enormity, because our theory of what constitutes a legal or illegal act, of what constitutes responsibility, of what constitutes justice is so fixed, so metaphysical, that we cannot adjust the theory to our practice. We are able to create new varieties and improve our varieties of plants and animals because we have a scientific method which enables us to form new ideas of what the species is, of what are the causes of defects and undesirable qualities. We can conceive of new forms and better forms because we know and can control the conditions out of which they will arise.

In the matter of justice the species are fixed by a minutely worded statute that defines the criminal and by implication the just man, and the court is occupied principally in interpreting the meaning of the statute, not in determining the justice of the description. Now while it is true that the social sciences have not achieved the position of exact sciences, they can approach such situations as these with a scientific spirit, and make use of a scientific method. Indeed we see the beginnings of this change, we have already noted its somewhat tardy beginning in education. In politics, the recall, and the referendum, imply a new mutual interplay between the individual and public sentiment, and tends to give this form of social consciousness definite organs for control in the state. In our juridical procedure the Juvenile Court and the system of parole find themselves quite outside the stereotyped conceptions of legal justice and recognize the relation of the misdemeanor to the conditions out of which it arose. They recognize also that justice should be a process of socializing the individual – not the awarding of fixed penalties for fixed external acts.

In a word, in the most serious problems of social practice we can see the demand for scientific method, and we can discover the beginnings of the creations of this scientific method.

This movement has many names: the conservation of human values, the insurgency, the recall and the referendum, the elimination of the juvenile delinquent, the living wage and sanitary shops, the right of the child to his childhood – I might go on multiplying phases of the movement – but they all imply new conceptions of social objects and they all call for a right to tests of these new conceptions, these hypotheses in social practice. They all insist that no conception or definition of rights and wrongs, of individuals and states, of acts and consequences, shall be accepted and maintained unless they actually work in meeting the problems of social practice. I know of no more valuable contribution to this movement than a thoroughgoing acceptance by the community of the dictum that science has the same right of way in social practice as that which the modern world has granted it in physical practice. Since the days of the French Revolution men have been becoming more and more clearly aware that the social order changeth giving place to the new, but we have not recognized any method by which this change could be controlled. So men have clung to certain doctrines, to certain fixed ideas while they have hesitatingly surrendered others.

We need the faith of the scientist who is willing to surrender all to the test of experiment. We need to recognize further that science carries with it no fixed program. It meets each problem as it arises. The problem arises out of practice and is tested again by practice. The socialists have come forward with a fixed program. They have been quite as metaphysical as the theorists whom they have sought to supplant. But even in socialism, the programmist is giving way to the opportunist. They are beginning to demand science in social control.

Let me close with the suggestion that we are losing the meaning of life because we are not willing to conceive of social objects in terms of social practice. What all high endeavor, all devotion to humanity, what all religion has sought has been to inspire immediate conduct with the meaning of the whole of life, to gain the consciousness of the social meaning of our individual acts, and this is precisely what scientific method achieves. It states the parts in terms of the whole. It defines its objects in terms of the processes that are going on. Science in social practice must be profoundly religious.

Note

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18

ON SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (n.d.)*

From the attitude of Tennyson, who

Saw the heavens filled with commerce, argosies of magic sails,
Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales;

to that of Orville Wright, wrestling with the problem of the actual construction of a machine that flies, we can recognize all the stages in the creation of a scientific object. We see first the dream of the object surcharged with the emotional values which will belong to it when it is realized fact. The principles that are involved in the structure of the object of poetry and romance are those that govern artistic creation. The reality of the work of art is tested by its control over this imagery and by the genuineness and balance of the emotional response which it calls out.

In Kipling's story of the "Night Mail" there is an appeal to other tests of objective reality. The tests are still in the realm of the imagination of the artist, but they demand a more complete mechanism of imagery, with details which carry with them a more complete mechanism of imagery, with details which carry with them a semblance of the same reality as that which pervades the story of "The ship that found itself" by the same author. The very appeal to such tests of reality in the case of the air ships while it carries a certain objectivity with it at the same time affects us with the unpleasant reaction to that which does not achieve what its program demands. It is specious as are the tales of Jules Verne. The air ship is not real in the sense of the navies of Tennyson's vision, which demand nothing but the imagery of the eye, and the appropriate emotional response.

Kipling's tale confounds and for the moment overpowers the imagination with a detail of imagery which to produce an objectivity comparable to that of Tennyson's argosies of magic sail, would need just that completion which the author cannot give. The mind cannot rest in such imagery. It neither enables us to realize the import of the object nor its actuality.

Finally we have carried the problem to the ultimate phase in which the structure of the object is conceived in terms of the principles which govern its flight. We leave the navies and argosies which are as yet impracticable, and the more technical imagery of Kipling, that lies still outside the reality which has appeared within the field of conduct. The aeroplane is defined by its actual use. It is constructed in accordance with the principles of its use. That wonderful mechanism, the gas-engine, which has made the aeroplane possible, and which has evolved out of the demands of the automobile, is a still more effective illustration of an object which has been defined more narrowly and successfully in terms of the physical conduct out of whose necessities it has sprung. The very ends and purposes which it serves have been translated over into the physical principles which have made their realization possible. In every successful mechanism the end has been stated in terms of the means and the end continues to exist only as a statement of further perfection, as a problem presented to the inventor, whose solution again translates it into the means that are discovered or created to realize this ideal.

These physical principles which translate the ends into means are the principles of the physical behavior of the engineer and the inventor. For it is legitimate to say that the mechanism is stated in terms of behavior. The application of tools, of such forces as steam and electricity extend almost indefinitely in various directions the activities of the human body. We talk by the telegraph and telephone, we move with the locomotive and the steamboat, we lift with electric cranes with hydraulic hammers. Starting with the lever and the simple machines which the principle of the lever has put at man's disposal, his behavior has become steadily more complex and more far-reaching, but the mechanism of this behavior has arisen within the behavior itself and every step in advance is but the complication of old forms which give rise to new methods of acting and thus enable us to reach the goals which exist at first beyond our reach. While these ends thus exist at first in terms of unrealized desires, in imagery instinct with emotion, they are fulfilled and achieved when we can state them in terms of the behavior already under our control.

As behavior has become a constantly more important psychological category, as we find in the point of view it makes possible the bridge connecting man's intelligence with that of animal's into whose consciousness we cannot enter, it is of importance that we should define it more narrowly. It may be applied in the first place only to conduct, i.e. to movements which subserve ends which are valuable to the form or the species to which it belongs. Such a conception does not necessarily imply consciousness. The doctrine of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest as the vera causa of evolution present conduct determined by the life interests of form or species, without the precondition of the presence in consciousness of the ideas of those interests. In the second place, the more complex the activity becomes, the more interdependent become the processes of stimulation and response. Where a distant stimulus leads an animal to approach and come in contact with an object there must be a constant adjustment of the sense process to the approach toward and finally in some degree to the actual contact. It is of course still more evident that the movements of approach and contact reaction must be under the control of the sensations

that come from the distant object. This mutual relation between the stimulation and the response which is essential to successful complex activities is the earliest form under which appears the effect of reaction upon stimulation, the reaction of the response into the stimulation. It is that in the behavior which answers to imagery in introspection, the constant readiness to adjust the sensing process by the result of the movement that the sensing process has induced. In behavior such an attitude of a form toward its environment would be the nearest approach to what is described on the inside as perception. Where this adjustment of the sensing process to a distant stimulus has become so habitual that it proceeds automatically we find in the continued reaction to the changed field of stimulation into the process of sensation what we term imagery in perception. To see an object as distant or hard is to adjust our process of movements of approach and manipulation. Behavior is then that type of activity which is purposive and in which the effect of the response tends to modify the value of the stimulation, or in other words, that form of activity in which conduct is modified by experience. The manner in which the purposive character of behavior appears is in the relation of instincts, impulses and habits to stimulation. The organized group of reactions which makes up an instinct predisposes the animal to a certain type of stimulation. An aroused instinct sensitizes an animal to certain stimuli. The hungry animal has a keen sense for food, while the satiated animal's senses are dulled to the same odors. We recognize the same phenomenon introspectively, in the selective nature of attention. Any undertaking predisposes us to recognize and respond to those stimuli which will mediate the act. Psychologically we explain this by the presence of imagery which renders the particular stimulus in question more vivid. Thus the image of a book sought to enables us to pick it out of the rows of books in the shelves. While association represents in some sense the organization of our imagery as this has arisen out of past experience, the selection of imagery is a function of conduct, of the act, and we may speak of ourselves as being sensitized to certain imagery by the habits or impulses that are seeking expression, as we have spoken of the animals as sensitized to certain stimuli by the instincts which are demanding expression.

In this general field of behavior with its responses playing back into stimulation, and its instincts, impulses and habits of actions acting selectively upon the outer environment and upon what we may call the environment of imagery, lies the particular field of social behavior, to which I wish to call attention, especially to its relation to the rest of our behavior.

Social behavior may be readily defined as that which responds to the attitudes and movements of other individuals. These are its stimulations, and its responses again affect other individuals, in like manner, i.e. the social responses as a rule are themselves stimulations to responses by other forms. Without attempting to exhaust the field by definition, we find four types of social behavior which are broad enough to reach down into the conduct of animals lower than man, and which have certainly included the most important social conduct in the development of human consciousness from lower forms. I refer to the behavior of sex, of parent and child form, of hostility, including attack and defence, and of flight and hiding.

The very nature of social behavior calls for the adaptation of the action of one individual to that of another, and the success of the adaptation must depend upon the promptness with which the individuals answer in their conduct to the movements and attitudes of other individuals. Certainly that form which adjusted itself earliest to the oncoming acts of another would be most likely to survive in the struggle for existence. In the fight the first suggestion of what an enemy was about to do would be the most important stimulation for a form which must withstand the attack. Nor is this true only in the behavior of battle, on reproduction, in the care of the young, in the escape by flight and hiding, the earlier individuals can distinguish the nature of what other individuals are commencing to do, the successful will be thus social adjustments.

If we isolate for a moment these stimulations which assume so much importance in social behavior, I mean the early stages and preparations for social acts, we will see that they include the whole group of so-called gestures. Gesture in the wide sense in which it is now used in comparative psychology includes not only those movements of hands and arms and the body which are referred to under this term in untechnical speech, but all the expressions of countenance, all the attitudes of body, and even the exclamations, the growls, and cries, and finally the articulate speech which has presumably arisen out of cries and other exclamatory sounds. These are all brought under the common term expressions of emotion and as such have been dealt with successively by naturalists and psychologists, since Darwin called attention to their strategic importance in the evidence for the evolution of human intelligence.

For Darwin they were important as vestiges of the acts of lower forms, thus betraying the genealogy of man in his behavior. Beside their vestigial character, such as that of the barring of the teeth, and the angry snarl of a man whose means of attack have long since ceased to be the teeth, these so-called expressions of the emotions include many attitudes and movements of facial muscles which Darwin thought of advantage to the individual in protection and preparation for violent activity. He called in also a principle of contrast which he thought would explain various gestures and attitudes, perhaps the least fortunate part of his discussion. Others such as [Theodor] Piderit have laid emphasis upon the expressive character of the gesture and assumed that it has persisted because it has had just this nature of revealing what the individual was feeling. Spencer again has attempted a purely physiological explanation. Gesture in this large sense according to Spencer is simply the result of the overflow of nervous energy, which showing itself first of all in the groups of muscles which are less stable and to his mind therefore the smallest, spreads over the whole system finally under the conditions of overwhelming emotion leading to the spasmodic contraction of all the muscles of the system. Wundt has attempted a psycho-physical explanation which to my mind does not explain at all the gestures, but imply asserts their existence as the physiological accompaniments of certain psychical states.

What none of these theories have adequately recognized is the strategical place which the gestures occupy in social conduct. Let me repeat that I am using gesture in the inclusive sense to which I referred above. It includes all attitudes, expressions of countenance, movements of the body and arms, and the changes of breathing which appear in the exclamatory sounds and thus as well the articulate speech which arises

out of these exclamatory sounds. In social conduct these all lie at the beginning of social acts. They are all preparations for such acts or the first stages in such acts. This is as true in the facial expressions as in the clinched fist or the outstretched arms of the mother toward the child. From the infinitesimal movements of the eye we read the oncoming, and shifts in attitude which we would be powerless to describe are tremendously expressive of what another may be going to do. It is only when the actor using this whole category of gestures as his material for creation, that we appreciate what a complete language there is within their field; a language which lacks the facility of articulate speech but none of its expressiveness. These gestures then are the appropriate stimuli to social acts, because they are the indications of the activities which social animals are about to carry out toward other forms in the same group. They are the most important elements in the social situation, and must be or become those elements which will determine the social responses. They have and continue to have a value which is not vestigial. They are not simply channels through which surplus energy flows off, and their psycho-physical nature can be only accounted for by a recognition of the function which they have performed in the development of social behavior.

Their import is most clearly presented of course through the function of speech which is a derivative of the earlier gesture, and we can see in the stimulation of one animal form by the beginnings of social acts on the part of another and the response which again calls out responses in the first a field of palaver out of which language grows, which is a means of inarticulate communication, even if it does not convey ideas.

These gestures have a second value beside that of calling out social acts which renders them the fitting material out of which to build language. This is that the response to the first suggestion of the act of another form leads to a gesture, that is, to the beginning of an answering act on the part of a second individual, and that this answering gesture is itself again a stimulus to the first to again change its attitude and readjust its act to the changed attitude of the individual toward which it commenced its own original activity.

We see here in perhaps a higher degree than in any other form of reaction the value of the response in affecting the stimulation. What form number two does in response to the stimulation of the gesture of form number one at once leads form number one to change its own attitude. If now through experience the response of form number two to the gesture of form number one becomes associated with this gesture of his, and he anticipates the change which he can introduce into the conduct of form number two through his own gestures, he has the power of control over his social environment which will exceed any control which he exercises over his physical environment. It is true that by movements and manipulation the human animal was early able to effect changes in his surroundings of physical objects, but they were slight as compared with the control which he could exercise through the development of gesture over the social objects of his group. Such a passage of the result of the response into the consciousness of the stimulation is, as we have seen, what goes to make up an object of perception. To see an angry enemy might lead simply to attack or flight. To cautiously approach such an enemy with the consciousness not only of the threatening nature of his gestures, and the feel of one's own stiffening muscles and readiness to act, but also

with the consciousness of the way in which the enemy will respond to one's own attitude, it to present the enemy as an object in the full sense of that term, for the consciousness of the value of one's response to something in terms of the sensations that come to us from the thing is to have just that consciousness of meaning which is involved in perception.

It is of interest to note that the language is but the development of the gestures within which our first consciousness of social objects must have arisen. Certainly the first social objects were presented in the facial expressions, the attitudes of body which made of them stimulations to response. The tones of the voice were parts of this group of stimulations which served as the body of the social object. If these contents of experience had meaning to other individuals, it was because they answered instinctively with corresponding attitudes, expressions, and sounds. It was because the gestures these individuals made suggested the probable responses in the persons of the others that these contents became objects instinct with meaning, and speech has been but the further development of this interchange of gesture which in its earlier form was the first consciousness of a social object.

It is pertinent to ask whether the social object was not in all probability the first object of any sort which arose in human consciousness. Is it likely that any other thing would so soon take on meaning to such a being as the human animal as another member of his group? It may be urged that physical objects are of as great importance as the social objects, that adjustment to these is essential to successful social reaction, that the social object is made up of physical stuff. On the other hand, we must remember that an animal may react to a physical environment without presenting it as made up of objects. Relatively perfect adjustment to an environment can exist and does exist among forms so low in the series that no one would ascribe to them a consciousness of objects. The relation to a social environment involves not adjustment to relatively stable objects but to objects which are constantly changing in answer to the responses of the individual himself. The value of his own responses is reflected in the changes in the social object. If it be true that the meaning of an object is to be found in the consciousness of our habitual reactions to it, there would be no object that could arise so readily in consciousness as the social object, for there could be none which would emphasize the value of our own responses so sharply as the other individuals of a social group whose form and character are so largely dependent upon our responses to them. Nothing could so definitely bring the import of our response to consciousness as the anticipation of varying reactions on the part of other members of the group to the gestures we were about to make.

There is much to support this view in the early history of the race as we catch glimpses of it in the remains of cult and myth, and in the growth of child consciousness, much that supports the idea that the earliest form of reflective consciousness was social and that our consciousness of physical objects is an abstraction from an experience that is primarily social. I cannot enter into this evidence in detail. I can only refer to the fact that man has always found himself in the beginnings of thought over against an environment in which everything is conceived of as alive. That animism and fetishism show man presenting so-called physical objects as selves whose relations to him are

those of vaguely conceived persons. That primitive man has universally personified every object to which he directed his attention. That the child gets his first control over social objects and that the earliest forms of his thinking is entirely in social terms.

Accepting this position of the primal character of social consciousness and recognizing that our very abstract thought itself is a conversation between an I and a Me, that the very language in which we think is taken from the gesture of social intercourse and is always objectified in conversation, that our own selves are first of all the reflections of the attitudes of others towards us, and that we as children refer the experiences of our bodily sensations and feeling to these selves built up out of the reactions of others to our social reactions; I wish to suggest some of the implications of the position.

The result of the development of reflective thought has been the world of physical objects from which gradually the personal element has been eliminated. First of all, the spirits, the mana, and the selves have been banished from physical things, then have followed the gods and goddesses and the world became an indifferent theater within which the history was run. Still man has clung to the idea that the physical universe has existed as his habitat and Christianity formulated a philosophy of history in which the earth has arisen to serve as the home of a humanity which there lives out the drama of its relations to the supreme self, the God in social relationship with whom is found the supreme fact in this universe, the ultimate reality to which all other facts must be referred.

From the time of Galileo modern physical science has steadily undermined this *Weltanschauung*.¹ The reference of physical phenomena to the social religious consciousness reflected in earlier Christian doctrine has been insistently and consistently ignored. The explanation of the world for physical science has not been found in social consciousness. On the contrary, physical science has built of a universe which has dwarfed the social object, has reduced it to a moment in time in the aeons of stellar and geologic evolution, from being the ultimate reality it has become a negligible speck in the overwhelming masses of the universe.

It is true that idealistic philosophy has attempted to turn the tables upon this movement of physical science, has resolved the physical universe into products of thought and identified it with an absolute self and has centered our selves in this divine self. But this grandiose attempt has been quite as disastrous for social consciousness and its objects as have been the surer constructions of physical science. Human beings and their fortunes become even more unimportant and unreal when they are to be the mere privations and negations of the only reality: the infinite and absolute. The empirical selves of social consciousness become only the necessary errors of a finite consciousness.

What is demanded is that first of all we should make a thoroughgoing application of scientific method not only to the abstraction from social consciousness – the world of physical objects, but to the objects of the social world as well, to determine what reality these objects have in comparison with those of physical science, and secondly that we should determine what the import and meaning of these objects of physical and social sciences are to be for a conduct, a behavior, which must remain what it always has been fundamentally social.

Scientific method applied to the study of the social consciousness may be assumed to present us with objects which will be of the same logical character as that of the

objects of the physical sciences. The latter when presented in their simplest form are hypothetical constructions which enable us to state the uniformities of our physical experience. Their reality arises from the fact that when we state our experience in terms of them, we can control conduct. Science applied to social consciousness constructs objects of the same logical character. Social objects are selves and science must indicate the manners in which selves arise in experience, as physical science determines the manner in which mountain ranges, trees, and animals have arisen.

Social science will not endow us with souls anymore than physical science endows nature with the ultimate essences of Aristotelian metaphysics. Any object of any science whether physical or social will be a construction within experience and it will be scientific just in so far as we are able to determine the uniformities, i.e. the laws, which govern its appearance. The function of social science will be the control over the conditions which are responsible for the appearance and growth of social objects, that is, selves. It is of interest to note the dependence of a large part of our social conduct upon a metaphysical i.e. unscientific conception of social objects. While society can breed noble cattle, it cannot undertake to breed a race of men. We stand hesitantly before the social ambitions that we see breeding and fashioning criminals and degenerates but we are so convinced that the criminal's nature is independent of these conditions and therefore responsible for his conduct, that it seems more important to us to prevent his crime than to change the conditions and thus to create a different self. Our system of criminal justice by its adherence to the doctrine of the metaphysical nature of the self actually presents the criminal placing him and holding him in a class from which he can as little escape as the member of an East Indian caste. Everyone who cares to acquaint himself with juvenile crime is aware of the fact that out of entirely imminent material our society, courts and jails are daily manufacturing the criminals whom our offices of the court will intermittently pursue throughout their deformed lives. Juvenile courts have taken a short Sabbath days journey in the direction of reform of these conditions, that they have gone so short a distance that to procedures of criminal courts not summarily revised is due to the fact that any reform of court procedure even one that stretches out the hand to unthinkingly and irresponsible childhood strikes at once upon a conception of the fixed nature of the self. This conception is so fundamental in our whole theory of justice that the slightest reform threatens the whole structure.

Education has its metaphysical presupposition in the human mind. The fixed conviction that the mind is a container in which whatever the school curriculum prescribes can be stored, instead of an organization of consciousness whose function is to mediate the life process of the child, continues to make our educational reforms halfhearted. The hesitant manner in which we approach the mostly unaware of the institutions of marriage and prostitution, and the metaphysical rights of property where that we have not a scientific attitude in dealing with social problems, that we still regard social objects as ultimate essences instead of constructions whose justification lies in the control they give us over experience. Nor is this metaphysical attitude confused to the conservative. The ultimate individualist, the anarchist, is generally an arch-metaphysician. The program-socialist has turned the guns of a metaphysical political economy upon the present order of things so that he may turn private

property over to the state, a program which emphasizes the dogmatic doctrine of property itself.

If selves can be defined in terms of the social processes which they mediate we have a point of view from which to criticize the getting of intelligence or the control over the new possessions. Finally, we face that strange shift in values which has followed upon the triumphs of modern physical science, the changing of man and his interests by the overwhelming magnitudes in the space-time, and mass of man's universe.

I have suggested that social consciousness is the primal point of man's reflection, that its objects are his earliest objects, and that the social ends are the fullest and most concrete, but while we have abstracted a certain part of our experience the so-called physical world, and have constructed such physical objects that we can control its processes, we have not as yet applied the same scientific methods to social experience, we have not been able or ready to construct such social objects that whereupon them we may control social processes. The result has been that the whole meaning of the physical universe can be read into its parts, while the isolated self means little more than the restricted experience of the man who lives by himself.

The ideal of religious and moral experience is that we should actually realize the social meaning of our conduct. But this ideal cannot be realized until we can conceive ourselves in terms of the social processes which at bottom constitute our final reality, and this cannot be achieved until social science constructs these selves as objects by which to control this life. Until science has done for narrower social consciousness what others achieved for the abstractions of physical experience, we can bring the chasm between the physical world and man or self-consciousness enter into the heritage of the universe that is ours.

Notes

- * Partial typescript, partial manuscript, Mead Papers Archive, Box: 10, Folder: 24, 22 pp. 1 Worldvision.

IV. Time and social order

19

THE OBJECTIVE REALITY OF PERSPECTIVES (1926)*

The grandiose undertaking of Absolute Idealism to bring the whole of reality within experience failed. It failed because it left the perspective of the finite ego hopelessly infected with subjectivity and consequently unreal. From its point of view the theoretical and practical life of the individual had no part in the creative advance of nature. It failed also because scientific method, with its achievements of discovery and invention, could find no adequate statement in its dialectic. It recognized the two dominant forces of modern life, the creative individual and creative science only to abrogate them as falsifications of the experience of the absolute ego. The task remained unfulfilled, the task of restoring to nature the characters and qualities which a metaphysics of mind and a science of matter and motion had concurred in relegating to consciousness, and of finding such a place for mind in nature that nature could appear in experience. A constructive restatement of the problem was presented by a physiological and experimental psychology that fastened mind inextricably in an organic nature which both science and philosophy recognized. The dividend which philosophy declared upon this restatement is indicated in William James's reasoned query "Does Consciousness exist?" The metaphysical assault upon the dualism of mind and nature, that has been becoming every day more intolerable, has been made in regular formation by Bergson's evolutionary philosophy, by neo-idealism, by neo-realism, and by pragmatism. And no one can say as yet that the position has been successfully carried.

I wish to call attention to two unconnected movements which seem to me to be approaching a strategic position of great importance – which may be called the objectivity of perspectives. These two movements are, first, that phase of behavioristic psychology which is planting communication, thinking, and substantive meanings as inextricably within nature as biological psychology has placed general animal and human intelligence; and second, an aspect of the philosophy of relativism which Professor Whitehead has presented.

Professor Whitehead interprets relativity in terms of events passing in a four-dimensional Minkowski world. The order in which they pass, however, is relative to

a consentient set. The consentient set is determined by its relation to a percipient event or organism. The percipient event establishes a lasting character of here and there, of now and then, and is itself an enduring pattern. The pattern repeats itself in the passage of events. These recurrent patterns are grasped together or prehended into a unity, which must have as great a temporal spread as the organism requires to be what it is, whether this period is found in the revolutions of the electrons in an iron atom or in the specious present of a human being. Such a percipient event or organism establishes a consentient set of patterns of events that endure in the relations of here and there, of now and then, through such periods or essential epochs, constituting thus slabs of nature, and differentiating space from time. This perspective of the organism is then there in nature. What in the perspective does not preserve the enduring character of here and there, is in motion. From the standpoint of some other organism these moving objects may be at rest, and what is here at rest will be, in the time system of this other perspective, in motion. In Professor Whitehead's phrase, in so far as nature is patient of an organism, it is stratified into perspectives, whose intersections constitute the creative advance of nature. Professor Whitehead has with entire success stated the physical theory of relativity in terms of intersecting time systems.

What I wish to pick out of Professor Whitehead's philosophy of nature is this conception of nature as an organization of perspectives, which are there in nature. The conception of the perspective as there in nature is in a sense an unexpected donation by the most abstruse physical science to philosophy. They are not distorted perspectives of some perfect patterns, nor do they lie in consciousnesses as selections among things whose reality is to be found in a noumenal world. They are in their interrelationship the nature that science knows. Biology has dealt with them in terms of forms and their environments, and in ecology deals with the organization of environments, but it has conceded a world of physical particles in absolute space and time that is there in independence of any environment of an organism, of any perspective. Professor Whitehead generalizes the conception of organism to include any unitary structure whose nature demands a period within which to be itself, which is therefore not only a spatial but also a temporal structure, or a process. Any such structure stratifies nature by its intersection into its perspective, and differentiates its own permanent space and time from the general passage of events. Thus the world of the physical sciences is swept into the domain of organic environments, and there is no world of independent physical entities out of which the perspectives are merely selections. In the place of such a world appear all of the perspectives in their interrelationship to each other.

I do not wish to consider Professor Whitehead's Bergsonian edition of Spinoza's underlying substance that individualizes itself in the structure of the events, nor his Platonic heaven of eternal objects where lie the hierarchies of patterns, that are there envisaged as possibilities and have ingression into events, but rather his Leibnizian filiation, as it appears in his conception of the perspective as the mirroring in the event of all other events. Leibniz made a psychological process central in his philosophy of nature. The contents of his monads were psychical states, perceptions, and *petites perceptions*, which were inevitably representative of the rest of the reality of the universe of

which they were but partially developed expressions. The represented content of all monads was identical, in so far as it was clear and distinct, so that the organization of these perspectives was a harmony preestablished in an identity of rational content. Professor Whitehead's principle of organization of perspectives is not the representation of an identical content, but the intersection by different time systems of the same body of events. It is, of course, the abandonment of simple location as the principle of physical existence, i.e., that the existence of a physical object is found in its occupancy of a certain volume of absolute space in an instant of absolute time; and the taking of time seriously, i.e., the recognition that there are an indefinite number of possible simultaneities of any event with other events, and consequently an indefinite number of possible temporal orders of the same events, that make it possible to conceive of the same body of events as organized into an indefinite number of different perspectives.

Without undertaking to discuss Professor Whitehead's doctrine of the prehension into the unity of the event of the aspects of other events, which I am unable to work out satisfactorily, from the summary statements I have found in his writings, I wish to consider the conception of a body of events as the organization of different perspectives of these events, from the standpoint of the field of social science, and that of behavioristic psychology.

In the first place, this seems to be exactly the subject matter of any social science. The human experience with which social science occupies itself is primarily that of individuals. It is only so far as the happenings, the environmental conditions, the values, their uniformities and laws enter into the experience of individuals as individuals that they become the subject of consideration by these sciences. Environmental conditions, for example, exist only in so far as they affect actual individuals, and only as they affect these individuals. The laws of these happenings are but the statistical uniformities of the happenings to and in the experiences of A, B, C, and D. Furthermore the import of these happenings and these values must be found in the experiences of these individuals if they are to exist for these sciences at all.

In the second place, it is only in so far as the individual acts not only in his own perspective but also in the perspective of others, especially in the common perspective of a group, that a society arises and its affairs become the object of scientific inquiry. The limitation of social organization is found in the inability of individuals to place themselves in the perspectives of others, to take their points of view. I do not wish to belabor the point, which is commonplace enough, but to suggest that we find here an actual organization of perspectives, and that the principle of it is fairly evident. This principle is that the individual enters into the perspectives of others, in so far as he is able to take their attitudes, or occupy their points of view.

But while the principle is a commonplace for social conduct, its implications are very serious if one accepts the objectivity of perspectives, and recognizes that these perspectives are made up of other selves with minds; that here is no nature that can be closed to mind. The social perspective exists in the experience of the individual in so far as it is intelligible, and it is its intelligibility that is the condition of the individual entering into the perspectives of others, especially of the group. In the field of any social science the objective data are those experiences of the individuals in which

they take the attitude of the community, i.e., in which they enter into the perspectives of the other members of the community. Of course the social scientist may generalize from the standpoint of his universe of discourse what remains hopelessly subjective in the experiences of another community, as the psychologist can interpret what for the individual is an unintelligible feeling. I am speaking not from the standpoint of the epistemologist, nor that of the metaphysician. I am asking simply what is objective for the social scientist, what is the subject matter of his science, and I wish to point out that the critical scientist is only replacing the narrower social perspectives of other communities by that of a more highly organized and hence more universal community.

It is instructive to note that never has the character of that common perspective changed more rapidly than since we have gained further control over the technique by which the individual perspective becomes the perspective of the most universal community, that of thinking men, that is, the technique of the experimental method. We are deluded, by the ease with which we can, by what may be fairly called transformation formulae, translate the experience of other communities into that of our own, into giving finality to the perspective of our own thought; but a glance at the bewildering rapidity with which different histories, i.e., different pasts have succeeded each other, and new physical universes have arisen, is sufficient to assure us that no generation has been so uncertain as to what will be the common perspective of the next. We have never been so uncertain as to what are the values which economics undertakes to define, what are the political rights and obligations of citizens, what are the community values of friendship, of passion, of parenthood, of amusement, of beauty, of social solidarity in its unnumbered forms, or of those values which have been gathered under the relations of man to the highest community or to God. On the other hand there has never been a time at which men could determine so readily the conditions under which values, whatever they are, can be secured. In terms of common conditions, by transformation formulae, we can pass from one value field to another, and thus come nearer finding out which is more valuable, or rather how to conserve each. The common perspective is comprehensibility, and comprehensibility is the statement in terms of common social conditions.

It is the relation of the individual perspective to the common perspective that is of importance. To the biologist there is a common environment of an ant hill or of a beehive, which is rendered possible by the intricate social relationships of the ants and the bees. It is entirely improbable that this perspective exists in the perspectives of individual ants or bees, for there is no evidence of communication. Communication is a social process whose natural history shows that it arises out of cooperative activities, such as those involved in sex, parenthood, fighting, herding, and the like, in which some phase of the act of one form, which may be called a gesture, acts as a stimulus to others to carry on their parts of the social act. It does not become communication in the full sense, i.e., the stimulus does not become a significant symbol, until the gesture tends to arouse the same response in the individual who makes it that it arouses in the others. The history of the growth of language shows that in its earlier stages the vocal gesture addressed to another awakens in the individual who makes the gesture not simply the tendency to the response which it calls forth in the other, such

as the seizing of a weapon or the avoiding of a danger, but primarily the social role which the other plays in the cooperative act. This is indicated in the early play period in the development of the child, and in the richness in social implication of language structures in the speech of primitive peoples.

In the process of communication the individual is an other before he is a self. It is in addressing himself in the role of an other that his self arises in experience. The growth of the organized game out of simple play in the experience of the child, and of organized group activities in human society, placed the individual then in a variety of roles, in so far as these were parts of the social act, and the very organization of these in the whole act gave them a common character in indicating what he had to do. He is able then to become a generalized other in addressing himself in the attitude of the group or the community. In this situation he has become a definite self over against the social whole to which he belongs. This is the common perspective. It exists in the organisms of all the members of the community, because the physiological differentiation of human forms belongs largely to the consummatory phase of the act.

The overt phase within which social organization takes place is occupied with things, physical things or implements. In the societies of the invertebrates, which have indeed a complexity comparable with human societies, the organization is largely dependent upon physiological differentiation. In such a society, evidently, there is no phase of the act of the individual in which he can find himself taking the attitude of the other. Physiological differentiation, apart from the direct relations of sex and parenthood, plays no part in the organization of human society. The mechanism of human society is that of bodily selves who assist or hinder each other in their cooperative acts by the manipulation of physical things. In the earliest forms of society these physical things are treated as selves, i.e., those social responses, which we can all detect in ourselves to inanimate things which aid or hinder us, are dominant among primitive peoples in the social organization that depends on the use of physical means. The primitive man keeps *en rapport* with implements and weapons by conversation in the form of magic rites and ceremonies. On the other hand the bodily selves of members of the social group are as clearly implemental as the implements are social. Social beings are things as definitely as physical things are social.

The key to the genetic development of human intelligence is found in the recognition of these two aspects. It arises in those early stages of communication in which the organism arouses in itself the attitude of the other and so addresses itself and thus becomes an object to itself, becomes in other words a self, while the same sort of content in the act constitutes the other that constitutes the self. Out of this process thought arises, i.e., conversation with one's self, in the role of the specific other and then in the role of the generalized other, in the fashion I indicated above. It is important to recognize that the self does not project itself into the other. The others and the self arise in the social act together. The content of the act may be said to lie within the organism but it is projected into the other only in the sense in which it is projected into the self, a fact upon which the whole of psycho-analysis rests. We pinch ourselves to be sure that we are awake as we grasp an object to be sure that it is there. The other phase of human intelligence is that it is occupied with physical things. Physical things are

perceptual things. They also arise within the act. This is initiated by a distant stimulus and leads through approximation or withdrawal to contact or the avoidance of contact. The outcome of the act is in consummation, e.g., as in eating, but in the behavior of the human animal a mediate stage of manipulation intervenes. The hand fashions the physical or perceptual thing. The perceptual thing is fully there in the manipulatory area, where it is both seen and felt, where is found both the promise of the contact and its fulfilment, for it is characteristic of the distant stimulation and the act that it initiates that there are already aroused the attitudes of manipulation, – what I will call terminal attitudes of the perceptual act, that readiness to grasp, to come into effective contact, which in some sense control the approach to the distant stimulation. It is in the operation with these perceptual or physical things which lie within the physiological act short of consummation that the peculiar human intelligence is found. Man is an implemental animal. It is mediate to consummation. The hand carries the food to the mouth, or the child to the breast, but in the social act this mediation becomes indefinitely complicated, and the task arises of stating the consummation, or the end, in terms of means. There are two conditions for this: one is the inhibition, which takes place when conflicting ways of completing the act check the expression of any one way, and the other is the operation of the social mechanism, which I have described, by which the individual can indicate to others and to himself the perceptual things that can be seized and manipulated and combined. It is within this field of implemental things picked out by the significant symbols of gesture, not in that of physiological differentiation, that the complexities of human society have developed. And, to recur to my former statement, in this field selves are implemental physical things just as among primitive peoples physical things are selves.

My suggestion was that we find in society and social experience, interpreted in terms of a behavioristic psychology, an instance of that organization of perspectives, which is for me at least the most obscure phase of Professor Whitehead's philosophy. In his objective statement of relativity the existence of motion in the passage of events depends not upon what is taking place in an absolute space and time, but upon the relation of a consentient set to a percipient event. Such a relation stratifies nature. These stratifications are not only there in nature but they are the only forms of nature that are there. This dependence of nature upon the percipient event is not a reflection of nature into consciousness. Permanent spaces and times, which are successions of these strata, rest and motion, are there, but they are there only in their relationship to percipient events or organisms. We can then go further and say that the sensuous qualities of nature are there in nature, but there in their relationship to animal organisms. We can advance to the other values which have been regarded as dependent upon appetite, appreciation, and affection, and thus restore to nature all that a dualistic doctrine has relegated to consciousness, since the spatio-temporal structure of the world and the motion with which exact physical science is occupied is found to exist in nature only in its relationship to percipient events or organisms.

But rest and motion no more imply each other than do objectivity and subjectivity. There are perspectives which cease to be objective, such as the Ptolemaic order, since it does not select those consentient sets with the proper dynamical axes, and there are

those behind the mirror and those of an alcoholic brain. What has happened in all of these instances, from the most universal to the most particular, is that the rejected perspective fails to agree with that common perspective which the individual finds himself occupying as a member of the community of minds, which is constitutive of his self. This is not a case of the surrender to a vote of the majority, but the development of another self through its intercourse with others and hence with himself.

What I am suggesting is that this process, in which a perspective ceases to be objective, becomes if you like subjective; and in which new common minds and new common perspectives arise, is an instance of the organization of perspectives in nature, of the creative advance of nature. This amounts to the affirmation that mind as it appears in the mechanism of social conduct is the organization of perspectives in nature and at least a phase of the creative advance of nature. Nature in its relationship to the organism, and including the organism, is a perspective that is there. A state of mind of the organism is the establishment of simultaneity between the organism and a group of events, through the arrest of action under inhibition as above described. This arrest of action means the tendencies within the organism to act in conflicting ways in the completion of the whole act. The attitude of the organism calls out or tends to call out responses in other organisms, which responses, in the case of human gesture, the organism calls out in itself, and thus excites itself to respond to these responses. It is the identification of these responses with the distant stimuli that establishes simultaneity, that gives insides to these distant stimuli, and a self to the organism. Without such an establishment of simultaneity, these stimuli are spatio-temporally distant from the organism, and their reality lies in the future of passage. The establishment of simultaneity wrenches this future reality into a possible present, for all our presents beyond the manipulatory area are only possibilities, as respects their perceptual reality. We are acting toward the future realization of the act, as if it were present, because the organism is taking the role of the other. In the perceptual inanimate object the organic content that survives is the resistance that the organism both feels and exerts in the manipulatory area. The actual spatio-temporal structure of passing events with those characters which answer to the susceptibilities of the organism are there in nature, but they are temporally as well as spatially away from the organism. The reality awaits upon the success of the act. Present reality is a possibility. It is what would be if we were there instead of here. Through the social mechanism of significant symbols the organism places itself there as a possibility, which acquires increasing probability as it fits into the spatio-temporal structure and the demands of the whole complex act of which its conduct is a part. But the possibility is there in nature, for it is made up of actual structures of events and their contents, and the possible realizations of the acts in the form of adjustments and readjustments of the processes involved. When we view them as possibilities we call them mental or working hypotheses.

I submit that the only instance we have of prehension in experience is this holding together of future and past as possibilities – for all pasts are as essentially subject to revision as the futures, and are, therefore, only possibilities – and the common content which endures is that which is common to the organism and environment in the perspective. This in the organism is identified with the spatio-temporally distant

stimuli as a possibly real present, past, and future. The unity lies in the act or process, the prehension is the exercise of this unity, when the process has been checked through conflicting tendencies, and the conditions and results of these tendencies are held as possibilities in a specious present.

Thus the social and psychological process is but an instance of what takes place in nature, if nature is an evolution, i.e., if it proceeds by reconstruction in the presence of conflicts, and if, therefore, possibilities of different reconstructions are present, reconstructing its pasts as well as its futures. It is the relativity of time, that is, an indefinite number of possible orders of events, that introduces possibility in nature. When there was but one recognized order of nature, possibility had no other place than in the mental constructions of the future or the incompletely known past. But the reality of a spatio-temporally distant situation lies ahead, and any present existence of it, beyond the manipulatory area, can be only a possibility. Certain characters are there, but what *things* they are can only be realized when the acts these distant stimulations arouse are completed. What they are now is represented by a set of possible spatio-temporal structures. That these future realizations appear as present possibilities is due to the arrest of the act of the organism, and its ability to indicate these possibilities.

That these possibilities have varying degrees of probability is due to the relation of the various inhibited tendencies in the organism to the whole act. The organization of this whole act the human social organism can indicate to others and to itself. It has the pattern which determines other selves and physical things, and the organism as a self and a thing, and the meanings which are indicated have the universality of the whole community to which the organism belongs. They constitute a universe of discourse. It is the fitting in of the particular tendencies into this larger pattern of the whole process that constitutes the probability of the present existence of the things which any one act implies. Its full reality is still dependent upon the accomplishment of the act, upon experimental evidence. It is then such a coincidence of the perspective of the individual organism with the pattern of the whole act in which it is so involved that the organism can act within it, that constitutes the objectivity of the perspective.

The pattern of the whole social act can lie in the individual organism because it is carried out through implemental things to which any organism can react, and because indications of these reactions to others and the organism itself can be made by significant symbols. The reconstruction of the pattern can take place in the organism, and does take place in the so-called conscious process of mind. The psychological process is an instance of the creative advance of nature.

In living forms lower than man the distant perspective may through sensitivity exist in the experience of the form and the grasping of this in the adjustments of conduct answer to the formation of the stratification of nature, but the reconstruction of the pattern within which the life of the organism lies does not fall within the experience of the organism. In inanimate organisms the maintenance of a temporal structure, i.e., of a process, still stratifies nature, and gives rise to spaces and times, but neither they nor the entities that occupy them enter as experiential facts into the processes of the organisms. The distinction of objectivity and subjectivity can only arise where the pattern of the larger process, within which lies the process of the individual organism,

falls in some degree within the experience of the individual organism, i.e., it belongs only to the experience of the social organism.

Note

- * As originally published in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, ed. by Edgar S. Brightman (New York: Longmans and Green, 1926), 75–85 (repr. in George Herbert Mead, *Philosophy of the Present*, ed. by Arthur E. Murphy (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1932; Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, repr. 2002), 171–82).

20

THE NATURE OF THE PAST (1929)*

The present is not the past and the future. The distinction which we make between them is evidently fundamental. If we spread a specious present so that it covers more events, as Whitehead suggests, taking in some of the past and conceivably some of the future, the events so included would belong, not to the past and the future, but to the present. It is true that in this present there is something going on. There is passage within the duration, but that is a present passage. The past arises with memory. We attach to the backward limit of the present the memory images of what has just taken place. In the same fashion we have images of the words which we are going to speak. We build out at both limits. But the images are in the present. Whitehead's suggestion that rendering these images sufficiently vivid would spread the specious present is quite beside the mark. No memory image, however vivid, would be anything but a memory image, which is a surrogate merely for what was or will be spoken.

The actual passage of reality is in the passage of one present into another, where alone is reality, and a present which has merged in another is not a past. Its reality is always that of a present. The past as it appears is in terms of representations of various sorts, typically in memory images, which are themselves present. It is not true that what has passed is in the past, for the early stages of a motion lying within a specious present are not past. They belong to something that is going on. The distinction between the present and the past evidently involves more than passage. An essential condition is its inclusion in some present in this representational form. Passage as it takes place in experience is an overlapping of one specious present by another. There is continuity of experience, which is a continuity of presents. In this continuity of experience there is distinction of happening. There is direction. There is dependence or conditioning. What is taking place flows out of that which is taking place. Not only does succession take place, but there is a succession of contents. What is going on would be otherwise if the earlier stage of the occurrence had been of a different character. It is always a passage of something. There is always a character which connects different phases of the passage,

and the earlier stage of the happening is the condition of the later stage. Otherwise there would be no passage. Mere juxtaposition of events, if this is conceivable, would not constitute passage. The connection involves both identity and difference, and it involves that in the identity which makes the condition for that which follows. The immediate position of a moving body is conditioned by that which preceded it. Continuity is involved as a presupposition in passage in experience.

Although apparently sudden dislocations take place, back of these we imply continuities within which these dislocations could be resolved into continuities. The spatio-temporal connections which these continuities express involve the conditioning of any spatio-temporal position by a previous set of positions. This conditioning is not complete determination, but the conditions that are involved in the continuity of passage are necessary. That which is novel can emerge, but conditions of the emergence are there. It is this conditioning which is the qualitative character of the past as distinguished from mere passage. Mere passage signifies disappearance and is negative. The conditioning, spatio-temporally considered, is the necessity of continuity of relationship in space-time and of characters which are dependent upon space and time, such as velocities and momenta. The discontinuous is the novel. When a force is applied which is responsible for an acceleration, the moment at which that force is applied may be as respects its appearance an emergence from a continuous past, but the spatio-temporal continuities set conditions for the accelerations which result from the application of the force.

There are other continuities which we look for besides those of space-time. These are those of the so-called uniformities of nature. The embedding of any two successive events and their characters, however fortuitous they may seem, within a continuity of happening registers itself as carrying some conditioning of their happening in the succession within which they have appeared. The physical sciences push this conditioning into spatio-temporal form as far as it is possible. They attempt so to state the two happenings that the mere fact that one occurs at a certain place and time determines in some degree that which follows upon it. The ideal of this presentation is an equation between a situation at one moment and that at the next. We seek such a statement that the mere passage of experience will determine that which takes place. Where this can rigorously be carried out we reach what Whitehead calls the Aristotelian adjectives of events, but where it is impossible to so present the happenings that the continuity of passage determines what will take place we have in his terms pseudo-adjectives of events. But that the continuities of space-time do carry with them conditions of that which takes place is a fundamental presupposition of experience. The order within which things happen and appear conditions that which will happen and appear.

It is here that we find the function of the past as it arises in memory and the records of the past. Imagery is not past but present. It rests with what we call our mental processes to place these images in a temporal order. We are engaged in spreading backward what is going on so that the steps we are taking will be a continuity in the advance to the goals of our conduct. That memory imagery has in it characters which tend to identify it as belonging to the past is undoubtedly true, and these characters seem to be frequently independent of its place in a continuous order. A face or a landscape may flash upon the inward eye with seemingly intrinsic evidence of past

experience, although we may have great difficulty in placing them. The evidence is not necessarily of an immediate character. There are certain sorts of images which belong to our pasts and we are confident of them because they fit in. And there are sorts of images which betray the operation of the imagination. A memory may be recognized as such by a method of exclusion, because it has not the fashion of the fancy – because we cannot otherwise account for it. The assurances which we give to a remembered occurrence come from the structures with which they accord.

What is, then, the immediate occasion for this building out of specious presents into a past? These presents themselves pass into each other by an overlapping process. There is no break except under what may be called pathological conditions. We do not build out into the past to preserve mere continuity, i.e., to fill out breaks in reality. But it is evident that we need to complete something that is lacking in that which is going on. The span of that which occupies us is greater than the span of the specious present. The “what it is” has a temporal spread which transcends our experience. This is very evident in the pasts which we carry around with us. They are in great part thought constructs of what the present by its nature involves, into which very slight material of memory imagery is fitted. This memory in a manner tests and verifies the structure. We must have arisen and eaten our breakfasts and taken the car, to be where we are. The sense of this past is there as in implication and bits of imperfect scenes come in at call – and sometimes refuse to arise. But even in this latter case we do not feel that the past is lost.

It may be said that the existence in experience of affairs that transcend our presents is the very past under discussion, and this is true, and what I am endeavoring to make evident. The past is an overflow of the present. It is oriented from the present. It is akin on the one side to our escape fancies, those in which we rebuild the world according to our hearts’ desires, and on the other to the selection of what is significant in the immediate situation, the significant that must be held and reconstructed, but its decisive character is the pushing back of the conditioning continuities of the present. The past is what must have been before it is present in experience as a past. A past triumph is indefinitely superior to an escape fancy, and will be worn threadbare before we take refuge in the realm of the imagination, but more particularly the past is the sure extension which the continuities of the present demand.

The picture which Bergson gives of it seems to me to belie both its character in experience and its functional character – the picture of an enormous incessantly accreting accumulation of “images” against which our nervous systems defend us by their selective mechanisms. The present does not carry any such burden with it. It passes into another present with the effects of the past in its textures, not with the burden of its events upon its back. And whatever account we give of our exiguous imagery, it is marked by what Bergson has himself emphasized, its function of filling out present perceptions. It bears no evidence of the richness of material which Bergson predicates. It is hard to recover and disappointing in its detail. Imagery plays the same role in the past that it plays in the present, that of supplying some element of detail that makes the construction possible.

The inevitability of existence is betrayed in its continuity. What follows flows from what was. If there is continuity, then what follows is conditioned by what was. A

complete break between events would remove the character of inevitability. The elimination of continuity is the gist of Hume's attack upon causality. While the recovery of continuity in passage is the gist of Kant's second deduction of the categories. If there were bare replacement of one experience by another, the experience would not be that of passage. They would be different experiences each wrapped up in itself, but with no connection, no way of passing from one to the other. Even a geometrical demonstration involves passage from situation to situation. The final structure is a timeless affair in the sense that it is a completed structure which is now irrelevant to the passage by which it has arisen. Any passage is in so far inevitable as earlier stages condition later achievements, and the demonstration is the exhibition of the continuity of the passage. One route when it is once taken is as inevitable as another. The child's whimsical movements of the men upon the chessboard is as inevitable as the play of the expert. In the one case its inevitability is displayed by the psychologist and in the other by the logician. Continuity in the passage of events is what we mean by the inevitable.

But are continuity could not be experienced. There is a tang of novelty in each moment of experience. Kant reached this by the *Mannigfaltigkeit der Empfindungen*,¹ an unordered sensuous content which becomes experience when it is placed within the forms of the understanding. Without this break within continuity, continuity would be inexperienceable. The content alone is blind, and the form alone is empty, and experience in either case is impossible. Still Kant's chasm between the two is illusory. The continuity is always of some quality, but as present passes into present there is always some break in the continuity – within the continuity, not of the continuity. The break reveals the continuity, while the continuity is the background for the novelty.

The memory of the unexpected appearance of a supposedly far distant friend, or the memory of an earthquake can never recover the peculiar tang of the experience. I remember that there was a break which is now connected with just the phases of the experience which were unconnected. We recall the joy or the terror, but it is over against a background of a continuum whose discontinuity has been healed. Something was going on – the rising anger of a titan or the adjustment of the earth's internal pressures which resulted in that which was unexpected, but this was not the original experience, when there was no connection between the events before the occurrence and the sudden emergence. Even if no qualitative causal connection appears in the memory, the spatio-temporal connection is there to be developed as thought or imagination may refashion it. Redintegration of the past can never bring back the unexpected. This is just the character of the past as distinguished from the passage of presents into each other. The primal break of novelty in passage is gone and the problem of bridging the contingent factors is before the mind, though it may go no further than the oppressive sense of chance or fate. The character of the past is that it connects what is unconnected in the merging of one present into another.

The corresponding character of the future is still more evident. The novel is already there in the present and introduced breaks into the continuity which we must repair to attain an approach to certainty in the future. The emergent future has therefore a hypothetical character. We can trace the spatio-temporal continuities into it and the

less rigorous continuities of other uniformities, but the particular aspects they will assume depend upon the adjustments which the present with its novelties will call out. Imagery from past continuities, such as the concluding words in the sentence we are speaking, or the house around the corner which we are nearing, approach the inevitable, but we may break the discourse and an explosion may send us down another road. The inevitable continuities belong to the structure of the hypothetical plans of action before us.

What is now to be said of these pasts and futures, when we seek them outside of human experience in terms of which we have been considering them? In the first place we can say that the only pasts and futures of which we are cognizant arise in human experience. They have also the extreme variability which attaches to human undertakings. Every generation rewrites its history – and its history is the only history it has of the world. While scientific data maintain a certain uniformity within these histories, so that we can identify them as data, their meaning is dependent upon the structure of the history as each generation writes it. There is no texture of data. Data are abstractions from things and must be given their places in the constructive pasts of human communities before they can become events. It is tempting to illustrate this in the shifting histories which our present generation has constructed of its habitat – including the whole universe, so far as it has been able to survey it, but the phenomenon is too evident and striking to call for illustration. Every advance in the interpretation of spectroscopic observations of the stars, every advance in the theory of the atoms opens the door to new accounts of the millennia of stellar history. They rival at present the rapidly changing histories of human communities. The immutable and incorruptible heavens exist only in rhetoric. Minute shifts in the lines of the spectrum or the readings of the spectroscope may add or subtract billions of years to the life of the stars.

The validity of these pasts depends upon the continuities which constitute their structure. These continuities in passage are the essence of inevitability, and when we feel the continuity we have reached the security we seek. It is an error to assume that the security depends upon the form of the continuity. For the Psalmist the only form of continuity that gave security was that of the Everlasting Hills and for the Greeks it was the Unchangeable Heavens. We find greater security in the laws of stellar evolution because it knits the continuities of the atoms with the continuities of the stars. The continuities of process are more universal than those of structure. More particularly we have swept away the cosmical and metaphysical chasm between the changeless heavens and the contingent earth. Ancient metaphysics divorced the two inseparable components of passage – the continuous and the emergent. The doctrine of evolution has obliterated the scandal from the union out of which arise all objects in experience. There is no more striking contrast in the history of thought than the gathering security with which we control events by rapidly reconstructing our histories, which reveal our dependable continuities when we stretch them out into their implied pasts; and the helplessness of ancient and medieval thought that found continuity only in a changeless order and an irrevocable past.

The conclusion is that there is no history of presents that merge into each other with their emergent novelties. The past which we construct from the standpoint of the new problem of today is based upon continuities which we discover in that

which has arisen, and it serves us until the rising novelty of tomorrow necessitates a new history which interprets the new future. All that emerges has continuity, but not until it does so emerge. If we could string together the presents as presents we would present the conditions under which the novel could arise but we would not deduce that which arose. Out of the discovered continuities of that which has arisen with all that has gone before we can reconstruct it – in the future, and we obtain the field for this reconstruction by stretching backward in history the new-found continuities. Within our narrow presents our histories give us the elbow room to cope with the ever-changing stream of reality.

If the novel emerges, there can be no history of a continuity of which it is a constituent part, though when it has emerged the continuities which it exhibits may enable us to state a succession of events within which it appears. Let us assume that life has emerged. In a genuine sense the conditions which allow of this emergence determine its appearance. It could not have appeared earlier than these events. The history of life will relate it to these events, which have now become its conditions, but previously were not its conditions, for there was no life to constitute those events the conditions of life. The setting up of the relation between the events which have become conditions and the emerging life is an establishment of continuity between the world before life and life itself, which was inconceivable before life appeared, as one establishes in his memory a continuity between the moment before the earthquake happened and the earthquake, which in its unexpectedness permitted in its happening no such connection. The past thus belongs to a generalized form of experience. It is the arising of relations between an emergent and a conditioning world. Any organism, taken in its widest Whiteheadian sense, maintains itself by means of relationships which, extended backward as well as forward, constitute a history of the world, but evidently it arises only after the appearance of that which gives to the world this value. The past consists of the relations of the earlier world to an emergent affair – relations which have therefore emerged with the affair.

Notes

* As originally published in *Essays in Honor of John Dewey*, ed. by John Coss (New York: Henry Holt, 1929), 235–42.

1 *The Metaphysics of Morals*.

Part III

Mead, a radical democrat

I. Moral and political philosophy

21

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF ETHICS (1908)*

The evolutionary point of view has had more than one important result for philosophical thought. Not the least important among these has been the conception of the evolution of evolution. Not only can we trace in the history of thought the evolution of the conception of evolution, but we find ourselves with a consciousness which we conceive of as evolved; the contents and the forms of these contents can be looked upon as the products of development. Among these contents and forms are found the temporal and spatial qualities of things, of the world. The very time process as well as the space of the universe lies in experience which is itself presented as the result of an evolution that arises in and through spatial conditions, which is first and foremost a temporal process.

The peculiarity of this situation lies in the fact that the involution appears in the immediate findings of science. Our geological and biological sciences unhesitatingly present epochs antedating man in terms of man's consciousness, and biology and scientific psychology has unhesitatingly present that consciousness as an evolution within which all the distinctions must be explained by the same general laws as those which are appealed to account for animal organs and functions. It is true that occasionally a scientist such as Poincaré recognizes that even the number system, as well as Euclidean space, is but a construction which has arisen and maintained itself because of its practical advantages, though we can draw no conclusions from these practical advantages to their metaphysical reality. If this position be generalized, there results the conception of an evolution within which the environment – that which our science has presented as a fixed datum in its physical nature – has been evolved as well as the form which has adapted itself to that environment; that the space within which evolution has taken place has arisen by the same laws; that the very time which makes an evolution presentable has arisen in like manner. Now, to a certain extent the conception of an evolution of environment as well as of the form has domesticated itself within our biological science. It has become evident that an environment can exist for a form

only in so far as the environment answers to the susceptibilities of the organism; that the organism determines thus its own environment; that the effect of every adaptation is a new environment which must change with that which responds to it. The full recognition, however, that form and environment must be phases that answer to each other, character for character, appears in ethical theory.

In a certain sense this is found in the statement which genetic psychology makes of the development of the consciousness of the individual. Here there can be no evolution of the intelligence except in so far as the child's world answers to increased powers of conscious control. The world and the individual must keep pace with each other in the life history of the individual. But the child comes into a world which receives him as a child. The world of the adult, from the point of view of descriptive psychology, is an independent environment within which the child and his world evolve. Within the field of ethics, on the other hand, the moral individual and his world cannot consistently be presented as themselves lying inside another moral field. The growth of moral consciousness must be coterminous with that of the moral situation. The moral life lies in the interaction of these two; the situation rises up in accusation of the moral personality which is unequal to it, and the personality rises to the situation only by a process which reconstructs the situation as profoundly as it reconstructs the self. No man has found moral power within himself except in so far as he has found a meaning in his world that answered to the new-found power, or discovered a deeper ethical meaning in his environment that did not reveal new capacities for activities within himself. Moral evolution takes place then as does that of the child; the moral personality and its world must arise *pari passu*, but, unlike the psychologist's statement of the development of the child, it does not lie inside a larger determining environment.

I am not ignorant of evolutionary ethics, nor that every type of ethical theory in these days has felt itself bound to interpret the development of moral consciousness in terms of custom and institutions. Thus we seem to postulate not only a community moral consciousness, a moral world which determines the growth of the moral consciousness of the individual, but also we imply that this determining moral environment goes back into a past that antedates moral consciousness itself. From this point of view, morality, i.e., control by community habit, has determined the development of individual moral consciousness as tyrannically as the intellectual world has controlled the growth of intelligence in the members of society. But this paradox disappears when we recognize that this control by the community over its members provides indeed the material out of which reflective moral consciousness builds up its own situation, but cannot exist as a situation until the moral consciousness of the individual constructs it.

It is another statement of the same thing that moral consciousness is the most concrete consciousness – the most inclusive statement which can be given of immediate experience. There is no phase of activity, intellectual or physical, no type of inner experience, no presentation of outer reality, which does not find its place within the moral judgment. There is nothing which may not be a condition or an element of conduct, and moral consciousness reaches its climax in the estimation of every possible

content of the individual and his situation. There is no other type of consciousness which must not abstract from other phases to assure its own existence. One cannot carry out an acute analysis and respond to the beauty of the object of analysis, one cannot swell with emotion and dispassionately observe. But we place every phase of our experience within the sweep of conscience; there is no one of these phases of consciousness which has not its legitimate function within the activity when viewed as moral. It is but a step further to claim that the abstractions of science and the expressions of the emotion and the direction of attention in perception and inference must find their functions, and hence their reason for existence, in the act; and that morality inheres in the act alone, but in none of these functions of the act (if I may be allowed two meanings of function in the same sentence).

It is, of course, possible to make this a metaphysical doctrine. If one finds reality in immediate experience and admits that the various intellectual, aesthetic, and perceptual processes exist only as parts and functions of an act which is the ultimate form of immediate experience, then the recognition of the ethical statement of this act as its fullest statement would found metaphysics upon ethics. The presentation of such a doctrine, however, would demand first of all a discussion of the meaning of the terms "immediate experience," of "reality," and the "cognitive state" that answers to it. I have no wish to enter this debatable field, that is loosely defined by the term pragmatism.

There are, however, certain implications of modern ethical doctrine which fall within the lines which I have indicated above; that are of interest quite apart from their relation to metaphysical and logical speculations. The implications to which I refer are those that flow from evolutionary doctrine on the one side and from the identification of purposive activity with moral activity, and the recognition that our intelligence is through and through purposive. The first implication that flows from this position is that the fundamental necessity of moral action is simply the necessity of action at all; or stated in other terms, that the motive does not arise from the relations of antecedently given ends of activities, but rather that the motive is the recognition of the end as it arises in consciousness. The other implication is that the moral interpretation of our experience must be found within the experience itself.¹

We are familiar with three ethical standpoints, that which finds in conscious control over action only the further development of conduct which has already unconsciously been determined by ends, that which finds conduct only where reflective thought is able to present a transcendental end, and that which recognizes conduct only where the individual and the environment – the situation – mutually determine each other. In the first case, moral necessity in conduct, for the conscious individual, is quite relative. It depends upon the degree of recognition which he reaches of the forces operating through him. Furthermore, the motive to act with reference to the end of the fullest life of the species is one which is primarily quite narrowly individualistic, and depends for a social interpretation upon the community of which the individual is a member. Moral necessity in conduct from this point of view is quite independent of the activity itself. So far from being the most fundamental reality it is a derivative by which, through what it is hard to call a *hocus pocus*, the individual acts, for what is only indirectly his own—a distant end, through a social *dressur*. It is, of

course, natural that this point of view should mediate the process of training by which men are to be led unwittingly to socially worthy action, rather than the immediate conduct of the individual who finds himself face to face with a moral problem. It is the standpoint of the publicist and the reformer of social institutions.

But if we admit that the evolutionary process consists in a mutual determination of the individual and his environment – not the determination of the individual by his environment, moral necessity in conduct is found in the very evolutionary situation. The possibility of intelligent action waits upon the determination of the conditions under which that action is to take place. The statement of these conditions becomes the end, when it is recognized that the statement is in terms of the activities that make up the personality of the individual. The content of the end is the mutuality of statement of personality, i.e., the tendencies to activity, in terms of the personalities who make up the environment, i.e., the conditions of the expression of the activities. It is because the man must recognize the public good in the exercise of his powers, and state the public good in terms of his own outgoing activities that his ends are moral. But it is not the public good which comes in from outside himself and lays a moral necessity upon him, nor is it a selfish propensity that drives him on to conduct.

It is inconceivable that such an outside end should have any but an extraneous position. It could never come into a personality except by the door of its own interest. The end could not be a social end. Nor could a purely individual propensity through the agency of community training become social. The moral necessity lies not in the end acting from without, nor in the push of inclination from within, but in the relation of the conditions of action to the impulses to action. The motive is neither a purely rational, external end, nor a private inclination, but the impulse presented in terms of its consequences; over against the consequences of the other impulses. The impulse so conditioned, so interpreted, becomes a motive to conduct. The moral necessity is that all activity which appears as impulse and environment should enter into the situation, and there is nothing which ensures this completeness of expression except the full interrelationship of the self and the situation. That one fully recognized the conflict which the impulse involves in its consequences with the consequences of all the other social processes that go to make him up, is the moral dictum. From the reconstructions that this recognition involves the immediate statement of the end appears. To enforce this dictum is simply to live as fully and consciously and as determinedly as possible.

The moral necessity for education is not an ideal of intelligence that lies before us of the clear refulgence of the intellect. It is the necessity of knowledge to do what is trying to be done, the dependence of the uninformed impulse upon means, method, and interpretation. The necessity of uprightness in public affairs does not rest upon a transcendental ideal of perfection of the self, nor upon the attainment of the possible sum of human happiness, but upon the economy and effectiveness, and consistency demanded in the industrial, commercial, social, and aesthetic activities of those that make up the community. To push reform is to give expression to all these impulses and present them in their consequences over against those of all the other social impulses out of which an organism of personalities arises.

There is abroad a feeling of lack of moral force; we look before and after – to our ancestors, our posterity – for incentive to right conduct, when in fact there is no moral necessity which is not involved in the impulses to conduct themselves. To correct one abuse we must emphasize the interests it jeopardizes. There is no reservoir of moral power, except that which lies in the impulses behind these interests. To correct the sin of the individual is to awaken through the consequences of the sin the normal activities which are inhibited by the excess. It is this healthful, aggressive, moral attitude, which it seems to me is encouraged by the recognition that moral consciousness is the most concrete, the most inclusive of all. Here we must abstract from nothing, and here we cannot appeal from ourselves to a power without ourselves that makes for righteousness. In the fullness of immediate experience, with the consciousness that out of the struggle to act must arise all power to mediate action, lies salvation. In like manner evolution in moral conduct can appeal to no environment without to stamp itself upon the individual; nor to him to adapt himself to a fixed order of the universe, but environment as well as individual appears in immediate experience; the one coterminous with the other, and moral endeavor appears in the mutual determination of one by the other.

Nowhere is this point of view more needed than in the struggles which fill our industrial and commercial life. The individual is treated as if he were quite separable from his environment; and still more is the environment conceived as if it were quite independent of the individual. Both laborer and the society which employs him are exhorted to recognize their obligations to each other, while each continues to operate within its own narrow radius; and because the employer regards the labor union as a fixed external environment of his activity, and would have all the relations between laborer and employer determined by the method in which he bargains and does business, he becomes a narrow individualist; and because the laborer would determine these same relations by the methods which he has used in building up this union, he becomes a socialist. What will take that and other allied problems out of the vicious circles in which they are at present found, is the recognition that it is the incompleteness with which the different social interests are present that is responsible for the inadequacy of the moral judgments. If the community educated and housed its members properly, and protected machinery, food, market, and thoroughfares adequately, the problems at present vexing the industrial world would largely disappear. We resent the introduction of the standard of life into the question of the wages; and yet if the social activities involved in the conception of the standard of life were given full expression, the wage question would be nearly answered. Every such problem is the inevitable indication of what has been left undone, of impulses checked, or interest overlooked. We turn back to history and talk about the evolution of man as if his environment were not the projection of himself in the conditions of conduct, as if the fulfillment of the Law and the Prophets were not the realization of all that is in us. The sources of power lie in that which has been overlooked. Again and again we are surprised to find that – the moral advance has not been along the straight line of the moral struggles in which a sin seemed to be faced by righteous effort, but by the appearance of a novel interest which has changed the whole nature of the problem. If

we were willing to recognize that the environment which surrounds the moral self is but the statement of the conditions under which his different conflicting impulses may get their expression, we would perceive that the reorganization must come from a new point of view which comes to consciousness through the conflict. The environment must change *pari passu* with the consciousness. Moral advance consists not in adapting individual natures to the fixed realities of a moral universe, but in constantly reconstructing and recreating the world as the individuals evolve.

The second implication to which reference has been made, is that we must find the interpretation of moral consciousness within the act. The appeal to a moral order which transcends either metaphysically or temporally the moral situation; the besetting assumption of the moralist that a moral reconstruction can be made intelligible only by a perfect moral order from which we have departed, or toward which we are moving, have very grave practical consequences which it becomes us to consider. In the first place these assumptions rob our moral consciousness of the intellectual interest which belongs to them of right. If morality connotes merely conformity to a given order, our intellectual reaction is confined to the recognition of agreement and disagreement, beyond that the moral reaction can be only emotional and instinctive. There may be, indeed, intellectual processes involved in stating this moral order, but such statement is confined, in the nature of the case, to apologetic and speculative thought to thought which cannot be a part of the immediate moral consciousness.

A moral order to which we must conform can never be built up in thought in the presence of an exigency. There are only two types of reaction in a practical situation. One may respond to well-recognized cues by well-formed habits, or one may adapt and reconstruct his habits by new interpretation of the situation. In the first instance we have habitual conduct, in the second that type of reaction which has been most explicitly worked out by the natural sciences. Most of our action, of course, falls within the first category, and involves no moral struggle. The second type, on the other hand, is that in which practically all our moral issues arise. If a practical scientific problem arises, such as the engineering problems in constructing railroads or driving tunnels, we recognize that the intellectual process by which the problem is solved cannot be a mere reference to a perfect model of conduct already in existence. On the contrary, just because the engineer is face to face with a real problem he must find in the physical situation facts of which he is at present ignorant, and at the same time readjust his habits; in fact, it is the possible readjustment of the habit that directs his attention in investigating the situation, and, on the other hand, what is discovered serves to mediate the formation of the new habit. In a word, there is the typical play of attention back and forth between perception and response. In any such process the criterion which governs the whole and its two phases – three phases if we distinguish between perception of the new data and the formation of the hypothesis by which they are interpreted and mediated in the response – can neither be external to the process. There exists as yet no plan of procedure which the engineer discovers or receives as a vision in the mount. The control is found in the relation of the different phases of the act which have been sketched above. It is the possibility of reaction to a stimulus that holds the reaction in the field of investigation and it is the continued

investigation of the field of stimulus which keeps the reaction continuous and pertinent. The control is then that which was earlier referred to as the process of evolution in which individual and environment mutually determine each other. It is the criterion of action, which uses working hypotheses, but which cannot possibly be identified with an external ideal. This process, whether met in the field of mechanical invention, or the range of engineering, or that of scientific research, is recognized as the most absorbing, most interesting, most fascinating intellectually with which the mind of man can occupy itself, and this interest belongs legitimately to the solution of every moral problem, for the procedure is identical intellectually.

Yet we succeed in robbing our reflective moral consciousness of a great part of this interest. For there is and can be no interest in merely identifying certain types of conduct with those found in a given theory. For example, there is no intellectual interest involved in merely identifying the control exercised by a financier over an industry with the concept of property, and justifying him in doing what he will, within the limits of the law, with his own. There may be a very vigorous emotional reaction against the suggestion that he be interfered with in these vested rights; or, on the other hand, against an institution of property which permits such individualistic exploitation of social values, but there is no intellectual interest except that which is either apologetic or purely speculative. It does not come into the moral reaction to the situation. And yet the enormous content of interest which does attach to these moral questions is attested by the social sciences which have sprung up and expanded in every college and university.

It is interesting to compare the intellectual treatment which such problems receive at the hands of the scientific investigator and the pulpit. In the latter there is at present no apparatus for investigation. The pulpit is committed to a right and wrong which are unquestioned, and from its point of view unquestionable. Its function then is not the intellectual one of finding out what in the new situation is right, but in inspiring to a right conduct which is supposed to be so plain that he who runs may read. The result has been that in the great moral issues of recent industrial history, such as the child labor, woman's labor, protection of machinery, and a multitude more, the pulpit has been necessarily silent. It had not the means nor the technique for finding out what was the right thing to do. The science of hygiene threatens the universal issue of temperance, while we can look forward to the time when investigation may enable us to approach understandingly the prostitute and her trade, and change the social conditions which have made her possible instead of merely scourging an abstract sin.

The loss to the community from the elimination of the intellectual phase of moral conduct it would be difficult to overestimate and this loss is unavoidable as long as the interpretation of conduct lies outside the immediate experience, as long as we must refer to a moral order without, to intellectually present the morality of conduct.

In conclusion may I refer to another loss which moral conduct dependent upon an external ideal involves. The interpretation of sin and wrong with reference to a moral order external to the conduct fails to identify the moral defect with the situation out of which it springs and by whose reconstruction it may be eliminated. An illustration will at once indicate, I think, what I have in mind. The responsibility for death and

accident upon our railroads cannot be laid at the doors of the system and those that work it, if an abstract doctrine of property and contract is used to judge the conduct of railroad managers and directors. The imperative necessity of the situation is that responsibility should be tested by the consequences of an act; that the moral judgment should find its criterion in the mutual determination of the individual and the situation. As it is, men who would risk their own lives to save a drowning man, regard themselves as justified in slaughtering others by the thousand to save money. Abstract valuations take the place of concrete valuations, and as the abstract external valuations are always the precipitations of earlier conduct, they are pretty uniformly inadequate.

But not only does an external moral ideal rob immediate moral conduct of its most important values, but it robs human nature of the most profound solace which can come to those who suffer – the knowledge that the loss and the suffering, with its subjective poignancy, has served to evaluate conduct, to determine what is and what is not worth while.

Notes

* As originally published in *International Journal of Ethics*, 18 (1908), 311–23.

1 The full analysis of position assumed here has been given by Prof. John Dewey in his article, “The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality,” in Vol. III, of the Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago.

22

NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE THEORY OF THE POLITICAL INSTITUTION (1915)*

The term natural rights suggests the political speculations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe, and the various revolutions that took them in some sense as their slogans. These revolutionary movements were one after the other increasingly forward-looking, constructive undertakings, until we may fairly say that as their results we find in representative government and growing democracy, revolution incorporated in the institution of government itself. That is, the form of government has become such that in its own operation the people can by legislation and amendment change it into any form they desire and still will have acted in a strictly legal and constitutional fashion. Furthermore, in the interplay of legislation and the execution and judicial interpretation of the legislation there arise not only the opportunities, but also the legally recognized occasions for the continual reconstruction of governmental institutions, so that a constant growth may take place in the form of institutions, and government may become in its own operation something entirely different from what it was, without any break or overthrow of constituted authority. Revolution has been incorporated into the constituted form of government itself.

And this has involved a revolution itself, for such an institutionalizing of revolution has been no less revolutionary with reference to revolution itself than it has been with reference to fixed forms of government. The tendency of each revolutionary movement had been to fix itself in relatively unchangeable governmental structure, that the successes it has spent and fought for might be preserved and entrenched, and thus had prepared the appropriate situation for the next revolution that sought in its turn to build its achievements into a new structure that should hold out

Against the wreckful siege of battering days.

In fact, the form of government in democratic countries has responded more completely to the demand for the opportunity for continual change than have the customs and

attitudes of the community itself. The embedded structure of society has become more conservative than its more external forms and machinery. The possible revolutions, in the old sense, which we can envisage today are supposed to be directed against this inner structure such as the very producing and holding of wealth, or the procreating and nurture of children, and it is quite on the cards that these revolutions might be carried out by methods which would be strictly constitutional and legal.

It is not remarkable, then, that rights which looked very definite to the gentlemen who drew up the American Declaration of Independence, or those who formulated the bills of rights that were to justify the French revolutions, should have an entirely different aspect and meaning today. Life, liberty, security, property, and even the pursuit of happiness took on a definite connotation from the dangers and hindrances men sought to eliminate, the dangers and hindrances which an autocratic government could put in the way of the enjoyment of these imprescriptible rights. And when these dangers and hindrances had been removed the definitions of the rights which had been given in terms of what threatened them lost their bearings and at the same time their content. How simple and self-evident are the following definitions, taken from the declaration of rights and duties prefixed to the French constitution of September 23, 1795:

- “The rights of man in society are liberty, equality, security, property.”
- “Liberty consists in the power to do that which does not injure the rights of others.”
- “Equality consists in this, that the law is the same for all, whether it protects, or whether it punishes.”
- “Equality does not admit any distinction of birth, or any inheritance of power.”
- “Security results from the cooperation of all to assure the rights of each.”
- “Property is the right to enjoy and dispose of one’s goods, one’s revenues, of the fruit of one’s labor, and of one’s industry.”
- “The law is the general will expressed by the majority of all the citizens or of their representatives.”
- “That which is not forbidden by law may not be prohibited. No one may be constrained to do that which the law does not ordain.”
- “No one may be summoned before court, accused, arrested, or detained, except in cases determined by law, according to the forms prescribed by law.”
- “Those who incite, give legal form to, sign, execute, or have executed arbitrary acts are culpable and are to be punished.”
- “All unnecessary severity in securing the person of the accused is to be severely repressed by law.”
- “No man may be judged until he has been heard or legally summoned.”
- “The law may only judge such penalties as are strictly necessary and proportioned to the offense.”
- “All treatment which aggravates the penalty set by the law is a crime.”
- “No law either criminal or civil may be applied retroactively.”
- “Every individual may dispose of his time and his services, but he may not offer himself for sale or be sold. His person is not alienable property.”

- “All taxes are established for the common good. It should be divided among those contributing to it, according to their abilities.”
- “The sovereignty resides essentially in the entirety of the citizens.”
- “No individual and no group of citizens may take to himself or itself sovereignty.”
- “No one without legal commission may exercise any authority or fill any public office.”
- “Every one has the right to take equal part in the formation of the law, in the nomination of the representatives of the people, and of public officers.”
- “Public offices may not become the property of those who hold them.”
- “Social security can not exist if the division of powers has not been established, if their limits have not been fixed, and if the responsibility of public officers has not been assured.”

Here we find liberty defined in terms of taking away liberty and other rights to be defined, equality in terms of the absence of legal distinctions, security in terms of its source, property in terms of the absence of interference with its use, whatever it may be. But to the minds of men of the year four, these definitions had definite contents, because they were undertaking to determine the conditions under which certain powers which it did not even occur to them to define might be exercised.

Now that these conditions are in large measure assured, that the danger of inherited dynastic autocratic power has largely disappeared, these same powers lack the definition which the outlining of certain conditions of their exercise gave to them, and with Taine we may criticize the working conceptions of the French Revolution as abstract.

It is to be remembered, however, that a *working* conception can be abstract only in so far as that to which it refers for its functioning, needs only to be designated, not to be analytically defined. The abstract political individual of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the abstract economic individual of the nineteenth century were quite concrete, every-day persons. They were pointed out by the negative definitions of those who speculated about them, and the negative definitions had reference to the hindrances to their activities which most interested the individuals. Thus Spinoza was interested in a community in which the inherent reason of the individual should find its natural expression, and the passions should be relegated to their proper place. Such a state would be founded by and through a *libera multitudo*, free in the Spinozistic sense that it would be conscious of its essentially rational nature. It is from the standpoint of Spinoza's theory of the passions as passive and privation, that he is led to regard man as the embodiment of an abstract *potentia*, which by his definition comes to consciousness and so to freedom by the very disappearance of those privations which are our passions. It is the irony of Spinoza's speculation that for conduct it was the passions, the negations, which were after all defined as to their content, while the *potentia* which was to exist in positive consciousness is defined only in terms of the cessation of the passions, and the conditions under which this may take place. The positive content of reason to which Spinoza arises in the denouement of his “Ethics” is a mystical emotion. But in his own struggle and in that which he predicated of all human conduct it was through the definition of what he had to overcome that he

designated the individual which was to rise triumphant. This potentia has the right to express itself, but the right is defined in terms of the obstacles to its expression.

The timorous Hobbes facing the disturbances of the Puritan revolution and the worse conditions which were likely to ensue defined the individual in terms of those hostile impulses which must lead to a *bellum omnium contra omnes*. It was this human being, lifted through Hobbes's fear out of all human relationship, whose rights, recognized only in a state of nature, must be entirely surrendered to an autocratic sovereign, who is defined entirely in terms of what he must surrender to be safely admitted within a human society. There could and can be no doubt to whom Hobbes referred in his abstract definition of the individual, nor can there be any question that the definition indicates the hindrances which keep the individual out of the social state to which he belongs. In the case of Hobbes the rights – so-called – of man are positive. They are the concrete satisfaction of every desire, just in so far as the man is able to attain that satisfaction. The individual who surrenders these rights, on the contrary, is entirely empty as a social being. He is the mere creature of the absolute sovereign.

The revolution of 1688 found its philosopher in John Locke, and its theory in his treatise on "Civil Government." Building on the very foundations which had seemed so abhorrent to Hobbes, the party that dethroned James and brought in by act of Parliament William and Mary, appealed to a certain common interest which they felt to be the interest of the individual. Thus we find in Locke's account of the state of nature the whole content of social existence which, according to Hobbes, was possible only under the absolute autocrat. There is lacking only a settled statement of law, received by common consent, an indifferent judge to administer it, and an executive to enforce the decisions. But this legislation, justice, and execution is only the carrying out of actions with reference to common ends which are already in the natures and conduct of men, before the government is constituted. The government comes in only to give adequate expression and effect to natural social attitudes and conduct of men in a state of nature. There is to be found property, the family, and neighborly interest in one another. Was ever human nature so quickly regenerated as between the publications of the "*Leviathan*" and the "*Treatise on Civil Government*?" With such a human nature, so admirable in its native state, the emphasis must now be laid upon the restrictions to be placed upon government, not those to be placed upon the individual. The laws must be free from the influence of private interest, they must have in view alone the public good. The taxes raised must be by common consent, and the original power of the people to fashion its own government for its own ends must not be placed in any other hands or power.

Here we have a statement of rights of the people against any usurping, misgoverning government. And they again are negative, and yet they are the issues of the revolution of 1688, the elimination of court and dynastic interests in legislation, the vigor of parliament, and, in especial, its unquestioned hold upon the purse strings. But none of these human rights which Locke affirms over against a dethroned monarch is stated in positive form. There is no definition of the common good, nor of the purposes for which taxes should be raised and expended, nor what is the essential function of parliament. And for the purposes of presenting the case of the revolutionary party the

statement was far more effective than one which had undertaken to state what the common good of the community was or in what lay the authority of the supreme legislative body.

With Rousseau the affirmation of the social character of human nature is still more emphatic. There is not only a common good that exists, and can be recognized by all, there is also a common will by which it can be affirmed and enforced. The government which Locke calls out to carry out the social nature of men is but the expression of Rousseau's *volonté générale* which, it is true, constructs a government as an instrument to carry out its purposes. This government, however, is but a means to accomplish a definite common purpose, commonly conceived, and the execution of which is commonly determined. Over against such a mere instrument, such a servant of the common interest and will, the rights of the men who make up the state are the more sharply defined, but for that very purpose negatively stated. A statement of them was given in the form of the preamble to the constitution of the year four.

The rights of man, especially those which have been called natural rights, have been the expression of certain negative conditions under which men in society and under government could express themselves. And they have been formulated with reference to definite hindrances which have brought to consciousness the powers which were seeking expression, but only in terms of the obstacles themselves. In the "Areopagitica," in the whole eloquent plea for freedom of publication, Milton undertakes no definition of what is good to print, and we are in the same case to-day. After all we are legally free to say and to print what a jury of twelve talesmen think it proper for us to say and print. If this legal situation were the actual situation and the determination of what we might say or publish did lie with any twelve theoretically good men and true, picked by the sheriff, and not with what we call public sentiment, the situation would be ludicrously absurd. However, public sentiment does not undertake to define what it is proper to print except over against the dictum of a legislature or a judge, and then it does not speak positively as to what is the nature of what may be said or printed. It approves or disapproves of the particular law or decision that is applied in the particular case, and if you undertake to formulate a right out of this, you find that you have only an abstraction.

The natural right to liberty may be rendered by the pregnant phrase that there is no freedom except under the law, which is another way of saying that nothing may be forbidden to you which must not, by the same act, be forbidden to every one else under the same conditions, although this is not all that this phrase implies; but it will tell you nothing of what you are at liberty to do. It has always been for the crushing out of exceptional privileges that our wars of freedom have been fought. Not even the statement that a man must be an end and never a means can be made a positive content, i.e., can be made into a positive statement of what responsible personality consists in. In general no man is free who has not the means of expressing himself, but just what is necessary to that self-expression cannot be made clear. It is probable that Epictetus was far freer than was his master, and at the present time millions of men are expressing their freedom in exposing their bodies to torture and death. I do not say that we cannot formulate a fairly comprehensive statement of what has come to

be the stature and measure of what the citizen should be in our minds at the present moment. We would give him undoubtedly economic freedom, an education, an association with his fellow citizens and fellow workmen that would ensure him the means of control over situations affecting his physical, social, and intellectual well-being. But of one thing we may be sure that the next struggle for liberty, or our liberties, will arise out of some infraction that will not have reference to the definition which we have formulated of what the man should be and, consequently, of what constitute his liberties. On the contrary, we will find in all probability that the struggle will lead to a quite different definition from the one with which we started. No more illuminating instance of such a struggle can be found than in the fight of laborers for liberty to combine. The contests have always been over concrete restrictions, and every victory and defeat has left the question of what is the right to liberty of combination still undecided, though it has settled possibly for long periods to come a certain class of cases. The contents of our so-called natural rights have always been formulated negatively, with reference to restrictions to be overcome. When these restrictions have been overcome they represent a positive content of what we call for the time being our liberties. Thus we claim freedom of conscience in religious conduct. Slavery has gone by the board. Popular education, freedom of laborers to combine, etc., are mile-stones in our progress, and at each struggle we have added something to the fundamental rights of the man who is a part of the modern community. But we have also discovered that we never fight our battles over again. It is never the same question that arises again, and over against the new situation we find ourselves as unable satisfactorily to define the content of what our liberties are as our forefathers have been before us. We feel the narrow walls and brace ourselves to burst open the doors of opportunity that we find shut, but we can never apply the keys by which former doors were locked.

Historians of the theory of natural rights take pains to point out that the questions of the inherent character of these rights has been confused with that of their priority to the society within which they find their expression. The most glaring instance of this error is to be found in the common assumption of the contract theorists of society, that we can conceive of the individual citizen existing before the community, in the possession of the rights which afterwards the society undertakes to protect. On the contrary, it is pointed out that a right implies a recognition, and that this is a recognition which cannot be found outside of an organized social group. Thus they deny the possibility of rights inhering in the men in the state of nature as presented by Spinoza and Hobbes, for these men have only powers, such as have the beasts of the field, but no rights. On the other hand, the state of nature which upon Locke's hypothesis precedes the compact forming the state is already a society, however deficient it may have been in governmental institutions. Had Locke had the acquaintance of our anthropologists with primitive groups he would have recognized that his precontract men would have possessed an organized group of social habits out of which indeed governmental institutions were to arise, but which already performed the functions of government as definitely as the later institutions were destined to do. Rousseau of course is subject to the same error of supposing that his socially endowed men with their recognition of each other's personalities could have existed without some form

of social organization that must have fulfilled the function in some way of social control. If we are to correct their history we would substitute, for the coming together of these Lockean and Rousseauian precontract-men, the situations in which tribes that include a number of clans find the blood-feuds so costly in life and tribe-strength, that they get together to formulate a graduated set of fines and primitive courts to enforce these penalties. Here governmental institutions arise out of communities that have been controlled largely by customs that needed no institutional instruments for the exercise of their function. Here the rights that are formulated and enforced have already existed and hence have been already recognized in another form, and indeed in a true sense have been already enforced.

If we rob the term natural right of this implication of nature – that the right existed in a previous state of nature – can the term still be retained? We find that the term natural right is bound up with another very important conception in the history of political theory, that of natural law. Here the reference to nature does not imply a prior existence, but points rather to the fundamental character of the law, or in the other case to the fundamental character of the right. Here the emphasis upon *natural* sets it off against what is felt to be unnatural. Thus there is supposed to be a natural law of propinquity in marriage which throws into sharp contrast instances of unnatural marriages. And there are in the same sense the natural rights which may be contrasted with the unnatural rights which have been conferred upon privileged classes or individuals. Thus equality has been asserted as natural to man, and freedom of movement in the satisfaction of his wants. And the term may have either a backward or a forward look.

When Adam dug and Eve span.
Who was then the gentleman?

looked backward for the typical expression of human nature. Nature as Aristotle conceived it, on the other hand, reached its typical expression at the end of a period of growth or realization. And a modern evolutionist, Herbert Spencer, has presented the hypothesis of a human society that is to be the result of a process of evolution, within which there is to be complete adaptation, so that finally there will arise a human nature that is as yet only in embryo.

This conception of a right that belongs to the nature of society and that of the men who constitute that society brings us finally to the question, what beyond its recognition is involved in a right. We have seen that it comes to consciousness through some infraction, but this does not reveal its essential character. It can only exist in a society. Is it, then, conferred upon the individual by the group or society? From the standpoint of Bentham and Austin there are no natural rights, all rights being conferred, unless we accept Spencer's criticism on Benthamism that there must be assumed an original right to the enjoyment of pleasure. In any case it is the *common interest* on the part of society or those who constitute society in that which is the right of the individual which gives that right its recognition, and gives the ground for the enforcement of the right.

The attitude of the individual and of society may, however, be quite different, depending upon the point of view we adopt as to the character of the object which

the individual sets before himself as his end. Is he pursuing a private end which chances to have the approval of the rest of the community? Or is his object one that is to him also a common good? Even Mill has sought to show that through indissoluble association the private end may become the common end in the view of the individual himself. Kant sought, approaching the problem from the opposite pole, to reach a like goal through substituting the good will itself for the universal form of the act, advancing then from the good will as an end to a society of good wills as a kingdom of ends. It remained for post-Kantian philosophy to find in the doctrine of the universality of the end of the individual's act, and the fact that that end must be social, being an objectification of the self, the starting-point for a theory of the state. I have no intention of discussing this theory. I wish simply to point out that Kant, Hegel, and Mill all assume that the individual in society in large measure pursue ends which are not private, but are in his own mind public goods and his own good because they are public goods. Here we have a basis for a doctrine of rights which can be natural rights without the assumption of the existence of the individual and his right prior to society. The right is arbitrary from the standpoint of neither the individual nor the community. In so far as the end is a common good, the community recognizes the individual's end as a right because it is also the good of all, and will enforce that right in the interest of all. An evident illustration is found in property. The individual seeks property in a form which at the same time recognizes the property of others. In the same fashion the community in recognizing property as a common social object, which is yet the end of the individual, enforces the right of the individual to his own possession. This character certainly inheres in all so-called natural rights. In all of them we recognize that the individual in asserting his own right is also asserting that of all other members of the community, and that the community can only exist in so far as it recognizes and enforces these common ends, in which both the individual and the community are expressed.

It follows from this conception that the number of natural rights will be limited and in some sense defined at any time, depending upon the meaning we give to the term enforce. If by that we imply the exercise of *force majeure* through the judicial and executive institutions of the community, the number of kinds or rights which can be enforced at any one time in a community will be necessarily limited. If by enforcement we imply as well the action of custom, public opinion, and sympathetic response, and indeed these are the chief forces that enforce the will of the community, then the number of natural rights which men may possess will be practically unlimited, for their common objects may not be counted. Even the most selfish end must have the form of a public good, to have any value to the private individual, otherwise it cannot be his to have and to hold. It is evident that in one sense we have boxed the compass. We started with life, liberty, security, equality, pursuit of happiness, as natural rights. They were recognized as present in happiness, as natural rights. They were recognized as present in consciousness only when they were in some manner trespassed upon. They were found to be incapable of definition as to their content. From the point of view just suggested, every object that is pursued in a common or social form, implies a common good, that may demand recognition and the enforcement of the right of

the individual. Here there is no limit to the number of such goods, and hence no limit to such rights. They seem to be definable in terms of contents, for they are all the common interests of men and mankind, and we have them as contents ever in mind, as they are prizes of our effort, and the solace of our hours of relaxation.

This anomalous situation repeats itself when we look to the nature of human rights and to their guaranties in our political and judicial institutions. What is evident at once is the difficulty of formulating fundamental rights which are to be distinguished from the multitudinous objects, the ends of actions, that are sought through our government and courts. The problem is that of determining the distinction that is to be made between the private right which must take its chances against other demands of a like sort and the specific common good which is endangered and calls for the special protection of our institutions. I think I shall not be subject to contradiction if I assert that in this country at least, where we have gone further than men have gone in other countries in the attempt to formulate fundamental rights in our written constitutions, and in the use of the courts in their protection, we have not succeeded in rendering definite what the rights are which should receive these guaranties, and that behind the effort to state and defend these rights have always loomed other issues, which theoretically should be kept out of the question, but which come to be the deciding influences in the action of the courts.

It is evident that we do not assume that in other cases than those especially protected human rights are to be sacrificed. On the contrary, we assume that they are protected in the ordinary process of social conduct, both within and without the courts. Nor do we or should we assume that the rights which are so protected are less precious than those which call for the unusual action provided by our state and federal constitutions. On the contrary, must we not assume that issues which arise under the application of these guaranties are those leading to the formulation of new objects and the rights which attach to them. It is largely under the doctrine of the police power, that such new objects and rights are emerging in our kingdom of ends, and here what is demanded is not an exact definition of abstract human liberties, of the right to the due process of law, but that these new interests which have been what we have been pleased to call private interests in the past, should have the opportunity to appear as common goods. It is evident that categories which are to serve all these purposes must be abstract and empty of content and that they should get their content through the struggle which arises on the bare floor and between their distant walls.

It is not for me to discuss the architecture, curious and at times fascinating in its archaeological interest, of the staircases and corridors and doorways by which these modern throbbing issues reach these halls, nor the strange garbs that they have to assume to be presented at court. It is important to recognize what is going on, and to distinguish between that part of the process which merely holds the issue back from making its plea, and that which allows it to become gradually formulated. And it is important that we should realize the relation between these two phases of the process. This can be recognized in the instances which are most in evidence in the courts, those having to do with the protection of rights involved in property. In the social legislation which is appearing in such volume in all our states, rights which

have in the past inhaled in property are seriously affected. Now it is not of importance that these earlier rights should be protected if some common good which they have failed to recognize is at stake, nor should there be obstacles placed in the way of the appearance of this common good involved, in the interest of the ancient right. What is of importance is that all the interests which are involved should come to expression. For this purpose it is of importance that no hasty action should take place. And from this standpoint it is clear that political guaranties which delay action in the legislatures and constitutional provisions which are enforced in the courts have the same function.

On the face of it the former method, that of political guaranties, is the more logical, for it is in the legislature that it is possible to present more fully the human interests that are involved. Especially in a legislature such as the English, in which the responsibility for the execution of the laws is and must be felt. And in England the political guaranties are practically the only ones in existence. But I cannot discuss the relative value of these two types of guaranties, I can only insist that we should recognize that the drag which we put by means of both of them upon the changes in the structure in our society serves only the purpose of enabling all the interests that are involved in the issue at stake to come to the surface and be adequately estimated. Let us labor under no delusion; while we do not want hasty or ill-considered action, there is after all no right that must not eventually get its formulation in terms of a common good so universal that even those most opposed in the struggle will accept and acclaim it. And such a formulation must eventually take place in terms of concrete living interests.

In other words, we must recognize that the most concrete and most fully realized society is not that which is presented in institutions as such, but that which is found in the interplay of social habits and customs, in the readjustments of personal interests that have come into conflict and which take place outside of court, in the change of social attitude that is not dependent upon an act of legislature. In the society which is closest to that of the primitive man we find the reality of all that is prefigured and set out in the institutions, and while problems that are not and cannot be solved through the readjustments of the individual's habit and the immediate change in social attitudes have to be dealt with in the halls of legislature and the rooms of our high courts, they are only brought there to enable men to envisage them more clearly and especially to become conscious of interests which could not appear immediately in their reactions to each other. When, however, this has taken place and the essential meaning of the problem has been grasped, its solution lies in the action of common citizens with reference to the common goods which our institutions have brought to their view and so analyzed that they can react to these new interests as they have to those to which they are already adjusted.

In these days of discussion over the meaning of *Kultur*, we may entertain a false view of institutions. They are the tools and implements of the community; they are not civilization itself. Society has progressed by a process of integration which has gradually brought men and women who have been separated by physical and social distances so close together that they have come to react to those who have been afar off as to those with whom they have been in immediate sympathetic relation, and

political institutions have held people together in these as yet not fully integrated groups and in part have helped them to get still closer together and in part have kept them still farther apart. The political institution has especially held men together because it has represented and in some sense undertaken to make good, what was lacking through the absence of immediate social interrelationship. Thus through military activity men of different groups and different localities have been brought into a relationship which could be but the shadow of a real human community. And yet the relation of those thus socially and geographically at a distance could be mediated by the direct connection to the monarch. Here was a common bond, though it did not run from man to man directly, but from each to the sovereign. It became, of course, a basis for direct relationship in war through the attitude toward the common leader. But it also served other purposes. It gave in the first place a sense of the larger social whole to which men belonged. In the second place, the subjection to the monarch carried with it the theory at least of his protection. Thus the relation to the king could serve to replace in some degree the complete socialization of the whole realm. The king was the guarantee for all the rights that were not respected because men belonged to so many different groups and classes and districts instead of to one self-conscious community. Not only military activity has thus brought men of different groups together and held them together by means of a political institution till social integration could take place. Religion has served the same purpose. In Europe Pope and Emperor were together the institutional figures which in the Holy Roman Empire drew the shadowy outlines of Christendom and made it possible for men to realize that theoretically they belonged to a single society. But even more compelling than the influence of arms and religious faiths has been the influence of barter and trade and the wealth which they have procreated. Exchange of goods does not wait upon the decision of the clanging fight nor the acceptance of the prophet's message. It has undistanced the Alexanders and the Gregorys, and has set up a tenuous society of economic men from which no accessible member of the human race is excluded. Thus has money, that root of all evil, set the most grandiose problem to human kind of achieving the completed society which wealth-in-exchange has sketched. But if men that are otherwise hostile to each other will trade together there must be some guarantee that the human rights which neither is bound to respect in the other shall be regarded at least in so far as they continue to trade and barter. Let these same economic processes within a community force men from different classes together into relations which do not carry with them their own social organization and hence their own guarantee of mutual rights, and again some outside institution must arise to act as a surrogate for the control which a completely organized group would exercise directly. In a word, the political institution presupposes first, relations set up between those at an effective distance from each other, distance which may be measured in miles and days, or in unsurmounted barriers of social classes and castes; and second, that the social control over the conduct of men in this relationship, which would arise through the other social relations if these distances were overcome, must in the interest of the whole be exercised by some compelling social force within the radius of whose action the distant individuals fall; and third, that with the completion of the socialization of those

who lie within this relationship the function of the institution, its guarantee of rights, ceases. Most of our quarrels are settled out of court, and except at the street corners within the loop district few of our actions are governed by the police, nor are human rights the less carefully guarded; they are indefinitely better protected than the most vigilant police administration or system of courts could guard them. Human rights are never in such danger as when their only defenders are political institutions and their officers.

If this is in any sense a true account of the situation, every right that comes up for protection by our courts or other constitutional institution is confessedly in a form which is incomplete and inadequate, because it represents a social situation which is incomplete and inadequate. Until that situation can change the right may demand such defense as an institution can give it. But to stereotype the incomplete social situation even in the interest of action which should be neither hasty nor inconsiderate is not the proper function of the institution. It is true that until the human interests involved can be brought to public consciousness action should halt. But is it wise to have one organ to halt action and quite others or perhaps none at all for bringing these issues to the surface when the actual right is being safeguarded?

Furthermore, whatever confidence we may have in the brakes and drags which we put upon the wheels of popular action, we should not forget that the ultimate guarantee must be found in the reaction of men and women to a human situation so fully presented that their whole natures respond. However lacking in rigidity and solidity this may seem, it is at bottom the only guarantee of a human right to which we can finally appeal. Our other appeals are to institutions which delay the action in this highest court, and are legitimate when they make possible the complete presentation of the case. But is it wise to put our faith entirely in the valiant delayer of action, rather than in the agencies which will lead to the final social readjustments through their adequate presentation of the issues involved? Is it not true that our confidence in our courts has worked in no small degree with other causes to weaken the responsibility of our legislatures on the one hand, and on the other, to lead many of us to face social problems by turning our backs upon them, and approach them only when we have exhausted every delay the constitution provides?

Note

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23

SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE MORAL SCIENCES (1923)*

It had become a commonplace of the psychologist that there is a structure in our experience which runs out beyond what we ordinarily term our consciousness; that this structure of idea determines to a degree not generally recognized the very manner of our perception as well as that of our thinking, and that the structure itself is generally not in the focus of our attention and passes unnoticed in our thought and perceiving. It was this dependence of our field of direct experience upon such an unrecognized part of what we call mind that Freud has made the theme of his doctrines, in a realm that lies on the border of the abnormal or just over it. It is one of the valuable by-products of the Freudian psychology that it has brought many people to recognize that we do not only our thinking but also our perceiving with minds that have already an organized structure which determines in no small degree what the world of our immediate and reflective experience shall be. It is possible to recognize other censors beside those dramatically placed by Freud at the door of so-called consciousness to pass upon the figures that enter our dreams.

It is to one of these that I wish to call attention. It is that the intelligible order of the world implies a determined moral order – and for a moral order we may substitute a social order, for morality has to do with the relations of intelligent beings with each other and that this determined moral or social order is a world as it should be and will. We may express this as Kant expressed it as a world in which happiness will be proportioned to worth, or as the Utilitarians expressed it by saying that it will be one in which there will be realized the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or we may give it more concreteness by looking to a New Jerusalem that religious doctrine pictures, or we may find it in a perfect absolute of which we and our finite universe are but imperfect and inadequate parts and expressions. Whatever the conception of this moral order, definite or vague, it always has implied that the process of the universe in which we live in a real sense is akin to and favorable to the most admirable order in human society.

The most definite form which this belief or faith has taken in the western world is that of the plan of salvation as presented in Christian doctrine. The import of this doctrine was that whatever further purposes a divine providence might have in the conduct of the universe, man's moral regeneration and the growth of a society which this made possible was an end which was always involved in the physical world which was man's habitat. This was most succinctly expressed by St. Augustine, and passed into the form which is perhaps most familiar to us in Milton's "Paradise Lost" and "Paradise Regained." The sharpness of outline of the Plan has faded with the entirely new heavens and new earth which natural science, since the time of Galileo, has unfolded before men's eyes and minds, but the idea that the universe is in some way geared to the intelligence and excellence of our social and moral order not disappeared from the back of men's minds. Scientists such as Huxley have pointed out the incongruities that lie between this conception and the findings of a physical science, that sees in the whole life of the human race but an inconsiderable moment on an inconsiderable speck within the physical universe, that finds in a civilized moral society an aberration from a biological nature that is red in tooth and claw, and subject to a ruthless law of the survival of the fittest. And yet men, even in moods which were not emotional nor mystical, have rarely regarded their habitat as hostile or indifferent to what was best in their social life and structure.

However, it is very evident that the aspect of this kinship between human society and its secular habitat which belongs to our present scientific age is and must be profoundly different from that of St. Augustine, or St. Thomas Aquinas, or Luther, or Hamilton. In no one respect is this perhaps more evident than in our attitude toward the evils which the catastrophes of nature, disease and physical suffering entail upon us.

The view that the ordering of the world was primarily for the greater glory of God in the salvation of man, made of every event that affected men a direct action of providence with reference to the members of the human race, and there could be but one intelligent as well as but one pious attitude over against the action of providence, that of acceptance with thanksgiving or with resignation. Suffering and evil came as discipline.

It is hardly necessary to rehearse the steps in the development of the insistent curiosity of recent science, which has refused to accept any given order of nature as final, or to believe that seemingly inevitable events may not conceivably become quite different if we only comprehend what the manner of their happening is, or to forego the hope that human ingenuity may avert misfortunes if we can only understand their causes and conditions.

Here are two quite fundamentally opposed attitudes toward the kinship of the intelligence of men and the order of the world they live in. It is customary to call the one teleological and the other mechanical, to call the one spiritual and the other materialistic. The first attitude takes it pretty definitely for granted that we know what is right and what is wrong, that in certain definite respects we know what the social order should be; that the intelligent man in his moral conduct, and this is social conduct, starts off with certain truths given in his nature or by revelation, and shows his intelligence by shaping his action to these truths; that the path of righteousness is one that

he who runs may read and a man though a fool need not err therein. If the moral order, of which these truths are an essential part, is given, then the kinship of men's intelligence to the order of the physical universe will show itself in the triumph of this moral or social order, and men can themselves start off with this order as a presupposition in their conduct in the world. The end is given in advance, this is the meaning of teleology, and if we are confident that the universe is so constituted as to achieve this end, we will be intelligent in acting on this assumption.

We have seen that Huxley quite frankly denies, in the name of science, any justification for this faith. He saw nothing in nature that was akin to the social or moral order. In fact he regarded what he called altruistic conduct as an abandonment of the road along which nature was going. This view of Huxley arose in part out of an interpretation of biological evolution that is seen to be inadequate. Kropotkin could point out that social organization, with just that sort of conduct which Huxley called altruistic, is as legitimately to be considered an outcome of an evolutionary process as is the survival of the fittest individual in the struggle for existence. But Huxley's position is of interest because it so ingenuously assumes that a moral order must be an order which is given in advance, while our knowledge of nature is all drawn from what has happened. In our acquaintance with nature we can never assume a determining idea that fixes the result before it happens, as is the case when our ideas determine what the results of our conduct will be. So we speak of nature as mechanical or materialistic. This is just where the break seems to come between what we consider men's intelligence in moral and social conduct, and in men's understanding of nature. We can still believe, of course, that in the end the process of the universe will further ideals of a morally ordered society, and probably most men who are conversant with the findings of science and committed to its methods of research, still in the back of their minds carry this faith, or attitude of mind, but this attitude can be of no service in understanding objects about us in the everyday life of the scientifically minded. It is reserved for religious moods, when we try to bring together what are in their logic incompatible.

Let us state this incompatibility in its simplest form. In our moral conduct we control our actions in considerable degree, i.e., in proportion as we are intelligent, by our purposes, by the ideas of results not yet attained, that is, our conduct is teleological. In our comprehension of nature the result is controlled entirely by antecedent causes, that is nature proceeds mechanically, and there seems to be no kinship between such a nature and the intelligence of men seeking for a better social order.

I have no intention of broaching the metaphysical problem of the relation of a mind that is spiritual and a nature that is material. The question that I want to ask is this: Can the world of natural science provide objects for the world of social and moral conduct?

If we drop back two or three centuries, whether we measure them historically or in present attitudes of mind, we find a view of the physical world which furnished the objects that purposive social and moral conduct demanded. In the first place the physical cosmos as a whole appeared simply as the stage on which the plans of a divine providence were being enacted. In the second place the separate objects with

which men's conduct was engaged found their meaning in this providential plan and led to conduct which this plan for human society demanded. Men's attitudes toward disease, toward events which in present legal phraseology are denominated "acts of God," were those of supplication and resignation. In general those things which engaged human personal interest most acutely and which still had to be regarded from the standpoint of the community to which men belonged could always be conceived of as existing to fulfil the destinies of men in human society. In essence these physical things and occurrences were identical with their import for the success or failure of men's undertakings. They were as physical things and occurrences just what they meant for human conduct. To-day a disease is the history of a bacillus, an earthquake is a shift in surface strata due to gravitational forces, while the incredible vastness of the spread of matter and its inconceivable temporal stretches in comparison with the inconsequential minuteness of humanity and its momentary duration rob the physical universe of any seeming relevancy to the fortunes of our race.

This is the more striking because the period within which this shift of cosmical values has taken place is that within which physical things and their forces have become subservient to men's purposes, to an extent that would have been beyond the imaginal stretch of the medieval or ancient world. The physical universe which by its enormity has crushed the human insect into disappearing insignificance has like a jinn in the Arabian tale shown itself infinitely complaisant in magnifying man's mechanical capacity. In accepting his negligible crevice in the physical whole man has found access to the minute structure of things and by this route has reached both the storehouse and powerhouse of nature. The heraldic device of man's conquering intelligence should be a design blending differential x , the bacillus, and the electron. If humanity has fled shivering from the starry spaces, it has become minutely at home in the interstices of the speck that it inhabits for an instant.

But if we have succeeded in applying science to our mechanical task, and in this have accomplished prodigies, we do not seem to have succeeded in applying scientific method to the formulation of our ends and purposes. Consider the Great War. The idea that plunged Europe and then dragged the rest of the world into that catastrophe, the imperialisms, national, militaristic and economic are roughly identical with those that embroiled Christendom in the seventeenth century. It was only the weapons that crashed through those four years that belonged to the intellect of the twentieth century. There attaches to it the grotesquerie of a Yankee at the Court of King Arthur. Or consider the government of a cosmopolitan city, or of a great nation. There is at the disposal of the community for the carrying out of its policies the apparatus of a hundred sciences, but to secure the bare formulation of policy we are forced to involve ourselves in the factional interests of parties that are psychologically closely parallel to the turbulent politics of an ancient or a medieval commonwealth. We are enormously clever at fashioning our means, but we are still in no small measure dependent for conceiving our ends upon outworn mental structures that our very science has invalidated.

But it would be a mistake to assume that scientific method is applicable only in the fashioning and selection of means, and may not be used where the problem involves

conflicting social ends or values. The advance of scientific medicine in dealing with public health amply substantiates this.

In this advance numerous social values embodied or championed by various institutions, government, the church, the school and the family, have sought to maintain themselves against scientific procedure in combating disease and safeguarding health. Individual rights, religious dogmas and cults, family control of children, the economic advantage of cheap child labor for business, and many other accepted social values have been set up as absolute, across the path of progress of scientific public health conservation. But the demonstrated results of the hospital, vaccination, quarantine, and other means of medical service to the health of the community have forced men to bring these values into the field of other public goods and restate them so that public health could be the better preserved.

I imagine that the scientific advance of medicine presents as enlightening an illustration as could be found of the issue that seems to exist between scientific method and our conduct in social and moral affairs. The human community did not wait for a medical science to convince it that health is a community good. Combating disease by its medicine men has been one of the chief common concerns even in primitive societies whose technique was entirely magical. We do not turn to scientific method to determine what is a common good, though we have learned to avail ourselves of it in some of our common efforts and practices in pursuit of the good. However, scientific method is not an agent foreign to the mind, that may be called in and dismissed at will. It is an integral part of human intelligence, and when it has once been set at work it can only be dismissed by dismissing the intelligence itself. Unfortunately men have committed this sin against their intelligence again and again. They have incontinently rejected the very method which human intelligence has learned to employ because its results came in conflict with other social goods which they were unwilling to either sacrifice or restate. But again and again when they have undertaken to use their minds thereafter, they have found that their minds had become committed to the method they had rejected. The past history of and the present struggle with venereal disease illustrate this, chapter for chapter. Scientific method does not undertake to say what the good is, but when it has been employed, it is uncompromising in its demand that that good is no less a good because the scientific pursuit of it brings us within the taboos of institutions that are have regarded as inviolable. Nor does scientific method assert that the family and the church are not goods because its pursuit of public health has trenched upon conceptions of them which men have held to be practically absolute. What scientific method does require, if it is to be consistently used, is that all the conflicting ends, the institutions and their hitherto inviolable values, be brought together and so restated and reconstructed that intelligent conduct may be possible, with reference to all of them. Scientific method requires this because it is nothing but a highly developed form of impartial intelligence.

Here, then, is the issue, so far as an issue exists, between scientific method and social and moral conduct. If the community is seeking an end by the intelligent method of science and in doing this runs counter to its habits in attaining and maintaining other ends, these ends are just as subject to restatement and reconstruction as are the means

themselves. Nor does science pretend to say what this restatement or reconstruction must be. Its one insistent demand is that all the ends, all the valuable objects, institutions, and practices which are involved, must be taken into account. In other words, its attitude toward conflicting ends is the same as its attitude toward conflicting facts and theories in the field of research. It does not state what hypothesis must be adopted. It does insist that any acceptable hypothesis must take into account all the facts involved.

Now such a method can be in conflict with social conduct only if that conduct sets up certain ends, institutions and their values, which are to be considered as inviolable in the form in which they have been received and are now accepted. There is no issue between scientific method and moral and social conduct that springs from the fact that science deals with the relation of past facts to each other while conduct deals with future ends.

Science does not attempt to formulate the end which social and moral conduct ought to pursue, any more than it pretends to announce what hypothesis will be found by the research scientist to solve his problem. It only insists that the object of our conduct must take into account and do justice to all of the values that prove to be involved in the enterprise, just as it insists that every fact involved in the research problem must be taken into account in an acceptable hypothesis. Scientific method is at war with dogmatism whether it appears in doctrine, or cult, or in social practice. Scientific method is not teleological in the sense of setting up a final cause that should determine our action, but it is as categorical in insisting upon our considering all factors in problems of conduct, as it is in demanding the recognition of all of the data that constitute the research problem.

Scientific method does not insure the satisfactory solution of the problem of conduct, any more than it insures the construction of an adequate hypothesis for the research problem. It is restricted to formulating rigorously the conditions for the solution. And here appears a profound difference between the two situations, that of moral and social conduct, and that of so-called scientific research. In problems of conduct we must act, however inadequate our plan of action may be. The research problem may be left because of our inability to find a satisfactory hypothesis. Furthermore, there are many values involved in our problems of social conduct to which we feel that we are unable to do justice in their whole import, and yet when they are once envisaged they appear too precious to be ignored, so that in our action we do homage to them. We do not do justice to them. They constitute our ideals. They abide in our conduct as prophecies of the day in which we can do them the justice they claim. They take on the form of institutions that presuppose situations which we admit are not realized, but which *demand* realization.

Such an ideal is democracy written into our government institutions. It implies a social situation so highly organized that the import of a protective tariff, a minimum wage or of a League of Nations, to all individuals in the community may be sufficiently evident to them all, to permit the formation of an intelligent public sentiment that will in the end pass decisively upon the issue before the country. This is what democratic government means, for the issue does not actually exist as such, until the members of the community realize something of what it means to them individually

and collectively. There cannot be self-government until there can be an intelligent will expressed in the community, growing out of the intelligent attitudes of the individuals and groups in whose experience the community exists. Our institutions are in so far democratic that when a public sentiment is definitely formed and expressed it is authoritative. But an authoritative public sentiment upon a public issue is very infrequent. My guess is that the number of instances of that in the history of the United States of America could be told upon the fingers of two hands, perhaps upon the fingers of one hand. In the meantime, as the then President Taft assured us on an historic occasion, we are governed by minorities, and the relatively intelligent minorities are swayed by the import of the issue to these minorities.

However, we are unwilling to surrender the ideal of such a government, if only for the sake of the exceptional occasions upon which it is realized, but more profoundly because we cherish the hope that the form of the institution in some way helps toward the realization of what it promises. The most grandiose of these community ideals is that which lies behind the structure of what was called Christendom, and found its historic expression in the Sermon on the Mount, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, and in the Golden Rule. These affirm that the interests of all men are so identical, that the man who acts in the interest of his neighbors will act in his own interest. Actually the history of Christendom has been a history of war and strife, and we are forced to admit that in these wars dynastic, national, and civil has arisen the intensive consciousness of the larger communities. It was the horror of the Great War that aroused, perhaps for the first time in the human race, a public sentiment passing all national bounds and demanding some organization that could express this sentiment and avert a still more terrible horror. The history of Christianity is the history of men's refusal to surrender this ideal.

To indicate in what concrete ways, psychological, social, and technological, the presence of these ideals in men's minds may have directly or indirectly favored their realization lies beyond the scope of this paper. What must be indicated is that they have only been kept in men's minds by institutions set up for this specific purpose. An institution should arise and be kept alive by its own function, but in so far as it does not function, the ideal of it can be kept alive only by some cult, whose aim is not the functioning of the institution, but the continued presence of the idea of it in the minds of those that cherish it.

The church is the outstanding illustration of such an institution. Its most important function has been the preservation in the minds of the community of the faith in a social order which did not exist. At the other end of the scale may be placed certain economic institutions, notably that of exchange. The economic man may be an abstraction, but he certainly exists and functions, and we need no cult to keep alive the faith in the functioning of money, though there is hardly an agency that has had more profound effects in bringing all men into association with each other. Between these lie our various institutions. We feel from time to time the necessity of arousing in our souls an emotional appreciation of the value of the family, of democracy, of the common school, of the university, because in their actual operation they do not express that value adequately.

The psychological technique of maintaining such a cult is the presentation by the imagination of a social situation free from the obstacles which forbid the institution being what it should be, and we organize social occasions which in every way favor such a frame of mind. We gather together in a place of worship, where we meet on the single common basis of all being worshippers of one God, or gather at a Thanksgiving, where all the differences and indifferences of family life are ignored, or we turn with affectionate regard to the Little Red School House where all the children were found studying the same books and immersed in the same common school life. Now the emotional and intellectual attitude of these occasions is essentially different from that of any common undertaking to make the institutions more effective, to reform it. The attitude implied in the cult of an institution is frankly hostile toward that which seeks its reform. The mental attitude attending a cult is always conservative, and if we are undertaking its reform we consider it reactionary. The emotional attitude in the cult of an institution flows from the very obstacles that defeat its proper functioning. We may become profoundly interested in the reform of an institution for better service, but if we wish to appraise it emotionally we envisage the wrongs, the vice, the ignorance, the selfishness' which the ideal of the institution condemns, and which frustrate its operation.

Now it is just these factors in social and moral conduct which render the application of scientific method, in that field, so profoundly different from its application in the field of the natural sciences. The formula is simple enough. Your conduct must take into account all of the values which are involved in the social or moral problem. But how are we to define these values? They ought to be defined by the conflict out of which the problem has arisen. In many cases they are sufficiently defined to enable us to act intelligently. If it is a question of visiting distant friends we find out how valuable it is to us, by the sacrifice of other things for which we wish to spend the money which the journey should cost. When we have counted up the cost, we may conclude that it isn't worth what we should have to forego. Of course the mere surrender of the contemplated visit is not the whole result. We have found out how much we want it, and have probably prepared to bring it about under more favorable conditions. For purposes of conduct, values define themselves definitely enough when they are brought into conflict with each other. So facts define themselves in scientific problems. The facts in the problem of the prevention of arteriosclerosis are the observations which indicate that none of the causes that have been supposed to conduce to it do actually account for it. The facts in the hunt for a pneumonia serum are that none of those constructed after the fashion of other successful sera give the desired immunity. The facts are determined by conflict.

But see how different the situation becomes when the problem is not the prevention of a disease, but the prevention of crime. If the problem were simply the determination of the values involved in terms of loss to the victim and to the community, over against the effort and expense involved in catching and punishing the criminal, the problem would not be a difficult one. No civilized community has ever hesitated to take these steps in view of the danger which the existence of crime entails. The difficulties arise over the methods of so-called criminal justice. It is supposed to

prevent crime, but it does not prevent it. At least it does not prevent it as vaccination prevents smallpox epidemics. It has some preventive effect. It is a palliative. But we cannot simply surrender criminal justice as inefficient, to use some other method, nor even to reform it simply from the standpoint of rendering it more efficient. For criminal justice has a cult value. We cherish the attitude of public reprobation of crime, or rather let us say of public vengeance upon the criminal, because of the emotional sanction it gives to a community ordered by a common law. We overlook the fact that we cannot keep up this emotional attitude without branding the criminal as an outcast, without in some sense preserving a criminal class or caste, and we are quite unwilling to estimate the value of this branding simply in terms of its preventive power. It has an absolute value too precious to be surrendered. If our social problem were simply that of prevention, we should have a standard by which we could fairly measure the values involved. We could never treat leprosy scientifically if we retained the older attitude of regarding the leper as unclean. The relatively recent history of the scientific treatment of the mentally diseased is one of passing out of a cult attitude toward the insane. Or consider nationalism. We cannot simply set about the elimination of war by methods which history has amply justified, because of the cult value of patriotism. The time-honored and simplest method of arousing the emotional consciousness of national unity is presentation of the common enemy. It is confessedly most difficult if not impossible to arouse this emotional consciousness out of the common life within the community itself. And at times patriotism seems to have an almost infinite value. The cult values are incommensurable.

And yet these problems are not only real problems, they are insistent problems, and as I have before observed, we cannot defer action with reference to them, although these and most of the other social and moral problems are shot through with these incommensurable cult values. Nor can we take the attitude of the superior person, and affect the pose of one whose higher intelligence has raised himself above these incommensurables. They and what they represent are the most precious part of social heritage. But it is not their incommensurability that constitutes their value, nor should we hesitate to abandon the cult estimate of these institutions if their values can be stated in terms of their functions. The cult value of the institution is legitimate only when the social order for which it stands is hopelessly ideal. In so far as it approaches realization, its functional value must supersede its ideal value in our conduct.

It is to this task that a scientifically trained intelligence must insistently devote itself, that of stating, just as far as possible, our institutions, our social habits and customs in terms of what they are to do, in terms of their functions. There are no absolute values. There are only values which, on account of incomplete social organization, we cannot as yet estimate, and in face of these the first enterprise should be to complete the organization if only in thought so that some rough sort of estimate in terms of the other values involved becomes conceivable. And there is only one field within which the estimation can be made, and that is within the actual problem. The field within which we can advance our theory of states is that of the effort to avert war. The advance in our doctrine of criminal justice will be found in the undertaking of intelligent crime prevention. The problems of social theory must be research problems. It is to

one group of these problems which I wish particularly to refer. These are the problems of practical politics in the nation and especially in our municipalities.

I have already called attention to the chasm that separates the theory and practice of our democracy. The theory calls for the development of an intelligent public sentiment upon the issues before the community. In practice we depend not upon these to bring the voters to polls, but upon the spirit of party politics. The interest in the issues is so slight that any machine in a great city, that can insure by party organization and patronage a relatively small group of partisans who will always vote with the machine, can continue its hold on the city government for a considerable period no matter how corrupt its administration may be. It is perhaps this situation that leads us to overestimate the somewhat rough and clumsy method of registering public sentiment which the ballot box affords in a democracy. And in our heated efforts to reform corrupt administrations we accept the shibboleths of the professional politician that the essence of democracy is in voting on one side or the other. We attach a cult value to these somewhat crude methods of keeping a government of some sort going. The real hope of democracy, of course, lies in making the issues so immediate and practical that they can appear in the minds of the voter as his own problem. The wide spread of the manager instead of the manger or feed box form of city government is perhaps the most heartening sign of the times that this is beginning to take place. It does not seem to be an impossible task to get the average voter to see that the bulk of the administration of his municipality consists in carrying on a set of operations of vital importance to himself in an efficient businesslike fashion, that the question of public ownership of public utilities is simply a phase of this efficient administration, and that it is perfectly possible for a community to get such an efficient administration. The alliance in the practice and theory of democracy depends upon the successful translation of questions of public policy into the immediate problems of the citizens. It is the intensive growth of social interrelations and intercommunications that alone renders possible the recognition by the individual of the import for his social life of the corporate activity of the whole community. The task of intelligence is to use this growing consciousness of interdependence to formulate the problems of all, in terms of the problem of every one. In so far as this can be accomplished cult values will pass over into functional values.

Finally I wish to recur to the dictum to which I referred at the opening of this paper: That the intelligible order of the world implies a moral or social order, i.e., a world as it should be and may be. What form does this take if we apply scientific method to social conduct?

We have seen that the earliest formulation of it by Christian theology was that the intelligence of the creator and ruler of the world must show itself in bringing about in this world or the next the perfect society which man's moral and social nature implied and that our intelligence consists in accepting the inspired statement of this order. Scientific method has no vision, given in the mount, of a perfected order of society, but it does carry with it the assumption that the intelligence which exhibits itself in the solution of problems in natural science is of the same character as that which we apply or should apply in dealing with our social and moral problems; that

the intelligible order of the world is akin to its moral and social order because it is the same intelligence which enters into and controls the physical order and which deals with the problems of human societal. Not only is man as an animal and as an inquirer into nature at home in the world, but the society of men is equally a part of the order of the universe. What is called for in the perfection of this society is the same intelligence which he uses in becoming more completely a part of his physical environment and so controlling that environment. It is this frank acceptance of human society as a part of the natural order that scientific method demands when it is applied to the solution of social problems, and with it comes the demand, that just as far as possible we substitute functional values for cult values in formulating and undertaking to solve our social problems.

The difference in the pictures of the universe presented by these two attitudes is striking enough. The one contemplates a physical world in which man and the society of men are but pilgrims and strangers, seeking an abiding city not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. The goal toward which all creation moves was to be attained through the individual members of the human community becoming good, i.e., living by certain absolute and incommensurable values housed and hallowed by social institutions. This morality or social *dressur* calls for only so much intelligence as is required to recognize these institutions and the claims which their ideals make upon us. Anyone can be good, though but a few can be clever. There is hardly any kinship between this attitude and the age-long struggle of the human community to make itself intelligently at home in the physical habitat in which it finds itself. Man has domesticated the animals now these many centuries. He is but slowly advancing with painful effort in the domestication of the germ, though it is at present much more essential to community life.

The scientific attitude contemplates our physical habitat as primarily the environment of man who is the first cousin once removed of the arboreal anthropoid ape, but it views it as being transformed first through unreflective intelligence and then by reflective intelligence into the environment of a human society, the latest species to appear on the earth. This human society, made up of social individuals that are selves, has been intermittently and slowly digging itself in, burrowing into matter to get to the immediate environment of our cellular structure, and contracting distances and collapsing times to acquire the environment that a self-conscious society of men needs for its distinctive conduct. It is a great secular adventure, that has reached some measure of success, but is still far from accomplishment. The important character of this adventure is that society gets ahead, not by fastening its vision upon a clearly outlined distant goal, but by bringing about the immediate adjustment of itself to its surroundings, which the immediate problem demands. It is the only way in which it can proceed, for with every adjustment the environment has changed, and the society and its individuals have changed in like degree. By its own struggles with its insistent difficulties, the human mind is constantly emerging from one chrysalis after another into constantly new worlds which it could not possibly precise. But there is a heartening feature of this social or moral intelligence. It is entirely the same as the intelligence evidenced in the whole upward struggle of life on the earth, with this difference, that

the human social animal has acquired a mind, and can bring to bear upon the problem his own past experiences and that of others, and can test the solution that arises in his conduct. He does not know what the solution will be, but he does know the method of the solution. We, none of us, know where we are going, but we do know that we are on the way.

The order of the universe that we live in is the moral order. It has become the moral order by becoming the self-conscious method of the members of a human society. We are not pilgrims and strangers. We are at home in our own world, but it is not ours by inheritance but by conquest. The world that comes to us from the past possesses and controls us. We possess and control the world that we discover and invent. And this is the world of the moral order. It is a splendid adventure if we can rise to it.

Note

- * As originally published in *International Journal of Ethics*, 33 (1923), 229–47.

II. Crime, social reform and labour relations

24

ON THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS (n.d.)*

The settlement grew out of ecclesiastical philanthropy. There are many settlements at present in existence and successful activity which are dependent upon churches for much of their support both material and spiritual, and yet it is highly probable that the residents in these very settlements would insist that the peculiar activity of the settlement is essentially different from that of the church, and that it is necessary to maintain this peculiar attitude to even emphasize this difference at times in order that the settlement itself may do its own work. Most settlements are professedly free from ecclesiastical relations, and insist upon this freedom.

The time and place of this meeting is sufficient evidence of the close relation between the settlements and organized charity. Organized charity works constantly and effectively through settlements; but the settlement could not by any possibility be regarded as a part of organized charity. It presents a field within which organized charity can operate, but it is not and cannot be identified with that activity itself.

There are in the same fashion relations between the university and the settlement. Educational work has been one of the most striking phases of settlement life. Classes for those who need training of almost every description have arisen. The settlement has been a natural center for university extension. The settlement has also presented a field within which university study and investigation has been carried on. It has provided a point of departure for certain types of social research which could with the greatest difficulty have been undertaken but for the settlement. But a settlement could never become a department of a university, nor a church mission, nor an office of a district of organized charity. The moment it becomes any one of these it would cease to be a settlement.

Its character in the community as a home distinguishes it from any of the institutions with which it has been contrasted. The peculiar fact involved in the settlement is that its residents are at home in the quarter of the city where the settlement is placed. It is not a station planted by any other institution to save souls, nor a distributing office for

soup and coals, nor a laboratory where phenomena of a peculiar sort are examined. That which roots the settlement in the community is the fact that its residents live there, that this is their social *pou sto*.¹ It is this that prevents or saves the settlement from becoming institutionalized, which makes of it a field where various institutions may operate without making the settlement a part of themselves. This home nature of the settlement accounts also for the very great diversity among the settlements. They vary with the character of the residents who are at home there, there is no distinct institutional form which generalizes them into structural identity. It is true that there are certain types of activities which are almost uniformly found in all settlements, such as evening classes, the extension of charitable assistance to those in need, the club for boys, and opportunities for neighborhood social gatherings. But the relation of these activities to the settlement and its residents gives them a character which distinguishes them from the same type of activity when found in institutions. Where the settlement life is genuine there is back of all of its activities the spring of neighborliness, which robs the assistance given of the condescension of personal charity and of the abstract character of organized charity, which gives to the teacher and taught the personal relation which is sacrificed in the school for the sake of class-room efficiency. Perhaps the most important result of neighborliness in settlement consciousness is that the relations of the residents with their neighbours touch all sides of human nature and conduct. The residents need not specialize in a single aspect of humanity, need not regard those with whom they are in daily contact simply as cases. We are slowly learning to appreciate the importance of competently gathered statistics, but that the meaning of these statistics must be drawn from a sympathetic putting ourselves in the other man's place. It is the settlement-resident whose experience makes such interpretation peculiarly possible and natural. As illustrations I may be allowed to refer to the books which have come from the neighborliness of Jane Addams. There is a facility which inheres in a profession in some sense due to the protection which the professional attitude gives the professional man against all other aspects of the individual with whom he deals, except that which is his immediate interest. This facility is essential to the work of the profession. This abstraction from all except that which makes a case of a human being, is also a refuge into which sensitive and self-satisfied and uncertain human nature can withdraw from the distressing implications of human misery. The professional man tends to develop a spiritual shell and become a mollusc. The evangelist who would save a soul, the physician who will heal a disease, the anthropologist who wishes to determine a physical type, the artist who sees and will reproduce a character or a situation, even the social worker who studies the effects of alcoholism or the speeding up of factory labor, all go equipped with the armor of professionalism. They can none of them as such a neighbour in the fullest sense so him who fell among thieves. Any one of them may be the one who can most effectually bind his wounds, and yet no one of them be the one to adequately interpret him to the community.

Of course it is well within the possibilities that the professionalist may be a neighbour as well, indeed the selective power of professional insight is the greatest asset which we have of revealing the very human situations and experiences which the neighbour will comprehend and interpret.

But if the settlement is the point from which it is possible to approach social problems with the widest and most direct sympathy it is also the station where it is possible to approach our various moral and social problems in a scientific manner.

There is a very general discussion abroad on the question of scientific control – or moral conduct. I have no intention of going into the intricacies of the question. There are, however, certain implications of the problem which I think must be considered if we undertake to at all comprehend the settlement. The implications to which I refer are these, that a settlement is in some sense necessary to form a judgement upon the social and more specifically the moral problem which grow out of human poverty, ignorance, congestion – in general, out of the problems of human misery. We have abandoned the doctrine that the human misery which gathers in our great industrial centers is due to improvidence, to sloth, or to a native viciousness of the individuals there congregated. We no longer believe that juvenile crime can be adequately or even intelligently dealt with by the criminal court. We demand a juvenile court with extraordinary powers and even then it is recognized that as a court this new institution is helpless and futile in meeting the proposed causes from which so-called juvenile crime must spring.

We recognize that the prostitution in our cities is a phenomenon which is rather entrenched and perpetrated by our customary moral condemnation. We insure the prostitute remaining a prostitute by the ban under which we place her, and guarantee the commodity in the unholy commerce within which she is enslaved.

I have referred to three of the most poignant evils with which society is cursed. There are answers to each traditional moral judgement which have professed not only to place blame where it is due, but also to account for the conditions in some sense. Indeed we still hear from time to time the claim that the chief task before those who would reform society is the reformation of the individual, give him a good will and build up within him a moral character. The implication of these moral judgements are not that we can judge these men, women and children because we have adequate knowledge of them and their conditions. We accuse a certain type of moral judgement of spiritual arrogance. Its spiritual arrogance is perhaps exceeded by its intellectual arrogance. It pretends to know these acts and conditions because it pretends to condemn them. The settlement in confessing its ignorance of its neighbors and undertakings to understand them and their conditions by that very attitude suspends its judgement, and even recognizes that it must join new moral judgement.

Nowhere has modern society so sharply recognized the inadequacy, the folly of certain of its moral judgements as in its settlements. For these settlements deny that we can understand human misery and the delinquency that arise out of the misery until some of us have become sympathetic neighbors of this misery and so-called crime, and by taking this attitude we also condemn the moral and economic censure we have passed upon these people.

Whether consciously or not the settlement places itself in a different attitude from that of the church. For the church judges the individual and not the situation. It makes use of accepted standards and has no apparatus for studying condition or for revising and reconstructing its standards. The pulpit must give no uncertain sound for

the battle. It is not at present, in any case, able to make use of social science in determining what the morality of a situation involves, in what consists a new sin, where the blame must be laid for wrong that arises from novel conditions. And yet it is to scientific inquiry that we must look for this information – and we must await the findings of scientific inquiry before we can say what is wrong and what our duty is and what demands we make upon the men, women and children, who have become responsible for the situation or who have been helplessly caught within it. It is then to the relation of the settlement to social study, and the science which is completed to carry this on that I would most especially call your attention. I have already insisted that the settlement can be no more a social laboratory or station of observation for the university. It is more immediate, more vital than a mere laboratory or station can ever be. It is life, the life of neighbors, that much go on and must find the issues of life and death in the present moment however miserable or paltry that is condemned to be. But this life may be fraught with the promise which competent knowledge can give, because the intelligent neighbor can understand, and make possible the comprehension of the community. An illustration of the import of science for morals and social melioration to be found in the Pittsburgh Survey,² which has back of it exactly that spirit of the settlement which is essential to interpretation of social statistics. Such study not only springs from the spirit of neighborliness but it demands this same spirit of neighborliness to interpret and enforce its meaning in the community. The social settlement presents the possibility of approaching the study of social conditions from the standpoint of neighborliness and of evaluating its results through neighborliness. If such a starting point and such an evaluation can be secured there can be no greater insurance placed upon our democracy. It is possible to approach social study from the standpoint of national and municipal efficiency. Social reform and general improvement of the conditions of the laborers in the community can be regarded as a part of the industrial assets of the state and astutely pushed by farsighted statesmen as they are being pushed in Germany. They can be demanded as the program of a revolutionary party that looks toward a socialistic state and be fired by class hatreds. They can be undertaken for the sake of different social interests, and the pushing of specific causes with which different institutions are identified. By all means let such reformation be advanced. The results must place humanity upon a better basis and insure richer and healthful life to the thousands who are now cramped, dwarfed and stunted physically and spiritually by the conditions into which they are born and out of which they can never arise by their own crippled powers: but the study and consequent reform which springs from the consciousness of my neighbour, the consciousness that I am his keeper, will be neither materialistic nor inspired by class antipathies. This study and reform will be democratic in its inspiration, and will be evaluated for the whole man, little child and the old man, as well as the efficient labourer, will enter into the life of all and find experience to be preserved and increased in the humblest soul that looks up and is not fed.

We are too apt to entertain a false view of science. Social science struggling with its seemingly hopeless mass of data, uncertain of its methods, hesitant to leave the abstractions, leaning upon which as crutches, it has hobbled on to the mile-post of

today, looks toward the physical sciences with their well ordered facts and consistent doctrines, and is apt to assume that the gathering of such a body of digested material and the equipment with such an armory of effective hypotheses, is a task which social science can undertake as a theoretical science, while it hopes to put its results at the disposal of humanity, to have its applied branches which will depend upon the pure theory of the abstract doctrine. But this hope in this form implies an inadequate grasp of the history of the physical sciences. They have arisen not out of theoretical investigations, but from very concrete problems, and the direction which they have taken has been determined by the problems from which they sprang. It means everything to a science to have its problems determined by it. It will mean everything for our social investigation to have its problems determined for it. It will mean everything for our social investigation to have its problem set by a consciousness of the neighbour rather than by the demands for a larger industrial output, or the exploitations of capitalistic monopoly, or the exigencies of temperance and social purity causes. The difference that will arise from such a setting of the problem of social study will be found in the type of facts that will come to light.

In illustration the presentation of the social situation which inspires our program of industrial training is of interest. From the point of view of the skilled trades there is a paucity of skilled workmen, and industrial education is supposed to mean the supply of this need. Such a program does not interest itself in the education of the unskilled workman. He needs no special training, for the facility he gains in a few weeks in tending a machine. But he needs from the point of view of his own life an education that will help him to fill out the poverty of his factory activity, and his need for this education is much greater and much more imperative than is the demand for the training of the skilled laborer. It is not the program of the National Society for the Encouragement of Industrial Education which will push the case of the education of the unskilled laborer. It is to be feared that organized labor will not be keenly cognizant of his demands. He is not himself aware of what his need is, it is the neighbour who is vividly aware of his misfortune. It is the one who meets him coming a mere boy from the machine, half deadened by the monotony of the task, and exasperated with the boredom of it all, the prey of an unhealthful craze for diversion and excitement, who follows him along the deadening process of helpless specialization which makes him a part of the machine, and eventually of the scrapheap into which he goes with the machine when both are worn out, who sees his ambition dwindle, alcohol taking the place of the demand for diversion and the entire man collapsing, because he has no interest in his occupation and absolutely nothing within which to gain a foothold in other interests. It is only the person who can respond to the man as he is, and all that he is, who is competent to set the problem to social study, who can see a host of facts which come out but tardily and incompletely when the problem has been set by the special interest, or the special cause.

Perhaps the greatest heritage which America has of its today (*sic*), is its public school system. It is very inadequate in many respects, but it has this redeeming character, that it is for all, that it presents the ideal of the same system of education for all the people, and that with all the waste of much of the study, and the shortcoming of the

teaching force, it still carries with itself the conception of something liberal in its curriculum for every child that comes within its walls.

I do not know where we are to get and preserve this democratic ideal of human beings who are to be the subject of our scientific study, where we are to find our problem of reform stated in democratic terms unless the consciousness of the neighborliness which is the right of the settlement is found at the starting point of the social studies that are to reorganize our municipalities.

We suffer in comparison with the European municipalities, whose affairs are directed with foresight and carried on with efficiency. The ground for this difference is found, of course, in the efficient bureaucracies which have been inherited from an older undemocratic system. It remains to be seen whether it is possible for America to attain such efficiency, without sacrificing the democracy which is our heritage and this result can seemingly be reached only if there is such a genuine consciousness of the human being as the one that can arise from the settlement attitude of neighborliness.

But if the settlement presents the point of view from which social study should proceed, it is still more essential for the evaluation of scientific method and scientific results. We recognize that we live in the age of science, that the control of life has passed from tradition, from fixed social habits, and that science undertakes to do with directness what round-about social process accomplished in the earlier ages of human society. Politics and education furnish the striking examples of such change in point of view. The view of the state as an organ of the community that accomplishes its purposes with economy and directness is far removed from the conceptions of ruler and subject, and the indirect service rendered by the ruler to the community of which he was the creation. Education which existed at first only for the church and the clerical force of the monarch which gradually gathered to its curriculum the literature of the past and slowly accepted the sciences which had arisen outside its universities, has but recently faced the task of putting everyone in the community in the possession of books and numbers and the documents and methods which are essential for life in our sophisticated age. The science of administration and the science of education undertake to do with an eye single to their purposes what was the indirect result of many divergent social habits a century or two ago. The most striking change of this sort is to be found in medicine, sanitation and hygiene. Here we can at least see clearly if we cannot act directly. We witness the courageous attitude of nations that undertake to stamp out noxious plagues by long continued regulation which a century ago were regarded still as the visitations of an angry God. But in the face of such actual or possible accomplishments of science how slightly are its effects in our criminal courts, our determination of the standards of life, the control of economic resources, and the assurance of economic independence. How petty and insignificant have the contributions to the control of the sexual life and the breeding and early care of children. If we look at man as a bundle of instincts as he is presented by Professor McDougall in his *Social Psychology*, and ask what part of man has passed under the control of science, we will see that the most profound instincts, those which have to do with acquisition, with immediate self-assertion, with sex and parenthood, have been but slightly affected by scientific method. The secondary processes, by which these more

elemental impulses are organized and mediated in society, have been brought in part and can be evidently brought still further within the direction of scientific method. Here in the secondary processes we see what the end is toward which our conduct is directed and are ready to accept the statement from the expert, of the correct means to attain that end. But in the more profound reaches of man's nature, we have not been able to state what the end of its action is, and we have therefore not been able to seek at the hand of science the means which will bring the end within his grasp. We know very clearly how our children should be fed and clothed and protected against infection, but we have still to hear the scoldings of a Roosevelt on the question of race suicide, and have no way of settling the question by an undisputed appeal to scientific authority.

Notes

* Unpublished manuscript. Mead Archive Papers, Box: 13, Folder: 24, 12 pp.

1 Basis of operation.

2 Among the earliest sociological surveys in the US, the Pittsburgh Survey was conducted in 1907 and was funded by the Russell Sage Foundation.

25

SOCIAL BEARINGS OF INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION (1911)*

There have been certain coincidents in the educational system, the training system of our children, that have been in the last generation pretty definitely broken down, coincidents which are supposed to exist, but which no longer exist: the coincident between the fourteen-year period, the compulsory period of education and the elementary school period. It is assumed that the child spends fourteen years in school education and that these fourteen years carry him through the elementary school. Actually, as we know from many statistics which have been brought to our attention in so many different ways, something like fifty per cent of the children fail to complete the grades in this fourteen-year period – they drop out, and are supposed to go to work.

It is a very unfortunate situation, for it has been pretty definitely shown and is pretty definitely recognized, that children who do not stay through the elementary school period are not able to assimilate and hold onto that which they get in the lower grades. A child drops in the fifth year, even the seventh grade, and leaves school and goes to work, or tries to go to work, spends his time trying to find jobs; such a boy, if he is subjected to a fifth grade test, will be found as a rule to fall down in the test, to be unable to respond, even to the simple propositions called for, those which he at one time knew, but which he has been unable to hold onto. Taking our school system as it is at the present time, the children that leave school before they have completed the eighth grade, lose a very large part of that which they have already gained, so that it is no longer true that children spend fourteen years and at the end of that fourteen-year period have passed out of the eighth grade, we have said not only that the children have failed to complete the eighth grade, but also that they have lost that which they have supposed to have acquired, and we know that what they have acquired is very slight at the best, and if they have lost that, they are really simply in a pitiful condition from the point of view of schooling.

I can speak with some assurance on this subject, because the committee of which I was a member was instrumental in having a series of tests given to boys who had left

school before the eighth grade, as well as those who had finished the eighth grade and some of them had gotten into the high school. These boys in Chicago were to be found in some of the shops, in some large mercantile establishment, were picked up in some of the settlements, were found in the night schools and other places, and the results of these tests were that which I have already given you, namely, the boys who had left even in the seventh grade were not able to pass the simple fifth grade test in arithmetic, nor yet was their English what we would have a right to expect from children who had a fifth grade training. Even those boys who had been in school during the seventh grade were unable to meet this test of a grade which was two years below.

When we say then that fifty per cent of our children drop out of the elementary school before they have reached the eighth grade, we are practically saying that they have dropped out of the fifth grade; we are saying that the educational control which they have gotten, that this control falls below the fifth grade, and it is a very lamentable situation from the point of view of education, and from the point of view of the children it is a tragic situation, for, as these children get older, they feel the need of that training which is requisite to bring them up, they realize that great lack. We met a number of boys who were quite unable to pass the fifth grade tests, young men who would have been glad to have an opportunity at their age to do more, but were quite unable to really help themselves out; who were not able to make use of the night schools in such a way as to put themselves back where they ought to have been because of this lack of early training.

You can say then of the schools at the present time, the elementary school period, has failed to do what it is supposed to do for the boy, and this is not true simply of Chicago, but of the other large cities, and of most of the smaller cities, and I imagine it will hold fairly well for out in the country.

There is another coincidence which no longer exists, but which is presupposed in the education of our children, and that is the coincidence between the end of the school training and the beginnings of the apprenticeship. The boy who goes out at the end of the fourteenth-year period is supposed to commence to work, to have gained the training that he needs in order to become an artisan, or if he is working on a profession, to start in on that training. The elementary school period is supposed to carry all of our children up to this point, at which their training looks in some sense toward some sort of a vocation. Of course, our high schools would not regard themselves as looking definitely toward any specific calling in life; they assume that the training which they give is that of a cultural character. For those who enter and continue in the high schools, to a very large extent they are looking forward to some other sort of training; they have in mind entering upon some profession, or a type of education which will be of advantage to them if they enter into business. Those who do not go on with the high school may go into the technical high school where they will receive some sort of training of a mechanical, or technical type; or they may go out from the schools entirely, and, as it is assumed, enter upon some sort of apprenticeship for a trade.

This assumes that the children who are going to leave the schools are going to be able to enter upon some definite apprenticeship. The general training which they have

received in the schools and at home will be continued in training for a trade, or the profession which they are undertaking. That, of course, is the case if they are going to enter a profession; if they enter the high school and go on to college, they find the requisite methods of training for their choice in life – they are carrying from one school to another. Everything is arranged so that there is no gap.

But the boy who is going into a trade finds between the period of fourteen and sixteen years of age that there is no training for him. No factory will receive him, as for a skilled occupation, and he will not be taken in as an apprentice into any trade. Between those years, then, fourteen and sixteen, he is left without anything, and those are the years that call for training perhaps more definitely than the years that go immediately before; they are specially the years in which the training of character should be emphasized; there is practically no more critical period in the boy's life. And yet we drop the boy from the elementary school, expecting him to go into a trade, but between those years, fourteen and sixteen, he is left without a training. It is even worse than this, for not only is he left without any training, but the type of occupation which he is able to pick up, the sort of occupation he can get as an errand boy, or as a clerk in the corner grocery, or working for the Western Union Telegraph, the sort of thing he gets going from shop to another, is one which is disintegrating in its character, and at the end of that period he is worse off than when he left school at fourteen.

I presume all of you are familiar with the report brought out by the Commission of the State of Massachusetts, which deals with this age in boys between fourteen and sixteen.

It is very important, if we are looking to the training which our school system gives to its children, that we should recognize this very serious gap between the ages of fourteen and sixteen after we have taken the children through the elementary school period – that is, about fifty per cent of them, and then we expect them to get into the work of their lives. In order to do that, they have to have some sort of apprenticeship, but the fact remains that the doors to that apprenticeship are shut in their faces, so that for two years they wander from one thing to another, simply forming the bad habit of leaving one job and taking up another and whatever jobs they do get, fail to give them any training either in schooling or in character.

There we have two connections which we are supposed to make in the education and training of our children that we no longer make. Our society distinctly fails to make the connection between the period of compulsory education and the actual elementary school period for the majority of the children, and there is a failure to connect between the elementary school and the compulsory period, and the apprenticeship into which the boy is supposed to go and which is to give him a very large part of his training.

Now, there is another circumstance which confronts us. The industrial situation at present demands far more skill of its employees than it has demanded in the past, demands specialized skill, demands the skill of a mechanic, a competency which was not demanded in the past, and America, from having been a country satisfied with its high mark so far as its manufactures are concerned, is reaching abroad and insisting upon competing with other countries, and in order to do that it must be able to get

skilled workmen, so that our manufacturers are turning around and considering what sort of training laborers are getting, and we find the situation to which I have referred, that the elementary schools are not giving to the children the education which they are supposed to give to them, and that our children are not in the condition they should be when they come into the skilled industries after they have spent two years at this most critical time of their lives in the manner of which we have spoken, and then when they come into the trade that they are not the stuff they ought to be.

This thing has been brought home to us by the societies for the encouragement of industrial trade, and the manufacturers themselves have waked up to the fact that the community is not giving the training which is demanded, and they are turning around and demanding that this training should be so changed as to bring this about.

So that we are finding that there are various experiments being tried in different parts of the country, in different school systems, experiments which show an attempt to meet this situation to which I have just referred.

We naturally look abroad, for our competition comes from abroad. We know that in Germany they are meeting this situation more satisfactorily; that they felt this same demand for the training of skilled employees, and that it should be given by the community, and their school system has adapted itself to this situation, and has formed what are commonly called "continuation" schools which take the boy after he has left the elementary school and has entered into some sort of apprenticeship, and enables him to continue his work in his trade, at the same time giving him a certain amount of schooling, a certain amount of training. In this way, the whole knowledge and skill which the boy may have acquired is increased at the points at which he needs definite increase. The "continuation" school has been a specific German institution, an addition to a system of education which endeavors to deal with an industrial crisis in education.

Many of us have assumed that the sensible thing to do is simply accept the "continuation" schools from the hands of Germany, which introduced them into our system, to secure efficiency in our laborers by giving them continuous training after they have left the elementary schools.

We have some continuation schools at various points. There are in Cincinnati very interesting continuation schools which apply, however, to the secondary school period, and even perhaps carrying them beyond the secondary school period into the college period, continuation schools for highly skilled labor, where the boys spend half of their time in school and the other half of their time in shops, and accomplish in that way, from the point of view of education, frequently, more than those who spend all their time in shops.

We have similar continuation schools in connection with the Lewis Institute in Chicago¹ which are successful, and it might be assumed on the basis of such success, that we should introduce the continuation school into many trades and that we should assume that this will enable us to meet the situation we are facing.

There are also in Chicago certain apprenticeship schools and there are instances of those elsewhere in the country. The Carpenters' Union insists that their apprentices shall take three months school during certain years before they are allowed to

become masters in their own trade, and the training which they get in the schools in Chicago at the present time is very admirable training as far as it goes.

But still, after all, the continuation school in America is only at certain points, and not at the point where we feel the stress of the educational system the most, and on the whole it does not meet this demand we are speaking of, it does not take the average laborer and give him the training which he needs for the sake of his own education or even for his trade, and it is very questionable whether we should produce any such elaborate system of trade schools as Professor Kerschensteiner presented to us in Chicago a few months ago² as in use at Munich. Munich is a city of artisans and artists, there are no great industries in Munich, so that practically it is possible to connect every laborer with some form of a trade and it is possible to establish, as there has been established under the Professor, a continuation school for every trade. There a boy can go to a continuation school and get direction in his own trade, a training something along the line of civics, which is an enormous advantage to him, but, as I said, Munich is a city of artisans and artists, and the problem which is presented today among the schools of America for low skilled laborers is not met by the continuation schools, for that problem is not presented in Munich.

There are very considerable differences in America also. If you take the situation on the Atlantic Coast, there is a large demand for skilled labor, certain types of textual manufacture, tools, etc., demanding some form of industrial training which will give them skilled labor. In Cincinnati there has been this demand for greater skill among employers and there has been some response to that. And so you can pick out different cities in countries where there is a specific demand for skilled labor, but if we get to Chicago we find four enormous industries, the garment making industry, which employs sixty thousand laborers, the Stock Yards industry, the Harvester industry and the Steel industry. If we take these industries right through, we will find probably that seventy to seventy-five per cent of the laborers in these industries are either unskilled or low-skilled laborers; so far as these industries are concerned there is no great demand for great skill.

So far as that which we ordinarily call skill is concerned there is comparatively little demand for skilled labor in Chicago that is not met. There is a demand for men, of course, in these very industries to which I refer. There is a demand for skilled labor which of course must be set in the higher positions in the trades, but, on the whole, Chicago has managed to meet the demand for skilled labor without feeling it nearly as much as it has been felt on the Atlantic Coast, or in such places as Cincinnati and other places in the country. You can see that the situation in Chicago is an entirely different situation from that in Munich, and an entirely different situation from that even in the Atlantic Coast cities, and that a system of education which adjusts itself only to a demand for skilled industry, which is only trying to meet such a demand, would leave the great mass of laborers in Chicago entirely ignored. A system which should simply attempt to give us skilled labor is not going to take into account those children who are going on into the unskilled fields of industry, and if we should go out into other cities, I think we should find it true that the unskilled laborer represents the large majority. If we depend simply upon the demand which industry is

making upon the community for skilled labor, we are only going to take into account, half or less than half of the children who are going on to work.

Now, that is not the side of the question which has been emphasized by the National Society for the Encouragement of Industrial Education. This Society grew out of the demand for skilled laborers, and it is natural that they should consider that type of labor, or at least that all the institutions which are supposed to train children should seek to run out those who have received this valuable training. Of course, everyone will admit the enormous advantage to the child if he can get that skill, but you can see that any such system of training looks toward the manufacturer for its stimulation, it looks toward the industry itself, and as long as it does that it is going to practically ignore more than half of all the laborers, it is not going to take into account the children who leave the school at the age of fourteen, who go into an apprenticeship at that time and who are never going to an apprenticeship in a skilled trade; children who are going to become machine tenders and do the unskilled work of the world, and those minds and souls are going to be deadened by that process. It would seem to me that children in that condition are more in need of training certainly than the children who are going into a trade, if we take the point of view of the child which most of us would naturally take. The probability is that any boy who is going into a skilled industry will get the training, not only of the hand but of the mind, he must get it, and with it there will be a certain gain in the matter of character; but the boy that passes into the factory and becomes nothing but a machine tender, does nothing but carry out the few motions necessary to care for the machine, such a person becomes essentially a part of the machine and is in need of a very considerable training if he is not to be worn out and paralyzed by this type of industry.

It would seem to me that if we were to take an ideal condition, or as near an ideal condition as we can present, we should demand that no person should enter an unskilled industry until he had reached the age of at least eighteen and until he has had a sort of education which would enable him to bear up against the deadening effects of the occupation which he is entering; until he had interests of a certain character, if they cannot be found in the industry itself, which would enable him to keep his mind at work, which would give him the basis of the formation of character from the point of view of his place in the industry. I say that under conditions which will approach in anyway the ideal situation, children who are to go into the unskilled industries, take positions in factories where they are mere machine tenders, ought to be held in the school system for a longer period than those who are skilled and they should have a very careful education which will enable them to meet the deadening effects which they will there meet. It is a recognized fact that those who are in unskilled industries get no stimulation there from, and it is only fair that they should have their stimulation, such stimulation as can come to them outside of their occupation.

Under those circumstances, I think it is conceivable that a person should work, say, even eight hours a day at unskilled industry and still not be deadened by the industry itself, not be ruined as a human being. I think human nature can stand as much as that if it has other interests to look to, and it is toward such an ideal as that that I think we might look in developing our schools, our society and our industries.

Well now, that presents a side of the problem of the training of those who are going into the industries which we should keep in mind, and when we think of the fortunate children who are going into skilled industries and demand that they shall have the training which will make them effective artisans, we should also remember those who are going into the unskilled industries and demand that they have a training which will meet the more deadening effects which they are bound to receive.

I have laid considerable stress on this, because it seems to me to indicate that we are not able to approach this problem of industrial training from the point of view of the continuation school. It does in a manner meet the demand for skilled industry, and it is natural that the employers whose interests look in that direction first of all, should have conceived of the continuation school as a solution for this problem, but you can see that when we take into account all of our labor that from the human point at least this continuation school does not meet this demand.

To what then are we to turn? If we must turn away from industry because its interests are partial, to what shall we turn for the direction of the training which those who are going into the industries are to receive? Certainly we should turn to the schools. The school system is that system which has more consciously than any other institution certainly, the interest of the children at heart. It belongs to them to take care of those who are passing through this period and to carry them on from the kindergarten up to the time that they enter into life. The school system certainly should take charge of the fortunes of the children who are going into the industries; we may legitimately turn to this school system as manufacturers demand that which shall give skill, if necessary, beyond what is given them. If it fails to give that skill, then it is certainly fair for the manufacturers to complain and insist that that skill should be given.

But, on the other hand, the school system should look farther. It should consider the child who is to tend the machine, it should look upon this problem as one that belongs to it and should insist that if we are to take the interest of all the children into account, that industrial training is something that belongs to its care. I do not think the school system wants to step one side and leave to private interests – those who are interested in getting skilled industry to build up apprenticeship schools and provide themselves with skilled industry, and to leave the children who are to go into the unskilled industries and who need the training of their own schools, I say that I do not think that the school system wants to stand one side and leave these children unprotected.

The difference then between the situation as it exists here and as it exists there in Germany at the present time is that the schools in America – the public school system which undertakes to give a democratic education which is fitted for all, for the unskilled as well as the skilled – the system in America will have to take over the care of the children from the period of fourteen until they enter into their vocation, or into the higher training which lies beyond the function of the period of the public schools. The public school system, it seems to me, definitely has to assume this burden; it has got to undertake this task and carry it out, not only for those children who wish to go on to a college education, but for all the children, and to adapt itself

to this situation so that it will give that training which those are going into the industries really need.

It certainly is a remarkable thing that we should spend such very large sums of money as we do on the secondary training of children who come into our high schools and some who are going beyond that into college; it is remarkable that we are willing to spend as much as we do on this comparatively small fraction of the children in the community, and that we have done so little for the great majority of the children who never get into secondary schools, and yet who need during this period specific training. This is of course in part due to the fact that the type of training which we have given in our schools has been that of members – language. It has not been native to the schools to take over the work of apprenticeship. It does not belong to the school to give the child the skill which is to gain in the trade itself; it has occupied itself very much with the use of the techniques of number and language. Lastly, we have carried into the schools what we call manual training and household arts, constructive activities, not occupied with the use of language or number, but which are occupied with the medium of construction, the training of the hand, training in a type of skill which cannot be analyzed on the old theory. We can explain to the child how he is to go at division, the extraction of the square root, but we cannot explain to the child how he is to get skill, such skill, for instance, as he is to use as a cabinet maker; that is, a skill which has got to be gained doing the thing, the activity itself, and in bringing over these constructive activities into the school, we have introduced another type of education beyond that which we have in the past, and these constructive activities have been introduced because there has been a demand for this sort of activity itself. They have not come into the school because of a demand for greater skill, we have not undertaken to train children in the skill which they will exercise in the industry itself; our schools have merely responded to the demand for skill in commerce. It would seem that we should be able to give such training as will enable our pupils to become clerks, stenographers. Up in Chicago at the present time there 19,000 children who are attending business college, and they spend in these private business colleges as tuition more than Chicago spends on all its high schools. Our schools do not even fit our children for those occupations in which number and language are the techniques. The school system has not adjusted itself in the past to the demands which the community makes upon it in the way of occupation, of the manual training and the various constructive activities of an artistic character which have been introduced, not as representing the skill which the children are to exercise, but it is assumed that manual training educates the hand, and at the same time, the mind. It has been assumed that as far as constructive activities which the children carry on are concerned, that they would serve to educate the child from an aesthetic point of view; it has never been assumed that the skill which they are supposed to be getting is to be adapted to an occupation which they will carry on. We all know that we have even preserved in our arithmetic the types which will be carried out in business, and that there is no necessity of connecting the work in the schools with the work outside.

Now, if the school is to undertake the task of really caring for the training which the children are to have until they enter into their occupations or into the high schools

of learning, it is evident that it has got to connect itself with the occupations outside very much more closely than it is at present. If it is going to do this, it must establish trade schools, and if it is going to establish trade schools, it must take into account a training period up to these trade schools. In other words, if the public system is going to establish trade schools it has got to establish preliminary schools, pre-vocational schools. If the public is going to take an interest in the fortunes of the children, it has got to consider not only the training it is going to give the child, but the kind of vocation which the child is going to select.

There is in Boston a vocational school which tries to find out what sort of occupation the children are going into and the public schools of Boston have set aside one superintendent to have charge of this matter and hope that it may render such assistance as should be given to a child in picking out its vocation. This selection of vocation becomes also a part of the school system; if it is to train the child for its occupation, thus it must become or take over also this part of the educational system and become a vocational system.

Let us consider then what sort of a system we might look forward to in which the demands of industry itself is concerned, and so far as the demands of the child going into industry are concerned, what sort of a system would we have?

I presume we will recognize that children who are going into the trades and even those who are not going into the trades, might very profitably take up some sort of scheme of occupation, some preliminary trade training as early as the seventh or eighth grade, at least that sort of experiment has already been tried. You will find in connection with the practice schools of Pittsburgh courses which are in some sense pre-vocational courses. During the seventh and eighth grade they add one hour to the school day which will give one third of the time to certain kinds of trade activities and they are able to carry on practically the same academic training which has been in the regular school course. At least they assume that the children who graduate from this course are able to enter into any course in the high school. As I say in the seventh and eighth grades a portion of the time is given to what we call these pre-training steps, to cabinet-making, to carpentry, to metal work and various others, plumbing, and practically most of the building trades which have gathered about the construction of a house, in which the child can be profitably trained during this period, and if a training of this sort is given in the school period, which occupies from one third to half the time, it is still possible to carry the child through the seventh and eighth grades and leave him ready to enter any course in the high school, and there is a possibility of changing our system, so as to adjust it to the demand for skilled trade.

Now, what should we have after that? There would be of course under those circumstances the regular high school period, and then beside the high school period there would be the trade school; that could come in to fill this period between fourteen and sixteen. There could be the preparatory trade school; then the definite trade school, which would carry the boy on to the age of eighteen.

You may ask what would be the advantage of this for children who are to take up no skilled trade course. It seems to me it would be very fair to give to every child some sort of generalized trade training. In our technical high schools, we certainly

could make changes which would practically increase, double, perhaps treble the number of persons who could be taken into the schools by adding a certain period, say, one hour each day. It would be possible under those circumstances to group and bring all special work as such, into the first two years. After that it would be possible to give much more specialized training along certain lines out of which might come the more skilled mechanics or foremen, and it would be also possible to carry the children from this training even on into engineering and commerce.

In the high school in Boston they are taking the children along in that way, so that they can actually meet the demand in the commercial world.

I have occupied more time than I expected to, but what I want to make clear is that it is possible such adjustment of our educational system as it is necessary to meet this demand; that we must feel the responsibility of the education and care of our children up to the time at which they go into occupations, or into high schools, and that the advantages that will come are not only to be found in the lives of our children, but also in the system of education itself.

I am confident that industry at the present time presents a more liberal point of view from which to work out and develop such a curriculum than the point of view which we are occupying with our school system. We should be able to give more consideration to the social conditions of our children; for instance, in teaching the history of America, we can teach it from an industrial point of view, instead of keeping before them examples of the great warriors and wars of history, if we show them something of the history of the cotton gin and other inventions that bear upon those things they are likely to be interested in, it will throw more light on the history of the country than if we take the political view.

We have not begun to recognize the possibilities of liberal training that are to be found in the industrial world. I am very confident that if the schools will accept this responsibility of caring for the children up until the age in which they can go into an occupation, or into a higher trade, and attempt to fit them for that trade or occupation, they will find that they will enrich their curriculum, and that they are going to give a much wider, a much deeper, a much more vital education to those children than they have been giving in the past.

Notes

* Delivered in the fall of 1911 in Cincinnati, and published that same year in the *Western Drawing and Manual Training Association, 18th Annual Report*. Springfield, Illinois. The version here presented is based upon the original typescript held at the Mead Papers Archive. Box: 9, Folder: 24. Typescript, incomplete, 24 pp.

- 1 Founded in 1895, the Lewis Institute was the first college to offer adult education programs in the United States.
- 2 Kerchensteiner visited the United States in late 1910 under the sponsorship of the National Society for the Promotion of Industrial Education and in Chicago was sponsored by the Commercial Club of Chicago, promoted by the former Superintendent of Schools, Edwin G. Cooley who worked for them. This information was provided to me by Harold L. Orbach.

26

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNITIVE JUSTICE (1918)*

The study of instincts on the one side and of the motor character of human conduct upon the other has given us a different picture of human nature from that which a dogmatic doctrine of the soul and an intellectualistic psychology presented to an earlier generation.

The instincts even in the lower animal forms have lost their rigidity. They are found to be subject to modification by experience, and the nature of the animal is found to be not a bundle of instincts but an organization within which these congenital habits function to bring about complex acts – acts which are in many cases the result of instincts which have modified each other. Thus new activities arise which are not the simple expression of bare instincts. A striking illustration of this is found in play, especially among young animal forms, in which the hostile instinct is modified and held in check by the others that dominate the social life of the animals. Again the care which the parent form gives to the infant animal admits of hostile features which, however, do not attain the full expression of attack and destruction usually involved in the instinct from which they arise. Nor is this merging and interaction of such divergent instinctive acts a process of alternate dominance of now one and now another instinct. Play and parental care may be and generally are of a piece, in which the inhibition of one tendency by the others has entered into the structure of the animal's nature and seemingly even of its congenital nervous organization. Another illustration of such a merging of divergent instincts is found in the elaborate wooing of the female among the birds.

Back of all this type of organization of instinctive conduct lies the social life within which there must be co-operation of the different individuals, and therefore a continual adjustment of the responses to the changing attitudes of the animals that participate in the corporate acts. It is this body of organized instinctive reactions to one another which makes up the social nature of these forms, and it is from a social nature of this kind exhibited in the conduct of lower forms that our human nature is

evolved. An elaborate analysis of this is still in the making, but certain great features in it stand out with sufficient clearness to warrant comment. We find two opposing groups of instincts, those which we have named hostile and those which may be termed friendly, the latter being largely combinations of the parental and sexual instincts. The import of a herding instinct lying back of them all is still very uncertain if not dubious. What we do find is that individuals adjust themselves to each other in common social processes, but come into conflict with each other frequently in the process, that the expression of this individual hostility within the whole social act is primarily that of the destructive hostile type modified and molded by the organized social reaction, that where this modification and control breaks down, as, e.g., in the rivalry of males in the herd or pack, the hostile instinct may assert itself in its native ruthlessness.

If we turn to the human nature that has developed out of the social nature of lower animals, we find in addition to the organization of social conduct that I have indicated a vast elaboration of the process of adjustment of individuals to each other. This elaboration of gesture, to use Wundt's generalized term, reaches its most developed expression in language. Now language was first the attitude, glance of the eye, movement of the body and its parts indicating the oncoming social act to which the other individuals must adjust their conduct. It becomes language in the narrower sense when it is a common speech of whatever form; that is when through his gesture the individual addresses *himself* as well as the others who are involved in the act. His speech is their speech. He can address himself in their gestures and thus present to himself the whole social situation within which he is involved, so that not only is conduct social but consciousness becomes social as well.

It is out of this conduct and this consciousness that human society grows. What gives it its human character is that the individual through language addresses himself in the role of the others in the group and thus becomes aware of them in his own conduct. But while this phase of evolution is perhaps the most critical in the development of man, it is after all only an elaboration of the social conduct of lower forms. Self-conscious conduct is only an exponent which raises the possible complications of group activity to a higher degree. It does not change the character of the social nature that is elaborated and complicated, nor does it change the principles of its organization. Human nature still remains an organization of instincts which have mutually affected each other. Out of such fundamental instincts as those of sex, parenthood, and hostility has arisen an organized type of social conduct, the conduct of the individual within the group. The attack upon the other individuals of the group has been modified and softened so that the individual asserts himself as over against the others in play, in courting, in care of the young, in certain common attitudes of attack and defense, without the attempted destruction of the individuals attacked. If we use the common terminology we shall account for these modifications by the process of trial and error within the evolution out of which has arisen the social form. Out of the hostile instinct has arisen conduct modified by the social instincts that has served to delimit the conduct springing from sex, parenthood, and mutual defense and attack. It has been the function of the hostile instinct to provide the reaction by which the individual asserts himself within a social process, thus modifying that process while the hostile conduct is itself modified

pro tanto. The result is the appearance of new individuals, certain types of sex mates, playmates, parent and child forms, mates in fight and mates in defense. While this assertion of the individual within the social process delimits and checks the social act at various points it leads to a modified social response with a new field of operation which did not exist for the unmodified instincts. The source of these higher complexes of social conduct appears suddenly when through a breakdown of the organization of the social act there is enacted a crime of passion, the direct outcome of self-assertion within sex, family, or other group responses. Unmodified self-assertion under these conditions means the destruction of the individual attacked.

When now, through the exponent of self-consciousness, the complexities of social conduct are raised to the n th power, when the individual addresses himself as well as the others, by his gestures when in the role of another he can respond to his own stimulus, all the range of possible activities is brought within the field of social conduct. He finds himself within groups of varied sorts. The size of the group to which he can belong is limited only by his ability to co-operate with its members. Now the common control over the food process lifts these instincts out of the level of the mechanical response to biologically determined stimuli and brings them within the sweep of self-conscious direction inside of the larger group activity. And these varied groupings multiply the occasions of individual oppositions. Here again the instinct of hostility becomes the method of self-assertion, but while the oppositions are self-conscious the process of readjustment and the molding of the hostile attitudes by the larger social process remains in principle the same, though the long road of trial and error may be at times abandoned for the short cuts which the symbolism of language provides.

On the other hand the consciousness of self through consciousness of others is responsible for a more profound sense of hostility – that of the members of the groups to those opposed to it, or even to those merely outside it. And this hostility has the backing of the whole inner organization of the group. It provides the most favorable condition for the sense of group solidarity because in the common attack upon the common enemy the individual differences are obliterated. But in the development of these group hostilities we find the same self-assertion with the attempted elimination of the enemy giving way before the larger social whole within which the conflicting groups find themselves. The hostile self-assertion passes over into functional activities in the new type of conduct as it has taken place in play even among lower animal forms. The individual becomes aware of himself, not through the conquest of the other, but through the distinction of function. It is not so much that the actual hostile reactions are themselves transformed as that the individual who is conscious of himself as over against the enemy finds other opportunities for conduct which remove the immediate stimuli for destroying the enemy. Thus the conqueror who realized himself in his power of life or death over the captive found in the industrial value of the slave a new attitude which removed the sense of hostility and opened the door to that economic development which finally placed the two – upon the same ground of common citizenship.

It is in so far as the opposition reveals a larger underlying relationship within which the hostile individuals arouse non-hostile reactions that the hostile reactions themselves

become modified into a type of self-assertion which is balanced against the self-assertion of those who had been enemies, until finally these oppositions become the compensating activities of different individuals in a new social conduct. In other words the hostile instinct has the function of the *assertion* of the social self when this self comes into existence in the evolution of human behavior. The man who has achieved an economic, a legal, or any type of social triumph does not feel the impulse to physically annihilate his opponent, and ultimately the mere sense of the security of his social position may rob the stimulus to attack of all of its power.

The moral of this is, and one is certainly justified in emphasizing it at this time of a profound democratic movement in the midst of a world-war, that advance takes place in bringing to consciousness the larger social whole within which hostile attitudes pass over into self-assertions that are functional instead of destructive.

The following pages discuss the hostile attitude as it appears especially in punitive justice.

In the criminal court it is the purpose of the proceeding to prove that the defendant did or did not commit a certain act, that in case the defendant did commit the act this act falls under such and such a category of crime or misdemeanor as defined by the statute, and that, as a consequence, he is subject to such and such punishment. It is the assumption of this procedure that conviction and punishment are the accomplishment of justice and also that it is for the good of society, that is, that it is both just and expedient, though it is not assumed that in any particular case the meting out to criminal of the legal recompense of his crime will accomplish an immediate social good which will outweigh the immediate social evil that may result to him, his family, and society itself from conviction and imprisonment. Galsworthy's play *Justice* turns upon the wide discrepancy between legal justice and social good in a particular case. On the other side lies the belief that without this legal justice with all its miscarriages and disintegrating results society itself would be impossible. In the back of the public mind lie both these standards of criminal justice, that of retribution and that of prevention. It is just that a criminal should suffer in proportion to the evil that he has done. On the other hand it is just that the criminal should suffer so much and in such a manner that his penalty will serve to deter him and others from committing the like offense in the future. There has been a manifest shift in the emphasis upon these two standards. During the Middle Ages, when courts of justice were the antechambers to chambers of torture, the emphasis lay upon the nice proportioning of the suffering to the offense. In the grand epic manner Dante projected this torture chamber, as the accomplishment of justice, against the sphere of the heavens, and produced those magnificent distortions and magnifications of human primitive vengeance that the mediaeval heart and imagination accepted as divine.

There existed, however, even then no commensurability between retributory sufferings and the evil for which the criminal was held responsible. In the last analysis he suffered until satisfaction had been given to the outraged sentiments of the injured person, or of his kith and kin, or of the community, or of an angry God. To satisfy the latter an eternity might be too short, while a merciful death ultimately carried away from the most exacting community the victim who was paying for his sin in

the coin of his own agony. Commensurability does not exist between sin and suffering but does exist roughly between the sin and the amount and kind of suffering that will satisfy those who feel themselves aggrieved and yet it has become the judgment of our common moral consciousness that satisfaction in the suffering of the criminal has no legitimate place in assessing his punishment. Even in its sublimated form, as a part of righteous indignation, we recognize its legitimacy only in resenting and condemning injury, not in rendering justice for the evil done. It was therefore natural that in measuring the punishment the emphasis should shift from retribution to prevention, for there is a rough quantitative relation between the severity of the penalty and the fear which it inspires. This shift to the standard of expediency in determining the severity of the penalty does not mean that retribution is no longer the justification for punishment either in the popular mind or in legal theory, for however expedient it may be to visit crimes with condign punishments in the interest of the welfare of society, the justification for inflicting the suffering at all is found in the assumption that the criminal owes retributive suffering to the community; a debt which the community may collect in the form and amount which is most expedient to itself.

This curious combination of the concepts of retributive suffering which is the justification for punishment but may not be the standard for the amount and degree of the punishment, and of a social expediency which may not be the justification for the punishment itself but is the standard of the amount and kind of punishment inflicted, is evidently not the whole story. If retribution were the only justification for punishment it is hard to believe that punishment would not itself have disappeared when society came to recognize that a possible theory of punishment could not be worked out or maintained on the basis of retribution; especially when we recognize that a system of punishments assessed with reference to their deterrent powers not only works very inadequately in repressing crime but also preserves a criminal class. This other part of the story, which neither retribution nor social expediency tells, reveals itself in the assumed solemnity of criminal court procedure, in the majesty of the law, in the supposedly impartial and impersonal character of justice. These characters are not involved in the concept of retribution nor in that of deterrence. Lynch law is the very essence of retribution and is inspired with the grim assurance that such summary justice must strike terror into the heart of the prospective criminal, and lynch law lacks solemnity, and majesty, and is anything but impersonal or impartial. These characters inhere, not in the primitive impulses out of which punitive justice has arisen nor in the cautious prudence with which society devises protection for its goods, but in the judicial institution which theoretically acts on rule and not upon impulse and whose justice is to be done though the heavens fall. What, then, are these values evidenced in and maintained by the laws of punitive justice? The most patent value is the theoretically impartial enforcement of the common will. It is a procedure which undertakes to recognize and protect the individual in the interest of the common good and by the common will. In his acceptance of the law and dependence upon it the individual is at one with the community, while this very attitude carries with it the recognition of his responsibility to obey and support the law in its enforcement. So conceived the common law is an affirmation of citizenship. It is, however, a grave mistake to assume

that the law itself and men's attitudes toward it can exist *in abstracto*. It is a grave mistake, for too often the respect for law as law is what we demand of members of the community, while we are able to regard with comparative indifference defects both in the concrete laws and in their administration. It is not only a mistake, it is also a fundamental error, for all emotional attitudes – and even respect for law and a sense of responsibility are emotional attitudes – arise in response to concrete impulses. We do not respect law in the abstract but the values which the laws of the community conserve. We have no sense of responsibility as such but an emotional recognition of duties which our position in the community entails. Nor are these impulses and emotional reactions less concrete because they are so organized into complex habits that some slight but appropriate stimulus sets a whole complex of impulses into operation. A man who defends an apparently unimportant right on principle is defending the whole body of analogous rights which a vast complex of social habits tends to preserve. His emotional attitude, which is seemingly out of proportion to the immediate issue, answers to all of those social goods toward which the different impulses in the organized body of habits are directed. Nor may we assume that because our emotions answer to concrete impulses they are therefore necessarily egoistic or self-regarding. No small portion of the impulses which make up the human individual are immediately concerned with the good of others. The escape from selfishness is not by the Kantian road of an emotional response to the abstract universal, but by the recognition of the genuinely social character of human nature. An important instance of this illusory respect for abstract law appears in our attitude of dependence upon the law and its enforcement for the defense of our goods and those of others with whom we identify our interests.

A threatened attack upon these values places us in an attitude of defense, and as this defense is largely intrusted to the operation of the laws of the land we gain a respect for the laws which is in proportion to the goods which they defend. There is, however, another attitude more easily aroused under these conditions which is, I think, largely responsible for our respect for law as law. I refer to the attitude of hostility to the lawbreaker as an enemy to the society to which we belong. In this attitude we are defending the social structure against an enemy with all the animus which the threat to our own interests calls out. It is not the detailed operation of the law in defining the invasion of rights and their proper preservation that is the center of our interest but the capture and punishment of the personal enemy, who is also the public enemy. The law is the bulwark of our interests, and the hostile procedure against the enemy arouses a feeling of attachment due to the means put at our disposal for satisfying the hostile impulse. The law has become the weapon for overwhelming the thief of our purses, our good names, or even of our lives. We feel toward it as we feel toward the police officer who rescues us from a murderous assault. The respect for the law is obverse side of our hatred for the criminal aggressor. Furthermore the court procedure, after the man accused of the crime is put under arrest and has been brought to trial, emphasizes this emotional attitude. The state's attorney seeks a conviction. The accused must defend himself against this attack. The aggrieved person and the community find in this officer of the government their champion. A legal battle takes the place of the

former physical struggle which lead up to the arrest. The emotions called out are the emotions of battle. The impartiality of the court who sits as the adjudicator is the impartiality of the umpire between the contending parties. The assumption that contending parties will each do his utmost to win, places upon each, even upon the state's attorney, the obligation to get a verdict for his own side rather than to bring about a result which will be for the best interests of all concerned. The doctrine that the strict enforcement of the law in this fashion is for the best interest of all concerned has no bearing upon the point which I am trying to emphasize. This point is that the emotional attitude of the injured individual and of the other party to the proceedings – the community – towards the law is that engendered by the hostile enterprise in which the law has become the ponderous weapon of defense and attack.¹

There is another emotional content involved in this attitude of respect for law as law, which is perhaps of like importance with the other. I refer to that accompanying stigma placed upon the criminal. The revulsions against criminality reveal themselves in a sense of solidarity with the group, a sense of being a citizen which on the one hand excludes those who have transgressed the laws of the group and on the other inhibits tendencies to criminal acts in the citizen himself. It is this emotional reaction against conduct which excludes from society that gives to the moral taboos of the group such impressiveness. The majesty of the law is that of the angel with the fiery sword at the gate who can cut one off from the world to which he belongs. The majesty of the law is the dominance of the group over the individual, and the paraphernalia of criminal law serves not only to exile the rebellious individual from the group, but also to awaken in law-abiding members of society the inhibitions which make rebellion impossible to them. The formulation of these inhibitions is the basis of criminal law. The emotional content that accompanies them is a large part of the respect for law as law. In both these elements of our respect for law as law, in the respect for the common instrument of defense from and attack upon the enemy of ourselves and of society, and in the respect for that body of formulated custom which at once identifies us with the whole community and excludes those who break its commandments, we recognize concrete impulses – those of attack upon the enemy of ourselves and at the same time of the community, and those of inhibition and restraint through which we feel the common will, in the identity of prohibition and of exclusion. They are concrete impulses which at once identify us with the predominant whole and at the same time place us on the level of every other member of the group, and thus set up that theoretical impartiality and evenhandedness of punitive justice which calls out in no small degree our sense of loyalty and respect. And it is out of the universality that belongs to the sense of common action springing out of these impulses that the institutions of law and of regulative and repressive justice arise. While these impulses are concrete in respect of their immediate object, i.e., the criminal, the values which this hostile attitude toward the criminal protects either in society or in ourselves are negatively and abstractly conceived. Instinctively we estimate the worth of the goods protected by the procedure against the criminal and in terms of this hostile procedure. These goods are not simply the physical articles but include the more precious values of self-respect, in not allowing one's self to be overridden, in downing the enemy of the group, in affirming

the maxims of the group and its institutions against invasions. Now in all of this we have our backs toward that which we protect and our faces toward the actual or potential enemy. These goods are regarded as valuable because we are willing to fight and even die for them in certain exigencies, but their proceeding. The value is neither affirmed nor considered in the legal proceeding. The values thus obtained are not their values in use but sacrifice values. To many a man his country has become infinitely valuable because he finds himself willing to fight and die for it when the common impulse of attack upon the common enemy has been aroused, and yet he may have been, in his daily life, a traitor to the social values he is dying to protect because there was no emotional situation within which these values appeared in his consciousness. It is difficult to bring into commensurable relationship to each other a man's willingness to cheat his country out of its legitimate taxes and his willingness to fight and die for the same country. The reactions spring from different sets of impulses and lead to evaluations which seem to have nothing in common with each other. The type of valuation of social goods that arises out of the hostile attitude toward the criminal is negative, because it does not present the positive social function of the goods that the hostile procedure protects. From the standpoint of protection one thing behind the wall has the same import as anything else that lies behind the same defense. The respect for law as law thus is found to be a respect for a social organization of defense against the enemy of the group and a legal and judicial procedure that are oriented with reference to the criminal. The attempt to utilize these social attitudes and procedures to remove the causes of crime, to assess the kind and amount of punishment which the criminal should suffer in the interest of society, or to reinstate the criminal as a law-abiding citizen has failed utterly. For while the institutions which inspire our respect are concrete institutions with a definite function, they are responsible for a quite abstract and inadequate evaluation of society and its goods. These legal and political institutions organized with reference to the enemy or at least the outsider give a statement of social goods which is based upon defense and not upon function. The aim of the criminal proceeding is to determine whether the accused is innocent, i.e., still belongs to the group or whether he is guilty, i.e., is put under the ban which criminal punishment carries with it. The technical statement of this is found in the loss of the privileges of a citizen, in sentences of any severity, but the more serious ban is found in the fixed attitude of hostility on the part of the community toward a jailbird. One effect of this is to define the goods and privileges of the members of the community as theirs in virtue of their being law-abiding, and their responsibilities as exhausted by the statutes which determine the nature of criminal conduct. This effect is not due alone to the logical tendency to maintain the same definition of the institution of property over against the conduct of the thief and that of the law-abiding citizen. It is due in far greater degree to the feeling that we all stand together in the protection of property. In the positive definition of property, that is in terms of its social uses and functions, we are met by wide diversity of opinion, especially where the theoretically wide freedom of control over private property, asserted over against the thief, is restrained in the interest of problematic public goods. Out of this attitude toward the goods which the criminal law protects arises that fundamental difficulty in social reform which is due, not to

mere difference in opinion nor to conscious selfishness, but to the fact that what we term opinions are profound social attitudes which, once assumed, fuse all conflicting tendencies over against the enemy of the people. The respect for law as law in its positive use in defense of social goods becomes unwittingly a respect for the conceptions of these goods which the attitude of defense has fashioned. Property becomes sacred not because of its social uses but because all the community is as one in its defense, and this conception of property, taken over into the social struggle to make property serve its functions in the community, becomes the bulwark of these in possession, *beati possidentes*.

Beside property other institutions have arisen, that of the person with its rights, that of the family with its rights, and that of the government with its rights. Wherever rights exist, invasion of those rights may be punished, and a definition of these institutions is formulated in protecting the right against trespass. The definition is again the voice of the community as a whole proclaiming and penalizing the one whose conduct has placed him under the ban. There is the same unfortunate circumstance that the law speaking against the criminal gives the sanction of the sovereign authority of the community to the negative definition of the right. It is defined in terms of its contemplated invasion. The individual who is defending his own rights against the trespasser is led to state even his family and more general social interests in abstract individualistic terms. Abstract individualism and a negative conception of liberty in terms of the freedom from restraints become the working ideas in the community. They have the prestige of battle cries in the fight for freedom against privilege. They are still the countersigns of the descendants of those who cast off the bonds of political and social restraint in their defense and assertion of the rights their forefathers won. Wherever criminal justice, the modern elaborate development of the taboo, the ban, and their consequences in a primitive society, organizes and formulates public sentiment in defense of social goods and institutions against actual or prospective enemies, there we find that the definition of the enemies, in other words the criminals, carries with it the definition of the goods and institutions. It is the revenge of the criminal upon the society which crushes him. The concentration of public sentiment upon the criminal which mobilizes the institution of justice, paralyzes the undertaking to conceive our common goods in terms of their uses. The majesty of the law is that of the sword drawn against a common enemy. The evenhandedness of justice is that of universal conscription against a common enemy, and that of the abstract definition of rights which places the ban upon anyone who falls outside of its rigid terms.

Thus we see society almost helpless in the grip of the hostile attitude it has taken toward those who break its laws and contravene its institutions. Hostility toward the lawbreaker inevitably brings with it the attitudes of retribution, repression, and exclusion. These provide no principles for the eradication of crime, for returning the delinquent to normal social relations, nor for stating the transgressed rights and institutions in terms of their positive social functions.

On the other side of the ledger stands the fact that the attitude of hostility toward the lawbreaker has the unique advantage of uniting all members of the community in the emotional solidarity of aggression. While the most admirable of humanitarian

efforts are sure to run counter to the individual interests of very many in the community, or fail to touch the interest and imagination of the multitude and to leave the community divided or indifferent, the cry of thief or murder is attuned to profound complexes, lying below the surface of competing individual effort, and citizens who have separated by divergent interests stand together against the common enemy. Furthermore, the attitude reveals common, universal values which underlie like a bed-rock the divergent structures of individual ends that are mutually closed and hostile to each other. Seemingly without the criminal the cohesiveness of society would disappear and the universal goods of the community would crumble into mutually repellent individual particles. The criminal does not seriously endanger the structure of society by his destructive activities, and on the other hand he is responsible for a sense of solidarity, aroused among those whose attention would be otherwise centered upon interests quite divergent from those of each other. Thus courts of criminal justice may be essential to the preservation of society even when we take account of the impotence of the criminal over against society, and the clumsy failure of criminal law in the repression and suppression of crime. I am willing to admit that this statement is distorted, not however in its analysis of the efficacy of the procedure against the criminal, but in its failure to recognize the growing consciousness of the many common interests which is slowly changing our institutional conception of society, and its consequent exaggerated estimate upon the import of the criminal. But it is important that we should realize what the implications of this attitude of hostility are within our society. We should especially recognize the inevitable limitations which the attitude carries with it. Social organization which arises out of hostility at once emphasizes the character which is the basis of the opposition and tends to suppress all other characters in the members of the group. The cry of "stop thief" unites us all as property owners against the robber. We all stand shoulder to shoulder as Americans against a possible invader. Just in proportion as we organize by hostility do we suppress individuality. In a political campaign that is fought on party lines the members of the party surrender themselves to the party. They become simply members of the party whose conscious aim is to defeat the rival organization. For this purpose the party member becomes merely a republican or a democrat. The party symbol expresses everything. Where simple social aggression or defense with the purpose of eliminating or encysting an enemy is the purpose of the community, organization through the common attitude of hostility is normal and effective. But as long as the social organization is dominated by the attitude of hostility the individuals or groups who are the objectives of this organization will remain enemies. It is quite impossible psychologically to hate the sin and love the sinner. We are very much given to cheating ourselves in this regard. We assume that we can detect, pursue, indict, prosecute, and punish the criminal and still retain toward him the attitude of reinstating him in the community as soon as he indicates a change in social attitude himself, that we can at the same time watch for the definite transgression of the statute to catch and overwhelm the offender, and comprehend the situation out of which the offense grows. But the two attitudes, that of control of crime by the hostile procedure of the law and that of control through comprehension of social and psychological conditions, cannot be combined. To understand is to forgive

and the social procedure seems to deny the very responsibility which the law affirms, and on the other hand the pursuit by criminal justice inevitably awakens the hostile attitude in the offender and renders the attitude of mutual comprehension practically impossible. The social worker in the court is the sentimentalist, and the legalist in the social settlement in spite of his learned doctrine is the ignoramus.

While then the attitude of hostility, either against the transgressor of the laws or against the external enemy, gives to the group a sense of solidarity which most readily arouses like a burning flame and which consumes the differences of individual interests, the price paid for this solidarity of feeling is great and at times disastrous. Though human attitudes are far older than any human institutions and seem to retain identities of structure that make us at home in the heart of every man whose story has come down to us from the written and unwritten past, yet these attitudes take on new forms as they gather new social contents. The hostilities which flamed up between man and man, between family and family, and fixed the forms of old societies have changed as men came to realize the common whole within which these deadly struggles were fought out. Through rivalries, competitions, and co-operations men achieved the conception of a social state in which they asserted themselves while they at the same time affirmed the status of the others, on the basis not only of common rights and privileges but also on the basis of differences of interest and function, in an organization of more varied individuals. In the modern economic world a man is able to assert himself much more effectively against others through his acknowledgment of common property rights underlying their whole economic activity; while he demands acknowledgment for his individual competitive effort by recognizing and utilizing the varied activities and economic functions of others in the whole business complex.

This evolution reaches a still richer content when the self-assertion appears in the consciousness of social contribution that obtains the esteem of the others whose activities it complements and renders possible. In the world of scientific research rivalries do not preclude the warm recognition of the service which the work of one scientist renders to the whole co-operative undertaking of the *monde savante*. It is evident that such a social organization is not obtainable at will, but is dependent upon the slow growth of very varied and intricate social mechanisms. While no clearly definable set of conditions can be presented as responsible for this growth, it will I think be admitted that a very necessary condition, perhaps the most important one, is that of overcoming the temporal and spatial separations of men so that they are brought into closer interrelation with each other. Means of intercommunications have been the great civilizing agents. The multiple social stimulation of an indefinite number of varied contacts of a vast number of individuals with each other is the fertile field out of which spring social organizations, for these make possible the larger social life that can absorb the hostilities of different groups. When this condition has been supplied there seems to be an inherent tendency in social groups to advance from the hostile attitudes of individuals and groups toward each other through rivalries, competitions, and co-operations toward a functional self-assertion which recognizes and utilizes other selves and groups of selves in the activities in which social human nature expresses itself. And yet the attitude of hostility of a community toward those who have transgressed its laws or customs, i.e.,

its criminals, and toward the outer enemies has remained as a great solidifying power. The passionate appreciation of our religious, political, property, and family institutions has arisen in the attack upon those who individually or collectively have assailed or violated them, and hostility toward the actual or prospective enemies of our country has been the never-failing source of patriotism.

If then we undertake to deal with the causes of crime in a fundamental way, and as dispassionately as we are dealing with the causes of disease, and if we wish to substitute negotiation and international adjudication for war in settling disputes between nations, it is of some importance to consider what sort of emotional solidarity we can secure to replace that which the traditional procedures have supplied. It is in the juvenile court that we meet the undertaking to reach and understand the causes of social and individual breakdown, to mend if possible the defective situation and reinstate the individual at fault. This is not attended with any weakening of the sense of the values that are at stake, but a great part of the paraphernalia of hostile procedure is absent. The judge sits down with the child who has been committed to the court, with members of the family, parole officers, and others who may help to make the situation comprehensible and indicates what steps can be taken to bring matters to a normal condition. We find the beginnings of scientific technique in this study in the presence of the psychologist and medical officer who can report upon the mental and physical condition of the child, of the social workers who can report upon the situation of the families and neighborhood involved. Then there are other institutions beside the jails to which the children can be sent for prolonged observation and change of immediate environment. In centering interest upon reinstatement the sense of forward-looking moral responsibility is not only not weakened but is strengthened, for the court undertakes to determine what the child must do and be to take up normal social relations again. Where the responsibility rests upon others this can be brought out in much greater detail and with greater effect since it is not defined under abstract legal categories and the aim in determining responsibility is not to place punishment but to obtain future results. Out of this arises a much fuller presentation of the facts that are essential for dealing with the problem than can possibly appear in a criminal court procedure that aims to establish simply responsibility for a legally defined offense with the purpose of inflicting punishment. Of far greater importance is the appearance of the values of family relations, of schools, of training of all sorts, of opportunities to work, and of all the other factors that go to make up that which is worth while in the life of a child or an adult. Before the juvenile court it is possible to present all of these and all of them can enter the consideration of what action is to be taken. These are the things that are worth while. They are the ends that should determine conduct. It is impossible to discover their real import unless they can all be brought into relationship with each other.

It is impossible to deal with the problem of what the attitude and conduct of the community should be toward the individual who has broken its laws, or what his responsibility is in terms of future action, unless all the facts and all the values with reference to which the facts must be interpreted are there and can be impartially considered, just as it is impossible to deal scientifically with any problem without

recognizing all the facts and all the values involved. The attitude of hostility which places the criminal under the ban, and thus takes him out of society, and prescribes a hostile procedure by which he is secured, tried, and punished can take into account only those features of his conduct which constitute infraction of the law, and can state the relation of the criminal and society only in the terms of trial for fixing guilt and of punishment. All else is irrelevant. The adult criminal court is not undertaking to readjust a broken-down social situation, but to determine by the application of fixed rules whether the man is a member of society in good and regular standing or is an outcast. In accordance with these fixed rules what does not come under the legal definition not only does not naturally appear but it is actually excluded. Thus there exists a field of facts bearing upon the social problems that come into our courts and governmental administrative bureaus, facts which cannot be brought into direct use in solving these problems. It is with this material that the social scientist and the voluntary social worker and his organizations are occupied. In the juvenile court we have a striking instance of this material forcing its way into the institution of the court itself and compelling such a change in method that the material can be actually used. Recent changes of attitude toward the family permit facts bearing upon the care of children which earlier lay outside the purview of the court to enter into its consideration.

Other illustrations could be cited of this change in the structure and function of institutions by the pressure of data which the earlier form of the institution had excluded. One may cite the earlier theory of charity that it was a virtue of those in fortunate circumstances which is exercised toward the poor whom we have always with us, in its contrast with the conception of organized charity whose aim is not the exercise of an individual virtue but such a change in the condition of the individual case and of the community within which the cases arise that a poverty which requires charity may disappear. The author of a mediaeval treatise on charity considering the lepers as a field for good works contemplated the possibility of their disappearance with the ejaculation "which may God forbid!" The juvenile court is but one instance of an institution in which the consideration of facts which had been regarded as irrelevant or exceptional has carried with it a radical change in the institution. But it is of particular interest because the court is the objective form of the attitude of hostility on the part of the community toward the one who transgresses its laws and customs, and it is of further interest because it throws into relief the two types of emotional attitudes which answer to two types of social organization. Over against the emotional solidarity of the group opposing the enemy we find the interests which spring up around the effort to meet and solve a social problem. These interests are at first in opposition to each other. The interest in the individual delinquent opposes the interest in property and the social order dependent upon it. The interest in the change of the conditions which foster the delinquent is opposed to that identified with our positions in society as now ordered, and the resentment at added responsibilities which had not been formerly recognized or accepted.

But the genuine effort to deal with the actual problem brings with it tentative reconstructions which awaken new interests and emotional values. Such are the interests in better housing conditions, in different and more adequate schooling, in playgrounds

and small parks, in controlling child labor and in vocational guidance, in improved sanitation and hygiene, and in community and social centers. In the place of the emotional solidarity which makes us all one against the criminal there appears the cumulation of varied interests unconnected in the past which not only bring new meaning to the delinquent but which also bring the sense of growth, development, and achievement. This reconstructive attitude offers the cumulative interest which comes with interlocking diversified values. The discovery that tuberculosis, alcoholism, unemployment, school retardation, adolescent delinquency, among other social evils, reach their highest percentages in the same areas not only awakens the interest we have in combatting each of these evils, but creates a definite object, that of human misery, which focuses endeavor and builds up a concrete object of human welfare which is a complex of values. Such an organization of effort gives rise to an individual or self with a new content of character, a self that is effective since the impulses which lead to conduct are organized with reference to a clearly defined object.

It is of interest to compare this self with that which responds to the community call for defense of itself or its institutions. The dominant emotional coloring of the latter is found in the standing together of all the group against the common enemy. The consciousness which one has of others is stripped of the instinctive oppositions which in varying forms are aroused in us by the mere presence of others. These may be merely the slight rivalries and differences of opinion and of social attitude and position, or just the reserves which we all preserve over against those about us. In the common cause these can disappear. Their disappearance means a removal of resistance and friction and adds exhilaration and enthusiasm to the expression of one of the most powerful of human impulses. The result is a certain enlargement of the self in which one seems to be at one with everyone else in the group. It is not a self-consciousness in the way of contrasting one's self with others. One loses himself in the whole group in some sense and may attain the attitude in which he undergoes suffering and death for the common cause. In fact just as war removes the inhibitions from the attitude of hostility so it quickens and commends the attitude of self-assertion of a self which is fused with all the others in the community. The ban upon self-assertion which the consciousness of others in the group to which one belongs carries with it disappears when the assertion is directed against an object of common hostility or dislike. Even in times of peace we feel as a rule little if any disapproval of arrogance toward those of another nationality, and national self-conceit and the denigration of the achievements of other peoples may become virtues. The same tendency exists in varying degree among those who unite against the criminal or against the party foe. Attitudes of difference and opposition between members of the community or group are in abeyance and there is given the greater freedom for self-assertion against the enemy. Through these experiences come the powerful emotions which serve to evaluate for the time being what the whole community stands for in comparison with the interests of the individual who is opposed to the group. These experiences, however, serve only to set off against each other what the group stands for and the meager birthright of the individual who cuts himself off from the group.

What we all fight for, what we all protect, what we all affirm against the detractor, confers upon each in some measure the heritage of all, while to be outside the

community is to be an Esau without heritage and with every man's hand against him. Self-assertion against the common enemy, suppressing as it does the oppositions of individuals within the group and thus identifying them all in a common effort, is after all the self-assertion of the fight in which the opposing selves strive each to eliminate the other, and in so doing are setting up their own survival and the destruction of the others as the end. I know that many ideals have been the ends of war, at least in the minds of many of the fighters; that in so far the fighting was not to destroy the fighters but some pernicious institution, such as slavery, that many have fought bloody wars for liberty and freedom. No champions however, of such causes have ever failed to identify the causes in the struggle with themselves. The battle is for the survival of the right party and the death of the wrong. Over against the enemy we reach the ultimate form of self-assertion, whether it is the patriotic national self, or the party, or the schismatic self, or the institutional self, or simply the self of the hand to hand *mêlée*. It is the self whose existence calls for the destruction, or defeat, or subjection, or reduction of the enemy. It is a self that finds expression in vivid, concentrated activity and under appropriate conditions of the most violent type. The instinct of hostility which provides the structure for this self when fully aroused and put in competition with the other powerful human complexes of conduct, those of sex, of hunger, and of parenthood and of possession has proved itself as more dominant than they. It also carries with it the stimulus for readier and, for the time being, more complete socialization than any other instinctive organization. There is no ground upon which men get together so readily as that of a common enemy, while a common object of the instinct of sex, of possession, or of hunger leads to instant opposition, and even the common object of the parental instinct may be the spring of jealousy. The socializing agency of common hostility is marked, as I have above indicated, by its own defects. In so far as it is the dominant instinct it does not organize the other instincts for its object. It suppresses or holds the others in abeyance. While hostility itself may be a constituent part of the execution of any instinct, for they all involve oppositions, there is no other instinctive act of the human self which is a constituent part of the immediate instinctive process of fighting, while struggle with a possible opponent plays its part in the carrying out of every other instinctive activity. As a result those who fight together against common enemies instinctively tend to ignore the other social activities within which oppositions between the individuals engaged normally arise.

It is this temporary relief from the social frictions which attend upon all other co-operative activities which is largely responsible for the emotional upheavals of patriotism, of mob consciousness, and the extremes of party warfare, as well as for the gusto of malicious gossiping and scandal-mongering. Furthermore, in the exercise of this instinct success implies the triumph of the self over the enemy. The achievement of the process is the defeat of certain persons and the victory of others. The end takes the form of that sense of self-enlargement and assurance which comes with superiority of the self over others. The attention is directed toward the relative position of the self toward others. The values involved are those that only can be expressed in terms of interests and relations of the self in its differences from others. From the standpoint of one set of antagonists their victory is that of efficient civilization while

the other regards their victory as that of liberal ideas. All the way from the Tamerlanes who create a desert and call it peace to the idealistic warriors who fight and die for ideas, victory means the survival of one set of personalities and the elimination of others, and the ideas and ideals that become issues in the contest must perforce be personified if they are to appear in the struggles that arise out of the hostile instinct. War, whether it is physical, economic, or political, contemplates the elimination of the physical, economic, or political opponent. It is possible to confine the operation of this instinct within certain specific limitations and fields. In the prize fights as in the olden tourneys the annihilation of the enemy is ceremonially halted at a fixed stage in the struggle. In a football game the defeated team leaves the field to the champion. Successful competition in its sharpest form eliminates its competitor. The victor at the polls drives the opponent from the field of political administration. If the struggle can be *à outrance* within any field and contemplates the removal of the enemy from that field, the instinct of hostility has this power of uniting and fusing the contesting groups, but since victory is the aim of the fight and it is the victory of one party over the other, the issues of battle must be conceived in terms of the victor and the vanquished.

Other types of social organization growing out of the other instincts, such as possession, hunger, or parenthood, imply ends which are not as such identified with selves in their oppositions to other selves, though the objects toward which these instinctive activities are directed may be occasion for the exercise of the hostile instinct. The social organizations which arise about these objects are in good part due to the inhibitions placed upon the hostile impulse, inhibitions which are exercised by the other groups of impulses which the same situations call out. The possession by one individual in a family or clan group of a desirable object is an occasion for an attack on the part of other members of the group, but his characters as a member of the group are stimuli to family and clan responses which check the attack. It may be mere repression with smoldering antagonisms, or there may be such a social reorganization that the hostility can be given a function under social control, as in the party, political, and economic contests, in which certain party, political, and economic selves are driven from the field leaving others that carry out the social activity. Here the contest being restricted the most serious evils of the warfare are removed, while the contest has at least the value of the rough selection. The contest is regarded in some degree from the standpoint of the social function, not simply from that of the elimination of an enemy. As the field of constructive social activity widens the operation of the hostile impulse in its instinctive form decreases. This does not, however, mean that the reactions that go to make up the impulse or instinct have ceased to function. It does mean that the impulse ceases to be an undertaking to get rid of the offending object by injury and destruction, that is, an undertaking directed against another social being with capacities for suffering and death – physical, economical or political – like his own. It becomes in its organization with other impulses an undertaking to deal with a situation by removing obstacles. We still speak of him as fighting against his difficulties. The force of the original impulse is not lost but its objective is no longer the elimination of a person, but such a reconstruction that the profounder social activities may find their continued and fuller expression. The energy that expressed itself in burning witches

as the causes of plagues expends itself at present in medical research and sanitary regulations and may still be called a fight with disease.

In all these changes the interest shifts from the enemy to the reconstruction of social conditions. The self-assertion of the soldier and conqueror becomes that of the competitor in industry or business or politics, of the reformer, the administrator, of the physician or other social functionary. The test of success of this self lies in the change and construction of the social conditions which make the self possible, not in the conquest and elimination of other selves. His emotions are not those of mass consciousness dependent upon suppressed individualities, but arise out of the cumulative interests of varied undertakings converging upon a common problem of social reconstruction. This individual and his social organization are more difficult of accomplishment and subject to vastly greater friction than those which spring out of war. Their emotional content may not be so vivid, but they are the only remedy for war, and they meet the challenge which the continued existence of war in human society has thrown down to human intelligence.

Notes

* As originally published in *American Journal of Sociology*, 23 (1918), 577–602.

1 I am referring here to criminal law and its enforcement, not only because respect for the law and the majesty of the law have reference almost entirely to criminal justice, but also because a very large part, perhaps the largest part, of civil law proceedings are undertaken and carried out with the intent of defining and readjusting social situations without the hostile attitudes which characterize the criminal procedure. The parties to the civil proceedings belong to the same group and continue to belong to this group, whatever decision is rendered. No stigma attaches to the one who loses. Our emotional attitude toward this body of law is that of interest, of condemnation and approval as it fails or succeeds in its social function. It is not an institution that must be respected even in its disastrous failures. On the contrary it must be changed. It is hedged about in our feelings by no majesty. It is efficient or inefficient and as such awakens satisfaction or dissatisfaction and an interest in its reform which is in proportion to the social values concerned.

III. War, national identity and citizenship

27

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF INTERNATIONALISM (1915)*

The war in Europe has paid certain great spiritual dividends. From Germany, from France, from England and from Russia we have received accounts of the fusing of people and peoples into self-conscious nations. Men and women and children passed under the spell of the great experience. They felt, if they did not think it out, that these overwhelming moments of emotion were theirs because of their complete identification with each other in the whole community. It was only because of this flood-tide of national consciousness that they could be swept up to these ultimate heights of human experience. It was not so much that they were willing to sacrifice themselves for their country, as that for the time being they lived up to the enlargement of self-consciousness which is the inner side of the consciousness of a nation.

The most impressive accounts of these experiences come not so much from the outburst of great masses in the cities, as from the letters and reported incidents in the lives of families and individuals scattered throughout these countries.

Now these are types of the highest experiences that human nature has attained. It is the same in nature with that of saints and martyrs, and while it persists in its full emotional throb, it makes possible what men and women have regarded as the greatest moments in their lives. From the standpoint of the observer the man may be sacrificing himself for others; from his own he is realizing the meaning of his identity with his whole group.

We cannot remain long on these emotional heights. Devotion passes quite naturally into hatred of the enemy. This attitude, in the presence of actual danger to one's self and to all that has been precious, can be kept vivid and effective much longer than devotion. It is part of the almost instinctive technique of the community and its government to stimulate and play upon this hatred because it provides another mechanism for the sense of social identity after the exalted feeling of devotion has ebbed.

It does not necessarily detract from the lofty quality of the experiences that there was nothing in the attitudes of the peoples of Europe toward each other to account for the war itself.

There was, to be sure, a sense of dread of the military power of Germany among the people of France, Russia and England, and in Germany there was a widespread dread of the military power of Russia and France threatening Germany on both flanks, and of England upon the sea.

But the actual populations of these different countries carried on without clash or hatred an international life of commerce, industry, and intellectual interchange in social ideas, in literature, science, education, and even sport, which was beyond comparison more vivid and intimate than the national life in any country of Europe one hundred years ago. There never has been, within a shorter period than a century, so highly organized an intra-national life and consciousness in a country of the Western world as the international life of Europe before the first of last August. There was, of course, one exception to this statement. Between the Serbs and Austrians existed a racial hatred of long standing, that in Austria-Hungary at least called loudly for war.

With this exception there was nothing in the minds of the peoples, in their attitudes toward each other, or in profound popular movements that demanded or suggested war. Slavs in hundreds of thousands came every year into Germany to labor, not only in the harvest fields but even in manufacturing industry. The steady friendly invasion of France and England by Germans took place without racial friction. The movement which was most profoundly popular, the labor movement, was international. Science was international. There was hardly a field of interest, within which there did not exist some international organization defining and asserting international standards.

There was not a social issue, an idea dear to the hearts of the European community, that could by any possibility be identified with any one nation or its peculiar institutions. There was far greater unanimity of the masses of the whole European population against the economic and social domination of the upper groups than of the mass of any nation against another people. In fact, with the exception of Serbia, no government has dared present to its people any issue except that of self-defense, and the whole effort of the publicity department of every chancellery among the powers at war has been to present a case at home and abroad of a nation or a group of nations attacked without warrant and defending itself against unjustified aggression.

It would require the satire of a Swift or a Voltaire to do justice to the present situation, in which the greatest powers in Europe are engaged in the most terrible struggle the world has ever seen, while each is professedly occupied merely in self-defense. There is of course abundant reason for this identical formulation of the causes of the war. It is first of all an appeal to a public sentiment that is to be voiced by neutral nations, but, in the life and death grapple that is on, it is still more a mobilization of the moral forces at home. Nor are these two purposes distinct. Nations, like individuals, can become objects to themselves only as they see themselves through the eyes of others. Every appeal to public sentiment is as well an effort to justify oneself to oneself. I doubt if we have fully realized the importance of this identical formulation of the causes of war. Whatever else it means, it indicates clearly that for the masses of the European communities there is no justifiable cause of war except self-defense. There has arisen among the militaristic groups a revival of the cult of Napoleon with the appeal to the glory of combat and triumph. But not a military leader in Europe dares voice this appeal to slaughter and conquest.

Out of the warlike birth of the modern Prussian state and of the German Empire under its hegemony there has arisen a cult of the strong-armed state that finds justification for warfare in its own fortunes and in its own morale. But today there is not a German who can catch the public ear who will recognize that the cult of Treitschke and Von Bernhardi has an echo in the German nation.

Throughout the Western world there is now but one cause of war which can give rise to that entire national unity that constitutes the moral fitness for a life and death struggle – and that is self-defense.

Unfortunately the theory of warfare demands offense as the most effective form of defense, and the logic of offense carries with it capture and subjection, devastation and terror. To successfully defend their own, men must get down to the primitive instincts from which battle fury, the lust of carnage, rape and rapine. But whatever may be said in justification of such offense from the standpoint of the sadistic psychologists, or the Nietzschean counsel “to live dangerously”, it is impossible to organize the moral sentiment of the fighting nations for a campaign of offensive warfare, and each government feels the compulsion upon it to suppress reports of that terror which is the logic of offensive fighting. An accepted and avowed policy of terrorism would be more dangerous to the administration at home than to the conquered people. And this is true not because a womanish sympathy has weakened the fiber of the peoples, but because the sense of social solidarity inevitably sweeps in the very people who are to be terrorized. The international fabric of European life could not be tossed aside when war was declared. Purely national cultures could not be substituted for the international culture of the Western world, no more convincing evidence of this could be given than the attempt which certain German scientists made in their letters to their American colleagues to prove that English science was entire negligible.

It was psychologically impossible for these men to hate the English as enemies of the fatherland, as they wish to hate them, and still be on terms of international amity and co-operation within the field, even, of abstract science.

There is but one justification for killing which nations or individuals are willing to consciously accept, that of self-defense. The function of a social organization is to build up and enlarge the personality of nations as truly as that of individuals, and this cannot include the deliberate destruction of the very members of international society the consciousness of whom is essential to national self-consciousness.

But while it is true that it is psychologically impossible to mobilize a modern Western nation for any but a defensive war, we cannot push aside the fact that these nations have been willing to accept military preparedness as an essential part of their national lives. The knowledge that the nation is prepared to fight has given it the feeling of self-respect that the knowledge of the art of self-defense and physical fitness give to the well-mannered man.

There has been a great deal of superficial justification of this military preparation for self-defense. Up to the first of last August men could still maintain that preparation for war is the best guarantee of peace. Prince Kropotkine was the first to recognize publicly that the events which followed that date finally and utterly disproved this doctrine. It has been stated that a nation in arms will not lightly go to

war, and the phrase “a nation in arms” has been so pleasant on the tongue that men have stopped thinking when they have uttered it.

A nation under arms is in fact a nation bound to the unthinking obedience of the soldier to his commander. It is not and cannot be a nation in conscious control of its own policies and its own fortunes. Could there be better evidence of this than the fact of the five great nations fighting with each other for national existence, the people of all five believe that the war is one purely self-defense? The government of each has assured them that this is the case.

“Their’s not to reason why;
Their’s but to do and die”.

It is further maintained that in the relations of nations with each other military power and readiness inspires international respect and enables a nation to enforce its rights without the final proof of the battlefield.

In the words of our own militarist, a nation with the big stick may speak softly. And here again the picture is so agreeable that we are loath to look to the history of diplomacy. There it stands very plainly written that as soon as military force is admitted into the argument it as inevitable tends to crowd out considerations of right, as a file of soldiers introduced into a convention or a court silences every claim except that supported by the bayonet.

Lord Grey stretched his diplomat’s imagination nearly to the breaking point when he conceived of England approaching Germany’s situation from the standpoint of national right as distinct from national might, and appealed to the seemingly unrealizable ideal formulated by Gladstone of a public right governing European nations.

We have been living largely in diplomatic papers, and have sat with statesmen and monarchs agonizing over the terror that they foresaw and could not forefend even when they hesitatingly suggested the impossible, an international right, that might conceivably be put into the scales over against orders of mobilizations and dates and provisions of ultimata. The monstrous puerility of it all!

Because of the pomp and circumstance of diplomatic intercourse, and the terrible consequences it implies, we overlook the fact that there is at present no situation short of a street fight or a small boys’ squabble in which the actual procedure is the same as that of our ministers plenipotentiary and ambassadors extraordinary. And there is but one explanation: When there is an armed force behind every proposal, the only convincing counter argument is a *force majeure*, and when this argument has been displayed any other is a work of supererogation. There is but one possible justification for the situation, and it is the one offered – the necessity of it.

“There is no international right that anyone needs to respect. Between nations, except in moments of exaltation, might is the only right.”

While we are reading governmental papers we may accept it. We are back in the age of the Hohenstaufens, when the only guardian of international rights was the Lord of Hosts, the God of Battles.

The curious thing is that while we agree with the diplomatist and the warlord behind him that there is no international right, we would have sent any man not a

diplomat or his royal master to an insane asylum who acted upon that theory. A Frenchman or Englishman who made a contract with a German and refused to keep it, an Italian scientist who laid claim to the achievements of a Russian physiologist, and Englishman who outraged a Belgian peasant girl, all on the theory that there was no international right, would all have realized, not only in the country in which the offense was committed, but also in their own countries that there is an international right that is quite distinguishable from national right. In any case the fellow countrymen of that grandson of a Scotchman who was born in Koenigsberg, Germany, and who is so loudly acclaimed by that Teutonized Englishman Houston Chamberlain, the fellow countrymen of Immanuel Kant at least might recognize that the only reason there is any right at all in any nation or country is because there is a right that is recognized as international and more than international.

We know from some expensive experience that there is no such thing as national finance that is not founded upon international finance. We know there never has been a civilized race that is not a mingling of many bloods, but that no self-conscious civilization has ever arisen except out of the intercourse of ideas which have been actually internationalized and have thus become universal. A standard of any sort could not be merely national unless it were willing to be a contradiction in terms.

In a word, no nation could come to consciousness as a nation except within an international society, and there is no capacity or right or achievement of any nation for which it is not as dependent upon the international society that has made the nation possible, as is any German or Englishman or Russian dependent upon his own society for his capacities and rights and achievements.

Now it is true that human rights, being social growths have been slow growths, and that their growth has been marked by the same sort of violence as that which now on a Brobdignagian scale is devastating Europe. It is, then, easy to assume that international right is plant of still slower growth and that we must have the divine patience for which a thousand years is as one day, and one day is as a thousand years. We must assume, according to this doctrine, that when our was lords and foreign secretaries and militaristic leaders address us we are still in the age of the Hohenstaufens and their shining armors, while the words addressed to the world by the Pasteurs, the Kochs, the Mendelieffs, the Ibsens, the Anatole Frances, the Darwins, the Sir Henry Maines, the great industrialists, educators, and financiers reach their fellow countrymen because a twentieth century international society gave them both their social equipment and their equally essential audience.

We know the doctrine is a false one. We know that we have not only all the mechanisms necessary for expressing international rights of which we are vividly conscious, but also for enforcing them. We know that it is only the unwillingness of the peoples of our so-called Christendom to surrender that peculiar egoistic consciousness which each one of us experiences when his own nation stands up and shakes its fist in the face of another nation, together with the more profound experiences of self-devotion which go with it, that has kept Europe from working out and presenting for enactment international legislation that at a stroke would have replaced nations submissively bowing before their under officers and drill sergeants, and quite at the

mercy of their foreign offices, by a Hague or other tribunals and a small international police.

We know that it is not because the rights of people and peoples can be only affirmed and protected by the procedure of the Hohenstaufens or the more modern street ruffians that we have refused to permit international institutions to formulate them, and an international public opinion to enforce them.

What we are afraid to lose is this peculiar national self-consciousness, the sense of superiority to people of other nations and the patriotism and lofty devotions which seem to be dependent upon the national egotisms. We will not surrender these nor the occasions out of which they arise. There must be some things we are unwilling to arbitrate, otherwise we are craven people with dead souls.

It is of importance that men should realize that the problem of war is on the one hand ethical and on the other psychological. It is not a problem of institutional mechanisms, nor of an apparatus of universal ideas, nor of means of international communication and acquaintanceship. It is not a question, in other words, of creating an international society. All of these exist. It is a question of relative values. Are the spiritual experiences, both the egoistical and those of self-surrender, both the contemptible and the heroic, which seem to us to presuppose war – are these so valuable that we can afford to purchase them at the expense of Armageddon?

The problem is an ethical problem because it is a conflict of values. The Western world has now a definite bill of costs for its procedure in checking and cutting back the growth of the institutions and public sentiments which could without difficulty have settled the quarrel that was the occasion of Europe's holocaust. And on the other side it has experienced the values for the sake of which it has exposed itself to this loss.

There have been those moments of priceless emotional experience, in which men and women realized that they were all one when the nation was in danger. With many this elevated emotional tone will continue. With most it has ebbed into the compelling routine of the group of habits we call discipline, in very many into the hatred of the enemy by which one can still get that sense of solidarity that under other conditions we call mob consciousness.

These are enormously valuable experiences – even those must be called ignoble in comparison with the sense of entire self-devotion. They pervade the whole consciousness, giving even insignificant objects and experiences a vicarious import. There have been periods in former struggles for human liberty when these moments stood out not only as worth while in themselves, but with the added value of the issues for which men were fighting. Today men are fighting for no ideas. No nation is fighting for a better order of society. The international order of society is better than that of any nation which reserves to itself the right of fighting for any issue it chooses to call vital to its own interests.

This war has taken place because the nations have maintained the right to carry arms and thus have made a relatively insignificant incident the occasion for a European catastrophe.

It is of importance that the relative values should stand out clearly. It is probable that in the aftermath of the war these values will come with greater definiteness to men's

minds. Unless men are so circumstanced that they cannot reflect, they must gradually recognize that as nations – apart from small interested groups – they were fighting simply because they demanded as their highest privilege the right to fight on any occasion, and at any time.

It is an ethical question, then, because, perhaps for the first time in human history, has the value of war as a social institution existing for its own exercise, for its use in social organization, in physical training, in heightened national self-feeling, in opportunities for limitless hatreds and self-devotions, been put sharply in contrast with the costs and losses of warfare.

It is a psychological question because the values of war, and the preparation for it, have to be stated more and more completely in terms of attitudes and states of mind. The objective human interests for which men have fought in the past are now so embodied in the institutions of civilized states, and the habits and customs of the communities, that they are there vastly better safeguarded than they could be by armies and navies. It is the feeling of enlarged personality, of the national *amour propre*, a feeling not so much of what a people have or want as what they are, that militarism supports in national life.

If the ethical problem arises out of the conflict of values which a national military attitude and training maintains, and those which war destroys, the psychological question is whether the military attitude and training are essential for the self-respect of a nation; whether this antiquated, medieval method of giving every man the sense of being at one with the rest of the community must be preserved for the lack of better psychological mechanism. If the ethical problem is solved as we hope that it will be solved, if militarism is cashiered because it is too hideously expensive in human values, the question as to the way in which nations will arouse their patriotism is likely to consider what form patriotisms will take in the future, it is true that because the problem so largely psychological, the ethical problem of war stands out so clearly.

It is because in the relations of Western nations with each other we have nothing left to fight for except the right to fight for the sake of fighting, that we can squarely assess the value of this so-called national right. If bloodless revolution had not been embodied in the constitution of most of our Western states, war would be still necessary to bring men to the common consciousness of their rights and their willingness to die for them. At present any war is apt to be more dangerous than helpful to interests of those in our communities who need protection. In these days of scientific warfare, the disciplined populace who make up the army become the bulwark of economic and social privilege. No, at present war, as an institution, cannot be cast in the role of Greatheart who goes forth to protect the weak. It must find alone in the consciousness of fighting and being ready to fight all the values with which to offset the losses it entails.

Instinctively all those who were interested in the social reform felt that this war must set back the clock of social betterment unless it accomplished the feat of destroying militarism itself. And here the militarist stiffens the sinews, throws out his chest, and contrasts his red-blooded virility with the feminist, philanthropic social reform, and asks us whether we are willing to exchange the fighting man for the milksop.

We will not stop to consider the childish assumption that we must pull down fire and slaughter the whole structure of the Western world to secure bulging sinews, deep chests, and red blood corpuscles. The real question is: Why should anyone consider the work with which these reforms are occupied as white blooded and feministic? They are the identical interests – though vastly more intelligently conceived – for which our forefathers fought, bled and died. They are attempted concrete definitions of the life, the liberty and the pursuit of happiness of the great mass of the community. We cannot fight for them any longer, at least after the fashion of the modern fighting state, because the militaristic state must look upon itself as the potential enemy of all other states, while most of the social structure within which growth is taking place is international. The state as the instrument of the separate community is the organ through which these changes get formulated in that nation, but as long as it is necessarily hostile to internationalism it cannot become properly responsive to the labor movement, to social science, or even to industry. It follows that these movements of social reform and integration within the separate states are deformed, are allowed to advance only so far as the interests of the state in its separation permits them to go.

The result is that the so-called reformer is always on the begging hand over against the organized state. How far may the reform go without weakening the fixed state order of society? There is certainly no process more definitely international than industry and commerce. But industry is divided up from the governmental standpoint into those of the different nations, and barriers are set up to bring in a national net income by industries, that are conceived of as if they could stand alone. There can be no adequate standard of social control of an essentially international industry, from the point of view of a national budget. *The reformer stands in the position of the man urging concessions in the interests of humanity, and at the expense of the state.*

Now there are restricted fields, such as certain phases of hygiene, in which national and international interest palpably coincide. Here the trained man speaks with authority and does not present a pathetic plea. Even here, of course, there are limits to state action.

The German militaristic state has more intelligently than any other recognized the common grounds of international social growth and national state interests. Within these fields militarism has even advanced these reforms. The German bureaucracy has gained a certain detachment from the military standpoint of its government, which has enabled it to introduce industrial insurance, community care for infants, the fostering of vocational education, and better housing, among other reforms. The privileged interests, which have opposed these reforms in other countries have been summarily pushed one side by a purposeful government that has undertaken to make its people more effective, more powerful, more masterful than any other nation in the world.

Such a state can have only persecution for an international labor movement, while it will welcome an international hygiene. It will welcome an international physical science which puts nature under the control of a national industry, while it will frown upon Hague tribunals which would deal with conflicts of nations from the international instead of the national standpoints.

Even in Germany the social reformer brings his program to a government that has other interests besides those of international society, and asks somewhat humbly how

much of his program may be accepted. If science, and hygiene, and education, and art, and industry and commerce were as narrowly national as are armament and warfare in their interests, the social reformer would speak with authority and not as something of a milksop who is after all only trying to get a little good done.

Militarism is not simply an evil in itself. It is typical and conservative of a state that is narrowly national in its attitude, and that refuses to recognize the international society that after all has made the self-conscious state possible. The problem is then largely a psychological problem, for it has to do with the change of attitude, the willingness to accept the whole international fabric of society, and to regard the states and the communities of which they are the instruments, as subject to and controlled by the life of the whole, not as potential enemies for whose assault each state must be forever on the watch.

Unpublished conclusion

This change of attitude as had been already indicated will hardly take place because of a conscious determination to pass beyond a militaristic order of society. If it does take place it will be as the result of intended changes which involve this without intention. The countries of the Western world may be willing to reduce their armament, and the people may demand control of foreign policy. The general growth of democracy may crowd out these upper classes who supply the natural materials for offices, of a supernatural army, one that is a sacred dependence of the state, and at the same time, may make the subjection of the people to the drill sergeant no longer possible. The changes will come piece meal, in the gradual extension of the arbitration treaties, and the power of the Hague tribunals. This manner of change may be so that quickened by the terrible experiences of this war that actually such a catastrophe will become in consequence no longer possible. And the person that the problem will not be forced as a whole is that so much so that of the values and the mechanisms are dependent upon subconscious organizations of habits.

Because the state is the mechanism by which the community undertakes its deliberate corporate actions, it gets the value of the society itself. Upon social organization depend all our values and those who are also functionaries certainly do not hesitate to commence any attack upon the mechanism of the state as we directed against society, and in case of hostilities between states, men assume that war with all its machinery of destruction is leveled at all the values which society makes possible connotes some mechanism of the society within which states exist.

(...) enables them to come to terms with each other without fighting, men will mentally assume that the destruction which war threatens is directed against the society whose instrument the state is, and without which the society cannot be articulate or consciously active, and it will become possible for men to realize the possibility of such interaction of the states in the crucial interests of the larger whole when such interaction has managed to take place and has in taking place left a mechanism by means of which this reorganization may take place in the future.

The state is identified with all the values of security in men's minds – they are not aware that states imply the existence of each other as much as do individuals – that

states as such are but instruments of the communities – that the problem is to think out a mechanism for interaction of the communities within the larger whole – to get the consciousness that states over against each other have the same sort of value and function as that of the institutions within the state. These are recognized as dependent upon their function in the community and the community has provided a mechanism by means of which these may change in their interaction and under the stress of conflict – revolution has been embodied within the organization of the institutions – the institutions have not in this lost their reality or meaning – au contrair.

Bloodless war must be embodied in international organization – a process which will neither destroy nor weaken actual states, which institutions have attained the particularity of mutually affecting each other they are evidences of incomplete socialization and do not accomplish their full function – the state a resistant institution.

Note

- * As originally published in *Survey*, 6 March 1915, 604–7. This version includes a handwritten conclusion that was not included in the published version of 1915. The complete manuscript here reproduced can be found in the Mead Papers Archive, Addenda, Box: 2, Folder: 32.

28

ON NATIONALISM, INDUSTRIAL RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1917–18)*

Since the middle of the nineteenth century there has been a rising tide of nationalism throughout the world. It has run across the policies of most of the nations. Out of it has arisen the seething cauldron of the Balkan Peninsula, the deadly struggle that has grown to formidable proportions in the empire of the Habsburgs, and given birth to the war in which the whole world is now engaged. It has compelled a diametrical change in the policy of the English empire toward its colonies and possessions, and has produced upon this crowded stage the culmination of the age long Irish problem. In America it has appeared in the form of the negro question, and the exclusion of the Chinese and Japanese. With the force of an unseen irresistible current it has swept the internationale of Marxian socialism into the realm of myths. It appears glorified in the devotion of the French to France. In Belgium it reaches the majesty of complete tragedy, while in Hungary and Posen it takes on the form of hideous oppression. We feel it in the unified sentiment with which America has come into the war.

For nationalism, race consciousness, patriotism, mob consciousness are psychologically all the same. Whether it appears in a lynching or in the last devotion in a trench or the bowels of a torpedoed transport, or the fiery furnace of a falling aeroplane, or, in the arrogance of a Kultur that sets itself beyond right and wrong, in all cases it is the expression of the relation of the individual to the group to which he belongs, of the social possession that takes him out of himself. From the time that men passed into the clan down to the present it has represented that mechanism of human nature which has proliferated into all forms of society. Out of it has sprung all the spiritual treasures of the race and most of the inhuman ties of man to man. But it is too intimate, too subconscious to admit of ready analysis. We applaud and objurgate, we do not study, nor control it. We recognize the gesture and the passion in the enemy who is swept on by the same current by which we are borne against him. We fail to identify the force nor do we determinately seek for the technique by which it may be brought under our direction. And yet men's escape from the domination of the group has

always been by way of the realization of some larger social relation than that by which men have bound. In fact it has been the specific function of religion – the universal religions – to provide the sense of this larger whole which could transcend restricted social groups, and open the door for the larger spiritual life which clan and national cults could not offer. Plato's city beyond the heavens, and Paul's city not built with hands eternal in the heavens, the saints and sages "in solemn troops and sweet societies" that entertain the soul that it is not at home in this world and whose citizenship is in heaven, the soul that loses itself in God, and even the soul that escapes individuality in the Nirvana of Indian philosophy, all affirm another social habitat as the condition of escape from that which actually confines and constricts the individual. The major premise of every syllogism in social reconstruction is the actual existence of a social order which includes the particular reform in question there – under as a specific instance. It is not, however, essential that this other social order should be in the heavens nor in Atlantis, nor the Sun nor in Mars, nor, to express it in other words, is it necessary that the social reformer should believe firmly in the existence of a Utopia in actual existence somewhere in the heavens or on the earth. If he does he is an idealist.

The empiricist proceeds on other assumptions and presents his projects on a stage set with much more modest properties. He cannot escape the necessity of the major premise, but he finds it not in a vision given in the mount, but in certain universal characters in human society as it exists in our experience, from which, the empiricist affirms, there follow conclusions in reformation of the institutions under which we are living. The empiricist has found two such universal characters which find their expression one in democracy and the other in property. The principle of democracy is that there are common ends in which men are individually interested, and that these individual interests in community ends may be made the basis of government. Different schools have very different ways of accounting for the individual's acquiring an interest in a community end, but they all affirm that it finally appears, and that with its appearance comes the possibility of democratic institutions, and they are confident that this situation is present in all human societies in which civilization exists, though the democratic conclusions may not have been drawn from the premises. It may be necessary to inaugurate revolutions to oust privileged classes and monarchs from power, but the material for the erection of democratic institutions is present, and requires only the freedom of the individual from restraint, and sufficient education to recognize the community ends which are also his own, to reach their fruition.

Such community ends are frequently defined as natural rights, and refer to the individual impulses, such as those which find their expression in the family, in property, and in the acquirement of knowledge, in the free utterance of opinion, not to mention the negative rights, that is, the freedom from interference on the part of others in the exercise of one's positive rights. There have been wide variations in the statement of these so-called rights, but what has been common to all statements of them is this interest of the individual in their exercise, and the like interest of the community in the individual's possessing them and exercising them. All recognize that in the common individual and community interest lies the possibility of popular

government. The result of such uncertainty as to just what the rights and the functions of the individual are is that he remains a very abstract person.

The Declaration of Independence says that he should be free and unburdened by a privileged class above him, that his rights are to life liberty and the pursuit of happiness, certainly a vague definition of the political individual. Has he a right to an education, for example, even if he is not able to meet the expense of an education out of his own pocket? What are the mutual rights of the members of a family, beyond this that they may all pursue happiness? Do his rights include those of healthful surroundings and adequate return from his labor to meet normal standards of living? Has he a right to the opportunity to labor at all? We are unquestionably nearer an answer to these questions than were those who wrote the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, but even in countries with so-called liberal institutions there is as yet no clear answer, and yet they all have to do with interests which are both those of the individual and of the community, and in which what is to the genuine interest of the community must to that of the individual and vice versa.

The second conception in which the interest of individual and the community coincide is found in property. Property is a universal. You cannot claim it yourself without recognizing it in the possessions of your neighbor. To safeguard his property is to protect your own. Your most insistent emphasis upon your own property rights is the affirmation of those of all the community. The rights of the individual to and over his property include that of exchange and the contract which is a part of the process, especially when it is extended in time and space. Property is of course one of the fundamental rights which go to make up the political individual. Under conditions of detail production that is consumed within the political community, and an exchange of goods that is found also mainly at home, going abroad only at great risk and in search of high profits and then as a part of the foreign political policy of the country, a part of the colonial system, or the extension of empire; under these conditions property is merely a category of the rights of man that goes to make up the political individual, the individual whose interests are sufficiently identical with those of the community to enable him to enter into the government of the country.

While such political individuals were sufficiently abstract and universal to make the idea of a larger society than that of any single nation comprehensible, the interest in the political individual centered in his relationship to the government within the national communities. Democracy was quite confined to revolutionary and reform movements inside the nations, and did not become the basis for international speculation or agitation to any considerable degree. But in the development of the factory system, with its wholesale production of the commodities of everyday life, and the economic theories of Hume and Adam Smith that grew out of it, an international economic life arose, which was not the field of abstract speculation but of intense concrete economic activity. The economic man in distinction from the political man did not find his habitat within the political community. The favorite spot for settling him by the speculative economists was a desert island where with only a few other economic individuals, he commenced his production and exchanges under the simplest conditions. It was the boast of these economists that these simple conditions were those to

which the most complex and complicated of economic processes could be reduced. They had nothing to do with political boundaries, except as the governments of different countries introduced pernicious barriers, protective and exclusion tariffs, to interfere with the action of the inherent laws of production and distribution. It was out of this economic process with its conceptions of the economic man and the international economic regime, that modern industry and finance and the internationale of socialism arose. Back of all interference with the economic process lay the conception of the free production under the most favorable economic conditions, the free distribution where the best markets could be secured, and a vivid reform movement for free trade in the interest of cheaper food was pushed on the one hand and the revolutionary movement for the control of industry by the masses of the laborers in their own interest on the other. Neither of these movements was national. The passionate free trader believed that it would inaugurate an era of peace, by removing all economic causes for warfare. The socialists had no other interest in the political organization of his country except to get control of it for the purpose of taking over a capitalistic industry, converting it into an industry conducted in the interests of the vast number of producers.

The conception of the political man opened the door to the reform movements in the direction of popular control over government. The conception of the economic man opened the door to revolutionary movements which sought to overthrow present governments, or to reduce governmental activities to the minimum of police supervision, of a process that would run of itself.

It is interesting to note how slow, haphazard, and inconsiderable has been the democratic evolution since the period of the French Revolution. With the exception of tardy enlargement of the electorate (up to the present a half of the community has been shut out on inconsequent sex lines), and the introduction of popular education, which has not been adapted to its purpose of acquainting the rising generation with their physical and social opportunities and has therefore been largely ineffective, with these exceptions it is not too much to say that political democracy has been sterile and ineffectual. Thus while the vote has been placed in more and more hands, and the schools have been opened to more and more children the political control in the community has remained with much the same classes in whose hands it reposed at the beginning of the century. The common interests of the individual and the community have not been greatly widened. They still rest largely with the so-called natural rights. The common interests gathering about the family, really popular education, the great fields of recreation and aesthetic enjoyment, and the varied human contacts which these involve, have been mostly meagerly occupied. This is illustrated both in the city and in the country. In the city where men and children are massed together and subject to the spell of the crowd, none of this concentration of emotional life has been put into intelligent cooperation in constructive activity, or in recreation, while city politics have retained the type of corruption that was invested and perfected in 1850. In the country where the most interesting of occupations is still largely unspecialized and there remains a field for artisanship, where there is the opportunity to apply scientific training with immediate results the methods of production have remained more stationary than in any other form of creating wealth. There are a host of human interests,

which have too little or no influence at all, that should enter into the organization of social forces that bring about social control, in other words, into the government of the community. We express this absence of important social interests from the governing institutions of the community by the distinction drawn between social control through these institutions and that exercised by public opinion. Into public opinion enters all that has any place in the consciousness of the community, while political control is exercised only through the interests which go to make up the political individual.

It would be wrong to fail to recognize the considerable additions which have been to the content of the political individual, that have come by way of preservation of the health of the community, through control of disease, regulation of housing, of working conditions in the interest of health, especially those of women and children, through universal public education, and the grants for higher technical and even so-called cultural training. All of these indicate that the individual which the community recognizes has added both rights and duties to his nature which had no place in that of the eighteenth century individual. On the other hand, it would be equally wrong to assume that these rights and duties stand for clearly defined principles which can be logically applied. The earlier conception of property was such a principle, and its applications have made the most logical part of governmental administration. This remains the most consistent part of the governmental administration today, notwithstanding the invasions upon the former rigid conceptions of property which are found in more recent legislation and court interpretations. No one could say that the modern individual has such a right to good health, and the conditions essential to its preservation, as that which he possesses to his property. No one could clearly outline the amount of enlightenment to which a citizen of a modern community may lay claim. These innovations have come by way of police regulations in the interest of public welfare. Ignorance, disease, and insanitary conditions are suppressed as public nuisances, municipal invasion into the fields of the aesthetic and of recreation are uncertain, and without even as much logical organization as those into the fields of education and health. The difference between these two fields, that of definite rights belonging to the political individual, and that of privileges coming to him through the exercise of public police power in the interest of the general welfare, appears in the different conceptions of liberty that the two imply. The liberty that grows out of rights inhering in the nature of the individual such as that of self-defense, or property, is one which is not restrained by the definition of the right, and this definition carries with it the conditions under which the power may be exercised, but does not thereby restrict the right.

Thus the right of property is defined in terms of the full control which one may exercise over one's own. This definition does not restrict its use, it indicates the field of its use. The definition of a right presents the territory within which it may be exercised without restraint. Restrictions which legislation and court interpretation have introduced are regarded as defining that which is property rather than restraining a right. Thus an ordinance may prohibit building which is not safeguarded against danger of fire upon land owned in a certain district. The prohibition deprives the owner of a certain possession in that land. His possession is in it as a site for certain

types of structures, but not in it as a site for others. When a right has been defined the door has been opened for its exercise. The advantages which accrue to the children if citizens through attendance upon public schools, on the other hand, reach them if the public has acted in creating the schools. They come as privileges rather than as rights, and the definition of these privileges leaves the individual dependent upon public action for his profit by them. Thus our social polity implies individuals who control their property, while it may determine in what that property may consist. It desiderates enlightened citizens and opens schools for the education of each advancing generation. He is free to do what he will with his own, he may take advantage, indeed may be required to take advantage, of the opportunities of educating his children, but the right to educate his children does not spring from his own parental interest in the children, but from permissive or compelling legislation. While the distinction here indicated cannot be made hard and fast, and the privilege tends under exercise and long tenure to become a right, it yet does mark an important difference in the nature of our liberties. Those that are conceived of as springing from natural rights, which form the basis of the individualism of the nineteenth century, while the liberties which accrue to the individual from the privileges, lay the foundations for the socialistic doctrines which are characteristic of the latter part of the same century.

The whole of social doctrine has gathered about this distinction. The determination to keep the structure of the community within the lines indicated by the political individual has left the privileges that accrue from social control and reconstruction without any vital relation with the natural rights. The dominant reason for this is to be found in the economic situation, which has placed in the hands of those in controlling possession of the wealth of the community a ruling influence in the country. In the vivid industrial life of the last century and this, the right of control of one's property has put in the keeping of those who control the country's wealth the increasingly complex and rich social activities which are dependent on the expenditure of the country's income. Slowly governmental control of this wealth when its influence reaches important social undertakings such as education, public health, transportation and the like, has assumed a new function which an earlier economic doctrine refused to admit. The conflict lies between the conception of these undertakings and that of the independent individual. The social control invades what had been considered as his rights. On the other hand, the undertakings to give the individual the training and opportunity for physical well-being, the larger social experience, with access to the finer sorts of values, have inevitably led to a new conception of what the individual should be, but the individual, who should be, has no authority over against the well entrenched political individual, who is in possession. This is the contention of the socialists. As has been already indicated, socialist doctrine stands upon the translation of the privileges extended to the individual by society, in the interests of the community as a whole, into rights. The refusal to recognize these as rights to which all members of the community may lay claim, is laid at the door of the economic exploitation which private property in the hands of the older individual has made possible. The socialistic remedy for this evil is abrogation of property in the means of production of wealth. Thus they would extend the character of privilege from the

fields such as those of education, health, enjoyment of art and recreation to that of all property in capital.

All rights then would come from the state to the individual, and an absolute state would be erected over the individuals from which all their rights would come as privileges. This socialistic doctrine is no less a logical result of the abstract individual, than the political theory and practice which has allowed community control to pass so largely into the hands of the possessing class. The individual is abstract because only the impulse of having and holding, the impulse out of which property arises in the community, and that of hostile self assertion which, under social conditions such as have arisen in modern democracies, becomes that of self-government are recognized as preconditions of our social order. With individuals who can assert themselves in the demand for government of their own making, and who are free to control what is their own in the group a modern society may be built. With the powers and prerogatives they are endowed by the state. This situation has a double effect. On the one side, community action leading to the change in the conception and definition of property is regarded as attacking the foundations of society, while on the other hand activities springing from impulses that give rise to the family, education and science, art and recreation are conceived of as dependent upon the action of the state. There is, of course, no fundamental reason in human nature for this distinction. The rights of self-government and that of property are no less dependent upon social organization for their actual form and validity, than are those that spring from the impulses of sex, parental and filial responses, and those of social adjustments and intercommunication. There is, at bottom, as good a right to express oneself through constructive workmanship (Veblen's instinct of workmanship) as through property, and on the other hand there is an ever increasing recognition that the conditions under which property control is to be exercised must be under community supervision.

The two foci about which the modern community revolves are the individual and the state. In the conception of the Manchester School, the state could be reduced to a minimum, and the individual with his two fundamental attitudes of demand for self-government and for property, could be left with a nothing but the barest modicum of police control. The opposite pole is that which finds in government control the principle of social organization, and erects the state entirely above any individual expression. The bureaucratic German state is the corresponding instance in contrast with the individualistic English society. It is indeed the achievement of human society that it has been able to socialize these resistant individualistic impulses, that of the hostile self-assertion, and that of property: that attitude which resists with physical force direction from another and that which excludes others from the use of what is within one's possession. In the opinion of Hobbes these two impulses, especially the latter, can lead to nothing but the war of all against all. In his view, complete surrender of all so-called rights to an absolute sovereign was the only solution to the problem of forming a society out of recalcitrant human nature. Modern democracy actually in existence means that men can reach the position of respecting the rights of others when demanding the right of self-government for themselves, as they can demand protection for their own property in the respect which they pay to the ownership of

others. For it was not about these human impulses that primitive societies arose. Clan organization appealed to the family as its cohesive principle. Cooperative interest in hunting, in magic control of nature and disease, in the primitive art of decoration and the dance, in the initiation of children into the tribe, in the care of flocks and herds, and finally in the common fight against the enemies of a tribe, these were the socializing influences in early human organization. Modern democratic society has deliberately undertaken to eliminate the family, religion, art and recreation, and the community training of children from its method of government. Primarily the state is supposed to be constituted out of freemen, who in asserting their independence of outer control, agree to respect the independence of others and to join in the obedience only to the common will in undertakings which affect the community as a whole. The most definite common interest, beyond that of defense against aggression of powers that are still organized on the tribal principles, that is, feudal, religious, and dynastic principles, has been that of property. The democratic state was primarily instituted for the defense of freedom and property.

Other interests were regarded as far as possible as individual affairs. Religion was the matter of one's conscience. The training of one's children lay within the regulation of the father. So far as possible the family was considered the property of the head of the family. The earnings and other property of the wife and minor children belonged to the head of the family. Festivals, theater, dance, and works of art, education and science had no governmental significance. They belonged in the private lives of the citizens. However, conduct on the part of the citizen which affected the comfort, health, and safety of the citizens could by their corporate action be abated or regulated, but sacred precedents, bills of rights, and written constitutions jealously protected the individual against invasion of his rights, and the rigorous theorist of the school wished these police regulations to be reduced to the lowest terms. It was the "night watchman state".

It is not necessary to review the gradual increase and spread of the functions of government, its inevitable interference with the inhumanities of the factory system, its unwilling shouldering of the cost and direction of the education of the children of the community, its less grudging assumption of the task of encouraging and housing and displaying of the national art, its spasmodic undertaking under popular pressure of some degree of control over corporate business and transportation, its slow recognition of the necessity of public control of health conditions and recreation. It has been the spirit in which these innovations have been made that is of special importance. They have been made always as concessions, without frank recognition of their property. They have represented compromises in which the possessing classes and the governments that they inspired never admitted the public obligation to do what they grudgingly undertook. It was the expense that was always presented an unanswerable argument. Each concession was regarded as a step down a fatal incline into a gulf which was bottomless. The distribution of the country's income in accordance with the existing economic order was the presupposition of all consideration of community responsibility for other than political and economic expressions of human nature. If diversions of funds to the government for such so-called humanitarian and philanthropic purposes

could take place without disturbing the healthful normal operation of business, further taxation for these purposes could be allowed, but always with an eye to the danger of the precedent established. The whole procedure emphasized the divorce between the abstract political and economic man from the rest of human interest, impulse and endeavor. And yet the actual structure of society depends as necessarily upon the other sides of human nature as upon these, and in the end it cannot be possible to so grudgingly recognize other than political and economic activities in the operation of social control, that operation which we call government, with the consent of the governed.

Under simpler conditions of earlier American life the divorce was not definitely felt because education was but a slight affair. Science had not presented the avoidable evils which public control can obviate. National values had not taken on the forms of self-conscious art, and economic processes did not need the supervision which became so crying a demand of later times. But the effect of the development of the industrial nineteenth century has been to bring about a complex social organization in which men have become much more interdependent than was formerly the case.

Starting with the institution of property we find a constantly widening group involved in its acquirement and in its expenditure. The outstanding evidence of this may be found in the vast organization of business, the centralizing of financing of industrial undertakings, the growth of investment in corporations with its divorce of ownership and control. On the other hand, stands the organization of labor. The coming together of men in new social relations because of their dependence upon the factory system that employs them in great numbers and without reference to their status; the social issues that are raised in the contests between organized labor and organized capital, and the multitudinous contacts in the crowded city existence which centers about the great factory industries all involve a new social order in which the present institution of property fails to express the values and fulfil the functions which the institutions implies. Its great political function is to give the individual independence, so that he may order his life to meet the obligations which his relations impose upon him, and obtain the larger social experiences which are essential to his full being. Such a man is prepared to take up his political duties and exercise his political privileges. Without these he is not a freeman, but dependent upon others for what is essential to his normal social expression. Furthermore property involves control over the means and tools which he makes use of in the productive activity by which he justifies his existence in the community. Inadequate return for labor, which results from unjust distribution of the profits of industry, deprives a large percentage of the population in our industrial communities of this economic independence which is the foundation of a country of freemen. Factory methods, insufficient training, and the absence of the voice of labor in determining the conditions of work, deprive the laborer of the control over what is apt to be his sole property, his capacity to work and his skill. On the other hand, the disproportionate returns, which go to the owners of the capital invested in the industry and to those who control the sources from which capital flows into industry, has not only the results to which reference has just been made, but encourage forms of expenditure which set up prestige values as the social function of property. These social aims become dominant not only in the attitudes of those who have considerable surplus to

302 Mead, a radical democrat

expend, but they tend to set the fashion subconsciously in the expenditures and the social aims these imply on the part of the whole community.

Note

- * Unpublished paper written between April 1917 and November 1918, Mead Papers Archive, Addenda, Box: 3, Folder: 2, 14 pp. This paper can also be found, under the title “The Rising Tide of Nationalism”, in Deegan, 2008: 226–36.

29

HOW CAN A SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP BE SECURED? (n.d.)*

In time of war the spiritual experience of the most profound importance is the emotional realization of the supreme value of citizenship in the nation to which one belongs. The psychology of this experience is not hard to discover. Unification of all parties in the community brings with it the suppression of all the differences which call for the continual social readjustments that make up the life of the community. The everyday tangible and superficial ends of existence are for the time being forgotten and the consciousness of everyone finds but one problem, the mutually exclusive alternatives, either the continued life of the society that is responsible for his own existence, or the particular sacrifice which he is asked to make. The fact that the enemy directs his attack against the life of the community, throws up into consciousness the fundamental processes of being a citizen, while the unification of all individuals abstracts from all those specific ends which differentiates one individual from another. Being a citizen lies back of all living in the community, but it stands for the group of habitual processes which are so fundamental and universal and continuously in operation that in times of peace one may be unaware of them. It is the unconscious foundation for all the negations of each other's ends and ideas which produces the diversities of individuals in the social whole.

In times of peace just because each is occupied in expressing himself and being himself in contradistinction from others he cannot, unless he undertakes to reconstruct society, very well be that which he is in common with everyone else, a citizen of the community and nothing more. Nor does his consciousness of his rights and privileges as a citizen when he appeals to them in support of his cause against that of others, in the courts of law or in the primaries or the election of candidates of his party, emphasize the worth of citizenship except by implication. The immediate value which he has in mind is of his cause or measure or interest which he maintains expresses this citizenship, while the opposing cause or measure or interest would express it not at all or but inadequately in comparison with his own. Thus the

conflict of values is between relative and competing forms of expressing citizenship and does not bring to consciousness the value of citizenship itself. It seems to require a situation in which there arises simply the alternative of the continued existence of the community wiped out. When the English shopkeeper objects to the officer who would enroll him, that his shop with its business would go to pieces if he left it, the reply is, what's the good of the shop if the Germans conquer? The unendurableness of living under such conditions overbalances the individual loss, probable suffering and even death. With the great majority of people there is little hesitancy in responding to this alternative, if the two alternatives can be made to appear the only ones and mutually exclusive. Human nature protects itself against this disjunctive judgment by refusing to accept it. The citizen refuses to believe either that the society is in reality in serious danger, or that his preference of his own comfort and life would destroy the community so far as he is concerned, i.e. would deprive him of citizenship and the social self that is dependent upon this fellowship.

When the disjunction has been successfully constructed the value to the individual of his relationship to the community is brought finally into consciousness in competition with any other values that may arise in competition. It is so brought into consciousness by the threat of its annihilation. Either he may continue to live while the community in which alone he desires to live is destroyed, or he may continue to live and the community also may survive but he is physically or spiritually cast out of it. In either case, the emotional value of his citizenship does come to consciousness. When the disjunction has been once successfully constructed there is no doubt as to the outcome of the evaluation. It is a contradiction in terms to assume that a social being can will to destroy the ground upon which alone he can rest his experience. It is true that physical impulses which are not under the control of the social self may make of the soldier at the moment of peril a so-called coward who winces before the suffering, but the number of such cowards is but an insignificant percentage of those who make up the community. Panics and defeats are generally social and not physical phenomena. The lack of the specific training which welds the units of the army together, the absence of the clearly cut alternatives in the minds of the people, the lack of confidence in the leadership of nations and armies, such are the causes of the breakdown of morals and these are the social causes. The most favorable situation for the construction of the alternative is found in a war of defence, and it is the function of statesmanship in any community which is approaching the probability of war, to impress upon the people that they are face to face with enemies who are seeking to destroy the nation.

The actual social whole to which the individual belongs and which is responsible for his self consciousness varies enormously. In a professional army it may be the army itself. For the religious recluse the community that gives him his awareness of himself may be spiritual figures that inhabit the mind. One's country may be the republic of letters. It may be one's family or a certain group in the underworld. If the logic of the social situation can only be used there is some community for which every social being is ready to die, if only the alternative can be so shaped that he realizes it; that is in danger without which continued life is psychologically impossible for him.

While such an experience brings to emotional realization the import of the group to which we belong, it is accomplished at inevitable loss. The loss is due to the submerging of values in which the individual asserts himself over against the other members of the society. Striking illustrations of this tendency of the mobilizing of the minds of the community for war can be found in the extreme anxiety of organized labor in England and of the Home Rulers in Ireland because of the peremptory shelving of the causes for which they had been. Hours of labor that are recognized as destructive of the health of the laborer are accepted. Children are taken out of school too early and allowed to work so long that the effect must be to stunt their growth. Women undertake tasks which legislation and court decrees had forbidden in times of peace. Social propaganda suddenly lapses. To the logic of this tendency we cannot take exception. An interest that can demand the sacrifice of the best blood of the country on the field of battle, can surely demand sacrifices of the mobilized army of industry at home, that is as essential to the defense of the country as is the devotion of soldiers on the battle field. The more serious injury appears in the attitude of mind which persists in the community after the war. In a period of great emotional stress these values have been sacrificed for the supreme social value. They stand as relatively unimportant. They have been discarded as spiritual impedimenta, thrown away to save the fundamentals. It may take the life of generations to bring people to the recognition of the fact that the fundamentals are after all only valuable for the other values which for the time being have been forgotten in the life and death struggle to save the foundations. It is the sacrifice of the cargo to save the ship, and yet the end and purpose of ships is to carry cargos. It required twenty-five years to distract the political attention of America from the fact that the union had been saved by the republican party and direct it to the social interests for which alone the union can exist. And during that period this absorption of political sentiment in an issue that was already passed, left corruption free to flourish in all corners of the republic.

The welding of a united Germany through blood and iron made militarism such a symbol of unity that Germany has been unable to think nationally except in terms of a *Kriegsherr*, a *Schwertadel* and a world armed against her. She conceives of her application of trained intelligence to social problems, which has been possible in small part through the detachment of her militaristic government, as a *Kultur* which can conceivably be spread through the world by force of arms. It has remained for Germany to conceive of that most international of all things – civilization – as a national achievement and possession, to be propagated by the sword. Thus in the evaluation of citizenship in time of war we are called upon to sacrifice for it just that which to a large extent gives it its value. And this is not simply the paradox of giving up one's life for what can be only enjoyed through life. In the period for preparation for war as well as after war we are forced constantly to give a supreme value to military interests and operations because in theory they protect the fundamentals of the state. The conclusion which military classes and interests and those dependent upon them seek to draw from this is that these fundamentals being counted as more valuable than all the rest, the same supreme value must be accorded to them when they come into conflict with the constructive activities or the community.

It is this situation which presents a challenge to the psychological doctrine of social values. Is it possible to bring to consciousness the value of one's relationship to the whole community in these constructive activities of daily life, which presuppose it, while they seem to ignore it; or is it only by sacrificing them all for the community that we can reach an emotional sense of the worth of the society to which we belong? Must we lose our lives to save them?

Psychologically the condition for the solution of the problem is the production of a situation that will bring the community in its relation to ourselves into the field of awareness and interest, in some other fashion than through the danger of losing it. The theoretical statement of the solution of the problem is not difficult. If we conceive that one course of action conserves the social structure while another threatens it, that one program means life and that more abundantly while another restricts and finally quenches the life of society, in these competing hypotheses for the solution of social problems the value of the life to be saved and enlarged should appear over against the program which promises to sacrifice it. In a word, it seems possible that one should appreciate the value of fundamental social relations in their fullest realization especially when contrasted with a scheme of conduct which will fail of this realization. And yet this is exactly what is lacking in our response to reform measures and movements. The candidate who claims that this program will save the country is met with a shrug of the shoulders or a contemptuous smile. The reformer's vision of a reorganized society is the surest indication to the public mind that the reformer is an unpractical dreamer. I am not referring to the lack of proportion between a plan of action and the accomplishment which the program-maker promises, nor to the visionary character of social utopias, but to the suspicion we feel at once of an undertaking which is supported by an emotional appeal to the results which it is to obtain. The orator or reformer who presents a picture of happiness in any other terms than those of the alleviation of immediate misery is classed as a sentimentalist, and even the picture of misery may fall into the same category. In the pulpit it is legitimate to state in emotional terms the ends of human conduct apart from any statement of the definite means by which these may be obtained – except in a New Jerusalem – while the social scientist must formulate his ends largely in terms of fixed institutions and their stereotyped formulations of the ends of social life: universal education, equal justice, order, popular government, and the rest of the ideals of liberalism. And the exceptions prove the rule. Our experimental schools have in some degree made it possible to state the ends of education in the immediate emotional interests of the child. The Junior George Republics and the Juvenile Courts deliberately undertake to state in terms of affective experience the results of governmental procedure and judicial control. This is confessedly easier in the problems of childhood than in those of the adult, but the initiative and referendum are bungling methods of asking the individual voters to present to himself how he enjoys the prospect of this measure or that. The domestic relations, courts, the pathological clinics and parole systems in the adult courts are extensions of the method of the Juvenile Court of looking at its problems in terms of immediate human situations which means that we are willing to regard our emotional responses to the social problem and to the measure suggested for their solution as permissible in the scientific procedure.

This seems at least to be the most striking difference between the older institutional procedure and that of the Juvenile Court. In the former the actual human situation with its evaluations must be forced into the formalized evaluations of the institution. What is right or wrong, what good or bad is determined by the standards and rules already determined. Conflict between such judgements and the attitude of the individual gives rise to the pathos of the Greek tragedy, the resignation of the religious devotee in the presence of suffering which he regards as the chastisement of a divine hand, the sense of an abstract majesty of law, or the revolt of the religious or political revisionist, and anarchist. These emotional states may serve thus for the statement of another individual problem, but not for the statement of the problem with which the institution deals. The statement of this problem is fixed in advance by the norms of the institution. The norms of the institution are not flexible, provisional means of bringing out the social problem as it appears in the individual's experience. Nor can the result of the operation of the judicial procedure be tested by the actual effect which it will have in the individual's experience. Quite the opposite attitude belongs to the Juvenile Court: sympathetic interrogation reconstructs as far as possible the actual situation, its motives, its values, its purposes. It becomes a tacit assumption of the procedure in this court that the statement of the court will be on all fours with the estimates and standards of the child, and the test that is most satisfactory result in the immediate relations of the child to the community that surrounds him.

In the habitual social life of the community where the fundamental relations are not called in question, they are, as was remarked earlier, practically below the level of consciousness, and where they are thrown up to consciousness by conflict between the interests of the individual and the formulated interests of the whole group the situation is not favorable for the emotional appreciation on the part of the individual of his citizenship in the community. Only insofar as in the attitude of contrition he accepts the estimate of the community upon his conduct will he be possessed by an emotional sense of the import of the state. Here again the result is attained by the sacrifice of the individual. He does not realize himself in the whole, but he realizes the whole in the negation of the self. It is possible but in the last degree unusual for the individual taking this attitude to undertake the reconstruction of his character upon the model of the institutional standards. The usual result is the revolt of the individual against the judgment of the institution and the community that is in his mind identified with it. The products of our prisons are defective and maimed personalities. The other situation, that typified by the Juvenile Court, is favorable to just this emotional realization of the fundamental relation of the individual and the community. For here there is mutual adjustment. That which the child feels to be valuable to himself is recognized and stated to him in terms of the community and community's rights and attitudes are presented to him in terms of his values, while there is the ever present test of the continuance of social relations to determine whether the statement of the problem and of its solution is a working and workable statement.

There is nothing novel in this statement of the moral judgment. It is the experience of every parent who has gone beyond the conception of building up his child's character by breaking his will, and compelling him to obey for the bare obedience's

sake. The Juvenile Court has simply carried over this experience of the parent into the relation of the state to the child. I am, however, confident that we have not realized the full implications of the change. Consider, for example, our discussion of property with the child and compare it with the attitude which the community takes toward its disinherited members in their resentment at their disinheritance. In our argument with our children we are quite free to go back of the institution of property and to present it as a method of giving them the control they demand over their goods and chattels, and thus protecting others in the control of their own. A sensible father does not start with rights. He starts with the social situation of which the child is a part and within which the child insists on being and remaining a part and works out his instruction in terms of the child's own interests, while he keeps before him the child's own conscious dependence upon the family and the neighborhood. I would not, of course, imply that society can meet its I.W.W.s¹ in this simple fashion. Certainly it cannot until it has found a way of convincing them that they are at home in the community in the same fashion as that in which the member of the family feels himself at home under the family tree. And yet the manner of procedure with the child is the logical procedure. It is the scientific manner of stating the problem and testing its solution. It is willing to define its objects in terms of an ongoing social process, and is ready therefore to bring any right or social sacrament into discussion and to a possible reconstruction. That such a problem may be formulated – such as the social justification of property – it is necessary that one should state the values that come to him by immemorial rights in the form of functions they perform. If he has property or wishes to have and keep property he will find himself estimating his citizenship in terms of such possession. If he has no possessions in goods and chattels but feels the justice of getting the social opportunities and personal development which possessions give, he must conceive of his citizenship in the community as productive of the opportunities and personal development which the goods buy. In either case, he will be in the attitude of realizing his relation to the community and of the community to himself in terms of the immediate values of personal problems.

This is not at present the situation which we face in approaching the problems of social science. Property and marriage are institutions which cannot be brought into the statement of a personal problem of conduct in the same fashion that one brings in the values of studies which are possible parts of one's curriculum in a university course, or alternative uses of money already in one's possessions, when the justice of the possession is not itself disputed. In fact, it is the very nature of the fixed institution that they are to be accepted as the preconditions of the solution of personal problems of those who are members of the society to which the institutions belong. As, however, these institutions are themselves the expressions of the fundamental organization of the community, all the social values guaranteed by them are lifted out of the realm of scientific assessment and reconstruction. It is, of course, true that by the indirect methods of legislation and referendum we may change these institutions and amend our Bills of Rights and our Constitutions. But the fundamental institutions are not as a rule changed by direct conscious undertaking.

After men have chafed under old forms and by subterfuge have escaped this or that implication of the institution, thus undermining it slowly building up new attitudes

and forms of conduct our legislation or decisions of court registers changes which have already taken place. While thus our institutions can change and evolve we are robbed of the conscious import of the process of change, and in especial we are not able to bring to consciousness the fundamental social values which are wrapped up in these institutions, except when these institutions and their values are attacked by the enemy without. If we could attack the institution by way of continual reconstruction we would have as real an opportunity of feeling its import as we have of the value of meeting a friend when we reconstruct our program giving up this, that, or the other privilege to compass this opportunity. We get hardly more immediate meaning out of the constant process of the evolution of social institutions that we do out of the processes of dialectical changes which take place unconsciously in our mouths to be registered by coming to Grimms as great laws of speech. We have indeed all the wear and tear of the problems of misery, of divorce, of abuse of childhood, et. al., but the particular case of misery may not be used as the direct evaluation for the property scheme which we have now and as a datum in an immediate change to be wrought out to solve this problem. We have the misery and the faith that out of it in the slow process of the ages is arising a better form of the state which will have eliminated this suffering and injustice and we can neither get ride of the misery nor take conscious part in the reconstruction. We can neither have our cake nor eat it. It is not my thesis that we might change all this and at once attack the social problems in the same completeness of method as that which we can attack those of disease or the velocity and mass of an electron; what I do maintain is that until we can do this we cannot get an emotional realization of the value of citizenship, except when our institutions and their values are in danger of destruction *vi et armis*,² for we are stopped from any direct evaluation of them in the process of social reconstruction.

When men accepted the order of society as final and its structure as divinely arranged, in their resignation and acceptance of the order of the world they registered the metaphysical value set by them through the sacrifices they made to them. But when we assume that changes are taking place which will tend to eliminate the losses we decry, and recognize that it is only because men in society have not yet got the control over the process of change as we are getting control over that of physics; that we cannot consciously live the life of reconstruction that is both that of the individual and of the community. It is no longer possible to draw water from these wells of salvation.

When we can apply the scientific method completely to social problems we will be able to consciously live the life which we are at present to a large part only existing, or viewing with the Epimethean eye of the historian.

Notes

* Unpublished paper, Mead Papers Archive, Addenda, Box: 2, Folder: 3, 11 pp. This paper can also be found in Deegan, 2008: 212–19.

1 “Industrial Workers of the World” is an international union. It was founded in 1905 in Chicago, where it is still based.

2 With force and arms.

30

NATIONAL-MINDEDNESS AND INTERNATIONAL-MINDEDNESS (1929)*

In the year 1910, in an article entitled, "The Moral Equivalent of War," William James stated the anomaly of war in the following sentences: "There is something highly paradoxical in the modern man's relation to war. Ask our millions, north and south, whether they would vote now (were such a thing possible) to have our war for the Union expunged from history, and the record of a peaceful transition to the present time substituted for that of its marches and battles, and probably hardly a handful of eccentrics would say yes. Those ancestors, those efforts, those memories and legends, are the most ideal part of what we now own together, a sacred spiritual possession worth more than all the blood poured out. Yet ask those same people whether they would be willing in cold blood to start another civil war now to gain another similar possession, and not one man or woman would vote for the proposition."

This was written for the Association for International Conciliation and was published four years before the beginning of the Great War. If the same proposition were offered to the voters of the nations who fought through that war, I doubt if there would not be as unanimous a consensus of opinion in favor of expunging that war from history and replacing it by a peaceful advance toward our present day, though there might be a tough-minded group in the community who would insist that there had been gained in the awful conflict a lesson that could never have been learned in any less terrible an experience. And that lesson they would say was the duty that lies upon the society of the human race of doing away with war. We are in no mood to cover up the criminal ineptitude of warfare by the heroisms which it displays or the ideals which it may consecrate. Yet we have not become noncombatants. The country would arm to a man in a genuine war of self-defense, but the doctrine of the recently solemnized Pact of Peace, that war as a legitimate measure of public policy has been forever damned, has the full-hearted support of the communities of the Western world. And I do not think that it is the horror of human suffering, even on the colossal scale of the Great War, that has been the controlling sentiment in this almost unanimous

consensus of the communities of the world. We have learned more from the published archives of Foreign Offices than we have from the records of battlefields and atrocities.

We have learned that those who controlled public policies and finally mobilized armies were utilizing fears and hatreds and cupidities and individual greeds and jealousies which were far from representing issues over which the communities themselves wished to fight or thought they were fighting. We know that even in this day a war may arise between self-governing communities, but we know also that the issues that would lead up to this war, if they could be intelligently presented to the peoples involved, would never be left to the arbitrament of the god of battles. Even national cupidity, if it exist, realizes that under present conditions a so-called successful war will cost more than it can profit. Warfare is an utterly stupid method of settling differences of interest between different nations.

Professor James's position is this, that no people would enter upon a war for the sake of that very ideal heritage, which they would not be willing to sacrifice after the war was fought. He did not believe that in prospect any community would regard war as a spiritually profitable undertaking. The belief I have expressed is that as regards the Great War no nation in retrospect regards the spiritual results of fighting it as a sufficient price to pay for having undergone its evils. Having stated his paradox, that while a war in retrospect may have paid a spiritual dividend which renders it a great national blessing, no war in prospect can be so assessed, Professor James advances to the explanation of war's continued existence, for we do not now maintain armies and navies for the sake of "battles long ago" but in preparation for those which may be just around the corner. I am using the word spiritual as the opposite of material. It covers every value that we cannot put into economic form.

Let us be quite clear upon the issue under discussion. It is conceded by everyone that any war but a genuinely defensive war is a prospective evil which intelligent communities will avoid. We are not entering into the contentious question whether offense is not the best method of defense, nor are we, at present, undertaking to define the field which a genuinely defensive war will defend, whether this field will include national honor and peculiar interests. We will assume that these questions have been decided in a common agreement to the satisfaction of all civilized communities. It is evident that if this fortunate position were ever attained, intelligent statesmanship would without difficulty eliminate war.

And Professor James goes on to point out the spiritual losses which society will suffer if war goes. First of all come "those ancestors, those memories and legends the ideal part of what we now own together," the spiritual heritage from war. But it is not upon this that Professor James insists, for he admits that we cannot deliberately shape our conduct to reach these results. We cannot plan wars to obtain spiritual heritages. The important spiritual values that he spreads out which come to us from war are the hardihood of body and mind, the willingness to pay to the uttermost for a supreme value, the ability to get out of our lesser selves, the acceptance of a supreme discipline which consistently subordinates minor ends to an ultimate end, the sense of at-oneness with all others in the community in the great enterprise, that exaltation of spirit which we all know is the loftiest experience and is so rare of attainment. For this war is in some

sense a school. Professor James does not discuss the seamy side of this schooling and the immense spiritual frustrations which it involves. And indeed he is not called upon to do so, since he was a pacifist and was seeking for the moral equivalent which he thought we should provide if we abandon this schooling, however costly and unintelligent it may be. For there is in his opinion nothing in an industrial civilization, which is organized for profit and comfort, whose springs of action are competition and our efforts to get ahead of our fellows, and whose great social organizations fail to sweep the individual into emotional realization of his identity with the community – nothing indeed in such a civilization that does or can provide this schooling. We conduct our government only by the use of political partisanship. The church anxiously avoids the major issues of the community. Loyalties to family, business, or schools, the more intense they are, the more exclusive are they.

Professor James's suggestion is that the youth of the country should be conscripted for useful labor, in which they would get the hardihood of body and mind which military training gives. It would be essential to the accomplishment of the purpose which Professor James had in mind that this labor should be felt by the conscripted youth to be necessary to the life of the community. They would have to feel that they were identified with the community in what they did, if they were to reach that emotional fusion which war under favorable conditions induces.

I do not think that Professor James regarded his suggestion so much as an immediately practicable undertaking as an illustration of the type of experience which society in some fashion must bring into the lives of citizens if they are to get the qualities and training which war gives however imperfectly. What he insists upon is that the social ends and values are there and that they should enter the lives of our citizens, and that society has within its power to work out in some fashion practicable ways in which this can be accomplished. His scheme of conscription to community labor was a striking and picturesque manner of presenting what ought to be a logical part of a pacifist program.

Nearly twenty years have passed since Professor James wrote "The Moral Equivalent of War," and within those years the Great War has been fought, and has brought forth the League of Nations, the most serious undertaking to end war which international society has ever made. The attention of the pacifist is upon other things than the "moral equivalent of war." A hopeful project has been put into actual operation, and the relations of nations have been subject to a publicity and a sort of criticism which are novel in history. We have remained outside of the League of Nations because in our history we have been largely outside of the political life of Europe that led to the great catastrophe. We have been and are unwilling to enter into that complex of national, racial, and economic problems which are so foreign to us. But the outcome of the war has none the less brought us into more intimate human and economic relations with European peoples than we have occupied in the past, and the absence of imperialism in our history and our fundamental dislike of militarism inevitably arouse a sympathy with the great experiment that is being tried out at Geneva. The pacifist has a text to preach from that that he never had before and a practical program that was inconceivable twenty years ago. The somewhat embarrassing challenge which

the great psychologist put up to him, he has pushed one side in the press of more practicable undertakings. Indeed, one re-reads the essay today with a certain sense of unreality.

Following this essay in *Memories and Studies* is an after-dinner address given by Professor James at a peace banquet. There is there the same account of human nature, bred through long centuries to fight, the same emphasis upon the failure of the pacifists' program to come to terms with the exigencies of life, and there is the same sense of the strength of the enemy – the rooted bellicosity of human nature and its demand for the thrill of battle. Said Professor James, "A deadly listlessness would come over most men's imagination of the future if they could seriously be brought to believe that never again in *saecula saeculorum* would a war trouble human history. In such a stagnant summer afternoon of a world, where would be the zest or interest?" We have had a surfeit of those thrills and have counted their cost, says the pacifist. It is not necessary to see the good in fighting any longer. The task of getting rid of it is too insistent when we have seen it and lived through it on the grand scale. There is the Peace Pact and there is the World Court, the very inception of which was American. For us to remain out of it is a scandal. In the midst of such activities, why should the pacifist stop to consider the psychology of fighting? But the challenge is still there, and it may be that the pacifist is not wisely pushing it one side, in the press of his immediately practicable undertakings. He might get a deeper insight into their import.

Let us consider the spiritual values in which war may school men and women, however costly the schooling may be. The hardihood of body and mind – the opposite of the nature of Roosevelt's "mollycoddle" – can conceivably be secured without the expense of warfare. The program suggests that of Charles Lamb, burning down the house to get a roast pig, but it points out sharply the criticism upon the present order of society. Our insistent motives to strenuous conduct are personal and individualistic, those of success in the competitions of business, the professions, and the social struggle. The effective public ideals are those of well-being, comfort, and that condition of body and mind in which men can enjoy life. Our social programs look to the removal of evils, sickness, misery, and drudgery. As Frederick Harrison said of the ideal of the utilitarians, they look toward a world in which everyone could be sure of smacking his lips over a good breakfast of ham and eggs. The strenuousness of life seizes upon the individual in the struggle for the means of living and competitive success, but it does not inexorably involve his public interests, until the existence of his society is threatened, and when a man becomes altruistically interested in public ends, these ends appear as the alleviation of suffering and attained enjoyments rather than as his own achievements – the concentrated interest in mastering and controlling his world.

The other values that war may foster – willingness to pay to the uttermost for supreme goods, the rising above our lower selves, the acceptance of a discipline which subordinates minor ends to ultimate ends, and the exaltation that rises from identification of one's self with all who are with him in the great enterprise – that we should look away from civil life to war to arouse these is but a further reflection upon the conscious motivation of that civil life. War presents common goods in an

imperative mood, which they will not assume in peaceful times, and therefore gives them a hold upon us which they never secure in philanthropic undertakings.

Professor James, however, has painted a picture of men who enjoy fighting immediately and have the zest of violent adventure in their blood through a long physiological and social heritage – the immanent bellicosity of human nature which I think he has overdrawn. The average man does not want to fight for the sake of fighting. Threaten him and what is precious to him and the fighting complex is indeed ready to blaze out. His interest in violent adventure is easily satisfied by the movie, the detective tale, and the dramas of literature and history. Professor James was himself sympathetic with the revulsion to violence from drudgery and ennui. There is a story current that after a two days' session at a Chautauqua he exclaimed, "O, for an Armenian massacre!" But I do not think that in the interests of peace we have to combat a fundamental instinct of bloodshed. If the bare interest in slaughtering our fellows were so immediate, the campaigns of Army and Navy Leagues would be much simpler and much less expensive. The case for war does not lie in the fighting itself, but in that for which war compels us to fight.

Professor James then calls the attention of his fellow-pacifists to war as a schoolmaster that succeeds, at least on occasions, in making the public good the intense interest of the individual, in enforcing a discipline which reduces minor ends into subordination to a supreme end, and finally in arousing an exaltation of spirit that springs from identification of one's self with the community for which he is ready to make the supreme sacrifice, and points out that as long as human nature responds almost instinctively to the call to arms and as long as there is no other undertaking that accomplishes this for the whole community those who would abolish war must offer some moral equivalent for war or render a reason for the sacrifice. War on occasions makes the good of the community the supreme good of the individual. What has the pacifist who would abolish war to put in its place?

In a word we make the public good our immediate interest when it arouses the fighting spirit. Otherwise it is apt to be a philanthropic good, to reach which we must put one side our private interests. To be interested in the public good we must be disinterested, that is, not interested in goods in which our personal selves are wrapped up. In wartime we identify ourselves with the nation, and its interests are the interests of our primal selves. And in the fighting mood we find that we are in sympathetic accord with all others who are fighting for the same cause. Then we experience the thrill of marching in common enthusiasm with all those who in daily life are our competitors, our possible rivals, and opponents. The barriers are down which we erect against our neighbors and business associates. In daily life they may be hostile to our interests. We proceed warily. We protect ourselves even against our partners, associates, and employees with contracts and agreements defended with penalties. Even our good manners are means of keeping possible bores at a distance. It is sound sense to regard everyone as a possible enemy. In wartime these barriers are down. We need to feel the support of our fellows in the struggle and we grapple them to ourselves. The great issue itself is hallowed by the sense of at-oneness of a vast multitude.

It is easy to study this in everyday situations. Gather ten or fifteen of your acquaintances and make the subject of your conversation the admirable qualities and services

of some one known to all. Then change the subject of converse to someone for whom all have a common dislike, and note how much warmer is the sense of at-oneness of those who are engaged in common disparagement than in encomium. The hostile attitude is peculiarly favorable to social cohesion. The solid South is the product of common hostility to the negro as a social equal. The Ku Klux Klan is a deliberate manufacture of compact groups by the use of racial and religious antipathies. I think it is worth our while to make some inquiry into this cohesive power, which the hostile impulse in human nature exercises with such absolute authority.

We have long known that behind the spiritual exaltation of wartime patriotism and the irresponsibility of mob-consciousness lies the same psychological mechanism. And this fact is a ground neither for extolling it nor for damning it. It is just a psychological mechanism which like other mechanisms has served both fine and ignoble ends. It is equally inept to define, with Dr. Johnson, patriotism as the last refuge of the scoundrel, and to exalt Judge Lynch as the embodiment of social justice. But it is both apt and obligatory upon us to examine this mechanism when we are not caught in its meshes, and are free to comprehend it; for when we are involved in it, it is next to impossible to approach it with impartial consideration. Neither the patriot in his moment of exaltation nor the member of the blind mob in his unrestrained ferocity is capable of following the dictum: Know thyself. He may conceivably get outside of his intoxication, but he is then engaged in controlling his passionate impulses. He is in no mood to understand them.

I have already indicated the character of this mechanism. The hostile impulse unites us against the common enemy, because it has force enough to break down customary social textures, by which we hold others at a distance from our inexpugnable selves. But it was this social structure by which we realized ourselves. Our rights and our privileges, our distinctions of capacity and skill, our superiorities and our inferiorities, our social positions and prestige, our manners and our foibles not only distinguish and separate us from others but they constitute us what we are to ourselves. They constitute our individualities, the selves that we recognize, when we thank God that we are not as other men are, and when we determine upon what terms we can live and work with members of our families, with our neighbors and our countrymen. If these are in any degree broken down we are no longer the same individuals that we were. To join ourselves with others in the common assault upon the common foe we have become more than allies, we have joined a clan, have different souls, and have the exuberant feeling of being at one with this community.

There lie in all of us both of these attitudes. It is only in our common interests and our identities with others that there is found the stuff out of which social selves are made – and it is only in distinguishing and protecting these selves from others that we exercise the self-consciousness that makes us responsible and rational beings.

But even the apparatus of this self-consciousness we have borrowed from the community. What are our rights in which we defend ourselves against all comers, but the rights which we recognize in others, that ours may be recognized by others? What are our peculiar powers and capacities but the facilities by which we perform our parts in common undertakings, and where would they be if others did not recognize

them and depend upon them? The proudest assertion of independent selfhood is but the affirmation of a unique capacity to fill some social role. Even the man who haughtily withdraws himself from the crowd, thinks of himself in terms of an ideal community which is but a refinement of the world in which he lives. It is by assuming the common attitudes to each other, which an organized community makes possible, that we are able to address ourselves in the inner forum of our thoughts and private purposes. A self is a composite or interaction of these two parts of our natures – the fundamental impulses which make us co-operating neighbors and friends, lovers and parents and children, and rivals, competitors, and enemies; on the other side the evocation of this self which we achieve when we address ourselves in the language which is the common speech of those about us. We talk to ourselves, ask ourselves what we will do under certain conditions, criticize and approve of our own suggestions and ideas, and in taking the organized attitudes of those engaged in common undertakings we direct our own impulses. These two parts are the matter and the form of the self, if I may use Aristotelian phraseology. The one is the stuff of social impulses and the other is the power which language has conferred upon us, of not only seeing ourselves as others see us but also of addressing ourselves in terms of the common ideas and functions which an organized society makes possible. We import the conversation of the group into our inner sessions and debate with ourselves. But the concatenated concepts which we use are ours because we are speaking in the language of the outer universe of discourse, the organized human world to which we belong.

In the sophisticated field of self-consciousness we control our conduct. We place ourselves over against other selves and determine what we want to do, what we have a right to do, and what other people may do. Here we assert ourselves and maintain ourselves by recognized rights and accorded privileges. In the field of the stuff – the matter – of personality we have no such power. We are born with our fundamental impulses. We choose our business associates and the members of our clubs and the guests at our dinner parties, but we *fall in love*, and whatever action we take upon this primal premiss, it is not a matter of our own choice. We say that we instinctively help a child who has fallen down, and our immediate attitudes toward puppies, kittens, and little pigs are different from those we take toward dogs, cats, and hogs, and the impulse to helpfulness is just as much an endowment as the impulse of hostility. This primal stuff of which we are made up is not under our direct control. The primitive sexual, parental, hostile, and co-operative impulses out of which our social selves are built up are few – but they get an almost infinite field of varied application in society, and with every development of means of intercourse, with every invention they find new opportunities of expression. Here by taking thought we can add to our social stature. But we have no direct control over our loves and our hates, our likes and our dislikes, and for this reason we are relatively helpless when a common enemy fuses us all into a common patriotic pack or stampedes us under the influence of sympathetic terror.

This, then, is the stuff out of which human social selves are made up, their primal stuff or matter of social impulses, and the form of sophisticated self-consciousness. But society is the interaction of these selves and an interaction that is only possible if out of their diversity unity arises. We are indefinitely different from each other, but our

differences make interaction possible. Society is unity in diversity. However there is always present the danger of its miscarriage. There are the two sources of its unity – the unity arising from the interconnection of all the different selves in their self-conscious diversity and that arising from the identity of common impulses; the unity, for example, of the members of a great highly organized industrial concern or of the faculties and the students of a great university and the unity of a crowd that rushes to save a child in danger of its life. By these two principles of unity society is maintained; but there is an ever present risk of failure. Every society has it at the back of its mind. We want security and we distrust it. Society in every period of its history has presented to itself that danger in one form or another. Today we dread the Bolsheviki. At another time it has been the “interests”; at times the mob, and at other times the arbitrary power of a monarch.

We come back to our original question, How shall we get and maintain that unity of society in which alone we can exist? The ever present method of creating cohesion from below, from the impulses, is found in the common hostile impulse. The criticisms which are exercised upon the civil motives are but illustrations of this. Government is by partisanship. We can bring the voters to the polls only through their hostility to opposite parties. A campaign for a community chest is quickened by competitive teams. The great days of the religions have been the days of hostility, between the religions, between the Church and the sects, or between different churches. The fight with the devil and all his angels united men whom a common hope of salvation left untouched. More evident still is the need of the fighting attitude when a large community with varied groups and opposing interests is to be brought into a self-conscious whole. The antagonism of the Chinese to the Japanese and the English did more than anything else to awaken a Chinese national spirit. In our Civil War slavery was the issue, because it divided the nation. Men of the North fought for the Union and in fighting for it they felt it. The readiest way of arousing an emotional appreciation of a common issue is to fight together for that issue, and until we have other means of attaining it we can hardly abandon war.

It is not a question of thrills nor of satisfying a deep-seated bellicosity in the human animal. It is a question of making ourselves actually feel the values that are wrapped up in the community. While war was still a possible national adventure, there was a certain rough psychological justification for the dictum, that at least one war in a generation was essential for the spiritual hygiene of the nation. The toleration of secret diplomacy, the cherishing of national honor and peculiar interests as lying outside the field of negotiation had behind it an obscure but profound feeling that in national honor and in these peculiar interests were symbolized a national unity which could be made precious by the arbitrament of war.

What better illustration of this can be found than in the Monroe Doctrine? None are agreed upon what the doctrine is. The nations of South and Central America in whose interests it was inaugurated with one voice denounce it. It is absurd to say that we can find an issue in the threatened neighborhood on this hemisphere of European powers, when our continent-wide, unfortified Canadian frontier, within the century and more since it was established, is almost the only frontier in the whole wide world

that has not been crossed by belligerent forces. No, it is something – no matter what it is – for which we will *fight*. To think of it in these terms is to feel that there is a nation back of it. The more unintelligible the issue is, the more it emphasizes the unanimity of the community. It is an issue that cannot be discussed for we cannot in cold blood find out what the issue is. We must be of one mind about it, for it is impossible to have different minds about that which no one can comprehend. The only issue involved in the Monroe Doctrine is this, are you a patriot, are you a red-blooded American, or are you a mollycoddle? Let us get down to real reasons and abandon good reasons. Even when we hope that there may be no future wars, we feel that we should keep certain issues which can arouse the fighting spirit, for the sake of their effect in drawing men together in a fashion which cannot be achieved by public interests, which are after all so divisive.

I take it that this is the real question that is put up to us by Professor James's moral equivalent of war. Can we find outside of the fighting spirit that unifying power which presents a supreme issue to which all others are subordinated, which will harden us to undergo everything, and unite us in the enthusiasm of a common end?

When I have borne in memory what has tamed
Great Nations, how ennobling thoughts depart
When men change swords for ledgers, and desert
The student's bower for gold, some fears unnamed
I had, my Country – am I to be blamed?

There is nothing in the history of human society nor in present-day experience which encourages us to look to the primal impulse of neighborliness for such cohesive power. The love of one's neighbor cannot be made into a common consuming passion. The great religions that have sought to embody it when they have dominated society have appeared as the Church militant. Auguste Comte, the great French sociologist and philosopher, sought to fashion a universal religion out of it. It gathered a handful of great souls into its communion. How widespread was its sweep of the community may be indicated by the tale that, in London, a gathering of the Comtists took place within which a schism arose. For even in this church sects appeared. A London wag reported that the members of the convention gathered in one cab and came away in two. There is, to be sure, no falling off in numbers of those who identify themselves with different Christian sects in the Western world, but there never was a time when the churches have had less power in organizing the community into common action. We can unite with common zeal to aid the victims of famines, of earthquakes, and of conflagrations, but we do not go into nor come out of such common undertakings with a sense of the supremacy of the nation or society that holds us together. The passion of love between the sexes isolates those whom it consumes, and family life segregates us. The positive social impulses exhibit no forces that bind us immediately together in conscious devotion to the complex community out of which our sophisticated selves arise. They have their place in the cults, mores, and customs that form the tissue of human society, but they do not flame out into a patriotism that can fuse men in the devotion to the fatherland.

The Great War has presented not a theory but a condition. If war were a possible measure of public policy, it might be kept for the sake of social cohesion, even if the ends for which wars are ostensibly fought were illusory and inadequate. But the Great War has made this no longer possible. Every war if allowed to go the accustomed way of wars will become a world war, and every war pursued uncompromisingly and intelligently must take as its objective the destruction not of hostile forces but of enemy nations in their entirety. It has become unthinkable as a policy for adjudicating national differences. It has become logically impossible. This is not to say that it may not arise. Another catastrophe may be necessary before we have cast off the cult of warfare, but we cannot any longer *think* our international life in terms of warfare. It follows that if we do *think* our national and international life, we can no longer depend upon war for the fusion of disparate and opposing elements in the nation. We are compelled to reach a sense of being a nation by means of rational self-consciousness. We must think ourselves in terms of the great community to which we belong. We cannot depend upon feeling ourselves at one with our compatriots, because the only effective feeling of unity springs from our common response against the common enemy. No other social emotion will melt us into one. Instead of depending upon a national soul we must achieve national-mindedness.

Professor James seems to have thought that we might substitute some other cult for the cult of warfare and reach the same emotional result – the cult of youth conscripted to necessary social labor. But cults are not deliberately created in this fashion. Plato admitted this. He needed a set of cults for his ideal state, but he was compelled to postulate them as already in being. Even his philosopher king could not legislate cults into existence. Mussolini refuses to recognize the logic of the situation. He is depending upon the hostile impulse to fuse his Fascist state, and he is compelled to talk in terms of wars. He has to quicken imaginations with pictures of Roman conquests, and the threat of full panoplied legions. He is undertaking to arouse an Italian soul, not to fashion an Italian mind. He is, undoubtedly, very far from wanting the wars whose threat helps to hold this society together, for nothing would more certainly shatter it than the operation of a modern war; but he can safely threaten for a while, in a Europe whose surrounding populations have had a surfeit of fighting. The task of becoming nationally minded is then that which the outcome of the Great War is imposing upon us.

We enter upon our civil conflicts with the comfortable sense of a sovereign state behind us endowed with supreme and ultimate force to compel adherence to law and order. This state can if necessary call out the national troops to enforce the unity of the community which conflicting interests may have threatened. Can we keep this sort of state unless it is endowed with an army trained to fight the country's wars? A police force, even a national police force, is not an army. The dread sovereignty of the state is evidenced in troops trained to the unthinking obedience which warfare enforces. If we are compelled to surrender war with the blind military obedience which it puts into the hands of the state, we will be compelled to think out rational solutions of our civil quarrels and think them out a good deal more quickly. It is a great deal easier to feel than it is to think. It is a great deal easier to be angry with one's

enemy than to sift the grounds of one's quarrel and find the basis for a reasonable solution. And if you can find grounds for making your enemy the enemy of the community – a Bolshevik, for example – the procedure is still easier. To use the mind with which the community has endowed you to compass the common interests rather than as a means of pursuing your own interest is a strenuous affair, and this is what it means to become nationally minded. Let me repeat if we surrender war there is no way of maintaining national unity except in discovering that unity in the midst of the diversity of individual concerns. There *is* a common good in which we are involved, and if society is still to exist we must discover it with our heads. We cannot depend upon our diaphragms and the visceral responses which a fight sets in operation.

There is something profoundly pathetic in the situation of great peoples, that have been struggling up through long centuries of fighting and its attendant miseries, coming closer and closer to each other in their daily life, fashioning unwittingly larger racial, lingual, liturgical, confessional, political, and economic communities, and realizing only intermittently the spiritual life which this larger community confers upon them, and realizing it only when they could fight for it. The pathos comes out most vividly in the nationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These nationalisms have meant the sudden realization that men belonged to communities that transcended their groups, families, and clans. They had attained selves through which they entered into relation with their common nationals, and the only way in which they could seize upon and enjoy this new spiritual experience was in the fight for its symbols, their common language and literature, and their common political organizations. The pathos lies in the inability to feel the new unity with the nation except in the union of arms. It is not that men love fighting for its own sake, but they undergo its rigors for the sake of conjunction with all those who are fighting in the same cause. There is only one solution for the problem and that is in finding the intelligible common objects, the objects of industry and commerce, the common values in literature, art, and science, the common human interests which political mechanisms define and protect and foster. But all these values are at first divisive. They appear at first as individual and class interests and at first one fights for them and against others who threaten them. The rational attitude is to find what common values lie back of the divisions and competitions. Within our communities the process of civilization is the discovery of these common ends which are the bases of social organizations. In social organization they come to mean not opposition but diverse occupations and activities. Difference of function takes the place of hostility of interest. The hard task is the realization of the common value in the experience of conflicting groups and individuals. It is the only substitute. In civilized communities while individuals and classes continue to contend, as they do, with each other, it is with the consciousness of common interests that are the bases both for their contentions and their solutions. The state is the guardian of these common interests, and its authority lies in the universal interest of all in their maintenance. The measure of civilization is found in the intelligence and will of the community in making these common interests the means and the reason for converting diversities into social organization.

The Great War has posed the problem before contending nations of carrying civilization into the community of nations; that is, it has left us with the demand for

international-mindedness. The moral equivalent of war is found in the intelligence and the will both to discover these common interests between contending nations and to make them the basis for the solution of the existing differences and for the common life which they will make possible.

This is the moral equivalent of war if the office of war is to adjust international differences. As an adjudicator war is utterly discredited since, as I have said, if war is logically pursued it leaves nothing to be adjudicated, not even the enemy nations themselves. However, it has not been the peace treaties after hostilities have ceased that have been the valuable contributions which warfare has made to human history. Professor James has indicated them – the spiritual heritage of devotions and heroisms and the consecrations of national values which occupy the most precious pages in history, and the emotional exaltation which accompanies the merging of a crowd of discrete individuals into a living union of men with a single purpose. These are the by-products of war which are in themselves invaluable, but to compass which no people would deliberately undertake war. This constitutes the paradox with which Professor James opened the discussion of his theme. It is a paradox the full depth of which he did not sound. The lying secret diplomacies, the exasperations of suppressed minorities, the profiteering of individuals and combines, the underhand conservation of selfish interests, which men have allowed in the past and still in a measure allow because they keep war as a valued possibility to hold the nation together – this is a stranger paradox. Must we simply surrender the values which we dare not directly invoke?

It is a question that concerns both ethics and psychology. The answer of ethics has already been given. The spiritual losses of war in prospect enormously outweigh any estimate we dare put upon these by-products. The psychological solution Professor James sought in a somewhat fantastic cult of youth conscripted for social labor. He would substitute a harmless cult for one that is extremely hazardous. We have seen that cults cannot be manufactured to order. The willingness of the communities of the world to keep up the apparatus of fighting and the threat of war is an advertisement both of the supreme value of the larger national self and the extreme difficulty of bringing the citizen to realize it. What Professor James saw was that it was only in war that public interests do not leave men cold. The war taxes are the only taxes that are willingly paid. It is still so much easier to revert to the old dispensation and chant with the Psalmist that our God is a man of war.

What I am seeking to bring out is that the chief difficulty in attaining international-mindedness does not lie in the clash of international interests but in the deep-seated need which nations feel of being ready to fight, not for ostensible ends but for the sake of the sense of national unity, of self-determination, of national self-respect that they can achieve in no other way so easily as in the readiness to fight.

National-mindedness and international-mindedness are inextricably involved in each other. Stable nations do not feel the need in any such degree as those that are seeking stability. It was the militaristic fusing of the German nation out of separate German states by Bismarck's policy of blood and iron and the fusion of a vast backward community of Russian peasants by a Czardom with a pan-Slavic battle-cry that played a great part in the origins of the Great War. When the French are convinced

that the German nation no longer needs to threaten her neighbors in order that she may feel her own national self, the fears of France will subside. Bismarck's proud sentence – Germany fears God and no one else on earth – was the challenge of a nation that dared not disarm because it feared internal disintegration. Bismarck's God was a man of war, that was the reflex of an international inferiority complex.

The outlawry of war as proclaimed in the Peace Pact goes then only halfway toward its great goal. It will be presumably approved by the nations of the world. So far as ostensible international differences are concerned, the peoples of the Western world are agreed that they should be settled by some method of negotiation, and that war to this end is no longer a policy which civilized nations may pursue. Self-defense remains a permissible ground for fighting, but with no war of offense there would be none of defense, and wars would vanish with the development of adequate means of negotiation, but we are not willing to have the readiness to fight disappear. So we retain national honor and peculiar interests. Why cannot these be adjudicated as well? Because these touch the sense of national self-respect. As long as we have these provisos, we have the proud sense of being willing to fight – to stake everything upon the assertion of national selfhood. It was this sense which President Wilson's unfortunate phrase offended – being too proud to fight. It was seemingly a phrase that contained a contradiction in terms. Pride predicates a fighting-spirit.

Now, if I am not mistaken such an attitude at the present period in human history is a revelation of an uncertainty of national selfhood and a grasping after the approved means of securing it – the wartime spirit. For at this period of the world's history there is no point of national honor and peculiar interest which is not as open to reasonable negotiation in a community of self-respecting nations as any of the so-called justiciable and negotiable issues, if we were sure of ourselves. But we are not sure of our national selves, and a certain amount of national psychoanalysis would be very valuable if not very probable. One thing, however, is clear, that we cannot attain international-mindedness until we have attained a higher degree of national-mindedness than we possess at present; and a rough gauge of it will be found in the necessity of retaining national honor and peculiar interests as *causae belli*.

Such a formulation seems to imply that if we were willing to get down to real reasons and abandon good reasons, if we were willing to be really reasonable we could immediately banish the threat of war from our international and our national life. I do not believe that this is the case. Civilization is not an affair of reasonableness; it is an affair of social organization. The selfhood of a community depends upon such an organization that common goods do become the ends of the individuals of the community. We know that these common goods are there, and in some considerable degree we can and do make them our individual ends and purposes, to such a degree that we have largely banished private warfare from the recognized methods of maintaining self-respect in civil conflicts. But there are still great gaps in our social organization, notably between our producers and the social service which they perform. Here there are groups that have to assure themselves of their self-respect by fighting on occasions. The labor unions and the employers as well preserve their solidarity, that is their sense of common selfhood, by the mechanism of hostility, that is by the threats of strikes

and lockouts. Back of it lies the inability of the laborer to realize himself in the social process in which he is engaged. Where such a situation becomes acute, men, if they can, will always bind themselves together by hostile organizations to realize their common purposes and ends and thus assure themselves the selfhood which society denies them. Men will always jealously maintain and guard this mechanism to assure themselves to themselves. We will get rid of the mechanism of warfare only as our common life permits the individual to identify his own ends and purposes with those of the community of which he is a part and which has endowed him with a self.

Note

* As originally published in *International Journal of Ethics*, 39 (1929), 385–407.

G. H. MEAD WORKS

A chronological listing of George Herbert Mead's published writings

1. 'The Relation of Art to Morality'. *Oberlin Review* 9 (1881).
2. 'Charles Lamb'. *Oberlin Review* 10 (1882).
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INDEX

- act/action x, 70, 102, 106, 135, 136, 215; ethics 215, 218, 220; instrumental/communicative action xiii; intelligent act 102, 109, 216, 240; knowledge/action interconnectedness xvi; language xiii, 265; moral action 215; psychical consciousness 7–8, 10, 11, 13; rationality x; social interaction x, 16, 19, 77–80; social theoretical foundation x, 16, 19; stimulus-response model xiv, 3–5, 17, 18, 21, 50, 53, 54, 77–80, 185; teleological 21; *see also* perception; response; social act; stimulus
- aesthetics 102, 110, 136–37; aesthetic consciousness 110–11; aesthetic realization 139, 142; art 28, 173, 174, 183; judgment 174
- Alexander, Samuel 73, 74, 76
- anarchy 86, 190, 307
- Angell, James Rowland 16, 51, 111
- animal 24, 66; conduct 27, 34, 50, 54; invertebrates 77, 78, 199; physiological adjustment 77–79; social conduct 77, 78–79; vertebrates 77, 79
- Aristotle 32, 41, 145, 150, 152, 174, 190, 227; Aristotelian science 177–78
- attention 17, 50, 51, 61, 180, 185; perception/response process 218; philosophy of science 105–6, 109, 135; the psychical 3, 4, 10, 12, 13; teleological behavior 26, 30, 37, 38, 40; voluntary attention 48, 50, 109; *see also* perception; response
- Augustine, St 144, 145, 147, 234
- Bacon, Francis 151, 153, 154
- Baldwin, James Mark 9–10, 20, 59, 93–94; circular reaction 18; social consciousness 15–16
- behavioristic psychology 70, 72, 97–98, 167, 195; organization of perspectives 197, 200–203; Prebehavioristic psychology 70; significant symbol 67–69
- Bentham, Jeremy 120, 227
- Bergson, Henri-Louis 72–73, 75, 77, 84, 195, 206
- body (physical organism) 21, 22–24, 28–31, 32; child 55–56; hardihood of body and mind 311–13; nature/mind dualism xiv, 9–10, 13, 23–24, 29, 32, 41, 47, 48, 95, 108, 135, 144, 154–55, 191, 195, 200, 235; physique 29–30; psychophysical parallelism 9–10, 13, 23–24, 29, 47, 48, 95, 108, 135
- Carnot, Nicolas Léonard 114, 115, 116
- change 41–42, 177, 182; Bergson, Henri-Louis 75; causes 35–37, 39–40, 42–43; consciousness of 104–5; invalidating one's known world 62, 105, 106; *see also* teleological behavior
- child: child labor 254, 255, 258–59, 260, 305; education 254–63; emergence of the self 67, 80–81, 214; gesture 55; juvenile crime 181, 190, 249, 275, 276; imitation 18, 67, 80, 81; language 18, 55, 199; percept 56; physical object 55–56;

- reflective consciousness 19; the self as social process 20, 189; self-consciousness 32, 80–81; social intelligence 55; social object 55, 189; social self 59, 61, 189; taking the role of the other 32, 68, 80–81, 199; talking to himself 67
- Christianity 82, 88, 97, 144–45, 175, 189, 231, 236, 239, 287, 294; Augustine, St 144, 145, 147, 234; the Church 145, 239, 312, 317, 318; cult 145; meaning of the world 145; moral judgement 219, 249–50; moral order 234, 242, 243; social settlement 247, 249–50; theology 234, 242, 243; *see also* Middle Ages
- citizenship xviii, xix, 266, 303–9; common law as affirmation of 268; consciousness of 303, 304, 306, 307; criminal justice 268, 270, 271, 306–8; emotional value 304–7, 308, 309; the military 305; property 308, 309; social nature 303, 304, 305; in times of peace 303–4, 307; value 304, 308, 309; war 303–5
- civilization 294, 305, 320, 322
- cognition 11, 48, 72, 76, 168, 215; imagery 53; the self 16; self-consciousness 145, 149; *see also* experience
- common good: ethics xvii, 223, 224–25, 228, 229, 230, 237; natural rights xvii, 223, 224–25, 228, 229, 230, 297; political theory xviii; war 314, 320, 321, 322–23
- communication 19, 93, 126, 198; communicative action xiii; conduct 97, 165–66; consciousness 16; Cooley, Charles Horton 93, 97; emergence of the self 199, 316; gesture 126, 198; meaning 16; mind 93; scientific knowledge 126, 127; society 168; symbol 93, 126, 165–66, 198; taking the role of the other 126; *see also* gesture; language; meaning
- Comte, Auguste 16, 120–21, 318
- conduct/behavior 11, 66; communication 97, 165–66; ethics 215–17, 219; experience as 75; imitation 15, 18; instinct 19, 264; intelligent conduct 34, 237; invention 184; meaning 191; self-consciousness 316; social consciousness 53–54, 184–85, 189, 191; social nature 17, 18; social organization 19, 264; stimulus 4, 5, 11; symbol 165–66; *see also* moral conduct; social conduct; teleological behavior
- consciousness 15, 16, 22, 58, 59, 69, 195; of attitude 51; aesthetic consciousness 110–11; ambiguity of the term 72–73; aspects of 90–91; as awareness 72, 73, 74, 76; Bergson's theory of perception 72–73; change, consciousness of 104–5; communication 16; as content 73–74; Descartes, René 154–55; emergence of the self 72, 73, 74, 76, 80, 94; experience 69, 72, 95, 135–36; imagery 74, 80; introspection 47, 48; of meaning 19, 50, 51; moral consciousness 214–15, 217, 218, 219; national consciousness 283, 284, 285, 287, 288; of the objective individual 108; philosophy of science 101–11, 135–36, 195; psychical consciousness 5, 6–8, 9, 10–14, 47–48; in psychology 47; public consciousness 90, 91, 232; rational consciousness 5, 319; religious consciousness 111; representational consciousness and mechanical world 154–55; the self 69, 80, 94; sensational consciousness 5; social nature 15, 16, 17, 57, 91, 188; social object 188–89; social organization 16, 57; social self 58, 59; subjective consciousness 108; symbol 69; *see also* mental process; mind; reflective consciousness; self-consciousness; social consciousness; thinking
- Cooley, Charles Horton 16, 89–98; communication 93, 97; consciousness, aspects 90–91; democracy 89, 97; emergence of the self 94; ethics 95; evolution theory 95, 96; *Human Nature and the Social Order* 16, 49, 95; introspection 89, 96, 97; mental process 91–92; mind 90, 91, 92–98; psychophysical parallelism 95; public consciousness 90, 91; the self 90–91, 93, 95, 96; self-consciousness 90–91, 94; social consciousness 90, 91, 93, 94, 96; *Social Organization* 16; *Social Process* 89; social psychology 93, 95; society, doctrine of 89–97
- Copernicus, Nicolaus 41, 43, 132, 150
- criminal justice xviii, 240–41, 267–80; citizenship 268, 270, 271, 306–8; crime 181, 222, 240–41, 267, 271, 272, 273, 275; the criminal 181, 190, 241, 267–68, 270–73; criminal law 121, 268, 270, 271, 273, 280n; hostility toward the criminal 269–70, 271, 272–75, 276, 277–78; institutions 268, 271, 272, 275, 276, 278; juvenile crime 181, 190, 249, 275, 276, 306–8; law 268–69, 272; law,

- respect for 269–70, 271, 272; lynch law 268, 293, 315; Middle Ages 267; property 271–72, 274; punishment 267–68, 269, 271, 275, 276; punitive justice xviii, 267–80; reconstruction of social conditions 276–77, 279–80; retributive suffering 267–68; rights 269, 272, 274; scientific technique 275; self-assertion 266–67, 274, 277–78, 280; social organization 271, 273, 274, 276, 279, 280; system of criminal justice 180, 181, 190; value 268, 269, 270–71, 273, 275, 278; *see also* ethics, philosophical basis; moral conduct; natural rights
- cult 139, 145, 156, 157, 199, 319, 321; cult value 241–42, 243; moral science 238, 240, 241–42, 243
- Darwin, Charles xv–xvi, 89, 112–21, 177; Darwin/Hegel comparison 120; evolution theory xv–xvi, 112–21, 186; *The Origin of Species* 112–13, 117; *see also* evolution theory
- democracy 84, 221–22, 250, 252, 253, 294, 295, 296, 299, 300; Cooley, Charles Horton 89, 97; democratic education 251, 260; empiricism 294; freedom 300; government 221; institution 238–39; as institutionalized revolution xviii, 221–22, 294, 295; moral science 238–39, 242; property 300; radical democratic politics xi, xvi–xx; social settlement 250, 252, 253; theory/practice chasm 238–39, 242; war 291; *see also* government; politics; state
- Democritus 32, 147–49, 154
- Descartes, René 71, 91, 154–55, 157, 158, 169, 177
- Dewey, John xiv, 51, 167, 168; the psychical 5–6; reflex arc concept 3–5, 101; stimulus 3–5, 7
- diplomacy 286–87, 317, 321
- Durkheim, Émile xii, xix
- economics 84, 85, 114–15, 231, 274, 298, 300–301, 312; the economic man 49, 239, 295–96, 301; privilege/right distinction 298; socialism 296
- education 68, 179, 190, 247, 251–52, 253, 295, 306; American public school system 251–52, 260–61; apprenticeship 255, 256, 257, 259, 260, 261, 296; child labor 254, 255, 258–59, 260; continuation school 257–58, 260; democratic education 251, 260; dropping out 254–55, 305; educational system 254, 256, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263; elementary school 254, 255, 256, 257; Germany 257, 258, 260; high school 255, 256, 262, 263; industrial education 256–63; Lewis Institute 257, 263; metaphysics 190; mind 180, 190; moral necessity 216; National Society for the Encouragement of Industrial Education 251, 259; popular education 226, 251–52, 260–61; as right 295, 298; scientific method 181; social settlement 247, 251–52, 253; solution of problems 126; vocational school 262; war as schooling 311–13
- ego 9, 10, 11, 16, 20, 60, 195; *see also* the self
- emotion 19, 240, 241, 288; citizenship 304–7, 308, 309; consciousness 16; devotion 86, 175, 182, 283, 293, 305, 318; emotional characters 27–28; emotional consciousness 241; emotional response 183, 269, 270; emotional value 22, 107, 276, 304–7, 309; expressions of the emotion 49, 186; gesture 19, 54; hatred 86, 269, 273, 283, 284, 285, 288; war 312, 317, 319, 321; *see also* hostility; solidarity
- empiricism 28, 121, 174, 294
- environment 21, 27; adaptation 37, 38; appearance of new objects 36–38, 40, 65; control of 32; evolution theory 27, 35, 213–14; individual/environment mutual determination 27, 33, 34, 35–37, 65, 215, 216, 217–18, 219; individual's influence on 27; social degeneration 94; *see also* teleological behavior
- epistemology *see* evolution theory; Greek philosophy; philosophy of science; scientific knowledge, nature of; truth
- ethics, philosophical basis xvi–xvii, 213–20; act 215, 218, 220; altruism xvii, 235; common good xvii, 223, 224–25, 228, 229, 230, 237; conduct 215–17, 219; control 214, 218–19; evolution theory 213–14; individual/environment mutual determination 215, 216, 217–18, 219; moral advance 217–18; moral consciousness 214–15, 217, 218, 219; moral necessity 215, 216, 217; moral order xvii, 218, 219, 233–36, 242–43, 244; morality as control by community habit 214; perception/response process 218–19; rational, internationalist

- approach xxi; righteousness 217, 219, 234–35; social order 233–34, 242–43; *see also* justice; moral conduct; moral science
- evolution theory 27, 35, 47, 76, 265; adaptation 37, 38, 47, 65, 120, 227; Cooley, Charles Horton 95, 96; environment 27, 35, 213–14; ethics 213–14; expressions of the emotion 49, 186; functional psychology 47; influence upon other sciences 112, 116, 121; moral science 235, 243; natural selection hypothesis 112, 118, 120; philosophy of science xv–xvi, 112–13, 117; social science 117, 121; of society 49, 227, 265–66; temporality 208; *see also* Darwin, Charles; environment
- experience 27, 34, 38, 127, 146, 163, 197; as conduct 75; consciousness 69, 72, 95, 135–36; contact experience 25–26, 53–54, 71, 76, 90, 184, 200; imagery 24–25; immediate experience 13, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28–29, 43, 65, 66, 129, 130, 215; inner experience 56, 57, 94, 145, 146; object 34–35; as past overflowing the present 206–7, 209; pragmatism 169; as process passing into the future 83, 201, 202, 204–5, 206–7; reflection 52; representational consciousness and mechanical world 145–46, 150–51, 153–54; scientific knowledge 123, 127, 131, 132; sensuous experience 28, 55, 145–46; social nature 167–68; subjective experience 56; teleological behavior 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28–29, 34–35, 38, 43; truth 160, 163, 167–69
- family xix, 120, 170, 237, 276, 300, 308, 312, 318; public consciousness 90; right 294, 295, 296; value 239, 272, 275
- Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 119
- freedom 108–9, 288, 294, 297; natural right xviii, 222, 223, 225–26, 227, 228, 297
- French Revolution 118, 120, 182, 222–23, 296; *see also* revolution
- Freud, Sigmund 233
- Galileo 41, 113, 151–54, 157, 177, 189, 234
- “the generalized other” xiii, xv, 80, 22, 199; emergence of the self 81; moral reconstruction xvii; nationalism xx; social control 81, 84–85; teleological behavior 22; thinking 68, 83; universal/multiple instances 84; *see also* taking the role of the other
- Germany 120, 250, 321–22; education 257, 258, 260; militarism 284, 290, 305
- gesture 19, 21, 66, 125–26, 265; child 55; communication 126, 198; consciousness of meaning/reflective consciousness 50, 51; emergence of the self 32, 80–81; image 50–51, 126; meaning 19, 50; response 50, 51, 54, 187, 198; social conduct 186–87; social consciousness 54, 55; social nature 19, 49–51, 189; social object 49–51, 55, 66–67; social self 60; stimulus 50, 67, 81–82, 187, 198; symbolic gesture 69, 126, 198; teleological behavior 21, 24, 26, 30, 31, 32; vocal gesture 19, 54–55, 56, 67, 81–82, 97, 198; Wundt, Wilhelm Maximilian 19, 49, 66, 186, 265; *see also* communication; language; meaning
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 89, 117
- government 221, 295, 300–301, 317; democracy 221; natural rights 224, 225; political institutions 227, 228, 229, 230–32; popular control over 296; reform 296; revolution 221, 294, 296; social control 297, 298, 299, 301; social organization 299; *see also* democracy; politics; state
- Greek philosophy 48, 137–43, 208; Anaxagoras 139; Anaximander 141; Anaximenes 141; circumstances shaping Greek thought 137–38; Democritus 32, 147–48, 154; Empedocles 139; the Epicureans 148, 150; Greek physical expansion 139, 140, 141; Heraclitus 143; Hesiodic cosmology and theology 138, 139; Homeric cosmology and theology 138–39; Ionian philosophy 139, 142; metaphysics 103, 105, 190; mythology 138–39, 140, 142; object 140–41; Orphic cosmogony and theology 138, 139; Parmenides 143; physical world 138; Pythagoras 139, 141, 143, 159; religion 138, 143; social nature 138, 139, 141, 142, 143; Socrates 147; Thales 140; Xenophanes 139, 142; *see also* Aristotle; Plato
- Habermas, Jürgen xii–xiii
- habit 156, 185, 218, 291; discipline 288; social habit 94, 131, 226, 230, 241, 252, 269, 289
- Hegel, G. W. F. 11, 58, 102, 117, 119, 136, 163, 165, 228; Darwin/Hegel comparison 120; *Logic* 117; *Phenomenology of the Spirit* 108

- history 164; ancient world 174, 175, 176–77; historical method 121, 136; modern historical school 118, 119; philosophy of history 144, 189; temporality 208–9
- history of philosophy 189; aesthetic view 136; Greek philosophy 137–43; method 136; *see also* history of science
- history of science xvi, 118–20, 235–36, 251; evolution theory, influence upon other sciences 112, 116, 121; representational consciousness and mechanical world 144–55; *see also* evolution theory; history of philosophy
- Hobbes, Thomas xviii, 224, 226, 299
- hostility 266, 273, 275, 277–79, 291; hostile instinct 185, 264, 265, 267, 278, 279; hostility toward the criminal 269–70, 271, 272–75, 276, 277–78; self-assertion 266–67, 274, 277–78, 280; social organization 273, 274; solidarity 266, 270, 272–73, 317, 322; war 274, 275, 279, 291, 315, 317, 320, 322–23; *see also* criminal justice; war
- Hume, David 107, 147, 158, 207, 295
- Huxley, Thomas Henry 234, 235
- hypothesis 13, 33, 35, 62, 122, 128, 129, 130, 153, 162, 166, 178, 238; construction of 12, 28, 42, 106, 162; natural selection hypothesis 112, 118, 120; perception/hypothesis/response process 218–19; psychical state 106; working hypotheses 110, 128–30, 162, 163, 201, 219; *see also* method
- the “I” xiii, xiv, 57, 58, 59; “I”/“Me” fusion xix; the “I” of introspection 59; Kant: transcendental self 57; psychical consciousness 9–14, 91; psychology 9, 57; self of unecessitated choice xiv, 13; social consciousness 57; social self 58, 59; *see also* the self; subject
- idealism 118, 155, 163, 167, 195, 294
- image, imagery 66, 74, 127, 165, 183, 185; consciousness 74, 80; experience 24–25; gesture 50–51, 126; hallucination 26, 27, 66; image content 25; meaning 50–51, 74; memory image 26, 59, 61, 66, 127, 204, 205–6; mind 24, 53, 74; mirror image 30, 31; physical object 24–26, 39, 53, 55, 56, 66, 74; response 21, 50, 56, 57, 74, 165; social consciousness 185; social object 55; social self 59, 61; stimulus 26, 27, 50–51, 74; subjectivity 39; teleological behavior 21, 24–27, 30, 31, 39; temporality 204, 205–6; *see also* teleological behavior
- imitation 93; child 18, 67, 80, 81; conduct 15, 18; emergence of the self 67, 81; meaning 19; social consciousness 18–19, 68, 180; theory of imitation 15, 16, 17–19
- industrial world 256–57, 263, 300–302; ethics 217, 219, 249; industrial education 256–63; industrial rights and social conflict 293–302; Industrial Workers of the World 308, 309n; socialism 296
- inhibition 7, 8, 37, 38, 50, 200, 201, 264, 270
- instinct 17, 264–65; hostile instinct 185, 264, 265, 267, 278, 279; social instincts 17–19; social organization of conduct 19, 264; social self 267, 316; stimulus 17
- institution 86–87, 118, 238–41, 308–9; the Church 239; criminal justice 268, 271, 272, 275, 276, 278; cult value 240, 241; democracy 238–39; international institution 188, 292; moral science 238–41; political institutions 227, 228, 229, 230–32; reform 240; social control 87, 118; social organization 86–87; social value 308, 309; state 86–87; theory of political institution 221–32; *see also* government; state
- intelligence 37, 38, 39, 184, 199–200, 320; evolution theory 186; imagery 39; intelligent act 102, 109, 216, 240; intelligent conduct 34, 237; moral science 235, 237, 241, 242, 243; social intelligence 55; war 311, 320, 321
- internationalism 283–92; bloodless war 292; diplomacy 286–87, 321; Hague tribunals 288, 290, 291; international institution 188, 292; international legislation 88, 287; international/national interests 290–91; international right 286–87; international society/national consciousness relation 287; national consciousness 283, 284, 285, 287, 288; national-mindedness and international-mindedness xx, 310–23; Peace Pact 313, 322; rational, internationalist approach xix, xx, xxi; war 88, 283–92, 310–23; World Court 85, 313; *see also* nationalism; state; war
- introspection xiv, 58, 59, 60, 185; consciousness 47, 48; Cooley, Charles Horton 89, 96, 97; objective introspection 89; the psychical 6; self-consciousness 48, 51; social self 58, 59, 60

- invention, discovery 89, 175, 177, 178, 183–84, 195; appearance of new objects 36–38, 40, 178, 183–84; invention/discovery distinction 43–44; new objects 35–38, 39, 40, 41–42, 44, 61, 62, 105, 106, 126, 177, 178, 229; scientific discovery 122, 123, 125; teleological behavior 36, 37, 40, 41–44; *see also* object
- James, William xiv, 91, 102, 195; “The Moral Equivalent of War” 310–12, 318; *Principles of Psychology* xiv; psychical consciousness 6, 7; sciousness 59; the self/soul 16, 57; social aspect of the self 94; social consciousness 16; Stream of Consciousness 6, 59, 108; war 310–12, 313, 314, 318, 319, 321
- Joas, Hans xii, xiii
- John of Salisbury 147
- judgment 111, 119; aesthetic judgment 174; Kant, Immanuel 118, 120; moral judgement 219, 249–50, 307; subject of the judgment 160, 161; truth 158, 160, 161, 162, 166; truth as judgment/reality relationship 166
- justice xviii, 118; scientific method 181, 240–41; social control 180, 181; social justice 179, 180, 315; *see also* criminal justice; law
- Kant, Immanuel xvi–xvii, 119, 120, 207, 228, 233; judgment 118, 120; the self 57, 108, 136; transcendental idealism 57, 118; *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* 113–14, 118
- Kepler, Johannes 113, 150
- language 188, 265, 266; action, socialization and coordination of xiii, 265; child 18, 55, 199; emergence of the self 316; as product of social experience x, 19, 199; psychological theory of the origin of 49–51; social conduct 187, 188, 189; social consciousness 265; speech 54–55, 61, 82, 165, 186–87, 188, 199, 265, 309, 316; vocal gesture 19, 54–55, 56, 67, 81–82, 97, 198; *see also* communication; gesture; meaning
- Laplace, Pierre-Simon 113, 114
- law, legislation 221, 224, 268–69, 272, 308; civil law 280n; common law as affirmation of citizenship 268; criminal law 121, 268, 270, 271, 273, 280n; international legislation 88, 287; lynch law 268, 293, 315; natural law 227; respect for law as law 269–70, 271, 272; *see also* criminal justice; natural rights
- League of Nations 85, 238, 312
- learning 125, 126, 127; *see also* child; education
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 71, 157, 169, 177, 196–97
- liberalism 263, 279, 295, 306
- Locke, John xviii, 224–25, 226
- logic 80; communication 127; deductive logic 102, 103–4, 109, 111; inductive logic 102, 111; militarism 88; the psychical 12–13
- Lyell, Sir Charles 112, 114
- magic 32, 199
- McDougall, William 15, 16, 49, 252; human instincts 17
- Marx, Karl 84, 293
- the “Me” xiii, 23, 57, 58, 59; empirical self xiv, 9, 10, 13, 57; “I”/“Me” fusion xix; the “me” of introspection 59; psychology 9; social consciousness 56, 57; social object 56, 57; social self 58, 59; *see also* object; the self
- Mead, G. H.: classical status in sociological circles xii–xiii; dialogical social theory x; why read Mead today xiii–xx
- Mead, G. H., writings ix–xi; *Mind, Self, and Society* ix, x, xii, xviii; *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* ix, xv, xix, xxiv; *The Philosophy of the Act* ix, xv, 132; *Philosophy of the Present* ix, xv, 203
- meaning xv, 49, 111, 166; communication 16; consciousness of meaning 19, 50, 51; gesture 19, 50; image 50–51, 74; imitation 19; response 51, 69, 74; social aspect 16, 19, 50–51; social object 49, 50–51; symbol 67–68, 69, 165; teleological behavior 22, 38–39; universal meaning 68, 69; *see also* communication; gesture; language
- mechanical system theory 157, 158; mechanical world 154–55; representational consciousness and mechanical world 144–55; teleological behavior 22, 33–35, 36, 37, 39–42, 103
- memory 24, 58, 73, 204–7, 209; memory image 26, 59, 61, 66, 127, 204, 205–6; the self 23, 58, 59, 60; temporality 204, 205, 206, 207, 209

- mental process 32–33, 66, 80, 123, 157;
 Cooley, Charles Horton 91–92; emergence of the self 80; imagery 205; as inner process of the self 37; temporality 205–6; *see also* mind; thinking
- metaphysics 49, 72, 92, 95; education 190; ethics 215; Greek philosophy 103, 105, 190; philosophy of science 102, 103, 104, 105, 111, 132, 149, 155, 166, 167; political theory 190–91; psychology 71, 179–80; social science 179–80, 190–91; temporality 208
- method xv, 12, 38, 40, 95, 122–32, 136; Bacon, Francis 151; data 11, 12, 13, 92, 123, 125, 129–30, 131–32, 159, 168, 197–98, 208, 238; dogmatism 238; education 181; experiment 33, 35, 107, 122, 123–24, 128, 129, 153, 159–60, 178; Galileo 151–54, 177; historical method 121, 136; history of philosophy 136; hypotheses 13, 33, 35, 62, 122, 128, 129, 130, 153, 162, 166, 178, 238; idealism 195; moral science 235, 236–44, 250; observation 13, 30, 41, 43, 110, 122, 123–24, 128, 129, 132, 150–51, 154; philosophy of science xv, 102–5, 111, 113, 121, 135–36; politics 181; pragmatism 170; the problem 12, 28, 35, 62, 71, 92, 103–5, 111–12, 122, 124, 126, 130–32, 158, 161, 163, 182, 219, 238, 240, 241, 251; representational consciousness and mechanical world 144–55; science as problem-solving activity xv, xvi, xvii, 35, 101, 122, 130–31, 161, 176; scientific method 23, 49, 71, 96, 105, 122–32, 151–54, 163, 164, 177, 178, 181, 238, 252–53; scientific theory 13, 129, 130; social science 49, 96, 179, 180–82, 189–90, 191, 197–98, 238, 240, 242–43, 250–51, 252–53, 309; *see also* hypothesis
- Middle Ages 119, 157, 175, 177, 236, 267, 289; philosophy 145–46, 147, 150, 152, 208; Scholasticism 145, 149–50, 151, 154; *see also* Christianity
- the military 231, 284, 304, 305, 312; militarism 88, 289, 290, 291, 305, 312, 319; military readiness 285, 286; state 88, 319; *see also* war
- Mill, John Stuart 120–21, 228
- Milton, John 144, 225, 234
- mind xvi, 22, 69, 72, 80, 126–28, 233; communication 93; Cooley, Charles Horton 90, 91, 92–98; education 180, 190; emergence of 76, 83, 243; emergence of the self 80; hardihood of body and mind 311–13; imagery 24, 53, 74; as *locus* of the selves 80, 90, 95, 96, 97; national-mindedness and international-mindedness xx, 310–23; nature/mind dualism xiv, 9–10, 13, 23–24, 29, 32, 41, 47, 48, 95, 108, 135, 144, 154–55, 191, 195, 200, 235; objectivity of perspectives xvi, 195, 197, 201; public mind, 267, 268, 306; representational consciousness and mechanical world 144–55; social mind 35, 90, 91, 93, 127, 201; social nature xvi, 127; social order 95; subjectivity 123; symbol 69; taking the role of the other 127, 201; talking to himself 26, 30, 67; teleological behavior 24, 30, 37; thinking 30, 37; truth 157–69; *see also* consciousness; mental process; thinking
- moral conduct 34, 102, 103, 109–10, 191, 234, 240, 249; Cooley, Charles Horton 95; free will 44; impulses 109–10; industrial world 217, 219, 249; militarism 88; moral consciousness 214–15, 217, 218, 219; moral reflection 61; moral responsibility 34; moral self-consciousness 49, 244; moral struggle 110; prostitution 190, 219, 249; reconstruction of the self 61–62; righteousness 217, 219, 234–35; self-interest xvii; selfishness 61, 240, 269; social character of the ethical end 61; social conduct 234, 235, 238, 242; social settlement 249–50; value 109–10; war as ethical problem 288–89, 312–14; *see also* ethics, philosophical basis; justice; moral science
- moral science 233–44; Christian theology 234, 242, 243; criminal justice 240–41; cult 238, 240, 241–42, 243; democracy 238–39, 242; evolution theory 235, 243; institutions 227, 228, 229, 230–32, 238–41; intelligence 235, 237, 241, 242, 243; moral order xvii, 218, 219, 233–36, 242–43, 244; moral/social problem 62, 182, 240, 241, 251; scientific method 235, 236–44, 250; value 239–42; *see also* ethics, philosophical basis; moral conduct
- motion 8, 36, 41, 75, 113–15, 149, 152, 153; laws of 34, 37, 113, 179; as response 4–5; temporality 196, 200, 204; thought 148

- nationalism xviii, xix, 85, 241, 293–302, 320; “the generalized other” xx; international/national interests 290–91; international society/national consciousness relation 287; militarism 291; mob consciousness 278, 288, 293, 315; “nation in arms” 286; national consciousness 283, 284, 285, 287, 288; national-mindedness and international-mindedness xx, 310–23; national selfhood 322; patriotism xviii, xx, xxi, 241, 275, 278, 288, 289, 293, 315, 318; self-conscious nations xix; social object 85; war 293, 310–23; *see also* government; state; war
- natural rights xviii, 221–32, 269, 294–95, 297–98, 315; common good xvii, 223, 224–25, 228, 229, 230, 297; definition 222–24, 294, 297, 298; education 295, 298; equality 222, 223, 227, 228; family 294, 295, 296; government 224, 225; Hobbes, Thomas 224, 226; liberty xviii, 222, 223, 225–26, 227, 228; Locke, John 224–25, 226; natural law 227; negative formulation of 223, 224, 225, 226; political guarantees 229, 230; political institutions 227, 228, 229, 230–32; privilege/right distinction 298; property 222, 223, 224, 228, 229–30, 294, 295, 297–98, 299–300, 301; revolution 221, 222–23, 224–25; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 225, 226–27; security 222, 223, 228; social control 227; social organization 226–27; society 226–28, 230–31; Spinoza, Benedict 223–24, 226; state 299; theory of political institution 221–32; *see also* rights
- natural sciences 71, 155, 218, 240; *see also* method; philosophy of science; physical sciences
- neighborliness 248, 250, 252, 318
- nervous system 23–24, 42, 66, 70, 72, 79, 80, 92, 180; brain 20, 48, 69, 82, 180
- Newton, Isaac 112, 113, 154, 155, 158, 159, 177
- nominalism 146–47
- object: aesthetic/religious object 111; appearance of new objects 36–38, 40, 178, 183–84; disintegration/reconstitution process 6–7, 8, 10–14; Greek philosophy 140–41; meaning and value 111; new objects 35–38, 39, 40, 41–42, 44, 61, 62, 105, 106, 126, 177, 178, 229; object of knowledge 124, 128–29; philosophy of science 102, 111; scientific object 178, 183, 189–90; social self 58–59, 61; *see also* invention, discovery; the “Me”; physical object; social object
- objectivity xi, 10, 74, 83, 183, 200, 202; objective introspection 89; objectivity of perspectives xvi, 195–203; philosophy of science 102, 105, 107, 108; the psychical 6; psychology 76
- patriotism xviii, xx, xxi, 241, 275, 278, 288, 289, 293, 315, 318; *see also* nationalism
- perception 43, 53, 72, 74, 95, 97, 107, 128, 146, 147, 164, 185, 187–88; child 56; ethics 218; percept 21, 25–26, 43, 53, 72, 73; perception/hypothesis/response process 218–19; perception/response process 25, 56, 218–19; terminal attitudes of the perceptual act 200; *see also* attention; response; stimulus; stimulus-response model
- philosophy of science xv–xvi, 101–11, 196; aesthetics 102, 110; attention 105–6, 109, 135; change, consciousness of 104–5; consciousness 101–11, 135–36, 195; deductive logic 102, 103–4, 111; ethics 102, 103, 109–10; evolutionary theory xv–xvi, 112–13, 117; freedom 108–9; hypothesis 106, 110, 111; inductive logic 102, 111; invalidating one’s known world 62, 105, 106; judgment 111; metaphysics 102, 103, 104, 105, 111, 132, 149, 155, 166, 167; method xv, 102–5, 111, 113, 121, 135–36; object 102, 111; objectivity 102, 105, 107, 108; old/new universals 102, 104, 105, 109, 110; psychical state 105, 106–8, 110; psychology 102, 104, 105; reflective consciousness 101–2, 104; religion 111; science as problem-solving activity xv, xvi, xvii, 35, 101, 122, 130–31, 161, 176; self-consciousness 174; subjectivity 102, 106, 108, 109, 123; teleological psychology 103; theory of knowledge 126, 145, 146; truth 156–59, 163, 169; *see also* history of science; method; scientific knowledge, nature of; truth
- physical object 21, 48, 53, 55–56, 65–66, 188–89, 199–200; conduct 53; content 39; disintegration/reconstitution process 4, 6–7, 8, 10–14; imagery 24–26, 39, 53,

- 55, 56, 66, 74; inanimate object 21, 201; object teleological 21; social consciousness 53, 55–56; teleological behavior 21, 24–26, 33–38, 39; *see also* experience; object
- physical sciences 4, 37, 49, 65, 113–17, 174, 189; physical practice 176, 178, 182; physical theory 6, 108, 114, 174, 196; scientific object 178, 183, 189–90; shift in values due to modern physical science 191, 236; social object 189; spatio-temporal structure 200, 205, 207; theory of energy 114–17; war 174; *see also* mechanical system theory; method; natural sciences
- physiological psychology 29; 71, 195; psychophysical parallelism 9–10, 13, 23–24, 29, 47, 48, 95, 108, 135; social psychology as counterpart to 15–20; *see also* psychology
- Plato 103, 122, 145, 148, 174, 196, 294, 319
- politics 252; metaphysics 190–91; moral necessity 216; political guaranties 229, 230; political individual 143, 180, 223, 295, 297, 298; political institutions 227, 228, 229, 230–32; political self 180; political theory xviii, 120, 180–81; radical democratic politics xi, xvi–xx; rational, internationalist approach xix, xx, xxi; scientific method 181; social control 180, 181, 297; *see also* democracy; government; reform; revolution; state pragmatism xv, 70, 72, 195, 215; experience 169; method 170; pragmatic theory of truth 156–70; value 170
- prehension 197, 201–2
- progressivism xix–xx, 105, 190, 226, 237
- property xviii, xix, 190–91, 295; child 68; citizenship 308, 309; criminal justice 271–72, 274; empiricism 294; natural right 222, 223, 224, 228, 229–30, 294, 295, 297–98, 299–300, 301; as object 79, 80
- the psychical xiv, 3–14; disintegration/reconstitution process 4, 6–7, 8, 10–14; as experience of the “I” 9–14, 91; immediacy 6–8, 13; objectivity 6; philosophy of science 105, 106–8, 110; psychical consciousness 5, 6–8, 9, 10–14, 47–48; public consciousness 91; reflection 9, 13; scientific treatment/science of the psychical 12–13; society 91, 96–98; subjectivity 6, 8, 12–14
- psychology 12, 47–52, 70, 71–72, 164; consciousness 47, 48; empirical science 70, 71; epistemological problem 71–72, 94; functional psychology 13, 47, 71; the “I” 9, 57; introspection 47, 48; the “Me” 9; metaphysics 71, 179–80; philosophy of science 102, 104, 105; reflex arc concept 3–5; a science of the objective world 76; teleological psychology 103; theory of the origin of language 49–51; *see also* physiological psychology; social psychology
- psychophysical parallelism 9–10, 13, 23–24, 29, 47, 48, 95, 108, 135; *see also* body; mind; physiological psychology
- Ptolemy 41, 43, 174, 200
- rationality x; action x; human rational nature 32, 97, 119, 166, 168, 223, 315; rational choice model x; rational consciousness 5, 319; rational, internationalist approach xix, xx, xxi; rational self xvi; social theoretical foundation x; truth 157, 158, 169
- realism 70, 146, 164, 167; critical realism 72; neo-realism 72, 195; scholastic realism 150
- reflective consciousness 10–11, 189; consciousness of change 104–5; gesture 50, 51; scientific knowledge 122, 130; social nature 19; social instincts 19; philosophy of science 101–2, 104
- reflex arc concept 3–4, 101; “child with the candle” illustration 5, 38, 101, 105, 106; *see also* stimulus-response model
- reform 120–21, 180, 190, 216; government 296; institution 240; reformation of the individual 249; the reformer 290–91, 306; social reform 250, 271–72, 289–90; state 289–90; war 289–90
- relativism 73–76, 202; Whitehead, Alfred North 74–75, 195–96, 200; *see also* temporality
- religion 191, 208, 231, 294, 300, 318; Greece 138, 143; religious consciousness 111; religious object 111; social practice 182; social religious consciousness 189; *see also* Christianity
- Renaissance 41, 169; rationalization 157; representational consciousness and mechanical world 147, 149–54
- representational consciousness and mechanical world 144–55; Aristotle 145, 150, 152; atomistic conception of the

- world 148–49; Bacon, Francis 151, 153, 154; body-soul dualism 144, 154–55; consciousness 154–55; Descartes, René 154–55; experience 145–46, 150–51, 153–54; Galileo 151–54; mechanical world 154–55; Renaissance 147, 149–54; representationalism 147; Scholasticism 145, 149–50, 151, 154; scientific method 151–52, 153, 155; self-consciousness 144, 145–46, 149, 150; *see also* method; history of science
- response 21; emotional response 170, 183, 269, 306; gesture 50, 51, 54, 187, 198; imagery 21, 50, 56, 57, 74, 165; meaning 51, 69, 74; perception/hypothesis/response process 218–19; perception/response process 25, 56, 218–19; self-consciousness 60; simultaneity 201; social response 54, 84, 187, 266; *see also* act/action; attention; perception; stimulus; stimulus-response model
- revolution 121, 221–22, 224–25, 289, 292; democracy as institutionalized revolution xviii, 221–22; French Revolution 118, 120, 182, 222–23, 296; Glorious Revolution 224; government 221, 294, 296; natural rights 221, 222–23, 224–25
- rights 118, 315; criminal justice 269, 272, 274; human rights 224, 229, 231, 232, 287; industrial rights and social conflict 293–302; international right 286–87; right to fight 289; social control 227; state 299; taking the role of the other 32, 67, 80; *see also* natural rights
- romanticism 118–20, 121, 138
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques xviii 119, 225, 226–27
- Royce, Josiah, 51, 59; social consciousness 15–16, 18–19
- Russell, Bertrand 162, 164, 169
- Santayana, George 164, 169
- Schelling, Friedrich 117, 119, 163
- scholasticism 145, 149–50, 151, 154
- science *see* history of science; philosophy of science; science applied; scientific knowledge, nature of; temporality; truth
- science applied 173–82; ancient world 174, 175, 176–77; modern scientific object 178; modern world 174–75, 176, 182; philosophy 196; physical practice 176, 178, 182; science as social reconstructive activity xvi; scientific method 177, 178; social consciousness
- 189–91; social control 180, 181, 182; social object 179–80, 182; social practice 179–82; war 174–75, 176, 177
- scientific knowledge, nature of 122–32; communication 126, 127; copy theory 125, 128; exact sciences 124, 127; experience 123, 127, 131, 132; information/knowledge distinction 128; method 122–32; object of knowledge 124, 128–29; the problem 122, 126, 130–32; reflective thinking 122, 130; scientific discovery 122, 123, 125; social nature 127; symbol 126, 127; thinking 126, 127, 163; truth 156–58, 163–64, 168, 169; world as known 119, 125, 128, 130, 158; world as is there 122, 125, 128, 132, 158; *see also* method
- the self xi, 23–24, 29, 32, 40, 315–16; consciousness 69, 80, 94; contents 32; Cooley, Charles Horton 90–91, 93, 95, 96; the individual as object to himself 24, 30–31; James, William 16, 57; memory 23, 58, 59, 60; physical organism/body 16, 21, 22–23; political self 180; rational self xvi; reconstruction of the self 61–62; reflective self 60; social consciousness xvii, xviii, 9, 16, 20; social nature 20, 94, 127, 189, 315–16, 323; *see also* consciousness; the “I”; self-consciousness; social self
- the self, emergence of 56, 62, 67, 70–85, 94; behavioristic psychology 70; child 67, 80–81, 214; communication 199, 316; conditions 32, 78–79; consciousness 72, 73, 74, 76, 80, 94; Cooley, Charles Horton 94; “the generalized other” 81; gesture 32, 80–81; imitation 67, 81; language 316; mental process 80; mind 80; self-consciousness 80, 85; social act 77–79, 81, 82, 199; social conduct 32, 76–77, 80–82, 85; social control 81, 83–85; social object 77, 79, 80; taking the role of the other 32, 67, 80–81, 82–83, 84–85, 199, 316; talking to himself 82, 316; thinking 82, 83; *see also* the self
- self-consciousness 48, 57, 80, 174, 265, 316; attaining 80; child 32, 80–81; Cooley, Charles Horton 90–91, 94; curiosity 85; emergence of the self 80, 85; hostility 266; introspection 48, 51; moral self-consciousness 49, 244; representational consciousness and mechanical world 144, 145–46, 149,

- 150; response 60; self-conscious conduct 32; social conduct 266; social consciousness 57; social nature xiv, 51, 304, 315; social self 59–60, 61, 315, 316; subjectivity 51; teleological behavior 23–24, 29, 32, 40; *see also* consciousness; the self, emergence of; teleological behavior
- sensation 8, 28, 53, 123–24, 147, 185; color 6, 25, 29, 33, 72, 74, 149; odor 3, 22, 43, 53, 148; reflex arc concept 3–5, 101; sound 3, 18, 28, 29, 43, 149; as stimulus 4–5; taste 3, 22, 23, 148, 149; *see also* stimulus
- social act 31, 54, 55, 199, 265, 266, 278; emergence of the self 77–79, 81, 82, 199; physiological adjustment 77–78; social control 83, 84; stimulus-response model 17–19, 38, 55–57, 77–84, 90, 187, 188, 198–202; *see also* act/action
- social conduct x, 49, 54, 185, 265–66; emergence of the self 32, 76–77, 80–82, 85; gesture 186–87; hostility 266; language 187, 188, 189; moral conduct 234, 235, 238, 242; scientific method 238, 240, 242–43; self-consciousness 266; social consciousness 53, 54, 185–86, 188, 189; social control 85; social self 59, 60, 316; social values 219, 237, 271, 280n, 306, 308, 309; teleological behavior 21, 24, 31–32, 39; types 185, 198; *see also* conduct; moral conduct
- social consciousness 11, 15–16, 20, 52, 188–89, 265; conduct 53–54, 184–85, 189, 191; Cooley, Charles Horton 90, 91, 93, 94, 96; gesture 54, 55; the “I” 57; imagery 185; imitation 18–19, 68, 180; language 265; the “Me” 56, 57; mechanism 53–57, 60; physical object 53, 55–56; public consciousness 90, 91, 232; science applied to 189–91; scientific method 189–90, 191; the self xvii, xviii, 9, 16, 20; self-consciousness 57; social conduct 53, 54, 185–86, 188, 189; social mind 35, 90, 91, 93, 127, 201; social object 53, 55, 56, 57, 189–90, 191; social religious consciousness 189; social science 183–91; talking to himself 55, 57; *see also* social object
- social control xv, 49, 70–85, 180, 214, 227, 309; emergence of the self 81, 83–85; “the generalized other” 81, 84–85; government 297, 298, 299, 301; institution 87, 118; justice 180, 181; physiological adjustment 83–84; political self 180; politics 180, 181, 297; public opinion 297; rights 227; science applied 180, 181, 182; social act 83, 84; social conduct 85; social object 83, 84, 85; state 86–88; taking the role of the other 84–85; *see also* the self, emergence of; social order; state
- social nature: citizenship 303, 304, 305; of conduct 17, 18; of consciousness 15, 16, 17, 57, 91, 188; of experience 167–68; gesture 19, 49–51, 189; of mind xvi, 127; reflective consciousness 19; scientific knowledge 127; of the self 20, 94, 127, 189, 315–16, 323; self-consciousness xiv, 51, 304, 315
- social object 47–52, 66, 77–78, 179–80, 182, 188–89; child 55, 189; consciousness 188–89; emergence of the self 77, 79, 80; gesture 49–51, 55, 66–67; imagery 55; the “Me” 56, 57; meaning 49, 50–51; nationalism 85; psychological theory of the origin of language 49–51; science applied 179–80, 182; social consciousness 53, 55, 56, 57, 189–90, 191; social control 83, 84, 85; social science 189–90, 191; *see also* gesture; meaning
- social order xv, 182, 294, 299, 301; ethics 233–34, 242–43; mind 95; moral order xvii, 218, 219, 233–36, 242–43, 244; significant symbol 65–69; *see also* Cooley, Charles Horton; social control; state
- social organization 78, 82, 143, 176, 285, 301; civilization 320, 322; of conduct 19, 264; consciousness 16, 57; criminal justice 271, 273, 274, 276, 279, 280; government 299; Greece 143; hostility 273, 274; instinct 19, 264; institution 86–87; natural rights 226–27; organization of perspectives 197, 199; war 289, 291
- social psychology xiv; Cooley, Charles Horton 93, 95; as counterpart to physiological psychology 15–20; psychophysical parallelism 95; science xvi; scientific social psychology xv; social character of the self xvii, xviii, 9, 16; war as psychological problem 288, 289, 291, 314–15; *see also* Cooley, Charles Horton; imitation; social control; state; symbol
- social reconstruction 170, 280, 294, 309; criminal justice 276–77, 279–80
- social science 75, 190; evolution theory 117, 121; function of 190; metaphysics

- 179–80, 190–91; moral/social problem 62, 182, 240, 241, 251; organization of perspectives 197–203; science applied 179–82; scientific method 49, 96, 179, 180–82, 189–90, 191, 197–98, 238, 240, 242–43, 250–51, 252–53, 309; social consciousness 183–91; social object 189–90, 191; social settlement 250–51, 252–53; sociology 120
- social self xiii, xiv, 58–62, 85, 95, 267, 315, 316; child 59, 61, 189; consciousness 58, 59; gesture 60; the “I” 58, 59; image 59, 61; instinct 267, 316; introspection 58, 59, 60; the “Me” 58, 59; object 58–59, 61; reconstruction of the self 61–62; reflective self 60; self-consciousness 59–60, 61, 315, 316; social conduct 59, 60, 316; subject 58, 59; symbol 60; taking the role of the other 60–61, 62, 85; talking to himself 58–59, 60, 61; thinking 61; *see also* social consciousness
- social settlement 247–53, 255, 274; church 247, 249–50; democracy 250, 252, 253; education 247, 251–52, 253; home nature 247; institutionalization 248; moral conduct 249; moral judgement 249–50; neighborliness 248, 250, 252; organized charity 247, 248; social science 250–51, 252–53
- socialism 120, 182, 217, 296, 298–99
- society 89–96, 168, 265, 316–17; communication 168; Cooley, Charles Horton 89–98; emergence of 300; evolution theory 49, 227, 265–66; mind as *locus* of the selves 80, 90, 95, 96, 97; natural rights 226–28, 230–31; a psychical whole 91, 96–98; social conduct 265; social consciousness 265; social organism 167–68; war and social cohesion 316–20, 321; Whitehead, Alfred North 167–68
- solidarity 68, 198, 274, 275, 276, 285, 288; hostility 266, 270, 272–73, 322; war and social cohesion 316–20, 321
- Spencer, Herbert 186, 227
- Spinoza, Benedict 71, 169, 196, 223–24, 226
- state xix, 252, 291; institutional organization 86–87; international legislation 88; Manchester School 299; militarism 88, 319; rights 299; social control 86–88; social reform 289–90; socialization 87; sovereignty 319; war 86, 88, 291–92, 304, 320; *see also* government; politics
- stimulus 5, 14, 54, 66, 109; disintegration/reconstitution process 6–7, 8, 10–14; gesture 50, 67, 81–82, 187, 198; image 26, 27, 50–51, 74; instinct 17; sensation 4–5; simultaneity 201; *see also* act/action; attention; object; perception; response; sensation; stimulus-response model
- stimulus-response model xiv, 3–5, 53–57, 109, 165, 184–85, 198; act/action xiv, 3–5, 17, 18, 21, 50, 53, 54, 77–80, 185; reflex arc concept 3–4, 101; social act 17–19, 38, 55–57, 77–84, 90, 187, 188, 198–202; *see also* act/action; attention; perception; response; stimulus
- subject 9–10, 58–60; the psychical 12; subject of the judgment 160, 161; social self 58, 59; *see also* the “I”; the self
- subjectivity xiv, 9, 10; freedom 108–9; image 39; mind 123; philosophy of science 102, 106, 108, 109, 123; the psychical 6, 8, 9, 12, 14; self-consciousness 51; *see also* objectivity
- symbol 39, 60, 82, 165–66, 266; behavioristic psychology 65–69; communication 93, 126, 165–66, 198; consciousness 69; knowledge 126, 127; meaning 67–68, 69, 165; meaning, universal 68, 69; mind 69; origin 19; significant symbol xv, 67–69, 82, 201; social order 65–69; social self 60; symbolic gesture 69, 126, 198; taking the role of the other 68, 69; talking to himself 69; thinking 69, 126
- symbolic interactionism xii, xiii, xiv–xv; *see also* taking the role of the other
- taking the role of the other xiv–xv, 68, 69, 127; child 32, 68, 80–81, 199; communication 126; emergence of the self 32, 67, 80–81, 82–83, 84–85, 199, 316; mind 127, 201; rights 32, 67, 80; social control 84–85; social self 60–61, 62, 85; symbol 68, 69; thinking 83, 199; *see also* “the generalized other”
- talking to himself 24, 30, 31, 69; child 67; emergence of the self 82, 316; mind 26, 30, 67; social consciousness 55, 57; social self 58–59, 60, 61; symbol 69; teleological behavior 24, 30, 31; thinking 68, 69, 82, 83, 189, 199; *see also* thinking/thought
- Tarde, Gabriel 93, 94
- teleological behavior 21–44, 103, 234–35; change 35–37, 39–3; environment 21, 27, 32, 33, 34, 35–38, 40; experience

- 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28–29, 34–35, 38, 43; “the generalized other” 22; gesture 21, 24, 26, 30, 31, 32; imagery 21, 24–27, 30, 31, 39; intelligence 37, 38, 39; invention, discovery 36, 37, 40, 41–44; meaning 22, 38–39; mechanical system theory 22, 33–35, 36, 37, 39–42, 103; mental process 32–33, 37; mind 24, 30, 37; new objects 35–38, 39, 40, 44; object/active individual 31–32; physical object 21, 24–26, 33–38, 39; physical organism/body 21, 22–24, 28–31, 32; the self and teleological behavior 21–44, 235; the self-consciousness 23–24, 29, 32, 40; social conduct 21, 24, 31–32, 39; talking to himself 24, 30, 31; thinking 32, 37, 39; *verae causae* 33, 34, 36
- temporality xvi, 76, 195–203, 204–9, 213; continuity 205, 206, 207–9; evolution theory 208; experience/present as process passing into the future 83, 201, 202, 204–5, 206–7; the future 164, 165, 169, 202, 204, 207–8, 209; imagery 204, 205–6; the inevitable 207, 208; memory 204, 205, 206, 207, 209; memory image 26, 59, 61, 66, 127, 204, 205–6; mental process 205–6; metaphysics 208; motion 196, 200, 204; objective reality of perspectives 195–203; the past 165, 204–9; the past as overflow of the present 206–7, 209; the present 165, 201, 202, 204, 205–9; present/past distinction 204; relativism 74–76, 195–96, 200, 202; spatio-temporal structure 75–76, 200, 201–2, 205, 207, 213; *see also* Whitehead, Alfred North
- thinking/thought 32, 37, 39, 162–63, 166; consciousness 69; Descartes, René 154–55; emergence of 32; emergence of the self 82, 83; “the generalized other” 68, 83; as inner process of the self 37, 68; mind 30, 37; reflective thinking xvi, 35, 122, 130; scientific knowledge 126, 127, 163; social aspect 32; social self 61; symbol 69, 126; taking the role of the other 83, 199; talking to himself 68, 69, 82, 83, 189, 199; teleological behavior 32, 37, 39; thought 148, 162, 163–64, 166–67; *see also* mental process; mind; talking to himself
- Thomas Aquinas, St 145, 234
- trade 231, 296; education 255–59, 262, 263; Greece 137–38, 140, 143
- truth 158, 161, 166; behaviorism 167; experience 160, 163, 167–69; idealism 163, 167; judgment 158, 160, 161, 162, 166; philosophy 156–59, 163, 169; pragmatic theory 156–70; rationalization 157, 158, 169; realism 164, 167; knowledge/action interconnectedness xvi; science 156–58, 163–64, 168, 169; thought 162, 163–64, 166–67; value 157, 160, 169; *see also* method; philosophy of science; scientific knowledge, nature of
- United States: Civil War 310, 315, 317; Declaration of Independence 295; industrial education 256–63; industry 301; Ku Klux Klan 315; Monroe Doctrine 317–18; post-war injury 305; public school system 251–52, 260–61
- universals 102, 104, 105, 109, 110, 146, 162, 295
- utilitarianism 233, 313
- value 26, 53, 61, 84, 92, 111, 198, 239; citizenship 304, 308, 309; criminal justice 268, 269, 270–71, 273, 275, 278; cult value 241–42, 243; family 239, 272, 275; functional value 4, 8, 54; philosophy 169; pragmatism 170; moral science 109–10, 239–42; science 169; shift in values due to modern physical science 191, 236; social values 219, 237, 271, 280n, 306, 308, 309; state 86; truth 157, 160, 169; war 289, 313–14; war as problem of relative values 288; *see also* moral conduct
- war xviii–xx, 85, 173, 241, 278, 279, 2 83–92, 310–23; anomaly of 310; bloodless war 292; causes 284, 285, 288–89; citizenship 303–5; Civil War 310, 315, 317; common good 314, 320, 321, 322–23; democracy 291; diplomacy 286–87, 317, 321; as ethical problem 288–89, 312–14; hostility 274, 275, 279, 291, 315, 317, 320, 322–23; international legislation 88; James, William 310–12, 313, 314, 318, 319, 321; moral equivalent of war 314, 321; pacifism 312–13, 314; Peace Pact 313, 322; physical sciences 174; post-war injury 305; as psychological problem 288, 289, 291, 314–15; remedy for 280, 323; right to fight 289; as schooling 311–13; science applied 174–75, 176,

- 177; self-assertion 267, 315, 322;
 self-defense 284, 285, 286, 297, 310,
 311, 322; social cohesion 316–20, 321;
 social object 85; social organization 289,
 291; social reform 289–90; state 86, 88,
 291–92, 304, 320; value 288, 289,
 313–14; weapon 173, 175, 177, 288,
 291; *see also* the military; nationalism;
 World War I
- Weber, Max xii, xix, 114
- Whitehead, Alfred North xvi, 204, 205,
 209; Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm
- 196–97; objectivity of perspectives xvi,
 195, 197, 201; organization of perspectives
 196, 197, 200, 201; relativism 74–75,
 195–96, 200; *Science and the Modern
 World* 157; social organism 167–68, 203;
see also temporality
- World Court 85, 313
- World War I/Great War xviii–xx, xxi,
 236, 239, 310–11, 312, 319, 320, 321;
see also war
- Wundt, Wilhelm Maximilian 5, 10; gesture
 19, 49, 66, 186, 265; *see also* gesture