

SOCIOLOGY

INQUIRIES INTO THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL FORMS

Volume 1

Translated and Edited by

Anthony J. Blasi, Anton K. Jacobs & Mathew Kanjirathinkal

Introduction by **Horst J. Helle**

BRILL

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Dedicated to
Fabio Barbosa Dasilva
Mentor and inspiration for many

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[1] Each of these chapters contains various discussions that in greater or small intervals encircle the title problem and, apart from that relevance, comprises a relatively *independent* contribution to the whole argument. The purpose and methodical structure of this undertaking also advances its arrangement under a modest central idea, as it affords the question under discussion great latitude. Therefore the chapter titles given below only very incompletely cover the contents, for which the Index at the end of the volume gives a much more adequate accounting.

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FOREWORD BY GEORG SIMMEL

When an inquiry proceeds in accordance with the legitimate cognitive purposes and methods of an existing discipline, it is then defined by its relation to this context; the introduction to the new inquiry does not have to start by justifying the right to such a study, but merely take advantage of what has already been justified. If an inquiry for the time being goes without the kind of preliminaries that make the justification for its problematic at least beyond question, if the outline that delimits the field in terms of phenomena finds its formula mapped out in no area of known investigation—then its obvious position in the system of sciences and the discussion of its methods and their potential fruitfulness is a new and independent endeavor. It demands its solution, in lieu of a foreword, as the first part of the inquiry itself.

The endeavor undertaken here finds itself in this situation—to give the protean concept of sociology a well-defined content, governed by a methodically reliable design of the problem. The demand on the reader to grasp this one problem continuously as the first chapter develops it—because otherwise these pages could appear to be an accumulation of incoherent facts and reflections—is the one thing that must be placed in the front of the book.

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We would like to thank Horst Helle for providing this volume with an introduction to Georg Simmel and his social thought, and for reviewing part of the translation. We are also indebted to Lutz Kaelber and Dietrich Jung, who also reviewed parts of the translation. We would like to thank Hans Geser and Daniel Liechty for responding to our inquiries, and William H. Swatos, Jr., for editorial advice. We would like to express our thanks to Tennessee State University for providing Anthony J. Blasi with release time for this work. The following editors of Brill have been immensely helpful: Hylke Faber, Nienke Brienen-Moolenaar, Regine Reincke, Joed Elich. A special thank you to Jean Roth Jacobs and to Becki Kanjirathinkal for their remarkable patience and support. For encouragement and advice, we are deeply grateful to Fabio Barbosa Dasilva. Of course, any shortcomings are our responsibility.

AJB, AKJ, MK

A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION

The original translated in this volume is the first, 1908, edition of *Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* by Georg Simmel. There was a posthumous edition issued by the same publisher in 1922 after Simmel died in 1918. Suhrkamp published it again in 1992, with variations, most of which are not substantive in nature and, of course, were not overseen by Simmel. We have sought to give voice in English to what Simmel himself gave expression.

Simmel has an idiosyncratic use of German that is difficult to read and certainly to translate. We have tried to retain his basic style (in terms of overall sentence and paragraph structure, choice of metaphors) while writing in twenty-first century standard English (in terms of diction, grammar, punctuation) as clearly as we can. The faithfulness to Simmel means it will not read exactly as it would if a native English speaker had written it, but the efforts to offer clear English will, we hope, make Simmel accessible in ways he has not been heretofore.

The declension of adjectives, pronouns, and articles in German allows much greater freedom to substitute them for nouns when referring to a noun earlier in a sentence or in another sentence prior. However, it can be confusing in English since, for example, 'it' in English is the only form of 'it,' whereas in German 'it' can be *es, ihm, ihn, sie, dem, den*, and so on. So at times we have repeated the noun instead of using the pronoun, have added the noun to its substantive adjective, and so on. For example, in chapter five we have offered the sentence:

> The superfluous 'overflows,' *i.e.* it flows out further from one's starting point; and while it then is still attached to this point, around the area of the merely necessary it lays another more encircling periphery that is in principle without boundary.

If translated more literally it would read:

> The superfluous 'overflows,' *i.e.* it flows out further from one's starting point; and while it then is still attached to this, around the area of the merely necessary it lays another more encircling that is in principle without boundary.

In the German 'this' refers to 'starting point' in this sentence, and 'more encircling' refers to 'periphery' used in the sentence immediately prior.

Throughout we have used gender-inclusive language. This has been a little more difficult than usual because the use of gender plays a more powerful grammatical role in German and because of Simmel's idiosyncratic use of German, which offers then the double difficulty of translating Simmel both clearly and faithfully. We have also used inclusive language wherever Simmel talked about God, trying to avoid male references to the divine. We have been quite strict about inclusive language except where the use of gender is essential for the meaning.

Simmel uses words and phrases from a variety of languages. At times we have left the original in the text, usually offering a translation in a footnote that ends in '—ed.' referring to us, the translators and editors. At other times, we have translated the word or phrase into standard English, again with an explanatory footnote. The determining factors have been 'feel' and distance from English-usage. We also added footnotes that identify allusions and sources that Simmel himself did not identify. Simmel's own footnotes are simply translated without any identifying information.

It was common in 1908 to use 'primitive' for peoples and practices of societies before widespread agricultural development, literacy, and a more highly, usually hierarchically, organized division of labor. Social scientists came to view the concept as evaluative, implying superiority on the part of Western observers. It is not easily translated without any sense of evaluation; however, we have worked at casting it in a variety of ways, depending on the context, in language today considered non-evaluative, or at least less so. But this has usually meant the use of 'indigenous people(s).' Related to this cultural sensitivity, Simmel sometimes manifested the sense of superiority to less developed societies common at that time in ways that could not be changed without violating fidelity in translation, and so we have left those instances as they are.

Simmel has a fondness for using the word *Kreis* (circle, sphere) in contexts where the more generic English word 'group' would also work and has often been so translated in the past. And he has a fondness for using the word *Element* (element, component part) in contexts where the English word 'member' would also work. Since 'circle,' 'sphere,' and 'element' can also function in this way in English, we have tended

to stay close to Simmel's usage out of fidelity to his style; however, at times when it seemed a bit too odd in English, we have departed from that practice.

Finally, there is Simmel's neologism, *Vergesellschaftung*. Early translators rendered it 'socialization,' but that term has come to mean in English, having an impact on an individual that makes the latter a competent member of a society or group. Midway through the twentieth century, Kurt Wolff translated it with the English neologism 'sociation'; that term has not generally found its way into common usage, outside of discussions of Simmel's sociology.[1] Sometimes Simmel means by *Vergesellschaftung* to refer to social interaction, but at other times he is referring to the creation of social entities; the two meanings pertain to processes that may be empirically the same but are spoken of in different ways in English. Consequently we have translated it as 'social interaction' or 'creating society,' as the context suggests.

The English word 'social' can translate the German *sozial, gesellschaftlich*, and *soziologisch*, all of which Simmel used in various contexts. We have used 'social' throughout for *sozial* and *gesellschaftlich*, but have varied 'social' and 'sociological' for *soziologisch*.

There have been earlier translations of portions of Simmel's *Soziologie*, many of them very good ones.[2] We have found them to be freer

[1] Georg Simmel, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, translated, edited and with an introduction by Kurt H. Wolff. New York: Free Press, 1950.

[2] In addition to the Wolff translation cited above, which translated major portions from the 1923 edition, major portions are also translated in Wolff (ed.), *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1955); Wolff (ed.), *Georg Simmel, 1858–1918: A Collection of Essays, with Translations and a Bibliography* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1959); and Donald N. Levine (ed.) *Georg Simmel on Individuality and SocialForms* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). Other translations from *Soziologie* include "The Problem of Sociology," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 6(3):412–23 (1895), anonymous translator, also *American Journal of Sociology* (hereafter *AJS*) 15(3):289–320 (1909), Albion W. Small ; "Superiority and Subordination as Subject-Matter of Sociology," *AJS* 2(2):167–89, (3):392–415 (1896), Albion W. Small; "The Persistence of Social Groups," *AJS* 3(5):662–98, (6):829–36, 4(1):35–50 (1898), Albion W. Small; "The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group," *AJS* 8(1):1–46, (2):158–96 (1902), Albion W. Small; "The Sociology of Conflict," *AJS* 9(4):490–525, (5):672–89, (6):798–811 (1904), Albion W. Small; "Fashion," *International Quarterly* 10(1):130–55 (1904), anonymous; "The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies," *AJS* 11(4):441–98 (1906), Albion W. Small; "How is Society Possible?" *AJS* 16(3):372–91 (1910), Albion W. Small; "The Sociological Significance of the 'Stranger'," in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921 [1924]), pp. 322–27; "Sociology of the Senses: Visual Interaction," in Park and Burgess, pp.

renderings than permissible for our project of giving Simmel himself a voice. In a few instances, earlier efforts strike us as more paraphrases than genuine translations. There is nothing inherently erroneous in a paraphrase; for example, one would hardly criticize Harriet Matineau for paraphrasing Auguste Comte. But we have desired to make manifest the mode of argument of Simmel himself, a method embodied in his authorial procedures, a method that runs throughout his book in the form of quite consistent modalities of expression. We believe that the whole volume is something different from a collection of its parts, and so we have translated *de novo*, giving the whole, we hope, a fresh and accurate reading.

356–61; "The Poor," *Social Problems* 13:2 (1965), Claire Jacobnson; "Space and Spatial Relations," in David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (eds.) *Simmel on Culture* (London: Sage, 1997). A few of the Wolff translations are reprinted in P.A. Lawrence (ed.) *Georg Simmel: Sociologist and European* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976).

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATION

Horst J. Helle

When my Munich team and I published the English language version of Simmel's *Essays on Religion* (Simmel 1997) we noticed to our surprise that some of our German native speakers from Austria, Northern Switzerland and Germany preferred to work with the English translation rather than the German original (Simmel 1989). They explained their preference by pointing to the complicated sentence structure in Simmel's authentic writing, which we had to change in order to produce a readable English language text. That astonishing effect may well repeat itself in the case of the present volume.

As its translators explain in their *Note on the Translation*, Simmel's German "is difficult to read and certainly to translate." This is so because preserving the typical sentence structure on the one hand, and remaining faithful to the author's intentions on the other frequently turn out to be troubling alternatives. The test for the quality of this English language rendering accordingly is not to put an isolated sentence from the original and its translation side by side to compare them linguistically, but rather to read a whole page in one language and then ponder whether or not the same meaning is coming across in the other. Passing such a test would reflect the intentions of the present translators.

This translation of course stands—fortunately—on the shoulder of giants. The Free Press, then a famous American publishing house in Glencoe, Illinois, produced a book in 1955 with the double title *Conflict*, translated by Kurt H. Wolff—*The Web of Group-Affiliations*, translated by Reinhard Bendix. Everett Cherrington Hughes in his *Foreword* praises Wolff for doing "American scholars a distinct service by translating and publishing important parts of the sociological work of Georg Simmel in a volume entitled *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (1950)" (Simmel 1955, 7). Hughes then goes on welcoming Reinhard Bendix to the joint effort, thanking him for "making an additional chapter of Simmel's *Soziologie* available." This is necessary because—and Hughes, whose German was fluent, regrets that—"Americans whose mother-tongue is English (including those among them whose mother tongue was not English) are extremely loathe to learn other languages" (Simmel 1955, 7). For

Wolff (see Simmel 1950) and Bendix, of course, German was a native language. If making an English translation of Simmel's work available was a distinct service to scholarship in 1955, it is certainly so in 2008. Such service has been contributed by Peter Etzkorn, Guy Oakes, Donald Levine, Deena Weinstein, Michael Weinstein and others.

Yet, crossing the language barrier—which in the past was more or less identical with crossing the Atlantic Ocean—was for Simmel's ideas a project that started much earlier than half a century ago. It appears that Simmel's two volume book *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft* (Introduction to the moral science) (Simmel reprinted 1983a, 1983b) was made known in excerpts in the *International Journal of Ethics* very soon after it appeared in German in 1892–93 (Simmel 1893), and what has become part of the present book as *The Problem of Sociology* was previously published in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* in 1895 (Simmel 1895). This shows that Simmel was known in America during his life time (1858–1918) when of course many more American scholars than today had the ability to also read him in German, and when George Herbert Mead—to name an example—published a review on Simmel's book on money (Simmel 1907) within months after Simmel's work became available (Mead 1901).

Simmel examined from 1894 to 1908 the fundamental premises relating to a methodical basis for the new discipline of sociology. As earlier publications leading up to the 1908 book we must mention the book of 1890 On Social Differentiation, the article "Das Problem der Soziologie" ("The problem of sociology") in Schmoller's yearbook of 1894 (Simmel 1894), "The problem of sociology" of 1895 (Simmel 1895), the lecture which Robert Park apparently noted down in 1899 (Simmel 1931), and the incorporation of that lecture manuscript in the present book *Soziologie* (Simmel 1908).

Simmel preferred being spontaneous about picking his topics and had been publishing on a wide variety of subject matters because he was devising and testing a unified method for the humanities. But he acknowledged in a letter to Heinrich Rickert of May 28, 1901 that he felt the obligation to publish a book with the purpose of clarifying what sociology is and which theoretical approach the new discipline ought to take. It took him till 1908 before that book was finally completed, and we have it before us here in English a century later.

Simmel explains in his preface that to clarify the position of sociology in the context of the other scholarly activities, and to describe its methods and their respective usefulness, is to him a new and important

task that cannot be undertaken in a preface but rather must be tackled in chapter 1 of the book. In it the author wants to free sociology from its vagueness by linking it firmly to a content that is governed by a unifying approach. In his short preface Simmel also beseeches his readers to keep chapter 1 in mind when reading the other parts of his book: Unless regarded from the perspective developed in chapter 1, the other texts may appear to be incoherent.

Having given this brief orientation in the preface Simmel turns to *The Problem of Sociology* as his first chapter. Sociology came about during the nineteenth century as a reaction to the political power of the masses that established themselves over against the interests of the individual. The new discipline claims to follow up that effective power and to describe it in its consequences within society. Social classes initiate political change not by affecting the significance of individuals but rather by being part of society. As a consequence, humans became conscious of the fact that individual lives are affected by a multitude of influences from the social environment.

As a consequence of the overcoming of the individualistic perspective, Simmel argues that the traditional manner of conducting intellectual enquiry—ascribing all important phenomena to the action of individuals—had come to an end. A new understanding was beginning to find acceptance that saw the forces of social developments as being rooted in society. The new discipline of sociology, he believed, attempted to take account of this. Simmel gives examples: art, religion, economic life, morality, technological progress, politics and health. These are all areas in which he believes people are beginning to realize that society is not only the target, but also the originator of certain events.

Simmel points out that this then-new way of looking at individual lives has given rise to relativism. It carried with it the temptation to dissolve the individual, and what is essential in itself, into outcomes of exchanges, with the singularity of the person being reduced to an intersection of social influences. He is critical of such relativistic thinking and throughout his publications has been a strong spokesperson for the uniqueness of the individual and for the dignity of the person. Simmel is also critical of conceiving sociology as the universal discipline of human affairs with no distinct borders, like a newly discovered country in which every homeless or uprooted area of research can stake a claim. The fact that the thinking and acting of humans occur in the context of society is to Simmel not a sufficient and acceptable reason for dealing with every aspect of it from a sociological context.

Simmel also rejects any definition of sociology as a collective term for the accumulation of certain facts, empty generalizations and abstractions. It is this kind of accumulation of empty concepts detached from concrete life that has brought about the "doom of philosophy" (Simmel, 1894: 272) and would mean the same ruin for sociology. Almost prophetically, he anticipates the dead end that certain areas of sociological theorization would reach. If sociology is to establish itself as a serious and respectable discipline, it must differentiate itself within the broad field of the social sciences, which includes economics, psychology and history, and be in a position to emphasize the distinctiveness of its approach.

Having outlined what he rejects, Simmel turns to positively describing what he wants to constitute sociology, what he wants sociology to be. While all the humanities will have to acknowledge that humans are influenced by the fact that they live in interaction with each other, sociology differs from them not by *what* is under investigation but rather by *how* it is studied. Sociology then, is a new method, a novel approach that will investigate familiar phenomena from a new angel. For sociology to be able to establish itself as an independent new discipline, it must raise the concept of society to the level of an overarching idea to which other phenomena will then have to be subordinated. They all, by being viewed in the context of society, and to the extent to which that happens, will then became the object of one discipline, sociology.

The formative processes in society take place as a result of the large number of interactions, to which Simmel assigns the status of 'objective reality.' This is derived from the epistemological thesis that reality is embodied in relations. And it is indeed the interactions between individuals that constitute life itself. The reality with which social science is therefore concerned does not only consist of elements which are, as it were, anatomically dissected, lifeless entities; instead we are to perceive life as a unified whole, integrated through interaction. This approach applies to the psychical unity of the individual as well as the unity of society and the other complex social groups that sociology investigates.

Thus, the concept of society is central as well as crucial. It requires the distinction between form and content. However, form and content do not signify separate objects but distinct aspects of what sociology studies. Simmel calls contents those driving forces that move individual persons to interact with others, which by themselves are not yet social. Examples he mentions are impulses, interests, inclinations and psycho-

logical conditions of a person that cause humans to turn toward one another. Other illustrations of content are hunger, love, and religiosity. Forms come about as a result of the interaction that these contents motivate. The individuals create together and for each other social forms in the context of which their wishes can be fulfilled, their desires can be realized. The forms are based on a common interest, like a sect that serves religious needs, and all forms culminate so to speak in the form of forms at the highest level, which is society. The chapters that follow chapter 1 of this book are illustrations of the variety of forms in society.

Simmel expects his readers to grasp that well enough so they can follow him as it were to the next exercise. He points out that identical forms can come about in society on the basis of totally different contents, therefore serving quite disparate purposes. His examples are competition, division of labor, subordination as forms of social behavior that we encounter in government offices, in business enterprises, in churches and elsewhere. The contents in these illustrations are political, economic, and religious interests; and diverse as those contents may be, they all have the potential of leading to the same forms, like competition and division of labor.

On the other hand, Simmel also wants his readers to understand that identical content may produce quite divers forms. This is immediately plausible if religiosity is used as an illustration. The religious desire as a content can find its socialized form in a strict sect with near dictatorial leadership, in a liberal association of self-governing faithful, in a hierarchical church etc. Similarly, the content of hunger resulting in economic interests has created in human history a wide variety of forms of which money (Simmel 1907) is the one that interests Simmel most.

Having clarified what he means by form and content, Simmel returns to the central concept that identifies sociology as a discipline: society. This central and all encompassing idea too, has the two aspects: society as content and society as form. Society as content is the mass of people that comprise it and who of course have a reality beyond the social. To study what is content, however, is not the task of sociology. Other disciplines, like history, psychology, or economics are responsible for that. Sociology then, is the study of society as form, as the highest and overarching form that encompasses all the other forms within it.

Attached to chapter 1 is a long footnote (followed by a shorter one). In it Simmel describes the other chapters of the book as both illustrations—from the perspective of his sociological method—and as

fragments—from the perspective of the organization of the subject matter of the book. He also anticipates the likely critique that his text lacks systematic coherence. The chapter closes with philosophical considerations of sociology as a problem and with the fundamental question of how society is possible. This leads Simmel to his first excursus.

Following Kant's investigation about the prerequisites for the existence of nature—"How is nature possible?"—Simmel asks the analogous questions about society. To enquire into the requirements for the existence of society is of course the most thorough method of clarifying what Simmel understands by 'society.' In answer to the question "How is nature possible?" Kant had sought to identify the forms that make up the essence of the human intellect, since he claimed that nature was a product of intellectual activity anyway. By posing the analogous question for society, Simmel emphasize that his methodical intention is completely different from Kant's.

The qualitative threshold that divides natural philosophy from social philosophy will become clear to anyone who, like Simmel, appreciates that when dealing with data relating to nature, unity is only created in the mind of the researcher and that the objects of research remain unaffected by this. Society, in contrast, consists of conscious individuals, and their intellectual constructs create a unity (in circumstances that are the very object of investigation) not only within the individual but also as an immediate reality of society.

Thus natural philosophy creates and studies processes that do not directly influence nature, whereas social philosophy must take account of processes of the conscious mind that themselves already are, and certainly influence, social reality. There is for Simmel a new transition from nature to society in which epistemology becomes empirical science. By 1908, the year he first published this book, Simmel's epistemology had reached a level that made it possible to adapt easily to a theory of society and henceforth to become sociology. What then are the intellectual processes that individuals, as the elements of society, must have undergone in order for society to be possible?

Simmel attempts to outline some of the *a priori* conditions or forms of socialization that must exist in order to make society possible:

1. The image that one person gains of another person from personal contact is skewed in the direction of generalization using familiar categories. This image cannot be the mirror-like reflection of an unchanging reality, but is constructed in a particular way. That is a

necessary consequence of the fact that complete knowledge of the individuality of others is not accessible to us. For society to be possible, we form generalized impressions of our fellow humans and assign each of them to a general category, despite the singularity of each. It is then possible to designate each person to a particular sphere. Within the spheres of military officers, people of religious faith, civil servants, scholars, and family members, each individual makes a certain assumption in how he or she sees the other person by implying: This person is a member of my social circle.

2. Every individual is not only a part of society but also something else besides. There can be no total social engulfment; the individual must always hold back a part of personal existence from total identification with society. Simmel sees this in such a differentiated and dynamic way as to envisage the different variations of the relationship between both 'parts,' saying of the individual: The nature of one's being social is determined or partly determined by the nature of one's not being completely social. Simmel anticipates his studies and mentions as examples the stranger, the enemy, the criminal, and the poor, which are presented as social forms in other chapters of this book. The quality of interaction of people within social categories would be quite different, were each person to confront every other person only as what one is in a particular category, as representative of the particular social role one happens to be seen in.
3. Society is a combination of dissimilar elements, for even where democratic or socialist forces plan or partially realize an 'equality,' it can only be equality in the sense of being equal in value; there can be no question of homogeneity. In this diversity lies the prerequisite for cooperation. The *a priori* principle Simmel is leading up to here is the assumption that each individual can find a place in society, that this ideally appropriate position for the individual in society does actually exist in social reality—this is the condition upon which the social life of the individual is based, and which one might term the universality of individuality. This *a priori* principle is the basis for the category of occupation (vocation), but is of course not identical with the world of working life.

It may be appropriated to state that Simmel's account of social *a prioris* does not possess *normative* status. He also repeatedly mentions that those theoretical fundamentals do not *describe* social conditions. He thus neither requires that these *a prioris* should empirically exist,

nor does he claim that they do. If in any concrete individual case the condition of the *a priori* is not fulfilled, then that particular person is not constituting society. But society as a whole is only possible because people—Simmel calls them society's elements—generally speaking do actually realize these *a priori* conditions.

As the author reminded his readers in the preface, the methodological directives of chapter 1 must be kept in mind in order to understand the rest of the book. It is not meaningful in this introduction to the translation to attempt a preview of the entire volume, but two important segments are picked here to use them as illustrations of how Simmel applies his method to social forms: They are *competition* as a form in which humans may interact under conditions of conflict, and the from of strangeness in interaction that becomes the fate and characteristic of Simmel's famous *stranger*.

The observations on competition are embedded in chapter 4 on conflict. Simmel chooses his illustrations of this specific form of interaction from different contents of social life: from commerce of course—and that was to be expected—but also from erotic interaction (two men competing for the attention of a women), from religion (two denominations competing for membership of the faithful), and from physical performance in sport. What competitive activities in these various areas of human behavior have in common is the transformation of intentions of the potentially selfish individual into some common good. Simmel sees here advantages for the community in which a particular type of conflict occurs, advantages that only competition can generate.

He expands on the idea that activities undertaken by an individual for purely subjective reasons have the potential of resulting in objective advantages for society as a whole. This is, however, not merely a confirmation of the *invisible hand* behind the selfish actions of individuals, it is for Simmel a philosophical principle of a much more general scope. In fact Simmel illustrates his point by referring to examples from religion, erotic pleasure, and scholarship. In each of these domains individualistic interests have the potential of resulting in an increase of the common good. Scholarship, for instance, is a content of the objective culture, and is realized by means of individual curiosity and drive for new insights.

All these advantages can only be achieved provided conflict occurs in the specific form of competition. That means, as Simmel has explained before, that the goal of competition between parties in society is nearly always to attain the approval of one or many third persons. This is

achieved in part by this incredible effect of being in a social relationship with people: it compels the competitor, who finds his fellow competitor at his side and only as a result of that really starts competing, to approach and appeal to the potential customer, to connect to the latter, to find out the customer's weaknesses and strengths and to adapt to them. It is the society-creating effect of competition that educates people to be good competitors and thereby to be the producers of valuable services for society through artfully multiplied opportunities to make connections and gain approval. Gradually competition becomes more and more important, because to the extent to which slavery, the mechanical taking control of the human being, ceases, the necessity arises to win the person over via the soul. The more the individual is liberated from traditionalistic external control, the more the individual person must be subjected to competition.

For competition to be able to function in society, it needs to be governed by prescriptions that originate from legal as well as moral sources. From both, there spring imperatives that regulate human conduct toward one another, imperatives that are not social in the conventional sense of the word—yet Simmel calls them sociological. Here Simmel hints at a fundamental conviction of his that ties sociology to ethics. Reality as experienced by humans is by necessity socially constructed, and the great cultural pespectives that humans have at their disposal for such construction include scholarship, art, religion, and indeed an integrated concept of ethics.

The texts in this volume are particularly convincing because the reader knows or senses that Simmel frequently writes as it were from within his own person. He also writes from his own experience in his excursus on the stranger in chapter 9. There is one footnote in the excursus that is telling and interesting. It comments on Simmel's observation that frequently strangers are blamed for political unrest or rioting:

> But where this is falsely claimed on the part of those who feel attacked, it originates from the tendency of the upper strata to exculpate the lower strata who were in closer relationship with them beforehand. Because while they present the fiction that the rebels were actually not guilty, that they were only incited, that the rebellion did really not originate from them—they exculpate themselves, deny any real reason for the rebellion in the first place.

Here we have a political statement by Simmel that, in addition to the reasons that are often discussed, may have contributed to his career

problems. As is abundantly clear from the footnote to his excursus *Der Fremde*, Simmel did not identify with "the upper strata" who typically blame aliens for any serious political opposition. He interprets that tendency as the denial of "any real reason for the rebellion." He indicates that there is probably a reason for a rebellion, but that members of the upper strata deny it.

Simmel introduces the stranger using as illustration the European Jew who as businessman would travel long distances, as Simmel's father used to do. "The stranger is a member of the group itself, no different from the poor and the various *inner enemies*—a member whose immanent presence and membership include at the same time being an outsider and in opposition." This description probably describes his father's as well as Georg Simmel's own position in Berlin quite well.

Simmel examines the status of minorities in society under the concept of the stranger. He sees a remarkable dynamism in the contact between two groups that are initially distinct, but where each group provides the other with individual aliens; this dynamic process initiates change in both groups with a quite compelling predictability. This idea was adopted by William Isaac Thomas (Thomas, 1923). Simmel describes the "convergence of hitherto separated circles" as follows:

a. Two populations are distinct from one another in important characteristics, that is to say that all the members within each group are similar to each other in one particular respect and different from the members of the other group. The requirement of solidarity within each of the two groups initially means that members must suppress personal peculiarities or distinctive features and preferably demonstrate those qualities that show them to be typical or even model representatives of the particular group they belong to. They would thus be required to dress and behave in a uniform manner.
b. The increase in population intensifies competition in the struggle to survive. Under the influence of this increased competition, individuals gradually develop much more distinctive characteristics of their own. This happens in both of the originally distinctive groups in a similar way, since, according to Simmel, the number of 'human formations' is limited. This fiercer competition thus forces both groups to depart increasingly from their traditional uniformity, so that these various 'human formations' can assert themselves as individual deviations from the group norm.

c. This process of departure from uniformity in a process of increasing individualization affects both groups of this theoretical model in the same way, and thus brings about a decrease in the differences between them. Almost totally independent of the original nature of their difference, therefore, there is eventually considerable convergence between the two populations.

The stranger plays an important part in this process of social change. Depending on the place of origin, the stranger may come from a faraway country and yet now be close at hand, and thus demonstrates in a quite concrete and practical way that there are different forms of life, not only as a distant, utopian theory but personified in the here-and-now as an alien person. The stranger thus signifies to the native what one might term an 'alternative lifestyle,' to use an unfortunate expression. Of course, the benefits rendered in terms of new life forms as represented by the very presence of the stranger also involves a loss of uniformity, consensus, solidarity and inner unity in the groups. Since the peculiarities of the groups become increasingly worn away, they become so similar that belonging to one group or the other is almost of no matter to the individual. The population becomes individualized and the state of being a stranger applies to everyone.

Simmel describes being a stranger as a particular form of interaction. Wherever and whenever human beings come to encounter one another, they assume that elements of closeness and distance are both present. Set against this general assumption, the interaction between native and alien represents a rather exceptional and particularly interesting case. Thus as far as Simmel is concerned, a stranger is a person from afar who is now close at hand because of coming to stay, although leaving again is possible.

The stranger is not "the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but the one who comes today and stays tomorrow—the potential wanderer, as it were..." The stranger's status in the newly joined social environment is characterized by the fact that one "does not originally belong to it, and that one brings qualities to it that do not and cannot originate from this new environment." As a potential wanderer, the alien's consciousness and forms of action are not limited to a particular locality. The stranger has no home, so to speak, or, to put it positively, that home is nowhere, in the land of 'Utopia.' This is why the stranger's thought can be 'U-topian', not tied to any *topos*—that is to say not bound by any restraints of locality.

The advent of the stranger repeatedly shatters the native society's sense of being a universal society. Self-satisfied society witnesses how the alien who has joined it unexpectedly cannot be forced to acquiesce to its order. This very presence thus makes society see the falsehood of such a claim to universality. In the presence of the stranger, a supposedly universal orientation is revealed as locally restricted and provincial. Thus the alien has both a destructive and constructive effect at one and the same time, as a representative of alternative patterns of thought and an initiator of social change. At the same time the alien also provides a new, constructive goal, demonstrating a Utopia towards which the locals can orientate their future efforts. Thus while providing an impulse to innovation, the stranger may also cause offence to members of conservative circles. The stranger is initially and principally an individual who is not integrated into the host society, and very often one who does not wish for such integration, in many historical instances compensating for the burden that this imposes with a strong belief in predestination or divine election.

In order better to understand the conditions under which Simmel was displaying his unusual creativity as author, it may be helpful to look at his biography. Isaak Simmel, the grandfather of Georg, had lived in Silesia, and there he received, as a mature man, citizenship rights in Breslau around 1840. He was the founder of a successful merchant family. His son Edward, Georg Simmel's father, was born there in 1810. Edward was a merchant himself. During one of his numerous travels, between 1830 and 1835, he converted in Paris from the Jewish faith to Christianity, becoming a Roman Catholic. In 1838 Edward Simmel married Flora Bodenstein, who also came from Breslau. Her family too had converted from Judaism to the Christian faith. Georg Simmel's parents moved to Berlin where Edward Simmel founded the chocolate factory called Felix & Sarotti, which he later apparently was able to sell advantageously (Gassen and Landmann 1958:11; an earlier version of this biography was published in Helle 2001:12–18).

When Edward Simmel died early in 1874, he left a sizeable estate. He was survived by his wife and seven children, of which Georg was the youngest. The early death of the father would have meant a catastrophe in material respects for the family had there not been the inheritance. Julius Friedlaender, a friend of the family and an important music publisher, became the legal guardian of Georg Simmel. Later on, Simmel dedicated his doctoral dissertation to him "with gratitude and love" (Gassen and Landmann 1958:11).

Like his mother, Georg Simmel was baptized as a Protestant. During World War I he left the church, not so much because he wanted to turn his back on the Christian faith, but out of a "need for religious independence" (Gassen and Landmann 1958:12; see also Becher 1984:3–17). Gertrud Kinel, whom he married in 1890, also came from a religiously mixed family. Georg and Gertrud Simmel had a son, Hans, who became an associate professor of medicine in Jena; he died in the late 1930s as an immigrant in the United States (see Käsler 1985).

Georg and Gertrud Simmel's household in Berlin became a cultural center: It was there that Rainer Maria Rilke, Stefan George, Edmund Husserl, Reinhold and Sabine Lepsius, Heinrich Rickert, Max and Marianne Weber, and others were regular guests. Simmel's presence at the University of Berlin had a great attraction for audiences from quite diverse social circles: Simmel's lectures about problems of logic, ethics, esthetics, sociology of religion, social psychology, and sociology were sometimes acclaimed as cultural events, announced in newspapers and occasionally even critiqued. As many colleagues scornfully noted, his audiences included many foreigners, intellectually interested non-academics, students from all disciplines, and especially numerous women. Those who had heard his lectures unanimously told of Simmel's fascinating style of presentation, of his ability to attach almost physical substance to his train of thought, and to make the objects of his lectures appear in the mental eye of the audience, instead of presenting ready-made, seemingly undeniable results as did many of his colleagues (Schnabel 1976:272).

He received his entire schooling and university education, which contributed to Simmel's later successes as a university teacher, in Berlin. At the age of 18 he successfully finished his secondary school. He enrolled in the summer semester of 1876 at the University of Berlin, where he studied for five years. Here he attended courses in history under Theodor Mommsen, attended lectures about cross-cultural psychology by Lazarus und Steinthal, and finally studied philosophy as a student of the less-well-known professors Zeller and Harms, who introduced him to the works of Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche; of these, Kant had the strongest influence on Simmel. The importance of the University of Berlin can be inferred from the fact that during his studies Simmel had as his teachers Droysen, von Sybel, von Treitschke, Jordan, and Hermann Grimm (Simmel 1881:33; Tenbruck 1958:588).

During 1881 Simmel applied for permission to take the doctoral examinations. The topic of his dissertation was *Psychological-Ethnological*

Studies about the Origins of Music. This dissertation was not accepted! According to the available documents and written evaluations, the professors in charge cited as reasons for the rejection the patchwork-like sketchiness and the insufficient precision of the line of reasoning. While admitting that the topic of research was extraordinary, they criticized the manner in which it was carried out—many typographical errors, illegible quotations, etc. In other words, one would have to assume that the dissertation Simmel wrote and submitted was somewhat sketchily done.

On the other hand, shortly before he applied for opening the formal procedures that were surposed to lead to his doctoral degree, he had won a prize with another scholarly work. This successful work carried the title, *Presentation and Examination of Several of Kant's Perspectives on the Essence of Matter*. The professors who were dissatisfied with his "dissertation" suggested that he should withdraw his work on the origin of music and present in its place this prize-winning work he had written on another occasion. Simmel gladly accepted this friendly advice and he could thus be granted the doctoral degree. The oral doctoral examinations were in the fields of philosophy, history of art, and medieval Italian. The new dissertation became Simmel's first book, published in 1881 in Berlin under the title, *The Essence of Matter According to Kant's Physical Monadology* (Simmel 1881). Despite the successful completion of his doctoral exams, it is certain that Georg Simmel's degree-process was to be remembered as characterized by extremely unusual events.

Two years after receiving his doctoral degree, Simmel applied to the same faculty of philosophy at the University of Berlin for the formal permission to teach in the area of philosophy. During this application procedure, which should promote him to the rank of an independently teaching faculty member (*Privatdozent*), even more difficult problems arose. For his postdoctoral dissertation, he had again written a work about Kant, this time about Kant's theory of space and time. The professors whom the Dean had appointed to judge this dissertation—among them Wilhelm Wundt—turned it down. According to them, this work was not bad from a scientific point of view but it circled around the topic without fully dealing with it. Only after Professors Dilthey and Zeller forcefully came to Simmel's defense was it finally accepted as a *Habilitationsschrift*.

After the academic trial lecture *(Probevorlesung)* that Simmel had to deliver, the oral examination of the candidate by the faculty members was marked by an unheard-of and dramatic event; Professor Zeller

remarked that he considered a specific lobe of the brain to be the seat of the human soul, whereupon Simmel—ignoring the social situation he was in—uncompromisingly declared Zeller's point of view to be nonsense. As an immediate consequence, Simmel did not pass this examination on his first try (Schnabel 1976:273).

The extraordinary circumstances with regard to his doctoral and post-doctoral examination procedures presumably left a mark in the memory of the faculty members in Berlin, although in both cases Simmel finally succeeded in obtaining the degree. In addition to anti-Semitism, which is widely mentioned in the literature and which would have played a role especially in the social circles of the Ministries of Cultural Affairs, one can safely assume that these occurrences contributed to preventing a smooth academic career path for Simmel. At any rate, in January of 1885 Simmel passed the postdoctoral examinations in philosophy and thereby became a *Privatdozent* at the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Berlin.

The general style of work and life, which he was to then adopt, has been described in this way:

> Simmel used to work in the mornings and evenings, whereas he preferred to see guests and friends in the afternoons. His closest friend was the economist Ignaz Jastrow. Both talked to each other in such a manner that the one hardly listened to what the other said; despite this, they always had the impression of having understood each other well. Simmel's production came easy to him. For his lectures, he made almost no notes and improvised as he talked. He wrote articles one after the other, without second drafts or corrections, as if he already could see them take form in his mind's eye. (Gassen and Landmann, 1958:13).

In 1898 the faculty to which he belonged as Privatdozent requested that he be promoted to an associate professor (Extraordinarius), which would have been equivalent to giving him a permanent position. (See, however, Coser 1968). The Ministry of Cultural Affairs, however, did not grant this request. In February 1900, the same academic body repeated its attempt to make Georg Simmel an Extraordinarius, this time finally with success. Then: In 1908 the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Heidelberg had an opening to be filled, its second full professorship in philosophy. Following the recommendation of Gothein and Max Weber, Dean Hampe suggested on February 17th to the Ministry of Cultural Affairs in Karlsruhe as a first choice (primo loco) the name of Rickert and as a second choice Simmel.

Although Rickert declined the call for this chair, Georg Simmel did not get the chance to go to Heidelberg. The position remained vacant for a while until a certain Schwarz was called to fill it. Georg Simmel is said to have had an offer to teach in the United States that, probably because of World War I, did not materialize. Finally, in 1914, Simmel got a call to the University of Strassburg (now Strasbourg). As much as he may have been delighted to finally become a full professor, the farewell from Berlin must have been painful for him because he had become part of its cultural and scholarly life.

> That Simmel now leaves the university where he had worked for thirty years not only means a loss for it, but also for himself. Such a personal, such an irreplaceable style of teaching as Simmel's has its audience, as in a theater, and one knows: the audience does not necessarily follow the stage director whom it holds in high esteem into a new house. (Ludwig 1914:413).

Simmel belonged to those who are not willing to accept artificially created forms of intellectual discipline as rituals. He made full use of the economic independence that he was fortunate to have, in order to remain intellectually independent as well. This is one of the keys towards understanding the admirable creativity and diversity that characterized his scholarly work up until his death. When he felt himself to be incurably ill, he asked his doctor: How long do I still have to live? He needed to know because his most important book still had to be finished. The doctor told him the truth and Simmel withdrew and completed *Perspective on Life (Lebensanschauung).* He confronted death like an ancient philosopher. "I await the Delian ship," he wrote to a friend. On September 26, 1918, he died from cancer of the liver in Strasbourg, where he had been appointed four years before. Death at this point in time was perhaps a blessing because many former Strasbourg professors fell into utter poverty shortly thereafter, when Alsace became French again (Gassen and Landmann 1958:13).

Following the already mentioned published dissertation about Kant, Simmel started his publishing activity in 1882 with an article in the *Journal of Ethno-Psychology and Linguistics* (*Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*) under the title, "Psychological and Ethnological Studies about Music" (Simmel 1882). These are the rescued fragments of the dissertation that had been declined. The first book that he published after his dissertation appeared in 1890 under the title of "*On Social Differentiation—Sociological and Psychological Studies* (Simmel 1890).

The subtitle expressly signals the claim of presenting a contribution to sociology. Parts of chapter 5 of that book have become part of chapter 6 in this one, as Simmel acknowledges in a footnote here at the beginning of chapter 6.

The title of this translation—as of its original—is *Sociology (Soziologie)*. The subtitle reads: *Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms.* The German original is available in 2008 in two versions: a) the sixth edition as published 1983 by Duncker and Humblot in Berlin, the publisher who has the original copyright to much of Simmel's works, and b) volume 11 in the collected works of Georg Simmel *(Gesamtausgabe in 24 Bänden)* available at Suhrkamp publishers in Frankfurt, Main. The Suhrkamp cloth edition is sold out, but the paperback version can be ordered. There is an obvious interest in Simmel today, and this book has become a classic work that is read today as it was a century ago.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM OF SOCIOLOGY

If it is correct that human knowledge developed from practical necessity and that knowing how to keep safe is a weapon in the struggle for existence against nature and in the competition of people with each other, it is no longer tied up with this origin. From being a mere means to a goal of action it has become an ultimate goal in itself. Yet knowledge, even under the self-governing form of science, has not broken off the relationship with practical interests altogether, even though it no longer appears entirely as an outcome of the latter but as interactions of the two, each with its own autonomous claims. Because scientific knowledge offers, in technology, not only the realization of extrinsic purposes but is also directed to the theoretical need for insight into the practical purposes, sometimes new directions of thought turn up that nevertheless touch upon problematics and forms of intellectuality, out of interests in a new sensitivity and desire only for their purely abstract character. So these are the claims that the science of sociology is concerned to raise: the theoretical pursuit and reflection on the practical power that the masses have acquired in the nineteenth century against the interests of individuals. However, the import and concern that the lower classes have caused the higher is scarcely conveyed in the concept, "society." It is still true that the social distance between the classes does not allow their members to be seen as individuals but as a unified mass, and that this distance does not leave the two bound together in any other fundamental way than that together they comprise "a society." While the significance of classes lies not in their ostensive separate importance but in their comprising a "society," theoretical consciousness—as a result of the practical balance of power—at once took up as true the idea that every individual phenomenon is mainly determined through immeasurably immense influences from its social environment. And this idea obtained, so to speak, a retrospective power: next to the present society the past appeared as the substance that shaped individual existence, like waves in the sea. Here ground was gained in that the specific forms of these forces alone shaping individuals became explainable to them. This line of thought lent support to modern relativism, the tendency

to dissolve the distinct and essential into interworkings; the individual became only the location where social threads link, the personality only the particular way in which this occurs. Since we have been brought to the conscious awareness that every human act takes place inside society and nothing can evade its influence, so everything that was not the science of external nature must be the science of society. It appears as the all encompassing domain in which ethics as well as cultural history, political economy as well as religious studies, aesthetics as well as demography, politics as well as ethnology are gathered together because the objects of these sciences take form in the compass of society. So the science of humanity would be the science of society. Contributing to this picture of sociology as the science of everything human was that it was a *new* science and consequently going into every possible problem not otherwise firmly fixed—just as a newly developing field typically becomes the El Dorado of homeless and itinerant beings; the inevitably vague and indefensible boundaries at the beginning grant everyone the right to accommodations. On closer inspection, throwing together all these former areas of study produces nothing new. It means only that the historical, psychological, and normative sciences are thrown into a large pot and the label 'sociology' tacked on. With that, only a new name would have been obtained, while everything that it treats is already fixed in its contents and relations, or produced inside the former domains of research. The fact that human thought and action occur in and are shaped by society makes sociology no more the all encompassing science of it than one can make chemistry, botany and astronomy the contents of psychology, because their topics are in the end only in human consciousness and subject to its requirements.

To be sure a misunderstood but in itself very significant fact underlies that error. The insight that the human being may be defined in all its essence and manifestations as living in interaction with other human beings simply must lead to a new manner of *consideration* in all the so called cultural sciences. It is no longer possible to explain historical facts in the widest sense of the word, the content of culture, the varieties of knowledge, and the norms of morality in terms of the individual, individual intellect, and individual interest, or where this does not work, to seize immediately upon metaphysical or magical accounts. With regard to language, for example, one no longer stands before the alternatives that it was invented by an individual genius or given by God; no longer need one split it up, to use religious images, between the invention of the clever priest and direct revelation and so forth. Rather, we now

believe that we understand historical phenomena from the interaction and the cooperation of individuals, from the accumulation and sublimation of countless individual contributions, from the embodiment of social energies in structures that stand and develop outside of the individual. Sociology therefore, in its relationship to the older sciences, is a new *method*, an aid in research for grappling with phenomena from all those fields in a new way. However, it does not operate essentially differently than induction at present; and induction has penetrated into all possible sciences as a new research principle, acclimatized, as it were, in each one of them, and introducing new solutions to longstanding problems. At the same time, though, sociology is no more a unique or all-embracing science than induction. Insofar as it depends on having to understand humans as social beings and society as the vehicle of historical events, it embraces no object that is not already dealt with in one of the previously existing sciences. Rather it is only a new avenue for all of them, a method of science that, due to its applicability to almost all problems, is not a separate science that stands by itself.

But what could its unique and new object be? What inquiry makes sociology an independent and demarcated science? It is obvious that its discovery as a new science does not depend for its legitimacy on objects unknown till now. Everything that we simply call an object is a complex of determinants and relationships, each of which reveals multiple facets, any of which can become an object of a special science. Every science is based on an abstraction for comprehending the entirety of something, an entirety we cannot grasp with a science limited to just one aspect of its perspective or one of its concepts. Every science develops through splitting up the totality of things or its matter of inquiry into individual qualities and functions, after which an idea is found that allows the latter to blend in and as they occur allows the selected qualities and functions to be fixed to real things with methodological coherence. So, for example, the linguistic facts, which are now connected as the material of comparative linguistics, had long existed among scientifically treated phenomena; however, that special science originated with the discovery of the concept under which what were formerly disconnected as separate speech complexes were grouped and subjected to specific laws. Similarly sociology as a specialized science can find its unique object, insofar as it simply draws a new line through facts which are well known as such but for which a concept would not be ready until now. It makes the cluster of facts that fall on that line into a common and cognitively patterned methodological-scientific unit.

Over against the most complicated, disorganized, and not scientifically ordered facts of historical society, the concepts of politics, the economy, culture, etc. produce that kind of organized knowledge, whether by linking certain portions of those facts, some more valuable than others, to unique historical developments or by identifying groups of elements that necessarily bring together both the historically unique and the timeless. Now there shall be a sociology as a distinctive science whose job it is to subject the concept of *society* as such—beyond the superficial collection of facts, to the social-historical results of a new abstraction and ordering, in such a way that certain determinants, formerly noted only in other varied connections, are seen as cohering and therefore as objects of *one* science.

This perspective comes to light by way of an analysis of the concept of society that one can describe as differentiating between the form and content of society, while emphasizing that this is really only an analogy for purposes of making a contrast between distinct neighboring elements. This distinction will have to be understood in its unique meaning without prejudging the specific meaning of this preliminary label. I start, then, with the broadest image of society to avoid the fight over definitions: That is, a society exists where several individuals enter into interaction. This interaction always originates from specific impulses within or for the sake of specific purposes. Erotic, religious, or purely social impulses, purposes of defense from attack, the play of commerce, the need for assistance from instruction, and countless other purposes bring it about that human beings enter into fellowship—correlating their affairs with one another in activity for one another, with one another, against one another, activity that both affects them and feels the effects of them. These interactions indicate precisely that the individuals bearing these motivating drives and purposes become a unity, indeed a 'society.' Then unity in an empirical sense is nothing other than the interaction of elements; an organic body is a unity because its organs are in a closer interchange of their energies than with any outside entity. A state is *one*, because the corresponding relationship of mutual interworkings exists among its citizens; indeed we could not call the world one if every part did not somehow influence every other, if anywhere the always actively mediating reciprocity of interworkings were severed. That unity or social interaction can have very different degrees, depending on the kind and closeness of the interaction—from the casual meeting, to a walk to visit the family, from all 'terminated' associations to membership in a state, from the transient society of hotel

guests to the intimate bond of a medieval guild. I am describing now everything that exists in individuals, the immediate concrete locus of every historical reality—such as impulse, interest, purpose, predisposition, psychological state, and incitement in such a way as to say that on account of them people affect one another and are in turn affected. I call them the content, the stuff, so to speak, of social interaction. In and of itself this stuff, of which life is full, the motives that drive it, are not quite social. Neither hunger nor love, neither work nor religiosity, neither technology nor the functions and products of intelligence yet mean social interaction in the simple and pure sense given to the term; rather they only shape it, in that they structure the isolated individuals in proximity into definite forms of association and mutuality that belong under the general idea of interaction. Social interaction is also the process, materialized in countless separate forms, in which individuals for these reasons—sentient or ideal, momentary or lasting, conscious or unconscious, causally driven or propelled teleologically—come together as a unity in which these interests are realized.

In every existing social phenomenon, content and social form construct a united reality; a social form can no more exist disconnected from content as can a spatial form exist without some material, the form of which it is. Rather, these are in reality inseparable elements of each social being and process: an interest, goal, motive, and a form or kind of interaction among individuals, through which or in which a *Gestalt* of the content attains social reality.

Now what 'society,' in every currently valid sense of the word, plainly makes into society, are manifestly the above-mentioned kinds of interaction. Some number of people would not be a society, simply on account of each harboring some factually determined or individually motivating life content; but if the vitality of this content attains the form of mutual influence, when one person affects another—directly or through an intervening third party—only then has the purely spatial proximity or even temporal succession of people become a society. Should there thus be a science, whose object is society and nothing else, it would inquire only into these interworkings, these kinds and forms of social interaction. Thus anything else that is also found under 'society,' anything realized through it and in its context, is not society as such. It would only be some content that accompanies this form or which this form of coexistence engenders along with that structure we call 'society' in the wider and usual sense. That both of these, inseparable in reality, are separated in scientific abstraction, that the forms of interchange

or social interaction, conceptually stripped of the contents by which exclusively they become social, are combined and subordinated to a methodologically standardized scientific perspective—this seems to me the singular and complete possibility for justifying a specific science of society as such. With this the facts that we point to as the socio-historical reality would first be actually sketched out at the level of the purely social.

Now such abstractions alone might manage to make a science out of the complexity as well as unity of reality, indeed may even be demanded by the internal requirements of cognition. Some legitimation for it must lie in the structure of objectivity itself, because only in some functional connection to factuality can there be protection against unfruitful questions, against haphazard scientific conceptualization. It is an error for a naïve naturalism to allow mere data to comprise analytical or synthetic formations through which they become the content of science, so that there are analyses it actually has more or less conformed to those formations (something like a portrait fundamentally altering the natural human appearance and therefore having a greater chance than another for an entirely alien image); whereof then the better or worse warrant for those scientific problems and methods can be gauged. So now the rule that will apply an analysis by forms and contents to socio-historical phenomena and bring those phenomena to a synthesis rests upon two stipulations that can only be verified factually: It must be found on the one hand that the same form of social interaction occurs with wholly different contents for altogether different ends, and conversely that the same substantive interest is clothed in wholly different forms of social interaction as its vehicle or types of fulfillment—just as the same geometrical forms are found in different materials and the same material takes on different spatial forms, or just like the corresponding fit between the forms of logic and the contents of cognition.

Both, however, are undeniable as fact. We therefore find in social groups, with the most varied purposes and significance conceivable, the same formal patterns of behavior among individuals. Domination and subordination, competition, imitation, division of labor, factionalism, representation, the reciprocal nature of inclusion and exclusion, and countless others are found in a political organization as well as a religious community, in a conspiratorial band as well as a business, in an art school as well as a family. As multiple as are the interests for which these social interactions come about, the forms by which they are achieved can still be the same. And conversely, substantively similar

interests can exhibit very differently formed social interactions, e.g. economic interests are realized as much through competition as through the systematic organization of manufacturers, as readily through agreements against other economic classes as through agreements with them. The contents of religious life, with invariably identical contents, require at one time a free form of community and at another time a centralized one. The interests on which the relationships between the sexes is based are satisfied in a hardly comprehensible multiplicity of family forms. Pedagogical interests lead now to a liberal, now to a despotic relational form between the teacher and the single student, now to more collectivistic ones between the former and the entire population of students. Just as there can be identical forms in which are found the most diverse contents, so can the matter persist while the association of individuals sustaining it moves inside a diversity of forms. Thus while in their reality facts make matter and form an indissoluble unity of social life, they still lend a legitimation to sociological problems that require the identification, systematic organization, psychological grounding, and historical development of pure forms of social interaction.

This problem directly contradicts the method that the previous individual social sciences had created because their division of labor was determined entirely by the diversity of *contents*. Political economy, the typology of church organizations, the history of educational systems, ethics, politics, theories of sexual life etc. have divided up the field of social phenomena among themselves, so that a sociology—that wanted to comprehend, with its construct of form and content, the totality of these phenomena—could result in nothing other than a combination of those areas of study. As long as the lines we draw through historical reality to separate it into distinct fields of research join only those points that highlight content interests, no area is conceded to a particular sociology. Rather a line is needed that cuts through everything previously drawn and constitutes as a specific field the pure facts of social interaction, according to their multiple configurations and detaching them from their connection with various contents. In that way it will have become specialized science in the same sense that epistemology became one—with all the obvious differences of methods and results—in that it abstracted categories or functions of cognition from the multiple perceptions of individual things. Sociology belongs to that type of science whose special character is not that its object clusters with others under a broader concept (in the manner of classical and German philology, or optics and acoustics), but rather places a whole field

of objects under a particular perspective. Not its object but its way of looking, especially by carrying out its abstraction, distinguishes it from the customary historical-social sciences.

The idea of society, for purposes of scientific treatment, covers two strictly differentiated meanings. It is first the complex of interacting individuals, the socially formed human *matter*, as that constitutes the entire historical reality. Then, however, 'society' is also the sum of individual *forms* of relationship by which individuals are able to become a society in the first sense. So one might at first call a distinctly formed material a 'sphere,' but the pure *Gestalt* or form in a mathematical sense enables such mere material to become a sphere in a first sense. When one speaks of social sciences according to that earlier meaning, their object is everything that occurs in and with society. Social science in a second sense has forces, relationships, and forms as its subject matter, through which people socialize, things that, viewed separately, constitute 'society' in the strict sense—which obviously is not altered by circumstance, so that the content of social interaction, the specific modifications of its substantive purpose and interest, is distinguished often or always from its particular form. Here the objection would be wholly false that all these forms—hierarchies, corporations, competitions, forms of marriage, friendships, social customs, rule by one, and rule by many—would only be constellation-like incidents in existing societies: were a society not already present, the prerequisites and the opportunity for allowing such forms to come about would be lacking. The suggestion thus arises that in every society known to us a great number of such associations are at work—*i.e.*, forms of social interaction. If then one form ceases to exist, 'society' would still be there so that certainly it can appear in every particular one; the form would arise in a society already preparing or producing such a phenomenon. However, were one to remove *all* of them, no society would remain. Not until such interrelations are generated on account of certain motives and interests does society emerge. So then it remains that the concern of social science in the widest sense is the history and laws of such a developing comprehensive picture. Because this is broken up among the individual social sciences, left to sociology is the specific task of considering the abstracted forms that do not so much *generate* social interaction but rather *are* social interaction. Society in a sense that sociology can use is, then, either the overall abstract concept for these forms, the genus of which they are species, or the actual momentary summation of the same. Further, it follows from this idea that a given

quantity of individuals can be a society in greater or lesser degrees. With every new awakening of emergent formations, every construction of factions, every coalescence in a mutual work or shared feeling and thought, every sharper division of serving and ruling, every shared meal time, and every adorning oneself for others, even the same group becomes more 'society' than it was before. There is simply never a society of the type that forms on the basis of any single associative paradigm because there is no such thing as interaction *per se*. There are only specific types, with whose emergence society simply is, and which are neither the cause nor consequence of it; rather they themselves are it instantly. Only the boundless profusion and diversity that are operative at every moment have given the general concept society an apparently independent historical reality. Perhaps the reason for the characteristic vagueness and uncertainty that adhere to the concept and former treatments of general sociology lies in this hypostasizing of a pure abstraction—just as the concept of life did not progress well so long as science regarded it as a unitary phenomenon of actual reality. Only inasmuch as the discrete processes inside organisms, whose summation or interweaving life is, were analyzed, only inasmuch as it was recognized that life exists only in these specific activities and between organs and cells, did the life sciences acquire a firm foundation.

It is first necessary to find out in society what 'society' actually is, just as geometry determines in spatial things what spatiality actually is. Sociology, as the science of human social existence, which can still be the object of scientific study in countless other respects, thus stands in relation to the specialized disciplines as geometry stands in relation to the physical-chemical sciences of matter. Geometry considers the form through which matter becomes empirical bodies at all—form, which of course exists as such only in the abstract, just as do the forms of social interaction. Both geometry and sociology leave to other disciplines the study of the contents that are present in their forms; even the study of the totality of phenomena, whose pure form are their concern, is left to the others. It is hardly necessary to mention that this analogy with geometry does not apply more broadly than its purpose here of attempting to clarify the fundamental problems of sociology. Above all geometry has the advantage of finding in its field extremely simple patterns to which complicated figures can be reduced; hence it constructs the whole range of possible formations from a relatively few postulates. In contrast, even a mere approximate reduction into simple elements is not to be expected for the forms of social interaction in the foreseeable

future. The result is that sociological forms, even if tolerably accurate, are valid for only a relatively small range of phenomena. Thus if one says, for example, that domination and subordination are a formation found in almost every human social interaction, little is gained by this general acknowledgement. It is necessary, rather, to focus inquiry on the individual types of superior-subordinate relations, on the specific forms of their realization, which now, with some certainty, lose their accuracy at the periphery of their validity.

These alternatives are proposed for any science: either it is to lead to the discovery of timelessly valid laws or to the representation and conceptualization of time-specific historically real developments. In any case, though, one does not exclude the countless cases in empirical scientific undertakings that stand between these two types; so the problematic identified here of a necessity to decide between them is not dealt with at the outset. The object abstracted out from reality allows these empirical manifestations to be observed on the one hand in the law-like regularities that, located entirely within the factual structure of elements, apply irrespective of their temporal-spatial realization; they *are effective* precisely in that they enable historical developments to operate one time or a thousand. On the other hand, however, those same forms of social interaction can be observed, with their now and then occurrences as well as with their historical development in definite groups in mind. In the latter instances their identification would basically be historical narrative for its own sake, and in the former instances induction material for the discovery of timeless law-like regularities. We learn about competition, for example, from countless instances telling us about it in very different domains—politics, political economy, history of religions, art. It is now a matter of establishing from these facts what competition as a pure form of human relationships means, under what circumstances it arises, how it develops, what modifications it undergoes with different kinds of objects of competition, by what concurrent formal and material regulations of a society it is inspired or reduced, how competition between individuals differs from that between groups—in short, what it is as a form of interaction among humankind that can absorb all possible contents, but by the uniformity of its appearance, despite great differences in content, shows that it belongs to a well-ordered and abstractly justified field following its own laws. The uniform is lifted from the complex manifestations like a cross-section; the dissimilar in them—here, that is, the substantive interests—is set in their competitive opposition. It is also suitable to deal with all the great relationships and

interactions that form societies: factionalism; imitation; the formation of classes, circles, and secondary divisions; the embodiment of social interaction in separate structures of a factual, personal, and ideational kind; the growth and role of hierarchy; delegated representation; and the importance of a common opponent for the inner cohesion of a group. Then such chief problems are joined to the same specific form of groups manifesting on the one hand features peculiar to the form and on the other hand complicated features—these, for example: the meaning of the "impartial," the "poor" as organic members of societies, the numerical determination of group processes, the *primus inter pares*, and the *tertius gaudens*. To mention even more complex processes: the intersection of various circles in individual personalities; the distinct importance of the "secret" in the formation of circles; the modification of group characteristics, incorporating detached individuals, whether through locally coalescing factors or factors not attributable to them; and countless others.

I leave open, as indicated above, the question of whether *absolutely* identical forms with diverse contents appear. The near similarity that they manifest under multitudinous material—likewise with the contrary—suffices to regard this as possible *in principle*. That it is not entirely realized simply shows the difference of the historical-mental event, with its never fully rationalizable fluctuations and complexities, from the capacity of geometry to free *its* concept of compliant shapes with absolute clarity from their realization in matter. One also keeps in mind that this uniformity in the nature of interaction, with the arbitrary distinction between human and material things, is first of all only a means to carry out and legitimate for all individual phenomena the scientific distinction between form and content. Methodologically, this would be required even if the actual constellations do not lend themselves to that inductive practice that allows the same to be crystallized out of the difference, in the same way as the geometrical abstraction of the spatial form of a body is also justified, even if this body were to be formed this way in the world only one time. That there is a difficulty in practice here is obvious. There is, for example, the fact that towards the end of the Middle Ages certain craft masters, because of the expansion of business networks for the supply of materials, were pressed to abandon journeymen and to use new means to attract customers, all of which was inconsistent with the old craft principles whereby each master was supposed to receive the same 'nutrition' as the others, and for that reason sought to place themselves outside earlier

narrow associations. Concerning the pure sociological form abstracted from a specific content, it is important to consider that the widening of the circle to which an individual's action binds him goes hand in hand with a stronger accentuation of personal distinctiveness, greater freedom, and the mutual differentiation of individuals. But as far as I can tell, there is no sure effective method to extract this sociological meaning from that complex content-determined fact. Which sheer sociological configuration, which particular interrelationship of individuals is included in the historical event when abstracting from individuals with all their interests and impulses and from the conditions of purely factual behavior—well, it is possible to interpret the historical facts in a variety of ways, and one can refer to the historical facts that occupy the reality of definite sociological forms only in their material totality, and devoid of the means, by hook or crook render teachable its breakdown from the material and form-sociological point of view. This is the case with the proof of a geometrical theorem by the unavoidably haphazard and crudely sketched figure. The mathematician, however, can still recognize that the concept of the ideal geometrical figure is known and effective and is viewed now wholly internally as essentially the meaning of the chalk or ink lines. However in sociology the comparable assumption should not be made; we cannot logically force a solution for the problem of what, out of the whole complex phenomenon, is pure interaction.

Here one must accept the odium of speaking of intuitive practice—though well apart from speculative-metaphysical intuition—about a specific angle of vision with which that distinction is realized and by which we can be guided, albeit only by demonstration with examples, until some later time when we will have conceptualized fully expressive and reliably guiding methods. And that raises the difficulty that not only is there no indubitable handle for the implementation of this sociologically foundational idea, but also that even where it functions tolerably well, in many instances the aligning of events under it or under the perception of certainty with regard to *contents* still often remains arbitrary. Inasmuch, for example, that the phenomenon of the 'poor' is a sociological type, a result of relational forms within a group, occasioned by general currents and movements, it is necessarily generated when people congregate. Or poverty can be viewed as the material outcome of certain idiosyncratic human characteristics, or exclusively from the viewpoint of substantive economic interests. Opposite opinions about it will be possible. On the whole one can view historical phenomena from

three principal perspectives: that of individual beings, who are the real carriers of situations; that of the technical forms of interaction, which are executed certainly only by individual beings but are not considered just from the standpoint of individuals but of their togetherness, their with-one-another and for-one-another; and that of the conceptually definable content of situations and events, in which case one does not inquire about their bearers or their relationships but their purely factual meaning, the economy and technology, art and science, legal norms and products of the emotional life. These three perspectives continuously intertwine with one another. The methodological necessity to keep them apart is always confronted by the difficulty of arranging each one in a track independent of the others, and by the desire for a single view of reality encompassing all standpoints. And however deeply one leads back into the other, grounding and being grounded, it will never be able to get a fix on all cases, and for that reason, in spite of all the methodological clarity and crispness of the principal formulation, the ambiguity is hardly avoidable that the treatment of an individual problem seems to belong now to one, now to the other category and is itself never clearly within one or the other way of treating it. In the end, I hope that the methodology of the sociology proposed here will emerge more definitely and even perhaps more clearly through the exposition of its individual problems than through this abstract outline. It is certainly not altogether uncommon in intellectual matters—indeed, in the broadest and deepest problem areas, rather widespread—that anything we must refer to with the unavoidable metaphor *foundation* is not as fixed as the superstructure erected upon it. So the practice of science, especially in fields yet undeveloped, will not be able to do without a certain measure of instinctive activity, the motives and norms of which will only later acquire a fully clear awareness and conceptual development. And yet so little is it permitted for scientific practice to ever give itself over to those vague instinctual methods of procedure, intuitively applied only in the single inquiry, that it is still in order to condemn them to unfruitfulness if one should wish to make still early steps into a completely formulated method for treating new problems.[1]

[1] We are considering in only a rough way the endless complexity of social life that gives rise to ideas and methods for mastering it intellectually. So it would be megalomania right now to hope and want to reach for fundamental clarity of questions and certitude of answers. It seems to me worthy to admit this right up front since in

Within the problem area that is constructed by selecting out the forms of social interaction from the whole manifestation of society, portions of research offered here yet remain that are, so to speak, quantitatively beyond the tasks that are recognized as sociological. That is to say one inquires at first into the back-and-forth influences among individuals, the sum of which produces society's cohesion, so that a progression is revealed at once, indeed a world, as it were, of such forms of relationship that were either not included at all in previous social science or without insight into their primary and vital meaning. On the whole sociology has been limited in fact to social phenomena in which the interactive forces are already crystallized out from their immediate bearers, at least as idea-units. States, manufacturers' associations, clergy, forms of family, economic conditions, military affairs, corporations, brotherhoods, depictions of class, and division of industrial labor—these and similar large agencies and systems appear to comprise society and fill in the sphere of its science. It is obvious that the larger, more important, and more dominant a province of social interest with its course of action is, the sooner will an objective expression, an abstract existence beyond the individual and primary process, emerge from immediate inter-individual life-and-work. But now one to two further important points need to be added. In addition to its comprehensive and outwardly important imposing phenomena, visible at a distance, it is made up of innumerable apparently small forms of relationship and types of interaction among people (negligible in the single case), but which are presented to an inestimable degree by these single cases, and insofar as they are

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this way at least a resolute beginning can be made instead of making a claim to a finality, the meaning of which would be doubtful in any case in this sort of venture. So the chapters of this book are thought of as examples with regard to method, as fragments with regard to contents, which I must consider for the science of society. In both respects it seemed in order to choose the most heterogeneous themes possible, mixing the general and specialized. The less the present offering here is rounded off to a systematic coherence, the further will the parts lie from one another around such an apparently all-encompassing circle, in which a future perfection of sociology will unite its isolated and unanchored points. Since I am myself thus emphasizing the wholly fragmentary and incomplete character of this book, I will not defend myself against criticisms of that with a preventative *apologia*. So if for certain the selection of a single problem and exemplification will appear to fall short of the ideal of an objective thoroughness, this would only show that I have not made the basic ideas understood clearly enough. Such clarity will only be possible after setting out and turning down a very long road, and every systematically concluded completeness would be minimally a self-deception. Integrity can be attained here by someone only in the subjective sense that one shares everything one manages to see.

in motion among the comprehensive and, so to speak, official social forms, they bring about indeed nothing less than society as we know it. Limiting sociology to the official social formations resembles the earlier science of the interior of human bodies, which fixed upon describing the large organs—heart, liver, lung, stomach, etc., but missed and neglected the uncounted, the not popularly known, or those whose purposes were unknown. Without them, the more obvious organs would never produce a living body. The actually experienced existing life of society cannot be pieced together from the structures of the aforementioned type, those that make up the conventional objects of social science. Without the effects of the countless interworkings in individual small widespread syntheses, to which these inquires should be for the most part devoted, it would be fragmented into a multiplicity of discontinuous systems. What the scientific establishment of such unapparent social forms also makes difficult is that which makes it infinitely important for the deeper understanding of society: that they have generally not yet hardened into fixed supra-individual images; rather society appears to be in a state, as it were, of being born—of course not actually in its primal historically inscrutable beginning but in everything that takes place every day every hour; social interaction among people continuously making connections and breaking them off and making them again, a perpetual flowing and pulsing that unites individuals, even when it does not amount to actual organization. Here it is, so to speak, a matter of the microscopic-molecular processes inside human material that are, however, the actual *activity* that links together or hypostasizes those macroscopic fixed entities and systems. That humans look at one other and that they are jealous of each other, that they exchange letters or eat lunch together, that beyond all tangible interests they elicit sympathy in one another, that the gratitude of altruistic service consistently has an unbreakable bonding effect, that one asks directions from another, and that they dress and adorn themselves for one another—all the thousands of person-to-person performances, momentary or enduring, conscious or not, fleeting or momentous relationships, from which these examples are selected entirely arbitrarily, continuously tie us together. Such threads are woven at every moment, allowed to fall, are taken up again, substituted for others, and interwoven with others. Here dwell the interworkings among the atoms of society, accessible only to the psychological microscope, the interworkings that sustain the thoroughgoing tenacity and elasticity, the entire variety and uniformity of this so meaningful and so enigmatic life of society. It is a matter of

applying the principle of infinitely many and infinitely small effects, juxtaposed on society, as in the sciences of juxtaposition—of geology, of the tenets of biological evolution, history as effectively proven. The immeasurably small steps produce the coherence of historical unity; likewise the not-so-apparent person-to-person interactions produce the coherence of historical unity. What goes on perpetually in physical and mental contact, in reciprocal excitation of desire and suffering, in conversations and silences, in common and antagonistic interests—that is really what determines the wonderful untearableness of society, the fluctuation of its life, with which its elements constantly achieve, lose, and shift their equilibrium. Perhaps what the advent of microscopic research meant for the science of organic life will be what the advent of this knowledge will achieve for social science. Inquiry till then was limited to the large, separate, distinct bodily organs, the form and functional variety of which were a matter of course; now then life process appeared in relation to its smallest carriers, the cells, and in its identity with the countless and continuous interactions among them. As they attach to or destroy one another, assimilate or chemically influence one another—this finally allows us to understand gradually how body generates its form, maintains it, or changes it. The large organs, in which these fundamental bearers of life and their interactions have combined in visible macroscopic specialized structures and activities, would never have made the network of life comprehensible if those countless activities taking place among the smallest elements, now as it were tied together by the macroscopic, had not revealed themselves as basic and fundamental to life. Wholly apart from any sociological or metaphysical analogy between the realities of society and organisms, it is now a matter here of the analogy of methodological deliberation and its development; of the exposure of the delicate threads, the irreducible relations among human beings, by whose continual performance all these large structures, now objective and possessing an actual history, are founded and borne. These entirely primary processes, which construct society out of the immediate, individual material, are thus, alongside the higher and more complicated activities and structures, to undergo formal examination. The specific interactions that from a theoretical view do not lend themselves to this undertaking to quite the usual extent, are to be examined as society-constructing forms, as parts of social interaction in general. Indeed, the more an exhaustive examination is purposefully devoted to these apparently insignificant varieties of relations, the better sociology gets at seeing them clearly.

Just with this turn, however, the research projected here appears to become nothing other than a chapter of psychology, at best social psychology. Now there is for sure no doubt that all social processes and instincts have their seat in psyches, that social interaction is a psychological phenomenon, and it is fundamental to its reality that a majority of elements becomes a unity. There is no single analogy in the world of physical bodies; there an insurmountable spatial impenetrability remains a given. Whatever external events we might also identify as social, it would be like a marionette play, not any more conceivable and meaningful than the interpenetration of clouds or the interweaving development of tree branches, if we were not to recognize fully as a matter of course psychological motivations, feelings, thoughts, and needs, not only as bearers of those events but as their essential vitality and us really as only interested parties. The causal understanding of any social event would have thus been attained in fact if psychological assessments and their development according to 'psychological laws'—so problematic a concept for us—had permitted the complete deduction of these events. There is also no doubt that the conceptions of historical-social existence available to us are nothing other than psychological chains that we reproduce with either an intuitive or methodologically systematic psychology and, with internal plausibility, get to the feeling of a psychological necessity of the developments in question. Consequently each history, each portrayal of a social situation, is an exercise of psychological knowledge. However, it is of utmost methodological importance and downright crucial for the principles of the human sciences generally that the scientific treatment of psychological facts not employ psychology in any way; also where we continuously make use of psychological laws and knowledge, where the explanation of every single fact is possible only in psychological terms—as is the case inside of sociology—the aim and intention of this practice need not proceed throughout by way of psychology; that is, not some law of mental processes that can deal with a specific content, but rather according to the contents and their configuration themselves. There is here a bit of a contrast to the sciences of external nature, which as facts of the intellectual life also play out after all only inside the mind. The discovery of each astronomical or chemical truth, as well as the contemplation of every one of them, is an occurrence in consciousness that a fully developed psychology could deduce entirely from purely mental conditions and developments. But these sciences arise insofar as they turn the *contents* and correlates of mental processes into objects,

in the same way as we construe a painting in terms of its aesthetic and art-historical meaning and not from the physical wave lengths that its colors emit and that of course produce and sustain the whole real existence of the painting. It is forever *a* reality we cannot grasp scientifically in its actuality and totality, but must take up from a series of separate standpoints and thereby organize them into a variety of scientific optics that are independent of one another. This is now needed also for all mental occurrences, the contents of which are not themselves included in an autonomous realm and do not *intuitively* resist objectifying their own mental reality. The forms and rules of a language, for example, though certainly built up only from mental capacities for mental purposes, still come to be treated by a linguistic science that completely avoids any single given reification of its object. It is therefore portrayed, analyzed, and constructed purely in accord with its subject matter and the formations present only in its contents. The situation is the same with the facts of social interaction. That people influence one another, that the one does something or suffers something, manifests being or becoming, because others are present and they express, act, or emote—of course this is all a matter of mental phenomena, and the historical occurrence of every single case of it is to be understood only through psychologically pertinent concepts, through the plausibility of psychological progressions, through the interpretation of the outwardly visible by means of psychological categories. However, now a unique scientific perspective can disregard these mental events as something else altogether and place their contents in relationships, as it organizes, tracks, analyzes them for itself under the concept of social interaction. Thus it would be established, for example, that the relationship of the more powerful to the weaker in the form of *primus inter pares* typically gravitates toward becoming an absolute domination by one and gradually rules out moments of equality. Although this is, in the reality of history, a psychological event, it interests us now only from the sociological standpoint: how the various stages here of higher and lower ranks string together, to what extent a higher rank in a certain kind of relationship is compatible with an order of equality in other relationships, and at what point the superiority of power destroys equality in them; whether the issue of association, the possibility of cooperation, is greater in the earlier or in the later stages of such processes, and so on. Or it becomes established that enmities are the most bitter when they arise on the basis of an earlier or still somehow felt commonality and unity, in the same way that the most fervent hatred has

been identified as that among blood relatives. Some will view this and even be able to characterize it as only psychologically comprehensible. But considered as a sociological formation, it is not of interest in itself as concurrent mental sequences in each of two individuals; rather of interest is the synopsis of both under the categories of unification and division: how fully the relationship between two individuals or parties can include opposition and solidarity—allowing the former or the latter to color the whole; which types of solidarity offer the means for crueler, profoundly hurtful damage, as memory or irrepressible instinct, than is possible at the outset from prior unfamiliarity. In short, as that study represents the realization of *relational forms* of people, which also represents them as a specific combination of sociological categories—that is what matters, even though the singular or typical description of the activity itself can also be psychological. Taking up an earlier suggestion, despite all the differences one can compare this with the geometrical deduction drawn from a figure sketched on a blackboard. What can be presented and seen here are only physically laid out chalk marks; however, what we *mean* with the geometrical considerations is not the chalk marks themselves, but rather their meaning for the geometrical concept, which is altogether different from that physical figure as a storehouse of chalk particles—while on the other hand it can also be followed as this material thing under scientific categories, and its physical materialization or its chemical composition or its optic impression can be, more or less, objects of specific investigations. Sociological data are similarly mental processes the immediate reality of which is presented in the first instance in psychological categories; however these, though indispensable for the depiction of facts, remain outside the *purpose* of sociological consideration, which is in fact borne only by the mental activities and only able to portray the factuality of social interaction through them—somewhat like a drama, which from beginning to end contains only psychological events, can only be understood psychologically and yet has its intention not in psychological knowledge but in the syntheses that shape the contents of the mental events under the point of view of the tragic, the art form, the symbols of life.[2]

[2] The introduction of a new way of thinking about facts must support the various aspects of its method through analogies with recognized fields; but not until the perhaps endless process in which the principle specifies its realizations within concrete research and in which these realizations legitimate the principle as fruitful, can such analogies with them clarify wherein the difference of materials at first obscures the

While the theory of social interaction as such, isolated from all the social sciences that are defined by some other content of social life, appears as the only science that is entitled to the name *social science* in the strict sense, the designation is not of course the important thing but the discovery of that new complex of specialized problematics. The argument over what *sociology* really means seems to me as something completely unimportant, so long as it turns only on conferring this title on an already existing and worked-over circle of activity. If, however, the title *sociology* is singled out for this set of problems with the pretension of covering the concept of sociology fully and solely, this must still be justified over and against one other problem-group that undeniably seeks no less to attain, beyond the contents of the specialized social sciences, propositions about society as such and as a whole.

As with every exact science intended for the direct understanding of facts, the social is also delimited from two philosophical domains. One encompasses the conditions, foundational concepts, and presuppositions of specialized research, which can find no completion in it themselves because they rather are already the basis for it; in the other, this specialized research is led to completions and coherence and is set up with questions and concepts related to them, that have no place inside experience and directly objective knowledge. The former is epistemology, that is, the metaphysics of the specialized fields under discussion. The latter refers actually to two problems that remain, however, justifiably unseparated in the actual thought process: Dissatisfaction with the fragmentary character of specialized knowledge that leads to premature closure at fact checking and accumulation of evidence by supplementing the incompleteness with speculation; and this same practice even serves the parallel need to encompass the compatible and incompatible pieces in an overall unified picture. Next to this metaphysical function focused on the *degree* of knowledge, another one is directed towards a different dimension of existence, wherein lies the metaphysical meaning of its contents: we express it as meaning or purpose, as absolute substance under the relative appearances, also as value or religious meaning. With regard to society, these spiritual attitudes generate questions as these: Is society the end of human existence or a means for the individual? Is it perhaps not even a means for the individual but, on the contrary, an

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now-crucial similarity in form; this process surely risks misunderstanding only to the degree at which it is no longer necessary.

inhibition? Does its value reside in its functional life or in the generation of an objective mind or in the ethical qualities that it evokes in individuals? Is a cosmic analogy revealed in the typical developmental stages of society, so that the social relationships of people would fit into a universal foundation-laying form or rhythm, not obvious to them but manifest in all phenomena and also governing the root forces of material reality? Can there at all be a metaphysical-religious meaning of the whole, or is this reserved for individual souls?

These and numerous similar questions by themselves do not appear to me to possess the categorical independence, the unique relationship between object and method that would justify establishing sociology as a new science that would rank it with the existing ones. Since all these are strictly *philosophical* questions, and they have taken society as their object, it amounts to only an extension of a structure in the manner of a previously given kind of knowledge to a wider field. Whether we recognize philosophy as actually a science or not, social philosophy has no fundamental reason whatsoever to avoid the advantages or disadvantages of its connection to philosophy generally by its constitution as a special science of sociology.

Not as in the past,[3] nothing else remains of the kind of philosophical problem that society has as a presupposition, but to inquire into the presuppositions of society itself—not in the historical sense, by which one is supposed to describe the actual occurrence of any particular society or the physical and anthropological conditions that can arise on the basis of that society. It is also not a matter here of the particular drives that draw subjects, while encountering other subjects, into social interactions, the types of which sociology describes. But rather: if such subjects exist—what are the presuppositions for conscious beings to be a sociological entity? It is not in these parts, however, in and for themselves, that society is found; it is certainly real in the forms of interaction. What then are the inner and principal conditions, on the basis of which subjects generally generate society out of the individuals equipped with such drives, the *a priori* that the empirical structure of individuals, insofar as they are socially capable, makes possible and forms? How are the empirically emerging particular forms possible,

[3] Simmel's phraseology that follows is reminiscent of Luther's "Here I stand; I can do no other"—ed.

which fall under the general idea of society, and how can society generally be an objective form of subjective souls?

Excursus on the Problem: How is Society Possible?

Kant could ask and answer the fundamental question in his philosophy: How is nature possible?—only because for him nature was nothing else but the representation of nature. This does not merely mean that 'the world is my representation,' that we can speak of nature only insofar as it is a content of our consciousness, but what we call nature is a distinct manner in which our intellect collects, arranges, and forms sense impressions. These 'given' sensations of colors and tastes, tones and temperatures, resistances and scents, which extend throughout our consciousness in the chance sequences of subjective experience, are not 'nature' by themselves, but they become it through the activity of the mind that put them together as objects and series of objects, substances and properties, causal connections. As the elements of the world are immediately given over to us, according to Kant, there exists no particular connectedness among them, however, that makes them the intelligible law-abiding unity of nature, or more correctly: simply being nature in itself signifies incoherent and lawless flashing fragments of the world. So the Kantian depiction of the world creates the singular dilemma that our sense impressions are, for him, purely subjective, since they depend on the physical-psychic organization that could be different for different beings, and on the fortuitousness of their stimulations; but they become 'objects' when they are picked up by the forms in our intellects, through which firm regularities and a coherent picture of 'nature' are formed; but on the other hand those sensations are still real data unalterably adding content to the world and a guarantee for a reality independent of us, so that now those intellectual formations of them into objects, relationships, and regularities appear as subjective, things brought about by us in contrast to what we receive from existence, as though the functions of the intellect itself, themselves unchanging, had constructed another nature in regards to content out of other sense material. Nature for Kant is a particular kind of experience, an image developing through and in our knowledge-categories. Hence the question, How is nature possible? *I.e.*, what are the conditions that must be present for there to be nature—freeing it through the search for forms that make up the essence of our intellect and thereby bring about nature as such *a priori*.

It would be advisable to deal with the question of the conditions by which society is possible in an analogous manner. For here too there are individual elements that continue to exist apart from one another in certain sense, operate as sensations and undergo a synthesis into the unity of society only through a process of consciousness that places the individual being of the one element in relation to that of the other in definite forms according to definite rules. The decisive difference between the unity of a society and the unity of nature, however, is this: that the latter—for the Kantian standpoint presup-

posed here—comes about exclusively in the observing subjects, is produced exclusively by them in and from those disconnected elements of sensation; whereas the societal unity is realized only by its own elements, nothing else, since they are conscious and actively synthesize, and needs no spectator. That proposition of Kant—that connection might never lie in things because it is brought about only by subjects—does not hold for societal connection, which, in contrast, is in fact directly fulfilled in the 'things,' which in this case are individual minds. Even as a synthesis it naturally remains something purely mental and without parallels among spatial constructs and their interactions. However, the unifying in this case needs none of the factors outside its elements, since each of them serves the function of exercizing the psychological power of the observer vis-à-vis external reality: the consciousness constituting a unity with others is in this case actually the entire existing unity in question. Naturally this does not mean on the one hand the abstract consciousness of the concept of unity but the innumerable individual relationships, the feeling and knowledge of this defining and being defined vis-à-vis the other, and on the other hand rules out even so much as an observant third party crafting anything, let alone a well-founded subjective synthesis of the relations between persons, as between spatial elements. Whatever realm of outwardly evident being is to be combined into an entity, it does not ensue from its immediate and simply objective contents but is determined by the categories of the subject and by the subject's knowledge interests. Society, however, is the objective entity that does not need an observer not included within it.

Things in nature on the one hand are more separate from one another than are minds; the unity of one person with another, lying in the understanding, in love, in shared work—there is simply no analogy to it in the spatial world, where every being occupies its own space, sharing it with no other. But on the other hand the fragments of spatial being comprise an entity in the consciousness of the observer, which is then not attained by the togetherness of individuals. Because the objects of the synthesis are in this case autonomous beings, centers of consciousness, personal entities, they resist, in the mind of another subject, that absolute coherence that the 'selflessness' of inanimate things must obey. So a quantity of people is in reality a much greater unity, though less so as a concept, than table, chairs, sofa, rug and mirror depict 'a furnished room' or river, meadow, trees, house are 'a landscape' or 'an image' in a painting. In an altogether different sense than the outer world, society is 'my representation,' *i.e.* situated in the activity of the consciousness. For the other mind itself has as much of a reality for me as I do myself, a reality that is distinguished from that of material things. If Kant yet assures us that spatial objects would have exactly the same certainty as my own existence, only the specific contents of my subjective life can be meant by the latter; for the general basis of representation, the feeling of being an 'I,' has an unconditionality and imperturbability that is obtained by no single representation of a material exterior. Indeed even this certainty has for us, warranted or not, the facticity of the 'you'; and whether as source or effect of this certainty, we feel the 'you' as something independent of our representation of it, something

precisely for itself, as our own existence. That the for-itself of others still does not prevent us from representing them to ourselves, so that something, never entirely captured by our representation, becomes nevertheless the contents and thus the product of this re-presentation—this is the deepest psychological-epistemological schema[4] and problem of social interaction. Inside one's own consciousness we distinguish very precisely between the foundational nature of the 'I,' the presupposition of every representation that does not participate in the ever incomplete problematic of sorting out its contents—and these contents, which are collectively presented with their coming and going, their doubtfulness and modifiability, in general as simple products of that absolute and ultimate power and existence of our spiritual being. To the other minds, however, although we are still conceptualizing them as well, we must nevertheless transfer just these conditions or, rather, unconditionality of one's own 'I,' which has for us that utmost measure of reality that our self possesses with regard to its contents and from which we are certain that it holds also for those other minds with regard to their contents. Under these circumstances the question—How is society possible?—has a completely different methodological significance from that of, How is nature possible? For the latter is answered by forms of cognition by which the subject effects the synthesis of the factual elements of 'nature,' whereas the former is answered by the *a priori* conditions found in the elements themselves, through which they actually combine to form the synthesis, 'society.' In a certain sense the entire contents of this book, as developed on the basis of the principles presented above, is the initial attempt at an answer to this question. For it seeks the processes, ultimately occurring in individuals, that give rise to their being a society—not as transient prior causes of this result but as processes sharing in the synthesis, the whole of which we call society. However, the question is to be understood in a more fundamental sense. I said that the function of effecting synthetic unity that, vis-à-vis nature, lies in the observing subject would, vis-à-vis society, pass over to the elements of society itself. The conscious construction of society is, to be sure, not present in the individual *in abstracto*, but for all that everybody knows the others as bound up with them; so much is this knowledge about others as social actors, this awareness of the whole complex as a society—so much is this knowledge and awareness given over only to achieving this with single concrete contents. But perhaps this is nothing other than the 'unity of awareness,' according to which we proceed, to be sure, in consciousness processes assigning a concrete content to the other, without however having a separate consciousness of the unity itself as something other than rare and after-the-fact abstractions. Now there is the question, What wholly universal and *a priori* ground is there? Which must actually be the presuppositons whereby individual concrete events would be actual socialization processes in

[4] Here Simmel appears to be adopting a usage of Kant, where *Schema* appears in apposition to *representation*; Kant also speaks of *Schemata* of the individual category—ed.

individual consciousness? Which elements are contained in them that make it possible for their enactment, which is the production of a social unity out of individuals, to say it abstractly? The sociological *a priori* conditions will have the same double meaning as the those that 'render nature possible.' They will on the one hand determine completely or incompletely the actual social interaction processes as functions or forces of mental developments; on the other hand they are the ideal logical presuppositions for the complete society, although society is possibly never perfectly realized in this completion. In the same way the law of causality on the one hand dwells and works in the actual cognitive processes; on the other hand it constructs the form of truth as the ideal system of completed knowledge, independent of the process, whether or not this is realized through that transient relatively random mental dynamic, and independently of the true reality, more or less consciously and effectively approximating the ideal.

It is a non-issue whether the research into these conditions of the social process should be epistemologically significant or not, because in fact the picture arising from them and standardized by their forms is not knowledge but practical processes and states of being. However what I mean here and what should be examined as the general idea of social interaction in its conditions is something knowledge-like: consciousness of socializing or being associated. Perhaps it would be better to call it an awareness rather than a knowledge. Since in this case the subject does not stand over against an object from which it would gradually extract a conceptual construct, but the consciousness of social interaction is instantly a consciousness of its carriers or its inner meaning. It is a matter of the processes of interaction that, for the individual, mean the reality of being associated—not abstractly of course, but certainly capable of abstract expression. Which forms must remain as the basis, or which specific categories a person must, as it were, bring along while this consciousness develops, and which are thus the forms that must carry the resulting consciousness society as a reality of knowledge, this we can undoubtedly call the epistemology of society. I try in the following to sketch several of these *a priori* conditions or forms of social interaction—for sure not identifiable as, in a word, the Kantian categories—as an example of such research.

I.

The image of others that a person acquires from personal contact is occasioned by real fluctuations that are not simple illusions in incomplete experience, faulty focus, and sympathetic or hostile biases, but important alterations in the character of real objects. And indeed these principally follow two dimensions. We see others generalized to some extent, perhaps because it is not given to us to be able to represent one fully to ourselves with our varying individuality. Every reproduction of a soul is shaped by the resemblance to it, and although this is by no means the only condition for mental knowledge—since on the one hand a simultaneous dissimilarity seems necessary for achieving distance and objectivity, and on the other hand there is an intellectual capacity to view oneself beyond the similarity or difference of being—so complete knowledge would still presuppose a complete similarity. It appears as though each person

has a mark of individuality deep down within, that can be copied internally by no one else, for whom this mark is always qualitatively different. And that this contention is still not logically compatible with that distance and objective judgment on which moreover the representation of others rests only plainly proves that the complete knowledge of the individuality of others is denied us; and all relationships among people are limited by the varying degree of this *lacuna*. Whatever its cause might be, its result is in any case a generalization of the mental picture of others, a blurring of the contours that a relationship to others superimposes on the uniqueness of this picture. We represent all people, with a particular consequence for our practical activity toward them, as the type 'human,' to which their individuality allows them to belong; we think of them, aside all their singularity, under a general category that certainly does not encompass them fully and that they do not completely match—with that condition the relationship between the general idea and the individuality proper to them is discerned. In order to take cognizance of people, we view them not according to their pure individuality but framed, highlighted, or even reduced by means of a general type by which we recognize them. Even when this distortion is so imperceptible that we are not aware of it more readily, even then when all the characterological general ideas common among people fail—moral or immoral, independent or dependent, master or slave, etc.—we still categorize people intrinsically after a wordless type with which their pure being-for-itself does not coincide.

And this leads to a further step. We form a picture directly from the total uniqueness of a personality that is not identical with its reality, but also still not a general type; rather the picture we get is what it would display if it were, so to speak, entirely itself, if it were to realize the ideal potential that is, for better or for worse, in every person. We are all fragments, not only of humanity in general but also of ourselves. We are amalgamations not only of the human type in general, not only of types of good and evil and the like, but we are also amalgamations of our own individuality and uniqueness—no longer distinguishable in principle—which envelops our visible reality as if drawn with ideal lines. However, the view of the other broadens these fragments into what we never actually are purely and wholly. The fragments that are actually there can scarcely not be seen only juxtaposed, but as we fill in the blind spot in our field of vision, completely unconsciously of course, we construct the fullness of its individuality from these fragments. The praxis of life pressures us to shape the picture of a person only from the bits of reality empirically known; but even that rests on these changes and amplifications, on the transformation of the actual fragments into the generality of a type and into the completion of the hypothetical personality.

This basic procedure, though seldom actually brought to completion, functions inside the already existing society as the *a priori* for further interactions arising among individuals. Within any given circle based, say, on a common vocation or mutual interest, every member sees every other member not purely empirically but through an *a priori* that the circle imposes on each participating consciousness. In the circle of officers, the church faithful, civil servants, the

learned, family members, each sees the other under the obvious assumption that this is a member of my circle. Arising from the shared life-basis are certain suppositions through which people view one another as through a veil. To be sure this does not simply cloak the uniqueness of the personality but while fusing its quite real individual existence with that of a unified construct, it gives it a new form. We see the other not merely as an individual but as a colleague or fellow worker or a fellow member of a political faction, in short as a fellow inhabitant of the same specific world, and this unavoidable presupposition, operating entirely automatically, is one of the means by which the other's personality and reality is brought to the proper level and form in the minds of others necessary for sociability.

This obviously also holds for the relationship of members of various circles to one another. The civilian who meets an officer cannot free himself at all from the reality that this individual is an officer. And, although being an officer may be pertinent to this personality, his image still prejudices toward the schematic type comparable to it in the representation of the other. This also holds for the Protestant in regard to the Catholic, the shopkeeper in regard to the civil servant, the layperson in regard to the priest, etc. The concealment of the lines of reality is present everywhere through social generalization, which essentially rules out its discovery inside a socially separated differentiated main society. Because the generalization is always at the same time more or less than the personality, the human being finds alterations, deletions, and extrapolations from all these *a priori* operating categories: from one's type as person, from the conception of a whole unique person, from the general public to which one belongs. Hovering above all this as a heuristic principle of knowledge is the idea of a person's real, absolutely individual indubitability; but while it appears at first as though the achievement of this would provide one with the completely correct foundational sense of self, those alterations and distortions are in fact what obstruct this ideal knowledge of the self even while being precisely the conditions by which the relationships that we know alone as social become possible—somewhat similar to the Kantian categories of understanding that form the immediately given data into wholly new objects, while alone making the given world knowable.

II.

Another category under which subjects see themselves and one another, so formed that they are able to produce empirical society, may be formulated with the seemingly trivial statement that every member of a group is not only a part of society but also something else besides. To the extent that the part of the individual not facing society or not absorbed in it is not simply disconnected from its socially significant part, i.e. entirely external to society, this functions as a social *a priori* to accommodate that external part, willingly or unwillingly; however, the fact that the individual is in certain respects not a member of society creates the positive condition for it being just such a member in other respects. What kind a person's socialized being is, is determined or co-determined by the kind of one's unsocialized being. The following investigations will yield several kinds whose sociological significance is even established in

their core and essence, precisely because they are somehow excluded from the society for which their existence is important—as with the stranger, the enemy, the felon, even the poor. However this holds not only for such general characters but, with countless modifications, for every individual phenomenon. That every moment finds us enveloped by relationships with people and its content directly or indirectly determined by them does not at all suggest the contrary, but the social envelope as such pertains even to beings that are not fully enclosed in it. We know that the civil servant is not only a civil servant, the merchant is not only a merchant, the officer is not only an officer; and this extra-social being—its temperament and its fated outcome, its interests and the merit of its personality—may alter very little the essential operations of the civil servant, the merchant, the soldier, and yet it gives opposing aspects to every one of them, always a particular nuance and a social persona permeated by extra-social imponderables. All the social intercourse of people within social categories would be different if they confronted one another merely as categories, as bearers of the social roles falling to them just at that moment. Indeed individuals differentiate one another just as much by occupation as by social situation, according to whatever degree of that 'additive' they possess or permit, given its social content. At one pole of this continuum the person comes to be perhaps in love or in friendship; in this case what the individual keeps in reserve, beyond the developments and activities directed toward the other, can approach a threshold of nothing, quantitatively; there is only a single life that can be viewed or lived from two angles, at one time from the inside, from the *terminus a quo* of the subject, then however, while nothing has changed, from the perspective of the beloved, from the category of the subject's *terminus ad quem*, which absorbs it completely. In an entirely different direction, the Catholic priest demonstrates formally the same phenomenon, in that his ecclesiastical function completely envelopes and engulfs his individual being-for-himself. In the first of these extreme cases the 'additive' of social activity vanishes because its content is wholly absorbed in the turn toward the other; in the second, because the corresponding type is in principle absorbed by the content. The appearance of the modern culture, economically driven by money, now manifests the antithesis, wherein the person approximates the ideal of absolute objectivity as one producing, buying or selling, generally doing anything. Leaving out of account high positions of leadership, the individual life, the tone of the whole personality, is absorbed in striving; people become only the bearers of settlements of performance and non-performance as determined by objective norms, and everything that does not pertain to this pure matter-of-factness is in fact likewise absorbed into it. The personality with its special coloration, its irrationality, its inner life, has absorbed the 'additive' fully into itself, and only relinguished to those social activities the specific energies in pure detachment.

Social individuals always move between these extremes so that the energies and determinations directed toward the inner center manifest some meaning for the activities and convictions that are important to the other. Since, in the borderline case, even the consciousness of what the person is and signifies—this social activity or predisposition supposedly set apart from the other person

and not even entering into a sociological relationship with the other—this very consciousness exerts a completely positive influence on the attitude that the subject assumes toward the other and the other toward the subject. The *a priori* for empirical social life is that life is not entirely social. We form our interrelations under the negative restraint that a part of our personality is not to enter into them, and yet this part has an effect on the social processes in the mind through general psychological connections overall, but furthermore just the formal fact that it stands outside the social processes determines what kind of influence. In addition, that societies are essentially patterns existing simultaneously inside and outside of society underlies one of the most important sociological formations: namely that between a society and its individuals a relationship can exist as between two parties, indeed perhaps always exists, actually or potentially. Thus society engenders perhaps the most conscious, at least the most universal form foundational for life itself: that the individual person can never stand within a union without also standing outside it, that one is inserted into no arrangement without also being found opposite it. This holds for the transcendent and most comprehensive associations as well as for the most singular and incidental. The religious person feels fully embraced by the divine essence, as though one were nothing more than a pulse beat of divine life; one's own substance is unconditionally abandoned to mystical undifferentiation in that of the absolute. And yet, for this absorption to have any meaning, one must preserve some sense of a self, a kind of personal counterpart, a distinct I, for which this dissolving into the divine All-Being is an eternal challenge, a process that would neither be metaphysically possible nor religiously sensible if it did not originate with a being-for-itself of the subject: the meaning of oneness-with-God is dependent on the otherness-of-God. Beyond this culmination in the transcendent the relationship with nature as a whole that the human spirit claims for itself throughout its entire history manifests the same form. On the one hand we know ourselves incorporated in nature as one of its products that stands next to the others, like among likes, a point through which its substance and energies come and go just as they circle through flowing water and blooming flowers. And yet the soul, apart from all these interweavings and incorporations, has the feeling of an independent being-for-itself, which we identify with the logically precarious idea of freedom. All this movement, whose element we ourselves indeed are, countering and parlaying, culminates in the radical statement that nature is only a representation in the human mind. However as nature at this point with all its inherent undeniable lawfulness and firm reality is included in the I, so, on the other hand, this I, with all its freedom and being-for-itself, its opposition to mere nature, is yet a member of it; it is precisely the overarching coherence of nature opposite it, that it encompasse, this independent, indeed frequently even hostile essence, so that what, in accord with its deepest sense of being alive, stands outside of nature must nevertheless be an element of it. Now this formulation holds no less for the relationship between the particular circles of the relational milieu and individuals, or, if one combines this with the concept or feeling of being associated in general, for the relationship among individuals absolutely. We know ourselves on the one hand as products

of society: the physiological succession of ancestors, their adaptations and establishments, the traditions of their work, their knowledge and faith, the entire spirit of the past crystallized in objective forms—these determine the arrangements and content of our life so that the question could arise whether the individual is therefore simply anything other than a receptacle into which previously existing elements mix in various amounts; for if these elements are also ultimately produced by individuals, with the contribution of each one being an increasingly faint amount and the factors being produced only through their species-like and social convergence, in the synthesis of which the vaunted individuality would then again consist. On the other hand we know ourselves as a member of society, with our life-process and its meaning and purpose just as interdependently woven in a proximity in society as in a progression in it. We have, as natural character, so little being-for-ourselves because the circulation of natural elements goes through us as through completely selfless creatures, and the similarity to natural laws renders our whole existence a pure exemplar of their inevitability—so little do we dwell as social entities around an autonomous center, but moment by moment we are pieced together from interrelationships with others and are thus comparable to the organic substance that exists for us as though a sum of many sense impressions but not as an existence of a being-for-itself. Now, however, we feel that this social diffusion does not completely usurp our personality; it is not only a matter of the reserves already mentioned, of unique contents whose meaning and development at the outset lie only in the individual psyche and generally find no place in the social context; not only a matter of the formation of social contents, whose unity as an individual psyche, again, is not itself social essence any more than an artistic pattern, composed of patches of color on a canvass, is derived from the chemical constitution of the colors themselves. But above all, the entire content of life, as completely as it may be able to be explained by social antecedents and interrelationships, is still to be regarded concurrently under the category of individual life, as the experience of the individual and completely oriented to the individual. Both are only separate categories under which the same content appears, just as plants can be considered one time in terms of the conditions of their biological origin, another time in terms of their practical uses, a third time in terms of their aesthetic meaning. The standpoint from which the existence of the individual is ordered and conceptualized can be taken from inside as well as outside it; the totality of life, with all its socially derivable contents, is to be grasped as the centripetal tendency of its carrier, just as it can, with all its parts reserved for the individual, still count as a product and element of social life.

With that, then, the reality of social interaction brings the individual into the position of duality with which I began: that the individual is engaged in it and at the same time stands over against it, is a member of its organism and at the same time itself a complete organic whole, a being for it and a being for itself. However the essential nature and the meaning of the peculiar sociological *a priori* grounded in it, is this: that the interior and the exterior between individual and society are not two agents existing side by side—although they can develop incidentally in that way, even to the extent of a hostile antagonism—but that

they identify the entirely integral position of the living social being. One's existence is not only, in a partition of its substance, partially social and partially individual; rather, it falls under the basic, formative, irreducible category of a unity that we can express only through the synthesis or the simultaneity of both determining positions, logically contrary to one another, as member and as being-for-oneself—as being produced by and occupied by society and as life from out of one's own center and for the sake of one's own center. Society does not exist as only previously emerged from beings that are in part not socialized, but from such beings as feel on the one hand like fully social entities and on the other, while retaining the same content, as fully personal ones. And these are not two unrelated juxtaposed standpoints, as when one examines the same body at one time in terms of its weight and at another in terms of its color, but both form the union that we call social existence, the synthetic category—as the concept of causality is an *a priori* union even though it includes both substantively altogether different elements of cause and effect. That this formation is available to us, this capacity of beings—every one of which can experience the self as the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of its developments, destinies, and qualities—to create precisely the operational concept of society and to know this then as the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of those vitalities and determinations of existence—this is an *a priori* of the empirical society that makes its form as we know it possible.

III.

Society is a construct of unlike parts. Since even where democratic or socialist tendencies anticipate or partially achieve an 'equality,' it is always a matter only of a similar evaluation of persons, achievements, and positions, whereas the issue of an equality of persons with regard to their natures, life-contents, and destinies cannot even be entertained. And whereas on the other hand an enslaved population makes up only a mass, as in the great oriental despotisms, this equality affects everyone always only with respect to certain facets of existence, perhaps the political or economic, never however the entire selves, whose innate qualities, personal associations, and lived destinies will unavoidably have a kind of uniqueness and unmistakableness, not only for the interiority of life but also for its social interactions with other beings. Let us imagine society as a purely objective schema, so that it appears as an arrangement of contents and accomplishments—all related to one another in space, time, concepts, and values—and next to which one can in this respect disregard the personality, the I-form, that carries its dynamics. If that dissimilarity of elements now allows each accomplishment or quality inside this arrangement to appear as one characterized individually, unambiguously fixed in its place, society then looks like a cosmos whose multiplicity in being and movement is, to be sure, incalculable, but in which every point can be composed and developed only in that given manner if the structure of the whole is not to be changed. What has been generally said of the structure of the earth—that not a grain of sand could be shaped differently and placed elsewhere than it currently is without this presupposing and resulting in a change of all existence—is repeated in the structure of society, viewed as an interconnection of qualitatively distinct

phenomena. An analogous image of society in general, but in miniature, rather simplified in words, is found in a snapshot of the civil service, which as such is composed of a definite organization of 'positions' with a predetermined set of skill requirements that exist detached from their respective office holders, offering up an idealized association. Inside of such an organization new entrants find unambiguously specific posts, just as though these positions were waiting for them and to which their energies must harmoniously conform. What here is a conscious, systematic arrangement of work roles is naturally a tangled confusing play of functions in the whole of society; the positions in society are not produced by a purposeful design but, understandably, just by the actual creative activity and experience of individuals. And in spite of this enormous difference, in spite of every irrationality and imperfection, however reprehensible from a standpoint of merit, that the historical society demonstrates, its phenomenological structure—the sum and relationship of the kind of existence and accomplishments offered objectively socially by every element—remains an arrangement of elements, of which each person takes an individually defined position, a coordination of objectively and, in its social significance, meaningfully, although not always valuable, functions and functional centers; in the process of this the purely personal, the inwardly productive, the impulses and reflexes of the real 'I' remain entirely outside consideration. Or expressed differently, the life of society proceeds—viewed not psychologically but phenomenologically purely in terms of its social contents—as though every element were predetermined for its place in the totality; with all this discrepancy from the ideal claims, it simply continues as if every one of its members were fully relationally integrated, each one dependent on all others and all others on the one, just because each one is individually a part of it.

At this point conspicuously obvious is the *a priori* which we need to discuss now and which offers the 'possibility' of belonging to society. That every individual is directed according to one's own rank in a definite position inside of one's social milieu: that this appropriate position is hypothetically available to one, actually throughout the social whole for that matter—that is the presumption under which the individual lives out a social life and which one can point to as the universal value of individuality. Whether it is elaborated into clear conceptual consciousness is independent of whether it also finds its realization in the actual course of life—just as the *a priori* status of causal laws as a formative presupposition of knowledge is independent of whether consciousness formulates it in separate concepts and whether or not the psychological reality always proceeds in accord with it. Our knowledge of life rests on the presumption of a pre-established harmony between our mental energies, albeit individual ones, and external objective existence; thus this always remains the expression of the immediate phenomenon, whether or not one were to attribute it metaphysically or psychologically to the production of existence through the intellect alone. If social life as such depends on the presupposition of a fundamental harmony between the individual an d the social whole, it does little to hinder the sharp clash of the ethical with the pleasurable life.

Had social reality been shaped by this principal presumption without restraint and without fail, we would have the perfect society—again not in the ethical sense or eudaemonistic perfection but conceptually: i.e., not the *perfect* society but the perfect *society.* As this *a priori* of one's social existence goes, so goes the individual: the thoroughgoing correlation of individual beings with their environing circles, the necessity for the life of the whole integrating them by way of the particularity of their subjectivity—in so far as the whole does not realize this *a priori* or find it realized, it is simply not socialized and society is not the unbroken interconnected reality that the concept of it suggests.

With the category of vocation, this attitude is sharply intensified. Certainly antiquity did not know of this concept in the sense of a personal distinctiveness and a society structured by a division of labor. But what is fundamental to it—that socially functional activity is consistently the expression of inner capacity, that the wholeness and durability of subjectivity practically objectivizes itself by way of its function in society—that also existed in antiquity. Insofar as this connection was effected on a more generally uniform content, its principle appears in the Aristotelian saying, that some people were meant by their nature δουλεύειν (to serve), others δεσπόζειν (to rule). With a further development of the idea it indicates the peculiar structure: that on the one hand society produces and provides a 'position' in itself that is indeed distinct from others in content and outline, but in principle it can be fulfilled by many and is so to speak somewhat anonymous; and that now, despite its general character, this position is then taken up by the individual on the basis of an inner 'call' a qualification felt as wholly personal. For there to be a 'calling' at all, there must exist a harmony, however derived, between the structure and life process of society on the one hand and the individual make up and predispositions on the other. On that harmony as a prevalent assumption ultimately rests the idea that there exists a position-and-performance in society for each person, to which one is 'called,' and an imperative to search for it until one finds it.

Empirical society becomes 'possible' only through this *a priori*, climaxing in the concept of vocation, which is indeed to be identified not as heretofore with a simple slogan, as the Kantian categories would have it. The processes of consciousness in which socialization takes place—the unity out of many, the reciprocal recognition of individuals, the changing significance of individuals for the totality of others and of this totality for individuals—all this proceeds, in principle, completely outside abstract conscious but self-revealing in the reality of praxis, under this assumption: that the individuality of the person finds a place in the structure of the collective, indeed that this structure is positioned beforehand to a certain extent, despite its unpredictability, for the individual and its activity. The causal connection that involves every social element in the being and action of every other one and thus brings the external network of society into existence is transformed into a teleological one as soon as one considers from the perspective of the individual carriers, from its creators, who experience themselves each as an 'I' and whose activity develops on the basis of a being-for-itself, self-determining personality. That this phenomenal totality should align itself with that person's goal, as though personalities came

from outside, and offers it from its internally regulated life process the place where its unique nature will be that of playing a necessary part in the life of the whole—this gives, as a fundamental category, the consciousness of the individual the form that characterizes it as a social element.

It is a fairly idle question whether the inquiries into the epistemology of society that are supposed to be exemplified in these sketches belong in social philosophy or perhaps sociology after all. There may be a boundary zone for both methods—the soundness of the sociological problem, as heretofore delineated, and the demarcation from philosophical issues suffer as little from it as the clarity of the ideas of day and night suffer on account of the existence of twilight, or the ideas of human and animal because perhaps intermediate stages are found sometimes that unify the characteristics of both in a way not conceptually separable for us. While the sociological question arises in the abstraction from the complex phenomenon that we call social life, which is actually only society, *i.e.* social interaction; while it eliminates in the purity of the concept everything that will be realized at all only historically within society but which does not constitute society *as such* as a unique and autonomous form of existence—a completely unambiguous core of tasks is created. It may be that the periphery of the problem area provisionally or permanently adjoins other areas that become definitions of doubtful boundaries. The center remains no less fixed in its place on that account.

I move on to demonstrate the fruitfulness of this central idea and problem in specific inquiries. Far from claiming to offer the number of forms of interaction that make up society or to do them justice at a distance, they only show the way that could lead to the scientific analysis of the full perimeter of 'society' from the totality of life—they mean to show this, in that they themselves are the first steps toward it.

CHAPTER TWO

THE QUANTITATIVE CONDITIONING OF THE GROUP

A series of forms of collective life, of alliances and reciprocal influences of individuals, shall be examined first in terms of the importance that the shear number of individuals interacting in these forms has for them. One will grant from the beginning and from everyday experiences that a group of a certain magnitude must take measures for its maintenance and development, and design forms and organs that it did not previously need; and that on the other hand smaller groups exhibit qualities and patterns of interaction that they inevitably lose with an enlargement of their size. Quantitative determination has a double importance: the negative, in that certain formations, which are necessary or possible from the content or other conditions of life, can materialize on this side or that side of a numerical border of participants; the positive, in that other formations are required directly by specific purely quantitative modifications of the group. Obviously they do not appear in every case but depend for their part on other determinants of the group; however, it is decisive that the formations under investigation stand out from the other factors only under the condition of a definitive numerical expansion. So let it be noted, for example, that completely or approximate socialistic arrangements until now were feasible only in rather small groups, but are ever frustrated in large ones. The inherent tendency to share fairly in burdens and pleasures can be readily realized in a small group and, what is clearly just as important, be reviewed and monitored by individuals. What each would endure for the whole and how the whole compensates each are implicit in one another, so that agreements and settlements are readily produced. In a large group, especially, the inevitable differentiation within it of persons, their functions and their demands hinders this. A very large number of people can form a unity only by a definitive division of labor; not only by virtue of the economic technology at hand but principally because it generates the interlocking and interdependence that connects everyone throughout with each other through countless third persons, and without that a widely scattered group would break apart at every opportunity. An ever tighter unity of the group is required; therefore, the

specialization of the individuals must be all the more definite, all the more unconditional, thus relating the individuals to the whole and the whole to the individuals. The socialism of a large group would thus require the sharpest differentiation of personalities, which naturally would have to extend over their work to their feelings and desires. However, this complicates to the extreme the comparison among them of achievements, of remunerations, the adjustments among both, on which for small and therefore undifferentiated groups the possibility of an approximation of socialism rests. What logically limits such groups of advanced culture, as they are called, to numerical insignificance is their dependence on goods that generally cannot be offered under their own group's conditions of production. To my knowledge there is in contemporary Europe only one case approaching a socialist form of organization:[1] the Familistere de Guise, a large ironworks factory that was founded in 1880 by a follower of Fourier[2] on the principle of complete sustenance for each worker and his family, guaranteeing a minimum subsistence, care and education of children at no cost, and collective provision of the necessities for life. The cooperative employed about 2,000 people in the 1890s and seemed viable. This reveals, however, that it can cover, from among the totality of all the existing living conditions around it, only the satisfaction of needs unavoidably remaining in under its own control. Because human needs are not likewise to

[1] The historical material, by which this research is assisted, is in its content-reliability limited by two factors: the service to be performed here must be selected on the one hand from so many and various fields of historical-social life that the limited labor power of an individual is left essentially with secondary sources for its compilation, and these could be verified only seldom through one's own fact-checking. On the other hand the extension of this collection through a long stretch of years will make it conceivable that not every fact can be confronted right before publication of the book with the latest state of the research. The communication of any particular social fact, which is only an incidental goal of this book, would not be allowed because of the latitude indicated here for unproven and mistaken things. However, with this attempt to obtain the possibility of a new scientific abstraction for social reality, the essential endeavor can simply be to complete this abstraction with some kind of examples and to prove it to be meaningful. If I am permitted, for the sake of methodological clarity, to exaggerate something, it will simply depend on the possibility that the examples are real rather than the actuality that they are. Because their truth is not supposed to—or only in a few cases—prove the truth of a general claim, but even where the expression could allow it to appear so, they are still only for analysis of objects, irrelevant in themselves, and the correct and fruitful kind, as this is done, not the truth about the reality of its object, is that which is here either achieved or missed. In principle the investigation is to have led also to object lessons and deferred their significant reality to the relative factual knowledge of the reader.

[2] Charles Fourier, nineteenth century French utopian socialist—ed.

be rationalized as production would, they often appear to have a chance and unpredictability that allows coverage only for a price that borders the incalculably irrational and inappropriate. A group that avoids this and is set for full systematizing and uninterrupted practicality in its operations will always only be able to be a small one, because it can procure only by a large inclusive one what would be required for the satisfaction of possibilities of life in any higher culture. Further there is a kind of collective church formation whose sociological structure does not allow for large memberships: hence the Waldensian, Mennonite, and Moravian sects. Wherever the dogma in them forbids oaths, military service, and uniforms; where wholly personal matters belong to the community, such as employment, organization of the day, even marriage; where a special attire distinguishes the faithful from all others and identifies them as members; where the subjective experience of an immediate relationship to Jesus holds the community together—from all this it is obvious that an expansion into a large group would rupture the bond that holds the group together, a bond that depends in important respects on its exceptionality and opposition to a larger group. At least in this sociological perspective the claim of these sects to represent the original Christianity is not unwarranted. Since, in exhibiting an undifferentiated unity of dogma and lifestyle, they were possible only in those small communities within larger surrounding ones that served them precisely as an external complement necessary for their vitality, a contrast by which they became conscious of their own uniqueness. Thus the expansion of Christianity to the whole state must have altered its sociological character no less fully than its spiritual contents. What's more, in that an aristocratic corporate entity can have only a relatively small area is contained in its very concept. Nevertheless, over this patent obviousness, as a result of the position of sovereignty vis-à-vis the masses, there appears here, albeit in widely fluctuating borders, to be yet an absolute numerical limitation of this type. But beyond this natural fact, a numerical limit, though varying within wide boundaries but still absolute in its way, seems to exist, following from governance over the masses. That is, I mean that there is no certain proportion that would allow the ruling aristocracy unlimited growth commensurate with a growing number of subjects; rather there is an absolute limit for it beyond which the aristocratic form of group can no longer be held in place. This limit is determined by partly external, partly psychological circumstances: an aristocratic group that is supposed to function as a totality must still be wholly visible to the

individual participant; each must still be able to be personally acquainted with each other; blood relationships and relationships by marriage must branch out and be traced throughout the whole corporate entity. If the historical aristocracies, from Sparta to Venice, have the tendency to shrink to the smallest possible number, this is then not simply an egoistical aversion to participating in governance but the instinctual sense that the circumstances of life of an aristocracy can be fulfilled with a not only relatively but with an absolutely small number of its members. The unlimited right of the first born, which is the essence of aristocracy, comprises the means for limiting expansion; only under its presumption was the ancient Theban law possible that would not permit the number of country estates to increase, just as the Corinthian law that the number of families would have to always remain the same. It is for that reason thoroughly characteristic that Plato once, when speaking of the ruling ολιγοι [few], identifies them also directly as the μη πολλοι [not the many]. When an aristocratic corporate entity leaves room for the appearance of democratic-centrifugal tendencies, which tend to appear in the transition to very large communities, it develops into as deadly an opposition to their life principle, as it did for the nobility of the undivided Poland. In the more fortunate case any such contradiction dissolves through alterations into a unified democratic social form. For example, the ancient independent German farm community with its completely personal equality of members was thoroughly aristocratic and thus became in its continuation in the urban communities the original source of democracy. If this numerical density is to be avoided, there is simply nothing left than to draw at some definite point a hard line for growth and to set this quantitative density of formations in opposition to all individuals beyond this level of crowding and perhaps even to those qualified for entry; and often at the first appearance of an aristocratic nature, it is conscious of this inherent resistance to the demand for expansion. Thus the old genteel constitution seems to have been repeatedly turned into a genuine aristocracy because a new population, foreign to the genteel communities, was forced on it, too numerous to be absorbed gradually into the kinship groups. Before this increase of the whole group, the genteel communities, quantitatively limited by their whole nature, could be just maintained only as an aristocracy. Accordingly the Richerzeche Security Guild of Cologne consisted originally of the totality of free citizens; in that the masses, however, were increasing the population, it became an aristocratic society closed off to all intruders. Certainly the tendency of political

aristocracies to get fixated on becoming "not many" leads regularly not to the conservation of the existing membership but decline and extinction. Not only due to physiological causes but small groups closed in on themselves are generally distinguished from larger ones because fortune itself, which often strengthens and renews the larger ones, destroys the small ones. A disastrous war that ruins a small city-state can regenerate a large state. In fact even this is not only because of the immediately obvious external reasons but because the ratio of the power reserves to the actual level of energy is different in both cases. Small and centripetally organized groups tend to call up fully and utilize completely the powers present within them; in large ones, in contrast, there remains not only absolutely but also relatively much more in latent reserve. The demand of the whole is not made on every member continuously and completely, but it can allow a lot of energy to remain socially unexploited, which can then be drawn on and actualized in an emergency. Therefore, where such dangers that require a quantum of unused social energy are excluded by the circumstances, even measures of numerical diminution, which still exceed the inbreeding, can be thoroughly practical. In the mountains of Tibet polyandry prevails, and indeed, as even the missionaries recognize, to the benefit of society. The soil there is so barren that a rapid growth of the population would result in the greatest distress; to avoid this, however, polyandry is an advantageous method. When we hear that families among the Bushmen must even divide up from time to time because of the sterility of the soil, the measure that shrinks the family to a size compatible with the possibilities of nutrition appears precisely in the interest of its unity and its most highly noted foundational social significance. The dangers of quantitative shrinkage for its inner structure are here guarded against by the external life conditions of the group and their consequences.

Where the small group involves personalities to a large extent in its unity—especially in political groups—it exerts pressure precisely on account of its unity towards a hardness of position vis-à-vis persons, objective roles, and other groups; the large one, with its multiplicity and diversity of individuals, requires or tolerates it much less. The history of the Greek and Italian cities, as well as that of the Swiss cantons, shows that small communities situated very near to one another, where they are not moving towards federation, tend to live more in open or latent enmity for one another. Warfare and the conventions of war are often more bitter and particularly ruthless between them than between large

states. It is precisely that lack of agencies, reserves, less established and transitional individuals that hampers modification and adjustment for them and thus confronts them more frequently, through their external situations as well as on the basis of their fundamental sociological configuration, with the issue of existence or non-existence.

Next to such traits of small groups, I highlight with the same unavoidably arbitrary selection from countless cases the following sociological characterization of large groups. I assume that these, compared to the smaller, seem to manifest a smaller measure of radicalism and rigidity of opinion. This requires, however, a qualification. As soon as great masses are set into motion—politically, socially, or religiously—they display a thoughtless radicalism, a triumph of extremist parties over moderate ones. Underlying this, first of all, is that large masses can be satisfied and governed only by *simple* ideas: what is common to many must also be accessible to the lowest, most primitive mind among them, and even higher and more sophisticated personalities will never in great numbers concur in the complicated and highly developed, but rather in the relatively simple, commonly human images and impulses. Now, however, given that the realities, in which the ideas of the mass are supposed to become practical, are continually very diversely articulated and composed from a great number of highly divergent elements—simple ideas can function only quite one-sidedly, thoughtlessly, and radically. This will still come to a climax in which the behavior of an actually converging crowd is in question. Here the ebb and flow of countless suggestions produce an extraordinarily strong nervous excitement that often carries the individuals along unconsciously; every impulse swells up avalanche-like, and allows the crowd to become the prey of the ever most passionate personality in it. Thus it was declared that an essential means for tempering democracy was to have the votes of the Roman people be taken according to set groups—*tributim et centuriatim descriptis ordinibus, classibus, aetatibus* etc.[3]—while the Greek democracies would vote as units under the immediate spell of orators. This fusion of masses into an emotion in which all individuality and reservations of personalities are suspended is of course so thoroughly radical in content, far from every negotiation and deliberation, that it would lead to noisy impracticability and destruction if it did not end up for the most part in inner weariness and set-backs, the consequences of that one-sided

[3] Latin: by tribe and by hundreds according to rank, class, age, etc.—ed.

exaggeration. For all that, it still happens that the masses—in the sense in question here—have little to lose, yet believe on the contrary to be able to win everything; this is the situation in which most of the restraints on radicalism tend to fall away. Also groups forget more frequently than the individual that their power simply has limits; and indeed they overlook this more easily in the mass in which the members are unknown to one another, as is typical for a larger multitude assembling by chance.

Beyond *that* radicalism, which is encountered through its purely emotional character indeed directly in large cooperating groups, it simply remains to be observed that small parties are generally more radical than large ones—of course within the limits that the ideas the party stands for allow. The radicalism referred to here is plainly a sociological one, *i.e.* it is borne by the unrestricted surrender of the individual to the current of the group, because of the sharp boundary vis-à-vis neighboring structures necessary for group self-preservation, because of the impossibility in the extremely narrow limits to establish a pluralism of widely projecting aspirations and ideas; the actual *contents* of radicalism are in good measure independent of the multitude. It has been observed that the conservative-reactionary elements in contemporary Germany are compelled just by their numerical strength to contain the ruthlessness of their efforts; they are made up of so very many and different social strata that they can pursue none of their movement's aims straight to the end without always stirring up a scandal among a portion of their following. Likewise the Social Democratic Party has been forced by its quantitative growth to temper its qualitative radicalism, grant some latitude to dogmatic deviations, to grant their inconsistency, if not explicitly, albeit with an act of compromise here and there. The unconditional cohesiveness of the elements, on which the potential for radicalism is sociologically based, is less able to survive the greater the diversity of individual elements that the numerical increase brings in. Thus professional workers' alliances, whose goal is the improvement of the details of working conditions, know very well that with growing coverage they lose in inner cohesion. Here, though, the numerical expansion on the other hand has the enormous significance that every additional member frees the coalition from a competitor who might undercut and thereby threaten them in their existence. There occurs, of course, obviously quite specific life conditions for a group that forms inside of a larger one under the idea, also achieving its meaning primarily through it, of uniting *all* the elements in itself that fall under

its presumptions. In such cases there is a tendency to have the cachet: whoever is not for me is against me. And the personality outside the group, to whom the demand of this, as it were, ideal is directed, inflicts one very real injury on it through the mere indifference of those not on board; be it, as in the case of the labor coalitions, through competition, be it through the documentation for outsiders of the limits of the group's power, be it, in that it accomplishes anything only with inclusion of all relevant elements, as with many industrial cartels. When the question of the integrity of a group thus arises (certainly not applicable to all), the question is whether all the elements, to which its principle extends, are also really contained in it—because the consequences of this *integrity* of them who have its *size* must still be carefully differentiated. Certainly it will be greater when it is whole than when it is incomplete. However, it is not this size as a quantity, but the first problem deriving from it, whether it thereby fully delineates a border that can become so important for the group that, as in the case of the labor coalitions, the disadvantages to cohesion and unity simply resulting from growth stand directly in antagonistic and countervailing relationship to the advantages of increasing wholeness.

In general one can to some essential extent explain the structures that are so characteristic of the large group, in that it creates with them a substitute for personal and immediate solidarity that is inherent in the small group. It is a matter of authorities who for that purpose manage and facilitate the interplay among the elements and thus function as an independent carrier of social unity, because this establishes itself no longer as a matter of relationship from person to person. To this end offices and agents emerge, regulations and symbols of group life, organizations and general social conceptions. This book treats the forming and functioning of these in so many passages that here only their relevance with respect to quantity is to be emphasized: they all develop substantially pure and mature only in large groups as the abstract form of group relationships that can no longer exist tangibly at a given expanse: their suitability, reflected in thousands of social qualities, rests ultimately on quantitative preconditions. The character of the supra-personal and objective, with which such embodiments of the powers of the group confront the individual, arise directly from the *multiplicity* of the more-or-less effective individual elements. Then the individual is paralyzed by them on account of their multiplicity, and the universal ascends to such a distance from one that it appears as something existing entirely of itself, something not needing individuals, indeed often enough

something antagonistic to the individual—somewhat like the concept that recapitulates the collective in singular and separate manifestations, the higher it stands over each one of them, the more it realizes in itself; so that even the universal concepts that rule the largest circle of individuals—the abstractions with which metaphysics reckons—attain a separate life whose norms and developments are alien or inimical to those of the tangible individual. The large group thus achieves its unity—as it develops itself in its organs and in its law, in its political concepts and in its ideals—only at the price of a great distance of all these structures from individuals, their views and their needs, which find immediate effectiveness and consideration in the social life of a small group. From this relationship there emerges the frequent difficulties of organizations in which a tier of smaller assemblages is contained in a larger one: in that the circumstances are accurately seen only close-up and treated with interest and care; that on the other hand only from the distance that the central office has, a correct and orderly relationship of all the particulars to one another is to be established—a discrepancy that continually shows up, for example, in the policy toward poverty, in the trade union, in the educational administration. The person-to-person relationships that comprise the life principle of the small group do not survive the distance and coldness of the objective abstract norms without which the large group cannot exist.[4]

The structural difference that the mere differences in group size produce will be clearer still in the role of certain more prominent and effective individuals. It applies namely not only to the obvious reality

[4] A typical difficulty of human relations presents itself here. We are continually led by our theoretical as well as by our practical attitudes in relation to all possible circles to stand inside them and likewise outside them. For example, those who speak against smoking, on the one hand, must themselves smoke; on the other hand, they are simply not permitted to do so—because they themselves do not smoke, they lack the knowledge of its attraction which they condemn; if they smoke, however, one will not judge it legitimate that they repudiate themselves. For one to give an opinion about women "in the plural," will require the experience of close relations with them, just as being free and distant from them is needed to change the emotional judgment. Only when we become well acquainted with, stand within, be on a par with, do we have knowledge and understanding; only when distance breaks off the immediate contact in every sense do we have the objectivity and perspective that are just as necessary for judgment. This dualism of near and far, which is necessary for the uniformly proper action, belongs to some extent to the basic forms of our life and its problematic. That one and the same matter can be dealt with properly on the one hand only within a narrow formation, on the other hand only within a large one, is a formal sociological contradiction that constitutes a special case of those that are universally human.

that a given number of such individuals in a large group has a different meaning than in a small one; but their effectiveness changes with the quantitative change in the groups whether their own quantity rises or falls in exact proportion with that of the group. When a millionaire lives in a city of 10,000 inhabitants in economic intermediate position, that person's role in the life of the city and the overall physiognomy that the city gains through this citizen has a completely different meaning than each one of fifty millionaires, as the case may be, for a city of 500,000 inhabitants—although the numerical relation between the millionaire and the millionaire's fellow citizens, which however solely determined that meaning, remained unchanged. If there are four members in a party of twenty persons in a parliament critical of the party program or secessionist, their role in the trends and proceedings of the party will be a different one than if the party is fifty people strong and has ten rebels in its midst: in general, despite the identically remaining proportion, its significance of those ten will be greater in the larger party. Finally, it has been emphasized that a military tyranny, *ceteris paribus*, would be all the more durable the greater its domain, because if the army includes about one percent of the population, a population of ten million is more readily held in check with an army of 100,000 than a city of 100,000 with 100 soldiers or a village of 100 with one of its own. The peculiarity here is that the absolute number of the whole group and that of its influential members make the *relations* within the group noticeably different, even though their numerical proportion remains the same. Those arbitrarily augmented examples show that the relationship of sociological elements depends not only on the relative but also the absolute numerical quantity of these elements. Once such elements are described as a party within a group, the relationship of this party to the whole is then not only shifted when it rises or falls numerically while the latter remains constant, but also, when this change affects the whole and the part in fully the same measure; thereby the sociological meaning of the largeness or smallness of the *whole group* itself vis-à-vis the numerical *relations* of the elements is shown, where at first glance the meaning of the numbers for the inner relationships of the group alone appear to bind.

The difference in form in the group-related activity of individuals, which is determined by the size of the group, extends beyond its mere factual existence to the category of norm, that which should be done, perhaps most clearly as the difference between custom and law. It

seems as though, among the Aryan peoples, the primary bonds of individuals to a supra-individual order of life might start from an entirely universal instinct or concept that the rules, the proper, the obligatory would generally represent; it is perhaps the *dharma* of the Hindus, the θεμις [law] of the Greeks, the *fas* [divine will] of the Latins that reveal this undifferentiated "general normativity." The particular rules in the fields of religion, morality, convention and law are branches that still remain undivorced from it; it is their original unity, before subsequent abstraction. Contrary to the opinion now that morality, custom, and law developed, as it is were, as counterparts from that seed condition, it seems to me rather that they still live on in that which we call custom, and these represent the undifferentiated condition that releases from itself the form of law and of morality in various directions. Morality is pertinent for us here only in so far as it results in the conduct of the individual toward other individuals or toward the whole, thus having the same kind of content as custom and law. Only that the second subject, by whose opposition the behavioral form of morality develops in the individual, is situated in itself; with the same division by which the 'I' speaks to itself, 'I am'—while it places itself over against itself, as a knowing subject, over against itself as a known object—it also says to itself, 'I should.' The relationship of two subjects that emerges as imperative repeats itself by virtue of the fundamental capacity of our psyche to confront itself and to view and treat itself as an other inside the individual soul itself; meanwhile I leave it open whether this is a transfer of the empirically previously ongoing inter-individual relationship to the elements of the individual soul or originates more purely from its spontaneity. Now on the other hand once the normative forms have taken on definite contents, then these get free of their original sociological carriers and ascend to an inner and independent necessity that must be identified as ideal; these contents—ways of acting or states of the subject—are now valuable in and for themselves, they ought, and their being social in nature or somehow having social significance now no longer determines their imperative tone, which flows rather from their objective-ideal meaning and value. But neither that personal Gestalt of the moral nor this development of the three normativizations towards the aspect of objective and supra-social meaning prevents their contents from being considered here as social adaptations and the three forms as guarantees for their being realized by the individual. There are actually *forms* of the internal and external relation of the individual

to a social group; because the identical content of this relation has assumed now one and now the other of these motivations or formations: what at one time or in one place was custom has been elsewhere or later state law or was left to personal morality; what was upheld by the force of law became merely good custom; what was entrusted to the conscience of the individual was often enough later enforced by the state, etc. The extremities of this spectrum are law and morality, between which custom, from which both developed, stands virtually in the middle. Law has its differentiated organs in the legislative and the executive powers by which it can, first, define its focal content quite precisely and, second, enforce it externally; but it is thereby functionally limited to the completely *indispensable* preconditions of group life; what the general public of individuals *can* demand absolutely is only that that they *must* demand absolutely. On the other hand the unrestricted morality of the individual possesses no statute other than that given over to it autonomously from within, and no executive other than the conscience; thus its purview admittedly embraces in principle all activity, but in practice apparently has specific, random and fluctuating boundaries according to the context in every individual case.[5]

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[5] That law and morality alike arise from, as it were, *one* turn in social development is reflected in the teleological significance of both, mutually referencing each other more than a first appearance betrays. When the narrow behavior of the individual, which includes a life everywhere regulated by custom, loses ground to the legal norm, which is much more remote from all individuals—then the freedom attained thereby is not permitted, in the interest of society, to be left up to the self: the legal imperatives are supplemented by moral imperatives, and plug the gaps in the normative rule of life produced by the discontinuation of general regulation by custom. In contrast to custom, the normative regulation through both of them is relocated simultaneously much higher over the individual and much deeper into the self. Whatever the personal and metaphysical values both the conscience and autonomous morality may represent—their social ones, which alone are in question here, lie in their immense prophylactic function. Law and custom grasp onto the external and material reality of voluntary action, functioning thus purely preventively through fear; to render this motive unnecessary, mostly they just need additional absorption—albeit not always—into personal morality. However this lies at the root of action; it molds the innermost being of the subject until the correct deed is discharged by the self entirely from the self without requiring the support of those relatively external forces. But society has no interest in the purely moral perfection of the subject; it is only important to it, is only bred by it, insofar as it provides a conceivably broad guarantee of socially useful behavior now on the part of the subject. In individual morality, society itself creates an organ that is actually not only more effective than law and custom but in addition spares the expenses and formalities of those institutions; as is the tendency of society then, in order to provide its necessities as cheaply as possible, to nurture the 'good conscience,' whereby the individual rewards oneself for good behavior that would otherwise probably have to be guaranteed somehow by law or custom.

Now it is through custom that a circle secures for itself the proper behavior of its members when the force of law is inadmissible and individual morality unreliable. As today custom functions as a supplement to both of these orders, so was it at one time the sole rule for life when those differentiated forms of normativeness did not at all yet exist or only embryonically. The sociological location of custom is indicated thusly: it lies between the largest circle, each member of which is subordinate as an individual to law, and absolute individuality, which is the sole bearer of free morality. Thus it belongs to the smaller circles—the middle structures between them. Almost every custom is a status- or class-custom; its manners of expression in external behavior, in fashion, and in honor always govern only a subsection of the largest circle, which is shared with law, and have there again different content in neighboring sections.[6] To violations of beneficial customs only those of the smaller circle who are thereby somehow affected or are witnesses to them react, whereas a violation of the legal order calls for a reaction of the whole. Since custom has for its executive authority only public opinion and certain directly consequential reactions of individuals to it, it is out of the question that a large circle as such would govern it. The know-how requiring no design—that which commercial custom as such would offer or require compared to that of the aristocracy, that of a religious circle compared to that of a literary one, etc.—suggests that, for guaranteeing the same content of custom made up from specific conditions that a smaller circle required, neither the coercion of state law nor entirely dependable autonomous moral impulses are available. What is common to these and the primitive groups with which our social history begins is nothing other than being numerically inconsequential. The forms of life that at that time sufficed entirely for the solidarity of the circle withdrew upon its enlargement to its subsections. Because now these contain those possibilities of personal relationship that approximate equality of levels of membership, those common interests, and ideals, one can leave to them the social regulation of one of the more precarious and elastic types of normative regulation, such as custom. With an increasing number of elements and thus their inevitable increase of independence, these conditions cease to exist for the circle. The characteristic binding power of custom becomes too

[6] Compare here the discussion of the sociological form of honor in the chapter on the self-preservation of the group and the intersection of circles.

little for the state and too much for the individual, its *content* however too much for the state and too little for the individual. The former requires greater guarantees, the latter greater freedom, and only in those respects in which every element still belongs to mid-sized circles is it socially ruled by custom.

That the large circle requires and allows for stringent and objective normative regulation, crystallized as law, coincides with greater freedom, flexibility, and individuality on the part of its elements. If, therefore, on the one hand the socially necessary repressions must be fixed more precisely and guarded more rigorously, then this is, on the other hand, more tolerable for individuals because they have a greater latitude for freedom outside of these relentless pressures. So if on the one hand the socially necessary inhibitions must be set more narrowly and guarded more rigorously, still on the other this is more tolerable for individuals since they have so much greater latitude for freedom outside of these highly precise strictures. This is all the clearer the more the law or norm emerging from it is proscription or prohibition. Among the indigenous Brazilians it is generally forbidden to marry one's own sister or the daughter of one's brother. This applies all the more strongly the larger the tribe is, while in smaller more isolated hordes brother and sister often live together. The prohibitive character of the norm—which is more suited to law than to custom—is indicated more in the larger circle since it offers the individual ampler positive compensation than the smaller. In that the expansion of the group favors the transformation of its norms into the form of law, it becomes apparent, on the other hand, that many a unification of small structures into one larger occurred at first or continually only for the sake of legal administration, and their unity stands only in the sign of uniformly enforced law. Thus the county of the New England states was originally only "an aggregation of towns for *judicial purposes*." There are obvious exceptions to this connection linking the difference between the social form of custom and that of law to the quantitative difference of the circle. The original folk units of the Germanic tribes, over which the great Frankish, English, and Swedish empires arose, were often able to save their jurisdiction for a long time; frequently these particularly were nationalized relatively late. And, on the other hand, in modern international relations multiple customs that are not yet set in law prevail; inside the individual states some behavior is fixed as law that in the relationships towards the outside, thus inside the largest circle of

all, must be left to the more relaxed form of custom. The solution to the contradiction is simple. The size of the group naturally calls for the legal form only to the degree in which the multiplicity of its elements *is integrated into a unity*. Where, instead of a definite centralization, only rather loose commonalities allow the circle to be identified as *one* at all, this identification reveals very obviously its generally relative character. Social unity is an incremental concept, and if a form of regulation is required by a specific quantity of the circle, then it can be the same with a different quantity and a different one with the same quantity, if the degree of *unity* that it bears and by which it is borne is a different one. The significance of the numerical relationships is thus not at all discernible if a large circle on account of its specific tasks can or must do just as well without the legal form of its norms, as is otherwise possible only to a small one. The very disconnected state structures of early Germanic times simply did not yet possess the cohesion of the elements that is as much the cause as the effect of legal constitutions among contemporary large groups; and certain norms in the pure form of custom are produced in collective relationships between modern states just as in individual ones because here there is lacking the unity over the parties that is the carrier of a legal order, and is replaced in a small as well as in a less formal group by the more direct interactions from element to element; however, custom directly corresponds to them as a form of regulation. Thus even the apparent exceptions confirm the correlation that obtains between custom and law on the one hand and measurements of the group on the other.

Now it is obvious that the concepts, large and small circle, are of extraordinary scientific coarseness, quite vague and obscuring and actually only useful generally for suggesting the dependence of the sociological character of the form of a group on its quantitative circumstances—not, however, for indicating any more exactly the actual proportion that exists between the former and the latter. Nevertheless ascertaining this proportion more exactly is perhaps not ruled out in all cases. To be sure, to insert exact numerical values into the formations and relationships considered up to now would obviously be a completely fanciful venture in the foreseeable progression of our knowledge; but for the moment let us within more modest boundaries indicate characteristics of those social interactions that occur between a limited number of persons and are characterized by this limitation. As transitions from the fully numerical uncertainty to the fully numerical certainty I am

noting several cases in which the latter in principle already has its own sociological significance, but without a determination of the same having occurred in the individual.

1. Number functions as the group's principle of classification, *i.e.*, it will treat similar parts, produced through enumeration, as relative unities. Later I will discuss the particular meanings of the individual numbers for this, and highlight here only the principle. That a whole group, which somehow feels itself as *one*, generally divides itself, and indeed not only from top to bottom by the criterion of the ruling and the ruled, but even among its coordinated members—that is one of the greatest advances of humanity; it is the anatomical structure by which the higher organic-social processes are established. Now the classification can proceed from ancestry or voluntary associations or the similarity of occupations or grouping by districts; the numerical principle is linked to those; it divides the quantities of existing people or families into a certain number and so acquires quantitatively corresponding subdivisions, to each of which the whole relates roughly as their individuals are related to them. Now this principle is surely so schematic that it must in practice be fashioned into something more concrete: the numerically similar subdivisions, somehow closely associated with one another—relatives, friends, neighbors—were comprised of components that are complementary either by being similar or dissimilar. However it is crucial that the numerical similarity constitutes the formative principle of the categorizing—although it is never decisive *by itself* but only plays a role that varies from the greatest to the smallest. Nomadic tribes, for example, often in the absence of the more stable life pursuits, generally have hardly any other possibility to organize themselves than according to the principle of number; its significance for such a group on the march is still evident today determining the structure of the military. It continues naturally enough that with the dividing up of a conquered land or the colonization of a newly discovered one—where for the time being there is as yet no organization by some objective scale—the principle of incorporating in equally-proportioned shares prevails; for example, the oldest constitution of Iceland is ordered in that way. In a rather pure manner the Cleisthenes reform,[7] with this

[7] Cleisthenes (6th century B.C.E. Athenian) replaced an oligarchical government with a more democratic division of power, based on equal proportions of inhabitants organized into new "tribes"—ed.

principle, brought about one of the greatest social-historical revolutions. When he established a council of five hundred members, fifty from each of the ten *phyles*, each *demos* received a corresponding number of council seats according to its headcount.[8] The rational idea, to create a representative body from the whole group purely by the principle of number, exceeds the typical "*centuria*" (about which more is to be said hereafter) as a higher state of development, and for the first time uses the method of purely numerical division to enable governmental entity to function as the symbol of the people.

2. While so far it is a matter of separate divisions of the same size, number can also be used to distinguish from a total group a unique and indeed leading circle of persons. Thus one often called the guild leader according to its number: in Frankfurt with the wool weavers they were called the Six, with the bakers the Eight; in medieval Barcelona the senate was the One Hundred, etc. It is most peculiar how, in itself least revealing, even the *most prominent* personalities are identified by number regardless of any other qualification. It seems to me that the presupposition behind this is that by a number such as six is meant not 6 individual elements existing in isolation from one another but a synthesis of them; six is not 1 and 1 and 1 etc., but a new concept that results from the *combination* of these elements and is not realized pro rata in each of them for itself. In this book I identify the living functional interaction of elements often as their unity, which would rise above their mere sum and in sociological contrast to it. Here, however, by the identification of a directorship, a committee and so forth with the mere sum is meant in reality that functional combination, and as designation it is then even possible that the number signifies also even a unity from unities. In the case alluded to, the Six are not simply scattered about in a homogeneous group, but they stand for a specific and fixed *structure of the group*, by which six persons from it are given prominence and forged together into a leading entity. The character-less impersonality of naming with a number is here even exceedingly characteristic; for it indicates more definitely than could any less formal idea, that no individuals are hereby as persons meant, but that it is purely a social structure: the structure of the group requires a certain contingent of itself as leadership. In that purely numerical idea lies the pure objectivity of the formation, which is indifferent toward everything

[8] Greek: *phyle*, tribe; *demos*, people—ed.

personal on the part of the members and only requires that one simply be one of the Six. There is perhaps scarcely any more effective expression with which to indicate at one and the same time the elevation of individuals and the complete irrelevance of what they are as persons apart from this function.

The formation of group unity that is revealed in the assembling of members in a greater number is emphasized especially strongly with an ostensive exception. The Senate of Barcelona, which is called the One Hundred, eventually had in reality more members, up to two hundred, without for that reason changing its name. The same phenomenon arises when the number functions not as a principle of emphasis but as a principle of classification. Wherever hereafter the handling of classification of the population consisted of groups of a hundred, this membership of the division was almost nowhere strictly adhered to. This is expressly reported by the ancient Germanic groups of hundred. There the number becomes a direct synonym for the social sector that at first included or was supposed to include such a circle of individuals. This inconspicuous fact shows the enormous importance of numerical determination for the structure of the group. The number even becomes independent of its arithmetical content; it shows only that the relationship of the member to the whole is a numerical one, or the firmly established number stands for this relationship. Only the idea of classification by a hundred elements remains, while the empirical relationships realize this only more or less exactly. When it was said of the Germanic groups of hundred that they would express only an indeterminately large quantity between the individual and the whole cohort—then this indicates precisely the sociologically identified type: the life of the group requires a middle-level entity between the one and the all, a vehicle for certain functions that neither the one nor the other can accomplish, and the structure designated for these tasks is labeled simply according to its *numerical* determination. The *functions* do not supply the name because they are multiple and changing; what remains the same is only the bringing together of some part of the totality into a unit. How *large* this part is at any given time may be uncertain; the enduring numerical designation indicates that the general numerical relationship was felt to be the essential thing. There emerges thereby an occurrence in the social realm whose psychological form also shows up elsewhere. The Russian coin denominations are supposed to be derived from an old system of weights in such a way that every higher denomination contains ten times the one below it. Actually, however,

not only the absolute, but also the relative metal content of the coins changed frequently, whereupon, though, their relative value, once they were brought into the numerical order, remained the same. Whereas the actual values of the metal change relatively, the role that they have to play in exchange is assigned by the constancy of these face-value relations so that their historically first weight-relations permanently provide the name and symbol for these relations. Also the number comes to be the representative of the thing that it enumerates, and then the essence is thereby designated so that it is a matter of a relation between the whole and a part, in that the numerical meaning of the earliest relations covers all later variations. The metal extraction tax in sixteenth century Spain was called the *Quinto* because it amounted to a fifth of the value; and it would retain this name later, albeit with entirely different proportions. Thus the word *tithe* came, already among the ancient Israelites and in variety of ways, to simply mean levy—as the group of hundred came to mean simply a section. That the quantitative relation, which is the essence of the tax as well as the social classification, became psychologically dominant over its particular content proves most conclusively that the original numerical moniker crystalizes into a designation for modifications in the relationship.

3. The numerical determination as organizational form occupies a position inside the development of society. Specifically, quantitative classification emerges historically as a substitute for the principle of the clan. Apparently in many places the groups had at first been composed of kin-affiliated subgroups, each of which formed an entity economically, penally, politically, and in other respects; that this internally very well established organization was replaced by the forging together of ten or a hundred persons directly even into those solidifying capacities—can appear at first as a strange trivialization, a schematic completely devoid of inner life. One would also search in vain among the inherently cohesive principles of this group for a justification of that organic root being replaced by this mechanical formulaic principle. Rather the basis for this can only reside in the *whole* that is made up of such classifications and makes demands that are independent of the life principles of its parts. To the extent that the whole as unity becomes more encompassing and powerful, the parts lose their particular meaning—at least at first and before the highest stages of development; they yield to the whole the meaning that they possessed in and for themselves, and are then the more functional the less any self-sufficient idea lives in each of them and the more they, as parts lacking their own character, receive in return

a position and importance only from their contribution to the whole.[9] This does not apply to certain of the most complete types of development: there are social structures, especially of the most formidable size and most complete organization, that can allow the individual element the greatest freedom to live according to its peculiar norms and in its most idiosyncratic forms; on the other hand there are such that attain the strength of the whole only on the condition of their elements having their own most enhanced and differentiated life. The transition from clan to Hundred, however, seems to indicate that middle stage in which the inner meaningless and characterless nature of the members means progress for the whole; then only so were they easily managed under the given circumstances, directed by simple norms and without that resistance to the central authority that emerges all too easily with any subgroup of a stronger internal solidarity.

Where the composition or action of the group is quantitatively determined—from the ancient group of hundred to the modern rule of the majority—a suppression of individuality is present; it is a point at which the profound internal discrepancy between actual democratic and liberal-individualist social thought very clearly appears. That one produces an "approximate total" from personalities, and goes on like this without any consideration of the distinctiveness of the individuals involved; that one counts the votes and does not weigh them; that institutions, prescriptions and proscriptions, achievements and capacities are from the outset firmly fixed at a particular number—that is either despotic or democratic, but in any case it is a reduction of the actual and total substance of the individual personality to the formal fact that it is simply *one*; in that it takes a position in an organization only by virtue of a number, one's character as a member of the group has become the complete master over one's distinctive character as an individual. The classification into numerically equal subgroups may thus be continuously modified as roughly and practically as in the groups of hundred of the Germans, the Peruvians, and the Chinese, or purposefully and exactly refined as in a modern army—here it always indicates most clearly and most mercilessly the legal form of the group existing for itself, there as a new emergent tendency, still in a position of constant struggle and compromise with others, in full development. The supra-individuality of the grouping, the fully developing independence of its

[9] See the introduction to the chapter in this volume on the intersection of circles.

form vis-à-vis any reality of individual existence, lives nowhere more absolutely and more emphatically than in the reduction of the principles of organization to purely mathematical relationships; and the extent to which this occurs, as it very often appears in the most varied groups, is at the same time the extent to which the idea of being a group in its most abstract form has absorbed the individuality of its factors.

4. Finally, important sociological consequences are linked to quantitative determination—although the effective number of elements can be entirely different depending on the circumstances—of a kind that 'society' exemplifies now and again in the modern sense of sociability. How many persons must one invite for it to be a 'society'?[10] Evidently the qualitative relationships between host and guests does not decide the matter; and the invitation of two or three persons who stand in relation to us fully formally and not subjectively still does not bring about 'society'—whereas this does occur if we gather together fifteen close friends. The number always remains decisive, although its *size* in individual cases naturally depends on the quality and closeness of the relationships among the members. The three circumstances—the relationships of the host to each of the guests by itself, the guests to one another, the way each participant subjectively experiences all these relationships—form the basis on which the number of participants then decides whether a society or a mere being together (of the nature of friendship or matter-of-fact in purpose) exists. There is here thus generated with every numerical modification a very definitely experienced change into an entirely different sociological category—thus little of the extent of this modification is to be grasped with our psychological resources. But at least the qualitative sociological results of the quantitative cause can be described to some extent.

First of all, 'society' requires a rather specific external set-up. Whoever invites one or two from a circle of, say, thirty acquaintances desires 'nothing formal.' But if someone invites all thirty at the same time, there immediately arises entirely new demands for food, drink, attire, etiquette, an extraordinarily increased expenditure for aspects

[10] In this numbered section Simmel has numerous instances of '*Gesellschaft*' in quotation marks and seems to want to indicate thereby an undetermined number of participants at which a social gathering or occasion takes on a level of objectivity transcending the inter-subjective reality of intimates. Where in this section he puts *Gesellschaft* in quotation marks, we've translated it 'society'; and where he has used *Gesellschaft* without quotation marks, we've translated it as 'social gathering' or 'social occasion'—ed.

of sensual attractions and enjoyments. This is a very clear example of how the mere increase in size reduces the intensity of personalities. In a considerably smaller gathering a kind of reciprocal accommodation is possible; the common ground that makes up the contents of their sociability can include such all-embracing or highly suitable portions of their individualities that the gathering takes on the character of intellectuality, of differentiated and most highly developed psychic energy. However, the more persons who congregate, the lower the possibility that they will coincide in those more valuable and intimately essential aspects, the more deeply must that point be sought that is common to their motives and interests.[11]

To the extent, however, that the number of members provides no place for the more highly personal and intellectual pursuits, one must seek to compensate for the shortage of these charms through an increase in the superficial and sensory. The shear joy of being together has always had a particularly close connection to the number of festively gathered persons and the extravagance; at the end of the middle ages, for example, the extravagance at weddings went so far with the retinue escorting the bridal couples that the authorities sometimes prescribed through their sumptuary laws exactly how many persons the entourage would be allowed to have. If food and drink has always been the medium for the association of a wider circle, for which an integrative mood and interest in another direction would be difficult to achieve, so a 'society,' then, purely on account of a quantitative composition that rules out the commonality and social interaction of the subtle and intellectual moods, will have to accentuate all the more strongly and certainly these sensual pleasures common to all.

A further characteristic of 'society' on the basis of its numerical difference, in contrast to the gathering of a few, is found in that a full uniformity of mood cannot in general, as with the latter, be achieved and

[11] Consequently the complaint about the banality of interaction in large social gatherings manifests complete sociological misunderstanding. The relatively low level of intensity on which a larger grouping gathers is not in principle remediable. Since all the higher and finer attainments are of a more individual kind and are thus not suited for commonality of content, they can in any case have a socializing effect, should a unity be acquired through a division of labor—which, however, is apparently possible only inside a 'society' of a small size, and at higher quantities would negate its very nature. It is therefore a thoroughly correct sociological instinct when one senses the more notable emergence of personal individuality in a 'society' often as a bit of tactlessness—even one in itself meaningful and enjoyable.

furthermore should not; rather, on the contrary, in a further contrast, the formation of subgroups is indicated. The life principle of a social gathering of a few personal friends is very much opposed to dividing, say, into two separate moods, indeed even only separate conversations; 'society' is present in that moment, when instead of its necessarily *one* center, a duality emerges: on the one hand an inclusive but still rather informal centrality that is essentially found only outwardly and physically—which is why social gatherings of the same social level, the larger they are, the more they resemble one another as wholes, just as their personal exchanges are also more diverse; on the other hand the special small centers of shared conversation, mood, interest, which, however, continuously exchange participants. Consequently there is the continual alternating between engaging and breaking off in the large social gathering, which will be experienced, depending on the temperament of the subject, one moment as the most unbearable superficiality, the next as an effortless rhythm of high aesthetic charm. This technical sociological type is demonstrated in a particularly pure example by the ball with the modern style of dance: a momentary relationship always of a couple of actually fanciful closeness develops into an entirely new form through the constant exchange between couples; that physical closeness between each other of complete strangers makes it possible here for all the guests to be *one* host who, however casual the relationship to this host may be, permits a certain reciprocal assurance and legitimation, there again by way of the impersonal, quasi anonymous character of the relationships that the size of the social gathering and its formalistically bound behavior offers. Obviously these traits of the large social occasion, which the ball presents, as it were, by sublimating, perhaps even caricaturing them, are tied to a certain minimum of participants; and one can sometimes make the interesting observation that an intimate group of fewer persons takes on the character of 'society' through the arrival of one single additional person.

In one case, which certainly concerns a far less complicated human matter, the size that produces a particular sociological institutional structure appears to be set somewhat more firmly. The patriarchal family household in the most diverse settings and even under wholly different economic conditions always numbers twenty to thirty people, so that those conditions cannot be the cause or at least not the exclusive cause of the similarity in size. It is rather likely that the internal interactions that constitute the particular structure of the household generate the necessary proportions of narrowness and width for precisely within

that boundary. The patriarchal family was everywhere characterized by a great intimacy and solidarity, which had its center in the *pater familias*, the paternalism of which he exercised over the affairs of every individual in the interest of the whole as well as in his own egoistic interest. Hence arose the upper limit: this kind of cohesion and control appears to be able to include no greater quantity of members for the corresponding psychological level of development. On the other hand the lower limit follows from the fact that such a self-reliant group must cultivate for its self-sufficiency and its self-preservation certain collective psychological realities that tend to materialize only above a certain numerical threshold: resoluteness for the offensive and defensive, confidence on the part of each one always to find the necessary support and reinforcement, above all: the religious spirit whose elevation and inspiration arises, at first from the mixture of many contributing factors, in mutual elimination of their peculiarly individual character, above the individuals—or: lifts the individuals above themselves. The number mentioned specified perhaps empirically the approximate range over which and under which the group could not go if it would cultivate the character traits of the patriarchal household. It appears as though with growing individualization, beyond this level of civilization, those intimacies were possible only among an ever decreasing number of persons; on the other hand the phenomena relevant to the *size* of the family required precisely an ever growing circle. The needs that were realized above and below this numerical complement differentiated; one part requires a smaller complement, the other a larger one, so that later on one finds no structure anymore that can suffice for them in the same consistent manner as the patriarchal family had.

Apart from such singular cases, all those questions pertinent to the numerical requirement for a 'society' have a sophistic tone: how many soldiers make up an army, how many participants are necessary for a political party, how many joiners make a crowd. They seem to repeat the classical questions: how many grains of wheat make up a heap? Since, then, one, two, three, four grains do not do it at all, but a thousand certainly, there would have to be a boundary between these numbers at which the addition of a single grain to the previous ones would make a 'heap'; however, should someone make this attempt at continuous counting, it becomes evident that no one is able to identify this boundary. The logical basis of these difficulties lies in there being a numerical series that appears continuously, ceaselessly increasing due to the relative insignificance of each individual element, and that this

at some point is to allow for the application of a qualitatively new idea, abruptly replacing altogether one previously applied. This is obviously a contradictory requirement: the continuous, conceptually, simply cannot justify purely from itself a sudden break and transition. The sociological difficulty, however, has another complication that lies beyond that of the ancient sophists. Because by a 'heap' of grain one understands either an accumulation, and then one is logically justified in calling it that as soon as only one layer simply appears over the spot underneath; or should it thereby be designated simply by an amount, then it is unjustifiably required from a concept such as heap, which by its very nature is rather variable and indeterminate, that it should acquiesce in its application now to entirely determinate unambiguously delimited realities. In the sociological cases, however, characteristically wholly new phenomena appear with an increasing quantity that appear not even proportionately at the lower existing quantity: a political party has a qualitatively different significance from a small clique; several curious spectators standing together manifest different characteristics than a 'crowd,' etc. The uncertainty coming from the impossibility of numerically grasping these concepts by the corresponding quantities might be resolved in the following way. That vacillation concerns apparently only certain middling sizes; some lower numbers do not yet reliably comprise the collectivities in question; some rather high ones comprise them entirely without question. Now there are indeed those qualities sociologically signifying a numerically more negligible formation: the gathering that falls short of 'society,' the troop of soldiers that does not yet make up an army, the collaborating miscreants who are not quite a 'gang.' While these qualities stand in contrast to others arguably characteristic of the *large* community, the character of the numerically in-between can be interpreted to comprise both, so that each of the two is made rudimentarily perceptible in individual features, now emerging, now disappearing, or becoming latent. Thus while such structures situated in the numerically middle zone also objectively participate partially or alternately in the definitive character of that situated above it or below it, the subjective uncertainty in deciding which of the two they belong to is to be explained. It is thus not that in a formation without sociological qualities suddenly, like the crystal in the mother liquid, a quite definite sociological constellation is supposed to start, without one, though, knowing the distinct moment of this transformation; but rather it is that two different kinds of formations, each consisting of a number of features and variously qualitatively nuanced, converge under

certain quantitative conditions in a social structure and share the latter between themselves in a variety of ways; so that the question, to which of the two the structure belongs, does not at all suffer from the difficulty of recognizing a continuous series but is instead one posed in an objectively false manner.[12]

These convergences then would affect social formations that indeed depend on the number of interacting elements, but without this dependence being sufficiently formulated for us to be conscious of them for purposes of drawing their sociological consequences from individual specific quantities. However, this latter is not out of the question if we are satisfied with just adequate elementary forms. If we begin with the lower limit of the quantitative range, mathematically determined sizes appear as unambiguous preconditions for characteristically sociological structures.

The numerically simplest formations that can still be characterized as social interaction at all seem to arise, of course, between two elements. However, there is, viewed from the outside, an as yet simpler structure that belongs among sociological categories; namely—as paradoxically and actually contradictory as it seems—the isolated individual person.

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[12] More exactly, however, the situation is probably this. To every definite number of elements, there corresponds, depending on the purpose and meaning of its association, a sociological form, an arranging, cohesiveness, relationship of the parts to the whole, etc.—that with each and every arriving and departing member, a modification, however immeasurably small and imperceptible, is experienced. But since we do not have a specific expression for each of these endlessly many sociological situations, even when for us perceptible in its nature, often nothing else remains but to think of it as made up from two situations—one more, as it were, relevant, the other less. In any event it is thereby not so much a matter of a composite as it is, say, the so-called emotional blend of friendship and love, or hate and contempt, or pleasure and pain. Here there is in most cases an integrative emotional state—which will occupy us later on—for which we have no immediate concept and which we therefore through synthesis and mutual qualification of two others paraphrase more than describe; here as elsewhere the actual unity of being is not available to us, but we must break it up into a duality of elements, neither of which covers it completely, in order to have it emerge from the interweaving of the two. This is, however, only a conceptual analysis possible after the fact that does not trace the actual process of becoming the distinct being of those entities. So where the concepts coined for social units—meeting and society, troop and army, clique and party, pair and gang, personal following and school, assembly and crowd—find no certain application, because the human material for the one seems to be too little and for the other too much, there remains nevertheless as precise a standard sociological formation of as precise a correspondence specifically to the numerical qualification as in those more definitive cases. It is only that the lack of a specific concept for these countless nuances forces us to describe their qualities as a mixture of the forms that correspond to numerically smaller and numerically higher structures.

As a matter of fact, though, the processes that shape the duality of elements are often simpler than those necessary for the sociological characterization of the singular. For the latter it is a matter principally of two pertinent phenomena: solitariness and freedom. The shear fact that an individual is not at all in any kind of interaction with other individuals is of course not a sociological one, but still it also does not satisfy the full concept of the solitary. This, in fact, so far as it is emphasized and internally meaningful, does not in any way mean simply the absence of any society, but rather its existence somehow imagined and only then negated. Solitude receives its unambiguously positive meaning as a distant effect of society—be it as echoes of past or anticipation of future relationships, be it as yearning or as voluntary seclusion. The solitary person is not thus characterized as though from time immemorial the sole inhabitant of the earth; rather even such a *person's* situation is determined by social interaction, albeit negatively denoted. All the joy as well as all the bitterness of solitude are indeed only different kinds of reaction to socially experienced influences; it is an interaction from which the one member is actually separate after exercising certain influences and yet lives on and functions yet in the imagination of the other subject. Rather characteristic of this is the well-known psychological fact that the feeling of being alone seldom appears so decidedly and hauntingly in an actual physical isolation as when one is conscious of oneself as alien and disconnected among many physically quite present people—at a social gathering, in the train car, in the crush of the crowded urban street. It is necessarily essentially a matter of the configuration of a group whether it fosters or in general enables such manufactured feelings of loneliness in its midst. Close and intimate communities do not often allow such an, as it were, intercellular vacuum in their structure. As one speaks, however, of a social deficit that is produced in certain amounts according to the social conditions: the antisocial phenomena of the disenfranchised, criminals, prostitutes, suicides—so a given quantity and quality of social life produces a certain number of occasional or chronically lonely existences that the statistics by themselves certainly cannot grasp numerically. In another manner solitude becomes sociologically meaningful as soon as it no longer consists of a relationship occurring in an individual between the individual and a specific group or the group life in general but rather emerges as pause or periodical differentiation inside of one and the same relationship. This becomes important for those relationships that are concerned, based on their foundational concepts, precisely with

the ongoing negation of solitude, such as, above all, the monogamous marriage. In so far as the finest internal nuances find expression in its constitution, it makes a fundamental difference whether husband and wife have indeed still preserved the joy of solitude for themselves or whether their relationship is never to be interrupted by indulgence in this—be it because their habitual togetherness has deprived them of the attractiveness of it, be it because a lack of inner security of love leads them to fear those kinds of interruptions as betrayals or, worse, as a *threat* to fidelity. Thus solitude, a phenomenon apparently limited to the individual subject, consisting in the negation of sociality, is nevertheless of highly positive sociological significance: not only from the perspective of the subject, in whom it exhibits as conscious perception an entirely given relationship to society, but also through the definitive characteristic that offers up encompassing groups as well as the most intimate relationships, as cause as well as effect, for its occurrence.

Among its many sociological implications, freedom also has an aspect pertinent to this. It too appears at first as the simple negation of social connection, because every connection is a relationship. Free persons simply do not form unities together with others, but are ones for themselves. Now there may be a freedom that exists in this sheer unrelatedness, in the sheer absence of any limitation by other beings: a Christian or Hindu hermit, a solitary settler in a German or American forest may enjoy a freedom in the sense that one's existence is filled throughout with other than social contents—likewise perhaps a collectivity, a household, or a political entity that exists completely insulated, without neighbors, and without relationships to other entities. However, for an entity that exists in connection to others, freedom has a much more positive meaning. It is a specific kind of relationship to the environment, a co-relational phenomenon that loses its meaning if there is no counterpart. It has in this regard two extremely important meanings for the deep structure of society.

1. For social people, freedom is neither a self-evident condition given at the outset nor a possession of more-or-less substantial durability acquired for all time. For sure not just because every single hypothetical demand that engages the strength of the individual generally towards a particular course actually has the tendency to proceed without limits; almost all relationships—governmental, party, family, friendship, erotic—though voluntary, go overboard and spin their demands, if left to their own resources, out over everybody; emotionally they become often uncannily surrounded by an imaginary sphere from which one

then must emphatically mark out for oneself a reserve of strengths, commitments, interests. However, it is not only the extensiveness of demands by which the social egoism of any social involvement endangers the freedom of its participants but indeed the relentlessness with which the entirely one-sided and narrow demand of already existing bonds likewise emerges. Each one of this sort tends to assert its rights with complete lack of mercy and indifference toward other interests and duties—whether they are compatible with it or fully incompatible—and limits the freedom of the individual by this nature of its manner no less than by its quantitative extent. Over against this form of our relationships freedom manifests itself as an ongoing process of liberation, as a struggle not only for the independence of the 'I' but also for the right even to remain in the *interdependence* each moment with *free will*—as a struggle that must be renewed after each victory. Detachment as negative social behavior is thus in reality almost never a dormant property but a ceaseless loosening from bonds that continually either actually restrict the being-for-self of the individual or strive to do so in principle; freedom is not a solipsistic existence but a sociological event, not a situation confined to the singularity of the subject but a relationship, albeit definitely viewed from the standpoint of the one subject.

2. Considered functionally as well as substantively, freedom is something completely other than the repudiation of relationships, than the untouchability of the individual spheres by those located nearby. It follows from that very simple idea that a person is not only free but indeed also wants to use that freedom for something. This use, however, is for the most part nothing other than the domination and exploitation of other people. For the social individual (*i.e.*, one living in permanent interrelationships with others) freedom would in countless instances be entirely without content and purpose if it did not make possible or constitute the extension of one's will to those others. Quite correctly our language identifies certain insults and violations as 'having taken liberties with someone,' and likewise many languages have used their word for freedom in the sense of right or privilege. The purely negative character of freedom as a relationship of the subject to one's self complements a very positive one in two ways: freedom exists for the most part in a process of liberation, it rises above and against a bond, and remains then as a reaction against this meaning, consciousness, and value; and it consists no less of a power relationship to others, of the possibility of acquiring advantage inside of a relationship, of the obligation or subjugation of the other, in which freedom only then

finds its value and its realization. The inherent meaning of freedom for the subject is thus only as the watershed between both of its social relevancies: that the subject is bound by others and binds others. It shrivels up to nothing, so to speak, thereby revealing the actual meaning of freedom, even when visualized as a quality of the individual, as indeed this twofold social relationship.

Since now there are such frequent multi-faceted and indirect connections consisting of determinants such as solitude and freedom, but still though as sociological forms of relationship—nevertheless the *methodologically* most simple sociological formation simply remains effectively that between *two* participants. It provides the prototype, the germ, and the material for countless complex cases, although its sociological importance in no way rests only on its expansion and diversification. Rather it is itself indeed a social interaction with which not only many forms of such are generally very purely and characteristically realized, but the reduction to the duality of elements is even the condition under which alone a variety of forms of relation emerge. The typical sociological entity reveals itself then, in that not only does the greatest diversity of individuality and the attendant motives not alter the identity of these formations, but that even these occasionally arise as much between two groups—families, states, associations of different kinds—as between two individual persons.

The specific characterization of a relationship through the duality of participants fully represents everyday experiences: a common share, an undertaking, an agreement, a shared secret binds participants into twos in a way quite different than when only three participate in it. Perhaps this is most characteristic of the secret, wherein the general experience seems to show that this minimum, with which the secret crosses the boundary of the being-for-itself, is at the same time the maximum with which its preservation is reasonably secured. A secret ecclesiastic-political society that was organized in France and Italy at the beginning of the nineteenth century had separate grades, whereby the actual governing secrets were known only to the higher of these grades; permitted to be *discussed*, however, only between *two* members each of those high grades. The limit of two is thus felt to be so decisive that, where it can no longer be maintained with respect to knowledge, it is still observed with respect to speech! Now in general the difference between the bond of two and that of more members is thereby set, in that that relationship, as a unity of two individuals, stands to each of the participants as greater-numbered formations stand to it. Much as

it may appear, say, to a third party as an independent entity above the individual, that is as a rule not the case for its participants, but each sees oneself in relation to the other, and not as one in an overarching collectivity. The social structure rests directly on the one and on the other. The departure of any individual would destroy the whole, so it does not attain the same supra-personal life that one feels as independent of oneself; whereas already even with a social formation of three a *group* can yet continue to exist even after the departure of one.

This dependence of the dyad on the pure individuality of the single member lets the idea of its existence be accompanied by that of its end in a way more nearly and perceptibly than is the case with other unions, which all members know can survive their individual departures or deaths. Just as the life of the individual is shaded in some way by the idea of one's death, so is the life of associations. By 'idea' is here understood not only the theoretical, conscious thought but a portion or modification of our being. Death stands before us not as a fate that will at any moment intrude, previously only as an idea or prophecy, as a present fear or hope, without interfering in the reality of this life until it occurs. Rather, that we will die is from the very beginning of life an intrinsic quality; in all of our living reality something *is*, which later as our death simply finds its last phase or revelation: we *are*, from our birth on, something that will die. Admittedly we vary in this; not only does it vary in the way that we subjectively imagine this quality and its final effect and react to it, but the way in which this element of our being interweaves with its other elements is of most extreme diversity. And so it is with groups. Every multimember group can be immortal in its idea, and this gives each of its members as such a completely unique sociological feeling, however one wishes to face death personally.[13] That, however, a union of two, certainly not with regard to its life but with regard to its death, depends on each of its elements for its very being—because two are required for its life, not however for its death—the entire inner attitude of the individual must contribute to it, albeit not always consciously and not always equably. For the feeling of bonding, there has to be a tone of peril and of indispensability which makes it on the one hand an actual place of a

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[13] Compare the more detailed examination of this in the chapter on the self-preservation of the group.

genuine sociological tragedy, on the other hand a sentimentality and mournful problematic.

This tone is generally pervasive where the end of the union is organically grafted into its positive structure. From a northern French city recently there was a report of a strange 'Union of the Broken Dish.' For years there, some industrialists are supposed to have joined in a meal. Once when a dish fell to the ground and broke, someone remarked by chance that the number of pieces was exactly the same as the number of people present—an omen for them to join together in a union of friendship in which each should owe the others good turns and assistance. Each of the gentlemen took a piece of the dish. Whenever one of them dies, his porcelain fragment is delivered back to the chairman, who glues the pieces handed back to him together. The last survivor is then supposed to glue the last piece, and the thusly repaired dish must be quickly buried. With that the 'Union of the Broken Dish' is finally liquidated and vanishes. Undoubtedly, the emotional tone inside this fellowship and in relationship to it would be a completely changed one if new members had been admitted and its life thereby perpetuated indefinitely. Its being designed from the very beginning to die gives it a certain *cachet*—which dyadic affiliations possess at the outset by virtue of the numerical limitation of their structure.

From the same structural foundation also only relationships of two are actually exposed to the characteristic coloration or decoloration that we identify as triviality. Because only where the claim to an individuality is productive of its appearance or achievement, the feeling of triviality produces its absence. It is still hardly adequately observed how relationships, with fully unchanged content, are colored by the pervading imagination, however frequently or rarely similarly constituted. It is not only erotic relationships that receive through imagination (that there has never yet been such an experience) a special and meaningful timbre quite apart from their otherwise ostensible content and worth. Perhaps since there is hardly any externally objective property whose value—not only its economic value—would not from the infrequency or frequency contribute to the consciousness or unconsciousness of such, so perhaps also no relationship in its inner meaning for its carriers is independent of the factor of its amount of recurrence; this rate of occurrence can also mean thereby the repetitions of the same contents, situations, excitements inside the relationship itself. With the feeling of triviality we associate a certain level of frequency, of consciousness of the repetition of life content, the value of which is contingent directly upon a level

of infrequency. Now it seems as though the life of a supra-individual social entity or the relationship of the individual to it has generally not faced this question, as though here, where the substantive meaning of the relationship transcends the individuality, even its individuality in the sense of the uniqueness or infrequency played no role and its absence thus operated as triviality. For the dyadic relationships of love, of marriage, of friendship—or even such higher numbered relationships that produce no higher structure often than the social gathering—the tone of triviality leading to despair or ruin proves the sociological character of the dual formations: to commit to the immediacy of the interaction and to deprive each of the elements of the supra-individual unity facing them, while they simultaneously partake of it.

That the sociological event remains thus within the personal apart-and-dependent existence, without the elements progressing to the formation of an overarching whole—as it exists in principle even with groups of two—is, moreover, the basis of 'intimacy.' This characteristic of a relationship seems to me to return to the initially individual disposition: in that the person gladly differentiates oneself from the other, the qualitatively individual is regarded as the core, value, and *sine qua non* of one's existence—a presumption in no way always justified since for many it is quite typically the contrary, the essence and substantial value of their personality shared with others. Now this repeats itself with aggregations. For them, too, it is manifest that the quite unique contents their participants share with one another but with no one outside this community have become the center and the real gratification of this community. This is the form of intimacy. To be sure, in every relationship some components, which its carriers contribute only to this relationship and no other, blend with others that are not exactly unique to this relationship but which the individual also shares in the same or similar way with other persons. Now as soon as that first, the internal aspect of the relationship, is experienced as its essence, as soon as it establishes its affective structure on that which each one gives or shows exclusively only to their own and to no one else—then the characteristic coloration is given that one calls intimacy. It is not the content of the relationship on which this rests. Two relationships, with regard to the mix of individual-exclusive contents as well as those radiating out in other directions, may be quite similar: only that one is *intimate* in which the former appears as the vehicle or axis of the relationship. When on the contrary certain people on the outside or people whose disposition is relatively alien to us initiate expressions and

confessions like those that are otherwise reserved only for those closest to us, in such a case we nevertheless feel that this 'intimate' relational *content* does not yet make it intimate; because our entire relationship even to these people rests in its substance and its meaning still only on its general, non-individual components, and the former, certainly otherwise perhaps never revealed, nevertheless allows the relationship its own exclusive content because it does not become the basis of its form outside of intimacy. That this is the essence of intimacy makes it thus frequently a danger for closely bound dyads, perhaps most of all for marriage. In that the couple share the little 'intimacies' of the day, the kindnesses or unkindnesses of the hour, the faults carefully hidden from all others—it stands to reason that to transfer the accent and the substance of the relationship directly into the definitely fully individualistic, yet still objectively entirely irrelevant, and to view it as though actually lying outside the marriage, as something which one also shares with others, and which is perhaps the most important of the personality, the spiritual, the gracious, the general interests, is to gradually remove it from marriage.

Now there is the matter of how much the intimate character of the dyadic bond is connected to its sociological specificity, forming from it no higher unity over its individual elements. For this unity, its concrete carriers being thus so very much only those two, would be indeed effectively a third that can somehow come between them. The more extensive a community is, the easier it is, on the one hand, for an objective unity to form over the individuals, and, on the other, the less intimate it becomes; both of these characteristics are internally connected. That one is merely faced with others in a relationship and does not at the same time feel an objective supra-individual structure as existing and real—that is yet seldom actually fully clear in triadic relationships, but is nevertheless the condition of intimacy. That a third thus added to the two persons of a group interrupts the most intimate feeling, is significant for the more delicate structure of the groupings of two; and it is valid in principle that even marriage, as soon as it has led to a child, is sometimes undermined. It is worthwhile substantiating this with a few words in order to characterize the affiliation of two members.

Just as duality, which tends to shape the form of our life content, presses toward reconciliations, whose successes as much as their failures make that duality all the more visible—so the masculine and the feminine, as the first example or prototype of this, press towards another,

for unification, which becomes possible precisely only by way of the contrasting character of both, and which stands directly before the most impassioned desire for one another, in one another as something in the deepest unattainable ground. That it remains denied to the 'I' to grasp the 'Not I' actually and absolutely becomes nowhere more deeply felt than here where opposites nevertheless appear created for completion and fusion. Passion seeks to tear down the boundaries of the 'I' and merge with the other; however, they do not become an entity, but rather a new entity results: the child. And the characteristically dualistic condition of its becoming: a closeness that must nevertheless remain a remoteness, and its ultimate, which the soul desires, can never be reached, and a remoteness that presses endlessly to become one—with this, what has become stands also between its progenitors, and these varying sentiments associated with them allow now one, now the other to take effect. So it is that cold, internally estranged marriages desire no child because it binds: its uniting function highlights the foundation of that dominant estrangement all the more effectively, but also all the more undesired. Sometimes however very passionate and fervent marriages also want no child—because it divides. The metaphysical oneness, into which both sought to fuse only with one another, has now slipped through their fingers and stands over against them as a third physical presence that intrudes between them. But even a go-between must appear as a separation, to those who desire unmediated unity, in the same way that a bridge connects two banks, but nevertheless forms a measurable gap between them; and where a go-between is superfluous, it is worse than superfluous.

For all that the monogamous marriage seems here to be of the essential completion of the sociological character of dyadic groupings—which is given through the absence of a supra-personal entity—an exception has to be made. The not-at-all unusual fact that there are decidedly poor marriages between admirable personalities and very good ones between quite deficient personalities indicates first of all that this structure, however *dependent* it is on each one of the participants, nevertheless can have a character that coincides with no member. If by chance each of the spouses suffers confusion, difficulties, inadequacies, but understands these to be as it were limited to oneself, while one contributes only one's best and purest in the marital relationship, this keeps it free from all personal inadequacies—so this may certainly hold first of all only for the spouse as a person, but nevertheless the feeling still arises that the marriage is something supra-personal, something

in itself valuable and holy that is beyond the mundanity of each of its partners. While inside a relationship the one turns a sympathetic side only to that of the other, behaves only with respect for the other, these attributes, although certainly always one's duty, nevertheless obtain an entirely different color, mood, and meaning from when, in relation to one's own 'I,' they interweave only in the whole complex of *this relationship*. Consequently, for the consciousness of each of the two, the relationship can crystallize into an essence outside of it that is more and better—under some circumstances, also worse—than the individual self, an essence towards which one has obligations, and from which goods and fortune come to one as from an objective being. With regard to marriage this exemption of group unity from its being built on the basic 'I' and 'Thou' is facilitated by two kinds of factors. First by its incomparable closeness. That two so fundamentally different essences as man and wife form that kind of close bond, that the Egoism of the individual is so fundamentally overridden not only in favor of the other but in favor of the relationship as a whole, which includes family interests, family honor, the children above all—this is actually a wonder that is no longer rationally explainable beyond even this foundational seat of the conscious 'I.' And the same is expressed in the separation of this union from its singular elements: the fact that each one of them experiences the relationship as something that takes on its own life with its own powers is only a formulation of its incommensurability with what we tend to imagine as the personal and rooted in the comprehensible 'I.' This is furthermore especially required by the supra-individuality of the marital forms for the meaning of their social regulation and historical transmission. So immeasurably varied are the character and value of marriages—no one can dare decide whether they are more or less varied than single individuals—nevertheless no couple, after all, forged the form of marriage, but rather it is viewed as a relatively set form inside each cultural circle, removed from choice, not affected by individual hues and fortunes in its formal essence. In the history of marriage it is striking how large—and certainly always traditional—a role third persons, often not even relatives, play in the courtship, the arrangements over the dowry, the wedding customs—up to the officiating priest. This non-individual initiation of the relationship symbolizes very tangibly the sociologically unique structure of marriage: that the most personal of all relationships both with regard for substantive interests as well as formal configuration is appropri-

ated and directed by plainly supra-personal, socio-historical entities. This insertion of traditional elements into the marital relationship, which places it significantly in contrast to the individual freedom in the arrangement, say, of the relationship of friendship, and in essence permits only acceptance or rejection but no modification, obviously promotes the sense of an *objective* formation and supra-personal unity in the marriage; although each of the two participants is in relation only to the single other, each feels nevertheless at least partially as though in relation only to a collectivity: as the mere bearer of a supra-individual structure that is in its essence and norms, however, independent of each one who is yet an organic member of it.

It seems as though modern culture, while it increasingly individualizes the character of the individual marriage, still leaves the supra-individuality that forms the core of the sociological form of marriage wholly untouched, indeed increases it in some respects. The variety of forms of marriage—whether based on the choice of contracting parties or determined by their particular social position—as it occurs in partly cultured and higher past cultures, appears at first as an individual form that especially lends itself to the differentiation in single cases. In reality it is quite the contrary: each of these separate kinds is still something thoroughly unindividual, socially preformed, and throughout the beginning of its differentiation is much more narrow and brutal than a wholly general and thoroughgoing fixed form of marriage, whose more abstract essence must necessarily allow greater room for personal differentiation. This is a thoroughgoing sociological formation: there is a much greater freedom for individual behavior and design when the social fixation concerns the whole public, when a thoroughgoing form is socially imposed on all relevant relationships—such as when, with apparent responsiveness to individual circumstances and needs, social arrangements specialize themselves into all kinds of particular forms. The actually individual is in the latter case much more predetermined, the freedom for differentiation is greater if the unfreedom pertains quite overall to persistent traits.[14] Thus the unity of the modern form of marriage clearly offers wider latitude for further elaboration than does a majority of socially predetermined forms—while through its invariable universality, however, it extraordinarily increases the cachet of objectivity,

[14] These correlations are dealt with extensively in the last chapter.

of the independent standing vis-à-vis all individual modifications, which matter to us now.[15]

Something sociologically similar could yet be seen in the duality of the partners of a business. Although its foundation and perhaps operation rely exclusively on the cooperation of both of these persons, the matter of this cooperation, the business or firm, is still an objective structure about which each of the partners has constituent rights and duties—often not unlike those toward a third partner. Nevertheless, this has a different sociological meaning from that in the case of marriage; since the 'business' from the outset is something separate from the person of the proprietor due to the objectivity of the economy, and indeed in a duality the proprietor is no different from a sole or joint proprietorship. The interacting relationship of the partners with one another has its objective outside itself, while that in marriage has it

[15] The actual intertwining of the subjective and objective characters, of the personal and the general supra-personal that marriage offers, is indeed found in the fundamental process, the physiological coupling, that alone is common to all historically known forms of marriage, while perhaps no single additional purpose is invariably found for all of them. This process on the one hand is felt as the most intimate and personal, but on the other hand as the absolutely general that allows the personality to immerse itself directly in the service to the genus, in the universal organic demand of nature. Its psychological secret is found in this double character of the act as that of the completely personal and the completely supra-personal, and from this it becomes understandable how this act could become the immediate basis of the marital relationship, which repeats this duality now on a higher sociological level. Now however there immediately emerges with the relationship of marriage to sexual activity a most peculiar formal complication. While an exact definition of marriage may be quite impossible in light of the historical heterogeneity of its forms, it can nevertheless be determined what relation between man and woman marriage in any case is *not*: the purely sexual. Whatever else marriage may be, it is always and everywhere *more* than sexual intercourse; however divergent may be the directions towards which marriage goes, it transcends them—*that* it transcends sexual intercourse is primarily what makes marriage marriage. This is an almost unique sociological formation: that the one point that alone is common to all forms of marriage is at the same time the very one that it must transcend to result in a marriage. Only entirely remote analogies to this appear to occur in other realms: so artists, as they pursue even heterogeneous stylistic or imaginary-like tendencies, must equally know most exactly the naturalistic phenomena, not in order to remain with them, but in order to fulfill in that transcendence over them their specifically artistic task; in the way that all the historical and individual variations of gastronomic culture have still had to satisfy the same thing, the physiological needs of their field, but not in order to remain stationary there but precisely to step beyond this satisfaction of shear general need with the most diverse allurements. Within the sociological formations, however, marriage appears to be the only or at least the purest of this type: all cases of a conceptual social form really involving only one unique element common to all, but *for that very reason* do not become realizations of this concept unless they add to that commonality something further, something unavoidably individual, something different in different cases.

within itself; in the former the relationship is the means toward obtaining some objective result, in the latter any objective actually appears only as a means for the subjective relationship. It is all the more notable that in marriage, nevertheless, the objectivity of the groups of two and the independence of the group structure grow further away from the immediate psychological subjectivity.

One constellation however of utmost sociological importance is lacking in that group of two, while it is in principle open to every plurality: the *shifting* from duties and responsibilities to the impersonal structure—which so frequently characterizes social life, and not to its advantage. And, to be sure, from two angles: Every whole that is more than a mere pair of given individuals has an uncertainty in its boundaries and its power, which easily tempts one to expect all kinds of benefits from it that in fact obligate the individual member; one shifts them onto society, in the way one often in the same psychological tendency shifts them into one's own future, whose vague possibilities give room for everything or will secure through one's own growing powers everything that one would not readily want to take on at the moment. Over against the power of the individual, transparent in the relationships just considered but therefore also just as clearly limited, stands the always somewhat mystical power of the totality, from which one therefore easily expects not only what the individual can achieve but also what one would not like to achieve; and indeed with the sense of this shift of responsibility being fully legitimate. One of the best North American experts shifts a large part of the deficiencies and constraints under which the governmental apparatus works onto the belief in the power of public opinion. The individual is supposed to rely on the totality inherently recognizing and doing right, and so easily loses the individual initiative for the public interest. This intensifies conceptually into the positive phenomenon that this selfsame author thusly describes:

> The longer public opinion has ruled, the more absolute is the authority of the majority likely to become, the less likely are energetic minorities to arise, the more are politicians likely to occupy themselves, not in forming opinion, but in discovering it and hastening to obey it.[16]

[16] Quotation is from James Bryce in *The American Commonwealth*, vol. II, first published in London in 1888; see James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, vol. 2 (1888), The Online Library of Liberty, Liberty Fund, Inc., 2005 <http://oll.libertyfund.org/Home3/Book.php?recordID=0004.02> [accessed 26 November 2006].

Likewise dangerous for the individual is membership in a whole, just as much with regard to inaction as action. Here it is a matter not only of the increase of impulsiveness and elimination of moral restraint, as these emerge in the individual in a crowd of people and lead to criminal mob action in which even the legal responsibility of the member is controversial, but also that the true or the alleged interest of a community entitles or obliges the individual to actions for which one as an individual would not like to bear responsibility. Economic enterprises make demands of such shameless egoism, office colleagues confess to such howling abuses, fraternities of a political as well as of a scientific type exercise such outrageous suppression of individual rights—as would not at all be possible for an individual or would at least make one blush if one were to answer for it as a person. As a member of a collective, however, one does all this with the clearest conscience because, as such, one is anonymous and shielded by the whole, indeed feels, as it were, concealed and intends at least formally to represent its interests. There are few cases in which the distance of the societal entity from the elements that form it gets so strongly, indeed almost in caricature, tangibly and effectively out of hand.

This reduction of the practical value of the personality, which the inclusion into a group often brings for the individual, must be indicated in order to characterize the dyad by its exemption. While here each member has only *one* other individual beside oneself, but not a greater number that would comprise a higher entity, the dependence of the whole on the member and thereby a share of responsibility for every collective action, is obvious. It can of course, as often enough happens, shift responsibilities to the companion, but the latter will be able to reject this much more immediately and definitely than can often be the case with an anonymous whole, for which the energy of personal interest or justifiable substitute for such cases is lacking. And likewise as little as one of two, on account of it, can hide what one does behind the group, so little can one, on account of it, depend on it for what one does not do. The strengths with which the group transcends the individual, to be sure very imprecisely and very partially, albeit still very noticeably, cannot compensate for individual inadequacy as in larger groupings; since in many cases two united individuals accomplish more than two isolated ones, so it is nevertheless characteristic in this case that each one must actually do something, and that, if one refuses this, only the other, and not the supra-individual power, is left—as is the case, indeed, even already by a combination of three. The importance

of this provision, however, lies in no way only in the negative, in that which it excludes; from it stems rather also a narrow and specific tone of the combination of two. Precisely in that each one knows one could depend on the other alone and no one else, there is a special dedication to the other—e.g., marriage, friendship, but also the more external affiliations of two groups, including political ones—each element finds its social destiny in relationship to it and more highly dependent on it as an all or nothing affair than in more distant associations. This characteristic closeness is manifest most simply in the contrast to the combination of three. In that kind of grouping each individual element acts as a mediating authority for the other two and shows the two-fold function of such: both to bind together and to separate. Where three elements—A, B, and C—form a community, the direct relationship, for example, between A and B, is supplemented by an indirect one through their common relationship to C. This is a form-sociological enrichment, that each two elements, besides being bound by the direct and shortest line, is also yet bound by a refracted one; points at which they can find no immediate contact are created in interaction with the third member to whom each has a different perspective and unites each in the unity of the third personality; divisiveness that the participants cannot straighten out themselves are repaired by the third member or by its being dealt with in an encompassing whole. However, the direct binding is not only strengthened by the indirect but also disrupted. Still there is no such intimate relationship between three in which each individual would not be experienced occasionally as an intruder by the other two, and would also be only through the sharing of certain moods that their focus and modest tenderness can unfold at the undistracted glance of eye into eye; every attachment of two is thereby irritated that it has an onlooker. One can also note how extraordinarily difficult and seldom it is for three people to go, for instance, on a visit to a museum or before a landscape in an actually cohesive mood that develops relatively easily between two. A and B can emphasize and experience without interruption the μ they have in common because the ν that A does not share with B and the ξ that B does not share with A are readily felt as individual reserve and as though on an altogether different floor. Now, however, C appears, who has ν in common with A and ξ in common with B; thus is ended even with this the schema favorable for the unity of the whole as well as the assimilation of the mood in principle. While two can actually be *a* party relatively beyond any doubt, three tend to form immediately,

in most emotionally subtle affiliations, three parties—by pairs—and thereby override the united relationship of, now one, now the other. The sociological structure of the bond of two is thereby characterized in that both lack the strengthened connection by the third, with respect to a social framework inclusive of the two, as well as the distraction and diversion of pure and immediate reciprocity. However, in many cases precisely that lack will make the relationship stronger and more intense, because in the feeling of being exclusively dependent on one another and on the cohesive powers that one is able to expect from nowhere in particular, not immediately evident in social interaction—some otherwise undeveloped powers of community, stemming as well from more remote psychic reservoirs, will come alive, and some disturbances and threats, to which one could be misled in the reliance on a third as well as on a collectivity, are more scrupulously avoided. This limitation, to which the relationship between two people is susceptible, is precisely the basis on which they construct the principal occasion of jealousy.

But one other expression of the same basic sociological constellation lies in the observation that relationships between two, formation of a whole from only two participants, presupposes a greater individualization of each of the two than, *ceteris paribus*, a whole made from many elements. Here, the essence is that in a union of two there is no majority that can outvote the individuals, an occasion immediately given by the addition of a third. Relationships, however, in which the oppression of the individual by a majority is possible, not only reduce individuality but generally, insofar as they are voluntary, they are not in general inclined to entertain very distinctive individualities. Whereupon indeed two commonly confused ideas are to be distinguished: the definitive and the strong individuality. There are personalities and collective entities that are of the most extreme individuality but do not have the power to protect this characteristic in the face of suppressions or leveling powers; whereas the strong personality tends to firm up its formation precisely in the face of opposition, in the struggle for its distinctiveness and over against all temptations to conform and blend in. The former, the merely qualitative individuality, will shun associations in which it finds itself opposite a possible majority; it is, however, as though it is predestined to multiple pairings because it is dependent by its distinctiveness as well as by its vulnerability on completion through another. The other type, the more intensive individuality, will, however, rather view itself in opposition to a majority against whose quantitative preponderance it can prove its dynamism. To be sure, technical reasons, as it were,

will justify this preference: Napoleon's consulate-of-three was decidedly more comfortable for him than a duality would have been, since then he needed to win over only the *one* colleague (what the strongest nature among the three will quite readily succeed in doing) in order to dominate the other, *i.e.* in fact both others, in the most legal manner. On the whole it can be said, however, that on the one hand the union of two, compared to larger numbers, favors a relatively greater individuality of the participants, on the one hand, and, on the other, presumes that the suppression of character by way of social incorporation into an average level is absent here. Since it is for that reason true that women are the less individual gender, that the differentiation of individuals deviates less from the generic type than is the case on the average for men—so the very widespread opinion of them would be understandable, that they are in general less responsive to friendship than men. Because friendship is a relationship resting entirely and completely on the individualities of the members, perhaps even more than marriage, which, through its traditional forms, its social definitions, and its actual interests, includes the rather supra-individual, an independence from the distinctiveness of the personalities. The fundamental differentiation, on which marriage rests, is in itself indeed still not an individual one but one of types; friendship, however, rests on one that is purely personal, and for that reason it is understandable that on the level of lower personality development in general actual and ongoing friendships are rare, and that on the other hand the modern highly sophisticated woman shows a conspicuously growing capability and inclination towards relationships of friendship and, to be sure, with men as well as with women. The entirely individual differentiation has here gained preponderance over that of types, and we therefore see the correlation produced between the sharpest individualization and a relationship that is limited absolutely at this stage to the relationship between two; naturally that does not exclude the same person being able to stand in different friendships at the same time.

That relationships between couples generally have such specific traits indicates not only the fact that the entry of a third changes them but also, what is often observed, that the further expansion to four or more in no way modifies the essence of the grouping correspondingly more. So, for example, a marriage with a child has a completely different character from a childless one, while it does not differ so very significantly from a marriage with two or more children. Of course the difference in its inner being that the second child brings about is considerably

greater again than what is being produced by a third. However, this still follows the mentioned norm, since a marriage with a child is in many respects a relationship with two members: the parents as a unit on the one hand, the child on the other. The second child is here actually not only a fourth but, sociologically viewed, simultaneously also a third member of a relationship that exercises the characteristic effects of such; because inside the family, as soon as the actual period of infancy is past, the parents much more commonly form a functioning unity than does the totality of children. Also in the realm of marital forms, the critical difference is whether monogamy generally prevails or the husband also has a second wife. If the latter is the case, the third or twentieth wife is relatively unimportant for the structure of the marriage. Inside the boundary drawn thereby, the step towards the second wife is here, of course, also at least from *one* perspective more consequential than that towards yet a greater number because just the duality of wives can generate in the life of the husband the sharpest conflicts and deepest disturbances, which do not in general increase with each additional one. Since with this, such a degradation and de-individualization of women is established, such a decisive reduction of the relationship to its sensual side (because every more mental relationship is also always more naturally individual)—it will not in general result in those deeper upheavals for the husband that can flow precisely and only from a relationship of two.

The same basic motif recurs in Voltaire's claim regarding the political usefulness of religious anarchy: two sects in rivalry inside a nation would unavoidably produce disturbances and difficulties that could never arise from two hundred.[17] The significance that the duality of the one element possesses in a multi-member combination is, of course, no less intrinsic and invasive, when it, instead of disruption, directly serves to safeguard the whole relationship. Thus it was asserted that the collegiality of the two Roman consuls may have counteracted monarchical appetites still more effectively than the system of nine top officials in Athens. It is the same tension of duality that simply functions, now destructively, now preserving, depending on the sundry circumstances of the whole association; what is essential here is that this latter one acquires an entirely different sociological character as soon as the activity in question

[17] "If there were only one religion in England, there would be danger of tyranny; if there were two, they would cut each other's throats; but there are thirty, and they live happily together in peace." Voltaire, *Philosophical Letters*, translated and introduced by Ernest Dilworth (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961 [1733/34]), p. 26—ed.

is carried out either by an individual person or a number greater than two. By the same logic as the Roman consuls, leading colleagues are often paired together: the two kings of the Spartans, whose continuous disagreements were explicitly emphasized as a protection for the state; the two chief war leaders of the Iroquois tribes; the two city guardians of medieval Augsburg, where the attempt at a unitary mayor's office stood under a severe penalty. The characteristic irritations between the dualistic elements of a larger structure acquire the function by themselves of maintaining the status quo, while in the cited examples the fusion for unity would have easily led to an individual higher lordship, the enlargement to plurality, however, to an oligarchic clique.

Now regarding the type that showed the duality of elements in general as so critical that any further increase does not significantly alter it, I mention yet two very singular facts, but nevertheless of the utmost importance as sociological types. The political standing of France in Europe was immediately changed most significantly when it entered into a close relationship with Russia. A third or fourth ally would not bring about any essential change, once the principal one has occurred. The contents of human life vary quite significantly depending on whether the first step is the most difficult and decisive, and all later ones have secondary importance for them—or whether it does not yet mean anything for it, and not until its developments and increases realize the changes which it only portends. The numerical relations of social interaction provide ample examples of both forms, as will be pointed out time and again below. For a state whose isolation stands in reciprocal relation with the loss of its political prestige, the reality of an alliance is generally the crucial thing, while perhaps certain economic or military advantages are obtained only when a *circle* of alliances is available from which even *one* is not allowed to go missing should success not be forthcoming. Between these two types then there is obviously that in which the specific character and success of the alliance appears in proportion to the number of elements, as is the rule with the association of large masses. The second type includes the experience that command- and assistance-relationships change their character in principle if instead of *one* domestic servant, assistant, or other kind of subordinate, two of them are allied. Housewives sometimes prefer—wholly apart from the matter of cost—to manage with one servant because of the extra difficulties that a greater number of them brings with it. The single one will, because of the natural lack of self-assurance, strive to draw near and fit in to the personal sphere and circle of interest of the rule of the master; that very same person will

be moved, with an eventual second party, to organize against the rule because now each of the two has the support of the other; the sense of rank with its latent or more conscious opposition to the domination of the master will then become effective for the two because it emerges as what they have in common. In short, the sociological situation between the dominant and the subordinate is absolutely altered as soon as the third element enters; instead of solidarity, now there is in fact party formation, instead of emphasis on what binds those who serve with those who rule, now in fact the disjunctive, because the commonalities on the part of the comrades are sought and naturally found, which constitutes the opposition of both against that shared by those who dominate. Furthermore, the transformation of the numerical difference into a qualitative one is no less fundamental when it shows up in the opposite consequence for the ruling element of the association: one is better able to hold two at a desirable distance than one, and possesses in their jealousy and competition a tool to hold each down and to keep them compliant, for which there is no equivalent over against *one*. An old saying says technically the same thing: "Who has one child is its slave; who has more is their lord." In any event the grouping of three stands in contrast to the dyad as a fully new structure, the latter characteristically distinguished in such a way that the former is specifically distinguished backwards against it but, however, not forwards against increased groupings to four or more elements.

In the transition to the peculiar formations of the triad of elements, the diversity of the character of groups is to be emphasized, which their division into two or three main parties produces. Impassioned times tend to place the entire life of the public under the motto: Who is not for me is against me. The result must be a division of the elements into two parties. All interests, persuasions, impulses that generally place us in a positive or negative relationship to another are distinguished by the extent to which that principle holds for them, and they fall into a spectrum, beginning from the radical exclusion of all mediation and nonpartisanship to tolerance for the opposed standpoint as one likewise legitimate and to a whole spectrum of standpoints agreeing *more or less* with one's own positions. Every decision that has a relationship to the narrower and wider circle surrounding us, that determines our place in them, that involves an inner or outer cooperation, a benevolence or mere tolerance, self-promotion or threat—every such decision occupies a definite rung on that scale; each draws an ideal line around us that decisively either includes or excludes every other person, or has spaces where the question of inclusion or exclusion is not raised, or that is

managed in such a way that it makes mere contact or merely partial inclusiveness and partial exclusivity possible. Whether and with what decisiveness the question of "for me or against me?" is raised is determined in no way only by the logical stringency of its content, indeed not even the passion with which the soul insists on this content, but likewise by the relationship of those doing the asking to their social circles. The stricter and more solidary this is, the less the subject can co-exist with others as entirely equally disposed fellows, and the more an ideal demand embraces the totality of all the latter as a unity—the more intransigent will each one become in regard to the question of for or against. The radicalism with which Jesus formulated this ruling rests on an indefinitely strong feeling of the unified solidarity of all those to whom his message came. That there is over against this not only a simple acceptance or rejection but indeed even an acceptance or fight—that is the strongest expression for the indeterminate unity of those who belong and the indeterminate outsider status of those who do not belong: the fight, the being-against-me, is always still a distinctive *relationship*, proclaiming yet a stronger internal, albeit perversely developed, unity than the indifferently co-existing and the intermediate kingdom of half-and-half. This basic sociological sense will therefore force a division of the whole complex of elements into *two* parties. Where in contrast that passionate feeling of envelopment vis-à-vis the whole is lacking, which forces each into a positive relationship—acceptance or resistance—with the emerging idea or demand; where every faction is satisfied in essence with its existence as a faction, without the earnest demand for inclusion in the totality—there the soil is prepared for a multiplicity of party formations, for tolerance, for moderate parties, for a scale of gradually tiered differences. That epochs wherein the great masses are put into movement manifest the dualism of parties and preclude indifference and the minimizing of the influence of moderate parties—becomes understandable from the radicalism that appeared to us a little while ago as the character of mass movements. The *simplicity* of the ideas by which these are guided forces a definite 'Yes' or 'No.'[18]

[18] Throughout history the democratic tendencies, in so far as they lead the great mass movements, go in for *simple* regulations, laws, principles; the various standpoints taking antipathetic practices into account are all complicated for democracy by varied ongoing considerations, while the aristocracy on the other hand tends to abhor universal and compulsory law and to establish the particularity of the individual element—of the personal, local, objective type—in their law.

This radical decisiveness in mass movements does not thoroughly prevent their total shift from one extreme to another; indeed, it is not difficult to conceive of this happening even to completely irrelevant trifles. Any one cause, X, which corresponds to mood A, may affect an assembled mass. In that mass is a number of individuals or even only a single one whose temperament and natural enthusiasm are predisposed to A. Such persons are highly excited by X; it is grist to their mill and understandably they assume the leadership in the mass already in some measure set out in this direction by X; the mass follows them through their spiritedness and drive into their exaggerated frame of mind, while the individuals who are by nature disposed to mentality B, the opposite of A, remain silent in the face of X. Now enter any one Y, which B warrants, then the former must keep silent, and the game repeats itself in the direction of B with the same exaggeration; it simply comes from the fact that in every mass individuals are available whose nature is disposed towards a more extreme development of the correspondingly excited frame of mind, and that these, as the momentarily strongest and most impressive, take the mass with them in the direction of their frame of mind, while the contrarily disposed remain passive during this movement that offers them and the whole no motivation towards their particular direction. Expressed wholly in principle, it is the inducement of the formal radicalism of the mass and its easily changing content that a resultant middle line arises, not from its elements disposed in various directions, and that a momentary preponderance of one direction tends at the same time to silence *completely* the representatives of the others, instead of their participating proportionally in the mass action, so that for any particular tendency getting a hearing there exists absolutely no inhibition to prevent it from going to an extreme. Over against the fundamental practical problems there are as a rule only two *simple* standpoints, while there may be countless complex and thus intervening ones. Likewise in general every *vital* movement inside a group—from the familial, through all interest groups, to the political—will be disposed to its own division into a pure dualism. The heightened tempo in the execution of interests in the course of developmental stages presses always towards more resolute decisions and divisions. All interventions require time and leisure; quiet and stagnating epochs, in which the life questions are not stirred up but remain covered over by the routine of everyday concerns, easily allow imperceptible changes to emerge and give way to an indifference on the part of personalities whom a more lively current would have to drag into the conflict of the major

factions. The typical division of the sociological constellation remains then always that of two or of three main factions. In the function of the third, to mediate between two extremes, several divisions into graduated levels are possible; here there is, so to speak, only a broadening or even refinement in the technical design of the principle. This change, itself determining the configuration internally, is for sure always realized through the introduction of the *third* party.

The role played by the third party and the configurations that result among *three* social elements have hereby indeed been suggested for the most part. The two present, as the first synthesis and unification, thus also the first disunity and antithesis; the entry of the third means transformation, reconciliation, abandonment of absolute opposition—of course occasionally even the instigation of such. The triad as such seems to me to result in three kinds of typical group formations that on the one hand are not possible with just two elements, on the other hand are with a number greater than three either likewise excluded or expand only quantitatively without changing their type of form.

1. *The nonpartisan and the mediator*. It is a most effective sociological reality that the common relationship of isolated elements to one outside the reach of their power leads to an association between them—going from the confederation of states, which is concluded for the defense against a common enemy, to the invisible church, which incorporates all the faithful into a union by way of the identical relationship of everyone to the one God. This social constructing mediation of a third element is treated, however, in a later context. Because the third element has here such a distance from each of the others that actual sociological interactions, which would combine the three elements, are not occurring, but rather dyadic configurations: while either the relationship of the one or the other joining together is sociologically certain, it persists between them as a unity on the one hand and the center of interests confronting them on the other. Here, however, it is a matter of three elements standing so close to one another or in common movement that they form a permanent or temporary group.

In the most significant case of dyadic formations, that of the monogamous marriage, the child or children, as the case may be, often exercises the function of the third element that keeps the whole together. Among many primitive peoples, the marriage is first considered actually complete or even indissoluble when a child is born; and one of the motives from which emerging culture deeply and closely connects marriage is surely this, that the children become independent of it relatively late

and thus need care for a longer time. The basis for the aforementioned fact naturally lies in the value that the child has for the husband and in his tendency, sanctioned by law and custom, to disown a childless wife. The real effect of this, however, is that precisely the third additional member actually first closes the circle, in that it binds the other two together. This can occur in two forms: either the existence of the third member immediately establishes or strengthens the bond between the two—as for example when the birth of a child increases the couple's love for one another or at least that of the husband for the wife—or the relationship of both individuals to the third results in a new and *indirect* bond between them—as the common concerns of a marital couple for a child generally mean a bond that simply must lead via this child and often consist of sympathies that could not operate at all without such an intermediate station. This occasion of internal socializing from three elements—whereas the two elements on their own would resist this—is the basis of the phenomenon mentioned above that some internally disharmonious marriages want no child: it is the instinct that the circle would thereby be closed, inside of which they would be held more closely together—and to be sure not only superficially but also in the deeper psychological levels—than they intended it to be.

Another variety of mediation occurs in the third functioning as an impartial element. Thus the third party will either bring about the unity of both conflicting parties while it seeks to disengage and simply continue to function, while it seeks to exclude itself and make the two disunited or divided parties unite *without* mediation; or the third will emerge as conciliator and bring their conflicting claims more or less into balance and thereby eliminate the divisiveness. The disputes between workers and employers have developed both forms of agreement, especially in England. We find bargaining councils in which the parties dispose of disputes through negotiations under the chairmanship of a mediator. Certainly the mediator will bring about the agreement in this form only if each party views the relationship as more advantageous in peace than the grounds for the hostility, in short if the actual situation warrants it in and of itself. The enormous prospect for both parties being convinced by this faith, which is brought about by the mediation of the mediator—apart from the obvious elimination of misunderstandings, effective persuasion, etc.—is formed in the following manner. While the impartial member puts forth the claims and grounds of one party to the other, they lose the tone of subjective passion that tends to provoke the same from the other side. Here what is so often unfortunate

becomes beneficial: that the feeling that accompanies a psychological content within its first bearer tends to be substantially moderated inside a second for whom this content is transient. Therefore, recommendations and intercessions that must first pass through several mediating persons, are so often ineffective, even when their objective contents arrive entirely unchanged at the deciding authority; simply with the transmission there are emotional imponderables lost that complement not only insufficiently objective reasons, but also furnish sufficient reasons with just the incentives for practical realization. This fact, most highly important for the development of purely psychological influence, brings it about in the simple case of a third mediating social element, that the emotional accents accompanying the demands, because this is formulated by an impartial side and presented to the other, are abruptly separated from the substantive content, and thus that circle disastrous for any agreement is avoided—that in which the vehemence of the one calls out the same in the other, this latter reality, then, reactively raising the vehemence of the former, and so forth until there is no stopping it. On top of that each party not only hears more objectively but must express itself more objectively than with unmediated confrontation. For it must now matter to them that they also win over the mediator to *their* point of view, which is exactly where the third is not an arbitrator but only the manager of the initial compromise and must always stop short of the actual decision, whereas, however, an arbitrator in the end definitively takes a side—which can be expected precisely in this case only on the basis of the most objective grounds. Inside the social method there is nothing that would serve the unification of conflicting parties so effectively as its objectivity, that is, the attempt to let the purely factual content of grievances and demands speak—philosophically stated: the objective spirit of the party's position—so that persons themselves appear only as irrelevant carriers of it. The personal form in which objective contents are subjectively alive must pay for its warmth, its colorfulness, its depth of feeling, with the acrimony of the antagonism that it generates in instances of conflict; the moderation of these personal tones is the condition under which understanding and unification of opponents is achievable, and indeed especially because only then each party is actually aware of what the other *must* demand. Expressed psychologically, it is a matter of a reduction of the obstinate form of antagonism to the intellectual: intellect is everywhere the principle of understanding on whose ground can be encountered what is rejected uncompromisingly on the grounds of feelings and their willful

decisions. The merit of the mediator, then, is to bring about this reduction, to present it in itself or even to form a kind of central station that, in whatever form the matter of controversy gets into from one side, dispenses it to the others and withholds everything beyond it that tends to stir up useless conflict conducted without mediation.

For the analysis of community life it is important to make it clear that the constellation heretofore identified in all groups that count more than two elements occurs continually even where the mediator is not specifically selected, is even not particularly known or identified as such. The group of three is here only a type and schema; all cases of mediation reduce in the end to its form. There is absolutely no community of three, from the hour-long conversation to the life of a family, in which now these, now those two do not get into a disagreement of a harmless or pointed, momentary or long-lasting, theoretical or practical nature—and in which the third would not function mediatively. This happens countless times in quite rudimentary form, only hinted at, mixed with other actions and interactions from which the mediative function is never purely absent. Such mediations need not even take place in words: a gesture, a kind of listening, the mood that comes from a person, suffices for giving a misunderstanding between two others a direction toward unity, to make the essential commonality perceptible underneath a sharp difference of opinion, to put this in a form in which it is most easily discharged. It is not at all necessarily a matter of actual conflict or strife; rather there are a thousand entirely minor differences of opinion, the hint of an antagonism between personalities, the emergence of wholly momentarily opposed interests or feelings—which colors the fluctuating forms of every enduring collective life and is determined by the presence of a third continually and almost unavoidably performing the mediating function. This function rotates, so to speak, among the three elements, because the ebb and flow of shared life tends to realize that form in every possible combination of members.

The impartiality needed for mediating can have two kinds of precondition: the third is impartial because of either standing outside the contrasting interests and opinions, untouched by them, or because of sharing in *both* at the same time. The first case is the simplest, bringing with it the fewest complications. In disputes between English workers and employers, for example, a nonpartisan is often called in who can be neither a worker nor an employer. Noteworthy is the resoluteness with which the above emphasized division of the material from the personal moments of the conflict is here realized. The impartial member brings

the presumption of absolute personal disinterestedness to the material concerns of the conflicting parties, viewing them as though from an entirely pure, impersonal intellect, untouched by any subjective residue. The mediator must, however, have a subjective interest in the *persons* or complex of persons whose issues of conflict are merely theoretical for the mediator because otherwise the mediator would not take on the function of mediation. Thus here a more-or-less purely objective mechanism of subjective warmth is put into operation; the personal distance from the objective meaning of the conflict and the simultaneous subjective interest in functional combination characterize then the position of the impartial and render it all the more suitable, the more sharply each of these angles is developed in itself and the more unified at the same time both work together precisely in this differentiation.

There tends to be a more complicated formation in the situation for the nonpartisan who is obligated to play an equal role vis-à-vis the conflicting interests, instead of being unaffected by them. A position of mediation on this basis will then frequently arise when personalities belong to another interest circle in respect to location rather than to actual role. So in earlier times the bishops could sometimes intervene between the secular powers of their parish and the pope; so, too, civil servants, who are close to the special interests of their district, will be the most suitable mediators when a collision occurs between these special interests and the general interests of the state, whose civil servants they are; thus will the degree of impartiality and simultaneous interest that is available for the mediation between two divided local groups often be found in the personalities who come from the one and live in the other. The difficulty of such positions for the mediators tends to originate then from the equality of interest in both parties, their internal equanimity not being firmly secure and often enough distrusted by *both* parties. A more difficult and often tragic situation arises, however, when there are no such separate provinces of interest for the third party with which the third is bound to the one or the other party, but when the third's *whole* personality is close to both; this grows most extremely acute when the issue of conflict is in general not quite objectifiable and the objective meaning of the conflict is actually only a pretense or an opportunity for deeper personal incompatibilities. Then the third, who is tied to each of the two with equal sincerity through love or duty, through fate or custom, can be *crushed* by the conflict, much more than if taking one of the two sides; and all the more so than in those cases when the balance of the intermediary's interests allows no tilt to either

side but tends nevertheless to lead to no successful mediation because the reduction to a merely objective opposition collapses. This is very often the pattern in family conflicts. While the intermediaries whose impartiality is a consequence of a similar distance from those in conflict, capable then of pleasing both parties relatively easily, they will, because of their equal closeness to both, encounter great difficulty and get caught up personally in the most awkward emotional ambivalence. Consequently, when the mediator is *chosen*, one will prefer, in otherwise similar circumstances, the equally disinterested over the equally interested; so, for example, the Italian cities in the middle ages would often obtain their judges from other cities to be sure of their impartiality with regard to the internal party feuds.

With this, there is the transition to the second form of reconciliation by the impartial: that of arbitration. As long as the third element functions as a genuine mediator, the cessation of the conflict still remains exclusively in the hands of the parties themselves. By the selection of an arbitrator, however, they have handed over the final decision; they have, if you will, outsourced their drive for reconciliation; it has come to be in the person of the arbitrator, whereby it gains particular clarity and power vis-à-vis the antagonistic parties. The voluntary appeal to an arbitrator, to whom one submits *a priori*, presupposes a greater subjective trust in the objectivity of the judgment than does any other form of adjudication. Since even before the state court only the action of the *plaintiffs*, in fact, arise from confidence in a fair-minded decision (because they view it in their case as beneficial for the just); the defendants must enter into the process, irrespective of whether or not they believe in the impartiality of judge. Arbitration, however, as mentioned, comes about only through such trust on the part of *both* sides. In principle mediation is sharply differentiated from arbitration by the indicated difference, and the more official the action of reconciliation is, the more it adheres to this distinction: from the conflicts between capitalists and workers, which I mentioned above, to those of large-scale politics, in which the 'good services' of a government being approached for the settlement of a conflict between two becomes something altogether different than the appeal for arbitration sometimes made to the rulers of a third country. In the everyday reality of private life, where the typical group of three continually places the one manifestly or latently, fully or partially, into the margin between both of the others, a great many intermediate levels will be generated: with the inexhaustible variety of possible relationships, the appeal of the parties to the third and whose

voluntarily or violently seized initiative toward unity will often put the third in a place where the distinction between the mediating and the arbitrating element is overall not very great. For understanding the real fabric of human society and its indescribable richness and dynamism, it is of utmost importance to sharpen the view for such formations and transformations, for the merely hinted and then again hidden forms of relationship, for their embryonic and fragmentary development. The examples in which each one of the concepts constructed for these forms of relationship are presented entirely purely are, of course, the indispensable manipulations of sociology, but for the actual life of society they act only as the approximately exact spatial forms by which one uses geometrical sentences to typify the immeasurable complexity of the real formations of matter.

On the whole, after all is said and done, the existence of the impartial serves the survival of the group; as a particular representative of the intellectual energy vis-à-vis parties momentarily dominated more by desire and emotion, it replenishes, as it were, the fullness of the mental unity that dwells in the life of the group. The impartial, on the one hand, is the force of restraint over against the passion of the others, and can, on the other hand, bear and lead even the movement of the whole group when the antagonism of the other two elements wants to paralyze their strengths. Nevertheless this outcome can turn into its opposite. From the indicated context the most intellectually talented elements of a group will lean especially in the direction of neutrality because cool reason tends to find light and shadows on both sides, and its objective fairness does not categorically favor one side easily. For this reason the most intelligent elements are sometimes kept away from influence on the decision in conflicts, while such influence precisely from their perspective is most desirable. Straightaway they, when the group is at that point of decision between Yes and No, would have to throw their weight onto the scale, given that this then will move all the more probably in the right direction. Thus when neutrality does not directly serve practical mediation, it will, by means of its link to intellectuality, result in the decision being left to the play of the more foolish or at best more biased powers in the group. When therefore the impartial action as such so often experiences disapproval—since Solon—this is something rather healthy in the social mind and is a return to a much deeper instinct for the welfare of the whole, as something of a suspicion of cowardice which neutrality often meets, although often quite wrongly.

It is quite obvious that neutrality, functioning as a third just as equally distant as sympathetic to the colliding two, can blend in with the most varied types of relationships of the former to the latter and to the group as a whole. That, for example, the third, who is engaged with others in a group but who had, until now, stood far from their conflicts is pulled into them, but nevertheless precisely with the cachet of independence from the parties already established—this can serve the unity and balance of the group very well, albeit overall in the form of the instability of that latter. It is in this sociological form that in England the third estate first participated in matters of state. Since Henry III these were irrevocably bound to collaboration with the great barons, who, together with the prelates, had to approve funds; the combination of these estates against the king was powerful, indeed often superior. Nevertheless constant divisions, abuses, coups, and conflicts resulted, instead of a fruitful collaboration. And then both parties felt that a remedy could be found only by bringing in a third party: the subvassals and freemen, the earldoms and cities previously excluded from affairs of state. When their council representatives—the beginning of the lower house—were summoned, the third element exercised the double function: to make the government actually a counterpart to the totality of the state, and used it as an authority that helped the older parties to a certain extent to be objective with regard to the government and thereby funnel their strengths, heretofore consumed in opposition, more harmoniously into the united functioning of the state.

2. *The tertius gaudens*. The neutrality of the third element served or damaged the group as a whole in the combinations discussed so far. The mediator as well as the arbitrator wish to rescue the unity of the group from the danger of breaking up. Obviously their relatively superior position, however, can also be exploited for their own purely egoistic interests: while they conduct themselves at one time as mediator for the purposes of the group, on another they reverse and make the interactions between the parties and between them and the parties a means for their own purposes. Here it is never a matter of a structure already previously consolidated into whose social life this event would appear beside others; rather it is precisely here that the relationship between the parties and the impartial one is often first established *ad hoc*; elements that otherwise do not comprise any unity of interaction can get caught up in a dispute; a third, to whom both are equally unconnected beforehand, may spontaneously take the opportunity that this dispute offers a nonpartisan, and thus can produce a rather

unstable interaction, the liveliness and formal richness of which for each element member stands entirely out of proportion to the fleetingness of its durability.

I would mention two apparent kinds of the *tertius gaudens* without going into detail, because the interaction within the group of three, whose typical formations are the present concern, does not characteristically stand out. Rather, a certain passivity either on the part of the two conflicting elements or on that of the third is characteristic of it. It can be arranged to the advantage of the third in such a way that both of the others are held in check, and the third can pocket a profit for which one of the two would have otherwise challenged the third. The dispute brings about here only a paralysis of powers that, were they able, would be turned against the third. The situation then actually cancels the interaction among the three elements instead of adding to it the kind without which the most obvious outcome for the three elements cannot be gained. The deliberate effecting of this situation is a matter of the next configuration of three. Secondly the third can have an advantage only because the action of one combative party realizes this advantage for the sake of *that one's* ends, even without any initiative required on the part of the one advantaged. The model here is that the benefits and advances that one party allows to accrue to a third are designed to injure the opposing party. So the English worker-protection laws were originally passed in part because of the mere grudge of the Tories against the liberal manufacturers; in this way many charitable actions owe their origin to the competition for popularity. It is in a strange way precisely an especially petty and malicious disposition that, in order to aggravate a second, treats a third well: the indifference toward the intrinsic moral character of altruism cannot stand out more sharply than through such an exploitation of it. And it is doubly significant that one can achieve the goal of aggravating opponents by the benefits that one accords one's friends as well as those that one accords one's enemies.

The more fundamental formations arise here when the third for its part turns practically, supportively, generously to the one party (thus not only intellectually matter-of-fact, as the arbitrator) and thereby extracts its direct or indirect gain. Two main developments occur within this form: two parties are hostile toward one another and thus compete for the good will of the third, or two parties compete for the good will of the third and therefore are hostile toward one another. This difference is especially important for the further development of the constellation.

To wit, an already existing hostility presses each party to seek the good will of the third; so the decision in this conflict will mean the addition of the third to the side of one party at the beginning of the struggle; conversely, where two elements independently of each other strive for the favor of a third, and this forms the basis of their hostility, their party-formation, the definitive granting of this favor—which in this case is thus an object, not a means of conflict—tends to put an end to this: the decision has been made, and further hostility has thereby become practically pointless. In both cases the advantage of neutrality with which the *tertius* originally stands over against them both, lies in the fact that those in that position can set their *conditions* for their decision. Where for whatever reason this proposal of conditions is denied them, then the situation also does not offer them the full benefit. So is it in one of the most common instances of the second type, the competition of two persons of the same gender for the favor of a person of the other. Here the decision of the latter depends in general not on that person's will in the same sense as that of a buyer between two competing suppliers or princes granting favor between competing petitioners; rather it is offered through existing feelings that do not obtain from will and from the outset do not place that person in any kind of a position for choosing. Therefore, of offerings whose significance is controlled by choice, we are talking here only of exceptional cases, and yet the situation of the *tertius gaudens* is taken fully for granted, its specific exploitation as a whole is nevertheless denied. The most encompassing example of the *tertius gaudens* is the buying public in an economy with free competition. The contest for customers gives it an almost complete independence from the individual supplier—although the supplier is dependent on the totality of buyers, a coalition of them would thus immediately reverse the relationship—and allows it to link its purchases to the satisfaction of its desires with regard to the quality and price of goods. The situation of the *tertius gaudens* has then still the peculiar advantage that the producers must yet try even to anticipate those conditions, to guess the unspoken or unconscious wishes of consumers, not at all to suggest or to accustom them to what is on hand. From the first mentioned case of the woman between two suitors, in which, because the decision depends on her being and not on her actions, the one choosing tends not to place any conditions and thus does not exploit the situation—leads a continuing series of phenomena up to that of modern consumption, from which the being of the personality is fully excluded and in which the advantage of those choosing goes so far that the parties take from them the increase

of conditions even to its maximum. The latter is the farthest extreme to where the situation of the *tertius gaudens* can take this.

The history of any cooperative alliance, from that between states to that between family members, tends to offer an example of the other formation—conflict forcing the parties to compete for the help of the third who originally has no relationship to the issue. In the following variation the very simple typical course is still of special sociological interest. In order for the third to acquire that advantageous position, the power accrued need not necessarily possess a great quantity compared to the great power of each party. Rather, how great the power of the third must be for this is determined exclusively through the relationship that the powers *of the parties* exhibit *among one another*. Actually it obviously depends only on its being enough to counterbalance one of them. Thus if the forces are about equal, a minimal increase is enough to be the decisive factor toward the one side. Hence the frequent influence of small parliamentary parties that they can never acquire through their own importance but only by way of the big parties being held roughly in a balance. Generally, where majorities decide, everything thus frequently hanging on a single vote, there is the possibility that completely unimportant parties put forth the most crass conditions for their support. Parallels can appear in the relationships of small states to large ones involved in conflict. It simply depends only on the forces of two antagonistic entities mutually paralyzing one another so that the position, however weak, of the yet unengaged third is given relatively unlimited power. Entities strong in themselves will naturally profit no less from this situation; what is, of course, made difficult in some formations, e.g. inside of a definitively shaped party existence, is that precisely the large parties are frequently very firmly set in material respects and in their relation to one another, and therefore do not have that full freedom of decision-making that all the advantages of the *tertius gaudens* would offer them. Through entirely uniquely favorable constellations the Center party in the German parliaments has more-or-less evaded this limitation for the last hundred years. What extraordinarily strengthens its position of power, of course, is that its party ideology commits it to a definite direction with regard to only a rather small portion of the parliamentary decisions. With regard to all other decisions it can fully freely decide for itself, now one way, now another: it can speak out for or against protective tariffs, for or against labor-friendly legislation, for or against military demands, without being prejudiced by its party program. Consequently in all such cases it stands as a *tertius gaudens*

among the parties, each of whom can endeavor to curry its favor. No landowner will seek the assistance of the Social Democrats for grain tariffs, since it is known that they must oppose them on party grounds; no Liberal will look or bargain for their aid against customs duties since it is known that they on party grounds approve of them anyway. In contrast, both can go to the Center party which on account of its freedom in this matter is free, even in principle, to grant their wish. On the other hand, what even from the very beginning is a strong factor in the situation of the *tertius gaudens* is that it frequently saves the *tertius gaudens* the trouble of having to develop real power. The advantages of the *tertius gaudens* will in fact flow from the situation indicated here not only in an actual conflict but even in a tense relationship and latent antagonism on the part of the other two; it works here through the mere *possibility* of siding with one or the other of them, even if that does not really happen. As for the change in English politics in early modernity, compared to the medieval era, this was always characteristic of it, to the extent that England no longer sought possessions and direct domination on the continent but always possessed a power that potentially stood between the continental powers. Already in the sixteenth century it was said that France and Spain would be the scales of the European balance; England, however, the tongue or the holder of the balance.[19] The bishops of Rome had already with great emphasis cultivated this rather formal principle in the history leading up to Leo the Great (440–461), in that they compelled the warring parties within the Church to grant to them the position of the decisive power.[20] Quite early on, bishops standing in dogmatic or other disputes with others had appealed for support to Roman colleagues, and the latter had in principle always taken the side of the petitioners. Consequently there was nothing left for the respective second party except to likewise turn to the bishop of Rome in order to not have him as an opponent from the beginning. The latter thereby obtained for himself the prerogative and tradition of an arbitrating authority. What can be termed the sociological logic of the situation of three, in which two are engaged in conflict, has here evolved from the perspective of the *tertius gaudens* with particular clarity and intensity.

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[19] "The tongue or the holder of the balance," English in the original—ed.
[20] Dates for Leo the Great added—ed.

Now the advantage that accrues to the third from this—that of having an *a priori* identical, equally independent, and thereby even determining relationship with the other two—is not tied only to both of the others being in a state of opposition. It is instead enough that they have in general merely a certain distinctiveness, alienation, qualitative dualism towards one another; this is in fact the general formula for the type by which the enmity of the elements forms only one particular, albeit the most frequent, case. Especially notable, for example, is the following advantage of a *tertius* resulting from the mere duality. If B is obligated to A to perform a specifically defined duty, and this passes from B to C and D, among whom the performance is to be distributed, the temptation arises for A to impose, where possible, on each of the two just a little bit more than half, so that A benefits overall even more than before, given that the obligation was still in one hand. In 1751 the government especially in Bohemia had to prohibit, with division of peasant areas by the squirearchy, the imposition of a greater burden of service on each divided portion than would have been the case correspondingly before division. With the division of the obligation to the two the idea prevails that each individual has in any case less to accomplish than the former individual, on whom was the burden of the whole; the more precise appraisal of the amount goes back to before and can be thus easily transferred. Thus while here, so to speak, the mere numerical reality of the duality instead of the unity of the party produces the situation of the *tertius gaudens*, it rises in the following case above a duality determined by qualitative difference. The legal power of the English kings after the Norman conquest, unheard of in the Germanic middle ages, is explained by the fact that William the Conqueror indeed encountered the legal rights of Anglo-Saxon peoples, which in principle should have been respected, and likewise his Normans brought their native rights with them. However, these two legal structures did not fit together; they provided no unity for people's rights before the king, who through the singularity of his interest could shift between the two and largely annul them. In the disunion of nations—not only because they constantly fought with one another, but because their difference impeded an assertion of a law common to them—lay the basis for absolutism, and therefore his power sank steadily as soon as both nationalities actually fused into one.

The favorable position of the third generally disappears then in the moment in which the other two combine into a unity, *i.e.* the grouping in the relationship at issue reforms from a triadic into a dyadic

combination. It is instructive not only concerning the specific problem but group life in general that this outcome can occur even without personal unification or merging of interests: in that the object of antagonism is deprived of its subjective demands through the objective specification of the dispute. This seems to me to illuminate the following case especially well. Through modern industry leading to an ongoing interlocking of the most varied trades and perpetually presenting new tasks that belong historically to no existing craft, there is very frequently produced, especially in England, conflicts of competence between various categories of workers. In the large firms the shipbuilders are always in conflict with the joiners, the tinsmiths with the blacksmiths, the boilermakers with the metalworkers, the bricklayers with the tile workers, over for which of them a specific work would be fitting. Each trade immediately stops working if it believes that another one is encroaching upon the tasks entitled to it. The irresolvable conflict here is that fixed limitations of subjective rights are presumed to be objects that in their essence are continually in flux. Such conflicts between workers have often severely weakened their position before the entrepreneurs. The latter have a moral advantage, as a result of the workers' internal disputes, as soon as their workers go on strike and thereby do them immeasurable damage, and moreover they have it in their power to threaten every single trade with arbitrarily pushing the work in question off onto another. The economic interest of every trade in not allowing the work to be taken away rests on the fear that the competing worker might do it more cheaply and thereby eventually lower the standard pay scale for that work. It would thus be suggested as one way out that the trade unions might, in consultation with the combined entrepreneurs, set the pay scale for each kind of work and then leave it up to the entrepreneurs to choose which category of worker they want to employ for each existing work; then those left out need not fear any damage to their economic interests *in principle.* Objectifying the matter of conflict removes the advantage of the entrepreneurs in terms of wage pressure and playing the two parties against one another; even though choosing among the different unions remains with them, the choice is however no longer an advantage. The earlier undifferentiation of the elements of the workforce and of its material conditions has differentiated, and while the entrepreneur with regard to the former is still left in the formal situation of the *tertius gaudens*, the objective establishment the latter has eliminated the chances for its exploitation.

Many of the kinds of strife mentioned here and in the next formation must have contributed to producing or increasing the position of the medieval church among the emerging world powers of the Middle Ages. With the perpetual unrest and strife in the large and small political districts, the one stable power, already equally honored or feared by every party, had to gain an incomparable privilege. Countless times it is in general only the stability of the third party in the changing phases of strife, its unaffectedness by the issues of conflict around which the two parties oscillate up and down, that brings it its predominance and its possibilities of gain. The more violently and especially the longer lasting the conflict of the parties allows their positions to fluctuate, the more superior, respected, and opportunity-rich will steadfastness and persistence, *ceteris paribus*, shape the position of a third *purely as formal fact*. There is probably just no greater example of this constellation observed everywhere than the Catholic Church. For the overall characterization of the *tertius gaudens* with regard to all the church's forms, the most notable is the fact that the mere distinction of spiritual energies that it and the others introduce into the relationship belong to the sources of its privileges. What I mentioned previously in general about non-partisans—that they represent more the intellectuality, and those in conflict, however, more the passion and drive—this gives them, where they want to exploit the situation egoistically, a dominating, so to speak, enthroned position at an ideal height and that external advantage that the dispassionate participant possesses amidst every complexity. And even where one spurns the practical exploitation of one's more impartial view and of one's powers, uninvolved from the very beginning but always available, the situation incorporates at least the feeling of a quiet ironic superiority over the parties who exert so much effort in a contest for a prize so unimportant to oneself.

3. *Divide et impera*.[21] In these combinations of triadic patterns it is a matter of an existing or emerging dispute between two elements from which the third derived advantage; it is time now to consider separately that nuance, although not always in reality defined in this way, where the third deliberately creates the dispute in order to gain a commanding situation. It is also to be mentioned here in advance that the triad, of course, represents just the smallest number of participants necessary

[21] Latin: "Divide and conquer"—ed.

for this formation and thus may serve as the simplest schema. It is here thus a matter of two elements originally united with each other over against a third or dependent on one another, and the third knowing to set the powers united against *oneself* into activity against *one another*; the outcome then is that either they hold each other in check so that one can pursue one's advantage undisturbed by the two or they so weaken each other that neither of them is able to mount a resistance to the superior power of the third. I will now characterize several steps on the scale in which one can order the relevant phenomena. The simplest then is where a superior power hinders the unification of elements who are not yet at all striving positively towards such a unification, but who nevertheless *could* perhaps do it. To this belongs, above all, the legal prohibitions of political associations, both altogether as well as of linkages between associations that are permitted to exist separately. For the most part there is not any definitively substantiated fear, nor any kind of demonstrable danger to dominating powers from such combinations. Rather the form of association as such is feared because it could *possibly* incorporate a dangerous content. Pliny the Younger says expressly in his correspondence with Trajan that the Christians are dangerous because they form such a cooperative society; otherwise, however, they are fully harmless.[22] The experience that revolutionary tendencies or even those directed towards change of the existing tendencies must take the form of union of as many interests as possible leads to the logically false but psychologically very understandable converse, that all associations have a tendency to be directed against the powers that be. The prohibition is thus founded, so to speak, on a possibility of the utmost: not only are the combinations, forbidden from the very beginning, merely possible and frequently do not even exist in the *desire* of those thus kept apart, but the dangers, for the sake of which the interdiction results, would even be just a *possibility* on the part of the realized combination. In the form of this prohibition against association the *divide et impera* emerges thus as conceivably the most sublimated prophylaxis of the one element against all eventualities from the combining of others. This preventative form can be immediately replicated formally where the majority, which stands over against the one, consists of the various elements of power of one and the same personality. The Anglo-Norman kingdom took care that the manors in the feudal era were scattered as widely

[22] Pliny the Younger, Letter 10, to Trajan—ed.

possible: several of the most powerful vassals were long-established in 17 to 21 shires. Because of this principle of local division the jurisdictions of the crown's vassals could not be consolidated into large sovereign domains as on the continent. So we hear about earlier apportionments of lands among the sons of lords: the portions were to have been laid out as haphazardly as possible in order to forestall complete secession. The idea of the unified state seeks thus to preserve its domination by splitting up every territorial portion which, if it were spatially enclosed, could easily secede.

The prophylactic hindering of association now acts more pointedly of course when a direct striving for the latter exists. Under this schema belongs—indeed complicated with yet other motives—the phenomenon of employers in general adamantly refusing, in wage and other contested issues, to deal with intermediaries who do not belong to their own work force.[23] Thereby they impede not only the workers from strengthening their position through alliance with a personality who has nothing to fear or expect from the employers, but they hamper as well the unified action of the work force of a different enterprise which, for example, is working for thoroughgoing implementation *of a single* wage scale. While the intermediary is rejected who could concomitantly negotiate for several labor groups, the employer prevents the threatening prospect of unified workers; in relation to the existing efforts for such a possibility, this is sensed as so important for their position that business associations sometimes require of each of their members as a duty under their bylaws this isolation of their work forces in disputes and negotiations. In the history of the English union federations, principally in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, one sees an extraordinary development, as the exploitation of this 'divide'[24] by the entrepreneurs was stopped by an impersonal authority. They began, namely, from both sides to attach a validity to the decisions of the impartial arbiter, called in for disputes, *beyond the specific case*. Consequently there was now, instead of many, just one universal rule over the, albeit still individually led, negotiations of the employers with their own workers, and this is evidently an intermediate step towards the collective bargaining agreement inside the whole industry, inclusive of all interests, in which

[23] The German is *die Arbeiterschaft*, which means "working class" or the "work force"; Simmel seems to be using it here in the sense of a particular craft or the workers associated with a specific industry—ed.

[24] In English—ed.

the practice of the 'divide' ceases to exist. Constitutional rulers attempt to go beyond that mere prophylaxis to prevent, by divisions of parliament, the formation of troublesome majorities. I will mention only an example that is of interest principally because of its radicalism. Under George III, the English court engaged in the practice of declaring all party entities *as such* actually inadmissible and incompatible with the welfare of the state. And through the principle that only the individual person and that person's individual qualification could hold political office; while laws and general directives were described as the specific achievements of that multiplicity, 'men, not measures,' were required.[25] So the practical significance of individuality was played against the actions of majorities, and by somewhat contemptuously identifying the social plural with abstract generality, the dissolution of it into its atoms was sought as allegedly what is alone real and functional.

The division of elements takes on an active form rather than a prohibitive wherever the third establishes jealousy between them. By this what is not yet meant are the cases in which the third lets the other two annihilate each other in order establish a new order of things at their expense; rather here it is often a matter of conservative tendencies in that the third wants thereby to preserve already existing prerogatives; so a feared coalition of both the others is hindered by means of jealousy between them from the first signs of its emergence or minimal development. A special refinement of this technique appears to have been made in a case reported from ancient Peru. It was a general practice of the Incas to divide a newly conquered tribe into two roughly equal halves and to install a director into each of the two, and in fact *with a small difference in rank between both*. This was actually the most suitable means to elicit between these chieftains a rivalry that would not allow any united action against the rulers on the party of the subservient realms to develop. A position of complete equality as well as one of great difference would more likely result in a unification: the former because then an actual bisecting of the leadership rather than any other relationship would have led to eventual action, and because, where it nevertheless would have been required of the subordination, equal pairs most easily conform to that technical necessity; the latter because with the inequality the leadership of the one would have encountered no resistance. The *slight* difference in rank allows it least to come to

[25] "Men, not measures" in English. Quotation marks added—ed.

an organic and gratifying relationship in the feared unification here because the one with more would have without doubt demanded absolute privilege, the one with less however not being great enough to suggest the same ambition.

The principle of *unequal apportionment* of anything of value in order to so arouse jealousy as a means of *divide et impera* is a commonly favored technique, against which certain social conditions once more offer in principle similar protection. The Australian aborigines were stirred up against one another through unequally apportioned offerings in order to govern them more easily. But this always failed because of the communism of the hordes who immediately distributed every gift, no matter who received it, among all the members. Next to jealousy it is mistrust above all that is used as a psychological means for the same purpose, and which, in contrast to the former, renders it possible to restrain even larger crowds from conspiratorial alliances. To its greatest effect, this was used by the Venetian government on the grandest scale through the staged demand to the citizens for denunciation somehow of anyone suspect. No one knew whether one's closest acquaintance was in the service of the state inquisition, and so revolutionary plans, which presuppose mutual trust on the part of a great number of people, were cut off at the root; consequently in later Venetian history open revolt is as good as non-existent.

The most blatant form of *divide et impera*, the unleashing of actual conflict between two elements, can have its objective in the relationship of the third to the two as well as to objectives lying outside them. The latter occurs, for example, where one of the three claimants to an office understands how to incite the other two against one another so that through the gossip and slander each of them puts into circulation about the other, they mutually destroy each other's chances. In all cases of this type the art of the third manifests itself in the magnitude of the distance the third knows to keep from the action being instigated. The more one steers the conflict by pulling on invisible strings, the more one knows how to apply the fire so that it burns further without one's additional involvement and oversight, the more, then, not only will the conflict of the two others be carried on more pointedly and directly to their mutual ruin, but the more also the prize at issue, that held between *them*, or the objects otherwise desired by the third seem to fall into the third's lap as if by themselves. The Venetians were also masters of this technique. In order to usurp the holdings of nobles on *terra firma*, they had the means to distribute noble titles to younger people or those

not of noble birth. The indignation of the older ones and nobles over that always provided an occasion for brawls and breaches of the peace between both parties, whereupon the Venetian government would, all according to legal form, confiscate the holdings of the guilty persons. In precisely such cases, where the uniting together of the divided elements against the common oppressor would be of the most obvious utility, it becomes patently clear that, as a general condition for *divide et empera*, hostilities do not in any manner require only the collision of real interests for their basis. If only some kind of need for hostility in general, an antagonism that seeks only its object, exists in the soul, it can easily succeed in substituting some other opponent entirely instead of that opponent against whom the animosity would have meaning and purpose. *Divide et impera* requires of its artist the evocation—through baiting, slander, flattery, arousal of expectations, etc.—of that general condition of excitation and combativeness in which the suggestion of an opponent, not at all really obvious as such, can suffice. In this way the form of conflict can be entirely disengaged from its content and rationale. The third, who would actually benefit from the hostility of the other two, can remain, as it were, invisible between them, so that the collision of the two does not impact the third but occurs reciprocally between them themselves.

Where the purpose of the third does not lie in an object but in the direct domination over the other two elements, two sociological perspectives are fundamental. 1. Certain elements are formed in such a way that they can be combated successfully only through similarly formed ones. The desire for their subjection finds no immediately suitable point of attack; so it remains only to keep them, so to speak, divided among themselves and divisions involved in a struggle they can conduct with identical weapons until they are sufficiently weakened enough to fall prey to the third. Of England it was said, they could conquer India only through Indians, just as Xerxes had recognized that Greece is best fought through Greeks. Precisely those dependent on one another through the common identity of interests know best one another's weaknesses and points of vulnerability, so that the principle of the *similia similibus*[26]—the annihilation of some kind of condition by

[26] Latin: "likes with likes," in the sense of "fighting fire with fire" or "it takes one to know one"—ed.

the stimulation of a similar one—can be repeated here to the greatest extent. While one best achieves mutual advancement and unification with a certain measure of qualitative differentiation, because through this there arises completion, coalescence, organically differentiated life—the mutual destruction seems best effected with qualitative similarity, of course apart from so great a quantitative preponderance of power on the part of the one party that the relationship of the qualities becomes of no overall consequence. The whole category of enmities that culminate in sibling conflict derives its radically destructive character just as much from experience and knowledge as from the instincts originating in the root unity which make available to each the weapons that are most deadly against just this opponent. What forms the basis of the relationship of the similar to each other—the knowledge of the external situation and empathy with the inner—that is obviously likewise the means for the deepest injuries that exclude no attack possibility and leads, since it is in its essence mutual, to the most thorough annihilation. For this reason the combat of likes through likes, the division of the opponent into two qualitatively homogeneous parties, is one of the most thoroughgoing realizations of the *divide et impera*. 2. Where it is not possible for oppressors to get their business done exclusively through the sacrifice of the victims themselves, where they must themselves intervene in their struggle, the schema is very simple: they support the one just as long as needed to squash the other, whereupon they then have the other as an easy prey. This support will in any case be at its most functional for the one who is already the stronger. This can take the more negative form of the more powerful being spared by one element in an oppressing complex of them. So Rome in its subjugation of Greece indeed maintained the most obvious reserve against Athens and Sparta. This tactic must elicit resentment and jealousy on the part of one, arrogance and confidence on the part of the other, a split that makes the prey easygoing for the oppressor. This method of those with the will to rule: to sponsor the stronger of two actually equivalent interests facing them until they have ruined the weaker and then with an about face to confront and to subjugate the one now isolated—this method is no less favored in the founding of empires than in the fisticuffs of street youths, no different in the administration of political parties through a government than in the economic competition among, say, three elements: a very powerful financier or manufacturer and two less significant but troublesome and unequal competitors facing off against

one another. In this case the first, in order to hinder a countervailing coalition of the other two, enters into a price or production arrangement with the stronger of them that secures a considerable advantage for that one and through which the weaker one is crushed. Once this is done, then the powerful one can dump the former confederate and drive the latter, who now has nothing left to fall back on, into the ground through predatory pricing or some other method.

I will proceed to an altogether different type of those sociological formations that are conditioned by the quantitative determination of their elements. In the configurations of two and three, it was a matter of the intra-group life with all its differentiations, syntheses, and antitheses, that unfolds with this minimum or maximum number of members. The question did not involve the group as a whole in its relationship to another or to a larger one of which it is a part, but the intrinsic reciprocal relationship of its components. But now, in contrast, we inquire as to the significance evident in the determination of quantity towards the outside, indeed its most essential function, in that it makes the distribution of a group into subgroups possible. The teleological sense of this is, as already highlighted above, the easier overseeing and directing of the entire group, often a first organization, more correctly: its mechanization; considered purely formally, the possibility is thereby given to guard the formation, character, arrangements of divisions of the whole, independent of the quantitative development of the whole itself: The components with which the administration bargains remain qualitatively always the same sociologically, and the increase of the whole changes only their multiplier. This is, for example, the immense benefit of the numerical division of armies; their increase proceeds thereby with relative technical ease, in that it is effected as an ever repeated formation of the numerically and thus organizationally already fixed cadres. This advantage is evidently linked to a numerical determination in general, but not to specific numbers. Meanwhile in this regard one of the number groups already mentioned above became historically of especial importance for social distributions: ten and its derivatives. For this combination of ten members for communal tasks and responsibilities, which appears in many of the most ancient cultures, the number of fingers was without a doubt particularly decisive. With a total lack of arithmetical skill one has in the fingers a first principle of orientation for ascertaining a large number of units, for making their divisions and groupings clear. This general, often enough accentuated meaning of the principle of fives and tens is, however, still utilized espe-

cially for social application: by the fingers having a relatively mutual independence and independent movement, but still being inseparably linked together (in France one says of two friends, *ils sont unis comme deux doigts de la main*)[27] and obtaining their actual sense only in being together—they thereby offer a very apt picture of the social union of individuals. The unity and particular joint effectiveness of those small subgroups of the larger collectivities could not be any more clearly symbolized. Still most recently the Czech Omladina secret society was constituted according to the principle of five: the very leadership belonged to several "Hands," which consisted of one thumb each, *i.e.* the uppermost leader and four fingers.[28] How strongly one sensed precisely the number ten as consistently belonging together inside of a larger group is demonstrated perhaps also by the custom reaching back into early antiquity of the decimation of military divisions during insurgencies, desertions, etc. Precisely ten was simply considered a unity that for purposes of punishment could be represented by an individual; or experience roughly concurs that a ringleader tends to be found on average somewhere among ten. The division of a whole group into ten numerically similar parts, though obviously leading to a completely different result and wholly without a factually practical relation to the division into ten individuals, still seems to me to derive psychologically from this. As the Jews returned from the second exile, 42,360 Jews with their slaves, they were divided in such a way that a dwelling in Jerusalem took a one-in-ten drawn lot; the remaining nine tenths went to rural lands. These were decidedly too few for the capital city, which is why they also had to be equally concerned about an increase in the population of Jerusalem. The power of the principle of ten as a basis for social division seems here to have worked blindly against practical necessity.

[27] French: They are united as two fingers of a hand—ed.

[28] Seen from another and more general perspective, the division according to the number of fingers belongs to the typical tendency to use phenomena of available, clearly natural rhythm for these social purposes, at least in name and symbol. A secret political society under Louis Philippe called itself the Seasons. Six members under the leadership of a seventh, called Sunday, formed a week, four weeks a month, three months a season, four seasons the highest unit standing under a commander-in-chief. With all the play-like character, this naming activity still probably had a feeling as though one hereby participated in a form of unity replicated from the different components indicated by nature itself. And the mystical coloring, to which secret societies are so inclined, will have favored this symbolic representation with which one could intend to link a power of cosmic design to the designated structure.

The group of a hundred, derived from that principle, is primarily and essentially also a means of division, and admittedly the most important historically. I have already mentioned that it became the direct conceptual substitute for division in general, so that it remains the very name for the subgroup even when this contains many fewer or more members. The hundred appears—perhaps most decisively in the great role that it plays in the administration of Anglo-Saxon England—as it were, as the idea of the subgroup in general, whose internal meaning is not altered by its outward incompleteness. Consequently it is right to note that the group of a hundred in ancient Peru always with due diligence voluntarily paid their tribute to the Incas, even when they had been reduced to a fourth of their population. The basic sociological reality here is that these communal associations were experienced as entities apart from their members. But now since the tax obligation, it seems, did not apply to the association as such but to its hundred participants—so the assumption of this obligation by the remaining twenty-five shows all the more sharply how necessarily from nature the unity of a hundred was felt more than precisely one hundred. On the other hand it is unavoidable that the division into groups of a hundred penetrates many kinds of organic relationships of elements and aggregates of elements—of the familial, the neighbor, the friendship type—because it always remains a mechanical technical principle, teleologically, not naturally, driven. Occasionally then the decimal division comes close to being more organic: thus the medieval German imperial army is formed according to nationalities; nevertheless we also hear of a division of the army by thousands, which then had to cut through and prevail over that more natural ordering determined by a *terminus a quo*.[29] Yet the strong centripetal force that rules the formation into hundreds suggests its meaning is to be sought not only in its purpose of division, which is something external to it and with which it serves the larger encompassing group. Now apart from that, it is found as a matter of fact that the hundred-count of members, purely as such, lends a special significance and dignity to the group. The nobility among the Epizephyrian Locroi[30] traced its descent back to noble women from the thusly named "hundred houses" that had been involved in the founding of the colony. By the same token the original

[29] Latin: point of origin—ed.
[30] An ancient people in the South of Italy—ed.

settlements by which Rome is supposed to have been founded included a hundred Latin people, a hundred Sabine, and a hundred brought together from various components. The hundred-count of members apparently lends the group a certain style, the precisely delimited strict outline, over against which each somewhat smaller or somewhat larger number appears rather vague and less complete in itself. It has an inner unity and system that make it especially suitable for that construction of myths of origin, a peculiar union of mystical symmetry and rational sense, while all other numbers of members of groups are felt as random, not as holding together from within in the same manner, furthermore not unalterable according to their own structure. The particularly adequate relationship with our categories of understanding, the easy survey of a hundred-count that makes it so suitable as a principle of division, appears here as a reflection of an *objective* feature of the group that comes directly from its numerical determination.

This qualification just mentioned arises completely from what was discussed up till now. With the combinations of two and three, quantity determined the particular inner life of the group, but it does not do it so much as a quantity; the group does not manifest all those phenomena because it had this size as a whole, but rather it was a matter of the determination of each single element through its interaction with one or with two other elements. It is entirely otherwise with all the derivatives of the finger count: here it was a matter of the basis for synthesis in the easier oversight, organization, manageability, in short, not actually in the group itself, but in the subject who has to deal with it theoretically or practically. A third meaning of the quantity of members is now finally pertinent, in that the group possesses, objectively and as a whole—thus without differentiation of individual positions of the elements—certain characteristics only below or only over a definite amount. Quite generally this was treated already above in the distinction between the large and the small group; now however it is a question whether the characteristics of the whole group come from *particular* numbers of members—whereby obviously the patterns of interaction among the individuals constitute the real and decisive process; but now they do not constitute the object of inquiry in the singularity of the individuals but their being combined into a picture of the whole. The facts that point to this significance of the quantity of the group belong entirely to a single type: obligations having to meet legal prescriptions concerning the minimum or maximum size of associations that are required for certain functions or rights. The basis for this is evident. The specific qualities,

the combinations, evolve on the basis of their membership number, and of course what the legal prescriptions about that require would always parallel what is associated with the same number, provided that there were no psychological differences among people and if the workings of a group followed from its size as closely as would the dynamic workings of a material mass in motion. The unavoidable individual differences of the members, however, renders all exact and prior determinations completely illusory: they can allow the same amount of power and rashness, of concentration or decentralization, of self-sufficiency or need for leadership to emerge that appear in circumstances determined by a group at one time, a second time to be sure by one much smaller, a third time by one much greater. However, the legal prescriptions that have those qualities of associations as a basis for regulation cannot technically cope with such oscillations and paralyzations through the random human material, but must specify membership counts as an average to which they link rights and duties of associations. Basically the assumption must be that a certain common spirit, a certain mood, power, tendency would arise among a number of associated people when and only when this number has reached a certain level. Depending on whether this outcome is desired or abhorred, one will demand a minimum number or permit only a maximum. I will first cite some examples only for the latter. In the early Greek era there were legal specifications that the crew of boats should amount to no more than five men, in order to prevent their turning to piracy. Out of fear of the leagues of skilled workers the cities of the Rhineland in 1436 decided that no more than three skilled workers were allowed to go about dressed alike. Generally one most often encounters political prohibitions having this intent. Most frequently overall political prohibitions of this sense occur. In 1305 Philip the Fair prohibited all assemblies of more than five persons, whatever estate they were and whatever form they would take. Under the *ancient régime* twenty nobles were not even allowed to join in a discussion without the king specifically granting it. Napoleon III forbade all associations of more than twenty persons not specifically allowed. In England the conventicle act under Charles II made all religious meetings of more than five persons in a house subject to penalty, and the English reaction at the beginning of the nineteenth century forbade all meetings of over fifty persons without notice being given well in advance. During states of siege often no more than three or five people were allowed to gather in the street, and some years

ago the Berlin supreme court decided that an 'assembly' in the legal sense, which would thus require police notification, would hold with the presence from eight persons. Purely in the economic realm this is borne, for example, in the English law of 1708—enacted under the influence of the Bank of England—that the legal associations inside the finance industry were permitted to include no more than six partners. The conviction must be widespread on the part of the governing that only inside of groups of a given size is found the courage or imprudence, the spirit of venture or contagious impulse to certain actions that one simply prefers not to allow to rise. Most clearly this is the motive behind laws of morality: when the number of participants at a banquet, fellow riders in an elevator, etc. is limited, because experience has shown that in a larger mass the sensual impulses more easily win the upper hand, the infection from the bad example progresses there more rapidly, the feeling of individual responsibility is disabled. The opposite direction, on the same basis, is taken by the regulations that require precisely some minimum number of participants for a specific legal effect. Thus any collective business enterprise in England can be incorporated as soon as it has at least seven partners; thus everywhere the law requires a certain, though extraordinarily varying minimum, number of judges for making a valid judgment, so that for example in many places some panels of judges were simply called the seven. With regard to the former phenomenon, it is assumed that only with this number of partners would there be adequate guarantees and effective solidarities, without which laws of incorporation are a danger to the national economy. In the second example the prescribed minimum number seems then to function in such a way that the errors and extreme opinions of individuals balance one another and thereby the collective opinion would arrive at what is objectively correct. This minimum requirement emerges especially strongly in religious formation. The regular gatherings of Buddhist monks of a certain area required the presence of at least four monks for the purpose of religious inculcation and a kind of confession.[31] This number thus made up the synod, as it were, and then everyone had, as a member of the same, some kind of a significance other than an individual monk, which is what he simply

[31] Beichte—"Confession" in the sense of the Catholic sacrament of Reconciliation—ed.

was, as long as only about three met. So Jews are always supposed to pray together with at least ten. So, according to the Lockean constitution of North Carolina,[32] any given church or religious community is supposed to have been permitted to start if it was comprised of at least seven members. The power, intensity, and stability of the spirit of the religious community is in these cases then anticipated only from a certain number of members reciprocally maintained and increased. Summarizing: where the law specifies a minimum number, trust works in support of the multiplicity and mistrust against the energies of isolated individuals; where a maximum number is set, just the opposite, mistrust works against the multiplicity, and is not directed against its individual components.

Now, however, a prohibition may be linked to a maximum or a permission to a minimum—the legislators will have not doubted that the results they fear or desire are on average bound uncertainly and entirely to the established range; but the arbitrariness of the set limit is in any case here unavoidable and justified, just as in determining the age at which someone assumes the rights and duties of adulthood. Certainly the inner capacity for this appears in some earlier, in others later, in *no one* at the stroke of the minute set by law; however, actual practice can win the established standards that it needs only in so far as it carves a continuous series into two sections at one point for the purposes of the law. The completely different treatment of those sections can find no precise justification in their objective nature. For this reason it is so extraordinarily instructive that in all determinations, for which the examples given above are chosen, the specific character of human beings, over whom the directive applies, enters not at all into consideration, even though it governs every individual case. But it is not something tangible, and only the number as such still holds. And, to express the deep feeling for it prevalent everywhere, it is essential that it would be the crucial factor, if somehow the individual differences would not cancel out their effects, that these effects nevertheless be contained more certainly in the final total phenomenon.

[32] The philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) assisted Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, in drawing up a constitution for the North American colonial province of Carolina, 1672–1673—ed.

CHAPTER THREE

DOMINATION AND SUBORDINATION

Broadly speaking, no one is particularly concerned that one's influence might affect the other, but rather that this influence, this affecting of the other, would react back on one, the determining one. For this reason, there is for sure a reciprocal action along with that abstract desire to dominate that is thereby satisfying—that the behavior or suffering, the positive or negative condition of the other, manifests itself to the subject as the product of *the subject's* will. This so-to-say solipsistic exercise of a dominating power, whose significance for dominant people exists exclusively in the consciousness of one's effectiveness, is indeed primarily a rudimentary sociological form, and on the strength of it there is as little social interaction as between an artist and the artist's sculpture, which nevertheless also acts back on the artist with the consciousness of one's power of creation. Meanwhile the desire to dominate—even in this sublimated form whose practical significance is not actually the exploitation of the other but rather merely the consciousness of its possibility—in no way signifies the most extreme egoistical ruthlessness. Because the desire to dominate wants so very much to break the *inner* resistance of the subjugated while egoism is concerned only with the *outward* show of victory, it always has a kind of interest in the other person; the other is a value for that desire. Now where egoism is not immediately a desire to dominate, but instead the other is of absolute indifference for it and is a simple instrument over which one's own purposes takes precedence, even the last shred of mutuality in social interaction is eclipsed. That the absolute exclusion of every specific interest of one party invalidates the concept of society is seen, relatively speaking, in the determination by the lawyers of the late Roman period that the *societas leonina* is simply no longer to be understood as a social contract.[1] And in the same sense it has been said of the lower workers in the modern giant businesses whose jobs are eliminated by effective

[1] Deriving from the fable of the lion entering into a hunting partnership with other animals but keeping the prey to itself, the *societas leona* was a partnership in which all profits would go to only one of the partners—ed.

competition in the struggle with other entrepreneurs: the difference in the strategic position between them and their employers is so overwhelming that the work contract simply ceases to be a 'contract' in the usual sense of the word because one is unconditionally at the mercy of the other. In this respect, the moral principle—to never use a person merely as a means—certainly appears as the formula for every social interaction. Where the significance of the one party sinks to a point at which one of the 'I's no longer enters the relationship with any salient influence, one can speak of society as nothing more meaningful than the relationship between the carpenter and the carpenter's bench.

Now the elimination of all spontaneity within a situation of subordination is in reality considerably less common than the freely offered popular expressions suggest with such notions as 'coercion,' 'having-no-choice,' 'absolute necessity.' Even in the most oppressive and cruel relations of subjugation there always yet remains a substantial measure of personal freedom. We do not become conscious of it ourselves only because testing it in such cases requires a sacrifice that we commonly consider entirely unacceptable for us. The 'unlimited' coercion that the cruelest tyrant actually exercises over us is always altogether limited; that is to say, limited so that we want to avoid the threatened punishment or special consequences of the insubordination. Precisely viewed, the relationship of dominance and subordination annihilates the freedom of the subjugated only in the case of direct physical coercion; otherwise it tends simply to demand a price we are not typically inclined to pay for the realization of freedom. It can increasingly narrow the circle of external influences in which it realizes itself, but, except for the use of physical coercion, never to the point of completely disappearing. The moral aspect of this examination is not our concern here, but rather the sociological: social interaction—*i.e.*, action reciprocally determined and undertaken occurring only from personal positions exists even in those cases of dominance and subordination, and this generates therefore yet another *sociological* form, in which 'force,' as usually understood, is used by one party to rob the other of every spontaneity and thereby every true 'action' that would be one side of an interaction.

In view of the enormous role of relations of domination and subordination, it is of the greatest importance for the analysis of social existence to be clear about this spontaneity and complicity on the part of the subordinate subject in view of the frequent concealment of them in the more superficial way of looking at things. What one, e.g., calls 'authority' presupposes in large measure, as is typically recognized, a

freedom of those subject to the authority; it is, even where it seems to 'crush' them, not based on coercion and pure resignation alone. The peculiar creation of 'authority' that is significant for the life of the community in its varying degrees—rudimentary as well as fully developed, passing as well as durable forms—seems to come about in two kinds of ways. A personality excelling in eminence and power earns, by way of its greater proximity or even greater distance, a faith and trust, a decisive gravity in its judgments, that bears the character of an objective authority; the personality has won a prerogative and axiomatic trustworthiness for its decisions that towers over the ever variable, relative, critically vulnerable value of subjective personality, at least by comparison. As a person operates 'authoritatively,' the quantity of that person's importance is turned into a new quality, has taken on for its milieu, as it were, the aggregate condition of objectivity. The same thing can occur in reverse: a power transcending the individual—state, church, school, the organizations of family or military—by virtue of its nature invests a single personality with a prestige, a rank, a power of the final-say that would never develop by virtue of someone's own character. 'Authority'—the essence of which is that a person makes decisions with that reliability and command of recognition that befits logically only the transpersonal, objective axiom or deduction—has here devolved, as it were, from above onto a person, while in the former case it grew from the qualities of the person, as by *generatio aequivoca*.[2] At the point of this conversion and transfer the more-or-less voluntary faith of those subject to the authority has now manifestly to be brought into action. Since that transformation from the transpersonal to the esteemed personality provides the latter with yet only minimal advantage over the verifiable and rational, it is completed by the ones faithful to authority themselves; it is a sociological event requiring also the spontaneous cooperation of the subjugated people. Indeed, that one experiences an authority as 'oppressive' is itself an indicator of the actually presupposed and never entirely eliminated independence of the other.

Authority is distinguished from that nuance of superiority known as prestige. With prestige, the factor of extra-subjective importance, the identification of a personality with an objective power or norm, is missing. The power of the individual is fully decisive for leadership;

[2] Latin: spontaneous generation—ed.

it remains as such not only consciously, but in contrast to the typical leader who always manifests a certain mixture of personal and additional objective factors, prestige emanates just as much from the purely personal factors as does authority from the objectivity of norms and powers. Although this superiority finds its essence especially in 'enthusiasm,' in the unquestioning devotion of individuals and masses—more so than in authority whose higher but cooler normative structure leaves room for a critique even by the obedient—it still appears nevertheless as a type of voluntary homage to the superior person. Perhaps, in fact, a deeper freedom of the subject lies in the acknowledgment of authority, as in the enchantment felt from the prestige of a prince or a priest, of a military or spiritual leader; nevertheless, for the *feeling* of the led it is different. We cannot often defend ourselves against authority; the *élan*, however, with which we follow the prestigious individual contains a persistent consciousness of spontaneity. Simply because the devotion here applies only to the wholly personal, it appears also to issue only from the ground of personality with its irrepressible memory of freedom. Certainly people endlessly deceive themselves regarding the degree of freedom present in any kind of action because, to be sure, the conscious idea with which we account for that inner reality feels so clear and certain to us; however one interprets freedom, one will be able to say that some degree of it, albeit not the amount believed, exists wherever the feeling and conviction of it exist.[3]

Yet a more positive activity persists on the part of the ostensibly merely passive elements in relationships such as these: the speaker before the assembly, the teacher before the class—the one at the head of the group here appears solely to be dominant for the present; nevertheless those who find themselves in such a situation understand the influential and controlling feedback from this mass who appear merely docile and controlled by the leader. And this is not only with regard to moments of immediate opposition. All leaders are also led, just as in countless instances the master of the slave is led by the slaves. "I am their leader,

[3] Here—and analogously in many other cases—it does not depend at all on defining the concept of prestige, but rather on establishing the existence of a certain variety of human social interaction, fully indifferently with regard to its label. The presentation merely starts in an expedient manner frequently with the concept that offers the best linguistic fit for the relationship to be uncovered in order generally just to point it out. This gives the appearance of a simple act of definition, not that the substance for a concept should here be found, but rather that an actual content should be described that sometimes has the chance of being covered by an already existing concept.

therefore I must follow them," said one of the greatest German party leaders with regard to his following. At its crassest this shows itself with the journalist who offers content and direction for the opinions of a silent multitude, but who, at the same time must thoroughly hear, combine, surmise what then the actual tendencies of the multitude are—what it wishes to hear, what it wants confirmed, with regard to what it desires to be led. While the public is seemingly subject only to the suggestion of the journalist, the journalist is in reality likewise at the mercy of the public. A most complicated interaction, whose spontaneous powers on the two sides indeed possess very different forms, hides itself in this case behind the appearance of the pure superiority of one element over against the passive docility of the other. In personal relationships where the whole content and meaning is allocated exclusively by one party for service to the other party, the full extent of this submission is often tied to that other party itself submitting to the first party, albeit in another stratum of the relationship. Thus Bismarck states his view regarding his relationship to Wilhelm I:

> A certain measure of submission is determined by the law, a greater by political conviction; where it goes beyond that, it requires a personal feeling of *reciprocity*. My attachment had its primary basis in a faithful commitment to royalty; but in the particularity of this case, it is indeed only possible under the influence of a certain reciprocity—between lord and servant.

Hypnotic suggestion, perhaps, offers the most characteristic instance of this type. A prominent hypnotist has emphasized that with every hypnosis there occurs an influence, not easy to specify, of the hypnotized on the hypnotist and that without this the effect would not be achieved. Whereas the phenomenon here proffers the unconditional influence by the one and the unconditional being influenced on the other side, this also involves an interaction, an exchange of influences, that turns the pure one-sidedness of dominance and subordination back into a *sociological* form.

I offer yet again from the legal field several instances of domination and subordination whose seemingly purely one-sided relationship manifests without difficulty the actual presence of interaction. When with absolute despotism sovereigns attach the threat of punishment or the promise of reward to their commands, this means then that they themselves are willing to be bound by their decrees: subordinates shall have the right on their part to require something of them; despots bind themselves by that established punishment, however severe it may be,

to not inflict one even more severe. Whether afterwards they actually allow the promised reward or the limitations on punishment to operate or not is another question. The *basic idea* of the relationship is certainly that the dominating one fully controls the subordinate, yet a claim is guaranteed to the subordinate that the subordinate can assert or even renounce: so that even this most categorical form of relationship would definitely still include some kind of spontaneity for subordinates. In one peculiar permutation, the legitimation of the interaction inside an apparently purely one-sided and most passive subordination becomes effective in one medieval theory of the state: the state is so founded that people would be *mutually* obliged to submit to one common leader; the ruler—also obviously unlimited—is appointed on the basis of a contract of the vassals among themselves. Here the idea of reciprocity descends from the sovereign relationship—into which the equal sided theories are transferred from the contract between sovereign and people—to the ground of this relationship itself: the duty towards the prince is felt as the very formation, expression, technique of a relationship of mutuality among the individuals of the nation. And when, as with Hobbes, the sovereign, lacking any policy for conflict with the subjects, can be in breach of contract simply because the sovereign did not conclude any kind of contract with them, the counterpart to this is that the subjects, when they revolt against the sovereign, are thereby also not breaking any contract entered into with the sovereign; rather, the contract broken is that that the members of society have concluded among themselves to allow this sovereign to rule. The suppression of the element of mutuality accounts for the observation that the tyranny of the whole over its own members is worse than the tyranny of a prince. For this reason, and by no means only in the realm of politics, the fact that the whole is conscious of its member not as one in opposition to itself but rather as one of its own, included as a part of the whole, often results in a singular ruthlessness towards the member, a ruthlessness altogether different from the personal cruelty of a sovereign. Every formal opposition, even when it comes from substantial subjugation, is an interaction that always in principle includes some restriction on *every* member and departs from it only in individual exceptions. Where the domination manifests that particular ruthlessness, as in the case of the whole that has its member at its disposal, there is lacking then precisely that opposition whose form contains a spontaneity for *both* parties and thereby a limitation on *both*.

The original Roman concept of law expressed this is quite splendidly. Law demands, according to its pure meaning, a submission that leaves subjects without any kind of room for spontaneity or counteraction. That this was somewhat involved in legislation, indeed, that it yielded to the law currently in force is, for all that, of no importance; in this case it simply disassembled itself into the subject and object of legislation, and the rule of law going from subject to object is not thereby changed in its meaning, so that both co-exist at the same time in one physical person. Nevertheless, the Romans in their concept of law directly indicated an interaction. Law, to wit, means originally *contract*, though with the meaning that its conditions are established by the proponent, and the other party can accept or reject them only in their entirety. So the *lex publica populi romani*[4] initially states that the king proposed it, the people accepted it. With that, the concept, which appears most definitively to exclude the reality of social interaction, nevertheless indicates it by its linguistic expression. This drives a wedge, as it were, in the prerogative of the Roman king that only he is to be permitted to speak to the people. Such a prerogative means to be sure the jealously exclusive unity of his sovereignty—as analogously in Greek antiquity complete democracy marked the right of everyone to speak to the people—but it implies, after all, the recognition of the importance that speech has for the people and that the people themselves thus have. It implies that the people, despite receiving only that one-sided operation, were yet a party to the contract, were indeed kept in reserve as the only party with whom to contract.

With these preliminary remarks only the actual sociological, socially constructing character of domination and subordination would have been shown, especially for the instances in which, instead of a social, there seemed to be a merely mechanical relationship: the position of the subordinated as one of no spontaneity whatsoever, a servicing object or instrument for the one dominating. Surely in several ways these remarks have succeeded at least in making visible, under the one-sided picture of influence, sociologically decisive *social interaction*.

The types of domination can be categorized, for the present purely superficially, for the sake of discussion, according to a threefold schema: by an individual, by a group, by an objective power, be it social or

[4] Latin: public law of the Roman people—ed.

imaginary. I will now discuss several of the sociological implications of these possibilities.

The subordination of a group under *one* person leads above all to a very pronounced unification of the group and, to be sure, near uniformity in both of the characteristic forms of this subordination: first, namely, when the group forms with its head an actual inner unity, when the sovereign mobilizes the group's energies in their characteristic orientation, integrating them so that domination means actually only that the will of the group has acquired a unified voice or body. But, second, also when the group feels itself in opposition to its head, forming itself into a society in opposition. With regard to the former case, every survey across the fields of sociology shows immediately the immeasurable advantage of a single head for the concentration and energy-efficient management of the group's powers. I want to cite two substantively very heterogeneous manifestations of common subordination in which it is immediately obvious how indispensable it is for the unity of the whole. It is for this reason that the sociology of religions in principle distinguishes between whether a unification of the individuals of a group occurs in such a way that the shared God as the symbol and the consecration of its collective self, as it were, grows out of this—as is the case in many primitive religions—or whether it is the conception of God in its turn that brings together the otherwise disunited or barely cohering elements into a unity. The extent to which Christendom realized this latter form requires no explanation, not even as individual sects find their special and especially strong bond in the absolutely subjective and mystical relationship to the person of Jesus, which every individual possesses as an individual and, for that matter, fully independently from every other person and from the community. Moreover the claim was made by the Jews: in contrast to the religions developing at the same time, where the relationship is first of all of every companion with every other one and only then is the whole united with the divine principle, the common covenant relationship to the Lord—*i.e.*, directly concerning everyone—would be perceived there as the actual strength and meaning of the national solidarity. Medieval feudalism frequently had opportunity to duplicate this formal structure based on the immensely interwoven personal dependencies and 'servanthood'—most markedly perhaps in the associations of vassals, bound court and house servants, who stood in a narrow, purely personal relationship to the prince. The associations that these formed had no more substantive basis than the serfs coming from village communities

on neighboring land; the persons were used for a variety of services, had variously appropriate property, and formed nevertheless narrowly closed associations without the consent of which no one could enter them or could be dismissed from them. They had developed their own family and property law, even possessed among themselves freedom of contract and trade, penalties exacted for violations of the domestic peace—and for this tight unity they had absolutely no other foundation than the identity of the lord whom they served, who represented them outside the land and acted on their behalf in common law proceedings. Just as in the case of religion, subordination is here under an individual power and not, as in many particularly political instances, the result or the expression of an existing organic community or community of interest; rather the domination of *one* lord is the cause in this case of an arranged solidarity, otherwise not achievable through some special relationship. It is by the way not only the similarity, but also the very dissimilarity in relationship of inferiors to the dominating leader that gives such a characteristic social form its stability. The variation in distance or nearness to that ruling head creates an arrangement that is for that reason no less firm and structured on account of the inner surface of these distances often being jealousy, repulsion, arrogance. The social level of each Indian caste is established according to its relationship to the Brahmin. Would the Brahmin accept a gift from one of their followers? a glass of water from the follower's hand without hesitation? with difficulties? would it be rejected in disgust? That the distinctive rigidity of the caste system binds itself in this manner is thus noteworthy for the present question of form because the mere fact of an absolute head here is determinative as a purely ideal factor for each member and thereby of the totality of their relational structure. That that highest plateau is occupied by a great many individual persons is entirely irrelevant because the sociological form of its impact is here exactly the same as that of the individual person: the relationship to 'the Brahmin' is decisive. So the formal characteristics of subordination under a single person *can* operate as well with a multiplicity of superior individuals. The *specific* sociological meaning of this multiplicity will reveal other phenomena to us.

Now that unifying consequence of subordination under *one* ruling power manifests itself no less when the group finds itself in opposition. In the political group as in the factory, in the school classroom as in the church fellowship, it is to be observed how the culmination of organization up to an apex helps bring about the unity of the whole

in the case of harmony as well as in opposition, how perhaps in the latter the group is compelled even more 'to pull itself together.' When the collective antagonism is at one of the most powerful points, where a majority of individuals or groups is moved to coalesce, this opposition is especially intense when the common opponent is at the same time the common sovereign. Certainly not in obvious and effective but in latent form, this combination is found probably everywhere: in some measure or some kind of relationship the sovereign is almost always an adversary. The human being has an inner ambivalent relationship to the principle of subordination. On the one hand, there is for sure the desire to be governed; the majority of people *cannot* only not exist without leadership, but they sense it too; they seek the higher power that absolves them of responsibility for themselves and a restraining, regulating strictness that protects them not only from the outside but also from themselves. No less, however, they need the opposition to the leading power that acquires only then, as it were through thrust and counter-thrust, the proper place in the inner system of life of those who are to obey. Indeed, one might say that obedience and opposition are simply the two sides or components, oriented in various directions and appearing as autonomous drives, of one human attitude, in itself wholly consistent. The simplest case is the political, in which the totality may consist of parties striving apart from one another and against one another but nevertheless sharing the common interest of confining the jurisdiction of the crown within limits—alongside the absolute practical necessity of this crown, in truth, also of all the intuitive attachment to it. In England centuries after the Magna Carta the awareness remained alive that certain constitutional rights must be adhered to and augmented for *all* classes, that the aristocracy could not lay claim to its freedoms without at the same time freedom for the poorer classes and that a common law for aristocracy, citizen, and farmer would be the correlate for the check on personal authority; and it has often been emphasized that, as long as this latter objective remains the goal, the aristocracy consistently has the people and the clergy on its side. And even where it does not come to this type of unification by way of single-party rule, at the very least a common field of struggle over it is created for its subjects: between those who stand with the ruler and those against. There is scarcely ever a social realm, subject to a supreme leader, in which this *pro* and *contra* struggle does not bring the members to a vitality of interactions and interweavings that, in spite of all the setbacks, clashes, and war costs, is in the end

still far superior at centralizing power than is some peaceful but indifferent neighborliness.

Because, for the present here, it is not a matter of constructing dogmatically a one-sided picture but rather of demonstrating fundamental processes whose endlessly different quantities and combinations often allow superficial appearances to work completely against each other, it must be emphasized that the common subordination under a ruling power in no way always leads to centralization but, depending on certain tendencies, also to the opposite result. English legislation was erected against Non-Conformists—thus uniformly against Presbyterians, Catholics, Jews—a combination of punishment and exclusion that was relevant to military service as well as voting or holding office, property as well as civil service. The state-church official used his prerogatives to give uniform expression of his hatred for all of them.[5] However, the oppressed were not thereby, as one might expect, united into a commonality of any kind, but the hatred for the established believers was still exceeded by that that the Presbyterians harbored towards the Catholics and vice versa. Here a psychological 'threshold phenomenon' appears to be in evidence. There is a degree of opposition between social elements that becomes inoperative under burdens experienced jointly and makes room for outer and even inner unity. Should that original aversion, though, cross over a certain threshold, the oppression common to them has the opposite effect. Not only because, with an already strongly dominant embitterment of everyone towards one party flowing from other sources, the general irritation increases and, contrary to all rational grounds, also flows typically into that already deeply dug bed; but above all, because the common suffering presses the social elements still closer to one another, it is of course precisely to this forced nearness that their wholly inner dissociation and irreconcilability wholly capitulates only under compulsion. Wherever a unity, however produced, is not capable of overcoming an antagonism, then it does not allow the antagonism to continue under the *status quo ante* but rather intensifies it just as the difference in all areas becomes sharper and more conscious to the extent that the parties move nearer to one another. The development of shared domination among subjects by way of jealousy brings about another more obvious type of repulsion.

[5] 'State-church official' is a rendering of *Staatskirchler*, which is a generic term for an official connected to both the state and the church—ed.

It engenders the negative correspondence mentioned above: that common hatred is an even stronger bond when the mutually hated is simultaneously the shared ruler: the common love, which through jealousy turns its subjects into enemies, does this even more decisively when the commonly loved is at the same time the common sovereign. A specialist in relationships among the Muslims of the Near East[6] reports that the children in a harem who had different mothers always behave with hostility toward one another. The reason for this may be the jealousy with which the mothers monitored the expressions of love by the father to the children who were not their own. The particular nuance of jealousy, as soon as it refers to that power superior to both parties, is this: whoever understands how to win the love of the contested personality for oneself has indeed then in an unusual sense and with quite especially powerful results triumphed over the rival. The sublime attraction: to become sovereign over the rival; in so far as one becomes sovereign over the latter, it has to lead, through the reciprocity in which the commonality of the sovereign generates this attraction, to a highest magnification of the jealousy.

As I return from these dissociating consequences of subordination under an individual power to their unifying consequences, I emphasize yet again how much easier discordances between parties are balanced when they are subordinate to one and the same higher power than when each is fully independent. How many of the conflicts, on which the Greek as well as the Italian city-states likely perished, would not have displayed these destructive consequences if only a central power had commonly dominated them with some kind of higher authority! Where such a power is missing, the conflict of some elements has the disastrous tendency to offer resolution only through a direct clash of quantum power. Quite generally it has to do with the idea of the 'higher authority,' whose effectiveness applies in various formations through almost all human collectives. It is a formal sociological characteristic of the first order whether there exists in or for a society a 'higher authority' or not. This need not be a ruler in the usual or official sense of the word. For example, the regime of *intellectuals*, their individual contents, or respective representatives is always a higher authority over attachments

[6] Simmel: *Ein Kenner türkischer Verhältnisse*...; literally, 'A specialist in Turkish relationships....' Simmel was writing before World War I when the Ottoman Empire still stood, and it was common for Western thinkers to use 'Turks' and 'Turkish' generically for Muslims of the Near East—ed.

and controversies that are grounded in interests, instincts, emotions. It may decide prejudicially and inadequately; its decision may or may not find agreement. Just as logic remains the higher authority over the conflicting contents of its own proceedings, even though we may think illogically, so the most intelligent remains the higher authority inside a multiple-member group, but in some instances it may frequently be by ones having a strong will or warm feeling for a personage that a dispute among colleagues is settled. The very specific nature of the 'higher authority' to which one appeals for arbitration or to whose intervention one joins oneself with the feeling of legitimacy, however, typically lies only on the side of intellectuality. Another means of unifying diverging parties that the presence of a ruling authority especially facilitates, is this. Where it does not appear possible to unify factions on the basis of their given characteristics when the factions are either fighting or coexisting indifferently as strangers, then it is sometimes accomplished when both are reconstituted in new circumstances that then make unity possible; or also: they are equipped with new qualities on the basis of which this can occur. The removal of ill feelings, the generation of mutual interests, the establishment of a wide-ranging mutuality is often accomplished—from children at play to religious and political parties—through some kind of new thing being added to the previously diverging or indifferent aims and resolutions of the factions, something that qualifies as a suitable point of convergence and thereby also exposes the hitherto diverging parties as unifiable. Also natures that cannot converge directly often allow an indirect reconciliation wherein it leads beyond their prior development, or through the addition of a new element it rests on new and now connecting foundations. So, for example, the homogeneity of the Gallic provinces was therefore most urgently required so that everybody was Latinized by Rome in the end. It goes without saying how very much this mode of unification requires precisely the 'higher authority,' how relatively easily a power, transcending the parties and somehow dominating them, will be able to lead each of them with both interests and aims, place both on a common footing that they perhaps would have never found on their own or that their willfulness, pride, and prejudice in antagonism would have kept from developing. When one speaks in praise of the Christian religion, that it leads souls to 'peaceableness,' the sociological reason for that then is surely the feeling of common subordination of all beings under the divine principle. The Christian faithful is convinced that over the Christian and any given adversary—whether or not the

adversary is devout—stands that highest authority, and this moves one some distance away from the temptation to the violent testing of one's powers. The Christian God can be a bond for such wide circles that are engaged in his 'peace' from the outset precisely because He stands so immeasurably high over every individual, and the individual has in Him a 'higher authority' at every moment and in common with all the others.

Unification by means of mutual subordination can present itself in two different forms: as leveling and as ranking. In that a number of people are equally subject to a single authority, to that extent they are equal. The correlation between despotism and equalizing has long been recognized. It runs not only from the despot's concern to level the subjugated—which will be discussed presently—but in the opposite direction: a decisive leveling easily leads in its turn to despotic forms. Nevertheless, this does not apply to just any type of 'leveling.' When Alcibiades singles out the cities of Sicily as filled by dissimilar masses of peoples, he intends by that to identify them as easy prey for the conqueror. As a matter of fact, a homogeneous citizenship under tyranny[7] affords a more successful resistance than one consisting of very divergent and therefore disjointed elements. The leveling most welcome to despotism pertains therefore only to differences in rank, not differences in character. A homogeneity based on character and predisposition, even in a society structured in different levels, will put up a strong resistance to the former, but only a trifling resistance will be found where many types of personality co-exist in an equality that is not organically structured. The principal motive of the sole ruler to level out the differences, then, is this, that very strong dominant and subordinate relationships among the subjugated come into competition with the ruler's own domination—both materially and psychologically. Not to mention here that for despotic rule too strong an oppression of some strata through others is just as dangerous as too great a feeling of power on the part of those oppressed. This is because a rebellion by them against these mid-level powers becomes easily directed against the highest power also, as roles continuing by the power of the inertia direct the movement against the highest power, even if they are not at the head of the movement but instead only assisting. Oriental rulers,

[7] Simmel uses *Tyrannis* here which in German designates especially a tyranny of ancient Greece—ed.

therefore, restrict the education of aristocrats; so the Near Eastern Sultan,[8] in this manner, guards his radical, entirely non-negotiable superiority over *all* his subjects. So long as each existing power in the state had been derived in some way from him and then is returned to him upon the death of the occupant, no hereditary aristocracy develops. With that the absolute magnitude of sovereignty and the equal rank of the subjects was realized as correlative phenomena. This tendency is reflected in the phenomenon that despots cherish servants of only average ability, as it has been emphatically noted of Napoleon I. A German prince is supposed to have asked the minister, when the proposal was made for the transfer of a distinguished civil servant to another state office: "Is the man absolutely necessary for us?" "Fully, your highness." "Then we want to let him go. I cannot need essential servants." While despotism, though, does not in any way seek especially inferior servants, its inherent relationship to leveling becomes evident; so Tacitus, about this tendency of Tiberius to install mediocre officials, says: *ex optimis periculum sibi, a pessimis dedecus publicum metuebat*.[9] It is significant that, where the single-ruler sovereignty does not bear the character of despotism, this tendency immediately subsides, indeed, makes way for just the opposite, as Bismarck says of Wilhelm I, that he not only endured it, but even felt himself uplifted that he had a distinguished and powerful servant. Where rulers then do not, as in the case of the Sultan, hinder the growth of mid-level powers from the outset, they often seek to bring about a relative leveling by promoting the efforts of lower strata to acquire legal rights equal to those of the mid-level powers. Medieval and later history is full of examples of that. In England the royal power effected that correlation between its own omnipotence and the legal equality of the subjects most deliberately since the Norman era: William the Conqueror breaks the bond that existed beforehand, as on the continent, between the nobility immediately enfeoffed under him and the subvassals by forcing every subvassal to swear fealty to him directly. The growth of great vassals of the crown would be thereby denied sovereignty on the one hand and on the other the basis for a unified legal structure for all classes would be put in place. The English crown of the eleventh and twelfth centuries

[8] Simmel: *türkische Sultan*—ed.

[9] "From the best he feared danger to himself, from the worst, public disgrace." Tacitus, Annales ab excessu divi Augusti, ed. Charles Dennis Fisher (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), book I, chapter 80 (2.91)—Ed.

based its extraordinary power on the uniformity with which the free possession of military, court, police, and tax duties were subjugated without exception. The same form appears in the Roman Empire. The Republic became incapable of continuing because the legal or actual dominance of the city of Rome over Italy and the provinces was no longer maintained. The Empire only established a domination while it made the Romans as devoid of rights as the peoples who were conquered by them; consequently an impartial legislation would establish a legal leveling for *all* citizens, whose correlate was the unconditional height and unity of the sovereign. It hardly needs to be mentioned that here 'leveling' is to be understood throughout as a wholly relative tendency very limited in its realization. A major science of the forms of society must propose concepts and conceptual frameworks with a purity and abstract construction as these never appear in the historical realization of their contents. The sociological imagination, however, which grasps the basic concept of interaction in its particular meanings and forms, is wont to analyze complex phenomena in their single factors in approaching patterns inductively—this can be done only with auxiliary constructs, so to speak absolute lines and figures that are always found in real social processes only as beginnings, fragments, continuously interrupted and modified partial realizations. In every single socio-historical configuration a probably never wholly clear number of interworkings of elements is at work, and we can as little disassemble its given form into its collected factors and reassemble them again as we can make some piece of material exactly conforming to the form of the ideal figure of our geometry, although the *principle* of both must be possible through distinguishing and combining the scientific constructs. For sociological comprehension, the historical phenomenon must be reconstructed in such a way that its unity is dismantled in a number of concepts and syntheses proceeding into a pure particular one-sidedness, with straight lines, so to speak. Under these concepts and syntheses its principal character is as a rule ascertained; through bending and modifying it projects the image of that form on the new level of abstraction with gradually increasing exactitude. The rule of the Sultan over subjects lacking rights; that of the English king over a people who rose up just 150 years later against King John; that of the Roman emperor, who was actually the presider over the more or less autonomous communities comprising the realm—all these governance-by-one are unique at the top as well as at the 'leveling' of the subjects that corresponds to it. And still the live motif of this correlation is com-

mon to them; the borderless distinctiveness of the immediate material phenomena still makes room for the same ideal line with which that correlation, admittedly a scientific abstract depiction in its purity and standardization, is drawn among them.

The same tendency of domination by means of leveling is clothed in phenomena of directly clashing surfaces. It is typical behavior when Philip the Good of Burgundy[10] endeavored to suppress the freedom of the Dutch cities, but at the same time provided many individual corporations with very extensive privileges. Since these legal differences originated expressly from the free discretion on the part of the ruler, they mark all the more clearly the similarity of those being subjugated which the subjects face *a priori*. In the cited example, this is characterized very well by the privileges being admittedly extensive in content but measured short in duration: the legal privilege was never lost to the source from which it flowed. This privilege, seemingly the opposite of leveling, is revealed as the heightened form of the latter that it assumes as a correlate of absolute personal control.

The rule by one is reproached for countless cases of absurdity that would reside in the purely quantitative disproportion between the singularity of the ruler and the multitude of those ruled over, that the unworthy and undeserving are set in a relationship of this party of one and of the other one in the relationship. Actually a very unique and consequential sociological causal formation resides in the solution of this contradiction. The structure of a society, in which only one rules and the great mass is allowed to be ruled, has within it only the normative meaning that the mass, *i.e.* the ruled element, *includes only a portion of each personality belonging to it*, while the ruling one gives over an entire personality to the relationship. The ruler and the one ruled-over hardly enter at all with the same quantum of their personalities into the relationship. The 'mass' is formed with many individuals uniting their personalities, biased impulses, interests, powers—while what every personality is as such stands above the level of this massification, *i.e.* is not embedded in what is actually controlled by this one person. It need not be emphasized that this new proportion that allows the full quantum of personality of the ruler to compensate for the multiplied partial

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[10] Philip the Good (1396–1467), sometime ally of England, conquered Holland in 1428 and ruled what is now Belgium, Luxembourg, most of The Netherlands, and parts of France by 1460—ed.

quantities of the governed personalities only assumes its quantitative form as a symbolic expression of need. The personality as such eludes every arithmetically comprehensible form so completely that when we speak of the 'whole' personality, its 'unity,' or a 'part' of it, we mean some inner quality that can only be had as a mental experience; we have hardly any direct expression for it, so that what is taken from a whole other order of things is as incorrect as it is indispensable. The whole dominance-relationship between one and many, and obviously not only the political, rests on that disassembling of the personality. And this application of it within domination and subordination is only a special case of its general importance for all interaction. One will have to say of even so close a union as marriage that one is never *wholly* married but even at best only with a part of the personality, as large as that part may be—just as one is never completely a citizen of a city, fellow worker, or church member. The separation among people that principally characterizes the governance of the many by one has been already recognized by Grotius, where he counters the objection, governing power cannot be acquired through purchase since it would concern free persons, with the distinction between private and public *subjection*. The *subjectio publica* (public subjection) does not carry the *sui juris esse* (existing in its own right) as does the *subjection privata* (private subjection). If a *populus* (people) is sold, not the individual persons but only the *jus eos regendi, qua populus sunt* (right of ruling them *as they are a people*) would be the object of the sale. It belongs to the highest duties of the political craft, including church politics, family politics, any power politics at all, to seek out and so to speak carve out those aspects of people with which they comprise a more or less leveled 'mass' that can stand next to ruler at the same height, separate from that which must be allowed their individual freedom, but which the whole personalities of the subordinated comprise together with it. The groupings are characteristically distinguished by the ratio between the whole personality and that quantity of it with which it merges into the 'mass.' The degree of its governability depends on the difference of this quantity, and, in fact, in the way that a group can be dominated all the sooner and more radically by an individual, the single individual in the mass yields a small part of the whole personality to be the object of the *subjection*. Where the social unit incorporates so much of the personalities into itself, where they are interwoven so tightly into a whole, as in the Greek city states or the medieval municipalities, governance by one becomes something contradictory and unworkable. This principal relationship,

simple in itself, is complicated by the working of two factors: by the greatness or smallness of the subservient groups and through the degree to which the personalities differ from one another. The larger a group is, other things being equal, the smaller will be the compass of thought and interest, feeling and character in which individuals coincide and form a 'mass.' To the extent that governance extends to what is common to them, it will be borne more readily by the individuals according to the size of the group, and every basic trend in this direction on the part of governance by one is illustrated very clearly: The more people the one rules over, the less of each individual the one rules over. But secondly, it is now of crucial importance whether the individuals are differentiated enough in their mental structure to separate the elements of their being lying within and outside self-governing districts practically and perceptibly. Only if this coincides with the just mentioned art of governing, of distinguishing for oneself among the elements among the subordinate individuals open to control and those escaping it, will the opposition between governance and freedom, the disproportionate preponderance of the one over the many, be somewhat resolved. In such cases individuality can develop freely in very despotically governed groups. Thus the formation of modern individuality began in the despotisms of the Italian Renaissance. There as in other cases, e.g. under Napoleon I, if the sovereign has a personal interest in them—hence those that are distant from the realm of political domination—all aspects of the personality through which one does not belong to the 'mass' are granted the greatest freedom. And it is thus conceivable that in very small circles, where the narrow confines of the blended existence and the thoroughgoing inner and outer solidarities again and again frustrate that separation and allow a, so to speak, false fusion, dominating relationships develop very easily into an unbearable tyranny. This structure of the small circle unites frequently with the ineptitude of the dominant persons to make the relationship between parents and children often most unsatisfying. It is often the critical blunder of parents that they authoritatively impose on their children a life plan for everything, even in the things for which the children are not suited. Likewise, when the priest, from the area over which he is able to co-ordinate the community, wants to rule the private life of the believers on which they, seen from the religious community, are in any case individually differentiated. In all such cases there is lacking a proper selection of those essential parts that are suitable for the formation of the 'mass' and whose subjection to rule is easily borne and felt as proper.

The leveling of the mass, as such, established through the selection and combination of governable aspects of its individuals, is of the greatest significance for the sociology of power. It accounts for the fact, in connection with what was formerly stated, that it is often easier to rule over a larger than over a smaller group, especially if it has to do with decidedly different individuals, each additional one of whom reduces further the realm of all that is held in common: where such personalities are in question, the leveling threshold of the many, *ceteris paribus*, lies lower than that of the few, and the domination of the former thereby increases. This is the sociological basis for the observation by Hamilton in the *Federalist*: it would be the great popular mistake to want to increase the safeguards *against the government of a few* by multiplying members of congress. Beyond a certain number, the people's representation might indeed appear more democratic, but will in fact be oligarchical: the machine may be enlarged, but the fewer will be the springs by which its motions are directed.[11] And in the same sense a hundred years later one of the preeminent experts of Anglo-American party activity observed that a party leader would have to notice that as one climbed higher in power and influence, the more obvious it was *by how few persons the world is governed*. Herein lies also the deeper sociological meaning of the close relationship that exists between the *authority* of a political totality and its sovereign. Hence the legitimate authority for everybody developed from those coincident points that lie beyond their purely individual life-contents or life-forms, or seen in another way, beyond the totality of the single person. Authority is an objectively linking form for these supra-individual interests, qualities, elements of possession and existence, just as they find their subjective form or their correlate in the ruler of the whole. If indeed this particular analysis and synthesis

[11] The expression, 'the machine..directed,' is given in English by Simmel. Hamilton's or Madison's words: "The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will for ever admonish them that, on the contrary, after securing a sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed." Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist*, in Great Books of the Western World, general ed., Robert Maynard Hutchins (Chicago: William Benton; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952 [1787–88]), p. 181, #58—ed.

of the individuals provides the basis for single-ruler sovereignty overall, from this it becomes understandable that sometimes an astonishingly small measure of exceptional qualities suffices to win domination over an entirety, that dominated, they submit with an acquiescence that would not be logically justifiable, given the opposing qualities between the ruling one and the subjugated when considered as whole persons. Where, however, the differentiation among individuals necessary for domination of the mass is lacking, the correspondingly modest demands on the quality of the ruler are also absent. Aristotle says that in his time no more legitimate single-rulers could arise because there were at that time simply so many similarly first-rate personalities in every state that no individual could any longer claim such superiority over others. The Greek citizen's interests and feelings were evidently so bound to the political whole, one's personality was so fully invested in the sphere of the universal, that it could not come to any differentiation, as it were, of political aspects, over against which one would have been also able to reserve an essential part of one's personality as private possession. With this constellation the single-ruler sovereignty presumes it inherently correct that the ruler is superior to every subject by authority of the whole personality—a requirement that is not at all in question where the object of domination is only the sum of those parts of individuals separated out and combinable into the 'mass.'

Next to this type of single-ruler sovereignty, whose completion results in the leveling of its subordinates on principle, stands the second, by which the group takes on the form of a pyramid. The subordinates put the ruler in successive gradations of power; strata going from the lowest mass to the top become increasingly smaller, and increasingly significant. This form of the group can be generated in two different ways. It can come from the autocratic power of an individual. This individual disperses the substance of that power—while maintaining the form and title—and allows it to slide downwards, whereby naturally then a little more remains with each stratum than with the next further away. Thus while the power gradually trickles through, a continuity and graduated arrangement of super- and subordinates must result, so long as no other events and conditions interfere in this process, distorting it. That is indeed how social forms are frequently produced in oriental states: the power of the highest rung crumbles, perhaps because it is internally indefensible, and the above-emphasized proportion between subjugation and individual freedom is not retained by it, perhaps because the personalities are too indolent and too ignorant of the skill

of ruling to protect their power. An altogether different character is borne by the pyramidal form of society when it results from the *intention* of the ruler; it means then not a weakening of one's power but rather its furtherance and consolidation. It is here thus not a matter of the quantity of power of the sovereignty that is dispersed to the lower levels, but rather that they are organized solely *among themselves* according to the degree of power and position. Thereby the, as it were, quantum of subordination remains the same as in the form of the leveled and takes on only the form of inequality among the individuals who have to bear it; in connection with that, there emerges then an apparently natural convergence of the elements to the sovereign as measured by their relative rank. From this, a great solidity of the whole structure can result, its load-bearing capacities streaming towards the pinnacle more securely and cumulatively, just as when they are of equal level. That the superior significance of the monarch radiates out, in certain respects, over the high-ranking person in that circle and pours over others who are close in relationship is not a reduction but rather an increase of the monarch's own significance. During the earlier English Norman period there was overall no permanent or obligatory council for the king; however the dignity and eminence of his rule itself produced it, in that he would in important cases accept consultation by a *consilium baronum* (council of barons). This dignity, apparently produced simply through its concentration to the highest degree in his personality, still needed a dispersal and expansion. Since it would be the case that although real enough with him, as his, the power was indeed that of only a single person and not of a place, he relied upon a majority for an assistance that, while it actually shared and somehow thus participated in his power and eminence, it reflected back on *him* with greater intensity and fuller effectiveness. And indeed before that: that the the penalty for the homicide of a vassal of the Anglo-Saxon king was especially high; that as oath helper the vassal had an especially high value; that his stablehand and the man in whose house he has a drink is raised through special legal protection above the mass—that belongs simply not only to the prerogative of the king, but this descending terrace of his prerogative is at the same time, as a construction from below, even a pillar of support for the latter; while he shares his superiority, it does not become less, but more. Then sovereigns also have in their hands awards and rewards of fine gradations in the form of a promotion in rank, which cost them nothing but which bind recruits even closer and more firmly to them. The great number of social ranks that the Roman

emperor created—from the slaves and the lowliest over the usually free, an almost continuous scale up to senator—appears to have been directly determined by such a tendency. In this respect the aristocracy of royalty is formally identical; it too makes use of the multi-layered arrangment of the subjects—as, e.g., in Geneva still around the middle of the 18th century various gradations of the rights of the citizens existed, according to whether they were called *citoyens, bourgeois, habitants, natifs, sujets*. While as many as possible have still something under themselves, they all are interested in the preservation of the prevailing order. Frequently it has to do in such instances less with a gradation of real power than an essentially abstract superiority by way of titles and positions—however much this also develops into tangible consequences, apparent perhaps at its most crass in the fine gradations of classes ranked by the dozens in the activity of the Indian castes. Even when one such pyramid, arranged as a result of honors and privileges, again finds its pinnacle in the sovereign, in no way does it always coincide with the similarly formed structure of ranked *power* positions, prevailing perhaps nearby. The structure of a pyramid of power will always suffer from the principal difficulty that the irrational, fluctuating qualities of the persons will never universally coincide with the rigorously logically drawn contour of individual positions—a formal difficulty of all orders of rank modeled from a given schema, which finds in these systems, topped off by a personal sovereign, nobody who gives credence to anything like the socialist propositions for institutions that they will put the most deserving one into the leading superordinate position. Here as there, it comes again to that fundamental incommensurability between the schematic of positions and the internally variable essence of the human being, never exactly conforming to conceptually static forms—the difficulty still comes to this of *recognizing* the suitable personality for every position; whether someone deserves a specific position of power or not cannot, on countless occasions, even be shown until the person is in the position. It is this, intertwined with the deepest and most precious of human essence, that every placement of a person into a new position of authority or function, and when done based on the most stringent test and the surest antecedents, always contains a risk, always remains an attempt that can succeed or fail. It is the relationship of the person to the world in general and to life that we have to decide *in advance*, that is, produce by our decision those facts that need already actually to have been produced and known in order to make that decision more rational and certain. This general aprioristic difficulty of all human

activity becomes quite apparent especially with the construction of the scale of social power not arising immediately organically from the inherent powers of individuals and the natural relationships of society, but constructed arbitrarily by a dominating personality; this circumstance will indeed hardly occur historically in absolute purity—at the most it finds its parallel in the socialistic utopias alluded to—however, it shows its peculiarities and complications certainly in the rudimentary and mixed forms that are actually observable.[12]

The other way by which a hierarchy of power with an apex is generated goes in reverse. From an original relative equality of social elements, individuals gain greater importance, several especially powerful individuals again distinguishing themselves from the aggregate of the former, until there evolves one or more leading roles. The pyramid of the super- and subordination in this case is built from the ground up. There is no need for examples of this process because it is found everywhere, albeit occuring by the most varied rhythms, most purely perhaps in the area of economics and politics, very noticeably however also in that of intellectual cultivation, in school rooms, in the evolution of the standard of living, in the aesthetic relationship, in the fundamental growth of the military organization.

The classic example of the combination of both ways in which a hierarchical super- and subordination of groups takes place is the feudal state of the middle ages. So long as the full citizens—the Greek, Roman, Old German—knew no subordination under an individual, there continued on the one hand full equality with those of their kind, on the other hand severe treatment against all of lower standing. This characteristic social form finds in feudalism—assuming all historical connecting links—likewise its characteristic antithesis, which filled in the cleft between freedom and unfreedom by a hierarchy of stations; the 'service,' *servitium*, binds together all the members of the kingdom among themselves and with the monarch. The monarchs relinquished from their own possessions, as their greater subjects for their part enfeoffed lesser subordinate vassals with land, so that a hierarchical structure of position, property, duty arose. However, the very same results were effected by the social process from the opposite direction. The middle layers

[12] The phrase, 'in the rudimentary and mixed forms' translates *in den rudimentären und mit andern Erscheinungen gemischten Formen*; literally, in the rudimentary and with-other-phenomena mixed forms'—ed.

emerged not only through contribution from above, but also through accumulation from below, while originally free, small landowners gave up their land to more powerful lords in order to receive it back as a fiefdom for them. Nevertheless, those landlords through the ever further acquisition of power, which the weak kingdoms could not restrain, grew from their lordly positions into monarchical power. Such a pyramidal form gives each one of its elements a double position between the lowest and the highest: all are superordinate and all are subordinate, dependent on the above and at the same time independent in so far as others are dependent on them. Perhaps this double sociological meaning of feudalism—whose dual genesis, through contribution from above and accumulation from below, it accentuated especiallly strongly—provided the contrariety of its consequences. In proportion as consciousness and praxis gave the independent or the dependent moment prominence to the middle-level powers, feudalism in Germany could lead to erosion of the highest sovereign power and in England could offer the crown the form for its all-encompassing power.

Gradation belongs to those structural and life forms of the group that result from the factor of quantity, that are therefore more or less mechanical, and historically precede the organic reality of group formation, which is based on individual qualitative differences; they are thereby certainly not absolutely separate, but continue to exist next to it and interwoven with it. There above all belongs the division of groups into subordinate groups whose social role is rooted in their numerical equality or at least numerical significance, as with the hundred; there belongs the determination of the social position exclusively according to the measure of property; there the structure of the group according to firmly established ranks, as feudalism above all manifested hierarchy—the essence of civil and military offices. That first example of this formation already points to its characteristic objectivity or limiting principle. It is exactly in this way that feudalism, as it developed from the beginning of the German Middle Ages, broke up the old orders, the free and unfree, the noble and the humble, that depended on the diversity of the association of individual relationship. In the process there now arose 'service' as the general working principle—the objective necessity that everyone in some way served someone higher, which authorized the distinction: whom and under which conditions. The essentially quantitative hierarchy of positions thus resulting was in many ways quite separate from the earlier cooperative positions of individuals. It is naturally not essential that this structure develop to its fullest in the

absolute sense because its formal significance is manifest inside every group, no matter whether it is identified entirely as such. Indeed, the household of the Roman slave had already been ordered precisely in this manner; the entire production process of the large slave economy independently managed by the *villicus* and *procurator* through all possible classifications all the way to the supervisor for every ten persons. Such an organizational form has a notable material vividness and thereby gives every member, simultaneously elevated and subordinated and thus positioned from two angles, a specifically determined sociological sense of their lives, as it were, which has to project itself onto the entire group as the boundaries and balance of their solidarity. For that reason, despotic or reactionary endeavors strive, in their fear before any solidarity among the oppressed, to get them organized *hierarchically*, sometimes even with unusual vigor. With noteworthy precise sensitivity to the power of domination and subordination to create social structure[13] and with understandable detail, the reactionary English ministry of 1831 forbade all unions

> composed of separate bodies, with various divisions and subdivisions, under leaders with a gradation of rank and authority, and distinguished by certain badges, and subject to the general control and direction of a superior council.

Incidentally, this form is to be thoroughly differentiated from the others of simultaneous domination and subordination: that an individual is dominant in *one* rank or partially in some respect, but subordinate in another rank or some other respect. This arrangement has a rather distinct and qualitative nature; it tends to be an amalgam resulting from the specific establishment or fate of the individual, while predetermining simultaneous domination and subordination in one and the same ranking much more objectively and then establishing it less ambiguously and more firmly as a social status. And, as I just emphasized, it is itself also of great cohesive value for the social structure, in that it thereby links up with the transformation of ascent in the latter *eo ipso* as a goal for one to strive for. Inside of freemasonry, for example, they maintained this motive, purely formally, for adhering to 'rank.' Indeed, the fundamentals of the material—here, ritual—knowlege of the journeyman and master ranks is communicated to the 'apprentice';

[13] The phrase 'to create social structure' translates *Sozialisierungskraft*—ed.

only such steps, so it is said, endowed brotherhood with a definite vigor, incited through the lure of novelty and promoting the aspiration of the new recruits.

These social structures, as they are formatively shaped through the domination by an individual, uniformly with regard to the components of the most diverse groups, can, evidently, as I have already pointed out, occur even with the subordination under a majority; however, the majority of the dominant—wherever these have coordinated with one another—is not characteristic of them, and it is therefore sociologically irrelevant whether the dominant position of *one* is by chance filled by a majority of persons. Indeed it needs to be remarked that monarchy is generally the prototype and primary form of the relationship of subordination. With its fundamental place within the facts of domination and subordination, it goes right along with the other forms of organization, the oligarchical and the republican—not only in the political meaning of this concept—but in its being able to offer them legitimate space inside its sphere, so that the imperium of the single ruler can encompass very well these types of secondary structures, while they themselves, wherever these are the most prominent and extensive, can be exercised only very relatively or in illegitimate ways. It is so materially evident and imposing that it itself operates those very systems that arose precisely in reaction to it and as its abrogation. Of the American president it is claimed, as well as of the Athenian *archon* and the Roman *consul*, that, with certain qualifications, they were nevertheless simply the heirs of monarchical power, of which the kings were supposed to have been deprived by the appropriate revolutions. From the Americans themselves one hears that their freedom only consists precisely in both large political parties alternating control; each for its own part, however, tyrannizes fully in monarchical fashion. Likewise they proceeded to prove by the democracy of the French Revolution that it is nothing more than an inverted kingdom fitted out with the same qualities as one. The *volonté générale* of Rousseau, by which he counsels submission without resistance, thoroughly contains the essence of absolute rule. And Proudhon claims that a parliament that has resulted from universal franchise is indistinguishable from absolute monarchy. The people's representative would be unfailingly, unassailably, irresponsibly nothing more in essence than the monarch. The monarchical principle is just as lively and prominent in a parliament as in a legitimate monarch. Actually the parliament does not even lack for the phenomenon of veneration that seems otherwise reserved quite specifically for the

single monarch. It is a typical feature that then still persists as a formal relationship among group elements, even when a change of the entire sociological trend seems to make it impossible. The peculiar strength of monarchy, which survives its death, so to speak, lies in the reality that it carries forth its tone in addition to structure, the meaning of which is precisely the negation of monarchy; this is one of the most striking things about this unique sociological formation, that it appropriates to itself not only materially different contents, but can even infuse itself into the spirit of its opposite as well as in the changed *forms*. So extensive is this formal significance of monarchy that it is preserved even *explicitly* where its contents are negated and exactly because they are negated. The office of the Doge in Venice was continually losing its power until finally it had none at all. However, it was anxiously conserved in order to hinder thereby exactly an evolution that might just bring an actual ruler to the throne. The opposition does not in this case destroy monarchy in order to consolidate power definitively in its own formation, but guards it precisely to prevent its actual consolidation. Both of these truly opposing cases are constant witnesses to the formative power of this form of rule.

Indeed, the antitheses that it forces together devolve even into one and the same phenomenon. There monarchy has interest in the monarchical institution even where it lies entirely outside of its immediate realm of influence. The experience, which all such widely divergent manifestations of a specific social form mutually rely on and which secure this form, so to say, reciprocally, appears to become evident in the most varied relationships of domination, most distinctively with aristocracy and monarchy. For that reason a monarchy is coincidentally indebted to it whenever it weakens, for specific political reasons, the monarchical principle in other countries. The nearly rebellious opposition that the government of Mazarin[14] experienced from the populace as well as from the direction of Parliament led to French politics being blamed for undergirding the uprisings in neighboring countries against their governments. The monarchical idea would thereby experience a weakening that would reflect back upon the instigators themselves who intended to defend their interests through those rebellions. And

[14] Mazarin (Giulio Mazarini), successor to Cardinal Richelieu as chief minister of France, as a foreigner and dominant political force met with opposition from the French nobility—ed.

vice-versa: when Cromwell rejected the title of king, the royalists were on that account saddened. Because however unbearable it would have been for them to see the king's murderer on the throne, they would have welcomed the elemental reality, as a preparation for the Restoration, that there was once again a king. But on such utilitarian justifications, consequently borrowed for expansion of the monarchy, the monarchical sentiment still functions with regard to certain phenomena in a manner that is directly opposed to the personal advantage of its bearer. When during the reign of Louis XIV the Portuguese rebellion against Spain broke out, he nevertheless said of it: "However bad a prince may be, even so, subjects revolting is always criminal." And Bismarck claims that Wilhelm I would have felt an 'instinctively monarchical disapproval' against Bennigsen[15] and his earlier activities in Hannover. Because however much Bennigsen and his party may have done also for the Prussification of Hannover, such behavior of a subject towards its originating (Guelphic) dynasty would have gone against his sense of princely prerogative. The internal power of monarchy is great enough to incorporate even the enemy in principled sympathy, and to oppose the friend, as soon as one enters into a personally fully necessary fight against any one monarch, on a level of feeling fully as deep as if against an enemy.

Finally features emerge of a type, not yet touched upon at all, when the existing similarity or dissimilarity, in any *other* respect, becomes a problem between dominant and subordinate, nearby or distant. It is crucial for the sociological formation of a group whether it prefers to subordinate itself to a stranger or one of its own, whether the one or the other is useful and worthwhile for it, or the contrary. The medieval lord in Germany originally had the right to name any judges and leaders from the outside to the court. Finally, though, the concession was often obtained that the official had to be named from the circle of the serfs. Exactly the opposite was in force when the count of Flanders, in 1228, made a specially important pledge to his "beloved jurors and citizens of Ghent" that the judges and executive officers installed by him and his subordinate officers shall not be drawn from Ghent or be married to a Ghent. To be sure, this difference has above all the reasons for its intentions: the outsider is unaligned, the insider more prejudiced. The first reason was evidently decisive for this desire of the

[15] Evidently Alexander Levin von Bennigsen (1809–1893)—ed.

citizens of Ghent, as mentioned, for them to be guided by the earlier practices of free Italian cities, often using judges from other cities to protect themselves from the influencing of legal formulations by family loyalties or internal party allegiance. From the same motive such brilliant rulers as Louis XI[16] and Matthias Corvinus[17] named their highest possible officers from the outside or even from low ranks; another effective justification was advanced yet in the 19th century by Bentham for the reason that foreigners make the best civil servants: they would simply supervise most scrupulously. The preference for those nearby or for those who are similar appears from the very beginning to be a bit of a paradox, although it can lead to a peculiarly mechanical *similia similibus*, as is reported of an old Libyan clan and more recently of the Ashanti: that the king would rule over the men, and the queen—who is his sister—over the women. Exactly the cohesion of the group, which I stress as the result of its subordination under their own kind, is confirmed by the phenomenon that the central power seeks to dismantle that immanent jurisdiction of subordinate groups. Still in the 14th century in England the idea was widespread that one's local community would be the competent judge for each person, but Richard II[18] then decided precisely that nobody could be a judge of the court or release people from gaol in one's own county! And the correlate of the cohesion of the group was in this case the freedom of the individual. Also during the decline of Anglo-Saxon kingdoms judgment by peers, the Pares, was highly prized as protection against the arbitrary will of royal or noble governors.

So there are definite rational reasons of practical usefulness for choosing subordination under one's peers or under foreigners. However, the motives for such a choice are not exhausted by this category, but additionally there are instinctive and intuitive, as well as abstract and indirect; and there has to be even more, since the former often assigns the same weight to the trappings of both: the greater understanding of the person on the inside and the greater impartiality of the one coming from the outside may often offset one another, and there needs to be

[16] King Louis XI of France (1461–1483) had no use for royal trappings and surrounded himself with associates of lowly birth—Ed.

[17] Matthias Corvinus (Mathew Corwin, in English; 1443–1490), King of Hungary 1458–1490, King of Bohemia after 1469, Duke of Austria after 1486; he had an army of mercenaries and was rumored to have sounded out public opinion by mingling with commoners—ed.

[18] Richard II, 1377–1399—ed.

some other authority to decide between them. Making itself felt here, always important for every sociological formation, is the psychological antinomy: that we are drawn on the one hand to those similar to us and on the other hand to those opposite us. In which case, in which area the one or the other will work, whether in our whole nature the one or the other tendency wins out—that appears to belong to the rather primary nature of the individuals themselves according to their sober assessments. Opposites complete us, like people strengthen us; opposites intrigue and stimulate us, like people comfort us. With quite different measures the one or the other obtains for us a feeling of legitimation of our being. When however we experience one of the specific phenomena as advisable for us over against the other, the other repels us; those different seem antagonistic to us, those like us seem boring; the different become for us a challenge that is too much, the similar a challenge that is too little; it is as difficult to find a place for the one as for the other—there, because points of contact and similarity with us are missing; here, because we experience them either as the same as us or, yet worse, even as superfluous to us. The internal variety of our relationships to an individual, but also to a group, depends fundamentally on there being some kind of correspondence between most or a majority of their and our characteristics; that these characteristics be, in part, similar, in part, heterogeneous; and in both cases attraction as well as repulsion are generated, in whose interplay and combinations the entire relationship runs its course; a similar result occurs when one and the same relationship, for example, which seems to have an unassailable commonality and inevitability, triggers in us, on the one hand, sympathetic and, on the other, antipathetic feelings. So a social power similarly constructed will be advantaged in its own realm, on the one hand, not only on account of the natural sympathy for the supposed relationship, but also because the stimulation of the principle has to be to its advantage. On the other hand, though, the opposite is generated by jealousy, competition, the desire just to be the *only* agent of the principle. This is especially obvious in the relationship of monarchy to aristocracy. On the one hand, the aristocracy's principle of heredity is inextricably relevant to monarchy; on its account a party alliance is formed with them; a platform is established on it and thereby advantaging it; on the other hand, the monarchy cannot often tolerate a status existing next to it, even a hereditary one by which its own right is privileged; it must desire that every one of its own members be specially privileged. So the Roman Empire originally privileged the

senatorial aristocracy and guaranteed them their heritability—however, after Diocletian it was overshadowed by a civil-service aristocracy in which every member achieved the high position by way of personal advancement. Whether in such typical cases attraction or repulsion of the similar is given greater weight is decided apparently not only from utilitarian motives but from those deep dispositions of the soul for the value of the similar or that of the dissimilar.

The particular type under discussion here devolves from the wholly general type of this sociological problem. Time and again it is a matter not of a rationalized sentiment whether one feels more humbled by subordination to someone near at hand or someone at greater distance. Thus the whole social instinct and sense of life of the Middle Ages is seen in the fact that the appointments of the guilds with public authority in the 13th century required at the same time the subordination of all workers of the same trade under it: because it would have been unthinkable that a commercial court would be required for anyone who was not a comrade of the legal community doing the deciding sit over people. And just the opposite and hard-to-explain feeling, because of no obvious single advantage, leads several Australian tribes to not elect their own chiefs, but to have them elected by neighboring tribes—as also with several primitive peoples common currency is not manufactured by them themselves but must be introduced from the outside so that now and then one finds a kind of industry, producing specie (mussel shells etc.) that is exported as their money to distant places. On the whole—qualified by various modifications; the lower a group is situated as a whole, the more each single member is accustomed to subordination—a group will even more grudgingly allow one on the same level as they to dominate them; the higher a group as a whole is situated, the more likely it is to subordinate itself to a peer. Domination by equals is difficult for the former because each is positioned lowly; for the latter more easily because each is highly placed. The acme of this sentiment was furnished by the House of Lords, which was not only recognized by all the peers as their sole judge, but in the year 1330 once explicitly rejected the insinuation when it wanted to pass judgment on yet other people as though they were peers. So decisive, therefore, is the tendency to grant the power of judgment only to one's equals that it even becomes retrogressively operative; logically incorrect but throughout deeply psychological and understandable, they conclude: because our equal is judged only by us, so everyone we judge becomes in some sense our equal. Just as here such a distinctive relationship of subordination

as that of the judged to one's judge, so is a definitive coordination is felt, as sometimes conversely coordination is felt as subordination. And conceptually here the dualtiy repeats itself—dissociation as well as involvement—ostensibly rational grounds and dark instincts. Medieval city dwellers, with their rights under the aristocracy but positioned over the peasants, expediently rejected ideas of a universal equality of rights, because they feared that equalization would cost them more, to the advantage of the peasants, than it would secure for them from the aristocracy. Not uniquely, this sociological type is encountered: that a midlevel social stratum can achieve higher elevation only at the price of aligning itself to the lower—this equalization, however, feels like such a reduction in rank for itself that it prefers to forego the elevation that could be won only in this way. Thus the Creoles in Latin America experienced unequivocally fierce jealousy toward the Spaniards from Europe, but even stronger disdain for Mulattoes and Mestizos, Negroes and Indians. The Creoles would have had to align wthemselves with them in order to acquire for themselves equality with the Spaniards, and given their racist feelings, this alignment would have felt like such a demotion that, for that reason, they preferred relinguishing equality with the Spaniards. Yet more abstractly and instinctively, this formative combination is stated in Henry Sumner Maine's expression: the principle of nationality, as it is often advanced, would seem to mean that human beings of one race act unjustly towards those of another when they should have common political dispositions. Wherever thus two different national characters exist, A and B, A then appears subordinate to B as soon as the same constitution is expected for the former as for the lattter, and furthermore even if identical *contents* throughout defines no lower position or subordination.

Finally the subordination under the more distant personality has the very important significance that it in the same measure is the more suitable in so far as the circle of subordinates is made up from heterogeneous members, foreign or hostile to one another. The elements of a majority, subject to a superior, operate like the particular ideas that belong under a universal concept. This must be even higher and more abstract, that is, the further it is from each particular concept, the more different are all those concepts from one another which it has to encompass uniformly. The most typical case, presenting itself in identical form in the most varied realms, is the handling from above of conflicting parties who choose a referee. The farther this one is from the party-like interestedness from the others—while, analogous to the

higher concept, it must somehow have inherently and accessibly that which both sets up the strife as well as the potential reconciliation—the more readily will the parties submit to its decision. There is a *threshold* of difference beyond which the meeting of the conflicting parties might find a point of uniform agreement however far such a point is. Looking back at the former history of the commercial court of arbitration in England, it is to be emphasized that the same thing is excellently served in the interpretation of work contracts and laws. These, however, would be seldom the reason for larger strikes and lockouts alongside of which it would be a question whether workers or employers preferred to change the working conditions. Here, though, where it is a question of new *foundations* of relationship between the parties, the court is irrelevant; the discrepancy between the interests has become so wide that the arbitration courts would have to be infinitely high over them to span it and effect a settlement—however imaginable concepts are with such heterogeneous contents, no such universal concept is to be found that would allow them to strike a bargain based on what they share in common.

Further, in the case of conflicting parties who might submit to the higher authority of the arbitration court, the parties having to be coordinated is of decisive importance. Should some kind of a dominant and subordinate relationship already hold between them, it becomes far too easy for the relationship of the judge to one of them to produce a disturbing impartiality for that one; even if the judge is quite distant from the material interests of both parties, often the judgment will favor the dominant, sometimes though also the subordinate party. Here is the region of class sympathies that often are entirely subconscious since they have developed perpetually with the whole thought and feeling of the subjects, and they form, as it were, the *a priori* that shapes the judge's ostensibly purely objective deliberation of the case and manifests interconnections with their congruent perspectives so that, in spite of the endeavor to avoid it, most of the time lead not to actual objectivity and balanced judgment but to its exact opposite. Furthermore, the belief that the judge is biased—especially where the parties are of very different ranks and power, and even if the judge is not so biased—is enough to make the entire proceedings illusory. The English chamber of arbitration often calls a foreign manufacturer as an arbitrator for conflicts between workers and employers. Ordinarily, however, if the decision turns out against the workers, they accuse the judge of favoring the judge's class, however irreproachable the judge's

character may be; on the other hand, if perhaps a parliamentarian is called, the manufacturers assume then a partiality for the largest class of voters. Thus a fully satisfying situation will result only with full parity for both parties—indeed because the superior ones will otherwise exploit the advantage of their position to get a personality whose decisions will be convenient for them. Therefore we can on the other hand conclude: The naming of an impartial arbitrator is always a sign that the conflicting parties are together achieving at least some coordination. Precisely on account of the voluntary English court of arbitration, where workers and employers submit contractually to the decision of the judge, who may be neither employer nor worker, the equalization granted to the workers by the employers on their part could move the latter to relinguish assistance from their kind for the settlement of the conflict and entrust it entirely to this outsider. Finally an example of the greatest material difference can tell us that the more the shared relationship of several elements to a superior assumes or produces a coordination between these elements—in spite of all otherwise existing distinctions, unfamiliarities, conflicts—the *higher* the dominant power will stand above them. For the importance of religion for forming societies in wider circles, it is obviously very important that God is located at a definite distance from the believers. The, as it were, immediate proximity with believers where the divine principles of all totemistic and fetishistic religons, but also the old Jewish God, are located makes such a religion quite unsuited for ruling wide circles. The incredible height of the Christian concept of God first makes the homogeneity of the heterogeneous before God possible; the distance from him was so immeasurable that the differeneces between human beings is thereby dissolved. That did not hinder an intimate relation of the heart to God, for here dwelled those aspects of humanity in which presumably all human distinctions fade, which, however, crystallized into this purity and this unique existence only by way of the influence of that highest principle and, as it were, the relationship to it. But perhaps the Catholic Church could only create a world religion precisely so that it interrupted *this* direct immediacy and, as it inserted itself into the breach, rendered God as well itself highly unreachable in *this* relationship to the individual.

With regard to those social structures that are characterized by domination of a *majority*, of a social totality over individuals or other totalities, it is noticeable from the outset that the consequence for the subordinates is very uneven. The most that the Spartan and Thessalonian slaves

wanted was to become slaves of the state instead of individuals. In Prussia, before the emancipation of the serfs, they were by far better off on demesnes of the state than were the private peasants. In the large, modern business enterprises and warehouses, where there is practically no individuality, but they are either corporations or they possess the same impersonal techniques of management, the employees are better situated than in the small businesses where they are exploited by the owners. This relationship repeats itself wherever, instead of the difference between indivduals and collectives, it has to do with that between smaller and larger collectives. The destiny of India is better under the British government than under the East India Company. At the same time it is of course irrelevant whether this larger collective stands under a single ruler, particularly when the technique practiced by the superior carries the character of superindividuality in the widest sense: the aristocratic rule of the Roman Republic oppressed the provinces at a distance far harder than Caesarism, which was much more just and objective. To belong to a larger realm also tends to be better for those in service positions. The large manors that arose in the seventh century in the kingdom of France in many cases created an entirely new advantageous situation for the subordinate population. The large estate permitted an organization and differentiation of the working personnel among whom there emerged qualified individuals doing highly valued labor and were thus permitted, although still not free, to climb socially within the estate. It is entirely in this manner that state penal laws frequently come to be milder than those of the liberated realms.

Now, however, as indicated, a number of phenomena run counter to this. The allies of Athens and Rome and the territories that had formerly been subject to individual Swiss cantons were as gruesomely oppressed and exploited as would have hardly been the case under the tyranny of a single sovereign. The same corporation that, because of the technique of its operation, exploits its employees less than the private entrepreneur, in many cases, was *allowed*, when it has to do with compensation or benefits, to operate less liberally than the private person who is not accountable to anybody with regard to costs. And regarding the specific impulses: the cruelty that was exercised for the pleasure of the Roman circus-goer, who often demanded even more extreme intensification, would probably not have been perpetrated by many of them if the offender had stood individual-to-individual, right before them.

The principal reason for these various consequences of plural or majority rule over their subordinates lies above all in the character of the *objectivity* that it bears, in the suspension of certain feelings, sentiments, impulses that are effective only in the individual behavior of subjects but not as soon as they operate collectively. Now as the case may be, the position of the subordinate—within the given relationship and its specific contents, affected favorably or unfavorably by the objectivity or by the individual subjectivity in the character of the relationship—will produce those differences. Wherever subordinates in their situation have need of charitable and selfless grace from the rulers, they will suffer at the objective rule of a majority; with relationships where the situation is served expediently precisely only by legality, impartiality, functionality, this is just what this ruler will desire. It is significant for this reason that the state legally convicts the criminal, but cannot pardon, and even in republics takes care to keep the right of pardon reserved to individual persons. Most effectively this stands for the material interests of community, which will lead to the greatest possible advantages and least amount of sacrifice following purely objective principle. A cruelty, as it may be exericised by individuals for the sake of cruelty, lies by no means in the currently obvious harshness and ruthlessness, but only in a fully consequential functionality—just as also the brutality of the people of sheer wealth, in so far as they operate under the same point of view, which appears to them typically not at all blameworthy because they are conscious only of a strictly logically driven activity.

Indeed this objectivity of the collective behavior, in many cases purely negative, means that certain norms that otherwise hold for the single personality are nullified, and is then only a form for concealing this nullification and soothe the conscience about it. Every individual involved in decision-making can retreat behind it, provided it was simply a general decision, and mask one's own desire for gain and brutality, provided it was only in pursuit of the advantage of the totality. That the possession of power—and certainly on the one side the especially quickly acquired, on the other side the especially enduring—leads to its misuse holds for individuals only with many and illuminating exceptions; when, however, it does not hold for corporate bodies and classes, then only especially fortunate circumstances prevented it. It is rather noteworthy that the disappearance of the individual subject behind the totality of the system also then promotes relatively increased power for the individual, even if the subjugated party is also a collective. The psychological reproduction of suffering, the essential vehicle of compassion

and leniency, is easily negated if no identifiable or visible individual has to bear it, but only a totality without, as it were, any subject. So it has been noted, the English polity in its entire history is supposed to have been characterized by an extraordinary justice towards persons and an similarly great injustice towards totalities. It is only through an appreciation of that strong sentiment for the rights of individuals that the psychology behind the treatment of dissenters, Jews, Irish, Indians, in earlier periods also the Scots, can be understood. The submersion of the forms and norms of personality in the objectivity of the collective being is what also defines the suffering of totalities, then, as business-as-usual. Objectivity functions, to be sure, in the form of laws; where it is not essential, though, and personal conscientiousness is stalled, it is frequently demonstrated that the latter is simply not a collective-psychological trait; and this is even more decisive when the object of action, because it too has the same nature of a collective, does not at all offer any stimulus for that personal trait to unfold. The abuses of force, for example, in the American city governments would hardly require their enormous dimensions if the ruling groups were not corporations and the dominated not collectives; it is therefore significant that one believed these abuses could sometimes be controlled by increasing the power of the mayor—so that there would be someone who could be made personally responsibile!

Mass behavior, which I illustrated with the Roman circus crowd, is offered as an exception to the objectivity of the actions of a large number, which in reality presents only a deeper confirmation of the rule. Namely, there exists a fundamental difference between the effective nature of a collective as one homogeneous structure, an abstraction, as it were, embodying a specific structure—economic co-operative, state, church, all combinations that actually or for all practical purposes are to be viewed as legal persons—on the one side, and that of a collective as an actually co-existing aggregation on the other. In both cases the resulting dissolution of the individual-personal differentiation leads in the first to the emergence of opportune traits transcending the individual, if you will; in the other, however, lying below the individual. Inside a physically proximal crowd there are countless suggestions and nervous influences going back and forth, robbing individuals of their repose and independence of thought and action, so that the most fleeting stimulations often rise up in the crowd, avalanche-like, to the most excessive impulses, and the higher, discriminating, critical functions are as good as turned off. For that reason, one laughs at jokes in the theater and in

assemblies that would leave one quite cold in a room; for that reason, the manifestations of spiritualism work best in 'circles'; for that reason, parlor games usually achieve the greatest joyful outcome, however low one is feeling; thus the rapid essentially quite unfathomable changes of mood in a mass; thus the countless observations over the 'stupidity' of collectives.[19] I attribute the paralysis of the higher character traits, this inability to resist being swept away, as stated, to the incalculable number of influences and impressions that crisscross in a crowd from person to person, strengthening, recoiling, distracting, reproducing. From this confusion of minimal stimuli below the threshold of consciousness emerges, on the one hand, besides the costs of clear and consequential mental activity, a great nervous excitement, in which the darkest, most primitive, normally controlled instincts of nature awaken, and on the other hand, a hypnotic paralysis that allows the crowd to go along with every suggestive impulse leading to the extreme. Add to that the power-rush and the individual lack of responsibility for single persons in a currently teaming crowd whereby the moral inhibitions of low and brutal drives fail. The cruelty of crowds is sufficiently explained by that, be it Roman circus-goer or medieval Jew-baiter or American Negro-lyncher, and the ugly lot of those that are subject to a corresponding submissive crowd. To be sure, the typical duality here shows itself in the consequences of this social relationship of subordination: the impulsivity and suggestibility of the crowd can lead them opportunely to follow stimuli to magnanimity and enthusiasm, to which likewise the individual alone would otherwise not rise. The last reason for the contradictions inside this configuration is, to put it this way, that no permanent and changeless but rather a variable and haphazard relationship exists between the individuals with their situations and requirements, on the one side, and all the super- and subindividual entities and internal-external states of consciousness that accompany rallies, on the the other. When thus the abstract social units—factual, cold, consequential—act as an individual, when conversely tangible crowds—impulsive, senseless, extreme—move collectively as if each individual were acting separately, each of these cases can be of such a variety that it can be more favorable or, on the contrary, less favorable for the subordinated. The randomness, frankly, is not at all random, but rather the logical expression of the incommensurability between the situations of specific individuals, whom and

[19] More about this in the chapter on self-preservation.

whose needs it concerns, and the entities and dispositions that rule the cooperation and coexistence of the many or that serve them.

With these subordinations under a majority the individual elements of the majority were coordinated with one another, or at least they functioned here with respect to matters to be considered as though they were coordinated. There arises then new phenomena as soon as the dominant majority does not act as a unity of homogeneous elements; the dominated can thereby be either in conflict among themselves, or they can form a hierarchy in which one superior is subordinated to another. I should consider initially the first case, whose types allow us to point out the variety of consequences for the subordinates.

If someone is *totally* subject to several persons or groups, so much so that there is no spontaneity to exert in the relationship but complete dependence on every one of the superiors—suffering will be particularly severe under conflicts among the latter. For each one will lay *complete* claim to the subordinates and their powers and services and will hold them, nevertheless, responsible for whatever they do or allow as a result of coercion by the others as though it were voluntary. This is the situation of the 'servant of two masters'; it plays out in any situation, from children standing between parents in a state of conflict to the situation of a small state always dependent on two powerful neighboring states, and in case of conflict, then, the one caught between will often be made responsible by each for whatever the dependent relationship compels to be done for the other. If this conflict is fully internalized within the circle of the individual subordinates, it functions like ideal, moral powers that place their demands on the subjectivity of the people themselves, so the situation appears as a 'conflict of duties.' That external conflict flows, so to say, not from the subjects themselves but only onto them; however, this conflict crops up in the soul leading the moral consciousness to strive for two different sides, to be obedient towards two mutually exclusive powers. Thus while this in principle excludes the will of the subject, and, whenever this occured, could as a rule be completed quickly, there is precisely underlying the conflict of duties the fullest freedom of the subject which alone can carry the recognition of both claims as morally obligatory. In the mean time this opposition apparently does not hinder the conflict of the two from obtaining both forms of obedience to the demanding powers at the same time. As long as a conflict is purely external, it is worst when the personality is weak; if, however, it becomes internal, it will become most destructive when the personality is strong. With the rudimentary

forms of such conflicts, through which our life moves, both large and small, we are accustomed to that sort of thing; we come to terms with them so instinctively through compromises and division of our obligations that they, for the most part, do not even become conscious as conflicts. Where this occurs, however, an insolubility of this situation, according to its pure sociological form, tends to become visible, even if its fortuitous contents also permit a disentanglement and reconciliation. Since as long as the strife of elements continues, wherein each raises full claim to one and the same subject, no division of one's powers will be enough for those demands; indeed, in general not even a relative solution through such division will be possible, because one must show one's true colors, and the individual action stands before an uncompromising *pro* or *contra*. Between the religiously cloaked claim of the family group, which required the burial of Polyneices, and the state law that forbids it, there is for Antigone no differentiating compromise; after her death the internal conflicts she feels are just as difficult and irreconciled as at the beginning of the tragedy, and prove thereby that no behavior or fate whatsoever of those subjugated can remove the conflict they project into it. And even where the collision does not take place between those powers themselves, but only inside the doubly obedient subject, and so seems rather to be mediated by way of a division of the subject's work between them—it is only the happy accident from the consequences of the contents of the situation that makes the solution possible. The prototype is here: Give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and to God what belongs to God; but if one needs for a godly work precisely the coin that Caesar demands? The sheer reciprocal estrangement and disorganization of the authorities, on which an individual is contemporaneously dependent, is sufficient to turn one's situation basically into one full of contradictions. And this even the more so, the more the conflict is internalized in the subject and arises from the ideal demands that draw life from one's own conscientiousness. In both examples drawn above the subjective moral emphasis rests indeed fundamentally on the *one* side of the opposition, and on the other the subject is more subservient by way of an external inevitability. If, however, both demands are from the same inner gravity, it is of little help, with the firmest conviction, whether we decide for one or divide up our strengths between them. Since the unfulfilled—whether whole or in part—in spite of everything, continues to have an effect with its emphasis on wholeness, its unfulfilled amount makes us fully responsible for it, even if it was outwardly impossible to

satisfy it, and even if under the given circumstances this solution was the most morally correct. Every actual moral demand has something absolute that is not satisfied with a relative fulfillment that is alone recognized as real by another one. Here, too, where we are under no other authority than personal conscience, we are not better off than in the external case of the mutually conflicting relationships that grant us no leeway in favor of the other. Also internally we find no peace, as long as a moral necessity remains unrealized, no matter whether we have a clean conscience with regard to it, provided that we, because of the existence of another one—that likewise produces a sense of its possible realization—could not give it more than we did.

With the subordination under external conflicting or estranged powers, the position of the subordinate certainly becomes a fully different one as soon as the subordinate possesses even some spontaneity, has some of its own power to insert into the relationship. Here the situation comes in the most diverse arrangements: *duobus litigantibus tertius gaudet*—which the previous chapter treated. Here would be advanced only several of its applications in the case of the *subordination* of the *tertius* and also in the event that there exists no strife, but only mutual estrangement of the higher authorities.[20]

The availability of some amount of freedom of the subordinates is a condition that is apt to lead to an incremental process that sometimes goes all the way to a dissolution of the subordination. A fundamental difference of the medieval serfs from vassals consists in that the former had and could have only *one* lord; the latter, however, could take land from various lords and give them the oath of service. Through this possibility, to go into various feudal relationships, the vassal gained in relation to the single feudal lord a firm footing and independence; the essential subordination of the vassal's position became thereby rather considerably equal. A formally similar situation was created for the religious subject by polytheism. Although such subjects are aware of being ruled over by a plurality of divine powers, nevertheless they can—perhaps not entirely logically, to be sure, but at this level actually psychologically—turn from the inaccessible or powerless god to another, richer in opportunities; still in contemporary Catholicism believers turn away from a saint who has not rewarded their special adoration, in order to devote themselves to another—although they could not

[20] Latin: *duobus litigantibus tertius gaudet*, while two argue, the third rejoices—ed.

deny, in principle, the continuing power that the former also has over them. In so far as subjects have at least a certain choice between the authorities over them, they gain, at least perhaps for their sense of wholeness, a certain feeling of independence from each one, which is denied them wherever the identical sum of religious dependence is united inescapably in a single conception of God. And this is also the form in which modern persons gain a definite indpendence in the economic realm. They are, especially in the large cities, absolutely more dependent on the sum total of their suppliers than are the people in more natural economic circumstances. However, because they possess nearly an unlimited possibility of choosing among suppliers, with also the possibility to change from one to another, they have then a freedom that is not to be compared to that of those in simpler or small-town relationships.

The same determinate form of relationship arises when the divergence of the dominant groups unfolds one after another instead of simultaneously. Here now the most varied adaptations offer themselves relative to the historical contents and special conditions in all of which dwells the same form-phenomenon. The Roman senate was formally very dependent on the senior officials. Since, however, they had short term limits and the Senate in contrast kept its members permanently, the power of the Senate thus became in fact far greater than one would get from a reading of the official relationship to those bearers of power. In basically the same way the power of the Commons against the English Crown has grown since the 14th century. The dynastic parties were still able to determine the elections, in the sense of royalism or reform, in favor of York or of Lancaster. But amidst all these proofs of the rulers' power, the House of Commons still persisted as such and acquired thereby, precisely because of those oscillations and changes in the wind among the highest regions, a firmness, power and independence that perhaps it would never have won with undisturbed unity in the movements of the highest ranks. Correspondingly the increase in democratic consciousness in France was derived from the reality that, since the fall of Napoleon I, changing government powers quickly followed one after another, each incapable, insecure, wooing the goodwill of the masses, whereby every citizen then correctly came to a consciousness of personal social significance. Although citizens were subordinated by every single one of these governments, they began nevertheless to feel their own strength because they formed the permanent element in the midst of all the change and conflict of the governments.

The power against the various concomitant elements, which accrues to an element of a relationship by the mere fact of its endurance, is such a universal, formal consequence that its exploitation through any kind of relationship of subordination may be understood only as a specific case. It holds no less for the dominant parties: from the enormous advantage that 'the state' and 'the church' already gain through their mere stability relative to the short life of that of the dominated, to such a singular fact: that the frequency of puerperal fever in the Middle Ages extraordinarily raised the sovereignty of the man in the house. Since the consequence of that was that the strongest men had several wives consecutively and thereby concentrated the head-of-the-household power, as it were, into one person while the power of the housewife was distributed among several sequentially.

Without exception the phenomena of domination and subordination seemed to facilitate entirely opposed consequences for the dominated. Overall, however, closer inspection has allowed us to recognize the grounds of this opposition based on the same general type, without having to give up the nature of the form for whatever contents it offered up. The situation is not different with the second combination now under consideration: that a plurality of dominant authorities, instead of being estranged or hostile to one another, are among themselves even dominant and subordinate. Decisive here is whether the subordinate actually possesses an unmediated relationship to the highest ranked of the superiors above or whether the intermediate authority, still dominating the subordinate, is still subordinate to the highest and separates the former from the latter, and thus by itself *de facto* represents the dominant elements. Cases of the first type were created by feudalism, in which those who were oppressed by the greater vassals remained, yet, simultaneously the oppressed under the highest noble houses. A rather pure picture hereof is provided by English feudalism at the time of William the Conqueror, described by Stubbs:

> All men continued to be primarily the king's men and the public peace to be his peace. Their lords might demand their service to fulfil their own obligations, but the king could call them to the fyrd, summon them to his courts, and tax them without the intervention of their lords, and to the king they could look for protection against all foes.[21]

[21] Simmel quotes in English. Stubbs presumably is William Stubbs, author of *The Constitutional History of England in its Origin and Development* (3 vols.), 1873–78—ed.

Thus the situation of the subordinate to a higher dominant group is a favorable one if the latter is also subordinate to an even higher, against which the former has a defense. This is also the actual natural result of the social configuration here before us. Since, as a rule, some kind of opposition and jurisdictional dispute among adjacent elements in the hierarchy of dominant groups is taking place, the intermediate element is often in conflict with the higher as well as with the lower ones. And the fact that common opposition also binds together otherwise most diverse elements with no other means for unity is one of the typical formal rules that prove true universally for all areas of social life. A nuance hereof becomes especially important for the problem before us: already in the early Orient it is the glory of a ruler to take up the cause of the weaker who are oppressed by a stronger—if only because the ruler is thereby shown to be the stronger of the strong. In Greece it is found that a heretofore ruling oligarchy, one and the same personality, is denounced with the label of a tyrant, whom the lower masses honor as their liberator from tyranny, just as happened with Euphron of Sikyon. It is hardly necessary to reiterate the frequency with which the motif—that the lower masses are supported by the ruler in their struggle with the aristocracy—recurrs in history. Indeed even where this direct relationship between the highest and the lowest ranks of the social scale does not exist for the purpose of keeping down the middle level, where instead the lowest and the middle both are oppressed by the highest, the mere fact that this happens to the middle level as well results in minimally a psychological emotional relief for the lowest rank. With some African and Asian peoples polygyny is so designed that only one of the wives counts as the actual, first or legitimate wife, and the others have a subordinate or servant position in relation to her. Even then, though, her position is in no way better against the husband; for him she is just as much a slave as the others. Without a doubt such a situation—that in which the relationship between two dominant groups stands under the same burden from above as that of the subordinates themselves—makes the burden, as human beings in general are disposed, more tolerable for the latter. Human beings tend to extract some satisfaction from the oppression of one's oppressor; with some feeling of superiority they tend to empathize with the ruler of their ruler, even wherever this sociological constellation means not in the least any real relief from the burdens on them.

Now wherever the form or content of the social structure excludes contact between the highest and lowest levels and thus excludes any

shared opposition to the middle, and there is a unidirectional continuity between the top and bottom, the way opens up for a typical sociological event that one can identify as a shifting of the burden. Over against the simple case that a more powerful one uses the position for the exploitation of a weaker, what this has to do with here is the stronger parties transfering any decline of their position, against which they cannot defend themselves, onto a defenceless party and seeking thereby to preserve the *status quo ante*. The retailer shifts the difficulties that arise through the desires and moods of the public onto the wholesaler, the wholesaler onto the producers, the producers onto the workers. In every hierarchy a new burden or demand moves along the line of least resistance, which finally, albeit not necessarily upon immediate appearance or at the first stage, tends to be constantly towards those below. This is the tragedy of the lowest people in every social order. They have to suffer not only under the deprivations, strains, and setbacks, the sum total of which simply characterizes their situation, but every new burden that higher levels meet with at any given point is passed down, whenever in any way technically possible, and stops only with them. The Irish agrarian conditions offer a very pure example. The English lord who owned property in Ireland, but never went there, leased it to a tenant, this one again to a another tenant, etc., so that the poor farmers had to lease their few acres often from the fifth or sixth middleman. With this it came out that, first of all, they had to pay 6 Pf. Sterling for an acre, of which the owners kept only 10 Shillings; further, however, every one-Shilling raise in rent that the owner imposed on the tenant with whom he had immediate dealings, came not as a one-Shilling raise but twelve times that for the farmer. So it goes without saying that the original increase of burden is not passed on absolutely but relatively, which corresponds to the otherwise already existing measure of power of the higher over the lower. So the rebuke that an official receives from a superior may be limited in the moderate expressions of the higher educational level; this official, however, might of course express the consequential frustration by a rough yell at the next subordinate, and this one in anger beats the children for the sake of an otherwsie quite useless reason.

While the especially uncomfortable situation of the lowest element in a multi-level hierarchy of domination and subordination is founded on the reality that the structure permits a definite continual slide of burden from the top down, a formally quite different one leads to similar results for the lowest positioned, in so far as it also destroys that

connection with the highest element that was its support against the middle rank. When, to wit, this latter moves between the other two so widely and powerfully that all rules of the highest authority in favor of the lowest tier must be mediated by the middle, which is in possession of the governing functions, this results easily, instead of a binding between the high and the low, in a disjunction between them. As long as serfdom existed, the aristocracy was a bearer of the organization and administration of states; they exercised judicial, economic, taxing functions over their subjects without which the state at that time would not have been able to exist, and certainly bound the subject masses in this manner to the general interest and the highest power. Since, though, the aristocracy still has its own private interests, for which it wants to use the peasants, it exploits its position as the organ of administration between government and peasants, and for a very long time actually annuled those rules and laws by which the government would have assumed responsibility for the peasants—what it for a very long time could do only through and by the aristocracy. It is quite obvious that this form of stratification, isolating ranks from one another, damages not only the lowest but also the highest member of the hierarchy because the strengths flowing from the former up are overlooked by it. Thus for this reason the German kingdom in the Middle Ages was extraordinarily weakened, in that the ascending lesser aristocracy was duty bound only to the higher aristocracy because they were enfeoffed only by them. In the end the middle member of the higher aristocracy cut off the lesser entirely from the crown.

The outcome of this structure, with its divisions and unifications, for the lowest member by the way naturally depends on the tendency of the higher members to have the lowest at their disposal. In contrast to the heretofore noted phenomenon, the detachment by the middle members favorable to the lowest, the extension over them through modifications can be unfavorable for them. The first case occurred in England after Edward I, when the exercise of the judicial, financial, and police ministries gradually switched over officially to the moneyed classes organized in county and city units. They took over entirely the protection of the individual against absolute power. As the regional units concentrated in Parliament, they became that counterweight to the highest power, defending the vulnerable individuals against lawless and unjust infringements of state regimes. In the *ancien régime* of France the process ran in the reverse. Here the aristocracy was always bound closely to the regional circles in which they managed and governed

and whose interests they represented against the central government. The state forced itself into this relationship between aristocracy and peasant and gradually took from the former their governing functions: judicial as well as care of the poor, law enforcement as well as road construction. The aristocracy wanted to have nothing to do with this centralized regime, which was driven only by financial distress; they pulled back from their social responsibilities and turned the peasants over to the royal governors and officials, who were concerned only with the state's treasury or their own as well, and pushed the peasants fully from their original foothold with the aristocracy.

A particular form of subordination under a majority lies in the principle of the 'outvoting' of minorities by majorities. However, this takes root and it branches out into much broader interests of social formation, beyond its significance for the sociology of domination and subordination, that it seems appropriate to treat in in a special excursus.

Excursus on Outvoting

The essence of the construction of society, from which the incomparability of its results as well as the insolubility of its internal problems consistently emerge, is this: that from self-contained unities—as human personalities more or less are—would come a new unity. One cannot, for sure, produce a painting out of paintings, no tree is made up of trees; the whole and the independent do not grow out of totalities, but out of dependent parts. But society turns whole and fully self-centered parts into an overarching whole. All the restless evolution of societal forms, large as well as small, is in the last analysis only the ever-renewed attempt to reconcile the inner-oriented unity and totality of the individual with its social role as a part and contribution toward saving the unity and totality of society from dissolution by the independence of its parts. Now since every conflict between the members of a whole makes its continued existence doubtful, it is the significance of voting, the results of which the minority also agrees to accept, that the unity of the whole over the antagonisms of the principles and interests under all circumstances should remain master. It is, in all its apparent simplicity, one of the most genial of means to bring the strife among individuals into an eventually unifying conclusion.

But this form, the including of the dissenters too, by which each participant in the voting accepts its result in practice—unless someone leaves the group altogether with this result—this form has in no way always been as self-evident as it appears to us today. In part a mental inflexibility that does not understand the establishment of a social unity out of dissenting elements, and in part a strong individuality that might not obey any decision without its own full agreement have not admitted the majority principle into many kinds of communities but demanded unanimity for every decision. The decisions

of the Germanic Marches had to be unanimous; whatever could not achieve unanimity did not happen. Late into the Middle Ages the English aristocracy, who had dissented from or was not present at the approval of a tax, often refused to pay it. Wherever unanimity is demanded for the choice of a king or leader, that sense of individuality is in effect; of those who have not themselves chosen the ruler, it is also not expected or required that they obey the ruler. In the tribal council of the Iroquois as in the Polish parliament, no decision counted from which even only one voice had dissented. Nonetheless, the motive—that it would be fully contradictory to perform a collective action that an individual disagrees with—does not have such a requirement of unanimity as a logical consequence, since if a suggestion without full unity of voice is considered rejected, thus to be sure the coercion of the minority is prevented, but now in reverse the majority is thereby coerced. Also, those who refrain from a majority approved discipline tend to foster something quite positive, accompanied by perceptible results, and then this becomes the totality forced by the minority by dint of the principle of necessary unanimity. Apart from this outvoting of the majority, which in league with the unanimity principle negates in principle the individual freedom striven for, it results often enough in historical practice in the same result. For the Spanish kings there was no favorable situation for the suppression of the Aragonese Court just because of this 'freedom': until 1592 the Court could make no decision if only one member of the four classes objected—a paralysis of actions that required a substitute directly through a less crippling authority. Now when it is not possible, in lieu of some practical conclusion, to let a decision drop, and it must be obtained under any circumstance, as though by the verdict of a jury (which we meet, for example, in England and America), its requirement of unanimity rests on the more or less unconsciously operating assumption that the objective truth must be simply always subjectively convincing, and that, conversely, the confluence of the subjective persuasions is the sign of objective substance. A simple majority decision thus probably does not yet contain the whole truth; otherwise, it ought to have been successful at marshalling all the votes around it. In spite of its illusory clarity, the fundamentally mystical faith in the power of truth, in the final coalescence of the logically correct with the psychologically real, thus contributes here to the creation of the solution of those major conflicts between the individual persuasions and the requirement for a unified whole outcome. In its practical consequences this faith, no less than that individualistic foundation of consensus, turns its own underlying tendency around: where the jury remains sequestered until they come to a unanimous verdict, nearly unavoidable for a possible minority there arises the idea to try, against the minority's own persuasion which it cannot hope to carry through anyway, to side with the majority in order thereby to avoid the meaningless and eventually unbearable prolonging of the session.

Where in contrast majority decsions are what count, the subordination of the minority can arise from two motives whose difference is of utmost sociological significance. The coercion of the minority can come, first precisely from the fact that the many are more powerful than the few. Although, or rather, because each individual counts the same as another in voting, the

majority would—whether through the ballot or the medium of a system of representation as such—have the physical power to coerce the minority. Voting serves the purpose of restricting the exercise of every immediate measure of power and mediating its eventual result through the vote count, thereby perhaps convincing the minority of the futility of a substantial resistance. There are thus in the group two parties standing as two opposing groups, between which the balance of power, represented by the vote, is decisive. The latter serves here the same methodological purpose as diplomatic or other negotiations between parties who want to avoid the ultima ratio of fighting. Finally, exceptions aside, each individual also gives in only when the opponent can make it clear that the real thing would bring at least even as great a loss for the individual. Voting is, just like negotiations, a projection of the real powers and their consideration onto the level of spirit, an anticipation in an abstract symbol of the way out of real fighting and coercion. For all that, this supports the actual balance of power and the forced subordination imposed on the minority. Sometimes, however, this is sublimated from the physical into the ethical form. When in the later Middle Ages the principle is often met—the minority is supposed to follow the majority—evidently by that it is not only meant that the minority is for all practical purposes supposed to join in in whatever the majority decides, but it is also supposed to accept the will of the majority, to acknowledge that the majority wants what is right. Unanimity reigns here not as reality but as moral requirement; the resulting action, against the will of the minority, is supposed to be legitimated subsequently by unity of will. The old German tribes' real requirement for unanimity effervesces into an ideal requirement, in which indeed a whole new motive is discernible: from an internal right that goes beyond the predominance of the vote count and beyond the external superior strength, the majority might symbolized by this. The majority looks like the natural representative of the totality and plays a part in that meaning of the unity of the whole that, beyond the mere sum of individuals participating, does not entirely lack a trans-empirical, mystical tone. Later when Grotius claimed the majority has *naturaliter jus integri*,[22] that internal claim is thereby attached to the minority; because a right not only must but should be acknowledged. That, however, the majority has the right of the whole 'from nature,' that is, by way of inner, rational necessity, this leads to the presently emergent nuance of the right to out vote, to its second significant main motive. The voice of the majority means now no longer the voice of the greater power inside the group, but the sign that the unitary will of the group has decided for the one side. The requirement of unanimity rests throughout on an individualistic basis. That was the original sociological perception of the German tribes: the unity of the community did not live beyond the individuals but entirely in them; for that reason the group will was not only not emphasized, but it did not exist at all as long as one single member dissented. But also where outvoting counts, it still has an individualistic foundation if its meaning is simply that the many are more power-

[22] Latin: by nature the right of the whole—*ed.*

ful than the few and that the vote is supposed to arrive at the eventual outcome of the real measure of powers without this measure itself. Over against that now it is in principle a new direction when an objective group unity with its own one unified will is presupposed, if it were conscious, if it were such that the praxis unfolds as if such a being-for-itself group will existed. The will of the state, the community, the church, the special-interest group exists then beyond the differences of the inclusive individual wills, just as it exists beyond the temporal changes of its carriers. Since now it is only one, it must operate in a definite unified manner, and since the fact of the antagonistic wills of its bearers resists it, one must solve this contradiction by accepting the majority of these wills knowing or representing better than the minority. Here the subordination of the latter has thus an entirely different meaning than formerly because it is in principle not excluded but included, and the majority operates not in the name of its own greater power but in that of the ideal unity and totality, and only this, which speaks through the mouth of the majority, subordinates the minority because the minority is a part of it from the outset. This is the internal principle of parliamentary votes, insofar as every member of parliament feels oneself as the representative of the entire people, in contrast to special-interest representation, for which it in the end always operates based on the principle of individualism as the measure of power, and likewise with regional representation, which is based on the erroneous idea that the totality of regional interests would be the same as the totality of interests. The transition to this fundamental sociological principle is to be seen in the development of the English Lower House. Its members were counted from the outset not as the representatives of a definite number of citizens but also not as those of the people as a whole, but rather as appointees of specific regional political associations, villages and counties that simply had the right to participate in the formation of Parliament. This regional principle, so firmly held that for a long time every member of the Commons had to maintain residence in one's electoral district, was nonetheless still somehow of an ideal nature, in that it ascended over the mere sum of individual voters. Now all that remained was to bring the common interests of the proliferation and growing awareness of all these associations into the higher association to which they all belonged: to have the unity of the state gradually appear as the actual subject of their commissions. The individual districts that they represent cohere through the recognition of their essential solidarity with the state as a whole to such an extent that those districts then exercise only the function of designating the representatives for the representation of the whole. Wherever such a cohesive will of the group is axiomatic, elements of the minority dissent then, as it were, merely as individuals, not as members of the group. This alone can be the deeper meaning of the Lockean theory of the original contract on which the state is supposed to be founded. This must, because it forms the absolute basis of unification, be thoroughly settled unanimously. However, it now includes, for its part, the provision that everyone should look on the will of the majority as one's own. While individuals embrace the social contract, they are still absolutely free; they cannot then be subjugated by any outvoting. If they embrace it, though, they are then no longer free individuals but social

essence and, as such, merely a part of a unity whose will finds its decisive expression in the will of the majority. It is only a definitive formulation of this if Rousseau thus perceives no oppression in outvoting since only a misconception by the dissenter could elicit that; the dissenter would have taken the *volunté générale*[23] to be something it was not. This is also the basis of the belief that as an element of the group one could not want anything other that the will of the group, about which surely the individual but not the majority of individuals could be mistaken. For this reason Rousseau makes a very fine distinction between the formal reality of voting and the contents thereof, and explains that one indeed participates through it in and for oneself in the formation of the general will. One is duty bound thereby, so one could explicate the Rousseauean ideas, not to avoid the unity of this will, not to destroy it while one is setting one's own will against that of the majority. So the subordination under the majority is simply the logical consequence of belonging to the social unity that one declared by voting. The practice is not entirely separate from this abstract theory. Their most knowledgeable experts say about the federation of the English trade unions that majority decisions in it would be able to be just and practical only in so far as the interests of the individual confederating associations were of the same type.[24] As soon, however, as the varying sentiments of the majority and the minority emerge from an actual difference in interests, every coercive act exercised as a result of outvoting would lead to an inevitable division of the participants. That is, thus, that a vote makes sense only when the existing interests can go together as a unity. Should the disjointedly ongoing efforts prevent this centralization, it then becomes fully contradictory to entrust the decision to a majority because the unity of will that they are otherwise supposed to be able to recognize, certainly better than the minority, does not objectively exist. There exists the apparent contradiction that, however, illuminates the relationship by its foundation: that just wherever a trans-individual unity exists or is presupposed, outvoting is possible; where it is missing, there is need of the unanimity that in practice and in principle replaces that unity by actual uniformity from case to case. It is entirely in this sense, when the town charter of Leiden in 1266 determines that, for the admission of foreigners into the city, the approval of eight town jurors is necessary; for court judgments, however, not unanimity but only a simple majority is required under this. The law, according to which the judges decide, is one for all times uniformly determined, and it has to do only with recognizing the relationship of the single case; what counts presumably more correctly for the majority than the minority. The acceptance of a new citizen, however, touches on all the various and widely dispersed interests inside the citizenry so that its approval can be granted not from the abstract unity of the citizens, but only from the sum of all individual interests; that is, by unanimity.

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[23] French: General will—trans.

[24] Simmel probably has in mind the National Association of United Trades for the Protection of Labour—ed.

This deeper foundation of outvoting, revealing now, if you will, the hypothetically already existing will of an authoritative unity, does not, for all that, quite remove the difficulty that attaches to the majority as sheer coercive advantage of power. Because the conflict over what would now be the contents of the will of that abstract unity will not often be easier to resolve than the immediate actual interests. The coercion of the minority is no small thing, even if it occurs in this roundabout way and under some other label. Minimally an entirely new dignity would have to be added then to the concept of the majority: since surely it might be plausible, albeit in no way certain from the outset, that the majority for its part is better informed. This will be especially doubtful where the responsibility for the knowledge and its resulting action are placed on the individual, as in the higher religions. The opposition of the individual conscience against the decisions and actions of majorities is alive through the entire history of Christianity. When in the second century the Christian churches of a regional gathering entered into debate over religious and external affairs, the resolutions of the assembly were not binding for the dissenting minority. But with this individualism the church's aspiration for unity was stuck with an irresolvable conflict. The Roman state wanted to affirm only a united church; the church itself sought to consolidate itself through imitation of the unity of the state; so the originally independent Christian churches were forced into a total institution whose councils decided the contents of the faith by majority vote. This was an unheard of coercion of the individuals or minimally the churches whose unity till then had consisted only in the similarity of ideals and hopes that each possessed for oneself. A submission in matters of faith was based on internal and personal foundations; that, however, the majority as such demanded submission and declared every dissenter a non-Christian—this is legitimated, then, as I pointed out, by the appropriation of a whole new meaning of majority: one has to accept that God is always with the majority! This motif, as unconsciously foundational sense formulated in one way or another, runs through the entire later development of forms of voting. That a belief, only for the reason that its carriers make up a greater number than those of another belief, should hit upon the sense of the trans-individual unity of all, is an entirely undemonstrable dogma; indeed, from the very start, with so little foundation, without the help of a more or less mystical relationship between unity and majority, it hangs in the air or rests on the pitiful foundation, which must nevertheless be dealt with somehow, that the majority as such knows what is right; furthermore, if one does not also already accept that the majority knows what is right, there is then also no good reason to accept this of the minority.

All these difficulties that the requirement of unanimity, like the subordination of the minority, threatens from various directions, are only the expression of the fundamental problematic of the entire situation: to extract a uniformity of voluntary action from a totality that consists of variously interested individuals. This balance cannot be smoothly achieved, just as one can hardly, from black and white elements, construct a structure with the requirement that the structure is to be entirely black or white. Even in that most favorable case of a presumed group unity beyond the individuals for whose inclinations

the vote count is simply a means of knowledge to be accepted—it remains not only uncertain that the objectively necessary decision would be identical with the outcome of the vote, but then the elements of the minority only actually dissent as individuals, not as elements of that unified group, so they are still present as individuals, belong in any case to the group in the wider sense, and do not simply dissolve before the group. Somehow even as individuals with their dissent they still rise up into the whole of the group. The division of human beings into a social being and as individuals of it is, to be sure, a necessary and useful fiction, with which, however, the reality and its demands are in no way exhausted. It characterizes the inadequacy and the sense of internal contradication of the voting methods that in some places, to the last in the Hungarian Parliament certainly still up into the third decade of the nineteenth century, the votes were not counted but weighed; this so that the leader could also make known the opinion of the minority as results of the vote! It seems ridiculous that a human being accepts an opinion as false merely because others think it is true—others, each of whom is, according to the presupposition of voting, equally justified and of equal worth by that fact; but the requirement of unanimity, with which one wants to confront this nonsense, has shown itself as no less full of contradiction and coercive. And this is no accidental dilemma and simply logical difficulty, but it is one of the symptoms of the deep and tragic ambiguity that fundamentally runs through every social formation, every formation of a unity from unities. The individual who lives from out of an inner foundation, who can be responsible for one's own actions, is supposed to, as if governing one's own convictions, adjust not only one's will to the goals of others—this remains, as morality, always an issue of one's own will and issues from the innermost part of the personality—but one is supposed to become, with one's acquiescent self, a part of the totality whose center lies outside one. This is not a matter of specific harmonies or collisions from both centers of command, but rather of our internally standing under two opposing alien norms; so the dynamic around one's own center, which is something altogether different from egoism, demands to be something just as definitive and the guiding sense of life as is demanded by the dynamic around the social center. Now in the vote over the action of the group the single person does not come as an individual, but in that member-like, trans-individual function. But the dissenting vote grafts onto these mere social bases yet a reflection, a secondary form of individuality and its particularity. And even this individuality, which demands nothing but the recognition and presentation of the will of the trans-individual group unit, is negated by the fact of being outvoted. Even here the minority, to belong to which everyone gets an unavoidable chance, must submit, and certainly not only in the simple sense in which even convictions and drives are, as a rule, negated by opposing forces and their influence extinguished, but in the, as it were, more cunning sense, so that the losers, because they are treated within the uniformity of the group, must participate positively in the action that is decided upon against their will and conviction, indeed, so that they, by the unanimity of the final decision, which does not contain a trace of their dissent, count also as bearers of it. In this way the outvoting goes from the mere,

active coercion of the one by the many to the most excessive expression of the dualism—albeit often in experience harmonizing, but in principle, however, irreconcilable and tragic—the dualism between the independent existence of the individual and that of the social whole.

I come now finally to the third type of formation, in which subordination occurs neither under an individual nor under a plurality, but under an impersonal, objective principle. In that an actual, at least direct, interaction is excluded here, this form of subordination seems to remove the element of freedom. Those who are subordinate to an objective law feel determined by it; they themselves have no effect on it; they have no possibility to react to the law itself in an effective way, as can even the poorest slave, in some measure, the master. Then those who do not obey the law somewhat are generally not *really* subordinate to it, and when they amend the law, they are not at all subject to the old law; however, to the new law they are again subordinate in that plainly unfree way. Nevertheless, for modern, objective people, who know to distinguish the realm of spontaneous reality from that of obedience, the subordination under a law that is executed by impersonal, uninfluenceable powers is a more respectable position. Otherwise, however, where the personality could guard its sense of self only by complete spontaneity, this is still always related, in the case of complete subordination, to the reactions between persons. For this reason, the princes of the sixteenth century in France, Germany, Scotland, the Netherlands often experienced substantial opposition when they governed through trained substitutes or administrative bodies—that is, according to laws. The command was felt as something personal; they would consider obedience to it only as a matter of personal devotion which in all circumstances does have the form of free mutuality.

This passionate personalism of the subordinate relationship carried over almost into a caricature when, in Spain at the beginning of the modern era, it is reported that an impoverished aristocrat who became a cook or footman in a noble household did not thereby definitively lose nobility; it remained dormant, and a favorable change in fate would awaken it again. When such a nobleman, however, became at some point a tradesman, one's nobility was destroyed. The modern sensibility that separates the work and the person and therefore views personal worth as best safeguarded by focusing as objectively as possible on content, is directly contrary to this. An American girl, for instance, who would work in a factory without that feeling of disgrace would feel fully

downgraded as a cook in a family. And already in the thirteenth century in Florence the *lower* guilds contained the activities of direct service to persons—shoemaker, innkeeper, school teacher—while those indeed still serving the public, but viewed separately from the individual person, formed the higher guilds, such as clothmaker and shopkeeper. In Spain, however, where the traditions of knighthood, with their insertion of the person into all proceedings, still flourished, every functioning person-to-person relationship, to whatever exent, had to count as acceptable, however every subordination under more objective standards, every insertion into an impersonal relational context, because of the many and anonymous persons of service occupations, had to count as fully degrading. Further, in the legal theories of Althusius[25] there lingers an aversion to the objectivity of law. With him, the *summus magistratus*[26] does exercise law alien to the individual, but not as representative of the state, rather only because the magistrate is appointed by the people; that, instead of the appointment resulting from or provided by the people personally, the appointment could also be designated by the law of the sovereign to represent the state is an idea still foreign to him. To antiquity, on the other hand, subordination under the law had seemed especially agreeable precisely because of its lack of a personal nature. Aristotle extolled the law as το μεσον, the moderate, neutral, free of passion, and Plato as well had recognized, in the same sense, rule by impersonal law as the best means to counteract self-interest. While this, however, was only a psychological motivation that does not get at the core of the question, the change from personalism to objectivism in the relationship of obedience, in principle not derived from utilitarian considerations, occurs with Plato in yet another theory: in the ideal state the insight of the ruler stands above the law; as soon as the wellbeing of the whole seems to require it, the ruler has to be able to act even in opposition to the ruler's own laws. Only where there were no true statesmen, laws would be needed that would not under any circumstance permit violation. Thus law appears here as the lesser evil, but not because subordination under a person, in contrast to which all law-abidingness has something mechanical and passive, possessed an element of freer dignity, as with the German experience. But the rigidity of it, with which it confronts the changing and unforeseen demands of

[25] Johannes Althusius (1557–1683), early modern Calvinist political thinker—ed.
[26] Latin: highest magistrate—ed.

life clumsily and inadequately, is experienced as the absence of law—an evil that only the insight of a personal ruler, bound to no prejudice, escapes and which is only converted into a relative advantage where this insight is lacking. Here it thus remains always the *content* of the law and, as it were, its total state that determines its value or lack thereof over against the subordination under persons. That the relationship of obedience is in its inner principle and in the whole feel for life different for the obedient, depending on whether it comes from a law or a person, does not enter into these considerations. The entirely universal or formal relation between rule by law and rule by person is in the first place surely practically expressed: Where the law is not strong or extensive enough, persons are needed—and where the persons are not responsive, law is needed. But, far beyond that, it depends on the decisions of the latter undiscussed sociological sense of value whether one views the rule by human beings as the provisional arrangement for the rule of matured law or, on the contrary, the rule of law only as a stopgap or a *faute de mieux*[27] for the rule of a personality absolutely qualified to rule.

Objective authority can become pivotal for the relationship between the ruling and the ruled in still another form: in that not a law or an ideal norm but a concrete state of affairs arranges the relationship of domination. Thus under the legal force of the principle of patrimony, according to which within serfdom, where "the air makes one its possession," most radically in Russian feudalims, the subjects as such are only jurisdictions of land areas; for its fearsome hardness gradually ended a personal enslavement that had also allowed the selling of slaves, and the kind of subservient relationships to the estate required that the serf could be sold only with it at the same time. Allowing for all the differences in contents and quantity, this form, though, is sometimes repeated in the context of modern factory workers who are shackled by their own interest to a factory by means of certain arrangements: if somehow it has become possible for them to purchase their own home, if they have to use up all their own money to participate in the welfare system, they leave the factory at their earliest convenience, etc. So they are shackled in a way purely by property, which makes them in a quite specific manner helpless in relation to the employer. Indeed, at bottom, it was the same form of rule that was established in the most

[27] For want of something better—ed.

primitive patriarchal relationship by means not of a merely physical but by a living object: the children belonged to the father, not because he was their progenitor but because the mother belonged to him; just as the owner of a tree also owns its fruit, so also the children fathered by other men were no less his own. This type of rule tends to bring with it a degrading harshness and existence of absolute subjugation. Since, insofar as people are subjugated in this way they belong to things, they sink psychologically into the category of a mere *thing*. Where law establishes rule—so one could say with the necessary reservations—since the dominant ones move onto the plane of objectivity, where it is a matter of acting as thing, so the same thing happens to the dominated. This situation tends to be more advantageous in the first case, less in the second, than in the many cases of purely personal subordination.

A sociological interest in the direct sense attaches itself now to the subordination under an objective principle in two essential cases. First, when that ideal, dominant principle is itself a sign of the psychological consolidation of a real social power, and secondly, when it establishes ties among the those same groups subordinated together under it. The first is, above all, to be taken into account in consideration of the moral imperatives. In moral consciousness we feel ourselves subordinated by a command that appears to be carried by no human, personal power. We hearken to the voice of conscience only *in* us when, equal in deciveness against all subjective egoism, it appears to be able to stem only from a suitable authority *outside* the subject. As we know, the attempt has been made to resolve this contradiction in such a way that one would derive the contents of morality from social commands: what is necessary to the species and the group, and what this therefore requires for its self-preservation from the members, is to be cultivated in individuals gradually as instinct, so that it would appear in them as their own autonomous feeling, the actually personal, and thus often in contrast to the social commands. Thusly is explained the double character of the moral command: that it, on the one hand, confronts us as an impersonal order, to which we simply have to submit, and that yet, on the other hand, is imposed on us from no external power, but rather only from our own most inner impulse. In any case here is one of the cases in which the individual reproduces inside one's own consciousness the relationships that exist between one as wholeness and the group. It is an old observation that the ideas of the individual soul in all its relationships of association and separation, of differentiation and unification, act in such a way as individuals act towards one another. From this there

forms a curious specification, that those internal psychological relations repeat, then, not only those between individuals in general, but between the individual and the surrounding circle. What society requires of its members: fitting in and being loyal, altruism and work, self-control and truthfulness—all this the individuals require of themselves.

With that, there are several rather significant motives mixed together. Society confronts individuals with regulations, to which they become accustomed until it is no longer necessary to use the coarser as well as more refined means by which the coercion was effected. Either one's nature becomes thereby so fashioned or refashioned that one acts, in a sense, instinctively, with consistently unmediated will, without even being conscious of a law; in this way the pre-Islamic Arabs lacked any concept of an objectively legal restraint; the final authority everywhere was the purely personal resolution; however, this was thoroughly steeped in and normed by the spirit of the clan and the requirements of clan life. Or the law dwells as imperative in the individual consciousness, carried by the authoritative weight of society, but independent of whether the society really stands behind itself with its power of coercion or only with its openly declared will. The individual interacts with society in such a way that that objective relationship—with all its oppressions, liberations, changing emphases—has come to be an interplay between the individual's social impulses and those of the 'I', in the narrower sense, whereby both are included in the 'I' in the wider sense. However, this is not yet the above-mentioned objectively real legality in which the socio-historical origin is lost to consciousness. On a certain higher level of morality the motive of action is no longer in a substantially human, albeit individual-transcendent, power; rather here the origin of moral necessities flows beyond the antitheses of individual and totality. They stem just as little from the latter as from the singular reality of individual life. Only for the carriers in this place of reality is their conscience free for acting based on individual reason. Their obligating power stems from them themselves, from their inner, transpersonal authority, from an objective ideality that we have to recognize, whether we want to or not, as a reality whose validity is fully independent from its awareness in a consciousness. The *content* that fills these forms, however, is—not necessarily, but frequently—the societal requirement that now, as it were, no longer operates with its social impetus, but rather as in the metempsychosis into a norm that is supposed to be fulfilled for its own sake, not on my account and not on your account. It is a matter here of differences that are not only psychologically of the greatest weakness,

but whose boundaries are also in practice constantly blurring. But this mixing of motives in which the mental reality moves, makes its basic division that much more urgent. Whether society and the individual confront one another as power and power and the subordination of the latter is effected through a source, flowing as if without interruption, always renewing the energy of the former, or whether this energy transforms itself into a psychological impulse in the souls of the individuals and this, feeling like social nature itself, fights against and represses the individual's own impulses directed by the 'egoistic' part, or whether the ought that human beings experience as an objective reality over them as real as Being itself, fills up with the contents of society's life demands—those are types that only exhaust the kinds of subordination of individuals under their group. The three powers that bring about societal life: the society, the individuals, objectivity— one after another here become norm-giving, but in such a way that each of them takes into itself the social contents, the measure of domination of the society over the individuals, and each of them forms and carries forward the power, the will, the necessities of society in its own specific manner.

Objectivity in the relationship of these three is not only valid as the absolute, a law towering over the other two in an ideal realm, but determinative, as it were, in a yet other dimension altogether. Society is often the third party that solves the conflicts between the individual and objectivity or fosters links between their discontinuities. In the field of the genealogy of knowledge, the concept of society freed us from the alternative of earlier times: that a cultural value either originated with an individual or had to be bestowed by an objective power—as was shown in the first chapter with several examples. In practice it is through the workings of social interaction that one can satisfy one's demands on the objective order. The fact that the cooperation of the many, the efforts of the society as a unity, side by side and one after another, coaxes out of nature not only a higher amount, but higher qualities and types, of need satisfactions that have to remain denied to individual effort—that is a symbol of the deeper basic reality that society stands between the individual person and the general law of nature—as a mental particular it approaches the former, as a universal the latter. Only, it is the universal that is not abstract. Indeed, every historical group exists as an individual case, as does a historical person; but what it is in relationship to other groups, in relationship to its members, is supra-individual. However, not in the way the concept

of its individual realizations, which combines what they have in common, but in a particular type of generality, like the organic body—the generality of its members, or something like 'room furnishings'—the generality of table and chair, wardrobe and mirror. And this particular generality coincides with the specific objectivity that society possesses for its members as subjects. The individual does not stand in relation to this universality as to nature whose objectivity is altogether indifferent to whether a subject mentally participates in it or not, imagines it correctly or falsely or not at all; the being of that is and its laws hold, independently of the meaning that both may have for a subject. Society, however, also transcends the individual, lives its own lawful life, confronts the individual with historical and imperative steadfastness; however, this confrontation is simultaneously a being inside; the hard indifference towards it is simultaneously an interest; the social objectivity has need of, if indeed it is not determined by, individual subjectivity in general. Through such determinations society becomes a mid-level structure between the subject and every absolutely impersonal generality and objectivity. In this direction there lies something like the following observation. As long as the economy has not yet offered up actually objective prices, had not yet led knowledge and regulation to the idea of supply and demand, production costs, rewards for risk, profits, etc., this commodity would just be so and so much value and must have this and this firm price—so long are the direct interventions of society, its organs and laws, much stronger and more rigorous in business enterprises with regard to price and stability. Sales taxes, oversight of quantity and quality of production, indeed, in additional ways, even luxury laws and consumer constraints are frequently introduced in the stage of the economy where the personal freedom of the business enterprise would strive for an unrelenting objectivity still without yet being able to get to a pure, abstract determination of prices. Here the concrete generality enters, the living objectivity of society, often inept, limiting, schematic, but always a transubjective power that provides the individual with a norm before receiving this from the structure of the thing itself and from its recognized lawlikeness. In the intellectual arena the very same formal development takes place to a much greater measure yet: from subordination under society to subordination under objectivity. The entirety of intellectual history shows how very much the intellect of the individual—before directly confronting the object in order to derive the content of its ideas of truth from its materiality—fills up exclusively with traditional, authoritarian ways of thinking,

'assumed by all.' A tenet and norm of the mind that desires to know is not at first the object, the immediate observation and interpretation of which it is not able to handle at all, but the common opinion about the object. This mediates a theoretical idea of it, from the most stupid superstition up to the most refined prejudice almost completely disguising non-independence of accepting and unobjectivity of content. It is as if the human being cannot so lightly bear standing before the object eyeball to eyeball, had grown up neither to the severity of its lawlikeness nor to the freedom which it, the object, gives the person, in contrast to the coercion coming from all of humankind. Bending under the authority of the many or their representatives, under the hand-me-down opinion, under the socially accepted viewpoint is a mediator: it is, after all, more modifiable than the law of matter; the mediation of the mental is perceptible in it; it delivers, as it were, an already digested mental product—and, on the other hand, it gives a dependence, a reduction of responsibility that is the compensation for the lack of that self-reliance that the pure, situated relationship between the 'I' and matter gives us. No less than the concept of truth, the individual finds that of justice in the objective sense of its mediation leading up to this stage in the manifest behavior of society. In the realm of punishments as in the specific regulations of life the correlation of guilt and sin, merit and debt, accomplishment and failure is evidently at first a matter of social expediency or social impulsivity. Perhaps the equivalence of action and reaction, in which justice exists, is never one analytically resulting directly from these elements—but always requires a third: an ideal, a goal, a final authority, by which it first establishes or produces its synthesized self-correspondence. Originally the interests and forms of the community life that surrounds the individuals, the subjects of the realization of justice, are the third factors. This community life creates the measures and implements them, in which the justice or injustice of their relationship, not detectable in those elements in isolation, is brought forth. Because of that and first mediated by it, the inner necessity of their 'just' self-consistency arises as the materially and historically later stage, appearing in the counterpressures of those very elements. The higher norm, which perhaps also in this case still determines weight and counterweght according to its degree of relationship, has now fully entered into the elements, has been transformed from it into a powerful functioning value in itself. Justice appears now—from the inner meaning of sin and of pain, of good deed and of happiness, of performance and of reciprocation—as itself an objective essential relationship; it

is even supposed to be realized for its own sake: *fiat justitia, perat mundus*—while to the earlier standpoint precisely the preservation of the world made up the legal argument of justice.[28] No matter which of the hypothetical meanings of justice is not discussed here—historically and psychologically objective law, in which it is embodied purely for its own sake and which requires fulfillment for its own sake, is a later stage of development that precedes, preparing and mediating the way for, the demand of justice from social objectivity alone.

Finally this same development occurs inside morality in the narrower sense. The first given content of morality is of an altruistically social nature; not as though it had in and for itself an independent essence, which this content only appropriated, but the devotion of the I to a You (in the singular or the multiple) appears as the concept of the moral itself, as its definition. Over against this are presented the philosophical moral teachings in which a gradually objective ought is detached from the question of the I and the You, a much later stage. If for Plato it is a matter of the idea of the good becoming realized, for Kant, that the principle of individual action is adaptable to universal law, for Nietzsche, that the human being is to go beyond the current level of development—so these norms may cover also appropriately the for-one-another of subjects; on some fundamental level, however, it does not now depend on this but also the subjectivity of beings for whom action eventually becomes relevant. Since seen from this perspective the relationship is also for the societal complex of subjects only the incidental fulfillment of a much generalized norm and basis of obligation that can offer legitimation to the socially and altruistically directed action, but can also withhold it. The ethical obedience to the demands of You and society is, in the development of the individual as well as the married, the first dissolving of naive egoism prior to the ethical state; at this stage numberlessness remains standing: in principle, however, it is preparation and transition for the subordination under an objective law that even stands beyond the You and the I and by itself first offers the interests of one or the other as moral contents.

What now concerns the second sociological question in relation to the subordination under an impersonal ideal principle: how this functions based on the reciprocal relationship of the jointly subordinated,

[28] Latin: *fiat justitia, perat mundus*, Let justice be done (even if) the world be destroyed—ed.

so also to be grasped here is that in many cases that subordination by abstract ideal is preceded by a real one. Frequently we see a personality or class exercising its domination in the name of an ideal principle by which they too would be subordinated. So this last appears then logically to precede, and the real organization of rule under people appears to develop, in consequence of this dependence on an abstract ideal. Historically, however, the path into rules is reversed: from very real personal relationships of power arises dominations and subordinations, out of which gradually, through spiritualization of the dominating power or through enlargement and depersonalization of the whole relationship, an ideal, objective power grows, as if then the dominant exercises its power only as its nearest agent. The development of the position of the *pater familias* by the Aryans shows this clearly.[29] Originally—as this type was presented—its power was unlimited and thoroughly subjective, that is, his momentary wish, his personal advantage is decisive over all arrangements. However, this arbitrary power moved gadually under a feeling of responsibility; the unit of the family, somewhat embodied in the *spiritus familiaris*,[30] came to be felt as the power of the abstract ideal, in relation to which also the master of the whole was experienced as a mere executor, abiding by the law. In this sense it happens that custom and habit, instead of subjective desire, determine his actions, his decisions, and judgments, so that he no longer acts as unlimited master of the family estate, but more as its custodian in the interests of the whole, so that his position bears more the character of an office than of despotic law. So the relationship between dominant and subordinate is placed on a whole new basis: while in the first arena the latter, as it were, constituted only a personal jurisdiction of the former, now the objective idea of the family is created, which stands over all individuals, and of which the leading patriarch is as subordinate as every other member, whom he now is able to command only in the name of the ideal of unity. Here arises the most extremely important type of this form: that the commanding themselves are subordinate to the law that they have given. Their will receives in that moment, in which it becomes law, the nature of objectivity and thereby separates from its subjective-personal origin. As soon the master gives the law as law, it is documented thusly as the organ of a spiritual necessity, revealing

[29] Latin: *pater familias*, father of the family, *i.e.*, patriarch—ed.
[30] Latin: *spiritus familaris*, family spirit—ed.

thereby only a norm that is valid merely because of its inner sense and that of the situation, whether or not it is actually just then given by the lord. Indeed, when instead of this more-or-less clearly conceived legitimation, the will of masters itself actually becomes law, they cannot at all avoid therefore stepping out of the sphere of the subjective; they carry that transpersonal legitimation in themselves, as it were, *a priori*. Accompanying the inner structure of the law is the lawgiver, insofar as there is such, thereby being as a person even as subordinate as all other persons. So is it clearly expressed in the privileges of medieval Flemish cities; the jurors were supposed to offer every person an impartial judgment, even against the counts themselves, *who grant the privilege*, and such a sovereign ruler as the great Elector introduces, without seeking collective approval, a poll tax—but then he has not only his court pay it, but pays it himself!

The most recent period offers an example of the development of an objective superiority, to which the original and also continuing command has to submit along with the subordinates *under it*, similar in form to that of the history of the family insofar as its mode of production allows objective and technical factors to dominate the personal. Many kinds of domination and subordination that earlier bore a personal character, so much so that in the relationship in question the one was plainly dominant, the other just as clearly subordinate, have now so changed that both are in like measure subject to an objective purpose, and only inside this common relationship to the higher principle does the subordination of the one continue under the other as a technical necessity. As long as the relationship of hired labor is viewed as a contractual agreement—the working person is leased—so long does it contain essentially a factor of subordination of the worker under the contractor. This factor is, however, dismissed as soon as one views the labor contract not as leasing the person, but as purchasing the commodity labor. Then the subordination that it requires of the worker—so it has been expressed—is effected only "under the cooperative process that is as necessary for the entrepreneur executing some kind of activity as it is for the worker." The worker is now no longer subject as a person, but functions only as a servant of an objective economic process, inside of which the element of contractor or manager is superior to the worker, thus not at all personally but solely objectively required.

The feeling of equality of the modern worker must be in part based on this foundation, which points as well to its purely sociological nature, in that it continues frequently entirely without influence on the materal

well-being of the worker. While workers yet sell only a quantitatively circumscribed ability—be it more or less than that required of them before in the personal formation—they are liberated as human beings from the relationship of subordination, which they view now as only an additional factor of the processes of production, in so far as these are coordinated by the head of production. This technical objectivity has its symbol in the legitimation of the contractual relationship: once the contract is concluded, it stands then as objective norm over *both* parties. In the Middle Ages this identifies the turning point of the relationship of association that originally means complete personal submission to the master; in general journeywork was serfdom. The association of journeymen of a particular position coalesced around the attempt to change the personal relationship of service into a relationship of contract. Of highest significance is the appearance, as soon as the organization of the serfs succeeded, of the title 'journeyman.' The contractual formation, whatever be its materal content, correlates relative equality instead of absolute subordination. It strengthens its objectivity yet further when the contract, instead of being made between two individual persons, consists of collective determinations between a group of workers on the one side and a group of employers on the other, as was done particularly through the English trade unions. The trade unions and the employer federations in specifically widely progressive industries conclude contracts over pay rates, work hours, overtime, time off, etc., from which no concluded contract between individuals of these categories was permitted to deviate. Hereby the impersonality of the labor relationship is obviously extraordinarily heightened; its objectivity finds its suitable carrier and expression in the individual-transcending collectivity. All things considered, this character is especially guaranteeed when the work contracts are concluded for the shortest possible time. The English trade unions have always pressed for that, in spite of the consequentially greater insecurity of employment. By the right to leave one's workplace, so it has been explained, the laborer is distinguished from the slave; when the workers, however, give up this right for a lengthy period, they are for that entire extended period then subject to all conditions that the employer imposes on them, with the exception of those explicitly stipulated, and have lost the protection that that right of dissolving the relationship gives them. Instead of the breadth of the bond, with which earlier the whole personality was bound, with much longer contract periods the duration of the bond becomes the concern. What the objectivity with short contracts more decisively safeguards is

nothing positive, but only this: to set boundaries so that the objectively determined relationship of production would be transformed into a subjectively determined choice, whereas with long contracts there is not sufficient protection. The fact that inside the domestic-servant relationship, at least as it is constituted in middle Europe at the time, the whole person, as it were, still enters into subordination, and this did not yet develop into the objectivity of a materially circumscribed performance—explains the basic unwholesomeness of this arrangement. Actually it comes nearer to a more complete form where it is taken over by the services of persons who only have to perform distinct material functions inside the house and in so far as they are coordinated by the 'housewife,' while the respectively earlier prevailing relationship engages them as whole personalities and they are responsible, as the concept of 'all-around maid' shows most clearly, for 'unbounded services'; precisely through this lack of objective determination they become subordinated to the housewife as a person. In pronounced patriarchal circumstances, in contrast to the present, the 'house' counted as an objective end and value in itself, towards which the housewife and the domestic servants worked together. Even with a full personal subordination, this creates a certain equalization carried by the interest that the servant, bound firmly and permanently to the house, tends to experience. The 'Du,' the domestic servant, expressed in one respect one's subordination as person; in another respect, however, it put the servant on a level closer to the children of the house and inserted the servant that much more intimately into the organization. Thus this relationship of obedience is oddly in force at just the opposite pole of its development into some measurable kind of objective conception: with complete patriarchal subordination, whereby the household still has, as it were, absolute value, which the work of the housewife serves likewise just like that of the domestice servant, albeit in a higher position; and then with complete differentiation, where work and service for trade are objectively predetermined, and personal attachment, which is the correlate of subordination of indeterminate measure, does not come into play. The current position of the domestic servant as member of the household, especially in the major cities, has lost the one objectivity, but not yet won the other; the whole personality is no longer subjectively engaged in the objective ideal of the 'house,' though without being able to actually withdraw from this because of the demand for a kind of complete service. Finally the relationship between officers and common soldiers may exemplify this type of form. Here the tension between the

subordination inside the organism of the group and the equalization that arises through service is shared under the concept of the defense of the fatherland that is imaginably the broadest and understandably manifests this breadth most noticeably in the field, where on the one hand discipline is most unmerciful, on the other hand, however, comradely relationship between officers and the rank and file is required, in part, by unique situations, in part, by the morale of the whole. In peacetime, where the military is in the position of being prohibited from the methods of its purpose, its technical structure unavoidably develops psychologically into the end purpose, so that the domination and subordination on which the technicalities of the organization rest stand in the foreground of consciousness, and that peculiar sociological hybrid of equalization through common subordination only comes under an objective concept when the situation changes calling this concept as the actual purpose of the military into consciousness.

Such double roles of the individual—one occupying a dominant or subordinate position inside the organization of the contents of one's unique life, this organization as a whole, however, standing under a ruling concept that every one of its members obtains an equal or nearly equal position in relation to everybody on the outside—these double roles let the purely form-sociological situation become one of peculiarly mixed feelings in the life of its carrier. An employee of a large business may have a leading position in it; however, as soon as that employee is in a position before the public and for that reason is acting ideally for the business as a whole, the employee will behave zealously and devotedly. In contrast, these elements in the frequent pride of the subordinate—the servant in the aristocratic household, the member of free-standing intellectual or social circles that at this level are still only peripheral—coalesce in order to represent the worth of the entire circle and its concept all the more energetically before all those standing outside, since they seek to obtain, in the negative way of differentiation from others, the fixed internal-external position, which is granted them only imperfectly by a kind of positive relation to the circle itself. The greatest formal multiplicity of this type is offered perhaps by the Catholic hierarchy. While every member is bound by a blind, unresisting obedience, the lowest member, nevertheless, also stands apart from every layperson in absolute height at which the idea of eternity rises over everything temporal—and at the same time its highest member is professed 'the servant of the servants'; the monk, who may be absolute dictator inside his order, clothes himself with the

deepest humility and servility before every begger; but the brother of the lowest order is with all unconditionality of church authority superior to the earthly prince.

Besides this cross-cut through the phenomena of domination and subordination, which orders them according to the question whether one or many, whether persons or objective structures bear the weight of governance, another is allowed to emerge in the sociological perspective that alters the degrees of domination, especially as it relates to freedom and the conditions for it. This line will be pursued in the following investigations.

Where multiple and dynamic dominations and subordinations exist in a group—be it as a unified hierarchical construction, be it as a multiplicity of dominant-subordinate relationships existing side by side—the group will as a whole derive its character essentially from subordination, as it is evident especially clearly in bureaucratically regulated states. For the strata extend downward in rapid proportion. Where thus domination and subordination in general stand in the foreground of form-sociological consciousness, the quantitatively predominant sides of this correlation, that of subordination, will color the totality of the picture. Based on entirely unique combinations, the impression and the feeling of an overall domination of a group can also certainly ensue. The pride and the contempt for work of the Spanish originates from their having for a long time the oppressed Moors as their workers; when later they had exterminated and expelled them and the Jews, there remained to them indeed only the aura of the dominant, while there were no longer any subordinate people present who could form a complement to it. At the time of their highest glory it was particularly expressed among the Spanish that, because they wanted to take a position as a nation in the world, in the individual states the nobility would assume the positions of military officers and civil servants. Something similar, only on a more solid foundation, had already appeared in the Spartan warrior democracy. Because, while it oppressed the neighboring tribes, it did not enslave them but allowed them their land and treated them only as serfs, these developed together into a lower stratum that formed a gentry over against the totality of full citizenship—so they behaved very much among themselves democratically. This was not a simple aristocracy that from the beginning had arranged the more unlawful elements together into a group unity. But it was actually the entire original state that, in preserving the status quo through the substructure of that stratum, made the totality of its membership, as it were,

into an aristocracy. Also in more characteristic respects the Spartans repeated the principle of universal domination: the Spartan army was so *stratified* that it consisted in large part of commanders.

At this point the peculiar sociological type of form crops up: an element's arrangements, which could arise only in their relationship to another and possess their content and meaning in relation to that other, becoming, nevertheless, autonomous from all interaction-dependent qualities of that element. That one is dominant presupposes an object of domination; the mental reality by itself can avoid this conceptual necessity up to a certain degree. The one internal motif involved points to Plato for sure. Among the endless variety of realms of sovereignty, by size and content, in respect to sovereignty as such, as function, there would be no difference: it would be the one and the same capacity to command, which the πολιτικος as well as the βασιλευς, the δεσποτης as well as the οικονομος would have to possess.[31] For that reason the actual πολιτικος is for him not necessarily the practitioner of the highest executive power, but the one that possesses the 'science of command'—no matter whether or not one has something to command. This originated thus in the subjective ground of the relationship of sovereignty, which arises not only as the correlate of a real relationship of rule, but exists independently of its material existence. The 'born king' requires, if you will, no land, he *is* king, he does not need it to *become* one. If the Spartans formed no aristocracy, but felt themselves nevertheless noble, the Spaniards had the consciousness of lordliness, even as they no longer possessed servants—so this has that deeper meaning: that the interaction of the lordly relationship is the sociological expression or the actualization of the more internally determined qualities in the subject. Whoever adopts this is a δυναμει, a ruler; one side is, so to speak, dropped out of the two-sided relationship, and exists only in ideal form, without which the other would thereby lose the importance that would be one's due within the relationship. While this then occurs for all the members of a larger group, it gives expression to the idea that they see themselves overall as manifesting 'equality,' without having to underscore by that name precisely wherein their equality lies. The fully enfranchised citizens of Sparta were called simply the 'ομοιοι.[32] The

[31] πολιτικος (politikos), politician; βασιλευς (basileus), king; δεσποτης (despotes), despot; οικονομος (oikonomos), head of household—ed.

[32] `ομοιοι, equals—ed.

aristocratic nature of their political and economic position in relation to the other levels is fully self-evident, so that they use as identification for themselves only their formal relationship to one another and did not have to mention at all what constituted the contents of other strata. A similar feeling lies overall at the foundation, where the aristocracy signifies itself as peers. They exist, as it were, only for one another; the others do not concern them even enough to give expression in their collective identity to their superiority—on their account indeed only one kind of identification is needed.[33]

The other type, the concept of domination without realizing the logically required correlate of the corresponding subordination, lies in the transfer of forms produced inside a large circle to a small one whose relationships do not justify it. Specific positions in an expanded circle make up a power, a measure of domination, a meaning in itself, that they lose as soon as they are repeated in a smaller circle without changing their form. However for all that, they also bring into these the tone of superiority and command with them that they possessed there and that has become, as it were, a determination of such a position substantially independent of the relation that carried it. The

[33] This is only an example of a general sociological occurrence. A number of elements have the same relation to a definite condition; the latter gives content and meaning precisely to the uncertain group interest. Now it happens that this decisive point on which the elements converge disappears from the identification, indeed, perhaps from consciousness, and only the fact of the equality of the elements—thus taking place exclusively in relation to that point—finds emphasis. So the aristocracy, as mentioned, not only often identifies itself as peers, but with the same name many French cities in the 12th and 13th centuries identified their jurors and judges. When the 'Society for Ethical Culture' was supposed to have been founded in Berlin, a brochure about it appeared under the title, 'Preliminary Communications of a Circle of Like-minded Men and Women.' Not a word was offered about in what the equality of views actually consisted. In the Spanish Chamber, around 1905, a party formed that identified itself simply as the 'Party of the United.' A party-type group of Munich artist colleagues in the nineties called itself 'The Group of Colleagues,' without adding any wholly officially used title that would then make up the contents of collegiality and distinguish this combination from a union of colleagues among school teachers or actors, agents or editors. These inconspicuous events contain the most striking sociological fact that the formal relation of certain individuals can become master over the contents and purpose of this relation; this could not occur in all that *labeling* if it did not somehow reveal the direction of social *consciousness*. The elements of a group being of equal right, their being like-minded, their being colleagues, has won an extraordinary importance over the substance that it clothes in these sociological forms, and with respect to that the latter now have an overall meaning. And the practical conduct, very much determined by matter excluded from the naming, is manifest countless times indeed, upon a more exact examination of such groupings, in the relevance and the effectiveness of those pure types of relation and formal structures.

communication here is often a 'title' to which close relationships allow hardly a trace of meaningful power, whose aplomb, however, it has still maintained from its origin in the outlying group. The Dutch *Rederikjers*, a kind of mastersinger in the 15th century, had in every one of its many groups kings, princes, archdeacons, etc. I remember the 'officers' of the Salvation Army, the 'high degrees' of the Free Masons: a Free Mason chapter in France, 1756, declared its members "sovereign and born princes of the whole order"; another, a little later, called itself *Conseil des Empereurs d'Orient et d'Occident*.[34] Of course, it is not only the purely spatial-numerical size of the groups, whose transformations effect the transposition of an originally dominant position in relationships that release them from their logically required subordination and allows in spite of that the cachet of domination. Contractions of the group's life in the sense of intensity could cause this as well. What the entire Hellenistic reality destroyed during the period of the emperor was the restriction of its sphere of significance, the evacuation of all deeper or wide-ranging content—while a feeling still able to or having to protect some kind of superiority, an ambition that carried its ideal from the great past to feudalism, had survived this past. With that arose that empty ambition that eventually was celebrated by the victor in the festivals, the officers of a meaningless commune, the inhabitant of a seat of honor or of a recognition by statue, by a public of idlers for the wordsmithing of the speaker who yet lacks any political influence—the ambition arose by which all these suggested a feeling of significance and prerogative without any real superiority. The height over the average level in which the social preferences and privileges of this plane of persons was raised would not at all have been capable of being introduced in the real structure of the Greek society of that time. Descending from the previous meaning of the community that offered overall a foundation for the same kind of superiorities, they were now, without changing their dimensions, instituted in much smaller proportions and made possible precisely because of their lack of content, a general search for social positions of elevation that were missing the lower-level correlate. And it introduces here, to a certain extent regressively, an odd multi-leveled interconnected character into human activities that the primitive, 'sympathetic magic' shows in great purity: one believes, phenomena lying outside the human spheres of power to

[34] French: Council of the Emperors of the East and West—ed.

be able to be called forth for that purpose, so that one produces it in smaller measures in oneself. So with many kinds of peoples, pouring out water is a strong rain enchantment. The power of the universal concept is in every way so far-reaching that one believes, with some kind of a minimal or one-sided realization of it, to have won for it in general even more of its reality on much higher levels of extensity and intensity. A phenomenon of 'authority' shows the type, of interest to us here, of this behavior in a particular modification. The internal dominance that someone has won on the grounds of a one-sided ability or quality very often helps acquire 'authority' in question and responsibilities and perspectives that have nothing at all to do with that actual guarded excellence. Even here then the partially existing and justified 'domination' will carry over to a complete relationship in which the correlate of an actually 'ruled' realm is missing. Only, the paradoxical phenomenon of the absolutely developed level of domination has changed here as into another dimension, for which the logically required measure of subordination is lacking, a dimension that has, as it were, absorbed this or only imaginarily possesses it.

I begin with a group as a whole being able to bear the character of subordination without the actual corresponding measure of domination existing in it practically and comprehensibly; the opposite is formed by the cases here treated, in which a domination as an absolute quality seems to exist, resting on no corresponding measure of subordination. However, this is a rare form; rather the opposite of the former generally appears as *freedom* for all. Taking a closer look however, liberation from subordination shows up almost always at the same time as the gain of some kind of command—be it the hitherto opposing dominant group, be it a newly constructed level designated definitively now as subordination. As the greatest English constitutional historian once said of the quarrel of Puritanism: "Like every other struggle for liberty it ended in being a struggle for supremacy."[35] Now this general scheme is, of course, not often realized in an entirely pure type, but rather mostly as *one* tendency simultaneously at work among many fragmentary, refracted, modified forms, deriving, nevertheless, from that foundational drive; substituting domination for freedom is always noticeable, and I now apply myself to its essential types.

[35] Simmel gives this in English—ed.

For Greek citizens both values were in general not sharply separated in the political realm. What they lacked was the sphere of individual rights that protected them from the claims and arbitrariness of the general public and that would have guaranteed them a truly independent existence as well as constitutional freedom vis-à-vis the state. For that reason there was freedom actually only in one form: as a contribution to the rule of the state itself. This is consistent with the sociological type, particularly the communistic movements of antiquity, in which the aim, though, was not the abolition of private property but rather greater participation in it on the part of the disinherited. And finally, on the lowest level, at which gaining a superiority is out of the question, this principal form of behavior is repeated: the Greek slave revolts hardly ever led to the blasting of slave fetters overall, but rather to a narrower, more tolerable burden from them; the revolts rose up more against the singular misuse of the institution rather than the demand for its fundamental abolition. It typically makes a difference whether what is supposed to be achieved—protection from danger, the redress of grievances, the gain of desired worth—is through abolition of the sociological form that was the carrier of all those negativities, or still within this preserved form. Where wholly constructed relationships are firmly based on domination and subordination, the liberation of the subordinate does not necessarily mean universal freedom, which a change of the social form from the ground up would presume, but rather only a step up onto that plane of those who rule; this leads to some logically inherent practical contradictions and will be examined later. The result of the French Revolution for the third estate—apparently its mere liberation from the privileges of the privileged—meant the gain of domination in both the above-mentioned senses; by its economic muscle it made the heretofore higher estates dependent on it; in this way, then, however, it was momentously consequential, along with its complete emancipation, that in the same process there was formed, as it were, a fourth estate, which the third exploits and over which the third could lift itself. Therefore one cannot in any way draw the simple analogy that the fourth estate would want to do today what the third would have done then. This is a point at which freedom manifests its relationship to equality, indeed also the necessary breaking apart of the relationship. When universal freedom rules, so likewise does universal equality; since with the former only the negative is set, that no kind of command exists—a setting where on account of its negativity the otherwise most differentiated elements can be together. Equality,

however, which thus appears as the first consequence or accident of freedom, is in reality only the passageway through which the rapacity of human beings must pass as soon as it seizes the oppressed masses. No one is typically content with the position occupied vis-à-vis one's fellow creatures, but rather everyone wants to capture one in some way more favorable. When then the newly developed majority feels the wish for an elevated lifestyle, the very first expression of it will thus be that they want to have and be the same as the upper most ten thousand. Equality with the higher groups is the first proffered content with which the drive for its own elevation is realized, as manifested in any close circle, be it a school class, a merchant class, or a hierarchy of officials. That belongs to the grounds of the fact that the anger of the proletariat, for the most part, is not turned towards the highest strata but against the bourgeoisie; because these are seen immediately above the proletariat, they are identified by the proletariat as the step on the ladder of fortune that is the next for them to climb, and therefore on which, for the present and in the interest of rising higher, their consciousness and their desire are concentrated. The lower want to be the same as the next higher up; it is all the same to them, as experience shows a thousand-fold, that this situation, the earlier epitome of their striving, is nothing further than the point of exit for a farther one, only the first station of the path going on endlessly towards the most favorable position. Overall, where one sought to realize equality, one has from this new floor turned the striving of the individual effectively into a striving to surpass the others in every possible way. Being equal, which comes logically with freedom, so long as it is in force in its pure and negative sense as not-dominated, is in no way its definitive aim—so often also the inclination of human beings to view the next essential or achievable step of one's series of desires as the finally satisfying one, which has deceived them. Indeed, the naïve lack of clarity transposes superiority into what drives freedom beyond the stage of equality; because, whether really accomplished or not, the expression of typical truth in every case is that of a coal carrier to a richly clothed lady in the year 1848: "Indeed, Madame, now everything will be equal: I will go in silk, and you will carry coal." This is the unavoidable outcome of what was mentioned earlier: that one does not only have freedom, but it also needs to be used for something. So the 'freedom of the church' concerns itself in no way merely with the liberation from dominating earthly powers, but even thereby to pass over into a domination of them. The teaching freedom of the church, for example, means that

the state contains citizens who are saturated by it and stand under its influence, whereby the state then often enough falls under its rule. Of the class privileges of the Middle Ages it has been said that they were often a means to help win the freedom of all, including the disfranchised, by means of a comprehensive effective tyrannical pressure. If this is accomplished, however, the continued existence of privilege operates now in the sense that the freedom of all is again restricted. The freedom of the privileged produces a situation whose inner structure certainly brings with it the freedom of all as its consequence or condition; however, this freedom carries in itself latently the preference of those elements from which it has come, and which over time, under the currently won freedom of movement, actually reverts back again so that the freedom of the rest is restricted.

This augmentation of freedom through domination gains a particular form here, where the freedom of a participating group inside one of a larger, especially state association, is in question. Such freedom is introduced historically in many ways as the more or less extensive peculiar jurisdiction of that group. With that, then, freedom means that the group as a whole, as a trans-individual unity, is set up as the master over its individual members. What is critical is that the specific circle does not have the right to just any decision it likes—this would not subordinate its members to it—but rather a right to its own law, since this coordinates them with the large circle surrounding them, which incidentally the law manages and thereby unconditionally subjugates everyone affiliated with it. The smaller group tends to hold to it then with utmost strictness, so that its membership submits to its court because it knows its freedom is based on it. In medieval Denmark a guild member permitted a claim against another to be pursued only before the guild's court. The claimant is not prevented externally from also bringing it before the public court of the king or the bishop; however, this is valid—wherever, as one supposes, the guild expressly permitted it—for a wrong against the guild as well as against the guild member concerned and is for that reason subject to judgments from both. The city of Frankfurt had received from the Kaiser the privilege that at no time an external court should be called against its citizens; after that, in 1396, a citizen of Frankfurt was arrested because he had filed a claim against another Frankfurter who owed him money, with an external court. Here both sides can have freedom: on the one side a being respected, a right, a power to assert, on the other side an exclusion, a contemptuous indifference on the part of the higher power—so it is not a counter case that the

medieval Jews enjoyed their own jurisdiction with their lawsuits among themselves, but it seems rather to have signified a disfranchisement and neglect. It was entirely different with the Jews of the Eastern Empire during the time of the Caesars; Strabo says of the Alexandrian Jews, for example, that they had their own higher court that decided their cases—a special legal position that turned into a source of hatred for the Jews. And this happened certainly because the Jews claimed that their religion requires an administration of justice unique only to them. This tendency went so far in medieval Cologne that it was reported as fact that, for a short time, Jews had had the privilege to decide cases by a Jewish judge even against Christians. In such phenomena the individual was perhaps not freer from the group than under the rule of common law; however, their group thereby enjoyed a freedom that the rest of the citizens felt ostensibly as an exemption. The prerogative of a circle with its own administration of justice is in no way based on the specific contents of its administered law; its members being simply subjugated to it alone is really, as *Form*, a freedom. The guild masters fought against the cooperative jurisdiction of the trade unions, even where their area of decision making was quite narrow and contained to some extent only the maintenance of propriety and the good customs. For they knew very well that the codes and practices of the morals police from these unions gave the journeymen a consciousness of solidarity, of professional honor, of organizational autonomy that functioned as support and strong comradeship over against the masters. And they knew that this sociological form was fundamental and, if it was once conceded, the further expansion of its content depended only on current relationships of power and economics. The general substance of this freedom of the whole is the subjugation of the individual—whereby then the indication suggested above is that it need not in any manner indicate a materially larger freedom for the individual. The doctrine of the people's sovereignty, over against the princely, as it arose in the Middle Ages, signified throughout not the freedom of the individual but that of the church in place of the state to rule over the individual; and just as in the 16th century monarchical actions take up the ideas of the sovereign people and ground their rule on a kind of private law contract between princes and people, so also the individual is not supposed to become free but be subjugated directly by the domination of the church's confession and of the professional groups.

Indeed, the eminent interest of the relative whole in the rule over its individuals, resulting in the proposed position of such an especially

limited and privileged circle, often leads to a situation in which those special courts of jurisdiction are more rigorous than the large encompassing circle that permits them this exemption. The Danish guilds, of which I have already spoken, determined that if a guild member breaks the business contract in force with another, that member, as vendor, is obliged to pay twice as much to the buyer than would have to be paid to the king's officials if the vendor were not a guild member, and twice as much to all the guild members than would have to be paid to the city. The structure of the larger circle, as such, allows it to give the individual more freedom than the smaller whose continued existence depends more directly on the behavior of every individual member being advantageous to it; it must also always prove itself anew through the strictness of its legal judgments; so it is trusted by its members as it exercises firm and worthy rule over them and gives the state authority no reason for remedial intervention. However, this regime over its members, in which its freedom consists, can become a worse reality than just legal harshness. The great independence of the German cities required, indeed until into the 16th century, its uttermost development; then, however, produced an oligarchic class- and blood-rule that oppressed most severely everyone having no share in the authority; only the rising state powers, in a nearly two-hundred-year struggle, put a stop to this tyrannical exploitation of the cities' freedom and were able to guarantee the freedom of the individual from them. Self-government, the benefit of which is established, indeed simply hides the danger of local parliaments in which egoistic class interests dominate. The correlation changes into that, so to speak, pathological exaggeration that has the gain of freedom accompanied by the gain of domination, as though by its completion and its contents.

From an altogether different angle, the type in question here—the further development of the group's and many comparable groups' liberation needing no subordination of others—is transformed into the striving or winning of domination—when we observe the differentiation that tends to come over a lower stratum during its climb to freeer or generally better living conditions. The result thereof is very often just that certain parts of a group similarly striving for the top really get to the top, which means, however, only that they become one part of the already previously dominant layers and the remaining others remain among the dominated. Of course this is especially the case where there already exists a separation of the dominant and the subordinate inside the upward-climbing stratum; then, after the rebellion against the com-

mon upper-level is ended, while in the background during the movement a distinction among the rebels immediately emerges again and makes it so that the previous occupants of the highest level are assimilated to this highest sector while the latter's heretofore comrades-in-arms become pressed down that much deeper. Something of this type was carried out by a part of the English labor revolution of 1830. The workers formed, in order to win the right to vote for parliament, a union with the reform party and the middle classes; the result was the passing of a law that endowed all classes with the right to vote—not only the workers. By the same formula, around the fourth century before Christ, the estates struggle in Rome had played out. The wealthy plebeians, who desired *conubium*[36] and a more democratic filling of offices in the interests of their class, concluded an alliance with the middle class and the lower classes. The outcome of the whole movement was that those points of their program that pertained mainly to the upper classes were attained; the reforms that were supposed to lift up the middle class and the small farmers, however, soon came to nothing. And the Bohemian Revolution of 1848 went in the same manner, where the farmers eliminated the final remnants of legal villeinage. As soon as this had been attained, the differences that before and during the revolution had been rejected on grounds of the common subjugation were immediately in force in the situation of the farmers. The lower classes of the rural population demanded a division of the communal property. In the affluent farmers this awoke immediately all their conservative instincts, and they resisted the demands of the rural proletariat, in alliance with whom they had defeated the lords, in the same way as the lords had resisted theirs. It is an entirely typical occurrence: that the stronger, who indeed may have perhaps done the *most*, would then like to inherit the fruits of victory *alone*; the relatively prevalent contribution to the winning grows into the claim to absolutely prevailing contribution to the winnings. For its realization, this schema is greatly aided sociologically by what was already emphasized: that a rank-like stratification, in the widest sense, is present, and out of the lower stratum, risen as a whole, the stronger elements in it win attachment to the higher, heretofore combated stratum. Thereby the heretofore relative difference between the better and the worse placed elements of that stratum comes to be, as it were, absolute; the quantum of acquired advantages has among the

[36] Latin: *conubium*, right to intermarry; Simmel gives it as *das Connubium*—ed.

former reached the threshold at which it turns into a new qualitative advantage. In a formally similar sense this occurred incidentally in Spanish America, whenever among its people of color an especially capable head showed up, who either inaugurated or inspired fear of a freer and better position for one's race. To such a person the patent was granted, "that he should count for white." In that such a leader was assimilated to the ruling stratum, attained an equality at that level that eventually would have been able to be won for the leader and the leader's own race, the leader now had a superiority over the members of that race. Sensitive to this sociological type, for example, worker-friendly politicians in Austria have raised misgivings about the workers' committees, by which, though, the oppression of the workers is to be alleviated. They feared that these committees could lead to a worker aristocracy that would thereby be more easily drawn closer to the positions advantageous to the interests of the employer, and that the rest of the work force would thus pay a greater price. Thus what in general is the chance of the best workers in their class to advance, what at first glance appears to be documentary certainty of progress for the working class as a whole, in reality, however, is in no way favorable for it. Since it is thereby robbed of its best and leading elements, the absolute rise of certain members is at the same time a relative rise over their class and, with that, a separation from it, a regular bleeding that robs it of its best blood. For that reason it is from the beginning advantageous to an elite, against which a mass of people is outraged, if they can get them to elect representatives who will lead the negotiations. In that way in every case the overpowering, overflowing onslaught of the mass as such is broken; it is first of all kept in check by their own leaders in such a way now that it is no longer done by the elite itself; these leaders exercise the formal function of the authorities over against the mass and thereby prepare the re-entry of the latter into the regimented.

In all this, from the most varied angles towards the unfolding phenomena, there remains always a constant sociological kernel: that the striving and winning of freedom, with its multiple negative and positive meanings, has at the same time the striving and winning of domination as a corollary or consequence. Socialism as well as anarchism will deny the necessity of this connection. While the dynamic balance of the individuals that one can identify as social freedom appeared here as simply the point of entry—of a real or even only imaginary character—from which the scale immediately again tipped towards one

side, they will declare its stabilization as possible just as soon as the social organization is no longer fashioned overall as domination and subordination, but as a coordination of all elements. The grounds that one tends to offer against this possibility, which, however, are not under discussion here, are to be joined together as that of the *terminus a quo* and that of the *terminus ad quem*:[37] the natural differentiation of persons, not eliminated through any kind of discipline, is not to be permitted expression in a ranking towards above and below, towards commanding and obeying; and the technology of skilled work does require for its greatest completion a hierarchical structure of society, the "one spirit for a thousand hands," the structure made up of commanding and working. The constitution of the subjects and the claims of objective accomplishment, the carriers of work and the fulfillment of their goals, come together in the necessity of domination and subordination, so that causality and teleology consistently press for this form; precisely that would be its most distinctive and decisive justification and absolute necessity. There appears historically, nevertheless, sporadic attempts at a social form whose principal fulfillment could unite the ongoing reality of domination and subordination with the values of freedom, in order to abolish the former by introducing socialism and anarchism. The motive for this effort lies, though, exclusively in the feeling state of the subjects, in the consciousness of degradation and oppression, in the drawing of the whole 'I' into the lowness of the social level; and on the other hand in the personal arrogance, to which the externally leading position raises self-esteem. If any kind of organization of society could avoid these psychological consequences of social inequality, they would stay that way without further ado. One overlooks frequently the purely technical character of socialism: that it is a *means* to the cause of certain subjective reactions, that its final authority lies in the people and the attitude towards life being evoked by it. Indeed, as it is simply our mental construct, the means has become fully the goal; the rational organization of society and the abolition of command and subjugation appear as not worth talking about, not even as the value that calls for the realization of that personal-eudaemonistic outcome. However, in this, then, lies the actual psychological power that socialism has introduced into the movement of history. As mere means, however, it underlies the fate of every means: in principle never to be only that; since multiple

[37] Latin: *terminus a quo*, starting point; *terminus ad quem*, destination—ed.

causes can have the same effect, it is thus never out of the question that the same goal can be accomplished through various means. Socialism, in so far as its establishment is meant to be dependent on the will of the people, is only the first proposal for the elimination of that lack of eudaemonistic fulfillment originating from historical inequality, and because it is so closely associated with the requirement for the removal of that lack, it appears tied to that removal. There is, however, no logical reason to tie the definitively crucial feeling of worth and even the good life exclusively to socialism, when it would be possible to dissolve the corresponding association between the domination and subordination on the one hand and the feeling of personal devaluation and subjugation on the other. Perhaps this creates an increase of psychological independence of individuals' feelings about life from external activity overall and the position that the individual accepts inside its sphere. It leads one to suspect that whenever the activity of production increasingly becomes merely technological in the current of culture, it loses its consequences for the inwardness and personality of the person more completely. Actually we find the approximation of this separation as the sociological type of many developments. While personality and ability are originally closely affiliated, now, however, the division of labor and the production of *products for the market*, that is, for a wholly unknown and indifferent consuming public, cause the personality to withdraw ever more from achievement and from itself. Now the required obedience may still be so absolute—it is no longer of any consequence for the level of attitude towards life or sense of self, because it is only a technical necessity, a form of organization that likewise remains in the confined realm of externality as manual work itself. This differentiation of the objective and the subjective elements of life, by which the subordination remains preserved in its technical-organizational worth but abandons its personal and internally depressing and class-reducing consequences—is obviously no panacea for similar difficulties and suffering that commanding-and-obeying brings with it in all realms; it is in this area only the expression in principle of a very partially effective tendency that in reality never comes to an unambiguous and final accomplishment. One of the purest examples is offered by the voluntary service of the today's military. The spirited and socially elevated man may here subject himself to the sergeant, indeed tolerate treatment that, if it were really a matter of his self and his honor, would drive him to the most desperate reactions. But the consciousness that he has to

yield not at all as an individual personality but only as an impersonal member of an objective procedure requiring such discipline does not let it come to a feeling of debasement and oppression—at least in most cases. Inside the economy it is especially the transition from manual labor to machine labor and natural compensation to wages that this objectification of domination and subordination favored, over against the worker solidarity in which the oversight and command of the master extended over all relationships of the members and entirely over the prerogatives of the purely work relationship.

The same developmental goal could be served by a further important type of sociological formation. Proudhon, as is generally known, wants to abolish all domination and subordination, in that he wants to dissolve those governing structures that have been differentiated out of the interaction of individuals as bearers of social powers, and re-ground all order and all cohesion on the unmediated interaction among free, coordinated individuals. But now this coordination is to be achieved perhaps by a continuity of domination and subordination *when precisely it alternates*: an ideal constitution, in which A is superior to B in a relationship or in a time, but in another relationship or another time B is superior to A. The organizational value of domination and subordination would thereby be conceded while its oppression, one-sidedness, and injustice would be abolished. There are now actually extraordinarily many occurrences of living societies in which this type of form has been actualized, albeit if only in a more embryonically, garbled, and disguised manner. An example within a narrow framework is perhaps an association of production workers in a company for which they elect a master craftsman and foreman. While they are subordinate to the one chosen in the work of the enterprise, they are dominant with regard to its general direction and results. While all groups in which the leader changes—either through election more commonly, or according to regular rotation, from the presidency down to the social club—carry forward this combination of domination and subordination from the simultaneous form into the chronological alternation, they win the technical advantages of domination and subordination while avoiding their personal disadvantages. All the various democracies seek to accomplish this through the limited terms of their officials. Through this the ideal is realized that everyone gets the greatest possibility for a turn at some time; hence also the frequent prevention of re-election. The concurrent domination and subordination is one of the most powerful forms

of social interaction and can form, with proper distribution across the diversity of fields, a very strong bond between individuals through the close interaction that it represents.

Stirner[38] sees the essence of constitutionalism in this: "The ministers dominate over their masters, the princes, the deputies over their masters, the people." And yet in a deeper sense parliamentary government contains this form of correlation. If modern jurisprudence apportions all legal relationships into such an order of equality and of domination and subordination, so, too, must many of the earliest such by alternative forms of domination and subordination. The order of equality between two citizens may exist in neither possessing a prerogative over the other. While each, however, chooses a representative, and this representative has a say over laws that are in force also for the other, a relationship of alternating domination and subordination ensues, and indeed as an expression of the coordination. This form is generally of decisive importance for constitutional questions, as Aristotle already recognized when he distinguished between the portion of governmental power according to law, from the portion of governmental power according to administration. By a citizen, in contrast to a non-citizen, being a bearer of state power, it is still not said that the citizen does not belong somewhat inside the organization merely and permanently belongs to those who simply obey. Whoever may be numbered among the *ολιγοι*, those possessing fitness for military service, can belong, with regard to exercising governmental power, along with those of lesser fitness, to the *δημος*; while somewhat fewer people of higher valuation are eligible to hold office, those of lower valuation, however, are authorized merely to participate in the *εκκλησια*.[39] A state oriented towards the first relationship turned out to be possibly an ολιγαρχια, towards the second, under some circumstances, a democracy.[40] The official here is subordinate to the government in general, whose bearers in the practical organization are in turn subordinate to the official. One has both refined and generally given expression to this relationship in that the people as object of the empire were in contrast with the individual as a member coordinated with all the others: the individual is to be in that respect an object of duty in this corporate body. And certainly

[38] Max Stirner (Caspar Schmidt, 1806–56), author of *The Ego and His Own*—ed.

[39] Greek: ολιγοι (oligoi), few; δημος (demos), people; εκκλησια (ekklesia), assembly—ed.

[40] Greek: ολιγαρχια (oligarchia), oligarchy—ed.

this differentiation and likewise the unification of the group's life, still effected through the interchangeability of domination and subordination, increase when one makes note of certain contents to which this form corresponds. One has lifted up as the strength of democracy—with full consciousness of the paradox thereof—that all are servants in the things in which they possess the most precise know-how, namely in the vocation where they must obey the wishes of consumers, the directives of business owners and managers or other contractors—while they, in the general political interests of the whole, are with command, by which they have no unique relationship of their own but that along with all others. Where the highest authority is at the same time competent, then the absolute subjugation of the lower ranks may be quite unavoidable; and if in a democracy the respective numerical majority possesses this concentration of knowledge and power, it would exercise tyranny no less dangerously than an autocracy. In order to not let it come to this split between those above and those below, but to preserve a unity of the whole, it would require this singular interlacing by which the highest power would be close to those who would be subordinate with respect to expertise! Nothing less than the design of the state would rest on the complicity of alternating dominations and subordinations between the same powers, which is what the parliamentary and church constitutions converged on after the Glorious Revolution in England. The clergy had a deep animosity towards the parliamentary regime and above all towards the prerogative that the regime demanded vis-à-vis the clergy. The peace agreement took place—with regard to the main points—thusly with the church maintaining a special jurisdiction over marriage and wills and its sanctions against Catholics and non-churchgoers. Therefore it forgot about its teaching of irrevocable 'obedience' and recognized that the divine order of the world had place for a parliamentary order, to whose particular provisions even the clergy would be subservient. In turn, however, the church dominated parliament, in that an oath of entry was demanded which, without question, only members of the established church were permitted to affirm, absolutely no one of another faith—bluntly Dissenters. The reigning spiritual and earthly classes were interwoven in such a way that the archbishops maintained their place in the upper house over the dukes, the bishops over the lords, while all the pastors were subject to the patronage of the earthly ruling class. Thereby the local spiritual matters were again relinquished to the control of the parishes. This was the form of interaction that the otherwise clashing power factions

could achieve, thereby generally bringing about the state church of the 18th century and a unified organization of English life. Even the marital relationship owes its inner and outer stability and unity at least in part to the fact that it involves a large number of fields of interest, and in some of them, one party is dominant, in others the other party. Thereby emerges a mutual growth, a unity and at the same time certainly an internal vitality of the relationship, such as is hardly attainable by any other sociological form. What is identified as the 'equality' of husband and wife in marriage—as fact or as pious wish—will arguably turn out to be in large part such an alternating domination and subordination. At any rate there thereby emerges, especially when one notices the thousand subtle relations of everyday life, not comprehensible in principle, a more organic relationship than would a mechanical equality in the immediate sense; that alternation inherently implies that the respective domination would not appear as brutish command. This form of relationship formed even one of the firmest bonds for the army of Cromwell. The same soldier who blindly obeyed superiors in military circumstances often served during worship services as the sermonizer before these superiors; a corporal could lead the prayer in which the captain along with the rest of the congregation participated; the army that followed its comanders without question, when once a political purpose had been accepted, had thus for its part made prior political decisions that the commanders had to submit to. By this reciprocal alternation of domination and subordination the Puritan army maintained, as long as it existed, an extraordinary solidarity and stability.

Now this advantageous success of the form of social interaction under consideration depends, however, on the sphere inside of which one social element is dominant, having been very exactly and unambiguously circumscribed from those in which the other is dominant. As soon as this is not the case, perpetual conflicts over authority will ensue, and the outcome will not be a strengthening, but rather a weakening of solidarity. Especially where a usual subordinate occasionally acquires a dominance that otherwise remains in the realm of their subordination, then, in part through the nature of the rebellion that this situation for the most part will support, in part through the absence of ability of the usually subordinate to dominate in the same realm—the solidarity and stability of the group will suffer. So at the time of Spain as a world power, rebellions broke out periodically in the Spanish army; for example, in the Netherlands. It was held together as a whole with

such frightful discipline, but it showed on occasion, nevertheless, an irrepressibly democratic energy. In certain nearly calculable intervals they rebelled against the officers, removed them and chose their own officers who, however, under the supervision of the soldiers, were permitted to stand and do nothing whatever that all the subordinates did not approve. The damage from such ongoing confusion of domination and subordination in one and the same realm requires no discussion. It is found likewise in indirect form in the limited terms of elected officials in many democracies; there is indeed the achievement that the largest possible number of citizens succeed sometime to a position of leadership—however, the other side of it is that long-range plans, continuity of actions, consequentially adopted measures, technical perfections are often enough hindered. In the ancient republics, though, this rapid alternation was not yet damaging to this extent, in so far as their constitution was simple and transparent and most of the citizens possessed the requisite knowledge and training for the offices. The sociological form of those events in the Spanish army demonstrated, with very different content, the great unhealthiness that emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the American Episcopal Church. The congregations were gripped precisely by a frenzied passion to exercise control over their clergy who were employed, however, precisely for the sake of moral and church control over the congregations! In the aftermath of this contumaciousness of the congregations, the clergy in Virginia for a long time afterwards were employed always for only a year. With one small adjustment, though formally similar in essentials, this sociological event occurred in official hierarchies where the superior is technically dependent on the subordinates. Higher officers often lack the knowledge of the technical details or of the actual situation. The lower officers are active their entire lives mostly in the same circle of tasks and thereby gain a specialist's knowledge of their narrow realms, which eludes those who move rapidly through various levels—whereas the latter's decisions, though, can not be administered without that detailed knowledge. With the privilege of government service, which knights and senators had in the Roman period of the Caesars, they did not mess around with theoretical preparatory training but simply left the acquisition of the necessary knowledge to praxis. This, however—already in the last period of the Republic—had had the consequence that the higher officials were dependent on their understudies, who, not always changing, were to provide a definite routine for the conduct of business in the situation. This is in Russia a thoroughgoing

phenomenon, which becomes especially advantageous through the manner of allocation of offices there. Advancement takes place there according to class rank, although not only inside of the same department, but whoever has reached a certain class is often, based on one's desire or that of the superior even with the same rank, transferred into another entirely. So it was, at least until recently, not unusual that the school graduate, after six months' service at the front, became an officer without further ado; an officer obtained, then, under transfer into the corresponding official level of the military charge, some office in the civil service more appealing. One was on one's own in both cases to find one's way without appropriate preparatory training for the new situations. For this reason, technical ignorance of the higher officials for their positions emerges with unavoidable frequency, which renders the officials thus inescapably dependent on underlings and their know-how. The reciprocity of domination and subordination thus often makes the subordinates appear as the actual managers and the dominant as only the executives, and thereby damages the authenticity of the organization, just as a deliberately arranged alternation of domination and subordination can support it.

Beyond these specific formations the reality of sequential rule poses an entirely common sociological problem. Domination and subordination fashion, on the one hand, a form of objective organization of the society; they are, on the other hand, the expression of personal qualitative differences among the people. Now how do both of these determinants interact, and how is the form of social interaction influenced by the discrepancies of this relationship?

At the beginning of social development the domination of one personality over another must have been the adequate expression and consequence of personal superiority. There is absolutely no reason why, in a social situation without a firm organization that assigns individuals *a priori* to their positions, one person should be subordinate to another if neither power, piety, superiority in body or spirit or willpower, or suggestion characterizes the other—in short, the relationship of one's personal being to the other. Since the initial stage of social formation is historically unavailable to us, as a principle of methodology we must at least make the most likely simple assumption: a state approximating equilibrium. This operates as if derived from cosmology. Because we do not know the situation at the beginning of the world process, we must, with the most likely simplification, make the effort to deduce the origin and advance of varieties and differentiations from the homogeneity

and state of equilibrium of world elements. Now indeed there is no doubt that when those presumptions are taken in an absolute sense, no world process could begin, because they offer no cause for movement and differentiation; rather, some kind of a differentiating behavior of elements, as a minimum always, must be placed at the initial position in order to thereby render it comprehensible from out of the wider differentiations. Thus we are also constrained, in the development of social diversity, to assume a most simple fictive state; the minimum of diversity, which is required as the seed of all later differentiations, will have to be placed arguably thereby in the purely personal differences of the assets of individuals. The dissimilarities of people diverging from one another are thus first of all to be deduced from such qualitative individualizations. So required or presumed of the sovereign in primitive times are perfections that are unusual to that degree or in that combination. The Greek king of the heroic period must not only be courageous, wise, and eloquent, but also as distinguished as possible in athletic exercises as well as an excellent a carpenter, shipbuilder, and farmer. The position of King David was based, as emphasized above, for the most part on his being at the same time singer and warrior, layman and prophet, and possessing the ability to fuse the earthly power of the state with the spiritual theocracy. From this origin of domination and subordination, which of course is still effective within society at all times and perpetually founds new relationships, permanent structures of domination and subordination still develop; individuals are either born into them or they achieve the particular positions on the basis of wholly other qualities from those that the domination and subordination in question originally established. This change from the subjectivity of sovereign relationships to one of objective formation and fixation is effected through the purely quantitative expansion of the realm of sovereignty. For this universally obvious relationship between the increasing quantity of elements and the objectivity of standards applicable to them are two actually opposed motifs of significance. The multiplication of elements contains at the same time an augmentation of the qualitative features active in them. With that, the improbability increases that some element of subjective individuality would have a similar or a sufficiently similar relationship to each of them. To the degree that differences accumulate inside the realm of rule or standardization, the sovereign or the standard must try to dispose of its individual character and adopt a universal one, held above the fluctuations of subjectivity. On the other hand the very same expansion of the

sphere leads to division of labor and differentiation among its leading elements. The ruler of a large group can no longer, as the Greek king, be measure and leader for all its material interests; it requires rather a multifaceted specialization and compartment-like arrangement of the regime. Above all, however, the division of labor stands in correlation with the objectification of activities and relationships; it shifts the ability of the individual into a proper connection outside the individual's sphere; the personality as a whole and inwardly rises beyond its one-sided activity whose purely objectively circumscribed results combine now first with those of yet other personalities into one totality. Case by case, person by person, the extent of such causes will have carried the resulting relationships of domination over into the objective form in which, as it were, not the person, but the position is what is dominant. The *a priori* of the relationship is now no longer the people with their characteristics, from which the social relation emerges, but these relations as objective forms, 'positions,' quasi empty spaces and outlines, that are supposed to be actually 'filled' by individuals. The more fixed and technically elaborate the organization of the group is, the more objective and formal the schemata of domination and subordination are found, for which then only the appropriate persons are subsequently sought, or it finds its role occupants through the mere accidents of birth and other chance occurrences. In this connection it is in no way only a matter of considering the hierarchy of governmental positions. The moneyed economy generates a quite similar social formation based on the areas of its dominance. The possession or the lack of a certain sum of money means a certain social position, almost entirely independently of the personal qualities of the person who fills it. Money brought into relief the previously emphasized divorce between the person as personality and as bearer of a certain individual performance or interest; anyone's property grants one who can seize it or somehow purchase it a power and a position that appear and disappear with the holder of this property, not, however, with the personality and its characteristics. People move through the positions that correspond to certain financial holdings just as purely incidental fill-ins go through fixed, given forms. That modern society, by the way, does not always exhibit this discrepancy between position and personality needs no emphasis. Rather in many cases, even through the dissolution of the objective contents of the position by the personality as such, a certain agility in its allocation will be fashioned, which realizes the appropriate proportion on a new, often more rational basis—quite apart from the enormously

increased possibilities that the liberal structures in general give for the benefit of the position's corresponding powers—although the powers in question here are often so specialized that the domination won by them, nevertheless, does not accrue to the personality according to its total value. That discrepancy will occasionally reach its maximum extent even in certain intermediate arrangements, as the corporate and the guild-like. It has been rightly emphasized that the system of large industry would give the exclusively talented person more opportunity for distinction than previously. The numerical proportion of foremen and supervisors to workers is supposed to be smaller today than the numerical proportion of small craftsmen to wage workers two hundred years ago. But special talent is supposed to be able to lead much more certainly to a higher position. Whether it gets to this position is only the peculiar chance of the unfolding of personal quality and its place in governing or being governed, which is offered by the objectification of the positions, by their differentiation from the purely personal nature of individuality.

Socialism very much abhors this blindly accidental relationship between the objective graduation of positions and the qualifications of persons; its organizational proposals, though, result in this same sociological configuration because it requires an absolutely centralized, thus necessarily severely structured and hierarchical, constitution and administration; it presumes, however, that all individuals are *a priori* equally capable to fill every desirable position in this hierarchy. However, just that which thereby seemed meaningless in the present circumstances is highlighted from one particular angle, at least in principle. For in the pure democratic outcome the led *choose* the leaders; no guaranty is offered against the chance relationship between person and position, not only because one must be an expert oneself to elect the best expert but because the principle of election from the bottom up delivers accidental results widely throughout all extensive spheres. However, pure party votes are exempted from this; in them the meaningful or chance factor under consideration is precisely ruled out since the party vote as such certainly is not directed towards the person because that candidate possesses these definite personal qualities, but rather because that person is the—stated in the extreme—anonymous representative of a specific objective principle. The form of producing the leader for which socialism would logically have to reach is the random assignment of positions. Much more than the rotation that is, after all, never fully accomplished in extensive relationships, the slogan brings the ideal claim

of each to expression. It is therefore in no way democratic in itself, not only because it can also hold for a dominating aristocracy and stands as pure formal principle entirely beyond these antitheses, but above all because democracy means the actual participation of everybody; the drawing of positions of leadership however converts this into an ideal, into the merely potential right of every individual to succeed to a position of leadership. The detached principle fully severs the mediation between individuals and their positions that is carried by the subjective suitability; with this principle the formal organizational requirement of domination and subordination has generally become fully master over the personal qualities from which it had come.

Related to the problem of the relationship between the personal and the solely position-relevant superiority, two meaningfully sociological thought forms are distinguished. In view of actual inequality (dissolvable only in a utopia) in the qualities of people, the 'rule of the best' is in any case the form that brings to expression most exactly and purposively in external reality the inner and conceptual relationship of people. This is perhaps the deepest reason why artists are so often aristocratically inclined; because every artistry rests on the assumption that the inner sense of things shows itself adequately in their manifestation if one would just understand how to see these correctly and fully; the detachment of the world from its value, from the appearance of its meaning, is the anti-artistic mentality par excellence—the artist must recast the *unmediated* reality so much so that it would surrender its true, trans-accidental form, which is then, however, at the same time the expression of its spiritual and metaphysical sense. The psychological and historical connection between the aristocratic and artistic view of life was permitted thus at least in part a return to the idea that only an aristocratic order provides a visible form, their so to speak aesthetic symbol for the internal value relations of people. Now, however, an aristocracy in this pure sense, as rule by the best, as Plato viewed it, is empirically not realizable. First of all, because until now no practice has been found, by which 'the best' would be recognized with certainty and placed in position; neither the *a priori* methods of breeding of a ruling caste, nor the *a posteriori* of natural selection in free competition for the favored position, nor the so to speak average of persons elected from under or from above has shown itself adequate for that. There are additional difficulties yet for the assumption that people seldom content themselves with being under the superiority of even the best, because they want no superiority in general or at least none in which they

themselves would not play a part; and, furthermore, that the possession of power, even when acquired originally legally, tends to demoralize, not always the individual for sure, but almost always corporate bodies and classes—thus the opinion of Aristotle makes sense: certainly from the abstract point of view there would come to the individual or the family, who perhaps towers above all others in αρετη,[41] absolute rule over these others; from the demands of praxis, in contrast, it would be advisable to blend this rule with that of the masses; their quantitative superiority would have to work together with that of the qualitative. Beyond these intermediary thoughts, however, the highlighted difficulties of a 'rule of the best' can lead to a resignation to let equality in general serve as the practical control because it would introduce *the lesser evil* over against those disadvantages of—the logically solely justified—aristocracy. Now since it would, however, be impossible to give expression with certainty and constancy to the subjective differences in objective relationships of domination, one is then supposed to disconnect them generally from the determination of the social structure and thus regulate it as if they did not exist.

However, since the question of the greater or lesser evil in rule is to be decided only according to personal evaluation, the same pessimistic attitude can lead to the exact opposite conviction: that overall—in large as well as in small spheres—it has to be better to be governed by unqualified persons than none at all, that the social group must accept the form of domination and subordination more from internal and objective necessity, so that it is, then, only a fortunate accident if the objectively necessary, preformed position is occupied by the subjectively adequate individual. This formal tendency comes from quite primitive experiences and necessities. First of all, from the form of rule representing or creating a bond: less accommodating times, without a multiplicity of forms of interaction available, often have no other means to bring about the formal solidarity of the whole than to subordinate individuals not directly bound to it under its already associated members. At the time in Germany when the earliest constitution with personal and property equality in the community had ended, landless people lacked the active rights of freedom—if they did not want to remain without any bond to the commonwealth, they had to attach themselves to a master in order to participate indirectly as a protected member in the

[41] Greek: αρετη (arete), virtue, goodness—ed.

public corporations. The totality had an interest in their doing this because it could tolerate no unconnected people in its realm, and for that reason Anglo-Saxon law made the landless explicitly responsible to 'be under a lord.' Likewise in medieval England the interest of the community required that aliens place themselves under the protection of a lord. One belonged to a group when one possessed a parcel of one's own land; whoever lacked this and yet wanted to belong to it, they had to belong to someone who was bound to it in that primary manner. The general importance of leading personalities, with a relative indifference to their corresponding personal qualifications, likewise appeared formally in some early manifestations of the principle of election. Elections to the medieval English Parliament, for example, appear to have been managed with astonishing negligence and indifference: based only on the borough designating a member to parliament; it appears that the designee was accepted *whoever* it was, thereby reducing its importance—which was manifested no less in the indifference towards the qualification of the *electorate* frequently conspicuous in the Middle Ages. Whoever is simply present takes part in voting; no value appears to have been placed on legitimation or on a definite number of votes. Apparently this disregard for the electoral body is simply the expression of the disregard for the quality of the personnel resulting from the election. Quite generally the conviction of the necessity of *coercion* ultimately works in the same way; human nature simply needs it in order not to degenerate fully into purposeless and formless activity. It is completely the same with respect to the general character of this postulate whether subordination happens under one person and that person's arbitrary will or under a law: certain extreme cases excepted, in which the value of subordination as form over the nonsense of its content can no longer become master, it is only of secondary interest whether the law with regard to content is something better or worse, just so long as it acts with the nature of a ruling personality. Here one could point to the advantages of hereditary despotism—thus to a certain degree independent of the qualities of the person—especially where it is a matter of the integrative, political and cultural life of large territories, and where it is ahead of the free federation, which is similar to the prerogatives of marriage over free love. No one can deny that the force of law and custom holds countless marriages together, which morally speaking would have to come apart: persons are here subject to a law that does not suit their case. In others, however, the same coercion, although presently and subjectively felt as severe, is of irreplaceable

worth because it holds together those who morally speaking should remain together, but who, in some kind of a momentary disgruntlement, bad temper or feeling of vacillation, would separate if only they could, and would thereby irreparably impoverish or destroy their life. The marriage law may be good or bad with regard to its content for the respective applicable case or not: the simple force of remaining together that results from it develops an individual value of a eudaemonistic and ethical kind—outside of that of social functionality—which, from the pessimistically biased perspective here presumed, would not in general be realized upon the discontinuation of that coercion. Already each one's consciousness of being compulsorily bound to the other may make the solidarity utterly unbearable; in others, however, it will bring with it docility, self-control, cultivation of the spirit such that, at any possible time of breaking off, no one would feel moved to do so but rather feel drawn only by the wish to configure the current inescapable totality of existence so that it is as bearable as possible. The consciousness of standing under bondage in general, of being subjugated to a dominant authority—be it an ideal or social law, a voluntarily associating personality or a steward of higher norms—this consciousness is, as the case may be, revolting or crushing; probably, however, for the majority of people it is an irreplaceable foothold for the inner and outer life of our souls that seems—in the unavoidable symbolic expression of all psychology—to dwell on two levels: one deep, hardly or not at all flexible that bears the real meaning or substance of our being, while the other consists of currently dominant impulses and isolated excitements. The second would still, as is actually the case, more often carry the day against the first and allow the former no fissure through which the pressing and rapid shedding of its elements could come to the surface, unless the feeling of coercion, whatever the source, did not dam up its current, put the brakes on its vacillations and capriciousness, and thereby perpetually provide space and compensation to the persisting undercurrent. Compared to this functional significance of constraint as such, its particular content is of secondary importance. The meaningless may be redeemed by the meaningful, but even this now has its questionable meaning simply in that that it teams up with the former; indeed, not only the suffering from the force, but also the opposition against it, against the unjustified as against the justified, exercises this function of repression and interruption on the rhythm of the surface of our life, whereby then the deeper currents of the most private and substantial life, impervious to external repression, reach consciousness

and effectiveness. Now insofar as the force is identical with some sort of dominance, this combination shows the member-element in it that its individuality in governance is to some extent indifferent to the quality and law of domination, and that reveals the deeper sense of a claim of authority par excellence.

Indeed, it is in principle impossible that personal qualification and social position in the ranks of domination and subordination would thoroughly and completely correspond, no matter what organization one may propose for this purpose, and certainly based on the fact that there are always more people who are qualified for superior positions than it provides superior positions. Out of the typical workers of a factory there are certainly a great many who could likewise be just as good foremen or employers; of the common soldiers a great many who would fully possess the aptitude of an officer; of the millions of subjects of a ruler without doubt a great number who would likewise be good or better rulers. The divine right of kings is just the expression of subjective quality not being decisive, but rather some other exalted authority, above human scale. Thus the breach between those who have attained a leading position and those who have the ability for it must not be roughly assessed very much lest it yield contrariwise many persons in dominant positions who are not qualified for them. For this type of incongruity between person and position appears more important than it is in reality. For one thing the incompetence inside a position from which others are led emerges especially glaringly, for obvious reasons, proving more difficult to conceal than a great many other human deficiencies—and certainly especially because just as many others, frankly qualified for the position, but subordinate, are standing right there. Furthermore this unsuitability in many cases does not at all come from individual defects, but from contradictory demands of the office, the immediate consequence of which is nevertheless easily imputed to the occupant of the office as subjective culpability. The modern 'national government,' for example, has in theory an infallibility that is the expression of its—in principle—absolute objectivity. Of course, measured by this fanciful infallibility, its real carriers frequently appear deficient. In reality the purely individual shortcomings of leading personalities are relative rare. Given the absurd and uncontrollable accidents by which people in all areas accede to their positions, it would thus be an incomprehensible wonder that an even greater amount of incompetence does not appear in filling them if one were not compelled to accept the fact that the latent qualifications for

the positions are very widely available. It rests on the assumption that republican constitutions upon the creation of their offices ask only for negative instances, that is, whether the aspirants hade made themselves undeserving of the office by some other kind of activity—whenever in Athens, for example, appointment was made by lot, it was simply examined whether the selected treated his parents well, his taxes were paid, etc.—thus only whether something *against* him was provided, so it was assumed that *a priori* everyone would be worthy. This is the deep insight of the proverb: "To whomever God gives a task, he also gives understanding for it." Since the 'understanding' needed for filling the higher positions also exists in many people, evidently it does not reveal itself until someone, however selected, accepts the position. This incommensurability between the quantum of skills for ruling and that of their actualization is explained perhaps by the difference between the character of the person as a social entity and as an individual. The group as such is basic and in need of leadership; the characteristics that it displays as quintessentially common are simply those handed down, thus more primitive and undifferentiated, or easily suggestible, thus 'inferior.' But in general as soon as a group formation of greater mass occurs, it is advisable that the whole mass be organized in the form of subordination under a few. That does not, however, apparently prevent every individual in this mass from supposedly possessing higher and finer characteristics. Only, these are of an individual sort, visible from a *different* perspective that does not arise from the common property and for that reason not helping improve the base level at which all are seen with certainty. It follows from this relationship that, from one angle, the group as a whole is in need of a leader, and it can thus offer many subordinates and only few dominant; from the other angle, however, every individual in that group is more highly qualified as group element then and thus as a subordinate.

The corporate principle and the current order come to terms with this built-in contradiction of all social formations between the fair demand for superior position and the technical impossibility of satisfying it, in that they construct classes into a pyramidal shape with an ever smaller number of members over others and thereby restrict *a priori* the number of the 'qualified' for the leading positions. This selection is not directed towards the available individuals, but, just the opposite, it predetermines them. From an abundance of look-alikes one cannot bring anyone into the earned position. For that reason these arrangements could serve as the attempt, contrary to the viewpoint of filling the position from the

individuals, to breed them for it. Instead of the slowness with which this can operate by way of heredity and of preparatory education, emergency procedures, so to speak, are also deployed that lift up the personalities to the capacity of leadership and governance, regardless of their previously existing quality, through authoritative or mystical rules. For the paternalistic state of the 17th and 18th centuries the subject was not capable of any kind of participation in public affairs; with regard to politics one remained forever in need of leadership. In the moment, however, in which someone occupies a public office, one receives at a stroke the superior insights and public spirit that makes one capable of piloting the totality—as though by civil service one would rise as by *generatio aequivoca* from being a minor not only to maturity, but to leadership, with all the necessary qualities of intellect and character.[42] The tension between the *a priori* lack of qualification of one for a determined superiority and the absolute qualification that one gains *a posteriori* through the influence a higher authority reaches its maximum inside the Catholic priesthood. Here no family tradition, no functional education plays any part from childhood on; indeed the personal quality of the candidate is in principle unimportant over against the spirit existing in mystical objectivity, with which ordination to the priesthood endows one. The superior merit is not conferred on him just because he is by nature predetermined for it (whether or not this can contribute naturally and establish a certain differentiation among the authorized), also not by *chance*, whether he has from the beginning been an appointed or not appointed—but the consecration *accomplishes it*, because it conveys the *Spirit*, the unique qualification for the accomplishment to which the Spirit calls. That God gives to one, whom he gives an office, also the understanding for it—here this principle is most radically realized, from both its sides (that of former ineligibility and of that afterwards), through the 'office'-created eligibility.

[42] Latin: *generatio aequivoca*, spontaneous generation—ed.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONFLICT

That conflict is of sociological significance, in that it engenders or modifies communities of interest, solidarity, and organization, is never disputed in principle. In conventional opinion, however, the question must seem paradoxical whether or not conflict comprises a form of association irrespective of its consequences or concomitants. At first this appears as a merely semantic issue. If every pattern of interaction among people is an association, conflict too, which is certainly one of the liveliest patterns of interaction, one that is logically impossible to limit to a single participant, by all means counts as a form of association. In fact, the actually dissociating activities are the *origins* of conflict—hate and envy, need and desire. A conflict breaks out only based on them; thus it is actually a curative move against the dualism leading towards division, and a way to work out some kind of unity, even if by annihilating one party—somewhat like the most acute phenomena of illness often displayed in the exertions of the organism to free itself from disturbances and harms. This is not in any way what the commonplace saying, "*Si vis pacem para bellum*,"[1] indicates, but in general this special case branches off from that. Conflict itself is only the resolution of the tension between opponents; that it ends in peace is only a single especially obvious expression of its being a synthesis of elements, an opposed-to-one-another that belongs with the for-one-another under *one* higher concept. This concept is marked by the common opposition of both forms of relationship in contrast to the mere mutual indifference between elements; the rejection as well as the dissolution of association are also negations, but it is precisely in this difference that conflict in contrast identifies the positive moment that is interwoven with its negating character in a unity that is only apparently but not actually breaking up.

From the viewpoint of the sociologically affirmative nature of conflict all social constructs undergo a characteristic ordering. Notably appearing

[1] Latin: If you want peace, prepare for war—ed.

immediately is that, when the relationships of people with one another—in contrast to what each is with oneself and in relationship to objects—comprise the matter of a particular observation, the traditional objects of sociology comprise only one subdivision of this expansive science defined really by one *principle*. It appeared as though there were only two standard objects of the science of humanity: the entity of the individual and the entity from individuals, the society, as though a third were logically excluded. Then conflict as such finds no place where it could be studied apart from the contributions that it makes to the forms of immediate unity in society. It is a *sui generic* fact, and its classification under the concept of unity would be both forced and futile because it means, in fact, the negation of unity. Now, however, it appears as a comprehensive classification in the theory of the relationships of those people who make up a unity, thus distinguishing the socially supportive in the narrower sense from others that work against unity. But now it is to be kept in mind that every actual historical relationship tends to share in *both* categories. However, just as the individuals do not achieve simply the unification of their personalities, harmonizing their contents completely according to logical or objective, religious or ethical norms, but just as opposition and strife precedes not only such unity, but are functioning in it in every moment of their lives—so there could not be any kind of social unity in which the converging directions of elements would not be permeated inextricably by the diverging ones. A group that would be the quintessentially centripetal and harmonious pure 'union' is not only empirically unreal but would also manifest no real life process; the society of saints that Dante saw in the Rose of Paradise may behave that way, but it is spared any change and development, while the sacred gathering of church fathers in Raphael's *Disputa* is already represented, if not as an actual conflict, still as a considerable difference of moods and directions of thought from which all the enthusiasm and real organic coalescence of the gathering flows. As the cosmos needs 'love and hate,' attractive and repulsive forces, in order to have a form, so society also needs some quantitative ratio of harmony and disharmony, association and competition, good will and ill will, in order to arrive at a specific formation. But these divisions are not at all merely sociological liabilities, negative proceedings, so that the definitive, real society would come about only through other positive social powers, and for sure always only so far as they do not hinder it. This commonplace view is quite superficial; society as it exists is the result

of both categories of interaction, which appear completely positive with respect to both.[2]

The misunderstanding, that as the one tears down what the other builds up, and as what is finally left over is the result of a subtraction of it (while in reality it is better identified as that of addition of it)—this misunderstanding likely originates from the double meaning of the concept of unity. We designate as unity the consensus and the combination of social elements, in contrast to their divisions, dissociations, disharmonies; a unity, however, also means to us the complete synthesis of persons, energies, and forms into a group, the final totality of it, in which the integrative, in the stricter sense, as well as the dualistic relationships are included. So we are led back to the group formation that we sense as 'integrative,' with respect to those of its

[2] This is generally the sociological case of an opposition in views of life. In the usual view, two parties of life stand everywhere opposed to one another, one of which sustains the positives, the actual content or even substance of life itself, the other, however, in its meaning is non-being, of which, following its negation, then, the positivities construct authentic life; thus joy and sorrow, virtue and burdens, strengths and deficiency, successes and failures act out the given contents and breaks in the process of life. A different one appearss to me, however, as the highest concept that is indicated vis-à-vis these opposing pairs: all these polar differentiations are to be grasped as *one* life, even in what is not supposed to be from a single ideal and is merely a negative, not supposed to feel the pulse beat of a central vitality or to awaken the whole meaning of our existence from *both* parties; also that which appears as isolated, disturbing and destructive in the all-encompassing context of life, is necessarily positive, not a void, but the fulfillment of a role reserved for it alone. Now there may be a height—away from everything that at the objective level and in the scale of values is encountered by all as a plus and minus, as in opposition to one another, confronting one another mutually incompatibly—by which it is nevertheless felt as an intertwined unitary life. To reach this height or to continuously grasp it may be denied to us; too gladly we think of and sense our essential being, which we actually and ultimately mean, as identical with *one* of these positions; depending on our optimistic or pessimistic sense of life, the other appears to us as superficial, accident, something to be eliminated or removed, so that the true life united in itself would rise. We are everywhere implicated in this dualism—which the text will presently explain further—from the narrowest to the most extensive provinces of life, personal, factual, or social: we have or are a totality or unity that separates into two logically and factually contrary factors, and we then identify our totality with *one* of these factions and experience the other as something foreign, not actually something proper to us, and negating our central and full being. Life stirs continually between this tendency and the other—the tendency that also allows the whole actually to be the whole, that the unity that still concerns both objects separately also actually stimulates life in each of the two and in their combination. The right of the latter tendency, however, to lay claim to the sociological phenomenon of conflict is all the more called for as strife puts forth its socially destroying power as an apparently indisputable fact.

functional components that apply as *specifically* integrative—therefore with the exclusion of the other wider additional meaning of the word. Contributing to this imprecision is the corresponding ambiguity of the division or opposition from the other side. While this displays its negating or more destructive meaning *among the individual elements*, it is naively concluded that it would have to function in the same manner for the relationship of the whole. In reality, however, what between individuals is considered as a negative thing from a particular angle and in isolation, something detrimental, need not likewise function in any such way inside the totality of the relationship, for there is here—as perhaps the competition of individuals within an economy shows most simply—along with others, a whole new picture of interactive patterns unaffected by the conflict in which the negative and dualistic plays its rather positive role, apart from what was perhaps destructive in individual relationships.

These more complicated cases exhibit here two rather contradictory types. First the superficially close, infinitely many life relationships of inclusive commonality, such as marriage. Not only for marriages gone unequivocally awry but also for such that have found a tolerable or at least bearable *modus vivendi*—a certain measure of disagreements, internal differences, and outward controversies that, after all and in spite of everything, preserves the bond, is in general organically bound to, and not to be separated from, the unity of the sociological formation. Such marriages are in no way less of a marriage for having conflict in them; rather they have developed as these definitively characteristic totalities from just such elements, to which this quota of strife irreducibly belongs. On the other hand, the thoroughly positive and integrating role of antagonism emerges in cases where the structure is characterized by the clarity and carefully preserved purity of social divisions and strata. Thus the Indian social system is not only based on the hierarchy of castes but also directly on their mutual revulsion. Animosities keep not only the boundaries within the group from gradually blurring—so that they can be consciously cultivated as guarantees of existing arrangements—but they are moreover also directly sociologically productive: they often give classes and personalities their initial reciprocal relation, which they would not have discovered or not in that way if by chance the objective causes of the animosity had indeed existed but unaccompanied by the *feeling* and the expressions of animosity. It would in no way always result in a richer and fuller community life if the repelling and, viewed individually, even destructive energies within it were to

disappear—as when a more extensive fortune results when its liabilities cease to exist—but rather in a picture changed just as much and often just as unrealizable as after a cessation of the forces of cooperation and affection, helpfulness and harmony of interests. This holds not only on a large-scale for competition, which determines, purely as a formal relationship of tension and quite apart from its objective *consequences*, the state of opposition and distance of the elements, but also wherever the association depends on the spirit of the individual souls. Thus, for example, the opposition of an element against someone with whom one is already in a social relationship is therefore not merely a negative social factor because it is frequently the only means whereby it becomes even possible for us to be in association with actually unendurable personalities. If we did not have the power and right at least to offer opposition to tyranny and obstinacy, capriciousness and tactlessness, we would not put up at all with relationships to people from whose character we suffer such things; rather we would be pushed to steps of such desperation that would for sure dissolve the relationship, although they are not exactly 'conflict.' And indeed not only on account of the fact—while not essential here—that oppressions[3] tend to increase if one surrenders to them quietly and without protest; but opposition grants us an inner satisfaction, diversion, relief—just as it gives humility and patience under other psychological circumstances. Our opposition gives us the feeling of not being completely oppressed in the relationship; it allows our power to prove itself consciously and thus initially lends a liveliness and interactive ability to relationships from which we would have withdrawn at all costs without this corrective.

In fact it not only achieves this when it does not come with noticeable results but also when it does not come to light from the outset at all, when it remains purely internal; even where in practice it is hardly expressed, it can produce inner balance—sometimes even for *both* sides of the relationship—a calm and an ideal sense of power, and thereby save the relationship whose continuation is often inconceivable to outsiders. Opposition is, then, an aspect of relationship itself; it is tied to the same rights by the other bases of the existence of the relationship; it is not only a *means* of preserving the relationship as a whole, but one

[3] 'Oppressions' translates *Bedrückungen*, which could also be translated 'depressions'—not entirely unreasonable in this context; maybe Simmel even intended the double entendre—ed.

of the concrete functions in which this relationship in reality consists. Where the relationships are purely superficial and thus not of practical consequence, the latent form of conflict provides this service: aversion, the feeling of a mutual alienation and repulsion that at the moment of close contact, brought about in some way, would immediately erupt into explicit hate and conflict. Without this aversion, urban life, which brings everyone daily into contact with countless others, would not have any kind of imaginable form. The whole internal organization of such interaction is based on an extremely intricate gradation of sympathy, indifference, and aversion of the most momentary as well as enduring kind. The sphere of indifference is thereby relatively small; the activity of our souls, though, responds to almost every impression of another person with some kind of specific feeling, whose subconsciousness, fleetingness, and motion only appear to neutralize it in indifference. Actually this latter would be as unnatural to us as the vagueness of random reciprocal suggestion is unbearable, and antipathy, the harbinger of active antagonism, protects us before both of these typical threats of the metropolis; it secures the distances and avoidances without which this type of life could not be led at all: its measure and its ingredients, the rhythm of its emergence and disappearance, the forms in which it is fulfilled—this forms an indivisible whole from the configuration of urban life, with the motives that are unifying in the narrower sense; what appears intuitively in this as dissociation is in reality thus only one of its elementary forms of being a society.

If therefore the conflictual relationships do not also produce a social structure by themselves but always only in correlation with unifying energies, so that only both together constitute the concrete entity of group life—so the former are hardly distinguished in this respect from the other social forms that sociology infers from the diversity of actual existence. Neither love nor the division of labor, neither common conduct towards a third nor friendship, neither party membership nor domination and subordination needs bring into being or maintain dictatorially a historic unification, and where this is however the case, the process thusly characterized by that already contains a plurality of distinct forms of relationship; it is then simply the essence of human spirits not to allow themselves to be bound together by *one* thread, in the same way that scientific analysis does not stop with the elementary unities in their specific bonding strength. Indeed, perhaps this whole analysis, still in an objectifying and apparent reciprocal meaning, is a mere subjective act: perhaps the bonds between the individual elements

are indeed frequently rather uniform, but *that* unity is not within the grasp of our understanding—it is precisely by the richest and substantively most complex living relationships that this mystical unity becomes most strongly conscious to us—and it simply remains then to present them as the functional combination of a plurality of binding energies. These are limited and reciprocally modified until the picture comes into relief that objective reality arrived at in a much simpler and unified way but one resistant to articulation through understanding. However, the procedures play out in the individual soul as well. In every moment these processes are of so complex a kind, harboring such an abundance of manifold or contradictory vicissitudes, that identifying them with *one* of our psychological concepts is always incomplete and actually falsifying: even the life moments of the individual soul are never connected by just *one* thread. Nevertheless, even this one picture is that which analytical thinking goes about creating from the inaccessible unity of the soul. Certainly there is much that we have to conceive of as in themselves fully unitary—as a blend of emotions, as a compound of multiple drives, as a competition of conflicting feelings; however, the calculations of understanding lack a schema for this unity, and so it must construct it as a resultant of multiple elements. When we are simultaneously attracted to and repelled by things, when noble and base characteristics appear to be blended in an activity, when the feeling for someone is made up of respect and friendship, or from paternal or maternal and erotic impulses, or from ethical and aesthetic values—then these are certainly frequently in themselves fully unitary as actual mental processes, but we can describe them only indirectly and therefore render them into a concert of manifold mental elements with various analogies, prior motives, or external consequences. If this is correct, then compound relationships between several souls must in many cases also be essentially unitive. The distance that characterizes the relationship between two associated people, for example, often appears to us as the result of an affection that would have had to produce a much greater closeness, and of an animosity that would have had to actually drive them completely apart; while each is delimiting the other, that objective measure of distance simply seems to emerge. This can, however, be quite incorrect; the relationship is from the inside invested in this distance; it has, so to speak, from the very beginning a certain temperature that does not at first come about as a balance of an actually warmer and an actually cooler condition. The measure of superiority and influence that is created between two persons is often interpreted by us as produced

through the strength of the one party which intersects, though, with a respective weakness in the other; this strength and weakness may be present, but their duality is frequently often not at all evident in the relationship as it functions, but is determined rather by the combined nature of the elements, and we break down its immediate character into those factors only after the fact. Erotic relationships offer the most frequent example. As they often appear to us woven out of love and respect, or also contempt; from love and felt harmony of natures and synchronistic consciousness to the completion of one another through opposition; from love and imperiousness or the need for dependence. What the observer or even the subject itself interprets as two combining streams is in reality often only one of them. In the relationship, as it exists after all, the whole personality of one affects that of the other, and its reality is independent of the consideration that, if this relationship had simply not existed, the personalities would themselves then infuse at least respect or fondness or the opposite of that. Countless times we describe that sort of thing as emotionally mixed or proportionately blended because we construe the outcomes that the qualities of the one party would exercise on the other, as *if they operated in isolation*—which they simply do *not* do; seen quite apart from the fact here that the mix of feelings and relationships themselves, where spoken of with greater justification, remains always a problematic expression that translates a spatially vivid event with unrestricted symbolism into fully heterogeneous mental relationships.

So it must also often occur with the so-called mix of converging and diverging currents in a community. Then either the relationship is from the very beginning *sui generis, i.e.* its motivation and form are in themselves entirely unitary and accordingly we compose it from a monistic and an antagonistic current only in order to be able to describe it and arrange it. Or each of them is definitely present from the very beginning, but, as it were, before the relationship came to be; *in* it they have developed into an organic unity in which either of them is not made noticeable at all with its specific energy; of course, related to that and not to be overlooked is the enormous number of relationships in which the parts of relationships in opposition continue to run objectively and separately next to one another and can in any given moment be distinguished from the total context. It is a peculiar nuance of the historical development of relationships that they sometimes manifest at an early stage an undifferentiated unity of converging and diverging tendencies that only later unfolds into a complete differentiation. Still

in the thirteenth century permanent assemblies of nobles are found in the courts of central Europe which are a kind of council to the prince, live as his guests, and at the same time are a semi-permanent representation of the aristocracy, who also saw to their interests, however, *against* those of the prince. The community of interests with the king, whose administration they occasionally served, and the oppositional protection of their own collective rights existed in these structures not only inseparably *side by side* but *inside* one another; the position was surely experienced as unifying just as its elements appear to us as incompatible. In England around this time the parliament of barons was still hardly distinguishable from an augmented council of the king. Factionalism and critical or partisan enmity are here still resolved in an embryonic unity. As long as it is in general initially a matter of the fashioning of institutions that have to solve the ever multifaceted and complex problem of the inner balance of the group, as long as it will be frequently uncertain whether its effective combination shall work for the benefit of the whole in the form of opposition, competition, and criticism, or in that of unmediated unity and harmony—an original state of indifference will exist that appears logically inconsistent from the later complications but which necessarily corresponds to the organization's undeveloped state. The subjective personal relationships often develop in an oppositional direction because the sharpness of factionalism or hostility in early cultural epochs tends to be relatively acute. Half- and undetermined relationships among people, taking root in a semi-consciousness of feelings, the final word of which can be hate just as well as love, which, indeed, betrays its indifference sometimes in a pendulum between both—such relationships are as native to mature and more-than-mature times as to youthful ones.

As little as antagonism by itself amounts to making a society, so little does it—borderline cases aside—tend to be absent as a sociological factor in processes of making one, and its role can increase in perpetuity, that is, up to the displacement of all forces of unity. Thus the resulting scale of relationships is also constructed from ethical categories, although these latter are in general not suitable indicators for uncovering incidentally and thoroughly what is sociological among the phenomena. The value sensations with which we attend the acts of will of individuals produce series that have a purely random relationship to the selecting of their forms of relationship in accord with objective conceptual viewpoints. One would rob ethics of its deepest and finest content as soon as one represented it as a kind of sociology: the activity

of the soul in and toward itself, which does not enter into its external relationships at all; its religious movements, which serve only its own redemption or ruin; its dedication to the objective value of knowledge, beauty, the significance of things, which stand beyond any bond with other humans. The blend of harmonious and hostile relationships, however, has sociological and ethical levels overlapping from the outset. It begins here with the action of A for the benefit of B, proceeds to A's own benefit by means of B, without using B, but also without harming B, and finally leads to egoistic action at the expense of B. While this is now reciprocated on the part of B, though almost never in the exact same way and to the same degree, the unavoidable mixing of convergence and divergence originates in human relationships.

Admittedly, there are conflicts that seem to exclude any other dynamic: e.g. that between the robber or rowdy and a victim. If such a conflict leads to utter destruction, then it borders without question on treacherous murder, in which the admixture of unifying factors equaled zero; as soon as any kind of protection against that exists, some limit to violent action, there is indeed a force for making a sociely, even if only as restraint. Kant claimed that every war in which the parties imposed no such restraint in the use of possible means has to have become a war of extermination, especially on psychological grounds. Since wherever one would not at least abstain from assassination, breach of promise, and incitement to betrayal, one destroys the very trust in the enemy's way of thinking that makes a peaceful conclusion at all possible. Almost inevitably some element of common ground weaves itself into the hostilities, where the state of open violence has given way to some other kind of relationship that perhaps manifests a completely undiminished sum of hostility between the parties. When the Lombards had conquered Italy in the sixth century, they imposed a tribute of one third of the harvest on their subjects, and so every single victor was in fact dependent on the levy of particular individuals. With the type here described the hatred of the conquered towards their oppressors may be especially strong, indeed, perhaps yet stronger, than during the fight itself, and may be reciprocated by the latter no less intensively—be it, because the hatred towards them who hate us is an instinctive preventive measure, be it, because, as is generally known, we tend to hate them whom we have injured. Nevertheless, now there exists in the relationship a community, precisely that which the enmity produced, which required participation of the Lombards in the affairs of the indigenous people, which was at the same time an

undeniable parallel of interests. In that at this point divergence and harmony became inextricably intertwined, the content of the former actually developed as the germ of future community. This form type was realized most broadly in the enslavement—in lieu of killing—of captured enemies. Of course, in this slavery myriad times there is the marginal case of absolute internal animosity, the occasion of which, however, effects precisely a sociological relationship and thereby often enough its own mitigation. The intensification of opposition can be thus directly provoked for the sake of its own reduction, in fact not at all only as an extreme measure, in the confidence that the antagonism would end beyond some level in exhaustion or in an understanding of its folly; but also in that occasionally princes serve as leaders of the opposition in monarchies, as, for example, Gustav Vasa did.[4] Opposition is definitely thereby intensified; this new emphasis brings its elements to what would have otherwise been kept far away from them; but at the same time precisely for that reason it is kept within certain limits. While the government strengthens the opposition seemingly deliberately, it takes the sting out of it precisely through this accommodation.

Another marginal case appears to occur when conflict is occasioned exclusively through the desire to fight. As soon as an object ignites it, a desire to have or to dominate, rage or revenge, not only do conditions arise from the object or the materializing situation that subordinate the fight to common norms or mutual restrictions, but where an ultimate goal in question is situated externally, it will be colored by the fact that any goal is in principle achievable through *various* means. Desire for a possession as well as for domination, indeed for the annihilation of an enemy, can be satisfied as much by alternative maneuvers and occurrences as by conflict. Where conflict is simply a specific means toward a *terminus ad quem*,[5] no reason exists for not limiting or refraining from it where it can be replaced by other means with the same results. But where it is determined exclusively by the subjective *terminus a quo*,[6] where inner energies exist that *can* be satisfied only by conflict as such—in that case substituting something else for it is impossible, because it is its own purpose and content and thus completely free

[4] Gustav Vasa (ca. 1496–1560), son of a Swedish senator, led a rebellion against King Christian II of Denmark and thereby established the Kingdom of Sweden and his own dynasty—ed.

[5] Latin: point of arrival—ed.

[6] Latin: point of departure—ed.

of any supplementation by other forms. Such a conflict for the sake of conflict seems to suggest a certain impulse of formal hostility that sometimes necessitates psychological observation and about whose various forms it is now time to speak.

The skeptical moralists speak of a natural hostility among human beings, for whom *homo homini lupus est*,[7] and "in the misfortune of our best friends is something that does not completely displease us."[8] But the completely opposite moral-philosophical attitude, which derives moral selflessness from the transcendental foundations of our nature, is not thereby all that very far removed from that pessimism, for it nevertheless concedes that devotion to the 'Thou' is not found in the experience and calculability of our drives. Empirically, rationally, the human being is accordingly plainly egoist, and every twist of this natural reality can no longer occur through nature itself but only through the *deus ex machina* of a metaphysical being inside us. So a naturally occurring opposition seems to present itself as a form or foundation of human relationships, standing at least alongside the other, sympathy between human beings. The peculiarly strong interest that people tend to take, for example, precisely in the *suffering* of the other is only explained by a blend of both motivations. The not infrequent 'spirit of opposition' points to the antipathy that is a part of our being, which in no way resides only in those for whom nay-saying is a matter of principle, such as those who are the exasperation of their environment, in friend as well as in family circles, in committees as well as among the theater public; it is likewise in no way the most characteristic triumph of the political realm, in the persons of opposition whose classical type Macaulay describes in Robert Ferguson: "His hostility was not to Popery or to Protestantism, to monarchical government or to republican government, to the house of Stuarts or to the house of Nassau, but to whatever was at the time

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[7] Latin, translated loosely: "People are like wolves toward one another." Simmel actually mixes Latin and German: "...für die homo homini lupus ist..."—ed.

[8] Simmel does not cite his sources here. The Latin quotation is apparently originally from the play *Asinaria* by Plautus [Eugene Ehrlich, *Amo, Amas, Amat and More*, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 144]. The latter quotation is apparently from François Duc de La Rochefoucauld (1613–1680), in an early edition of *Reflexions ou Sentences et Maximes Morales* (editions were published, starting in 1665). See Rodney Ohebsion, "A Collection of Wisdom: Francois duc de La Rochefoucauld," in *Immediex Publishing*, <http://www.immediex.com/rochefoucauld.html> [accessed 2 May 2007]—ed.

established."[9] All such cases that one considers types of 'pure opposition' *need* not, for all that, be this; because such opponents tend to offer themselves as defenders of threatened rights, as advocates for the just, chivalrous protectors of the minority as such. Much less distinctive occurrences seem to me to betray an abstract oppositional drive more clearly: the quiet, often hardly conscious, frequently immediately fleeting impulse to negate a claim or demand, especially when it confronts us in categorical form. Even in thoroughly harmonious relationships among many thoroughly tractable natures, this instinct for opposition arises with the unavoidability of a reflex movement and blends into the overall performance, though without notable consequence. And if one wanted to identify this as really something of a protective instinct—in the way that many animals automatically extend their defense or attack mechanisms at a mere touch—this would then directly manifest the primary, fundamental character of opposition; what is meant is that the personality, where it itself is hardly affected but is faced purely with objective expressions of another, can do nothing else but assert through opposition that the first instinct with which it affirms itself is the negation of the other.

Above all, it seems impossible to relinquish an *a priori* conflict instinct if the incredibly petty, even silly causes of the most serious conflicts are considered. An English historian tells that not long ago throughout the country two Irish parties had fought furiously, whose hostility is supposed to have arisen from a dispute over the color of a cow. In India for decades dangerous insurgencies occurred as a result of the feud between two parties who knew nothing about one another except that they were the party of the right and left hand. And this pettiness of the origins of dispute emerges only, as it were, at the other end, so that the dispute also often flows into similarly childish phenomena. Moslems and Hindus live in India in continuous latent enmity, and they indicate this by the Moslems buttoning their outer garment on the right, the Hindus on the left, by their sitting in rows in the circle at common meals so that the poor Moslems use a side of a certain leaf as a plate and the poor Hindus the other. In human enmities, cause and effect stand so often apart from context and reasonable proportion that one

[9] The source: Thomas Babington Macaulay, *The History of England From the Accession of James II*—ed.

cannot correctly ascertain whether the purported object of the dispute is really the occasion for it or only an offshoot of an already existing antagonism; leastwise the impenetrability of some kind of a rational foundation for the contest leads us into suspicion vis-à-vis such specific instances of struggle as those between the Roman and Greek race-track factions, the partisans of ʽομοουσιος and ʽομοιουσιος,[10] the War of the Roses (red and white roses), the Guelfs and the Ghibellines. In general one has the impression that human beings would no more love one another on account of such trifles and trivialities than hate.

Finally, the often eerily faint suggestion of a hostile disposition seems to me to point to a primordial need for animosity. The average person in general finds it much more difficult to inspire in another any kind of confidence and affection for a third person, until then a neutral, than mistrust and antipathy. Particularly noteworthy here it appears that this difference is relatively glaring especially where it is a matter of a slight degree on the part of both, the elementary beginnings of the disposition and of the prejudice for or against someone; then at a higher degree leading to action, it is no longer this inclination, fleeting but revelatory of a basic instinct, that adjudicates, but more conscious considerations. It manifests the same basic fact, albeit with a different twist, that those slight prejudices, haunting our picture of another just like a shadow, can be suggested to us even by completely different personalities, while a *favorable* preconception requires for sure an authoritative instigator or one comfortably close to us. Perhaps without this ease or thoughtlessness with which the average person reacts directly to suggestions of an *unfavorable* type, the *aliquid haeret*[11] would not acquire its tragic truth. The observation of some antipathies and factionalizing, intrigues and open conflicts could allow the animosity to line up under those primary human energies that are not unleashed by the external reality of their objects but rather are self-constructed based on their objects. So it is said, human beings do not have religion because they believe in a God but because they have religion as a disposition of the soul; then they believe in a God. This is generally well recognized with regard to love, in that, especially in youthful years, it is not merely the reaction of our soul, thereby called forth by its object as that object becomes

[10] *Homousios* and *homoiousios*, an early Christian theological dispute—ed.

[11] Aliquid haeret, Latin: literally, *something stays* or, in this case, *something will stick*—ed.

a sensation of color in our optical apparatus; rather the soul has the need to love, and so reaches out to take hold of some kind of an object that satisfies it, even while it clothes it for itself, if need be, with the characteristics that apparently initially called forth the love. This is not to say that—emphasizing the same qualification—this could not also be the development of the opposite affect, that the soul would not also possess a built-in autochthonous need to hate and to fight, which often then for its part projects its hate-inspiring characteristics into the objects that it designates for itself. This case being not so flagrantly obvious as that of the corresponding love may lie in the fact that the love drive, by virtue of its immense physiological intensification in youth, documents its spontaneity, its determination by the *terminus a quo*, quite unmistakably. The hate drive probably has such acute stages in itself only exceptionally, whereby its subjective-spontaneous character would become conscious in the same way.[12]

If, then, a formal instinct for animosity actually exists in humans as a counterpart to the need for comradeship, it nevertheless appears to me to stem historically from one of those mental distillation processes in which inner movements ultimately leave behind the form that is common to them as an autonomous drive in the soul. Interests of every kind compel us so frequently towards conflict over particular goods, into opposition against particular personalities, that there may very well be a condition of stimulation, pressuring us as a residuum of them towards expressions of antagonism, transformed within our kind's hereditary inventory. The reciprocal relationship of primitive groups is well known and, for oft-debated reasons, almost continuously a hostile one. The most definitive example is perhaps the Native Americans,[13] by which every tribe viewed itself as existing in principle in a state of war with every

[12] All relationships of one person to another are divided most fundamentally according to this question—albeit in countless transitions between its 'yes' and 'no': whether its psychological foundation is a drive of the subject, which in itself, as drive, develops even without any external stimulus and for its part from the outset seeks an adequate object for it—be that it it finds it as adequate, be that it transforms it through fantasy and necessity into adequacy; or whether the psychological foundation consists in the reaction that the being or activity of a personality calls forth in us; naturally the potentialities for it must also be present in us, but they would by themselves remain latent and would never by themselves take shape as drives. Intellectual as well as aesthetic, sympathetic as well as antipathetic relationships to people materialize into this contrast, and frequently draw their formula for development, their intensity and their climax, only from this foundation.

[13] Simmel, for that time, of course, writes: *Indianer*—ed.

other tribe with whom it had not expressly concluded a peace treaty. It must not be forgotten, however, that in early cultural conditions war comprised almost the only form in which a group came into contact at all with foreign groups. As long as inter-territorial trade was undeveloped, individual travel unknown, psychological commonalities not yet transcending group boundaries, there was no sociological relationship between the separate groups apart from war. Here the relationship of the group elements to one another and that of the groups—primitive ones—to one another manifest a completely oppositional form. Inside the closed circle enmity as a rule means the *breaking off* of relationships, the withdrawal and avoidance of contacts; here even the impassioned interaction of open conflict is accompanied by these negative aspects. In contrast, distinct groups remain entirely indifferent to one another, so long as there is peace, and first gain an active importance for one another in war. For that reason even the same drive for expansion and influence, which requires internally an unconditional peace as the foundation of intertwined interests and unhindered interaction, can appear towards the outside as a warlike tendency.

Despite the autonomy that one may thus grant to the antagonistic drive in the psyche, still it is not quite enough on which to ground all the phenomena of animosity. First of all, because even the most spontaneous drive curbs its sovereignty to the extent that it does not turn to just any desirable object but only those that are in some way suitable: certainly hunger stems from the subject, without first being actualized by the object, and yet it will not jump at stones and wood but only at objects in some way edible. So even love and hate, however little their drives may be rooted in an external stimulus, will nevertheless require some kind of a structure corresponding to their objects, and will have their complete manifestation only under this concurrence. On the other hand, it seems to me likely that the drive of animosity, on account of its formal character, accelerates in general only with regard to materially induced controversies, putting the pedal to the metal, as it were. And where a conflict springs from a pure, formal desire to fight, which is thus entirely impersonal, in principle indifferent regarding the content as well as the opponent—there hate and fury towards the opponent as a person unavoidably runs its course, as does the interest in a contested prize, because these affects nourish and increase the psychological force of the conflict. It is *functional* also to hate the opponent with whom one is fighting for whatever reason, just as it is functional to love the one to whom one is bound and with whom one must get along. The

truth expressed by a popular song in Berlin, "What one does for love, it is pleasing to repeat," applies as well to what one does for hate. The reciprocal behavior of human beings is often understandable only in that an inner accommodation cultivates for us those feelings that are then the most functional for the given situation, for its exploitation or its completion, for tolerating or shortening it, feelings that empower us through psychological integration, as they are required for the performance of the tasks at hand and the neutralizing of the inner conflicting drives. So no serious fight may long endure without the support—even if developing only gradually—of a *complex* of psychological drives. This is of great sociological significance: the purity of conflict only for the sake of conflict undergoes such admixtures of, in part, more objective interests, in part, of such impulses that can also be satisfied in other ways than through conflict and that in practice throw a bridge between the strife and other forms of interaction. I know of actually only one single case in which the attraction of conflict and victory in and of itself, as a rule only the one element of substantively induced antagonism, constitutes the exclusive motive: the sporting competition, and indeed this kind of event takes place without a prize located outside the game itself.[14] Here the purely sociological attraction of achieving mastery and recognition against others in the contests of skill combines with the purely individual pleasure of purposeful and successful movement, and in the playful gamble with the favor of destiny that blesses us with a mystically harmonious relationship to the powers-that-be beyond individual as well as social events. In any case, the athletic contest contains in its *sociological motivation* absolutely nothing other than the contest itself. The worthless token which is struggled for, often with the same passion as for pieces of gold, exposes the formalism of this impulse, which also often far outweighs the material interest in the competition for gold pieces. Now it is noteworthy that precisely this most complete dualism presupposes in its actualization sociological forms in the narrower sense, standardization: one *allies* in order to fight, and one fights under the mutually recognized domination of norms and rules. As noted, these standardizations, in whose forms this nevertheless develops, do not enter into the *motivations* behind the whole undertaking; they present the

[14] 'Sporting competition' translates *das Kampfspiel* (literally 'fight-game' or 'conflict-game'), which can mean boxing match, prize-fight, jousting tournament, or any kind of athletic or quasi-athletic contest for its own sake—ed.

mechanism without which such a conflict, excluding all heterogeneous or objective reasons, would not be feasible. Indeed, the standardization of the athletic contest is often one so rigorous, impersonal, mutually observed with strictness of an honor code, as associations for cooperative enterprises hardly ever exhibit.

This example places next to one another the principle of conflict and that of association, the latter of which likewise holds opposites together, almost with the purity of abstract concepts and are thus revealed as acquiring their full sociological sense and reality only in relation to one another. The same form dominates litigation, albeit without this tidiness and mixture of elements. Certainly there is here a contested objective, which can be settled satisfactorily through this voluntary concession, something not possible with conflict for the sake of conflict; and what one even in legal disputes identifies as a desire and passion for fighting is likely in most cases something else altogether: namely the energetic sense of justice, the impossibility of tolerating a real or imagined infringement in the sphere of law with which the 'I' feels a sense of identification. The complete obstinacy and the uncompromising stubbornness by which parties in legal processes so often bleed to death, hardly has the character of the offensive even on the part of the plaintiff, but rather that of the defensive in a deeper sense: it is simply a matter of the self-preservation of the personality that so extends into one's property and one's rights that every encroachment on them defeats it, and for that reason the fight is a matter consequential for one's entire existence. This individualistic impulse and not the sociological one for fighting will thus determine such cases. Considering the form of conflict itself, however, the legal dispute is indeed an absolute conflict; *i.e.*, the respective claims are pursued with pure objectivity and with all permissible means, without being driven or moderated by personal or some kind of other extraneously located factors; the legal dispute is purely dispute in so far as nothing enters into the complete action that does not belong to the dispute *as such* and would not serve the purpose of the dispute. While otherwise even in the wildest conflicts something yet subjective, some kind of a simple fateful turn, an intervention by a third party is leastwise possible, all such is here excluded by the objectivity with which just the dispute and nothing but the dispute proceeds. This exclusion from litigation of everything that is not conflict can of course lead to a formalism of conflict that proceeds independently of the content. This occurs on the one hand in the legal sophistry whereby the pros and cons of the objective factors themselves are generally no longer considered,

but instead an entirely abstract conflict is simply erected imaginatively. On the other hand the dispute is sometimes transferred to parties who have no relationship at all to that which is supposed to be decided by the conflict. When legal disputes in higher cultures are fought out by professional advocates, this serves then the pure resolution of the dispute apart from all personal associations that have nothing to do with it; when however Otto the Great determines that a legally disputed question should be decided by a divinely judged duel, and indeed between professional fencers—so all that is left of the entire issue of the conflict is the mere form, so that that is what is fought and triumphs, this is all that is shared between the dispute that is supposed to be decided and that which it decides. This case expresses in caricaturing exaggeration this presently concerned reduction and limitation of the legal dispute to the mere element of contest. However, this most merciless type of conflict is positioned precisely through its pure objectivity—because it stands indeed quite beyond the subjective opposites of compassion and cruelty and far more thoroughly on the presupposition of a unity and commonality of the parties than is the case as strictly or in similar measure with hardly any other kind of relationship. The common subordination to the law, the mutual recognition that the decision should result only from the objective force of the arguments, the adherence to formalities that apply uncompromisingly to both parties, the consciousness that the entire process is to be enveloped by a social power and order which only then gives it meaning and reliability—all this allows the legal dispute to rest on a broad foundation of unity and consensus among the disputants; thus the parties to a hearing take the form, albeit in smaller measure, of an entity of a commercial-type transaction, in that they acknowledge, along with all the opposition of interests, mutually—amicably—mandatory norms. The *common* presuppositions that exclude everything merely personal from the legal dispute carry that character of pure objectivity, to which for its part now the inexorability, the severity, the unconditional character of the dispute conforms. The interactive relationship between the dualism and the unity of the sociological relationship is manifested thus in the legal dispute no less than the sporting contest; precisely the most extreme and unbridled nature of the contest takes place while it is surrounded and supported by the strict unity of common norms and limitations.

Ultimately this emerges everywhere where the parties are preoccupied by an objective interest, *i.e.* wherever the issue in dispute and therefore the dispute itself is differentiated from the personality itself.

Here now the duality is possible that the conflict can turn purely on objective decisions and leave everything personal outside it and in a state of peace; or it can simply grip the persons in their subjectivity, without thereby leading concurrently to an alteration or change in the objective interests, which the parties hold in common. The latter type is characterized by the expression from Leibniz: he would pursue even his deadly enemy if he could learn something from him. That this can becalm and moderate enmity itself is so obvious here that only the opposite result can come into question. And though the enmity that runs alongside an association and understanding in objective matters has, so to say, a clarity and certainty in its own right, the consciousness of such a separation assures us that we will not let the personal animosity encroach where it does not belong; and yet this good conscience that we purchase for ourselves with that differentiation can in some circumstances actually lead to an intensification of the animosity. Because where it is thus limited to its actual source, which at the same time is the most subjective of the personality, we abandon ourselves to it at times progressively more passionately, more concentrated, than when its impulse yet shared a ballast of secondary animosities in realms that are actually only attached to that central one. Where the same differentiation, on the contrary, leaves the dispute attached only to impersonal interests, the useless intensification and embitterment, whereby the personalizing of objective controversies tends towards revenge, will certainly similarly cease; on the other hand, however, the consciousness of being the representative of supra-individual demands, of fighting not for oneself but only for the substantive issue can give the fight a radicalism and a ruthlessness that finds its analogy in the collective conduct of many very selfless, highly idealistically disposed people: since they do not take themselves into consideration, they do not take others into consideration either and think it fully justifiable to sacrifice themselves as well as to slaughter others for the idea. Such a fight, in which certainly all the powers of the person are engaged, while the victory is supposed to accrue only to the issue at hand, will bear the character of the noble: since the noble person is the wholly personal one who yet knows to hold one's personality entirely in reserve; therefore, objectivity functions as *noblesse*.[15] But once this separation is accomplished and the conflict objectified, it rather consistently does not

[15] *Noblesse*, French for nobility—ed.

yield to one of renewed restraint; indeed, this would be a sin against the objective interest on which the conflict has focused. The struggle is fought out now with absolute severity over this mutual interest of the parties—in that each defends only the issue and its claim, and foregoes all personal self-seeking—without intensifying but also without the mitigations of a court of persons and obedient only to its immanent logic. The opposition thus formed between unity and antagonism intensifies perhaps most perceptibly where both parties are really pursuing one and the same goal, for example, the exploration of a scientific truth. Here any indulgence, any polite renunciation of the merciless exposure of the antagonist, any peace agreement before a completely decisive victory would be a betrayal of that very objectivity for which personality had been excluded from the contest. Social struggles since Marx, with infinite further variations, develop into the same form. Insofar as it is recognized that the situation of the workers is determined by the objective conditions and forms of production, independently of the will and ability of individual persons, the personal bitterness of the principal struggle as well as the local one clearly diminishes. The employer as such is then no longer a bloodsucker and damnable egoist, the worker no longer in all circumstances of sinful covetousness; both parties at least begin to cast their demands and tactics in something other than the personal motivation of malevolence. This objectification is guided in Germany actually in a theoretical manner, in England by means of labor unions; while personal and individual antagonism with us was overridden by the more abstract generality of historical and class movements, there it was by the strict supra-individual unity in the actions of the labor unions and employers' associations. The intensity of the fight, however, did not for that reason decrease; indeed, on the contrary, it became more goal-driven, more concentrated, and at the same time more far reaching in the consciousness of the individuals, to be fought not only and often not at all for themselves, but for a great supra-personal goal. An interesting symptom of this correlation is furnished for example by the boycott of the Berlin breweries by the workers in the year 1894. This was one of the most severe regional conflicts of the last century, conducted by both sides with the most extreme energy, but without any—really very obvious—personal hatefulness of the boycott leaders towards the brewers or the directors towards them. Indeed, two of the party leaders in the middle of the struggle set forth their opinions about it in one and the same periodical, both objectively and thus agreeing in the presentation of the facts, and differing partisan-wise

only in the practical implications. While the conflict separates out everything irrelevantly personal and thereby limits quantitatively the antagonism, a mutual respect, an understanding in everything personal is made possible, generating an acceptance of being driven by shared historical imperatives—this unifying basis nevertheless did not modify the intensity, irreconcilability and unyielding consequence of the struggle, but increased it.

The opponents having a shared reality over which their conflict arises in the first place can indeed appear in much less noble events than in those touched on above: when, namely, the commonality is not an objective norm, an interest situated beyond the competitive egoism of the party, but rather a covert factional agreement in a shared egoistic purpose common to both of them. To some degree that was the case with the two major parties in England in the eighteenth century. An opposition of political convictions, which would have gotten to the root of things, did not exist between them since it was for both of them equally a matter of the perpetuation of the aristocratic regime. It was the peculiarity that two parties who divided the ground of political contest fully between themselves did not, though, fight radically—because they concluded a tacit pact with each other against something which was not at all politically factional. One linked the parliamentary corruption of that period with this peculiar restriction of conflict: selling out one's conviction for the good of the opposing party did not seem all that bad to anyone since the creed of this opposing party had indeed a rather broad, albeit also hidden basis in common with that of one's own, beyond which their fight initially began! The ease of corruption showed that the restriction of antagonism by an existing commonality had not made it then more principled or objective but on the contrary calmed it and tainted its objectively necessary meaning.

In other purer cases the synthesis of convergence and divergence of relationships can have the opposite result if unity is the starting point and foundation of the relationship and then conflict rises above it. This tends to be more passionate and radical than where no kind of prior or simultaneously existing solidarity of the parties is found. Where the ancient Jewish law permitted bigamy, it nevertheless prohibited marriage with two sisters (although a man could marry one after the death of the other) because this would especially lend itself to the incitement of jealousy! It is thus presumed, without more ado, as a reality of experience that a stronger antagonism is found on grounds of familial commonalities than among strangers. The mutual hatred of rather small

neighboring states, whose whole world view, whose local relationships and interests are unavoidably most similar, indeed must often coincide, is frequently much more passionate and irreconcilable than that between large nations that are spatially as well as materially completely removed from each other. That was the fate of Greece and late Roman Italy, and an escalation of the same shook England before the amalgamation of the two races came about after the Norman Conquest. The hatred between these two, who lived indiscriminately on the same territory, bound to one another by progressively functional life interests, held together by a uniform national consciousness—and yet internally fully alien to one another, generally without mutual understanding and in power interests absolutely hostile to one another—this hatred was, as justifiably emphasized, more bitter than it can emerge at all between externally and internally separated tribes. Church relationships provide the clearest examples since the smallest difference among them in their dogmatic focus immediately takes on a logical incompatibility: when there is any deviation at all, it is conceptually indifferent whether it is great or small. Thus it was in the confessional disputes between the Lutherans and the members of the Reformed Church, specifically in the seventeenth century. Hardly had the great separation from Catholicism taken place, the totality so divided on account of the most idle things into parties whom one hears saying from time to time that one could sooner maintain fellowship with the Papists than with those of the other confession! And when in 1875 in Bern a difficulty over the location of the Catholic worships service arose, the Pope would not allow it to be held in the church that the Old Catholics used, but possibly in a Reformed church.

Two kinds of commonality are possible as foundations of a whole other heightened antagonism: the commonality of qualities and the commonality by way of involvement in *the same* social context. The former refers exclusively to the fact that we are different beings. An opposition must excite the consciousness all the more deeply and intensely when it is in contrast to a correspondingly greater similarity among the parties. In a peaceful or affectionate ambience this is an excellent safeguard of the association, comparable to the warning function of pain inside an organism, because precisely the energized consciousness with which the dissonance is felt on the otherwise thoroughgoing harmony of the relationship immediately urges the removal of the cause of the dispute so that it would not simply further gnaw in semi-consciousness through to the foundation of the relationship. However, where this basic

intention ultimately to get along in all circumstances is lacking, the consciousness of the antagonism, already sharpened by the similarity, will itself intensify. People who have much in common often treat one another with greater wickedness and injustice than complete strangers, sometimes because the large common area between them was taken for granted, and so, rather than that, the momentary difference controls their position toward one another, but mainly just because so little is different between them that every smallest antagonism has a completely different relative importance than between those more different who are from the outset mutually fixed with all possible differences. Hence the family conflicts over the incredibly smallest things, hence the tragedy of the 'trifle' over which completely compatible people sometimes have a falling out. This by no means always proves that the forces for harmony were already declining; it can simply follow from some great similarity in qualities, inclinations, convictions, so that the falling out over a completely unimportant point comes to be felt through the sharpness of the opposition as something entirely unbearable. It comes down to this: one is objective about the stranger, with whom one shares neither qualities nor extensive interests; one holds one's own personality in reserve; thus the single difference does not so easily become all-consuming. Very different people are encountered typically regarding issues of only a single negotiation or coincidence of interest, and therefore the resolution of a conflict is limited to that matter. The more we as whole persons have in common with another, the more readily will our wholeness link up every single connection with that person; thus the completely disproportionate vehemence with which otherwise thoroughly controlled people sometimes allow themselves to be carried away when it comes to their closest intimates. All the joy and the depth in the connections to another person with whom we feel ourselves, as it were, identified: so that no single connection, no single word, no single common action or trouble actually remains single, but each is a garment for the whole soul that stretches over the other and is welcomed—just this makes an emerging dispute among such persons often so passionately expansive and gives the schema to the disastrous: "You—of all people." Sometimes closely bonded people are too accustomed to putting the totality of their being and sentiment into the aspects that attract them towards one another to be able also to endow the dispute with subtlety and more-or-less with a boundary by which it would not grow beyond its cause and its objective significance and carry the whole personality into the quarrel. At the highest level of

mental development this may be avoided because inherent in it is the binding of complete devotion of the soul to a person with nevertheless a fully mutual separation of the elements of the soul; while undifferentiated passion blends the totality of persons with the arousal of a part or moment, education allows no such element to go beyond its own, firmly circumscribed claim, and the relationship, thereby harmonious in nature, offers the advantage to the persons of becoming conscious right at the moment of conflict of how negligible it is in relation to the forces that bind them together. But apart from this, the refined sensitivity for distinctions will, particularly in deep natures, make positive and negative feelings thereby all the more passionate, so that they stand in contrast to the past with its opposing hue, and certainly with nonrecurring, irrevocable determinations of their relationship, quite distinct from the back-and-forth oscillations in the everyday banalities of a togetherness entirely unquestioned. Between men and women a very fundamental aversion, even a feeling of hate—not for any specific reasons but as the mutual repulsion of the whole personal being—is sometimes an initial stage in a relationship, whose second stage is passionate love. One could come to the paradoxical presumption that in natures that are meant to be of the closest of emotional relationships, this cycle would be evoked by an instinctive utility in order to procure the definitive feeling through its opposite prelude—like winding up in preparation—the passionate intensification and consciousness which one has then gained. The same form is manifested in the opposite phenomenon: the deepest hatred grows out of broken love. Here not only is the sensitivity to difference probably decisive, but above all the denial of one's own past that is involved in such a change in sentiment. To recognize a deep love—and certainly not only a sexual one—as a mistake and a lack of instinct is such an exposure of oneself, such a fracture through the security and integrity of our self-consciousness that inevitably we make the object of this unbearable reality pay for it. We conveniently cover up the covert feeling of our own guilt for it with the hatred that makes it easy for us to shift the entire blame onto the other.

This exceptional bitter feeling from conflicts within relationships in which by their nature domestic peace is supposed to rule seems to be a positive reinforcement of the commonplace assumption that relationships manifest their closeness and strength particularly in the absence of differences. However, this commonplace assumption is not even valid by way of exception. That no sources of conflict would appear at all

in very intimate communities, communities dominating one's whole life or at least involving all aspects of life, as marriage is for example, is completely impossible. Never really to indulge those conflicts, but rather to take precautions against them from a distance, to curtail them from the very beginning with mutual agreement, is in no way always a matter of the most genuine and deepest affection; on the contrary it occurs precisely in attitudes that are certainly loving, moral, faithful, but lack the ultimate, most absolute devotion of feeing. The individual, to not bring this into conscious awareness, is all the more anxiously trying to keep the relationship pure of every shadow, to compensate for the lack thereof through the most extreme friendliness, self-control, regard for the other, especially though to soothe one's conscience over the weaker or stronger insincerity of one's behavior, which even the most genuine, often indeed the most passionate desire cannot change into reality—because it is here a matter of feelings that are not subject to the will but arrive or fail to arrive like forces of fate. The insecurity sensed at the foundation of such a relationship moves us with the desire to maintain it at all cost, often with too entirely exaggerated a selflessness, shielding it excessively mechanically by avoiding every possibility of conflict as a matter of principle. Where one is certain of the irreversibility and unconditional nature of one's own feeling, this excessive peaceableness is not needed at all; one knows that no shock can reach to the foundation of the relationship on which they will ever and again come together. The strongest love can best endure a blow, and the fear of a lesser one, the consequences of which cannot at all be foreseen and which one would thus have to avoid under all circumstances, does not even come up. As discord among intimate people can thus have even more tragic consequences than among acquaintances, so precisely from those connections the most deeply grounded relationship lets it come about much sooner in one of that kind, while some admittedly good and moral relationships, but rooted in feelings that are less deep, proceed apparently more harmoniously and less conflict-ridden.

A particular nuance of the sociological sensitivity to difference and the accentuation of conflict on the basis of similarity arises where the separation of originally homogeneous elements is intentional, where the separation follows not actually from the conflict, but the conflict from the separation. The prototype for this is the hatred of the renegade and that against the renegade. The image of the former harmony still functions so strongly that the present opposition is infinitely much more acute and bitter than if no relationship at all had existed from the very

beginning. Add to this, that both parties will extract the difference from the lingering similarity—the unambiguity of which is of utmost importance to both of them—frequently in just such a way that it expands out beyond its original source and seizes on every relevant point at all; for this purpose of securing position, theoretical or religious apostasy leads to a mutual denunciation in any kind of ethical, personal, internal or external respect, which is not at all necessary when the exact same difference occurs between strangers. Indeed, that in general a difference of *convictions* degenerates into hatred and strife occurs for the most part only with essentially and originally homogeneous parties. The sociologically very important phenomenon of 'respect for the enemy' tends to be absent where the enmity arose over an earlier solidarity. Where then so much similarity continues to exist that confusion and the blurring of boundaries are possible, points of difference have to be accentuated with a sharpness that is often not at all justified by the matter itself but only by this danger. This functioned, for example, in the case mentioned above of Catholicism in Bern. Roman Catholicism does not need to fear that through an external contact with such a fully heterogeneous church as the Reformed its uniqueness would be threatened, but arguably through contact with one so closely related as Old Catholicism.

This example already touches on the second type in question here, which certainly in practice more or less coincides with the other: the enmity whose intensification is grounded in solidarity and unity—which is in no way also always similarity. The reason for its separate treatment is that here, instead of the sense of difference, a whole new rationale arises, the peculiar appearance of social hatred, *i.e.* of the hatred for a group member, not from personal motives, but because a danger to the existence of the group comes from that person. Insofar as such a person threatens by discord inside the group, the one party hates the other not only on the substantive basis that provoked the discord, but also on the sociological, in that we simply hate the enemy of the group as such. While this is a reciprocal occurrence, and each blames the other for threatening the whole, an intensification accrues to the antagonism precisely by virtue of the membership of its parties in *one* unitary group. Most characteristic of this are the cases in which it does not actually come to a breaking up of the group; since until this has occurred, it means a specific solution to the conflict has been found, the personal difference found its sociological solution, and the instigator of ever renewed irritation was removed. It is in fact precisely

for this result that the strain between antagonism and the still existing unity must operate. As it is dreadful to be alienated from someone to whom one is nevertheless bonded—outwardly, however also internally bonded in the most tragic cases—from whom one *cannot get free*, even if one wanted to, so the bitterness increases when one does not *want* the community to break up, because one does not want to give up the values of belonging to the all-encompassing unity, or because one feels this unity as an objective value, the threat to which generates strife and hatred. From these constellations arise the vehemence with which, for example, fights inside of a political faction or a labor union or a family are settled. The individual soul offers an analogy to this. The feeling that a conflict within us between sensual and ascetic, or selfish and moral, or practical and intellectual tendencies diminishes not only the claims of one or both parties and obviates the possibility of an entirely free fulfillment of life, but often enough threatens the integrity, the balance and the ego-strength of the soul as a whole—this feeling might in some cases suppress the conflict from the very beginning; where, however, it is not sufficient for that, it gives the struggle on the contrary something grim and desperate, an accent as though there were actually something much more essential being fought over than the immediate object of strife in question; the energy with which each one of those tendencies would subdue the other is not nourished only by its, as it were, egoistic interest but by that which goes beyond it to the integrity of the 'I' for which this struggle means a rupture and a degradation when it does not end with an unambiguous victory. So the strife inside a tightly bound group often enough goes beyond the measure that its object and its immediate interest would justify for the parties; for emotion is attached to this to the extent that the dispute is not only an issue of the parties but the group as a whole, so that every party fights, as it were, in the name of this, and in the opponent has not only *its* opponent but at the same time that of their higher sociological unity.

Finally there is an apparently wholly individual, in reality very significant sociological fact that can tie the most extreme vehemence of antagonistic arousal to the closeness of association: jealousy. Linguistic usage doe not use this concept unambiguously and frequently does not distinguish it from envy. Undoubtedly both emotions are of the greatest importance in the formation of human relations. With both it is a matter of something valued whose attainment and safeguarding a third person, actually or symbolically, impedes for us. Where it is a matter of attaining, we speak more of envy; where a matter safeguarding, we

speak of jealousy; but of course the defining allocation of the words is in itself entirely meaningless and only the distinction of the social-psychological processes is important. It is characteristically described as jealousy that the subject thinks it has a rightful claim to that possession, while envy is not concerned about a right but simply for the desirability of what one has been denied; it does not therefore even matter to the subject whether the good is denied it *because* the third person possesses it or whether loss or renunciation on the part of the third party would not help the subject get it. Jealousy on the other hand is in its inner course and coloring thereby directly determined, in that the possession is denied us *because* it is in the hands of another, and in that it would immediately fall to us with the breakup thereof: the experience of the envious turns more on the possession, that of the jealous more on the possessor. One can envy the fame of another even when one has not the least claim to fame oneself; one is jealous of that person, however, when one is of the opinion that one is likewise and preferably deserving of it than the other. Embittering and gnawing for the jealous is a certain fiction of the feeling—however unjustified, indeed absurd as it may be—that the other has, as it were, robbed one of the fame. Jealousy is an experience of so specific a kind and strength that it, having arisen from some kind of exceptional mental combination, inwardly adds onto its typical situation.

To a certain extent in the middle between the specific phenomena of envy and jealousy stands a third belonging to this scale that can be identified as resentment: the envious desire for an object not because it is in itself particularly desirable to the subject but only because the other person has it. This manner of experience develops into two extremes that change into the negation of one's own possession. On the one hand the form of passionate resentment that prefers to forego the object for oneself, indeed prefers its destruction rather than grant it to another; and the second: one's own complete indifference or aversion to the object and still the thought that the other would possess it is completely unbearable. Such forms of envy draw the reciprocal behaviors of people into a thousand gradations and combinations. The large problem area in which the relationships of people are susceptible to things as causes or effects of their relations with one another is in no small part covered by this type of affect. It is here not only just a matter of money or power, love or social standing being desired, so that rivalry or some other outflanking or removal of a person is a mere procedure, no different in its inner sense than the overcoming of

a physical obstacle. Rather, the accompanying feeling that attaches to such a merely external and secondary relationship of persons develops in these modifications of the envy into autonomous sociological forms in which only envy's *content* plays a part in the desire for the objects; what is then established is that the final indicated stages of the sequence have fully stripped away the interest in the objective contents of the object and maintained it merely as a matter wholly indifferent in itself, around which the personal relationship crystallizes. On this general basis the significance that jealousy has for our particular problem is now manifest, and which it then has for sure if its content is a person or as the case may be the relationship of a subject to it. Incidentally it seems to me that linguistic usage would not accept 'jealousy' as pertinent for a purely impersonal object. What we are concerned with here is the relationship between the jealous individual and the person for whose sake jealousy is directed against a third person; the relationship to this third person has a completely different, much less peculiar and complicated sociologically characteristic form. For this reason fury and hate, contempt and cruelty arise towards that person directly *on the presumption of a connectedness*, an outer or inner, real or supposed claim to love, friendship, recognition, association of some kind. Here the antagonism, be it felt mutually or unilaterally, stiffens all the more strongly and further the more it derived from unconditional unity and the more passionately its conquest is desired. If the consciousness of the jealous frequently seems to swing between love and hate, that means that both of these strata, of which the second is layered over the first in all its breadth, alternately gain the stronger consciousness for themselves. Especially important is the previously mentioned condition: the *right* that one believes one has to the psychological or physical possession, to the love or the adoration of the subject who is the object of jealousy. A man might *envy* another over the possession of a woman; jealous, however, is only the person who has some kind of *claim* to their possession. However, this claim can exist merely in the passion of desire. Because to derive a right from this is a common human characteristic: the child will excuse itself for the transgression of something forbidden by saying of that forbidden item, "But I really wanted it"; the adulterer, insofar as he possesses the least trace of conscience, would not be able to target the offended husband in a duel if in his love for the woman he did not see a right that he would be defending against the purely legal right of a spouse; just as the mere possession counts everywhere also as the right of possession, so desire too turns into the preliminary stage for such a right, and the

double meaning of 'claim'—as simple desire and as legally grounded desire—indicates that really wanting the right adds its own force to the force of a right itself. To be sure, jealousy often turns into the most pitiable drama precisely through this claim to a right: to assert claims of *right* to feelings such as love and friendship is an endeavor with fully ill-suited means. The plane on which one can have recourse for the grounding of a right, of an external or internal one, has nothing in common with that on which those feelings lie; to desire to enforce it with a mere right, however deeply and well deserved it may be in various ways, is as senseless as wanting to order a bird, who is long gone out of earshot and eyesight, back into its cage. This ineffectiveness of entitlement in matters of love generates the phenomenon characteristic of jealousy: that in the end it clings to the *external proofs* of the feeling, which are indeed enforceable by the appeal to the sense of duty, yet guarding, with this paltry gratification and self-deception, the body of the relationship as if it still had something of its soul in it.

The *claim* that belongs to the jealous is often fully acknowledged as such by the other side; it signifies or endows, as every entitlement between persons, a kind of oneness; it is the ideal or legal existence of a bond, of a positive relationship of some sort, at least its subjective anticipation. Rising then over the existing and far-reaching unity is at the same time its negation which the very situation of jealousy creates. Here, as in some other concurrences of unity and antagonism, the two are not separated into different realms and then held together and apart by the total reach of the personalities; rather precisely that unity, still existing in some kind of internal or external form, experienced at least on the part of one party as truly or imaginatively real, is negated. The feeling of jealousy sets a wholly unique, blinding, irreconcilable bitterness between the persons, because the rupture between them has then become exactly the point of their *bond*, and thus the tension between them has imparted to the negative factor the maximum that is possible in severity and emphasis. From this then, in that this formal social relationship dominates the internal situation, we can account for the strange, actually completely unlimited breadth of factors by which jealousy is nourished and the prevalent substantive meaninglessness of its development. Where either the structure of the relationship clothes such a synthesis by synthesis-and-antithesis from the very beginning, or where the soul of the individual offers this structure inside of its own dispositions, every arbitrary cause will thereby produce consequences, and for sure these will be conceptually all the more easily appealing,

indeed more often will have already been in effect. In that every human act and statement lends itself to a multifaceted interpretation of its intent and attitude, jealousy, which wants to see everywhere only *one* interpretation, provides a fully pliable tool. While jealousy can tie the most passionate hatred to the ongoing continuation of the most passionate love and the annihilation of *both* parties to the effect of the most heartfelt solidarity—because the jealous destroy the relationship in as much as they are provoked to the destruction of the other—jealousy is perhaps that social phenomenon in which the construction of antagonism by way of unity achieves its subjectively most radical form.

Specific types of such a synthesis manifest the phenomena that one comprehends as competitions. First it is decisive for the sociological nature of competition that the conflict is an indirect one. Whoever does direct damage to or removes the opponent altogether no longer competes against that opponent. The linguistic usage in general utilizes the word preferably only for such contests that consist of the parallel efforts of both parties for one and the same prize. The differences of these from other types of conflict thus allow a more precise designation. The pure form of the competitive contest is above all not offensive and defensive—for the simple reason that the prize for the contest is not held by one of the opponents. Whoever struggles with another to acquire that person's money or spouse or reputation proceeds in altogether different forms, with a completely different method, than when one *competes* with another, to direct the money of the public into one's pocket, to win the favor of a woman, to make a greater name for oneself through words and actions. While in many other types of conflict, therefore, the defeat of the opponent brings immediately not only the victory prize but is the prize of victory itself, with competition two other combinations appear: where the defeat of the competitor is the temporally first necessity, because this defeat in itself just does not yet mean anything, but the goal of the whole action is reached only through the presentation in itself of value entirely independent from that fight. The merchant who has successfully cast suspicion with the public on the unreliability of the competitors has thereby not yet won anything if the needs of the public are not directly linked to the goods that that particular businessperson offers; the suitor who has scared off or made it impossible for the rival is thereby not one step further if the desired love rejects the suitor; a proselyte no longer needs to adhere to a faith that strives to win proselytes even if that faith has removed all the competitors from the field by exposing their deficiencies—if

the nature of that proselyte's needs that it can satisfy is not accommodated. The competitive struggle thereby acquires its tone with this type in that the decision of the contest does not yet realize the goal for itself, as in those cases where rage or revenge, punishment or the ideal value of the victory as such motivates the conflict. Perhaps the second type of competition differs still more from other conflicts. In this one the conflict generally consists only in each of the contenders striving for the goal for oneself without expending any effort on the opponent. The runner who wants to be effective only through one's speed, the merchant who wants to be effective only through the price of one's goods, the evangelist who wants to be effective only through the internal persuasiveness of one's teachings exemplify this curious type of conflict, which matches, in intensity and passionate exertion to one's utmost, every other type, which rises to its most extreme effort also through the mutual consciousness of the effort of one's opponent, and yet, viewed from the outside, proceeds as though there were no opponent in the world but only the goal. Through the undeviating course in the affair, this competition form can appropriate contents by which the antagonism becomes a pure formality and serves not only a common purpose but allows even the victory of the victor to benefit the defeated. At the siege of Malta by the Turks in 1565, the grand master divided the forts of the island among the various nations to which the knights belonged so that the rivalry over which nation would be the bravest would be exploited for the defense of the whole. Here then is a genuine competition, in the course of which any damage to the opponent that could hinder one's full deployment in the rivalry is, however, excluded from the outset. This is such a very pure example because, to be sure, presumably the wish to conquer in the contest for honor calls forth the entirely particular contingent of strength; the victory to be won for that purpose, however, is such that its success also extends to the defeated. Similarly every competition occasioned by ambition in the scientific realm manifests a conflict that is not directed against the opponent but towards the common goal, wherein it is assumed that the knowledge won by the victor is also gain and advancement for the losers. With artistic competition this last extension of the principle tends to be missing because the aggregate objective value, equally including that of both parties, in light of the individualistic nature of art, is not consciously, albeit perhaps ideally, present. This absence in commercial competition is still more decisive for the consumer who nevertheless belongs under the same formal principle of conflict. For here too the

contest is aimed directly at the most perfect service, and the benefit to a third or to the whole is its result. So the subjectivity of the end goal becomes most wonderfully intertwined in this form with the objectivity of the end result; a supra-individual unity of a material or social nature includes the parties and their conflict; one struggles against without directly opposing the opponent, non-contact, so to speak. Thus the subjective antagonistic incitement leads us to the realization of objective values, and the victory in the contest is not actually the result of a *fight*, but simply the realization of values that lie beyond the conflict.

Therein then lies the enormous value of competition for the social circle, provided that the competitors are enclosed by it. While the other types of conflict—that in which either the prize is originally in the hands of the one party, or where the subjective hostility and not the winning of a prize shapes the motive for conflict—let the values and strengths of the opponents be mutually consumed, and frequently as a result all that remains for the totality is what is left over from the simple subtraction of the weaker power from the stronger; competition, wherever it is kept free from mixing with other forms of conflict, functions conversely, usually increasing value through its incomparable combination: because viewed from the standpoint of the group it offers subjective motives as a means for producing objective social values and, from the standpoint of the party, utilizing the production of the objectively valued as a means to win subjective satisfactions.[16]

[16] This is a very clear case of a common type: a means being for the species, for the group, in short, for the encompassing formation what an end goal is for the individual, and vice-versa. At its highest this holds on a wide scale for the relationship of people to the metaphysical totality, to their God. Hence the idea of a divine plan for the world develops because the end goals of the individual being are nothing more than stages and means that help realize the absolute end goal of all earthly activities, as it is set in the divine mind; for the subject, however, in the absoluteness of its ego interests, not only the empirical but also that transcendental reality is only a means for one's goal: one's welfare on the earth or one's salvation in the beyond, happy repose, redemptive completion, or ecstatic fullness of the divine is sought through God who mediates all this to people; just as God as the absolute Being obtains selfhood indirectly via humanity, so humanity obtains selfhood itself via God. This was observed a long time ago with regard to the relationship between the individual and the individual's species in the biological sense; erotic pleasure, for the former a self-justifying end goal in itself, is for the species only a means by which to secure its continuation beyond every temporary population; this preservation of the species, which counts at least analogically as its goal, is for the individual often enough only the means to perpetuate oneself in one's children, to secure a kind of immortality for one's possessions, one's qualities, one's vitality. In social relationships what it amounts to simply is what one describes as a harmony of interests between the society and the individual. The action

However, the material advance that competition gains through its characteristically mediated pattern of interaction is not as important here as the directly social. While the goal over which competition among parties exists within a society still favors probably one or more third persons continuously, it drives each of the two parties between whom it occurs with extraordinary closeness against that third. One tends to emphasize competition's poisoning, disrupting, destroying effects and to concede only incidentally those substantive values as its products. Along with it, however, there is nevertheless this enormous society-forming effect: it forces the candidate, who has a competitor nearby and frequently only then becomes an actual competitor, to meet with and to approach other competitors, to combine with them, to explore their weaknesses and strengths and to adapt to them, to seek out or to construct all the bridges that could combine one's own being and capacity with theirs. Of course this happens often at the price of personal dignity and of the material value of production; above all, the competition between the producers of the highest spiritual activities causes those who are set for the leadership of the mass to submit to it; in general just to get to an effective exercise of one's function as teacher or party leader, as artist or journalist, what is required is obedience to the instincts or moods of the mass, as soon as the mass, because of competition, has its choice of the candidates. Thus, of course, *substantively* an inversion of rank ordering and social valuation is created, but this does not lessen the importance of competition for the synthesis of

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of the individual is normed and harnessed to carry and develop the legal and moral, the political and cultural conditions of the people; however, what is thereby accomplished as a whole is only that the individual's own eudaemonistic and moral, material and abstract interests seize those supra-individual values as a means; thus science, for example, is a content of the objective culture and as such a self-sufficient end goal of social development, which is realized through the means of the individual drives for knowledge; for the individual, however, the entirety of the science at hand including the part of it worked on by the individual self is merely a means for the satisfaction of the individual's personal drive for knowledge. Now these relationships indeed are in no way always of such harmonious symmetry; in fact, often enough they harbor the contradiction that certainly the whole as well as the part deals with itself as end and thus the other as means; neither one of them, however, wants to accept this role as means. From this arise frictions that are palpable at every point of life and allow the realization of the goals of the whole as well as of the part only with a certain loss. The mutual self-annihilation of engergies that is of no advantage for positive results, and the futility and wastefulness of those proven to be weaker generate just such reductions inside of competition, which otherwise manifests so clearly that symmetry of one another's parallel goals.

the society.[17] What works for it countless times is what as a rule works only for love: spying out the innermost wishes of others before they have even become conscious of those wishes themselves. The antagonistic tension of opposition to competitors sharpens the sensitivity on the part of merchants for the preferences of the public to the point of a nearly clairvoyant instinct for the impending changes in its tastes, fashions, interests; but not only with merchants but also with journalists, artists, booksellers, politicians. Modern competition, which is identified as the conflict of all against all, is at the same time, though, the conflict of all for all. Nobody will deny the tragedy therein—that the elements of society work against one another instead of with one another, that immense energy is squandered in the struggle against competitors, energy that would be useful for positive work, that in the end even the positive and valuable achievement comes to nothing, unutilized and unrewarded, as soon as a more valuable or at least more attractive one enters into competition with it. However, all these liabilities of competition on the social balance sheet still stand right *along side* the immense synthetic power of the fact that competition in society is nevertheless competition for people, a wrestling for praise and employment, for concessions and commitments of every kind, a wrestling of the few for the many as well as the many for the few; in short, an interweaving of a thousand social threads by the concentration of consciousness on the desire and emotions and thinking of one's fellow human beings, by the adapting of supply to demand, by the ingenious manifold possibilities of winning connection and favor. Since the narrow and naïve solidarity of primitive and social systems of decentralization gave way, which had to be the immediate result of the quantitative expansion of groups, the effort of people for people, the accommodation of the one to the others just for the prize of competition seems possible, hence the simultaneous conflict against a neighbor for the third—against whom, by the way, one competes perhaps in another kind of relationship for the former. Many kinds of interests that ultimately hold the circle together from member to member seem to be vital only with the expansion and individualization of society, when the need and the heat of competition force them onto the conscious subject. Also the socializing power of competition in no way manifests itself only in these coarser, so to speak, official cases. In countless combinations of family

[17] *Synthesis* is in English in the original—ed.

life as well as the erotic, of social chitchat as well as the disputation aimed at persuasion, of the friendship as well as the satisfactions of vanity, we meet the competition of the two for the third; frequently, of course, only in hints, comments immediately dropped, as aspects or partial manifestations of a total process. Everywhere it appears, however, there corresponds to the antagonism of competitions an offering or enticement, a promise or attachment, which brings each of the two into relationship with the third; for the victor especially this frequently acquires an intensity to which it would not have come without the characteristically continual comparison of one's own accomplishment with that of another, made possible only through competition, and without the excitation by the opportunities of competition. The more liberalism is inserted, besides the economic and political, also into the familial and social, church-related and friendship-related, hierarchical and across-the-board interactive relationships, in other words, the less these are predetermined and governed by universal historical norms and the more they are abandoned to the unstable equilibrium, produced on a case-by-case basis, or the shifting of powers—the more their form will depend on continuing competition; and the outcome of this, in turn, will depend in most cases on the interest, the love, the hopes, that the competitors, to varying extent, know to excite in the third party or parties, the center of competing movements. The most valuable object for human beings is the human being, both directly and indirectly. The latter because in it the energies of the subhuman nature are stored up, just as in the animal that we consume or put to work for us, are those of the plant kingdom, and just as in the latter those of sun and earth, air and water. Humanity is the most condensed structure and the most productive for exploitation, and to the extent that slavery comes to an end, *i.e.* the mechanical seizing of a very self, the need arises to win humans over psychologically. Conflict *with* humans, which was a conflict over them and their enslavement, thus changed into the more complicated phenomenon of competition in which one person certainly fights with another, but over a third. And winning over this third—to attain in a thousand ways only through the social means of persuasion or convincing, outbidding and underbidding, suggestion or threat, in short, through psychological connection—also means in its results just as frequently only one such bond, only the establishment of one, from the momentary purchase in the store to that of marriage. With the cultural increase of the intensity and condensation of the contents of life, the struggle for this most condensed of all goods, the human

soul, must occupy ever greater space and thereby likewise increase as well as deepen the intensity of social interactions that are its means as well as its goal.

Herein was already suggested how very much the sociological character of the circle differs by the extent and type of competition that it permits. This is obviously an aspect of the problem of correlation, to which each part of the previous arrangements made a contribution: there exists a relationship between the structure of each social circle and the degree of hostilities that it can tolerate among its elements. For the political whole, criminal law in many cases sets the limit up to which dispute and vengeance, violence and cheating are still compatible with the continued existence of the whole. When one has characterized the content of criminal law in this sense as the ethical minimum, then it is not fully applicable—for the simple reason that a state would thus always break apart if, with the strictest prevention, all punishable prohibitions were enacted against all those attacks, injuries, hostilities. Every penal sanction counts on the widespread and predominant part played by inhibitions to which it itself contributes nothing to restraining the development of those corroding energies. The minimum of ethical peaceable behavior, without which the civil society cannot exist, thus goes beyond the categories guaranteed by penal law itself; then it is simply presupposed that these disturbances left exempt from punishment do not themselves overstep the level of social tolerance. The more closely the group is unified, the more the enmity between its elements can have entirely polarizing meanings: on the one hand the group can, precisely because of its closeness, tolerate an internal antagonism without breaking apart, the strength of the synthesizing forces being equal to that of the antithetical; on the other hand a group whose principle of life is an extensive uniformity and solidarity is to that extent directly threatened especially by each internal dispute. Even this same centripetalism of the group renders it, vis-à-vis the dangers from the enmities of its members, dependent on various circumstances, either more capable of antagonism or less.

Such close unions as marriage show both simultaneously: there is probably no other union that could endure such maniacal hatred, such total antipathy, such continuous contention and irritation without falling apart; and then again it is, if not the only one, nevertheless one of the very few forms of relationship that can, through the outwardly most unremarkable, literally indescribable rupture, indeed through a

single antagonistic word, so lose the depth and beauty of its meaning that even the most passionate desire on the part of both parties does not gain it back. In larger groups two structures, ostensibly entirely contrary to one another, will allow a considerable measure of internal hostilities. At once easy to mention, a certain solidarity producing ties. By virtue of these, damages that are produced through hostile clashes here and there can be made good relatively easily; the elements grant so much power or value to the whole that it can also secure for the individuals freedom for antagonisms, certainly in that the expenditure of energy effected through them is compensated at the same time by other earnings. This is one reason why very well organized communities can tolerate more internal divisions and frictions than more mechanical, internally disjointed conglomerates. The unity which is precisely acquired in greater measure only through more fine-tuned organizations can more easily bring the assets and liabilities into balance within the totality and bring the available strengths somewhere right to the place where weaknesses have arisen through disagreements between the elements—as well as through any other kinds of loss. The inverse structure has precisely the same general effect: comparable to the configuration of the ship's hull made out of opposing firmly closed chambers so that by any damage to the hull the water itself cannot pour through the whole ship. The social principle here is thus precisely a certain sealing off of those parties colliding with one another, who, whatever they do to each other, are then to settle with one another, having to bear their damages, however, without thereby the existence of the whole being damaged. The correct choice or combination of the two methods: the organic solidarity with which the whole compensates for the damages through partial conflicts, or the isolation by which it shelters itself against those damages—is of course a vital issue for every union, from the family to the state, from the economic to the merely psychological sense of unity. The extremes are identified, for example, on the one hand in the modern state, which not only readily tolerates the disputes of political parties, even expending considerable energy in the process, but uses them for its own equilibrium and development, and on the other hand the ancient and medieval city-state, which was often weakened to the point of annihilation by internal party conflicts. On the whole the bigger a group is the better able it will be to unite both methods, and certainly in that form the fact that the parties have to settle their primary damages accruing from the dispute; however, the secondary

consequences for the life of the whole can be paid from its reserves—a combination that is obviously difficult when the group is small and all its elements are thereby in action near one another.

While I now return to the particular relationship of the *competitive* conflict to the structure of its circle, the difference appears first of all: whether the substantive interest of the circle is determined by a form that by itself forbids or limits the competition—or whether it, in itself probably susceptible to the competition, is hindered only by its particular historical formation through principles generally existing in it and apart from the matters at issue. The first is possible under two conditions. Competition enters in when a good, not plentiful enough or accessible to all contenders, falls only to the victor of a competition among them—it is thus obviously excluded where either the elements of a circle do not in general strive for a good that would equally be desired by them—or where it is certainly the case that the good is, however, equally plentiful for all. Everywhere the presumption then speaks in favor of the former wherever the social interaction does not come from a common *terminus ad quem* but a common *terminus a quo* of a unifying source. Thus it is above all with the family. Occasional competitions may indeed occur in it: the children can compete for the love or for the inheritance of the parents, or even the parents among themselves for the love of the children. This is, however, determined by personal happenstance—not unlike when two brothers, for example, are business competitors—and without reference to the *principle* of family. This principle is in fact the one of organic life; the organism is but its own purpose; as such, it does not refer beyond itself to a goal external to itself, for the acquisition of which its elements would have to compete. Purely personal hostility arising out of the clash of personalities is, of course, sufficiently opposed to the principle of peace without which the family cannot exist in the long run; however just the closeness of life together, the social and economic compatibility, the rather monumental presumption of unity—all this directly brings about friction, tension, and opposition especially easily; indeed, family conflict is a form of conflict *sui generis*. Its cause, its intensity, its expansion to those uninvolved, the form of the fight as that of the reconciliation is, by its course on the basis of an organic unity matured by thousands of internal and external ties, fully idiosyncratic, comparable to no other conflict. However competition is absent in this combination of symptoms since family conflict spins directly from person to person, and the indirectness of orientation toward an objective goal that is innate to competition probably arises by chance rather

than originating from its specific energies. The other sociological type of competition-free conflict is exemplified by the religious community. Here indeed parallel strivings of all are directed at one and the same goal for all, but it does not become competitive because the reaching of this goal by the one does not exclude the others from it. At least according to the Christian concept there is room in God's house for all. When, nevertheless, predestination withholds this place from some and preserves it for others, the immediate senselessness of any competition is thereby enunciated. This is in fact a characteristic form and destiny of candidatures running in parallel, which one could designate as passive competition; the lottery and games of chance are pure manifestations of precisely the same type. Certainly it is a rivalry for a prize, but it lacks the essence of competition: the difference in individual energies as the basis for winning and losing. The outcome is for sure in some kind of prior concession, but its distinction is not linked to the difference in the latter.[18] This produces, among individuals of a circle incorporated by that kind of chance, a thoroughly unique relationship, an entirely new blend of similarity and dissimilarity of conditions in contrast to real competition. Where a number of people perform exactly the same action and stand exactly the same chances of success, but know that a force they cannot influence is denying success altogether or granting it altogether, on the one hand an indifference will prevail among them, entirely unlike competition where success depends on the comparison of performance; on the other hand consciousness of earning or losing the prize on the basis of the quality of effort operates soothingly and objectively based on identification with the others, while here, where this feeling is lacking, envy and embitterment have their intrinsic place. The elect in a predestination, the winners in *trente-et-quarante*, will not be hated by the loser but envied; since the performances are independent of one another, the two competitors have a greater distance and *a priori* indifference towards one another than the competitors of an economic or sport contest; and with one such precisely the deservingness of the loser will easily produce the characteristic hatred that exists in the projection of one's own feelings of inadequacy onto the one who is responsible for our feeling so. The affinity—always by the way very loose—within that circle, then, insofar as a predestination of godly or

[18] The tranlsation loses some word play here, which reads literally "but its distinction (*Verschiedenheit*) is not linked to the distinction (*Verschiedenheit*) in that"—ed.

fate-like or human authorities constitutes what they have in common, is a specific intertwining of indifference and latent envy that becomes actualized after the decision along with the corresponding feelings of the victor. As this deviates very much from the mutually stimulating feelings of competition, as there is still also a smaller or stronger blend of this affinity by way of shared chances even in every genuine competition, some kind of an appeal is made to a something in the power over the parties that decides on its own and not from performance. The very transforming extent of this fatalistic addition produces an entirely particular graduation of the relationship of competition up to the type of the election by grace, in which that alone is determinative and the active and differentiating factor that competition as such suggests is completely eliminated.

As a second apparent competition in religious groups, jealous passion stands out, trying to outdo others in the production of the highest good, which may increase effort a great deal—the fulfillment of commands and meritorious work, the devotions and the asceticism, prayers and donations. However, that additional feature of competition is absent whereby the prize must remain denied to one because it falls to the other. Here there is a sociologically noticeable difference that one may indicate as that between competition and rivalry. In every competition, even for the ideal goods of honor and love, the meaning of performance is determined by the relationship that it has with the performance of the next person; the performance of the victor, remaining exactly the same, would yet produce a fully different objective return for the victor if that of the competitor were greater than it instead of lesser. This dependence of the absolute outcome on the relative one (expressed differently: of the objective on the personal) drives the whole movement of competition, but is entirely absent inside that of religious rivalry. Since in this case the action of the individual bears its fruit quite directly, it would be unworthy of the absolute justice of the Highest Authority to allow the wages of individual action somehow to depend on whether the merit of that of any other individual is higher or lower; it is rather recompensed to each only according to *that person's* deeds, as measured by transcendent norms, while competition actually repays each according to the works of the next person—according to the relation between the former and the latter. Insofar as the goal for which the members of a circle as such strive is religious, *i.e.*, unlimited and independent of the relationship among themselves, and possesses the possibility of being granted, the circle will develop no competition. This is therefore

also the case with all associations that are based plainly on receptivity and offer in general no room for individually differentiated activities: scientific or literary unions that only stage lectures, travel societies, organizations for purely epicurean purposes.

So in all these cases, sociological formations that arise from the particular purposes of the group and that exclude competition can thus, for reasons that stand beyond their substantive interests and character, simply further impose on group life the renunciation of either competition in general or of certain of its means. The former occurs to the degree in which the socialistic principle of the coordinated organization of all work and the more-or-less communist one of the equality of the rewards from labor achieve dominance. Viewed formally, competition rests on the principle of individualism; however, as soon as it occurs within a group, its relationship to the social principle is immediately clear: the subordination of all individuality under the integrative interest of the whole. Individual competitors are to be sure ends in themselves; they apply their energies for the victory of *their* interests. However, because the conflict of competition is maintained by means of objective efforts and tends to produce some kind of valuable result for a third party, the purely social interest—constituting this result as an end goal that is only a byproduct for the competitors themselves—can not only allow the competition but can directly provoke it. It is thus in no way, as one readily thinks, solidly bound to the individualistic principle for which the individual, the individual's happiness, achievement, and fulfillment comprise the absolute meaning and purpose of all historical life. With regard to the question of the final goal it has in fact the indifference of any mere technology. It finds its opposition and its negation, then, not in the principle of that solely dominating social interest but only in another *technology* that it creates itself, and which is termed *socialism* in the narrower sense. In other words, the valuation of the whole vis-à-vis the fate of the individual, the tendency of establishments, or at least the thoughts on the totality altogether and inclusive of everyone, is to have every individual generally serving the whole—this is bound up with the school of thought that would *organize* every single task of labor; *i.e.*, one seeks to direct these jobs from a unifying, rational plan that excludes every tension between the elements, any expenditure of energy on competition, any chance of purely personal initiative; success for the whole will thus not be achieved through the antagonistic self-serving measures of spontaneously evoked powers, but rather from the directive of a center that from the outset organizes everything

into a harmonious operation and complementarity, as is achieved most fully in the civil service of a state or the personnel of a factory. This socialist form of production is nothing more than a technique to attain the material goals of happiness and of culture, of justice and of fulfillment—and must therefore give way to competition wherever that appears to be the more practically suitable means. It is in no way, then, only a matter of political party membership, but the question whether the satisfaction of a need, the creation of a value, should be left to the competition of individual workers or their rational organization, their opposition to one another or collaboration—this question demands to be answered in a thousand partial or rudimentary forms, with nationalization and monopolization, with price competition and children's games; it makes itself felt in the problem whether science and religion engender the deeper values of life when they are organized into a harmonious system or precisely when each of the two seeks to surpass the solutions that the other offers and this competition forces both to the highest possible development; it becomes important for the decisions of the stage director: whether for the overall effect it is more correct to let every actor develop a complete individuality and through competition of the independent efforts enhance and enliven the whole or whether from the outset the overall artistic effect should restrain the individualities to a compliant accommodation; it is mirrored inside the individual when we at one time feel the conflict of ethical and aesthetic impulses, of intellectual and instinctive solutions as the condition for those choices that express our actual being most authentically and vitally, and at another time permit these opposed individual forces to have their say only in so far as they order themselves into a unified system of life led by *one* tendency. One will not fully understand socialism in its usual sense if one does not recognize it as the completed and purely motivated configuration of a technique of life that, along with its antithesis, extends to approaches and less recognizable realizations over the whole problem area of interlinkage-by-diversity. Although with the insight into the merely technical character of these arrangements, socialistic organization must now give up its claim as a self-justifying goal and final authoritative word, and, along with individualistic competition, insofar as that too is a means for supra-individual ends, would have to take up mathematical weighing, though this is not to deny then that such calculation frequently fails our intellectual resources and that the decision depends on the basic instincts of individual natures. It is only from these, of course, that the establishment

of the end goals originates, viewed purely abstractly, while the means will be determined by objectively theoretical insight; in practice, however, the insight is not only so incomplete that the subjective impulses must complete the choices in their stead, but also often so weak that it does not withstand their persuasive power. Then very often beyond all reasonable justification, the immediate attraction of this uniformly organized, internally egalitarian, friction-excluding form of group, as it has now been sublimated into socialism, will win the victory over the rhapsodic, the energy wastefulness, the fragmentation and chance of the *competitive form* of production; insofar as individuals draw close to this frame of mind, they will exclude competition even from realms whose content would not be incompatible with it.

It is much the same where there is no question of an organic unity of the whole but a mechanical similarity of parts. The purest case of the type is shaped by the constitution of the guild, in as much as it rests on the principle that every master should have 'the same nourishment.' It is of the essence of competition that the parity of each member-element with the other is continuously shifted up or down. Each of two competing producers simply prefers the uncertain chance of differentiation over the splitting of the profit that is certain with the more exact equality of the opening bid: while one offers something or other, indeed perhaps much fewer than half the consumers will be won, but perhaps also much more. The principle of chance, which is realized in competition, is so inconsistent with the principle of equality that the guild suppressed competition by every means: by the prohibition of having more than one shop and more than a very limited number of assistants, selling anything other than one's own product, offering different quantities, qualities and prices than the guild had set. How little the conditions of the matter required these restrictions was, however, very soon revealed by their coming breakup; it was simply the, on the one hand, abstract, on the other hand, personal principle of equality that prohibited the competitive from of production. No further examples are needed here. The alternative that determines the countless provinces and individual cases of human behavior—whether to fight for a value or divide it amicably—leads here to that particular form of conflict, competition; since the parties do not wrestle directly with one another here but for the success of their achievements with a third entity, the division of the value consists then in the voluntary equivalence of these achievements. Moreover, the resolution of this does not depend entirely on the calculation of probability alone, which will demonstrate

at one time the gamble of competition oscillating between everything and nothing, at another the more certain equal achievement but one more limited than the greater one; in fact the mindset of the social epoch or the temperament of the individuals, often enough beyond all reckoning of reason, will decide for the one or the other, and certainly be able from this intuitive and thus general character of the decision to extend the renunciation of competition there too where the matter itself does not require it at all.

Other modifications of social interaction manifest themselves as soon as the renunciation does not concern competition as such but, during its continued existence, only certain of its means. It is a matter here of stages of development in which the absolute competition of the animalistic struggle for existence turns into relative competition; *i.e.*, in which all those frictions and paralyzing of forces alike that are not needed for the purposes of competition are gradually eliminated. Not only the yield but also the intensity of competition remains untouched; the latter is supposed to be really molded only from the *yield* and deviations therefrom diverted into channels in which the forces of *both* parties are reduced and thereby also subjective as well as the objective efficiency. This produces two forms that one can identify as the inter-individual and the supra-individual limitation of the means of competition. The one occurs where a number of competitors voluntarily come to an agreement to forego specific practices with which one could outdo the others: the renunciation by the one is here only good so long as the other adheres to it; thus the settlement of the retail book sellers of a location to grant no more than 10 or 5 percent or no discount at all on the selling prices; or an agreement of shop owners to close the businesses at 9 or 8 o'clock, etc. What is decisive here is only egoistic utility; the one forgoes the indicated means of gaining customers, knowing that the other would immediately follow suit, and the additional profit they would have shared would not have equaled the additional expense they would have also shared. What is here relinquished is thus not actually competition—which always requires some inequality—but just such points in which no competition is possible because equality for all competitors derives directly from them. This type of form, although until now not purely realized all that frequently, is nevertheless of great significance because it shows as a unification of competitors on the field of competition itself to be possible, without this somehow diminishing competition; their antagonism is driven by this demonstration of a point of concurrence of interests all the more intensively on the issue, to

where it can play out purely, and this inter-individual limitation of the means can continue indefinitely to unburden competition of all that is not really competition because it mutually balances itself without effect. Since the means of competition consists for the most part of advantages that are offered to a third, so in like measure the third will have to bear the costs of the agreement over the renunciation regarding it—in the economy, of course, the consumer; indeed the road to cartelization is thereby directly taken. Once it has been really understood that one can save oneself from the practices of competition in this and many such ways without harm, as long as the competitors do the same, this can have, besides the already emphasized consequence of an ever more intense and pure competition, just the opposite consequence: that one sets in motion the arrangement to the point of abolishing competition altogether, to the point of an organization of firms that now not only no longer fight over the market but maintain it according to a common plan. This renunciation of competition has a whole other sociological meaning than that accentuated in the guild: because it leaves the individuals independent, their equality required the reduction even of the most capable to that level on which the weakest could also compete with them; this will be the inevitable form in which the independent elements are able to accomplish a mechanical equality. With cartelization, however, it is from the beginning not at all the situation of the subject, but the objective purposiveness of the business that is the starting point. Therein the limitation of the means of competition that removes everything not serving the purposes of competition and which ultimately limits as well the still remaining character of competition now reaches its climax, because the thorough domination of the market and the dependence of consumers won thereby makes competition as such superfluous.

Finally there occurs the limitation of the means of competition that leaves the continuation of competition itself untouched by authorities that stand entirely beyond the competitors and their spheres of interest: by law and morality. The law denies to competition in general only those means that are also forbidden among humans in their other relationships: acts of violence and property damage, fraud and slander, threat and forgery. Otherwise, competition is that antagonism whose forms and consequences are affected relatively less by legal prohibitions than the other forms of conflict. Penal law would immediately take action if one would destroy the economic, social, familial, indeed even physical existence of someone through direct attack of that sort, as is

possible to do through competition by simply erecting a factory next to someone else's, installing a personnel office next to someone else's, submitting a prize essay alongside someone else's. Why the goods brought to ruin through competition are not protected from it appears quite clear indeed. First of all, because competitors lack any *dolus*.[19] None of them wants to gain something other than by one's own achievement, and the other thereby going under is a side-effect, fully irrelevant to the victor, albeit perhaps regrettable. Moreover, because the element of actual violation is absent from competition, defeat as well as victory for that matter is simply the apt and suitable expression of the mutual measure of power: victors have available the exact same chances as the defeated, and the latter have to chalk up their ruin exclusively to their own deficiencies. As for the former, *dolus* directed against the person of the harmed is lacking, just as in a great number of the punishable offenses, in none of which what emerges from revenge, malice, or cruelty appears: the bankrupt who set capital assets aside simply want to save for themselves a bit of property, and the fact that the claims of their creditors are thereby damaged may be to the bankrupt themselves a regrettable *conditio sine qua non*;[20] those who trek through the streets at night yelling are punished for disturbing the peace even when they only want to give expression to their high-spirited mood and gave no thought at all to the fact that they thereby rob others of their night's rest. Thus at least to some extent negligence would occasion responsibility on the part of those who ruin another person through their bid for something. And the exculpation through the similarity of the circumstances, the voluntariness of the whole action, and the justice with which the success of competition follows the strengths deployed—this would likewise argue well against the punishment of almost all types of duels. If in a brawl begun by two sides voluntarily and under identical circumstances, one side is seriously injured, punishing the other side is no more logically consistent than it would be to penalize a merchant who has driven one's competitor into the ground with fair methods. That this does not occur is due in part to legally technical grounds, but mainly doubtless socially utilitarian, in that the society does not like to forego the advantages that competition between individuals brings to it and that outweigh by far the downside that it suffers through the

[19] Latin: malice. Simmel is referring to the legal standard of malicious intent—ed.
[20] Latin: necessary condition—ed.

occasional destruction of individuals in the competitive struggle. This is the obvious provision in the legal principle of the *code civil*, on which the entire juristic treatment of *concurrence déloyale* is built: [21]

> Everything someone does that causes another damage obligates the former to make reparations to the extent of the fault that produces it.[22]

Society would not grant that an individual could harm another individual directly and simply for one's own advantage in the manner just described; but it allows it because this damage occurs in an indirect way on account of an objective achievement that is valuable for an indeterminate number of individuals—just as our state would not also allow officers' duels if in this case the personal interest of one individual alone actually required the annihilation of another and the inner coherence of the officer corps did not draw a strength from this concept of honor, the advantage of which for the state outweighs the sacrifice of the individual.

French and German legislation admittedly has for some time now proceeded to limit the means of competition in the interest of the competitors themselves. The basic intention for this is to protect the individual merchant against such advantages of one's competitors that could be acquired by morally improper means. Thus, for example, all advertisements are prohibited that are supposed to lead the buyer through deceptive offers to the mistaken belief that this merchant offers more advantageous terms than any other—and if in fact an overcharging of the public is indeed not thereby occurring. Moreover it is forbidden to create an illusion on the part of the buyer by the presentation of the product that it is not otherwise obtainable for the same price—even if the quantity actually sold is for all intents and purposes the usual amount and the price is fair. A third type: a familiar firm with a large clientele can then prevent anyone of the same name from bringing to market a similar brand as though under its name when it can lead the customers thereby to think that it is the brand of that firm—no matter whether the product offered under that name is better or worse than the original.

What interests us here about these provisions is the apparently entirely new viewpoint, to protect the competitors who spurn unsavory methods

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[21] French for civil code; *concurrence déloyale* is unfair competition—ed.

[22] French in Simmel's text: *Tout fait quelconque de l'homme qui cause à autrui un dommage oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer*—ed.

of winning customers from those who would use them; while otherwise all restrictions of business practices are meant to impede cheating the *public*, this is no motive in the laws in question, and its absence does not hinder their application in any way. Meanwhile if one looks closely, these prohibitions are nothing other than explications of the longest existing fraud clauses; the nature of this explication is not only of legal but also of form-sociological interest. German criminal law punishes it as fraud if someone, in order to procure a pecuniary advantage, "thereby damages the welfare of another by leading the other into error by way of deception through false pretenses." This is now thus impartially understood as though the error would have to be provoked in *the same person* whose welfare is supposed to be damaged. However, the wording of the law contains nothing about this identity; and while it therefore also allows it to be prosecuted as fraud if the welfare of A is thereby damaged in that an error has been evoked in a B—it includes those cases of unfair competition entirely. For these mean that a misapprehension is evoked in the public—without it suffering a disadvantage—and thereby the honest competitor is injured in equity—without the false pretenses deceiving *that party*. Whoever lies to the buyer, saying there is a clearance sale because of a death, perhaps does no injury if the price is about the same steady one as that of the competitor, but this injures the competitor by possibly taking customers away who would have remained faithful without the dishonest enticement. Thus the law is certainly no limitation of competitive means as such, no specific protection of competitors from each other. The behavior of society vis-à-vis competition is not captured by it now prescribing this limitation of its means, but, on the contrary, by it neglecting it for so long even though it is nothing if not an always logically needed application of valid criminal law. To this we can add the following: If the motives behind these laws everywhere emphasize that they impose no restrictions whatsoever on honest competition but would hinder only what contravenes true competition conducted in good faith, then one can for our present purposes express it more sharply as their eliminating from competition that which in the sociological sense is just not competition. For this latter is indeed an attainment thoroughly fought out objectively, which benefits third parties. Those objective social criteria, however, are contravened and displaced as soon as means of advertising, enticement, deceit are resorted to, which have absolutely no material benefit but represent a *kind of extra indirect*, purely egoistic struggle, not one directed in a socially useful manner. What jurisprudence identifies

as 'honest' competition is taken precisely to be whatever conforms to that pure concept of competition. An annotation of the German law expressly excludes the following case from it: That someone place a huge competing business next to a clothing shop and sell at cutthroat prices, made known through showy advertisements, until the small merchant has been destroyed. Here is presented the most brutal violation, and the relationship between the two competitors, viewed individualistically, is certainly nothing other than that between a strong robber and a weak victim. However, from the social standpoint, it is genuine, *i.e.*, competition exclusively conducted through the object and the third party—because the advertising, as long as it communicates only truth, serves the public. But what contained, for example, misleading statements, although they may do no harm, would still not be something useful, and from *that* point onward the protection of the competitors against ruin can therefore enter in; indeed, it even must in order to keep the competing powers entirely focused on the pure, *i.e.*, the socially utilitarian form of competition. Thus even the specific limitations that the law places on the means of competition are revealed precisely as a limitation of the limitations, which competition undergoes through merely subjectively individualistic practices.

All the more should one believe that here the law, as is often the case, would be complemented by morality, which, however, is not bound to social utility but rather repeatedly regulates human behavior according to norms that lie within or beyond the interests of society: according to the impulses of an immediate feeling that simply seeks peace even with oneself and finds this often precisely in the opposition to the claims of society—as in accordance with metaphysical and religious ideas that sometimes even include these claims, sometimes, however, altogether also reject them as historically limited contingencies. From both sources flow behavioral imperatives from person to person that are not social in the usual sense—albeit sociological—and by virtue of them the whole of human nature now only finds itself once again in the ideal form of the ought. That ascetic, altruistic, fatalistic morals reduce competition as much as possible, together with its means, requires no comment. Typical European morality, however, conducts itself more tolerantly towards competition than towards many other types of antagonism. This has to do with a specific combination of character traits that constitutes competition. On the one hand, as moral beings we hesitate all the less to employ our strength against an opponent; we are conscious of an ever further distance between our subjective personality and our

resolute performance called forth in struggle. Where immediate personal strengths wrestle against one another, we feel obliged rather to resort to respect and reservation, less able to avoid the appeal to compassion; indeed, a type of modesty sometimes hinders us in immediate antagonism from letting loose our energies entirely without reservation, from revealing all our cards, from involving our whole being in a struggle in which personality stands against personality. With struggles that are driven by objective results these ethical and aesthetic reservations fall by the wayside. Consequently, one can compete with personalities with whom one would altogether avoid a personal controversy. By turning to the object, competition receives that cruelty of all objectivity that exists not from a desire for others' suffering but precisely in the subjective factors ruling out calculation. This indifference towards the subjective, as characterizes logic, law, and the money economy, allows personalities who are absolutely not cruel, nevertheless, to perpetrate all the severities of competition—and with a clear conscience, indeed not wishing evil. While here then the retreat of the personality behind the objectivity of the system unburdens the moral consciousness, the very same effect is also achieved through the immediate oppositional element of competition, through the exact proportionality with which the outcome of competition corresponds to the peculiar strengths called forth from the subjects. Apart from deviations that have nothing to do with the nature of competition but stem from their interweaving with other fates and relationships, the outcome of competition is the unerring indicator of the personal ability that has been objectified in accomplishment. What benefits us at the cost of others through the favor of people or conjunctures of coincidence or deeply foreordained destiny we do not exploit with as good a conscience as the yield that goes back only to our most individual action. For next to the sacrificial morality stands self-affirmation; both of them have their common opponent simply in the fact that our relationship to others is at the mercy of external powers, independent of the 'I.' Where finally, as in pure competition, the self tips the scales, a satisfied sense of justice compensates our instinctive morality for the ruthlessness of the competition—and to be sure not only that of the victor, but perhaps also of the defeated.[23]

[23] This is arguably one of the points at which the relationship of competition stands out in the traits of modern existence. Humanity and its mission in life, individuality, and the material content of its activity appear before the beginning of the modern era to be in greater solidarity, more fused, as it were, in a more unselfconscious reciprocal

The various unitings among the parties to conflict discussed so far have revealed blendings of antithesis and synthesis, a structure with one over the other, and mutual restrictions as intensifications. Besides these, there is the further sociological importance of conflict, which it possesses not for the relationship of the parties to one another but for the inner structure of each party. Daily experience shows how easily a conflict between two individuals changes the individual not only in one's relationship to the other but also within oneself; and to be sure—quite apart from its distorting or refining, weakening or strengthening *consequences* for the individual—through the pre-conditions that it imposes, the inner alterations and adaptations that it breeds on account of their usefulness for the prosecution of the conflict. Our language provides an unusually apt formulation for the essence of these immanent changes: Combatants must '*sich zusammennehmen*' ('get a grip on themselves' or 'pull themselves together'), *i.e.*, all their energies must be concentrated at one point as it were, so that they can be employed in any given instant in the precisely needed direction. In peacetime one may '*sich gehen lassen*' ('let oneself go')—*oneself, i.e.*, the individual strengths and interests of one's being, which may unfold in various directions independently of one another. In times of attack and defense, however, this would bring with it a loss of power through the contrary strivings of a divided being and a loss of time through its repeated regrouping and reorganization, so that now the whole person must accept the form of concentration as one's inner disposition for conflict and chance for victory. Behavior that is similar in form is needed by a group in the same situation. This necessity of centralization—of the tightening up of the solidarity of all elements which alone insures their deployment for the respective needs

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abandon than afterwards. Recent centuries have, on the one hand, created objective interests, an establishment from material culture of otherwise unheard of power and autonomy; on the other hand, deepened the subjectivity of the Ego, the belonging-to-oneself of the individual soul vis-à-vis all material and social prejudices, likewise unheard of. This sharply differentiated consciousness of the issue and the self on the part of modern people allows the conflict form of competition to appear as though it were created for them. Here is the pure objectivity of action that owes its effect exclusively to the cause and its legal effects, along with full indifference towards the personality standing behind it. And yet here is also the full self-responsibility of the person, the dependence of success on individual strength, and to be sure precisely because here personal ability is weighed against personal ability entirely by impersonal forces. The deepest tendencies of modern life, the material and the personal, have found in competition one of their meeting points in which they directly belong practically together and thus demonstrate their contrariety as members *of a* historical unity complementing one another.

without a waste of time and energy—is so self-evident in conflict that in countless historical examples it prevails over even the most complete democracy of peacetime, beginning, for example, from the well-known differences of the peace and war organizations of the North American Indians to London's apprentice tailors who in the first quarter of the nineteenth century possessed completely different organizations for peace and for war with employers. In calm times they consisted of small autonomous general assemblies in 30 lodges. In times of war each lodge had a deputy; these deputies formed a council and elected in its turn a very small council, from which all commands emanated and which were to be obeyed unconditionally. In general the labor unions at that time had the principle that all should decide upon what was also in the interests of all. Here, however, the emergency demonstrated an organic formation of the most stringent effectiveness, which functioned completely autocratically and whose blessing the workers recognized without opposition. The known reciprocal effect between the condition of despotism and warlike tendencies of a group rests on this formal basis: war requires the centralistic sharpening of the group form that despotism best guarantees; and conversely once this exists and that form is realized, the energies cumulated and compressed in this manner strive very easily towards natural discharge, towards an external war. In this context an example of the reverse may be offered for its characteristic clarity—one of the most anarchistic peoples is the Greenland Eskimos. No kind of chieftainship exists among them at all; to be sure, they gladly look to the most experienced one among them when it comes to fishing, but that person possesses no kind of authority and there exists no means of coercion at all for those who would exclude themselves from the common endeavor. And then it is reported of these people that the only manner in which disputes among them are fought out—is a singing contest. Those who believe themselves injured by others devise derisive verses about them and recite them in an assembly of the people summoned only for this, whereupon the opponents answer in the same way. Corresponding to the absolute absence of any warlike instinct, thus, is likewise the absolute absence of any political centralization. For this reason, among all the respective organizations of the totality of a group, that of the military is always the most centralized—excepting perhaps the fire department, which is formally faced with quite comparable necessities—the one in which any independent action on the part of elements is excluded by the unconditional domination of the central authority, and therefore

the momentum is realized without any dynamic loss in the movement of the whole. On the other hand, what characterizes a confederation as such is its unity as a war-making power. While in all other respects each state may keep its independence, in this it is not permitted when a relationship of confederation is actually supposed to exist, so that what is identified as a virtually complete confederation is that it would form an absolute unity in its—essentially yet open or latent warlike—relationship to other states, while its members would possess complete independence in their relationship to one another.

In view of the incomparable benefits of a united organization for the purpose of conflict, one would believe every party would thereby have to have the most extreme interest in having the opposing party lack this unity.[24] Nevertheless, there are several cases of the contrary: the form of centralization into which the situation of conflict forces the party outgrows the party itself and provokes it to mostly prefer seeing even the opponent over against itself in this form. In the struggles of recent decades between workers and employers, this extended to a most unlikely place. The Royal Commission on Labour in England judged in 1894 that the fixed organization of workers would be favorable for the employers in an industry, and likewise that of the employers for the workers. Admittedly the result of that would then be that an outbreak strike could become greatly extended and of long duration, but for both parties this would still always be more advantageous and less costly than the many local deals, work stoppages, and minor conflicts that do not cease in the absence of a strict organization of the parties. In the same way a war between modern states, destructive and costly as it may be, is still always better on balance than the incessant small conflicts and frictions in periods in which the governments were less strongly centralized. In Germany too the workers had recognized that one strict and effective organization of employers precisely for the fighting out of conflicts of interest is for all intents and purposes in the interest of the workers themselves. Since only that kind of an organization can present representatives with whom one is able to negotiate with full confidence, only when faced with that is the work force of the industry in question certain that the result arrived at is not immediately called into question by those employers not present. The disadvantage that a party suffers on account of the unified organization

[24] Compare the earlier comments about *divide et impera*.

of the opponent—because it is also an advantage for itself—is more than offset here by the fact that with both parties so constituted the conflict itself can be one of more focus, more visibility, securing a lasting and truly general peace—whereas one certainly more often wins individual victories against a diffuse mass of foes, but arrives with great difficulty at decisive actions actually fitting the ratio of strengths. This case is thus so deeply instructive regarding the fundamental connection between the form of unity and the conflict behavior of the group because it allows the practicality of this connection to triumph over even the immediate disadvantage for the respective opponent. It reveals that centripetalism that places the objective outcome of conflict on the surest and shortest path as the objectively ideal form of the constitution for conflict; this teleology, as it were, more-or-less transcending the parties, lets each individual party do its own arithmetic and thereby be able to fashion the apparent contradiction of turning each advantage of the opponent into an advantage of its own.

It makes an essential difference for the sociological meaning of a formation whether a group as a whole enters into an antagonistic relationship with an externally situated power, and thus the tightening of its bonds and increase in its unity occurs in consciousness and action; or every element of a larger grouping has its enemy, and, because this is the same one for all, now more than ever a federation of all comes about—whether formerly they had in general nothing to do with each other or whether at least for the moment new formations develop among them. It must still be emphasized for the first case that conflict or war can on the one hand get a group past various discrepancies and individual deviations within it; on the other hand, however, it can often bring to the relationships within it a clarity and decisiveness achieved in no other way. This is to be observed especially in groupings that are smaller and have not yet attained the objectification of a modern state. If a political party that unites multiple interests sees itself forced into a very definite and one-sided situation of conflict, this is a straightforward opportunity for secessions; in such moments all that is left is to forget about the internal opposing interests or to expressly clarify them by expelling certain members. Should a family contain individuals with strong but latent differences, the moment danger or attack forces them into the greatest possible closeness will be just the one that secures its unity in the long run or destroys it permanently, the moment at which it is decided absolutely accurately how great a cooperation of such personalities is possible. When a school class plans a prank on the teacher

or a brawl with another class, it takes care certainly on the one hand to silence all kinds of inner enmities, but on the other hand, however, it always causes certain students to break off from the rest, not only out of material motives but rather because they do not want to join in on such peremptory attacks with them and the others with whom they readily cooperate in other respects within the framework of the class. In short, the condition of peace for a group permits antagonistic elements within it to live among themselves in an unsettled situation because each one can go one's own way and can avoid confrontations. The condition of strife, however, pulls the elements so firmly together and places them under an impulse of such unification that they have to get along with each other or completely repel each other; for that reason too an external war is sometimes the final means for a state shot through with internal hostilities to overcome them; sometimes, however, precisely that allows the whole to disintegrate definitively.

For that reason groups who find themselves in some kind of state of war are not tolerant; they can tolerate individual deviance from the unity of the principle of cohesion only up to a critically limited extent. The method for this is occasionally an apparent tolerance exercised in order to be able to exclude with all the more resoluteness those not *definitively* falling into line. The Catholic Church found itself actually forever in a double state of war: against the entire complex of various teachings that together comprise heresy, and against the life interests and powers alongside it that lay claim in some way to a realm of power independent of it. The cohesive form of unity that it needed in this situation was thereby won by it nevertheless treating dissidents as long as possible as still belonging to it; from the moment, however, when this was no longer possible, it repudiated them with an incomparable energy. For that kind of formation a certain flexibility of its form is of the utmost importance,[25] not in order to produce a conversion and reconciliation with the antagonistic powers but rather precisely to set itself in opposition to them with extreme severity, yet without somehow suffering the loss of useful elements. The flexibility is not an extension beyond its own boundary; rather that closes off the flexible body no less unequivocally than it marks the boundary of a rigid one. This malleability characterizes, *e.g.*, the monastic orders, through which the

[25] On the flexibility of social forms in general, compare the end of the chapter on self-preservation.

mystical or fanatical impulses, surfacing in all religions, could here live out their absolutely arranged life style innocently in one church, while exactly the same thing in Protestantism, with its sporadically much greater dogmatic intolerance, often led to secessions from and splinterings of its unity. Sociological patterns of action that are specific to the female gender appear to go back to the same motive. Among the most diverse elements of which all the relationships between men and women consist, there is found also a typical animosity emergent from the two sources—that women, as the physically weaker, are always in danger of economic and personal exploitation and absence of rights,[26] and that they, as the objects of the sensual desire of men, must maintain a defensive posture against them. So seldom then does this struggle, flowing through the inner and personal history of human gender, lead to a direct cooperation of women against men, that there is instead a transpersonal form that serves as a means of protection against both of these dangers and in which therefore the female gender is interested, so to say, *in corpore*: custom—whose sociological nature, characterized above, is to be drawn upon once again for its current implications. The strong personality knows to protect itself individually against attacks or, if needed, simply needs legal protection; the weak would be lost, in spite of the latter, if the individuals with superior power did not themselves somehow abstain from the exploitation of this superiority. This occurs in part through morality; but since morality has no executive apart from the conscience of the individual, it functions uncertainly enough that it needs to be supplemented by custom; admittedly this does not have the precision and certainty of the legal norm, but in any case it is guaranteed by an instinctive aversion to and by some perceptibly unpleasant consequences of its violation. Now custom is the real protection of the weak who would be no match in a fight of unfettered forces. Its character is thus essentially that of prohibition, of restriction; it effects a certain equality between the weak and the strong that goes so far in its constraint on the merely natural relationship of the two that it even favors the weak—as chivalry demonstrates, for example. In the chronic struggle between men and women those that are the stronger and the aggressor are compelled into the protection

[26] I speak here of the relationship as it has existed for the greater part of known history, and leave aside whether that will henceforth become or has already become partially invalid through the modern development of rights and strengths of women.

of custom, so they are assigned—assigned by their own interest—to be its guardians. For that reason they themselves are of course also occupied most strictly with the observance of the whole complex of custom codes, as well as where it is not at all immediately a matter of masculine harms: all norms of customs exist together in a dense interrelationship; the violation of each one weakens the principle and thereby every other one. For this reason women tend out of necessity to stick together; here an actual unity corresponds to the peculiar ideals with which men generalize about them when they speak of 'women' as such, and which certainly has the character of a *partisan*-like opposition. This solidarity which they have apart from men and which is already expressed by Freidank:[27] "The man bears his dishonor alone—But when a woman falls—They all come under reproach"—this gender-like solidarity has in its interest in custom a real vehicle as its shared means of conflict. And therefore finally repeated here is the sociological form now under consideration. As a rule women know, concerning one woman, only the complete inclusion or the complete exclusion from the realm of custom. There exists among them the tendency, as far as possible, not to admit a breach in custom by a woman, to interpret it as insignificant except where scandal mongering and other individual motives are working against it. If this, however, is no longer possible, they pass a judgment of exclusion from 'good society,' unable to be appealed and unconditionally harsh; if the breach of custom must be acknowledged, the guilty one is radically eliminated from that unity that is held together by the shared interest in custom. So one knows that women make the same damning judgment of Gretchen as they do the Lady of the Camellias, Stella as well as Messalina,[28] without making an adjustment for those standing between the inside and the outside of custom by way of a concession to distinctions of degree. The defensive position of women does not allow for the wall of custom to be reduced at even just one point; the party of women knows no compromise in principle, but only dogmatic acceptance of an individual into the ideal totality of 'decent women' or just as dogmatic expulsion from it—an

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[27] Freidank was a 13th-century poet who became known for his aphorisms–ed.

[28] Two references seem to be the successive wives, Gretchen and Stella, in Lilian Gask's *The Fairies and the Christmas Child*; Gretchen made her husband jealous by giving hospitality to an old man who turned out to be an elf, and Stella was a wealthy but scolding wife. Alexandre Dumas favored a courtesan, to whom he referred as his "camellia lady." Messalina, the third wife of the Roman Emperor Claudius, had a poor reputation because of her intrigues and multiple affairs—ed.

alternative whose purely moral justification is in no way beyond all doubt and is conceivable only in terms of the demand for an indivisible unity that the party, united against an opponent, must provide its elements. For this same reason a reduction of its membership even for political parties can be advantageous, as soon as this purifies them of the elements inclined to negotiations and compromises. For this to be advisable, two conditions must usually be jointly met: an acute state of conflict, secondly, that the conflicting group is relatively small; the type is the minority party and to be sure especially when it is not limited to the defensive. English parliamentary history has proven this numerous times; when, for example, the Whig party in 1793 had a complete meltdown, it functioned to strengthen it, when in turn a defection of all those members still in any way compromising and lukewarm occurred. The few very resolute personalities remaining behind could only then operate a consistent and radical politics. The majority group need not consist of such pro-and-con decisiveness. Waffling and provisional hangers-on are less dangerous for it because a large area can tolerate such phenomena at the periphery without it affecting its center; but with groups of narrower circumference where the periphery stands very near to the center, any kind of uncertainty of an element immediately threatens the core and thereby the cohesiveness of the whole; because of the narrow range between the elements, what is lacking is the elasticity of the group that is here the condition of tolerance.

For this reason, groups and minorities who live among conflict and persecution often reject cooperation and acquiescence from the other side because the solidarity of their opposition, without which they cannot continue to fight, is thereby blurred. For example, this emerged more than once in the confessional disputes in England. Immediately under James II, as well as under William and Mary, the nonconformists and independents, Baptists, Quakers occasionally experienced from the government a cooperation to which they were not completely in agreement. Thus the more flexible and irresolute elements among them were accorded a temptation and possibility to take half-way measures or at least to soften their hostility. Any flexibility from the other side, *which is however only partial*, threatens the uniformity in the opposition of all members and thus that cohesive uniformity of which a fighting minority with an uncompromising alternative must consist. For this reason the unity of groups is so often generally lost when they no longer have an enemy. One can emphasize this with Protestantism from a variety of angles. Simply because 'protest' would have been essential for it, it

would thus lose its energy or its inner uniformity as soon as the opponent against whom it protests is out of the range of fire; indeed, this is so to such a degree that Protestantism in this case would duplicate the conflict with the enemy even in itself and would break up into a free and an orthodox party; just as in North America's party history the complete withdrawal of one of the two great parties repeatedly had the immediate consequence that the other would dissolve into subgroups with their own partisan differences. It is not necessarily even advantageous for the unity of Protestantism that it does not have any actual heretics. The conscious solidarity of the Catholic Church, in contrast, has been decisively strengthened by the reality of heresy and by the combative attitude towards it. The many various elements of the Church have always gotten their orientation, as it were, by the irreconcilability of the opposition against heresy and, in spite of some discordant interests, can become conscious of her unity. Consequently complete victory over its foe is not always, in a sociological sense, a fortunate event for a group, because the energy that guarantees its cohesiveness thereby declines, and the disintegrative forces that are always at work gain ground. The collapse of the Roman-Latin Federation in the fifth century BCE has been accounted for by the fact that the common foe was then overcome. Perhaps its basis—protection from one side, devotion by the other—had already for some time no longer been entirely natural; but this emerged now just where no common opponent any longer sustained the whole over its internal contradictions. Indeed, it may just be really politically shrewd inside some groups to look for an enemy so that the unity of the elements would remain consciously and effectively its vital interest.

The last mentioned example allows a transition to the broadening of this integrating significance of conflict: that by it is not only an existing unity in itself more energetically concentrated, and all elements that could blur the sharpness of its boundaries against the enemy are radically excluded—but also that it generally unifies persons and groups who otherwise have nothing to do with one another. The energy with which conflict operates in this direction explicitly comes to that arguably most decidedly when the link between the conflict situation and unification is strong enough for it to become also already meaningful in the opposite direction. Psychological associations generally show their strength in their also being effective in an inverse way; when, for example, a certain personality is introduced under the idea of the hero, the link between both images is then proven to be firmest if the idea of

the hero cannot be thought at all without the image of that personality appearing. As alliance for purposes of conflict is an event experienced countless times, sometimes the mere bonding of elements, even where it is concluded with no kind of aggressive or generally conflict-like purposes, appears to other powers as a threatening and hostile act. The despotism of the modern state points above all to medieval thinking on unification, so that ultimately every association, as such, between cities, estates, knights, or any elements of the state for that matter were regarded by the government as a rebellion, as a struggle against it in latent form. Charlemagne prohibited guilds as sworn allegiances and permitted them without oath exclusively for charitable purposes. The point of the prohibition lies in the sworn commitment itself with purposes that are permitted because state-threatening purposes could be easily tied to them. Thus the Moravian land ordinance of 1628 dictates: "Thus to enter into or to erect *foedera* or alliances, to whatever end and against whomever it may be intended, pertains to nobody other than the king." That the dominating authority, nevertheless, sometimes even favors or establishes associations proves nothing on the contrary but that everything is supposed to be conducted for this cohesiveness, and certainly not only in the most obvious case of counteracting the association of an existing party of opposition but in the more interesting case of diverting the drive for association in a harmless direction. After the Romans had dissolved all the political associations of the Greeks, Hadrian created an association of all Greeks (χοινον συνεδριον των Ελληνων)[29] with ideal purposes: games, commemorations, preservation of an ideal, an entirely nonpolitical Panhellenism.

Now the historical cases make particularly obvious for the relationship here immediately in question that it can only be a matter of the *degree* of unification that is in this way achievable. The establishment of the unity of the state stands above all. Essentially France owes the consciousness of its national cohesiveness primarily to the struggle against the English; the Spanish territories were turned into *one people* by the war with the Moors. The next lower level is marked by federal states and confederations of states according to their coherence and the measure of power of their central power in further various gradations. The United States had need of its Civil War, Switzerland of the struggle against Austria, the Netherlands of the rebellion against Spain,

[29] *Koinon sunedrion ton Hellenon*, literally «common council of the Greeks»—ed.

the Achaean League of the fight against Macedonia; the foundation of the new German Reich had its counterpart. The formation of unified estates belongs in this realm; for them the moment of conflict, latent and open oppositions, is one of such obvious significance that I mention only a negative example. That in Russia no actual aristocracy exists as a closed stratum would have to appear actually to favor the broad and unrestrained development of a bourgeoisie. In reality just the opposite is the case. Had there been, as elsewhere, a powerful aristocracy, it would surely have set itself frequently in opposition to the prince, who in turn in that struggle would have depended on an urban bourgeoisie. Obviously such a situation of conflict then would have interested the princes in developing a unified bourgeois class. The elements of such a one found in this case not even in general anything so conflict-relevant as to join together into a class because no conflict existed between the nobility and the central power in which they would have been able to share in winning some prize by being in league with one side or the other. In all positive cases of this type the indication is that the unity came about certainly through strife and for the same purposes, but exists beyond fighting and no longer allows interrelated interests and unifying energies to merge with warlike purpose. The significance of conflict here is actually only in putting the latently existing relationship and unity into effect; even more, it is here the occasion for the internally necessary unifications, as well as their purpose. *Inside* the collective interest in conflict there is admittedly yet another nuance: whether the unification for the purpose of conflict is meant for attack and defense or only for defense. This last is probably the case for the majority of coalitions of already existing groups, namely wherever it is a matter of very many groups or groups very diverse from one another. The goal of defense is the collectivist minimum because it is for every single group and for every individual the most unavoidable test of the instinct of self-preservation. The more and the more varied are the elements that unite, the narrower apparently is the number of interests in which they concur, and in the most extreme case it reverts to the most primitive instinct: the defense of existence. Over against the fear, for example, on the part of the business community that all English trade unions could at the same time make common resolve, one of their most unconditional supporters sincerely emphasized: even if it came to that, it could be exclusively for the purposes of defense!

From the cases, then, in which the collectivizing effect of strife extends beyond the moment and the immediate purpose, what can happen even

with the same minimum mentioned is that their extension devolves further to the cases in which the union occurs really only *ad hoc*. Here the two types are distinguishable: the cooperative federal union for a single action that, however frequent, especially in actual wars, requires the service of all the energies of the elements; it produces a total unity that, however, after the achievement or failure of their urgent purpose, releases its parts again to their former separate existence, somewhat as with the Greeks after eliminating the Persian danger. With the other type the unity is less complete but also less transitory; it forms a group not so much around a time as around the contents regarding a singular purpose of conflict, which has no effect on the other aspects of the elements. So a Federation of Associated Employers of Labour has existed in England since 1873, founded to counter the influence of the trade unions; also several years later in the United States a federation of employers as such was formed, without regard for the various branches of business, to defy the strike movement of the workers as a whole. The character of both types appears then naturally at its most acute when the elements of the fighting entity are not just indifferent towards one another but hostile, either in other periods or in other relationships; the unifying power of the principle of conflict never manifests such strength as when it cuts a temporal or material enclave out of relationships of competition or animosity. The opposition between the other antagonism and the momentary comradeship-in-arms can develop to such an extent under certain circumstances that precisely the absoluteness of their enmity forms for the parties the direct cause of their union. The opposition in the English Parliament has sometimes comes to such a point that the extremists became dissatisfied with the ministerial direction of the government and formed a party with the *primary* opposition, held together by the common opposition towards the Ministry. So the ultra-Whigs under Pulteney joined with the high Tories against Robert Walpole. It was thus precisely the principle of radicalism, which lives by the hostility toward the Tories, that fused its adherents together with them: were they not so strongly opposed to the Tories, they would not have merged with the Tories in order thereby to bring about the downfall of the Whig minister who was not Whiggish enough for them. This case is so glaring because the common opponent brings together the otherwise enemies based on the perception of both of them that the opponent stands too far on the other side. By the way, though, it is only the purest example of the banal experience that even

the bitterest enmities do not hinder bonding, as soon as it concerns a common enemy. This is especially the case if each or at least one of the two of the now cooperating parties has very concrete and immediate ends for the achievement of which it needs only the removal of a certain opponent. In France's history from the Huguenots to Richelieu we observe with respect to the internal parties that it is enough that the one appears more hostile towards Spain or England, Savoy or Holland, so that immediately the other joins this external political power, with no concern over its harmony or disharmony with their positive tendencies. These parties in France had, however, thoroughly tangible goals in sight, simply freedom from the opposition, and needed only space for them. They were therefore ready to ally themselves with any opponent whatever of this opponent, insofar as this one had the same intention, fully indifferent to their relationship otherwise. The *more purely negative* or destructive an enmity is, the more readily will it bring about an alliance among those who otherwise lack any motive for mutuality.

Finally the lowest step on this scale, the least acute form, is formed by the alliances consisting simply of a shared mentality. One knows that one belongs insofar as one has a similar aversion or a similar practical interest against a third, however without it needing to lead to a common action in conflict. Here also two types are distinguished. The large-scale enterprise, few employers standing over against the masses of workers, has apparently succeeded in actually bringing about not only several effective alliances of the latter to the conflict over working conditions, but also the whole general mindset that all wage workers somehow belong together because they all stand in principle in the same struggle with the employers. At several points this mindset certainly crystallizes into several actions of political party formation or of wage dispute. However, as a whole it cannot become essentially practical; it remains the mindset of an abstract solidarity by way of the common opposition against an abstract foe. If here the feeling of unity is abstract, but ongoing, then in the second case concrete but fleeting; this is the case, *e.g.*, when personalities of the same high levels of cultivation and sentiment, otherwise foreign to one another, find themselves in a social circle, in a train car, or someplace similar, with persons raw and vulgar in behavior. Without it coming to any kind of commotion, without a word or glance being exchanged, the former feel as a party held together by the common aversion, at least in the ideal sense, against the aggressive boorishness of the others. With its most extremely delicate

and sensitive character, with a simultaneous ambiguity, this common mindset seals off the ranks of those for whom fully alien elements are brought together by the commonality of an antagonism.

Where the synthesizing power of a common opponent is not a question of the quantity of points of interest but of the duration and the intensity of the alliance, it works especially well if, instead of the actual fight, there is the ongoing *threat* from a foe. From the beginning of the Achaean league, about 270 BCE, the emphasis was placed on Achaia being surrounded by enemies who had, however, everything else to do at the moment but attack it; and such a period of danger, which would always threaten but be forever put off, would have been especially suitable to strengthen the feeling of unity. This is a case of the unique type: a certain *distance* between the elements to be united on the one hand and the point and interest that unites them on the other hand being an especially favorable constellation for the binding, especially where it is a matter of an extensive circle. This applies to religious relations: in contrast to the tribal and national deities, the universal God of Christianity stands an infinite distance from the believers; fully absent from God are the peculiar characteristics relative to the individual; for this reason, God can then assemble even the most heterogeneous peoples and personalities into one incomparable religious community. Even further: clothing always characterizes certain social strata as belonging together; and it now often seems to fulfill this social function best when it comes from the outside. To clothe oneself as one does in Paris signifies a narrow and exclusive society of a certain social level in other lands; certainly the prophet Zephaniah speaks of the behavior of wearing foreign clothing as such.[30] The very many meanings that the symbol 'distance' covers have varying psychological associations; almost always, *e.g.*, a substantive idea that is presented as somehow 'removed' seems to function more impersonally. The individual reaction that results from close proximity and contact is thereby less intense, carries a less immediately subjective character, and can therefore be the same for a greater number of individuals. As the general concept that is supposed to encompass a number of individual beings is all the more abstract, *i.e.*, moves all the farther away from each individual one of them, and

[30] Simmel seems to be alluding to Zephaniah 1.8: "And on the day of the Lord's sacrifice—I will punish the officials and the king's sons and all who array themselves in foreign attire" (RSV translation)—Ed.

the more there are differences among them, so then a social point of unity, having a greater distance from the allying elements—and certainly in the spatial as well as in the figurative sense—appears specifically to exercise integrating and encompassing functions. Such a unification by a danger that, however, has more of a chronic than acute character, a struggle not settled but always latent, will be most effective where an ongoing unity of elements of somehow differing aspirations is in question. So it happened with the Achaean League, which I cited above; as Montesquieu comments: while calm and trust would generate glory and security for the monarchy, a republic would find it necessary to fear someone.[31] Obviously emotion is here the basis for the purported constellation: the monarchy as such certainly looks after the cohesion of potentially antagonistic elements; where these, however, have no one over them who coerces them into unity, but they possess relative sovereignty, then they will readily break apart if one of all the respective dangers does not force them together—a danger that can hold up obviously not as a one-time conflict as such but only as an ongoing threat and guarantee an enduring structure.

While this is more a question of degree, the essential connection of the collectivity with hostility still needs perhaps supplementation as follows. Conflictual undertakings are much more inclined than peaceable ones, from the time of their formation, to call upon as large a number as possible of members for collaboration, who, otherwise separated from one another, would not have begun the undertaking on their own initiative. With peaceable actions one tends as a whole to limit oneself to those also otherwise close associates; but for 'allies'—in itself an indifferent concept which has indeed received a warlike flavor in linguistic usage—often enough one takes elements with whom one has hardly anything in common, indeed, would not care to. It happens, first, that war, and not only the political one, often presents an emergency in which one cannot be choosy about the acquisition of additional helpers; second, that the objective of the action lies outside the field or other immediate peripheries of interest of one's allies, and they can thus, after a completed conflict, return again to their former distance; third, that gain through conflict does tend indeed to be a dangerous but at best a

[31] Montesquieu's reference to the Greek confederacy that Simmel has in mind is probably that in the opening paragraphs of Book IX, Charles Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws* (New York: Hafner, 1949)—Ed.

particularly rapid and intensive one, and therefore exercises on certain temperaments a formal attraction, which peaceful undertakings must bring about only by their specific *content*; fourth, that the conflict renders the truly personal unimportant among those fighting and thereby even allows the alliance of elements otherwise quite heterogeneous. Thereupon follows finally the motive, that hostilities themselves readily excite one another. Certainly inside one and the same group, when it comes to a feud against another, all possible latent or half forgotten animosities among its individuals break out towards those in the other. And thus the war between two groups tends to arouse in a third every ill will and resentment towards one of them that would not have led to an outbreak but, now that another has paved the way, provoke the alignment with their action. It is entirely in this sense that, especially in earlier times, the unifying relationships of peoples were in general only those of war, while other relationships, such as commerce, hospitality, and intermarriage, still involved only a relationship among individuals that would make the agreement between the groups of people possible but would not on its own set them into motion.

When a historical development occurs in a continuous rhythmical change in periodical pairs, one achieving its own meaning equally and simply in relationship with the other and in antithesis to the development—then the unified picture that we form from such a process seldom repeats its objective harmony and the persisting plane on which its elements alternate with one another. Rather we almost unavoidably give the change in the development a kind of teleological accent, so that the one period is viewed always as the starting-point, objectively primary, from which the other develops, while the transition again from the latter to the former appears as a retrogression. The world process, *e.g.*, is then to be an eternal change of qualitative regularity of combined quantities of matter and of differentiated dispersion of the very same, and we would like to be convinced that one always emerges from the other, and then again the other from the one; however, as our categorical concepts function at this time, we hold, however, the condition of undifferentiation to be the first, *i.e.*, our need to explain strongly requires contrarily that multiplicity derive from the uniform, although it would be objectively perhaps more correct to accept neither as the first but rather as one eternal rhythm in which we stop at no calculated stages; rather, they have to always originate from an earlier, opposing one. It is similar with the principles of rest and movement. They alternate endlessly with one another just as much as in the sev-

eral series of existence; but one tends to sense the state of rest as the original or even as the definitive, that which would need no derivation, so to speak. Thus while we examine two periods together, either the one always seems to be the explanatory one or the one being reduced to, and only in this rank-ordering do we believe we have grasped the meaning of their alternation: we are not satisfied with their mere alternation, as the phenomenon reveals it, and no element therein authorized as the primary and none as the secondary. Humanity is simply too much a differentiating, evaluating, and purposeful being for it not to subdivide the unbroken flow of alternating periods by such emphases, and would interpret them according to the form, as it were, of master and servant, or preparation and fulfillment, or intermediate states and definitive ones. And so it is with conflict and peace. In the after-one-another as well as in the next-to-one-another of societal life they inextricably intermingle in such a way that in every state of peace the conditions for the future fight are building, in every fight those for the future peace; should one trace backwards the succession of social developments under these categories, one is unable to stop anywhere; in the historical reality both states point continuously to the other. Nevertheless, we sense an inner difference of its phases in this succession: conflict appears as the temporary, whose purpose lies in peace and its contents. While the rhythm of these elements, objectively considered, proceeds fully equally on *one* plane, our valuation constructs from it, as it were, iambic verses, with war as thesis and peace as arsis. Thus in the oldest constitution of Rome the king must ask the citizenry their consent first if he wants to begin a war; but this consent is not required—it being presupposed as obvious—if it is a matter of concluding peace. This already suggests that the transition from conflict to peace will offer a more essential problem than the reverse. The latter requires actually no particular consideration; because the situations inside peace, from which the open conflict emerges, are themselves already conflict in diffuse, unnoticed, or latent form. Since, if, *e.g.*, the economic flourishing of the North American southern states before the Civil War, which they had by virtue of the slave economy in advance of the northern states, was also the reason for the war, it stands at rest in this way as long as no additional antagonism arises from it, but there exist only immanent conditions of one and the other realm, generally beyond the specific question of war and peace. In the moment, however, in which the inclination leading towards war approached it, this inclination itself was simply already an accumulation of antagonisms: hateful

attitudes, newspaper polemics, frictions between private persons and, on the verge of war, mutually moralistic suspicions in realms outside the central point of contention. The end of peace thus is not marked by a unique sociological situation, but antagonism develops directly from all kinds of material relationships inside of peace, albeit not uniformly in its clearest or strongest form. Quite otherwise though in the reverse: peace does not likewise accumulate on strife; the conclusion of strife is a specific undertaking that belongs neither in the one nor in the other category, just as a bridge is something different from either of the banks that it connects. The sociology of conflict thus needs, at least as an appendix, an analysis of forms in which a conflict is ended and which present several specific patterns of interaction observed under no other circumstances.

There is probably no soul who would entirely deny the formal allure of conflict and that of peace, and since each of the two exists to some extent in every moment, the excitement of the newness of change between the two grows. It is only the rhythm of this alteration which is sought by the individual nature, which part of it is experienced as an arsis and which as a thesis, whether it evokes it on its own initiative or expects it from the developments of fate—only this distinguishes its individuality. The first motive of the end of strife, the need for peace, is therefore something much more substantive than the mere fatigue with the struggle; it is that rhythm that allows us now to long for peace, as well as for an entirely real situation that in no way means only the absence of conflict. Only, one must not understand the rhythm entirely mechanically. Admittedly it has been said that intimate relationships, such as love and friendship, required occasional differences in order to be reminded of the contrast with the estrangement endured before their great happiness; or in order to interrupt the closeness of the relationship, which simply has something obsessive, encompassing for the individual, by a departure that renders its oppressiveness imperceptible. It will not be the deepest relationships that require such a cycle; it will more likely be peculiar of rougher natures that demand bluntly stimulating differences and whose life moments favor the change into contrasts: it is the type of the rabble brawling one moment and amicable the next, that requires discord for the preservation of the relationship. The very deep and refined relationship will manage without an antagonistic interval and find its stimulating contrasts in the surrounding world, in the dissonances and animosities in the rest of existence that deliver

sufficient background for the consciousness of its respite. However, to differentiate on the one hand the exhaustion of the powers that can place the requirement of peace unequivocally next to the ongoing desire to fight, on the other hand the diversion of interest from the strife by a greater interest in another object, belongs to the indirect motives for the desire for peace. The interest in another object produces various moral hypocrisies and self-deceptions: one pretends or believes to be burying the hatchet out of ideal interests in peace while in reality only having lost interest in the object of conflict and preferring to free up one's powers for other matters.

While the end of conflict in deeply grounded relationships comes about through their indivertible undercurrent coming to the surface again and smoothing out the counter-movements within it, entirely new nuances arise where the *abolition of the object of dispute* ends the antagonism. Every conflict that is not of an absolutely impersonal kind makes use of the available powers of the individual; it functions as a point of crystallization around which they are organized to a greater or lesser degree—internally repeating the form of core and auxiliary troops—and thereby provides the entire complex of the personality, once in conflict, its own peculiar structure. If the conflict ends in one of the usual ways—through victory and defeat, through reconciliation, through compromise—this mental structure is reconstructed back into that of the peaceful condition; the central point gives the engaged energies its transformation from an excited state into a calm one. Instead of this organic, albeit endlessly multiply developing process of inner cessation of the conflictual movement, however, a wholly irrational and turbulent one often comes about if the object of conflict suddenly falls away, so that the whole activity is suspended, so to speak, in a void; this happens especially since our feelings are more conservative than our intellect, and thus their stimulation in no way ceases at the moment that the mind recognizes that their cause is no longer valid. Confusion and damage occur everywhere when mental activities that originated on account of a specific matter are suddenly deprived of it, so that they can no longer develop and find completion in a natural manner but sustain themselves groundlessly or grasp for a meaningless substitute object. So if chance or a higher power makes off with its goal while the dispute is in progress—a rivalry whose contested object decides for a third, a dispute over plunder that is in the meantime stolen by another, theoretical controversies whose problem a superior

mind suddenly solves so that both of the competing claims prove to be wrong—there is thus often still an empty continuation of conflict, an unfruitful mutual recrimination, a resurgence of earlier, long-buried differences; this is the lingering reverberation of conflict activity that must under these circumstances have its fling in some kind of quite senseless and tumultuous style before coming to rest. Most notably, this occurs perhaps in those cases where the object of dispute is recognized by both parties as illusory, not worth the fight. Here shame over the error often allows the conflict to continue for yet a long time, with a rootless and tiresome expenditure of energy, but with all the more bitterness towards the opponent who drives us to this Don Quixotism.

The simplest and most radical type of turning conflict into peace is *victory*—a quite unique phenomenon of life for which there are certainly countless individual forms and degrees—which, however, possesses a similarity with no other identified phenomenon that can otherwise occur among human beings. Out of the many varieties of victory that give the subsequent peace a particular quality, I mention only that which is brought about not exclusively through the overpowering of one party but at least partially by the acquiescence of the other. This surrender, declaring oneself defeated or submitting patiently to the victory of the other without having already exhausted all powers for resistance and possibilities, is not always a simple phenomenon. It can function as a certain ascetic tendency, the desire for self-abasement and self-sacrifice, not strong enough to surrender without a fight beforehand but emerging as soon as the mindset of the defeated begins to seize the soul, or even finding its most sublime allure for the antithesis of the still animated conflict mentality. Pressing one to the same conclusion, moreover, is the feeling that it is nobler to submit than to cling to the very last to the unlikely chance of a turnaround. To drop this chance and, at the price of one's own defeat, avoiding it in its complete unavoidability being demonstrated right up to the last—this has something of the great and noble style of human beings who are certain not only of their strength but also their weakness without having to be perceptibly assured of it again every time. Finally, in this voluntary act of self-declared defeat lies another final proof of the power of the subject who is at least capable of this last act; indeed, it has thereby actually given something to the victor. For this reason it is sometimes observed in personal conflicts that the submission of the one party before the other has yet actually achieved its goal by its own power, is experienced from this as a kind

of affront—as though it were actually the weaker party to whom one submitted on some basis other than that it was necessary.[32]

Ending a conflict through *compromise* stands in complete contrast to doing so through a victory. It is one of the most characteristic classificatory kinds of conflicts whether they are by their nature amenable to a compromise or not. This is in no way only a matter of whether what is at stake forms an indivisible unity or whether it can be shared among the parties. With regard to certain objects, compromise through sharing is out of the question: between rivals for the favor of a woman, between prospective buyers for one and the same indivisible item for sale, also conflicts whose motives are hatred and revenge. Nevertheless conflicts over indivisible objects are still open to compromise when they are justifiable; so the actual prize of conflict can in fact fall only to the one, who, however, compensates the other for compliance with something else of value. Whether goods are fungible in this manner naturally does not depend on some objective equivalence between them but on the inclination of the parties to end the antagonism through concession and compensation. This chance ranges between the cases of pure stubbornness, on the one hand, in which the most rational and generous compensation, for which the party would otherwise gladly give up the contested object, is rejected only for the reason that it is offered precisely by the opponent—and the other, in which the party from the beginning seems attracted by the uniqueness of the contest prize, but then relinquishes it willingly to the other, compensated by an object whose ability to substitute for that remains often fully mysterious to any third party.

[32] This belongs in the category of forms of relationships in which an indulgence is an offence. There are cases enough of politeness that are insults, gifts that humiliate, sympathetic sharing that functions as fresh importunity or increases the suffering of its victim, kindnesses by which the forced gratitude or the relationship established by them is more unpleasant than the deprivation remedied by them. That such sociological constellations are possible goes back to the frequent and deep discrepancy that exists between the objectively expressed contents of a situation or behavior, composed as a particular concept on the one hand, and its individual realization on the other, the latter of which it experiences as a mere element of one richly complicated totality of life. This is the formula for distinguishing whether one treats the ailment or the sick person, whether one punishes the offense or the offender, whether the teacher imparts educational material or educates the students. Thus some are objectively a good deed, according to its conceptual contents, while it can be the opposite as an individually experienced reality.

On the whole, compromise, particularly that brought about by fungibility, belonging for us so very much to the everyday and self-evident life skills, is one of the greatest inventions of humanity. It is the impulse of the naturally human as well as that of the child to reach immediately for every pleasing object, no matter whether it is already in the possession of another. Robbery is—next to the gift—the nearest form of the exchange of possessions, and any such instance of it seldom occurs in primitive relationships without a fight. That this can now be avoided, in that one offers the possessor of the desired object another from one's own possessions and thereby converts the whole exchange finally then into one more trifling, as though one continues or begins the conflict—to realize that is the beginning of all cultivated economy, every higher trafficking of goods. Every exchange for a thing is a compromise—and indeed this is the poverty of things over against the merely psychological, in that *their* exchange always presupposes a giving away and a renunciation, while love and all the contents of the spirit can be exchanged without those who become richer being paid at the expense of others who become poorer. When it is reported of certain social circumstances that it counts as chivalrous to rob and to combat robbery, but counts exchange and purchase as undignified and base, then the compromising character of exchange functions for the purpose of converting the concession and renunciation into the antipole of all conflict and victory. Every exchange presupposes that valuations and interests have taken on an objective character. Then it is not the merely subjective passion of the desire which only conflict satisfies that is no longer decisive, but the recognized value of the object, acknowledged by both interests, which, materially unchanged, is expressible through various objects. The abandonment of the valued object because one preserves the quantity of value contained in it in another form is in its simplicity truly the wonderful means of settling matters between opposed interests other than through conflict. However, this certainly required a long historical development because it presupposes a psychological solution of the general emotional value from the individual object that is fused with it, an elevation above the self-interest in the immediate desire. The compromise through fungibility—of which exchange is a special case—means the essentially, albeit only very partially, realized possibility of avoiding conflict or putting it off till the very end before the mere power of the subject has decided it.

As a purely subjective proceeding *reconciliation* stands in contrast to the objective character that the resolution of conflict through compromise

has. I mean here not the reconciliation that is the consequence of a compromise or some other settlement of the conflict, but the cause of these. Reconcilability is a primary attitude that, quite beyond objective reasons, seeks to end conflict, just as the desire to fight no less sustains it without objective cause. This entirely elementary and irrational tendency toward reconciliation is definitely in play in the countless cases where conflict concludes in other than the most merciless consequence of the relations of power. It is something different from weakness or graciousness, social morality or neighborly love. It does not even coincide with peaceableness. For the latter avoids conflict from the beginning or wages it when it is imposed, along with the ongoing undercurrent of the need for peace—whereas reconciliation in its full character often appears immediately after a total commitment to conflict. Most likely its social-psychological nature seems related to forgiveness, which also after all in no way presumes a laxity of reaction, an absence of the power of antagonism, but quite simply flashes up just after the deepest felt injustice and passionate conflict. For that reason there is something irrational in reconciliation as well as in forgiveness, something like a denial of what one was even just a moment ago. This mysterious rhythm of the soul, which lets the processes of this type be conditioned precisely only by those contradicting it, is revealed perhaps most strongly in forgiveness, since it is indeed probably the single emotional process that we readily assume is subject to the will—for otherwise the *plea* for forgiveness would be senseless. A plea can move us to something only where the will has the power. My sparing the conquered enemy, my renouncing any revenge on my offender can conceivably occur after a request because it depends on my will; that I *forgive* them, however, *i.e.* that the *feeling* of antagonism, hatred, and separation would make space for another *feeling*—to be able to make the bare decision about that thus hardly seems at one's disposal, just as with feelings in general. In reality, though, it is otherwise, and there are seldom cases in which we are simply not *able* even with the best will to forgive. There is in forgiveness, if one seeks to feel it thoroughly down to its ultimate foundation, something rationally not exactly conceptual, and reconciliation has shared in this quality to a certain extent as well, whereby both sociological processes then transform meaningfully into the mysticism of religion; they can do this because they, as sociological, already contain a mystically religious element.

Now the 'reconciled' relationship poses a special problem in its difference from one that was never broken. This is not the relationship

touched on earlier, whose more internal rhythm swings in general between discord and reconciliation, but those that have suffered a true break and have accordingly gone together again as on a new basis. Few character traits are as distinguishable for relationships as whether they are increased or reduced in their intensity in that case. At least this is the alternative for all deeper and more sensitive natures; where a relationship, after it has experienced a radical break, comes to life again afterwards in exactly the same manner as if nothing had happened, one can in general presume either a more frivolous or more coarsely grained attitude. The case mentioned as a pair is the least complicated: that an estrangement once it has happened may never be quite overcome, even not through the most earnest will of the parties, is readily understandable; where no remnant of the issue of conflict as such remained, no irreconcilability at all need be existent, but the mere fact that in general a break was once there is decisive. Often playing a part in this outcome in close relationships, which have at some time come to the point of a more extreme estrangement, is this: one has seen that one can in general get on without the other, that life, albeit not very happy, nevertheless simply goes on. This does not merely diminish the value of the relationship, but after the unity is again re-established the individuals are easily reproached by a kind of betrayal and infidelity that is not in any way to be made good and that interweaves into the re-developing relationship a dispiritedness and a mistrust of its individuals towards their own feelings.

Of course, self-deception often occurs here. The surprising relative ease with which one sometimes bears the breakup of a close relationship stems from the rage that we still possess from the catastrophe. It stirred up all manner of forces in us, the momentum of which still carries us for a time and keeps us going. But just as the death of a loved one also does not unfold in all its terrible severity in the first hour, since only the further passage of time provides all the situations in which the deceased was normally an element, we now have situations to live through as though with a limb ripped from us and which no initial moment could comprehensively anticipate—thus a valuable relationship does not, so to speak, dissolve in the first moment of a separation in which rather the *reasons* for its dissolution dominate our consciousness; but we feel the bereavement every single hour, time and again, and so our emotions will often not be set aright for a long time, though in the first moment they seemed to bear it with a certain composure. For this reason the reconciliation of some relationships is

also to an extent deeper and more passionate when the break existed a longer time. Likewise for the same reason, however, it is in general conceivable that the *tempo* of the reconciliation, of the 'forgive and forget,' is of greater significance for the further structural development of the relationship, and that those conclusions of strife do not really neutralize it unless the latent energies found some kind of actualization beforehand: only in the more open or at least more conscious situation are they actually imbued with the inclination for reconciliation. Just as one may not learn fast enough, if what is learned is to remain with us, so one may also not forget fast enough, if the forgetting is to develop its sociological significance fully.

That, in contrast, the measure of intensity of the reconciled relationship *exceeds* that of the unbroken has various causes. Mainly a background is thereby created, from which all values and survivals of the union stand out more consciously and clearly. To this is brought the discretion with which one deals with every reference to past events, a new sensitivity, indeed, a new unexpressed togetherness in the relationship. For in all respects the common avoidance of an all-too-sensitive point can mean likewise a great intimacy and self-understanding, as well as the lack of inhibition that transforms every object of the individuals' inner lives into an object of affirming togetherness; and finally: the intensity of the desire to protect the revived relationship before every shadow comes not only from the suffering experienced in the rupture, but above all from the consciousness that a second break might no longer be able to be healed in the manner the first was. For, in countless cases and at least among sensitive people, this would turn the whole relationship into a caricature. It can presumably, even in the most deeply grounded relationship, come to a tragic break and to a reconciliation; but this then belongs to the events that can occur only once and whose repetition robs them of all worth and seriousness. Because once the first repetition has occurred, then nothing speaks against a second and third, which would trivialize all the emotional shocks of the process and reduce it to a frivolous game. Perhaps this feeling that another rupture would be the definitive one—a feeling to which there is hardly an analogy with the first one—is for finer natures the strongest bond by which the reconciled relationship is distinguished from one that was never broken.

Precisely because of the deeper significance that the degree of reconciliation after the strife, on a par with the suffering inflicted on the one or the other side, has for the development of the relationship between

the persons, its negative extreme, irreconcilability, plays a part in this significance. It can also be, as can reconcilability, a formal attitude of the soul that indeed requires an external situation for its actualization but then comes in entirely spontaneously and not only as a consequence of different, intervening emotions. Both tendencies belong to the polar foundational elements whose blending constitutes all relationships between people. One hears it said occasionally, "Whoever could not forget, could also not forgive," that is to say, not fully reconcile. This would mean evidently the most terrible irreconcilability, for it makes the reconciliation dependent on the disappearance from consciousness of every cause for its opposite; as with all processes based on forgetting, it would also be in constant danger of being recalled. If the whole argument is to make sense, then, it runs in the opposite direction: where the reconcilability exists as a primary fact, it will be the reason that the discord and the suffering that the other caused one no longer arises in consciousness. Accordingly the actual irreconcilability also in no way consists in the consciousness now not being able to get over the past conflicts; this is in fact just a consequence. Irreconcilability means that through the conflict the soul has suffered a modification of its *being* that is no longer to be undone, comparable not so much to a wound that cannot be healed as to a limb that has been lost. This is the most tragic irreconcilability: neither an anger nor a reservation or secret defiance needs to remain in the soul and lay a definite barrier between the one and the other; it is simply that through the brawl of the conflict something in the soul has been killed that is not to be brought to life again, not even through characteristically passionate effort for it; here lies a point at which the powerlessness of the will over against the actual being of a human is glaringly obvious—in the strongest psychological contrast to the previously discussed type of forgiveness. While this is the form of irreconcilability of highly integrated and not just easily agitated natures, there exists one other, internally strongly differentiated: the image and the after-effect of the conflict and everything pertaining to it that one had thrown at the other remain in existence in consciousness and cannot be gotten over. However, around this though there now grows the undiminished love and devotion in which those memories and resignations function not as shortcomings but, like organic components, are fitted into the picture of the other, whom we love, as it were, inclusive of this liability in the balance of our whole relationship to that person—just as we nevertheless love a person even with all that person's faults, which we wish away perhaps,

but cannot think away. The bitterness of the conflict, the points whereby the personality of the other has disappointed that bring an ongoing renunciation or an ever renewed irritation into the relationship—all this is unforgotten and actually unreconciled. However it is, as it were, localized, as a factor taken up into the whole relationship under whose central intensity it is not necessary to suffer.

It goes without saying that both of these phenomena of irreconcilability, which are obviously differentiated from what is usually called that, nevertheless include the whole scale even of the latter: the one allows the consequence of the conflict, fully released from its individual contents, to sink right into the center of the soul; it reshapes the personality, in so far as it pertains to the other, at its deepest level. On the other hand, the psychological legacy of the discord is, as it were, isolated in the other, remaining a single element that can be taken up into the picture of the other, then to be embraced along with the whole personality. Between that worst and this lightest case of irreconcilability obviously there lies the whole manifold of degrees to which irreconcilability places peace even in the shadows of conflict.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SECRET AND THE SECRET SOCIETY

All relationships of human beings obviously rest on their knowing something about one another. People in business *know* that their competitors want to buy as cheaply as possible and sell as high as possible; teachers *know* that they can expect a certain quality and quantity of educational content from the students; within any social class individuals *know* roughly what level of education they have to presuppose on the part of one another—and obviously without such knowledge the actions between person and person touched on here would not be able to occur at all. In all relationships of a personally differentiated kind—as one can say with readily evident reservations—there develops an intensity and coloring to the degree to which every part reveals itself to the other through word and deed. How much error and mere prejudice may be hidden in all this knowledge is uncertain. Just as we gain, however, over against our perception of the external nature, alongside its deceptions and deficiencies, enough truth as is required for life and progress of our kind, so each knows the other with whom one has anything to do, in large part or as a whole correctly enough that communication and relationship are possible. That one knows with *whom* one has something to do is the first condition for having something to do with someone at all; the usual reciprocal mental image in some long ongoing conversation or in the encounter on the same social level is, appearing so very much as an empty form, an apt symbol of that mutual knowledge that is an *a priori* of any relationship. This is frequently concealed from consciousness because for an extraordinarily large number of relationships we need only know the rather typical tendencies and qualities mutually available, which, in their necessity, are usually only noticed when they are lacking at some point. It would merit a specialized investigation, which type and degree of mutual knowledge is required for the various relationships among people; how general psychological presuppositions, with which each approaches any other, interweave with the specific experiences about the individual before us; how in some realms mutual knowledge need not or is not permitted to be the same for both parties; how existing

relationships are determined in their development only by the increasing knowledge about the other on the part of both or just one; finally, contrariwise: how our objectively psychological image of the other is influenced by the real relationships of praxis and of disposition. The latter is by no means meant in the sense of misrepresentation. But in a fully legitimate way the theoretical idea of a particular individual is a different one, according to the standpoint from which it is grasped and which is given by the whole relationship of the knowing to the known. Because one can never know another *absolutely*—which would mean the knowledge of every individual thought and every attitude—because one forms for oneself in fact a personal unity of the other from the fragments in which the other is solely available to us, then the latter depends on that part of the other that our standpoint vis-à-vis the other allows us to see. These differences, however, originate in no way only through such a reality as the quantity of knowledge. No psychological knowledge is a poor imitation of its object, but each is, just as those of the external character, dependent on the forms that the knowing mind brings with it and by which it appropriates the data. These forms, however, are highly individually differentiated where it is a matter of the knowledge of an individual about an individual; they do not lend themselves to scientific generalization and supra-subjective strength of conviction that is attainable regarding external nature and only typical mental processes. When A has a different idea of M than B possesses, then this need not in the least signify incompleteness or delusion, but as A is simply situated in relation to M according to A's essence and the general circumstances, this image of M is truth for A, likewise as for B with a substantially different one. It is by no means an issue of the objectively correct knowledge of M beyond both of them, by which they would be legitimated according to the degree of their agreement with it. The ideal of truth rather, which indeed the image of M in the conceptualization by A always only approaches asymptotically, is also as *ideal* different from that by B; it contains, as an integrating, shaping pre-condition, the mental characteristic of A and the particular relationship in which A and M fall into with one another through their characters and their destinies. Every relationship between persons has a picture of the one arising in the other, and this operates obviously in interaction with the real relationship: while it creates the premises on which one's idea of the other serves as a catalyst for one thing or another and possesses a truth legitimized for this case, the real interaction of the individuals is based, on the other hand, on the image that

they acquire from one another. There is here one of the deeply based cycles of mental life, in which one element presupposes a second, now this one but now that one. While in narrower realms this is a fallacy that invalidates the whole, it is more generally and fundamentally the unavoidable expression of the unity to which both of the elements attend, and which cannot be expressed in our thought forms other than by the construction of the first on the second and simultaneously of the second on the first. Thus our relationships develop on the basis of a simultaneous knowledge of one another, and this knowledge on the basis of the actual relationships, both meshing together indissolubly and, through its alternation within the sociological interaction, demonstrating this as one point at which the being and the concept make their mysterious unity empirically evident.

Our knowledge of the whole being on which our actions are grounded is marked by characteristic limitations and diversions. That 'only in error is life, in knowledge is death' can in principle not be valid of course because a being enmeshed in ongoing errors would act progressively pointlessly and thus would definitely perish.[1] Nevertheless, in view of our random and deficient adaptations to our life circumstances, there is no doubt that we preserve only so much truth but also so much ignorance and acquire so much error as is useful for our practical action—going from the great, the cognitions transforming the life of humanity that nevertheless fail to materialize or remain disregarded unless the whole cultural situation makes these changes possible and useful, to the 'life story' of the individual, who so often has need of illusion about one's ability, indeed, about one's feelings of superstition with regard to the gods as well as people in order to preserve oneself in one's being and one's potential.[2] In this psychological sense error is coordinated with truth: the usefulness of the outer as well as the inner life ensures that we, from the one as well as from the other, have precisely *that* which forms the basis of activity necessary for us—naturally only in general and on the whole and with a wide latitude for fluctuation and imperfect adaptation.

[1] The statement 'only in error is life, in knowledge is death' translates *nur der Irrtum das Leben, das Wissen der Tod ist*, based on Friedrich Schiller's poem "Kassandra," which has the lines: *Nur der Irrtum ist das Leben,/Und das Wissen ist der Tod*—ed.

[2] "Life story" translates *Lebenslüge*, literally 'life lies,' meaning basically a life of deception; it seems to be used here in the sense of the lies that make life bearable, but it could also be translated colloquially as 'life story,' thus making an ironic play on words—ed.

Now, however, there is inside the sphere of the objects for truth and illusion a certain portion in which both can take on a character that occurs nowhere else: the interior of the person before us, who can either intentionally reveal to us the truth about oneself or deceive us with a lie or concealment about it. No other object can explain itself to us or hide from us in this way as a person can, because no other modifies its behavior through consideration of its becoming known. This modification does not occur, of course, without exception: frequently the other person is to us basically just like another piece of nature that to our knowledge remains, as it were, silent. As far as expressions of the other are thus possible, and even such that are modified by no thought given to this use of them but are fully unguarded and immediate disclosures—a principal factor in the characterization of the individual through the individual's context becomes important. It has been declared a problem, and the broadest conclusions then drawn from it, that our mental process, which proceeds purely naturally, would, however, in its content as well as always concurrently be in conformity with logical norms; it is in fact most remarkable that a mere event brought forth by natural causes goes on as though it were governed by the ideal laws of logic; for it is no different than as if a tree branch, bound with a telegraph apparatus so that its movements in the wind activate it, gave rise thereby to signals that produce for us an intelligible meaning. In view of this unique problem, which as a whole is not under discussion here, the one thing to be noted though is: our actual psychological processes are logically regulated to a much lesser extent than it seems by its *expressions*. If one pays close attention to the concepts as they proceed in the course of time continually through our consciousness, then their flickering, their zigzag movements, the confusing whirl of objectively unintegrated images and ideas, their, as it were, merely tentative combinations not at all logically justifiable—all this is extremely remote from any kind of rational pattern; only, we are not frequently conscious of it because our pronounced interests lie in the 'as needed' part of our mental life, for we tend quickly to pass over and ignore its leaps, its irrationalities, and its chaos, in spite of the psychological reality of it all, in preference for the more-or-less logical or the otherwise valuable. So now all that which we share with another in words or perhaps in some other way, even the most subjective, the most impulsive, the most intimate, is a selection from the actual mental totality whose absolutely accurate disclosure in terms of content and sequence would bring any person—if a paradoxical expression is permitted—into the insane asylum. There

are fragments of our actual inner life, not only with regard to quantity, that we ourselves reveal to the nearest person alone; but these, too, are not a selection that represents that reality, as it were, *pro rata*, but a viewpoint of judgment, of value, of the relationship to the hearer, of regard for the other's understanding from encounters. We also like to say something that goes beyond the interjection and the minimal communication: we never thereby present directly and faithfully what is actually going on in us right then, but a teleologically directed, excluding, and recomposing conversion of the inner reality. With an instinct that automatically excludes the opposite, we show nobody the purely causally real course of our mental processes, wholly incoherent and irrational from the standpoint of logic, factuality, and meaningfulness, but always only an extract from them stylized by selection and arrangement; and there is no other interaction and no other society at all thinkable than that resting on this teleologically determined ignorance of one for the other. From this self-evident, *a priori*, as it were, absolute presupposition the relative differences are grasped that we know as sincere self-revelation and deceptive self-concealment.

Every lie, even if its object were of a factual nature, is by its inner essence a generation of error outside the lying *subject*, for it consists in the liar hiding from the other the true conception that is treated. That the one lied to has a false ideal about the *matter* does not exhaust the specific essence of the lie—it shares that with simple error—but rather what one will accept about the inner opinion of the *lying person* in a deception. Truthfulness and falsehood then are of the most far-ranging importance for the relationships of people with one another. Sociological structures differ most characteristically by the degree to which falsehood is at work in them. In the first place, falsehood is often more harmless for the existence of the group in very simple relationships than in complex ones. Primitive persons—living in small scale circles, meeting needs through their own production or direct cooperation, limiting intellectual interests to their own experiences or on-going traditions—oversee and control the material of their existence more easily and more completely than people in a higher civilization. The innumerable errors and superstitions in the life of the primitive person are admittedly destructive enough for that person, but not to the extent that their counterparts would be in advanced epochs because the praxis of one's life is established in the main on those few facts and relationships by which one's narrow face-to-face sphere allows one to acquire a *correct* point of view directly. With a richer and broader cultural life, on the

contrary, life stands on a thousand presuppositions the causes of which the individual cannot at all trace and verify, but which must be taken on faith. In a much wider range of things than one is in the habit of clarifying for oneself our modern existence—from the economy, which is becoming evermore an economy of credit, to scientific enterprise, in which the majority of researchers have to use the unlimited results of others they themselves cannot at all verify—rests on faith in the honesty of others. We erect our most important decisions on a complicated system of representations, most of which presuppose the confidence that we are not deceived. Thus the lie becomes in modern relations something much more devastating, putting the foundation of life into question much more than was the case in the past. If the lie were to appear to us today as so venial a sin as among the Greek gods, the Jewish patriarchs, or the South Sea Islanders, if the extreme sternness of the moral order were not acting as a deterrent of it, the structure of modern life, which is in a much broader than economic sense a 'credit economy,' would be absolutely impossible. This relationship of time is repeated in the distances of other dimensions. The further third persons stand from the center of our personality, the sooner we can come to terms with their untruthfulness practically but also inwardly: when the two persons closest to us lie, life becomes unbearable. This banality must nevertheless be emphasized sociologically since it shows that the measure of truthfulness and falsehood that are compatible with the existence of relationships form a scale on which the degrees of intensity of the relationships are to be read.

With that relative social *approval* of falsehood in primitive circumstances, however, there comes a positive purposefulness for it. Where the initial organizing, ranking, centralizing of the group are the issue, it will occur through a subjection of the weak to physical and mental superiors. The lie that is accepted, *i.e.*, not seen through, is undoubtedly a means to bring mental superiority into effect and to use for the direction and domination of the less clever. It is a mental law of the jungle, just as brutal but sometimes just as suitable as the physical, be it as a selection for the cultivation of intelligence, be it to create the leisure for the production of higher cultural goods for a certain few for whom others must work, be it to provide the leader for the forces of the group. The more these purposes are met by means of lesser undesired side-effects, the less need is there for falsehood and the more room there will be for an awareness of its ethical reprehensibility. This process is not yet in any way concluded. Small business proprietors still believe

today to not be able to dispense with certain deceptive promotions of wares and practice them then with a good conscience. Wholesale trade and retail business on a really large scale have overcome this phase and can proceed in the presentation of their wares with full candidness. As soon as the mode of enterprise even of the small and midlevel business operators has reached the same completed development, the exaggerations and blatant falsehoods in advertisements and promotions, for which they are not in general resented today, will experience the same ethical condemnation that is today already, for all practice purposes, in the position of being superfluous in big business. Commerce based on truthfulness will be generally all the more appropriate inside a group the more the well-being of the many rather than the few forms its norm. This is because the deceived—hence those harmed by the lie—will always be in the majority in relation to the liar who finds advantage through deception. Therefore, 'enlightenment,' which aims at the elimination of falsehood at work in social life, is thoroughly democratic in character.

Interaction among people normally rests on certain elements being common to their conceptual worlds, on objectively mental contents forming the material that is developed through its relationships to subjective life; the model and the essential vehicle for that, equally for all, is language. If one looks a bit closer, though, the basis hereby intended consists in no way only in what one and the other know or, as the case may be, what one knows as the mental content of the other, but it is interwoven with what one knows, but the other does not. And certainly the significance of this limitation will turn out to be still more positive than that which resulted earlier from the antithesis between the illogical-accidental reality of the course of ideas and that which we logically select from them purposefully in order to reveal it to others. The dualistic essence of human nature, the expressions of which flow mostly from scattered sources, allows every measurement to be experienced as a large one and a small one at the same time, according to whether it is compared with something smaller or greater—this also leaves social relationships completely dualistically determined: concord, harmony, cooperation, which count as the plainly socializing strengths, must be penetrated by distance, competition, repulsion, in order to produce the real configuration of society; the durable organizing forms that seem to fashion society in one form or another must be continuously stirred up through individualistically irregular powers, put off balance, whittled away in order to achieve, yielding and resisting, the vitality of

their reaction and development; the relationships of an intimate nature, whose formal vehicle is physical-mental nearness, lose the attraction, indeed, the content of their intimacy as soon as the further relationship does not include, simultaneously and alternately, also distance and pauses; finally, it thus comes about that the knowledge about one another that positively affects relationships does so, though not really for itself alone—but once they exist they likewise presuppose a certain ignorance, an immeasurable changing degree of mutual concealment. The lie is only a very crude, ultimately often contradictory form in which this necessity comes to light. Though it may often destroy a relationship, as long as it existed it was still an integrating element of the nature of the relationship. One must take care not to be deceived by an ethical point of view, by the negative evaluation of the lie over the completely positive sociological significance that it exercises in the formation of certain concrete relationships. Furthermore, the lie, with regard to the elementary sociological reality now at issue, is the limiting of knowledge of the one by the other—only *one* of the possible means here, the positive and, as it were, aggressive method, whose purpose in general is achieved through shear secrecy and concealment. These more general and more negative forms are at issue in what follows.

Before the secret as a consciously desired concealment is taken up, it needs to be mentioned to what different extents different relationships allow the reciprocal knowledge of whole personalities outside their boundaries. Of the associations that still in general include direct interaction, the association for a purpose stands here at the top—and certainly that in which absolutely objective and definite duties are requisite from the beginning for belonging to the association—most undeniably, of course, in the form of pure money dues. Here the reality of interaction, the cohesiveness, the common specific aim is not at all based on one knowing the other psychologically. The individual, as a member of the group, is exclusively the bearer of a definite activity, and generally which individual motives drive one to it or which corporate personality supports one's activity is completely irrelevant here. The association formed for a purpose is the quintessentially *discreet* sociological formation; its participants are from a psychological viewpoint anonymous and need only, in order to form the association, know about one another *that* they form it. The increasing objectification of our culture, whose constructs arise more and more from impersonal energies and appropriate the subjective entirety of the individual less and less, as exemplified most simply in the contrast between handiwork

in the crafts and factory work—this objectification also affects social structures, so that associations in which the whole and individual person entered formerly and which consequently required a mutual knowledge about the immediate substantive content of the relationship are now exclusively set up on this being clearly distinguished.

That prior or later form of knowledge about a person (the trust one places in the other—evidently one of the most important synthetic strengths inside society) thereby acquires a particular evolution. Trust, as the hypothesis for future behavior, which is certain enough thereby to ground practical action, is, as hypothesis, a middle position between knowledge and ignorance of others. Someone who knows all need not *trust*, someone who knows nothing cannot reasonably trust at all.[3] What degree of knowledge and ignorance must be blended to make possible the individual practical decision based on trust is what characterizes eras, realms of interest, individuals. That objectification of culture definitively distinguished the quantities of knowledge and lack of knowledge required for trust. The modern merchant who enters into business with another, the scholar who undertakes research together with another, the leader of a political party who comes to an agreement with the leader of another party over election issues or matters of legislation—all these know, apart from exceptions and imperfections, exactly what is necessary to know about their partner for forming the relationship. The traditions and institutions, the power of public opinion, and the shifting of opinion that inescapably prejudices individuals have become so firm and reliable that one needs to know only certain external traits about

[3] Admittedly there is another type of trust that, since it stands beyond knowledge and ignorance, affects the present context only indirectly: that which one calls the *faith* of a person in another and which belongs to the category of religious faith. Just as one never believed in God on the basis of the 'proofs for the existence of God'—these proofs are in fact only the additional justification or intellectual reflection entirely of a disposition of the heart—so one 'believes' in a person without this belief being justified by proofs of the worthiness of the person, indeed, often in spite of proofs for the opposite of worthiness. This trust, this inner unconditionality vis-à-vis a person is imparted neither by experiences nor by hypotheses but by a primary disposition of the soul with regard to the other. In completely pure form, detached from any empirical consideration, this condition of faith probably appears only inside religion; regarding people, it will likely always require a stimulus or a confirmation by the knowledge treated above or an expectation; while on the other hand certainly also in those social forms of trust, even as they appear exactly and intellectually justified, there may be a supplement of that intuitive, indeed, mystical 'faith' of person in person. Perhaps even that hereby identified is a basic category of human behavior, going back to the metaphysical meaning of our relationships and only empirically, randomly, fragmentarily actualized by the conscious, singular foundations of trust.

another in order to have the trust needed for acting in concert. The foundation of personal qualities by which a modification of the behavior inside the relationship could come about is in principle no longer of concern; the motivation and regulation of this behavior has been so objectified that trust no longer requires actual personal knowledge. In more primitive, less differentiated circumstances one knew very much more about one's partner—in a personal sense—and very much less with regard to purely factual reliability. Both belong together: in order to generate the necessary trust in light of the lack with regard to the latter, a much higher level of knowledge was needed in the former. That purely general knowledge of one, involving only the facts about the person, at the boundary of which what is personally unique can remain private, must be supplemented emphatically then by the knowledge of the personal as soon as the association for a purpose possesses an essential significance for the *total existence* of the participants. The businessperson who sells grain or petroleum to another needs to know only whether that person is good for the amount; but as soon as one takes the other on as an associate, one must not only know the financial condition and certain rather general qualities of the person, but must know the latter extensively as a personality, that person's respectability, sociability, whether of a venturesome or cautious temperament; and on such knowledge—reciprocally—rests not only the establishment of the relationship but its whole continuation, the daily joint activities, the division of functions among the partners. The privacy of the personality is now more socially limited; with the extent to which the common interest is now carried by personal qualities, the personality is no longer allowed such a wide-ranging being-for-itself.

Beyond the associations formed for a purpose, but also beyond the relationships rooted in the whole personality, there is the relationship socially most characteristic in the higher levels of culture that they refer to now as merely the 'acquaintance.' That one 'knows' mutually does not at all mean in this sense that one *knows* mutually, *i.e.* that one had an insight into the actual individuality of the personality, but only that each, as it were, had taken notice of the existence of the other. Characteristically for the idea of acquaintance the 'introduction' by name is enough: the knowledge of the 'that,' not the 'what' of the personality, defines 'acquaintance.' When one declares oneself acquainted with a certain person, indeed even to be well acquainted, one is thus indicating very clearly the lack of an actually intimate relationship; one knows under this rubric only what of another is external: either in the

purely socially representative sense or in that we know just what the other shows us; the degree of knowledge that 'being well acquainted with another' includes, as it were, not the 'in-oneself' of the other, not that which is in the inner layer, but only that which is essentially turned to the other and to the world. Therefore, the circle of acquaintances in this social sense is the actual location of 'discretion.' This is because this circle certainly not only exists in the respect for the *privacy* of the other, for one's immediate *desire* to hide this or that from us, but for sure in that one steers clear of the knowledge of everything that the other does not positively reveal. Thus it is in principle not a matter here of *something definite* that one is not permitted to know, but of the entirely general reserve exercised toward the whole personality, and of a special form of the typical antithesis of imperatives: what is not forbidden is allowed, and what is not allowed is forbidden. So the relationships of people part ways at the question regarding the knowledge of each other: what is not hidden it is permitted to know, and what is not revealed it is also not permitted to know. The latter decision corresponds to the feeling, effective also elsewhere, that around every person there is an ideal sphere, in various directions and for various persons certainly largely unequal, which one cannot penetrate without destroying the value of the personality of the individual. Honor sets such a field in place around the person; linguistic usage speaks of an offense to honor very precisely as 'getting too close'; the radius of that sphere identifies, as it were, the distance whose violation by a personal stranger offends one's honor. Another sphere of the same form corresponds to what one refers to as the 'importance' of a personality. Before the 'important' person there exists an inner compulsion to maintain distance, which does not immediately disappear even in the intimate relationship with someone and which is not present only for those who have no feel for importance. For this reason that sphere of distance does not exist for the 'chamber servant' because there are no 'heroes' for such, which is due, however, not to the heroes but to the chamber servant. For that reason, too, all intrusiveness is bound up with a conspicuous lack of feeling for the differences of the importance of people; whoever is intrusive with respect to an important personage does not—as it could appear superficially—esteem that person highly or overly highly but, on the contrary, reveals thereby just the lack of actual respect. As the painter often emphatically renders the importance of a form in a multi-figured picture by arranging the others at a considerable distance around it, so also the sociological parallel of importance is the distance that keeps

others outside a personality's specific sphere filled with that person's power, purposes, greatness. For such a person, although a somewhat differently emphasized periphery surrounds the person, occupied with personal affairs and activities, penetrating it by *paying attention* amounts to an injury to that one's personality. Just as material property is more-or-less an extension of the Ego—property is simply what is subject to the will of the possessor just as, in only graduated differentiation, is the body, which is our first 'possession'—and just as therefore every intrusion into vested property rights is felt as a violation of the personality, so there is a private property of the mind whose violation causes an injury of the Ego in the very center of the self. Discretion is nothing other than the sense of correctness with reference to the sphere of the contents of life not to be shared. Of course it is rather variously expanded in its circumstances according to various personalities, just as also that of marriage and of property each has a radius quite different for persons 'nearby' than for strangers and the indifferent. With the above mentioned more narrowly conceived social relationships, identified most simply as 'acquaintances,' it is a matter first of all of a quite typical boundary, beyond which there are perhaps no guarded secrets, but about which the other conventionally goes into with discretion, not with questions or other invasions.

The question, where does this boundary lie, is even in principle not at all to be answered simply but leads down into the most subtle texture of social formation. The right to that realm of mental life cannot be affirmed precisely as private property in an absolute sense any more than that of the material realm. We know that inside higher culture the latter—with regard to the three essential aspects of acquisition, security, productiveness—rests never merely on the powers of the individual but requires as well the circumstances and powers of the social milieu, and that therefore its limitation—be it through the prohibitions concerning acquisition, be it through taxation—is from the start the right of the whole; but this right is still more deeply grounded than on the principle of achievement and anti-achievement between society and individual, namely rather on the much more elementary principle that the part must allow as much limitation of one's being- and having-for-oneself to fall to itself as the preservation and the purposes of the whole require. And this applies as well to the inner sphere of the person. This is because in the interest of exchange and of social solidarity, one *must* know certain things about the other, and this other does not have the right from the moral standpoint to offer resistance against it and to require discretion

from the former, *i.e.* an undisturbed possession of one's own being and consciousness as well, where the discretion would damage the social interests. The businessperson who contracts long-term obligations with another, the master who engages a domestic servant but also the latter before placing oneself into the relationship of service, the superior in promoting a subordinate, the housewife who accepts a new personality into her social circle—all these must be authorized to learn or deduce from the past and present of the person in question, everything about temperament and moral character on which the action or refusal to act concerning the person may be reasonably based. These are rather crude cases in which the duty of discretion, to abstain from knowing about all that the other does not freely reveal to us, must retreat before practical realities. But in more refined and less clear forms, in fragmentary statements and things unexpressed, the whole interactive dynamic of human beings rests on each knowing something more of the other than the other willingly reveals, and frequently one would not wish the discovery of that by the other if the one knew of it. While this can be considered an indiscretion in an individual sense, in a social one, however, it is necessary as a condition for the closeness and vitality existing in social interaction—and it is extraordinarily difficult to point to the limit of the right to this breach of private mental property. In general, human beings grant themselves the right to know everything that they can fathom purely through psychological observation and reflection without turning to patently illegal means. Actually, though, the indiscretion exercised in this manner can be just as brutally and morally objectionable as listening at closed doors and glancing at other people's letters. To those who are especially psychologically sensitive, people betray their most secret thoughts and characteristics countless times, though not only but often precisely because they are anxiously straining to guard them. The greedy, spying gathering of every indiscreet word, the penetrating reflection—what this intonation probably would mean, what those expressions allow one to conclude, what the blushing at the mention of a certain name perhaps betrayed—all this does not overstep the boundary of outward discretion; it is entirely the work of one's own intellect and for that reason an apparently undisputed right of the subject; and this often occurs completely involuntarily, so much more than the misuse of psychological superiority—we cannot at all often put a stop to our interpretations of the other, to the construals of another's inner life. As much as the decent person will forbid to the self the pondering over the secrecy of another, that exploitation of the

other's imprudence and defenselessness, there takes place a process of knowledge of this realm often so automatically, its results standing before us often so suddenly and conspicuously, that good will can do nothing at all to counter it. Where the undoubtedly disallowed can be unavoidable, however, the demarcation between allowed and disallowed is all the more unclear. How far discretion has to abstain also from the mental encroachment 'of everything that is existing,' how far the interests of the human enterprise of communication, the relying-on-one-another of the members of the same group limit this duty of discretion—that is a question to whose answer neither moral tact nor the overview of the objective relationships and their demands alone suffice, since in fact both must operate completely together. The subtle and complicated nature of this question offers the individual to a much higher degree no general norm for prejudicing the decision than would be necessary for a question of private property in a material sense.

This pre-form or this supplement concerning the secret, in which not the behavior of the secret-holder but that of another is in question, in which with the blending of mutual knowledge or ignorance the accent lies more on the measure of knowledge than ignorance—over against this we come to a completely new turn: in those very relationships which center, not as those until now firmly circumscribed, and if even only by the fact of their pure 'superficiality,' around materially fixed interests but those, at least according to their conception, building on the whole breadth of the personality. Here the main types are friendship and marriage. Insofar as the ideal of friendship from antiquity has been appropriated and, in a curious way further developed precisely in the romantic sense, there is the by-product of absolute psychological intimacy, that material property is also supposed to be common among friends. This entry of the whole undivided 'I' into the relationship may thus be more plausible in friendship than in love, since it lacks the one-sided intensification based on one element that love experiences in its sensuality. Indeed, it occurs thereby that in the whole scope of possible reasons for association one takes, as it were, the *Tête*, a certain organizing of the same, as it is bestowed on a group through the leadership.[4] A very strong relational element often paves the way along which the others follow without this latent casualty; and undeniably with most people sexual love opens widest the gates of the whole personality; indeed,

[4] *Tête*, French for 'head'; in this case, probably 'lead'—ed.

with not a few love is the only form in which they can give their whole 'I,' just as with artists the form of their respective art offers the only possibility to proffer their whole inner being. Especially frequently this is to be observed with women—certainly also 'Christian love,' intended entirely differently, is supposed to accomplish the same correspondingly—in that they not only, because they love, sacrifice their whole being without reservation, but that this whole being is, as it were, dissolved chemically in the love and flows only and entirely in its coloring, form, temperature onto the other. On the other hand, however, where the feeling of love is not expansive enough, the remaining contents of the soul not adaptive enough, the predominance of the erotic bonds that remain can, as I indicated, suppress practical-moral as well as the spiritual connections, the self-exposure of the reservoirs of the personality lying beyond the erotic. Friendship, which lacks this intensity but also this frequent disproportionate dedication, may more readily bind the whole person with the whole person, may more readily loosen the reserve of the soul, to be sure, not so passionately, but in wider scope and in the longer run. Such complete familiarity meanwhile would have to become more difficult with the ever increasing differentiation of people. Perhaps the modern person has too much to hide in order to have a friendship in the ancient sense; perhaps personalities are also, apart from very young years, too uniquely individualized in order to enable the complete mutuality of relationship, of the mere entry into relationship, to which indeed ever so much mental divination and productive fantasy belong on the part of the other. It seems that, therefore, modern sensitivity tends more towards differentiated friendships, *i.e.* to such that have their realm associated typically with only one pertinent aspect of the personalities and in which the rest plays no role. With that a wholly different kind of friendship emerges that is of greatest importance for our problem: the degree of intrusion or reserve inside the friendship relationship. These differentiated friendships that associate us with one person by the aspect of disposition, with another by that of shared intellectual interest, with a third for the sake of religious impulses, with a fourth through common experiences—these represent a completely unique synthesis with regard to the issue of discretion, of self-revelation, and self-censorship; they do not require that the friends look into the realms of interest and feeling that are simply not a part of the relationship, and to refer to them would make the boundary of the mutual self-understanding emotionally painful. But the relationship, in this way limited and enveloped in discretion, can nevertheless come

from the center of the whole personality, saturated from its ultimate root sap, so much so that it pours forth into a section of its periphery; it leads, with its notion, into this same depth of feeling and to the same willing sacrifice as undifferentiated epochs and persons bind them simply with a commonality of the whole periphery of life, for which reserve and discretion are no problem.

Much more difficult is the degree of self-revelation and self-reserve in marriage, with their complements—intrusion and discretion. It pertains here to the wholly general problem area, most difficult for the sociology of the intimate relationship: whether the maximum of common values is thereby achieved in the personalities giving up their being-for-self entirely to one another or, on the contrary, by holding back—whether they do not somehow belong to one another qualitatively *more* when they belong to each other quantitatively *less*. This question of degree can of course be answered only along with the other: how then, inside the totality of the communicability of the person, is the boundary to be drawn at which the restraint and the respect for the other would possibly begin. The preference of modern marriage—which makes both questions of course answerable only on a case-by-case basis—is that this boundary is not set in place from the start, as is the case in other and earlier cultures. In the latter particularly, marriage is in principle generally not erotic but only a socio-economic institution; satisfaction of the desires of love is thereby tied to it only accidentally; it is contracted, with exceptions of course, not on the basis of individual attraction but for reasons of family alliances, of work relationships, of offspring. It was in this sense brought to its uttermost clear differentiation by the Greeks; according to Demosthenes: "We have *hetaerae* for pleasure and concubines for daily needs, wives, however, for providing us legitimate children and for tending to the interior of the household."[5] Obviously with such a mechanical relationship, functioning outside the psychological center—as is shown, by the way, with certain qualifications, in the history and observation of marriage at every step—on the one hand, neither the need nor the possibility of intimate mutual self-revelation will exist; but on the other hand some reserves of sensitivity and purity will also fall away that are still precisely the flower of a completely spiritualized, entirely personal close relationship in spite of their apparent negativity. The same tendency to exclude certain aspects of life from

[5] Attributed to him in an oration, *Against Neaera*—ed.

the mutuality of marriage *a priori* and by supra-individual statute lies in the multiplicity of marital forms within a circle of people, among whom those concluding a marriage have to make a prior decision, and who distinguish the economic, religious, and familial interests in the marriage in manifold ways: thus it is with indigenous peoples, with the Hindus, and with the Romans.[6] Now nobody will fail to recognize that in modern life also marriage is probably entered into mainly from conventional or material motives. Nevertheless, as it is often realized, the social *notion* of the modern marriage is the common possession of all of life's contents insofar as they determine directly and through their effects the value and the destiny of the personality. And the precedence of this ideal claim is not at all without effect; it has provided room and stimulation often enough for developing an originally very incomplete commonality into an ever more encompassing one. But while the very indeterminacy of this process supports happiness and inner vitality for the relationship, its reversal tends to foster heavy disappointments: namely when absolute unity is anticipated from the start, desire as well as offering know no kind of restraint, even not that which yet remains for all finer and deeper natures ever in the dark recesses of the soul when it intends to pour itself out entirely in the presence of the other.

In marriage as well as in marital-like free relationships the temptation is manifest from the beginning to open oneself fully to each other, to send the last of the soul's reservations on to those of the corporeal, to lose oneself fully in one another without reserve. This will, however, more than anything else, considerably threaten the future of the relationship. Without danger, only those people can give of themselves *completely* who in general *can*not give of themselves completely because the abundance of their souls rests in continually developing further, which means that every devotion immediately nurtures new treasures that have an inexhaustibility of properties latent in the soul, and these can therefore be revealed and given away only so much in any given moment, like a tree with this year's harvest bearing that of next year's. It is otherwise, however, with those who, with the upsurge of feeling, the unconditionality of devotion, subtract the revelation of the life of their souls from, as it were, the capital, whereby the revelatory source of ever new spiritual attainment, not at all separable from the 'I,' is not

[6] The expression 'indigenous peoples' translates *Naturvölker*, literally 'nature peoples'—ed.

at all lacking. Then the chance is near that one will some day stand before oneself with empty hands, that the Dionysian blessedness of giving leaves behind an impoverishment that yet retroactively—unjustly, but for that reason no less bitterly—gives the lie even to the savored indulgences and their joy. We are simply so equipped that we not only, as mentioned above, need a certain proportion of truth and error as a basis of our love, but also of clarity and ambiguity in the pattern of our life's elements. What we see clearly short of the latter foundation thus shows us just the limit of its attraction and prohibits the fantasy from weaving into it its possibilities, for the loss of which no reality can compensate us, because that is merely *self-activity* that cannot be replaced in the long run by obtaining and enjoying. The other person is supposed to give us not only an additional gift, but also the possibility of giving it, with hopes and idealizations, with hidden beauties and even unconscious attractions. The site, however, at which we deposit all this production, produced by us but for the other, is the ambiguous horizon of the other's personality, the intermediate realm in which faith displaces knowledge. It is certainly to be emphasized that it is not in any way a matter only of illusions and optimistic or amorous self-deception but simply that a part of the person closest to us must be offered to us in the form of ambiguity and opacity for their attraction to remain elevated for us; thereby the majority of people make up for the attractiveness that the minority possesses with the inexhaustibility of their inner life and growth. The mere fact of absolute knowledge, of full psychological exploration, disillusions us even without prior intoxication, benumbs the vitality of relationships, and allows their continuation to appear as something actually pointless. This is the danger of complete and, in a more than superficial sense, shameless devotion, toward which unlimited possibilities of intimate relationships tempt one, which indeed are easily felt as a kind of duty—especially where no absolute security of one's own feeling exists and the concern over not giving the other enough leads to giving the other too much. In this absence of mutual discretion, in the sense of giving and taking, many marriages clearly go aground, *i.e.*, fall into a dull, banal habituation, into a matter of course that no longer has room for surprises. The fertile depth of relationships, which in the end senses and honors behind each something revealed yet another final one that also stimulates someone assuredly obsessed to conquer anew daily, is simply the wage of that sensitivity and self-control that still respects the inner privacy

even in the closest all-consuming relationship, that allows the right to inquire to be restricted by the right to privacy.

All these combinations are sociologically significant in that the secret of one is recognized in some measure by the other, in that the intentionally or unintentionally hidden is intentionally or unintentionally respected. The intent to conceal, however, takes on a wholly different intensity as soon as it is faced with the intent to uncover. Then that tendentious hide-and-seek and masquerade arises, that aggressive defense, as it were, against the third person, which one now actually identifies as a secret. The secret in this sense, the concealment of realities carried out by negative or positive means, is one of the greatest achievements of humanity; contrary to the childish condition in which every idea is immediately spoken, every undertaking is open for all to see, an immense expansion of life is achieved with the secret because its various contents cannot make an appearance at all with complete publicity. The secret offers the possibility of a, so to speak, second world next to the apparent one, and this is influenced by the former most strongly. Whether and how much secrecy is in it characterizes every relationship between two people or between two groups; for even where the other does not notice its existence, for that reason the activity of those concealing, and thus the whole relationship, is in any case modified.[7] The historical development of society is in many respects marked by earlier manifest matters moving into the protection of secrecy, and conversely earlier secret matters being able to dispense with this protection and revealing themselves—comparable to that other evolution of the spirit: the initially conscious activity sinks into the unconscious-mechanical exercise, and on the other hand the earlier unconscious-instinctive climbs into the light of consciousness. How this disperses to the various formations of private as well as public life; how that evolution leads to ever more purposeful situations, while at first the secret is often, ineptly and undifferentiatedly, extended far too widely, conversely, for the many the advantage of concealment not recognized until late; how the magnitude of the secret

[7] This concealment has in many cases a sociological consequence of an especially ethically paradoxical quality. So destructive is it namely for a relationship between two people when the one has committed an offense against the other, of which both are conscious, it can thus be advantageous for the relationship if only the guilty party knows about it, because that person is moved thereby to circumspection, tenderness, secret desire to make it good again, to indulgence and selflessness that with a completely good conscience would be far from one's mind.

is modified in its consequences through the importance or indifference of its contents—all this as pure inquiry has allowed the meaning of the secret for the structure of human realities of interaction to shine forth. The multiply ethical negativity of secrecy need not mislead us about these things because the secret is a general sociological form that stands completely neutral over the value-relevance of its contents. It assimilates, on the one hand, the highest value: thus the keen shame of the noble soul that conceals precisely its best in order not to allow itself the reward of praise and gain; then after this one possesses, as it were, compensation but not the actual value itself. On the other hand, the secret is certainly not in league with the devil, but the devil is in a direct connection with the secret. This is because immorality is concealed for obvious reasons—even where its content meets with no social penalty, as with sexual indiscretions. The internally isolating effect of immorality as such, even apart from all primary social repulsions, is, next to the many ostensible linkages of the ethical and the social continua, a real and important effect; the secret is—among other things—also the social expression of moral wickedness; although the classical sentence, "No one would be so evil as to also desire to appear evil," contradicts the facts.[8] Since defiance and cynicism are not allowed to come to mask wickedness often enough, they can exploit it indeed for elevating the personality vis-à-vis others, to the point that occasionally one becomes renowned for non-existing immoralities.

The use of the secret as a sociological technique—as a form of activity without which certain goals are not at all achievable in light of our social surroundings—is readily seen. Not quite so obvious are the attractions and values that it possesses beyond this significance as a means, the peculiar attraction of the formally secretive behavior, apart from its particular contents. First of all, the strongly emphasized exclusion of all outsiders bestows a correspondingly strongly emphasized feeling of ownership. For many natures, possession simply does not get its proper significance even by positively having, but requires the awareness that others have to do without it. It is evidently the susceptibility of our sense for *difference* that accounts for this. Moreover, since the reality of the exclusion of others from a possession will come especially when the value of the possession is great, psychologically the reverse suggests itself, that the many would have to be those denied something valuable. And

[8] Quotation marks added—ed.

thus the inner ownership of the most varied kind obtains a characteristic accent of value through the form of the secret, in which the substantive significance of the secreted facts often enough recedes entirely, in that others simply know nothing of it. Among children, a pride and self-pretension are often based on one being able to say to the other, "I know something you don't know"—in fact thus meant broadly that this is stated as a formal means of bragging and degrading of the other, even where it is completely untrue and no secret is held at all. From the least into the greatest relationships this jealousy of knowledge on account of facts hidden from others is manifest. English parliamentary negotiations were secret for a long time, and even under George III publicity in the press about them was subject to criminal prosecution, in fact expressly as an injury to parliamentary *privileges*. The secret gives the person an exceptional position; it functions as a purely social attraction, in principle independent of the content that it shelters, but of course to the degree that the latter increases, the exclusively possessed secret is meaningful and extensive. The converse also works, analogously to what was just mentioned. Every high-level personality and all high-level accomplishments hold something mysterious for average people. Certainly all human existence and action issue from undeciphered powers. However, inside an order of equality, qualitatively and with the same values, this does not yet make one a problem for the other, especially since a certain immediate understanding, not carried by the intellect, occurs in this equality. Essential dissimilarity, however, does not allow it to come to this, and the general mysteriousness becomes effective immediately in the form of the singular difference—somewhat like one, always living in the same landscape, may not come upon the problem of our being influenced by the milieu of the landscape, which intrudes, though, as soon as we change surroundings and the difference in life-feeling makes us attentive to its provocative force. From the secret that overshadows all that is deep and important there develops the typical mistake: all secrecy is something essential and meaningful. The natural impulse to idealize and the natural timidity of people work to the same end concerning the unknown, to magnify it through fantasy and give it an emphasis that the revealed reality would not for the most part have acquired.

Now strangely enough, together with these attractions of the secret is joined its logical opposite: those of betrayal—which are obviously no less sociological in nature. The secret involves a tension that is resolved in the instant of its being revealed. This forms the reversal in

the development of the secret, collecting and culminating in it once again all the attractions—as the moment of squandering lets one enjoy with the greatest intensity the value of the object: the feeling of power, provided with the possession of money, is concentrated for the soul of the squanderer most completely and with the greatest of relish where one parts with that power. The secret is also sustained by the consciousness that there is the *capacity* for betrayal, and thereby the power of changing destiny and of surprises, of joys and destructions, albeit perhaps only at hand for self-destruction. Therefore, a possibility and temptation of betrayal swirls around the secret, and with the external danger of being discovered is intertwined the internal one of self-discovery that the powerful attraction of the abyss resembles. The secret places a barrier between people but at the same time also the seductive appeal to break through by divulging or confessing—which the mental life of the secret accompanies as an overtone. Therefore, the sociological significance of the secret finds its practical measure, the mode of its realization, first of all in the ability or inclination of the subject to keep it to oneself, or in its resistance or weakness of temptation towards betrayal. Out of the interplay of these two interests, to conceal and to divulge, flow nuances and destinies throughout the whole realm of human interactive relationships. If according to our earlier determination every relationship between people has its characterization in how much secrecy there is in it or around it, then its further development is determined in this sense in accord with the degree of mixture of retentive and declining energies—the former borne by the practical interest and the formal attraction of the secret as such, the latter by the inability to tolerate any longer the strain of keeping the secret and by the superiority which, residing in the secret in latent form, as it were, is fully actualized emotionally in the moment of disclosure, on the other hand, however, also often in the desire for confession that can contain that feeling of power in a more negative and perverse form than self-abasement and contrition.

All these factors that determine the sociological role of the secret are of an individual nature; however, the degree to which the constructions and the complications of the personalities form secrets depends at the same time on the social structure on which its life stands. Now in this connection the deciding factor is that the secret is a factor of individualization of the first order, and certainly in the typical double role: that social relationships of more strongly personal differentiation permit and require it in great measure, and that conversely the secret carries and

increases such differentiation. In a small and narrowly enclosed circle the formation and preservation of secrets will indeed be technically difficult because everyone stands near the relationships of everyone else and because the frequency and intimacy of the contacts occasion too many temptations to disclosure. However, there is also no need for secrets to any substantial degree since this social formation tends to level its elements and work against those peculiarities of being, action, and possession whose preservation demands the form of the secret. That with the considerable expansion of the circle all this passes over into its opposite is obvious. Here as usual the relationships of the money economy reveal most clearly the specific characteristics of the *large* circle. Since the traffic in economic assets takes place continuously by means of money, an otherwise unachievable secrecy became possible with it. Three properties of the monetary form of assets become important here: its compressibility, which allows it to make someone into a rich person with a check that one lets slip unnoticed into that person's hand; its abstractness and featureless nature, by virtue of whose transactions, acquisition, and exchange of property can be hidden in a manner and made undetectable, as is impossible so long as assets can be possessed only as bulky unambiguously tangible objects; finally its long-range effect by means of which one can invest in the most remote and continuously changing assets and thereby keep it entirely from the eyes of the nearest associates. These possibilities for dissimulation, which are produced to the extent that monetary economic relationships expand and have to be exposed to dangers especially in economic activities with other people's money, have aroused the public for the fiscal management of corporations and states as a protective rule. This points to a closer regulation of the evolutionary formula touched on above: that all through the form of the secret an ongoing in- and outflow of content occurs, in that what was originally manifest becomes secret, originally hidden sheds its cover—so that one could come to the paradoxical idea that human affiliation would need a certain measure of secrecy under otherwise similar circumstances, that only its objects would change: while it would leave the one, it would grasp the other, and would acquire with this exchange an unchanged quantum. A somewhat more exact complement is detectable for this schema. It seems as though, with the increasing practicality of culture, the matters of generality have become ever more open, those of the individual ever more hidden. In less developed conditions the relationships of individual persons cannot, as already noted, be protected from mutual observation and meddling

to the degree that it can within the modern life-style, especially in the large city, which has produced an entirely new measure of reserve and discretion. In contrast, the bearers of the public interest in the political systems of earlier times took care to wrap themselves in a mystical authority, while in more seasoned and wider relationships there accrues to them, through the expansion of their area of domination, through the objectivity of their methods, through the distance from each individual person, the security and honor that allows them to tolerate the public exposure of their behavior. However, that secrecy in public matters manifests its inner contradiction in its immediately producing the counter-movements of betrayal on the one side and espionage on the other. Still in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the governments were most fearfully concealing the magnitude of state debt, the tax rates, the military headcount—with the result that the diplomatic service in many cases had nothing better to do than to spy, intercept letters, bring persons who 'knew' something or other to the service personnel for a chat.[9] In the nineteenth century, however, publicity itself captures the affairs of state to such an extent that now governments officially publish the data, without the concealment of which until now no regime seemed possible. Thus politics, business administration, and courts lost their secrecy and inaccessibility to the same degree that the individual won the possibility of an ever more complete withdrawal, whereby modern life cultivated a method for the secluding of private affairs in the midst of a large urban collective density, just as earlier it was achievable only through spatial seclusion.

To what extent this development is to be viewed as an expedient one, however, depends on axioms of social values. Every democracy will view publicity as a condition desirable in itself, based on the fundamental notion that everyone should also know those events and circumstances that concern them—because this is the prerequisite they must have

[9] This countermovement occurs also in the reverse direction. It was noticed in English court history that the actual court cabal, clandestine insinuations, the organizational intrigues do not yet come about with despotism, but first of all when the king has constitutional advisors, when the government is in this respect an openly accessible system. Only then would the king begin—and this would be especially noticeable after Edward II—to form, over against this somehow or other intrusive co-governing circle, an unofficial, more-or-less underground circle of advisors, which in itself could address the king and through its efforts would produce a chain of concealment and conspiracies.

to make decisions together; and all common knowledge also inherently includes the psychological goad of wanting to act in concert. It remains uncertain whether that conclusion is entirely valid. If over the individualistic interests there emerges an objective sovereign structure, combining certain features from them, then it can by virtue of its formal autonomy very probably be justified in having a secret function, without thereby denying its 'public openness' in the sense of protecting the material interests of all. Thus a *logical* connection consequent upon the greater *value* of the condition of public openness does not exist. Perhaps, however, the general schema of cultural differentiation manifests itself here: what is public becomes ever more public, the private ever more private. And for sure this historical development brings to expression the deeper, objective significance: the public, according to its essence, according to all its initial contents, becomes even outwardly, according to its sociological form, ever more public; and that which has a being-for-itself according to its inner meaning, the centripetal matters of the individual, even in their sociological position, acquire an ever more private character, an ever more distinctive possibility of remaining a secret.

What I pointed out before, that the secret also works as an ornamental property and asset of the personality, contains within itself the contradiction that precisely that which is withheld and concealed from the consciousness of others gains emphasis in their consciousness, and the subject is supposed to appear to be especially noteworthy exactly through that which is being concealed from them. It demonstrates that the need for social display does not make use just of the inner most contradictory means, but in that even those *against* which it is indeed actually opposed in that case, while paying the price of that superiority, enter the picture—with a mixture of willingness and reluctance certainly—however, in practice it achieves the desired recognition. It makes sense then to demonstrate an analogous structure right at the apparent sociologically opposite pole of the secret, that of adornment and its social significance. It is the essence and the meaning of adornment to direct the eyes of others to the adorned, and to that extent it is the antagonist of the secret, which for its part, however, also does not elude the personally accenting function. Adornment similarly operates in a way that it blends superiority over others with a dependence on them, and on the other hand blends the other's good will and envy in a way that requires a special portrayal as a sociological form of interaction.

Excursus on Jewelry and Adornment[10]

Interwoven with the desire of the person to please associates are the opposite tendencies in the interplay of which the relationship between individuals generally takes place: a goodness is in it, a desire to be a joy to the other, but also the other desire: that this joy and 'favor' would flow back as recognition and esteem, our personality be reckoned as an asset. And this need increases so far that it entirely contradicts that initial selflessness of the desire to please: even by this kindness one wants to distinguish oneself before others, wants to be the object of an attention that will not fall to the lot of others—to the point of being envied. Here the kindness becomes a means of the will to power; there arises thereby in some souls the strange contradiction that, with regard to those people over whom they stand with their being and activity, they nevertheless find it necessary to build up their self-esteem in their consciousness precisely in order to keep them subordinate.

Characteristic formations of these motives, the outwardness and the inwardness of their forms weaving into one another, convey the meaning of adornment. Thus this meaning is to give prominence to the personality, to highlight it as in some way an excellent one, but not through a direct expression of power, through something that compels the other from the outside, but only through the kindness that is aroused in one and for that reason still contains some kind of voluntary element. One adorns oneself for oneself and can do that only while one adorns oneself for others. It is one of the oddest sociological deductions that an act that serves exclusively to place emphasis on and increase the importance of its bearer nevertheless achieves its goal exclusively through the pleasing view it offers others exclusively as a type of thankfulness to these others. This is because even the envy for adornment means simply the desire of the envious to win the same recognition and admiration for oneself, and one's envy proves just how very much these values are tied to adornment for that person. Adornment is something absolutely egoistic insofar as it makes its bearer stand out, sustains and increases one's self-esteem at the cost of others (because the common adornment of all would no longer set off the individual), and at the same time something altruistic because its enjoyment is simply meant for these others—whereas even the possessor can enjoy it only in the moment before the mirror—and only with the reflection of this presentation attains value for the adornment. Just as everywhere in the formation of the aesthetic, the trends of life that reality strangely juxtaposed with one another or counterposed antagonistically against one another, are revealed as intimately related—so in the sociological patterns of interaction this human arena of the struggle of the being-for-oneself and being-for-others, the aesthetic structure of adornment denotes a point at which both of these crosscurrents are dependent on one another as means and end.

[10] *Schmuck*, which Simmel uses in this heading and in the previous paragraph, means both 'jewelry' and 'adornment.' We use either or both of the English terms as the context requires—ed.

Adornment increases or enhances the impression of the personality, while it functions as its, as it were, radiation. For that reason gleaming metals and the precious stones have always been its substance and are 'adornment'[11] in the narrower sense, similar to clothing and coiffure, which indeed also 'adorn.' One can speak of a radioactivity of the person; there is around everyone, as it were, a larger or smaller sphere of radiating significance from each, in which everybody else who has anything to do with that person immerses—a sphere where the physical and psychological elements inextricably blend: the sensually noticeable influences that radiate out from a person to one's surroundings are in some manner the carriers of spiritual lightning flashes; and they function as the symbols of such even where they are in fact only external, where no kind of power of suggestion or importance of the personality streams through it. The radiations of adornment, the sensual attention that it provokes, create such an enhancement for the personality or even an intensification of its sphere that it is, as it were, greater when it is adorned. While adornment tends to be at the same time some kind of significant object of value, it is as a synthesis of the having and the being of a subject whereby it goes from being merely a possession to a sensual and emphatic distinction of the personality itself. This is not the case with usual clothing because it enters consciousness as individually distinctive neither from the perspective of having nor from that of being; only when decorated clothing and the highest of valuables have concentrated their value and radiating significance as in one smallest point does the having of the personality turn into a visible quality of its being. And all this not in spite of adornment being something 'superfluous' but precisely because it is. The immediately necessary is more closely bound to the person; it surrounds one's being with a thinner periphery. The superfluous 'overflows,' *i.e.* it flows out further from one's starting point; and while it is then still attached to this point, around the area of the merely necessary it lays another more encircling periphery that is in principle limitless. The superfluous conceptually has no quantity in itself; the freedom and magnificence of our being increase to the degree of superfluity that associates us with our having, because no given structure imposes on it any kind of limiting norm, such as that which necessity as such indicates.

This accentuation of the personality is actualized, however, directly by means of an impersonal feature. Everything that in any way 'adorns' the person is ordered in a scale according to how closely bound it is to the physical personality. For primitive peoples the absolutely joined adornment is typically the tattoo. The opposite extreme is metal and stone jewelry, which is absolutely not individualistic and can be worn by anyone. Between these two, stands clothing—though not so un-interchangeable and personal as the tattoo, but also not so un-individual and detachable as jewelry. However, it is precisely in its impersonality that its elegance lies. This enduringly self-contained, thoroughly un-individually demonstrative, solid unmodifiability of stone and metal now

[11] This clauses makes sense only remembering, as mentioned, that in German, *Schmuck* is used for both 'adornment' and 'jewelry'—ed.

nevertheless being forced to serve the personality—is precisely what gives jewelry its most subtle appeal. The authentically elegant eludes the amplification of the peculiarly individual; it always sets a sphere of a more general, more stylized, as it were, abstract nature around the person—which obviously does not prevent the refinements with which this generality of the personality is combined. That new clothes function especially elegantly lies in the fact that they are still 'stiffer,' *i.e.*, do not yet accommodate all the modifications of the individual body as unconditionally as clothes worn a longer time, which are already stretched and squeezed from the special movements of the wearer and thereby betray that person's special style more completely. This 'newness,' this unmodifiability by individuality is to the greatest degree characteristic of metal jewelry: it is forever new; it stands coolly untouchable beyond the singularity and beyond the destiny of its wearer, which cannot in any way be said of clothing. A long-worn piece of clothing is closely bound up with the body; it has an intimacy that clashes altogether with the essence of elegance. This is because elegance is something for 'others'; it is a social concept that draws its value receiving general recognition.

If adornment then is supposed to augment the individual by way of something supra-individual, which seeks to reach all and is received and esteemed by all, then it must, beyond its mere material effect, have style. Style is forever a universal that brings the contents of personal life and creativity into a form shared with many and made accessible to many. In the actual artwork its style interests us all that much less, the greater that personal uniqueness and subjective life are expressed in it; since it thereby appeals to the personal aspect also of the observer, the latter is alone in the world, so to speak, with the artwork. In contrast, for all that we call arts and crafts, which on account of their usefulness appeal to a wide range of people, we require a more general, more typical creation; in them is supposed to be expressed not only a soul presented in its uniqueness but a widespread, historical or social sensitivity and attitude that makes its subsumption into the life systems of a great many individuals possible. It is the greatest of errors to think that adornment has to be an individual work of art because it is supposed to always adorn an individual. Quite the contrary: because it is supposed to serve the individual, it need not itself be of individual essence, just as little as the furniture on which we sit or the eating utensil with which we fiddle need be individual works of art. Rather, all that occupies the wider sphere of life around the person—in contrast to the work of art which is not incorporated in a different life at all but is a self-sufficient world—must envelop the individual as in ever widening, concentric spheres, leading to or going out from the person. This dissolution of focus on individuality, this generalizing beyond being unique that now, however, carries what is individual as a basis or as a radiating circle or takes it up as in a wide-flowing stream—this is the essence of stylization; out of the instinct for it, adornment has been formed continually into a relatively rigid genre.

Beyond the formal stylizing of adornment is the material means of its social purpose, that glitter of jewelry by which its wearer appears as the center point of a radiating circle in which everyone nearby, every beholding

eye, is included. While the ray of the gemstone seems to radiate out to the other, as the beam of the view that directs the eye towards it, it carries the social significance of adornment—the being-for-the-other that returns to it as an expansion of the subject's sphere of significance. The radii of this circle mark on the one hand the distance that adornment generates between people: I have something that you do not; on the other hand, however, they allow the other not only to participate, but they shine precisely for the other, they exist overall only for the sake of the other. Through its material, jewelry is a distancing and an indulgence in one act. For that reason it is thus especially serviceable to vanity, which needs others in order to be able to disdain them. Herein lies the deep difference between vanity and arrogant pride: the latter, whose self-consciousness actually only rests in itself, tends to spurn 'adornment' in every sense. Entering here with the same tendency is the significance of the 'right' material. The appeal of the 'genuine,' in every respect, consists in its being more than its immediate appearance, which it shares with the forgery. So it is not, like the latter, something in isolation, but it has roots in a ground beyond its mere appearance, while the imitation is only that which one sees in it momentarily. Thus the 'genuine' person is the person on whom one can depend, even when out of one's sight. This more-than-appearance for jewelry is its value; because this is something not to be seen in it, which, in contrast to the skillful forgery, is added to its appearance. For this reason, then, this value always being realizable, is acknowledged by all, possesses a relative timelessness—jewelry is placed in a supra-situational, supra-personal context of value. Artificial jewelry, dignified hardware,[12] is what it accomplishes for the wearer momentarily; genuine jewelry is about enduring value; it is rooted in the appraisals of the whole circle of society and branches out in it. The appeal and emphasis that it shares with its individual wearer therefore draws sustenance from this supra-individual ground; its aesthetic value, which here is indeed also a value 'for others,' becomes through authenticity the symbol of universal estimation and membership in the overall social value system.

In medieval France there was once a decree according to which the wearing of gold jewelry was forbidden to all persons below a certain rank. Most unmistakably herein resides the combination that carries the entire essence of jewelry: that with jewelry the sociological and aesthetic emphasis of the personality will come together as in a focal point, the being-for-itself and being-for-others reciprocally cause and effect. Then the aesthetic display, the right to attract and please, need go only so far here as is circumscribed by the socially meaningful sphere of the individual, and also thereby it adds the social to the appeal that adornment gains for its wholly individual manifestation, as well as being a representative of one's group and 'adorned' with all that that means. On the same rays going out from the individual, as it were, that effect, that expansion of one's sphere of impression, the meaning of

[12] 'Dignified hardware': Simmel uses the French word for hardware, *quincaillerie*—ed.

one's rank, symbolized by this jewelry, is carried to the individual, the jewelry here appearing as the means to transform the social power or position into a perceptibly personal prominence.

Finally the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in adornment draw together into a still different formation when it is reported that the private property of the women among indigenous peoples, in general originating later than that of the men, refers primarily and often exclusively to jewelry. If the personal property of the men tends to begin with that of weapons, then this reveals the active, more aggressive nature of the man, who expands the sphere of his personality without regard to the will of others. For the more passive female nature this effect—in all superficial difference formally the same—is more dependent on the good will of others. Every possession is an extension of the personality; my property is that which obeys my will, i.e. wherein my 'I' is expressed and outwardly realized; first of all and most completely this occurs with regard to our body, and for that reason it is our first and most unconditional possession. With the decorated body we possess more; we are so to speak master over something wider and nobler when we have the decorated body at our disposal. So it is deeply meaningful when adornment becomes above all the special property, because it produces that amplified 'I,' that expanded sphere around us that we fill with our personality and that consists of the favor and the attention of our environment—the environment which more casually ignores the unadorned and therefore, as it were, the more unexpanded appearance not included in its periphery. That in those ancient indigenous circumstances what becomes the most excellent property for a woman is precisely that which has meaning for others and can, only with recognition from those others, help her acquire an enhancement of the value and importance of her 'I,' rebounding back to the wearer—this reveals thus once again the fundamental principle of adornment. For the grand strivings of the soul, playing with and against one another, and of society—the enhancement thereby of the 'I,' in that one is there for others, as well as of existence, in that one accentuates and extends oneself for others—adornment created its own unique synthesis in the form of the aesthetic; while this form, in and of itself, transcends the contrasting efforts of individual humans, they find in it not only a peaceful co-existence but that reciprocal creating that develops as the idea and the promise of their deeper metaphysical unity beyond the clash of their appearances.

While the secret is a social condition that characterizes the reciprocal relationship of group elements, or rather, forms together with other forms of relationship the relational totality—it can moreover be extended to a group as a whole through the creation of 'secret societies.' So long as the being, doing, and having of an individual exists as a secret, its general social meaning is isolation, opposition, egoistic individualization. Here the sociological meaning of the secret is one more external: as a relationship of the person who possesses the secret

to the person who does not possess it. However, as soon as a group as such assumes secrecy as its form of existence, its social meaning becomes a more internal one: it then conditions the interrelationships of those who possess the secret in common. But since that relationship of exclusion towards the uninitiated with its peculiar nuances is here also a reality, it confronts the sociology of the secret society then with the complicated problem of grasping the immanent forms of a group that are determined by secretive activity towards other elements. I will not begin this discussion with a systematic classification of secret societies, which would have only an extrinsic historical interest; their essential categories will reveal themselves without that.

The first internal relation of the secret society that is essential is the mutual *trust* among its elements. And this is required of it to a particular degree because the purpose of the secret-holding is above all *protection*. Of all the measures for protection certainly the most radical is to make oneself invisible. Here the secret society is distinguished in principle from the individual who seeks the protection of the secret. This is possible actually only for individual undertakings or circumstances; on the whole it may be possible to hide oneself at times, to absent oneself spatially, but one's existence can, apart from completely abstruse combinations, be no secret. In contrast, this is altogether possible for a social entity: its elements can operate with the most frequent interaction, but that they form a society, a conspiracy or a criminal gang, a religious conventicle or an alliance for sexual extravagance—this can, in its essence and permanence, be a secret. Certainly distinguished from this type, in which the individuals are indeed not hidden but their alliance is, are the associations in which this formation is indeed openly known, but the membership or the purpose or the special arrangements of the association are secret, as it is with many secret associations of indigenous peoples or with the Freemasons. The latter types are obviously not granted the same unqualified protection by the form of the secret as the former, because that which is known of them always offers a point of attack for further inquiry. In contrast these relatively secret societies often have the advantage of a certain maneuverability; because from the very beginning they are prepared for a measure of openness, they can come to terms even with additional exposure sooner than those who are actually secret as societies; these are destroyed very frequently by their first being discovered because their secrecy tends to be governed by the radical alternative of all or nothing. It is the weakness of the secret society that secrets do not remain permanently safeguarded—so one can

rightly say, a secret that two know is no longer a secret. Therefore, the protection that they give is by their very nature certainly an absolute one but only temporary, and for contents of a positive social value their being carried by secret societies is actually a state of transition that they no longer require after achieving a certain level of strength. Secrecy, in the end, is equal only to the protection that one gains by holding back intrusions, and thus clears the way practically for something else: namely for that with the strength that is a match for the intrusions. The secret society is under these circumstances the appropriate social form for matters that are still, as it were, in infancy, in the vulnerability of early periods of development. The young discovery, religion, morality, party is often still weak and needful of protection, and for *that* reason it hides. Therefore, there are times in which new life contents, working their way up under the resistance of existing powers, are just made for the development of secret societies, as, for example, the eighteenth century demonstrates. So there were at that time, to name just one example, the elements of the liberal party already in Germany, but their emergence in an established political form yet hindered by the governmental circumstances. Thus the secret association was then the form in which the cells remain protected and could grow, as was done most notably for those of the Order of the Illuminati.[13] The same kind of protection that secrecy offers the rising development also serves the declining. Social endeavors and forces being driven out by newly rising ones display the flight into secrecy that represents, so to speak, a transitional stage between being and nonbeing. When with the end of the Middle Ages the suppression of the German communal associations by the strengthening central powers began, there unfolded in them an extensive secret life: in surreptitious meetings and agreements, in the secret practice of law and force—just as animals seek out the protection of the hiding-place when they go off to die. This double function of the secret association, as a form of protection as well as an in-between station for both emerging and for declining powers, is perhaps most evident in religious developments. As long as the Christian communities were persecuted by the state, they often had to hide their meetings, their worship, their whole existence in secrecy; but as soon as Christianity

[13] It is impossible to preserve Simmel's play on words in this sentence, in that 'association' and 'cells' translate German that is nearly literally 'bunch' or 'bundle' and 'buds,' respectively—ed.

had become a state religion, there remained for the adherents of the persecuted, dying paganism simply the same concealment of their cultic societies to which they had formerly forced the now dominant religion. Quite generally the secret society appears everywhere as a correlate of despotism and police restriction, as protection as well as defense and offense against the coercive pressure of central powers; and certainly in no way only the political but likewise inside the church as well as school classes and families.

Corresponding to this protective character as an external quality of the secret society, as noted, is an internal one, the mutual trust of the participants; and certainly here a rather specific trust: the talent of being able to keep quiet. Depending on their content, associations may be based on various kinds of presumptions of trust: on the trust in business-like efficiency or in religious conviction, in courage or love, in respectable attitude or—in criminal societies—in the radical break with moral velleities. But as soon as the society becomes a secret one, added to the trust determined by the particular purposes of the organization is a formal trust in concealment—obviously a faith in personality that has a more sociologically abstract character than any other since every possible common issue can be placed under it. It happens then, exceptions aside, that no other trust requires such an uninterrupted subjective renewal, because where it is a matter of faith in attachment or energy, in morality or intelligence, in a sense of decency or tact, the facts that establish the degree of trust once and for all and that bring the probability of disappointment to a minimum will more likely be at hand. The chance of giving away a secret, however, is dependent on the carelessness of a moment, the mellowness or the excitement of a mood, the possibly unconscious nuance of an emphasis. Maintaining secrecy is something so labile, the temptations of betrayal so varied, that in many cases such an endless course leads from secrecy to indiscretion because the unconditional trust in the former includes an incomparable preponderance of subjective factors. For this reason secret societies—whose rudimentary forms begin with any secret shared by two and whose spread to all places and times is a rather huge, yet hardly ever also merely quantitatively valued reality—produce a most highly effective schooling in the morality of a bond among people. For in the trust of one person in another there also lies as high a moral value as in complying with a trust, maybe indeed a still freer and more serviceable trust, because a trust that is maintained by us contains an almost coercive precedent, and to deceive requires for sure a rather deliberate

wickedness. In contrast, one 'places' trust; it cannot be *required* to the same degree as one would conform to it once given.[14]

In the meantime, of course, secret societies search for the means to encourage psychologically a concealment that is not directly enforceable. The oath and threat of punishment are foremost here and need no discussion. More interesting is the more frequently encountered method of systematically teaching novices to be altogether silent from the outset. In view of the difficulties indicated above of actually guarding one's tongue absolutely, that is, in view of the effortlessly engaging link that exists at the less developed stages between thought and expression—with children and indigenous peoples thought and speech are almost one—it must first of all be required of those learning to keep silent before the suppression of definitively specific matters can be expected.[15] So we hear of a secret organization on Ceram in the Moluccan Islands, in which not only is silence imposed on the young man seeking admission, which he goes through upon entrance, but he is not permitted to speak a word with anybody at all for weeks, even in his family. Here for sure not only that instructional factor of the continuous silence operates, but it falls in with the mental lack of differentiation of this stage (in a period where something definite is supposed to be concealed) to forbid speaking at all and with the radicalism with which less developed peoples readily seize upon the death penalty (whereas later a partial punishment is established for a partial transgression); or just as they are inclined to surrender an entirely disproportionate part of their property

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[14] 'Places' translates *schenkt*—literally 'gives' in the sense of giving a present—ed.

[15] If human interaction is conditioned by the ability to speak, it is shaped by the ability to keep silent—which admittedly appears only here and there. Where all ideas, feelings, and impulses bubble forth uninhibited as speech, a chaotic disorder is created rather than some kind of organic co-ordination. This capacity for concealment necessary for the formation of an orderly interaction is seldom made clear since it is self-evident to us—although it doubtless has a historical development that begins with the chatter of the child and the earliest human, for whom its introduction first acquires even for them some reality and self-protection and, corresponding to that, the cumbersome codes of silence mentioned in the text; and this historical development leads to the urbanity of the culture of the more developed society, for which the feeling of security is among its greatest possessions: where one must speak and where one must be silent so that, *e.g.*, in a society the innkeeper has to hold back while the guests are carrying on a conversation among themselves, but then, paradoxically, must immediately intrude when a gap presents itself. An intermediate phenomenon, for example, may be offered by the medieval guilds, which by statute punished everyone who interrupted the alderman in his speech. [In this footnote, 'of the… earliest human' translates *des Negers* (literally 'of the… Negro'), presumably a reference to the idea that human life originated in Africa, but which we have not translated literally for obvious reasons—ed.]

for something momentarily appealing. It is the specific 'ineptitude' that expresses itself in all this, because its essence, however, consists probably in the inability to undertake for a definitely limited purposeful movement the likewise definitely localized nerve activation: the inept person moves the whole arm where only two fingers would be needed for one's purpose, the whole body where a precisely distinct arm movement would be indicated. At that point, then, it is the predominance of the psychological association that, as it increases hugely the danger of giving secrets away, also thus allows the prohibition to go beyond its singular, purposefully determined content and instead take over entirely the function that poses it. If, in contrast, the secret society of the Pythagoreans prescribed for the novices a silence of several years, the intention even here probably goes beyond the mere pedagogy for the concealment of the secrets of the league, but now not on account of that ineptitude, but precisely because they would expand the distinct purpose in its own course: not only for concealing particular matters, but that the adept should learn in general how to control oneself. The league went for a strict self-discipline and stylized purity of life, and whoever was able to tolerate being silent for years was probably also up to resisting temptations other than those of talkativeness.

Another method of placing secrecy on an objective basis was employed by the secret league of the Gallic Druids. The content of their secrets lay mainly in sacred songs that had to be memorized by every Druid. This was so arranged, however—especially through the probable prohibition against transcribing the songs—that it took an extraordinarily long time, up to twenty years. Through this long period of learning, before there is something at all essential to betray, a gradual habituation to concealment takes place; the attraction of revealing a secret does not fall, as it were, all of a sudden upon the undisciplined spirit who can in this way slowly adjust to resisting it. In many far-reaching contexts of social structure, however, that other condition remains: that the songs are not permitted to be written down. That is more than a safeguard against the disclosure of secrets. The reliance on instruction from person to person and the fount of critical information flowing exclusively in the league and not in an objective document—this ties the individual participant incomparably close to the community, provides the abiding sensation that, loosed from this substance, one would lose one's own being and it would never be found again. Perhaps it has not yet been adequately noted how very much in the more developed culture the objectification of the mind influences

the individual's acquisition of independence. So long as the immediate tradition, individual instruction, above all also the setting of norms by personal authorities, still determine the mental life of the individual, one is located solidly in the surrounding, vital group; it alone gives one the possibility of a fulfilled and spiritual existence; the direction of all channels through which the contents of one's life flow perceptively runs at every moment only between oneself and one's social milieu. As soon, however, as the division of labor[16] has realized its investment in the form of written law, in visible works and enduring examples, that immediate organic current of sap between the actual group and its individual member is interrupted; instead of the life process of the latter being bound continually and concurrently to the former, one can support oneself now from sources independent of any objective personal presence. It is relatively irrelevant that this now readily available reserve originated in the processes of the collective consciousness; not only are the generations left far behind who are not at all bound by this current sense of individuality, their actions crystallized in that reserve, but above all it is the form of objectivity of this reserve, its being detached from the subjective personality, whereby an extra-social source of nourishment is opened for the individual; and one's spiritual substance, by degree and type, becomes much more notable by one's ability to appropriate than by the independent measuring out of performance. The particular closeness of the bond inside the secret society, which is left for later discussion and which possesses its, so to speak, categorical emotion in the specific 'trust,' therefore advantageously permits the avoidance of writing the matters down where the handing down of mental contents forms its pivotal point.

Excursus on Written Communication

Several remarks about the sociology of the letter are in order here because the letter obviously also offers a wholly unique constellation within the category of secret-keeping. First the written work has an essence contrasting all secrecy. Before the general use of writing any legal transaction, however simple, had to be concluded before witnesses. The written form replaces this when it includes admittedly only a potential but unlimited 'public' for that purpose; it means that not only the witnesses but anyone in general can know that the business has been concluded. The characteristic form is available to our consciousness;

[16] *Gattungsarbeit*—ed.

this availability can be identified simply as 'objective spirit': Natural laws and moral imperatives, ideas and artistic creations, which are, as it were, available to anyone who can and wants to have recourse to them, are in their timeless validity independent of whether, when, or by whom this recourse occurs. Truth, which as a mental construct is an altogether different thing from its transiently real object, remains true whether it is known and acknowledged or not; the moral and legal law is valid whether or not it is observed. Writing is a symbol or sensual vehicle of this immensely significant category. The mental content, once written down, has thereby received an objective form, in principle a timelessness of its being-there, of an unlimitedness—one after another as well as side-by-side—of reproduction available to subjective consciousness without, however, because it is fixed, its meaning and validity becoming dependent on the apprehension or exclusion of these mental realizations by individuals. Thus something written possesses an objective existence that relinquishes any guarantee of remaining secret. But this lack of security from any given cognizance allows the indiscretion in the letter to be experienced perhaps as something rather emphatically ignoble, so that for those of finer sensibility it is precisely the worthlessness of the letter when it comes to being a protection for maintaining secrecy. In that the letter so directly links the objective revocation of all security of the secret to the subjective increase of this security, the characteristic antitheses that actually carry the letter as a sociological phenomenon converge. The form of epistolary expression means an objectification of its contents, which forms here a particular synthesis, on the one hand, of being intended for a single individual, on the other, its correlate, the personality and subjectivity that the letter writer submits—in contrast to the one who writes for publication. And precisely in the latter respect the letter as a form of interaction is something wholly unique. In an immediate presence every participant in interaction gives the other more than the mere contents of one's words; one thereby sees one's counterpart and plunges into the sphere of a state of mind that is not at all expressible in words, feels the thousand nuances in the emphasis and in the rhythm of its expression; the logic or the desired content of one's words undergoes a reach and modification for which the letter offers at the outside only sketchy analogies; and even these will generally arise only from memories of personal interaction. It is the advantage and disadvantage of the letter in principle to give the pure factual content of our momentary mental life and to silence that which we cannot or do not want to say. And so characteristically the letter, if not distinguished for example from a treatise simply by its not being published, is something immediate, simply personal, and for sure in no way only when it is a matter of lyrical outpourings but even if it is thoroughly concrete information. This objectifying of the subjective, this stripping of the latter from all that one just does not want to reveal of the matter and of oneself, is possible only in times of highly developed culture where one has adequate command of the psychological technique of bestowing a permanent form on momentary attitudes and thoughts that, though only momentary, are thought and conceived of as corresponding to the actual demand and situation. Where an inner production has the character of 'performance,' this durable form is completely adequate;

in the letter, however, there is a contradiction between the character of the contents and that of the form, which producing, sustaining, and exploiting it requiress a controlling objectivity and differentiation.

This synthesis finds its additional analogy in the blending of precision and ambiguity that is characteristic of written expression, most of all, the letter. These generally apply to the expressions from person to person, a sociological category of the first rank, a general area in which the discussions of this chapter obviously belong. It is not a matter here, however, of simply the more or less that the one submits from the self for the other to know but that the given is more or less clear for the recipient and that a relative plurality of possible meanings corresponds to a lack of clarity, as a trade-off. Surely there is no other more enduring relationship among people in which the changing degree of clarity and the interpretability of expressions do not play a thoroughly essential role, albeit most consciously realized only in its practical results. The written expression appears first of all as the more secure, as the only one from which "no iota may be taken."[17] However, this prerogative of the written text is merely a consequence of an absence: missing from it are the accompanying phenomena of the sound and the emphases of the voice, gesture and countenance, which for the spoken word are likewise a source of lack of clarity as well as clarity. Actually, however, the recipient tends not to be satisfied with the purely logical sense of a word, which the letter definitely delivers with less ambiguity than speech; indeed countless times one can be not at all satisfied because, in order even to simply grasp the logical meaning it requires more than the logical meaning. For that reason the letter is, in spite of or, better, because of its clarity, much more than speech, the locus of 'interpretations' and therefore of misunderstandings.

Corresponding to the cultural level at which a relationship or a recurring relationship dependent on written communication is at all possible, their qualitative characteristics are also separated here from one another in a sharper differentiation: what in human expressions is in their essence clear is in the letter clearer than in speech; that which in the expressions is in principle ambiguous is on the other hand more ambiguous in the letter than in speech. If one expresses this in the categories of freedom and constraint that the expression possesses for the recipient, then one's understanding in relation to its logical core is more constrained by the letter, but freer in relation to its deeper and personal meaning than with speech. One can say that speech reveals its secret through everything surrounding it that is visible but not audible as well as the imponderables of even the speaker; the letter, however, conceals that. The letter is thus clearer where it is not a matter of a secret of the other, but unclear and ambiguous where it is. Under the secret of the other I understand the other's logically inexpressible attitudes and qualities of being, which we nevertheless draw on countless times in order to understand the real meaning of even entirely concrete statements. In speech, these interpretive aids are so

[17] A quotation from Goethe's *Faust*: "kein Iota rauben läß"—ed.

merged with the conceptual content that a complete unity of comprehension results; perhaps this is the most decisive case of the general fact that human beings are in general unable to distinguish between what they really see, hear, experience and what their interpretations create out of that through adding-on, subtracting, reshaping. It belongs to the mental results of written interaction that it differentiates out from this naïve unity of its elements and thereby illustrates the multiplicity of those theoretically separate factors that constitute our so apparently simple mutual 'understanding.'

With these questions of the technique of maintaining secrecy it is not to be forgotten that in no way is the secret only a means under whose protection the material purposes of the community are supposed to be furthered, but that on the contrary the formation of community for its part in many ways should serve to ensure that certain matters remain secret. This occurs in the particular type of secret societies whose substance is an esoteric doctrine, a theoretical, mystical, religious *knowledge*. Here the secret is a sociological end in itself; it is a matter of the knowledge that is not meant for the many; those in the know form a community in order to mutually guarantee the maintenance of secrecy. Were those in the know merely a sum of disconnected personalities, the secret would soon be lost; the collectivization, however, offers each of the individuals a psychological support to protect them before the temptations of revealing secrets. While the secret, as I have emphasized, functions to isolate and individualize, collectivization is then a counterweight to it. All kinds of collectivization shuffle the need for individualization and for collectivization back and forth within their forms or even their contents, as though the need of an enduring mixed relationship would be met by qualitatively ever changing dimensions: thus the secret society counterbalances the factor of isolation, which is characteristic of every secret, through the fact that it is indeed a *society*.

Secrecy and individualistic peculiarity are such decisive correlates that collectivization can play two entirely opposite roles for each. It can at one time, as just emphasized, be pursued alongside the existing secret, in part to balance its isolating consequence, to satisfy, *inside* the secrecy, the impulse for social belonging that it cuts off outwardly. On the other hand, however, secrecy essentially weakens in importance wherever peculiarity is abhorred for substantive reasons as a matter of principle. Freemasonry emphasizes that it desires to be the *most universal* society, 'the fraternity of fraternities,' the only one that rejects

any specific purpose and with it every particularistic nature and wants exclusively to make *all* good people collectively its concern. And hand in hand with this ever more decisively developing tendency, the shared validation of the secret character for the lodges is increasingly reduced to merely formal outward appearances. That secrecy is encouraged at one time through collectivization, undone another time, is thus no contradiction at all; there are simply various forms in which its association with individualization is expressed—in somewhat the way the connection of weakness with fear is demonstrated, in that the weak person seeks collectivization for self-protection, as well as avoiding collectivization if greater dangers are feared inside it than in isolation.

Touched on to some degree above, the initiation of the member belongs then to the realm of a very far-reaching sociological form, within which secret societies are themselves marked in a particular manner: it is the principle of hierarchy, of the step-like structuring of the elements of a society. The detail and systemization with which the precisely secret societies effect their division of labor and ranking of their members is associated with a feature to be commented on subsequently: with the strong *consciousness* of their life that replaces the organic instinctive powers by a constantly regulating will and replaces the growth from within by a designing purposefulness. This rationalisticism of its structure cannot be more clearly expressed than in its carefully considered, intelligible architectonics. Hence, e.g., the structure of the earlier mentioned secret Czech society of the Omladina which is modeled after a group of the Carbonari and in 1893 became known through a legal proceeding. The leadership of the Omladina falls into 'thumb' and 'fingers.' In a private meeting the 'thumb' is chosen by those present; this one chooses four 'fingers'; the fingers choose then again a thumb, and this second thumb is introduced to the first thumb. The second thumb chooses again four fingers and these again a thumb, and so the articulation advances farther; the first thumb knows all the thumbs, but the rest of the thumbs do not know one another. Of the fingers only those four know one another who are subordinate to a common thumb. All the activities of the Omladina are directed by the first thumb, the 'dictator.' This one informs the rest of the thumbs of all intended undertakings; the thumbs distribute the orders then to the fingers subordinate to them, and the fingers in turn to the Omladina members assigned to them.

The secret society having to be constructed from the bottom up by deliberation and conscious will obviously offers one free play for the

idiosyncratic desire that comes with voluntarily arranging such a construction, a plan of determining such schemata. All systemization—of science, of lifestyle, of society—contains a test of power; it subjects a matter, which is outside thought, to a form that thought had moulded. And if this is true of all attempts to organize a group on a principle, then it culminates in the secret society, which does not develop but is constructed, which has to reckon with an ever smaller quantum of preformed parts than any kind of despotic or socialist systemization. To the making of plans and the impulse to build, which are already in themselves a will to power, there is joined the particular inducement in the advancement of a schema of positions and their relationships of rank to make determinative use of a wide, future, and ideally submissive circle of human beings. Very notably this desire is sometimes detached from that purposefulness and goes off in completely fantastic constructions of hierarchy. Hence, e.g., the 'high degrees' of degenerated Freemasonry; as characteristic, I cite simply several things from the organization of the 'Order of African Architects,' which arose after the middle of the eighteenth century in Germany and France and which, even after being constructed along the principles of Freemasonry, the Freemasons wanted to eradicate. Only fifteen officials were responsible for the administration of the very small society: *Summus Magister, Summi Magistri locum tenens, Prior, Subprior, Magister*, etc.[18] The ranks of the association were seven: Scottish apprentice, Scottish brother, Scottish master, Scottish knight, the *Eques regii, Eques de secta consueta, Eques silentii regii*, etc.[19]

The formation of ritual within secret societies encounters the same conditions of development as does hierarchy; even here their own lack of being prejudiced by historical organization, their construction on an autonomous basis, brings about an extraordinary freedom and abundance of formation. There is perhaps no outward feature that would characterize the secret society so decisively and in typical contrast to the open society than the valuing of customs, formulae, rites, and their uniquely preponderant and antithetical relationship to the substantive purposes of the society. These are sometimes less anxiously guarded than the secrecy of the ritual. Advanced Freemasonry emphasizes expressly, it is no secret association, it would have no cause to hide

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[18] Latin: Highest Teacher, substitute for Highest Teacher, Prior, Subprior, Teacher, etc.—ed.

[19] Latin: Royal Knight, Knight of the Regular Party, Silent Royal Knight, etc.—ed.

membership in it, its intentions, and its activities; the vow of secrecy refers exclusively to the forms of Masonic ritual. Quite characteristically the student order of the Amicists at the end of the eighteenth century decrees in § 1 of its statutes:

> It is the most sacred duty of every member to maintain the deepest silence about such matters that pertain to the well-being of the order. To this belong: Symbols of the order and signs of recognition, brothers' names, ceremonies, etc.

Only later in the same statute is the purpose and nature of the order revealed and set forth in detail! In a less voluminous book that describes the constitution and the nature of the Carbonari, the enumeration of the formulae and customs for the reception of new members and meetings fills seventy-five pages! It is not necessary to give further examples; the role of ritual in secret societies is well enough known, from the religious-mystical groups of antiquity on the one hand to the Rosicrucians of the eighteenth century on the other, to the most insane criminal gangs. The social motivations of these associations are perhaps as follows.

The conspicuous thing in the treatment of ritual in secret societies is not only the stringency with which it is observed but above all the anxiousness with which it is kept as a secret—as if its disclosure would be just as destructive as that of the purposes and actions, or perhaps of the existence of the society at all. The purpose behind this is probably that only then through this inclusion of a whole complex of outward forms in the secretiveness does the entire scope of action and interest of the secret society become a completed unity. The secret society must seek to create a type of total life on its own terms; then around the content of its purpose, which it sharply emphasizes, it builds a formulaic system, like a body around the soul, and places both equally under the protection of secrecy because only then does it become a harmonious whole in which one part supports the other. That with this, the secretiveness of the *externals* is especially strongly emphasized is therefore necessary because it is not so self-evident here and not required by any immediate interest such as the substantive purpose of the association. This is no different than, for example, in the military and in the religious community. In both, the fact that formalism, the formulaic system, the fixing of conduct take in such a broad area is in general rather fully explained in that both claim the entire person, *i.e.*, that each of them projects the entire life onto a particular plane; each

allows a multiplicity of strengths and interests to merge together under a specific perspective into an enclosed unity. The secret society tends to strive just for this: among its essential features is that, even where it has a hold on the individual only according to partial interests, where it is inherently a purely purpose-driven association, it nevertheless lays claim to a greater extent to the whole person, unites personalities inside its total sphere with one another, and obligates them towards one another more than even the same substantive purpose would in an open society. While the symbolism of the rite stimulates a breadth of unstably limited feelings over all imaginable individual interests, the secret society interweaves these latter into a common claim on the individual. The special purpose of the secret society is expanded by the ritual form into a unity and totality that is closed, socially as well as subjectively. Furthermore, it happens that through such formalism as well as through hierarchy, the secret society develops into a kind of reverse image of the official world, against which it stands in contrast. It is the sociological norm emerging everywhere that structures that stand in opposition to and isolation from the larger ones surrounding them, nevertheless, repeat the forms of the latter in themselves. Only a structure that in some way can count as a totality is in a position to hold its elements tightly to itself; it borrows from that larger totality the type of organic enclosure by virtue of which its members are actually circulated by a unifying life stream, a totality to whose forms its individuals were adapted and which can be defied best of all precisely through imitating it.

The same situation offers yet further in the secret society the following motive for the sociology of ritual. Every such society includes a measure of *freedom* that is actually not provided for in the structure of the whole surrounding group. Then should the secret society, such as the Vehme,[20] desire to restore the inadequate juridical practice of the political sphere, or should it desire, like the conspiracy or criminal gang, to rebel against the law, or should it, like the mysteries, want to hold itself beyond the commands and prohibitions of the wider society—the withdrawal that characterizes the secret society always has the tone of freedom; with that withdrawal, it enters a region where the norms of the surrounding realm do not apply. The essence of the secret society

[20] *Vehme*—secret tribunal in Westphalia, said to have been founded by Charlemagne—ed.

as such is autonomy. But it is of such a type that approaches anarchy; stepping out of the bonding range of the society-at-large has as the consequence for the secret society a modest rootlessness, lacking a firm sense of vitality and normative supports. Now this deficit is what is helped by the certainty and detail of their ritual. It demonstrates even here how very much human beings require a definite balance between freedom and law, and where the determining measure of both does not come to them from *one* source, they try to supplement the given amount of one with a quantity of another obtained from some other source until that balance is reached. With ritual, the secret society voluntarily takes on a formal constraint that its substantive detachment and being-for-itself need as a complement. It is notable that among the Freemasons it is precisely the Americans—who also enjoy the greatest political freedom—by whom the strongest uniformity in operations, the greatest regimentation of ritual is demanded in all the lodges; while in Germany—where the otherwise sufficiently strong degree of bondedness does not let it come so readily to a counter-demand in the sense of a limitation of freedom—a greater freedom of style is exercised in the operations of the individual lodge. The objectively, often completely meaningless, schematic constraint of ritual in the secret society is thus not at all a contradiction of its nearly anarchical freedom, its cutting loose from the norms of the sphere surrounding it, but on the contrary, how extensively secret societies are widespread is as a rule evidence of a lack of public freedom, of police-like regimentation, of political oppression, of a reaction of the demand for freedom—thus in reverse the internal ritual regimentation of these societies points to a measure of freedom and detachment for which the balance of human nature now demands that schematism as a normative counterpart.

These last considerations have already led to the methodological principle from which I want to analyze the still remaining traits of secret societies: how much they are generally expressed specifically as the typical traits of creating society through essentially quantitative changes. The reason for this kind of conceptualization of the secret society leads to a repeated observation of its position in the sociological complex of forms.

The secrecy pertinent to societies is a primary sociological fact, a definite type and color of association, a formal quality of relationship, determining the disposition of the group or its elements in direct or indirect interaction with other such factors. Regarded historically, however, the secret society is a secondary formation, *i.e.*, it originates

always only inside an already established society. Expressed differently: the secret society is in itself, even through its secrecy, characterized just as other societies—or even the secret society itself—by its domination and subordination or its purpose or its imitative character; but also its being able to develop as so characterized is possible only under the presumption of a society otherwise already constructed. It positions itself even as a narrower sphere inside of the wider one to which it is in opposition; this opposition, which would also be its purpose, is in any case intended in the sense of sealing off; even that secret society that desires only to offer fully selflessly a definite service to the totality and dissolve itself upon its fulfillment obviously maintains its temporary distinction from that totality as an unavoidable means to its purpose. Thus there is, of the many smaller groups that are encircled by larger ones, hardly one that would have to emphasize a formal self-sufficiency for itself as strongly through its sociological constellation. Its secrecy surrounds it like a border, beyond which there is then material or at least formal opposition, and which it therefore unites into itself for a complete unity. In the formations of every other kind of group the *content* of group life, the actions of the members in rights and duties, can so conform to their consciousness that the formal reality of constructing the society normally plays hardly a role therein; however, the secret society cannot at all allow its members to lose the clear and emphatic consciousness that just forms a *society*: compared with other ties, the ever palpable fervor needing oversight lends the form of association depending on it a significance predominant over against the content. Fully lacking in the secret society is the organic development, the instinctual character in accumulation, every dispassionate truism of belonging together and forming a unity. Through the *conscious awareness* of being a society, in its coming into existence and ongoingly accentuated in its life, the secret society is the opposite of all instinctive societies in which unity is more or less simply the expression of their rooted elements having coalesced: its social-psychological form is altogether that of the purpose-driven association. This constellation makes it understandable that the definiteness of the shape of the structure of the circle generally gains a specific intensification in the secret society, and that its essential sociological traits develop as a mere increase in quantity of rather universal relational types.

One of these traits has already been indicated: the character and solidarity of the circle through segregation from the social environment.

In this sense the often elaborate signs of recognition through which the individual member is legitimized as belonging to the society operate—and they were certainly more necessary for precisely this purpose in times before the general spread of literacy than later—when their other sociological relevancies exceed that of mere legitimation. So long as initiation confirmations, notifications, descriptions were lacking, an association whose subdivisions were located in various locations would have no means at all for excluding someone unauthorized, for having their benefits and communications delivered only to the truly entitled, except through signs that would be revealed only to these latter, who were duty bound to keep them secret and through which they could be legitimated as a member in any given situation of association. The purpose of *separation* is very clearly represented precisely in the development that certain secret associations of indigenous peoples have undergone, especially in Africa and among the Indians. These associations are formed only by men and are pursued essentially with the intention of marking their segregation from women. The members appear, as soon as they go into action, in masks, and it is typically forbidden, with severe penalties, for women to go near them. Nevertheless, here and there women manage to get in on the secret that the frightful appearances are no ghosts but their husbands. Where this occurred, the associations often lost their entire meaning and came to be a harmless masquerade. The undifferentiated imagination of a member of a pre-literate culture[21] cannot fully imagine the separation at all that one wishes to emphasize except as the one striving and authorized for it *hiding* oneself, making oneself invisible. That is the crudest and outwardly most radical type of concealment, in that not only a single action of the person but even the whole person is concealed: the association *does* not do something full of secrecy, but the totality of its bearer *itself* comes to be the secret. This form of the secret society is fully consistent with the pre-literate mental level in which the whole subject is yet fully absorbed in every particular activity, where this is not yet sufficiently objectified in order to allow it a character that the whole person does not identically share. Accordingly it is likewise understandable that as soon as the mask of secrecy is penetrated, the whole separation becomes invalid and the association loses its inner meaning along with its method and expression.

Here separation has the sense of a value-expression: one separates oneself because one does not want to demean oneself with the char-

[21] *Naturmenschen*—ed.

acter of the others since one wants to make one's own superiority felt over against them. Everywhere this motive leads to the formation of groups that are sharply distinguished from those obviously formed for practical purposes. In that those who want to stand out join together, an aristocracy originates that strengthens and, as it were, expands the position and the self-consciousness of the individual through the weight of their sum total. The fact that segregation and group formation are thus united by the aristocratizing motive produces in many instances from the very beginning the cachet of 'special,' in the sense of valuation: it is already noteworthy in school classes, comrades, uniting as intimate circles already by the merely formal fact of organizing a special group, viewing themselves as an elite over the unorganized others, and that these latter acknowledge such higher value involuntarily through their hostility and envy. In these instances secrecy and secretiveness are a superior maintenance of the wall against the outside and thereby a strengthening of the aristocratic character of groups.

This importance of the secret bond as an intensification of the sociological self-imposed segregation in general emerges strikingly in political aristocracies. Secrecy has belonged to the requisites of aristocratic rule from time immemorial. It exploits the psychological reality that the unknown as such appears ominous, powerful, and threatening, above all thereby seeking to hide the numerical insignificance of the ruling class. In Sparta the number of warriors was kept as secret as possible, and in Venice the same purpose was meant to be achieved by mandating a simple black uniform for all nobles: a conspicuous costume would not let the small number of rulers be so obvious to the people. This increased to the point of complete concealment of the circle of the highest rulers: the names of the three state inquisitors were not known to anyone except the Council of Ten, who chose them. In several Swiss aristocracies one of the most important offices was known forthrightly as the Hidden, and in Freiburg the aristocratic families became known as 'the hidden lineages.' In contrast to that is that of the democratic view, bound up with publicity and, in the same vein, the tendency towards a common and constitutional law. This is because such tendencies are intended for an unlimited number of subjects and are therefore public by nature. Conversely the utilization of secrecy inside the aristocratic regime is only the most extreme intensification of that social segregation and exemption, on account of which aristocracy tends to work against a universal, fundamentally fixed legislation.

Where the concept of the aristocratic shifts from the politics of a group to the attitude of an individual, the relation of isolation and

secrecy acquires an apparently completely different level. Consummate nobility in a moral as well as in a spiritual sense disdains any concealment because its inner certainty makes it indifferent towards what others know or do not know about us, whether they evaluate us as right or wrong, high or low; for it, secrecy is a concession to those on the outside, a behavioral dependence on regard for them. For this reason the 'mask,' which so many hold for the sign and the proof of one's aristocratic soul directed away from the masses, is precisely the proof of the importance the masses give it. The mask of the truly noble is in the many not understanding them indeed, not generally, so to speak, seeing them, even when they show themselves unveiled.

The separation from all those outside the circle, which, as a general sociological fact regarding form, serves secrecy as an intensifying technique, acquires a specific color through the majority of ranks in which the initiation into the secret societies right up to their final mysteries tends to occur and which illuminated already earlier for us another sociological trait of the secret society. As a rule the solemn vow of secrecy is required of the novice for everything that the novice will learn even before the reception into only the first rank occurs. The absolute and formal separation that secrecy can achieve is effected with that. But then when the actual content or purpose of the society becomes available to the entrant at first little by little—be this the finished purification and consecration of the soul through the initiations into the mysteries, be it the absolute dissolution of every moral boundary, as with the Assassins and other criminal societies—the separation is shaped differently in material respects: continually, relatively. The novice is in this manner still closer to the status of the non-participant; testing and education are required of one up until comprehension of the whole or center of the society. Through that, however, a protectiveness of that latter, an isolating in relation to the outside, is apparently achieved, that goes beyond what is won by the oath upon entry: care is taken—as was already occasionally demonstrated in the example of the Druids—that the one still unproven also *has* little to betray, while within the principal secrecy that then surrounds the group as a whole the graduated secret-keeping creates as it were an elastic sphere of protection for its innermost and most essential matters.

The contrast between the exoteric and esoteric members, as is attributed to the Pythagoreans, is the most striking form of this protective device. The sphere of those only partially initiated forms to a certain extent a buffer zone against those not initiated at all. Just as

it is everywhere the dual function of the 'middleperson' to connect and to separate, or rather, as that person plays only *one* role, which we identify, however, according to our categories of comprehension and according to the direction of our attention, now as binding, now as separating—so the unity here of the activities outwardly antithetical to one another is shown in the brightest light: precisely because the lower ranks of the society form a mediating passage to the actual core of the secrecy, they create the gradual consolidation of the sphere of repulsion around it that protects it more certainly than the coarseness of being radically entirely inside or entirely outside could do.

The sociological being-for-self presents itself in a practical turn as a group egoism: the group pursues its purposes with that lack of attention towards the purposes of the structures outside itself, which with the individual is called simply egoism. Indeed, the group thereby tends to acquire a moral justification for the consciousness of the individual, in that the group's purposes in and for themselves take on a supra-individual objective character, that one often cannot name a single person who profited directly from the group-egoistic activity, indeed, that this activity often demands selflessness and sacrifice from its own representatives. Here, however, it is not a matter of ethical valuation but of the separation of the group from its environment that the group egoism effects or signifies. Now, however, with regard to a smaller circle that wishes to remain and develop inside a larger one, this will have a certain limit so long as it exists in plain sight. An open association, of course, may still contend as intensely against other units larger than itself or against the whole establishment of them—it will, however, always have to claim that the realization of its ultimate goals would work to the advantage of the whole, and the necessity of this extreme claim will in any case impose some kind of limit on the actual egoism of its action. With secret societies this necessity falls away, and there will be at least the possibility of that absolute animosity towards others or towards the whole that the open society cannot admit to and thus cannot also unconditionally exercise. Nothing so distinguishes the detached mood of the secret societies from their social surroundings, symbolized or even encouraged, as the omission of that hypocrisy or actual condescension that the open society by necessity puts into the teleology of the surrounding totality.

In spite of the actual quantitative demarcation of every real society, there is nevertheless a considerable range of them whose inner tendency is this: whoever is not excluded is included. Within certain political,

religious, status peripheries anyone who satisfies certain external conditions, usually not given by volition but inherent to one's existence, is viewed without further ado as 'belonging.' Whoever, e.g., is born in the territory of the state, that person is, where special circumstances do not make one an exception, a member of the often complicated entity of the state; the member of a specific social class is, of course, included in the social conventions and binding forms of it if that member does not become a voluntary or involuntary outsider;[22] the extreme is seen in the claim of a church to include actually the whole human race, so that only historical happenstance, sinful obduracy, or a definite divine will would exclude anybody from this religious association, ideally appropriate even for *them*. Here then are two distinct ways that apparently signify a principal differentiation of the sociological meaning of societies, however much praxis may blend them or diminish their distinctness: over against the principle, that whoever is not expressly excluded is included, stands the other, that whoever is not expressly included is excluded. Secret societies constitute the latter type in its most categorical purity. The unconditional nature of their separation, consciously maintained with every step of their development, has as a consequence as well as a cause, that those not expressly included are thereby simply expressly excluded. The Freemasons could not better support their recent strongly emphasized assertion that they are not a true 'secret society' than by their concurrently expressed ideal of including *all* people and representing humanity as a whole.

Here as everywhere the increase in insularity from the outside corresponds to an identical integration within because these are simply the two sides or outward manifestations of one and the same sociological activity. A purpose that induces people to enter into a secret association with others excludes from membership, more often than not, from the very beginning, such a predominant portion of its general social circle that potential and actual participants take on a value of scarcity. The individual simply cannot have a falling out with them because it could be so much more difficult to replace them with others than it can in a legitimate organization *ceteris paribus*. Consequently every discord inside the secret society brings the danger of betrayal with it; avoiding it in this case tends to join the self-preservation of the individual to that of the whole. Ultimately a range of occasions for conflict are removed

[22] The term *outsider* is in English in the original—ed.

through the detachment of the secret society from the surrounding social syntheses. Among all the ties of an individual, those through a secret socialization always assume a position of exemption which has, however, in contrast to the open interactions—familial and governmental, religious and economic, social class and friendship, however varied be their content—a wholly different measure and type of levels of contact. At first the contrast with secret societies makes it clear that the demands of those lying in a plane, so to speak, cut across one another; and as they, as it were, lead to an open struggle of competition for the energy and the interest of the individual, so inside each single circle the individuals collide, because each person is claimed simultaneously for the interests of another circle elsewhere. These kinds of collisions are, in view of the sociological isolation of the secret society, very limited. Consistent with their purposes and their operation, competing interests from that dimension of open ties are left at the door. Surely because it tends to fill *its* dimension alone since an individual will hardly belong to several secret societies, every secret society exercises a kind of absolute domination over its members, who do not come to conflict among themselves as readily as they do from the coordination of those others. The 'peace of the castle' that should actually prevail inside every organization is favored in secret societies by their singular and exceptional terms in a formally incomparable way. Indeed, it appears as though, yet wholly apart from this more realistic basis, even the mere form of secrecy as such keeps the participants freer from previous influences and disturbances and thereby facilitates concord for them. An English politician had in the secrecy that surrounded the English cabinet the reason for its strength: anyone who had been active in public life would know that a small number of people would be all the more easily brought to agreement the more secret were the negotiations.

The particular measure of cohesion inside secret societies is in accord with the degree of centralization: they offer examples of an unconditional and blind obedience to the leadership, of course, just as it also admittedly occurs elsewhere, but is here especially remarkable in light of the frequently anarchic and law-contravening character of the society. The more criminal the purposes of the secret society are, the more unlimited the power of the leadership tends to be and the more fiercely it tends to be exercised. The Assassins in Arabia, the *Chauffeurs* (a particularly savage band of robbers from an organizational network in eighteenth-century France), the Gardunas in Spain (a criminal society that had connections to the Inquisition from the seventeenth to

the beginning of the nineteenth century)—all these, whose nature was lawlessness and rebellion, were under a leader whom they themselves played a part in installing and to whom they deferred uncritically and unconditionally. Moreover, not only is the correlation of the needs for freedom and for belonging operative, as is evident in the strictness of the ritual, and which here contains both extremes: the excess of freedom that such organizations possess against all otherwise valid norms had, for the sake of emotional equilibrium, to be balanced by a like excess of subservience and renunciation of one's own will. But quite possibly more essential was the necessity of centralization, which is the vital condition of the secret society; and most certainly when, as a criminal society, it lives off the surrounding circles, meddles in them with a wide variety of radiations and activities, and is severely threatened by betrayal as well as deflected interests as soon as the uncompromising adherence to a center does not prevail in it.

It is thus noted that the secret society is especially exposed to serious dangers if no strict unifying authority develops in it on some basis. The Waldensians were by nature definitely no secret society, but became such in the thirteenth century simply to keep themselves hidden because of external pressure. Thereby it became impossible for them to assemble regularly, and this in turn led to the loss of unity in their doctrine; it gave rise to a number of separately existing and developing branches that often stood in hostile opposition to one another. They lapsed into weakness because they lacked the necessary and complementary attribute of the secret association, continuously effective centralization. And that the significant power of the Freemason chapter is evidently not entirely relative to its extent and its means lies probably in the wide-ranging autonomy of its components, which possess neither a unified organization nor a central authority. While their common features extend only to principles and signs of recognition, they are such only for the identity and the relationship of person-to-person, and not for the centralization that holds the powers of the elements together and that is the correlate of the distinctiveness of the secret society.

It is nothing but an exaggeration of this formal theme that secret societies are often led by *unknown* superiors: the lower levels are not supposed to know whom they obey. This occurs, of course, above all for the protection of secrecy and increases intentionally, in Italy, to the point of forming a secret society at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Guelphic Knight, which worked for the liberation and unification of Italy: it had in its various positions accordingly a

supreme council of six persons who did not know one another, but communicated with each other only through a middle person known as 'the visible.' However, this is in no way the only serviceable purpose of secret superiors. They signify rather the most extreme, abstract sublimation of centralized dependence. The tension between the adherent and the leadership is at its highest when the latter moves out of sight; there remains simply the pure, so to speak, merciless, impersonally colorless reality of obedience, from which the one in command has disappeared as a subject. When obedience towards an impersonal authority, towards a mere office, towards the bearer of an objective law, already has the character of inflexible rigor, then this intensifies yet to an uncanny absoluteness when the commanding personality remains in principle hidden. For when, concurrently along with the visibility and recognition of the commander, the power of the personality is lacking from the relationship of command, indeed even the individual suggestion thereof, then removed from it are even the limitations, the merely relative and so to speak 'human' that adheres to the sensible, singular person; obedience in this case must be colored by the feeling of being subordinate to an unreachable power and one not at all defined by its boundaries, which one sees nowhere but can therefore suspect everywhere. The sociologically general cohesion of a group through the unity of the commanding authority has, in the secret society with an unknown superior, been transferred, as it were, to a *focus imaginarius* and has thereby won its purest, highest form.

The sociological character corresponding to this centralized subordination to individual elements of the secret society is that of de-individualization. Where the society does not have the interests of its individuals immediately in mind, but operates, as it were, based on itself, since it uses its members as means for purposes and actions located outside theirs—here the secret society demonstrates anew a heightened degree of the dissolution of the self, of the leveling of individuality, which social being already undergoes in general and as such, and with which the secret *society* counterbalances the above emphasized individualizing and differentiating character of the *secrecy* as such. This begins with the secret societies of indigenous peoples, the appearance and enactment of which occurs almost everywhere by the use of masks, so that an expert determines directly that where one finds masks with an indigenous people, this would allow one to at least suspect the existence of secret societies. It is, of course, in the nature of the secret society that its members hide their membership. But while the person in question

indeed appears and operates and not only acts entirely unambiguously as a member of the secret society, and whose individuality with this membership is identical to any other known individuality, the disappearance of the personality as such behind one's role in the secret society is that which is most strongly emphasized. In the Irish conspiracy that was organized in the 1870s in America under the name *Clan na Gael*, the individual members were never identified with their names but only with numbers. Certainly this also occurred normally for the practical purpose of maintaining secrecy, but it demonstrates how very much it suppresses individuality. With people who count only as numbers, who perhaps—as it at least occurs in analogous cases—are hardly known to the other members by their personal names, the leadership will operate much more thoughtlessly, much more indifferently toward their individual wishes and abilities than if the association were to include each of its members as personal beings. Functioning no less in this sense are the extensive role and the rigor of the ritual. This is because such activity always means that the objective formation has become dominant over the personal aspect of contribution and participation. The hierarchical order allows for the individual only as bearer of a predetermined role; it reserves for every participant an, as it were, stylized garment in which one's personal contours disappear.

It is only another name for this elimination of the distinctive personality when secret societies cultivate a largely relative equality among their members; the despotic character of their constitutions is violated so little by this that its correlate is found in the leveling of the dominated also in all other possible types of despotic groups. Inside the secret society there exists frequently among the members a fraternal equality that stands in sharp and tendentious contrast to their differences in all their other life situations. Significantly this is pronouncedly evident on the one hand in secret societies of a religious or ethical character—which greatly accentuate the reality of fraternity—on the other hand in those of an illegal nature. Bismarck speaks in his memoirs of a widely networked pederast association in Berlin that he came to know as a young court official, and emphasizes "the *leveling* effect of the common workings of the forbidden throughout all strata."[23] This depersonalization in which the secret society unilaterally sharpens a typical relationship between

[23] Presumably, *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, the first two volumes of which were published in 1901—ed.

an individual and society appears ultimately as the characteristic *release from responsibility*. Here, too, the mask is the most primitive phenomenon. Most of the African secret societies are represented, as it were, by a man dressed as a forest spirit; this one commits any number of violations on those who encounter him by chance, up to robbery and murder. A responsibility for his foul deeds does not apply to him, and certainly evidently only because of his masking: that is the somewhat unhelpful form under which those societies let the personalities of their adherents disappear and without which these latter would undoubtedly be overtaken by revenge and punishment. But responsibility is simply so directly linked to the 'I'—also philosophically the issue of responsibility falls into the issue of the 'I'—that for this naïve awareness disguising the person removes all responsibility. Political refinement, however, is served no less by this connection. In the United States House of Representatives the actual decisions, which the full House almost always endorses, are taken in standing committees. Their negotiations, however, are secret, and thus the most essential part of legislative activity is hidden from the public. Thereby the political responsibility of the individual representative appears for the most part to be extinguished since nobody can be held responsible for proceedings that are not subject to scrutiny. While the parts played by the individual person in the decisions remain hidden, they appear to be carried by a supra-individual authority; release from responsibility is here also the result or the symbol for that increased sociological de-individualization that corresponds to the secrecy of group action. For all boards, faculties, committees, trustees, etc. whose deliberations are secret, precisely the same thing holds: the individuals disappear as persons into the, so to speak, nameless circle of membership, and with them the responsibility, which belongs to such persons, cannot at all attach a tangible essence to their particular behaviors.

Ultimately this unilateral increase of general social characteristics is attested to by the danger from which the greater surrounding sphere believes itself, rightly or wrongly, threatened by the secret societies. Where strong centralization is striven for—especially with regard to the political—special unions of elements are abhorred purely as such, irrespective of their contents and purposes; as entities they comprise simply, as it were, competition for the principal center that wants to reserve for itself alone any combining into a form of unity. The concern of the central power before any 'special union' extends—which has already been repeatedly and importantly emphasized throughout

these explorations—throughout the history of the state. One characteristic type is indicated somewhat by the Swiss Convention of 1481, according to which no separate alliances were permitted between the ten confederated states; another one, the persecution of the journeymen associations by the despotism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; a third, the tendency to deprive the communes of rights that the modern state frequently manifests. This danger of the separate association for the surrounding total society appears magnified when it comes to the secret society. Human beings seldom have a calm and rational attitude toward those known slightly or only vaguely. The recklessness that treats those unknown as non-existent and the fearful imagination that inflates them directly into enormous dangers and horrors tend to play roles in their behavior. Thus the secret society appears for sure as a dangerously secret one. As one cannot know for certain whether or not a special society will use its power, accumulated for legal purposes, sometime also for those undesired, and for that reason the principal distrust of the central powers arises towards subject groups, so there exists over against alliances that are in principle hidden all the more closely the suspicion that its secrecy hides dangers. The Orange Societies that were organized early in the nineteenth century in England for the suppression of Catholicism avoided all public discussion and worked only in secret through personal connections and correspondence. But precisely this secrecy allowed them to appear to be a public danger: it raised the suspicion "that men, who shrank from appealing to public opinion, meditated a resort to force." So the secret organization definitely appears purely on the grounds of its secrecy as dangerously verging upon conspiracy against the existing powers. How much this is only an increase of the general political dubiousness of the special association is demonstrated well by such phenomena as the following: The oldest German guilds offered their members an effective legal protection and thereby substituted for the protection of the state for them; for that reason, on the one side, the Danish kings saw in them safeguards of the public order and favored them. On the other side, however, they appeared for exactly the same reason directly as *competitors* of the state; the Franconian statutes, therefore, condemned them, and surely because they identified them as *conspiracies*. The secret association is deemed so much an enemy of the central power that, now conversely, every politically abhorrent club is labeled as such!

Sociology
Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms

Volume 2

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By

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With an introduction by

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[1] Each of these chapters contains various discussions that in greater or small intervals encircle the title problem and, apart from that relevance, comprises a relatively *independent* contribution to the whole argument. The purpose and methodical structure of this undertaking also advances its arrangement under a modest central idea, as it affords the question under discussion great latitude. Therefore the chapter titles given below only very incompletely cover the contents, for which the Index at the end of the volume gives a much more adequate accounting.

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CHAPTER SIX

THE INTERSECTION OF SOCIAL CIRCLES[1]

The difference between advanced and crude thinking is manifested in the different motives that determine the associations of ideas. The accidental juxtaposition in space and time suffices at first to connect ideas psychologically; the union of attributes that form a concrete object appears at first as a coherent whole, and each one of them stands with the others in whose company one has come to know them, in a closely associative context. It comes to consciousness as a conceptual content existing in itself only when it occurs in further and different connections; then what is common to all these appears in bright illumination and concurrently in mutual association, while it becomes increasingly free of the ties to the objective other, those linked with it only by accidental juxtaposition to the same object. Thus through the actually perceptible the association rises above the initial idea toward that supported by the content of the concepts on which the higher formation of concepts is based and toward that which extracts what is common even from its entanglements with the most varied realities.

The development that takes place here among concepts finds an analogy in the relationship of individuals among themselves. Individuals see themselves initially in a context that, relatively indifferent to their individuality, binds them to their fate and imposes a close involvement with those things near to which the accident of their birth has placed them; and of course this initial context means the beginning circumstances of a phylogenetic as well as an ontogenetic development. But its progression, then, moves towards associative relationships of homogeneous components from heterogeneous circles. Thus the family encompasses a number of various particular individuals who are at first dependent on this bond to the strictest degree. With further development, however, each individual weaves a bond to personalities

[1] A portion of this chapter is taken from my *Über sociale Differenzierung, sociologische und psychologische Untersuchungen* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1890), Ch. V. [Simmel's expression 'circle' (*Kreis*) is often rendered 'group' in order to make the English more idiomatic—ed.]

that lie outside this original circle of association and instead possess a relationship to the individual through an actual similarity of dispositions, inclinations, activities, etc.; the association through superficial togetherness is more and more displaced by one of such substantive relationships. As the higher concept ties together that which is common to a large number of greatly varied intuitive complexes, so the higher practical point of view joins together similar individuals from thoroughly foreign and unrelated groups; new spheres of contact are established that position the earlier, relatively more naturally given, more physically bound relationships, into the most diverse places.

I remember, for example, that the independent groups whose associations earlier made up the universities were divided according to the nationality of the students. Their place was taken later by the divisions according to the common interests of students, the faculties. Here the relatedness, determined from the *terminus a quo* locally and physiologically, was replaced to the most radical extent by the synthesis from the perspective of purpose, of the internally relevant, or, if you will, individual interest. Under somewhat more complicated conditions a development of the English trade unions manifests the same form. Predominant in the trade unions originally was the tendency for the individual groups on the local level to agree that workers coming from the outside were excluded; frictions and petty jealousies were unavoidable between the divisions thusly separated. This situation, however, was superseded gradually in the direction of a united combination of the craft throughout the whole land. Subsequent reality perchance sealed this transformation. When the cotton weavers concluded a uniform piece rate, it was likely seen that this would lead to a concentration of the industry in the favorably situated location and to losses for the more distant villages. Therefore, the representatives of these also settled for it because it would be best for the craft as a whole. Although it had been from the very beginning a matter only of workers associated on the basis of the same activity, nevertheless, lying under this prerequisite was above all the emphasis of association on local proximity, which without doubt led to a closer connection of the individual craft with unions of substantially different trades but existing in the same location. The development moves away from this relationship to the union in which the similarity of activity came to be the sole determinant of its connections. In place of the *city*, so states one historian of trade unions regarding this change, the *trade* became the governing unity of the workers' organization. Evidently a factor of freedom is in effect here;

for however much constraint the situation of the individual worker contained, the affiliation to a trade contains in general more freedom of choice than that to a city. Generally the entire model of development suggested here is subject to the tendency for the increase of freedom: it certainly does not remove the bond, but it makes it a matter of freedom to whom one is bound. So, compared to the local or some other determining bond having nothing to do with the subject, the one freely chosen will then, as a rule, be effected by the actual characteristics of those choosing and thereby permit the construction of the group based on practical relationships, *i.e.*, ones residing in the nature of the subjects. For that reason it is frequently expedient to continue to take advantage of the association brought about in this way, on account of its formal solidity, for teleological purposes that lay far from its original motive for coming into being. In the Spartan *syssition* they sat fifteen to a table, by free election.[2] *One* vote sufficed to reject the applicant. This table fellowship was at the root of army unity. Entering into the role of neighborhood and blood relations for the building of community, then, were the actual tendencies and sympathies found in individuals. The organization of the army, to which this was relevant, was of the utmost strictness and practicality; however, between it and the, in its own way, likewise impersonal relationship of proximity and blood, the *syssition* election operated as a pivotal point, infusing the rational meaning of bond by a freedom of the quite differently constructed rationality of the army organization. Apart from this as a particular method for the establishment of military organization, however, this unconditional prerogative in itself certainly penetrated the familial manner of relationship for the Spartans. In the rest of Greece it was the same clan or the same district that would be found together in a division of the army; only in Sparta did the objective military interest break through this prejudice and purely on its own accord determine the division of the army. Certainly among indigenous peoples, e.g., some African peoples, it has been observed how the war-centered polities destroy clan organization. Since the women as a whole represent the principle of the naturally growing, family-like belonging, the animosity for everything feminine is thereby explained—the powerlessness of women in warlike organizations. The relative frequency of matriarchy

[2] *Syssition* was a military division centered around the concept of dining together—ed.

among warlike peoples may, on the one hand, result from the emphatically contrasting nature of civil relationships versus the militaristic; on the other hand, from individual psychological motives: the warrior is certainly tyrannical and brutal at home, but yet again tired, at ease, casual, content, provided that he is cared for and another is in charge. The *main* objective, however, has nothing to do with these civil circumstances; it splinters the clan and creates from its atoms a new, purely rational structure.[3] The decisive factor is simply that here the warriors form a whole organized only from military and no other interests at all; in other matters entirely different bonds might pull them apart, which then, if they interfered in that wholeness, would be irrational. In the election of comrades in the Spartan *syssitia*, freedom was—what it often is not—a principle of rationalization. Then, by virtue of it, the qualities of the personality became basic determinants of unification—a fully new, revolutionary, and, in spite of all arbitrariness and irrationality in any given case, nevertheless clearly rational motive for unifying, in contrast to its causes theretofore. The 'independent league' functioned in this sense in the last three centuries of medieval Germany. In the earliest era of the free village communities the solidarity of members was a locally developed one; the feudal era created then, in the relationship to *one* lord, an entirely different kind and yet entirely external ground for unity; the free league first laid this basis in the desires of the associated individuals themselves. It goes without saying that entirely unique formations had to be produced for the common life of individuals when those earlier, as it were, more haphazard motives, not grounded in the personality, were removed or contradicted by this new one of spontaneity.

The later kind of unity, which develops out of a more original one, need not always be more rational in nature; the consequences for the outer as well as for the inner situation of the individual will have a particular coloring when both of one's binding ties are rooted in equally deep, organic causes lying beyond one's choice. The culturally much less developed Australian aborigines live in small, relatively closely bound tribes. Furthermore, though, their whole population is divided into five *gentes* or totem clans in such a way that in every tribe members of various *gentes* are found and every *gens* stretches over several tribes. The totem members do not form a tighter union inside the tribe; rather, their clan runs equally through all these demarcations,

[3] The phrase '*main* objective' translates *Sach*gesichtspunkt—ed.

all forming a large family. When in a fight between two tribes, those belonging to the same totem confront one another, they move out of each other's way and seek another opponent (which is also reported of the Mortlack Islanders); sexual relations between men and women occur without question according to these *gens* relations, even when they have otherwise never met one another on account of their membership in different tribes. For these wretched beings, who are not at all capable of an actually rational manner of association, such groupings by duality of affiliation, so sharply separated, directed more-or-less horizontally and vertically, must mean an enrichment in the feeling of being alive, an otherwise probably unreachable stretching and, so to speak, doubling of existence. A formally similar intersection of a very different content and effect is frequently brought about inside the cultivated family life through gender solidarity. Where, e.g., the mother of the man is drawn into the differences between a married couple, her instincts—in so far as they function, so to speak, *a priori* and apart from all individual peculiarities of the case—will incline at one time towards the son as the blood relative, at another, however, surely also to her daughter-in-law as a member of the same gender. Sharing the same gender belongs among the causes of solidarity that perennially permeate social life and intersect with all the others in the most varied degrees and types. As a rule it will function as an organic, natural type, in contrast to which most of the others have something individual, deliberate, conscious. In the case mentioned, while one will perhaps sense that the relationship between mother and son is the one given and operative by nature, the solidarity of the woman with the woman as such, in contrast, is something secondary, reflected upon, more than a general concept because significant as an immediate energy. Sharing the same gender sometimes shows the unique type of unifying motive that is by its nature certainly primarily, fundamentally contrary to all choice—which, however, for its effectiveness often only succeeds through mediations, reflections, conscious pursuit, so that one motive substantially much later and more accidental functions relatively as the first and unavoidable one—the formula, that what is last προς ημας is what is first φυσει, proving true here too.[4]

In relation to this mid-point between an organic and a rational character, having gender in common as a form sociological motive

[4] Translating the Greek: "what is last to us, is what is first by nature"—ed.

is related to age similarity, which in relatively uncomplicated circumstances can become a basis for division even of the whole group. Thus in Sparta there were about 220 political parties identified as πρεσβυτεροι, νεοι, νεανισχοι, etc.;[5] thus one finds with various indigenous peoples the men organized into age groups, each of which has a particular social meaning, functions, lifestyle. This basis for unity is absolutely personal and at the same time absolutely non-individual. Obviously that last identified scheme is possible only where the culture does not yet have at its disposal any extensive objectively intellectual possession. This is because the latter directly favors the unfolding of individual differences in intellect, of intellectual inclinations, of faction by ideas, whereby then individuals show themselves as belonging together at quite different age levels. Therefore this lack of acquired intellectual content is also one of the reasons why youth as such hang together more widely, feel themselves drawn to youth much more—often with astonishing indifference towards their individuality—than occurs among elders. The division according to age groups—albeit extraordinarily crude—is an integration by personality and objectivity in the cause of group formation. The antitheses to this otherwise emphasized: the organic and the rational—are brought together here: a wholly organic, even physiological reality for individuals arises as a purely conceptual force through a consciously desired synthesis of means of association; the purely natural and personal determination by stages of life works as a fully objective principle. It is understandable that in unrefined circumstances this fixed guiding principle, deprived of all choice, which is nevertheless with regard to content one of very direct vividness and determinative of a feeling of being alive, acquires great significance for the social structure.

One of the simplest examples of the superstructure of a circle oriented to the immediately organic according to objective viewpoints is the one cited: the original association of the family group being modified by the individuals' individuality placing them in other circles; one of the highest, the 'republic of scholars,' that half ideal, half real bond of all personalities coming together in a circle of such a highest universal goal as knowledge in general, who in other respects belong to groups most diverse in relation to nationality, personal and special interests,

[5] Literally: *presbyteroi*, elders; *neoi*, younger ones; *neaniskoi*, youth—ed.

social position, etc. Yet stronger and more characteristic than in the present, the Renaissance period manifested the energy with which intellectual and cultural interest singles out those associated from the most various circles and brings them together into a new community. The humanistic interest broke through the medieval segregation of groups and strata and gave people who came from the most different points of origin and who frequently still remained true to the most varied occupations, to a common active or passive participation in thought and knowledge that crossed the former forms and divisions of life at the most manifold points. The precise fact that humanism appeared at that time to all peoples and circles from the outside as something equally alien to them enabled it to become a common realm for them all, *i.e.*, to elements of each of them. The idea prevailed that the distinguished belong together; this is manifest during the fourteenth century in the appearance of collections of biographies that simply depict outstanding people as such, collected in a standard work, be they theologians or artists, statesmen or philologists. In characteristic forms state leaders recognize this basis for a new classification, a new analysis and synthesis of circles, so to speak: Robert of Naples concluded a friendship with Petrarch and gave him his own purple mantel; two hundred years later this social motif lost its lyrical form and took on one more substantial and more strictly limited: Francis I of France wanted to turn the circle that centered around scholarly studies into one self-contained and even independent of the universities. The latter, which were intended for the training of theologians and lawyers, were supposed to make room for a type of academy whose members would dedicate themselves to research and teaching without any practical purpose. As a consequence of that kind of separation of the purely intellectual eminence from all that was otherwise held as valuable, the Venetian Senate could write to the Curia at the extradition of Giordano Bruno: Bruno may be one of the worst heretics, have done the most reprehensible things, led a dissolute and plainly diabolical life—otherwise, however, he may be one of the most excellent minds that one could imagine, of the rarest erudition and intellectual greatness.[6] The wanderlust and adventurousness of the humanists, indeed their character, in part, richly deviant and unreliable, was in accord with this independence of the mind from all other

[6] Simmel does not cite a source or use quotation marks for what appears here to be a translated direct quotation—ed.

demands on people; and that independence shaped the center of their life and made them indifferent toward these demands. The individual humanist, while moving about in the colorful variety of life circumstances, replayed the lot of humanism that enveloped the poor scholar and monk as well as the powerful commanders and resplendent princes in *one* milieu of intellectual interest. Thereby what was of the highest significance for the finer structure of society was anticipated—that which admittedly already had its model in antiquity: that the criterion of intellectuality can function as a basis for the differentiation and the new formation of circles. Such had been heretofore either volitional (economic, military, political in the wider and narrower senses) or affective (religious) or based on a mixture of both (familial). That now intellectuality, the interest of knowledge, forms circles whose members are gathering together from all kinds of already existing ones, is like an intensification of the phenomenon of relatively recently developing group formations, often bearing a rational character, whose content is created by conscious deliberation and intellectual purpose. This formal entity of secondary formations, with the centering of circles around interests of intellectuality, has achieved its most powerful manifestation, determining even the contents.

The number of various circles then in which the individual stands is one of the indicators of culture. If the modern person belongs at first to the family of origin, then to that founded by oneself along with one's spouse, then to one's occupation, which frequently incorporates one into several more circles of interest (e.g., in every occupation that contains dominant and subordinate persons, everyone stands in the circle of one's particular business, office, bureau, etc., which always combines the high and the low, as well as in the circle that forms from the the equally ranked in different businesses); if one is conscious of one's citizenship as well as belonging to a definite social rank, is moreover a reserve officer, belongs to a couple of clubs and possesses a social circuit touching on the most varied circles, then this is indeed a very great variety of groups, some of which are certainly coordinated, but others of which get ordered in such a way that the one appears as the original alliance from which the individual on the basis of one's own particular qualities changes over to a more distanct circle, thereby separating from the members left in the first circle. The connection to them can continue further, just like one aspect of a complex idea, if psychologically long ago it also acquired purely substantive associations; nevertheless, the bond to the complex, with which it exists just

spatially and temporally, need not in any way be lost. In less of an individualistic manner typical circles of belonging during the Middle Ages were offered to individuals beyond that of one's town citizenship. The Hanseatic League linked city with city and allowed individuals to take part in a sphere of action that reached not only beyond each individual but far beyond the borders of the kingdom; the guild communities, on the other hand, also did not ask for the municipal area, but organized individuals beyond their town citizenship into associations that stretched throughout all of Germany. And like the guild association transcending city boundaries, so the journeymen's association reached beyond the guild boundaries.

The latter configurations had the characteristic of taking hold of the individual not as an individual but as a member of a circle and of incorporating that circle as *such* into wider circles. To be sure the association of associations places individuals in a plurality of circles; but because these do not actually intersect they then have their own relevance to the problem of individuality, distinct from the mentioned social constellations of the circles, which will be discussed later. In the medieval league the idea existed—however often practice deviated from it—that only similar people could be united, in easily obvious relation to the completeness with which the medieval person turned one's existence over to the league. Therefore, initially cities allied with cities, monasteries with monasteries, guilds with related guilds. This was an expansion of the egalitarian principle, even if members of one corporation might be quite unlike those of the other allied to it; but as *members of a corporation* they were equal to each other, and only insofar as they were this, not insofar as they were outwardly individually differentiated, the alliance held true. But even as that *modus operandi* spread to alliances of different kinds of league, these were precisely as leagues, as factors of power inside new complexes, but still experienced as similarity; the individual as such remained outside the broader agreement, so that a person's membership in it added nothing of a personally individualizing element for that person. After all, this was, even as it was being carried out, the transitional form from the stricter sense of the medieval league that, by that sense, most telling perhaps in the old guilds and earlier medieval fraternities, did not permit the individual to join other circles—to the modern unions whose fellowship the isolated individual can join in any number desired.

From this, then, various consequences result. The groups to which the individual belongs form, as it were, a system of coordinates in such

a way that each additional one defines the individual more exactly and unambiguously. The attachment to any given one of them still leaves individuality wide latitude; however, the more there are, the more unlikely it is that yet other persons will manifest the same combination of groups, that this many circles would yet again intersect at *one* point. As the concrete object of our knowledge loses its individuality when we bring it under a universal concept according to some characteristic but recovers it to the degree that other concepts are emphasized, under which its other characteristics place it, so that each thing, platonically speaking, shares in as many different ideas as it possesses qualities and thereby acquires its individual specificity; precisely so is it the case for the personality in relation to the circles to which it belongs.

Just as one has appealed to the substantial object that stands before us as the synthesis of sense impressions—so that each object has, as it were, all the more definite being the more sensed qualities have been found together at its occurrence—so we form from the individual elements of life, each of which is socially constructed or interwoven, that which we call subjectivity κατ εξοχην,[7] the personality that combines the elements of culture into an individual style. After the synthesis of the subjective brought forth the objective, the synthesis of the objective produces then a newer and higher subjective—just as the personality submits itself to the social circle and loses itself in it, only then, through the unique intersection of the social circles, to regain its individuality in that intersection. Incidentally its purposeful determination thus comes to be in a way the reverse image of its causal: by its origin one explained it as a point of intersection of countless social threads, as the consequence of the inheritance from the most varied circles and periods of adaptation, and its individuality as the particularity of the quanta and combinations in which the generic elements come together. Now it is attached with the variety of its drives and interests to the social structure; so it is then, as it were, a radiation and restoration of that which it received, in an anologous but conscious and enhanced form.

The moral personality develops entirely new certitudes but also entirely new tasks when it goes from the settled establishment in *one* circle into the intersection of many circles. At first the earlier unambiguity and certainty yield to a fluctuation of life tendencies; in this sense, says an old English proverb: "Whoever speaks two languages is

[7] Greek: according to prominence—ed.

a rascal." That conflicts of an inner and outer nature arise through a multiplicity of social affiliations, conflicts that threaten the individual with a mental duality, indeed with mental rupture, is no proof against its stabilizing effect, strengthening personal unity. Since that dualism and this unity support each other reciprocally precisely because the personality is a unity, the division can become an issue for it; the more varied group interests meet and press for settlement together inside us, the more definitely does the 'I' become conscious of its unity. It has always been the case that affiliation to several families has above all been that which marriage effects for each of the spouses, the site of enrichment, but also of conflicts that bring the individual to an internal and external adjustment as well as to energetic self-assertion. In the make-up of ancient *gentes* the intersection of the circles in the individual is often so obvious as to belong to the lineage or totem tribe of the mother instead of that of the narrower familial or local tribe of the father. But these simpler people are not on a par with conflicts such as those just indicated, in a deep connection with the personality not yet having been cultivated into an acute awareness in them. With characteristic purposefulness both types of association are therefore frequently so essentially differently designed that they do not encroach on each other. It is the maternal affinity that has a more ideal, mental essence, the paternal, however, a real, more material, directly active one. The maternal relations or totem bond among the Australians, the Hereros, and many indigenous hunting peoples in general holds no significance for the ongoing everyday life; it is generally not operative in daily life but only in those ceremonial occasions of deeper meaning: weddings, funerals, blood revenge; that latter, inside the life of indigenous peoples, has an ideal, as it were, abstract character. The totem group, which the maternal lineage possesses and is therefore frequently scattered through many clans or tribes, is held together often only by common dietary restrictions and ceremonies, above all by special names and coats-of-arm symbols. The paternal relations, in which everyday real life is carried out, warfare, alliances, inheritance, the hunt, etc. do not have such, but do not require it either because their local unity and melding of their immediate interests takes care of their collective consciousness. On this level every local bond tends not to carry a more ideal character—whereas it is of a peculiarly higher development for a solidarity to be able to be supra-local and yet thoroughly of a realistic and concrete nature. Those indigenous circles, however, in whose point of intersection their individuals stand—the patrilocal and matrilineal—must be

separated from one another as concrete and abstract social values in order to make this indistinct way of thinking possible at all, to bring both together in one and the same person.

Wholy unique in kind and consequence were the phenomena of intersection that took place with the Catholic priesthood. No stratum was excluded from supplying priests and monks; the power that was unique to the church's station lured the *highest* as well as the *lowest* social elements. With regard to medieval England it is noted that in general strong class aversions prevailed, but the clergy, although strongly closed in on itself as a class, nevertheless produced no class hatred because it came from all classes, and every family had some member in it. The counterpart to that was that church landholdings were found everywhere; while thus next to the unendingly many titles to property in every province, almost in every community, there existed one standing under that aspect, a regional unity of the spiritual stratum arose that was counterpart, consequence, and foundation of the material one. This is the most gigantic example in prior history of a formation of a circle that intersected all other existing groups—but at the same time is characterized thereby as creating no coincidence in the individuals. The priesthood to some extent could have, from any perspective, such a fully unprejudiced outreach to the existing social ranks because it thereby simply removed the individual, whom it grasped, from his social stratum and did not allow him to maintain any determinants from there, even one's name itself, that would then have fully specified the newly acquired personality; the latter was defined rather fully from the new circle—indeed with the consequence that our context confirms, *e contrario*, that the priest is not permitted any individuality in the other valid senses, no differential determination, but, because he is *entirely* a priest, must be also entirely a *priest.*[8] The encounter with the circle is then not at all functional for the individual, but only for the profession as a whole in which the earlier affiliations of all strata and circles are found together. The thoroughgoing positive sociological security that the higher social structure gained here from the intersection of the circles in it resulted from the fact that it had no relationship with one that it did not have with another. Among the means that Catholicism employed to place the individual priest beyond the intersection of circles, that of celibacy is the most radical. This is because marriage

[8] The phrase, *e contrario*, is Latin for 'on the contrary'—ed.

means such a sociologically binding specification that the individual is frequently no longer entirely free to take a position inside of another circle that would accept a person, a position that would be determined just by the interest of this second circle. It is noteworthy that the lower Russian clergy, whose duties necessitate a life among the people, is generally married, but the higher governing clergy is celibate—while even the lowest Roman Catholic priest assumes a position in his village that is, so to speak, abstract, set apart from a life in common with his surroundings. Certainly insofar as the Russian priesthood actually forms a transition to the Protestant clergy, in principle entirely interwoven in civic life, it is as such almost exclusively endogamous: the priest seldom marries anyone other than a priest's daughter. Hence the consequences of marriage for the other sociological ties of the spouse are frequently so considerable that the affiliations are distinguished specifically by whether the marriage of their members has a significance for them or not. In the Middle Ages and even later the marriage of a journeyman was viewed by fellow journeymen very unhappily; indeed, in some guilds the entry of a married journeyman was made with great difficulty. This was because marriage limited the journeymen's mobility, which was required not only for maintaining the vitality of the unity and internal linkage among the profession of journeymen, but also for the facilitation of mobility of the members according to work opportunities; the marriage of the journeyman broke through the uniformity of interests, the appearance independent from the masters, the closed nature of the craft. The intersection of ties, because of the particular structure of marriage and family, had here the unavoidable consequence of largely removing the individual from the other bond. It goes without saying that on analogous grounds bachelorhood was also viewed for soldiers as the proper state wherever there existed a strongly differentiated 'military stratum'; rather in accord with the case of the Russian clergy, marriage or concubinage was permitted for the Macedonian regiments of the Ptolemies and after that for the soldiers in the Roman imperial era—but then the troops were frequently replenished by the offspring of these unions; not until the deep rooting of the modern army in the organic life of the people were officers completely exempted in this respect. Incidentally it is obvious that the same form-sociological constellation can also appear in substantively different conditions, albeit not so typically and essentially as with marriage. Just as the old student universities in Bologna denied admission to native students and withdrew membership rights from members who acquired citizenship in the

city after more than ten years residence in the city, so the Hanseatic League of German merchants excluded any affiliate in Flanders who had acquired Flemish citizenship. If groups diverge too far from one another in their meaning and their requirements of the individual, they do not intersect at all, or at least not in terms of their purposes. And a circle that wants to take in its member into itself unconditionally finds—alongside the more substantial motive of jealousy—a formal contradiction therein in that the differentiation of individuals requires toleration for their concurrent membership in others.

The social definition of the individual will be all the greater when the defining circles are juxtaposed rather than concentric; *i.e.* gradually narrower circles, such as nation, social class, occupation, singular categories inside them, will provide the person participating in them no special individual place because the smallest of them all by itself signifies membership in the wider ones. Nevertheless, these affiliations stuffed inside one another, so to speak, define their individuals in a by no means always unified manner; their relationship of concentricity can be a mechanical rather than an organic one, so that in spite of this relationship they influence their individuals as though independently juxtaposed to one another. This is shown to a degree in early law when someone guilty of an offense is punished twice: by the narrower circle to which the offender belongs and by the larger that surrounds it. When in late medieval Frankfurt a guild member had not fulfilled his military service, the guild leaders punished him, but besides them then the city council as well. Likewise with slander and libel, after they were atoned for by the guild, the affronted still sought justice through the courts. Conversely, in the older guild orders the guild had reserved for itself the punishment of offenders even when the court had already done this. This two-in-one proved very clearly to the person affected that both circles surrounded one concentrically in certain respects, in other respects, though, intersected in that person, and the involvement in the narrower one still did not quite include everything that involvement in the wider one meant—as in the foregoing example, certainly membership in one particular category inside a wider general occupational circle presupposes all the determinants that pertain to the latter. A positively antagonistic relationship between the narrower and the wider circle in its particular significance for the situation of the individual—next to the countless cases where it is a matter of the overall general conflict between the whole and the part—manifests the

following type. When a larger group A consists of the smaller groups m and n, it happens then that A in its narrower but essential sense of existence is identical only with m, while n stands in opposition to m precisely in that respect. This was the relationship of the free *Burgenses* or *Bürger* communities and the bishop-led ministries, which frequently made up the bulk of the city population in the early Middle Ages. Actually both together formed the broader concept of the city. In the narrower sense, though, only the first were 'the city.' The vassals of the bishop had thus a double status: they were members of the citizenry and yet extended on another side with interest and law into another circle altogether; they were on the one side a part, on the other the opposite of the *Burgenses*. The very position that alienated them from the city, as vassals of the bishop, made them in every individual case a member of that particular city. If these more proper citizens were perchance distributed in guilds, then each individual was uniformly enveloped by this narrower and the wider circles of the city. The circle of ministries, however, was likewise certainly encircled on the one side by the circle of the city, on the other side, however, cut off from it. This relationship was so contradictory that the ministries were transferred either into the actual *Bürger* communities or eliminated altogether from the sphere of the city. In spite of such inconveniences and difficulties that arise for the position of the individual from membership in concentric circles closing in around one, this is, however, one of the first forms yet in which partnership in such a plurality is possible for the individual who began a social existence absorbed into *one* circle. The uniqueness of the nature of medieval solidarity in contrast to the modern has often been accentuated: it occupied the whole person; it served not only a particular objectively circumscribed purpose but was an association, encompassing the whole persons of those who had come together for that purpose. The drive for the formation of association functioned yet further, so that it was satisfied when these unions assembled altogether to form a higher order of unions. As long as the intentional association had not yet been found, the possibility of functioning collectively with others with purely objective contributions for purely objective purposes and thereby reserving the totality of the 'I'—that form was then the simply emerging but in reality sociologically brilliant means for allowing the individual to participate in a plurality of circles without becoming alienated from the local membership in the original one. The enrichment of the individual as a social being thusly attained was admittedly

a limited one, which is not to be gained by virtue of the purpose-driven association, but nevertheless great enough, since what the higher association brought to the individual was thus in no way contained in its narrower one, just as the concept tree, to which the oak belongs simultaneously, includes already all the features of the concept plant, which in turn contains that of the tree. And it itself would have gained nothing other than what this metaphor indicates—thus the assignment under the concept plant has a meaning for the oak, which it, under the concept tree, so very logically for the conceptual content of the plant includes but yet does not possess: the relationship, of course, to all that that is plant but is not a tree. The concentric structure of circles is thereby the systematic and frequently also the historical intermediate stage whereby they, lying *next* to one another, encounter one another in one and the same personality.

In personal consequences, it admittedly differs immeasurably from the concentric form if someone belongs to a scientific association quite outside an occupational status, is a consultant for a corporation, and occupies a volunteer city office; the less participation by oneself in one circle leaves room for participating in another one, the more definitely is the person affected by standing in the intersection of them both. As far as the participation in offices and institutions comes into question here, it depends of course on the breadth of its division of labor whether a characteristic combination of talents, a particular latitude of action, allows the union of several functions in a person to appear in it. The structure of the objective social formations also offers in this manner the greater or lesser possibility of constituting or expressing through them the distinctiveness and singularity of the subject. In England it was for a long time common for a plurality of quite different authorities to be formed from the same personnel. Already in the Middle Ages one and the same person could operate as a circuit court judge (justice in eyre), a member of the treasury staff (Baron of the Exchequer), a member of the judiciary (justice *in banco*). While the same circle of persons were clustered in such varied official councils, obviously a particular characteristic of the subjects is not given in this synthesis: the objective contents of the functions could not yet be adequately differentiated under such circumstances to make the unification of the individuals into a *ratio essendi* or *cognoscendi*[9] of a completely individual solidarity.

[9] Mostly Latin: basis of being or recognizing—ed.

On the other hand, quite apart from the contents of the clusters, the mere fact that the individual of the heretofore single, one-dimensionally determining bond affiliates with new associations is certainly sufficient to give oneself a stronger consciousness of individuality in general, at least to go beyond the presumptive self-understanding from the earlier association. For this reason—which is important at yet other places in these investigations—the representatives of the existing bonds are already oriented towards the purely formal reality of the new ones, even if in their contents these offer absolutely no competition with the former. The frequent imperial prohibitions of the German federated cities in the 12th and 13th centuries might well have been intended to meet concrete dangers. However, the federal government and the hierarchy in the French and at first also in the German empires coming out against the guilds is something much more abstract and important; here it was a matter of the purely free union as such, the nature of which permitted an unlimited increase, giving competition to the existing associative powers, a matter of the personality acquiring a unique situation through the mere fact of multiple associations in which the bonds are oriented to the personalities, while in the earlier, so to speak, singly dominating syntheses the personalities remained oriented to the bonds. Thereby the potential for individualization also grows immeasurably so that the same person in the various circles to which that person concurrently belongs can appropriate entirely different relational positions. This is already important with respect to the intersection of familial social circles. The dissolution of the proto-Germanic clan formation became considerable by taking account of the female lineage, fostered indeed merely by the in-law relations. Then one could belong to various familial circles at the same time; the rights and duties from each of them competed so effectively with each of the others that, as has been expressed, no kinship communities existed, but only relatives. This result, however, could not have occurred with the same intensity at all, indeed, the whole situation could not at all have come about, if the individual had assumed the same position in each familial lineage. However, while one stood at one time in a central position but at the same time elsewhere in a peripheral one, possessed in the one lineage a position of authority but in the other a position coordinated with many others, here located in a more economically relevant situation but there only in one of personal significance, and the structure of these relations excluded the possibility of a second individual occupying the exact same position inside the same *concerns*—the result was an individual situation

that was impossible with a mono-lineal kinship community.[10] Since even here the individual would likely be born at a totally determinant position, the accent of importance always attached to it because this line provided a lineage for a person; in itself it ruled the individual, while conversely at the intersections it was the individual who brought about the contact of one lineage with the other. Now apart from such possibilities inside the familial bonds of, so to speak, self-initiating positions and their individual combinations—there is immediately produced once more, in a more active manner, by every new union under an egalitarian viewpoint a certain inequality in itself, a differentiation between the leadership and the led; if a unifying interest, perhaps something like the mentioned humanistic one, was a common bond for high and low persons which neutralized their other difference, a new distinction between high and low then arose inside this commonality and according to its own categories, which stood wholly apart from any parallel with the high and low inside their other circles, but then thereby distinguishing the personality all that much more and situating it from all that many more angles. However, the same characteristic result can also occur by means of the very equality that prevails inside of a newly formed circle: when, for instance, its members appropriate and maintain positions of extremely different standing in the groups previously encompassing them. Then it is precisely this reality, that one standing low in an original circle and another standing high, are now equal in a social sense, which is a most highly peculiar social development for each of them. For example, the medieval knighthood functioned in this sense. With it, the officials—the court dependents attached to the prince—were established in a community of equal rank to which the prince, indeed the emperor himself, belonged and which made all its members equally high in rank in knightly things. This gave the officials a position that had nothing to do with their ministerial duty and rights that did not stem from their lord. The difference by birth of the noble, the free, and the vassal was thus not eliminated, but it was intersected by a new line that from beginning to end contained *one* level: that of the, not concretely but ideally, operative fellowship of being united by an identical knightly right and custom. Outside the circles in which one stood either high or low, whoever was now concurrently classified in one in which everyone stood absolutely 'equal' acquired by that an individu-

[10] Simmel gives 'concerns' in English—ed.

alizing synthesis; the structure of the circles in which one participated had to enrich and determine one's feeling of life uniquely as a social being. While the level of the positions which one and the same person in various groups assumes are fully independent of one another, rare combinations can arise such as those in lands with universal military duty, so that the intellectually and socially highest ranked person has to be subordinate to a non-commissioned officer, or in the Parisian beggars guild that possesses an elected 'king' who was originally only a beggar like all of them and, insofar as I know, also ongoingly remains such, who is vested with truly princely honors and preferment—perhaps the strangest and most individualizing union of a low and high estate in one and the same social position. Also this intersection can occur inside one single relationship as soon as it includes a plurality of relations in itself, as, e.g., the private tutor—and even more so with the earlier private tutors of youths of the nobility. The tutor is supposed to have superiority over the pupil, to dominate and lead—and is yet still the servant of that master; or when in Cromwell's army any corporal especially well versed in the Bible could deliver a morally reprimanding sermon to his major while he obeyed him unreservedly in official matters. Finally the issue of these intersections with the determining consequences falls back for the individual even closer onto oneself; so, e.g., in the characteristic phenomenon of aristocrats with liberal attitudes, the cosmopolitan with prominent churchly tendencies, the scholar who seeks out exclusively relations among practical persons, etc.

Those intersections taking place inside of a single group find their typical example in the competition among persons who possess allegiances in different directions. The merchant is, on the one side, tied to other merchants in a circle that has a large number of common interests: economic-political legislation, social standing of the merchant class, its public image, uniting against the public for the maintenance of definite prices, and many others—so it goes with the whole world of business as such and allows them to appear as a unity agaisnt third parties. On the other hand, however, each business person is in a competitive position against any number of others; entrance into this profession simultaneously creates for them association and isolation, similar and different positioning; they look after their interest through the most bitter competition with those with whom they nevertheless must frequently join together most closely on account of their shared interest. This internal contradiction is probably at its admittedly crassest in the realm of the business person, while also existing in some way in

all other realms, down to the ephemeral socializing of the evening get-together. An immeasurable possibility of individualizing combinations open up thereby in the individual belonging to a multiplicity of circles in which the proportion of competition and association vary greatly. It is a trivial observation that the instinctive needs of human beings for both of these go in contrary directions, that one desires to feel and deal *with* others but also *against* others; a definite measure of one and the other and their proportion is a purely formal necessity for human beings that they satisfy with the most diverse contents—and for sure in such a way that frequently the grasping for certain contents of life is not at all understandable based on their material significance but only on the satisfaction that those formal drives find in them. Individuality, with respect to its natural striving as well as its historical emergence, is thereby characterized by a quantitative proportion between association and competition that is decisive for it. And the opposite tendency also arises directly from that: that the need for a clearly outlined, unambiguous development of individuality drives individuals to the choice of certain circles in whose intersection they would place themselves and from whose solidarity—one in essence offering the form of connection, the other the form of competition—they would obtain a maximum of that individualization. Thus where strong competition prevails within one circle, the members gladly seek for themselves other groups that are as uncompetitive as possible; therefore in the business stratum a decided preference for convivial clubs is found, whereas the class consciousness of aristocrats, for the most part excluding competition inside its own circle, renders that kind of supplementation rather superficial for them and suggests to them instead associations that in themselves promote strong competition, e.g., all that is maintained by interests in sport. Finally, I mention here also the frequently discrepant intersections that emerge when an individual or a group is ruled by interests that are opposed to one another and which therefore allow them to belong at the same time to entirely opposed parties. For individuals such a reality occurs when a strong political party life prevails in a pluralistically developed culture; then of course there is a tendency for the emergence of the phenomenon of political parties differing from one another in the various perspectives even with regard to issues that have nothing to do with the politics, so that a particular trend in literature, arts, religiosity, etc. is associated with one party, the opposite trend with another; in the end the line that divides the parties extends entirely through the totality of life interests. Then it goes without saying that the individual,

who does not wish to be put entirely under the influence of the party, will perhaps join up with a group of aesthetic or religious conviction that is amalgamated with one's political opposition. One stands at the intersection of two groups who are normally consciously opposed to one another.

The most significant and at the same time most characteristic example is offered perhaps by religious affiliation since the detachment of religion from its originally national or local bond, so immeasurably important for the history of the world, has occurred. In both sociological forms: that either the religious community signifies at the same time the community in other essential or most far-reaching interests—or that it is fully freed precisely from all solidarity with that which is not religion—the essence of religion is equally fully expressed in both, only in each case in a different language or on a different level of development. That existence together, that a sharing of life interests, is not possible with people with whom one does not share faith is fully understandable; for the deeply justified need of such a unity in the entire ancient world, Semitic as well as Greco-Roman, it was *a priori* sufficient that religion arose as a matter of the clan or the state, *i.e.*—with few exceptions—God was merged directly with the interests of the political group, the duties towards God directly with the all-encompassing duties towards it. But the power of the religious motive is no less evident where it is independent and strong enough to unite fellow believers above all the variations from their other ties, directly opposite all connections from other motives for combining. The latter religious situation is obviously an eminently individualistic one; the religious attitude has cut itself off from the foothold it had from being bound up with the total complex of social ties, and while it withdraws into the individual soul and its responsibility, it reaches out to others equally qualified only in this respect, and perhaps in no other. That Christianity is, in its pure sense, an entirely individualistic religion—surpassed in that only by the original Buddhism, which, however, is actually not a religion but teaches exclusively a salvation attainable on an absolutely personal path without any transcendent intervention—this made the spread of Christianity possible throughout all the varieties of national and local groups; just as, looked at from the other side, the consciousness of Christians that they carry their church membership into any community whatsoever has to have definitely produced the feeling of individual determination and self-confidence, whichever other character and whichever other duties may also accrue to them from that

community. This sociological significance of religion is the reflection of its entirely universal dual relationship to life: it stands at one time in opposition to all the contents of our existence, is the counterpart and equivalent of life in general, untouchable by life's secular movements and interests; and at another time yet again it sides with a party among the parties of this life, above which it had in principle risen, becomes an element next to all of life's other elements, involves itself in a multiplicity and succession of relationships within life that it had rejected a moment ago. So here emerges this strange interweaving: the rejection of every sociological bond, as happens in deeper religiosity, makes the contact possible for individuals of one's religiously inclined circle with all other possible circles whose members do not have those interests in common with them; and the connections occurring thereby serve in turn as the sociological accentuation and definition of the individuals as well as the religious groups. This schema continues into the particulars of the religious person and into particular intermingling with the remaining interests of the subjects. In the disputes between France and Spain the Huguenots once put themselves at the service of the king when it was a matter of opposing Catholic Spain and its friends inside France; another time, oppressed by the king, they allied directly with Spain. Another distinct situation of duality arose at the time of the cruel oppression of the Irish Catholics by England. One day the Protestants of England and Ireland would experience themselves allied against the common religious foe without regard to nationality; the next day the Protestants and Catholics of Ireland would join together against the oppressor of their common fatherland without regard to religious difference. In contrast it appears to peoples among whom the primitive unity of the circle exists in a still unbroken religious and political relationship, as in China, as something entirely unheard of and inconceivable that European nations would intervene for the protection of Chinese and Turkish Christians. Where this unity, however, is so decayed, as in Switzerland, the abstract nature of religion—which then again acquires from its abstractness a rather definite position in relation to all other interests—gives rise directly to very characteristic intersections. Switzerland, of course, by virtue of the enormous differences between cantons, has no very decisive party reality of the kind that would separate the politically like-minded in the different cantons into major parties in relation to the government as a whole. *Only the Ultramontanes from all the cantons* form a solid bloc in political matters. One can readily presume that this detachment of the religious from

the political groupings holds as well in reverse and alliances in the latter respect are made possible that would have frustrated the continuing unity of both. The most outstanding example perhaps is the 1707 union completed between England and Scotland. For both parts the advantage of being *one* state was tied to the fact that the duality of the churches continued to exist. The political and religious system had been until then closely associated in both countries; only insofar as this would loosen could the political interests amalgamate, which the religious would not have tolerated. "They could," so it was said of the countries, "preserve harmony only by agreeing to differ."[11] Once this solution took place, with its possible consequence of intersection, then the freedom gained by that is no longer vulnerable to revocation from within. For that reason the principle, *cuius region eius religio*,[12] has the force of law only if it does not need to be expressed, but expresses the organically integrated, naively undifferentiated primitive situation. Admittedly, it is rather strange when the religious viewpoint, detached from all other grounds for separation, fuses the persons and interests actually requiring differentiation; this integration, however, is experienced as having originated entirely parallel to and based on the simple objective grounds of differentiation. Thus in the year 1896 the Jewish laborers in Manchester formed themselves into an organization that explicitly was supposed to include *all* categories of workers (mainly they were tailors, cobblers, and bakers) and that wanted then to make common cause with the other trade unions in regard to the interests of workers—while these others, though, were fully constructed on the basis of the division of labor according to the *objective* categories of various types of work, and certainly in such a decisive manner that the trade unions, for their part, could not therefore be induced to merge with the International because it was constituted from the outset without regard for the similarity of craft activity of its members. Although that fact seems to lead back into the lack of differentiation between a religious and socioeconomic community of interests, it still demonstrates their uncoupling in principle, in that the synthesis, by its voluntary coordination with

[11] Source of quotation is unknown—ed.

[12] Latin: 'Whose territory, that person's religion,' was a principle that goes back to the Roman Emperor Constantine; the formula is usually associated with the Peace of Augsburg (1555), which established Lutheran and Catholic Christianities in different parts of northern Europe—ed.

purely objectively differentiated structures, reveals itself as an integration technically for only practical purposes. With the Catholic labor unions in Germany the case is altogether different on account of the extent of their reach, on account of the political role of Catholicism as such in Germany, and because the workers here are not in so an exposed position because of their religion as are the Jewish workers. In Germany the differentiation leads inside the originally universal Catholic unions to the organization of special work cooperatives (e.g., earlier in Aachen for a number years: of the weavers, spinners, dressers, needle makers, metalworkers, and construction workers); the association is large enough to offer room for such a division without the intersection then necessarily involving these special cooperatives in a confluence with the non-confessional ones of the same craft. Nevertheless, this latter did occur anyway, and that inner division is obviously the first step toward that.

Finally an intersection of a higher order arises as a result of the religious powers being sublimated into the priesthood. The sociological formula of this sublimation—the relationship of representation and leadership, control and cooperation, reverence and material concern between believers and priests—certainly varies from one religion to another, but what they typically have in common is that one can still speak, with reservations, of a formal similarity of the position of the priest within to those of quite different groups—as those of the nobility, of the military, of business. Then from this initially arises interests of solidarity—a self-perception, a cohering among priests, which under certain circumstances can transcend even a substantive opposition between the Protestant 'Positives' and the Catholic clerics.[13] The individual priest or the more closely knit group of priests stands at a point of intersection in which the membership in a national, confessional, in some way partisan association coincides with that of the association of the universal priesthood, links its in part social, in part ethical-metaphysical affinity, and which gives the individual subjects a uniquely determined character distinct from the other members of the one as well as the other group.

[13] Simmel's phrase is *zwischen den evangelischen Positiven und den katholischen Klerikalen*. The former were adherents of 'positive theology,' a term coined by Denys Petau in the 17th century; that theology held that humans can acquire secure knowledge about God and the divine Will by means of reason and cognition. We are indebted to Hans Geser for identifying this allusion—ed.

The development of the public mind is thus manifested in sufficiently many circles of whatever objective form and organization being at hand to afford every essential side of a multiply talented personality an association and a society to participate in. Hereby a common approach is offered to the ideal of collectivism as well as individualism. On the one hand the individual finds, then, for every inclination and endeavor, a community that facilitates the satisfaction of them and accordingly offers a purposefully proven form for one's activities and all the advantages of group membership; on the other hand the specificity of individuality is protected by the *combination* of circles that can be unique in every instance. Thus one can say: society arises from individuals, the individual arises from society. When the advanced culture more and more expands the social circle to which we belong with our whole personality, the individual is still in large measure on one's own and deprived of many supports and advantages of the tightly related group: thus there is now in every establishment of circles and social groups, in which people interested in the same thing can gather in whatever numbers, a compensation for that isolation of the personality that emerges from the break with the narrow confinement of earlier conditions.

The confinement of this association is to be measured by whether and to what degree such a circle has developed a particular 'honor,' of the type that the damage or the insult to the honor of one member is experienced by every other member as a diminishment of one's own honor, or that the community possesses a personal honor collectively, changes in which play out in the experience of honor of every member. With the establishment of this specific concept of honor (family honor, officers' honor, business honor, *etc.*) such circles secure for themselves the purposeful behavior of their members, especially in the area of the specific difference by which they are distinguished from the widest social circle, and in such a way that with regard to the compulsory rules for such correct behavior the state's laws contain no regulations for them.[14] Thus through specific circles, which can mean even a single person, generating particular honors for themselves and the wider circle cultivating a more abstract, universal concept of honor that differs from the narrower one of the fixed special circles, but which nevertheless still applies to the members of these latter—in this way the fine

[14] Additional particulars about this in the chapter on self-preservation.

points of the norms of honor become symbols of the circles. There is a professional honor with a negative sign, a professional dishonor that subtracts a certain latitude from the behavior generally counting as humanly honorable or so in the whole surrounding society, just as the positive professional honor adds demands to it. Thus there were and are—for the many categories of businesspersons and again especially the speculator, but also the low penny-a-liner, the demimonde—certain things permitted and covered with a good conscience through professional consciousness, practiced by them that do not otherwise generally count as honorable.[15] Next to this profession-related disrespectability the individual can, however, be thoroughly honorable in one's universally human relations in the conventional sense, in the same way incidentally as that the protection of the specific professional honor does not hinder the individual who would act thoroughly dishonorably according to general ideas. Thus various sides of the personality can be subject to various codes of honor as reflections of the various groups to which the person belongs simultaneously. The same requirement can, e.g., thereby receive two quite different emphases. To not tolerate being insulted can be the maxim of someone who in private life, however, acts quite differently, such as in the capacity of a reserve officer or in an office. The attention to the honor of a wife as protection for one's own manliness will have a different accent in the family of a priest as opposed to a circle of young lieutenants, so that a member of the latter, who stems from the former, can feel in himself very clearly the conflict between these concepts of honor from his membership in two circles. In general this formation of professional codes of honor—which appear in the thousands quite rudimentarily dressed in simple nuances of feeling and action, in more personal or more material motives—reveals one of the most significant form-sociological developments. The narrow and strict attachment of earlier circumstances, in which the social group as a whole, with respect to its central authority, regulates all the behavior of the individual according to the most varied ways, limits its regulative power more and more to the essential interests of the totality; the freedom of the individual gains more and more domains for itself. These become filled by new group formations, but in such a way that

[15] The expressions 'penny-a-liner' and 'demimonde' are given in English and French, respectively—ed.

the interests of the individual determine which groups one will belong to; consequently, instead of external means of coercion, the sense of honor suffices to compel one to adhere to those norms necessary for the continued existence of the group. Moreover this process does not get its start only from the official power of coercion; in general where a group power originally dominates a number of individual life interests that stand materially outside a relation to its purposes—namely in the family, in the guild, in the religious community etc.—the dependence and association in relation to them are handed over to the specialized association in which participation is a matter of personal freedom, whereby then the task of creating society can be accomplished in a much fuller manner than through the earlier affiliation more negligent about individuality.

Furthermore, it happens that the undifferentiated domination of a social power over people, however comprehensive and strict it may be, nevertheless does not and cannot concern itself over the whole range of life's relationships, and that they will then leave to the purely individual will all those of less concern and pertinence; indeed greater coercion rules in the remaining relationships; thus the Greek and, even more so, the old Roman citizen had to subordinate himself unconditionally, certainly in everything having to do with politics only, anything then in connection to issues pertinent to the norms and purposes of his national community; however, for that reason, as lord of his house, he possessed an all-the-more unlimited domination; thus that narrowest social association, as we observed in the small groupings of indigenous peoples, gives the individual complete freedom to act in any way one desires towards all people standing outside one's tribe; thus tyranny finds in general its correlate and even its support in the most complete freedom and even lack of restraint of personalities with regard to the relationships not important for them. After this dysfunctional apportionment of collectivistic coercion and individualistic volition, one more appropriate and just appears, where the substantive content of the being and dispositions of persons are decisive regarding the associative formation, because then collective supports for their heretofore entirely uncontrolled and individualistically determined operations are more easily found; for to the same degree to which the personality is set free as a whole, it also seeks out social affiliation for its various aspects and limits voluntarily the individualistic discretion as it finds another substitute for the undifferentiated bond to a collective power;

thus we see, e.g., in countries with great political freedom an especially strongly cultivated unity,[16] in religious communities without a strongly hierarchically exercised church authority a lively sect-formation, etc. In a word, freedom and obligation are apportioned with more balance if the social transactions, rather than the juggling of heterogeneous elements of the personality in a unitary circle, offer the possibility that the homogeneous is assembled from heterogeneous circles.

This is one of the most important ways the progressing development takes: the differentiation and division of labor are initially, so to speak, of a quantitative nature and apportion the spheres of activity in such a way certainly that for an individual or a group an other comes as one among others, but each of them includes a sum of qualitatively different relationships; however, this differentiation is later singled out and united from all these circles into one now qualitatively integrated sphere of activity. Public administration frequently develops in this manner, in such a way that the initially entirely undifferentiated center of administration sets aside an array of areas each of which is subordinate to an individual authority or personality. However, these areas are first of all of a local nature; thus, e.g., a director on behalf of the French council of state is sent into a province to exercise there all the various functions that the council of state itself otherwise exercises over the entire country; it is a parceling out, depending on the quantity of work, in the form of a regional division. From that comes the later differentiation of division by functions, when, e.g., from the council of state are formed the various ministries, each of whose activity reaches over the entire country but only in a qualitatively determined respect. The promotion of officials to the national level corresponds to this. It offers, in contrast to being restricted to the same local district, the greater possibility of always providing for the individual official the most appropriate and suitable position for one's abilities and merit, and furthermore promotes the closer functional tie of the provinces to one another. It is therefore appropriate that these promotions come only

[16] Obviously this can also develop on another political basis; for example, where decidedly individualistic tendencies encounter extensive state patronization. Here the accent turns directly on the individualistic moment of the cultivation of unity, on the degree of freedom that it contains from official coercion and by which it directly grants individuality a formal support against it. As in the case cited in the text, socially borne feelings of freedom and feelings of bonding intersect even here; only here, in contrast, political groupings belong to the first and associational ones to the second. The same holds for the second example in the text [religious communities—ed.].

to the higher officials, while the subalterns as a rule persist for their entire lives in the same province. The greater significance of personal talent, which exists on their part in contrast to the general activity of the subaltern, is as much the cause as the effect of the sphere of one's substantive functions combining interchangeably with the characteristics and interests of multiple locations; over against the fixed locale this intersection of circles manifests the greater freedom that is the correlate of individual life. Now a phenomenon is met that seems to negate directly the differentiation exhibited in the example from France, in reality, however, presenting yet a higher stage. In the Directorate, nearly independently, Rewbell led the Judiciary, Barras the police, Carnot the military, etc. A wholly different division of responsibilities existed, however, for appointing provincial officials: for Rewbell administered the East, Barras the South, Carnot the North, etc. The differentiation of substantive functions thus remains in force while crisscrossing all the separate locales. Now naming officials actually required expert knowledge only secondarily; in the first place, personal or local knowledge. Here thus was the form of local division, with its crisscrossing of all varieties of technical knowledge that would apply. The opposite of that is seen in the entirely noteworthy lack of differentiation of the *Consejos*, ministerial councils formed under Philip II in Spain. According to an Italian report, there were the following councils: *dell' Indie, di Castiglia, d'Aragona, d'inquisizione, di camera, dell'ordini, di Guerra, di hazzienda, di giustizia, d'Italia, di stato*.[17] Since all these seem to have been coordinated, the activities of the department ministers and the regional ministers must have continually collided with one another. Here there is, so to speak, only a division by function in general which is simply without principle because it allows the local and the substantive principle to function *without separation*.

If the specialization in the healing arts in ancient Egypt had already developed one physician for the arm and another for the leg, this was also a differentiation from the perspective of site, in contrast to which modern medicine consigns similar pathological conditions to which body members are subject to the same specialist, so that the functional similarity then prevails in place of grouping by accidental external features. This gets reversed then again—albeit in a different respect—with those

[17] Italian: that of the Indies, Castille, Aragon, inquisition, parliament, warrants, war, finance (*hazzienda*, archaic Spanish), justice, Italy, state—ed.

specialists who do not treat only specific illnesses and only them, but all illnesses, but only with *one* particular method or *one* means. Thus, e.g., the natural healers who cure everything ultimately with water. Here then evidently this one-dimensionality is the same as with those Egyptian physicians, only that it has a functional rather than site-related character, thanks to modern development—thereby proving that there is even within that character yet again the distinction between externally mechanical and substantively adapted methods. That new form of apportionment, going beyond the older differentiation and grouping, is manifested further, for example, by the businesses that handle all the various materials for the production of complex objects, *e.g.*, the whole of railroad materials, all the articles for restaurateurs, dentists, shoe manufacturers, warehouses for house and kitchen equipment, etc. The integrating perspective, resulting after the combination of the objects stemming from the most varied spheres of production, is their connection to an integrating purpose that they collectively serve, the *terminus ad quem*, while the division of labor takes place as a rule according to the integration of the *terminus a quo*, of the like kind of manufacture. These businesses, which have the latter certainly as a presupposition, represent a magnified division of labor in that, from entirely heterogeneous branches that however already operate in themselves with a wide division of labor, they belong together from one point of view and, so to speak, include the divisions into a new keynote of harmony. Finally consumers' co-operatives represent yet another wholly different crisscrossing and collection of materials by a principle heterogeneous to them, especially those that are formed for specified occupational categories, for laborers, military officers, officials. In them the stocked articles are with few exceptions the same for the latter two professions; a purely formal moment of separation, fully independent of the material, allows each an existence for itself. What function this contains, however, is to be managed from this: the department store for German officials is a corporation that stands before its consumers like any merchant, that fulfills its purpose as such all the better the more that is purchased with it without the limitation to a particular clientele in and for itself being necessary for their business and one or another result. Accordingly, if it had been opened then simply as a consumers' co-operative that is immediately accessible or even only as an ordinary business that sells reliably at reasonable prices, the outcome would certainly have remained far behind what was actually achieved. Precisely this materially fully unnecessary personal restriction removes hindrances and uncertain-

ties that otherwise make business difficult and effects a strong appeal to all those included in this restriction, albeit if actually for no other reason than because it excludes everyone else. All these facts, as such, have—with perhaps the exception of the last one mentioned—evidently no social significance. They serve here only as analogies of sociological combinations and developments to show that in them universal forms and norms prevail that are operative widely over the sociological realm. The external-mechanical unity of things, their dismantling and the rational-substantive combination of elements, the manufacture of new aggregates from higher transcendent viewpoints—all these are in general typical forms of human mentality. As sociological forms are realized by an unlimited quantity of contents, so those forms themselves are arrangements of more deeply situated, more universally mental, basic functions. Everywhere form and content are only relative concepts, categories of knowledge for managing phenomena and their intellectual organization, so that in any relationship the very same thing that emerges as a form when seen from above, as it were, must be noted in another one as content when seen from below.

A coalescence into an integrated social consciousness that is especially interesting for the supra-individual distinctiveness by virtue of its height of abstraction is found in the solidarity of laborers as such. No matter what the individuals make, whether cannons or toys, the formal fact that they work for wages at all unites them with those located in the same situation; the common relationship to capital forms to some extent the identifying particularization[18] that permits the distinction between what is in common from all the various types of jobs and creates an integration for all therein engaged. The immeasurable importance that the psychological differentiation of the concept of 'worker' in general had from that of the weaver, the mechanical engineer, the miner, etc. became definitely clear by the English reaction at the beginning of the nineteenth century; through the Corresponding Societies Act it was established that every written agreement of the labor unions among themselves and furthermore all societies that had been compounded from various branches were prohibited. There was apparently an awareness that if the merger of the general form of the relationship of

[18] 'Identifying particularization'—Simmel's term is *Exponenten*; he seems to have in mind 'exponent' as used in lingusitics to refer to a unit of discourse that concretizes another more abstract unit—ed.

worker with the specialty area were once dissolved, once the co-operative integration of a range of branches were shifted by an opposed paralysis of differences to an illumination of what they all have in common—the formula and the aegis of a new social circle would be thereby created and the circle's relationship to the earlier unpredictable complications would yield. After the differentiation of labor forms its various branches, the more abstract consciousness finds again a common thread that ties together what these hold in common into a new social circle. The logical process manifests itself here in interaction with the socio-historical. It required the expansion of industry, hundreds or thousands of workers placed under exactly the same objectively personal conditions, and precisely with the advancing division of labor the different branches becoming all the more dependent on one another; it required the complete penetration of the money economy, which reduces the importance of personal ability entirely to its financial value; it required the heightening of the demands of life and their lack of fit to wages—to lend to the element of wage labor as such the decisive emphasis. In the universal concept of wage labor those social forces, relationships, circumstances collect as in a flash-point, to diffuse out from it again, as it were, in radiating effects that they would not have been able to find without this logico-formal recapitulation. And if the International had formed its sections, as mentioned, at first without regard for the trade differences, it later changed, however, and organized in trade unions—in that way, though, this was only a technical arrangement, with which they believed then to be serving the universal interest of labor; underlying even this, as starting and endpoint, was simply the concept of 'the worker.' And this, in itself a concept neutralizing all the differentiations of labor, grew from a merely logical into a legal position: the right of worker safety, worker insurance, etc. generated a legal concept of the worker and filled it with a content whereby the mere fact that someone is a worker at all secures certain legal consequences. And next to the logical, ethical, legal meanings of this traversing of all the varieties of labor, the 'general strike' thereby becomes a distinct possibility—a strike that is not undertaken for the purposes of an individual trade but for pressing the political rights of the entire work force, like the Chartist strike of 1842 or the Belgian workers' strike of 1893. It is interesting how this concept, once it arose as an absolute generality, introduces the same character and its consequences even into smaller formations. In France since 1884 a law about professional associations exists, whereby twenty and more persons who practice the *same* or related profession

can establish themselves as a professional syndicate without authorization of the government. Thereupon, soon afterwards a syndicate of 'railroad workers' was founded, for whose members that similarity of activity does not actually exist. The common element of the blacksmiths and porters, switchmen and upholsterers, conductors and engineers is exclusively that they are all workers in support of the railroad. Of course the reason for forming syndicates is that by means of them the individual profession can exert pressure on management for which an isolated power is not enough. The meaning of 'workers in general' was narrowed here, under the same formal-logical *modus procedendi*, to that of 'railroad workers in general,' in which all distinctions of activity are eliminated, and became immediately practical to the extent of the narrowing. The form under which the same thing succeeds for that wider idea tends to be the coalition of coalitions. Here, where indeed the initial union of all personnel has been dismissed and only the pure concept of cabinetmaker or shoemaker, glass blower or weaver prevails, the concept of the worker, under the removal in principle of all distinctions of the work content, comes all the more easily and sharply to greater authority. To the mason as such it is of course immaterial whether the calico printer, who belongs to the same union federation, receives a higher or lower hourly wage. The acquisition of more favorable working conditions is thus not the task of the cartel with regard to a single worker, but rather only to workers as a collective party.

Of course it is similarly the case when employers in different branches form coalitions; the employer in one industry has no interest as such in the relationship of the employer to the workers in another; the intention of a coalition is only a matter of a strengthened position of the entrepreneur in general vis-à-vis the worker in general. This universal concept of entrepreneur has to be generated as a correlate to that of the worker. Only, this logical synchronism does not immediately become a psychological and practical one. In essence this probably comes about from three causes: by the smaller number of entrepreneurs vis-à-vis that of the workers (the more instances of a type come under consideration, the sooner its universal concept is formed); by the competition of employers among themselves, which does not exist among the workers; finally by the merging of entrepreneurial activity with its respective particular content—diminished only in the most recent period by sublimated capitalism. Modern industrial technology renders the worker much more indifferent to one's specific kind of work, just as it is correspondingly the case for the entrepreneur regarding one's

factory. Nevertheless in the end the solidarity of the worker at many points allows also the solidarity of the entrepreneurs to congeal into an effective universal of concept for the latter. There emerged not only coalitions of employers of the same branch but also coalitions of completely different coalitions. In the United States already in 1892, in view of the increasing number of strikes by workers, a federation of employers as such had been formed in order to place a party-like, united resistance against them. The earlier theoretical unity of the relationship between employers and employees, in spite of all disagreements, nevertheless rested on the merging of the content of the work with those formal positions. Through these correspondingly individually determined relationships the differentiated universal concepts of the worker-in-general and the entrepreneur-in-general laid a diagonal line and acquired superiority over that unity. In their place came the correlation of two universal formal concepts, which are thus, as it were, determined essentially according to their logical opposition, and for which the individual worker and the individual employer, amid the withdrawal of the substantial link through the content of the work, had come to be merely incidental examples.

The rise of the business class as a partly real, partly ideal complex of persons—each one of which is just a business person in general, irrespective of what is sold—is related to the social origin of the working class. However, the detachment of the universal from the specific is made easier here since the form of activity in the function of the individual merchant already possesses a great deal of independence from its content. For while the activity of the worker is thoroughly dependent on it, *what* the worker does then does not easily constitute itself as a pure concept of activity relative to it; the activity of the merchant is relatively independent from that *with which* the merchant deals, and includes, even in more primitive situations, an important diversity in the same functions of purchasing, transporting, delivering, not at all predetermined by a change in objects. So we hear originally of the 'merchant' purely and simply and find frequently even today in small German cities the business sign, *Warenhandlung* (Merchandise Dealer) without anything added regarding the type of goods handled. What the functional character of the individual business person reveals, the multiplicity of business people in the developed economy repeatedly is now ready to do. The variety of material contents, based on the division of labor, surrenders all the specialties of commercial business and permits then the commonality that was not in any case definitely

closely linked with a specialty to become the logical bond of the business class, whose differences in contents are traversed then by an inclusive concept of common interests. And likewise this concept marks also the dissolution of dividing lines between business people who are situated beyond the distinctiveness of the objects of their occupation. Up to the beginning of the modern era in the centers of large business exchange, individual foreign 'nations' had specific privileges that distinguished them from one another and from the local people and joined each to a particular group. But in the 16th century in Antwerp and Lyon when freedom of trade was granted, business people streamed there, unbound by those antitheses and syntheses; together and with the heretofore unheard-of concentration of trade, there arose then, from the individuals of the former 'nations' a universal 'entrepreneurship' whose rather homogeneous rights and customs were no more altered by the variety of their enterprises than their individual and national peculiarities. Once again one is able to note that the norms for trade among business people separate all the more cleanly from the special conditions necessary for a branch; accordingly economic production splits into more branches while, e.g., in industrial cities that are essentially limited to one branch it is to be observed how the concept of the industrial still did not detach much from that of the iron, textile, and tool industries, and the customs even of the other kinds of industrial trade in general borrow their character principally from the branches shaping consciousness. The practical phenomena thoroughly follow even here the psychology of logic: were there only one single type of tree, the concept of tree in general would never have come to be formed. So too people who are in themselves strongly differentiated and variously educated and occupied are more inclined towards cosmopolitan feelings and opinions than the one-dimensional natures to whom the universally human is represented only in that limited form because they are unable to put themselves in the shoes of other personalities and thus penetrate the experience of what is common to all. For that reason, as noted, the practical consequences of a development of a higher universality do not always appear chronologically, but give rise to the stimulus, also frequently interactively, that helps call forth the consciousness of the common ground of society. Thus, e.g., one's solidarity with the class of trades workers is evoked by the apprenticeship; if the work is cheapened and deteriorated by an excessive employment of apprentices, the checking of this malady in any given trade would only force the apprentices to flood another one, then only a common

action can help—a consequence, that is of course possible only through the multiplicity of trades, but the unity of all of them over their specific differences must be brought into consciousness.

Finally I will identify alongside the types of worker and business person a third as an example for the solution of an, as it were, more abstract group, whose universally conceptual qualities were until now firmly merged with the particular conditions of their elements, while these elements now identify the intersection of the newly arisen circle with relationships that it left behind as a yet more singular one. I mean the sociological evolution that the concept of 'woman' has undergone recently and that exhibits a number of otherwise not readily observable formal complications.[19] Something highly characteristic persisted in the social situation of the individual woman; quite specifically, of course, the most universal, where she is placed with all other women under one of the broadest concepts: that she is a woman and thereby fulfills the functions of her own gender; exactly this circumstance deprived her of the real formation of solidarity, of practical solidarity with other women, precisely because it bound her within the confines of the house, commanded devotion entirely to a single person, thwarted outreach beyond the given circle of relationship by marriage, family, conviviality, and if need be, by charity and religion. The parallelism among women in their being and acting has a content so constituted that it hinders the social exploitation of similarity because it means the total preoccupation of each inside one's own circle, excluding precisely the other women similarly situated. Her universal qualification as a woman is thereby *a priori* determined to be organically established in the interests of the circle of her house, in the most extreme sociological contrast, say, to the merchant, in whose individual activity, as we saw, the universal form stands out as though by itself in contrast to the particular contents. It appears as though in very primitive ethnological relationships the disassociation of women was negligible and they acted sometimes as a party closed off from the men. Probably in these cases the woman was not yet so completely absorbed by the interests of the household as in more developed epochs; with all the tyrannizing by the man, nevertheless, the simpler and less differentiated circumstances of family and household do not take them so far from the universal, with

[19] 'Woman' here translates *Frau* which in German, of course, is 'wife' and 'woman'—ed.

all the women divided, and they do not melt down into as specialized an obligatory sphere as the more cultivated household represents it.

In that now in the present the latter has been relaxed enough around the 'woman question' to allow a general issue of women as a totality to arise and to lead to all sorts of actions, changed circumstances, formations of community—this manifests a very characteristically sociological phenomenon. The isolation of women from one another by enclosing each one of them in an entirely individualized circle of interests rests on fully differentiating women from men. With the training of the mind and activity, with the claim of personality and relationship to the surrounding world, the man appears as a whole in the ongoing processes of our culture as the *higher* being, and beyond the question of status both genders appear so essentially different that they are destined to be only opposing complements; the feminine existence has its meaning exclusively in that which the man cannot be or desire to do; life's meaning for them hinges thus not on relationship to the same but to the different, and they are all but completely taken up with this. However, most recently now women have fixed their eyes on an equality in all respects and have come to some opportune beginnings: in personal position and economic independence, in mental formation and consciousness of personality, in social freedom and the roles in public life—they place themselves now in direct *comparison to* men; a party-like difference towards men that emphasizes the solidarity of women's interests with one another is announced in the moment in which the diminishment—as a cause or as an effect of it—of that principle of being and acting differently, right and interest different from men; in caricatures of the movement—women striving in their whole essence and appearance for complete masculinity—there occurs quite often the most passionate antagonism towards men. This constellation is readily understandable. In the measure of equality of position, of value, of qualities, independence must be developed over against him with whom one until now stood in a relationship of the lower or at best the merely other and therefore relied on for one's being. This one-dimensional freedom, however, obviously allows what that being has in common with others to become more strongly visible and effective, and until now that did not occur on account of the subordinate and complementary relationship. So there exists here an extraordinarily pure case of the formation of a higher, conceptually universal circle, differentiated from the narrower circles that until now relegated every element to a singular relation. One should not get the idea that the

proletarian and the bourgeois women's movements are moving in diametrically opposed practical directions. The proletarian woman was given socio-economic freedom by industrial development—however miserable it may be for its individual women. The girl goes into the factory at an age that certainly would still require the more intimate atmosphere of the parental home; the married woman is removed by work outside the house from household duties towards husband and children. Here then the woman is actually freed from the singular bond in which she was entirely determined by the subordination under the man or by activity completely different from him. This social reality remains entirely untouched by the fact that it is undesired and injurious, and that the desire of the proletarian woman is for a limitation of that 'freedom,' for the possibility of being again to a greater degree a familial being, wife and mother. Within the bourgeois stratum the same economic development removed countless housekeeping activities from the home, both mere functions and productive creations, and thereby deprived an enormous number of women the sufficient testing of their powers—while they nevertheless, certainly for the most part, remained harnessed within the boundaries of the home. Their longing, then, is for the freedom of economic or other activity; they feel themselves subjectively detached from the particular sphere of the household, just as the proletarian woman feels that way from the outside. From this difference of strata in which the detachment is complete, there follows the difference of practical desire: the one class of women wants back in the house, the other wants out of the house. However, apart from this, this difference still gives way to equivalences: the woman question with regard marriage law, property law, authority over children, etc. affects both classes equally—so the essentials remain in force that in the one as in the other form the sociological isolation of the woman, the result of her integration into the home, is pressured by modern industrialization toward dissolution. Whether this occurs in the form of too much or in that of too little, in both cases the independence won as well as that striven for shifts the accent to the fact that the woman is simply a woman who shares practical situations and needs with other women. With the dissolution of complete, particular occupation by the household, the universal concept of woman loses its purely abstract character and becomes the leading idea of a membership group that is now already revealed *in embryo* by purely female support associations, associations for attaining rights for women, female student unions, women's congresses, agitation by women for political and social inter-

ests. Corresponding to the extraordinary closeness of the historically existing ties of the concept, woman, to the specific life contents of the individuals—which is much greater than correspondingly in the case of the worker and the business person—indeed no one today can say what the actual direction and limit of the movement is; but what has been achieved is that very many individual women experience themselves as standing at the intersection of groupings that tie them on the one hand to the persons and contents of their personal lives, on the other to women in general.

Should the differentiation here bring about the construction of the superordinate sphere from that of the more individual, in which it formerly lay only latent, then it now has, secondly, even more coordinated circles to free from one another. The guild, e.g., exercised oversight over the whole personality in the sense that the interest of the craft had to regulate the entirety of one's activity. One who became an apprentice under a master became at the same time a member of the master's family etc.; in brief, the specialized occupation became most firmly the center of all of life, often including the political and affective life. Of the forces that led to the dissolution of these amalgamations, that lying in the division of labor is here under consideration. In every human being whose various life contents are guided by a circle of interest, the power of this latter will *ceteris paribus* be reduced to the same degree as it is reduced in itself in scope. Narrowness of consciousness causes a complex occupation, a multiplicity of concepts accompanying it, even the other unrelated ideas about the world, to be drawn into its insular spell.[20] Substantive relationships between the narrowness of consciousness and these elements need not exist at all; through the necessity, in an occupation not narrowed by the division of labor, to exchange ideas relatively quickly—with the symbolic manner of speaking to which one is bound in more complicated problems in thinking—such a measure of psychic energy is consumed that the cultivation of other interests suffers from it, and now those thus weakened come all the more likely into associative or other dependence on that central cognitive circle. Just as a person filled with a great passion places even the most remote content, every encounter with superfluous material that runs through one's consciousness, into some kind of

[20] 'Insular spell': Simmel uses the term *Bann*, which means both 'excommunication' and 'spell'—ed.

connection to that passion, just as one's whole mental life receives its light and its shadows from it—so a corresponding mental centralization is effected by every vocation that leaves only a relatively small amount of consciousness for life's other relationships. Herein lies one of the most important internal consequences of the division of labor; it is grounded in the psychological fact, already mentioned, that in a given time, all other things being equal, the more conceptual power is employed, the more frequently the consciousness of one concept must be exchanged for another. This exchange of ideas has the same result as the intensity of a passion does in its case. Therefore, an activity not subject to the division of labor, again all things being equal, becomes a central one sooner than does a specialized one; everything else is drawn into an absorbing place in the course of a person's life, and certainly especially in periods during which the rest of life's relationships still lack the variety and change-filled stimulations of the modern era. Furthermore, one-dimensional occupations tend to be of a more mechanical nature and therefore—wherever they by chance do not render mental energy entirely atrophied by the complete absorption of strength and time—allow more space in consciousness for other connections, with their value and their independence. This coordinating segregation of interests that were formerly merged into a central one is promoted also by yet another consequence of the division of labor that coheres with the above discussed detachment of the higher social concept from the more particularly determined circles. Associations between central and peripheral concepts and circles of interest, which were constructed merely from psychological and historical causes, are for the most part held substantively necessary for as long a time until experience shows us personalities that exhibit the very same center along with a different periphery or an equivalent periphery along with a different center. If then membership in a vocation would render the rest of life's interests dependent on it, this dependence would have to loosen with the increase of occupational branches because, in spite of their differentiation, many kinds of similarities come to light in all the rest of the interests.

This form of development becomes most important for the inner and outer circumstances of people. A certain element in us is bound to another one that represents a universal character in a particular pattern shared with many others; and the bond takes up this second one originally in the unbroken coherence of its universality as well as its particular type. Now a process of dissolution occurs in this way:

the first element binds somewhere with a third that offers for sure the universal of the second but in an entirely other particularity. This experience can have two rather opposed consequences, depending on how both parts of the second element are blended. Should this be the case in a very close type, the bond of the elements from which we began is altogether severed. This will frequently occur, e.g., with the connection of the moral life to the religious. For the individual person, one's religion as a rule is *the* religion; any other is not at all considered. If that person has grounded morality on the particular concepts of this religion and then has the convincing experience that another morality, just as good, just as correct and valuable, is derived for other individuals fully from other religious ideas, then probably only in very rare instances will one conclude: morality is then in general linked to the religious sentiment only by that which is common to all religions. Rather one is more likely to draw the sweeping conclusion: morality actually has nothing to do with religion; one will then acquire from that the autonomy of morality, and not the likewise at least logically justified idea of connecting it to the sustaining *universality* of religion. It is different, e.g., where people acquire the feeling of having fulfilled one's duty only from an altruism that is ongoingly bound up for them with a painful conquest of the 'I,' with an ascetic self-mortification. Should one then notice in other people that the same calm and satisfaction of conscience has its source in an easily and freely exercised altruism, in a life obviously serene for others, it is then not so easily concluded that the sought-for inner peace and the feeling, to be something valuable, would have had nothing at all to do with the dedication to the non-ego, but only that the particularly ascetic development of altruism is not required for it, that this, even in an entirely different form and color, has the same result, even though its universality is still preserved. The aforementioned issue of the detachment of occupational interest from the rest of life's interests by means of the multiplicity of occupations, though only an inclination in the earlier phenomenon, becomes a certain intermediate phenomenon as a primary consequence. That a person has an occupation at all will always be connected to the totality of one's life; this entirely formal universal will always function as a center toward which many other points of life's periphery are oriented. However, this remains itself a formal, functional accomplishment of the occupation and is compatible with the increasing loosening of all occupational contents from the truly personal in life.

The growing differentiation of occupations had to show the individual

how the very same orientation of different life contents can be linked with different occupations and thus must be independent from one's occupation to an increasingly greater extent. And the differentiation of those other life contents similarly advancing with the cultural movement lead to the same result. The diversity of occupation along with a homogeneity of the rest of the interests and the diversity of these along with a homogeneity of occupation had to lead, in the same way, to their psychological and actual detachment from one another. Should we look at the progress of the differentiation and concentration, from schematic points of view external to those of greater intimacy, there is manifest then a definite analogy in the theoretical realm: it was earlier believed that one could, by the collection of larger groups of life forms according to the characteristics of an external affinity, resolve the most important tasks of understanding them; but one obtained a yet deeper and more correct insight only by discovering morphological and physiological similarities in apparently very different things that one had brought under correspondingly different conceptual types, and thus one came to laws of organic life that were realized at widely separated points in the array of organic beings, and the knowledge of them brought about unification of what one earlier had distributed according to external criteria in conceptual types of completely independent origin. Here the collecting of materially homogeneous from heterogeneous circles marks the higher level of development.

A circle expanding around a new rational center in place of a more mechanical-superficial one does not always need to assemble its material from various constructs; *i.e.*, it need not always mean the creation of new groups. Rather, it happens that the exact same circle is transformed from one to another form, that by way of the already existing synthesis a higher, more organic concept displaces the cruder and more random from its root-like, collating function. To an extent the twelfth century development followed in Rouen and other northern French cities in the so-called *iurati communiae* follows this schema.[21] These formed a community obligated by a mutual oath that generally coincided with the citizenry probably in essence but not completely and not in principle. Then we hear in the constitutions of the community about inhabitants who violate the *iurati*, as well as those who pretend falsely to belong to them. Now, however, even further: whoever lived a year and a day in the

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[21] *Iurati communiae*—Latin, 'oaths of community'—ed.

city, as the law specified, is supposed to swear allegiance to a *communia*, and whoever wants to get out of it is supposed to leave the area of the city. This commune grew in strength everywhere to such an extent that in the end it drew into itself the entire population, not always entirely voluntarily. Here then was at first a purely local relatively accidental association of city dwellers as such. This will, however, gradually grow from an intentional, founded-on-principle, purpose-driven association until the entire complex, without being essentially modified in its material and in the fact of its solidarity, is the bearer of this new higher type of union. The rational form, intersected by an integrating idea from an organized circle, is not the more primitive, if you will, more natural, but only the, so to speak, more solemn, more spiritual form, in which the latter comes together as though it were new. In matters of the broadest scope, this evolution in form is repeated in the relational bond between colonies and their mother country. European colonization, since Columbus and Vasco de Gama, allowed areas that lay quite far from the mother country and drew as good as no advantage from belonging to it still to be obliged on that basis to pay tribute and be considered a mere property. This objectively unjustified mode of linkage led to the secession of most colonies. At first when the thought arose, which Greater Britain represented, that the colony is simply a province of the mother country having equal rights with every province within the same realm, the basis for secession was absent. Since the manner of linkage has now been changed from a crudely external welding to one conforming to a higher sense of belonging, whose unity is no longer a rigid one but rather elastic, self-administration of the colony is relative independence of the member of an organic body. Instead of the simultaneity of the schematic and the rational synthesis, to which in the earlier examples the style of the new was driven by the old, here the same differentiation in form exists in a sequence.

If the triumph of the rationally objective principle over the superficially schematic thus goes hand in hand with universal cultural progress, this connection nevertheless, because it is not an *a priori*, can be broken under certain circumstances. The solidarity of the family appears, certainly in contrast to the bond according to objective viewpoints, as a mechanically external principle, yet on the other hand as one objectively grounded, if one views it in contrast to one of a purely numerical arrangement, as is seen in the grouping in tens and hundreds in ancient Peru, in China, and in a large part of ancient Europe. While the socio-political homogeneity of the family and its responsibility as

a whole for each member makes good sense and appears all the more rational the more one learns how the operation of heredity operates, the forging together of a continuously standardized number of persons to a group treated as a unity—with regard to structure, military duty, taxation, criminal responsibility, etc.—wholly lacks a rational root, and yet it acts, where we can follow it, as an ersatz of the kin principle and is of use to a higher stage of culture. The justification for it also lies not in the *terminus a quo*—with regard to this the family principle as a ground for differentiation and integration surpasses all others—but in the *terminus ad quem*; for the higher purpose of the state this is, precisely on account of its schematic character, an easily understood and easily organized division obviously more suitable than the older one. The military orders of ancient times were for the most part built on the principle of the clan- or family-like division. The Greeks of the heroic period fought according to phylae and phratries, the Germans according to tribes and lineages, the ancient Scots according to clans, each of which was recognizable in larger common undertakings by special insignia. This organic structure certainly had considerable purposefulness: a large capacity for holding the individual section together, a spur to ambition, a certain relieving of the high command for the concern with individuals and for the constituting of each cadre. However, these advantages were paid for by the frequent flare up of old prejudices and conflicts of the clans against one another and the hindering of the unity of the entire movement, the individual sections lacking altogether the organic bond and solidarity among themselves to the same degree to which each possessed these characteristics in itself. The *totality* was then certainly formed inorganically from its elements in spite of or because these elements were whole in themselves. And the mechanical construction of later armies without any kind of concern for the inner relationship among the elements of the division, seen from the standpoint of the whole, is internally much more organic when one understands under this concept the purposeful integrating regulation of every tiny part by a unifying idea, the reciprocal determination between each element and every other. This new ordering grasps the individual directly, and in that its divisions and groupings cut across all the others ruthlessly, it destroys organic bonds in favor of a mechanism, promoting though in an incomparably higher way the purpose from which that form, originally more organic in meaning, draws its value. Here discourse is generally about the concept of *technique*, certainly essential for more advanced times. Over against the more directionless,

more instinctively integrating constitution of life of primitive epochs, latter times succeed at achieving more cultural objectives with more mechanical means. So in the principles of a parliamentary election, in the way the precincts established for it cut through the pre-existing groups, this development stands out. Representation by categories—as, e.g., the Estates-General under Philip the Fair were representatives of clergy, nobility, and cities—appear at first as the natural and organic over against the purely external division of electoral bodies—as the Netherlands' Estates-General under Philipp II were local representatives of the individual provinces. The spatial enclosure includes such manifold often irreconcilable interests that a concerted expression of will by a single representative as well as that representative's vote is disqualified; the representation of interests, however, a principle more rational than that mechanical-external one, seems precisely to succeed at this. In reality the case is quite plain with regard to the army division. The individual groups—the complex of interests with its representatives—are in the final case more organically construed, but they stand more inorganically next to one another. The territorial mode of election is certainly more mechanical, but the exclusively territorial election does not also need to mean a representation of the exclusively territorial interest; rather it is precisely the technique for the organic composition of the *whole*, in that the single Member of Parliament in principle represents the whole country. The emerging partisan division according to *political* tendencies, following its concept, then pertains only to the variety of convictions with regard to the *means* which are solely important for achieving the well-being of the whole. The representation then of estates or of interests, as the case may be, with the logical strength of a higher concept, cuts across the superficiality of regional boundaries and in the process by this partial rationalism cheats the local-mechanical division as the technique for the much higher organic synthesis of the whole.

This is a principal developmental, by all means also sociological, schema of the culture: that meaningful, deeply significant institutions and patterns of action are replaced by those that appear in and of themselves completely mechanical, external, soulless; only the higher purpose, lying beyond that earlier stage, gives its combined efforts or its subsequent result a cultural significance, which each individual element must itself do without; this character is carried by the modern soldier in contrast to the knight of the Middle Ages, machine work in contrast to handicrafts, the modern uniformity and leveling of so many

circumstances of life that were earlier left up to the free self-education of the individual; now the enterprise is on the one hand too large and too complex to express a, so to speak, complete concept in any one of its elements; each of these can instead have only a mechanical and, for its own part, meaningless character and contribute its part to the realization of a concept only as a member of a totality. On the other hand there is often operative a differentiation that releases the mental element of activity, so that the mechanical and the mental obtain a separate existence, as, e.g., the worker at the embroidery machine exercises a much more mindless activity than the embroiderer has objectified in it while the spirit of this activity, so to speak, was transferred to the machine. Thus social institutions, hierarchies, assemblages can become more mechanical and superficial and yet serve the advance of culture, the inner unity of a totality, when a higher social purpose arises, to which they have to subordinate themselves and which no longer allows them to preserve for themselves the spirit and meaning with which an earlier situation completed the teleological set; and thus that exchange of the tribal principle for the principle of social division by tens is explained, although this actually appears as an integration of the objectively heterogeneous in contrast to the natural homogeneity of the family.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE POOR PERSON

Insofar as the human individual is social in nature, to each person's duty there corresponds another's right. Perhaps even more profound is the view that there are only rights in the first instance, that every individual has claims—those of human beings in general and those arising from their special situations—which as such become duties for the other. But since everyone who is thus entitled is also somehow obligated, a network of rights and duties back and forth arises in which it is the right that is the primary, leading factor; duty is admittedly only its unavoidable correlate situated in the same activity. One can look at society in general as a reciprocity of moral, legal, and conventional relationships, and as a reality justified under many other categories; that this implies a duty for others is only, so to speak, a logical or technical consequence, and if the unthinkable were to happen, that satisfying every claim in a way other than in the form of fulfilling the obligation were to be sufficient, society would not require the category of duty. With a radicalism that admittedly does not correspond to psychological reality, in the sense that an ethical-ideal construction would be feasible, all of love and sympathy, magnanimity and religious impulse could be regarded as the *rights* of the one receiving them. Ethical rigorism has already made the assertion about those motivations, that at the most what a person could accomplish at all would be the fulfillment of a duty, and that this already demand of itself what appears from a lax or self-flattering attitude as meritorious beyond duty; and from here it is only a step behind every duty on the part of one who is obligated, to establish the right of the entitled person. Indeed, this actually appears as the ultimately attainable and rational basis upon which one's actions toward another are demanded.

Now here appears a basic contrast between the sociological and ethical categories. While all relational acts are derived from a *right*—in the broadest sense that includes legal right as a component—the relationship of one person to another has penetrated the moral values of the individual completely and by itself determines their direction. But opposed to the unquestionable idealism of this standpoint stands the

no less profound refusal of any inter-individual origin of duty: our duties would be duties toward ourselves, and there would be no others at all. They may have action directed toward the other as *content*, but their form and motivation could not come to us as a duty from that, but would arise as pure autonomy from the 'I' and from its sheer interior, completely independent of anything outside itself. Only for right would the other be *the terminus a quo* of the motivation in our ethical behavior; in contrast, for morality as such the other is unconditionally the *terminus ad quem*. Ultimately, we are responsible for the morality of our actions only to ourselves, to the better 'I' in us, to the respect we have for ourselves, or as one may put the enigmatic point, what the soul finds within itself as its ultimate authority and from which it freely decides in what way the rights of the other are duties for it.

This principal dualism in the basic feeling for the sense of moral action has an example or empirical symbol in the different conceptions about providing assistance to the poor. The duty to provide it can appear as a mere correlate of the claims of the poor person. Especially in countries where begging is a regular business, the beggar believes, more or less naively, in a right to the alms, the refusal of which the beggar reprimands as the evasion of an obligatory tribute. The basis for the claim for support from the membership group has a completely different character—within the same type. A social perspective, according to which the individual is but the product of the social *milieu*, accords the beggar the right to demand a compensation for every emergency and loss. But even where no such extreme absence of self-responsibility exists, one could place emphasis, from a social perspective, on the right of the needy as the basis of all poor relief. Only when one assumes such a right, at least as a socio-legal fiction, the conduct of poor relief appears to be removed from what is arbitrary, from the dependence on chance financial conditions and other insecurities; the reliability of a function is increased everywhere if right constructs its methodological starting point in the correlation-pair of right and duty underlying it: for a person is on average more quickly prepared to claim a right than to fulfill a duty. Add to that the humanitarian motive, which makes the application and acceptance of support inwardly easy for the poor, since they are simply realizing their proper right; the dejection, the shame, and the degradation from charity are neutralized for the recipient to the extent that it is not granted out of mercy, a sense of duty, or expediency, but to the extent that it can be *demanded*. Since this right obviously has limits that are to be separately determined in every individual instance,

the right to support will not change these motivations toward others in a substantially quantitative sense. Their inner meaning is only established by it and rises out of a principal opinion about the relationship of the individual to other individuals and to the whole. The right to support belongs in the same category as the right to work and the right to one's existence. The obscurity of the quantitative limit that is suitable for this and other 'human rights' admittedly reaches its maximum especially with those where the support is with money, whose purely quantitative and relative character makes the objective demarcation of the claims much more difficult than, perhaps, the support in kind—as soon as it does not concern very complicated or individualized cases in which the poor person will use monetary help for greater purpose and productivity than one could achieve with support in kind with its providential character. Toward whom the right of the poor is in fact aimed is also in no way clear, and the decision about that marks deep sociological differences. The poor person, whose situation seems to be an injustice of the world order and who demands a remedy from, so to speak, the whole of existence, will easily make every individual who is found better situated by chance answerable to this demand out of solidarity. This creates a range: from criminal proletarians who see enemies in all well-dressed people, representatives of the class that 'disinherited' them, and who therefore rob them with a good conscience, to the humble beggars who implore for offerings "for the sake of God," *i.e.* as though each individual were obligated to fill the gaps in an order actually willed but not completely realized by God. Here the demand of the poor is aimed at the individual, but not at a particular one but only by virtue of the solidarity of humanity in general. Beyond this correlation, which allows precisely the whole of being, in view of the demand directed against it, to crystallize around any given individual as a representative, there are the richly shaded particular collectivities to whom the demand of the poor person turns. State, municipal community, parish, professional organization, friendship circles, and families may have as wholes exceedingly different relationships with their membership; still each of these relationships seems to contain an element that is actualized as a right for support in case an individual becomes pauperized. This is also common among such sociological relationships where they are perhaps otherwise very heterogeneous in nature. The claims of the poor springing from such bonds combine in unique ways in primitive settings, in which tribal customs and religious duties dominate the individual as an undifferentiated unity. Among the

ancient Semites the claim of the poor for participation in meals did not have a correlate in personal generosity but in social membership and religious custom. Where care of the poor has a sufficient basis in an organic linkage among the members, the *right* of the poor generally possesses a stronger emphasis—whether it derives religiously from metaphysical unity or from biologically based tribal or familial unity. We will see that where, on the contrary, the care for the poor depends teleologically on one reaching a goal through it instead of causally on an existing and real unity of the association of a group, the claim of the poor as a right is reduced to complete nothingness.

In fact while right and duty only appear in the cases referred to as two sides of an absolute relational unity, wholly new changes come about as soon as the duty of the giver, instead of the right of the recipient, forms the point of departure. In the extreme case, the poor person vanishes completely as a deserving subject and point of interest; the motive for giving lies exclusively in the importance of the giving for the giver. As Jesus said to the rich young man: give your possession to the poor—obviously his concern was not at all for the poor but rather for the soul of the young man, for whose salvation the renunciation was a mere means or symbol of salvation. The later Christian alms-giving is of the same nature: it is nothing but a form of asceticism or 'good work' that improves the otherworldly fate of the giver. The excesses of begging in the Middle Ages, the meaninglessness in the use of offerings, the demoralization of the proletariat by indiscriminate offerings, the contributions that worked against all cultural activity—this is the revenge, as it were, of almsgiving for a motive that is purely subjectivistic and one that takes into consideration only the giver of the offering, but not the recipient. From such a restriction on the person that gives, the motivation goes away—without being devoted to the recipient—as soon as the welfare of the social whole necessitates the care of the poor. That happens, willingly or required by law, in order to not allow the poor person to become an active, dangerous enemy of society, in order to make the diminished power of the poor person once again productive for it, and in order to prevent the degeneration of the poor person's descendents. Therefore the poor person as a person, the reflection of the situation of the poor in the person's feelings, is just as indifferent as it is for those who give alms for the sake of the salvation of their own soul; the subjective egoism of the latter is indeed overcome, but not for the sake of the poor but for that of society: the poor person receiving the offering is not the goal but a mere means, as in the former

case. The dominance of the social point of view of alms is proven by the fact that, from that perspective, it can just as well be refused—and indeed often personal pity or the unpleasant situation of saying "No" would directly move us to give.

Thus the care for the poor as a public arrangement now points to a very unique sociological constellation. It is thoroughly personal in content; it does not do anything other than relieve individual difficulties. It thereby differs from all other arrangements of public welfare and protection. For these would benefit *all* citizens—the military and police, school and roads, court and church, parliament and research. In principle these are not directed toward people as distinct individuals but rather to their totality itself; the union of many or all is the object of these institutions. The care of the poor, in contrast, in its concrete effects is entirely concerned with individuals and their condition. And precisely this individual becomes the destination of the modern abstract form of welfare, but not completely its *ultimate purpose*, which rather lies in the protection and support of the community. Indeed, one cannot designate the poor as a *means* to this—which would still improve the person's position—since the social action does not serve them but only a certain objective means of a material and administrative kind in order to eliminate the dangers threatened by them and to do away with the detractions from the achievable public interest. For sure this formal constellation apparently holds simply not only for the general whole but also for smaller circles: there is even unlimited help within the family not only for the sake of the person who is supported but thereby it would be no disgrace for the family and the family would not lose its reputation through the mere fact of a member's poverty. The support granted by the English labor unions to their members during unemployment was meant not so much to bring about an alleviation of individual want as to prevent the unemployed from working too cheaply out of need and thus depress the wage rate of the whole work force. From this meaning of welfare it becomes clear that, while it takes from the prosperous and gives to the poor, it still in no way approaches an equalization of these individual positions and that its idea will not at all overcome the *tendency* for the differentiation of society into rich and poor. Rather, the structure of society, as it simply exists, relies basically on the sharpest difference from any socialist and communist efforts that would have overcome this very structure. Its intent is precisely to mitigate some of the extreme manifestations of social division enough so that every structure can rely on it further. If it depended on the interest

in the individual poor person, there would in principle be no suitable limit where the provision of goods would have to stop, before it would achieve equality. But since it occurs instead of that, in the interest of the whole society—of political, familial, and any other socially defined circles—it has no basis for being sufficient in kind or quantity for the individual, since the preservation of the concerned totality in its status quo requires it.

Where this purely social, centralist teleology exists, the care of the poor offers perhaps the widest sociological tension between the immediate and remote end of an action. Emotionally, the alleviation of the subjective need is so categorical an end in itself that to dethrone it from its position of last resort and to make it a mere technique for the supra-subjective ends of a social unity, is a most extreme triumph of the social, a distancing of society from the individual that, with all its external inconspicuousness, is more fundamental and radical in its coolness and abstract character than the sacrifices of the individual for the whole, whereby means and end tend to be bound together in *one* emotional line.

The unique complication of duty and right that is found in modern government welfare is explained in this basic sociological conceptualization. In more than one instance, the principle confronts us that the duty to support the poor would exist on the part of the state, but no right on the part of the poor to be supported would correspond to it. As is expressly emphasized in England, for example, they have no cause for complaint or claim for damages for unlawfully denied support. In some ways the entire relationship of duties and rights transcends them. The right that corresponds to every duty of the state is not theirs but that of every individual citizen for the taxes levied for the poor to be raised to such a high level and be used in such a way that the public purposes of caring for the poor are actually served as well. Thus the poor would not have a legal cause for action if the care for the poor were neglected, but only the other members indirectly injured by this neglect. Thus if one could prove, for example, that a thief would have refrained from a robbery if the legally proper and requested poor relief had been granted him, in principle the person robbed could prosecute the welfare agency for damages. Support for the poor occupies the same place in legal teleology as the protection of animals. No one among us is punished for simply tormenting an animal, but only for having done it "publicly or in a way that causes scandal." Thus not the abused animal but the consideration for the witnesses of the abuse motivates the

punishment. This exclusion of the poor, which grants them no ultimate position in the teleological chain—indeed as we saw, not even really the status of being a means—is also revealed in the fact that in the modern relatively democratic states almost only *here* the persons having an essential interest in the administration are absolutely uninvolved in the administration of it. For a conception thusly noted, the care for the poor is just an expenditure of public resources for public purposes; and since its entire teleology thus lies outside of the poor themselves—which correspondingly is not the case with the interests of other administrative matters—it is only logical for the principle of self-administration otherwise acknowledged to some degree not to apply to the poor and the care of them. If the state is somehow obliged by a law to divert a torrent of water and thus manage to irrigate a certain district, the brook is somewhat in the situation of the support of the poor by the state: they are admittedly the objects of duty, but not the bearers of a right corresponding to it, which is what the lands adjacent to the brook are. But if the exclusively centralizing interest prevails at first, so can the right-duty relationship also be shifted in view of utilitarian considerations. The draft of the Prussian poor law of 1842 emphasized that the state must undertake the care of the poor in the interest of the public's common good. To that end it would order under public law that their agencies be bound to the support of needy individuals; it would not be about the latter themselves, who would possess no legal claim. This is indicated more pointedly where the state law imposes a duty on the better situated relatives to feed the poor. Here at first glance the poor person actually seems to have a *claim* on the prosperous relative, a claim that the state endeavors to secure and enforce. The inner sense is different, however. The political community provides for the poor for practical reasons, and in turn it creates on its part the backing for support on the relatives since the costs would otherwise be prohibitive to it or at least believed to be so. The immediate claim of one person on another that is in play, to an extent, between the poor and the rich brother and which is only a moral one, does not apply to the law at all; the law has exclusively the interests of the whole to look after and perceives it from both sides: the poor who are supported and the cost it exacts from their relatives. Such proceedings as the following show that this is the sociological structure of the sustenance law and that they would in no way give the force of law to what is only a moral duty: Certainly the moral responsibility for support among siblings is a most highly stringent one. However, as it was meant to be legally

established in the first draft of the civil code, the motives recognized the extraordinary hardness of it without further comment, and the introduction thereby gave the justification that the public burden of the poor would otherwise be increased too much. The very same thing is proven by the fact that the legal obligation to support sometimes extends to deciding the amount that would be required from the individual-moral standpoint. The high court has decided against an old man in needy circumstances, ruling that he had to provide his only property, a few hundred marks, for the support of an unemployable son, even though he explained credibly that he would soon himself be unemployable and that the money was his only reserve. It is extremely doubtful whether one can still speak in this case of a moral right of the son; but the general society does not question this either but only about whether under *general* current norms it can be held harmless for *its* duty toward the poor person. Moreover, this inner meaning of the obligation to provide sustenance is rightly symbolized by the practical course: at first the poor person is supported adequately upon making a plea and then only is inquiry made into a son or father who eventually, according to his financial status, will be sentenced to reimburse not the whole cost of the care, but perhaps a half or a third. The exclusively social meaning of the regulation is also discernible in that, according to the code of civil law, the obligation to support only has to enter in when it would not 'endanger' the 'living standard' of the person obligated. Whether support short of such endangerment would even be morally required in certain cases is at least doubtful. But the public cannot do without it in every instance since the descent of an individual in social standing does harm to the stability of society as a whole, which still seems to outweigh in social importance the material advantage to the individual gained by the extortion. Thus the duty to support does not contain a right of the poor to make a claim on their prosperous relatives; it is nothing other than the support duty obliging the state, which it passed on to the relatives and which required no corresponding claim at all on the part of the poor.

Now the above mentioned metaphor of the flowing stream was inexact to the extent that the poor individual is not only a poor person but also a citizen. *To the extent* that the poor, admittedly, have their share in the entitlement that the law accords all citizens as a correlate of the duty of the state to support the poor, to maintain the parallel with the brook and the adjacent lands, they are both the brook and lands adjacent to it in the sense in which the richest citizen is too. Even though the state

services, formally standing at the same admittedly ideal distance over all citizens, gain a much different substantive importance for individual situations themselves, and if the poor person is therefore not involved in the welfare system as a goal-setting subject but only as a member of the encompassing teleological state organization, still the poor person's role, so to speak, in this state function is a different one from that of the prosperous person. Hence we have the sociological insight that the entire materially caused uniqueness in the situation of the supported poor that on the one hand makes an individual's well-being the end goal of assistance, and on the other places one in opposition to the general intention of the state as an object without rights and a material to be molded—that this does not quite prevent someone's belonging as a member of the body politic. Despite those two definitions by which welfare seems to place one outside the body politic, or more correctly, makes someone organically a part of the whole, the poor person belongs to the historical reality of the society that lives in him and above him, ever as much a form-sociological member as the official, the taxpayer, the teacher, or the mediator of some transaction. The poor person, who admittedly stands materially, so to speak, outside the group in which he or she dwells, behaves somewhat as a stranger to the group; but a whole structure simply exists that encompasses both the stranger and the indigenous parts of the group whose particular interactions with the stranger create a group in a wider sense and characterize the actual historically existing circle. Thus the poor person is admittedly put in a sense outside the group, but this being outside is only a particular kind of interaction with it that weaves one into a union with the whole in this widest sense.

The sociological antinomy of the poor, in which the social-ethical difficulties of caring for the poor are mirrored, is resolved by this conceptualization. The solipsistic tendency of the medieval type of alms, which I mentioned, went past the poor internally, so to speak, for whom the action pertains externally; it was the complete neglect of the principle: never treat the other person as a mere means but always as an end at the same time. If in principle now the recipient is also a donor, a causal ray returns from him the donor, and this just turns the gift into a reciprocal action, into a social occurrence. But as in any case, if the recipients are completely excluded from the intended process of giving, and they play no other role than that of a box into which a donation for a mass for the dead is placed, so is the interaction cut off, and the action of giving is not a social event but a purely individual

one. Now, however, it seems the modern handling of welfare does not treat the poor person as an end; but it still remains to be said that the poor person, standing in this teleological line that reaches beyond, still belongs organically to the whole and on that given basis is an element woven into its purposive process. Admittedly, *a person*'s response to the donation that was given concerns each individual here as little as in the medieval form; but it thereby makes someone's economic activity possible again; it preserves someone's physical strength from decay, and someone's impulses are diverted from violent enrichment; the *totality* of their social circle on its part actually experiences a reaction to what it had done about the poor person. A purely individual relationship will only have ethical sufficiency and sociological perfection if every person is really the reciprocal goal of every other person—of course not only a goal; however, this does not apply to the actions of a supra-personal collective entity. Such an action with its teleology may quietly reach way over the individual and without being, so to speak, stopped by the individual, come back on itself: while every individual belongs to this totality, each thereby also, from the outset, stands at the endpoint of action; one is not, as in the other case, left outside, but in the same *immediate* denial of one's nature as being one's own end, one has, as a member of the whole, a part in its quality of being an intrinsic end.

Long before the clarification of this centralist viewpoint about the nature of welfare, its organic role in community life was indicated by substantial symbols. In earliest England the care for the poor began with the monasteries and church societies, and in fact, as will be explicitly emphasized, this came about because only property under mortmain possessed the reliable duration which is necessary for the care for the poor. The many secular donations from booty and penances did not serve the purpose since they did not yet find any foothold in the state administrative apparatus and were consumed without any continuing effect. The care for the poor was thus linked tightly to the only really substantially fixed point in the social warp and woof, and this linkage is shown in a negative way in the indignation about the clergy sent to England by Rome: because they would neglect the care for the poor. The foreign cleric simply did not feel internally linked to the community life, and his not providing for the poor appears as the surest sign of this lack of solidarity. The exact same linkage of the care for the poor with the most fixed substrate of social existence will become clear in the later link of the English poor taxes with land ownership: this was both the cause and the effect of the poor being considered

one organic component belonging to the land as such. The very same is asserted legally in 1861 as a part of the responsibility for the poor was transferred from the parish to the society for the poor. The costs of the care would no longer be borne by the parish alone but by a fund to which the parishes made contributions proportionate to the value of their lands. The proposal that the distribution would still take into account the population size was rejected expressly and often. With that the individualistic factor was rejected completely; the sum of persons no longer appears as the bearer of the care for the poor but rather the supra-personal entity that finds its substrate in the objectivity of earth and land. And the care of the poor stands so much in the center of the social group that in local administration to this focal point was gradually appended first the school and highway administration, health and registration services. Also besides, the welfare agency immediately turned into a vehicle—since it worked well—of governmental unity. The North German Federation decided that no one in need of help in the whole federal territory should remain without help and that no North German poor in one part of the federal territory should receive different treatment than in another part. If external technical reasons led to the linkage of the care of the poor to land ownership in England, this does not therefore alter its deeper sociological meaning when, on the other hand, the joining of the other administrative branches to it, as was mentioned, points directly to great technical disadvantages arising from the crossing of counties by the welfare organizations. The contrast of their technical implications allows the unity of their sociological implications for this matter to become really evident.

It is therefore a completely one-sided view when the care of the poor was described as "an organization of the propertied classes for the satisfaction of the feelings of moral obligation associated with ownership." Rather it is a part of the organization of the *whole* to which both the poor and the propertied classes belong. Just as the technical and material conditions of the social position of the poor make them out to be a mere object or transition point of a collective life looming over them, this is ultimately the role of every individual, concrete member of society. From the standpoint assumed for the moment, according to which what Spinoza said of God and the individual entity holds here: we can, of course, love God, but it would be contradictory for him, the unity including us, to love us back. Rather, what we devote to him would be a part of the unending love with which God loves himself. The particular exclusion that the poor experience on the part of the

community supporting them is the indicator for the role that they play *within* society, especially as a member; while one is technically a mere object of society, one is in a further sociological sense a subject who on the one hand forms, like all others, its reality, and on the other hand, as all others, stands beyond its supra-personal abstract unity.

Thus the general structure of the group also determines the answer to the question: Where does the poor person belong? If still engaging in any economic activity, a person belongs in as much a piece of the general economy that one deals with directly; in as much as someone is a member of a church, one belongs in it with no limitation differing from that of the coinciding district; in as much as one is a family member, one belongs in the personally and spatially established group of relatives; but where does someone belong insofar as one is poor? A society that is held together or organized by ethnic consciousness assigns the poor to their ethnic group; in a different one whose ethical responsibilities are essentially arranged through the church, the church or pious associations are the places of the social response to the reality of the poor. The 'whereas' clauses in the 1871 German law on place of residence for support answer this question in this way: the poor would belong to that community—*i.e.* the community would be responsible for their support—which would have benefited from their economic power before their impoverishment. Within the latter principle lies a trace of the social structure in which, before the complete breakthrough of modern public policy theory, every local community was the place that enjoyed the economic accomplishments of those who are at present impoverished. Modern flexibility, the inter-regional exchange of all efforts, has lifted this restriction, so that only the entire body politic is considered the *terminus a quo* and *ad quem* of all activity. If state law now allows everyone to take up residence in any community whatever, the latter no longer has the correlate of its growing together with its inhabitants—namely the right to ward off the settlement of unsuitable persons; so the solidary bond with the individual can no more be expected from it in taking and giving. Only for practical reasons and only as organs of the state—as the cited 'whereas' clauses in the law emphasize—did the communities undertake the burden of the poor. This is thus the ultimate stage that the formal position of the poor achieved, revealing its dependence on the general stage of social development: it pertains to the largest practically possible social circle, not a part of the whole to the extent that it forms a unity at all, but the whole is the place or the power where the poor person, insofar as

being poor, belongs. Finally, for this circle, because it is the largest and it does not have anywhere where it could shift the responsibility outside of itself, the difficulty that the welfare workers in the small communities emphasize does not exist: the small communities thus frequently especially struggled with supporting the poor since they feared they would be saddled with them forever if they once dealt with them at all. Here, however, a most effective feature of human interaction appears, which one can call moral induction: where a good deed of any kind, even the most spontaneous, most singular, in no way an obligatory duty, is performed, an obligation to continue with the good deed comes about that really lives on not only as a claim of the receiver but also in a feeling on the part of the giver. It is a quite ordinary experience that beggars, to whom one regularly gave, right away consider it their rightful claim and the donor's duty, the breaking off of which they reprimand as the misappropriation of an obligatory contribution owed them, so that they consequently feel more bitter about it than toward hardly anyone who would have completely and always denied them the donation. Moreover, whoever maintained a needy person in higher circumstances for a long time after fixing precisely the period of support ahead of time, will nevertheless at the expiration of the period break off his offering with a painful feeling as if he were thereby encountering the violation of some obligation. With full consciousness a Talmudic law from the *Jore Deáh* ritual code proclaims: Whoever has supported a poor person three times with equal amounts tacitly takes on a duty toward that person, even if one did not have the intent of continuing: it assumes the character of a vow that can be annulled only on special grounds (e.g., one's own impoverishment). This case is much more complicated than that of a related one that forms the equivalent to *odisse quem laeseris*:[1] one loves the person to whom one has done good. Then it is understandable that one projects the satisfaction about a good deed onto the person who provided the opportunity for it; in the love for the one whom one brought an offering, one in essence is loving oneself, just as in hatred for someone whom one has treated unjustly one hates oneself. With so simple a psychology the feeling of obligation that the good deed leaves to the doer is not to be interpreted as the only form of *noblesse oblige*. I believe that here, however, an *a priori* assumption is at work: that any activity of this kind—despite its apparently absolute

[1] Latin: hating the person you have injured—ed.

voluntariness, its apparent character as an *opus supererogationis*[2]—would derive from an obligation, that under any such deed a deeply situated obligation becomes subconscious, which to a certain extent becomes apparent and tangible through the deed. It runs analogous to a theoretical induction that nevertheless assumes the equivalence of a past and a future course not simply because the former was conditioned so and so but because a *law* was derived from this that determines it just like it must determine each future one. A moral instinct for that must lie under that one, so that the first good deed already also corresponded to a duty from which the second now is demanded no less than the first. This obviously touches upon the motives that this chapter raised. If, generally, all devotion, all doing good and selflessness is even in the most extreme case no more than simple duty and obligation, this principle in the form of a particular case may be so represented that every act of charity in its deepest sense—if one will, in its metaphysical sense of morality—is the fulfillment of a duty manifested therein, which now of course is not completed by the isolated act. Rather it extends as far as the cause of the action still continues to exist. Any support shown to anyone would be the *ratio cognoscendi*[3] whereby one of the ideal lines of obligation from one person to another runs here that shows its timelessness in the continued effect of the bond that was once realized.

Besides the two forms of the right-duty relationship—the poor person has a right to support and there exists a duty to support, which is not arranged as an entitlement of the poor person directed at the society, the self-preservation of which requires from everyone of its organs and from certain circles—besides these there exists a third that typically rules the moral consciousness; a duty to support the poor exists on the part of the public and on the part of the prosperous, which finds an adequate purpose for it in the improved circumstance of the poor person; to this corresponds the claim of the latter as the other side of the purely moral relationship between the needy and the well-placed. If I am not mistaken, the emphasis within this relationship was something displaced since the eighteenth century. Most clearly in England the ideal of humanity and human rights have thrust aside the centralist point of view of the poor laws of Elizabeth—work had to be created

[2] Latin: a work performed in addition to what one is obligated to do—ed.
[3] Latin: basis for recognizing—ed.

for the poor person in the interest of the whole. Every poor person is to be entitled to a minimum existence just as much whether able and willing to work or not. In contrast, modern charity allows the correlation between moral duty (of the donor) and moral right (of the recipient) to be realized more by the former. Obviously this form is essentially realized by private charity, in contrast to public, and its sociological meaning is now the question for us.

First of all, to state the already mentioned tendency: treating the care of the poor more as a concern of the widest governmental circles after it was originally based everywhere on the community of the locality. At first the care for the poor person was the result of the communal bond that enveloped the community; before the supra-individual structure that the individuals saw around and above them was transformed from a community into the state, and before the freedom of movement completed this process, factually and psychologically, it was natural for the local community to support the needy. This is of the utmost importance for the whole sociology of the poor person: of all the non-individualistic social claims based on a purely general quality, those of the poor are materially the most impressive. Disregarding such acute excitations as those from misfortune or sexual provocation, there are none that would be so completely impersonal, so indifferent toward the other qualities of their object and at the same time making claims so effectively and immediately as those from need and misery. This has always lent a specifically *local* character to the duty toward the poor person, instead of centralizing it in so great a circle, instead of functioning through immediate perception only through the general concept of poverty—which is one of the longest roads sociological forms have had to cover between perception and abstraction. Since this change in the care for the poor person into an abstract state responsibility occurred—in England from 1834, in Germany somewhat after the middle of the century—its nature was modified in tandem with this centralizing form. Above all, the state admittedly kept the community obligated for the substantial part of the care, but now the community is only its agent. The local organizing is turned into a mere technique by which the objectively greatest capacity for action could be achieved. The community is no longer the starting point but the passageway for welfare. Thus poor associations are constituted everywhere according to the consideration of their suitability, e.g. in England so that they can maintain one workhouse each and—which is a conscious tendency—remain free of the bias of local influences. The increasing use of *salaried* welfare officials has the same

intent. Such an official stands in relation to the poor person much more as a representative of the collectivity on which the official depends for a salary than does the unpaid one, who functions so to speak more as a *person* and will be allowed to hold sooner the human, person-to-person point of view rather than the purely objective one. Finally a most highly sociologically indicative division of tasks appears. The fact that furthermore welfare is also delegated essentially to the community is thus very useful since every case must be dealt with individually, and this is possible only from nearby, and with accurate knowledge of, the *milieu*; but if the community has to approve the assistance, it must also raise the means since it would readily manage the public funds all too generously. On the other hand there are cases of need for which the danger of pre-schematizing that is avoided in this way does not exist since this and the needed acts of care are established according to wholly objective criteria: illness, blindness, deaf-muteness, insanity, chronic illness. Here welfare is a more technical matter and thus the state or the large unit is more efficient; its greater means and centralized administration, where personal matters and local circumstances are less decisive, point to its overwhelming advantages. And in addition to this qualitative determination of direct public activity, the quantitative appears, which especially distinguishes it from private charity; the state or the public in general only provides for the most urgent and immediate need. Everywhere, and most clearly in England, the care for the poor has the completely fixed principle that one could give to the poor person from the taxpayers' pockets only the absolutely necessary minimum of the cost of maintaining life.

Fundamentally this is related to the spiritual character of community action in general. The community, which encompasses the energies or interests of many individuals, can make room for their particularity only when it is a question of the whole structure of the division of labor whose members perform different functions. If, however, instead of this a uniform procedure is needed, whether directly or through a representative organ, its content can simply contain only the relative minimum of the personality sphere on a par with that of every other. At first this results in no larger expenditure being allowed in the name of a community than what is expected also of its stingiest member. A collectivity that is currently found together may come to an agreement on an upsurge of extravagant generosity; but where the will of every individual is not proven so directly but must be presup-

posed on the part of representatives, the assumption can only be that each person wants to spend as little as possible. Admittedly this is not a logically unavoidable necessity—for which the opposite would not also be a logical contradiction—but it corresponds to a psychological dogma that has acquired the practical value of logical proof through the overwhelming magnitude of its empirical confirmation. Out of its necessity the quantification has to embrace in effect the lowest level of the intellectual, economic, cultural, aesthetic, etc. scale: the character of a minimum: the right valid for all is described as the ethical minimum; the logic valid for all is the intellectual minimum; the 'right to work' claimed for all can only be extended to the person who represents a minimum for its value character; membership in a party requires in principle only that one acknowledge the minimum of the party's principles without which it could not exist. This type of social minimum is expressed most completely even in the directly negative character of quantification and level of interest.

Excursus on the Negativity of Collective Behavior

The unity of the just mentioned phenomena comes about in many aspects only through negation, and in fact such phenomena often develop the characteristic of negativity in the degree of its numerical scope. In mass actions the motives of the individuals are often so divergent that their union is all the more possible the more their content is purely negative, indeed destructive. The dissatisfaction that leads to large-scale revolutions always feeds off so many and often so directly opposed sources that their unification around a positive goal would hardly be carried out. The formation of unity, then, tends to be the responsibility of smaller circles, and the dispersed energies of individuals have worked to put in order as well as to destroy the countless private undertakings intended to unify the masses. In view of this, one of the most knowledgeable historians asserted that the crowd would always be ungrateful since, although the whole would be brought to a flourishing condition, individuals would above all feel what they lack personally. The divergence of individual decisions that leaves to the collectivity only negation (which obviously is regarded only *cum grano salis*[4] and beyond everything by which society overcomes this fate of its forces) is very evident, for example, in the late Russian revolution.[5] The unsafe spatial expansion, the personal differences in formation, the

[4] Latin: with a grain of salt—ed.
[5] Simmel appears to be referring to the 1905 failed revolution in Russia—ed.

variety of objectives that prevail in this movement actually made the idea of nihilism, the complete denial of what exists, into the applicable expression of the community for all its members.

The same trait appears in the outcome of large popular referenda, which is so often and almost incomprehensibly purely negative. Thus in Switzerland in 1900, for example, a law about confederate health and accident insurance would be flatly rejected by a referendum after it was accepted unanimously by both representatives of the people—the *Nationalrat* and the *Ständerat*; and this was just generally the fate of most statutory proposals that were subjected to referendum. Negation is just the simplest act, and thus large masses, whose members cannot agree upon a positive goal, just find themselves united in that. The standpoints of particular groups, by whom every law was rejected, were extremely different: particularistic and ultramontane, agrarian and capitalist, technical and partisan—and thus could have nothing but negation in common. Of course, conversely also, therefore, where they agree at least in negative stands, negation can suggest or prepare for the unity of many small groups. Thus it is striking that admittedly the Greeks would have shown great cultural differences among one another, but if one even compared the Arcadians and the Athenians with the contemporary Carthaginians or Egyptians, Persians, or Thracians, various negative characteristics would still have been held in common. Nowhere in historical Greece were there human sacrifices or deliberate mutilation; nowhere polygamy or the sale of children into slavery; nowhere the wholly unlimited obedience to an individual person. Amidst all the positive differences, the commonality of the purely negative still had to bring the solidarity to the consciousness of a cultural circle transcending the individual state.

The negative character of the bond that brings the large circle together into a unity appears above all in its norms. This is prepared by the phenomenon of binding arrangements of any kind having to be all the simpler and fewer the larger the compass of their applicability would be, all things being equal—beginning approximately with the rules of international etiquette that are very much fewer than would be observed in every smaller group, up to the fact that the individual states of the German Reich tend to have all the less encompassing constitutions the larger they are. Expressed in principle: with a widening scope of the circle, the commonalities that bind every one in the social unity to every one else always become less extensive. Therefore what at first could appear paradoxical: generally, it is possible to hold a large circle together with a small minimal number of norms than a small one. Now, in a qualitative sense, the patterns of behavior that a group must demand of its members in order to be able to exist as a group tend to be all the more purely prohibitive and restrictive in nature, the more extensive it is: the positive associations that give group life its unique substance member by member, must ultimately be left to the individual;[6] the variety of persons, interests, and

[6] Thus an English adage says: "The business of everybody is the business of nobody." This unique becoming-negative on the part of an action also appears as soon as it

processes becomes too great for it to be regulated from a center. The prohibiting function nevertheless remains only for the establishment of what must not be done under any circumstances, the limitation of freedom instead of steering it—by which is meant, of course, only the steering of a development continually thwarted and deflected by other tendencies. Thus it is so where a greater number of diverging circles of religious feeling or interest would be united into a unity. Allah emerged from the decline of Arab polytheism as the general conceptualization, so to speak, of God. Polytheism necessarily generates a religious splintering of faith circles since its components will turn to the different deities in unequal ways according to the difference in their inner and practical tendencies. Allah's abstract and unifying character is thus a negative one at first; it is his original nature "to keep off evil," but not to urge the doing of good; he is only the "one who restrains." The Hebrew God, who brought about or expressed a union of socio-religious combination unheard in antiquity—compared to every diverging polytheism and every unsocial monism, as in India—gives its most strongly emphasized norms of conduct in the form: Thou shalt not. In the German Empire, positive relationships in life, which are subject to civil law, first found their standard form in the civil code about thirty years after the founding of the Empire; in contrast, the criminal code with its prohibitive stipulations was already uniformly codified in the Empire from 1872. Exactly what makes prohibition especially suitable for generalizing smaller circles into a larger one is the circumstance that the counterpart of forbidden things is in no way always what is commanded but often is only what is permitted. Thus if no α could occur in the circle of A but probably β and γ, no β in the circle of B but probably α and γ, no γ in C but α *and* β *etc.—in this way the unified structure can be established in A, B, and C on the prohibition of* α, β, and γ. Unity is only possible if β and γ were not commanded in A but only permitted so that it can also be omitted. If instead β and γ would be just as positively commanded, as α is forbidden—and correspondingly in B and C—a unity would hardly appear because then what is directly proscribed on the one hand would then always be directly commanded on the other. Thus the following example: Since antiquity the enjoyment of a particular kind of animal—the exact one that was sacred for the individual's locality—was denied to every Egyptian. The doctrine that holiness requires abstention from all meat then arose as the result of the political amalgamation of a number of local cults into a national religion, on top of which a priesthood stood reigning in unison. This unification could come about only through the synthesis or universalizing of all these prohibitions. Since the enjoyment of all animals allowed in every locality (thus also able to be omitted!) would

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becomes the responsibility of the multitude in the motivation by which one explained the forbearance and indolence of the North Americans, who are otherwise so energetic, about public nuisances. One might resort to public opinion to bring everything about. Fatalism arises from that: "Making each individual feel his insignificance, disposes him to leave to the multitude the task of setting right what is every one else's business just as much as his own." (Quoted in English—ed.)

have been somewhat positively commanded, obviously there would have been hardly any possibility of collecting the particular rules about animals into one higher totality.

The more general a norm is, the larger the circle to which it applies, the less is its observance characteristic and significant for the individual, while violating it tends to be especially serious and fraught with consequences. First of all, one should be very clear on the intellectual domain. The theoretical understanding, without which there would be generally no human society, rests on a small number of widely accepted—although of course not consciously in the abstract—norms that we describe as logical. They form the minimum of what must be acknowledged by all who wish to interact with one another at all. The most fleeting coming together in agreement by individuals most foreign to one another, as well as the daily common life of those closest to one another, rests on this basis. Obedience of the imagination to these very simple norms, without which it would never be in harmony with experienced reality, is the most unrelinquishable and general condition of all social life; for amidst any difference between the inner and outer worldview, logic creates a certain common ground, the abandonment of which would have to cancel any intellectual commonality in the widest sense of the term. But now logic, understood narrowly, implies or provides no positive property at all; it is only a norm not to be violated; without that, its observance would provide some distinction, a specific good or quality. All attempts to obtain knowledge of something particular with the help of pure logic are frustrated, and its sociological importance is therefore one that is as negative as that of the criminal code: only the violation of it creates a particular and noticeable situation, but persistence in these norms creates theoretically, *i.e.* practically, nothing else for individuals than the possibility of remaining in the general group. Certainly even the intellectual connection of a thousand substantive divergences can fail with logic strictly adhered to; but with faulty logic it must fail—precisely as, admittedly, the moral and social solidarity can collapse even with a strict avoidance of all that is criminally forbidden, but with the breaking of these norms it must. It is no different with social forms in the narrower sense, insofar as they are really universal in a circle. They are suspended for nobody, but their violation is at the highest level when only what is most general in a circle will not be violated while the special norms that hold the smaller group together lend the individual a positive quality and difference to the extent that they are special. Also, on these conditions rests the practical uses of the social forms of civility that are so completely lacking in substance. Based on the positive presence of respect and devotion, of which they assure us, we may not exclude their least absence; yet the least violation of them convinces most unmistakably that those feelings do not exist. The greeting on the street does not give evidence of respect whatsoever; its omission, however, very strongly indicates the opposite. These forms completely withhold service as symbols of a positive inner disposition. But they express the negative most suitably, because quite a light omission can determine the relationship toward someone radically and definitely—and in fact, both to the degree to which the form

of civility is wholly general and conventional, it is of the very essence of the relatively large circle.

Thus it is that the action of the whole as a whole toward the poor person is limited to a minimum, thoroughly appropriate for the typical nature of the activity of whole societies. Along with the rationale that such action has as its content only what is clearly presupposed for everyone, the second rationale of this activity also has its source in the objective character of the care of the poor being limited to this minimum. What pertains to protecting someone from physical deterioration can be fixed objectively with approximate certitude. Every grant of more than this, every improvement toward a positive increase requires much less unambiguous criteria and is left to more subjective estimates in quantity and kind. I mentioned above that the cases of not very special neediness and thus ones requiring no subjective judgment—such as neediness through sickness and bodily defect especially—are most suitable for governmental welfare while the individually formed cases better fall to the share of the smaller local community. Even such objective ascertainability of the need that lends itself to the intervention of the largest community exists as soon as the support is limited to the minimum. The old epistemological correlation between generality and objectivity appears here again; in the field of knowledge the actual generality is the acknowledgment of a proposition through the—admittedly not historically real but ideal—universality of the spirit or an expression of its objectivity on one hand, while on the other it may be certainly irrefutable for one or many individuals and may possess the full meaning of the truth, but it still lacks the particular quality that we call objectivity. Thus in practice an action of the community can in principle be claimed only on a plainly objective basis. Where the reason is able to be evaluated only subjectively and lacks the potential for being established purely factually, though the claim may be no less urgent and its fulfillment no less valuable, it is nevertheless directed only to individuals, and their relationship corresponds to purely individual circumstances, and their fulfillment is simply through individuals.

If the objective perspective goes hand in hand with the tendency to nationalize all welfare—which admittedly until now nowhere exceeds the stage of that tendency completely—the extent to which the content is standardized, the logical application of which simply means objectivity,

derives not only out of the interests of the poor person but also out of those of the state. Here an essentially sociological form of the relationship of individual and community shows its advantage. Where grants or interventions pass over from being fulfilled by individuals to being fulfilled by the community, regulation by the community tends to use either too much or too little individual action. With statutory education the individual is forced not to learn too little; it leaves to the individuals whether they desire to learn more or 'too much.' With the statutory workday, it makes the employers not to want to expect too much from the workers, as it also leaves to them how much less to expect. And thus this regulation stands everywhere only on one side of the action, while the other side is given over to the freedom of the individual. This is the pattern in which our socially controlled activities appear to us: They are restricted as it were to one end alone; the society sets a boundary that is much for them or little for them, while more or less of the limitlessness of subjective discretion belongs to the others. Now, however, this pattern also deceives us in many cases where the social regulation actually occurs on both sides and only the practical interest steers attention only to the one side and allows the other to be overlooked. Where for example the private punishment of injustice shifts to the society and objective criminal law, in the law one has in view thereby only a greater assurance of expiation and a really sufficient measure and certainty of punishment being achieved. But in reality, it is not a matter of only being punished enough but also not being punished too much. Society not only protects perhaps the possibly harmed, but it also protects the criminal against excessive subjective reaction, *i.e.* it sets that level of punishment as the objective that corresponds not to the wish or purpose of the victim but to its social interest. And this is so not only in statutorily established relationships. Not every social stratum attaches much importance to each of its members achieving a certain minimum expenditure for clothing; it fixes a limit of the 'decent' suit, and one who remains below that no longer belongs to it. But admittedly it nevertheless also sets a limit in the other direction, not with the same clarity and with as conscious an emphasis: a certain level of luxury and elegance, indeed sometimes even of modernity, does not conform to one or the other group; whoever exceeds this upper threshold is sometimes treated as not completely belonging. Thus the group still does not also allow the freedom of the individual to be expanded fully on both sides but sets an objective limit to subjective discretion, *i.e.* one that the conditions of supra-individual

life in it require. This basic form is now replicated in the taking over of the care of the poor by the society. While at first it seems to have only an interest in boundaries: the poor person too receiving a proper share, not too little; the other, practically less effective, nevertheless also exists: that they do not receive too much. The inadequacy of private welfare lies not only in being too little but also in being too much, which leads the poor person to idleness, expends existing resources in economically unproductive ways, and capriciously benefits one at the expense of the other. The subjective impulse to be charitable errs on both sides, and although the danger of excess is not as great as that of too little, the objective norm still stands above it, which subtracts an interest in the individual from the interest of the community to no noticeable degree.

However, this transcending of the subjective point of view is valid both for the giver and the receiver of charity. While English public welfare begins only at total impoverishment, which was set objectively—specifically, that the workhouse offered a stay so little agreeable that no one chooses it but in really extreme need—it completely dispensed with the proof of personal worthiness. Private charity, which is for the clearly worthy individual, can often be much more individually selective, and since the state already provides for the most urgently needy, is thus its supplement. It has the task of making the poor person, who is already protected from starvation, capable of earning a living again, of curing the need for which the state has an only temporary relief. What is decisive is not need as such, although it is the *terminus a quo*, but the ideal of creating independent and economically valuable individuals; the state proceeds with a causal intent, private charity with a teleological one. Or put differently: The state comes to help poverty; private charity comes to help the poor person. Here lies a sociological difference of the first order. The abstract ideas by which some individual elements crystallize out from individually complicated reality countless times achieve a liveliness and effectiveness for action that seems in reality only to benefit the concrete total phenomenon. This begins with quite intimate relationships. The meaning of many erotic relationships is not to be expressed any way other than at least one of the parties not seeking the beloved but love, only that one is generally met with a feeling of remarkable indifference toward the individuality of the lover. In religious circumstances it sometimes appears that the only essential thing is there being a certain kind and degree of religiosity while the bearers of it are irrelevant; the action of the priest or the relationship

of the believer to the community is determined only by this generality, without regard to the particular motive that produces and colors this mood in the individual, and without any particular interest in the individual, who comes into consideration—or more correctly, does not come into consideration—only as the bearer of this impersonal activity. From the perspective of social ethics, a rationalism requires that the interaction of people be simply founded on subjective honesty. Truth, as an objective quality of a statement, must require from everyone to whom it would be addressed complete indifference toward the special characteristics and circumstances of the case; one so determined could not produce an individually differentiated right to truth. The truth, and not the speaking or hearing in individualization, would be the presupposition of the content or value of group interaction. Trends in criminology divide over the same question of whether punishment is for the crime or the criminal. An abstract objectivism demands punishment, once the crime occurs, as a restoration of the real or ideal disturbed order; based on the logic of ethics, it demands it as a consequence of the impersonal fact of the crime. From the other point of view only the guilty subject should be affected; the penal reaction comes in not because the crime occurred as something objective but because of a subject of the sin appearing in it that needs educating and being made harmless. Thus all individual circumstances of the case are exactly addressed by the amount of punishment as well as the general fact that there was a crime at all. This two-fold attitude also applies to poverty. One can proceed from poverty as from a specific factual phenomenon and seek to eliminate it with such questions as: to whom, from which individual cause, with which individual consequences do they always appear, does it require remedy and compensation for this social deficiency? On the other hand, interest is directed toward the poor individual—admittedly, of course, since the person is poor, but one does not wish to eliminate proportionately poverty in general with supportive action but to help this particular poor person. The person's poverty here serves only as an individual and singular qualification for it; it is so to speak only the present reason of being occupied with that person; the individual should generally be brought into a situation in which the poverty vanishes by itself. Thus this social service is directed more to the fact, more to the cause of poverty. Incidentally, it is sociologically important to note about this formulation that the naturally suited distribution of both public and private welfare be modified as soon as one pursues the causal chain a step further. The state meets

the superficially apparent need—especially so in England—and private charity addresses the individual reasons for it. But the fundamental economic and cultural conditions on which those personal circumstances arise as a basis—these again must form the matter for the community, and in fact they are so formed that they give as little chance as possible to individual weakness or unfavorable prejudice, ineptitude or mischance to produce poverty. Here, as in many other respects, the community, its conditions, interests, and actions encompass as it were individual determinations: on the one hand it represents an immediate surface on which the members perceive their appearance, the results of their own lives; on the other hand it is the broad underground where it develops—but in a way that, from its unity, the differences of individual arrangements and circumstances give that surface of the whole a conspicuous colorfulness of individual phenomena.[7]

The French principle of poverty is the direct opposite of the English one that gave occasion to this generalization. Here the care for the poor is regarded as the domain of private associations and persons from the outset, and the state intervenes only where this is not enough. This reversal does not mean of course that the private entities care for the most urgent cases, as the English state does, but the state provides care, as the English private entities do, going beyond what is individually desirable. The French principle makes it rather unmistakable that substantively the help cannot be so sharply and fundamentally separated

[7] Perhaps it is worthwhile noting here outside the immediate factual context that this inclusion of the individual formation by the social, where it reaches the root as well as the fruit, is allowed to be exactly reversed in the same form. As the individual appears there as a kind of universal structure for the social essence, so can the latter function as a mere intermediary stage of individual development. This begins with the basic substance of the personality that life brings with it, which we cannot imagine in its purity apart from its being formed through the historical milieu, but only sense as the enduring material of our personal existence and the never completely totaled sum of its possibilities. On the other hand we offer, as it were at the other end of our existence, an appearance or complex of appearances where it brings existence as the ultimate, most important, most formed one to which existence brings it for the individualistic standpoint. Between the two lie the social influences that we receive, the conditions by which the society shapes us in every phenomenon we ultimately present, the whole complex of general demands and inhibitions through which we have to go. Considered in that way, society thus offers with its actions and presentations exactly the stage beyond and before which the individual structure stands; it is the vehicle of the forces through which one of its stages passes into another of its stages, and these forces embrace the society in the way that, from the other standpoint, the social conditions and events embrace the individual who mediates between their general bases and their respective manifestations.

between the two steps as in England. Here and there in practice the situation will thus often take shape for the poor person in the same way. It is obvious, however, that a difference of the first order in sociological principles thereby results: It is a special case of the larger process by which the immediate interaction of group members changes into the action of the supra-individually unified whole and by which, as soon as this at all occurs one time, between both ways of social functioning, continual compromises, displacements, and changes in rank take place. Whether the social tension or disharmony that appears as individual poverty is brought to resolution directly between the members of society or through the mediation of the unity that is aroused from all the members, this is obviously a decision that is required by a formal equality in the whole social field, albeit only rarely as purely and clearly as this. Obvious as it is, this only needs mention in order to not be overlooked how very much 'private' care for the poor is also a social event, a sociological form that assigns the poor person a no less definite position—only not overly clear from a superficial view—as an organic member in group life. This fact is clearly illuminated precisely by the transition in form between the two: by the poor taxes on the one hand, the legal duty to provide for poor relatives on the other. As long as a special poor tax exists, the relationship between the community and the poor person had not attained the abstract clarity that sets one into an immediate bond with the community as an undivided unit; the state is rather only the intermediary that provides a regulation for the individuals absent any more voluntary contributions. As soon as the poor taxes are at all included in the tax liability and welfare follows from the general state or local revenues, that bond is realized; the support-relationship with the poor person becomes a function of the community as such, no longer the sum of individuals as in the case of the poor tax. The general interest is minted, so to speak, into a still more specialized form where the law requires supporting the needy relatives. Private support, which also embraces every other case of the structure and the teleology of group life, comes to a conscious intensification here by which it is dominated as well.

Once again I want to explain from the viewpoint just explicated what was emphasized above: that the relationship of the community to its poor is just as formal a society-constructing function as is that to the official or taxpayer. There I compared the poor person to the stranger, who similarly stands *opposite* to the group—but this being opposite implies a very specific relationship that pulls one into group life as a member.

So the poor person stands admittedly outside the group while being a mere object for undertakings by the community toward the individual, but this being on the outside is—put briefly—only a particular form of being inside. All this occurs in the society as, according to the Kantian expression, what is spatially outside of each other occurs in consciousness: admittedly in space everything would be outside of each other, and the subject too, graphically, would be external to the other things, but in a wider sense the space itself would be 'in me,' in the subject. But considered more closely, the double position of the poor person as characterized—as with the stranger—can only be established with gradual modifications to all members of the group. Individuals may adhere to group life with positive accomplishments so very much, may very much allow the personal content of their life to get woven into or to get out of this cycle, yet at the same time they stand *facing* this totality, giving and receiving, dealt with by it well or poorly, committed to it internally or only externally, in short facing the social circle as partner or as object, as to an opposite subject to which they nevertheless belong through the very same actions and circumstances on which the relationship of member, of being part of the subject, is based. This duality of the position, seeming logically difficult to reconcile, is a quite elementary sociological reality. An earlier association already manifested this in so simple a structure as marriage; in some situations, each of the spouses sees the marriage as a, so to speak, independent structure before them, creating duties, representations, goodness and evil—without this deriving from the other spouse as a person but from the whole that makes each of its parts an object to itself, however much it itself consists immediately only of these parts. This relationship of being simultaneously inside and outside becomes more complex and evident at the same time in the degree to which the membership of the group grows. This is not only because the whole thereby gives individuals an overwhelming independence, but above all because the more particular differentiations among the individuals dispose them to a whole range of nuances of that double relationship. With respect to the prince and the banker, the woman of the world and the priest, the artist and the official, the group has a special tendency on the one hand to make the person an object, to deal with them, to subjugate them, or to recognize them as power against power, and on the other hand for it to draw the person into itself as a direct participant in its life, just as a part of the whole that faces up to other participants anew. This is perhaps

a wholly uniform attitude of the social entity as such that is divided into the two sides or appears so different from two separate points of view—somewhat like the way the individual idea stands in opposition to the mind, really so distant as to be totally removed from it that the mind can be influenced by the mood of the whole: colored, suspended or suppressed, formed or eliminated—even while it is at the same time an integral part of this whole, an element of the mind that exists only apart from the togetherness and interpenetration of such elements. The poor person occupies a clearly distinct position on that scale. The support to which the community is obligated in its own interest but which the person has no right to demand in by far the majority of cases, turns one into an object of group action, sets one at a distance from the community, which often lets one live as an unworthy body at the mercy of the community and for this reason allows one to become a bitter enemy of it. The state expresses this when it withdraws certain civic rights from the recipient of public assistance. But this being on the outside still does not mean an absolute separation but just a wholly different relationship with the whole that, without this member, would just be different from what it is. And with the whole thus produced, that treatment of the individual as an object enters in with respect to the poor in a construction that includes their totality.

Now these descriptions do not appear to be valid for the poor in general but only to a certain portion of them: those who receive support, since there are still enough poor who are not assisted. The latter fact points out the relativistic nature of the concept of poverty. Anyone whose means do not match goals is a poor person. This purely individualistic concept is narrowed in its practical application in such a way that certain ends of arbitrary and purely personal discretion are exempted from it. First, those needs that are physically imposed on people: food, clothing, shelter. But no level of these needs is fixed with certainty that would be in effect in all circumstances and generally and below which poverty in the absolute sense would thus have existed. Rather every general milieu and every particular social stratum has needs peculiar to it, which being unable to satisfy means poverty. Hence the fact, banal in all developed cultures, that people who are poor within their class might be so in no deeper way since their means would be enough for the ends typical for them. The poorest in an absolute sense may thereby not suffer from the discrepancy of their means to their class-specific needs, so that hardly any poverty would exist in a psychological sense; or the richest may set goals for themselves that exceed those presumed class-

specific wishes and their own means, so that they feel psychologically that they are poor. Thus individual poverty—the non-attainment of the means to personal ends—can be absent where the social concept of it is found, and it can exist where there is no mention of it in the individual sense. Its relativism does not mean the relationship of individual means to really individual ends—which is something absolute according to the inherent meaning unaffected by anything that lies beyond the individual—but to the stratum-specific ends of the individual, to his or her social *a apriori*, which changes from one social stratum to the other. *What* level of need each group fixes, as it were, the zero point below which poverty begins and above which wealth begins, is by the way a very socio-historically notable variable. In somewhat developed circumstances it has always a latitude, often considerable, for fixing this. How the location of this point is related to the actual *majority*, whether one must already belong to the assisted minority in order not to be considered simply poor, whether on the contrary a class avoiding being overwhelmed by the feeling of poverty out of an instinctive expediency sets the scale very low below which poverty first begins, whether any one phenomenon is capable of moving this scale (as easily happens for example by the entry of a prosperous personality into a small city or into a some other small circle) or whether the group continues to hold onto what it has set once and for all—obviously these are fundamental sociological variables.

Because poverty appears in every social stratum that has formed a typical standard of needs pre-established for every individual, it also happens without further ado that in many cases a support for the poor person does not at all come into question. Nevertheless the principle of support is extended further than what its, as it were, official manifestations indicate. If in an extended family, for example, poorer and richer members exchange presents, one gives to the latter gifts according to good manners; to the former gifts not only more in value than that received from them, but precisely the quality of the gifts reveals the supportive character: one gives the poorer relatives *useful* things, *i.e.* those that help them maintain the accustomed class standard of living; thus in this sociological constellation the gifts prove to be completely different in the different strata. The sociology of the gift partially overlaps with that of poverty. An extremely rich scale of reciprocal relationships of people is shown in the gift, as well as in its content, the attitude and kind of giving, and also in the attitude and kind of receiving. Gift, theft, and exchange are the external forms of

interaction that are immediately linked to the question of property and by which each receives an inestimable richness of psychological properties defining a process social in itself. They correspond to the three motives of action: altruism, egoism, and objective standardization. Then it is the essence of exchange that objectively equal values are involved, the subjective motives of kindness or greed remain outside the process; to the extent that the exchange clearly reflects its idea in the process, the value of the objects is not measured according to the desires of the individual but according to the value of the other objects. Of the three, the gift manifests the greatest wealth of social constellations since the sentiment and condition of the giving and receiving are combined in it in the most various ways with all their particular nuances. Under the many categories that make a, so to speak, systematic ordering of these phenomena possible, this seems to be the most important for the problem of poverty: whether the particular meaning and goal of the gift resides in the end state attained with it, wherein the recipient should just have a particular object of value, or in the action itself, in which the giving as the expression of a sentiment of the giver, a love that must sacrifice, or an expansion of the Ego which more or less indiscriminately radiates itself in the gift. In this latter case, in which the process of the giving is, so to speak, its only purpose, the question of wealth or poverty obviously plays hardly any role; it would then be for the sake of the practical possibilities. But where it is given to the *poor person*, the emphasis is not on the process but on its result; the poor should *have* something. Obviously, countless mixtures of each kind exist between these two extreme kinds of gift. The more purely the latter kind prevails, the more impossible it often is to contribute to the poor person what is lacking in the form of gifts since the other social relationships among the persons are not carried out with gifts. One can always give where there is very great social distance or where there is greater personal closeness; however, it tends to be difficult to the extent that the social distance diminishes and the personal distance increases. In the higher strata the tragic situation often comes about that the needy would like to receive support and the wealthy would like to grant it, but the former can neither ask for it nor the latter offer it. The higher a class is, so much the more does it have an economic *a priori* limit below which what is poverty for it begins, set in a way so that this poverty seldom occurs, and is indeed in principle actually impossible. Accepting support thus moves the supported ones away from the prerequisites for status; it brings the evidence to light that one is

formally downgraded. Until this happens, the class prejudice is strong enough to make poverty, so to speak, invisible, so long as it remains an individual problem and does not have any social effect. The entire presuppositions of upper class life entails someone being poor in an individual sense, *i.e.* someone can stay within one's means below the needs of the class without having to reach for support. Thus one is poor in a social sense only if receiving support. And probably this would be generally valid: viewed sociologically, poverty does not occur first and then support follows—rather this is only its destiny also according to one's personal form—but the one who enjoys support should also enjoy it according to one's sociological constellation, which is called poverty—even if by chance this does not happen.

It is entirely in this sense, when it had been emphasized by the Social Democrats, that the modern proletarian would admittedly be poor, but not *any poorer.* The poor person does not come about as a social type through a certain level of want and deprivation but through receiving support or should be receiving it according to social norms. Thus to this way of thinking, poverty in itself and for itself is not to be defined as a fixed quantitative condition but only in terms of a social reaction that appears after a certain condition, just as crime, which immediately is a very difficult concept to define, has been defined as "an action associated with a public penalty."[8] So now some no longer define the essence of ethics from the inner constitution of the subject but from the results of what the subject does: its subjective intent counts as valuable only to the extent that it normally occasions a particular socially useful result. Thus the concept of personality is often not viewed as a characterization of one's being from within, which would qualify one for a specific social role, but on the contrary, the members of society who play a certain role in it are called personalities. The individual condition, as it is constituted from within itself, no more determines the idea in the first instance; rather the social teleology does this. The individual is established by the type, as the environing whole behaves around and toward the individual. Where this happens it is a continuation of a kind of modern idealism that does not seek to define a thing any more by its inherent nature but from the reaction that is given off

[8] Simmel seems to have Émile Durkheim's treatment of crime in mind; see Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, tr. George Simpson (New York: Macmillan, 1933), Ch. 2—ed.

from it in the subject. The membership function that the poor person serves within the existing society is not already given by one's being poor; only when the society—the whole or the individual members of it—responds with support to the person, does the latter play a specific social role.

This social meaning of the 'poor,' as opposed to the individual one, first allows the poor to unite into a kind of status group or unified layer within society. As was said, one does not belong to a socially defined category by simply being poor. One is just a poor merchant, artist, worker etc. and remains such through the kind of one's activity or standing of one's particular rank. One may take up a gradually changed position within the society because of poverty, but the individuals who find themselves in the different statuses and occupations at this stage are in no way united into a special social unit outside the boundaries of their home stratum. The moment they are assisted—many times already if the whole constellation normally requires this, even without it actually happening—they enter into a circle characterized by poverty. Admittedly this group is not held together by interaction among its members but by the collective attitude that society as a whole takes up toward it. Still there has not also always been a lack of that direct creation by society; in the fourteenth century, for example, there was a guild of poor people in Norwich, a *Poorman's Gild*, in Germany the so called *Elendengilden* (guilds of the wretched)—just as some time later in the Italian cities one encounters a party of the wealthy people, the *Optimates*, as they called themselves, that found the basis of their unity only in the fact of the wealth of each member. Certainly such a union of the poor soon became impossible because, with the increasing differentiation of society, the individual differences of the members in suitable education and attitude, interests and backgrounds became too many and too strong for still allowing the strength for the society-creation of *one* community.

Only where poverty brings with it a positive *content* that is common to many poor does an association of the poor as such come about. Thus the most extreme phenomenon of poverty—the lack of shelter—allows the persons affected by it to stream together in certain shelters in the large cities. When the first haystacks are erected in the vicinity of Berlin, the homeless, the *Penner* (bums), find one for themselves to make a suitable night lodging in the hay. A beginning of organization, nevertheless, exists under this, since the *Penner* of the one territory have a kind of leader, the

Oberpenner, who assigns the places in the night quarters to the members of the guild and settles disputes among them. The *Penner* see to it that no criminal sneaks in among them, and if this does happen they do him in, *i.e.* betray him to the police, for whom they generally perform occasional good services. The *Oberpenner* are well known personages whom the authorities always know how to find if they need information about the personal details of someone with a shady existence. Such specification of poverty, which they experience through its progression up to the point of homelessness, is necessary nowadays to win for them an associative momentum. By the way it is notable that the increased general well-being, the closer police supervision, above all the social consciousness that strangely mixes good and bad sensitivities, 'cannot bear' the sight of poverty—all this imposes on poverty the tendency to hide itself ever more. And this conceivably holds the poor further apart, allows them to feel much less like a coherent stratum than could be the case in the Middle Ages. The class of the poor, especially in modern society, is a most unique social synthesis. It has its importance and placement in the social body because of a great homogeneity that, however, as indicated, is absent from it in terms of the individual characteristics of its members. It is the common endpoint of destinies of the most different kinds; persons from the whole range of social variation flow into it. No change, development, intensification, or depression of social life passes by it without depositing a residue in the stratum of poverty as if in a reservoir. That is what is dreadful in this poverty—as distinct from merely being poor, which everyone has to sort out for themselves and which is only a coloration of an otherwise individually qualified situation—that there are people who are only poor in terms of their social position and nothing more. Incidentally this becomes especially certain and clear by virtue of an expansive and indiscriminate almsgiving, as in the Christian Middle Ages and under the rule of the Koran. But precisely to the extent that one was content with an official and unalterable fact, it did not have the bitterness and actual opposition with which a class influences the developmental and turbulent tendency of modern times that establishes its unity on a purely passive element, *i.e.* on that basis on which the society behaves toward the class in a certain way and treats it in a certain way. If political rights are taken away from the recipients of alms, this is the adequate expression of their not being anything socially, except being poor. This absence of a positive qualification for oneself causes what was indicated above—the stratum

of the poor developing no socially unifying force from outside or within itself despite the similarity of their situation. Poverty thus presents the wholly unique social constellation of a number of individuals taking up a very specific organic membership inside the whole by means of a purely individual fate. But this position is still not determined by one's own fate and condition but by others—individuals, associations, whole societies—seeking just to correct this condition, so that, according to the sociological concept, it is not the personal deficiency that makes people poor but the people supported for the sake of the deficiency are primarily the poor.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SELF-PRESERVATION OF THE GROUP[1]

The conflictual character that immediate experience manifests in the life of the individual—the need for conquest given at every moment, for defense against attacks, for firmness against temptations, for regaining a continuously losing balance—persists, as it were, above and below the psychological existence of the individual. The physiological processes within our bodies offer the same picture of an unceasing struggle. The self-preservation of the physical life is also never a static persistence, but an exercise in overcoming resistance, a construction of antitoxins against the poisons generated in the body itself, a response to attacks that would immediately become destructive without resistance offered against it. And such are the general forms in which the supra-individual structures also lead their lives. Even if they 'preserve themselves'—and, in fact, not only against external attacks that threaten their entire existence with one stroke as it were—we combine innumerable uninterrupted processes that are made manifest inside these structures as punch and counterpunch, peril and prevention, repulsion and reengagement among the members. For many reasons it is understandable that we see the simple stasis, the continuity of undisturbed tranquility, much more than the adjustments in play back and forth, formations of ever new means against ever new dangers in the preservation of the state and guild, church and interest group, family and school. First because the individual experiences all the frailty of life, the endlessness of offense and defense only within the self, while the corresponding processes of the collective structures are divided up among many individuals and over many points quite separated by space, content and interests, and are, therefore, not readily present in the consciousness of the individual in their entirety, though probably in their result: the persistence of the whole. Furthermore, these processes frequently occur in substrata of major dimensions and thus more slowly and ponderously over such long periods of time, so that the transitions of their individual stages

[1] We are indebted to Lutz Kaelber for his many suggestions for rendering Simmel's prose in this chapter—ed.

are barely noticeable. Finally, the most difficult but perhaps the most effective factor: all those collective structures affect us not only as individual historical realities whose temporal life process carries its entire significance, but they possess something of the timelessness of the general concept, the universal law, the general form, whose meaning and validity are not identical with the single appearing and disappearing example or occurrence. Admittedly the concept of the individual is also independent of the forces of reality generating or destroying one or the other individual; nevertheless we feel that the individual state or church seemingly absorbed more from the general concept of the state or church, and that here the historical structure somehow shares in the supra-particular, in the timelessness of the universal or form drawn from all the vicissitudes of life. The basis of this feeling should be that such collective structures admittedly possess an eternity relative *to their individual participants* and that they are indifferent toward their distinctiveness and survive their coming and going (which will be spoken about below). They proceed from there into the category of law, which is valid independently of its individual applications, and form, whose ideal meaning remains unaffected by all the variety in its material fulfillments. But these structures achieve this affinity with general timelessness only from the standpoint of the individual from whose fluctuating and transient existence they face as something persisting and ever surviving. Viewed from this comparison, they are themselves involved in the coming into and passing out of existence; if it happens in what one must call a life process, in another tempo and rhythm than that of the members, the self-preservation over a span of time, which is not a rigid unquestionability and inner immobility but a sum of internal processes, they are the defense against an enduring threat, the re-establishment of an often lost balance, the conscious or unconscious preparation of means to an end never realized by self, in order to experience the next moment.

These three kinds of self-preservation are independent of one another to a relatively great extent: Physiological self-preservation often occurs with a success or failure that is wholly opposed to the simultaneous psychological results; and this again has the same random relationship to that of the social group. The individual's instinct for self-preservation requires wholly different actions and employs wholly different powers than the self-preservation of one's group, so that the self-preservation of individuals can sometimes exist thoroughly intact and successful while that of the group becomes weak and the group splinters. Conversely

the latter can appear in full strength although that of the individual members is in decay. Above all, this phenomenon has led to the unified group being considered as a structure with an independent reality, leading a life according to its own laws and its own powers, independent of all its individual bearers—in a close analogy to the construction of a 'life spirit' or a special personal 'life force' in the physiological individual. A substantial unity, as it were, that was maintained in itself seemed to be created by the existence of the subject, in which delayed knowledge blocks the persistence of life, and replaced the thousand-fold intermeshing interaction processes among the factors. Our task in this essay is the social parallel. When we see that the most diverse social interactions visibly manifest particularly effective powers for self-preservation, into what more primary processes is this manifestation allowed to be decomposed? Nevertheless the persistence of the group—once it has come about—seems to portend a particular vitality, as it were, a permanence stemming from a unitary source, but which is thus only the apparent result or, more accurately, the complex of a number of individual and varying processes of social nature. Thus we ask, what particular kinds of direct or indirect interaction are there, if one speaks of the self-preservation of a social group?

The most general case in which the self-preservation of the group becomes a problem is found in the fact that it maintains its identity during the departure and change of its members. We say that it would be the same state, the same organization, the same army existing now as the one that existed for one or another number of decades or centuries, even though not a single one of the members of this association is 'the same' any more as in the earlier point in time. Here one of the cases is offered in which the temporal order of the phenomenon manifests a decided analogy with its spatial one. As the social union is still formed out of the individuals existing next to one another—*i.e.*, still outside one another—as the unavoidable separation that creates space between people is nevertheless overcome through the psychological bonds among them so that the image of a united 'one' arises in one another, so also the temporal separation of individuals and generations does not hinder their forming in our thinking a solid and continuing whole. With the spatially separated entities, this unity is borne by the interaction among them that takes place through space: among complex entities unity means nothing but a cohesion of the members that is represented by mutually exercised forces. With temporally separated entities, their unity cannot occur in this way since the interaction is

absent: an earlier one can probably affect a later one, but not the other way around. Therefore, precisely by the turnover of individuals, the maintenance of the social unity constitutes a special problem that is not yet solved at the same time with the coming into being of its unity at a given instant, as was explained.

The first and most immediate temporal element that confers this continuity on the unity of the group is the persistence of the locality, the soil and earth on which it lives. The state, still more the city, but also numerous other associations, have their unity first in the territory that forms the enduring substrate under all the changes in its content. In classical Greece it was above all the maintenance of the landownership to which the continuity of the family group was linked. This was carried in two opposite directions: its reduction by sale was typically regarded as an offense not only against the children but also the ancestors, since that broke the thread of the family's existence leading up from them; and its increase was only possible with difficulty, depending on circumstances. Thus Greece experienced landownership from above and below, as it were, to be suited to leading the family through all the vicissitudes of its individual existence as, in principle, something indestructible. Most remarkable, but also conceivable, is this importance of landownership for the continuation of the family in view of the fact that territory and land nevertheless did not possess its later importance for the Greek concept of state. As one always spoke of foreign state 'territories' as only the sum of their inhabitants—ὁι Αἴγύπτοι, οι Πέρσαι[2]—so for the Greeks the affiliation to one's state is never predicated on the land but only on the community of citizens. Where banished citizens are gathered in sufficient numbers elsewhere, they continue there without the state entity being further disturbed by the enemy; their continuity of life is thus manifest in the persons of the participants, but it does not seem to be bound to the land. In contrast, during the feudal and patrimonial era, the model principle by which the bond mediated by territory becomes effective in a definitely different manner. The inhabitants of the land are subject to the state government only as entities that come within its territory. Here the state as a specific formation of human materials actually has its continuity only in the permanence of the soil. While acquisition and loss of the domicile in the land means acquisition and loss of citizenship, the

[2] Greek: 'the Egyptians, the Persians'—ed.

specific ground and soil is the genuine object of rule, continuation of which carries the state through all the changes of its material. To the extent that the idea of the state in its ideal unity and indestructibility rose above the idea of the privately governed kind, the indivisibility of its territory also becomes a principle; its territory is no longer an indivisible thing, but a conceptual unity that is the correlate of state unity in general. While this crosses over from the abstract sphere into that of feeling, it constructs in the latter an emotion of patriotism that is infinitely important for political self-preservation. Consequently, as the modern person feels it, the persistence of the emotional sphere is wholly indispensable for it; the *fatherland* is very much a part of its effectiveness for holding the political group together. In the same way it is the sociological characteristics of the circumstances, which would be somewhat similar in every other respect, that considerably differ in their actual manifestation by their varying duration. One does not tend to clarify how much every factor of a human relationship that seems completely and exclusively distinct from its factual content, from its idea and feeling, what is actually present and is effective in it, and what appears definite, although at the same time, it depends on the conscious and unconscious thoughts over the duration of these factual contents; how every relationship is inevitably influenced by one estimating one's survival for a longer or shorter time, by one foreseeing one's end or seeing it as unlimited, by limitness appearing only as an actual non-ending or the impossibility of an end in principle. Examples of the last mentioned cases are marriage, the relationship to God, and that to the fatherland. These temporal determinants need not change the immediate and individual content of the relationships; they are a formal, though for their course an extremely influential coloration of themselves. Thus patriotism is not at all only a feeling and an ethical bond of individuals to their political group, but it needs the collaborative notion that the relationship to them is not dissolvable, and in fact is not dissolvable at all despite the freedom of movement of modern people. The clarity of the patriotic basis and ground as the unalterable and irreducible reason for that relationship becomes a vehicle of patriotism and a symbol of its limitlessness in time, and with this formal emphasis also gives its first individual moment the full solidifying force of the whole.

Now the continuation of the locality by itself admittedly does not mean the continuation of the social unit since if almost the whole population of a state is expelled or enslaved by a conquering group,

we still speak of the displaced national group despite the continuation of the territory. The unity whose continuation is at issue is in addition a psychological one, which in turn makes the territorial basis a unifying basis: this inner meaning of place for consciousness can completely replace the outer one. But one, though anecdotal case, reveals in an interesting way how even this kind of unity remains linked to its particular land by spiritual threads by a complete internalization of the social unity in its continuity. During the Spanish-American War in the summer of 1898 as the Spanish fleet seemed to threaten the American east coast, a Bostonian away from home was asked what he would think about his city possibly being bombarded.

> "Bombard Boston!" was the response. "You talk as though Boston were a locality. Boston is not a place; Boston is a state of mind. You can no more shoot it with a gun than you could shoot wisdom, or justice, or magnanimity."[3]

But once a territory has now taken on the mental bond and is designated as belonging to it, this, again, on the other hand is thus an essential vehicle for the further existence of the latter. Admittedly only one vehicle, since there are enough group formations that do not need a local basis: on the one hand all small groups such as the family that can stay exactly the same during changes of residence, on the other hand all large ones—such as the ideal community of 'the republic of scholars' or the other international cultural communities of literary and artistic interests, or the global trading groups—whose essence exists precisely in the denial and superseding of every linkage to a particular locality.

In contrast to this more formal condition, the physiological connection of the generations, the whole network of relationships among relatives, is of incomparably greater importance for the preservation of the group. Admittedly, affinity to the tribe alone is not always enough to guarantee the unity of the connections over a long time; rather in many cases it must involve local unity. The social unity of the Jews loosened seriously despite their anthropological and confessional unity since their diaspora; it closed more tightly again where a group of them lived on the same territory for a long time, and the efforts of modern Zionism to re-establish their comprehensive group

[3] Here Simmel quotes the man in English—ed.

unity linked them to their settling in the same location again. But on the other hand, where other connections fail, the physiological is the ultimate refuge on which the self-preservation of the group falls back. The more the German guild system ossified and withered internally and the weaker the actual strength of its cohesion became, the more vigorously each guild sealed itself off physiologically, *i.e.*, made family and marriage the requirement for admission. The history of the guild system is characterized by preference being shown the masters' sons. The guild was, in the main and with certain interruptions, an association handed down to the children. Nevertheless not only were material advantage and family egoism always clearly the motives here, but also the objective social ideal of the permanence and continuity of the guild structure as such. The thought that the self-isolation of the guild introduces—that one master should have 'the same food' as another—is no purely individualistic one, but guarantees an inner homogeneity that would keep the unity of the group from fragmenting. But of course a numerical limitation corresponded to this exclusion of the competition, for which the favoring of the master's son, *i.e.* the exclusion of one not physiologically belonging to the group, was the most obvious technique. Everywhere the tightness of a privileged social stratum, the strict distancing of the 'parvenu,' is the expression or means of maintaining its continuity; and this tight unity—admittedly not exclusively but most simply and plausibly—is borne on the tradition of privileges in the physiological line; it blocks at the earliest the fragmentation of the structure in a multiplicity of directions, interest-based associations, and characteristics. Augustus, who placed the greatest value on the continual preservation of the senatorial stratum as such, provided for its close unity by prohibiting its members from marrying emancipated persons, actors, and the children of these. For that stratum, however, he favored in every way the inheritance of dignity by senators' sons. Blood-relationship seemed to him as the cement that alone could hold the *ordo senatorius*[4] together: its unity, as it were, its contraction within the latitudinal dimension, was thus bound to its expansion in the longitudinal dimension of time. And in modern family life—as it presents itself as loosened, atomized, broken into a thousand ways by inner alienations and antagonistic autonomies—what still characterizes the family as *one* in the replacement of generations is actually the unique

[4] Latin: senatorial order—ed.

physiological connection and perhaps the succession by inheritance that is bound very closely with it. Out of all the bonds that earlier bore, the continuity of the family solidarity—occupational, religious, traditional, social standing mediated by reverence—one after the other, becomes less able to support the supra-individual unity of the family. Only the bond of the physiological, and what directly depends on it, still seems to succeed to some extent.

Therefore the genealogical linkage of generations succeeding one another is of such incomparable importance for the preservation of the uniform self of larger groups, because the replacement of one generation by the next, the succession of the one to the position of the other, *does not happen all at once*. The continuity is thereby created that takes into the next moment the vast majority of individuals who live in a given moment; the changeover, the separation and new entry of persons, in two contiguous moments always affects only an extremely small number in relation to the ones that endure. It is a fundamental factor that humans are not bound like animals to a specific mating season, but that children are born at any time. It can thus never be actually said within a group that a new generation begins at a given moment. The exit of the old and the entry of the new members takes place in it so gradually and continuously that it appears just like a united self, like an organic body in the change of its atoms. If the replacement of members happens all at once, with a sudden removal affecting the whole group, one would hardly be able to say that the group maintains its unified self despite the loss of members. The fact that at any time those who already belonged to the group in the earlier moment comprise the vast majority against the ones that follow saves the identity of the group despite the fact that moments that are spread out far from one another may not have a single member left in common. The gradualness of the change obviously has its importance not only in the function of saving the collective identity throughout the turnover of the individuals who maintain it, but also where the changeover affects other relevant circumstances. Moreover where the political forms, law, customs, the whole culture of a group changes, whereby after a certain time it actually presents a completely different picture, still the right to call it the same identical one depends on the change not affecting the totality of the life forms of the group at the same time. If it did that, it would be doubtful whether one should still call the group actually the 'same' one that it was before the critical moment; only the circumstance that the change affects only a minority of the collective life of the group at any

given moment makes it possible for it to maintain its self completely. It can be expressed schematically this way: If the totality of the individuals or other life circumstances of the group could be described as a b c d e in one moment, but in a later moment as m n o p q, one will still speak of a preservation of its unified self, provided the development maintains the following course: *a b c d e*—*m b c d e*—*m n c d e*—*m n o d e*—*m n o p e*—*m n o p q*, so that each step is only separated from the neighboring ones by one member and each moment shares the same main features with its neighboring moments.

This continuity amidst the change of the individuals who maintain the unity of the group is admittedly made most directly and drastically noticeable where it is based on reproduction.[5] But this could also occur in cases where this physical mediation is directly excluded, as within the Catholic clergy. Here the continuity is produced by having a sufficient number always remaining in office for instructing the new entrants. Celibacy showed here advantages over even physiological bonds for the strict uniform continuity of the group. It has been correctly noted that, given the great tendency in the Middle Ages toward the inheritance of occupations, without celibacy the clergy would have become a caste. Admittedly, this became the precise mechanism for the Russian secular clergy, which is obliged to marry, to achieve the maximum possible group continuity under this circumstance. Since the serfs could not become priests and the nobles did not want to, and since there was no actual middle class, the clergy had to replenish itself from within itself: the sons would also become priests, and they only married daughters of priests; exceptions required special permission. The Russian priesthood thereby became a caste limited to endogamy, whose lack of non-clerical family relationships conferred on them something of a freeman's status and inner continuity of the spirit of celibacy. It is remarkable that precisely this very sharp emphasis of physiological continuity in succession bordered upon an equally sharp exclusiveness. Nevertheless the superiority of the other system is unmistakable. Especially in the vitality and inner diversity of West European life—in contrast to the earlier Russian—the physiologically mediated continuity would have subjected the church to a life process with all its fluctuations, rhythms, upswings and senescence, as manifest in the guilds. With heredity the clergy would

[5] Simmel uses the expression, 'Proliferation.' He may have in mind the term in plant biology, which refers to propagation by means of buds or offshoots—ed.

have been exposed to the happenstances befalling the individual much more than now, where inclusion follows objective norms that include and exclude individuals with unbiased rigor. Here there are no undutiful sons who nevertheless remain in the family and in the class environment which thereby slackens them. Here continuity was really linked to the objective spirit with its timeless validity, and with that the transience of an only organic structure was avoided. But inevitably this requires a repressing of the individual. Thus already in the fourth century one began to prevent priests from leaving their status and membership in it, once it was accepted, and eliminated individual freedom. Only insofar as the timelessness of the collective idea was revealed in the lifelong and indestructible nature of the vocation was the danger that the change of the persons brought to that continuity minimized. However this was symbolized by nothing so aptly, and maintained so effectively, as by the ordination of priests. Here the 'spirit,' an ideal property of the church as a whole, is transferred from individual to individual, and none can attain it without this mediation. This is an ingenious means of leading the preservation of the group along an entirely unbroken line; here the sociological significance of physical propagation[6] took on, through the transferal of the consecration from one to the other, a spiritual body, so to speak, that guarantees the temporal continuity of the whole structure in the purest and most undisturbed manner. This social form is duplicated in other ways too, without such crystallization to a consistent permanence of the metaphysical spirit. For example it also gives official hierarchies their permanence and allows the nature, the objective spirit itself, to be maintained throughout all the turnover of individuals (which was already also indicated then, analogous to the case of the priests, in the ancient Roman idea that the magistracies actually came from the gods and that the consecration to them could only be imparted to the successor by the incumbent): the members existing in a given moment are altogether eliminated only when they were united long enough with their successors in the group, *i.e.*, enough to fully assimilate the spirit, form, and tendency of the group. The immortality of the group depends on this change being slow and gradual enough.

The reality indicated by this expression is of the greatest importance. The preservation of the consistent self of the group throughout

[6] See note 5 above—ed.

a potentially unlimited time period gives it an importance that, *ceteris paribus*, is infinitely superior to that of any individual. The individual life is designed in accord with its destiny, its value, its power to end in a limited time, and, to a certain extent, every individual must start at the beginning. While the life of the group lacks such a time limit that is set *a priori*, and while its forms are actually designed as though it would live forever, it arrives at an accumulation of the achievements, strengths, and experiences through which it rises further above the repeatedly shattered courses of individual life. In England this was the source of the power of the urban corporations since the early Middle Ages. They always had the right "of perpetuating their existence by filling up vacancies as they occur."[7] Admittedly the ancient privileges read only, for the townspeople "and their heirs"; but this in fact came to be exercised as a right to take in new members, so that whatever fate the members and their physical descendents met, the corporation as such would always survive as a whole. Incumbents electing colleagues[8] is the immensely important principal form that here takes the place of the function of priestly ordination mentioned above. It keeps the character of the group thoroughly the same through an undefined period of time and forms a certain analogy with the life of an organism, which also takes on only the ingredients adequate for it and able to be assimilated by it. It represents a continuation of the longevity in that it still sets in place members selected for passing traits on as well as for the eventuality where a member may possibly withdraw later. Thus, historically, the right to elect suitable colleagues to vacant positions was often attached to representative bodies that obtained life-long tenure, e.g., in the city councils of Basel, Freiburg, and Solothurn in the seventeenth century. The election by incumbents allows, as it were, the life threads of the group to proceed not only continuously but also in the same direction in perpetuity. Admittedly, the administrative committee's unlimited right to replenish itself, especially in England after the fifteenth century, led to an ossifying of the urban communal character. And its advantages, precisely even in the best cases, must be paid for by the particular importance of individuals vanishing behind their role of being the bearers of the preservation of the group. The immortality of the group feeds on that individual whom its spirit grasps—be it through

[7] Here Simmel uses the original English—ed.
[8] Kooptation—ed.

simple tradition, through special consecration, or through election by incumbents—and the crucial factor is thus not what one is for oneself but one's social assimilability. The preservation of the group as such must suffer from the connection with the transient and irreplaceable personality. But conversely, the more impersonal and anonymous such a one is, the more suitable it is, without encroaching further on the place of another, for securing for the group the uninterrupted preservation of its self. This was the immense advantage by which the Commons repulsed the previous superior strength of the House of Lords in the War of the Roses: A battle that snatched up half the nobility of the land and also took away from the House of Lords half of its power, since that was bound to the persons, while the House of Commons was in principle preserved from such a decline. The latter stratum seized power in the end; it proved to be the most tenaciously permanent in its group existence through the equality[9] of its members—that formal solidity was then also maintained by the reality that this stratum, "individually the poorest," was "collectively the richest."[10] This situation gives any group an advantage in competing with an individual: Concerning the Indian campaign, it was emphasized that dominance over India would have been won through no other means than the earlier example of the Great Mogul Conquest: Its advantage over the other usurpers in India would only have been that it could not be broken down.

Therefore wholly different arrangements now become necessary as soon as the life of the group is very intimately connected with that of a leading, ruling individual person. The history of all interregnums teaches us what dangers to the preservation of the group this social form contains—dangers that naturally grow in the same magnitude in which the ruler actually stands in the center of the functions by which the group protects its unity or, more correctly, creates it anew in every instant. Thus an interval of the reign may be rather unimportant where the prince serves only as a nominal ruler—*règne, mais ne gouverne pas*[11]—while conversely it is observed already in the bee colony that it turns into a complete anarchy as soon as its queen is removed from it. It is not only the mortality of the individual person that threatens the self-preservation of the group connected to that individual, but the

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[9] Simmel uses the French expression, *nivellement*—ed.
[10] Simmel gives the words in quotation marks in English—ed.
[11] French: He reigns, but he does not govern—ed.

character of the personality often opens up room at all for various sorts of attack. It was so in cases like the following: while the Merovingian era in many respects preserved the ancient Roman state entity intact, a fundamental difference appeared: the public power had become a personal, transferable, and divisible possession. However, this principle, which justified the power of kings, was turned against them because the barons who promoted the erection of the empire now demanded a personal share in the government too. The principle of personal power, after having been transferred to others, rebelled against the prince, who deemed it entirely his property. Precisely the *oneness* of the governing personality produced another type of danger for social solidarity, since its separate authorities do not exist at the same levels of power. In England the Reformation gave the king supremacy in ecclesiastical matters, insofar as he took over the rights and duties belonging to the previously autonomous church. However, because he reigned absolutely in the domain of the church and in the worldly matters, on the other hand, was limited by the decisions of Parliament and the independence of the municipalities, this produced a discrepancy that the Stuarts then sought to resolve when they expanded the divine right-of kings to an absolute rule in worldly matters also, resulting in the inevitable contradiction with the entire inherited constitution and administration, which severely shocked the stability of the form of the state.

In the political groups one seeks to counter all the dangers of the personality, especially those of the possible interval between personalities, through the principle that the king does not die. While in the early Middle Ages the tradition held that when the king dies his peace dies with him, the self-preservation of the group was, as it were, embodied in that principle. In England since the commencement of the reign of Edward I in 1272, an interregnum was no longer lawfully recognized. Meanwhile this form is already encountered in ethnological circumstances, in fact in a variation reminiscent of priestly ordination. The idea was often prevalent, for example, on the west coast of Africa, that the realm is governed by a 'great spirit' that always dwells in the person of the ruler; The Tibetan Dalai-Lama also forms a continuing succession of rulers in this way. The personality and its origin do not matter, but only that the spirit actually goes from the dying ruler to the new one. It is obvious that this separation of the actual bearer of dominion from the person who forms its visible dwelling place only threatens the security of the latter all the more where inheriting does not add anything real to

that ideal continuity. In China, sovereigns were dethroned because the absence of people's well-being proved that the divinity left him or was drained out of him. The princes then were yet mere people, disowning of whom could not be a sin, since the divine had indeed already disowned them. A Chinese sage thus answered the question about the legitimacy of the fear of killing Emperor Zhou[12] this way:

> Whoever violates virtue is called a robber, whoever violates the law is called a tyrant; but a robber and a tyrant are always only private persons. I have heard that Zhou as a private person was killed, but I have not heard that he as a prince was murdered.

In England it was said in the thirteenth century: If the pope does an injustice, he does not do it as pope; just as little could the king do an injustice because he would be the minister of God; if he still does it, he just acts not as a king but as a minister of the devil.[13] At the same time the same form of thought is expressed there this way: The king would not be the bearer of the divine spirit but of the law; and thus the king does not exist at all in the kingdom *ubi dominatur voluntas et non lex*.[14] Even during the civil war under Charles I the opposition loyal to the constitution, which maintained the indestructibility of the monarchy but nevertheless did not deny the errors of the king, was aided by the fiction that "the king in Parliament is conducting the war against the king in the royalist camp." In this way the idea of the indestructibility of the king turned into the next result that anyone who possessed the real power of gaining the crown must also be regarded the legitimate king. The person indeed became indifferent: whichever one ascends the throne always at that moment takes over the continuing kingship; thus in China, under the assumptions mentioned above, it was said that the victorious usurper simply has proved by his victory that the divine had already chosen him for its vessel. One would see precisely the fact that the Russian Czar was revered in a particularly radical way merely as the Czar, irrespective of his person, like an idol, as the underlying reason for the very frequent revolutions to which the Russian throne was exposed up into the nineteenth century. Still, with such a danger-

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[12] Emperor Zhou (1154–1122 B.C.E.), usually reported as given over to drink and beauties, and known for killing innocents and torturing honest officials—ed.

[13] The thirteenth century saying is given in a mixture of English and German—ed.

[14] Latin: where a will and not law governs—ed.

ously real discontinuity also of the 'Spirit' dwelling in the ruler that was precisely the bearer of the continuity, which threatened the monarchical form, this still thus included an immense advance on the side of self-preservation when one disregards the raw substantialization of 'Spirit.' Because the principle, that the king does not die, makes it evident that the king is conceptualized already as existing in his *spiritual* personhood. This allows for imagining much more readily of a continuation, for believing in an immortality, as the physical person, whose death is not even to be discussed. Thus the further one goes back in culture, the physical personality of the sovereign is all the more important and the dangers of instability are consequently all the greater as well. In the earlier German empire, it was still regarded a disgrace to the empire if the king lost an eye, and in the ancient Orient, defeated pretenders to the crown were often rendered forever incapable of governing by mutilating their ears. The body is more assailable than the spirit, and at the same time the identification of the state-idea with the king is all the more subjective an idea; the more distant the objectification, the more it is the *corporality* of the sovereign that would bear his sovereignty. There remains one of the most important sociologically foundational concepts concerning these primitive imperfections and insecurities: The king is king no more as a person but on the contrary, his person is only the vehicle, irrelevant in itself, for the abstract kinship, which is only as permanent as the group itself whose pinnacle it forms. By its objectification in the immortal office the principality attains a new psychological force for consolidation and cohesion within the group while, especially with the expansion of the group, it (the principality) obviously had to lose the old psychological force founded on mere personality.

Thus the concept of the unity of the sovereign power that corresponds to the unity of the group—the logical prerequisite of its self-preservation—is set on a completely new foundation. As long as the highest sovereignty as something immortal has not yet superseded the mortality of the sovereign person, a certain absoluteness is bound to it in the sense that an organizational composite of sovereign power from separate elements (e.g., king and parliament) is actually impossible. For this always has an objective impersonal nature that is incompatible with the pure personalism of a power born and dying with its holder; that character of objectivity also contradicts the freedom with which a sovereign power that is always establishing itself anew gives itself its form. It is interesting to pursue this in the teachings of Bodin, who first derived indivisibility

from the nature of sovereignty as the highest power (1557).[15] Since he did not yet clearly separate sovereignty from the sovereign, a mixed form of the state seemed contradictory to him—for it would appear to him, in light of the personalistic concept, as a twosome independent of one another and thus equally high sovereignties within the same state. And as a result of the same logic, the constitutional limitation that the ruler imposes on himself, for example, does not hold for his successor, "since the latter would himself be sovereign." Thus this means: the monarchy persisting under all the changes of persons is not capable of an act, but only the person who not only imputes to the kingship the physical conditions of the person, such as mortality and indivisibility, but also its psychological peculiarities, such as moodiness and perfidy. This is only in an apparent contrast with the Italian principality of the Renaissance honoring the precise principle that private persons would admittedly be bound to their word, but princes may make promises for reasons of state and then break them as they wish. Since the principality was conquered mostly by individuals without a legal basis, by the highest personality, it was the sovereign freedom of the individual who was only masked with the state's interest and thus rejected any objective norm as a limitation through factors beyond the personal sovereign power. The abstract unity of the group is actually developed only in the separation of the perennial kingship from the transient king; thus without its efficacy and continuity being broken, this unity only allows a plurality in the personal accomplishments and limitations of the sovereignty. Out of the same motive, the request was put to Cromwell to wear the crown precisely for the sake of preserving the state in its legitimacy and freedom. Only as king of England could he decisively succeed to the objectively fixed prerogatives of the crown and the legal form of governance; as 'Protector,' he would lack sovereignty in name, in reality he could prolong it to the extent of the power of his sword. The supra-personal nature of the kingship, by which the vicissitudes of its individual bearers are mastered, immediately appears here as the vehicle for the preservation of the group in the sameness and unity of its form.[16] And this separation of the personal from the political

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[15] Simmel is probably referring to the French historian Jean Bodin, known for his *Six livres de la république* (1576)—ed.

[16] The special phenomenon, which might almost be called loyalty here, is associated with this formation: the unconditional individual dedication to a person, not because of the person but because the person is the bearer of sovereignty. This is not completely

extends even to the private sphere of the ruler. It may seem like the ceremonial that surrounds him should by no means, as it could appear, only glorify his person and strengthen its expression. It is rather the expression for the inapproachability of the person that one associates not with this person, but only with the king as king, just as much he is individually constituted, that is the meaning of the strict etiquette of the court. Experientially it is therefore a restraint not only for the subjects but even for the sovereign: as it binds them to a supra-personally regulated form of interaction with the person of the king, so it also forces him often into a form of expression independent of his personal inclinations and moods.

The first way in which the continuing existence of the group is represented in the survival of the sovereign and seeks to overcome the mentioned dangers to the principles of immortality is the heredity of the honor of being a king. The physiological linkage within the royal family reflects the same within the group. The continuity and self-evidence by which the existence of the group progresses through time cannot be expressed more accurately and suitably than in the replacement of the father by the one destined to succeed to the throne from the outset and the son prepared for it at any time—as accordingly, the fact that the Roman empire had not cultivated an orderly succession contributed greatly to the decadence of the Empire and government. The correlate

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the general suggestiveness of the concept of sovereignty in general, which admittedly also characteristically produces devotion-phenomena. Rather it is only a matter of the ruler of the appropriate group. Bismarck once wrote, "I am loyal to *my* prince up into the Vendee, but I do not feel in any drop of my blood a trace of obligation toward any others to lift a finger for them." This feeling also exists outside of fealty, which is valid purely from person to person, since patriotism in general, which is valid only by chance for this or that person, is rather a third thing valid for the whole of the most useful individual phenomenon that forms a unity from the characteristics of the two. It is associated with the social unity, at the same time as the temporal sequence of its existence, being projected in a personal form that, however, lives its life from the essence of the group, not outside the person by whom it is borne. This particular feeling applies to a social supra-personal reality that still lives in the form of a fully personal one—thereby still giving a nuance to the piety of the priest, in whom the personality fades more before the ecclesiastical-divine mission—but it also applies to a personality that is the actual object of such reverence not because it is this personality but because it marks, as it were, a finite segment of the life of the group, in itself infinite—like we view with reverence many passing and in themselves perhaps unimportant phenomena of the external nature, in which we have a premonition of the laws whose timeless validity is represented in the coincidences in it. The thought that the king does not die produces the classic case of this type of feeling, which is a new principle altogether from the feeling of the purely personal sovereign.

of heredity is the unqualified security of the monarch on the throne. Then, where this security is absent, he will be mistrustful of his family most of all and seek to render them harmless, as occurred especially in the orient through killing, blinding, and placement in a monastery; and even this will readily lead to a dying-out of the lineage. Inheritance of the reign unfolds its meaning first when that condition is met by which inheritance also becomes the symbol as well as the bearer of the secure continuation of the group's form. Thus it was correctly noted that while Anglo-Saxon royal succession was originally absolutely determined by the personal war making ability of the sovereign, a time of the 'boy kings' could also come about—but only as the Westsaxon kingship had been consolidated by three long, unbroken, outstanding dynasties. The lineage of the throne became quite secure through these regimes going beyond the individual, and this security was expressed by those who did not meet the once-necessary personal conditions not being able to obtain the throne by means of the principle of hereditary ruler.

The group form was now maintained, so to speak, by its own power and thus only needed the ruler that belonged to it, but not his individual qualities. In another respect the English kingship developed an especially solid foundation for inheritance: through the medieval concept of chief royal dominion[17] over all lands and the demesne of the king—an interweaving of the royal family in which this property is inherited with the most enduring element of practical life—to which the German Empire has never brought its monarchy. The old English jurist thus treated succession to the throne in accordance with the principle of primogeniture, like inheritance in real estate. To the circumstance that the immortality of the group is oriented to the indestructibility of the land, as I explained, there arose an expression and means that is made clear in the immortality of the king and the in-principle indestructibility of his family.

Thus it was assumed for quite early times that large landholdings became one of the foundations for the origin of hereditary monarchy. In any case, outstanding wealth procured for the owner a position of leadership in the group. As long as it consists almost only of herds, however, it would be very precarious and could easily die off; only if it is less movable in nature, the chance exists for it to remain in hand for a long time, e.g. in a family. The stability characteristic of land,

[17] Simmel uses the expression *königliches Obereigentum*—ed.

though only in the hand of the leader, thus favors the stability of the form of the constitution. It lends the inheritance principle an adequate, as it were, foundation that is the same in form. The permanence of the state thinking is ultimately represented in the 'iron cattle' maintained on the domains. While inheritance of the sovereign office makes it independent of the qualities of the person (admittedly where its doubtfulness also exists), it clearly shows that the solidarity of the group had the combination of its functions in the unity, that it has become objective, and that it attained a continued existence and duration for itself that had nothing to do with the vicissitudes of the personality that represented it. Precisely the circumstance (on account of which the inheritance principle was so often called meaningless and dangerous) that it is purely formal in nature and thus can bring the completely inappropriate personality just as likely as the most appropriate into the position of governing—precisely this has a very deep meaning. For it documents precisely that the form of the group, the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, has become something purely factual and fixed. As long as the existence of the group is still uncertain and shaky, the highest, unifying apex can perform its function only by virtue of quite specific personal qualities. In general, social expediency also cares for this contest and for the selection process preceding the winning of governance in groups that are still unstable; as long as the group is still unsuitably organized, the leading personality must be so much the more 'suitable.' But where the form in which the group is preserved has already become firm and certain, there the personal factor can withdraw before the formal one and that type of government can gain preference which best brings to expression the continuity and the in-principle perpetuity of the group life so formed; however, it is the hereditary governance that represents in the most adequate and tangible form the principle that the king does not die.

Excursus on Hereditary Office

One of the major practical problems that are present in the nature of every social organization arises from the fact that the structure and interests of a society allow leading positions to emerge with exactly defined demands, objectively established functions—and the fact that only those individuals with the incalculable diversity and the fortuitousness of their talents, with personal happenstance hardly assuring their adequacy or inadequacy, are available to fulfill them. The fact that humanity fashioned society as its life form placed

into its foundation the deep contradiction between the objective demands, the supra-personal attitudes and norms that logical legalism develops purely from the reality of the situation—and the subjectivity of the personalities who must comply with that and not fit the whole of life, which is by nature vibrant and irrational, into the prescribed firmly constructed mold. It is not only a matter of the content of the one being agreeable to the content of the other, by an always happy coincidence; but it is a matter of something much deeper, that both are in their whole form and inner meaning foreign to one another, that the fluctuations of the individual existence, the personal life-processes as such, strive against the objectivity and steady intransigence of the demands from the social formation. An immeasurable portion of the history of our kind passes with the consequences of this contradiction and the attempts to avoid them.

Now there is a definiteness of personal life that is approached by being socially formed in this supra-individual established character: the reality of descent and inheritance; and in fact in a double sense, that the descendent is qualitatively similar to the father and grows in this natural similarity through education and tradition, and that a real community of interest, the feeling of inner and outer belongingness, the family unity, places the ancestors and descendents in a row that makes them the steps of a scale, without a qualitative similarity. In both ways, the fact of parentage and childhood reaches out over the fluctuations and happenstance of personal life. The inherited as the uncultivated similarity allows anticipating a substance that endures through the father and the son and, as stable in itself, is modified only somewhat differently by these different subjects. The functional solidarity of the family in turn becomes a counter-structure against the wider group; it stabilizes the isolated and wavering individual, but always as this individual, insofar as it carries that supra-personal association and is carried by the individual. While the transition of a social function from the father to the son or its persistence is generally fixed in one and the same family, this typical phenomenon manifests itself in its ultimate, instinctive suitability as an attempt to moderate the principal discrepancy between the objective social form and requirement and the subjectivity of the individual complying with it.

Perhaps this becomes clearest in the actual inheritance of sovereignty. Leadership in a group is originally won through usurpation on the part of an outstanding or powerful personage or through the selection of someone who seems suitable. The apparently irrational mode of inheritance replaces this subjective one; it can bring to the throne children, imbeciles, people unsuitable in every way. But each conflict or each evaluation, prior to the elevation of the subject based only on personal qualities, entails so many dangers and disruptions; all the contingencies and irrationalities of the mere individual are immediately pursued in this procedure so that this, at least in stable circumstances, prevails over all the evil chances of heredity. The supra-personhood of the group, its firmness in principle against the vicissitudes of a shear life process, is mirrored in the similar supra-personhood of its leadership, in which the son succeeds the father as he is created just as much a subject. And this objective firmness is so great that it outlives another form, wherein one often wants to unite the

advantage of inheritance with that of personal selection: namely, the ruler is selected, but only from the members of the ruling house. This was often the ancient Germanic custom, just as the caliphs in Spain selected their successors from their always very numerous descendents. Herodotus reports of the Chaonern in Epirus that they always elected their highest magistrate from one family, and the Athenian Archons were for a long time chosen from the royal house. Until the Jagellonian line died out in 1572, the Poles also chose their king without any regard to personal inheritance, but still from the royal house. The motive behind this procedure appears very clearly in a report about some Australian aboriginal tribes. There the chieftain is chosen from the sons of the deceased chieftain, and in fact the general view would be that the second son would be superior to the oldest in ability. If the choice should befall him or an even younger son, the oldest can challenge him in combat and, if he prevails, win the honor: he thereby simply proves that he is the more able one. The intent in this type also lies in the rationale that where the princely rank is abolished and dissolved into a number of individual offices; they are then monopolized, however, by the former princely family. Thus it happened often in the seventh and eighth centuries in Greece, where after the fall of the kingship, the Bakchiades family ruled Corinth, the Penteleides ruled Mytilene, the Basileides ruled Ephesus, etc.

Since the inheritance of office finds its meaning in the conjuncture of two motives—in the functioning of the person on whose individual power the performance is ultimately incumbent, and in the abolition of the excesses of individuality, as it were, its coordination to a supra-personal level—the most manifold combinations and accidents of a positive and negative kind are thus brought to awareness. Some princes have directly patronized the inheritance of office: thus Frederick II, the Hohenstaufen who limited the highest judicial positions to two families in which the study of law was hereditary; so also Louis XIV, who for a long time took his highest councilors from only two families, the Le Tellier and Colbert families.[18] In the latter case it was held as a motive that the king wanted to share state secrets with only two families; however, it was still the case that the individual member seemed to him to be suitable for the function through a family-limitation of it. Here this rose above one's purely personal responsibility as a family member; this uniting of the confidants entailed a seal against all outsiders, a seal that raised an inner defense against individual unreliability and temptation, which erected an inner protection against individual unreliability and vulnerability to being seduced. From this motive Sully[19] even arranged for the sale of the inheritance of judgeships; for if the office were fixed in a family, it would thereby be removed from the influence of the court and precisely that of the dominant party. While the individual receives the position of his father with certainty

[18] Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor, 1220–1250; Louis XIV, King of France, 1643–1715—ed.

[19] Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully (1561–1641), minister to Henri IV of France—ed.

and had to protect it for his son, he is on the one hand more independent than an individual selected from some place or other for the office; on the other hand, he carries a greater responsibility than if he had to arrange his administration on his own, beginning and ending with the limits of his own person. This latter motive becomes important in some selections for office that traditionally remain in certain families, as encountered in early English history and from where extremely favorable successions were noticed: neither the man who had to fear a not unforeseen and perhaps invincible competition nor one, who on the contrary, by mere birth, without any merit of his own, who is sure of honor and position, will establish his power so decisively and intensely, as the one who knows that inability in fact excludes him from election or re-election, however, ability procures it for him with certainty. This inconspicuous historical fact also covers one of the rules of life that are deepest and radiating out conspicuously in many social formations. Our life is arranged in such a way that we find ourselves in each moment in an in-between status of certainty and uncertainty about the results of our actions. To have absolute knowledge about this result would be to change our entire inner as well as outer existence in such a completely unpredictable way, as the absolute ignorance about it. Each of our actions takes a definite step on the scale of these mixtures; an infinite multitude of situations, decisions, and tests of power can grow out of the same content of our deeds, according to the share with which the knowledge and lack of knowledge blend in the expectation of its results. The example just cited only seems to show that the winning of dignity and power is not established through inheritance without any such regard for individuality, but by the meeting of subjective sufficiency with objective certainty—those elements precisely so mixed as to elicit a maximum of effort and ability.

Where, however, heredity attains a maximum of certainty and is thus no longer affected at all by the subjective quality of the incumbent, in many cases the office had to lose its importance. The major Castillian offices, e.g. the Admiral and the Constable of Castles, were originally of the greatest importance, but became hereditary in certain noble houses after Henry III[20] and quickly fell to merely honorary titles. Entirely the same occurred with the court offices of the Norman kings in England. As soon as the offices became hereditary, the real duties that were associated with them fell to a newly-existent category of officials. Only those offices that escaped being made hereditary still retained an importance for the constitution. It must be remarked concerning unconditional heredity, however, that the only thing that can be inherited with certainty is only the externality of the office, the title, honor, so to speak, the mere 'possibility' of function, which inevitably turns into an empty form since it is no longer borne by a selected individuality and infused with fresh blood. The deeper sociological meaning of the inheriting of offices appears to be that the objectivity of social formation interweaves with the subjectivity of

[20] Henry III of Castille reigned 1390–1404—ed.

personal performance. In the cases just mentioned, however, the latter factor sank to a minimal importance, whereby the whole meaning of this particular socio-historical construct, built from the interaction of both factors, then vanishes. This and other obvious dangers of the inheriting of offices gave a special importance to ecclesiastical honors that celibacy prevented from being inherited. While the major governmental offices in the German Middle Ages became hereditary in individual families, the king could still always move persons, through the bishopric and into the governmental service, who were commendable purely on account of their individual qualities. And in the era of the Norman rule in England and simultaneously in France even the highest political offices were often filled from the clergy, from whom alone it could not be feared that they were forming a monopoly of their power among their descendents. With this strong tendency toward inheritance in the Middle Ages it was from the start an advantage to the crown for no son to be available for a bishopric, who might have raised a claim to the dignity—which William Rufus,[21] for example, admittedly used to leave the bishoprics unfilled for a long time and take in their earnings for himself.

The solution that the inheriting of a function offers to the conflict between personal and supra-personal being is the information about a relatively primitive, little differentiated social condition. Certainly the official whom the family honor and family interest engage outside his personal relationship, who is educated in advance by the tradition of the predecessors for his occupation, is often the more capable and more reliable for the state; but obviously, this presupposes that the state places more weight on the general qualities of its functionaries, on what can be inherited and instilled, than on the characteristics of purely personal talents or suitability for very specialized tasks. Thus it is a matter of the cultural constitution of a public being not very differentiated in itself, in which one need not properly train and rationally employ the special kind of individual just yet, but needs sooner to seek to smooth the sharp edges of individuality. On the contrary, from the side of personalities, those particular capabilities and knowledge, which service to the community demanded at the time, were not yet gained in a purely personal way but came about only or most certainly through the tradition of the family entity. Generality and individuality had to meet in a certain state of disorganization and undifferentiation in order for the inheritance of an office to allow for a social purposefulness and to counterbalance its risks. These sociological conditions and results extend beyond the uniquely governmental offices. The gainful occupations are hereditary in many past social situations; the work not only actually passes down from father to son, but it is partly required by the public authority, and the taking up of another occupation is not at all permitted; it is also partly protected in that competition is kept away and patronages are tied to the familial engagement in the occupation. Here, the occupation also

[21] Third son of William the Conqueror, William II of England, called Rufus, reigned 1087–1100—ed.

has the character of a public office. The free exercise of personal powers is not yet suitably formed in order to provide the community with the activities needed by it, but it requires regulation and a certain pre-determination; the individual for his part does not yet find the possibilities of training and utilization of his work in the mere establishment of society but remains dependent on hereditary tradition and the collective force of the family for that. The refinement and strengthening of the public entity on the one hand and the greater independence of the individual on the other led beyond the inheritance of the occupation and even in fact near to where the character of the office first remained. Guild membership in its prime was regarded as a public office and was at the time completely non-hereditary, as the cities began their great development with the decline of feudalism. This was generally the time in which the feudal relationship of official function to the possession of land—obviously the most decisive vehicle of inheritance—was loosened, when the more powerful and, so to speak, more abstract form of political entities gave offices more and more the character of public law. And then the personality of the office, in principle, corresponded to that, which excluded every inheritance. Thus all sociological development seems to follow a typical pattern: the more purely and widespread the spirit or center of a group is elaborated, the higher the capacity and latitude of the whole increases for the personalities who bear the whole to become individual that way. The enlargement of the social group goes hand in hand with the formation of the individual.[22] The expanding, the growing weight of the abstract governmental or societal concept that makes it independent of the narrower aggregates of familial or locally connected groupings thus designates the independent differentiated individual personality ever more for social functions. This higher social structure leaves only the still completely general rearing and equipping of the future official to the family, but it makes available for his proper education the means that have become objective and that belong to the public entity. It thereby purchases the right to a completely individual and unprejudiced selection, so that family inheritance establishes no legal right to the office any more—a process that obviously is still far from complete. Consequently not the particular individual families but the sociologically related groups of the class, stratum, and 'circles' nevertheless provide even today the particular categories of public officials. It reveals the immense socio-historical import of this development, so that it applies not only to the actual officials but to countless 'statuses' formed by social usefulness, which are seemingly filled through private involvement and personal happenstance. In reality, however, this tends to produce a much more circumscribed group; society has not yet achieved the purely individual designation process but counts on so much preparatory work of the family and the stratum on the person that a certain general inheritance of these 'offices' exists as an equivalent. What remains as the underlying motive is the proportion between the objective determination

[22] The last chapter considers the explanation of this relationship.

and performance of the social totality and the subjective uniqueness of the individual, which is only now pulled asunder in a definite measure: what the society does for its officials has become more; with that, the differentiating selection and the individual freedom to choose the occupation have become greater. But each of the two is not yet developed to the highest degree at which the mixed state and the heritability of the function would be wholly and absolutely superfluous and superseded. Some stages of the social development reveal the contradiction to be ripe for that polar separation, while inertia still keeps the state of inheritability in place. The guild lost that free constitution that I mentioned above, and to the degree that its form no longer sufficed at all for the economic demands it became an inherited property of its members, so that at the time of its worst ossification and exclusiveness it was generally accessible only to the sons, sons-in-law, and spouses of the widows of guild masters. That character of public office was lost at the same time as its being filled with the personality, and it remained only familial egoism, which through inheritance excluded any individual selection. For the present this problem is obviously the most burning one with regard to the aristocracy, whose nature and strength rest above all on the hereditary principle but which, perhaps, throughout the greatest part of history, militated against the principle of a higher centralization of the state. How its rights and duties are bound up with property, how its hereditary candidacy is justified by a certain state position, depends on whether upbringing, tradition, and education reproduce in it the proprieties for all of them, as the state still cannot do without it; because the state pays for its incompetence, which the required functionaries by themselves alone exemplify, it must be content with the relative renunciation of individual choice and the protection of a certain type of its officer materials as the biological inheritance and the historical tradition produce it.

The not too frequent, seemingly isolated fact of the actual inheritance of office, as it results with all this, marks a specific stage of the large process between the individual and collective elements and tendencies of history. The liveliness of this process springs forth always anew from the double posture that replaces the social interest in the individual person: society comes from the fact that its element is an individually varied one, that it possesses certain qualities that distinguish that element from others; but it also depends on the fact that it would be the same or similar to others, that it does not stand out, but fits in a series of continuous quality. Individuals being similar to their parents and becoming similar to them through family tradition meets both requirements, insofar as they are fixed in their qualities and intended for specific courses of life and activities on the one hand, but on the other hand again this personal fixedness is still maintained at the level of one social arrangement. The inheriting of a social function or office expresses this subjective situation as it were, in an objective reflection. It also presupposes a personal peculiarity in order to be socially useful as a limitation of it to a general, traditionally regulated level. It thus demands and fixes a certain close relation between the individual and social factors, admittedly preparing the replacement of this by the higher form, in which both parts achieve higher rights: the individual, in that this can make personal activity a matter of choice and base it on qualities that are

independent of their relation to the individual's generational line, and to the extent that the society allows the individual freedom for them, it obtains on its part the full freedom of the choice of its functionaries. The equality of the relationship of both components, through this sociological form, corresponds to the equality of freedom, which evolves beyond itself.

The objectification of the solidarity of the group can also strip off the personal form so much that it links itself to an actual symbol that appears as much the cause as the effect of this solidarity. During the Amphictyonic League[23] associated with the common maintenance of the Delphic Temple, the Panionion, the league temple of the Ionic city league, was erected as the symbol of the already existing alliance. So in the German Middle Ages the imperial jewelry appeared as the visible aspect, as it were, of the imperial thought and its continuity, so that the possession of the jewelry procured for a pretender to the crown a considerable advantage over the competitors, and this was one of the factors that visibly supported precisely the legitimate heirs in their candidacy. It was a great help for Henry I that Conrad I sent the insignia of the crown to him, and for Kunigund that Henry II had later sent it to him.[24] Its delivery to the rightful new sovereign confirms the death, and reinforces the new ruler in his position. As military service became troublesome for the citizens of the larger cities in the Middle Ages and they encouraged journeymen with payment for it, they often retained in peacetime the organization that was once introduced by keeping the banner, since the banner conferred their community the character of being a guild. And it is notable that a violent rebellion of the Landau millers' and bakers' journeymen in 1432 began with their raising a banner on their lodge. Among the ancient Arabs each tribe led with a banner in war, but if several were united into a combat force, they

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[23] A league of ancient Greek nations connected to the temple of Demeter at Anthela and the temple of Apollo at Delphi. It was involved in four 'Sacred Wars,' *circa* 595 B.C.E. to 338 B.C.E.—ed.

[24] Conrad I (d. 918) was elected king of Germany but was never elected emperor. Emperor Henry I, a Saxon called "the Fowler," reigned 918–936. Emperor Henry II, also from the Saxon dynasty, reigned 1002–1024. Kunigund is evidently Conrad II, who reigned as emperor 1027–1039, the first of the Franconian or Salian dynasty. Both Henry I and Conrad II marked new dynasties and thus needed recognition to assume the imperial throne—ed.

led with only a single one that indicated their unity, and its bearer was the most prominent person in the war.

In view of the destructibility of a material object that nevertheless cannot compensate for it, as it can a person through the continuity of heritability, it is very dangerous for the group to seek such a support for its self-preservation. Some regiments lost their solidarity as soon as their flags were taken; various leagues dissolved upon the loss of their shields, their chest plates, and their Grail. Because the Hungarian crown kept this symbolic importance for an especially long time, it still stirred up violent unrest under Joseph II once, as it was transferred from Pressburg to Vienna; with the return of the crown these disturbances immediately abated.[25] In the Middle Ages it was especially the seal that symbolized the unity of a group and allowed it to appear to be an autonomous moral person. After an uprising against Emperor Charles IV in Frankfurt, his judge decided in 1366—after highly treacherous letters of the guilds were discovered, who affirmed under oath however that "they were sealed behind their back"—that "all seals of the guilds would be taken from them and not only smashed but also the possession and use of all association seals of the guilds together with those of all other associations" were to remain "forever prohibited."[26] In relation to this, the destruction of the shield of a community appears everywhere as a very real means to strike it, as it were, in the heart, to dissolve its unity. As the commune of Corbie was dissolved in 1308 due to debts and liabilities and its rights reverted to the king, the clapper was taken from the great bell as a sign that the commune had ceased to be. As the skilled workers' associations appeared to oppose the mercantile-despotic tendencies of the government under Frederick William I, the department head wrote to the king about the skilled workers: "these people conceive of themselves as though they formed a special *corpus* or *statum in republica*.[27] Thus he suggests "that the underworld plaques, journeymen's emblems and their other idols be destroyed *cum ignominia quadam*[28] so that they constitute no particular *corpus* as they now think." And a law of the English reaction specified in 1819 that the holding of

[25] Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor 1765–1790—ed.

[26] Charles IV, Holy Roman Emperor 1347–1378—ed.

[27] Latin: body or type of government. Frederick William I, King of Prussia 1786–1797—ed.

[28] Latin: with a certain ignominy—ed.

an assembly "with flags, banners or other emblems or ensigns"[29] would be punished with several years of imprisonment. Where social solidarity is, in the mean time, lost on the way, one can well say that it must have already been greatly weakened internally and that in this case the loss of the external symbols representing group unity is itself only the symbol for it, that the social members have lost their coherence. Then, where that is not the case, there the loss of group symbols has not only no power to dissolve, but directly has a power to unite. In that the symbol forfeits its physical reality, it can work as mere thought, yearning, ideal, something much more powerful, deeper, and indestructible. These two opposite effects of the destruction of group symbols for the solidity of the group at the same time allows one to observe what the destruction of the Jewish Temple by Titus had by way of consequences. The sociological importance of the Temple of Zion was that it gave the purely fluid solidarity of the Jews, who were obeying the Parthians or the Romans and speaking Aramaic or Greek, some tangible focus. What it indicated in itself was wholly indifferent for this; it was only the visible aspect of a functioning community, the possibility of binding together again the scattered and internally torn Jews at a point of, so to speak, real ideality. Now its destruction had the purpose of dissolving the Jewish priestly state that was a contradiction and danger for the political unity of the Roman Empire, compared to a number of Jews not many of whom had invested much in this centralization. In particular, it greatly furthered the loosening of the Pauline Christians from Judaism. For the Palestinian Jews, however, the break between Judaism and the rest of the world was thereby deepened, and its national-religious unity was raised into a despairing force by this destruction of their symbols. Thus the annihilation of group symbols affects the self-preservation of the group in two ways: destroying, where the solidifying interactions of the members are already weak in themselves, and strengthening where they are so strong in themselves that they can replace the lost tangible symbol with a spiritualized and idealized image.

The importance of a material symbol for the self-preservation of a society will now be much increased if beyond its symbolic meaning it also represents a real property, if the centralizing effect of the object thus depends on or is increased by the material interests of all members of the group being met within it. In this case it becomes especially impor-

[29] Simmel quotes these words in English—ed.

tant for the maintenance of the group to secure the common property from destruction, somewhat as one would do with the personal center of the group through the immortality of the king. The most frequent means for this purpose is mortmain, the regulation that the assets of a corporation, which should be such in perpetuity, are inalienable. As the passing of the individual is mirrored in the corruptibility of possessions, so are the immortality of the association in the inalienability of its property and the unavailability of that property for sale. Especially the ownership of the church corporation was like the lion's den, into which all went in but from which none came back out again. But just as for the highly-placed persons the immortality in no way means the desire to prolong ordinary life, the longing for a mere quantity of life, but should symbolize a certain quality of the soul, a grandeur of its worth above earthly happenstance only expressed in that way—so the immortality of property did not at all only serve the greed of the church but was a symbol of the eternity of the principle with which it was associated. Mortmain created the union of an indestructible axis and center, an invaluable means for the self-preservation of the group. It supported this character of mortmain that its possession essentially consisted in land and soil. In contrast to all movable property, especially money, real estate manifests an immobility and permanence that makes it the most suitable matter for the mortmain form of property, and its local character and fixed opportunity cause those who share in it to have a fixed point to which they are always, as it were, oriented—be it directly or within their interests—and can invariably encounter themselves. Over and above the material advantage admittedly imparted by it, it is an ingenious means for the group as such to maintain and preserve its form.

However, precisely this fact often involves the group in a conflict of a typical sociological importance, and indeed because of that it is inclusive of political society since the group that is promoted in its self-preservation is only a part of an always greater one. Almost all human forming of society, having the same character as well as content, labors at consolidating each individual segment into social unities that cultivate a tendency toward egoistic self-preservation in themselves. Their form and tendency replicate on a small scale those of the total group of which they are a part, but they also thereby simply place themselves in opposition against this group. The role that falls to them as a part and limb of an encompassing whole is not really compatible with the role that they themselves play as whole persons. I come back to the

principal side of this tragic relationship that recurs within every larger society and note only here how greatly it marks mortmain. While, as I explained above, it is of the highest importance for the existence of a self-contained total group that it possesses a land and soil as a solid foundation for its unity and demarcation, it can become alarming if a part of it simply demands the same thing for itself. The conflict of interests thusly established between the part and whole is manifest immediately in the fact that mortmain demanded and obtained freedom from taxation most of all, and indirectly, though significantly, that it was often a disadvantage to the national economy if such properties were removed from the flow of commerce. The modern suppression of the natural economy by the money economy admittedly not only allows the domination of the phenomena that are contrary to basing life generally on land ownership, but it led definitively to conditions changing over to the money economy that actually converted land ownership into a matter of possessing money. The Catholic congregations in France, for example, have largely converted their landholdings into money for decades because this directly promised them greater security: Money is allowed to be hidden more easily, attributed more readily to straw men, and more readily withdrawn from assessment and taxation than is real estate. While they mobilized their assets, they kept—by means of the safeguards of the modern legal environment that is replacing the substantial permanence that formerly real estate alone guaranteed—the advantages of the earlier form of mortmain while avoiding all the disadvantages that ensued from its inflexibility and immobile bounds. For the state, however, the danger of these accumulations of property of mortmain did not thereby lessen; their property in France was estimated some years ago to be up to eight billion franks—a substantial amount, which with its consolidation could very well use its cards against the state. The solidity of the social continuation that springs from the indestructibility and indissolubility of property works as a thorn in the side as soon as it is a matter of a part of a larger group, and what is self-preservation for just this part of a group becomes, from the point of view of the interests of the encompassing group, a stiffening and constriction of an organic limb and directly opposes the self-preservation of the whole. The noxiousness of mortmain was recognized very early. For example, the 1318 Frankfurt city peace settlement stipulated that within a year all the orders had to sell the properties that had been given to them; the same intent is revealed in the fifteenth century when the city ordinance of a Frisian town prohibited the clergy from build-

ing houses *of stone* without special permission of the city council. Such phenomena are typical in England from the Anglo-Saxon era since the clergy there was closely interwoven with the life of the community and had fully recognized the involvement of their land properties with communal responsibilities. Nevertheless already near the end of the Anglo-Saxon kingships the size of church properties in land was a difficult hindrance to the administration of the state insofar as it denied the king the means of remunerating his warriors. And the same apprehensions about mortmain for the whole state were also recognized in the structures indirectly or only minimally dependent on the church: in 1391 an English law was enacted that simply prohibited permanent corporations such as guilds and brotherhoods from acquiring lands! From the same point of view, the modern era struggles against the pleasure of the aristocracy pursue a quite parallel purpose: to create an objective organ that is free of the vicissitudes of individual fates for the unity and continuation of the family. Here too not only would there be the economic basis in the inalienable and indivisible property by which the continuity of the family is maintained under all circumstances, but at the same time a central point for family solidarity; the continuation of the family would be guaranteed not only in its material conditions but also in its sociological form. But here also—at least according to the opinion of many—this centripetal self-preservation of a small group is set in contrast to the self-preservation of the surrounding political totality, which, to be sure, wants to be an absolute entity and can therefore permit its parts just a fragile and relative existence—even while the absolute self-preservation of the parts makes that of the parts of the totality into a lose and endangered one.

Modern associations occasionally seek to replace these basic ideas of mortmain and cross-generational inheritance, with their enormous importance for the preservation of the group, with other forms having the same purpose—the thought that the fortune of the group is removed from the individual's disposition and strengthened as an independent objective structure, surviving untouched all instances of change in the individual. So some clubs bind their members through this practice so that when a member leaves, the payment of dues to the organization is not refunded.[30] It is thus documented that the group with its interest is

[30] How much groups facilitate and impede the entry and exit of individual members pertains to the quite essentially sociological characterizations and differentiations of the

placed completely beyond the individual member's sphere of interest, that it lives a life of its own, that it appropriates completely for itself the assets thereby gained for it, fully frees them from their individual owner and restores so little to them, as an organic body is capable of giving back to its possible previous bearer the nourishment that it once incorporated into its inner circulation. The old English labor unions that levied only low dues had the experience of their members joining and leaving with great ease. This changed with the increase of the dues. If a subdivision is dissatisfied with an activity of the whole union, it will think seriously before leaving since this entails the loss of its share of a considerable sum that accumulated over time. The continuous and intrinsically permanent preservation of the group is supported by not only this *modus procedendi*[31] but especially also by the same *modus* having to make psychologically vibrant in each member the idea of a

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social interaction. From this point of view one could set up a scale for all social creations. Groups for whom having many members matters because they draw their power from the shear volume of them, will generally facilitate entry and make exit burdensome. In contrast aristocratic groups will in general make entry difficult; but directly to the extent that they internally take much pride in themselves they will facilitate exit, so to speak, since these become the ones who do not want to take part in the prerogatives of the aristocracy, because they do not wish to stop those who do not want on any basis to assume the responsibilities of the group. Meanwhile within the nobility there emerges that formal relationship of the whole to the individual, the highest climax of which we already noted earlier with the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church, of course, has always had the tendency to treat heretics or those suspected of secession, as well as unreliable types, as self-evidently belonging to it as long as possible, and to overlook what separated them from her, as though it was not said; but the moment when that is becomes no longer tolerable, it tends to eject the heretic and the dissident with absolute decisiveness and without any compromise or without any transitional appearances. This practice encompasses a great part of the power and cleverness of the Catholic Church: the enormous broad mindedness, so long as it is still possible to fend off dissidents from within, and conversely its radical repulsion of them as soon as that is no longer possible. It has thereby combined the advantages of a maximum extent with those of a clear boundary. With regard to belongingness, the relation of the individual to a group stands under the formula: "The first sets us free, with the second we are vassals"—at another time, however, also under the exact opposite; then again entrance and exit are equally easy or equally difficult. The difference of the means through which both ease and difficulty occur is to be further noted: whether they are economic or moral, whether they do this as external law, as egoistic advantage of the members, or work as the inner influence of these. All this would require a detailed examination, the matter of which would be all existing types of group and in which the latter form-problems of their life must cross and in fact it would require an examination of two essential categories: the group life in its supra-personal being-for-itself and the relationship of the individual to this social union.

[31] Latin: modality of proceeding—ed.

supra-individual existence of a group unity independent of all personal preferences. 'Irrevocability' is also the technique by which the principal unity of the group is expressly realized and made clear. So some communities have the principle that the decision, once it is legally taken, is not changeable at all. A Greek religious community that wanted to discuss anew a rule that had been accepted for years, began with the explicit explanation: it should be allowed to decide contrary to what was earlier established. What is once decided according to the rules of the community appears in such cases to be part of its life, a piece of its being and therefore unchangeable; its 'timelessness' is documented in this, that the earlier moment, in which the decision was made, is inseparable from every later moment. This social technique of self-preservation recurs with greater force in the rule of certain clubs that even upon its dissolution the club's assets should not be divided among the members, but donated to some organization having a similar purpose. Here self-preservation no longer involves, so to speak, the physical existence of the group but its idea, which is likewise embodied in any other group that inherits it, and whose continuity should be maintained and shown precisely in the transfer of the property to it. This relationship is appropriately recognized with clarity in many of the French worker-cooperatives of the 1840s. The regulation is found in their statutes that the union property must, under no circumstances, be divided out, and this idea is set forth there that the associations of the same trades often formed syndicates in which each union turned over its indivisible fund in order to create a group treasury in which the contributions of the individual associations thereby merged into a new and objective unity, as the contributions of the individual did in the funds of the individual associations. A variation, as it were, of the thinking of these individual associations was thereby created; the syndicate was the embodied abstraction that turned into a self-subsisting entity of interests creating social entities that until then had existed only in a form of association that was characterized by more individual, more solitary contents. Thus the social motive of these associations was raised to a height at which, if no other forces had affected it destructively, it could have been maintained in complete security against all individual and material vicissitudes.

I come now to another type of means of social self-preservation that is detached from any reliance on an external connection and is secured purely mentally. Inside the ideal sphere there is nevertheless a

rich array of security that fundamentally differs in its importance ever so little from any substantial ones, though of course ultimately the latter also have their mental importance according to their sociological effect. First in order are the feelings that are directed admittedly at a social object but still imply only subjective states: Patriotism for nation and city, dedication to the religious community, family feeling, and the like. All this is so immeasurably important for the preservation of the group that it still remains thusly interwoven into the life process of the subjects and differs from those socially oriented processes whose content has coagulated around a fixed, albeit only ideal structure or is derived from such a one, such as the moral imperative, honor, or law. Morality may yet be autonomous in that way; its power draws from the freedom and self-responsibility of the soul, its content from its individual uniqueness—these nevertheless stand as an objective structure before the soul as a norm for which the reality of its life possesses the various activities of conforming or not conforming to it. Law too—in what it means to us internally and beyond its concrete organs—stands before us as an ideal object, as a norm that binds us purely psychologically and yet as something supra-personal, since the compelling power of law (I am speaking here essentially of the field of criminal law) does not lie completely in our having to do or refrain from doing something; law can only force us to suffer the penalty for a failure to act or refrain from acting, but it has no physical power to impose these matters on the inside of the will itself. Between these two forms in which social self-preservation enjoins its commandments on us, there is a third whose pertinent meaning I want to examine as a type: honor.

If one were to bring these types of norm to their completely articulated expression, setting aside the overlapping and exchange of content, law brings about outer purposes through outer means, morality effects inner purposes through inner means, and honor, outer purposes through inner means. They can be further arranged in the following order: morality, honor, law—thus each previous one covers the area of the following one, but not the other way around. Complete morality encompasses in itself what honor and law require; complete honor encompasses what law requires; law has the narrowest scope. Because law only requires that which the self-preservation of the group absolutely cannot do without, it must establish an executive that enforces the laws externally. Morality wants to regulate the total behavior of the individual (only that relevant to the social group concerns us here), and no constraint similar to the constraint of the law is allowed to be

enforced within this area; it remains dependent on the good and bad conscience. Honor takes a middle position: an injury to it is threatened by penalties that neither pure inwardness of moral reproach nor the corporal force of the legal sphere possesses. While society establishes the precepts of honor and secures them with partly inwardly subjective and partly social and externally perceptible consequences for violations, it creates for itself a unique form of guarantee for the proper conduct of its members in those practical areas that law cannot encompass and for which the guarantees through moral conscience alone are too unreliable.[32] If one also examines the precepts of honor for their content, they always appear as a means for maintaining a social group's solidarity, its reputation, its regularity, and the potential to promote its life processes. And in fact, that middle position of honor between law and morality in relation to executive action corresponds to a similar one in relation to the extension of their spheres. Law covers the entire scope of the group whose vital interests form a unity; the forces of morality circulate inside the individual; they are closely bound with the self-responsiveness of the personal conscience; the actions and omissions, however, that honor demands is revealed as what is useful to the particular groups that stand between the large group and the individual. Every honor is originally the honor of a *status, i.e.* a form of life useful to smaller groups that are involved with a larger group and, by virtue of the demands on their members to whom the idea of honor pertains, maintain their inner cohesion, their unifying character, and their closure against even the other groups of the same larger association. Now what appears to us beyond this limitation as the general human or, put differently, as purely individual honor, is a more abstract idea made possible by breaking through the barriers between social ranks; indeed one can name no single act that would attack human honor as such, *i.e.*, every honor without exception: it is a matter of honor for ascetics to let themselves to be spat at; for the girls of certain African tribes it is especially honorable to have as many relationships as possible. So then those specific ideas of honor of circumscribed groups are essential: family honor, the honor of officers, honor in commerce, even the honor of scoundrels. While the individual belongs to different groups, he or she can participate in different honors independently of one another; that

[32] In Chapter 2 the corresponding formal position was shown to exist for custom as well.

already became important for us earlier as a manifestation of 'crossing' social boundaries: it can be that someone who lost family honor steadfastly protects commercial honor or, as a researcher, protects scientific honor, and vice-versa; the robber can strictly maintain the precepts of his criminal honor, while having lost every other honor; a woman can have lost her sexual honor and still be the most honorable person in every other respect, etc. The phenomenon that already thereby arises, of honor demanding some things but permitting others, indicates the origin of honor in the teleology of the particular group, *i.e.* what the honor of one group unconditionally prohibits is completely compatible with the honor of a certain other circle and with indifference toward it.[33] The subtle honor that the officer corps cultivated allows some latitude for sexual behavior, which is not compatible with the honor of men in some other groups. The honor of merchants, most rigorous in many respects, allows such an exaggerated hyping of the products that a similar transgression of the limits of truthfulness would make an official or a scholar dishonorable; honor among scoundrels reveals this most unmistakably. Now it is precisely seen that the positive precepts of honor are always the conditions for the inner self-preservation of the group; what they tolerate is what each group, perhaps in contrast to every other group, holds to be compatible with the honor of its members; the groups relate their members' behavior to those who remain outside, so long as it does not somehow act back on the preservation of the group itself, the affairs of the personality as such, in which the more freedom is compatible with the concept of honor, the less it is tolerant with respect to the sociological requirements. Because it only depends on, and indeed only with respect to, a narrower group firmly circumscribed within a larger one, honor allows for, indeed demands, various patterns of behavior that are forbidden by law on the one hand—the form of self-preservation of the large group—and by morality on the other hand—the inner self-preservation of the individual; dueling is the most glaring example of this.

What is easily deceptive about the sense of honor as a sociological expedient is precisely the circumstance with which this expedient celebrates its highest triumph: that it is successful in instilling in the individuals the protection of their honor as their most inward, deepest, the most personal self-interests. There is perhaps no point at which

[33] Indifference—Simmel uses the Greek *Adiaphoron*—ed.

social and individual interest intertwine that way, where a matter that is comprehensible only from the former that has assumed an imperative form that only appears to spring up from the latter. So deeply anchored here is the requirement of the social group in the foundation of the life of its members that honor even takes on a note of isolation, indeed in many respects an almost offensive note. It even includes those patterns of behavior by which the advantage of the circle does not lie in the immediate self-dedication of the individual, in the circles' boundaries overlapping one another, in the indiscriminate uniting of their activities or being, but simply in that each one of them 'keeps to itself'; here it is the mutual independence of the parts that keeps the whole in its form. The social group's vested interests decorated with the name of honor are invested in a sphere around the individual into which no other may penetrate without meeting with repulsion, and these interests are thus secured in their realization by the individual without rival interests. As one can consider it the specific effect of religion that it converts one's own salvation into a duty, so it is the effect of honor, *mutatis mutandis*,[34] that it converts one's social duty into one's personal salvation. Thus the aspects of law and duty as they relate to honor change into each other: the protection of honor is so very much a duty that law presses one to the most enormous sacrifices for it—not only brought upon oneself but imposed on others and passes over others. It would be wholly incomprehensible why society actually would urge the individual with so strong a social and moral accent to protect this purely personal good of honor if it were not the shear form and technique whose content and goal is the preservation of the group. In this context—and because here it is just essentially a matter of maintaining, not actually of advancing and developing—it is conceivable that society provides the individual this good from the outset so that the individual need not acquire it but only to not lose it: the presumption is that everyone possesses it. Society can proceed seemingly so liberally because all actions necessary for not losing this personal possession has hardly any other content than what is social. That presumption goes so far that society allows even the libeler, the adulterer, and the slanderer dueling with identical weapons with the person innocently offended; for in so far as one is still 'honorable,' one presupposes the possibility that one perhaps had a right to one's action. But of course,

[34] Latin: with the things changed also changing other things—ed.

every social stratum, as the social bearer of honor, cherishes this favorable presumption only for its members, while the members of another stratum, beyond those within it notoriously lacking suitable honor, are not 'capable of satisfying' anything. Honor forms in this way one of the most wondrous, instinctively developed means of preserving group existence, not despite but because of the purely personal form of its appearance and consciousness.

From such linkages of social self-preservation to an individual person, to an actual substance, and to an ideal concept we now come to the cases in which it depends on an organ arising out of a plurality of persons: the objective principle in which their unity is represented, even bears again its group character. Thus the religious community embodies its solidarity and its life motive in the priesthood, and the political community regards its solidarity internally in the civil service, externally in its military standing, the latter for its part in the officer corps, every enduring club in its board of directors, every fleeting association in its committee, every political party in its parliamentary representation. The formation of such organs is the result of the social division of labor. The interactions among individuals, in which every social formation consists and which determines a particular form of the character of the group as such, originally occur quite immediately among the individual members of society. Thus the unity of operation arises from direct agreement or mutual accommodation of interests; the unity of the religious community from the religious need of each pressing to join together; the military constitution of the group from the protection and trust interests of each man capable of bearing arms; the administration of justice from the immediate judgment of the community; the organization for leaders and the led from the personal preferences of the individual before others; the economic coordination from the immediate exchange among the producers.[35]

These functions performed by the interests themselves, the functions that effect social unity, come undone over particular subgroups. The interactions of members with one another are thus substituted so that all of these members enter into relationship with the newly established

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[35] I do not wish to claim that this logically simplest condition actually formed the historical starting point of further social development everywhere else. But in order to clarify the actual importance of the division of labor of social apparatus, one must presuppose it, even if it would only be a fiction, which certainly it is not in numerous cases.

apparatus for themselves; put differently: While wherever no formation of an apparatus occurs, primarily the individual members alone have substantial existence, and their association is a purely functional one, this association now achieves its own separate existence for itself, not only apart from all group members to whom it generally refers, but also beyond the individual members who support it or enrich it. Thus the business class is a structure existing for itself that as such performs its function as a go-between among producers regardless of personnel changes. Thus still more clearly, the office exists as an objective apparatus through which the individual officials only, as it were, pass through, and behind which their personalities often enough vanish—even more completely than with the individual ruler, whose individual position blends with its bearer so much more closely than a pluralistic government; thus the church is an impersonal organism whose functions are assumed and carried out by the individual priests but not produced by them. In summary, what one earlier thought incorrectly about living beings—that life, which is actually only just a kind of interaction among some physical atoms, is borne by a unique life spirit—is valid as a correct simile for social existence: what is a direct interaction in its origin becomes in the end a special structure that exists for itself. But this special structure performs its function only as a supra-personal totality, *i.e.* the function of the total group; for the rest, its individual members remain individual members of the group and as such are subject to the conditions under which the effectiveness of any apparatus places all members of the totality: merchants must purchase the objects for their personal needs just as judges are subject to the law that they carry out, tax collectors must themselves pay taxes, and priests themselves must confess. Apart from all these personages these structures of the division of labor alone represent the idea or power that keeps the group together in the relationship under consideration, and these structures, as it were, solidify from the functional into a substantive reality.

It is one of the most deeply ingrained and most characteristic facts in human nature that both individuals and groups draw considerable power and support from structures that they themselves first equipped with the energies and qualities necessary for them. The strengths of the subject that support its preservation and development are often indirectly expressed, so that they first construct an apparently objective structure, out of which these strengths then flow back onto the subject: thus we conduct ourselves like someone who is recruiting an ally into a war, but first allocates for himself all armed forces with which he

might come to his assistance. I am reminded of the idea of gods that people first provided with all possible qualities, values and sublimities created from their own minds, in order then to obtain seemingly from them the moral law and the power to comply with it. I am reminded that we introduce our own feelings, profundity, and meaning into the landscape in order then to bring home from it solace, significance, and stimulation. I am reminded how often friends and wives seem to enrich us intellectually and with leisure, until we recognize that all these mental contents stem from ourselves and are only reflected back onto us by them. If a self-deception lies in all such processes, it is certainly not without a profound usefulness. Certainly many of our natural powers need such an expansion, transformation, and projection in order to reach their greatest usefulness; we must place them at a certain distance from ourselves so that they work on ourselves with maximum strength—thereby the deception as to their actual source becomes manifestly very useful so as not to disturb this effect. The development of differentiated organs for individual social purposes often falls into this form type: the group forces are concentrated into a special structure that then approaches the group as a totality with its own existence and character; while it serves the group purposes, powers independent of it seem to extend out from it that are nothing like even the transformed powers of its members, on whom it now works back.

Meanwhile this transformation is something completely radical and creative. Admittedly we will recognize what high usefulness for the social processes the mere representation of collective behavior through the action of a smaller number of representatives already possesses; but behind or next to this significance of mere quantity stands a deeper and qualitative significance of transferring the functions of the whole group onto a smaller select subgroup. There is an analogy to this in global scientific recognition. No science can describe or formulate exhaustively the fullness of the actual processes in existence or those of the qualitative conditions affecting something. Thus if we use the concepts that condense in themselves what is unclear and, as it were, make them manageable, that is not only a representation of the whole through a part that is essentially identical to it; but the idea has a different inner structure, a different epistemological, psychological, and metaphysical meaning as the whole of the thing that is subordinate to it; it projects this whole at a new level, expresses the extensive not only with a smaller extensity but in a fundamentally different form

whose syntheses are no miniature picture of any immediate appearances of totality, but are autonomous structures derived from their material. Thus arise, as it manifests itself, completely new sociological phenomena, not only existing in a reduced measure when it raises the representing and leading organ above a group, as it were, as its extract or as the general concept over an immense area of many individual activities. That such organs are of such importance for the self-preservation of the group perhaps becomes clearest through a consideration of a counter example. The original federal constitution of Germany perished in part because the federation developed no such organs. It had representatives with individual powers, for sure, but these were of a purely individual nature; the precisely required function was given to an individual representative. But how a representative of this kind differs from an official is unmistakable from the legal as well as from the sociological standpoint, although it is often irrelevant for our present inquiry, and mixed cases and transitions also appear in history often enough. At this position it is essential that the representative has a greater relationship to the individuals and their sum, and to their individual interests; but the official has a greater relationship with the objective social unity beyond the individuals.[36] This latter relationship

[36] It is relevant that, as a fact of greater form sociological importance, the 'representative' as a rule is only an individual from the group who is not, by virtue of the commissioning, singled out through this coordinating activity in principle, while the 'official' may be regarded as a private person unto himself even as he stands *before* all the individual persons of the group as an official. This results in an important association where for example, employers and employees negotiate wage agreements. The German commercial law stipulates that such negotiations must be conducted only by 'participants,' *i.e.* by managers and workers as representatives of their respective groups. That may have a purely technical rationale in that one credits only the participants with the necessary expertise and interestedness. Sociologically, however, it has to do with the fact that the parties do not form the necessary and mostly not at all a 'legal staff' or anything like that at all. Especially on the employees' side the representatives are chosen as a rule at meetings of a wholly unchecked, fluctuating crowd; there is hardly any discussion about all of the people affected by the wage agreement sharing in the authority, and it lacks what would make this superfluous: the social unity, a totality outside of its members, of those who are by chance present or absent. Actually this is the typical situation of the 'representative,' *i.e.* of the member of a mass consisting of a sum of its members who is assigned by them and indeed, with suitable sociological logic, as a rule with an imperative mandate. In contrast the official, who acts out of a spirit of supra-personal group unity, possesses much greater freedom with regard to the complex of the actual members. Precisely in the difference from the situation of the worker's *representative* it is remarkable that the general secretary of the English trade union organizations, which are of course structured

is especially favored and it makes it clear that as a rule it is a matter of an office, an organization of more or several of them that form an even supra-personal unity, one including the individual only by chance. It did not come to that in the early German period. The unity of the group remained limited to the immediate interaction of the member persons. It condensed again on the whole into the idea of the objective state, for which every momentary existence for the individual would be, as it were, only a sample or representative, even as it thus solidified into the individual organs from which each one undertook a special social function and relieved the whole community of it. The threats to the self-preservation of the group that arose from this insufficiency lend themselves somewhat to being subsumed under the following three main concepts:

1. The mechanism for the division of labor enables an easier mobility of the social body. As soon as the whole group must take action for a particular purpose—for political decisions, legal finding, administrative rules, etc.—it will suffer from an enormous unwieldiness, and indeed on two sides. First on the physical or local side: in order for the group to be able to work as a whole, generally it must first assemble in a place. The difficulty and the languor, indeed often the impossibility, of bringing them all together generally thwarts numerous undertakings and puts others on hold so long until it is too late. In this respect a wholly instinctive functionality creates a difference between groups, in which the difficulty of coming together exists and in those where it does not exist. Compare the constitution of Athens and that of the Achaean League: in Athens an assembly of the people was held three times a month, and thus the people could rule directly since everyone could be present easily; the office holders had only to carry out their commands. In contrast, the Achaean League was so spread out that only a small fraction of the people could come to the meeting—two times a year. Thus, although in principle the League was as democratic as Athens, the office holders had to be vested with greater power and freer discretion; they were 'officials' to a greater degree, in the sense of being bearers of the group's unity that existed beyond its temporary members. But if this external difficulty of gathering is overcome, the

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absolutely democratically, possesses a quite extraordinary power because he attends to the business of the association as a permanent officer—and not as a 'participant,' and that he actually exercises a personal dictatorship in the union organization where he is the only permanent officer.

psychological difficulty of coming together arises: achieving unanimity in a large crowd. Every broadly viewed action of a crowd carries a ballast of misgivings, reconsiderations, side interests, and especially lack of individuals' interest in it, from which a social apparatus is disconnected to the extent that it is intended exclusively to serve this one tangible purpose, and it consists of relatively few persons. Such group apparatuses thus serve their self-preservation through an increased flexibility and precision of the collective action, in contrast to which the movements of total groups have a rigid and sluggish character.[37] The deficiencies of mass action are openly attributed to these physical and psychological difficulties where the representatives are not appointed because of special qualifications and factual knowledge expertise. Thus at the end of the fifteenth century an ordinance from the district of [Bad] Dürkheimer in the Palatinate speaks of matters "that would be too much and too difficult for a whole community to deal with; so they chose eight able people from the community who promised to represent all that a whole community had to do." So in innumerable cases of the simple representation of the many by the few, the concern is about this superficial moment: an organization of the few, even without specific privileges, clearly has the advantage, over a crowd with many leaders, of easier mobility, shorter meetings, and more specific decisions. Thus one could call this a *principle of the unspecialized apparatus*: what

[37] The greater mobility of the task-differentiated organ does not completely impede its having a conservative character, especially if it serves those interests that are quite central to the group. Indeed, this must be so insofar as it is intended to maintain group unity, around which the singular, individually determined goings-on in and among the group members swing with unpredictable scope and with a randomness unconcerned about unity. The principle of the group that was otherwise realized by its immediacy is transferred to the official, although perhaps not with the same consciousness and the same technical perfection. The moral regulation within Christianity offers a very clear example, where in the early period every community member was held to the same strict morality as the presbyter or the bishop. With the enormous expansion of Christianity, however, this became impractical; the members of the community fell back into the moral praxis accepted in the land. But it was expected of the officials of the church—and with success—that they preserve the special morality bound up with the nature of this religion. What was once the requirement for anyone to be received into Christianity now became the requirement for ordination. In this kind of phenomenon the conservatism of the officialdom rests on the deep social foundation, so that the societal function or rule is transferred on to it, those that were otherwise the responsibility of the whole group but could not be sustained by it in its development in breadth and variety, but requires a differentiated, specially designated apparatus. Thus the conservatism does not appear as a mere accident of officialdom but—admittedly making room for many regulations that are judged the same and contrarily—as the expression of its sociological meaning.

is qualitatively more that the representatives accomplish in contrast to immediate group action rests expressly on its being quantitatively smaller. The Roman state was originally the whole of its citizenry organized in the popular assembly; and the later jurists say that only the difficulties of bringing the much increased *populus* into one place for the purpose of making laws made a *senatum vice populi consuli*[38] advisable. The unspecified character of the representing or leading apparatus is brought to expression most radically when it is not even elected, but the position is simply rotated. No examples of this are necessary here; this modality is particularly notable only somewhat in the case of the first English unions, the 'trade clubs' that needed a committee around 1800; its members, without special election, "named it in the order in which the names appears in the book." Since the qualification of any one person for representation was most doubtful according to the mental standard of the worker, the mechanical rotation here clearly represents fully the overwhelming usefulness of the quantitative factor: that few act for the many.

Besides, the difficulty of locality is not only expressed in cases of a needed assembly of the total group; it also appears in economic exchange. As long as purchase and exchange occur only in immediate meetings of producers and consumers, both are evidently very clumsy and inadequate and must often be extraordinarily hindered by the difficulty of this local condition. Meanwhile, as soon as the dealer steps in between, ultimately a class of dealers systematizes the commerce and makes available every possible connection between the economic interests and an incomparably closer and stronger cohesion of the group becomes evident. The insertion of a new apparatus that intervenes between the principal participants causes not a separation, as the sea often does between lands, but a bond. The unity of the group that consists in the bond of each member with the other mediated in some manner must become a much closer and more energetic one on the basis of the activity of the business class. Through the lasting effect of the business class, a system of regularly functioning, reciprocally balanced powers and relationship finally arises as a general form, in which the individual production and consumption fit only as an accidental factor, and which rises above this, like the state does over the individual citizen or the church over the individual believer. What is

[38] Latin: people…senate as a consul of the people—ed.

especially important for the preservation of the life form of the group in this and similar cases is this: that the member appointed to the work of the organization not be able to abandon the duty immediately when there is nothing to do—while the form of interaction contingent on the immediate interchanges of the members is paralyzed in many radical ways if that member stops once and thereby finds much greater difficulties in resuming it. It also applies to the moments of strength of a monarchy: The monarch is always there, and in action, while the rule by the many wastes energy on the one hand and manifests complete lacunae in its active presence on the other. If the population was not gathered on the Pnyx[39] or in Ding,[40] the state activity slept and had to first be awakened, while the prince is always, so to speak, awake. As soon as the interaction has created an apparatus to support it, the potential for a resumption is embodied in it, even during every interruption of the interaction; and because of the primary immediacy of interaction, there arises a gap that perhaps no longer fills up, the bridge now remains yet to be walked over, it maintains unbroken the continuity of form and the chance in order to actualize it again at any moment. Finally, the following also applies to the social psychological motives that link the formation of social apparatus directly to the quantitative expansion of the group: as the sweep of what is common to all members is all the smaller, the more members there are whom it concerns, because, of course, the subjective as well as the objective diversity and distance among the individuals thereby increase. The common denominator in a very large group thus occupies a relatively unimportant place in the individual; its blending into the whole personality does not cover very much, and it is thus relatively easily dispensed with and turned over to structures beyond the sum of individuals.

2. Where the whole group of similarly oriented and similarly placed members must be mobilized for a particular purpose, there internal opposition inevitably arises, of whom each has *a priori* the same weight and for which each lacks the decisive authority. An adequate expression of this situation then occurs when the majority never decides, but every dissenter either thwarts the solution generally or at least is not personally committed to a resolution. This danger confronts the development of the social apparatus on at least two sides, not only with

[39] Meeting place of the Athenian assembly—ed.
[40] Old Teutonic tribal assembly—ed.

respect to the externally suitable action, but also for the inner form and unity of the group. First, an office, a commission, a delegation etc., will have greater expertise than the generality of other persons; it will thus be those frictions and oppositions that originate from a shear lack of expertise that will be reduced from the outset. The consistency of action that everywhere originates from an objective knowledge of circumstances and from the exclusion of vacillating subjectivity will thus be all the more characteristic of groups, the more the management of its particular undertakings falls under an apparatus specifically designated for them: thus expertise actually means already being unified in principle; while there are countless subjective errors, but with objectively correct presentation, all must arrive at the same result. Not so obvious is the meaning of the second one, with every related point. The lack of objectivity that so often hinders unity in the action of the collective is not always the result of a mere lack of know how, but often also of the very far-reaching sociological fact that the factions that split the group in some important area carry this division even into decisions that would not be a factional matter at all according to objectively tangible criteria. The formal reality of the division competes with objective insight as basis for decision. Among the daily and countless examples of this is a particularly consequential type, which the splitting of a group into centralist and particularistic tendencies brings with it. For there are, perhaps, few issues for which an importance would not be gained for those tendencies, quite beyond their inherent meaning and the objective basis of reacting to them. In certain controversies about poverty, perhaps, this appears all the more blatantly as partisan politics should be removed from this area because of its social-ethical character. At the beginning of the new German Empire, however, it was dealt with as a matter of whether a highest authority for poverty should settle only inter-territorial disputes or also the cases inside each of the individual states—the objective usefulness of one or the other regulation did not come into the discussion so much as rather stating the stand of the parties on particularism or unity. And objective usefulness did not even remain the decisive factor, as a 'yes' or 'no'; the party acted on its conviction in principle wholly apart from any objective justification. But the party must still consider how this 'for' or 'against' relates to the growth of its power in the immediate situation, how this or that will affect a personality important in the party, etc. The latter, by which every inner linkage between the stand of the party and its actual activity is preserved, is, as it were, an irrelevance of the second order; it still

rises in this way to one of the third order: the form of the party often generally makes the decision result no more out of a practical motive than out of an irrelevant motive, but in a question that does not affect the party problem as such the decision is 'yes' only because the opponent decided for 'no,' and vice-versa. The line that divides the parties over a vital issue is drawn through all other issues possible, from the most general to the most specific in character, and indeed only because one may no longer be pulling in the same direction as the opponent on the main issue at all, and the bare fact that the opponent decided for one side of any one divide was already enough for oneself to seize upon the opposite side. Thus the Social Democrats in Germany voted against pro-labor rules simply because they were favored by the other party or by the government. Partisan polarization becomes, as it were, an *a priori* of praxis of that kind that every problem surfacing at all immediately divides into 'for' or 'against' along the existing party lines so that the divide, once it has taken place, grows into a formal necessity of remaining divided. I will mention only two examples for the different kinds. As the matter of spontaneous generation emerged in nineteenth century France, the Conservatives were passionately interested in its refutation and the Liberals for its affirmation. Similarly the different directions of literature correspond to the issue of popular aesthetic education in different places, among other things. And even if some remote relationship of the individual decision to the whole world view of a party were to be found, the *level* of the passion and intransigence for each individual would be given only because the other party simply represents the other position; and if a coincidence had committed the one party to a degree for the opposite position, the other one would have taken the corresponding reverse one, even if it were actually unsympathetic toward it. And now the other kind: As the German Liberal Party split into two groups in the Reichstag on May 6, 1893, because of the military bill, the state parliamentary factions remained together until July. In the October state parliamentary elections, the same people who had worked together up to then suddenly acted as opponents. In the newly opened parliament a difference of opinion was maintained by no side in any question to be determined by the parliament; but the separation nevertheless continued to be maintained. The pointlessness of such factional forms is especially manifest, but also especially often, when the contrasts within a small group appear due to circles based on personal interests and are then replicated in the largest group's issues over which admittedly the same people decide,

but would make decisions from completely different points of view. In German agricultural districts, it was thus frequently observed that the farmers and the workers voted in parliamentary elections differently than the large landholder only because the latter is opposed to their preferences in local communal issues.

In addition to all that, what sets parties sharply against each other comes in and takes effect everywhere that a larger mass of people—which is precisely not seized by a momentary impulse—must resort to the rules. For inevitably factions will be formed in it whose power is not overcome by objective facts and is revealed at least in delaying tactics and annoyances, exaggerations and obfuscations. This power of the party as a pure form that appears in a continuous progression through the most heterogeneous areas of interest is one of the greatest obstacles to unity, indeed to realizing the actions of a group action at all. The transfer to special apparatus of group issues that are too prominent should remedy the disruption and obstruction. While these issues are constructed from the outset from the point of view of an objectively defined purpose, this is immediately further removed psychologically from the other interests and opinions of people. These groups as such simply exists only *ad hoc*, and it frees in the consciousness of the individual the *hoc*; the objective very sharply from all matters, from what is irrelevant, makes it more difficult for the amalgamations, either deliberate or naïve, to come with objectively irrelevant provisions. The activity of the apparatus thereby becomes much more unified, vigorous, and purposeful; the group achieves self-preservation to the extent that the waste of energy ceases, that lies in those intermixtures and the mutual paralysis of energies following from them and that is unavoidable in the immediate undifferentiated management of group issues throughout the group. Obviously this advantage is not without a downside. Admittedly, it is likely that officials, acting so to speak not on their own but on the basis of the idea of the group, will act out of duty, but also that they will act *only* out of duty. With the same objectivity that controls their undertaking and decisions, they will also limit the amount of their expenditure of energy and their subjective personhood, as they must not allow these to influence their actions *in official matters* nor use their *reserve of energy* more widely since it is objectively standardized. And the more thoughtful aspects of the personality also become more valuable; the warm-heartedness, the unconditional devotedness, and the generosity in not distinguishing between one's own interests and those of strangers will be turned off by the objectification of the apparatus. As

objectivity is everywhere the correlate of the division of labor, so what is praised as the objectivity of the official as such is simply the result of the differentiation with which officialdom grew up around objectively specialized purposive view points freed from the amalgamation, and therefore the divisions, of collective life.

3. If these advantages that are produced by the construction of an apparatus for the action of the total group for its own self-preservation, the, as it were, tempo and rhythm of the group-sustaining processes, they are thus extended further onto their qualitative features. Now here at first that psychological pattern is decisive, which has already become so often important for us: The collective action of the crowd will always stand, in an intellectual sense, at a relatively low level; for the point on which a great number of individuals unites must lie very close to the level of the one that stands lowest among them; and, moreover, since every high standing one can climb downward but not every low standing one can climb up, the latter and not the former determines the point at which both can meet: what is common to all can only be the possession of the one that possesses the least. This rule, which is of the highest importance for all collective behavior—from a street mob to scholarly associations—of course possesses no mechanically uniform validity. The level of the persons of high standing is not simply a more of the same qualities of which the low standing one has less, so that under all circumstances the former would possess what the latter possesses, but the latter does not possess what the former possesses. Rather, the superior person is distinguished in kind so much from the subordinate one in some respects that the former cannot at all negotiate on this point, either in reality or understanding: If the valet does not understand the hero, so also the hero does not understand the valet. Only the metaphorical spatial expression of high and low standing permits a belief in a purely quantitative difference, so that the higher person would need only to subtract the surplus in order to be on a par with the lower person. Also at the same time with the existence of so general a difference, which cannot pass into a unity through the suppression and paralysis of a quantitative majority, no really collective action can occur. It is possible here to go through something of that externally with another, but that happens only with energies or portions of the personality that are not those of the real *personality*. If a majority should actually act in unison, it will only happen along those lines that makes a descent from a higher level to a lower level possible. Thus it is already to err on the side of optimism for one to describe such a social level

as the 'average'; the character of a group action must gravitate toward not the average and not toward the midpoint between the highest and lowest elements, but toward the lowest. This is an experience affirmed at all times—from Solon on, who said of the Athenians, individually each one would be a sly fox but in the Pnyx[41] they are a herd of sheep, to Frederick the Great, who declared his generals to be the most reasonable of people if he spoke with each of them alone, but were sheep heads when gathered into a council of war; then Schiller summarized this in the epigram: passably clever and intelligent people *in corpore*[42] turn into one fool. That is not only the result of that fatal leveling downward to what the cooperation of a crowd causes. There is also the fact that the leadership will shut off the most spirited, radical, most vocal members in an assembled crowed, but not the most intellectually important, who often lack passionate subjectivity and the suggestive power to make them go along. "Now because the intelligent withdraw and are silent," says Dio Chrysostom[43] to the Alexandrians, "the eternal strife, the unbridled talk, and suspicions arise among you." Where it is a matter of excitement and expression of emotions, this norm does not apply since a certain collective nervousness is produced in a crowd that is gathered together—a being swept away with emotion, a reciprocally produced stimulation—so that a temporary elevation of individuals over the average intensity of their feelings may occur. Thus when Karl Maria von Weber[44] said of the general public, "The individual is a donkey and the whole is still the voice of God"—so is this the experience of a musician who appeals to the sentiment of the crowd, not to its intellectuality. Rather it remains set at that below average level at which the highest and lowest can meet and which is empirically open to a considerable elevation probably in the area of emotion and impulses of desire, but not at that of the intellect. Now while the preservation of the group on the one hand rests on the immediate relationships of one individual to another and in these every person rests on the collectivity, everyone overall develops one's own intellect, this is absolutely not the case in those matters, on the other hand, where the group has

[41] Meeting place of the Athenian assembly—ed.

[42] Latin: as a body—ed.

[43] Greek philosopher, circa 40 to circa 120 C.E., known to have dressed in rags and performed manual labor, and as one who spoke truth to power.

[44] Carl Maria von Weber (1786–1826), German composer, pianist, and conductor—ed.

to act with unity. One can call the former the molecular movements of the group, the latter the molar; in the former a substitution of the individual in principle is neither possible nor necessary; in the latter both are the case. The experience of the large English labor unions—to take one example from countless ones—has shown that mass gatherings often embraced the most foolish and pernicious decisions (hence the 'aggregate meetings' were called the 'aggravated meetings'), and most of them were undone at the pleasure of the assemblies of delegates. Where a larger group itself conducts its affairs directly, necessity requires that everyone to some degree embrace and approve the measure, and embrace and approve the norm of trivial matters firmly; only if it is turned over to an organization consisting of relatively few people can the special talent for its business be of advantage. Talent and know how, as they are always characteristic of a few among the many, must in the best of cases struggle every time for influence within the group gathered to make decisions, while the few indisputably possess it at least in principle in the specialized apparatus.[45]

[45] Undoubtedly contradictory phenomena also appear: inside the civil service petty jealousy often maintains more influence than the talent that deserves it, while on the other hand the large crowd may follow a gifted individual readily and without regard to their own judgment. For an abstracting science such as sociology, it is unavoidable that the typical individual associations that it depicts cannot exhaust the fullness and complexity of historical reality. Then the association that it asserts would still be valid and effective thusly: The concrete happening will still always include a series of other forces outside it that can hide their effect in the ultimately visible effect of the whole. Certain law-like relationships of movements that are never represented in the empirically given world with pure consistency also form in part the substance of physics, which in the empirically given world never represent themselves in their pure consequence, in which mathematical calculation or the experiment in the laboratory reveals them. Thus the established relationships of forces are no less real and effective in all the cases in which the scientifically established conditions respectively find for themselves their original components; but their course does not show the purity of the scientific schemas because in addition to them a series of other forces and conditions is always still having an effect on the same substance; the portion of it may be hidden from immediate observation in the results of this or that which actually comprise the actual events, only an imperceptible and inextricable part may contribute to the total effect. This shortcoming, which every typically law-like knowledge of a relationship in reality manifests, obviously reaches a climax in the cultural sciences, since in their realms not only are the factors of individual events interwoven into a complexity that hardly lends itself to being untangled, but also the fate of the individual which might be analyzed escapes being ascertained through mathematics or experimentation. Every connection between cause and effect that one may look at as normal in historical occurrences or psychological likelihood will, in many cases in which its conditions obtain, still not appear to take place. This need not make the correctness of its certainty erroneous, but only proves that still other forces beside that one, perhaps set in the opposite

Therein resides the superiority of parliamentarianism over the plebiscite. It has been noted that direct referenda seldom show a majority for original and bold measures, that rather the majority is usually on the side of timidity, convenience, and triviality. The individual representative whom the mass elects still possesses personal qualities other than those that are in the mind of the voting mass, especially in the era of purely party elections. Representatives add something that exists beyond what really got them elected. One of the best experts on the English Parliament says of it: It is held as a matter of honor for Members of Parliament not to express the wishes of their constituency if they cannot reconcile them with their own convictions. Thus personal talents and intellectual nuance, as are found only in individual subjects, can gain considerable influence in Parliament and even serve its being preserved from the division into parties that endanger the unity of the group so often. Admittedly the effectiveness of personal principles in Parliament suffers from a new leveling: first because the Parliament, to which the individual speaks, is itself a relatively large body that includes extremely different parties and individuals so that the points of common and mutual understandings can only reside rather low on the intellectual scale. (For example the Parliamentary minutes report mentally trifling jokes: Merry-making!) Secondly, since the individuals belong to a party that as such remains not on an individual but on a social level and level their parliamentary activity at its source; therefore, all parliamentary and parliament-like delegations are reduced in value as soon as they have imperative mandates and are mere means of delivery for mechanically collecting the 'voices' of the 'mass' into one place. Thirdly, because a Member of Parliament speaks indirectly, though intentionally directed to the whole country. How much this exactly determines the inner character of the statements is seen from the fact that the speeches in Parliament in seventeenth century England were already somewhat rather clearly and consciously directed to the nation as a whole—although no publication of the debates was thinkable at the time. But the necessity of directing it to a mass not only spoils the 'character,' as Bismarck has said about politics and how it reveals the moral instability of actors in a theater despite all the skillful

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direction, were at work on the individuals in question, which had preponderance in the total visible effect.

corrections, but it also ties down endlessly the often unbounded finesse and particularity of intellectual discourse. The representatives of the mass as such seem to have something of the mental instability of the crowd itself—wherein a certain desire for power, irresponsibility, imbalance between the importance of the person and that of the ideas and interests that one represents, and finally something of the very illogical but psychologically still understandable cooperation: namely, precisely the consciousness of standing in the center of public attention. Without evading motives of this kind, one could not comprehend the street-kid-like scenes that are rather common in many parliaments and rather uncommon in very few. Cardinal Retz already notes in his memoirs, where he describes the Parisian Parliament at the time of the Fronde,[46] that such bodies, though they very often include persons of high standing and education, behave like the rabble in their discussions in assembly.

Since these departures from the intellectual advantage of the formation of the apparatus are only associated with parliamentarianism, they are not encountered in other kinds of that formation. Indeed, as the development of parliamentarianism shows, even these disadvantages form at higher levels precisely a proof for the necessity of constructing the apparatus. In England the impossibility of governing with so numerous, heterogeneous, unstable, and yet at the same time barely movable a body as the House of Commons was, led to the formation of ministries at the end of the seventeenth century. The English ministry is actually an organ of the Parliament that behaves in relationship to it somewhat as the Parliament itself behaves in relationship to the whole country. While it is formed by the leading members of the Parliament and represents the current majority in it, it unites the collective stances of the largest group—which it, as it were, represents in a sublimated form—with the advantages of individual talents, as they can take effect only through leadership on the part of individual personages within a committee of so few, as is the case in a ministry. The English ministry is an ingenious means to compensate, by means of a further concentration

[46] The Fronde was a rebellion, 1648–1653, during the minority of King Louis XIV, by French nobles against the centralization of government power in the hands of the crown, a policy begun by King Louis XIII and his minister Cardinal Richelieu and continued by the regent Anne of Austria and her minister Cardinal Mazarin (Mazarini). Cardinal Retz was the 17th century archbishop of Paris—ed.

of the differentiated apparatus, for those deficiencies with which the latter duplicates the inadequacy of the action of the whole group, for the avoidance of which it was created. The English labor unions preserved the advantages of the parliamentary form in another way through its disadvantages. They could not properly manage themselves just with their assembly of delegates, their 'Parliament,' but with salaried officials they believed to have brought under their jurisdiction a bureaucracy that was difficult to control. The large labor unions helped themselves by employing such officials for the districts in addition to the officials of the whole union, and sent them to the parliament that had control over the latter. Through their close connection with their respective constituencies, the district officials had different interests and duties quite different from those of the officials of the federation, which kept them from forming a unified bureaucracy together with these officials. The two positions, as representative of a district and as the employed official of the latter, form mutual counterbalances, and the function that the ministry exercises in the regional parliaments is shared by virtue of this provision by the parliament itself—a sociological formation that was anticipated in the primitive kind of 'Council' of the German cities as it originated everywhere in the twelfth century. Thus its nature signifies that it presents an advance from an either purely representing or purely governing officialdom to one that represents and governs at one and the same time. While the council governed, it nevertheless did so as an apparatus, not as master—which was symbolized by it swearing allegiance to the city. And here an attempt appears with a technique completely different from that which determines the relationship of the English ministry to the Parliament, and yet with a teleology, similar in form, of uniting the advantages of a smaller group with those of a larger one with regard to practical governance. Around the year 1400, the Frankfurt council consisted of 63 members for a time, of whom however actually only a third always conducted business, in fact in regular one-year rotation; but in important cases the portion that held office was authorized to consult one or both of the other thirds. Thereby such advantages as the following were gained, which were tied to a having a large number of council members. The trust of the citizenry, the representation of varied interests, and the mutual control that works against economic cliques and at the same time those that are wedded precisely to a numerical reduction of the apparatus, a tighter centralization, an ease of communication, and a less expensive administration. The proof for the formation of an apparatus that

grows above and beyond the parliaments is no less to be drawn from the opposite. The immense waste of time and resources with which the state machine in North America moves itself forward, writes one of its best scholars, is due to the fact that the public opinion influences everything, but none has the kind of leading power against it, as are the ministries in Europe. Neither in congress nor in the legislature of each state do government officials sit with ministerial authority, whose particular duty and task in life would be to take the initiative for fields yet to be taken up, to coordinate the conduct of business through leading ideas, to take responsibility for the maintenance and progress of the whole—in short, accomplishing what only individuals as such could accomplish and what, as this example shows, can hardly be replaced with the collective action of the members of the principal group—here under the form of 'public opinion.'

Excursus on Social Psychology

This consideration of the results that derive from the alliance of particular group members with the leading apparatuses is so essentially of a psychological kind that to a considerable extent sociology seems to become another name for social psychology. Since I sought to establish the epistemological difference between sociology and psychology in Chapter 1,[47] beyond this boundary setting, a closer positive determination of the particular psychology that is termed 'social' is now necessary. For if one does not really want to assign individual psychology to the place of sociology, social psychology is still termed a problem area independent of sociology and therefore it being confused with sociology could become a danger for the latter. So that the methodical separation of sociology from psychology generally accomplished above—despite all the dependence of sociology on psychology—would be valid also with regard to social psychology, proof is needed to show that the latter possesses no fundamental uniqueness concerning what is individual. I am building this proof here from the basis emphasized above, even though it would have its place anywhere else in this book. Admittedly the fact that mental processes occur only in individuals and nowhere else does not yet sufficiently negate the theory according to which the psychology of 'society' (of crowds, groups, nationalities, times) along with the psychology of individuals has as an equally valid structure, but one that is heterogeneous in nature and bearing. Rather, from the particular structure of the phenomena, to which this opinion refers, it must be made comprehensible how the notion of social psychology could result, despite the evident limitation of mental life to the individual bearer.

[47] Pp. 21ff. (in the German text—ed).

The development of language as well as of the state, of law as well as of religion, custom as well as general forms of culture generally point far beyond every individual mind; individuals can indeed share in such mental contents, without however the changing quantity of these participants altering the meaning or necessity of those structures. But because they in their collectivity must still have a producer and bearer, which no individual can be, it appears that the only subject that remains is the society, the unity out of, and above, the individuals. Here social psychology could think it would find its special area of interest: products of an undisputedly mental nature, existing in society and yet not dependent on individuals as such; so that if they are not fallen from heaven, only the society, the mental subject beyond the individual, is to be seen as its creator and bearer. This is the point of view from which one has spoken of a mind of the people, a consciousness of the society, a spirit of the times, and productive forces. We raise this mysticism, which places the mental processes outside the mind, which are always individual, while we distinguish the concrete mental processes in which law and custom, speech and culture, religion and life forms exist and are real, from the ideal contents of the same that are imagined for them. It can be said of the vocabulary and the connecting forms of language, as they can be found in dictionaries and grammar books, the legal norms set down in law codes, and the dogmatic content of religion, that they are valid—though not in the supra-historical sense, in which the natural law and the norms of logic are 'valid'—that they possess an inner dignity that is independent of the individual cases of their application by individuals. But this validity of their content is no mental existence that would need an empirical vehicle, even reserving the just mentioned distinction, as little as the Pythagorean theory needs anything similar. This intellectual nature is also certain and does not lie in the physically existing triangle because it expresses a relationship of its sides that we find to none of the same in their existence for themselves. On the other hand this incorporeality of the Pythagorean theorem ist also not the same, however, as its coming into thinking through an individual mind; for it remains valid, completely independently of whether or not it is imagined by one at all, just as language, legal norms, the moral imperatives, and the cultural forms that exist according to their content and meaning, independently of their fulfillment or non-fulfillment, frequency or rarity, with which they appear in the empirical consciousness. Here there is a special category that is admittedly only realized historically, but in the totality and unity of its content in which it appears to require a supra-individual creator and protector, not historically, but only existing ideally—while the psychological reality only creates fragments of it and carries it further or imagines that content as pure concepts. The empirical origin of the individual parts and forms of speech, as well as their practical application in each individual case, the effectiveness of law as a psychological factor in the merchant, in the criminal, or in the judge; how much and what kind of cultural content is passed on by one individual to another and is further developed in each—these are thoroughly problems for the individual psychology, which is admittedly only very incompletely developed for them. But in their disconnection from the process of the *individual* realization, speech,

law, general cultural structures, etc. are not perhaps products of the subject, a social soul, since the alternative is faulty: *i.e.*, if the spiritual does not dwell in individual spirits, it must certainly dwell in a social spirit. Rather there is a third: the objective spiritual *content*, which is nothing more of a psychological content than is the logical meaning of a judgment something psychological, although it can achieve a conscious reality only within and by virtue of the mental dynamic.

But now the lack of an insight into every mental production and reproduction, which foreseeably cannot be removed, allows these individual psychological actions to flow together into an undifferentiated mass, into the unity of a mental subject that offers itself seductively close to its bearer, a structure so obscure in its origin. In reality, its origin is individual-psychological, but not more unified, but needs a majority of mental unities that act on one another; conversely, insofar as they are considered a unity, they have no origin at all but are an ideal content, in the same way that the Pythagorean theory has no origin in terms of its content. Thus in contrast to them as unities, in abstraction from their accidental and partial reality in the individual mind, the question about a psychic bearer is posed altogether incorrectly and applies again only when they subsequently become concepts in individual minds, as when we speak of them now.

Now the motive that seems to force a special social psychic reality beyond the individual ones not only affects where objective spiritual structures present themselves as an ideal common possession but also where an immediate, sensual action of a crowd draws in the behavior patterns of individuals and molds them into a specific phenomenon not analyzable into these individual acts. This motive is the result of behavior—though not the behavior itself—appearing as something uniform. If a crowd destroys a house, pronounces a judgment, or breaks out into shouting, the actions of the individual subjects are summarized into an event that we describe as one, as the realization of an idea. And this is where the great confusion enters in: The unitary external result of many subjective mental processes is interpreted as the result of a unitary mental process—*i.e.* of a process in the collective mind. The uniformity of the resultant phenomenon is mirrored in the presupposed unity of its psychological result! The deception in this conclusion, however, on which the whole of collective psychology rests in its general distinction from individual psychology, is obvious: the unity of the collective behavior, which relies only on the side of the visible results, will worm its way into the side of the inner cause, the subjective bearer.

But a final motive that shows itself for many of the connections examined here as an indispensable part still appears of course to make a social psychology indispensable as a counterpart of individual psychology: the *qualitative* differentiation in feelings, actions, and ideas of the individuals situated in a crowd from the mental processes, which are not enacted within a crowd but in individual beings that are beings for themselves. Many times a commission comes to different conclusions than those the individual members would have reached on their own; individuals, surrounded by a crowd, are drawn into activities that would otherwise have remained quite strange to them; a

crowd lets itself offer activities and expectations that individuals would not permit to emanate from themselves if it were up to them alone; should the above-mentioned collective stupidity result from such crowds, they are what 'seem to the individual fairly clever and intelligent.' Here a new unity of their own thus seems to arise among the individuals that acts and reacts in a manner that is qualitatively different from them. When looked at closely, it is a matter in such cases of the conduct of individuals who are influenced by others who surround them; thereby nervous, intellectual, suggestive, and moral transformations of their mental constitution take place in contrast to other situations in which such influences do not exist. Now if these influences that are mutually encroaching internally modify all members of the group in the same way, their collective action will nevertheless look different from the action of each individual, if the latter were in another, isolated situation. Thus, what is psychological in action nevertheless remains no less individually psychological; the collective action consists no less of purely individual contributions. If one wants to find a qualitative difference here that would actually go beyond the individual, one would compare two things standing under wholly different conditions: the behavior of the individual not influenced by others with that influenced by others—two things whose difference located totally in the individual soul, along with every other difference of mood and mode of conduct; this difference in no way forces one side of the comparison to localize in a new supra-individual psychological entity. Thus this legitimately remains as a social psychological problem: which modification does the mental process of an individual undergo if the individual goes through the social environment under certain influences? However, this is a part of the general psychological task that is a matter of an individual psychological one—which is to say the same thing. Social psychology as a subdivision of it is somewhat coordinated with physiological psychology, which investigates the determination of mental processes through their connection with the body, just as it investigates their determination through their connection with other souls.

This fact of the mental influence through what is socially constituted—which is the singular object of social psychology, but admittedly one of immeasurably broad expanse—lends a certain claim to this idea of a type of question to which it has no right in and for itself; I call it, in terms of the most important facts, the statistical on the one hand and the ethnological on the other. Where within a group a psychological phenomenon is regularly repeated in a fraction of the whole, or something else, such as a specific characteristic, is found in the whole group or at least in its majority or on the average, one tends to speak of social psychological or even sociological phenomena. This is not without further justification, however. If in a certain era N suicides are found among M fatalities every year, this statement, as true as it may be, is still only possible by means of an overview by the observer. Admittedly social conditions can determine or co-determine the causality of individual deeds, but they do not have to; it can rather be a purely personal, inner deed. Moreover, the on-going spiritual characteristics of a group—be it national, related to status, or some other kind—can be purely parallel phenomena that perhaps go back to the commonality of descent, but are not worked out through the social life

as such. These cited descriptions of such phenomena are based on confusing being next to each other with being together. They would only be sociological when they could be viewed as a mutual relationship of subjects—which naturally does not involve morphologically similar contents on both sides—and they would only be social psychological to the extent that their occurrence in one individual would be caused by other individuals. But this need not be obvious at first; if the phenomenon in question were only found in a single individual, one would call it neither sociological nor social psychological, though it would have exactly the same cause in this case, as in the other one, where besides that in the same group hundreds and thousands appear in the same form and efficacy. The mere multiplication of one phenomenon that can be established only in individuals does not yet make them sociological or social psychological!—although this confusion of a high numerical equivalence with a dynamic-functional involvement is a constantly influential way of thinking.

One can name ethnological phenomena an analogous type: when the inability to recognize the series of individual events in their detail or the lack of interest in this detail allows copying only an average, copying a quite general determination of the psychic states or processes in a group. This is also the case, for example, if one wants to know how 'the Greeks' behaved in the battle of Marathon. Admittedly it is not intended here—even if it would be possible—to explain the mental process in each individual Greek fighter psychologically. But a quite special conceptual structure is created: the average Greek, the Greek type, the quintessential 'Greek'—obviously an ideal construction arises from what is required for knowing and without a claim of finding an exact counterpart in any one of the actual Greek individuals. Nevertheless the actual meaning of this conceptual category is not social because its point lies in no interaction, no practical involvement and functional unity of many persons; but actually 'the Greek,' even if unable to be named more uniquely, should be described by the mood and the manner of behavior of the mere sum of the warriors and projects an ideal average phenomenon that is as much an individual as the general concept of the Greeks existing in speech is simply one alone whose embodiment is this typical 'Greek.'

What becomes important in all these cases where it is a matter of a sum of individuals as such, where the social facts become important only as moments in the determination of the individual, not different from physiological or religious facts—what must nevertheless be valid in these as social psychological rests on the conclusion that the similarity of many individuals by which they permit an attaining of a type, an average, a picture uniform in some way, cannot come about without their influencing one another. The object of the research always remains the psychological individual; the group as a whole cannot also have a 'soul' for these research categories. But the homogeneity of many individuals, as these categories presuppose it, normally originates from the individuals' interactions; with its results of assimilation, of identical influence, and of setting uniform purposes, it also belongs to social psychology—which is revealed here also not as a counterpart adjoining individual psychology, but as a part of it.

The aforementioned factors combine to expose a society lacking the formation of an apparatus to the loosening and destructive powers that every social structure produces within itself. It is crucial, among other things, that the personalities that work in an antisocial and destructive way, especially against a certain existing social form, to be normally dedicated completely to this struggle, even if it is an indirect one. Equally whole personalities must oppose their whole personality that they put into play for the defense of the existing order. The collectivity of human beings actually develops specific powers that cannot be made up for by the summation of the partial strengths of many individuals. Thus the social self-preservation now above all also needs the formation of the apparatus against strong individual powers that do not actually work destructively and as a socially negative force, but strive to subjugate the group. The fact that the Evangelical Church did not resist the princes and was infinitely much less able than the Catholic Church to maintain its supremacy as a sociological structure seems to me to reside for the most part in the fact that it could not cultivate the supra-individual objective spirit consistently with its wholly individualistic principle constructed on the personal faith of the individual, a spirit that the Catholic Church allowed to become clear and effective in its organs: not only in the tightly structured hierarchy, whose personal head was able to face the principality with a formally equal defiance, but in monasticism, which bound the strictness of its ecclesiastical cohesion and teleology in a remarkably clever way with the great variety of its relationships with the lay world: as an example of sacred-ideal, as preacher, as confessor, as beggar. A band of mendicants was an organ of the Church that a prince could ill combat and to which the Evangelical Church for its part established nothing nearly as effective. Such failure to develop an apparatus turned into an undoing of the whole old-German cooperative constitution in this case, where I began this whole discussion. Thus it was no match to those strong rulers as they emerged during and after the Middle Ages in the local and central principalities. It perished because it lacked what only an organ of a society carried by individual powers could secure: swiftness of decision, unconditional summoning of all powers, and the highest intellectuality that is always developed only by individuals, whether their motive is the will to power or a feeling of responsibility. It would have required an 'official' (in the widest sense) whose sociological nature it is to represent the 'social level' in the form of individual intellectuality and activity, or to shape up to it.

This purposive remoteness of the apparatus of the group from its immediate action goes so far that among officials whose functions bear the character of immediate responsibility, flexibility, and summary decision, an *election* by the community is not even announced, but only the appointment by the government. The particular objectivity needed here is lacking in the immediate collectivity; it is always the party, and thus the sum of subjective convictions, that also decides about the method according to which they elect. As in fourteenth century England the judicial proceedings conducted before and through the community were always presented as inappropriate for carrying out the expanded range of police responsibilities, and the necessity of individual officers became unmistakable, who were then gradually formed into 'justices of the peace'—until the estates wanted to claim the selection of them entirely for themselves. They were always rejected, however, and rightly so as the result demonstrated. Exactly since the beginning of the parliamentary government it was inviolably held that all the judiciary should emerge from nomination alone, never from election; thus was the English crown already also paying the highest judges itself, and once when Parliament for its part offered to pay the salaries, the crown had rejected the proposal. By the government naming the official, its organizational character is raised, as it were, to the second power—corresponding to the general cultural development where people's goals are reached through an ever more elaborate structure of means, through which ever more frequent addition of means to means is achieved, but despite this apparent detour still more surely and in a wider range than through the immediacy of the primitive procedure.[48]

On the other hand the self-preservation of the group is dependent now on the apparatus being so differentiated out that it retains no *absolute* independence. Rather the idea must always remain (albeit in no way always consciously) that here it is still only a matter of the interactions in the group itself, that these remain in the end the basis whose latent energies, developments, and goals contain only a different practical form in that apparatus, a growth and enrichment through the specific accomplishments of individuality. The apparatus should not forget that its independence should only serve its dependence, that its character as an end in itself is only a means. Thus it can even happen that the organizational function is fully practiced in many respects when

[48] Addition of means to means: literally insertion of means for means—ed.

it does not fill up the entire existence of the functionary but holds good as a kind of a secondary office. The earliest bishops were laymen who occupied their position in the community as an honorary office. For precisely that reason they were able to live their lives in office in a purer and unworldly manner than later when it became a more differentiated independent calling. Then because it became inevitable that the forms of vocational officialdom that worldliness had cultivated now also found application to the spiritual; economic interests, hierarchical structures, thirst for power, and relationships to external powers had to build on to the purely religious function. To the extent that the function confers on the secondary office a clear objectivity of function, precisely the form of the principal vocation can bring with it an openly objective sociological and material consequence. Thus the dilettante is often devoted to art more purely and selflessly than the professional who must also live off of it; thus the love of two lovers is often of a more purely erotic character than that of a married couple. This is of course an exceptional formation that should only lead into the argument that autonomy and liberation of an organ from dependence on the whole life of the group can occasionally change its preserving effect into a destructive one. I introduce two kinds of reasons for this. *First*: If the apparatus attains too strong of a life of its own and its emphasis no longer resides in what it does for the group but on what it is for itself, its own self-preservation can come into conflict with that of the group itself. A mostly harmless but thus precisely very clear representative case of this kind is bureaucracy. The nature of the bureau, a formal organization for executing a more extensive administration, forms a pattern in itself that very often collides with the variable needs of practical social life, and indeed, on the one hand, because the specialized work of the bureau is not equipped for very individual and complicated cases that nevertheless must be dealt with within it, and on the other hand, because the only speed at which the bureaucratic machinery can work often stands in screaming contradiction with the urgency of the individual case. Now if a structure only functioning with such unbeneficial consequences forgets its role as a mere auxiliary organ and makes itself the goal of its existence, so must the difference between its life form and that of the whole group sharpen to directly harm the former. The self-preservations of both are no longer compatible with one another. From this perspective one could compare the bureaucratic pattern with the logical one that relates to the recognition of the real-

ity on the whole as the former does to public administration: a form and an instrument indispensable in the organic connection with the *substance* that it is called to shape, but in which its whole meaning and goal also lie. Meanwhile if logic opens up as an independent realization and presumes to construct for itself a self-contained knowledge without regard to the actual substance whose mere form it is, it constructs a world for itself that tends to stand in considerable opposition to the real world. The logical forms in their abstraction in relation to a particular science are a mere organ of the complete knowledge of things; as soon as it strives for a complete self-sufficiency instead of this role and is taken as the conclusion rather than a means of knowledge, so it is for the preservation, hampering the development and the unity of the of knowledge, as it can occasionally become the bureaucratic pattern with regard to the totality of the group interests. Thus it is said of collegiality and the 'provincial system' that it would admittedly be less consistent, knowledgeable, and discreet than the bureaucratic department system, but milder and more thoughtful, and more inclined to allow the person of those affected to be respected and to allow for an exception to the unrelenting rule when that is called for. In these systems the simply abstract state function has not yet become as objective and autocratic as in bureaucracy. Indeed even law does not always escape from this social configuration. From the outset it is nothing other than the very form of the mutual relationships of the group members that was presented as most necessary for the continuance of the group; it alone is not enough for guaranteeing this continuance or even progress of society, but it is the minimum that must be protected as the basis of every group's existence. Here the formation of the apparatus is twofold: 'Law' differentiates itself out from the factually required and, most of all, actually practiced behaviors, as the abstracted form and norm of these behaviors, logically connected, and complements them so that it now stands as authoritative against the actual behavior. But this ideal apparatus, serving the self-preservation of the group, now still needs resistance from a concrete organ for its effectiveness; technical grounds cancel that original unity in which either the *pater familias* or the assembled group administered justice, and they require a special profession for securing the maintenance of those norms in the interaction of group members. Now both that abstraction from group relationships into a logically closed system of laws and the embodiment of their content in a judiciary is so useful and indispensable that both bring

with them so inevitably the danger that precisely the firmness that is so necessary and the inner consistency of these formations may occasionally enter into opposition to the real progressive or individually complex circumstances and requirements of the group. Through the logical cohesion of its structure and the dignity of its administrative apparatus, law achieves not only an actual autonomy and, through its aim in a wide range, a necessary one, but it creates from itself—admittedly through a vicious circle—the right to an unconditional and unquestionable self-preservation. While the concrete situation of the group now occasionally requires other conditions for its self-preservation, situations arise that are expressed by the words: *fiat justitia, pereat mundus* and *summum jus summa injuria*.[49] Admittedly one seeks to attain the flexibility and pliancy that law should have by virtue of its being a mere apparatus, through the latitude that the judge is allowed in the application and interpretation of the law. Those cases of the collision between the self-preservation of law and that of the group lie at the limits of this latitude, which should only serve here as an example of the fact that precisely the solidity and autonomy that the group must want to concede to its apparatus for its own preservation can obscure the very character of the apparatus, and of the fact that the autonomy and inflexibility of the apparatus that acts for the whole can turn into a danger to the whole group. This evolution of an organ into an autocratic totality through bureaucracy as well as through the formalism of the law is all the more dangerous in that it has the appearance and pretense of happening for the sake of the whole. That is a tragedy of every social development that is more advanced: the group must want for the sake of its own collectively egoistic purposes to equip the apparatus with the independence that often works against these purposes. Sometimes the position of the military can also bring about this sociological form, since, as an apparatus in the division of labor for the self-preservation of the group, it must on technical grounds be an organism itself as much as possible; the cultivating of its occupational qualities, especially its tight inner cohesion, requires a vigorous closure against the other strata—beginning with the idea of the special nobility of the officer corps including the distinctiveness of its attire. As much as this independence of the military lies in a specific uniformity of life

[49] Latin: "Let there be justice, the world be damned," and, "Highest law, highest injury"—ed.

in the interests of the whole, it can nevertheless assume an absoluteness and rigidity that sets the military apart from the solidarity of the group as a state within the state and thus destroys the bond with the root from which alone its power and legitimacy can ultimately come to it. The modern citizen army seeks to confront this danger, and it represents a happy mean in the temporary duty of service of the whole people to bind the independence of the military to its organizational character.

Because for the sake of preserving the group, their organs, as independent to some degree, must confront it and must be set at a remove from the breadth of its immediate life, but this independence even for the sake of its own preservation needs very definite limits—this is obviously expressed in the problems of the *term of office*.[50] Even if the office is 'eternal' in principle as an expression and consequence of the eternal nature of the group with which it is bound as a vital organ, so is the independence of its real exercise still modified by how long the individual occupant administers it. The excursus on the inheritance of office shows the extreme in terms of longevity because heredity is as it were the continuation of the individual function beyond the lifespan of the individual. Admittedly at the same time an opposition emerges in the results: the inheritance of office at one time gave it its independence, with which it became like an autonomous force within the state, and at another time it allowed it to sink into insignificance and empty formality. Now the length of the personal term of office works in the very same dualism. The office of the sheriff was of great importance in the English Middle Ages; it lost that when Edward III in 1338 decreed that no sheriff should remain in office longer than one year. Conversely: the 'Sendgrafen' (legate counts) who were a very important apparatus of the central power under Charlemagne for the general control over the provinces, were normally nominated for only a year; meanwhile they

[50] This relationship mentioned here and previously belongs for the most part to a future discussion of a remaining sphere of tasks: what role the purely temporary regulations play for the constituting and the life of social forms. How the change in relationships, from the most intimate to the most official, behave as a function of their duration without outside moments influencing them; how a relationship obtains a form and coloration beforehand through it being based on a limited or long duration of time; how the effect of the limitation itself is modified completely according to whether the end of the relationship, of the institution, the employment etc. is set one point in time in advance or whether this is uncertain, and depends on 'notice,' on a waning of unifying impulses, or a change of external circumstances—all of which must be investigated in the individual case. There is a note about this in the chapter on space [Ch. 9—ed.].

lost their importance and the whole institution declined while later the nominations occurred for an indefinite term. The assumption is suggested that with respect to the longevity of an office the long term would then appropriately lead to its independence and thereby to a steady importance, if it includes an environment more regularly in a systematic and continuous endeavor to filling functions and thereby requires a routine that the frequently changing incumbents cannot acquire. On the other hand where an office takes up always new and unanticipated tasks, where quick decision and agile adaptation occur in ever changing situations and demands, there a frequent, so to speak, infusion of new blood will be suitable because the new officials will always approach them with fresh interest and the danger of this becoming a routine for them will not come about. Developing a considerable independence in such offices here through frequent changes of incumbents will not cause any injury to the group as in many cases the frequent rotation of placements in very independent and irresponsive offices has served as a counterbalance and protection of the community against their selfish abuse of them. This motive in the filling of offices works in a unique way in the United States, indeed by virtue of the democratic ethos that would like to hold the leading positions as close as possible to the primary group life, the sum of individual subjects. While the offices are filled with the supporters of the particular president, in general a large number of candidates gradually come to hold offices. Secondly and more importantly, however, this prevents the formation of a closed bureaucracy that could become a mistress rather than a maidservant of the public. Long traditions of that, with their knowledge and practices, prevent anyone from being readily able to assume any position, and this is contrary not only to the democratic spirit that allows the Americans to really believe in their suitability for every function but it encourages what is wholly unbearable for him: that the officials would seem to be of a higher nature, that their life is lifted above the great masses through an otherwise unattainable dedication. This group believed—at least until recently—they were only able to obtain this special form if their apparatus remained permanently weak, in continual exchanges with the masses, avoiding the independence of the office as much as possible. But now it is peculiar that this socially-oriented condition has precisely an extreme egoism of the officials for a basis. The winning party shares in the offices under the slogan: "To the victor go the spoils!" It considers the office a *property*, a personal advantage, and it does not

even conceal at all through the pretense of having sought it for the sake of the matter itself or of service to the society. And it is precisely that that should uphold the officers as servants of the public and prevent the formation of an autonomous bureaucracy. The service of the cause or of the enduring and objective interest of the collectivity requires a governing position above the individuals of the group because with it the apparatus outgrows the *supra-personal unity* of the collectivity. The principled democrat, however, does not want to be governed, even at the price of being served by that; the democrat does not acknowledge that the saying, "I am their leader, so I must serve them"—can just as well be reversed: "I want to serve them, so I must lead them." The pure objectivity of its meaning and leadership, which causes a certain height and culmination, is hindered by that egoistic subjectivism of the attitude about the exercise of office, but it includes, however, the danger of a bureaucratic, arrogant severing of the apparatus from the immediate liveliness of the group. And depending on how threatening the danger for the structure of the group is, it will hinder or favor the expansion of the offices into the character of being its own purpose.

Second: The possibility of an antagonism between the whole and the part, the group and its apparatus, should not only hold the independence of the latter within a certain limit, but it is also useful so that the differentiated function could revert back to the collectivity *if necessary*. The development of society has the peculiarity that its self-preservation can require the temporary dismantling of an already differentiated apparatus. This is not to make a close analogy with the atrophy of those animal organs that appears from the change of life environments, for example like the seeing-apparatus of animals that live continuously in dark caves becoming a mere rudiment. Since the function itself becomes superfluous in these cases and this is the reason for which the organs serving that function gradually wither away, in contrast, with social developments the function is indispensable and therefore must, where an inadequacy of the apparatus appears, revert back to the interactions among the primary members of the group, as the apparatus originated in the first place as the bearer of their division of labor. The structure of the group from the outset is in some cases based on such an alternation between the immediate function and that mediated through an apparatus. As with publicly-held corporations whose technical direction is admittedly the responsibility of the management while the general assembly is nevertheless empowered to remove the management or set

certain guidelines for it, the general assembly has neither disposition nor the competence for this. Here belongs, above all, the power of the parliament over the governing apparatus in lands governed in a purely parliamentary manner. The English government draws its power again and again from the grassroots of the people, which is distilled, as it were, in the parliament. The government naturally has this competence in various shadowy ways for the continuous self-preservation of the group since the purely objective and consistent treatment of businesses is endangered by the interventions of the parliament and especially by its review of them. In England this is moderated by the general conservatism and by a fine differentiation between the officials and administrative branches that are subject to the immediate competence of the parliament and those that require a relative independence and continuity. Smaller associations that allow their business to be conducted through a board or executive committee tend to be organized in such a way that these apparatus return their authority to the whole group, willingly or unwillingly, as soon as they are no longer up to the burden or responsibility of their functions. Every revolution, in which a political group dethrones its government and binds legislation and administration back to the immediate initiative of its members, belongs to this kind of sociological formation. Admittedly it readily happens now that such a restructuring of the apparatus is not possible in all groups. In very large groups or groups living in very complicated situations the assumption of administration by the group itself is simply impossible. The formation of organs became irrevocable and their malleability, their vital association with the members, can appear most of all in the members replacing the *persons* who comprise the apparatus in a given moment with more suitable persons. At any rate, the diverting back of group power from the apparatus to its original source, even if only as a transitional stage to a renewed constructing of an apparatus, still comes about in cases of a rather higher social formation. The Episcopal Church in North America suffered greatly up to the end of the eighteenth century from having no bishop because the English mother church that alone could have consecrated one refused to do that for political reasons. Therefore, the communities decided to help themselves in their greatest need and in the face of a danger of complete disintegration. In 1784 they sent delegations—lay and clergy—who assembled and constituted themselves as the supreme church unity, as the central apparatus, and for the provision of the church management. A historical specialist on this era portrays it this way:

> Never had so strange a sight been seen before in Christendom, as this necessity of various members knitting themselves together into one. In all other cases the unity of the common episcopate had held such limbs together: every member had visibly belonged to the community of which the presiding bishop was the head.[51]

The inner solidarity of the faithful—which up to then lay in the apparatus of the episcopacy and became, as it were, a substance lying outside them—now appeared again in its original nature. Now the power was returned to the immediate interaction of the members which was projecting that power from within themselves and which had worked on them from outside. This case is therefore particularly interesting because the function of keeping the church members together came to the bishop through consecration, *i.e.* from a source from above, one seemingly independent of the sociological function—and now was nevertheless replaced purely sociologically, through which the source of that power was unequivocally made visible. The fact that the communities knew how, after so long lasting and so effective a differentiation of their sociological forces on an apparatus, to replace it again with the immediacy of the community, was an indication of the extraordinary health of its socio-religious life. Very many communities of a most different kind have gone under when the relationship between the social powers of their members and the apparatus that arose from it was no longer malleable enough to be able to return to the members the functions that are necessary for their social self-preservation, in cases of omission or inefficiency on the part of the apparatus.

The evolution of differentiated organs is, so to speak, a substantial remedy for social self-preservation; with that the structure of society grows a new limb. Wholly different from that is the matter of treating how the instinct for self-preservation affects the life of the group from a functional perspective. The question whether it happens in an undifferentiated unity or with separate organs is secondary for that; rather that is a matter of the entire general form or the rate at which the life processes of the group play out. Here we encounter two principal possibilities: The group can be maintained 1) by preserving its

[51] Here Simmel uses the original English. The same quotation appears in Julia C. Emery, *A Century of Endeavor 1821–1921* (Chicago: Hammond Press, 1921), appendix, attributing it to Samuel Wilberforce, *History of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America* (London, J. Burns, 1844; New York: Stanford & Swords, 1949), though Emery does not give the title accurately—ed.

form as much as possible through a stability and rigidity in it so that it counters mounting dangers with substantial resistance and protects the relationship of its members throughout all changes in the external circumstances; 2) by the greatest possible variability of its form, in that it responds to change in the external conditions with such a change within itself and maintains itself in the flux so that it can accommodate every demand of the circumstances. These two possibilities apparently go back to a very general behavior of things since it finds an analogy in all possible spheres, even the physical. A body is protected from destruction through pressure and shock either through rigidity and unalterable solidarity of its elements so that the attacking force makes no dent at all, or through flexibility and elasticity, which admittedly yield to every attack but immediately restores the previous form to the body after it is over. The self-preservation of the group also holds together either through stability or through flexibility whereby the unity of an entity is documented in both ways: we recognize its unity either as a result of its always seeming the same in the face of different stimuli and situations, or its behaving differently in the face of each circumstance, in a special way exactly matching *it*—like a calculation with two factors always having to yield the same result with one changing and the other changing accordingly. Thus we say a person has got it all together when one, for example, manifests the aesthetic consideration and sensitivity toward all possible matters of life, but no less the one who behaves aesthetically where the object justifies it, but who has another kind of reaction where that is required by the object. Indeed this is perhaps the deeper consistency because manifold trials, whose manifold nature corresponds to the *object*, indicate an integrity of the subject that is all the more unshakable. So a person will appear to be consistent if a life situation of servitude has developed in that person a submissive behavior that one also manifests in all other activities not related to servitude; but it is no less 'consistent' if one, on the contrary, takes advantage of the underlings through brutality because of one's forced submission to superiors. And finally preservation and variation as sociological tendencies are only subtypes of something more generally human. And as such, these can, as pure forms of behavior, contain a meaning that binds together the most divergent content—as Augustus himself once praised Cato for the reason that everyone who did not want to have the existing condition of the state changed would be a good person and citizen. Now it is a matter of the closer determinations of these two methods of social self-preservation.

Self-preservation through conservative activity seems to be indicated where the collectivity consists of very disparate elements with latent or manifest oppositions, so that generally every *initiative*, of whatever kind, becomes dangerous and the very measures of preservation and positive usefulness must be avoided as soon as they bring a movement with them. Thus a very complex and enduring state, such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, needing to be held in a delicate balance, would generally be highly conservative since every movement could produce an irreparable disturbance of the balance. Generally this consequence is wholly associated with the form of heterogeneity of the constituent elements of a larger group, as soon as this difference does not lead to a harmonious mutual engagement and cooperation. Here the threat to the preservation of the social status quo resides in the fact that every initiative must elicit extremely different forms of response in the different social strata that are laden with completely opposing energies. The less the inner solidarity among the members of the group, the more probable it is that the oppositions will cause new incitements, new awakenings of consciousness, new occasions for decisions and developments to diverge further from one another. Then there are always countless ways in which people can become distant from one another, but often only a single way in which they can come close to one another. Change may still be useful in itself—its effect on the members will bring their whole heterogeneity into expression, indeed, to a heightened expression in the same sense in which the mere prolongation of divergent lines allows their divergence to appear more clearly.[52] The avoidance of every innovation, every departure from the previous way, will thus be shown to be a strict and rigid conservatism in order to hold the group in its existing form.

[52] The precise fact that the disruptions of a foreign war often serve to unite the divergent and threatened elements of the state together again in its balance, is an obviously real exception but one that confirms the rule. For war appeals to those energies that are nevertheless common to the opposed elements of the community and raises those that are vital and fundamental in nature so strongly into consciousness that the disturbance here annuls the presupposition for their harmfulness—the divergence of the elements. On the other hand, where it is not strong enough to overcome the oppositions existing in the group, war has the above-claimed effect: as often as it has given the last blow to the internally shattered statehood, it has let even the nonpolitical groups, split by inner oppositions, to stand before the alternative: either to forget their disputes against the other during the conflict or on the contrary to let them degenerate incurably.

In addition, for this behavior to be purposeful only a very broad but not necessarily hostile divergence among the group members is necessary. Where social differences are very great and do not begin to intermesh in intermediate stages, each swift movement and disruption of the structure of the collectivity must become much more dangerous than where mediating layers exist; since evolution always first takes hold of only a part of the group exclusively or especially firmly at first, there will be a gradualism in its progress or widening in the latter case, while in the former the movement will suddenly be very much more forcefully taking hold of both the ones not disposed to that and those far away from it. The middle classes will serve as buffers or shock absorbers that take in, soften, and diffuse the unavoidable disruptions of the structure of the whole in rapid development. Hence, societies that have clearly developed middle classes show a liberal character. And on the contrary it is most necessary that social peace, stability, and a conservative character of group life be preserved at all costs were it is a matter of the preservation of a discontinuous structure characterized by sharp internal differences. Therefore we also actually observe that with immense and irreconcilable class contrasts, peace and a persistence of forms of social life prevail sooner than with existing convergence, exchange, and mixing between the extremes of the social ladder. In the latter case the continuation of the collectvity in the *status quo ante* joins much sooner with fragile circumstances, abrupt developments, and progressive tendencies. Aristocratic constitutions are thus the authentic seats of conservatism; what is of interest here about this connection of motives, which will be treated later, is this: aristocracies form the strongest social divides on the one hand—more than monarchy does in a principled manner, which often ends up precisely as a leveling down, and only where it joins with the aristocratic principle, which however has no inner necessity and often has no outer necessity at all, does it create sharp class distinctions; on the other hand those constitutions are intended from within for a quiet, form-maintaining effect, since they have to be prepared neither for the unpredictability of a change on the throne nor for the moods of a mass of people.

This linkage between stability of the social character and the width of the degree of social distance is made evident also in the reverse direction. Where the self-preservation of the group through stability is forced from without, there strong social differences sometimes form as a result. The development of rural serfdom in Russia shows this to some extent. There was always a strong nomadic impulse in Russia that

the expansive nature of the country gladly accommodated. In order to secure the orderly development of the land it was thus necessary to deprive the farmers of their liberty; this happened under Theodore I in 1593. But now once the farmer was tied to the soil, he gradually lost the freedoms possessed until then. Here the forced immobility of the farmer became, as also many times in the rest of Europe, the means by which the landlord oppressed him more and more deeply. What was originally only a provisional rule finally made him a mere appendage of the property. Thus the group's instinct of self-preservation did not only create a tendency toward stability of the form of life with sharply existing oppositions; but where it directly evoked the latter it added growing social differences to it, proving that connection in principle.

Another case in which the self-preservation of the group will press toward the greatest possible stability and rigidity exists in outlived structures that no longer have any inner reason to exist and whose members actually belong to other relationships and forms of social life. Since the end of the Middle Ages, the German leagues of communities were weakened in their rights by the strengthening of central powers, and instead of the vital cohesion that they had derived from the importance of their previous social roles, only the mask and its externality remained for them—since then the last remaining means for their self-preservation was an extremely strict closure, the unconditional prohibition of the entry of additional communities. Every quantitative expansion of a group requires certain qualitative modifications and adaptations that an outdated structure can no longer undergo without breaking apart. An earlier chapter showed the social form in its narrow relationships of dependency on the numerical determination of its elements: the structure of the society that is the right one for a certain number of members is no longer the right one for an enlarged number. But the process of transforming it into a new structure requires the assimilation and working up of new members; it consumes energy. Structures that have lost their inner meaning no longer possess this energy for the task, but use all that they still have in order to protect the once existing form against internal and external dangers. That strict exclusion of additional members—such as also later characterized the antiquated guild constitutions—thus immediately meant not only a stabilization of the group, which it tied to the existing members and their descendents, but it also meant the avoidance of the structural transformations that were necessary for every quantitative expansion of the group, and for which a structure that had become unsuitable no longer had the

capability. The instinct of self-preservation will therefore lead such a group to measures of a rigid conservatism. Generally, structures incapable of competition will be inclined to this means of self-preservation. For to the extent that its form is fragile, passes through various stages, carries out new adaptations, the competitor is given an opportunity for dangerous attacks. The most vulnerable stage for societies, as for individuals, is that between two periods of adaptation. Whoever is in motion cannot be shielded on all sides at every moment, as can someone who is in a motionless, stable position. A group that feels wary of its competitor will thus, for the sake of its self-preservation, avoid any instability and evolution in its form and live by the principle, *quieta non movere*.[53] This rigid self-insulation will be especially useful where competition does not yet exist in reality, but it is a matter of preventing competition since one does not feel up to it. Here rigorous exclusionary rules alone will be able to maintain the state of affairs,[54] since the existence of new relationships, the presentation of new points of connection to the outside of the group would attract a larger circle, in which a group would encounter a superior competitor. This social rule may be effective in a very subtle way in the following context: A paper currency that is not redeemable, in contrast to the one covered (by precious metals), has the characteristic of being valid only within the region of the government that issues it and is not exportable. This is claimed as its greatest advantage: it remains in the land, is always there ready for all undertakings, and it does not enter into the balance of precious metals with another nation, which causes an importation of foreign goods and outflow of money in a relative surplus of money and thereby an immediately subsequent increase in prices. Thus there is an inner bond of the circulation of money limited to its land of origin and a self-preservation of its social form, while sealing it off from the wider competition of the world market. An economically strong land and one equal to that competition would not need this means, but it would certainly be clear that it would achieve a strengthening of its essential form of life precisely amidst instability, the vicissitudes, and development of an interdependence with all others. It should not be claimed, for example, that relatively small groups generally seek their preservation in the form of stability, and large ones in variability.

[53] Latin: Be still, no moving!—ed.
[54] Simmel uses the Latin, *status*—ed.

There are generally not such simple and definitive relations between such broad structures and patterns of activity, since each one of them includes an abundance of different factors that enter into multitudinous combinations with one another. Precisely very large groups, of course, need stability for their institutions that smaller ones can replace with swift wholesale adaptations. A conscious effort of the English labor federations to shift the site of its headquarters from time to time from one affiliate union to another has made room at a later time to settling its administration in one specific place and with particular persons. The large group can tolerate this stability of its institutions because it still always provides room through its size for sufficient changes, variations, as well as for local and temporal adaptations. Indeed, one can say: the large group increases both in itself as it increases generalization and individualization in itself, while the smaller group either represents one or the other or both in an incomplete state of development.

The essentially individual-psychological motive that supports the preservation of a relationship under the form of stability is termed 'fidelity.' The sociological importance of this encloses the specific matter of this chapter in so wide a circumference, and the immediate relevance here is so closely fused with the transition to what comes later, that I will move the discussion of it into a separate excursus, in which I also deal with the importance of gratitude for social structure, or rather as a sociological form in itself. Since, in an admittedly more particular type than fidelity, gratitude prevents the breaking off of a once intact relationship and works as an energy with which a relationship preserves its status quo in the face of unavoidable disturbances of a positive or negative kind.

Excursus on Fidelity and Gratitude

Fidelity belongs to those most universal patterns of action that can become significant for all interactions among people, which are most diverse not only materially but also sociologically. In domination and subordination as well as in equality, within a joint opposition against a third as well as within a shared friendship, in families as well as with respect to the state, in love as well as in relationship to an occupational group—in all these structures, seen purely in terms of their sociological configuration, fidelity and its opposite become important, as it were, as a sociological form of a second order, as the bearer of the existing and self-preserving kinds of relationship among members; in its universality it relates, as it were, to the sociological forms attained by it, as these behave toward the material contents and motives of social existence.

Without the phenomenon that we call 'fidelity,' society would not be able to exist in the factually given manner for any time at all. The factors that support the preservation of society—individual interests of the members, suggestion, force, idealism, mechanical habit, sense of duty, love, inertia—would not be able to protect it from breaking up if all of them were not complemented by the factor of fidelity. Admittedly the quantity and importance of these factors are not determinable in the individual case since fidelity, in its practical effect, always substitutes for another feeling, any trace of which whatever will hardly be wasted. That which is to be attributed to fidelity is intertwined with a collective result that resists quantitative analysis.

Because of the complementary character that befits fidelity (*Treue*), an expression 'faithful love' (*treue Liebe*), for example, is somewhat misleading. If love persists in a relationship between people, what need is there for fidelity? If the individuals are not bound together by fidelity at the very beginning but rather by the primary genuine disposition of the soul, why would fidelity still have to arrive after ten years as the guardian of the relationship, since, presumably, that is nevertheless just the same love even after ten years and must prove its binding strength entirely on its own, as in the first moment? If word usage would simply call *enduring* love 'faithful love' (*treue Liebe*), one need not, of course, object to that, since it is not a matter of words, but probably upon there being a mental—and social—condition that preserves the duration of a relationship beyond its first occurrence and which outlives these forces with the same synthesizing effect, as it had on it, and which we can only call 'fidelity,' although this word still includes a totally different sort of meaning, *i.e.*, the perseverance of these forces. One could describe fidelity as the ability of the soul to persevere, which keeps it keeps to a course that has been taken, after the stimulus that led it to that course in the first instance has passed. It is to be understood from this that I am always speaking here only about fidelity of a purely psychological kind, about a disposition that stems from within, not about a purely external relation, as, for example, within the marriage the legal concept of fidelity means nothing positive at all but only the non-occurrence of infidelity.

It is a fact of the highest sociological importance that countless relationships remain unchanged in their social structure, even though the feeling or practical occasion that allowed them to originate in the first instance have disappeared. The otherwise indubitable truth—that it is easier to destroy than to build—does not simply hold for certain human relationships. Admittedly the coming into existence of a relationship requires a certain amount of conditions, positive and negative, the absence of any one of which hinders its coming about from the beginning. But once it has begun, it is still in no way always destroyed by the subsequent loss of that condition without which it would not have arisen in the first place. An erotic relationship, for example, originating on the basis of physical beauty, can very well survive the latter's diminishing and turning into ugliness. What has been said about states—that they can only be maintained by the same means by which they are established—is only a very partial truth and no less than a general principle of social relations. Rather, the sociological connection from which it always arises

forms a self-preservation, a special stability of its form, independently of the original motives behind the connections. Without this ability of maintaining the social structure that was once constituted, society as a whole would collapse at every moment or be changed in an unimaginable way. The preservation of the form of unity is born psychologically by various forces—intellectual and practical, positive and negative. Fidelity is the underlying *sentimental* factor, or also the same thing in the form of feeling, its projection on the level of feeling. The feeling in question here—whose quality should be established only in its psychic reality, as much whether one accepts it as an adequate definition of the concept of fidelity or not—thus remains as defined. To those relationships that develop between individuals correspond a specific feeling, an interest, and an impulse that are relationship-oriented. Now, if the relationship continues further, there arises, in interaction with this ongoing stability, a special feeling or also this: those originally grounded mental conditions—many times, if not always—metamorphose themselves into a unique form that we call fidelity, into, as it were, a psychological reservoir or a form of collectvity or uniformity for the most diverse interests, emotions, and bonding motives; and over all the difference in their origin, they assume a certain similarity in the form of fidelity, which conceivably favors the lasting character of this feeling. Thus what is called true love, true devotion, etc. is not what is meant, nor that which means a certain modality or temporal quantity of an otherwise already identified feeling; but I mean that fidelity is a unique condition of the soul, directed toward the continuation of the relationship as such and independent of the specific emotional or volitional vehicle of its content. This mental constitution of the individual, manifest here in such different degrees, belongs to the *a priori* conditions of society that are first made possible, at least in their existence that is known to us, although it appears at extremely different levels that, meanwhile, can probably never drop to zero: the person with absolutely no fidelity, for whom the transformation of a relations-forming affect into a particular one and for whom the preservation of the feeling oriented toward relationship would be simply impossible, is not an unthinkable phenomenon. Thus, one could describe fidelity as an inductive conclusion of the feeling. A relationship comes into existence at such a moment. The feeling—in a formal similarity to a theoretical induction—derives a further conclusion from it: thus it also exists at a later moment; and as in intellectual induction one no longer needs to establish the later case as fact, since induction simply means that it remains spared for it, thus in very many cases of that later moment the reality of the feeling and interests is hardly to be found any more, but it replaces these with that inductively originated condition that is termed 'fidelity.' One must (and this pertains to the sociological foundation) think that, among very many relationships and associations of people with one another the mere habituation of being together and simply the factually longer existence of the relationship bring with it this inductive conclusion of the feeling. And this broadens the concept of fidelity and adds a very important factor to it: the externally given sociological situation, the togetherness, co-opts to some degree the feeling that really corresponds to it, although they were not present in the beginning and in relation to the grounding of the relationship. Here, the process of fidelity

becomes somewhat retrogressive. The psychological motives that create a relationship make room for the ones linked to it and for the specific feeling of fidelity, or change into it. If such came about now from any such external reasons, or at least mental ones, that do not correspond to the meaning of the association, then a fidelity toward it arises, and this allows the deeper emotional conditions, ones that are adequate for the alliance, to develop, which is legitimated as it were *per subsequens matrimonium animarum*.[55] The banal adage that is often heard regarding conventional or purely external reasons for marriages to occur—love would still certainly come in the marriage—is actually not always in error. If at first the continuation of the relationship had once found its psychological correlate in fidelity, its emotions, interests of the heart, inner associations, which become apparent now rather as their end result instead of their logical position at the beginning of the relationship, follow them in them finally—a development that admittedly does not come about without the intervening factor of fidelity, of the affect oriented toward the preservation of the relationship as such. Corresponding to the psychological association that, once the idea B is first linked to the idea A, now also works in the reverse direction and calls A into consciousness if B appears in it—the sociological form leads, in the way that was just indicated, to the inner condition corresponding to it, while otherwise the latter leads to the former. In France the '*secours temporaire*'[56] was introduced from the middle of the nineteenth century, in order to limit child abandonment and the transfer of the children to the foundling homes as much as possible, which was a fairly generous support for unwed mothers if they kept their children in their own care; and the authors of this measure on the basis of very extensive observations cited in its favor that in the overwhelming majority of cases, if it only succeeded at all in keeping the child with the mother for a time, then there would be no more danger of her parting with it. While the natural emotional bond of the mother to the child should actually lead to her keeping it with herself, this apparently does not always happen. But if it succeeds in moving the mother to keep the child with herself even if for only a short time in order to secure the benefit of this *secours temporaires* out of extraneous reasons, this external relationship gradually allows its emotional basis to grow between them.

These psychological configurations take on a particular emphasis in the phenomenon of the renegade, in whom one has noticed a fidelity typically toward a new political, religious, or some other party, a fidelity that, *ceteris paribus*, exceeds in consciousness and commitment that of the members belonging to the party. This goes so far that many times in Turkey the Turks born in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could not generally occupy the high positions of the state, but only Janissaries were accepted for that purpose, i.e. born Christians who were either converted of their own free will or Christian children who were robbed from their parents and reared as

[55] Latin: by the subsequent marriage of souls—ed.
[56] French: temporary aid—ed.

Turks. They were the most loyal and the most energetic subjects. This special fidelity of the renegade seems to me to be based on the circumstances under which one has entered the new relationship, affects one longer and more permanently than if one were, so to speak, naïve and reared without break in another relationship. If fidelity, as far as it concerns us here, is one's own life of relationship reflected in feeling, amidst indifference toward the eventual disappearance of the motive that originally established it, it will be effective all the more energetically and certainly the longer those motives still remain alive in the relationship and the lighter the burden of proof that is expected of the strength of the pure form of the relationship as such; and this will be most especially the case with the renegade, acutely aware of not being able to go back—thereupon, for the renegade the other relationship, from which one is irrevocably detached, always forms the background of the currently existing relationship, as in a form of sensitivity to difference. One is always, as it were, repelled anew from it and driven into the new relationship. The renegade's loyalty is particularly strong because it still contains in itself what fidelity as fidelity can spare: the conscious living out of the motive for the relationship that merges with the formal power of this simply enduring relationship, as in the cases where this opposed past and this exclusion of the possibility of going back or doing differently begins.

This already shows the purely conceptual structure of fidelity to be a sociological or, if one wishes, sociologically oriented affect. Other feelings, as much as they may bind people together, are still somewhat more solipsistic. Even love, friendship, patriotism, and sense of social duty have of course their nature first in an affect that occurs within the subject itself and remains imminent in the subject, as revealed perhaps most strongly in the words of Philene, "If I love you, what matters that to you?"[57] Here the emotions remain conditions of the subject first, despite their unending sociological importance. They are admittedly only created through the influence of other individuals or groups, but they also act before this influence is transformed into mutual influence; they need at least, if they are also directed toward another being, not to have the *relationship* with them for their real presupposition or content. This is simply the exact meaning of 'fidelity' (at least what is of concern here, although it also has still other meanings in common speech); it is the word for the particular feeling that is not oriented to possessing others, as to an eudaemonistic good of the one who feels it, also not to the well-being of others, as to an objective value standing before the subject, but to the preservation of the relationship with others; it does not establish this relationship and consequently cannot be, as with all the emotions, pre-sociological, but courses through what is established, holding onto one of the participants in the relationship as the inside of its self-preservation. Perhaps this specifically sociological character of fidelity is related to the fact that—more than our other feelings, which come upon us like rain and sunshine and without our will having control over their coming

[57] Evidently, from *Dialogue de Philene* by Jean de Mairet (1604–1686)—ed.

and going—it is amenable to our moral endeavors, so that its denial would be a stronger reproach to us than if love or social feeling—beyond their purely obligatory exercises—were lacking.

This special sociological importance of fidelity, however, still allows it to play a unifying role in a wholly fundamental duality affecting the principal form of all social processes. It is this: a relationship that is a fluctuating, continuously developing life process obtains a relatively stable external form. The social forms of people associating with one another, of the representation to the outside of the changes within their interior, *i.e.*, the process within each individual relating to the other, do not generally follow in close alliance; both levels have a different tempo of development, or it is also often the nature of the external form, that they do not actually develop at all. The strongest external crystallization amidst variable circumstances is evidently juridical: the form of marriage, which faces the changes in the personal relations with inflexibility, and the contract between two partners that divides the business between them despite it soon turning out that one does all the work and the other none; membership in a state or religious community that becomes completely alien or hostile to the individual. But also beyond such ostensive cases, it is noticeable step by step how the relationships developing between individuals—and also between groups—incline toward a crystallization of their form and how then they form a more or less fixed prejudice in favor of a further development in the relationship and, in turn, how they are hardly capable of a vibrant vitality to be able to adapt to the softer or stronger changes in concrete interactions. Besides, this contradicts only the discrepancies within the individual. The inner life, which we experience as a steaming, unstoppable up and down of thoughts and moods, thereby crystallizes for us even into formulae and fixed directions, often those that we fix in words. If it can also thereby be too concrete, perceptible inadequacies do not often appear in individuals; if in fortunate cases the fixed outer form can represent the point of emphasis or point of indifference around which life oscillates equally toward one and the other side, still the principal, formal contrast between the flowing, the essential agitation of the subjective mental life, and the ability of its forms remain, which somehow do not express and shape an ideal, a contrast with its reality, but directly this life itself. Since in individual life and in social life the external forms do not flow as the inner development itself, but always remain fixed for some time, the pattern is this: the external forms soon rush right ahead of the inner reality and quickly stand right behind it. Precisely when the superseded forms are shattered by the life pulsating behind them, it swings, so to speak, to an opposite extreme and creates forms that rush ahead of that real life and by which it is not yet completely filled—beginning with wholly personal relationships, where for example, the use of German *Sie* [formal 'you'] among those who have been friends for a long time is often found to be an unsuitable stiffness in the warmth of the relationship, but the *Du* [informal 'you'] just as often, at least at first, is a bit excessive as an anticipation of a total intimacy not yet achieved. Until changes in the political constitution, to replace forms that have become outdated and an unbearable force, through being liberal and broader, without the reality of the political

and economic forces ever being ripe for this yet, would be setting too wide a provisional framework in place of too narrow a one. Now fidelity, in the sense analyzed here has the implication for this pattern of social life that once the personal, fluctuating inwardness actually assumes the character of the fixed stable form of relationship, this sociological life, beyond the immediate one, and the stability that preserves its subjective rhythm, has here really become the content of the subjective, emotionally determined life. Viewed from the countless modifications, twists, and turns of the concrete destiny, fidelity is the bridge over and reconciliation for that deep and essential dualism that divides the life form of individual interiority from that of the social process that is certainly supported by the former. Fidelity is the disposition of the soul agitated and living itself out in a continual stream, with which it now nevertheless internally adopts the stability of the supra-individual form of relationship and adopts a content whose form must contradict the rhythm or lack of rhythm of the really lived life—although it created it itself. It takes up its meaning and value into this life.

To a much lesser extent than with fidelity, a sociological character appears immediately in the emotion of gratitude. Meanwhile the sociological importance of gratitude is hardly to be overestimated; only the external insignificance of its individual act—in contrast to which stands the immense expanse of its effectiveness—appears to have been almost fully deceptive about how the life and cohesion of society would be immeasurably different without the reality of gratitude.

First what gratitude brings about is a complement to the legal order. All human commerce is based on the pattern of devotedness and equivalency. Now, the equivalency of innumerable duties and performances can be enforced. In all economic exchanges that occur in legal form, in all fixed promises to perform something, in all obligations stemming from a legally regulated relationship, the legal constitution forces the receiving and giving of work and reciprocal work and provides for this interaction without which there is no social balance and cohesion. Now, however, there are numerous relationships for which no legal form exists, in which there can be no talk about a forcing of equivalents for devotedness. Gratitude appears here as something gratuitous, the bond of interaction, of engendering, receiving and giving of work and reciprocal work, where no external force guarantees it. Gratitude is thus in that sense a complement of the legal form, in the same sense as I showed honor to be.

In order to place this connection in its correct category, it must first be made clear that the personal, even in cases of person to person action involving things, somewhat as in robbery or gift, lies in the primitive form of the *exchange* of property, and it evolves into commerce in the objective meaning of the word. The exchange is the objectification of the interaction between people. While one gives something and the other gives something in turn that has the same value, the pure sensitivity of the relationship between the persons is externalized in objects, and this objectification of the relationship, its growing into things that come and go, becomes so complete that the personal interaction in the developed economy withdraws altogether and the products have achieved a life of their own; the relationships between them, the equivalency

of value between them, takes place automatically, purely mathematically, and the people only appear as the executors of the tendencies toward shifting and balancing, grounded in the products themselves. Objectively the same is given for objectively the same, and the persons themselves, though they obviously carry out the process for the sake of their interests, are actually indifferent. The relationship of people has become the relationship of objects. Now, gratitude originates likewise from and in the interaction among people, and turns inside, as every relationship of things springs from it and turns outward. It is the subjective residue of the act of receiving or also of giving. As the interaction emerges with the exchange of things from the immediate action of the interrelation, so with gratitude this action declines in its consequences, in its subjective importance, and in its mental echo down in the soul. It is, as it were, the moral memory of humanity, distinguished here from fidelity so that it is more practical, more impulsive in nature, so that although it can of course also remain purely within, by stimulating action the potential for new action is still an ideal bridge that the soul, so to speak, finds ever again, in order to construct a new bridge that would otherwise perhaps not be sufficient for reaching over to the other person. All social interaction beyond its first origin is based on the further effect of the relationship beyond the moment of its origin. If love or greed, obedience or hate, the sociability instinct or a thirst for power may allow an action of one person to another to emerge from itself, the creative mood does not serve to exhaust itself in the action, but somehow to live on in the sociological situation created by it. Gratitude is such a continuing existence in a most particular sense, an ideal survival of a relationship, even after it was somewhat broken off for a long time and the act of giving and receiving has been long completed. Although gratitude is a purely personal or, if one will, lyric emotion, it turns into one of the strongest bonds through its thousand-fold intermeshing within the society; it is the fertile emotional foundation from which not only are individual actions stimulated toward each other, but through its fundamental existence, even though often unconscious and interwoven with countless other motives, it adds a particular modification or intensity to actions, a linkage to them, a giving of continuity into the personality amidst the vicissitudes of life. If every thankful response to an earlier action still remaining in the hearts were to be wiped out with one blow, society, at least as we know it, would disintegrate.[58] If one can see

[58] Giving is, overall, one of the strongest sociological functions. Without the existence of continuous giving and receiving—also beyond commerce—no society would come into existence at all. For giving is in no way only a simple effect of one person on another but is exactly what is required by the sociological function: it is interaction. Insofar as the other either accepts or rejects, a certain repercussion is exercised on the one giving. The way one accepts, gratefully or ungratefully, as one already expected or is surprised, so that one is satisfied by the gift or remains dissatisfied, so that one feels elevated by the gift or humiliated—all this has a very specific repercussion on the giver, although, of course, not expressible in a particular concept and quantity, and thus each giving is an interaction between the giver and the recipient.

through all the outside/inside binding motives between individuals from the way they carry on exchange, how much they support commerce, which builds up society for the most part and does not only hold the structure together, gratitude will be seen simply as the motive that causes the repetition of the good deed from within, where one does not speak of external necessity. And the good deed is not only an actual giving from person to person, but we thank the artist and the poet who do not know us, and this fact creates innumerable ideal and concrete, looser and firmer bonds between them that such gratitude toward the same giver brings about; indeed we thank the giver not only for whatever somebody does, but one can describe the feeling only with the same idea with which we often react to the shear existence of personalities: we are thankful to them purely because they are there, because we experience them. And the finest and the most solid relationships are often associated with what offers exactly our whole personality to the other as from a duty to be thankful, independently of the feeling of all individual receptions, since it also applies to the whole of one's personality.

Now, the concrete content of gratitude, *i.e.* the responses to which it leads us, creates room for changes in the interaction, the delicacy of which does not lessen its importance for the structure of our relationships. The interior of this structure experiences an extraordinary richness of nuance since a gift accepted according to the psychological situation can only be responded to with another gift of the same kind given to the other. Thus perhaps one gives to the other what is termed a spirit, intellectual values, and the other shows gratitude by returning something of mental value; or one offers the other something aesthetic or some other appeal of one's personality, which is of a stronger nature and, as it were, infuses it with a will and equips one with firmness and power of decision. Now there is probably no interaction in which the to and fro, the giving and receiving, involve completely identical kinds.[59] But the cases that I have mentioned here are the ultimate increments of this unavoidable difference between gift and return gift in human relations, and where they appear very definite and with a heightened consciousness of the difference; they form an ethically as well as theoretically difficult problem of the same proportion of what one can call 'inner sociology.' That is, it often has the tone of a faint inner inappropriateness for one person to offer the other intellectual treasurers without considerably engaging in the relationship something of the spirit, while the other does not know anything to give for it as love; all such cases have something fatal at the level of feeling, since they somehow smack of a purchase. It is the difference between exchange in general and purchasing that is emphasized in the idea of the sale, that the actually on-going exchange involves two wholly heterogeneous things that are brought together and become comparable only through a common monetary value. Thus if a handicraft in somewhat earlier times, as there was not yet metal

[59] Simmel places the statement in the singular and uses the Latin expression, *quale*, for kinds—ed.

money, was sold for a cow or goat, which were wholly heterogeneous things but which were brought together and exchangeable through the economic, abstract-common value placed on both. In the modern money economy this heterogeneity has reached a high point. Since money is the common element, *i.e.* it expresses the exchange value in all exchangeable objects, it is incapable of expressing just what is individual among them; and hence a note of downgrading comes over the objects, insofar as they are presented as marketable, a note of reducing the individuals to what is common among them, what is common to this thing with all other marketable things, and above all what is common with money itself. Something of this basic heterogeneity occurs in the cases that I mentioned, where two people mutually offer one another different kinds of goods of their inner sensitivities, where gratitude for the gift is realized in an altogether different currency and thus something of the character of a sale enters into the exchange, which is here, *a priori*, inappropriate. One purchases love with what one gives from the soul. One purchases the attraction of a person that one wants to enjoy through superior suggestibility and willpower, which the person either wants to feel over oneself or wants to allow to be poured into oneself. The feeling of a certain inadequacy or unworthiness arises here only if the mutual offerings serve as detached objects that one exchanges, if the mutual gratitude involves only, so to speak, the good deed, only the exchanged content itself. However, especially in the circumstances in question here, the person is still not the merchant of the self. One's qualities, the powers and functions that flow out of one, exist not only for oneself as goods on the counter, but it happens that an individual, in order to feel oneself fully, even when giving only a single thing and offering only one aspect of one's personality, in this one aspect one's personality can be complete, one's personality in the form of this particular energy, of this particular attribute, can nevertheless give totally, as Spinoza would say. Any disproportion arises only where the differentiation within the relationship is so advanced that what one gives to the other is detached from the whole of the personality. Meanwhile, where this does not happen, a remarkable pure case of the otherwise not very frequent combination arises precisely here, that gratitude includes the reaction to the good deed and to the person who did it alike. In the seemingly objective response that only pertains to the gift and which consists of another gift, it is possible through that remarkable plasticity of the soul both to offer and to accept the entirety of the subjectivity of the one person as well as that of the other.

The most profound instance of this kind exists when the general inner disposition, which is attuned toward the other in the special way called gratitude, is not only, as it were, a broadening of the actual response of gratitude copied onto the totality of the soul, but when what we experience of goods and generosity from another is only like an incidental motive by which a predetermined relationship to the other is only activated in the inner nature of the soul. Here what we call gratitude and what had given the name to this disposition, as it were, from only one single proof, very deep under the familiar, takes on the valid form of gratitude for the object. One can say that at the deepest level it does not consist in the gift being reciprocated, but that in the

consciousness that one cannot repay, that here something exists that the soul of the recipient changes into a particular permanent disposition toward the other and brings to consciousness a presentiment of the inner endlessness of a relationship that cannot become completely exhausted or developed through a final demonstration or activity.

This coincides with another deep-lying incommensurability that is most essential for the relationship maintained under the category of gratitude. Where we have experienced from another something worthy of gratitude, where this was 'accomplished beforehand,' we can repay this completely with no return gift or reciprocity—although such may rightly and objectively outweigh the first gift—since voluntariness exists in the first giving, which is no longer existent in the equivalent return. Since we are already ethically bound to it, the pressure to give back is there, which is nevertheless a pressure, albeit not socio-legal but moral. The first manifestation arising from the complete spontaneity of the soul has a freedom that duty, even the duty of gratitude, lacks. Kant had decreed this character of duty with a bold stroke: The fulfillment of duty and freedom are identical. There he has confounded the negative side of freedom with the positive. Seemingly, we are free to fulfill or not to fulfill the duty that we feel as ideally above us. In reality, only the latter occurs in total freedom. Fulfilling it, however, results from a mental imperative, from the force that is the inner equivalent of the legal force of society. Complete freedom lies only on the side of what is allowed, not on that of the deed to which I am brought to the thought that it is a duty—just as I am brought to reciprocating a gift on the basis that I received it. We are free only when we are prepared, and that is the basis why in the case there lies a beauty not occasioned by the offer of gratitude, a spontaneous devotion, a sprouting up or blossoming toward another out of, as it were, the virgin soil of the soul that can be matched by no substantively overwhelming gift. Here remains a residue—with reference to the concrete content of the often seemingly unjustifiable evidence—that is expressed in the feeling that we cannot reciprocate a gift at all; for a freedom lives in it that the return gift, just because it is a return gift, cannot possess. Perhaps this is the basis why some people accept something reluctantly and if possible avoid being given a gift. If doing good and gratitude simply revolved around the object, that would be incomprehensible since one would then be making it all equivalent to revenge, which would be able to dissolve the inner bond completely. In reality, however, with everyone, perhaps, it simply works by instinct that the return gift cannot contain the decisive moment, the moment of the freedom of the first gift, and that with the acceptance of it one assumes an obligation that cannot be dissolved.[60] That as a rule people are so from a strong instinct of independence and individuality is reminiscent of the fact that the situation of gratitude is readily accompanied by a note of

[60] Of course this is an extreme expression whose distance from reality, however, is unavoidable in analysis, which wishes to isolate and make visible for itself alone the causal elements of the mental reality that are mixed up a thousand times, always distracting, and that exist almost only in rudiments.

an indissoluble bond, that it is of an indelible moral quality. Once we accept a deed, a sacrifice, or favor, that never completely extinguishable inner relationship can originate from it since gratitude is perhaps the single existing feeling that can be morally required and satisfied under all circumstances. If our inner reality, from within itself or as a response to an outer reality, has made it impossible for us to love, admire, or esteem anymore—aesthetically, ethically, intellectually—we can still always be ever grateful to those who have once deserved our gratitude. The soul is absolutely adaptable to this challenge, or could be so, so that perhaps a judgment against a lack of no other feeling is so rendered without mitigating circumstances as against ingratitude. Even the inward fidelity does not have the same culpability. There are relationships that, so to speak, operate from the outset with only a definite capital of feelings and whose investment is unavoidably accompanied by it being used up, so that its discontinuation involves no actual perfidy. But admittedly, the fact that in their beginning stages they are often not too different from the others that—to stay with the analogy—they live off of the interest and in which all the ardor and unreservedness of the giving does not diminish the capital. Admittedly it belongs to the most frequent errors of people to treat what is capital as interest and to form a relationship around it so that its rupture turns into a case of faithlessness. But this, then, is not an error from out of the freedom of the soul but the logical development of a fate reckoned with erroneous factors from the outset. And infidelity does not appear to be avoidable where, not the self revealing deception of the consciousness but a real change in the individuals rearranges the presuppositions of their relationship. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of human relationships rises out of the mixture of the stable and the variable elements of our nature, which is not at all to be rationalized and which is continuously shifting. If we have committed ourselves with our whole being to a binding relationship, we remain perhaps with certain aspects in the same attitude and predisposition more oriented toward the outside but also with some purely toward the inside; but another develops toward a wholly new interest, goal, or ability that completely diverts our nature as a whole into a new direction. They thus divert us from that relationship—whereby of course only the pure inwardness is meant, not the outward fulfillment of duties—with a kind of faithlessness that is neither wholly innocent since some connection to that which now must be broken still exists, nor wholly guilty since we are no longer the same persons who entered into the relationship; the subject to whom one could impute the faithlessness has vanished. Here such exoneration from out of the inner essence such as this does not enter into our feeling when our sense of gratitude is extinguished. It seems to dwell in a place within us that cannot be changed, for which we require consistency with greater claims than with a more passionate and even deeper feeling. This peculiar indissolubility of gratitude, which even in the reciprocation with a similar or greater return gift leaves a residue, can also leave it on both sides of a relationship—perhaps reverting to that freedom of the gift that lacked only the morally necessary return gift—which allows gratitude to appear just as fine as it is a solid a bond between people. In every relationship that is permanent

in some way a thousand occasions for thanks arise, of which even the most fleeting ones of their contribution to the reciprocal bond are not allowed to be lost. It arises from their summation, in the good cases, but sometimes also in those that are amply provided with counter instances—a general frame of mind of being quite obligated (one rightly claims to be 'bound' to the other for something worthy of gratitude), which is not able to be dissolved through any individual deeds; it belongs to the, as it were, microscopic but infinitely strong threads that tie one member of society to another and thereby, ultimately, all to a firmly formed common life.

In contrast to the stability and substantial solidity that some groups form as a condition of their self-preservation, others need precisely the greatest flexibility and interchangeability of social forms; for example the one that either only tolerates its existence within a larger one or just manages only *per nefas*.[61] Only with the most thorough *elasticity* can such a society combine a firmness of its interconnections with the continual defense and offense. It must, so to speak, slip into each hole, expand according to the circumstances, and be able to coordinate, as a body in an aggregate fluid condition must assume every form that is offered to it. Thus criminal and conspiratorial gangs must acquire the ability to split up immediately and act in separate groups; sometimes they must act without conditions, sometimes be subordinate to the leader; sometimes in direct contact, sometimes in indirect contact, but always protect the same common spirit; immediately after each dispersing to immediately reorganize anew exactly in any form possible, etc. They thereby achieve self-preservation, for which reason the Romani (Gypsies) are in the habit of saying about themselves that it would be pointless to hang them since they would never die. The same has been said of the Jews. The strength of their social solidarity, in practice the very effective feeling of solidarity among them, the peculiar, if also often relaxed, closure against all non-Jews—this sociological bond probably has lost its confessional character since emancipation, only to be exchanged for that against capitalists.[62] Thus 'the invisible organization' of the Jews would be just insurmountable because as soon as

[61] Latin: through wickedness—ed.

[62] This and what follows seem to be rationales presented by Simmel, himself of Jewish origin, of what was commonly said of social minorities such as Romani and Jews in Germany in the early twentieth century, along with the assumption that Jews became socialists in great numbers—ed.

the power of the press first and then that of the capital is freed from the hate against the Jews, their equivalent justification would rise up in the end; if Jewish social organization would not go into a decline but would only be deprived of its sociopolitical organization, it would still gain strength again in its original confessional form of association. This sociopolitical game has been already repeated locally and could also repeat everywhere.

Indeed, one could find the variability of the individual Jew, their wondrous ability in the most manifold tasks, and their nature to adapt to the most changed conditions life—one could describe this as a mirroring of the social group form in the form of the individual. Quite immediately the flexibility of the Jews in socio-economic relationships has been described exactly as a vehicle for their resistance. The better English worker is not at all driven away from the wage that seems necessary to him for his standard: he goes on strike or does rather substandard work or seeks some credit of a different kind rather than accept a wage for his craft below the standards that have been set. However the Jew rather accepts the lowest wage, as if not working at all, and thus is not acquainted with the quiet satisfaction with an achieved standard, but strives tirelessly beyond it: no minimum is too low, no maximum enough. This range of variation, which obviously extends from the individual life into that of the group, is as much the means of self-preservation of the Jew as the inflexibility and immovability simply are in the example of the English worker. Now whether the first suggested claim about the history of Judaism is substantively true or not, its presupposition is instructive for us: that the self-preservation of a social entity could occur directly through the change of its apparent form or its material basis, and that its continuation rests precisely on its changeability.

These two manners of social self-preservation enter into peculiarly characteristic contradictions through their relationship with wider sociological conceptions. If then the preservation of the group is very closely bound up with the maintenance of a certain stratum in its existence and uniqueness—the highest, the widest, the middle—the first two cases need more inflexibility in the form of social life, the last more flexibility. As I have already emphasized, aristocracies in general tend to be conservative. For if they really are what the word, *aristocracy*, means—the reign of the best—they are the most adequate expression of the real dissimilarity among people. In this case—about which I am not examining whether it is not almost always realized only very

partially—the spur for revolutionary movements is missing: the lack of fit between the inner qualification of persons and their social place, the exit point for the greatest human achievements and bravery as well as for the most absurd human undertakings. Once supposing this favorable case of aristocracy, a strict adherence of its total existence to forms and contents is necessary for its overall preservation since every experimental change threatens that delicate and rare proportionality between qualification and position either in reality or for the feeling of the person concerned, and thus would provide the stimulus for a principled transformation. In an aristocracy, the essential cause of that, however, will still be that absolute justice hardly ever exists in the governing relationships, that, rather, the reign of the few over the many tends to be raised on a wholly different foundation from that of an ideal suitability in that relationship. Under these circumstances the rulers will have the greatest interest in giving no cause for restless and innovative movements since every such movement would stimulate the just or only alleged claims of those being ruled. There would be the danger—and this is decisive for our line of thought—that not only would there be an exchange of persons but the whole constitution would be changed. As soon as structures for self-preservation are considered cautiously and they can only operate through a latent or real defense, they avoid progressive development. For during periods of development, a being expends its energy inwardly and has none free for defense. For every development, its success is something problematic, according to its inner as well as its outer chances, and therefore also a being for which how it exists does not matter so much as the fact that it exists will cultivate no impulse for development. Thus it is that in a fundamental relationship that age normally has the leading place in aristocracies, as does youth in democracies. But age has a physiologically grounded tendency toward conservatism; it can still only 'conserve' itself and can still allow itself to take a chance with the dangers of ever advancing development only in cases of an exceptional reserve of forces. And yet on the other hand, where age in practice enjoys prestige and position of power, conservatism will prevail: the young, at whose cost age now has its privilege—e.g., the frequently higher age limit for holding office in aristocracies—can only hope to enter into office only under similarly existing conditions. In such a context the aristocratic form of constitution preserves its status for itself best with the greatest immobility possible; and this in no way holds only for political groups but for ecclesiastical ones, interest groups, for informal and social groupings,

that lend themselves to aristocratic formation. As soon as this has happened, everywhere a strict conservatism becomes favorable not only for the temporary personal existence of a reign but also for its formal, principled preservation. Precisely the history of the reform movements in aristocratic constitutions makes this clear enough. The adaptation to newly existing social forces or ideals, as occurs through a mitigation of exploitation or subjugation, the legal establishment of privileges instead of arbitrary interpretations, and the lifting of the law and a good portion of the lower classes—this adaptation, insofar as it is conceded voluntarily, serves its goal not in what would thereby be changed but on the contrary in what would be thereby conserved. The lessening of aristocratic prerogatives is the *conditio sine qua non*[63] for rescuing the aristocratic regime at all. But if one had allowed the movement to proceed in the first place, these concessions are mostly no longer sufficient. Every reform tends to reveal new things that need reform, and the movement that was introduced for the preservation of the existing order leads down a slippery slope either towards its overthrow or, if the revived claims cannot succeed, to a radical reaction that reverses the changes that had already been put in place. This danger, which exists in every modification and flexibility of an aristocratic constitution—that the concession granted for its preservation leads under its own weight to a total revolution—allows the conservatism *à outrance*[64] and the existing form of defense in unconditional rigidity and inflexibility to appear as the good one for the social form of aristocracy.

Where the form of the group is not set by the prominence of a numerically small stratum but by the widest stratum and its autonomy, its self-preservation will likewise benefit from stability and motionless steadfastness. Thus it comes about that the broad masses, insofar as they serve as a permanent vehicle of a social unity, have a very rigid and immobile disposition. They diverge most sharply from the actually currently assembled multitude that in its mood and decisions is extremely labile and changes with the most fleeting impulses from one extreme of behavior to another. Where the multitude is not directly sensually stimulated and joins a nervous fluctuation through mutually exercised stimulation and suggestion, an uprooting of firm control

[63] Latin: indispensable condition—ed.
[64] French: in the extreme—ed.

which exposes the multitude to every current impulse, where rather its deeper and more enduring character becomes effective, there it follows, as it were, the law of inertia: it does not alter its condition of rest or movement by itself but only under the influence of new positive forces. Therefore movements that are borne by great masses and left on their own consequently go to their extreme, while on the other hand an equilibrium of conditions, once attained, is not easily set aside, as far as the masses are concerned. It corresponds to the practical instinct of the mass and meets the change of circumstances and stimulations of itself by means of a substantial firmness and intransigence in form, instead of protection through flexible adaptation and quickly instituted changes in its behavior. It becomes essential for political constitutions that the basis for their social form rest on the broadest and similarly qualified stratum, mostly among agricultural peoples—the ancient Roman peasantry and the ancient German communities of freemen. Here the behavior of their forms is prejudged by the content of the social interests. The farmer is conservative *a priori*; his business requires long time frames, durable equipment, persistent management, and tenacious steadfastness. The unpredictability of favorable weather, on which he depends, inclines him toward a certain fatalism that is manifested with respect to the external forces more by endurance than by avoidance; his technology cannot at all respond to market changes by such quick qualitative modifications as industry and business are accustomed to do. Added to that, the farmer above all wishes to have peace in his state and—what politicians of different times have known and exploited—it matters little to him, in contrast, what form this state takes. Thus here the technical conditions also create groups, the preservation of whose form coincides with that of the broadest agricultural stratum and with the disposition to achieve this preservation through firmness and tenacity, but not through instability in their life processes.

It is quite different where the middle class assumed control and the social form of the group rises and falls with its preservation. The middle class, however, has an upper and lower limit, and indeed of a kind that continuously picks up individuals both from the upper and from the lower classes and loses individuals to both. Thus it is stamped with a fluctuating, and the suitability of its behavior will thus be largely a suitability of adaptations, variations, and accommodations by which the once unavoidable movement of the totality is at least so directed or so encountered that the essential form and force remain preserved

amidst all changes of circumstances. One can describe the sociological form of a group, which is characterized by the breadth and prevalence of a middle class, as that of continuity; such a one subsists neither in a really continuous, thus unranked equality of individuals nor in the constitution of the group out of an upper stratum and a lower stratum that is abruptly cut off from the upper. The middle class actually brings to these two a wholly new sociological element; it is not only a third added to the existing two, which would so behave toward each of these two approximately and only in quantitative shadings as these two would toward each other. Rather the new emphasis is that the middle stratum has an upper and a lower limit, that it exists with this continuous exchange with both other strata, and a blurring of limits and continuous transitions are generated by this uninterrupted fluctuation. For an actual continuity of social life does not come about through individuals being placed in positions with so little distance from one another—this would still always produce a discontinuous structure—but only by circulating separate individuals through higher and lower positions: Only thus will the distance between the strata be bridged by a real continuity. The upper and lower condition must be able to meet in the fate of the individual, so that an actual interchange between upper and lower would reveal the sociological picture. And this, not just a simple in-between condition, brings the middle class to reality. It takes a little consideration to realize that this gradualness across gradations must also hold for the degrees within the middle class itself. The continuity of positions in relation to prestige, property, activity, education etc., lies not only in the minuteness of the differences that they, arranged on some objectively set scale, demonstrate, but in the frequency of the change that leads one and the same person through a multiplicity of such positions and thus brings about, as it were, continuous and varying personal encounters of objectively different situations. Under these circumstances the general social picture will take on the character of something *elastic*: the dominant middle class lends it an easy mobility of members, so that the self-preservation of the group is carried out through the change of outer or inner circumstances and attacks not so much through firmness and inflexibility in the cohesion of its members as through ready adaptability and quick transformation. The shear fact of the diversity within a society gives its individuals a greater freedom of movement without its social self-preservation being thereby threatened. The intolerant conservatism of the Athenian majority, to which Socrates fell victim, was justified by the idea that the *homogeneity* of the

population would make any disruption especially dangerous. With a larger number of manifold dominant and subordinated strata, a problematic, indeed even a subversive, idea may be somewhat propagated in many minds—there are so many inhibiting forces; diverse tendencies lie between such a movement and the decision of the whole or of the influential factors that the disruption does not seize the whole so quickly. But where neither such immediate variety nor an officialdom based on a division of labor exists, an incipient disruption somewhere easily takes root in the whole. Thus the instinct of self-preservation will recommend to the whole the suppression of movements and agitations on the part of individuals that hold the chance of social dangers. On the other hand, a development within early Christianity manifested a formally similar context. The first communities protected the spirit of their community with an extraordinary rigor and purity that knew no compromise with moral shortcomings or lapses when under persecution; a completely uniform composition of members in moral and religious matters corresponded to this stability in the life of the whole. But in the end the multiple lapses in the era of persecution forced the church finally to relax the absoluteness of its demands and grant membership to a whole spectrum of personalities who were more or less perfect. However, the inner differentiation meant at the same time a growing elasticity and accommodation on the part of the church as a whole; this new technique of its self-preservation, by which it learned finally to be satisfied with the changeable relationships with all manner of life forces, was associated with the break-up of its inner homogeneity and with the tolerance with which it allows its members to take on an unlimited variety of value-levels. It is interesting that the timelessness of the church principle is realized as much by a technique of unwavering rigidity as unlimited flexibility. The self-preservation of the church stands, as it were, at so abstract a level that it can be served indiscriminately by one or the other means. It can be shown quite generally that a group with very many positions built on one another, on a narrow scale, must have the character of a distinct changeability and variability if the worst state of health and breakdown should not result. In a great variety of possible situations it is much more unlikely from the start that everyone is placed at the right place right away than in a situation that places each person in a large group that embraces many sorts of games. Where a group includes only a few, sharply distinct life circumstances, the individuals are as a rule cultivated for their sphere from the outset. Such constitutions can create a correspondence between

dispositions and places of individuals whereby the individual spheres are relatively large and their demands and opportunities are broad enough to provide them a generally suitable place through inheritance, upbringing, or through the example of specific individuals. The constitution of the social order thus manifests, as it were, a harmony, pre-stabilized or set by cultivation, between the qualities or dispositions of the individual and the individual's place in the social totality. But where the sharply bounded strata have separated from each other in a great number of gradations of circumstances, thanks to the existence of a broad middle class, the mentioned forces cannot clearly predispose the individuals to the position where they belong; thus the order also into which the individual correctly and harmoniously entered must be, as it were, empirically achieved *a posteriori*: the individual must have the possibility of transferring from an unsuitable position to a suitable one. So in this case the self-preservation of the group form requires an ability to leave the group readily, a continuing correction, an ability to change positions, but also a malleability of the latter, so that particular individuals can also find particular positions. Thus, in order to preserve itself, one group with a dominant middle class requires a fully different behavior from a group with an aristocratic leadership or a group without a formation of gradations altogether. Admittedly, the changeability that the dominance of the middle manifestations lends a group can also rise up to a destructive character. Thus the form type—the simultaneous nearness and distance—which the middle or mixed elements possess compared to the more polar ones, incites opposition and is apparently effective because the children from mixed marriages are often the most dangerous opponents of aristocracy. The observation is handed down from antiquity that tyrants who overthrow aristocratic governments were mainly of mixed-rank parenthood. Thus in South America uprisings are fomented incomparably less often by Blacks and Indians than by mestizos and mulattos; and so are the children of Jewish-Christian marriages often especially sharp critics as much of the Jewish as of the German ways of life. But there is more. What the changeability and variability is in the group-forms in succession, the division of labor is in their juxtaposition. If among them it is a matter of the group as a whole adapting itself to the different life conditions appearing successively by means of corresponding changes in its form, in the division of labor it is a matter of developing it for the various, *simultaneously* existing requirements that correspond to the differences

of their individual members. The whole multiplicity and gradation of occupations and positions that we highlighted above is evidently possible only with a division of labor; and corresponding to this as its counterpart is the variability in forms of social life that is a characteristic of the middle class and its predominance. Neither the aristocracy nor the free peasantry tends toward a greater division of labor. The aristocracy does not because every division of labor brings with it gradations in rank that are inconsistent with status consciousness and the unity of the stratum; the peasantry does not because its technology hardly requires or allows for it. But now what is peculiar is that the quality of variability and division of labor that links them together objectively and within those who bear them sometimes work directly against one another with respect to the self-preservation of the group. This arises on the one hand, already from the previously mentioned fact that a multiplicity and long-term gradation of positions—which emerges precisely from the division of labor—leads to all kinds of difficulties and doubts, since an easy maneuverability and flexibility within the social elements do not come about readily. This works against the dangers that arise from the thoroughgoing division of labor: the fragmentation, the one-sidedness, the discrepancy between the abilities and position of the individual. On the other hand, the complementing circumstances of the division of labor and variation in relation to the preservation of groups are thus presented. There will be many cases in which the changeability of the middle class produces insecurity, uncertainty, and rootlessness. This is now paralyzed by the division of labor since it links the elements of the groups extraordinarily close to one another. Small groups of primitive peoples, however centrally they may be organized, nevertheless easily split asunder because ultimately any segment of them is equally capable of survival; each can do by itself what the other can, and thus, because of the their difficulties in eking out an existence, they depend on external relationship. However, this is not thus a special diminution of this unity; they can be joined together again completely at will. In contrast, the solidarity of a large cultural group rests on its division of labor. Out of necessity one is in need of another; the disintegration of the group would leave each individual wholly helpless. Thus, the division of labor, with its linking together of individuals with each other, works against variability when it becomes harmful to the preservation of the group. That will already be noticeable in smaller circles. A group of settlers will in general be

very flexible and diverse; one time it will become centralized, another time formed very freely, depending on its being rather pressured from outside or having some leeway. It will often leave the leadership to changing persons as interests change; one time it will link up with another group, at another time it must seek its welfare in the greatest possible isolation and with the greatest possible autonomy. Admittedly these variations in its sociological form will always support its self-preservation in individual cases; but on the whole they occasion conflict, insecurity, and fission. But in contrast, a developed division of labor arises strongly among them since on the one hand it makes the individual dependent on the group, and on the other hand it gives the group a heightened interest to hold on to the individual.

The readily changeable nature of group life, its propensity toward changes of a formal and personal kind, was in all the cases considered so far an adaptation to what was necessary for life: a bending in order not to break, necessary as long as the substantial firmness, off of which each destructive force generally rebounds, is not at hand. With its variability, the group responds to the change in circumstances and compensates for it so that the result is its own continued existence. But now it can be asked whether such variability, such continuity through such changing and often contrasting conditions actually serves the preservation of the group only as a reaction to the change of external conditions, or whether its innermost principle of existence does not also to some extent present the same requirement. Completely apart from what variations in its behavior the outer or inner causes elicit, is not the strength and health of its life processes, as a development of purely inner energies, perhaps bound up with a certain change in its activity, a shift in its interests, a more frequent reorganization of its form? We know about individuals that they need *changing* stimuli for their survival, that they maintain vigor and unity in their existence not by being always the same mechanically in their outer and inner condition and activity, but that they are designed from within, as it were, to prove their unity in the change not only of action and experience but also in the change within each of these. Thus it is not impossible that the consolidating bond of the group needs alternating stimuli in order to remain alert and strong. An indication of such an activity of the thing lies from the outset in certain phenomena that present a close fusion between a social entity as such and a certain content or its formation. Such a fusion conceivably appears when a substantive or otherwise particular condition exists unchanged for very long, and

there is a danger that, as the social entity is nevertheless finally transformed by some external event, it draws the social entity itself into its own destruction—exactly in the manner that religious ideas often grow together with moral sentiments by being interrelated over a long time, and by virtue of this association, if the religious ideas are eliminated through enlightenment, the moral norms can be uprooted with it too. Thus a formerly wealthy family often disintegrates if it is impoverished, but so do many poor if they suddenly become wealthy. And the worst internal factionalism and inner turmoil always exist in a formerly free state if it loses its freedom (I am reminded of Athens after the Macedonian era), but this also happens in a formerly despotically governed one as soon as it suddenly becomes free, which the history of revolutions proves often enough. It appears as though a certain changeability in the composition or formation of groups protects them against their inner unity being bound up with them, as it were, rigidly; the latter happens as the deepest vital nerve of the unified social entity is threatened immediately along with a still impending change. In contrast to this, every frequent change appears to serve as a kind of inoculation, the bonds between the most essential and the less vital characteristics remain looser, and the disruption of the less vital is generally a lesser danger for the preservation of the group unity.

We are readily inclined to view peace, harmony of interests, and concord to be the essence of social self-preservation, but every opposition as a disturbance of the unity, whose conservation is at issue, and as the unfruitful exhaustion of powers that could be directed to the positive construction of the organization of the group. Still the other opinions seem to be correct, which explain a certain rhythm between peace and conflict as more preservative of the life-form and in fact, as it were, according to two dimensions of that: thus the conflict of the group as a whole against external enemies in alternation with peaceful epochs, similar to the conflict of competitors, of parties, of opposing tendencies of every kind next to the realities of mutuality and harmony; the former alternates between harmonious and contradictory phenomena one after another, the latter placed one next to the other. The motive for both in the final analysis is one and the same, but realized in different ways. The struggle against a power that exists outside the group brings its unity and indispensability into consciousness most forcefully to preserve it undisturbed. It is a fact of the greatest sociological importance, one of the few that holds almost without exception for group formations of every kind, that the shared opposition unifying against a third party

works under all circumstances, and does so in fact with much greater certainty than does the shared friendly relationship with a third party. Probably there is hardly a group—familial, ecclesiastical, economic, political, or of whatever kind—that could go completely without this cement. It seems as though for us humans, whose whole mental nature is constructed on a sensitivity toward difference, a feeling of separation must always exist next to that of unity in order to make the latter perceptible and effective. But now this process, as mentioned, can also take place within the group itself. Aversions and antagonisms among the elements of a group toward one another can nevertheless bring the existent unity of the totality to the sharpest effectiveness; while they cut short, as it were, the threads of the social bonds, they simply stretch them and thereby make them visible. Admittedly, this is also the way toward allowing them to tear apart; but short of that, those contrary movements, which are indeed possible only on the basis of an underlying solidarity and close relations, will bring that basis to a stronger functioning, regardless of whether it is also accompanied by such a heightened consciousness of it. Thus attacks and assaults among the members of a community lead to the mandate of the law that should restrain them and, although they rise only on the basis of the hostile egoism of an individual, nevertheless brings to the totality its togetherness, solidarity, and common interest to consciousness and expression. Thus economic competition is an extremely close interrelation that brings the competitors and the buyers closer to one another and makes them more dependent on them and also on one another than if competition were excluded from the start. So the wish to avoid hostility and mitigate its consequences leads above all to a unification (e.g. industrial and political cartels) to all kinds of practices of economic and other trade that, though it arises only on the basis of a real or possible antagonism, still brings positive support to the cohesion of the whole. A special chapter of this book is devoted to discussing the sociology of conflict, whose power for the self-preservation of the society was, therefore, indicated here only in its general reality. Opposition and conflict in their importance for the self-preservation of the group are a characteristic example of the value that the variability of the group life and the change in its forms of activity possess for this purpose. Although so little of the antagonism generally ever dies out completely and everywhere, nevertheless, there is so much in its nature always to form a spatially and temporally based segment within the scope of the forces that band together and

uniformly harmonize. By its own nature, the antagonism represents one of the stimuli for change by which the principle of the unity of society evidently desires from its innermost necessities of life; perhaps, it desires because here as everywhere what remains can only become apparent in relation to what is changing and thereby to come into conscious force. Social unity is the form or the continuity-factor, as it might be called, that proves itself to be the fortress amidst all changes in its own particular development, its content, and its relationships to the material interests and experiences, and it proves all the more, the livelier the change is even in the latter. The deepening, solidity, and unity of, for example, the marital bond is certainly, *ceteris paribus*, a function of the variety and variability of the destinies, the experience of which derives from the formal permanence of the marital community of interest. It is the nature of things human that the life situation of its individual moments is the existence of their opposite. The variety of formations and the change of content are essential for the self-preservation of the group not only in the degree to which perceptions differ essentially, which allow the unity of it that contrasts the variations coming at them, but above all because this unity always comes back the same, while the formations, interests, and destinies, from which our consciousness separates them, are different each time. It thereby gains, against all disruptions, the same prospect of firmness and effectiveness that truth possesses against error. So little does truth possess in and of itself, in individual cases, an advantage or mystical power of self-assertion over error, so little is its ultimate victory consequently still probable, that it is only one while errors over the same matter are countless. Thus it is to be assumed from the outset that it comes back amidst the wavering of opinions more frequently, *indeed not more frequently than error in general, but nevertheless as every particular error.* Thus the unity of the social group has the chance of deepening and strengthening itself against all disruptions and vicissitudes, because the latter are always of a different kind, but the former in every occurrence of it, always comes back the same as before. By virtue of this situation of the matter, the favorable results of social variability for the preservation of the group mentioned above can remain in existence, without which the fact of change at all would have to change the principle of unity into a serious competition.

CHAPTER NINE

SPACE AND THE SPATIAL ORDERING OF SOCIETY

Among the most frequent degenerations of the human causal impulse is the cessation of the formal conditions without which particular events cannot occur for maintaining their positive, productive motives. The typical example is the power of time—an idiom that forever defrauds us of researching the *actual* grounds for the mitigation or the cooling off of sentiment, grounds for processes of mental healing or firmly established habits. With the significance of space it is frequently no different. When an aesthetic theory declares it the essential task of the plastic arts to make space perceptible for us, it misunderstands that our interest holds only for the particular shapes of things, but not space in general or spatiality, which constitutes only their *conditio sine qua non*, and neither its special essence nor its generating factor. If an interpretation of history presents the spatial factor in the foreground to such an extent that it would understand the greatness or the smallness of the realm, the crowdedness or dispersion of populations, the mobility or stability of the masses etc. as the, as it were, motives radiating out from space to the whole of historical life, then here too the essential spatial preoccupation of all these constellations runs into danger of being confused with their positive functional causes. Indeed kingdoms cannot have just any size whatever; indeed people cannot be near to or far from one another without space lending its form to it, any more than those processes that one attributes to time can occur outside of time.[1] But the contents of these forms still take on the distinctive feature of their fates only through other *contents*; space remains always the form, in itself ineffectual, in whose modifications the real energies

[1] When Simmel was writing, most Western countries were still kingdoms, often significantly so. Constitutional monarchies, of varying levels of democratic practice, in 1908 included Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Spain, Austria-Hungary, and Belgium. True monarchies included Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Many large nations outside Europe were "dominions" of monarchies: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, India, and Indonesia. Only the United States and by this time also France were fully outside the realm of monarchical government—ed.

are indeed revealed, but only in the way language expresses thought processes that proceed certainly *in* words but not *through* words. A geographical expanse of so and so many square miles does not make a great kingdom, but what does is the psychological powers that hold the inhabitants of such a realm together politically from a governing center. The form of spatial nearness or distance does not generate the peculiar phenomena of neighborliness or alienation, however inevitably it may seem. Rather even these are facts generated purely by psychological *contents*, the course of which stands in relationship to its spatial form in principle no differently than a battle or a telephone conversation to that of theirs—thus doubtlessly these processes too can be realized then only under quite specific spatial conditions. Not space, but the psychologically consequential organization and concentration of its parts have social significance. This synthesis of the role of space is a specifically psychological function that is certainly individually modified with every apparently 'natural' reality, but the categories from which it originates of course comply, more or less vividly, with the immediacy of space. For the social formation in the medieval cities of Flanders three such bases were cited: the 'natural commons,' *i.e.* the union of habitations under the common protection of rampart and ditch; the city magistracy, by which the community became a legal person; the church association of inhabitants in parishes. These are three wholly different themes that proceed to a combination of one and the same collection of persons within one and the same piece of terrain. That all three occupy the same district in such undisturbed togetherness, just as light and sound waves flow through the same space, effects its collective composition as of a piece, without the outward clarity of the function of 'rampart and ditch' giving preference basically to this theme over the others. That space is in general only an activity of the psyche, only the human way of binding unbounded sensory affections into integrated outlooks, is specifically reflected in the need of psychological functions for the individual historical forms of space.

In spite of these facts the emphasis on the spatial importance of things and processes is not unjustified. This is so because these often actually take their course in such a way that the formal, positive or negative condition of the spatiality comes up especially *for consideration* and we possess the clearest documentation of real forces in it. If in the end a chemical process or a game of chess is likewise bound to relativities of space, just as the course of war or just as the sales of agricultural products, then indeed the line of vision that pursues the interest of knowledge with

regard to the one or the other case differentiates so methodically that the question regarding the conditions and determinants of space and place falls at one time quite outside of them, at another time is quite definitely included. Social interaction among human beings is—apart from everything else it is—also experienced as a realization space. If a number of persons inside certain spatial boundaries live isolated from one another, then each of them simply fills their own immediate space with their substance and their activity, and between this space and the space right next to them is unfilled space; practically stated: nothing. In the moment in which two of these enter into social interaction, the space between them appears filled and enlivened. Of course this only rests on the double meaning of betweenness: that a relationship *between* two elements, which though only one, is in the one and in the other immanently an occurring movement or modification *between* them, in the sense of spatial intervention. Whatever errors this ambiguity might otherwise lead to, it is nevertheless of deep significance in this sociological matter. The betweenness as a merely functional reciprocity, whose content continues in each of its personal bearers, is also actually realized here as a claim of the space existing between these two; it always takes place actually *between* both points of space, with regard to which one and the other has a place of theirs designated for it, filled by each alone. Kant defines space simply as "the possibility of being together"—this then is sociological; interaction makes the formerly empty and null into something *for us*; it fills it, in that it makes it possible. Association, in the various types of interaction among individuals, brought about different possibilities of being together—in the psychological sense; some of them, however, are realized in such a way that the form of space, in which this typically occurs for all of them, justifies a particular emphasis for the purposes of our inquiry. So in the interest of penetrating the forms of association, we pursue the meaning that the spatial circumstances of an association possess for their particular determination and developments in a sociological sense.

I. First are several foundational qualities of spatial form with which forms of social life must reckon.

A. To this belongs that which one can call the exclusivity of space. Just as there is only one single universal space, of which all individual spaces are portions, so each portion of space has a kind of uniqueness for which there is hardly an analogy. To think of a specifically located portion of space in the plural is complete nonsense, and yet this makes it possible for a plurality of fully identical exemplars to be constituted

simultaneously from *different* objects; because then by each occupying a different portion of space from which one cannot at any time coincide with another, there is indeed *variety*, although their properties are absolutely indistinguishable. This uniqueness of space imparts itself then to the objects, in so far as they are presented as merely space-filling, and this becomes for praxis important for them to the highest degree, from which we tend precisely to emphasize and exploit the importance of space. Thus at the most basic level the three-dimensional nature of space for our purposes is the condition for filling it and making it productive. To the degree in which a social structure is blended or, so to speak, in solidarity with a certain expanse of ground, it has a character of uniqueness or exclusivity that is likewise not attainable in any other way. Certain types of bond can be realized in their complete sociological form only in such a way that inside the spatial realm, which is filled by one of its exemplars, there is no room for a second. Of others, on the other hand, any number whatever—sociologically similarly constituted—can fill the same sphere, in that they are more-or-less mutually permeable; because they have no intrinsic relationship to space, they cannot also result in spatial collisions. For the former, the single fully sufficient example is the state. Of it, it has been said, it would not be one association among many but the association dominating all, thus the only one of its kind. This conception, whose correctness for the whole essence of the state is beyond debate, holds in every case with regard to the spatial character of the state. The type of bond between the individuals whom the state constitutes or who constitute the state is bound up with the territory to such an extent that a second state contemporaneous with it, even of the same kind, is fully unthinkable. To a certain extent the municipality has the same character: within the boundaries of a city there can be only that city, and if by chance a second nevertheless arises inside the same boundaries, there are not two cities on the same ground and soil but on two territories, formerly united but now separate. However, this exclusivity is not as absolute as that of the state. The significant and functional area of a city—inside a state—ends though not at its geographical boundary, but, more or less noticeably, it extends out ripple-like over the whole land with cultural, economic, political currents, while the general administration of the state allows the strengths and interests of every part to coalesce with those of the whole. From this perspective the community loses its exclusive character and expands functionally over the whole state in such a way that this is the common sphere of influence for the, so to speak, ideal

extension of all individual communities. In that each reaches out over its immediate boundaries, it meets with all the others effective in the same total area, so that no one is the only one in it, and each one maintained a wider sphere, in which it is not alone, around the exclusivity of its narrower one. Also within the individual city this local form of group life can recur. If episcopal sees developed from the core of German communities, then the free community was never in possession of the whole city boundary; rather there existed next to it a bishop who had a comprehensive dominion of independent people behind him, ruled by their own laws. Further, there still existed in most cities a lord's court of the king with a separately administered court community, finally yet independent monasteries and Jewish communities that lived under their own laws. There was then in ancient times communities in the cities, but no genuine municipalities. Unavoidably, however, there developed from spatial proximity amalgamative and incorporative effects that, before all these divisions merged into the essence of a city, first produced an expression in the collectively shared peace of the city. With that, all the inhabitants were given a common law protective of their specifically personal rights; *i.e.* the legal sphere of each district would reach out beyond its demarcation (inside of which each community was the only one of its kind), extend in a manner equally for all to a total area including all, and lose local exclusivity with this expansion of its operative nature. This pattern constitutes the transition to the further stage of the spatial relationship of groups, where, because they are not bound to a definite expanse, they do not possess even the claim to uniqueness inside any one of them. So there could exist side by side on the territory of a city any number of sociologically quite similarly produced guilds. Each was indeed the guild of the entire city; they did not divide the given expanse quantitatively, but functionally; they did not collide spatially because they were not, as sociological formations, spatial, even though determined *by locality*. By their contents they had the exclusivity of the accomplishments of spatial expansion, inasmuch as for every particular craft there was just one guild in the city and no room for a second. By their form, however, countless structures of this type could, without opposition, occupy the same space. The most extreme pole of this continuum is exemplified by the church, at least when it, as does the Catholic Church, lays claim to unlimited extension as well as freedom from any limitation to locality. Nevertheless, several religions of this type could find themselves, e.g., in the same city. The Catholic church would be no less 'the city's Catholic church'—*i.e.*

standing in a particular organizationally local relationship to the city as a unity—than correspondingly that of any other religion. The principle of the church is non-spatial and therefore, although reaching out over every area, not precluded by any similarly formed structure. There is within the spatial a counterpart to the temporal opposition of the eternal and the timeless: the latter by its nature is not affected by the question of the now or earlier or later and is therefore indeed at every moment in time accessible or current; the former is precisely a temporal concept, namely of endless and unbroken time. The corresponding difference in the spatial, for which we have no similarly simple expressions, is formed on the one hand by the supra-spatial structures that have, by their own nature, no relationship to space, but then simply an equable relationship to all individual points of it; on the other hand those who enjoy their equable relationship to all spatial points not as equable indifference, but actually as bare possibility, as generically real and essential solidarity with the space. The purest type of the former is obviously the church, and of the latter, the state: between the two move intermediate phenomena, some of which I have alluded to; a particular light may fall on the formal nature of many kinds of social structures, therefore, from their level on the scale that leads from the completely territorially fixed and the exclusiveness following from that, to the completely supra-spatial and the possibility following from that of a co-dominium of many similar ones over the same section of space. Thus the proximity or distance, the exclusivity or multiplicity, which the relationship of the group to its land exhibits, is often the root and symbol of its structure.

B. A further quality of space that vitally affects patterns of social interaction is found in space dividing up for our practical use into portions that operate as units and—as cause as well as effect therefrom—are surrounded by boundaries. Now the configurations of the surfaces of the earth may appear to us to mark the boundaries where we are enrolled in the limitlessness of space, or purely ideal lines may divide similarly constituted portions of the land as a watershed, on which this side of and the other side of each little portion is gravitating to a different center: in all cases we comprehend the space, which a social group in some sense fills, as a unit that the unity of the group likewise expresses and bears, just as it is carried by it. The frame, the self-contained boundary of a structure, has a very similar meaning for the social group as for an artwork. Regarding this, the frame exercises the two functions that are actually only the two sides of a single one: separating the work

of art from and associating it with the surrounding world; the frame announces that inside of it there is a world subject to its own norms, a world that is not drawn into the determinants and dynamics of the surrounding world; while it symbolizes the self-sufficiency of the artwork, at the same time by its very nature it highlights the reality and imprint of the surroundings. So a society, in that its existential space is encompassed by keenly conscious borders, is thereby characterized as one also internally cohesive; and conversely: the interacting unity, the functional relationship of each element to each acquires its spatial expression in the framing boundary. There is probably nothing that demonstrates the power particularly of the cohesiveness of the state than that this sociological centripetalism, which however is in the end only a psychological coherence of personalities, grows up into a meaningfully experienced structure of a firmly circumscribing boundary line. It is rarely made clear how wondrously now the extensity of space accommodates the intensity of the sociological relationships, how the continuity of space, precisely because it contains subjectively no absolute boundary of any kind, simply allows then such a subjectivity to prevail throughout. As far as nature is concerned, every boundary placement is arbitrary, even in the case of an insular situation, because indeed in principle even the sea can be 'taken possession of.' Precisely on account of this lack of spatial prejudice in nature, the sharpness, in spite of its prevailing unconditionality, of the physical boundary once it is fixed makes the power of social association and its necessity, originating internally, especially vivid. For that reason the consciousness of being inside borders is also perhaps not the strongest with regard to the so-called natural boundaries (mountains, rivers, seas, deserts), but rather precisely solely with political borders, which lie simply on a geometrical line between neighbors. And in fact precisely because here dislocations, expansions, migrations, mergers are more obvious, because the structure at its edge hits upon vital, psychologically functional borders from which not only passive oppositions but very active repulsions come. Every such border signifies defense and offense; or more correctly perhaps: it is the spatial expression of a standard relationship between two neighbors, for which we have no entirely standard expression and which we perhaps can identify as the condition of neutrality for a defense and offense, as a condition of tension in which both lie latent, be it then developing or not.

And with that it is obviously not denied that the psychological border placement in every case would be facilitated and emphasized at those

natural territorial enclosures; indeed space often acquires, through the arrangement of its ground surfaces, divisions that color in a unique manner the relationships of the inhabitants among themselves and with those on the outside. The best known example is formed by the mountain dwellers with their characteristic merging into one of a sense of freedom and conservatism, of reserved behavior towards one another and passionate attachment to the land, which creates an extraordinarily strong bond between them.[2] The conservatism in the mountain valleys is explained very simply by the impediment of interaction with the outside world and the resulting lack of incentives for making changes; where the mountain context does not exercise this prohibitive effect, as in several regions of Greece, the conservative tendency does not in any way prevail. It has then only negative inducements, in contrast perhaps to other geographical determinants with the same result: the Nile offers the inhabitants along its banks, on the one hand, an extraordinary regularity, which they can count on, and the activity, which is necessary for the utilization of it. On the other hand, the fertility of its valley is so great that the population, once settled there, has no inducement to unsettled movements. These very positive elements stamp the region with a uniformity of ever-repeated life contents, bind them as if to the regularity of a machine, and have for centuries frequently forced upon the Nile Valley a conservative rigidity, in a way that was not at all achievable on the coasts of the Aegean, surely for geographical reasons.

The concept of boundary is in all human affairs of the utmost importance among them, although its meaning is not always a sociological one; because it indicates often enough only that the sphere of a personality has found a limit to power or intelligence, to the capacity to suffer or enjoy—but without then the sphere of another having settled at this limit and with its own boundary having determined more noticeably that of the first. This latter, the sociological boundary, implies an entirely

[2] This passion for the homeland, which is straightforwardly manifest among the mountain dwellers as a typical 'homesickness' and is immediately a purely individual affect, goes back perhaps to the conspicuous differentiating of the land that has to fasten consciousness strongly to it and to the uniqueness of its shape, often precisely to that small patch of earth that belongs to the individual or that one has inhabited. There is no intrinsic reason why mountain dwellers should love their homeland more than lowland dwellers. However, emotional life everywhere blends with the distinctively incomparable as a singularly felt formation in an especially close and effective way, therefore more with an old, angular, irregular city than with the pole-straight modern, more with the mountains in which each portion of the land manifests an entirely individual, unrecognizable shape than with the plains whose sections are all the same.

unique interaction. Each of the two elements affects the other, in that one sets the boundary for the other, but the content of this influence is simply the qualification beyond this boundary, thus still *not* in general meant to or able to affect the other. When this general concept of mutual limitation is drawn from the spatial boundary, this latter is still, understood more deeply, only the crystallization or removal of the real *psychological* boundary-establishing processes alone. It is not the lands, not the properties, not the city district and the rural district that set one another's boundaries, but the residents or owners performing the reciprocal action that I just indicated. From the sphere of two personalities or personality complexes each acquires an inner consistency for itself, a referring-to-one-another of its elements, a dynamic relationship to its center; and between both there is then produced that which is symbolized in the spatial boundary, the completion of the positive measure of power and right of its own sphere by way of the consciousness that does not extend power and right then into the other sphere. The boundary is not a spatial fact with sociological effects, but a sociological reality that is formed spatially. The idealistic principle that space is our conception—more precisely, that it is realized through our synthesizing activity by which we shape sense material—is specified here in such a way that the spatial formation that we call a boundary is a sociological function. If indeed at first it had become a spatial-sensual formation that we write into nature independent of its sociological-practical sense, then it has strong repercussions for the consciousness of the relationship of parties. While this line marks only the differentiation of relationship between the elements of a sphere among one another and between them and the elements of another, it becomes then, nevertheless, a living energy that drives them towards one another and does not leave them out of its unity and moves, as a physical force that radiates repulsions from both perspectives, between both.

Excursus on Social Boundary

Perhaps in most relationships between individuals as well as between groups the concept of the boundary becomes important in some way. Overall, where the interests of two elements concern the same property, their co-existence depends on a boundary line separating their spheres within the property—be this then the end of the dispute as a legal boundary or its beginning as a boundary perhaps of power. I am reminded then of a case, immeasurably meaningful for all human social existence, which the chapter on secrecy dealt with in

detail from a different standpoint. Every close association thoroughly rests on each one knowing more of the others through psychological hypotheses than is exhibited directly and with conscious intent. For if we were dependent only on that which is revealed, we would have before us, instead of a united people whom we understand and with whom we can deal, only numerous accidental and disconnected fragments of a soul. We must then through inferences, interpretations, and interpolations supplement the given fragments until as whole a person emerges as we need, internally and for life's praxis. Over against this unquestioned social right of fathoming others, whether or not intentional, stands however one's private possession of one's mental being, one's right to discretion—also to that which refrains from the pondering and deductions by which someone could penetrate against the will of the other into one's intimacies and reserve. Where, however, does the boundary lie between the allowed, indeed essential construction of another's soul and this psychological indiscretion? And this precarious, objective boundary means, however, only the boundary between both personality spheres; it means that the consciousness of the one may cover the sphere of another only up to a certain point and that it is here that the inviolable sphere of this other begins, the revelation of which only that person though has disposal. It is quite obvious that the eternally varied management of this demarcation stands in the closest interaction with the entire structure of social life: in indigenous-undifferentiated eras the right to enlargements of this psychological boundary becomes greater; the interest in it, however, is perhaps less than in eras of individualized persons and complicated relationships; with commercial transactions this boundary lies elsewhere than in the relationship between parents and children, among diplomats elsewhere than among comrades-in-arms. I have here touched again on this matter, rather far from the issue of space, in order to clarify in it the incomparable solidity and lucidity that the processes of social boundary-making obtain through their spatialization. Every boundary is a mental, more exactly, a sociological occurrence; however, by its investment in a border in space the mutual relationship acquires, from its positive and negative sides, a clarity and security—indeed also often a rigidity—that tends to remain denied to it as long as the encountering and partitioning of powers and rights is not yet projected into a physical form, and thus always persists, so to speak, in the *status nascens.*[3]

Another sociological boundary-making problem of the first rank lies in the different degrees to which single members of collective structures participate in them. That there is a difference between the full compatriot and the one-half or one-quarter compatriot signifies a boundary between these latter two and the totality to which one belongs nevertheless; or also a boundary inside the collective that marks the points, their center determined by radiating lines of rights and duties that indicate the boundary of participation for several elements, for others, however, not so, and also within the individual, who will experience especially sharply, in the lack of total acceptance into the

[3] Latin: state of being born—ed.

community, the boundary between the part of the personality that belongs in it and the part that remains outside the whole relationship. Occasionally a tragedy can result from this formation, when of course the group limits the degree in which it includes an individual, but subjectively no corresponding limitation takes place in the individual whose self-experiences, nevertheless, is that of entirely belonging to it, where in reality only a partial membership has been conceded. It is noteworthy and appropriate that the rights and duties of partial members of the group tend to be set more narrowly than those of full members. Since, however, this individual shares entirely in the contents and entirely in the destiny of the association, that which comes to one in terms of requirements, pains, and pleasures as a result of the participation is not determined, as it were, from the very beginning; one can only wait and see what happens with the whole and what the consequences will be according to one's place in the totality. In contrast, there is a tendency for there to be unique, assignable, objectively determined aspects of the association to which the half-compatriot is related; it is as a rule not a weaker relationship to the totality and unity of the group, so no difference in the intensity, but in the extensiveness: an exact determination of what one must accomplish and what one can demand, in relative independence of the fate of the whole group as well as one's own—while with the full compatriots that kind of demarcation of the share of the whole and of the part does not occur. The deeper sociological significance of the limitation or lack of limitation of belonging, however, is found in that the more exact determination of the relationship in a case of the latter gives it a more *objective* character than is possessed in a case of the former. I am reminded, for example, from a very singular realm, the difference in the status of the maid as opposed to the 'cleaning lady.' The relationship of the domestic servant to the 'household,' however uncoupled it may be from patriarchal circumstances, has nevertheless the nature of an organic membership; one's tasks follow the fluctuation in domestic activities, and one tends, albeit to a lesser degree, to participate in the mood and the fortunes of the household—because inside one's overall prescribed function there exists no precise limit thereof. The cleaning lady, on the other hand, is hired for duties that are precisely defined according to content and number of hours; consequently her relationship to the household has a thoroughly exact character, fully beyond the life process of the house, and she does not have, not even in proportion to the duties, the subjectively personal engagement of the domestic servant for the household, but only a purely objective relationship to it existing from a pre-determined sum of rights and duties. The greatest example, characterized elsewhere in this book, is the change from the medieval agreement that claimed the whole person and was thus in turn in solidarity with that person—to the modern one that, even where it is not purely an intentional association, returns typically only a limited amount of a participant's contribution with a limited amount of reciprocal contribution. Here the phenomenon of boundary-making between the whole and the part has propelled most unambiguously the objectificattion of the whole relationship as its correlate. It is interesting how occasionally a membership boundary is marked already in the Middle Ages. An aristocratic Anglo-Saxon guild of

the eleventh century decreed: if a comrade kills a person in self-defense or just revenge, the others are supposed to contribute to the wergild; but if it is done out of folly or wantonness, one's culpability is to be borne alone. Here the action of the individual becomes a matter of the collective only in so far as it is moral; in so far as it is an immoral act, the individual must deal with it alone. Other guilds of that time do not observe this boundary; they decree, e.g., without any reservation that if any one of them has been guilty of an offense: "let all bear it, let all share the same lot;"[4] a Danish guild considers explicitly even the case of murder and directs the guild members for their part to help their fellow member in escaping. In that first case, then, a boundary line exists between the whole and the individual, beyond which the latter is on one's own. The rationalistic character, which the boundary phenomena between these structures demonstrated, offers singly then a remarkable aspect when the contents by which the partnership is precisely circumscribed are opposed to such a quantitative division. This is quite likely the case to some extent for the Catholic institution that St. Francis established as the order of tertiaries: Laymen who want to be in brotherhood with a monastic order without themselves actually becoming monks pledge themselves to certain spiritual practices and contributions and thereby share in certain religious advantages of the main order, such as masses and indulgences, while remaining nevertheless entirely in their civil state. This careful balancing of being inside and outside seems to me, though, not to conform to the absoluteness of the religious nature. The communal life of the order exists for the sake of a goal whose inner structure rejects any more-or-less of it and, if participation in it occurs at all, turns the form of its boundary into an opposition vis-à-vis its contents. In general, from an easily observable connection, content is of more decisive significance for boundary phenomena than for other sociological forms. While in general the quantitative limitation of an interest in a common content imposes on the interested a reciprocal limitation, this is not the case for certain contents the types of which are found in the most varied systems of values: at one end, for example, the community commons on which each can allow as many cattle graze as one owns, at the other end, the kingdom of God in which everyone can participate and can posses entirely without the possession of it by the other being thereby curtailed.

It is a matter here, then, essentially of the social interactions that arise between the inside and the outside of the boundary; so there is need of an example at least of those interactions that the boundary offers as a framework between the elements of the enclosed group itself.[5] The essential thing here is the narrowness or the breadth of the frame-

[4] The phrase "let…lot" is without scare quotes but is in English in the original, so presumably then a quotation—ed. trans.

[5] Here Simmel is resuming section 'B,' which began before the Excursus—ed.

work—although in no way the only essential thing; because even the form into which the spatial framework brings the group, its uniform or, depending on various locations, strongly varying cohesive energy, the question whether the frame in general is produced by the same structure (as in one respect with islands, in another, with states in the situation of San Marino or the Indian tribute states) or is composed from several adjacent elements—all this is for the inner structure of the group of undoubted significance, which, however, shall here only be mentioned. The narrowness or breadth of the framework does not at all always coincide with the small or large size of the group. Rather, it depends on the tensions that develop within the group; when these find sufficient latitude without their expansion bumping against the boundaries, the framework is then wide enough, even if relatively many people meet within it, as is often the case with the constellation of oriental kingdoms. On the other hand, the frame is narrow when it functions even for a small number of people as a constraint beyond which certain energies, unable to unfold within, continually exert outward pressure. The effect of this latter constellation on the social form has, e.g., been unmistakably the experience of Venice: the narrow and immediately impervious boundedness of its territory is much more of an indication of the, so to speak, dynamic expansion among the relationships of the wider world than of a territorial expansion of power, which offers in such a situation only limited opportunities. Such a spatially far-sighted politics, reaching out beyond the nearest neighbors, makes, however, very emphatic intellectual demands, as cannot be realized on the greater part of the masses. Therefore, direct democracy for Venice was out of the question. It had to cultivate, in accord with its spatial life conditions, an aristocracy that, as has been claimed, governed the people much like the officers of a ship over the crew.

The reality of the spatial frame of the group, as a form-sociological one, is in no way limited to the political boundary. Its narrowness or breadth exercises its forming effects with corresponding modifications wherever a quantity of people congregate spatially. The frequently emphasized assembled aggregate: its impulsivity, its enthusiasm, its mob mentality—depends in part also on its being either out in the open or minimally—in contrast to other residential spaces—in a very large locality. The great open air gives people a feeling of freedom of movement, of being able to reach out into the indeterminate, of the as-yet undefined erecting of greater goals—just as in a narrow room it is felt as decisively impeded. That even those enormous spaces,

however, are frequently too small, *i.e.*, overcrowded, can only increase this agitating effect, the growth of individual ardor beyond its normal boundaries: then it must increase that collective feeling that melds the individual into a solidarity beyond one's individuality, a solidarity that sweeps over a person like a storm flood beyond one's own personal directives and responsibilities. The stimulating suggestive effects of a large mass and its collective psychological phenomena, in whose form the individual no longer recognizes one's contribution, increases to the extent of its cohesive pressure, and all the more so the greater the space it fills. A locality offering, besides a cohesive crowd, a large atmosphere for individuals not accustomed to it, necessarily favors that feeling of expansion and an unfolding of power going into an indeterminate direction, to which large aggregative masses are so easily directed, and which is grasped, as a glance of clarity into the narrow framework of a conventional room, only occasionally by exceptional individuals. This ambiguity of the spatial framework, which supports so vitally the typical excitements of the collective, however unclear and wide the borders overall, functions not only in the spatial sense, excitingly seductively to degrade clarity of consciousness—precisely this makes even unlawful assemblies in the dark so dangerous that the police of the medieval city sought to prevent them by locking up the back streets in the evening with chains, etc. Darkness gives the assembly actually a rather peculiar framework that brings together the significance of the narrow and the wide into one of characteristic unity. While one of course views only the closest environment, and behind this an impenetrably black wall rises, one feels pressed together closely with those nearest; differentiation from the space, beyond that of the most visible periphery, has reached its extreme case: this space appears to have disappeared altogether. On the other hand this also lets even the truly existing boundaries disappear; the imagination augments the darkness with overly exaggerated possibilities; one feels oneself surrounded by a fantastically indefinite and unlimited space. While now the fearfulness and insecurity of this darkness is here removed by that tight cohesiveness and mutual orientation of the many to one another, that feared excitement and incalculability of moving together in the dark arises as an entirely unique increase and combination of the enclosing and inherently expanding spatial boundary.

C. The third significance of space for social formations lies in the *settling* that it makes possible for its contents. Whether a group or specific individual elements of it or essential objects of its interest are fully fixed

or spatially indefinable obviously has to influence its structure, and, however much the conditions of nomadic and firmly settled groups are determined hereby through their differences is frequently enough realized to require here only an indication thereof. It is in no way a matter merely of a schematic extension of the principle of settling: that, applicable in the realm of the spatial, it would now be revealed in the material life contents as a stabilization and fixed order. This is because this immediately intelligible connection does not hold absolutely; precisely in very consolidated circumstances, freed from the possibility of external eradication, one will be able to dispense with some regulations and legal controls that are urgently required with general uncertainty and troubled relationships more easily prone to fragmentation. Whether and how, though, the group locks in its members with legal determination, that yields a manifest continuum of many members that ranges from the completely local bond to complete freedom. The bond has presumably the main forms that leaving home is either absolutely forbidden or that one is indeed at liberty to do so, but threatened with the loss of group membership entirely or more likely with its communal rights. Of many examples I would mention only the city ordinance from Harlem that stipulated in 1245, there are to be no expatriates: every citizen is duty-bound to live in the city, which one was permitted to leave only for planting and for harvesting up to 40 days for each. This is not exactly the question of freedom of movement that refers to the various districts within a larger political whole. Here rather is the issue whether one can leave the political unit entirely and yet still remain its citizen. The other type of bond is exemplified when in the eastern provinces of Prussia until 1891 the municipal suffrage is only for residents until the provincial reform of that year accorded it to all federal taxpayers. The more primitive the mental disposition is, the less can membership exist for it without residence and the more are the actual relationships accordingly also based on this personal presence of group members; with greater suppleness and range of mind, matters are organized in such a way that the essential determinants of membership can be preserved even in spatial absence, so that ultimately with a thoroughgoing money economy and division of labor an ever more extensive 'representation' of unmediated powers makes the presence of the individuals to a great extent dispensable.

A second sociological significance of spatial definition can be indicated by the symbolic expression of the 'pivot': the spatial situation of an object of interest generates specific forms of relationship that

group around it. Now every fixed thing of value—around which activities, economic transactions of any type are taking place—is actually such a stable pivot for unsettled relationships and social interactions. However, the spatial immobility of the object, at least today, does not determine those relationships in a particularly characteristic sociological manner. This is observed in a not uninteresting modification in that relationship of economic individuals that is realized with the mortgage. Fundamentally, with the mortgage this relationship gets directly linked almost exclusively to fixed property, the fixedness of which is combined with its indestructibility, which can count as the correlate of the previously treated exclusivity: it achieves the permanence for the singularity with which every part of our space is, so to speak, limited, by virtue of which real estate is so especially suited to the mortgage commitment. This is because only in this way is it possible that the mortgaged object remains in the hands of the debtor and is yet fully secured for the creditor; it can be neither carried off nor exchanged with another. But now the principle of insurance has made precisely those objects, the fixed nature in space of which is lacking altogether, still accessible to mortgage, namely ships. This is because what is especially important for the spatial fixedness of the mortgage—suitability for public registration—is what otherwise is readily attainable for ships. Thereupon, as in many other cases, the substantial definiteness revealed itself as a functional equivalent. The fixedness, which as a quality of property favors the mortgage, acquires this in reality at least in part through public record-making, to which it is disposed, which can also be established, though, by other means with the same result. So the pivot of economic interactions then is here certainly rather dominantly a spatially fixed value, but not actually because of its immobility, but rather because of specific functions connected to it. It was otherwise, however, in the Middle Ages, which required in general an altogether different mix of stability and mobility of life contents. We find countless 'relationships' in the social traffic of the Middle Ages that entirely elude our understanding of economic and private legal action, but still made into objects of such a kind. Governing power over territories as well as jurisdiction within them, church patronage as well as tax privileges, roads as well as coin minting privileges—all this is sold or loaned, provided as collateral or given away. To turn such labile objects, already in themselves existing in the basic interactions between people, into the object of nevertheless economic transactions would have to lead to still

more fluctuating and precarious circumstances if all these rights and conditions had not had the property *of being immovably fixed at the place of their practice.* This was the moment of stability that gave their purely dynamic and relativistic nature enough stability that further economic transactions could themselves then be grouped around them. Its local stabilization was not like that of a material object, which one would always find in the same place, but like the actually ideal one of a pivot that maintains a system of elements at a particular distance, in a social interaction, in mutual dependence.

The importance of a sociological relationship as pivot attaches to the fixed locality especially where the contact or assembly can occur only at a particular place for elements otherwise independent of one another. I will treat several examples of this phenomenon, which actually represents an interaction of the internally sociologically determined and the spatially. For churches in a situation of diaspora it is an extremely wise policy, especially where only the smallest number of adherents lives in a district, to immediately erect a chapel and permanent station of pastoral care. This establishment of a space comes to be a pivotal point for the relationships and the solidarity of the faithful, so that not only the strengths of the religious community develop in a location of pure isolation, but the strengths that radiate from such an apparent center also reawaken the consciousness of belonging to the confession in its adherents, whose religious desires in their isolation long lay asleep. The Catholic Church is far superior in this to the Evangelical.[6] She does not simply wait in the diaspora for a formal community of persons to constitute it spatially but starts it around the smallest core of persons, and this localization has countless times become the point of crystallization for an internally and numerically growing vital community. Everywhere cities function as the pivotal point of commerce for their narrower and wider surroundings; *i.e.* each one generates in itself countless ongoing and changing pivotal points of commercial interactivity. Commerce needs cities all the more decisively the more brisk it is, thereby revealing the complete difference *of its* vitality in contrast to the restless nomadic movement of ancient groups. It is the typical contrast of social activities: whether they involve simply a striving outwards from the spatially and

[6] Presumably Simmel is referring here to Germany or even to continental Europe. *Evangelical* in this instance means Protestants—trans.

objectively given, or the cycle of herding peoples alternating between pasture lands—or whether they rotate around fixed points. In the latter case, only as they are actually formed do they crystallize as the jumping-off point for permanent values, even if these only exist in the unaltered form of relationships and movements. This contrast in their forms of movement so often altogether dominates the outer and inner life that its spatial realization appears as merely a special case. Whether mental and social relationships have a firm center, around which interests and discourse circulate, or whether they simply follow the linear form of time, whether two political parties possess a fixed point between them (be it a steady similarity of stance or a steady opposition), or whether their relationship develops without prejudice on a case-by-case basis, whether in the individual person a strong singularly colored feeling for life prevails (perhaps of an aesthetic type) that links all of one's diverse interests (religious as well as theoretical, social as well as erotic), shades them into one another, sets them firmly in a sphere or whether one's interests unfold only according to their own relational strengths without such a lasting connection and ordering criterion—this leads evidently to the greatest difference of life schemata and defines the actual course of our existence through perpetual conflicts and mixtures of both. All of these, however, are simply individual developments of the same general antithesis inherent in the spatiality of the sociological pivot. When commerce shapes the city into such an antithesis, only then does the real meaning of commerce emerge; for this is indeed—in contrast to the simple venture into the realm of the unlimited in which the movement encounters a second equivalent power, without this encounter being necessarily hostile—which is always prior to a developed commerce. It now no longer means mutual elimination but a complementarity and thereby increase of strengths that needs the spatial base of support and therefore generates it. I am reminded, moreover, of the rendezvous, a specifically sociological form whose spatial specificity is characterized linguistically by the double meaning of the word: it indicates the encounter itself as well as the place for it.[7] The sociological nature of the rendezvous lies

[7] The more decidedly a concept is purely of a sociological type, *i.e.* indicating absolutely nothing substantial or individual but a pure form of relationship, the more likely it will be defined linguistically by its own contents or its bearer. Thus 'sovereignty' [*Herrschaft*] is nothing other than the functional relationship or relational form between those who command and those who obey; but in our language *Herrschaft* is then also the expression for the first party itself, but at the same time for the territory on which its governing occurs. What characteristically has the purest sociological word there

in the tension between the punctuality and the hastiness of the event on the one hand and its spatial-temporal fixednesss on the other. The rendezvous—and by no means only the erotic or illegitimate—stands out psychologically from the usual form of existence by the trait of *temporal singularity*, urgency, coming exclusively by way of the specific opportunity; and because it breaks away from the ongoing course of life's contents in an island-like manner, it wins immediately with its formal moments of time and place a particular hold on consciousness. For memory, the place, because it is perceptibly more graphic, usually develops a stronger associative power than the time, so that for memory, especially where it is a matter of a single and strongly emotional social interaction, the interaction tends to bind insolubly immediately with place, and thus, since this occurs reciprocally, the place thereafter remains the pivot around which memory then spins the individuals into an increasingly idealized correlation.

This sociological meaning of the point fixed in space is certainly similar to another that could be identified as the individualization of location. It appears an inconsequentially superficial fact that the urban houses in the Middle Ages quite universally and frequently up until into the 19th century were identified by proper names; the inhabitants of the Faubourg St. Antoine in Paris until just about 60 years ago are supposed to have regularly identified the houses with the proper names (*Au roi de Siam, Étoile d'or, etc.*) in spite of the numbering already in existence. For all that, in the distinction between the individual names and the mere number of the house a difference in the relationship of the owner as well as of the occupants to it—and likewise to that of its neighborhood—is expressed. The determinate and the indeterminate in identification are mixed here to quite a unique extent. The house designated with the proper name must give those persons a sense of spatial individuality, relationship to a *qualitatively* established spot in space; through the name, which was associated with the conception of the house, there is formed much more an inherent being of individually colored existence; it contains intuitively a higher type of individuality than does the identification by numbers that are repeated similarly in every street and constitute only quantitative differences between them.

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is: relationship [*das Verhältnis*]—to which popular linguistic usage has added to the fullest extent possible an erotic relationship to its meaning. Lovers 'have' a relationship [*Verhältnis*]; they are as a sociological entity 'a relationshp'; and finally he is 'her relationship' and she 'his relationship.'

Over against the ebb and flow of the social, especially the urban, traffic, that sort of naming testifies to a distinctiveness and personality of being according to its spatial aspect, which, compared to the situation now, however, is indeed paid for with an indistinctness and a lack of objective fixedness and must therefore disappear over a certain expanse and rapidity of traffic. The *named* house is not readily found; one cannot objectively construe its location, as now with geographical identification. The numbers signify, with all their indifference and abstractness as merely ordinal numbers, still a definite place in space, which the proper name of a locality does not do. The ultimate step, then, is on the one hand the reference to hotel guests by their room number and on the other that even the streets are no longer named but numbered consecutively as it is in part in New York. This antithesis in kinds of naming reveals in the sphere of the spatial a fully antithetical sociological position for the individual. The individualistic person with a qualitative fixedness and unchangeability of life contents thereby eludes the arrangement in an order that holds for all, in which one would have a definitely calculable location according to a constant principle. Where conversely the organization of the whole regulates the activities of the individual in accord with a goal not within the self, one's place must be fixed in accord with a system external to the self; not an inner or ideal norm but the relationship to the whole determines one's place, which is therefore established most suitably by a numerical-like arrangement. The automatic readiness of the waiter or coachman, whose unindividuality is distinguished precisely in that it is in its *content* ultimately not so mechanically uniform as that of the machinist, is therefore most highly appropriately emphasized through one's numbering instead of any kind of personal identification. This sociological difference is that which those different ways of identifying houses represent in the relationships of urban sectors projected into space. The numerability of city houses means in general an advance initially in the spatial fixing of individuals, in that these are now traceable by a mechanical method. This traceability is obviously of quite another nature than that of the medieval designating of particular quarters and streets for particular social strata and occupations or of the separation of Christian, Jewish, and Muslim quarters in oriental cities.[8] In contrast to this that system

[8] This immeasurably important sociological motif, that the qualitative relation is even spatially correlated, has found also, so to speak, an absolute expression: the common abode of departed souls.

is eminently unhistorically diagramatic; it is, as in the manner of any rationalism, on the one hand much more individual, on the other hand much more indifferent towards the individual as a person. Accordingly the intra-societal nature of urban life is expressed in the language of space. The purer this becomes, the more rationalistic it reveals itself to be—above all in the displacement of the individual, the accidental, the twisted, the bent in the layout of streets by the deadly straight, established by geometrical norms, universal rules. When, at the time of the sophists and of Socrates, the clear and consciously intentional rational triumphed over the intuitively traditional character of ancient Greece, Hippodamus of Miletus was recommending the principle of perfectly straight streets![9] The straightening of crooked streets, the installation of new diagonal roads, the whole modern system of right-angled symmetry and systematics is certainly immediately space-saving for the traffic but above all time-saving, as is required by the rationalization of life. With these traffic principles of traceability, on the one hand mechanical, on the other hand as fast as possible, the nature of the city in general, in contrast to the rural, is brought to the greatest purity, just as had been demonstrated indeed from the very beginning in the parallelism of the two aspects of streets—a perceptible rationalism, to which the structure of rural life possesses no analogy at all. In the essence of the city, following its whole possibility of existence, there lies a certain 'constructability,' in deep contrast to the more organic, intuitive, in the psychological sense, *tribal* principle. In conceptual connection with this, such, as it were, *a posteriori* constructed empires as that of Alexander and the Alexandrians, on the one hand, the Roman, on the other hand, were built absolutely on the principle of urban communities, not on that of the tribal entities: these empires were to be composed from citizenries settled inside the ringed wall. And this contrast of the rationally laid out urban settlement against the more natural-like tribal idea is echoed yet again among the Arabs: as long as they, in their earlier epochs, led a nomadic life without fixed settlements, genealogy was the only means of 'traceability,' of designating a person; later Omar I[10] complains that

[9] Hippodamus of Miletus was a fifth-century BCE architect who favored straight streets intersecting at right angels and geometrical forms; he planned Piraeus, the port of Athens, for Pericles, the city of Rhodes, and the Italian town of Thurii—ed.

[10] Omar I: associate of Mohammed and early caliph—ed.

the farmers no longer used their tribe but their village for identifying a person!

Were the individuality of the spatial elements now not to be united with the relationship to a wide and manifold circle in the one symbol of those proper names of individual houses, one can nevertheless perhaps by this measure, rather formally understood, set up a sociological scale. That is: the individuality, more-or-less the character of a personal uniqueness, which the location of certain persons or groups possesses, hinders or favors it, in the most varied mixtures, so that wide ranging relationships are linked by it to a variety of other elements. The most complete union of both determinants has been achieved by the Catholic Church with its seat in Rome. On the one hand, Rome is simply the unique location, the most incomparable historical geographical formation, established as though by a system of countless coordinates, hence "All roads lead to Rome"; on the other hand, however, through the immense scope and content of its past, it has appeared as a geometrical location for all the changes and contrasts of history whose meaning and traces have merged spiritually as though visibly in it or for it—thereby it lost entirely the limitation of being located at one spot. The church has, in that it possesses Rome, certainly a continuous local homeland with all the advantages of being always easily located, of perceptibly visual continuity, of a definite centralization of its functions and its own institutions; however, it need not pay for this with all the other difficulties and narrow-mindedness of the localization of power at one single individual point because Rome is, so to speak, not a single location at all. It reaches out in its social-psychological effect by the scope of the destinies and importance invested in it, far beyond its fixed location, while it offers the church, however, precisely also the definitiveness of *such* a localizability. It possesses, in order to support the purposes of the church in its governing relationship to the faithful, the utmost individuality and distinctiveness that any particular location would possess, and at the same time the elevation beyond all limitation and happenstance of an individually fixed existence. Large organizations as such require a spatial middle point because they cannot manage without domination and subordination, and the commander must as a rule occupy a fixed location in order, on the one hand, to have one's subordinates at hand and thereby, on the other hand, for them to know where at any given time they can find the chief. However, where the wonderful union of locality and supra-locality as in Rome does not occur, this can be acquired, then, always only with certain sacrifices.

The Franciscans were originally fully homeless beings; this demanded their individualistic liberation from all earthly ties, their poverty, their preaching mission. Only as the widely dispersed order then required 'ministers,' these needed, for the reasons mentioned, a permanent residence and therefore the brothers could not manage henceforth without the establishing of cloisters. This was of so much service technically to their power, though, that it reduced that incomparable peacefulness, that inner certainty of the first brothers, of whom one would say they certainly had nothing, but possessed everything; while they now shared with the rest of humanity ties of residence, their form of life became trivialized; their freedom was still very great but no longer infinite, because now they were bound to one point at least.

Entirely differently from Rome, the localization of the Jewish cult, otherwise comparable in some aspects, was ultimately effective in Jerusalem. As long as the Temple endured in Jerusalem, there ran from it, as it were, an invisible thread to every Jew dispersed in countless locations with their various state affiliations, interests, languages, indeed nuances of faith; it was the meeting point that mediated the partly substantial, partly spiritual connections for all of Jewry. But it had a regulation by which the local individualization was more strictly spun than the Roman and which enveloped them: sacrifices could be made only here; Yahweh had no other proper places of sacrifice. The destruction of the Temple, therefore, had to sever that bond; the specific strength and coloring that had come to the Yahweh cult through the rather singular specialization now made room for a more colorless deism. Thereby the displacement by Christianity happened more readily and with more energy; the place of the central site in Jerusalem was taken by the autonomous synagogue; the effective bond among the Jews withdrew ever more from the religious factor to the racial. That was the result of that loss of locality that the sociological tie had formulated so rigidly: here or nowhere.

D. A fourth type of outward relationship that is transformed in the vitality of sociological patterns of interaction is offered by space through the perceptible nearness or distance between persons who stand in some kind of relationship to one another. The first glance convinces that two associations, held together by the principle of common interests, strengths, attitudes, will differ in their character, depending on whether their participants are spatially in touch or separated from one another. And in fact not only in the obvious sense of a difference of total relationships—insofar as developing through physical proximity is added

to the relationship still internally independent of it, but in a way that spatially grounded patterns of interaction nevertheless essentially modify the former, possibly even at a distance. An economic cartelization as well as a friendship, an association of stamp collectors as well as a religious community can go without personal contact continuously or intermittently; but immediately manifest is the possibility of countless quantitative and qualitative transformations of binding ties when it does not have to overcome any distance. Before going into these, let the principle be noticed that the difference of both kinds of bond is more relative than the logical abruptness of the contrast of being together and being separate leads one to presume. The psychological effect of the former can be actually very largely replaced by means of indirect interaction and still more by that of the imagination. It is precisely for the opposite poles of human linkages in the psychological sense, *i.e.*, for the purely objectively impersonal and for that placed entirely on the intensity of feeling—that this result succeeds most readily; for the one, perhaps certain economic or scientific transactions because their contents are expressible in logical forms and so therefore completely in written form; for the other, such as religious and some unions of the heart, because the force of imagination and the submission of feeling often enough overcome the conditions of time and space in a mystically appearing manner. To the extent that these extremes lose their purity, spatial proximity becomes more necessary: when those objectively grounded relationships manifest gaps that are to be filled by simply logically incomprehensible imponderables, or when the purely internal ones cannot escape the mixture of externally perceptible needs. Perhaps the totality of social interactive patterns produces a gradient from this standpoint: which measure of spatial proximity or spatial distance a combination of given forms and content either requires or endures. The manner in which one could combine the criteria of such a scale should be exemplified further in the following.

The capacity for managing spatial tension in an association under common conditions of feeling and interests is dependent on the amount of available potential for abstraction. The more primitive the consciousness is, the less it is able to imagine the solidarity of the spatially separated or the lack of solidarity of the spatially near. At that point the manner of socially associative strengths reverts immediately to the ultimate foundations of mental life: namely to that where the naïve consistency of undeveloped imagination does not yet generally distinguish well between the 'I' and its environment. On the one hand

the 'I' merges, without further individualistic emphasis, into the images of other people and things, just as the lack of the 'I' is manifest with the child and the communistic semi-undifferentiation of earlier social circumstances; on the other hand no being-for-itself is acknowledged for the objects on this level; the naïve egoism of the child and of the natural person wants to acquire every desired thing immediately for oneself—and desires nearly everything that approaches perceptibly near—and thus the sphere of the 'I' reaches out for all practical purposes even over things, as occurs theoretically through the subjectivism of thought and the unawareness of objective legalities. For that reason, it becomes obvious how decisive for this mental constitution perceptible proximity must be for the consciousness of belonging-to-one-another. Because this proximity comes into play indeed not as an objective spatial fact but as the mental superstructure over it, it can thus, as mentioned already, be replaced at times even on this level by other psychological constellations, e.g. by membership in the same totemic band, which among the Australian aborigines brings individuals from entirely separate groups into close relationship so that they avoid entering into a group conflict with one another. As a whole, however, with primitive consciousness, then, the external contacts are the bearers of the internal—however varied these may be in their character; the undifferentiated imagination does not know rightly how to keep the two apart from one another; just as even today still in the backwardness of small-town relations the relationship to the next-door neighbor and the interest in that person plays an entirely different role than in the large city, in which one becomes accustomed, by the complication and confusion of the outward image of life, to perpetual abstractions, to indifference towards spatial intimacy as well as the close relationship to someone far away. In epochs in which spatially transcending abstraction is needed by objective circumstances but is hindered by the lack of psychological development, sociological stresses of considerable consequence arise for the form of relationship. E.g., the patronage of the Anglo-Saxon king over the Church was justified legally based on the distance of the See of Rome. Personal presence was felt at that time still very much as a condition for the exercise of authority, so that one would have to voluntarily relinquish this to an authority that far away. By the way, I would also like to take a historical digression in this context. Where the mental superiority of one part or the force of circumstances makes inevitable relationships at a distance for which the consciousness is actually not yet matured, then this would have to

contribute greatly to the formation of abstraction, as it were an elasticity of mind; sociological necessity would require the cultivation of its own ear for individual psychology. So probably the relationship of medieval Europe to Rome, where it was not breaking down on account of spatial distance, became indeed, precisely because of it, a school for the capacity for abstraction, for the ability to be consciously aware beyond what is perceptibly nearest, for the triumph of powers effective then by their content over those which were based on spatial presence. There seems to be a 'threshold' for overcoming distance for each of the relevant sociological relationships in such a way that the spatial distance, up to one of a certain size, increases the capacity for abstraction by which it is overcome; beyond this level, though, it is immediately weakened. Spatial distances with their flowing transitions and their different mental meanings manifest in general multiple threshold phenomena, especially in combination with temporal distances. This is most noteworthy with emotional relationships: a spatial separation may bring the mutual feeling to its highest attainable intensity for a while, but from a certain moment on it consumes the strength of the feeling, so to speak, and leads to its cooling and to an indifference. A close spatial distance will often modify the sensation only a little according to its tenor; a very great distance will allow it to flare up in desperate ardor; on the other hand, then, precisely that separation, spatially then insignificant, when it is nevertheless insurmountable, often leads to the most tragic situation because the divisive forces are felt more sharply in their substantial strength as though the space, in itself indifferent, stepped in between: the purely physical obstacle does not embitter as much as the moral; it does not function so very much as a fate tapered to the personality but more as the generally nonhuman.

If relationships at a far distance presuppose in the first place a certain intellectual development, conversely the more perceptible character of local proximity is manifest in them, so that one tends to stand on a friendly or, short of a decidedly positive one, hostile footing with close neighbors, and mutual indifference tends to be excluded to the extent of spatial closeness. The dominating intellectuality always means a reduction of emotional extremes. In accord with its objectivity as well as mental function, it is placed beyond the contrasts between which feeling and will swing; it is the principle of impartiality, so that neither individuals nor historical epochs of essentially intellectual color tend to be marked by one-sidedness or the intensity of love and hate. This correlation also holds for the individual relationships of people. Intel-

lectuality, as much as it offers a ground for general understanding, nevertheless places precisely thereby a distance between people: because it enables understanding and agreement between the most distant people, it establishes a cool and an often estranging objectivity between the closest. If spatially far distant relationships tend to manifest a certain calm, formality, disaffectedness, this appears to those thinking naively likewise as a direct consequence of distance, in the same way that the decrease of a throwing motion, according to the *measure* of the space traversed, looks like merely the *result* of spatial breadth. In reality the importance of spatial interval lies then in that it excludes the incitements, tensions, attractions, and repulsions that physical proximity calls forth, and thus produces in the complexity of socially interactive mental processes the dominant mode for those thinking intellectually. Towards the spatially near, with whom one is reciprocally involved in the most varied situations and moods without the possibility of foresight and choice, there tends to be then definite feelings so that this proximity can be the foundation of the most exuberant joy as well as the most unbearable coercion. It is an exceedingly old experience for residents of the same house to stand on friendly or hostile footing. Wherever there exists close relationships that would not be enhanced any further in their *essentials* by incessantly immediate nearness, such nearness is thereby best avoided because it brings with it all kinds of chances for contrasting coloration and thus offers too little to gain, but much to lose; it is good to have one's neighbors as friends, but it is dangerous to have one's friends as neighbors. There are probably only very few friendship relationships that do not involve some kind of distance in their closeness; spatial remoteness takes the place of the often embarrassing and irritating rules by which it is necessary to maintain that inner distance with continuous contact. The exceptions to that rule of emotional polarity with greater nearness confirm its basis: on the one hand with a very high educational level, on the other hand in the modern large city, complete indifference and exclusion of any mutual emotional reaction can occur among the closest of neighbors along the hall. In the first case, because the dominating intellectuality reduces the impulsive reactions to the, so to speak, attraction of contact; in the second, because incessant contact with countless people produces the very same effect through indifference; here indifference toward those proximally close is simply a protective device, without which a person in the metropolis would be mentally torn and scattered. Where this mitigating effect of life in the metropolis is counteracted by the particularly lively temperaments, other protective

devices have been occasionally pursued: in the Alexandria of the Roman Empire two of the five city quarters were inhabited principally by Jews, so that neighborly conflicts might be prevented as much as possible through mutually held customs. If, then, the mediator seeks first of all to separate colliding parties spatially, in contrast to this absolute move, the same mediator takes the trouble to bring them directly together when they are far from one another. Because with some natures the effective imagination at a distance unleashes an uninhibited exaggeration of feelings, over against which the consequent stimuli of physical proximity, however great they may be, seem nevertheless at the same time as somehow limited and finite.

Besides the practical effects of immediate spatial proximity and for consciousness, most important sociologically, to have such effects at least in that moment at hand, even if one does not actually make use of them—next to these the consequence of proximity for the form of association lies in the importance of the individual perceptions by which the individuals perceive one another.

Excursus on the Sociology of Sense Impression

The fact that we notice people physically near us at all develops in two respects whose joint effect is of fundamental sociological significance. Acting on the subject, the sense impression of a person brings about feelings in us of desire and aversion, of one's own enhancement and diminishment, of excitement or calm by the other's appearance or the tone of that person's voice, by the mere physical presence in the same space. All this is not of use for getting to know or defining the other; it is simply fine for me or just the opposite if someone is there whom I would see and hear. That person's self is left, so to speak, outside by this reaction of feeling to one's physical appearance. In the direction of the opposed dimension the development of the sense impression proceeds as soon as it becomes the means of knowledge of the other: what I see, hear, feel of the other is simply the bridge over which I would get to where that person is an object to me. The speech-sound and its meaning forms perhaps the clearest example. Just as the organ of a person has a fully immediately engaging or repulsive effect on us, irrespective of what that person says, so on the other hand what that person says helps us to the knowledge not only of the other's immediate thoughts but also to that person's mental being—thus is it probably with all sense impressions; they usher into the subject as that person's voice and feeling, and out to the object as knowledge of that one. Vis-à-vis non-human objects, both of these tend to lie far apart. To the physical presence of non-human objects, we emphasize either their emotional value: the aroma of the rose, the charm of a sound, the attraction of the branches that bend in the wind—we experience these things as a happiness in the interior of the

soul itself. Or we want to identify the rose or the sound or the tree—thus we apply fully different energies for that, often with conscious avoidance of feeling. What are here rather disparately alternating with one another are for the most part interwoven into a unity vis-à-vis human beings. Our sense impressions of a person allows the emotional value, on the one hand, the usefulness for an instinctive or sought-after knowledge of that person, on the other, to become jointly effective and for all practical purposes actually inextricable in the foundation of our relationship to the person. To a very different extent, of course, the construction being done by both, the sound of the voice and the content of what is said, the appearance and its psychological interpretation, the attraction or repulsion of the environment and the instinctive sizing-up of the other based on that person's mental coloration and sometimes also on the other's level of culture—in very different measures and mixes both of these developments of sense impression construct our relationship to the other.

Among the individual sense organs, the eye is applied to a fully unique sociological accomplishment: to the bonds and patterns of interaction of individuals who are looking at each other. Perhaps this is the most immediate and purest interactive relationship. Where otherwise sociological threads are spun, they tend to possess an objective content, to produce an objective form. Even the word spoken and heard still has an objective interpretation that would yet be transmissible perhaps in another manner. The most vital interactivity, however, in which the eye-to-eye look intertwines human beings, does not crystallize in any kind of objective formation; the unity that it establishes between them remains dissolved directly in the event, in the function. And so strong and sensitive is this bond that it is borne only by the shortest, the straight line between the eyes, and that the least diversion from this, the slightest glance to the side, fully destroys the singularity of this bond. There remains for sure no objective trace, as indeed, directly or indirectly, from all other types of relationships between people, even from exchanged words; the interactivity dies in the moment in which the immediacy of the function is abandoned; but the entire interaction of human beings, their mutual understanding and mutual rejection, their intimacy and their coolness, would in some way be incalculably changed if the eye-to-eye view did not exist—which, in contrast with the simple seeing or observing of the other, means a completely new and unparalleled relationship between them.

The closeness of this relationship is borne by the remarkable fact that the perceptive glance directed at the other is itself full of expression, and in fact precisely by the way one looks at the other. In the look that takes in the other one reveals oneself; with the same act, in which the subject seeks to know its object, it surrenders itself to the object. One cannot take with the eye without at the same time giving. The eye unveils to the other the soul that seeks to unveil the other. While this occurs obviously only in immediate eye-to-eye contact, it is here that the most complete mutuality in the whole realm of human relations is produced.

Hence it becomes really quite understandable why shame leads us to look to the ground to avoid the gaze of the other. Certainly not only for the purpose of keeping us spared of being perceptibly detected from observation by the

other in such a painful and confusing situation; but the deeper reason is that lowering my gaze deprives the other somehow of the possibility of detecting me. The look into the eye of the other serves not only for me to know the other but also for the other to know me; one's personality, one's mood, one's impulse towards the other is carried forth in the line that binds both our eyes. The 'ostrich-like attitude' in this physically immediate sociological relationship has a very real purpose: whoever does not look at the other actually eludes being seen to some degree. The person is not entirely quite there for the other should the other notice one, unless the first should also return the look of the other.

The sociological significance of the eye depends in the first instance, however, on the expressive significance of *countenance*, which, between one person and another, is offered as the first object in sight. We seldom clarify the extent to which even the practicality of our relationships depends on reciprocal recognition—not only in the sense of all the externalities or the momentary intentions and mood of the other, but what we consciously or instinctively recognize from the other's being, from the other's inner foundation, from the immutability of that person's essence; this unavoidably colors our immediate as well as our long-term relationship to that person. The face is indeed the geometrical location of all these recognitions; it is the symbol of all that accompanies the individual as the prior condition of one's life, all that is stored up in a person, what from the past has descended to the foundation of one's life and become one's enduring traits. While we make use of the face for such meaning, which thus serves greatly the purposes of praxis, a supra-practical element takes place in the exchange: the face causes the person to be understood not initially from one's action but from one's appearance. The face, viewed as an organ of expression, is, so to speak, of an entirely theoretical nature; it *does not act* like the hand, like the foot, like the whole body; it does not convey the internal or practical activity of the person, but it certainly *speaks* of it. The particular, sociologically consequentially rich type of 'knowledge' that the eye mediates is determined by the countenance being the essential object of inter-individual seeing. This knowing (*kennen*) is something other than recognition (*erkennen*). In some kind of admittedly fluctuating measure we know with the first glance at people whether we are going to have anything to do with them. That we are for the most part not conscious of this fact and of its fundamental significance for us lies in the fact that we direct our attention beyond this obvious basis directly at the recognizability of particular traits, of singular contents that decide our practical behavior towards the person in particular. Should one, however, press forward to the consciousness of this self-evident reality, it is then astounding how much we know of a person upon the first glance. Nothing expressible with concepts, divisible into individual properties; we cannot say absolutely perhaps whether the person seems smart or dumb, pleasant or vicious, high-spirited or sleepy to us. All this recognizability in the usual sense includes *universal* characteristics that the person shares with countless others. What, however, that first look imparts to us is not to be analyzed and interpreted into the conceptual and expressible—although it remains forever the tone of all later recognitions of that person—but it is the immediate grasp

of someone's individuality, just as that person's appearance, above all the face, betrays it to our look; wherefore it is basically insignificant that with this there also occur sufficient errors and corrections.

While the face then offers to the glance the apparently most complete symbol of the persistent inwardness and all of what our experiences have allowed to sink into our enduring basic nature, there is nevertheless at the same time the interactively rich situations of the moment. Emerging here is something completely unique in the realm of the human: that the universal, supra-singular nature of the individual presents itself always in the particular coloring of a momentary disposition, fulfillment, impulsiveness; that the unitary stability and the fluid multiplicity of our souls is, as it were, visible as an absolute concurrence, the one always in the form of the other. It is the utmost sociological contrast between the eye and the ear: that the former offers us then the revelation of the person bound in temporal form; the latter, however, what is permanent in one's nature, the sediment of one's past in the substantial form of one's traits so that before us we see, so to speak, the successions of a person's life in one concurrence. Then the indicated tone of the moment, as indeed the face documents it too, is removed by us so essentially from that which is spoken that in the actual effect of the perception of the face, the *permanent* character of the person recognized through it, prevails.

For that reason the sociological tone of the blind is altogether different than that of the deaf. For the blind the other is present actually only in the succession, in the sequence of that person's utterances. The restless, disturbing concurrence of characteristic traits, of the traces from all of one's past, as it lies outspread in the face of a person, escapes the blind, and that might be the reason for the peaceful and calm, uniformly friendly disposition toward the surroundings that is so often observed among the blind. Precisely the variegation in that concurrence, which the face *can* reveal, often renders it enigmatic; in general what we *see* of a person is interpreted through what we hear from that person, while the reverse is much less frequent. Therefore, the person who sees without hearing is much more confused, more at a loss, more disquieted than the person who hears without seeing. Herein necessarily lies a significant factor for the sociology of the metropolis. Going about in it, compared with the small city, manifests an immeasurable predominance of seeing over the hearing of others; and certainly not only because the chance meetings on the street in the small city concern a relatively large quota of acquaintances with whom one exchanges a word or whose sight reproduces for us the entire personality rather than just the visible—but above all through the means of public transportation. Before the development of buses, trains, and streetcars in the nineteenth century, people were not at all in a position to be able or to have to view one other for minutes or hours at a time without speaking to one another. Modern traffic, which involves by far the overwhelming portion of all perceptible relations between person and person, leaves people to an ever greater extent with the mere perception of the face and must thereby leave universal sociological feelings to fully altered presuppositions. On account of the mentioned shift, the just mentioned greater incomprehensibility of people

being only seen over that of people being heard contributes to the problematic of the modern feel of life, to the feeling of disorientation in collective living, of the isolation, and that one is surrounded on all sides by closed doors.

A sociologically extremely functional compensation for that difference in performance of the senses lies in the very much stronger memory capacity for the heard over that for the seen—in spite of that, what a person has spoken is, as such, irretrievable, while one is a relatively stable object before the eye. Indeed, for that reason one can much more readily deceive the ear of a person than the eye, and it is quite obvious that from this structure of our senses and their objects, in so far as a neighbor displays such, the whole class of human traffic is carried: if the words heard would not immediately vanish from the ear, albeit still grasped in memory, if the the contents of the face, which lack this strong reproductiveness, would not offer themselves up to visual perception—our inter-individual life would then stand on an absolutely different basis. It would be useless speculation to think about this as being otherwise, but considering its possibility in principle frees us from the dogma that human association, as we know it, is entirely obvious and, so to speak, beyond discussion, a reality for which there are no *particular* causes. With regard to the singly large social forms, historical research removed this dogma; we know that the constitution of our families as well as our form of economy, our law as well as our traditions are the outcomes of conditions that were different elsewhere and that therefore had other outcomes, that with these realities we in no way stand on the deepest foundation on which the given is even the absolutely necessary; it can no longer be conceived as a special formation from special causes. With regard to the entirely universal sociological functions playing out between one person and another, however, this question has not yet been posed. The primary, direct relationships that determine then all higher structures appear so solidary with the nature of society overall as to allow it to be overlooked that they are solidary only with the nature of humanity; it is from the particular conditions of this nature then that they require their explanation.

The just indicated contrast between an eye and an ear in their sociological significance is obviously a further extension of the double role to which indeed the eye appeared designated for itself alone. Just as all sense of reality always breaks up into the categories of being and becoming, so they dominate as well that which a person can and wants to notice of other people in general. We want to know: what sort of being is this person? What is the enduring substance of this person's nature? And: What is this person like in this moment? desiring? thinking? saying? This establishes for all practical purposes the division of labor between the senses. Apart from many modifications, what we see in a person is what is lasting in that individual, what is drawn on the face, as in a cross-section of geological layers, the history of a person's life and what lies at the foundation of that person's nature as a timeless dowry. The vicissitudes of historical expression do not approximate the variety of the differentiation that we detect through the ear. What we hear is what is momentary about someone, the flow of someone's nature. First, all sorts of secondary perceptions and conclusions reveal to us, even in someone's features, the mood of the moment and what is invariant in that person in a person's words. Otherwise in the whole of nature,

as it is offered to immediate sense impression, the lasting and the fleeting are allocated much more unevenly than among people. The permanent rock and the flowing stream are polar symbols of this unevenness. Only human beings are simultaneously something that always persists and flows before our senses; both the fleeting and the lasting have reached a height within them by which one is always measured against the other and is expressed in the other. The formation of this duality stands in an interaction with that of eye and ear; for if neither of the two completely ignores both kinds of perception, they are still, in general, dependent on mutual complementariness, on ascertaining the permanently plastic nature of human beings through the eye, and on their surfacing and submerging expressions through the ear.

In a sociological perspective, the ear is still separated from the eye through the absence of that reciprocity that sight produces between eye and eye. By its nature, the eye cannot receive something without giving at the same time, while the ear is the quintessentially egoistic organ that only takes but does not give; its outer shape almost seems to symbolize this in that it serves somewhat as a passive appendage of the human phenomenon, the most unmovable of all the organs on the head. It atones for this egoism by not being able to turn away or close like the eye, but since it only takes, it is also condemned to take all that comes near it—the sociological consequences of which is yet to be shown. Only together with the mouth, with speech, does the ear generate the internally unified act of taking and giving—but it also generates this in the alternation of the fact that one is not able to speak correctly when one hears and not hear correctly when one speaks, while the eye blends both in the miracle of the 'look.' On the other hand the unique relationship of the ear with the objects of private possession stands in contrast to its formal egoism. In general one can only 'possess' something visible while that which can only be heard is already in the past along with the moment of its present and no 'property' is preserved. It was an extraordinary exception when in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the great families strove to possess works of music that were only written for them and that were not allowed to be published. A number of Bach concertos originated from a prince's order for them. It pertained to the prominence of a house to possess works of music that were withheld from every other house. For our sensibility there is something perverse in this, since hearing is supra-individualistic in its nature: all those who are in a room must hear what transpires in it, and the fact that one picks it up does not take it away from another. Thus also arises the special mental emphasis that something spoken has if it is nevertheless intended exclusively for one individual. Innumerable others would be able to hear physically what one says to another only if they were there. If the content of something that is said excludes this formally physical possibility, this lends such a communication an incomparable sociological coloration. There is almost no secret that *could* be conveyed only through the eyes. Communication through the ear, however, actually includes a contradiction. It forces a form, that in and of itself and physically is turned toward an unlimited number of participants, to serve a content that totally excludes them all. This is the remarkable point of the orally shared secret, the conversation under four eyes; it expressly negates

the sensory character of speaking out loud, which involves the physical possibility of innumerably more hearers. Under normal circumstances generally not too many people can have one and the same facial expression at all, but by contrast extraordinarily many can have the same impression from hearing. One may compare a museum audience with a concert audience; for the determination of the hearing impression to communicate itself uniformly and in the same way to a crowd of people—a determination by no means simply external-quantitative but bound up deeply with its innermost nature—sociologically brings together a concert audience in an incomparably closer union and collective feeling than occurs with the visitors to a museum. Where, as an exception, even the eye yields such sameness of impression for a large number of people, the communalizing social effect also makes its appearance. When everyone can see the sky and the sun, I believe, that is the essential moment of coming together that every religion signifies. Because everyone somehow turns toward the sky or the sun, according to the origin or cultivation of each, everyone has some sort of relationship to that which is all-embracing and controlling the world. The fact that a sense that is so exclusive in the exercise of living as the eye, which even somehow modifies what is seen through the difference of viewpoint at the same time for each, nevertheless has a content that is not absolutely exclusive, but offers uniformly to each the sky, the sun, the stars—that must suggest, on the one hand, that transcending of the narrowness and distinctiveness of the subject that every religion contains, and bears or encourages, and on the other hand, that moment of the unification of believers that every religion alike possesses.

The different relationships of eye and ear to their objects, highlighted above, sociologically establish very different relationships between the individuals, whose associations depend on one or the other. The workers in a factory hall, the students in an auditorium, and the soldiers of a unit somehow think of themselves as one. And if this unity also springs forth from supersensible elements, it is still influenced in its character by the eye being the sense that is essentially effective for it, by the individuals being indeed able to see themselves during the processes that join them together, but not being able to speak. In this case the consciousness of unity will have a much more abstract character than if the being together is at the same time also an oral interaction. The eye shows, in addition to what is individual in the human being who is involved in the appearance, what is also the *same* in all to a greater degree than the ear does. The ear communicates the fullness of the divergent moods of the individual, the course and the momentary climax of thought and impulse, the whole polarity of subjective as well as objective life. From people whom we only see, we form a general concept infinitely more readily than if we could speak with each one. The usual incompleteness of seeing favors this difference. Very few people can say with certainty what the eye color of their friends is, or can vividly represent in their imagination the shape of the mouth of the people next to them. Actually, they have hardly seen them; one evidently *sees* in a person in a much higher degree what that person has in common with another than one *hears* this commonality in that person. The immediate production of very abstract, unspecific social structure is thus favored the most,

to the extent that the technique of the senses works by the proximity of sight, in the absence of the proximity of conversation. This situation has advanced very much, in accord with what was mentioned above, the formation of the modern idea of the 'worker.' This strange, effective concept, the idea that unites the generality of all wage laborers, regardless of what they do, was not found in previous centuries, when associations of fellow workers were often much narrower and more intimate, since they often depended essentially on personal interaction by word of mouth, which the factory hall and the mass rally lack. Here, where one saw countless things without seeing them, that high level abstraction was first made of all that is common to them, and it is often hindered in their development by all the individual, concrete, variable things as the ear transmits them to us.

The sociological importance of the lower senses diminishes before that of sight and sound, although that of smell not so much as the particular dullness and lack of potential for the development of its impressions leads one to assume. There is no doubt that the surrounding layer of air scents every person in a characteristic way, and in fact it is essential to the olfactory impression existing that way so that, of the two developments of the sensory experience—toward the subject, as liking or disliking it, and towards the object, as recognizing it—one allows the first to prevail by far. Smell does not form an object from within itself, as sight or sound does, but remains, so to speak, self-conscious within the subject; what is symbolized by it is that there are no independent, objective descriptive expressions for its differences. If we say: it smells sour, that means only that it smells like something smells that tastes sour. To a completely different degree from the sensations of those senses, those of smell escape description with words; they are not to be projected onto the level of abstraction. Instinctive antipathies and sympathies that are attached to the olfactory sphere surrounding people and those, for example, that often become important for the social relationship of two races living on the same territory, find all the less resistance of thought and volition. The reception of Africans into the higher levels of society in North America seems impossible from the outset because of their bodily atmosphere, and the aversion of Jews and Germans toward each other is often attributed to this same cause. The personal contact between cultivated people and workers, so often enthusiastically advocated for the social development of the present, which is also recognized by the cultivated as the ethical ideal of closing the gap between two worlds "of which one does not know how the other lives," simply fails before the insurmountable nature of the olfactory sense impressions. Certainly, many members of the upper strata, if it were necessary in the interest of social morality, would make considerable sacrifices of personal comfort and do without various preferences and enjoyments in favor of the disinherited, and the fact that this has not yet happened to a greater degree is clearly because the forms that are quite suitable for them have not been found yet. But one would have taken on all such sacrifices and dedication a thousand times more readily than the physical contact with the people onto whom "the venerable perspiration of work" clings. The social question is not only an ethical one, but also a nasal question. But admittedly this also works

on the positive side: no sight of the plight of the proletarian, even less the most realistic report about it, viewed from the most striking cases of all, will overpower us so sensually and immediately as the atmosphere, when we step into a basement apartment or a bar.

It is of significance, still insufficiently noticed, for the social culture that the actual perceptive acuity of all senses clearly declines but, in contrast, the emphasis on sense pleasure or lack of sense pleasure increases with the refinement of civilization. And I really believe that the heightened sensibility in this respect in general brings with it much more suffering and repulsion than joy and attraction. Modern people are choked by countless things, unendurably countless things appear to them through the senses, which a more undifferentiated and more robust manner of sensing accepts without any reaction of this kind. The individualizing tendency of modern people and the greater personality and the freedom of choice in their commitments must be consistent with that. With their partly immediately sensory and partly aesthetic manner of response, they can no longer retreat easily into traditional associations and close bonds in which they are not asked about their personal taste and their personal sensitivity. And inevitably this brings with it a greater isolation, a sharper delimitation of the personal sphere. Perhaps this development in the sense of smell is the most remarkable: Contemporary efforts at hygiene and cleanliness are no less results as causes of it. In general, the effectiveness of the senses at a distance becomes weaker with the heightening of culture, their effectiveness stronger within close range, and we become not only near-sighted but altogether near-sensed; however, we become all the more sensitive at these shorter distances. Now the sense of smell is already from the start a sense positioned more for the proximate, in contrast to sight and sound, and if we can perceive no more as objectively with it as can some primitive peoples, we react subjectively all the more intensely toward its impressions. The direction in which this happens is also the same as that mentioned previously, but also at a higher degree than with the other senses: A person with an especially fine nose certainly experiences very much more discomfort than joy by virtue of *this* refinement. Reinforcing that isolating repulsion that we owe to the refinement of the senses, here is more: When we smell something, we draw this impression or this radiating object so deeply into ourselves, into our center, we assimilate it, so to speak, through the vital process of respiration as close to us as is possible through no other sense in relation to an object, it would be then that we eat it. That we smell the atmosphere of somebody is a most intimate perception of that person; that person penetrates, so to speak, in the form of air, into our most inner senses, and it is obvious that this must lead to a choosing and a distancing with a heightened sensitivity toward olfactory impressions altogether, which to some extent forms one of the sensory bases for the social reserve of the modern individual. It is noteworthy that someone of such a fanatically exclusive individualism as Nietzsche often said openly of the type of person most hateful to him, “they do not smell good.” If the other senses build a thousand bridges among people, if they can soothe over with attractions the repulsions that they repeatedly cause, if weaving together the positive and negative values of their feelings gives the total concrete relation-

ships among people their coloration, one can note, by way of contrast, that the sense of smell is the dissociating sense. Not only because it communicates many more repulsions than attractions, not only because its judgments have something of the radical and unappealing that lets it be overcome only with difficulty by the judgments of the other senses or minds, but also precisely because the bringing together of the many never grants it any such attractions as that situation can unfold them for the other senses, at least under certain conditions: indeed, in general such interferences of the sense of smell will increase in a direct quantitative relation of the mass in whose midst they affect us. Cultural refinement, as already mentioned, points to an individualizing isolation through this arrangement, at least in the colder countries, while in southern lands chance influenced the coming together essentially in the open air, thus without having to manage that inconvenience.

Finally, *artificial* perfume plays a social role in that it effects a unique synthesis of individual egoistical and social purposes in the field of the sense of smell. Perfume accomplishes through the medium of the nose the same thing as jewelry does through the medium of the eye. Jewelry adds something completely impersonal to the personality, drawn in from outside, but nevertheless suits the person so well that it seems to emanate from the person. It enhances the person's sphere as the sparkle of gold and diamond; one situated near it basks in it and is thus, to some extent, caught in the sphere of the personality. Like clothing, it covers the personality with something that should still work at the same time as its own radiance. Insofar as it is a typical stylistic phenomenon, a blending of the personality into a generality that nevertheless brings the personality to a more impressive and more fashioned expression than its immediate reality could. Perfume covers the personal atmosphere; it replaces it with an objective one and yet makes it stand out at the same time. With the perfume that creates this fictive atmosphere, one presupposes that it will be agreeable to the other and that it would be a social value. As with jewelry, it must be pleasing independently of the person whose environment must please subjectively; and it must still at the same time be credited to the bearer as a person.

I should add a comment about sexual feeling in its relationship to space, although 'sensuality' here has a different meaning: not that of pure passivity, as when impressions of the sense of warmth or the sense of sight is being spoken of; but here desires and activities are placed on the receptive impressions with a greater immediacy than indicated in speech usage as sensibility. Now in this area of sensation spatial proximity seems to me to be of the greatest, perhaps of the decisive importance for an important social norm: The prohibition of marrying close relatives. I enter all the less into the controversy over the reason for this prohibition, as the problem of it seems to be incorrectly posed. Here, as opposed to all broader and significant social phenomena, one cannot generally inquire about 'the reason' but only about the reasons. Humanity is too diverse, too replete with forms and motives, for one to be able to contend with a single source or a single origin for the phenomena that occur in very different points on the earth and as results of long-term and obviously very different developments. As the debate over whether humans

'by nature' are monogamous or not is clearly incorrect, since even from the beginning as well as up to later times there have been monogamous and polygamous, celibate and mixtures of all these trends; thus all the motives cited for the prohibition appear to me to have actually been in effect, but none of them can claim to be the essential motive. Friendship and relationship of alliances with foreign lineages as well as hostile relationships that led to most of the robbery of women, the instinct of racial advancement as well as the husband's wish to separate his wife as much as possible from her family and its support for her—all this will have contributed to these marriage prohibitions in varying combinations. However, what is most essential may be this: the maintenance of discipline and order within the same house requires the complete exclusion of sexual intercourse between brothers and sisters, parents and children, and all the pairs of relatives who formed a spatially closed unit in earlier times. The spatial proximity in which the house holds its male and female members would allow the sexual impulse to degenerate into limitless debauchery if the most terrible penalties were not set on them, if an instinct were not cultivated through the most unrestricted sternness of social prohibitions, which from the outset excludes any mixing within the household group. It would speak against this rationale for the prohibition if it really held, as is claimed, originally only within the 'matrilocal family,' *i.e.* where at marriage the husband goes over to the family of the wife; moreover, if it were true, this matrilocal family would in no way coincide with the complex of people living together. But the period of youth before marriage, in which the male lives in his maternal household in any event, seems long enough to me to bring about all the dangers for household order that the prohibition seeks to counter; and if then this holds further for the divorced, this may be a further effect of the time that has become permanent in which he was not only a family associate but also an associate of his own household. The fact that in many places the clan regulations strongly prohibit marriage within the same clan, is in favor of this opinion, although real blood relatives are allowed without further consideration as soon as they are found by some happenstance in different clans. It is reported of the Pomtschas in Bogota that the men and women of one and the same settlement are considered brothers and sisters and thus do not enter into marriage with one another; but if the actual sister was born by chance in a different place from the brother, they were allowed to marry each other. In Rome, as long as the rigor of the household lineage stood at its height, all persons who stood under the same paternal authority, *i.e.* relatives up to the sixth degree, were prohibited from marrying one another. To the extent that the close cohesion and strict unity of the house was loosened, this rule was also softened, to the point where during the time Caesar even marriage between uncle and niece became legitimate. The prophylaxis was no longer needed as soon as the closeness of living together was loosened. This precautionary tendency appears everywhere, which is intended to obviate the temptation resulting from close physical contact, because giving into it would cause an especially violent disturbance of the family order—often of course with the radical lack of differentiation that can even otherwise only enforce a kind of partial norm upon the primitive stages of mind, so that it controls the

total and general range of its content, way beyond its boundary. Among the Braknas on the Fiji Islands and elsewhere brother and sister, male and female cousins, and brother-in-law and sister-in-law must neither speak nor eat with one another. In Ceylon[11] father and daughter, and mother and son cannot observe one another. Prohibitions corresponding to these exist among the indigenous Americans as well in the South Seas, among the Mongolians, and in Africa and India, against any interaction between mother-in-law and son-in-law, and between father-in-law and daughter-in-law. Among the Kyrgyz the young woman must not appear at all before any male member of her husband's family. Among many peoples, for example the Alfuren of Buru, the Dajaks, some Malayans, and the Serbs, among others, bride and bridegroom cannot interact with each other at all, and the Africans hold it especially honorable if a man marries a girl whom he has never seen before. And, again, under apparently contrasting circumstances, the same precaution appears, but made another step more subtle, when Islamic law prohibits a man from seeing the face of another woman whom he *cannot* marry.

Under these psychological conditions the norm exists that persons of the opposite sex who must not cultivate any sexual communion, shall not come spatially close together at all. However an exactly different norm corresponds to the contexts of sensuality that justify this: For persons of the opposite sex who unavoidably simply share the same space, marriage must be absolutely forbidden and made outwardly and inwardly impossible—as long as one wishes to avoid promiscuity in sexual behavior that drowns out any regulation. Thus many of these prohibitions affect not just blood relatives, but also foster brothers and sisters, and clan and group associates generally who live in a close local relationship. The Jameos of the Amazon River, some tribes in Australia and on Sumatra allow no marriage within the same village. The larger the households are, the stricter—e.g. among the Hindus, South Slaves, in the Nanusa Archipelago, and among the Nairs of Kerala—are the marriage prohibitions within one and the same group. Apparently it is much more difficult to protect propriety and order in a very large house than in a small one; thus the prohibition of marriage of close relatives was not sufficient, but extensive laws had to be introduced among those peoples that placed the whole house under the prohibition of marriage. As long as individual families lived apart, even blood relationships prevented marriage among them only to a limited degree. Among the Thanea Indians of Brazil, among whom marriages between relatives distant by two degrees are very frequent, every family lives in its own house, and this holds for the Bushmen and the Singhalese as well; also the fact that among the Jews marriage between brothers and sisters was strictly taboo, but between first cousins was allowed, is explained by the latter not living together in a household. By and large, prohibitions of marriage among primitive peoples are more extensive and stricter than among the more advanced ones; in the course of development, they were limited more and more to the really narrower family circle, apparently because the closeness of living

[11] Today's Sri Lanka—ed.

together only increasingly included more of the latter. The more extensive and diverse the social totality is that surrounds us, the smaller the familial subdivisions become that feel as belonging to one homogenous whole, the fewer the people who refer to the dangers of living close to one another, against which the prohibition of marriage formed a preventative rule.

Completely contrary to this motif, people have admittedly claimed that living together, as housemates do, would directly blunt sensual attraction; one would not desire with passion what one would have in view from earliest childhood daily and hourly; being accustomed to living together dampens fantasy and desire, which would only be stimulated rather by the distant and novel. On this psychological basis, it would not be the members of one's own family but always strangers toward whom the desire for marriage would be turned. However the psychological correctness of this theory is only conditional. The intimate living together not only produces apathy, but in many cases stimulation; otherwise the ancient wisdom, that love often arises in the course of a marriage where it might be absent upon entering into it, would not hold; otherwise the first intimate acquaintance with a person of the other sex would not be so dangerous during certain years. It is also possible that during the very primitive stages of development, when the prohibition in question comes into existence, that finer sense for individuality is lacking, because of which not the woman as such is charming, but her personality that is different from all others. This understanding, however, is the condition under which desire turns from the beings whom one already knows well, and who do not have a new individual attraction to offer, to strangers of a yet unknown individuality. As long as desire in its original unrefined condition dominates the man, any woman is like any other woman for him insofar as she is not too old or is ugly in his judgment; and that higher psychological need for change could have had no strength to overcome the natural inertia that referred him at first to the nearest female. An anonymous writing from the year 1740, *Bescheidene doch gründliche Gegenvorstellung von der Zulässigkeit der Ehe mit des verstorbenen Weibes Schwester*,[12] also rejects marriage with a deceased husband's brother, and in fact precisely from the point of view emphasized here, which makes a strange impression in this case, whereby the husband should still not abuse his right to eventually marry the woman in her lifetime after the death of the spouse, for which the frequent familial gatherings would give special opportunity. And already the Jewish philosopher Maimonides cited as a basis for that prohibition the danger of the immorality that lay all too near in living together in one house. Because of the prohibition of marriage, however, every husband would know that he should not direct his inclinations and thoughts in this direction at all.

All in all it seems to me that the spatial proximity is so effective for arousing the sense of sex that where cultivation and custom are upheld at all, and an inconceivable chaos in all legal and moral relationships should not

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[12] Translation: *Humble Though Thorough Refutation of the Admissibility of Marriage to a Deceased Wife's Sister*—ed.

arise, the strictest rules of separation must be established precisely between spatially proximate persons. If only the prohibitions of propriety and reserve that separated the members of a family are also valid for people who are far from each other, they would not be proven as powerless as they actually are often enough, but even more powerless in view of the special situation of those who live in a closer external unity. Thus a barrier had to be erected between them that does not exist for non-relatives. Neither are the ruinous effects of inbreeding on the race absolutely certain, nor is such knowledge among the primitive peoples likely to be sufficient to make marriage among relatives an unconditionally shocking horror for them. On the contrary, maintaining a sexual order is almost everywhere a closely observed requirement, and for that matter the incest taboo seems to me to be essentially introduced and given an instinctive obviousness as a prophylaxis against the allurements that must have resulted here from no other general circumstance as overwhelming as from local contact.

Of course in addition to these psychological (in the narrower sense) consequences of proximity or distance for social interactions stand those of a more logical or at least intellectual nature, which do not pertain to sensory-irrational immediacy. For example, the vicissitudes that a relationship undergoes through the transition of its elements from distance into spatial proximity in no way exist only in a growing intensity of the bond but also very much in attenuation, reservation, and repulsion. In addition to that direct antipathy that may issue from sensory proximity, principally at work here is an absence or denial of the idealization with which one more or less clothes the abstractly represented partners. If outer distance is lacking, it brings about the needed emphasis on inner distance, on the limit setting of the personal sphere, on the defense against inappropriate intimacy, and, in brief, against such dangers that do not come into question where there is spatial distance; it brings about certain caution and detour that interaction must produce directly through personal immediacy because greater objectivity, a moderation of personal angularities, and a smaller likelihood of too much hastiness and fervor often tend to be peculiar to the indirect and often interrupted distant interaction. It belongs to the finest social task of the art of life to preserve in a close relationship the values and sensitivities that develop between persons in a certain distance relative to the rarity of togetherness. One will spontaneously decide that the warmth and sensitivity of the relationship must increase with the level of personal closeness. One anticipates at the beginning, in the tone and intensity of interaction, what could indeed develop

in the most favorable case, admittedly in order to then feel that one expected too much of the mere form of the spatial relationship; we reach deeply into the void because the suddenness of the physical or permanent closeness has misled us about the slowness with which the mental closeness increases it again. Thus set-backs and cooling-off occur that not only undo these illusory excesses but also sweep away the previously attained values of love, friendship, common interest, or mental understanding. This situation does not belong to rare confusions among people, which could probably be avoided at the outset with instinctive tact; but once they occur, as a rule they no longer can be set right with tact alone, but only with the assistance of conscious assessments and deliberations. Physical closeness is still not always the adequate result of internal intimacy, but occurs where the latter remains in the status quo, often for entirely external reasons. And, therefore, corresponding to the physical occurrence the following happens: if one were to cause those changes in a body that warmth brings about in it, through another mechanical means, it cools off!

I take up a second example of relationships that are far distant from the intimacy that we mentioned, in order to dwell on the sociological distinctiveness of spatial distance in its more calculable consequences. Where a minority that is held together by the same interests is found in a larger group, it is very different for the relationship to the whole whether it lives spatially close together or scattered in small sections throughout the whole group. Which of the two forms is the more favorable for such a minority's position of power under otherwise similar conditions is not generally ascertainable. If the subgroup in question is found in a defensive posture vis-à-vis the majority, the level of its power decides that question. If the group is very small, so that no genuine resistance, but only an escape—making themselves invisible—and avoidance of devastating attacks remain in question, it is immediately obvious that the maximum possible dispersion is advisable. On the contrary, with considerably more strength, especially larger numbers of people for whom the chance already exists to withstand an attack, the most possible concentration will promote preservation. In the way that streams of herring are protected from danger by their tight concentration, in that they thus offer a narrower target and less space in between for enemies to penetrate, so living closer together provides the exposed minorities the greater probability of successful resistance, mutual support, and more effective consciousness of solidarity. The

mode of spatial dispersion of the Jews made both ways usable for them. While their diasporas distributed them throughout the cultural world, no persecution could encounter *all* of their segments, and there was always for those for whom life at one place was made impossible still a link, protection, and support at another; on the other hand, since they lived mostly as close neighbors in individual places either in the ghetto or elsewhere, they also enjoyed the advantages and powers that the compact togetherness without a vacuum develops for defense. Now if the energies have reached the threshold from which they also can advance to attacks, to win advantages and power, the relationship is reversed: at this stage, a concentrated minority cannot accomplish so much as one that cooperates from many points. Thus while at that stage, by virtue of the smaller and thus essential powers needed for defense, the ghetto was decisive for the Jews as advantageous and empowering, with growing certainty and energy it appeared as injurious to Judaism and their distribution throughout the total population raised their collective power most effectively. This is one of the not too infrequent instances in which the absolute growth of a quantity directly reverses the relations within it. Now if one does not look at the minority as the variable element in the sense of its structure, but inquires into the constitution of the environing totality in a given spatial dispersal or compactness of it, the following tendency necessarily results. A smaller special structure within an encompassing group that holds the central authority together will favor, with its spatial compactness, an individualizing form of governance granting autonomy to the parts. Since where such a part does not provide for its interests by itself, its life cannot be led according to its own norms; it has no technical possibility at all of being protected from the oppression by the whole. For example, a parliamentary regime that always subjects the very life of the parts to a mere majority decision will simply outvote such a minority. But if it lives dispersed so that there cannot be any talk about an independent development of immediate power or of their institutions for them, the autonomy of local sectors of the whole will be of no value for them since they still do not gain a majority. It will be rather centralist minded since the consideration by which it can still hope for something from the splitting of its energies is still the most to be expected from a unified, indeed perhaps absolutist central authority; it will attain a positive influence on so diffuse a structure only through individually outstanding personalities whom it produces, and the greatest chance for this form of power will also exist

precisely in view of a sovereignty as powerful and personal as possible. The local distance of the members makes it dependent on a central authority and its compactness leads it away from that.

The result of this spatial situation is an entirely different one when it is not a matter of a sector but a whole group. A community, all of whose elements live dispersed, if other causes are not strongly affecting it, will not have centralist inclinations as readily. As the Swiss rural regional communities in the Middle Ages were structured as collective state entities, they thereby essentially duplicated the basic characteristics of city constitutions. However the farmers' cooperative did not arise as did the urban one, almost completely in the agencies set up by it, but the early assembly of people remained the most important organ itself for the administration of justice and control over all public matters. Here, on the one hand, a certain mistrust is effective because the permanent control of the central organs from afar is impracticable, and on the other, the lesser vitality of the social interactions in the country is compared to that of the compact urban population. Objective structures are necessary for them as solid points in the storms and frictions that urban life generates as much through on-going contacts as through the strong but continuously gradated social differentiation of its members. These results of local conditions will also bring about a certain tenseness of centralization upon the democratic foundation of the urban population.

However, really direct democracy needs the spatially close limitation of its sphere, as the classic *Federalist Papers* proclaims: "The natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central point which will but just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand."[13] And in Greek antiquity it had to be experienced as a banishment if one lived so far from the place of the political assembly that one could not participate in it regularly. Democracy and aristocracy meet in this interest in immediate autonomy if their spatial conditions are the same. The Spartan history shows this limitation in a very interesting combination. There one knew very well that the dispersed settlement on the flat terrain favored aristocracy; because even democracies under this local condition assume a type of aristocratic character because of their self-sufficiency and their independence from

[13] In English in Simmel's text. The quotation is from *The Federalist*, number 14, written by James Madison—ed.

dominant central powers, as the history of the German tribes frequently reveals. Thus as the Spartans wanted to overthrow the democracy in Mantinea, they dissolved the city into a number of boroughs. But in the conflict between the agrarian character of their state, in which the spatial separation always remains tangible—and indeed to the extent it was also suitable to its aristocracy and to the vigorous centralization that their militarism required—they found an outlet to let their agrarian economy of serfs thrive while they themselves remained fairly close together in Sparta. In some way superficially similar to that, during the *ancient régime* the fate of the French noble took the same course. He had been autonomous to a great extend in his largely agrarian way of life until the government, which became ever more centralized with a clear culmination in the court life of Louis XIV, on the one hand undermined the legal and administrative independence of the noble and, on the other hand, drew him continuously to Paris. The correlation is thus in contrast to that of the opposition minority: Centralist tendencies correspond to the spatial concentration of the group and, conversely, autonomy to spatial dispersion. And since this relationship appears in complete contrast to the social tendencies of life, both democratic and aristocratic, it follows that the spatial factor of proximity or distance determines the sociological form of the group decisively or at least decisively in part.

E. All the sociological formations considered up to now described what lies next to one another spatially: boundary and distance, permanence and neighborhood are like continuations of the spatial configuration within the structure of humanity, which is distributed in space. The latter fact attaches wholly new consequences to the possibility that people *move* from place to place. The spatial constraints on their existence are thereby put in flux, and as humanity achieves the existence that we know only through its mobility, from wandering, countless further consequences for their interactions result from the change of place in the strict sense; we wish to sketch some of these consequences here. The basic division of these phenomena from the sociological point of view is: Which forms of social interaction are established in a wandering group, as opposed to a spatially fixed one? And: Which forms emerge for the group itself and for wandering persons if in fact no one group wanders as a whole but certain members of it do?

1. The principal formations of the first type are nomadism and those movements that are called migrations of people; for nomads

the wandering pertains to the substance of life that is best noted for its endlessness, for the circularity of constantly returning to the same places; but as for the migrations of people, the wandering is experienced more like an in-between condition between two different ways of life—be it that of being settled, or be it the earlier of the two, which is the nomadic. Insofar as the sociological consideration only inquires into the effect of the wandering as such, it need not distinguish between the two kinds. For the effect on the form of society is typically the same in both cases: Suppression or abolition of the inner differentiation of the group, hence an absence of a genuine political organization is often thoroughly compatible with despotic governance. The latter configuration is above all reminiscent of the relationship of patriarchal bonds within nomadism. Where the necessity arises for hunting peoples to scatter and wander, the husband takes his wife away from the neighborhood of her family, thereby thus deprives her of its support, and places her more decisively under his power, so that among the North American Indians the wandering of the family is made directly responsible for the transition from the female to the male kin organization. Then it happens that among authentic nomads stock-farming replaced hunting and that stock-farming as well as hunting are the business of males everywhere. Male despotism develops among nomads through this male responsibility over the most important or exclusive means of acquiring food. Family and state despotism, however, stand not only in a broad relationship of mutual production, but nomadism still has to favor the latter all the more decisively as the individual then has no support from the land. The same circumstance that makes nomads everywhere into subjects as well as objects of robbery—the mobility of property—makes life in general become something so unstable and rootless that the resistance against powerful, unifying personages is certainly not so strong as where the existence of each individual is consolidated on the land—especially since there is no question here of the chance of escaping, which was such a characteristic weapon for the wandering craft workers against state centralizing tendencies, as is to be similarly emphasized later. It still happens that those despotic collectives are created mostly for military purposes, to which the venturous and wild nomads will always be more disposed than will the farmers. As has been stated, nomadic groups, as a rule, lack the strict and solid organization, which otherwise cultivates the methods of military formations. There is hardly any disposition for that because of the wide dispersal and mutual

independence of the individual nomadic families, since a more sophisticated and more extensive organization presupposes a division of labor; the latter presupposes a spatially tight or dynamic contact among the elements. However, the despotic organization among those wandering masses of nomadic peoples, which ran through European history no less than that of China, Persia, and India, was obviously no organized synthesis, but its force rested precisely on the mechanical aggregation of wholly undifferentiated elements that poured forth with the steady and uninterrupted pressure of a mud flow. The lowlands and steppes that on the one hand encourage nomadic life, are on the other hand the headwaters of the migrations of the large tribes. Eastern Europe, Northern and Inner Asia, the American lowlands thus manifest cultivated racial types the least, and this ethnographic situation must be no less the result than the cause of a sociological leveling down. A deeply grounded relationship exists between the movement in space and the differentiation of social and personal contents of existence. Both only form different satisfactions of *one* side of opposite mental tendencies, the other side of which comes from silence, regularity, and a substantial uniformity of the feeling and picture of life: conflicts and compromises, mixtures and changing predominance of both lend themselves to be used as patterns in order to bring in all the content of human history. The extraordinary increase in the differences of needs among modern people simultaneously affects both forms—change of place and differentiation—but in other cases the two can substitute for each other so that societies that are spatially stable strongly differentiate internally; and wandering societies, in contrast, which have veiled their necessary feeling of differentiation from the outset, require a social leveling for the constitution of their nerves and for the simultaneous tendency of life in the opposite condition.

The stratagem of wandering is made the vehicle of this principal relationship. The members of a wandering band are especially closely dependent on one another; the common interests, in contrast to the settled groups, have more the form of the momentary and therefore obscure, with the peculiar energy of the present that so often triumphs over the objectively more essential, individual differences, in the double sense of the word: as qualitative or social variety and as strife and division among individuals. Impulses for spatial expansion and contraction stand in sharp contrast among nomadic tribes; conditions for nourishment lead the individuals as far apart from one another as possible (and

the spatial separation must also work towards a qualitative mental separation), while the need for protection nevertheless drives them together again and restrains differentiation.[14] Livingstone says of the divisions of African clans, which otherwise do not feel very connected, that they hold whole tribes very much together during wanderings and mutually support one another. From the Middle Ages, it is often reported that merchants who travel together had introduced a strongly communistic order among themselves, of which it is only a continuation that the merchant guilds or Hanses often established abroad, and that indeed characteristically right from the beginning of their development, they agree to a completely common life. Along the leveling moment of the travels, of course, there was no lack of the despotic in such cases. At least it is emphasized about the traits of the traveling merchants who traveled through the Roman Empire from Palmyra in the Euphrates region, that their leaders would have been the most noble men of quite old aristocracy, for whom the caravan participants would then often set up honorary pillars. It is thus assumed that their authority during the trip was a discrete one, under a relationship very analogous to that that of a ship captain during a voyage. Precisely because wandering individualizes and isolates in and of itself, because it places people on their own, it drives them to a close unity beyond the differences that exist otherwise. While it removes the support of the homeland from individuals, and at the same time removes the fixed levels among them, it directly brings to consciousness the travelers' fates, isolation, and rootlessness—to complement and augment a more than individual entity through the greatest possible commitment.

This essential sociological characteristic of wandering reveals itself as one that is in form always the same in phenomena that are in essence completely without any connection to what has been touched on until now. The travel acquaintance, as long as one is really only that and does not assume a character independent from that kind of association, often develops an intimacy and candor for which no genuine inner basis is to be found. Three causes appear to me to work in concert here: the liberation from the accustomed milieu, the mutuality of the momentary impressions and encounters, and the consciousness of the imminent and

[14] The unbalanced proximity of these two necessities, which find a harmony, organization, and complementary form in no higher viewpoint, both dominating, is perhaps the basis for the low and difficult development of the tribe at the stage of nomadism.

definitive separation that will happen again. The second of these factors is immediately clear in its effects on uniting and on a kind of spiritual communism, so long as even the identity of the experience lasts and the consciousness prevails; the other two, however, are only accessible to a more difficult sociological consideration. On the occasion of the first factor one must clarify how few people know from within, and through sure instincts, where the unalterable boundary of their private mental possession lies, and which reserves their individual being requires in order to keep themselves from being injured. Only through initiatives and reversals, through disappointments and adaptations do we gradually tend to discover what we must reveal about ourselves to others without allowing feelings of tactlessness against ourselves and direct damages to develop from embarrassing situations. The fact that the mental sphere of one individual is not at all as clearly set off from that of others at the outset as is the body, the fact that this boundary, after it also overcame the vicissitudes of its first formation, never absolutely overcomes its relativity—this readily appears when we leave behind us the accustomed relationships in which we marked out a fairly solid space for ourselves with gradually increasing rights and responsibilities, by understanding and being understood by others, by testing our powers and our emotional reactions, so that we certainly know here what we have to say and what to withhold and by what measure of both we create and sustain the accurate picture of our personality in others. Now since this relative measure of expression, set by the relationship to our environment, hardens for many people into an absolute in its own right, in an entirely new environment, one before entirely strange people, it generally loses any standard for self-revelation. On the one hand they are revealed under suggestions that they cannot resist in their actual state of being uprooted, and on the other hand in an inner uncertainty in which they can no more hold in check an intimacy or confession once they are prompted, but allow them to roll to the end as though they fell on a slanted plane. Now the third factor comes into play: we allow our accustomed reserve to drop so easily before those with whom we have nothing to do after this unique, mutual or one-sided revelation. All social interactions are influenced in the character of their form and content most decidedly by the idea of the duration for which one believes it is determined. This pertains to the sociological cognitions, the truth of which is admittedly unmistakably obvious for the grossest cases; for the finer ones, however, they are all the more frequently overlooked. That

the qualitative character of a bond between a man and a woman in a lifelong marriage is different from that in a fleeting relationship, that the professional soldier has a different relationship to the army than that of a one or two year service is admittedly self-evident for anyone; but the conclusion that these macroscopic effects of the quantity of time also must appear with a lesser proportionate starkness and, as it were, microscopically, seems to be applied nowhere. Whether a contract is completed in one or ten years, whether a get-together of colleagues is planned for a few hours in the evening or as something at a country outing for a whole day, or whether one gets together at the set dinner of a hotel that changes the guests every day or that of a pension that is intended for a longer stay, that is quite essential for the coloration of the process in otherwise wholly similar material, meaning, and personal character of the being together. Whichever way it works, the quantity of time is admittedly not looked at in itself but depends on the totality of the circumstances: the greater length of time will sometimes lead to something overlooked,[15] as it were to a lingering trace of the gathered group, since one is certain of it and does not yet find it necessary to strengthen the still irrevocable bond with new efforts; sometimes, again the consciousness of this simple indissolubility will move us toward a mutual adaptation and a more or less resigned flexibility in order to make the pressure, once it is taken on, at least as bearable as possible. Shortness of time will occasionally lead to the same intensity of the utilization of the relationship as its length, among other characteristics that can admittedly endure only a superficial or 'half' relationship over a short time but not over the long term. This reference to the effect that thought exerts on the duration of a relationship at any individual moment should show here only the sociological essence of the brief encounter belonging to a wider and principled context. The traveling acquaintance—from the feeling of being obligated to nothing, and of being really anonymous in relation to a person from whom one will be separated for ever in a few hours—often entices one to quite remarkable confidences, giving in unreservedly to the impulse to speak what only experience has taught, through their consequences, to control. Thus people have also attributed the erotic opportunities of the military to its not possessing the stationariness that most other sectors of society possess, to the relationship with the soldier possessing the coloration

[15] einer négligeance—ed.

of a fleeting dream on the part of the woman, a dream that not only involves no commitment but precisely by its brevity seduces one to the most superficial intensity in the exploitation of her and the devotion to him. Thus one has also explained the success of the mendicant friars by the fact that one often confessed with less embarrassment to those who had the right to hear confession anywhere and came today and left tomorrow, than to one's own pastor who had the penitent in sight for a long time. Here as often as the extremes appear to possess a certain uniform importance that is opposed to the middle sphere: one reveals oneself to the closest and the strangest persons while the layers that stand in between comprise the place of genuine reserve. Thus the following is also recognizable in these wide-ranging phenomena within the basic context: Peoples' peculiar lack of attachment as wanderers and toward wanderers, even by what I indicated above as an approach to spiritual communism, is a surrender beyond the other barriers of individualism; this sociological theme is alive in countless, difficult to recognize transformations, which promotes at a certain level a depersonalizing unity within the wandering group.

2. Totally apart from this is the consideration of how the wandering of a section affects the form of the whole, otherwise sedentary group. I mention here only two of the many relevant phenomena, of which one would continue to have an effect on the side of the unification of the group, and the other precisely on the side of its duality. In order to dynamically hold elements together that are distant from one another in a spatially spread out group, highly developed epochs develop a system of various means, above all everything that is customary to the objective culture, which is accompanied by the consciousness that it would be just the same here as it is at every point in the same group: the sameness of speech, law, general way of life, the style of buildings and tools; moreover, the functional units: the centralized administration of state and church that extends itself everywhere at the same time, the more selective associations of entrepreneurs that nevertheless reach out across all local separations, such as industrial workers, commercial associations of wholesalers and retailers, the more ideal but still very effective association of scholars, military association, school teachers, university professors, collectivities of all sorts—in short, a tangle of threads with an absolute or partial center that holds together all parts of a highly cultivated state, admittedly with very differently distributed energy, since the substantive culture according to quantity and kind is neither sufficiently uniform, nor do the functional connections turn all

elements with the same interest and same force toward their center. At any rate, insofar as these unifications are effective, they require only the movement of peoples through large stretches of space in trifling segments and, as it were, accidentally; modern life succeeds in bringing about the consciousness of social unity, on the one hand through those factual regularities and the knowledge of the common points of contact, and on the other hand through the institutions that are fixed once and for all, and finally and thirdly, through written communication. But as long as there is an absence of this objective organization and technology, it has another overriding significance as the secondary means of unification later: the wandering that, admittedly, because of its purely personal character, can never cover the breadth of the spatial territory as do those means and can never centralize the same circuit from the point of view of content. The merchant and the scholar, official and craftsperson, monk and artist, the highly prominent as well as the most depraved members of society were in the Middle Ages and at the beginning of the modern era much more mobile than now. What we gain in consciousness of solidarity through letters and books, checking account and warehouses, mechanical reproduction of the same model and photography had to be done at that time through travel by persons, which was as lacking in success as it was wasteful in implementation; for where it is a matter of merely factual communication, traveling is the most unhelpful and unspecialized means for a person since one must drag along, as heavy baggage, all that is external and internal to one's personality that has nothing directly to do with the business at hand. And if the byproduct of many personal and informal relationships were also thereby gained, that still does not exactly serve the purpose now in question, *i.e.*, making the unity of the group perceptible and effective. Pertinent relationships that leave the personal completely aside—and thus can lead from any element to many other ones without limitation—succeed more thoroughly to make conscious a unity that transcends individuals; precisely, the informal relationship not only excludes all others in substantial matters, but it exhausts itself in its immediate narrowness so that its benefit for the consciousness of the unity of the group, to which both belong, is minimal. It is indicative of this subjective nature of the linkages and at the same time also of their importance that in the Middle Ages the maintenance of highways and bridges was regarded as a *religious* duty. That so many of today's objectively mediated relationships came about in earlier times only

through the wandering of personalities seems to me to be a basis for the relative weakness of the consciousness of unity in the extended groups of antiquity.

After all, the wanderings were often the only vehicle, often at least one of the comparatively strongest ones, for centralization, especially in a political sense. On the one hand the king took the individual parts of the realm into his possession personally in the form of a circuit, as is reported of the ancient Franks and as did the earlier kings of Sweden; on the other hand, the king traveled around in the realm either periodically or continuously. The earliest Russian sovereigns did it periodically by visiting all the cities annually, and the German emperors of the old empire did it continuously. The Russian custom was supposed to have served the solidarity of the Empire, the German, which followed from the lack of an imperial capital, was thereby admittedly just the symbol of a dubious decentralization, but under these circumstances still the best that one could do for the unification of the separate parts of the empire in the person of the king. Precisely one of the causes of this traveling around on the part of the German princes—the fact that the taxes paid in kind to them had to be consumed on the spot for lack of a means of transportation—precisely this established a kind of entirely personal relationship between each place and the king. In England the arrangement of the itinerant justices through Henry II served an analogous purpose. With the imperfections of the centralization and communication, the administration of the counties was vulnerable from the outset to considerable abuse by county constables. The circuit judges first brought the highest state authority everywhere; with the distance that they had as strangers to each part of the realm, and with the substantial similarity of their judgments, they first pulled all parts of the kingdom beyond their scattered condition into a unity centralized under the king by law and administration. As long as there is a lack of the supra-local means, working at a distance, to bring the local settlement authorities also into this unity, the riding circuit of the officials gives the most effective possibility of centralizing the outlying regions into the ideal political unity. The physical impression of persons also works just the same way; one knows about them that they come from that center of the whole and return back to it. In this immediacy and clarity lies an advantage of this organization, borne by mobile members, held together before the more abstract means, who occasionally balance its fortuitousness and isolation. A half-socialist English organization, the

English Land-Restoration League, used a red coach ('red van') for its propaganda among the rural workers, in which its speaker lived and which, driving from place to place, formed the center stage at meetings and center of excitement. Such a wagon, with all its mobility, by virtue of its characteristics, a spectacle recognized everywhere, is still a psychologically stationary element; with its coming and going it brings the scattered party comrades their connectedness throughout the area to a stronger consciousness than would perhaps occur under otherwise similar circumstances of a fixed branch of the party, with the result that other parties would readily imitate this wagon-propaganda. In addition to state and party unity, travel can also serve religious unity. The English Christians only began founding parish churches late. At least well into the seventh century bishops moved around the diocese with their assistants to carry out church business; and thus certainly the religious unity of the *individual community* obtained an incomparable solidity and clarity through the church structure; thus the latter could more quickly work towards a particularistic isolation of the community while the unity of the whole diocese, indeed the Church in general, must have come more strongly into consciousness through the traveling of its bearer. Even now the Baptists in North America proceed with their recruitment of adherents in the more remote regions by means of special wagons, 'gospel cars,' that would be furnished as chapels. This mobility of worship services must be especially favorable for propaganda since it makes it clear to the scattered adherents that they are not in isolated lost outposts, but belong to a unified whole that is held together by continuously functioning connections. And finally it is still the moral conduct of the group toward its wandering members that it must occasionally come to the places of meeting and fellowship. Besides the indispensability that travel had for the whole economic and cultural activity in the Middle Ages, combined with its dangers and difficulties, the poor that were thus as much an object of general charities also wandered almost continuously—it would happen that the Church recommended travelers to the daily prayers of the devout in the same breath with the sick and the imprisoned. And similarly the Koran specifies: the fifth portion of the spoils belongs to God, His emissaries, the orphans, the beggars, and the wanderers. Then the immediate provision of welfare for the traveler was differentiated, in accordance with a general historical development, into the objective relief of the traveler on the road, assurances, institutions of different kinds, and into

the subjective ones allowing the individuals their independence and self-reliance. That general religious obligation toward the traveler was the ethical reflection of the continuous social interaction and functional unity that the traveler produced. As the traveler, even if not poor at all, can still be especially easily caught up in situations of need, and all the more so the less developed the outer culture is, it is in turn particularly suggested to the poor that they travel, since the individual fields of the harvest of alms is exhausted. The fact that poverty and wandering are so often presented as a completely unified phenomenon—the persisting type of the beggar, the 'roaming poor,' is probably only recently beginning to disappear completely in Germany—is the basis of one of the greatest difficulties of the care for the poor with reference to the sinking poor: that one has absolutely no sure means of distinguishing between the worker seeking employment who is caught in the course of that in undeserved difficulty, and the professional idler who moves from one place to another in order to live at the cost of other people.

In addition to the unifying effect of travel on the fixed group that strives to overcome functionally its spatial distancing from itself through coming and going, there is another one that serves precisely the antagonistic forces of the group. This occurs if one part of a group is principally settled, another characterized by its mobility, and this difference in formal spatial behavior then becomes the vehicle, instrument, and growth-factor of an otherwise already existing latent or open opposition. Here the most distinctive type is the vagabond and the adventurer, whose continuous roving about projects unrest, the rubato quality of their inner rhythm of life, onto territory. The difference between one settled by natural inclination and the wandering nature in itself already gives the structure and development of society infinitely possible variations. Each of these two temperaments senses in the other a natural and irreconcilable enemy. Since where, perhaps, it does not succeed in procuring the born vagabonds an employment adequate to their talent through a fine differentiation of professions—which very rarely succeeds where already the time toward regular employment for them is all too related to the fixedness in space—there they will exist as a parasite on the settled members of the society. However, they do not persecute the vagabonds only out of hate, but they hate them also because they must persecute them for their self preservation. And just the same, what drove the vagabonds into this exposed and weakened position, their instinct for a continuous change of place, their ability and desire to

'make themselves invisible' is still at the same time a protection against that persecution and ostracism; it is simultaneously an offensive and their defensive weapon. As the vagabonds' relationship with space is the adequate expression of their subjective interiority and erraticism, so is it the same for the relationships to their social groups.

Here it is exclusively a matter of unique elements that are forced by their restlessness and mobility, but are also capable of actually sustaining a conflict with the entire society. At least very rarely, compared to the interweaving of the social whole into the nature of the vagabond, unions among them are such that it is thus a matter not of wandering communities, in a sociological difference from nomads, but of a community of wanderers. The whole life principle of the adventurer resists that because an organization can hardly avoid some kind of permanence. There are, after all, beginnings of that, which one could call flowing social formations, which can however obviously always include within themselves and regulate only a small part of the inner and outer life of their members. One such homeless fellowship was the itinerant people of the Middle Ages; it needed the entire spirit of fellowship of the time so that these itinerant people would create a kind of inner order for themselves. While this fellowship rose even to the establishment of a 'Meisterschaft'[16] and other dignities, at least the formal edge of their opposition against the rest of the society became moderate. Now this happened even more decidedly in a different type of special movement as a bearer of a social antagonism: namely, where two parts of a group are set into a more active opposition by it. Here the traveling skilled worker, especially in the Middle Ages, is the best example. The organizations on which the skilled labor depended by their claims to support the cities and masters had travel as a prerequisite. Or looked at differently: both stood in an indissoluble interaction. The wandering would not have been technically possible without an arrangement that granted the skilled worker, who has migrated, an initial base of support; and inevitably comrades in the trade, who themselves came or will come into the same situation, would need to provide one. While the skilled crafts drew the work centers precisely to themselves, the skilled worker was actually a foreigner nowhere in Germany (and similarly in other lands); a network of information centers among the skilled workers provided relatively quickly for the balancing of demand and offer

[16] Recognized free status of a guild—ed.

of work at the individual places, and thus it was at first a very obvious benefit for them that allowed one association of skilled workers to arise from the skilled workers stretched out throughout the whole empire. Travel caused the skilled worker guilds to stand in a more active mutual interaction than the guilds of the masters with the immobility of their residence, and caused a unity of law and custom to develop among them, which afforded the individual or the smaller parts extraordinarily strong support in their struggles over wages, life style, honor, and social standing. The wanderings of skilled workers had to promote the formation of their specialized associations extraordinarily. The skilled worker born in one place was linked to the master through residence, piety, and a general relationship to things and persons. For the skilled workers, however, who had gathered together from everywhere, there was no other interest but the purely factual and technical; the personal bonds leading back to the master were dissolved, and there remained only the rationalist direction of interests and connections that are generally characteristic of the foreigner and made the foreigner everywhere, for example, the bearer of money transactions. Besides being reinforced by the socializing effect of the travels of its members, the struggling situation of the stratum of skilled workers was still intensified quite directly by their mobility; for this enabled it to execute work stoppages and boycotts in a way that the masters could not immediately counteract. Obviously this was only possible for the latter if they balanced the disadvantages of their being rooted in the soil with alliances that embraced the whole area for the travels of the skilled workers who came into question. Thus we hear of associations of cities and guilds in cohesive solidarity against the skilled workers, associations that tended to belong to the same geographically insulated zone that constituted a regular travel area for the skilled workers. Thus two different forms struggled with each other to dominate the same space: mobility, through which the group easily shifted here and there its elements for offense and defense, each time to the point of least resistance and most advantage, backed the ideal domination of the same space through the appointment of the others to defend through them the widely distributed groups. Through these, the inner differences of this group, out of which the mobility of the others drew their opportunities, would be eliminated; only after the regularity of the behavior and the strength for all elements of the master group were restored did the opportunity for the mobility of the opposing group become illusory. Accordingly, the state of the seventeenth and eighteenth century could also much sooner cope with the guilds

of masters, who, so to speak, had to hold still, than with the bands of skilled workers, because the skilled workers could withdraw from every territory and prevent immigration, thereby severely damaging business. Also, the states first aligned itself against the bands of skilled workers in the eighteenth century, *at the same time* as they were confronted by them in a large part of the imperial territory.

The character of social construction is formally determined to a high degree by how often their participants meet. Here this category is so peculiarly distributed between the masters and the skilled workers that frequently they are, of course, united by their settledness, and generally it is thus necessary to meet often, but actually only within the locally restricted group, in contrast to the others who admittedly meet less completely, more seldom, and occasionally, but in the broad circuits that include very many guild circles. Thus, while, for example, in the Middle Ages the skilled worker who broke a contract was generally penalized severely, it was conceded to the Berlin weaver in 1331 that at any instance the latter was allowed to demand payment and release *if thinking of abandoning the city*. It is an example of the contrary association that the multiple travels and wandering of the workers prevents a certain part of them from participating in a wage movement, and thereby places them in a disadvantage relative to the settled entrepreneurs; with the categories of workers who are generally mobilized according to their occupation, such as itinerant workers and sailors, the disadvantage of restlessness often increases up to the point of lawlessness because more often they cannot collect their witnesses against the entrepreneur in litigation over compensation and keep them together during the lengthy legal proceeding. Generally it seems as though the nearer to the present, the more favorable is the position of the settled against the opponent who is dependent on movement. And this is understandable given the decrease in the changing of places. Because it happens that people who are settled in principle can also still be transferred any time and anywhere, they can still enjoy more and more all the advantages of mobility along with the settled life, while for the unsettled, for the mobile in principle, the advantages of the settled life are not growing at the same rate.

Excursus on the Stranger

If travel as the loosening from any given point in space is the conceptual opposite of permanence somewhere, the sociological form of the 'stranger' nevertheless represents the union, so to speak, of the two conditions—admittedly here also representing the fact that the relationship to space is only the condition of the relationship to people on the one hand and the symbol of it on the other. Thus the stranger is not understood here as wanderer, the sense in which the term was used many times up to now, one who arrives today and leaves tomorrow, but as one who comes today and stays tomorrow—the potential wanderer, so to speak, who has not completely overcome the loosening of coming and going, though not moving on. The stranger is fixed within a certain spatial area—or one whose delimitation is analogous to being spatially limited—but the position of the stranger is thereby essentially determined by not belonging in it from the outset, and by introducing qualities that do not and cannot originate from the stranger. The union of the near and the far that every relation among people contains is achieved here in a configuration that formulates it most briefly in this way: The distance within the relationship means that the near is far away, but being a stranger means that the distant is near. Since, of course, being a stranger is an entirely positive relationship, a special form of interaction, the inhabitants of the star Sirius are not actually strangers to us—at least not in the sense of the word that comes into sociological consideration—but they do not exist at all for us, they stand outside of far and near. The stranger is a member of the group itself, not different from the poor and the various 'inner enemies'—an element whose immanent presence and membership include at the same time an externality and opposition. Now the pattern wherein repelling and distancing moments here comprise a form of togetherness and interacting unity may be outlined with the following statements, which are in no way intended to be exhaustive.

In the whole history of business, the stranger appears everywhere as a dealer, and the dealer, respectively, as stranger. As long as one's own need essentially dominates the economy, or a spatially narrow group exchanges its products, it needs no 'middleman' within it; a dealer comes into question only for those products that are produced outside the group. Insofar as almost no persons travel to the stranger in order to purchase these necessities—in which case, then, precisely they are 'foreign' merchants in this other area—the dealer *must* be a foreigner; no opportunity exists for another. This position of the stranger is intensified in consciousness when the stranger becomes fixed permanently in the place instead of again leaving the place of the business activity. For in countless cases, even this becomes possible even for the strangers only if they can live off the middle man. An economic circle that is in some way closed by parceled out earth and soil and handcrafts to satisfy demand will also grant an existence to the dealer; and because trade alone makes unlimited combinations possible, intellect always nevertheless finds expansion and new openings in trade, which is difficult for the producers to attain with their limited

mobility and their dependence on a circle of customers that can only expand gradually. Business can still always attract more people than can primary production, and it is the sphere indicated for the stranger who, so to speak, enters as a supernumerary into a group in which the economic positions are actually already taken. The history of the European Jews provides the classic example. The stranger is just not a landowner by nature, where 'land' is not understood in the physical sense only, but also in the figurative sense of a life substance that, if not fixed in a spatial position, is fixed in an ideal position in the social setting. Even in more intimate relationships of person to person, the stranger may also open up all manner of attraction and importance; but as long as they are found to be strangers, they are not 'land owners' among others. Now that dependence on the intermediate trade and many times, as in a sublimation of that, on purely financial business produces the specific quality of *mobility* in the stranger. While it happens within a circumscribed group, the synthesis of near and far resides in this, which constitutes the formal position of the stranger: The quintessentially movable comes to the stranger casually with each element in contact, but is bound up organically with *no* individual with familial, local, or occupational permanence.

Another expression of this configuration lies in the objectivity of the stranger. By not being radically committed to individual components or one-sided tendencies of the group, the stranger faces all of them with the special attitude of the 'objective' person, which does not mean, perhaps, a mere aloofness or disengagement but a particular form of the far and near, indifference and engagement. I refer to the analysis in Chapter 3, "Domination and Subordination," of the dominant positions of outsiders, as of that type which the practice of the Italian cities appears to be: appointing their judges from outside because no native was free of the bias of family interests and factions. The phenomenon mentioned a little while ago, which admittedly applies principally but nevertheless not exclusively to someone who is moving on, is also connected to the objectivity of the stranger: the fact that the most surprising openness and admissions are brought up to him, almost approaching the nature of a confession, which one carefully withholds from anyone who is close. Objectivity is by no means disengagement—since that generally exists outside of subjective and objective behavior—but an especially positive kind of participation—as the objectivity of a theoretical observation absolutely does not mean that the mind would be a passive *tabula rasa* onto which things inscribe their qualities, but the full activity of the mind working according to its own laws, only in such a way that it arranges the accidental displacements and accentuations, whose individual-subjective differences would provide completely different pictures of the same object. Objectivity can also be called freedom: The objective person is bound by no commitments that could prejudice the grasp, the understanding, and the evaluation of data. This freedom, which allows the stranger to experience and handle even the close relationship as from a bird's eye view, admittedly entails all manner of dangerous possibilities. Concerning rebellions of any kind it has always been claimed by the affected party that an incitement had taken place from outside through foreign emissaries and agitators. To the extent that this is correct, it

is an exaggeration of the specific role of the stranger: In practice and theory, the stranger has more freedom, observes circumstances with less prejudice, measures them against more general and more objective deals and is not bound in action by residence, loyalty, or precedents.[17]

Finally, the proportion of proximity and distance that gives the stranger the characteristic of objectivity nevertheless achieves a practical expression in the more abstract nature of the relationship to the person, *i.e.* one has only certain *more general* qualities in common with the stranger, while a relationship with those organically bound together is based on the similarity of specific differences from the merely general. All relationships that are personal in some way generally develop according to this pattern in manifold arrangements. About these it is not only determined that certain commonalities among the members *exist*, along with individual differences that either influence the relationship or are maintained outside of it; rather that commonality itself is therefore essentially determined in its effect on the relationship, whether it exists only among just these elements and is therefore indeed common within, but specific and incomparable without—or whether it is only common for the perception of their elements themselves, if it is common at all, to a group, or a type or humanity. In the latter case a dilution of the effectiveness of the general occurs in proportion to the size of the group bearing the same characteristic; admittedly it functions as a unifying basis for the members, but it does point *these* members directly to one another; also, this similarity could even associate each member with all possible others. This is also obviously a type in which a relationship includes the near and far at the same time: To the degree to which the similar factors have the same nature, the warmth of the relationship that they establish, an element of coolness, a feeling of the coincidence added to this relationship, and the connecting forces have lost their specific, centripetal character. Now in relation to the stranger, this configuration appears to me an extraordinary principled preponderance over the individuals, only to possess the commonalities of the elements proper to the relationship in question. The stranger is near us insofar as we feel similarities of a national or social, occupational or of generally human kind between the stranger and us; the stranger is far from us insofar as these similarities reach over both of us and bind us together only because they bind very many people generally. In this sense a strain of strangeness enters into even the closest relationships. At the stage of first passion, erotic relationships very decisively dismiss that generalized thought: a love like this has not yet existed at all; there would be nothing to compare either with the beloved or with our experience of the beloved. An estrangement—whether as a cause or as a result is difficult to decide—tends

[17] But where this is falsely claimed on the part of those affected, it originates from the tendency of the upper strata to exculpate the lower strata who were in unified closer relationship with them beforehand. Because while they present the fiction that the rebels were actually not guilty, that they were only incited, that the rebellion would not come about from them—they exculpate themselves, deny any real reason for the rebellion in the first place.

to enter at the moment in which the sense of uniqueness disappears from the relationship; a skepticism concerning its value in itself and for us connects directly with the thought that one would ultimately consummate with someone only a general human destiny, experience what has been experienced a thousand times before, and that if one had not met by chance just this person any other one would have had the same importance for us. And something of that sort may be absent in no relationship, however close, because that which is common to the two together is perhaps never merely common to them but belongs to a general idea that still includes many others, many *possibilities* of the same; as little as they may be realized, as often as we may forget them, they still propel themselves here and there, like shadows between people, like a mist lifting up from words indicating to everyone what would have to coagulate into a more solid embodiment in order to mean jealousy. Perhaps what in some cases is the more general, at least the more insurmountable foreignness than what is produced by differences and incomprehensibilities—that admittedly a similarity, harmony, and closeness exist, but with the feeling that this is actually no exclusive property of just this relationship but of a more general one that is sustained potentially between us and an uncertain number of others and thus no inner and exclusive necessity is allowed to be due to that realized relationship alone. On the other hand, there is a kind of 'foreignness' in which the commonality is directly excluded on the grounds of something more common that encompasses the parties: The relationship of the Greeks to the βαρβαρος (barbarian) is, perhaps, typical of this; all the cases in which the general qualities that one deems purely authentically and merely human are directly denied to the other. But here 'stranger' has no positive meaning; the relationship to the stranger is a non-relationship; this stranger is not what is being discussed here—a member of the group itself.

As such, rather, the stranger is near and far *at the same time*, as is the grounding of the relationship on only a general human similarity. A special tension arises between those two elements, however, when the consciousness of having only something very general in common nevertheless gives special emphasis to what is not directly common. But in the case of national, local, racial, and other strangers it is again nothing individual, but a foreign origin that is or can be common to many strangers. Thus strangers are also not really considered as individuals but as strangers of a particular type in general; the moment of distance is no less general for them than that of nearness. This form is at the basis, for example, of so special a case as the Medieval Jewish taxes, like those in Frankfurt, which were nevertheless still demanded. While the Beede paid by the Christian citizens changed with the level of ability at each time, the tax for each individual Jew was one fixed for all time. This fixedness was based on the Jew having a social position as Jew, not as a bearer of particular material contents. In tax matters, every other citizen was an owner of a particular fortune, and the tax could follow the changes in that. As a taxpayer the Jew, however, was in the first instance a Jew and therefore had a tax standing that was an invariant; this becomes most evident, of course, as soon as even these individual regulations, whose individuality was bounded by stiff irrevocability,

are repealed, and the strangers (not only Jews)[18] pay an altogether similar head tax. With all this being an organically unrelated add-on, the stranger is still an organic member of the group whose unified life includes the particular conditions of this element; only we do not know how to describe the unique unity of this position other than as its being composed of a certain measure of the near and a certain measure of the far, which, characterizing each relationship in whatever quantities, produce the specific formal relationship to the 'stranger' in a particular proportion and mutual tension.

While the sociological interest related to the phenomena only dealt with up to now from the point where the effectiveness of a particular spatial configuration began, the sociological importance lies, from another viewpoint, in the on-going process in the influence that the spatial determinants of a group experience through its actual social formations and forces. In the following examples the trend toward solidarity, even if not completely separable from other traits, as little as it was from them, will still appear decisive.

A. The transition from an original organization of a group, based on blood and tribe relationship, into a more mechanical, rational, more political one is often marked by the division of the group that follows according to spatial principles. It is above all national unity that prevails in this. The danger to the state of clan-organization lies precisely in the indifference of its principle against spatial relationship. Solidarity based on kin relationships is entirely supra-spatial according to its motive and thus holds territorially based national unity as something incomprehensible. A political organization that is set up on the clan principle must disintegrate after any sizeable growth because each of its subdivisions has within itself too solid, too organic a solidarity all too independent of the common land. The interest of state unity requires, rather, that its subgroups, insofar as they are politically effective, are formed in accord with a principle of non-difference that is thus simply less exclusive than that of family ties. Since it is thereby raised to the same height over all its members, the distance between them, especially as far as they are supra-personal, must be limited in some way; the absoluteness of the mutual exclusion that is proper to the family relationship principle is not compatible with the relatedness of the position of all members of the

[18] The phrase, 'not only Jews,' is inserted for clarification—ed.

state to one another, whom the state faces simply as a single absolute. Now, the organization of the state according to spatially delimited sectors corresponds most excellently with these requirements. Resistance against the interests of the community, which derives from the particularistic instinct of the self-preservation of groups unified through kinship, is not to be expected from them; they make it possible or necessary for the elements of genetically and qualitatively different kinds, if they are only locally based, still to be politically unified. In short, space as a basis of organization possesses that impartiality and regularity of behavior that makes it a correlate of governmental power with its characteristic behavior just as suitable to all its subjects. The most important example is the reform under Kleisthenes; it succeeded in breaking up the particularistic influence of the aristocratic families in that it divided the whole Attic nation into spatially demarcated *phylae* and *demes* as bases of self-administration. Without such conscious intent and hence only in rudimentary arrangements this principle appeared in Israelite society after the invasion of Canaan. While the original constitution was still an aristocratic one despite many economic, social, and religious similarities, and while prominent individual clans and leading lineages still dominated the others, now membership by place became important at the expense of family membership. Local communities were formed from the individual families that each settled in a village, and elements that were foreign but belonged to the locality, especially the Canaanites who were to be found; city elders appeared along side family elders. And parallel to this development of the locality principle a series of phenomena indicated how the diffusing quality of the herding way of life gives way to a centralizing tendency: larger cities arose, surrounded by areas and villages that saw their focal point and protection in those cities. Now in the councils of elders the fame of the family is no longer decisive but the ownership of fortunes, which always suggests a political association, especially if the ownership of money begins to predominate, since commerce and the possession of money can achieve extensive power only in a moderately uniformly ordered community. Finally the kingdom appeared, which admittedly did not intervene deeply in the social conditions at first, but in any case centralized tax and military entities and, significant in the present context, divided the land into governorships[19] that did not coincide with the old tribal divisions. In

[19] Simmel uses the French word *gouvernements*—ed.

an entirely different guise the same theme nevertheless applies at a stage of the development of the English Hundreds. As is well known, these were an ancient Germanic arrangement of military drafts, with physiological units admittedly equalized according to a formula, but in any case of greater psychological closeness and having a greater *esprit de corps*, units that, it seems to me, had to be first based superficially and schematically as the idea of the population devolved upon the district that had to place one hundred men obligated to serve in the military, in accordance with the settlement. This tendency reached its conclusion at the climax of the Anglo-Saxon monarchy, with its efforts at centralization: now the Hundreds are a geographically separate sub-district, the shires! The central monarchical, organizationally unified character of the Christian Church also appeared in contrast to the particularistic character of paganism in this form: The Christian saints, who performed the function of the old clan deities, no longer protected the familial entities but local communities! The process mentioned above—the linking of inhabitants of flat country to cities—generally makes the form in question available for the development process. For while rural life favors a particular aristocratic existence and hence organization according to family relationships, the city is more inclined to the rationalist and mechanistic form of life. So the crystallization around a city thus suggests mechanical-localizing instead of physiological motives for organization on the one hand, and on the other hand it is obviously of a centralist nature and facilitates the gathering of social forces into unified action. At the beginning of modernity, the Swiss made the transition from the familial constitution to a parochial one with their dependence on efficient cities, while Dithmarchen[20] achieved this transition only very imperfectly with many similarities of relationships, and probably lost its freedom around the middle of the sixteenth century on account of the backwardness of its constitution. As with the organization according to the principles of numbers, a mechanizing of social elements expresses itself among those who are internally related according to the principles of space, in contrast to the familial constitutions by which the individual groups have something of an autonomous unity of the living entity. But that characteristic of the parts is the condition for assembling into an extended whole and for the technique of governance that their higher unity exercises over its members.

[20] Dithmarschen: a district in Schleswig-Holstein—ed.

However, it is not only the political but also the economic organization whose completion often falls apart by divisions by a spatial principle, just as these in other cases are very representative of the lower stages with respect to qualitative and dynamic principles. The differentiation of production in space appears in two typical forms. First, as the elimination of migrant commerce. Not only did merchants wander since the most ancient times, but later the arms smiths and goldsmiths too, then in Germany also the masons, who understood originally foreign stone building here; before the invention of photography, portraitists in the nineteenth century often wandered from city to city in a similar manner. At this stage the demands that a specialized craftsperson from a fixed residential place could satisfy still thus formed no temporal continuity, but the craftsperson had to collect them independently of their spatial locations in order to take sufficient advantage of the craftwork. With the concentration of the population or with the growth of their needs, only the qualitative appeared in place of this, against the spatially bound, driven by need, localized, undifferentiated division of labor: the craftsperson, artist, or merchant sits in a shop or store and from there controls a sphere of customers from a certain radius as much as possible so that the producers of a certain area do not encroach on their preserves. Or the local differentiation occurs, for example already in ancient India, in a way that the representatives of the same craft settle together in a certain city quarter or in villages of craftspeople. Compared to the inorganic and accidental character of the wandering trades, here differentiation by spatial perspective serves the rational organic solidarity of the economy, and indeed as much at its primitive as its developed stages. The second economic form of local differentiation is only found at the latter stages, which sets about with the systematic dividing up of the markets among themselves as a somewhat large-scale cartel. Here it is especially the case that the place of the cartel members bears no necessary spatial relation to their respective market areas. For example, in international cartels customs or currency conditions could very well cause a particular market not to be partitioned for the one nearest to the area, but for producers living very far away. Thus the local division reached the peak of rationalization. For while the place of residence is relatively indifferent for the subjects themselves, in any event not decisive by itself for the configuration, it is now determined by the highest and ultimate point of the whole series of purposes and means, by the ultimate sale to the consumer. Where all preconditions within the teleological sequence have become fully compliant to their final goal, without allowing a determinant of one's own to occur, the

structure is so fully rationalized as to be logically imbued with the unity of the goal-oriented thinking. The way the organization achieved this is a local one, determined according to spatial market areas; but now even this spatial differentiation in its turn proceeds according to a purely rational perspective, independent of space.

B. The exercise of governance over people often documents its uniqueness in the special relationship to their spatial territory. We see the sovereignty of territory as an expression of sovereignty over people. The state governs over its territory because it governs all of its inhabitants. Seemingly one can certainly say more exhaustively that, on the contrary, the latter would be the case because the former holds true; since there is no more exceptionless encirclement of a population than those who are within the space itself—as geometrical theorems, just because they apply to space, must be applicable to all objects in space—sovereignty over territory seems to be the first and only adequate cause for the sovereignty over the people within it. Still this territorial sovereignty is an abstraction, a subsequent or anticipatory formula of personal governance in that it means, in addition to governance over the given people of the given places and at whatever places in the territory these or other people are to be found, they will always be subject in the same way. The idea of territorial sovereignty makes a continuum out of this endlessness of, so to speak, isolated possibilities; it anticipates with the unbroken form of space what can be realized here and there as concrete content. For the function of the state can only always be governing people, and governance over territory in itself would be nonsense. Seen conceptually, this is only the expression and, as a juridical fact, the result of the lack of exceptions by which the state governs the real and possible subjects within its borders. Of course there have been enough historical formations in which a political or individual power owned the ground and thereby derived governance over its inhabitants: as in feudal and patrimonial circumstances in which people are only elements of the land so that the sale of the latter under private law also makes them subjects of the new owner. Thus the Russian baronies in which the so and so many 'souls' belonged to the manor as such; the same theme carries over to a particular field, where the saying *cujus regio, ejus religio* holds.[21] But in reality governance over people still never

[21] *Cuius region, eius religio*—Latin, "whose territory, that person's religion." This was the formula for settling what religion would prevail after post-Reformation wars in Europe. It held in effect that the ruler's religion would also be that of the subjects—ed.

follows upon the ownership of an area in the same sense as the use of the products of the earth follows from its possession. Rather the association between the two must always be first created by special norms or the exercises of powers, *i.e.* governance over persons must always be a particular purpose, an express intent, not a self-evident jurisdiction. But if that is the case, sovereignty over the land as a region of its people is unavoidably something secondary, a technique or a summary expression for personal governance about which alone it is immediately concerned, in contrast to the command over the land for the sake of its produce or other use. In the latter case, the ownership of the land is what is immediately essential, since the fructification obviously follows it. Only the confounding of these two meanings of governance of a district can allow the misjudgment that here the sociological formation determines the notion of space that would determine subservient relations within a group. Thus where, as in feudalism, the utilization of ground under private law is not in the foreground of consciousness, we also find the king described in no way as the king of the land but only of its inhabitants, e.g. in the ancient Semitic kingdom.

Not only the general fact of governance, however, but also its special formations flow into a spatial expression. As a result of the functional centralization that formed the essence of the Roman state, as well as later that of the French and English ones, the Roman Empire up to its end as a territory independent of the city could regard Paris and London in France and England the fixed seats of that centralizing power. The sociological form achieved the most consistent expression in spatiality in the Tibetan theocracy: The capital Lhassa has a large cloister in its city center, to which all the country roads lead and where the seat of government is located. Now on the other hand, the German state could no longer have an actual spatial center at all as the reorganization into a federated kingdom was decided upon after the Carolingians, but only a delicate and personal center. The absence of a fixed capital and the continuous moving about of the king was the spatially logical result of that political structure. The formal character of this association will be emphasized still more strongly with a change of political relationships, simply because it is a change that results in the relocation of the capital. The old condition, be it administrative or merely psychological, is so tightly associated with the capital that the new, more expedient way requires a relocation, and indeed it would not matter, except that it must be some place other than in the former place. Thus the capital was often relocated in the Scandinavian kingdoms as Christianity was

introduced, and in the Orient the accession of a new ruler often led to a consequent change in the capital: the spatial projection of the functional change. This is precisely the most indicative at the smallest scale because a spatially small relocation does not really amount to the least, but only marks the fact of change in general. Among African tribes, the headquarters is often the only settlement similar to a city, and in order to make the dependence of this structure on the person of the ruler quite perceptible, it is transferred a few kilometers if the ruler is changed. In these cases the city of the ruler seems like a garment that surrounds the ruler's person and only moves along in the same direction as an expansion of his personality itself as a radiation of its importance; the destiny of this city must thus follow that of the ruler. That this localizing of the sovereign power is a relative one, *i.e.* that it has its meaning in its relationship to the subjects' place of residence, is expressed quite well in a somewhat paradoxical phenomenon that is mentioned in reports on the Bechuana: If the families are dissatisfied with their chieftain, they do not drive him off but for their part leave the village so that it comes about that one morning the chieftain is found completely alone in the village—a negative form of spatial formation that follows from the relationship of governance. In the way that space is concentrated or distributed, how the spatial points are fixed or changed, the sociological forms of relationship of governance congeals, as it were, into clear formations.

C. That social associations are transformed into certain spatial structures is exemplified in everyday life in the family and the club, the regiment and the university, the labor union and the religious community having their fixed locality, their 'house.' All associations that own a house, as distinctive as their contents may be throughout the world, thereby manifest a common sociological qualitative difference from such, so to speak, free-floating liaisons as friendships or support groups, groups temporarily working together or formed for illegal purposes, political parties and all the social formations seldom spilling over into praxis, that exist in the mere consciousness of common convictions and parallel endeavors. Those larger structures, which admittedly are not as such firmly domiciled, form a third qualitative type within the same sociological category, whose individual elements nevertheless always possess a house: the general army of corps that each has barracks; the church as a union of all like-minded believers, which is subdivided into parishes; families in the broad sense as opposed to their individual households, and countless others. This is certainly

only one among many influences under which the physical state of a social interaction is expressed and which in turn helps embody it. But it is important that it be made clear not only that the central solidarity is expressed in so many peripheral points, but that the importance of that solidarity and of these points continually merge into one another: The actual structure of a social formation is in no way determined only by its chief social motive but by a great number of threads and knots within them, by stabilizations and fluctuations that show only gradual differences in effectiveness, that show everything in relationship to the socially decisive: the formation of a oneness from a many.

The community's 'house' is now understood not in the sense of mere property, in the way, as a legal person, it can also possess a second one or a piece of land, but as the locality that is the spatial expression of its social energy, as a place of dwelling or meeting. In this sense it does not actually *have* the house because it does not come into consideration here as an economically valued object, but that the house represents the thought of the society in that the latter is localized in it. Speech usage indicates that, if a house is named after a family, when *church* has the meaning as much of the building as the ideal community, when the university, club, or whatever, it manifests the same ambiguity. Along with the term *sib*, however, the ancient Indian (Sanskrit) word *sabha*, which originally meant the assembly of the village community, pertained to the community house in which these assemblages took place. The close connection between the union itself and its house appears most decisively in the communities of the unmarried men who appear to represent one of the earliest categorical organizations and are still found now in Micronesia and Melanesia and among some Native Americans and Inuit.[22] That is a community life prior to any family life that in fact excludes no individual activities of individual persons but provides one a common place for eating and sleeping, for play and romance adventures, and even their unmarried ones have their point of contact to form a social unity—to which higher relationships bear hardly any analogy. From this communalization it is obvious that the lodge, the 'manor,' the absolutely indispensable embodiment, this kind of class formation in general cannot occur if it does not achieve its basis, its point of crystallization and visible expression in a common house. Although the comparison of earlier and more developed eras

[22] *Indianern und Eskimos*, as Simmel put it in the terminology of his day—ed.

in this respect meets with insurmountable difficulties, it seems to me as though the earlier era with its naive sensuality could have had a more active need compared to the abstract foreign kind to make the solidarity of such communities and their closure against the surrounding structures explicit through the close unity of a lodge. The common lodge is the means and the material representation of that supra-local contact without which primitive epochs could not conceive of themselves as having any internal solidarity at all. The common cemetery lies in the same formal setting. While the closest family includes such in its highest interest, the medieval worker associations always asked the Church authorities with whom they were associated for a common cemetery, and ultimately the worship center belonged where the person continually meets with God under the same rubric. The temple is still not only the gathering place of the faithful and hence the result and vehicle of their solidarity, but it is also the safeguard and extension of the fact that the Godhead has a spatial community with the faithful. Therefore, it has also been emphasized for good reason that the cult of pillars and stones that people fixed up is admittedly less poetic and obviously cruder than the worship of a spring or a tree, but that in reality the former includes a more intimate closeness between God and believer. For the deity dwells in the natural object, so to speak, on its own and without regard to the human person, who approaches the deity only subsequently and by chance; but if the deity consents to living in the work of the human hand, an entirely new relationship of the two is established; the human and the divine have each found a common place that needs both factors alike; the sociological relationship of the deity and the worshiper, and precisely only this, is invested in a spatial structure.

This sociological unity that generally leads to its localization in a fixed place and structure even appears through a purely gradual increase in its power and closeness to bring it about that those who are part of it are now not permitted to leave this locality. In reality it is reversed: precisely because the group still does not feel that its unity and its inner force over every member is adequately established, it attains an only external bonding. At least the relationship to the locality, as well as its opposite, can arise from two entirely opposed social forces: the liberality by which the modern state allows its citizens to move around, whether in order to distance themselves from it completely or to enjoy the rights of membership even at a distance, demonstrates the height and strength with which its being-for-itself was established over its individual

members; in contrast the local diffusion of the family, as opposed to its being permanently centered in the home location, is nevertheless the symptom of the gradual weakening of the family principle. Now by virtue of coercive rules that would bring about the cohesion of the group through the binding of individuals to the environing location as the external vehicle of the group's unity, it is essential that one would create no rule that is not observed on the spot. That is a quite general feature of earlier circumstances, especially in pre-monetary economies, since the capacity for social abstraction, which makes the balance of rights and duties independent of spatial proximity, is still lacking; and the money economy is the effect as well as the cause of that capacity. Insofar as I am referring to the earlier consideration of these same facts from the viewpoint of spatial 'fixedness,' I will give only two instructive examples. The Charter of St. Quentin that Philip Augustus[23] granted to that commune in 1195 reveals considerably many urban freedoms, unconditional legislative and taxation rights of the commune, local court, etc. However the citizens are expressly obligated to a regular stay in the city and may stay outside it for only certain specified seasons. And the other: as long as the guilds in Frankfurt were in essence independent of the council, a civil law was not necessary for guild membership. Indeed, whoever left the city could still retain guild privileges. Only since 1377, as the guilds were subject to the Council, could no one be accepted into a guild who had not already been a citizen and whoever surrendered citizenship rights lost at the same time any guild membership. Thus the former case is characteristic since it clearly contrasts the freedom of the commune against the freedom of individuals. While the totality already obtained self determination and internal freedom of movement, one did not know the continuance of this totality apart from securing the bonding of the members to its locality. The second example reveals the power of locality still more strongly as the embodiment of the unity of the group. The unity of the guild, maintained by a mere material motive, is relatively indifferent toward communal unity and thus toward the question of the places of residence of their individual members. But as soon as the more formal-functional, not the social character of the city, is established on a particular individual content over someone, it is immediately crystallized into the requirement of the local connection. The technical-content point of view of the guild is supra-local in itself

[23] Philip Augustus II, King of France 1180–1223—ed.

and thus in proportion to its governance gives the individual greater freedom of movement than the purely social freedom of city government; this does not come about as easily as with an abstract unity, but requires the spatial-concrete unity that it realizes through the force of place. From here it is a transitional phenomenon, when the 1192 city law of Brabant indeed demands of the citizens that they swear fidelity to the duke and the city, but allows them to leave unhindered after a stay of a year and a day. Although the actual relationships are not different than in the previous type, through this explicit emphasis a new point of view comes into effect: for rights, honor, or protection, which one enjoys by virtue of membership in the community, the individual would owe service in return that is waived in this case through a certain length of residence. The whole as such thereby faces its elements with obligations and grants, as between two parties; the city as a unity achieves a being-for-itself, and to this extent the distance from the individuals becomes greater and the physical-local bond, with which alone the earlier stage realizes its sociological unity, becomes dispensable. And this spatial expression of the relationship between the individual and the group remains the same in meaning when different life conditions of the group as a whole clothe it with the exact opposite appearance. Among nomadic peoples, some Arabs, and the Rekabites who were close to the Israelites, it was legally forbidden to own fields or to build a house. Here just the local establishment of the interests of the individual led to the loss of the association with the migratory nation. Here the life form of spatial disconnection thus expresses the sociological unity, just as the opposite of that does so if it is locally established.

D. Finally the empty space gains a significance as something more empty, in which particular sociological relationships of a negative as well as positive kind are expressed. Thus it is not a matter of the consequences of a given spatial interval for interaction in which the latter exists, but of such spatial determinations as consequences of other social conditions. In early times, peoples often had the need for their borders not also immediately being the borders of other peoples, but to have a desert region directly connected to it. Under Caesar Augustus one also sought to secure the imperial border by, for example, depopulating the regions between the Rhine and the *limes* (boundary forts): Such tribes as the Usipetes and Tenkteri had to resettle, partly, on the left shore and partly move more deeply into interior of the land. While the desert region was still imperial territory, from the time of Nero on there also had to be uninhabited land beyond the Roman boundaries. Thus the

Suevi already created earlier a desert around their territory, and the Isarnholt lay between the Danes and the Germans, the Sachsenwald between the Slaves and Germans, etc. Native American tribes too held that an extra stretch of land belonging to no one should lie between any two lands. The need for protection of individual groups is of course the cause of this, and hardly in any other relationship is space used as pure distance, as an expanse lacking in quality. As a rule a weakness or incapacity leads to taking these measures just as it occasionally drives the individual into loneliness. The sociological significance of this is that the defense thus attained will be paid for with the corresponding total relinquishment of the offense, and the idea of the whole being expressed in the saying, "Do nothing to me, I also do nothing to you." This scheme prevails not only between persons who do not watch each other at all but also remains as a downright, positive, and conscious maxim for countless relationships among those who share all kinds of things with one another, directly occasioning provocations and beginnings of various frictions. In external effects, this fits in with another general maxim, "As you do to me, I do to you," while internally it is exactly opposite in nature. The latter principle, although the action of the speaking party toward the other would be directed to the other, nevertheless manifests an aggressive quality, at least being prepared for any eventuality. The first principle, in contrast, although it takes the initiative, proves exactly the opposite of the offensive and the preparedness insofar as, through one's own laying down of weapons, one wants to allow oneself just the same stance that one allows the other. In multiple cases in which the Maxim, "Do me no harm, I also do you none," determines the conduct; there is nothing purer and clearer than deserted territory that places a border around a group; here the inner tendency is completely embodied in the spatial form.

The principle that is the opposite of the deserted border also represents the opposite stance: *quaeque terrae vacuae, eas publicas esse*,[24] as Tacitus expresses it; this was occasionally asserted by both the ancient Germans and recently by the American settlers with respect to the Native Americans. It openly manifests a fundamental difference in the forms of relationship of two groups, whether the empty area between them should belong to none or potentially to both, insofar as anyone who wants it can take hold of it and thus admittedly will often unleash

[24] Latin: Whatever lands are empty are public—ed.

conflict, which the other mode wants precisely to avoid. Typically, this difference in form is important. An object's belonging from the outset to neither of the separate parties can be self-consistent as well as develop into a more legal settlement, so that neither should seize it and at the same time either first seizing it would respectively be justified. Purely personal relationships proceed in accordance with this difference already. There often exists between two people an object or area of theoretical or emotional interest that they do not touch as if by tacit agreement, be it because this touching would be painful or because they fear a conflict on account of it. This does in no way always originate from mere sensitivity in feelings, but also from cowardice and weakness. Here people leave a region between themselves, as it were, empty and deserted, while a forceful seizure that does not shun the first shock[25] can develop that region for productiveness and new combinations. Therefore, there is an entirely different nuance, wherein it is mutually felt; and therefore a pre-eminence, respect, and a favorable productiveness of it follows the first encroachment upon the avoided territory as the wage of the courageous. In children's play it is likewise observed that any object that is a taboo for all, that rivalry or cooperation over it must not extend, so to speak, to non-public property, in contrast to the things that are held as public property, and the first one who wants, or who succeeds, can seize it. Economically inclined personalities sometimes leave some possibilities unrealized—in the exploitation of workers, the expansion of business lines, the attracting of customers—because they fear an all too violent clash, the increased strength of which they do not feel; while a stronger competitor, abandoning this foregone protection, actualizes any already existing strengths and chances of their area and looks at everything previously not made use of as public property, in the sense that anyone who comes first should take as much from or do as much with it as possible. Finally in the realm of business in general, insofar as it is considered under the category of morality: Since a social organization never has adequate laws and forces at its disposal to constantly force morally wished-for behavior from its members, it relies on them to willingly refrain from exploiting gaps in its laws. A sphere of reserve against what is used by others surrounds the decent person, a sphere of refraining from egoistic practices that the unscrupulous engage in without further ado, since indeed such practices can

[25] Simmel uses the French, *choc*—ed.

be prohibited only through inner moral impulses. Hence the frequent defenselessness of the moral person; one simply does not want to fight with the same weapons and about the same rewards as the rogue who seizes upon all already existing advantages as soon as it can be done without obvious risk. Thus there is among people an ideal vacuum, so to speak, into which the immoral persons enter and from which they profit. The substantive as well as the sociological essence of the whole social sphere is determined according to the extent to which it pushes through the renunciation of egoistic opportunities between individuals, securing each from the attacks of each, or whether the general behavior is governed according to the slogan: What is not forbidden is allowed. In the endless variety of all these phenomena, such a formal equality in difference within behavioral styles becomes palpable. The contrast between the principle of the border desert and the one that says that the terrain owned by no one would be open to occupation by anyone is thus stripped of its accidental and superficial character, in accordance with the basic idea. It appears as the clear embodiment, as the example realized in space of a typical functional mutuality of relationships between individuals or groups.

The neutrality of uninhabited territory gains an entirely different meaning when it enables the territory to serve a positive purpose: its function that had been up to now that of separation can also become that of connecting. Encounters of peoples that would be impractical on the territory of one or the other can sometimes still take place on the neutral territory, and the permanent form of that will be an uninhabited region belonging to no one, especially in primitive times. For where there are inhabitants, their impartiality and hence the security of each of the parties coming together is never permanently guaranteed, and above all a mental framework that clings completely to what is physical and concrete cannot probably imagine the neutrality of a territory better than thinking that no one even lived there. From here, where it indicates a shear absence, there is a further way to the neutrality as a general, wholly positive manner of relationships—and thus it will directly cleave to pieces of space—that indeed produces a totally determined possibility of relationships but which are still wholly indifferent by themselves. Out of all the potentialities of life, space is generally the impartiality that has become visible; almost all other contents and forms of our environment, through their specific properties, somehow have other meanings and opportunities for one or the other person or party, and only space reveals itself to every existence without

any prejudice. Often, the uninhabited terrain belonging to no one, which is simply, so to speak, pure space and nothing more, generally nourishes this neutrality of space for practical utilizations. Thus this is the given place for the economic commerce of primitive groups who actually live in a constant, at best latent state of war and mistrust of one another. Economic commerce as exchange of objective values is indeed a principle of neutrality and of position beyond any factionalism from the outset; even among Native American tribes who depend on war, the merchants can circulate freely from one to the other. The neutral zone, which can be thought of as nothing else because it is unoccupied, is thus everywhere found to be a correlate of the neutral exchange of merchandise and is especially accentuated, for example, in earliest England. Here the talk is admittedly of "the *boundary* place between two or more marks": this would have been recognized as "a neutral territory where men might meet" for commercial exchange "if not on friendly terms, at least without hostility."[26] So, actually, it is a matter here of the boundary at which the meeting takes place, so that none of the parties needs to leave their own territory; but just as we, when we speak of the 'present,' do not mean the exact present, but compose it on this side and on the other side of these simple points out of a piece of the past and a piece of the future, so that the border region for practical activity everywhere could open up a narrower or wider zone or to stretch ourselves to one like that, so that each party, if it crosses the border of its own mark, would still not encroach upon that of the other party. Thus the neutral space is classified as an important sociological type. Also where two parties always find themselves in conflict, it will be important for their development if each of the parties can meet with the other without entering upon their territory, thus without a supposition either of hostile attack or of surrender. In addition, if there was such a possibility for meeting without one of the two needing to leave one's standpoint, objectification and differentiation are thus introduced, which separate the object of conflict, about which an understanding or commonality is possible in the consciousness of the parties, from those interests that lie beyond it and that bring with them the more raw or impulsive mental states in the hostility. There belong, for example, quite commonly, at the stage of higher inner culture, the personal sides of the individuals with principled antagonisms

[26] The words inside the quotation marks appear in English in Simmel's text—ed.

and principled personal interests in personal enmity. There belong especially the spheres of sociability, the church, political life, art, and science, insofar as public peace prevails among them, and beginning in fact with their circuit in the intellectual sense up to the localities that are set aside for them. An unforeseeable number of examples show us areas where commerce, meetings, and material contacts of the kind possible between opposed parties, so that the conflict does not come to words, without having to give up the conflict, so that one in fact goes out from the border that otherwise separates us from the opponent, but without crossing over into it, but rather remains beyond this separation. While the empty, unoccupied border area between two tribes functions as a neutral zone for commercial or other traffic, it is the simplest such structure in its purely and most clearly negative character, which serves as a means for this unique differentiated form of relationship among antagonistic elements and in which it is embodied, so that, in the end, empty space itself is revealed as a vehicle and expression of sociological interaction.

CHAPTER TEN

THE EXPANSION OF THE GROUP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUALITY[1]

The themes, around which the inquiries of this book are collected into chapters, have been up to now generally individual concepts in the field of sociology, which have made room for a great variety, and often contrast, of the historical forms and form types that these concepts present. The summaries required for the practical purpose of classification had an inner rationale only to the extent that the manifestations and reflections generally contained the concept in question: the content of the individual chapters was not laid out in an integrated thesis, the evidence of which grew gradually, but rather in a sum of propositions that were grouped together under their titles. The inquiry that follows now should exemplify another type: it serves the demonstration of a single type, although in many modifications, packages, and mixtures of the context that emerges; not an idea but a statement is their common element. Instead of pursuing a singular abstracted form in the phenomena, in which it may be found and whose content is established by them in no particular order, here a certain correlation and mutually determined development of forms of social interaction will now be discussed.

The individual peculiarity of the personality and the social influences, interests, and relationships by which one is bound to one's social circle manifest a relationship in the course of their two-sided development, which appears as a typical form in the most different temporal and substantive sectors of social reality: that individuality of being and doing increases, in general, to the extent that the social circle surrounding the individual expands. From the many ways in which this expansion occurs and which supports the correlation just highlighted, I mention first those that go on in the proceedings of previously separate circles. If we have two social groups, M and N, that are distinctly different from each other in both their characteristic properties and opposing beliefs, but each of which consists of homogeneous and tightly interrelated elements, a quantitative expansion brings about an increasing

[1] A portion of this chapter is taken from my *Sozialen Differenzierung*, Chapter III.

differentiation. The originally minimal differences among the individuals in external and internal structures and activity are intensified through the necessity of earning an ever more contested living through ever more unique means; competition develops in numerical proportion to the specialization of individuals who participate in it. As different as the starting point of this process would have been in M and N, so must these gradually become similar to one another. However, there is only a relatively limited and very slowly multipliable number of essential human formations available. The more of them there are in a group, *i.e.* the more dissimilar the components of M become from one another and those of N from one another, the more probable it is that an ever growing number of structures will be produced in one group that are similar to those in the other. The deviation on all sides from the norm valid in itself until then for each complex must necessarily produce a similarity of the members of one group to those of the other group—at first qualitatively or ideally. This will therefore happen, of course, because among the social groups that are still so different, the forms of differentiation are the same or similar: the relationships of simple competition, the uniting of many who are weaker against a stronger, the greedy impulse of individuals, the progression in which individual relations grow once they are established, the attraction or repulsion that appear between individuals on the basis of their qualitative differentiation, etc. Leaving aside all interest-based connections with respect to content, this process will often lead to real relationships among members of two or more groups, who came to resemble one another in this way. This is observed, for example, with the international sympathy that aristocrats have for one another and that is independent of the specific content of the issues that would otherwise determine attraction and repulsion. In the same way—through specialization inside each individual group that was originally independent of other ones—sympathies also arise, however, at the other end of the social scale, as was evident with the internationalism of social democracy and how it has been the affective basis of the early skilled worker associations. Once the process of social differentiation has led to the division between high and low, the purely formal fact of a specific social standing brings the members of the most diverse groups who are characterized by it into internal and often also external relationship. With such a differentiation of the social group, the urge and inclination will grow, will reach out over its original limits in spatial, economic, and mental rela-

tionships, and will set in place, next to the initial centripetalism of the individual group, a centrifugal tendency as a bridge to other groups, with a growing individualization and hence the onset of a repulsion of its members. While originally, for example, the spirit of strict equality prevailed in the guilds, which on the one hand limited the individual to that quantity and quality of production that all the others achieved, and on the other hand sought to protect the individual through rules of sale and exchange to prevent being surpassed by others, it was still not possible to maintain this condition of non-differentiation for the long term. The master, made wealthy by some circumstance, no longer wanted to conform to the limits, sell his own product only, have no more than one trading post and a very limited number of assistants, and the like. But while he won his right to all this, in part after sharp conflict, a two-part result had to come about: First the original homogeneous mass of guild fellows had to differentiate with a growing division between rich and poor, capitalists and workers. Then, once the principle of equality was so broadly broken so that one could have another one work for him and choose his market freely according to his personal ability and energy, based on his knowledge of circumstances and his calculation of chances, those personal qualities also had to increase with the possibility to develop himself, to promote himself, and to lead to ever sharper specialization and individualization within the brotherhood and ultimately to its breakup. But on the other hand, a major extension beyond the previous market area became possible through this transformation; through the producer and dealer, formerly united in *one* person, being differentiated from one another, the dealer gained an incomparably freer mobility, and previously impossible commercial connections were realized. Individual freedom and the enlargement of business remain interrelated. Thus is indicated by the co-existence of the guild restrictions and large industrial concerns, as we had it around the beginning of the nineteenth century in Germany, the necessity of always allowing the large businesses the freedom of production and commerce, which one could or would limit collectivistically to the groups of smaller and narrower firms. It was thus in a twofold direction that the development from the narrow homogeneous guild circles set out and would prepare the way for their dissolution in this two-ness: first the individualizing differentiation and then the expanding out, making distant connections. Consequently the differentiation of the English guild members into dealers and actual workers

appears most strikingly in the trades that make 'articles of foreign demand,' such as tanners and tool makers. The division that is interwoven as a correlate with this expansion does not only involve the content of the work, but also the social control over it. So long as the small primitive group is self sufficient, there is still continuing equality even in a particular technical division of labor, so that each works for the group itself, each activity is socially centripetal. But as soon as the confines of the group are broken up and it enters into the exchange of special products with another one, there arises within it the differentiation between those who make products for the foreign market and those who make products for domestic consumption—two wholly opposed directions of inner life. The history of the emancipation of serfs reveals a similar process in this connection, for example in Prussia. The hereditarily subservient serfs, as they existed in Prussia up to about 1810, were in a unique intermediate position with respect to the land and the lord; admittedly the land belonged to the lord, but still not in a way that the farm worker did not have certain rights to it. Admittedly, on the other hand, he was subject to forced labor on that land, but worked next to the land assigned to him for his own interest. With the end of serfdom a certain part of his previously too limited rights to owned land was converted into full and free property, and the noble of the estate was dependent on wage laborers who were now recruited mostly from the owners of smaller properties bought from him. Thus while under the earlier condition the farmer joined in himself the partial qualities of owner and worker for an outside interest, he now appeared sharply differentiated: one part became a pure owner, the other a pure worker. But with the free movement of persons thus started, the establishment of more distant relationships was elicited; thus not only did the lifting of an external bond to the soil come into consideration, but also the status of the worker as such, who is soon employed everywhere; on the other hand, it made the alienation of free property by sale and thus commercial relationships, resettlements, etc., possible. Thus the observation set forth in the first statement is justified: Differentiation and individualization loosen the bond to the closest in order to create a new one—real or ideal—with the more distant.

A relationship fully corresponding to this is found in the world of animals and plants. With our domesticated animals (and the same holds for agricultural plant species) it is to be noted that the individuals of the same subspecies differ from one another more sharply

than is the case with the individuals of a corresponding species in the wild; but in contrast, the species of a family are closer to one another as wholes than is the case with uncultivated species. The increasing formation through breeding thus produces on the one hand a starker appearance of individuality within the same species, and on the other hand an approach toward the distant, a progression going beyond the originally homogeneous group of a similarity to a greater universality. And it is completely in accord with this if it is made certain for us that the domesticated animals of uncivilized people bear the character of a particular species much more than do the varieties maintained among civilized people; for they have not yet come to the point of training that diminishes the differences of the subgroups with more extended taming while increasing that of the individuals. And here the development of animals corresponds to that of their masters: In accord with the picture of primitive cultural conditions that we tend to make for ourselves (here the idea can remain in a certain ambiguity without harm), the individuals of the tribes have a greater qualitative similarity and a more solid practical unity; the tribes as totalities face one another as strangers and hostile: the closer the synthesis within each tribe, the more severe the antithesis toward the foreign tribe. With the progress of culture, the differentiation among individuals grows and the resemblance with the foreign tribe increases. An Englishman who had lived many years in India told me that it would be impossible for a European to come any closer to someone born there where castes might exist, but where no caste divisions prevailed, it would be easy. The closed nature of the caste, through such a clear homogeneity within as well as a clear line of separation from above and below, evidently prevents the development of what one must call the human-in-general and what makes a relationship with the foreign race possible.

It is completely in keeping with this that the broadly uncultivated masses of one civilized people are more homogeneous among themselves as opposed to those of another people who are distinguished by sharper characteristics than both are among the cultivated people of both groups. Within the culture, that synthesis-antithesis relationship is repeated when the ancient German guild system set about binding the guild *fellows* very closely together in order to set the guild *communities* strictly apart. The modern association, the goal-oriented group, in contrast, binds the fellows together only so much and imposes an equality on them only to the degree that its firmly re-written purpose requires and leaves them complete freedom in other matters and

tolerates every individuality and heterogeneity of their general personalities; but in exchange, it strives for a comprehensive union of all associations through the intricate division of labor, the leveling through a legal equality and money economy, and the solidarity of interests in the national economy. In these examples is indicated what the course of inquiry will make manifest everywhere: that the non-individuation of members in the narrower circle and the differentiation of members in the wider is manifest in the groups that coexist side-by-side, just as in the sequence of stages through which the development of a single group undergoes.

The basic idea may be turned into the generalization that in every person, all things being equal, there exists an invariant proportion, as it were, between the individual and the social that only changes form: The narrower the circle is to which we are committed, the lesser freedom of individuality we have. Thus this very circle is something individual; it cuts itself off just because it is smaller, with a sharper boundary, in relation to the others. And correspondingly: If the circle in which we act and to which we maintain our interest broadens, there is thus more room in it for the development of our individuality; but as *parts of this whole* we have less uniqueness, this whole as a social group is less individual. It is therefore not only the relative smallness and closeness of the community but also, or above all, its individualistic coloration to which the leveling of its individuals corresponds. Or put into a short formula: The elements of a differentiated circle are undifferentiated, and those of an undifferentiated circle differentiated. Of course, this is no sociological 'law of nature' but only, so to speak, a phenomenological formula that is intended to conceptualize the usual succession of courses of events that usually occur together; it indicates no cause of the phenomena, but the phenomenon whose entire underlying general association is represented in every individual case as the outcome of very diverse causes, although they represent in their combination the same formative forces of unconnected causes.

The first aspect of these linkages—the non-differentiation among the members of differentiated groups—portrays in a way the social pattern of Quakerism, which leads back precisely to the innermost motivations. As a whole, as a religious principle of the most extreme individualism and subjectivism, it binds the members of the community to the most uniform and democratic kind of life and existence, eliminating all individual differences as much as possible; however, it thus lacks any understanding of higher governmental unity and its purposes, so that

the individuality of the smaller group on the one hand excludes that of the individuals, while on the other it excludes commitment to the large group. And now this is represented in the individual this way: in what is a community matter, in worship gatherings, each is allowed to step up as a preacher, speak what and when one pleases; in contrast, the community watches over personal matters, so that, for example, no marriage takes place without the consent of a committee established for inquiring into the case. Thus they are individual only in what is common, but socially bound in what is individual. Both sides of that form are exemplified in the differences between the political formations of the northern and southern states of the United States, and in fact most clearly in the time before the Civil War. From the outset, the New England states in North America had a strongly local social trait; they formed 'townships' with a particular bond of the individual to the duties toward the whole, while this whole was comparatively very small but very independent. In contrast the southern states, settled more by individual adventurers who had no particular inclination toward 'local self-government,' very soon formed very extensive 'counties' as administrative units; indeed the actual political importance for them lies in the *state* as a whole, while a New England state is merely a 'combination of towns.' The more abstract, more colorless general state formation that joined them together corresponded to the more independent, almost anarchic, inclinations of the individual personalities of the South, while the more strictly regulated personalities of the North were inclined toward the cultivation of narrower urban cultures that possessed, however, quite strong individual coloration and autonomous characteristics.

One could speak, with all the above-mentioned reservations, of a quota of the tendency toward individualization and one toward non-differentiation that is determined by the personal, historical, and social environment and that remains the same, whether it is brought to fruition by the purely personal formation or by the social community to which the personality belongs. We lead, so to speak, a double or, if one will, halved existence: one time as an individual inside the social circle, with a perceptible separation from its other members, but then also as a member of this circle, in disengagement from what does not belong to it. Now if a need for individualization as well as a need for its opposite lives in us at all, it may be realized on both sides of our existence. For the *plus* in the satisfaction that something of the instinct for differentiation gains in the sense of the personality, as opposed to

the membership in the group, becomes a *minus* corresponding to the differentiation of the personality itself that gains the same quality in being united with its group members as a purely social being; *i.e.*, the increased individualization within the group goes hand in hand with a reduced individualization of the group itself, and vice-versa, if a particular amount of instinct is to be satisfied. As a Frenchman remarked concerning the desire for clubs in Germany,

> c'est elle qui habitue l'Allemand d'une part à ne pas compter uniquement sur l'Etat; d'autre part à ne pas compter uniquement avec lui-même. Elle l'empêche de s'enfermer dans ses intérêts particuliers et de s'en remettre à l'Etat de tous les intérêts généraux.[2]

It is also implied in this negative form of expression that there is a tendency toward the most general and one toward the most individual, but that both are not satisfied here by being differentiated into radically separated special structures; the club, however, would represent a mediator that is adequate for the dualistic quantum of instinct that exists in a certain amalgamation.

This is used as a heuristic principle (*i.e.*, not thereby portraying the actual causes of phenomena but only claiming: they occur *as though* such a twofold instinct dominated them and would counterbalance its realization in the separate sides of our nature); thus we have therein a most general norm according to which the different magnitudes of social groups only offer the chance of the most frequent opportunity; meanwhile that opportunity is realized by other circumstances. Thus we notice in certain circles, for example, indeed perhaps among peoples, an extravagant, exaggerated, capricious impulsivity; even a slavish bondage, to fashion is very prevalent. The madness that one person perpetrates is mimicked robotically by all the others. Others, in contrast, with a more sober and soldierly patterned form of life that is not on the whole nearly as colorful, nevertheless have a much stronger instinct for individuality and distinguish themselves within their uniform and simple lifestyle much more sharply and clearly from one another than those who lead a colorful and unsteady lifestyle. Thus the whole has a very individual character on the one hand, but its parts are very

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[2] French: "This is what accustoms the German not to rely only on the state on the one hand, and on the other hand not to rely only on oneself. It keeps one from being enclosed in one's own particular interests and leaving all general interests to the state"—ed.

similar to one another; on the other hand the whole is less colorful, less given to an extreme, but its parts are markedly differentiated from one another. As a form of social life, fashion is already in and of itself an eminent case of this correlation. The adornment and accentuation that it confers on the person nevertheless comes to the latter only as a member of a class that stands out as a whole from other classes through adopting the new fashion (as soon as the fashion has come down to these others, it will be abandoned by the person for whom a new one arises); the spread of the fashion means the inward leveling of the class and its elevation over all others. Meanwhile, for the moment, here it depends principally on the correlation that is associated with the *scope* of the social circle and tends to link the freedom of the group to the individual's being tied down; the coexistence of being communally tied down with political freedom, as we find in the Russian constitution of the pre-czarist era, provides a good example of this. Especially in the epoch of the Mongolian war, there was a great number of territorial units in Russia, principalities, cities, and village communities that were held together with one another by no unitary state bond and thus in general enjoyed great political freedom; but in turn the individual's being tied down to the local community was the narrowest thinkable, so much so that no private property existed at all in earth and soil, but only the commune owned these. The lack of binding relationships with a wider political circle corresponds to being narrowly enclosed in the circle of the community, which denies the individual any personal property, and often, certainly, personal mobility as well. Bismarck once said that a more restrictive provincialism prevailed in a French city of 200,000 inhabitants than in a German one of 10,000, and gave as a reason for this that Germany consisted of a large number of small states. Evidently the rather large state allows the commune a mental independence and insularity, and when, at a minimum, relatively small community feels like a totality, every assessment of *minutiae* must take place, which is just provincialism. In a smaller state the commune can feel more like a part of a whole; it is not so self-sufficient, does not have so much individuality, and therefore, more readily escapes that internally oppressive leveling of the individual, the result of which, according to our psychological sensitivity toward differences, must be a mental awareness of the smallest and pettiest goings-on and interests. As a rule one can protect individuality in only two ways within a narrow social circle: either by leading it (hence strong individuals sometimes like to be 'the foremost person in the village') or by existing in it only superficially,

but in essence keeping independent of it. But this is only possible either through a great strength of character or through eccentricity, since precisely that stands out particularly frequently in small towns.

The circles of social interests surround us concentrically: the more closely they enclose us, the smaller they must be. But now the person is never a purely collective being and never a purely individual one; of course it is a matter here, therefore, of only a 'more' or a 'less,' and only particular aspects and determinants of existence, in which the development of a prevalence of the 'more' is manifest in a prevalence of the 'less,' and vice-versa. And this development will be able to have stages in which the affiliations to the small as well as the larger social circles appear next to one another in a characteristic sequence. Thus while commitment to a narrower circle is less favorable in general for the survival of individuality as such than its existence in the largest possible generality, it is psychologically still to be noted that within a very large cultural community the membership in a family promotes individualization. The individual is not able to escape the whole; only insofar as one yields a portion of one's absolute 'I' to a few others and is joined together with them, can one still maintain the feeling of individuality and, in fact, do so without an exaggerated insularity, bitterness, and strangeness. Even while one expands one's personality and interests around those of a series of other persons, one is also set against the rest of the whole in a, so to speak, broader mass. Admittedly wide latitude is allowed for individuality in the sense of eccentricity and the unusual of every kind by a family-less life in a wide circle of wider playing field; but for differentiation, which then benefits the greatest whole and emerges from the strength but not from the lack of resistance against one-sided instincts—for this membership in a narrower circle inside the widest is often of benefit, admittedly often only as a preparation and transition. The family, whose meaning at first is one of *Realpolitik* and with cultural progress is increasingly one of ideal-psychology, on the one hand offers its members as an individual collectivity a provisional differentiation, at least in the sense of absolute individuality, and on the other hand it offers it a protective area within which individuality can develop, until it is ready for the widest universality. Membership in a family in higher cultures represents a blending of the characteristic importance of the narrow and wider social group where the rights of individuality and of the widest circle are asserted simultaneously. With respect to the animal world, the entirely similar observation was made already, that the inclination toward forming families stands in inverse relationship to

the formation of larger groups; the monogamous and even polygamous relationship has such an exclusivity; the care for the offspring preoccupies the elders so much, that the formation of broader societies suffers because of that among those kinds of animal. Thus organized groups are relatively rare among birds, while wild dogs, for example, among which complete sexual promiscuity and mutual distance between the sexes after the act prevail, mostly live in closely united packs; among the mammals, among which both familial and social instincts prevail, we always notice that in times of the dominance of these instincts, thus during the time of mating and reproduction, the social ones decrease significantly. Also the narrower the union of the parents and children in a family is, the smaller the number of children; I will mention only the instructive example that within the classes of fish whose offspring are left completely to themselves, the eggs are cast off by the millions, while the brooding and nesting fish, among whom the beginnings of familial unity are thus found, produce only a few eggs. This is why it has been asserted that social relationships among the animals did not evolve out of marital or parental relations but only sibling-like ones, since the latter allowed the individual much greater freedom than the former, and they therefore dispose the individual to join tightly in the larger circle that is offered right away among the siblings, so that being enclosed in an animal family was considered the greatest hindrance to an association with a larger animal society.

That unique twofold social role of the family—one to be an expansion of the individual personality, an entity in which one feels one's own blood coursing and appears closed off from all other social entities and enclosing us as a member, but then to represent a complex in which the individual is set off from all others and forms a selfhood over against an object—this twofold role inevitably causes a sociological ambiguity in the family; it allows the family to seem like a unified structure that acts like an individual, and thus assumes a characteristic position in larger and largest circles as soon as a middle circle appears that is inserted between the individual and the large circle positioned around it. The evolution of the family, at least as still seems recognizable in a series of points, repeats the pattern within itself, according to which it appears first as the enclosing circle that separates the life-periphery of its individuals, but itself is of greater independence and unity; but then contracts into a narrower formation and thus becomes suitable to play the role of the individual in social circles considerably widened beyond that first one. As the matriarchal family was supplanted by the sway

of male power, it was not at first so much the fact of procreation by the father that represented the family as *one*, but rather the dominance that he exercised over a particular number of people, under which were found and united under a single reign not only his offspring but people adopted, purchased, in-laws, their whole families, etc. The more recent family of pure blood relationship, in which parents and children form an independent household, differentiated out from this original patriarchal family later. Of course this was with far smaller and more individual a character than the expansive patriarchal family. That older group could be self-sufficient, if need be, both in maintaining itself and in military activity; but if it once individualized in small families, the uniting of the latter into a now expanded group, the supra-familial community of the state, was now possible and necessary. The platonic ideal state only extended this developmental trend since it suspended the family altogether and instead of this middle structure allowed only the individual to exist on the one hand and the state on the other.

Incidentally it is a typical difficulty with sociological inquiry, which finds in that twofold role of the family its clearest example where a larger and a smaller group do not confront each other simply so that the position of the individual in them is allowed to be compared without further ado; but where several ever widening circles build on one another, there the relationship can be visibly altered, insofar as a circle can be the wider one relative to a narrower one, and the narrower one can be wider relative to a third. Within the largest, still generally effective circles around us, all circles involved with it have this double meaning: they function on the one hand as unions of an individual character, often directly as social individualities, and on the other hand they function in accord with their being elements of a complex of a higher order, which perhaps still include in themselves beyond their individuals further complexes of a lower order. It is always precisely the *intermediate* structure that manifests the relationship in question—inner cohesion, outer repulsion—with regard to the more general higher structure and the more individual deeper one. The latter is a *relative individual* in relation to those just as it is a collective structure in relationship to still other ones. So where, as here, the normal correlation is sought among three stages described by their size—the primary individual member, the narrower circle, and the wider one—there possibly one and the same complex will be able to play all three roles under the circumstances, according to the relationship into which it enters. This does not thoroughly reduce the hermeneutic value of stat-

ing this correlation, but on the contrary provides its formal character to be accessible in every substantive particularity.

Of course there are enough social configurations in which the value of individuality and the need for it sharpens exclusively for the individual person, where each complex of several brings these features to the fore under all circumstances as the principal other authority. But on the other hand, it was already shown, however, that the meaning and instinct of individuality never stops at the boundary of the individual person, that it is something more general, more a matter of form, that can apply to a group as a whole and to individuals precisely as members of it, as soon as there is only something more extensive, something confronting it toward which the collective structure—now relatively individual—can be something conscious for itself and can gain its singular or indivisible character. Thus the phenomena that seem to contradict the correlation asserted here are explained as the following from the history of the United States. The anti-federalist party (which was first called the Republican), then the Whigs, and then the Democratic Party defended the independence and sovereignty of the states at the expense of the centralizing and national regime—but always with an appeal to the principle of individual freedom, the noninvolvement of the whole in the affairs of the individual. Individual freedom from precisely the relatively *large* circle is not thereby an occasion for a contradiction of the relationship, since the feeling of individuality here had penetrated the narrower circle that also encloses many individuals; these latter thus exercised the same sociological function here as single individuals do otherwise.

The boundary between the spheres that the instinct for individuality meets and the ones that this same instinct needs is thus not fixed in principle because it can extend from the position of the person to an indeterminant number of concentric structures around the person; one time its strength appears in any one sphere filled by it defining a neighboring one instantly as other and anti-individualistic, and at another time precisely by the need for separation not appearing so quickly and the neighboring sphere also still being of an individualistic shade. The political attitude of the Italians, for example, is on the whole regionalistic: Every province, often enough every city, is extraordinarily jealous of its uniqueness and freedom, often under a complete contrast against another and completely unconcerned with the value and right of the whole. Apparently, in accord with our general formula, it would have to be concluded that the members inside these separate

individualized sectors would be attuned collectivistically toward one another and toward equalization. But this is not the case at all; on the contrary the families among themselves and then again the individuals among themselves are driven by an extreme independent and separatist force. Here, as in the American case, there are, however, the three layers of our correlation: the single individual, smaller circles of them, and a large all-encompassing group. But there is no cause for that characteristic relationship between the first level and the third under a common contrast against the second, since this second becomes in practical consciousness an aspect of the first. Here the feeling of individuality has exceeded, as it were, the dimensions of the individual and has taken with it that social side of the individual that as a rule is constituted for the individual as the non-self.

Now the fact that the first and the third members in the three-member structure in general point to one another and form a common antithesis—in all the most different meanings of this word—to the middle member is revealed no less in the relationships of the subjects to those levels than in the objective relationships. An individual's personally ardent commitment tends to be aimed at the narrowest and widest circles, but not at the middle one. Perhaps, anyone who is devoted to a family will also be devoted to a fatherland, perhaps also to a completely general idea such as 'humanity' and the demands associated with a concept of it, perhaps also to a city and its honor in times when 'the city' constituted the widest practical circle of life. But for intermediary structures it will hardly occur either for a province or for a voluntary association; it may happen for *one* person or for very few who comprise a family circle, and then again for a very great number—but, for the sake of a hundred people hardly anyone becomes a martyr. The psychological meaning of the purely spatial 'nearby and distant' coincides completely with the metaphorical meaning of it if it places the entirety of the 'nearby' and the entirety of the 'distant' precisely under a category that is the same in practice. On the one hand, the innermost interest of the heart is linked to that person whom we continuously have in view and to whom our daily life is bound, and on the other hand is linked to someone from whom a wide insurmountable distance separates us, stirred up just as much by an unsatisfied longing for someone, while a relative coolness, a lesser stirring up of the consciousness, occurs for someone who is admittedly not so near but still also not insuperably distant. The exact same form is realized

by the fact observed by a noted authority on North America, that the county there has little importance:

> ...it is too large for the personal interest of the citizens: that goes to the township. It is too small to have traditions which command the respect or touch the affections of its inhabitants: these belong to the state.[3]

This 'meeting of the extremes' also holds for negative preferences. The Indian caste is endogamous; but within it there is again a very narrow circle in which marriage is prohibited. Thus the possibility of marriage exists here—and elsewhere still very frequently, indeed, in a certain sense maybe always, at least for the holding of weddings—only in the narrower circle: It is excluded in both the widest and the narrowest. And now this pattern of correlation is manifest once more in historical succession: The power and scope with which the guild once controlled the individual is now no longer valid for this type of circle, but on the one hand is valid for only the narrower circle of the family, and on the other for the wider circle of the state.

That the most individual and broadest formations, relatively speaking, relate to one another that way, as it were over the head of the middle formation—that is the underpinning, achieved at this point, of the fact, evident in the preceding and in the following, that the large circle favors individual freedom and the smaller limits it. The idea of individual freedom covers all kinds of things, through the variety of meanings of our differentiated provinces of interest, from, for example, the freedom of choosing a spouse to the freedom of economic initiative. I will cite an example for precisely each of these two. In times of rigid group separation into clans, families, occupational and birth strata, castes, etc., there tended to be only a relatively narrow circle available in which the man or wife could marry, compared to the advanced or liberal situation. But as far as we can examine these circumstances and make judgments with certain analogies with the present, the choice of the individuals was not difficult at all; it corresponded to the lesser differentiation of persons and marital circumstances that the individual man could be matched by external propriety without much specific internal direction and exclusivity by both sides, matched with almost any girl from the relevant circle. Advanced culture altered this situation

[3] Simmel is quoting James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (1888), Vol. I, Part II, Ch. 49, section v (Reprint, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995)—ed.

in two ways. The circle of potential spouses has widened extraordinarily through the mixing of strata, the elimination of religious barriers, the reduction of parental authority, freer movement in both the local and social senses, etc. But in turn the individual selection is a much more restricted one; the reality and direction of the wholly personal inclination, the consciousness that among all persons these two are meant for one another and only for one another—this became a shocking development even for the business class of the eighteenth century. A deeper meaning of freedom arises here: Individual freedom means freedom that is limited by individuality. A uniqueness of a being corresponding to the individual arises out of the uniqueness of that individual's nature, which can fulfill and free the individual. The correlate of the clarity of the individual's needs is that there would be a largest possible circle of possible objects of choice; because the more individual are the wishes and inner necessities, the more unlikely it is that they will find their satisfaction in one narrowly bounded area. In the earlier situation, in contrast, there was much less limitation from the fixed nature of personalities: The individual was much freer *from himself* concerning what choice one wished to make, since instead of a decisive differentiation there was a rough equivalence of all the choices under consideration; so the circle of these potential choices did not need to be considerably great. Thus admittedly the relatively undeveloped situation socially hemmed in the individual, but with this was joined the negative freedom of non-differentiation, that *liberum arbitrium*[4] given by the shear equivalency of the possible selections; under more advanced conditions; on the contrary, the social possibilities are much expanded, but they are limited by the positive meaning of *freedom*, in which every selection is, or at least ideally should be, the clearly determined expression of a unique kind of personality. And now in the general societal meaning of *freedom*: Feudalism produced nothing but narrow circles that bound one individual to another and limited the one with the duty toward the other. Therefore under the feudal system there was room neither for national enthusiasm or public spirit nor for individual entrepreneurialism or private industriousness; the same relationships that did not allow at the highest level the formation of a cultural unity of a social kind hindered the exercise of individual freedom at the lower level.

[4] Latin: *free choice* The term was used historically in theological arguments about the human ability to do good, but commonly translated rather inaccurately as *free will*.

But precisely because of that it remains thoroughly relevant and deeply delineated in concept if the 'free' person in the feudal era is one who stands under the law of the land, *i.e.* under the law of the widest circle; one who is bound, unfree, belongs to a feudal body, *i.e.* one's right derives from this narrower circle and in exclusion of the wider one. Now if freedom swings also to the extreme and if, as I indicated above, the largest group allows for an extreme education or miseducation of individualism, misanthropic isolation, grotesque and moody forms of life, it creates greater room for the crassly selfish way of life; this is still only the consequence of the wider group making fewer claims on us, being less concerned about the individual, and thus hinders less the outgrowth of the most perverse instincts than the smaller circle does. Here the size of the circle carries some blame, and it is a matter more of developments, so to speak, outside than inside the group; the larger group gives the members greater potential for these developments than does the smaller one.

In general, the meaning of *individuality* diverges in two directions; one is the one laid out above, the freedom and responsibility for oneself that suits the person in broad and turbulent social environments, while the smaller group is a 'narrow' one in a double sense—not only in its reach but in the restriction that it places on the individual, the control that it exercises over one, the small range of opportunities and changes that it allows one. The other meaning of *individuality*, however, is the qualitative: that each individual is separated from others, that one's being and activity with regard to form or content or both suits only that person and that this being different has a positive meaning and value for one's life. The formulations that the principle or ideal of individualism has undergone in modern times differ according to the emphasis placed on its first and second meanings. In general, the eighteenth century strove for individuality under the form of freedom, the emancipation of personal abilities from impositions of any kind, communal or ecclesiastical, political or economic. But nevertheless the assumption was valid that individuals freed from all socio-historical bonds would seem essentially the same, that 'the human as such,' with all the qualities and perfections of human nature, would be contained in every person and would need to be freed from every bond that deforms and misleads. The fact that people, as soon as they gain freedom, use it in order to differentiate themselves, to dominate or to be enslaved, to be better or worse than others, in short to develop every difference of individual potential—this escaped that individualism for

which 'freedom and equality' were two peacefully compatible, indeed mutually necessary values. But it is obvious how the breakup of all narrow and constraining unions was related to this—partially as its actual historical effect and at least partly as a desire and requirement for it. In the French Revolution, however, even the workers were forbidden to join associations aimed at securing better working conditions because such an association would limit the freedom of the individual member! Therefore this individualism is thoroughly correlated to a 'cosmopolitan' attitude; even national solidarity recoiled before the idea of 'Humanity'; in place of the particular regulations of the strata and circles, the rights of the individual, which were characterized as 'human rights,' stood prominently, hence that which derived from membership in the widest thinkable circle of all. The nineteenth century cultivated the other meaning of individuality, the opposite of the above-mentioned, that the eighteenth century had not generally seen, most prominently in romanticism from a theoretical viewpoint and practically in the prevalence of the division of labor. That the individual occupies and should occupy a place that this individual and no other can fill, that this place in the organization of the whole waits, so to speak, for one and that one should seek it until finding it, that both the personal and the social, the psychological and the metaphysical meaning of human existence would be fulfilled by this indispensability of one's being and by this sharpened differentiation—that is an ideal construct of individualism that obviously has little to do with the idea of the 'the human as such,' with the uniform human nature that exists in everyone, which would only need freedom for its emergence; it has nothing to do with such an idea; indeed it basically contradicts that: in the first sense lies the value emphasis on what is common to human beings; in the second, on what makes them distinct. However, they coincide precisely with reference to the correlation that I am now trying to prove. The expansion of the circle to which the first concept of individuality corresponded also favors the emergence of the second. Although the second does not look upon the whole of humanity, although it rather allows the individuals to complement one another and need one another through their specialization in the division of labor instead of allowing the atomizing of society into identical and simply only 'free' individuals; although historically it favors nationalism and a certain illiberalism rather than free cosmopolitanism, it is nevertheless bound to a relatively considerable size of the group in which it can arise and exist. How immediately the shear expansion of the economic circle, the increase of the

population, and the spatial limitlessness of competition has driven the specialization of activity needs only be mentioned. It is no different, and in fact especially so, with mental differentiation, since that tends to arise through the encounter of latent mental aptitudes with objectively existent mental products. The immediate interaction of subjectivities or the purely internal energy of a human seldom brings forth all that that one possesses by way of mental distinctiveness; rather a certain portion of what is called the 'objective spirit' appears to belong to traditions and the experiences of the *genre* in a thousand patterns, the art and knowledge that exist in perceptible forms, all the content of cultivation that the historical group possesses as something supra-subjective and yet as something in principle accessible to each person. It is characteristic of what is generally offered in objective structures of crystallized spirit that it provides precisely the material and stimulation for constructing the peculiarly personal form of mind: It is the essence of 'cultivation' that our purely personal potentiality is developed sometimes as a *form of the content* of the objective-spiritual given, sometimes as the *content of the form* of the objective-spiritual given; our mental life achieves its full uniqueness and personhood only in this synthesis, only in that it concretely incorporates its irreplaceability and complete individuality. This is the context that attaches spiritual differentiation to the size of the circle out of which the objective spirit comes to us; this circle can be the real-social one, or it may be of a more abstract, literary, historical kind—in correlation with its range, the chance will always grow to develop its performance, the uniqueness, the singularity, the being-for-self of our inner life and its intellectual, aesthetic, and practical creativity, as objective and general as these may be. The individualism of equivalency,[5] which is not from the outset a *contradictio in adjecto*[6] only if under 'individualism' one understands independence and freedom not limited by any narrow social bond, and the individualism of inequality, which draws the consequence of that freedom on the basis of the infinite variety of human capabilities and thus makes them incompatible with equivalency—both of these forms of individualism are found in their basic opposition together at one point: that each one finds the possibility of its development in the measure in which the circle around the

[5] *Gleichheit*, which can also mean *equality*—ed.
[6] Latin: a direct contradiction—ed.

individual provides it the stimulus and material through its quantitative expansion of the room for that purpose.

Now I will return to the association mentioned above: between a stronger cultivation and evaluation of individuality and cosmopolitanism, the *next social milieu* of the individual, which is, so to speak, one of a mindset that leaps over—and I am immediately reminded of the teaching of the Stoics. While the socio-political context in which the individual remains still forms the wellspring of ethical rules for Aristotle, the Stoic interest, which involves practical activity, was actually fixed only on the individual person, and the shaping of the individual toward the ideal that the system prescribes becomes so ultimate under the aegis of stoic *praxis* that the association of individuals to one another appeared only as a means to that ideal individualistic goal. But admittedly this was determined by the content of the ideal of a general reason that is at work in every individual, and every human has a share in this reason, whose realization in the individual comprises the Stoic ideal; reason threw a bond of equality and brotherhood around all that humanity signifies, beyond all limitations of nationality and social barriers. And so the individualism of the stoics thus has cosmopolitanism as its complement; the breakup of the narrower social group, favored no less in that epoch by the political relationships than by a theoretical consideration, shifted the central focus of ethical interest on the one hand to the individual and on the other hand to the widest circle to which each belongs as a human individual. Historical reality has followed this pattern in countless variations. When the medieval knight with his life orientation to the whole individual linked an emphatically cosmopolitan trait to testing and proving the person, when his self-determination gave room to the forms that created a European knighthood over all national boundaries, the directions were also signaled by this formula, which held sway in the entire Holy Roman Empire that in the end dissolved them. Thus it was destroyed on the one hand by the particularism of its components and on the other hand by the binding relationships to the remaining components of the European politics as a whole, through tightening and extending, which split up the national intermediary structures. That particularism was already evoked in and of itself by the same constellation, though extended in another dimension. Where elements that are already differentiated or on the way to being differentiated are forged into a comprehensive unity, there an increased intolerance, a stronger mutual repulsion, is often the result. The large common context that nevertheless requires differentiation

on the one hand in order to be able to exist as such, causes on the other hand a mutual friction of elements, a validation of oppositions, that would not have come about without their being forced into the union. The unification within a large commonality means that, albeit a passing one, it becomes a means for individualization and becoming aware. Exactly thus the medieval empire's politics of world domination first unleashed the particularism of peoples, strata, and princes, indeed called it into life; the intended and partially completed unification into a large whole first created, expanded, and made conscious that which was admittedly destined to cause its break up: the individuality of the parts. The culture of the Italian Renaissance followed this norm in a vivid fashion. It cultivated full individuality on the one hand and the attitude and cultured behavior extending far beyond the limits of the narrower social environment on the other. This was expressed directly, for example in the words of Dante that—with all his ardent love for the city of Florence—for him and people like him the world would be one's native land, as the sea is for fish; indirectly, and as it were *a posteriori*, it is thus shown that the life forms that the Italian Renaissance created were taken from the whole civilized world, and in fact precisely therefore, they gave previously undreamed of room for individuality, whatever kind of individuality it might be. As a symptom of this development, I mention here the contempt for the nobility during this epoch. The nobility is only of real importance so long as it signifies a social circle to which they tightly belong that stands out all the more vigorously from the mass of all others and indeed from below *and* above; denying it worth means infringing upon both markers; it means on the one hand the recognition of the value of the person, whatever hereditary group one belongs to, and on the other hand a leveling in relation to those over whom one has otherwise been elevated. Both find unconditional expression in Renaissance literature.

Excursus on the Nobility

With the nobility, social development created one of the intermediary structures around which turns the correlation that has been claimed here. And in fact it is 'intermediary' in the double meaning that the beginning of this inquiry into the concept of society has shown: The nobility is on the one hand a supra-personal social form of a unity of individuals that is inserted between these elements as individual beings and a large circle encompassing the nobility itself, like the guild and sect, the family and the political party; on

the other hand it is a concrete conglomerate of people that forms a middle member between the ruling power and the broad mass of the body politic.[7] This two-fold configuration rests on, thusly nuanced, and above the actual subject matter of this chapter, going so far beyond the determinations that have been laid out, that a separate presentation seems advisable for it.

The above-mentioned position of the nobility, which is between the most highly placed and the lower elements of the group, is also a formally different one from what we observed earlier as the 'middle class.' For the latter has its sociological distinctiveness in its being open to both of its boundaries, but the nobility in its being closed to both of them—though with many qualifications. The middle class can expand upward or downward, but the nobility repulses both. Even if the nobility tends to move its boundaries upward more readily than downward, for obvious reasons there are enough historical examples where it nevertheless also has positioned itself in opposition to the ruler as quite self-sufficient, enclosed, and centered on its own interests. It has thus brought about a position independent from both sides in a twofold sense: It derived itself like a wedge between the ruler and a large portion of the population, paralyzed the action of the former for the interests of the latter (as often at the time of the peasants' hereditary subservience and frequently during the feudal governments), but also has exercised a unifying effect, a mediating representation of the one to the other (especially so in England). In monarchical countries where the setting of the two boundaries is not clear-cut, the formation of a nobility also remains rudimentary. Thus a real nobility never developed in Turkey. This is due on the one hand to the Islamic perspective that allows the whole people to feel like an aristocracy, as something select compared to the unbelievers; on the other hand, because the absolute grandeur of the Sultan that was not to be mediated through anything did not allow to come into existence an authority that would stand closer to him in principle and in its own right than any other one. The fact that in Russia there is no aristocracy as a cohesive stratum but only isolated aristocrats who occasionally form groups—to be discussed later in more detail—results similarly from the absolutist position of the czar, but also because of the fact that the subject population forms no such practically united stratum as to provoke an association that would position itself above it. Conversely, the two-fold boundary of the nobility—which is still also a two-fold relationship—will nevertheless become diverse in lands having a developed stratum and richer relationships of strata, mixed in various ways in syntheses and antitheses—which must push the nobility from its actual position, though a new significance may develop for them. The life motives that Napoleon I imputed to the group that he created as his new nobility shows this to the point of caricature. Of this intermediary caste[8] he is reported to have said to the democrats, it is thoroughly demo-

[7] Of course, the second form applies only to the nobility in monarchical states; but in the context of this chapter, I am discussing only that, not the nobility of a governing aristocracy as such.

[8] Simmel uses the French: *caste intrmédiaire*—ed.

cratic because it is open at any time to anyone without hereditary prejudice; to the great lords: it will support the throne; to the moderate monarchists: it will counter any absolute regime because it will become a power in the state itself; to the Jacobins: the old nobility will actually be completely destroyed by it for the first time; to the old nobility: once it is decorated thus with new dignities, your old ones will be revived in them. So here the double position of the nobility was inflated into an ambiguity, which reveals precisely the specific duality as right and essential for it alone.

The two-front position of the nobility, which rests precisely on its self-confidence and being for itself (to be treated later in more detail), is mirrored again in its distinctive, more inwardly directed duality. It originates from the personages who always, for whatever reasons, are better off than others; but once it exists, personages who are already better off thus have it retroactively, as it were, because they belong to it. There is no need for examples of the 'prerogatives' of the nobility. But there probably is, for the other side of its position, its limitations and disadvantages. Around the year 1300 there was an extensive democratic movement in Florence, in the course of which quite specific, clear restrictions and burdens were imposed on the nobles, so that at the time one could be made a noble as a penalty. The original precedence of the nobility was extended, as it were, with a negative sign: The exceptional position of the nobility would remain as already existing, just that instead of the special advantages that it otherwise owed to this position, it found the content of that position in a very particular sacrifice and restriction. Something similar is found in a regulation in the eighteenth century in the very democratic Thurgau Canton in Switzerland. It was a matter at the time of eliminating all stratum-specific prerogatives, and the rule was subsequently accepted in the constitution that whoever wished to occupy a public office had to first renounce any nobility. The penalty, so to speak, thus weighed on the nobility, not to be able to hold public office. That was the limitation that was imposed on it, the counterbalance against the social prerogative. Such disadvantages of the nobles are expressed most characteristically if their criminal exemptions were turned into the reverse. While countless times the crime of the noble was punished more lightly than that of the common person, we nevertheless also encounter phenomena as the following. In medieval Dortmund, there was an extraordinarily distinguished guild, called the Reinoldsgilde, which was always called the Major Gilda. If any of its members committed a crime against the body and life of any other member, he had to pay an extra fine to the council in addition to the usual fine that anyone generally faced for that offense. An ordinance of the city law of Valenciennes from the twelfth century goes even further. It sets a certain fixed penalty for a theft committed by a page, apprentice, or citizen. But if a knight steals, the matter is quite different. A noble does not actually steal, but he robs; stealing does not fall within his competence, so to speak. If he appropriates something by injustice, it is presumed that it occurred by force, as robbery—and because it becomes robbery under that law, it is punished more severely than theft! The noble position of the knight thus prevents him from suffering the milder penalty. He stands on a height from the outset, where one can only sin more fundamentally, where

one cannot so much as commit so petty a sin such as theft that is settled with a lower penalty. Rights and burdens exist for the Brahmanic priestly aristocracy in a subtler way, but perhaps with the most radical tension. Perhaps there was never a hierarchy that dominated as unconditionally and possessed such fantastic prerogatives as these. But then one examines the life of the Brahman who was provided with this unheard of power and against whose word there was no appeal at all, who appeared as the only authoritative person in the whole population so that even the king was nothing but the subject of the priest—it was a so unbearably hard existence, of one enlaced in forms and formula, self-chastisements and limitations, that there would probably have been remarkably few Europeans who would have wanted to obtain the unheard of rights of the Brahman priest at this price. He was the most powerful but also the least free person in India. But maybe—as according to Giordano Bruno, necessity is of inferior value to God, and freedom of inferior value to a human being—even freedom seemed contemptible to him since it would have meant that every element of life would be something of equal value. It may be of equal value, whether the rabble did this or that; for a person of the highest nobility every moment must be arranged by a law because every moment is completely important. The phenomena of this type are summarized in *noblesse oblige*. All such difficulties or subtractions from the advantages of the position of the nobility in reality only fully signify its prominence and exclusivity. Only in allowing the masses of the many to do what is forbidden to the nobility is there the deepest contempt and indifference toward the masses. It lies in the fact that they are permitted many things that the nobility is forbidden to do: The masses are not considered to be worthy of the more stringent regulations. The non-noble may, if desired, make the same renunciations, but that does not belong to their social position; it is an irrelevant private matter. But for the noble it is a social duty, or more correctly: It is the prerogative of one's social stratum not to be allowed to do many things—perhaps the prohibition against commerce of is of that type, which runs through the whole history of the nobility from the ancient Egyptians onward. If the nobility has emphasized that *Quod licet Jovi non licet bovi*,[9] in its principle there is still also the reverse, *Quod licet bovi non licet Jovi*.[10] If the sociological form of the nobility is built at first on its clear group demarcation, which involves the whole being of personhood—so that all individual differences are only the symbol of an absolutely self-sufficient and closed kind of being—so this differentiation from the entire non-nobility will specify fully that the nobility may do what others may not, and what it may not do the others may.

Obviously the collective life of a group generated the nobility's particular structure from the inner conditions of its interaction, which reveals its formal character through the similarity of essential traits among endless differences of these groups in their otherwise formal and material characteristics. The

[9] Latin: What is permitted to Jove is not permitted to an ox—ed.
[10] Latin: What is permitted to an ox is not permitted to Jove—ed.

nobility in ancient Rome or in the Norman Empire, among the Indians or in the *ancien régime* possesses a correspondence of social traits within all the uniqueness of their life contents; and these also appear in a more rudimentary, unsettled, and passing form in any smaller groupings in which a fraction is gathered and set off as 'the aristocracy,' be it in large family groups, among workers, or within the clergy. For the nobility in the narrower sense, this commonality is illustrated with the observation that "Nobles become acquainted better in an evening than commoners do in a month." That obviously depends on the common conditions of existence being extended here very widely in personal conditions and the natural presupposition of relationships that are brought with them. In interests, world view, personal awareness, feeling for the position where they stand within the social order—in all that, the aristocrats obviously agree so much, and the fact that they agree in them is so known and obvious to them that they can come to personal matters much more quickly than others who must first assure themselves what basis they have in common. In order to "become acquainted with one another," *i.e.*, to reveal their individualities to one another, the nobles do not need so many preliminaries as those who have to first look for the *a priori* from which the particulars of thinking, interests, or natures can be presented.

This homogeneity of the sociological form appears to be important in a series of historical phenomena. The strange fact has been noted that many of the families of the high nobility in the separate countries of Europe are of foreign birth. In England the Fitzgerald family and the Herzogs of Leicester originate from Florence, the Herzogs of Portland from Holland; in France the Broglie family from Piedmont, the Herzogs of Des Car from Perugia, the Luynes from Arezzo; in Austria the Clary from Florence; in Prussia the Lynar from Faenza; in Poland the Poniatowski family from Bologna; in Italy the Rocca from Croatia, the Ruspoli from Scotland, the Torlonia from France, etc. Precisely because of its bond to the ownership of land and because of its traditional nationalism, with which its conservative world view tends to be bound up, the nobility seems to be especially little suited for such transplantations. The factors making them alike must be all the more effective, which suggest such a glimmering of the sort within it, which has been called the international republic of the nobles. This is enhanced through particular associations of the national nobility. Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, for example, the German nobility had very little connections with one another. Most nobles cared for their interests within the narrower circles of their places of residence or else their narrowest homelands.[11] But as the German nobles of the different regions met together during the war against Napoleon, for example, a contact among them produced what led to the quite unique structure, as it was called the *Adelskette* (Nobility Chain). The *Adelskette* was a half-secret association that probably came to be at the time of the Congress of Vienna. The nobility

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[11] Simmel appears to have in mind the small countries that at the beginning of the nineteenth century had not yet formed a united Germany—ed.

felt that since the French Revolution its role was in decline in Germany too, particularly through the emancipation of the peasants, and so sought somehow to create a common structure in order to restore its lost importance by taking advantage of the solidarity that existed among the whole nobility. This *Adelskette* expressly emphasized in its charter that everything political should remain foreign to it. If this might have contained a certain deception or self-deception, it nevertheless brings to expression here the essential thing, i.e., the nobility have in common what is common to all, purely because they are the nobility, as opposed to the sameness of their political and geographical boundaries. The similarity of purely material interests would not have been big enough to bring about this inter-German association of the nobility if the deeper bond in the form of nobility as such—the interpretation of which is still to be made—had not been effective. Finally a last example: The great importance of the nobility in Austria and the considerable prerogatives people have always granted it there goes back to the fact that, in the extraordinarily heterogeneous and divergent components of the Austrian monarchy, the nobility was still a continually uniform and qualitatively common element, and thus greatly served the unity of the whole. The similar formal position of the nobility in the very different parts of this assemblage of countries enabled it to be a collective Austrian aristocracy even if there is no collective Austrian nation. The unity that it had by virtue of its every similar social position enabled it to serve as the glue for uniting the whole.

However, everything considered up to now is a more or less superficial phenomenon that is based on the inner social structure of the nobility, but it still does not identify it. The sociological analysis of the nobility now centers around the general social content of the life of this particular group that possesses a wholly unique relationship to the individual being of its members. Here the individual is not only included in a union of individuals existing before him, contemporaneous with him, and after him, who are bound together following a formula in effect nowhere else; but what characterizes it is that the best and most valuable of this whole rank benefits every single member. It was often emphasized in this inquiry that the collective level of a group, the worth of all that which is really common, lies very close to the level of the one standing lowest in it; for as a rule someone with a high standing can sink to that of the lower, but the lower one cannot rise to that of the higher. Thus what should be common to them will be on the whole what the lower ones possess—as, for example, if a hundred people would march at the same pace, the pace that is kept is that of the person whose ability to march is the most limited. Now with the nobility the assumption is the reverse. Every personage in a noble group (be it in the narrow sense, the noble family, or in the wider sense of the noble of a land or epoch) has a share according to his worth in the fame that precisely the most outstanding members of this group have earned; such a personage joins the heritage of the stratum, as it were, *sub beneficio inventarii*;[12]

[12] Latin: under the generosity of the inventory—ed.

the positive values directly accumulated here in merits, precedence, and honors stream down on the individual in a direct way other than happens in any other group. This is the prejudice that the other strata allows to benefit the nobility that it cultivates among its own, which is ultimately the presupposition of the self-awareness, so to speak, for each individual member and forms as strong an individual foundation for it as a social one for the totality of the social stratum. The nobility has a unique tenacity situated in its social structure in the conserving of its 'objective spirit,' which the productivity of individuals crystallized in tradition, fixed form, work outcomes, etc. Thus in individual families what comprises their merit, glory, and value is what streams together, so to speak, into the general position of the 'nobility,' which is to be nevertheless distinguished in this respect from its purely external power and property. This even appears in an actual inverse formation. It was said of the organization of ancient nations that very frequently a nobility came into existence by the leader of the *gens* always being selected in the traditional manner from the same lineage. This lineage was thus not the one favored from the outset, but it would become favored only by its being expected that it would always bring forth a person qualified for the position of leader. Consequently while the whole family turns into a nobility, it discounted the service and merit that any one member of it might acquire sometime and which, reflected back, as it were, from the future, might procure the ennobling substance for the whole lineage. It is an informative metaphor when one speaks of the 'noble metals,' of the 'nobility' of gold and silver. This aristocracy of the metal exists, so it seems to me, first in its relative indestructibility: It is preserved forever because of its value, and it only changes the shape in its being continually recast, while its capital value is relatively unchangeable. A similar idea is the basis for the feeling of nobility and for the nobility: as if its individual members were only, so to speak, nothing but different castings, nothing but different forms of an enduring substance of value that is preserved through the whole series of being inherited. Hence the relationship that these individuals have to the historical group leading up to them gains a completely special accent. It is, so to speak, an immortality of the value that the nobility claims for itself and seeks to realize its sociological conditions. The reason for the fact that no aristocracy formed as a closed social stratum in Russia, up to Czar Theodore II,[13] the predecessor of Peter the Great is this: The honors and dignities of each person depended exclusively on the 'service,' the official activity, from which a classification for the family derived. The unique principle prevailed, that nobody should serve under a superior who had himself, in his turn, served under the father of the candidate; in order to establish the possible rights and positions of each person according to this principle, special registers were consulted. Continual conflicts over facts and rights among the families coming into consideration were the result of this, open and hidden competitions and rivalries. Therefore

[13] Czar Theodore II reigned from 1676 to 1682. The immediate predecessor to Peter the Great was Czar Ivan V, 1682–1689—ed.

the formation of a centripetal social stratum, the consolidation of individual forces and preferences into that common unified and persisting capital, around which the whole social structure of the nobility grows, was stifled.

This structure, as already described so far, lets one recognize without further ado why the nobility must attach importance to equality. It was already claimed about the ancient clan government that the nobles of different clans belonged to a single stratum, and that while the clan as such is exogamous as a rule (thus it permits no marriage among its members), that stratum always had the inclination to be endogamous, i.e. marrying only within itself. If the nobility presupposes, as it were, a strong foundation, with which each member in it is equipped and which must be passed on to later generations undiminished, each member must also emerge from only this circle; no circle in which privileges are not hereditary, which created that foundation, should be blended into it. Only thus can one be sure by and large that every member would also actually share in the power, attitude, and importance of the whole and that the particular relationship would be realized in which the value of the whole extends through each individual. This self-amplification from within supports the unique solidarity and self-sufficiency of this stratum that, so to speak, cannot need and must not need what lies outside itself. Thus it is like, so to speak, an island in the world comparable to artwork in which every part receives its meaning from the whole and testifies with its frame that the world can do nothing within and that the work is absolutely self-sufficient. This form creates a large part of the aesthetic appeal of the nobility that it exercised throughout time; for it holds not only for the individual, who thus attaches to and depends on good breeding and on the members of the nobility having cared for and cultivated their body and their social form over long generations better than is the case in other social strata, but that kind of appeal hovers in the image of the whole of the nobility, an attraction clearly dependent on the aesthetically satisfying form of the being-for-itself and solidarity-in-itself, the unity of the parts—all of which is analogous to artwork. This amplification of the being of the individual with a psychologically and historically inherited content can admittedly lead directly to a decadent emptiness. It appears as though traditional social contents and significance only become actual life values when they are balanced by the formative strength rising to a certain extent out of the individual. Consequently a self confidence of personal existence, a feeling of equally strong *independence*, but also a *responsibility* on the part of the individual, appear in the more excellent manifestations of the nobility. This is the result of the unique narrowness under the social formations with which a dependable essence, extended along the three dimensions of the past, present, and future, merged with the individual existence and has been converted into the consciousness on the part of the individual of a higher life value. But where the individual factor is too weak for the personal form to create the supra-personal essence, decadent phenomena appear, as noted: Then that essence inevitably becomes form; there is no importance to that life but the preservation of the specific honor of the social stratum and 'keeping one's composure'—somewhat as ultimately emerged in the nobility of the *ancient régime.*

The importance of the 'family tree' for this relationship of the family—as well as for the noble group generally—to the individual is of a deeper symbolism: The essential matter that forms the individual must have gone through the single trunk of the whole, just as the matter of the branch and fruit is what also formed the trunk. Perhaps this social constitution explains the aversion to work that the aristocracy manifested through the whole of social history up to the most recent era in which the economy hastened the creation of change through democratization. In real 'work' the subject is devoted to the object every moment, and however much the yield of work returns back to the subject again, the action as such still remains directed to an impersonal structure and finds its fullness in a formation of just this—be it a matter of the construction and reconstruction of ideas in the work of discovery, of the pedagogical formation of a student, or of working on physical materials. However, this is counter to the basic life feeling of the aristocracy as such, since what finds its center in the being of that subject is absolutely personal and emerges in the value of aristocracy alone and in what emerges from that, while work in the most meaningful sense is activity directed onto an exterior determined by the *terminus ad quem*. Thus Schiller distinguishes the noble natures, who pay with what they are, from the common natures, who pay with what they do. The nobles busy themselves, but they do not work (all such definitions, of course, change a thousand ways in every empirical case and appear misdirected). War and hunting, the historically typical preoccupation of the nobility, are still not 'work' in the real sense, despite all the toil attached to them. The subjective factor has a decidedly greater emphasis over the objective in these activities; the result does not manifest, as in work, an object set apart from the person that absorbed the person's energy into itself, but the emphasis lies in testing the strength of the subject itself. At most, artistic work offers some analogy with the aristocrat's kind of activity; it indeed does not really work on the object; rather, the forming of it is only important for it as the radiating out of a purely subjective movement from within. Only the activity of the artist and its value flow exclusively from the enigmatically unique point of its individuality, beyond which no further authority can be found that would have supported it or that would have been acting in it, while the specific action and consciousness of the aristocrat flows from the traditional essence of the family and the social stratum that found in him only an individual form, one now admittedly self confident and at rest.

A unique exception to this characteristic of the nobility comes about through the accumulation or ideal crystallization of dignities and offices, fortunes and honors, duties and rights that are gained within the family and social stratum and in which every member shared—not *pro rata* as with a share but as an indivisible property that is, as it were, the *a priori* of every personal being and act. In China, the rule prevails that the hereditary nobility gradually decreases. What would remain continuously in the family and thus what would make an accumulation of its importance possible is never granted quintessentially to the nobility, but there is an infinitely finely gradated series of honors; we have no expressions corresponding to these levels. And the son always stands on a level, a step lower than the father, so that after a particular succession

of generations the nobility ends altogether. If I am correctly informed, as the highest noble, the stratum of prince is conferred for twenty-six generations, so that after their course—and this also holds for the descendents of princes of the royal house not coming to power—the family returns again to the commoner status. This anomaly, which can only happen in an official or paper nobility, amounts to a normal progression with, so to speak, a negative sign. For this, though perhaps also deriving from an original grant, has its meaning in that gradual accumulation of values that were handed down; meanwhile the substance, as it were, is given for a time and is gradually used up. On the other hand a pattern proper to Tahiti manifests the normal form in a very instructive manner. There, if a son is born to a noble, the father abdicates his social position in favor of that of the son and, in fact "because the son has more nobility than the father." In a satirical poem of Glassbrenner from the middle of the nineteenth century the hollow dignity and inflated paltriness of a noble is depicted with the concluding verse, that he would still rightly have one point of pride:

> If on some day he must blessed die
> As an ancestor yet he will lie.

This is the same basic feeling as in the case in Tahiti, and on the sociological basis that the nobility once secured with the greatest historical success, it can appear in no way as meaningless as certain types of decline and general social circumstances in which that basis can no longer exist.

Now the definition of this basis is allowed to be carried out according to the broadest categories of life. Each person appears as some combination of predetermination and happenstance, of given material and a unique life-formation, of social inheritance and an individual management of it. In each person we see the prejudices of one's race, social stratum, tradition, family—in short, of what makes one the bearer of pre-existent contents and norms; we see these combined with unpredictability and personality, the free being-for-self—the former, as it were, the *a priori*, the latter the singular reality that together with the former generates the empirical phenomenon. Now the two are mixed in various ways in the large social type-formations and actually in the nobility in a quite individual way, the scientific establishing of which in abstract concepts, of course, is independent of the complications of reality that allow clouding, distracting, and particularizing forces to have effects in these pure relationships. Here those manifold prejudgments are merged together as in a riverbed: While the collected life contents, upbringing and marriage, occupation and political standpoint, aesthetic inclinations and economic expenditure are 'appropriate for the social stratum,' all become conformances that hand down to the individual the material of life as a byproduct, as it were, led through a single channel. There were certainly binding prejudgments of the same or greater strength everywhere in the guild and priesthoods, in the hereditary occupations and in the constraint of the caste and class entities. But now what is different about the nobility is that at the same time the other element of life—personality, freedom, stability—assumed a form changing into a higher value and meaning than occurs in the other forms since the substance handed

down in one was not something objective, as it were, transcending the individual; but the particular form and power of the individual makes this whole traditional material alive in the first place. Although the individual may often experience enough constraint from it, the meaning of the whole configuration is still that this valuable material that the social stratum and the family had accumulated would benefit the autonomous individually directed essence of the individual and would thus undergo no diminution but an enhancement. The self-sufficient, self-responsible, and satisfying existence is not a departure from the general well-being and common property, as in many other structures proper to the society, but their development, protection, and enlargement. This particular synthesis of the nobility stands between the extremes of the individual being engulfed by the group and it facing the individual with an oppositional independence. Through the stricture of the form of life proper to the social stratum it has that which created a very wide meeting ground among its members. Through the insistence on the same level of birth that brings about a physiological guarantee of the qualitative and historical solidarity of the stratum, through the stratagem of its tradition that allows the values and acquisitions of the family and social stratum to flow without loss as into a reservoir—through these social means the nobility, to an otherwise unattainable extent, melted its individuals down into the collectivity. However, the structure so impersonal in origin now has more decidedly than any other its goal and meaning in the existence of the individual, in the power and importance of the individual, and in the freedom and self-sufficiency of the individual's life. While the nobility, in its purest historical manifestation, unites the life values of the individual with unique strength in its collectivity, and while on the other hand its development aims with unconditional unanimity at the formation, growth, and independence of the individual, the nobility provided a historically unique solution to the balance between the whole and the individual, the predetermined realities and the personal arrangements of life.

Finally, the emergence of the money economy provides the greatest example in world history of the correlation between social expansion and the individual emphasis of life in content and form. The natural economy produces small economic circles relatively closed in on themselves; first the difficulty of transportation limits their scope and, accordingly, the technology of the natural economy does not allow much of a differentiation and individualization of activities to come about. The money economy alters this situation in two ways. The general acceptance of money as well as its easy transportability, and finally its transformation into finance and mail-order commerce allow its effects to spread to unlimited distances and ultimately create a single economic circle with interrelated interests, complementary production, and uniform practices in the general cultural world. On the other hand, money causes an immense individualization of economically active people: The

form of the money wage makes the worker infinitely more independent than any natural-economic payment; possessing money gives the person a previously unheard of freedom of movement, and the liberal norms that are regularly linked to the money economy place the individual in open competition against every other individual; finally this competition as well as that extension of the economic circle force a specialization of activity otherwise out of the question, at the height of its driven one-sidedness. These are only possible with the closing of transactions in the framework of a rather large circle. Money is the bond within the economy that sets the maximum expansion of the economic group into a relationship with the maximum differentiation of its members on the side of freedom and self-responsibility as well as on that of the qualitative division-of-labor differentiation; or more correctly, money develops the smaller, more closed, more homogeneous groups of the natural economy into a different one whose uniform character divides into the two aspects of expansion and individualization.

Political developments bring this pattern about in a great number of individual areas, admittedly under a manifold variation of the basic relationship. Somewhat in the way that no simultaneous progression occurs from the smaller, narrowly socialized circle to the large group and to the differentiation of the personality but a choice and alternation, the accent of the more developed situation falls *either* on the establishment of a broad general public and growing importance of the central organs *or* on the individual members becoming independent. Or, the expansion of the circle is not on a par with the development of the personality, even in the context of the circle's members, but with the idea of a highest personage to whom, as it were, the individual's will is submissive. I will cite some examples from the different realms of politics. In the agrarian case, the dissolution of the rural commons since the end of the Middle Ages occurred in these forms. The developing centralist states confiscated the commons, the common march, as a public good inside the state property and handed it over to the administrative organs of the whole state; on the other hand, to the extent that this did not happen, it parceled it among those with legitimate rights to it as private property. And in this latter action the two tendencies toward the individual and the most general are again simultaneously notable: For this parceling out was directed on the one hand by Roman legal concepts with their enthronement of individual interest and on the other hand by the idea that the parceling out of the commons would be to the advantage of the best cultivation of the

land, as well as of the widest community. Under very different material and collective conditions a phase of the history of the *Allmend*, the common property in the Swiss communities, still manifested the same form in the nineteenth century. Insofar as the *Allmenden* are transformed into the property of portions of communities, territorial and village corporations, they are handled in some cantons (Zurich, St. Gallen, among others) by the legislation with the tendency to parcel them out either to the individual neighbors or to allow them to be handed over to the larger territorial communities, because the smallest associations possessed too small a personal and territorial basis for allowing their property to be productive for the public entity.

The form of agrarian political measures highlighted above is generally more widespread in post-medieval development in Germany in the realm of internal politics. The authorities treated the particular circles of the unions set off against each other and against the whole with differentiated tendencies: on the one hand making them purely private legal structures that were a personal matter of the individual share holders, on the other hand elevating them to the status of state institutions. These corporations, which had dominated medieval society, had gradually solidified and narrowed in such a way that public life threatened to disintegrate into an incoherent sum of egoistic factions. Then with the beginning of the modern era, the thought of the all-inclusive universality, in contrast to these and dissolving them, was set by and admittedly in the form of the absolutism of the prince. Accordingly from this came the principle: 'the same law for all,' *i.e.*, the freeing of the individual on the one hand from the inhibiting of practical activity by the privileges of corporations, and on the other hand the loss by the individual of prerogatives enjoyed as a member of them, but which forced the individual into an often unnatural association with associates. Thus it is quite basically a matter of destroying, so to speak, the narrow, homogeneous, and so to speak middle level associations, the prevalence of which had characterized the earlier situation, in order to lead the development upwards to the state and downwards to the unprecedented freedom of the individual. The fact that on the other hand this state in practice found its effectiveness in the form of the highest personality, the unlimited sovereign, is so little a counter level of authority against the basic pattern that the latter is rather directly realized in an extraordinarily large number of cases, one after the other as well as simultaneously. This is the often emphasized link between republicanism and tyranny, between despotism and leveling, that history

makes manifest. Any form of government that borrows its character from the aristocracy or business class, that, in short, gives a greater part of social and political consciousness to narrower juxtaposed circles, as soon as it aims beyond itself at all, presses on the one hand toward consolidating in a personal leading authority and on the other hand toward socialism painted over with anarchism, which seeks to produce the absolute right of the free person by erasing all differences. The break up of the narrowly delimited groups within an otherwise unified whole has such a strict relationship with the accentuation of individuality that both the unity of a ruling personage and the individual freedom of all group members are interchangeable, merely as two variations on the same theme. It has been observed of political aristocracies, which are always constructed in the social pattern of closed and strictly restricted circles, that they seldom have great military success in broader contexts; and this may go back to their aversion toward those two authoritative levels, which are set upon replacing them in succession or at the same time: They are afraid on the one hand of rousing the whole population to an uprising and united action; on the other hand they are distrustful of individual generals with broad authority and great successes. Thus the correlation between the *volonté générale* and autocracy is so decided that it is used often enough as an official cover for intentions that aim ultimately at the suppression of the former. As the Earl of Leicester was appointed to the general governorship of the Netherlands in 1586, he strove for an unlimited reign far over the heads of the narrower authority of the estates general and the provincial social strata, up to then the governing bodies; and he did so in fact under the pretense of the absolutely democratic principle that the will of the people should be the absolute sovereign, and *it* had appointed Leicester. But it was thereby expressly emphasized that merchants and attorneys, farmers and crafts persons were not to interfere at all in governance but were to simply obey. Thus the ostensibly leveling democratization was driven so far that both the higher and the lower social strata were disenfranchised and only the ideal unity of the abstract 'people in general' remained; and opponents declared very soon that this newly discovered idea of the 'people' only sought to transfer this unconditional sovereignty to *one* person.

Our basic relationship gains yet further elaboration in local politics. The relationship is already evident in the Middle Ages in the English cities, with the larger ones being dominated by individual corporations or major nobles while in the smaller ones the people as a whole had

ruled. A homogeneity of members who uphold the evenness of their share of the governance simply corresponds to the smaller circles, but in the larger ones the shear mass of private individuals was pushed out and left to one side, and the individual ruling personages to the other. In a certain rudimentary form the administration of the North American cities shows the same pattern. As long as the cities are small, their offices being headed by a number of persons would emerge as the most suitable mode; but if they grow into metropolises, it would be more practical to entrust the office to only one person. Large-scale conditions need the individual, a fully responsible person, for their representation and management; the smaller circle could administer itself in a more undifferentiated way while a greater number of its members were always immediately at the rudder. Thus this social difference corresponds completely with the development by which the general political tendency of the several states of the union substantiate the basic pattern at issue here: It should begin with a weakening of parliamentarianism in the later decades and replace it in two ways: in one instance with direct plebiscite and in another instance with monarchical institutions, through a transfer of power to individual persons or person.

Finally, church politics provides examples that already find their analogy in purely religious developments. The polytheism of antiquity had many of the traits that I have collected here under the concept of the 'narrower group.' The cults set themselves apart by sharp inner, though local, boundaries; the groups of adherents were centripetal, often indifferent toward one another, often hostile. Even the deities were often ordered aristocratically, with complex dominations, subordinations, and separate spheres of influence. At the beginning of our calendar in classical culture, this situation led to monotheism, to the enthronement of a single and personal God who united in himself the spheres of influence of each singular and separate deity; and this means—insofar as our correlation appears as an almost logical necessity at this point—that the boundaries fell between the circles of adherents, that there would be a shepherd and a flock, that a 'greater circle' existed among the religions, the members of which existed entirely at one level in an 'equality before God.' The linkage of the religious community to the political one—characteristic of the pre-Christian religiosity—the centering of the religious group around the particular deity proper to it alone, which willingly gave room for many others beside itself, broke off. At the same time there was also the politically homogeneous solidarity of this group, religion as a socio-political

duty, every member being answerable to their deity for the errors of the whole collectivity. The religious individual with an unconditional self-responsibility emerged, the religiosity of the '*Kämmerlein*' (cell), the independence from any bond to the world and people other than the one there was in the undivided immediate relationship of the individual soul to its God—the God who was thus no less, indeed precisely thereby 'one's own,' because this was equally the God of all. Within the vast leveled universality, as it arose from the dissolution and amalgamation of all earlier particular groups, individuality was the counterpart of the absolute and unitary personhood of God, who emerged from the same analysis and synthesis of all earlier particular gods. And this form of development, which Christianity manifested in its original purity, was repeated once again in the politics of the Catholic Church. Within her the tendency toward the construction of separate groups, of a sharp demarcation of ranks and interests, also raised up anew an aristocracy of the clergy for the church over the stratum of the laity. But Pope Gregory VII[14] already united a decided demagogy with the absoluteness of his individual struggle for power, which brought the sharpest contrasts together and passed over the head of the exclusive aristocratic bishops. Afterwards celibacy reinforced this effort—since the married priest had a backing in a smaller group and thus very quickly generated a united opposition within the church, while in his individual isolation he thus fell prey unconditionally to the unrestricted universal—and Jesuitism took it up with the greatest success. For everywhere it countered the status-inclination of the clergy, emphasized the universal character of the priest, which allows him to feel as one with the faithful of all social strata; and in contrast to every aristocratic system it had as a purpose a uniform leveling of all the faithful on the one hand and a papal absolutism on the other.

Maybe one could express the whole relationship that is meant here and takes shape in the most diverse kinds of simultaneity, sequence,

[14] Pope Gregory VII (the monk Hildebrand), reigned 1073–1085. Simmel's is a particularly unsympathetic interpretation of this medieval pope. The secular authorities, *i.e.* nobility, had been controlling ecclesiastical appointments up to 1049, when Emperor Henry III (1039–1056) appointed Pope Leo IX. Leo issued a decree changing the way his successors would be selected—election by the cardinal clergy of the suburbs of Rome, a method that bypassed the Roman nobility and the Emperor. Gregory VII was the first pope elected under the new method. His effort to have the papacy control the appointment of bishops was part of a larger reform project known as the Cluniac Reform—ed.

and either/or in a way that the smaller group forms, so to speak, a middle proportionality between the expanded group and individuality, so that, closed in on itself and needing no other input, it produces the same result for life chances that emerges from the combination of the latter two. Now I will select some examples from jurisprudence, in fact from fields that are absolutely different in their historical substance. So, for instance, the total power of the Roman concept of the state had as its correlate that next to the *ius publcum* there was a *ius privatum.*[15] The legal restraint on the universal whole that was manifest in itself required a corresponding one for individuals inside that whole. There was the community in the broadest sense on the one hand and the individual person on the other; the most ancient Roman law knew no corporations, and in general this spirit remained with it. In contrast, there were no different legal principles for the community and for the individual; however, these publics are not the all-inclusive ones of the Roman state but smaller ones, occasioned by the changing and manifold needs of the individual. In smaller communities that disconnection of public law from private is not necessary since the individual is bound more deeply to the whole. This correlation appears as a unifying development in the right of blood revenge, for example in Arabia. Its essence rests entirely on the solidarity of sharply bounded tribal groups and on their autonomy: It held for the whole tribe or the family of the murderer and was carried out by the whole tribe or the family of the murder victim. Concerning it Mohammed's preference was clearly bound up with the explanation argued above. A national or state universality should transcend the particular groups and be leveling them through the common religion; a legal verdict would come from that universality, which replaced the particular legal interest with a supreme universally recognized authority. And accordingly, the verdict should affect the guilty individual alone and the collective responsibility of the particular group should discontinue: The widest universality and the individually circumscribed person now exist as results, albeit opposite ones, of the differentiation of the intermediary structures. With equal clarity, though with completely different contents, this form type appears in ancient Rome as the resultant stage of a continuous series, as development there broke up the patriarchal family grouping. If civil law and duties in war and peace pertained now to the sons as well as to the father, if

[15] *Ius publicum*... *ius privatum*, Latin: public law... private law—ed.

they could acquire personal importance, influence, booty etc., a tear thus rent the *patria potestas*,[16] which had to split the patriarchal relationship even more, and in fact in favor of the widened state functionality, in favor of the law of the greater whole over that of its members, but also in favor of the person; for the person could gain an importance from the relationship to this whole that the patriarchal relationship had curbed to an incomparable extent. Finally the formally similar process occurs in a particularly mixed phenomenon in which it is ascertained only with a tight grip on the basic idea. Up to the Norman era in England, a community was assigned to the individual sheriff and the royal judge for a long time, so that the jurisdiction had a certain local quality or constraint in which the interest of the community and that of the state were merged. However, the two separated after the middle of the twelfth century: Royal jurisdiction was now exercised by judicial commissions that traveled around great areas and thus apparently in a much more general and locally uninhibited way, while community interests were looked after through the growing importance of the local jury. In its purely internal interests the community represented the role of the individual here in our correlation; it was a social individual that had earlier lived its legal life in an undifferentiated unity with the universal state but now acquired a purer being-for-itself and with that stood next to the now just as clearly developed law of the large universality, or even in opposition to it.

It is only a consequence of the thought of such a relationship between the individual and the social if we say: The more the person comes to the foreground of interest as an individual rather than as a member of society, and therefore as that characteristic that pertains to someone purely as a human, the closer must the bond be that leads someone above the head of one's social group, as it were, toward all that is human in general, and makes the thought of an ideal unity of the human world obvious to a person. It is necessary not to make a disconnection in this tendency in the comprehension of the latter idea, which is actually required logically, even if it were hindered by all kinds of historical limitations. So we find in Plato on the one hand an interest in the purely individual, in the perfection of the individual person, an interest that is broadened into an ideal of friendship, and on the other hand one in the purely political, with a total neglect of the intervening

[16] Latin: fatherland power—ed.

associations and the interests borne by them. The way in which he emphasized the formation and activity of the individual person and the value of one's soul as an independent separate structure should also have consequently broken down the last barrier, that of the Greek form of the state, as also occurred with other philosophers of the time. It is only the coincidence of his political tendencies and national Greek attitude that kept him from drawing the real conclusion from his ideal construct for the individual: that beyond the individual there need be only the whole of humanity as a collectivity. It is the same if in Christianity the absolute concentration of all values on the soul and its salvation was singled out and thus that bond is still not recognized that is thereby made between Christianity and the whole of human existence, this process of unifying and equalizing (as the equality would also be by degrees, extending out onto the whole of humanity) finds its firm barrier rather in the membership in the church—somewhat as Zwingli explained that all orders, sects, separate associations, etc. must fall away, since all Christians should be brothers—*but just only Christians*. In a wholly consistent manner, on the other hand, extreme individualism frequently enters into an alliance with the doctrine of the equality of all persons. It is psychologically obvious enough that the terrible inequality into which the individual was born in some epochs of social history unleashed a reaction in two ways: both toward the right of individuality and that of general equality, since both tend to come up short for the larger masses to the same degree. A manifestation such as Rousseau is to be understood only from this two-fold relationship. The increasing development of general education shows the same tendency: It seeks to eliminate the sharp differences in mental levels and give each person the possibility, denied earlier, of asserting the individual talent of each precisely by producing a certain equality. I have already spoken above about the form that our correlation has in the concept of 'human rights.' The individualism of the eighteenth century sought only freedom, only the canceling out of those 'middle' circles and interstitial authorities that separated people from humanity, *i.e.* of those that hindered the development of that pure humanity that would form the value and core of personal existence in each individual, but covered and made one-sided by historical group separations and separate affiliations. As soon as one is really reliant on the self, on what is ultimate and essential within one, that individual stands on the same basis as any other, and freedom makes equality evident; the individuality that really is just that and not curbed by social repression represents the absolute unity

of the human race and blends into that unity. It is not necessary to explain how this theoretical-ethical conviction of the eighteenth century was elaborated in thoroughly practical and real conditions and simply acquired an enormous impact on them. That later meaning of individualism—that the actuality of human nature would entail being different in quality and value with respect to each person, and that the development and growth of this being different would be a moral imperative—this meaning is admittedly the immediate negation of any equality. For it seems altogether inadmissible to me to construct an equality precisely by each being so good as to be someone special and incomparable to any other. For someone to be so is indeed not a positive quality at all for oneself, but originates precisely in the comparison alone with others who are different only in the judgment of the subject that does not find in one what it has found in others. This is most immediately clear in the comparison of only two objects: The black object and the white object obviously do not have a common quality between them, that one is not white and the other is not black. Thus if there is only a sophistical misuse of words with reference to the *equivalence* of the human race to a qualitative singularity of the individual, the ideal of the *unity* of the human race is in no way irreconcilable with this assumption. For one can understand the difference of the individuals as a kind of division of labor, even if it means not at all an economic production nor an immediate cooperation of all. Admittedly this changes into the speculations of social metaphysics. The more unique someone is, the more one occupies a place that can be filled only by that person according to one's being, action, and fate and the more that place is reserved for that person alone in the order of the whole, the more is this whole to be grasped as a unity, a metaphysical organism in which every soul is a member, unable to be exchanged with any other, but presupposing all others and their working together for one's own life. Where the need exists to experience the totality of mental existence in the world as a unity, every person will need each other in this individual differentiation where the individual entities are necessarily complementary; each fills the place that all others allow for—it is more readily sufficient for this need for unity and hence for the grasp of the totality of existence through this than through the equality of natures, by which basically anyone would be able to replace anyone and the individual thus actually appears superfluous and without a real link with the whole. Meanwhile the ideal of equality, which in a wholly different sense united the utmost individu-

alization with the utmost expansion of the circle of beings belonging together, has never been furthered more than by the Christian doctrine of the immortality and infinitely valuable soul. The soul in its metaphysical individuality, placed on itself alone before its God, the single absolute value of existence, is like any other in that which alone matters in the end; for in the infinite and in the absolute there are no differences: The empirical differences of people do not come into consideration before the eternal and transcendent, in which all are the same. Individuals simply are not only the sums of the qualities whereby they were naturally as different as those qualities are, but apart from those, each one is an absolute entity by virtue of personhood, freedom, and immortality. The sociology of Christianity thus offers the historically greatest and at the same time metaphysical example for the correlation in question here: The soul free from all bonds, from all historical relationships constructed for any purposes whatever, aimed in the absolute being-for-itself only at those powers that are the same for all, comprises with all others a homogeneous being inclusive of all life; the unconditioned personality and the unconditioned expansion of the circle of what is like it are only two expressions for the unity of this religious conviction. And as much as this is at all a metaphysics or one interpretation of life, it is still unmistakable in the broad scope as an *a priori* attitude and feeling that it has influenced the historical relationships of people to one another and the attitude with which they encounter one another.

Indeed, the sociological understanding that has the general world view as both cause and effect within the correlation proposed here is evident even if the question of the narrowness or breadth of the world depiction does not even stop at the human world but includes objectivity altogether, the forms of which are so often formed by us as analogous to socially accustomed ones. It can probably be said that antiquity lacked the deepest and precise idea of subjectivity as much as the broadest and clearest idea of objectivity. The idea of natural law as a quintessentially objective and universally impartial control over being, in contrast to all 'values,' was no less foreign to it than the authentic idea of the 'I' with its productivity and freedom, its ambiguity, and its values outweighing the world; the soul neither went so far outside itself nor so far into itself as later occurred through the synthesis, or even antithesis, of the Christian life awareness through natural science and cultural science. This cannot be without an inner and at least indirect connection with the socio-political structure of the Greek world. The

enormous internal prerogative of the narrower state circle by and large captivated the individual inside a certain middling view of the world and life between the most universal and the most personal, and the whole form of existence produced by this limitation had to subside in order to create room for development on the two more extreme sides.

More directly than in its importance for the cosmic-metaphysical, our correlation becomes clear in the area of ethics. The Cynics already broke up the bond to the narrower social structure, otherwise typical for the Greek world, insofar as they embraced a basically cosmopolitan attitude on the one hand and on the other an individualist or egoistic one and excluded the middle link of patriotism. The expansion of the circle that the view and interest of the individual fills may perhaps annul the particular form of egoism that generates the real and ideal limitation of the social sphere and may favor a broadmindedness and enthusiastic broadening sweep of the soul that does not allow an approach to combining personal life with a narrow circle of interest of fellows in solidarity; but, significantly enough, where circumstances or the character hinder this result, precisely the extreme opposite will readily appear. To the greatest extent, as I have already mentioned, the money economy and the liberal tendencies associated with it loosened and dissolved the narrower affiliations on the one hand from the guild level ones to the national, and inaugurated the world economy, and on the other hand thoughtlessness favored egoism at all levels. The less producers know their consumers because of the enlargement of the economic circle, the more their interest is directed exclusively toward the level of the price that they can get from them; the more impersonally and less qualitatively their public face them, all the more is there a correspondingly exclusive orientation toward the non-qualitative result of work, toward money. Apart from those highest areas where the energy of the work arises from abstract idealism, workers will invest their person and ethical interests in work as much as their circle of buyers is also personally known to them and stand as close as has a place only in smaller relationships. As the size of the group for which the work grows, as the indifference with which they are able to face it increases, various factors decline that would limit economic egoism. Human nature and human relationships are so positioned in many respects that they turn back on themselves all the more if the individual's relationships exceed a certain perimeter size. Thus it is a matter not only of the purely quantitative extension of the circle that already has to lessen the intrinsic personal interest in each of its points

down to a minimum, but also of the qualitative variety within it, which prevents the interest from being set at a single point with unambiguous decisiveness and which thus leaves egoism, so to speak, as the logical result of the mutual paralysis of unbearable demands. From this formal theme one has it that, for example, one of the factors contributing to the color and inner heterogeneity of the Hapsburg possessions is that in their politics the Hapsburgs had in view only the interests of their house. Finally, it is the spatial extension of the market—not necessarily coinciding with its actual enlargement—that allows the subject to face at least its narrower circle egoistically. Up to the reigns of Henry III and Edward I, the English social strata were separated by the fact that many times their interests stretched out beyond the homeland: An English noble had a greater interest in a foreign war led by the nobility than in the domestic struggles over the law. A city dweller was more often interested in the situation of Dutch business conditions than in that of the English cities if it was not directly a matter of one's own business. The major church officials felt more like members of an international ecclesiastical entity than they showed specifically English sympathies. Only since the era of the above-mentioned kings did the classes begin to really merge into a united nation, and an end came to the mutual isolation, the egoistic character of which had been thoroughly associated with that expansion of cosmopolitan interests.

Beyond the importance that the expansion of groups has for the differential setting of wills, there is that for the development of the *feeling* of the personal 'I.' Admittedly nobody will fail to recognize that, because of its mass character, its rapid pluralism, its all-boundary transcending evening out of countless previously conserved characteristics, the style of modern life led directly to an unheard of leveling precisely of the personality-form of life. But just as little should the counter tendencies to this be unrecognized, as much as they may be deflected and paralyzed in the whole manifest effect. The fact that life in a wider circle and the interaction with it develops a greater consciousness of personhood in and for itself than grows in a narrow circle lies above all in the personality documenting itself directly through the exchange of individual feelings, thoughts, and actions. The more continuously and steadily life progresses, and the less the extremes of the emotional life are remote from their average level, the less starkly the feeling of personhood enters in; but the wider they extend, and the more energetically they sprout, the more powerfully do persons sense themselves as personalities. As persistence is only ascertained anywhere in what

changes, as only change in accidents allows permanence in substance to appear, so then is the 'I' especially experienced apparently as that which remains in all the change of psychological content, even if the latter gives it an especially rich opportunity. The personality is *not* simply the individual current condition, not the individual quality or the individual, though still such a unique destiny, but something that we feel apart from the details, something matured in consciousness from their experienced reality—if this, as it were, subsequently existing personality is also only the symptom, the *ratio cognoscendi*[17] of an underlying unified individuality that serves as the determining basis of this multiplicity but which cannot become conscious somewhat immediately but only as the gradual result of those multiple contents and eventualities of life. As long as psychological stimulations, especially feelings, occur only in a low number, the 'I' is merged with them and remains latently planted in them; it rises above them only to the extent that it becomes clear in our consciousness through the fullness of the generic differences that the 'I' itself is still common to all this, just as the higher idea of individual phenomena does not arise for us, then, if we know only one or a few of their formations, but only through knowledge of very many of them, and all the more highly and purely, the more clearly the difference in kind correlatively emerges in them. This change of the contents of the 'I,' however, which is actually only present to consciousness as the stationary pole in the transience of psychological phenomena, will be much more extraordinarily vivid within a large circle than in life within a smaller group. Stimulations of the feeling on which it is especially dependent for the subjective consciousness of the 'I' occur precisely where the very differentiated individual stands amidst other very differentiated individuals, and then comparisons, frictions, specialized relationships precipitate a plethora of reactions that remain latent in the narrower undifferentiated group, but here provoke the feeling of the 'I' as what is quintessentially proper to the self through precisely its fullness and generic difference.

A less direct way in which the relatively large group attains a special freedom within the person and a being-for-self for its members runs through the formation of organs that—as was examined above—lets the original immediate interactions of individuals crystallize in them and transfer to particular persons and structures. The more purely

[17] Latin: basis for knowing—ed.

and more completely this division of labor occurs—obviously with the extent of the enlargement of the group—the more will the individual be freed from the interactions and fusions replaced by it and abandon its centripetal concerns and tendencies. Forming organs is the means of uniting the solidarity of the group to the greatest freedom of the individuals. Admittedly, the organs bind every member to the group itself and thus to each other; but the decisive thing is that the immediate interactions preceding this arrangement drew the totality of the person into specialized activity in a way that brought about a disproportionate expenditure of energy. Whoever is not a judge for a whole life but only when the community is called together is not only hindered in actual practice but is burdened with extraneous concepts and interests in the exercise of the judicial office in an entirely different way from the professional judge. On the other hand once one is concerned with the court in the advanced circumstance, it is only then that one's whole interest is also really engaged in it. So long as every father of the household is a priest, he must function as such whether or not he is the right person for it; if there is a church with a professional priest, he enters into it because he really feels compelled by it and thus is completely into the activity. As long as no division of production exists, the individual must use what is produced just once with perhaps wholly different needs and wishes awakened in the meantime; as soon as there are special products for each need, everyone can choose what is desired so that one need not consume with mixed feelings. Thus the differentiating out of social organs does not mean that the individual would be detached from the bond with the whole but rather direct only the objectively justified portion of the personality to the bond. The point at which one is particularly affected by the whole or the arrangement of the totality now no longer draws the irrelevant portions of one's person into the relationship. With the organ, with the result and characteristics of the growth of the group, the interconnections are dissolved by which one must join in and deal with members in their situations and activities that do not belong to what one is interested in.

Finally, in the area of intellectuality, the interrelationships of our theoretical ideas often develop in the exact same form-type that we have observed here in the interrelationships of individuals with each other and thereby, perhaps more than individual social examples could, confirm this deeper sense stretching out over all details; one would call it its objective meaning which is only realized historically in all empirical cases and only with an approximate purity.

Excursus on the Analogy of the Individual Psychological and the Sociological Relationships

This analogy is in and of itself not of a sociological but a social philosophical nature in that its content is not knowledge of society but that of a general interconnection that is only found to be an example of it in social form. That individuals within a society frequently act toward one another in the same forms as the mental elements within an individual intellect is a very old observation. It could be thought psychologically in a general combinatorial analysis in regularly repeating forms of relationships among such elements. As the text will also still show for the individual psychological and theoretical developments, so, for example, a relatively narrow homogeneous cluster of elements, of whatever kind, will only find its expansion under the condition that every single element finds greater independence and qualitative difference from every other one. Thus the independence of each element would become incompatible with the limitation on its space for existence and activity by others, and a mutual repression thereby appears, some kind of struggle for existence among the individuals. Thus it would thereby directly occur that an individual element forms a diversity within itself that can turn it as a whole into a counterpart of the surrounding totality; a tendency toward well-roundedness and completeness can appear there that is not compatible with the role of part and member of a whole, and it must come into a conflict between the special or partial character of an element respectively of a province of a whole and its possible or actual character as a unified entity in itself, etc. In short, one may think psychologically of general types of relationship that encompass both the sociological forms as a special case—that is the elements form such in the socialized individual—and encompass even the individual groups of concrete processes of social interaction. Thus, a deeper foundation would be achieved, for example, for one being able to call the state a 'person writ large.' But the immediate relationships between society and the individual would not be sought apart from this formulation as they bring the mutual similarities about. The question will be posed from two points of view. First, if there is an individual mind, what effects go out from it to the whole so that they evoke in it the forms of their own conditions of stability and change? Second, if there is a whole, which influences that it exerts on the individual mind generate the relations in it that are parallel to its own ones? Thus, for example, there is the phenomenon of the 'faction.' The interests within the individual are in conflict countless times, as are the individuals. Others who increase the weight of any one idea thus gather around the ruling ideas, as the party supporters are grouped around the leading personality. Complexes of feelings and thoughts that have nothing really to do with the content of inner conflict are nevertheless drawn in, are brought in from their previous equilibrium, are colored by one or the other of the incompatible interests, exactly like party conflict, which splits essential parts of a group, and ultimately the entirety parcels out within itself, whether individuals or groups, what are actually strangers to them. All phases of a conflict—the balance of power that at times brings a conflict to a stalemate, the apparent victory of a party that gives the other one only an

opportunity for reassembling its forces, the influence of the mere hint of the outcome of the actual decision, direction and indirection in the application of forces—all this is the form of the course of both inner and outer conflicts alike. Now at least in order to give an example for both lines of inquiry with respect to this analogy: As the inner experiences of the subject probably form a pattern that serves as an *a priori* for its external experiences, and as the form in which material data are received and in accordance with which the data are interpreted. What 'conflict' is, is an altogether purely inner experience. From outside one sees certain actions of beings, each of which is, so to speak, not to be forced out from its space, by virtue of the impenetrability of the material on which the other cannot in the strict sense encroach. That the particular movements of always two such beings are a 'conflict' is a psychological interpretation; the 'intermeshing,' the unity being carried out in counter movements that we call conflict cannot be actually defined and its essence cannot be looked at from outside, but it can only be experienced internally. Therefore, a two-fold context arises: The real one, with which the mental experiences that we describe as the 'against one another' and the 'with one another,' the fusion and dissipation of the imagination, provide the schemata for our external behavior; the ideal one, with which we interpret, order, and name the externally perceived patterns of behavior of the individual at hand. We can hardly make any decision, achieve any conviction, without an always rudimentary, hardly conscious, and quickly sorted out conflict of motives and stimuli leading the way: Our entire mental life is saturated with that; it therefore suggests the assumption that the inter-individual processes that take place still always borrow a certain portion, both of their form and their meaning, on the basis of individual processes. And now in the other direction: The real conflict that we experience as a participant or as a spectator will provide the schema and meaning for inner processes. This will take place especially where the individual is not exclusively tied to one of the parties entering into a relationship but places some interest in each of them; then will 'two souls in one heart' sympathize and imitate the relationships of conflict and reconciliation, separation and unity, domination and subservience that occur between the targets of interest. The conflict that we see carried out outside ourselves first becomes accessible to us, so to speak, through the relations of our imaginings representing it inside us; the imagining of conflict is often a conflict of imaginings. And as occurs with the factional relationships briefly sketched here, so with those of the reconciliation and the exclusion, domination and equality, imitation and organization, and many others. The outside is formed and understood through the inside and in turn the inside, through the outside, but also, of course, simultaneously. The relationship between the immanent-subjective and the forms of social interaction stands in the same way as it stands between the former and the spatial-material. It has long been observed that the expressions for the movements of imagination—their rise and fall, fusion and separation, inhibition and recurrence, dejection and grandeur, and many others—take their names like all these from the movements of the outer world, and that we would have no inner *insight* and no names for such experiences without this symbolism. But if we look more closely, this symbolizing is no less effective the other way around. All that is really a process, a

relationship, a characteristic picture in these externals exist for us only as a subjective-mental object and movement that we sense in spatial vividness. The shear changes of place that those determinants of the sensual amount to would never serve as names for internal feelings if they were not already equipped by this with an emphasis and significance, with syntheses, that work below their surface. From the outset, emotional states and sensations of strength and feelings must enter into the events externally projected by us so that we might achieve through them demonstrations and expressions of internal facts. And similar to this mere externality, that third field also behaves toward the pure interiority of the individual subject: society, by means of which the individual mind indeed emerges from within itself, but not into the spatial world but rather into the supra-individuality of the interactions with other minds. Here too the inner behavior should supply the standardization and stimulation for the extra-subjective conditions that, however, return to it the service of giving form and meaning. And one can perhaps complete this with a wholly fundamental thought. The fact that we reduce a mental event to an 'idea' and comprehend it as its movements and combinations is in no way given thus by the nature of the thing, so obvious and exact as we are accustomed to see it. Rather, it is a continuously flowing process reduced to sharply contrasting elements; the contents of this process, which are given to us exclusively in the form of our consciousness, to some extent become substantial beings that are provided with energy and that act on their own and are acted upon. Where we grasp the life of the mind as a movement of ideas, it is never the immediate description of the data at hand, but is captured by the latter in a symbol and image and placed into categories that are not yet supplied by the data themselves. And, to me it is not improbable that the individual's image of every individual around us would directly prompt us to this objectification and illustration of the inner life. We experience our existence as it takes place among mere beings that move themselves, that come close and that go away, endowed with strengths and weaknesses; the people in our environment form our first world, one essentially interesting to us: It is obvious that we use the form of the transference, of independence, of mutual influence, in which their elements confront us with overpowering meaning that we use them for ordering and illustrating the world inside ourselves, and that we categorize the movements felt within us; we think of the elements that exist in themselves as so constructed that we see them before ourselves in this outer but mentally defined world. As every person is 'a representation' for us—'one' at a higher level than the others, appearing more than as types, more in the connections of the collective existence of the objects involved—so is every representation for us, so to speak, a person, *i.e.* our representation appears to us as the play of essences that, as we see them in the people, assert themselves and give way, unite and divide, and put into play sufficient and insufficient forces. That which cannot be immediately grasped by us, the inexpressible unity of the individual and society, is revealed in such a way that the mind is the image of the society and society the image of the mind.

Our concept formation takes the approach that a certain number of objects are at first gathered together into a category on the basis of very striking characteristics and sharply opposed to a different, although existing, concept. Now to the same degree that one next discovers in addition to those, other conspicuous and decisive qualities that distinguish the objects contained under the previously conceived idea, the sharp conceptual boundaries must be overcome within it. The history of human culture is full of examples of this process, one of the most outstanding of which is the transformation of the old theory of species into the theory of evolution. The earlier view believed it saw such sharp boundaries between the kinds of organism, so little similarity in essence that it could believe in no common descent but only in separate acts of creation; it satisfied the two-fold need of our mind for combining on the one hand and distinguishing on the other in a way that it included a large sum of similar instances in a unitary concept, but set this concept off all the more sharply from all others and, as it is in accord with the starting point of the formula developed here, which balanced the meager observation of individuality within the group with the all the sharper individualization of them from the others and through an exclusion of a general similarity of large classes or of the whole world of organisms. The new discovery shunts this conduct toward both sides; it satisfies the instinct for combining with the thought of a general unity of all living things, which brings to the fore the abundance of phenomena as related by blood through an original seed. It thus encounters the inclination toward differentiation and speciation through the notion that each individual is as it were, a particular stage of that developmental process of all living things. Insofar as it makes the fixed species boundaries fluid, it destroys at the same time the imaginary essential difference between what is purely individual and what is characteristic of a species. Thus it comprehends the general more generally and the individual more individually than could the earlier theory. And this is just the relationship of complementarity that is also established in actual social developments.

Generally the psychological development of our recognition process also manifests this two-fold direction. An unsophisticated level of thought is incapable on the one hand of rising to the highest generalization and comprehending universally valid laws from the intersection of which the particular individual arises. And on the other hand it lacks the sharpness of concept and affectionate devotion by which individuality as such is understood or also only perceived. The higher a spirit stands, the more

completely it differentiates in both respects; the world's phenomena leave it no rest until it reduces them to general laws, so that any uniqueness is completely missing and the combination of phenomena that are not very distant does not contradict the solution. But as accidental and fleeting as these combinations may be, they are now still there at one time, and whoever is capable of bringing to consciousness the universal and lasting elements of being must also sharply perceive the form of the individual in which they combine, because only the most exact insight into the individual phenomenon precisely allows for ascertaining the general laws and conditions that intersect in it. The blurring of thought counters both since the constituent elements of the phenomenon are neither clear enough to recognize the individual uniqueness nor the higher pattern that they have in common with others. Thus it is so in a deeper context that the anthropomorphism of the worldview retreats to the same degree that the knowledge of the similarity of people to all other beings according to the law of nature emerges for recognition; for when we recognize what is higher, to which we ourselves and everything else is subordinate, we thereby dispense with what we constitute to represent and judge the rest of the world's realities according to the particular norms of this accidental complication. The intrinsic importance and legitimacy of the other phenomena and processes in nature get lost in the anthropocentric kind of perspective and are stained by the color of humanness. Only rising toward that which also stands above it, to the most general natural law perspective, creates the legitimacy and worldview that knows and recognizes everything in its being-for-itself and individuality. I am convinced that if all movements in the world were reduced to the all-controlling lawfulness of the mechanics of the atoms, we would recognize more clearly than ever before how every being differs from every other one.

This epistemological and psychological relationship widens, although retaining the same developmental form, as soon as it is a matter of metaphysical universalities instead of natural law. Beside the mind's power of abstraction, here it is the ardor of the soul that derives the metaphysical flowering from its innermost being, the intimacy of life with the phenomena of the world that allows us to guess the most general, supra-empirical driving forces by which the world is held together in innermost being. And the very same depth and accumulation of perceptions often instill in us a reverential timidity in front of the instances of inner and outer phenomena, which then prevents us

precisely from seeking, as it were, an asylum in general concepts and images for the deficiency or even for only the inexplicability of immediate experience. Where this fate comes from and where it goes does not concern what matters to us, but precisely that this unique one in this particular combination is not comparable to anything else. While the highest metaphysical generalizations originate from the refined emotional life, such is often enough captured exactly by the perception and consideration of the empirical world of details, it is organized carefully enough to take account of all the vicissitudes, contrasts, and oddities in the relationship of the individuals by which tediousness is overcome, and is content with the mere contemplating and gazing at this fluctuant play of details. I hardly need to say that it is the aesthetic propensity of nature that represents this differentiation most completely; on the one hand it seeks the completion of the earthly and the partial in the building of an ideal world in which the pure-typical forms reside; on the other hand it seeks immersion in what is the most unique, the most individual of all the phenomena and their fates. We escape the narrowness of life—the metaphysical-mental counterpart of the 'narrower circle'—on both sides alike. The aesthetic state of mind—the creative as well as the receptive—has an eye for the typical, the quintessentially supra-individual in the most individual, most incomparable phenomenon, and for the values of the personal life that flow through what is the widest and the absolutely extensive. Therefore the actual opponent of the aesthetic tendency is philistinism, which cleaves to the middle, encloses itself in the small circle and acknowledges neither the right to individuality nor the duty toward the universal.

If the latter, as I have already indicated, are actually social philosophical considerations that do not in and of themselves belong here but only as clarifications and confirmations of the assumed sociological relevance, the latter broadens itself out to a still final and most universal aspect. That situation obtains not only *within* society, but it can include society as a whole. Humanity created social interaction as its form of life—which was not, so to speak, the only logical possibility; rather human species could also have been unsocial, as there are unsocial as well as social species of animals. But once that reality exists, however, it easily tempts the direct and indirect social categories to be thought of as applicable in each and every case under which the contents of human existence would be considered. But this is completely wrong. The fact that we are social beings places these contents under one,

but by no means the only possible perspective. One can of course—to mention the totally general opposite—behold, recognize, and systematize the contents living in society and only developed within it, in terms of their purely factual meaning. The inner validity, the coherence, the factual meaning of all the sciences, technologies, and arts is completely independent of their being realized within a social life and their finding only within in it the conditions for it, just as their objective meaning is as independent of the psychological processes by which their discoverer found them. They can, of course, also be considered under this psychological or that social angle. It is completely legitimate to investigate under what social circumstances the natural sciences that we have could come about. But the correctness of their statements, their systematic coherence, the adequacy or incompleteness of their methods has no social criterion and is nowhere influenced by the fact of its socio-historical origin, but is subject to exclusively inherent and timeless, *i.e.* purely objective, norms. And thus all contents of life have this two-fold category for themselves: They can be considered as results of social development, as objects of human interaction, but also in its material content with equal justification as elements of logical, technical, aesthetic, metaphysical realms that have their meaning within themselves and not in their social circumstances that depend on historical realizations. However, in addition to these categories two other essential ones still come into play. All those contents of life are borne immediately by individuals. Someone envisages them, they fill the consciousness of someone and they exist for the pleasure or sorrow of someone. While they are social, they are still also simultaneously individual and understandable in the mental processes in this or that individual, teleologically ending in a particular meaning for this or that individual. The fact that they would not have come about if this individual had not lived in society is admittedly true, but they would have actually become social just as little if they were not borne by individuals. On the one hand if I ask: What needs drove this individual to religious activity? What personal destiny persuaded the individual to found a sect? What value did this deed and experience have for the development of the soul? This question does not compete in the least with the other, which considers the same facts from the standpoint of society: What historical milieu allowed that inner need to develop? What interaction forms among individuals and in their relationship to outsiders turn them into a 'sect?' What enrichment or schisms does the public spirit undergo through such religious movements? The individual

and the society are *methodological concepts* for both historical knowledge and for evaluation and formulating laws—whether they apportion the data of events and conditions among themselves or place under two separate perspectives that unity of the data that we cannot comprehend immediately, somewhat like the contemplation of a picture understands it one time as a physiological optical phenomenon and another time as a cultural product, or views it one time from its artistic technique and another time from its content and emotional value. If one can express this with a conceptual radicalism, which, of course, praxis only follows quite fragmentarily, all human mental occurrences and ideal constructs are to be understood totally as contents and norms of the individual life, but also entirely as contents and norms of social interactive existence, as the cosmic-absolute existence for Spinoza is comprehended one time under the attribute of extension and at another time it is also understood entirely under the category of thought—*una eademque res, sed duobus modis expressa*.[18]

Beyond these two, a third perspective on them is coordinated methodologically, although its execution of our method before the sum of individual problems broadly succeeds only imperfectly and its theoretical universality is focused on the actual recognition of very few considerations. I have emphasized that social interaction would be the only socio-historical form that would have given the human species its life and, for the scientific-conceptual analysis, it is in no way identical with that species. One can therefore seek, independent of their specifically social genesis and significance, the value and the meaning of the data and contents of historical reality, which they have as factors in human life and as stages of its development. The fact that this 'human kind' has no concrete solidarity, no consciousness of unity, no continuous development, is no objection at all. 'Human kind' is, if one will, an 'idea'; like 'nature,' perhaps also like 'the society,' a category under which isolated phenomena can be considered, without which, its meaning thusly indicated, it would lead an isolated life or it would be preserved as a peculiar quality. However we can ask of every situation, every quality, and every action of a human: What does it mean as a stage of human evolution? What preconditions must the whole species attain before this was possible? What has humanity as a biological, ethical, and mental type gained or lost by that in value? When these questions are

[18] Latin: one and the same thing, but expressed in two modalities—ed.

answered in a certain way, it is by no means ruled out that they can also likewise be answered in a wholly different way from the standpoint of the society to which the acting individual belongs. Should that not regularly be the case, should that which the whole history of humanity turns to its benefit or disadvantage usually hold the same significance for the narrower group, socially bound together, should the socially essential simply also be the essential for the development or for the human system—all this does not prevent the categorizing and appraisal of the perspective of the whole of humanity, for whatever life content, from being a different one in principle from that of the perspective of society; and it does not preclude that both are independent from one another in their basic motives, however much it may always be one and the same fact, one and the same human being, one and the same cultural content that falls under one or the other classification.

Now, although the category of values and developments of types of humanity is methodologically severed from the category of the being and action of the individual, just as from those of the socially interactive life, nevertheless the former two remain in an inner connection in such a way that they encounter, as it were, *one* portion of the social category when encountering the others. Individuals are the material of the idea of humanity and of the questions raised by it, and it is only a secondary issue for them whether the activity of these individuals contributing to the conditioning and development of humanity is achieved in the form of a social interaction or in a purely personal activity in the thinking, attitude, and artistic formation, in the biological improvement or decline of the race or in the relationship to gods and idols. Admittedly, the existence and activity of the individual must run its course in some such form, and it constitutes the technology or intermediary link through which individuality can in practice become an effective element of humanity. However in all the indispensability of these individual forms that can be hardly discussed, among which social interaction stands at the top, the methodological poles of the consideration of human life remain: humanity and the individual. Objectively and historically this correlation with the fact of society may be of little broad importance—although this chapter has still shown its impact on a series of historical epochs, and modern individualism was traced more than once back to it. But it remains at least the ideal supportive structure by which 'society' is accorded its place in the array of concepts methodologically ordering the consideration of life. As within historical development the narrower 'more societalized' group gains both its inner and historical,

both its successive and simultaneous antithesis in by expanding itself into the larger group and specializing into the individual element of the society—so society in general appears from the point of view attainable at this juncture as a particular form of aggregation, beyond which the idea of humanity and that of the individual stand, subordinating its contents to other forms of consideration and evaluation.

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