

Two essays on development economics

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I. Land-rich economies, education and economic development

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Abstract

We analyze the emergence of large-scale education systems in a framework where growth is associated with changes in the configuration of the economy. We model the incentives that the economic elite could have (collectively) to accept taxation destined to finance the education of credit-constrained workers. Contrary to previous work, in our model, this incentive does not necessarily arise from a complementarity between physical and human capital in manufacturing. Instead, we emphasize the demand for human-capital-intensive services by high-income groups. Our model seems capable to account for salient features of the development of Latin America in the nineteenth century, where, in particular, land-rich countries such as Argentina established an extensive public education system and developed a sophisticated service sector before starting significant manufacturing activities.

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1. Introduction

Differences in economic development have been subject to varying interpretations. A traditional, and still relevant literature stressed structural factors, such as the abundance of natural resources, the specialization in activities that offer good opportunities for technical improvements, the existence of high saving propensities, extensive markets or other circumstances that may encourage a faster pace of technological change (see, among others, Chenery and Syrquin, 1975; Di Tella and Zymelman, 1967; Kuznets, 1965; Nurkse, 1961, Prebisch, 1951). More recently, the emphasis has shifted to social factors, and especially to the incentive effects of institutions and culture (see, among others, North, 1981; Landes, 1998; and Acemoglu et al., 2005). There is clear evidence that incentives (economic, social and political) and the institutions that mold them matter for development. However, those incentives operate in the concrete environment determined by the economy's configuration and experience. Institutions themselves are influenced by political and economic structures, that is, they are endogenously determined. Thus, a better understanding of the process of economic development requires considering the joint determination of economic structure and social institutions.

Human capital accumulation is a clear example of this interaction between institutional and structural factors. In a world with imperfect capital markets, low-income workers are constrained in their private investment in education. Thus, the nature (and, more starkly, the presence or absence) of a public school system critically determines the extent and the evolution of human capital accumulation. Different societies develop different school systems. The social decisions on education are certainly influenced by broad political and ideological factors, but they also respond to economic considerations and, therefore, they depend on the structure of the economy. In turn, changes in a society's levels of schooling and literacy would affect its social structure and, perhaps, the political institutions that determine the educational institutions themselves.

The United States and Canada developed schooling institutions since colonial times. By 1850, every northern state of the United States had already enacted a law strongly encouraging or requiring localities to establish "free schools", open to all children and supported by general taxes. The rest of the hemisphere trailed far behind those two countries in education and literacy. Even the most progressive Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, lagged more than fifty years behind the United States and Canada in providing primary schooling and attaining high levels of literacy. Most of Latin America was unable to achieve these standards until well into the twentieth century, if then (Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2000).

Why did some countries invest heavily in the education of broad segments of the population while others lagged behind? Galor and Moav (2006) provide a very interesting explanation: capitalists, as a group, may have incentives to invest in the education of the labor force because the productivity of physical capital in manufacturing production increases with the input of human skills. That is, capitalists can gain from tax-financing the emergence of a public education system in order to raise the return on their assets by increasing the supply of a complementary factor.

This argument seems relevant to North America (and to Western Europe; see Galor and Moav 2006), but it would have difficulties explaining the Latin America experience. Galor et al. (2005) extends the analysis in Galor and Moav (2006) by assuming that, although human skills contribute to increase the productivity of industrial capital, they provide no benefits for landlords as such. Then, if landlords have veto power over policies, they would block or delay the growth of public education (see also Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) for a complementary explanation). Certainly, this hypothesis can account for the delay of most Latin American countries, but it still does not rationalize the intermediate cases of the Southern Cone countries (mainly Argentina and

Uruguay) and Costa Rica, which started as early as the second part of the nineteenth century to develop important schooling systems, with a polity under the dominance of landholders.

In this paper we present a simple model of economic development which could serve to analyze alternative patterns of economic evolution, and to study the emergence of public education systems under different economic conditions. Our main focus, however, is the appearance of public education in land-abundant, open economies, where policies are essentially dictated by the interests of landlords, and which need not engage in the production of manufactured goods, since the demand for these may be wholly satisfied by imports.

The analysis assumes that the skill-intensity of output and consumption baskets increases with income levels, especially because the production of some services requires the input of educated workers. More specifically, the argument is founded on three central elements. First, individual preferences over consumption goods imply changes in the composition of individual spending as income grows, embodied in Engel curves. Second, the production of sophisticated services (which are non-tradeable goods, in an otherwise open economy) is intensive in human capital. Third, as in previous work, investment in human capital by individual households is constrained by lack of access to credit (see, for example, Banerjee and Newman, 1991; Galor and Zeira, 1993, Benabou, 1996). We also recognize that the quantity and quality of labor are not perfect substitutes. This implies that the number of high-income agents may have strong effects on how many individuals are subsidized to accumulate human capital. Thus, the size of the elite, as the group who demands goods particularly intensive in human capital, may have strong effects on the size of the group of educated workers. This would rationalize a link between historical conditions, especially with regard to the distribution of land, and social choices regarding the scope and the financing of the education system. Education would start earlier in agricultural-based economies when land is highly productive and its property sufficiently distributed as to create a demand for a sizeable number of educated workers. The proposition corresponds with the case made by Engermann and Sokoloff (2000), who indicated that the greater degree of inequality in Latin America, as compared to North America, played an important role in explaining the different behaviors regarding the establishment of educational institutions (see also Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2000).

The experience of the Southern Cone of America, and particularly that of Argentina, provides an illustration of the argument. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Argentina became increasingly integrated into the international economy as a large producer and exporter of agricultural goods, and an importer of manufactures. At the same time, the composition of primary output changed significantly, as agriculture expanded over cattle raising activities, a shift that favored less extensive forms of production (see, among others, Adelman and Morris, 1988, Cortés Conde, 1966). While the distribution of land and incomes was more unequal than in North America, where grain production was mainly based on family farms, it was less concentrated than in other Latin American economies. The expansion of agricultural activities allowed a very substantial growth of the urban population, especially in the city of Buenos Aires, which went from less than 100 thousand persons in 1855 to 180 thousand in 1869, and 660 thousand in 1895 (the dates correspond to census years). Apart from its administrative functions as the capital of the country, and from the growth in relatively simple manufacturing activities for the domestic market, the city developed an increasingly sophisticated, and large, service sector. At the same time, in the late part of the century, the country experienced what is widely considered one of the key processes in its history: the emergence of the system of public education, associated with the emblematic figure of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento.

Education had motivated discussions and multiple proposals since much earlier dates. Sarmiento himself, already in the decade of 1840, as an exile in Chile, had studied international experiences and written a book on the subject, with the programmatic title “Popular Education”. For Sarmiento, together with many influential figures in the country, education was to be the crucial

instrument in the struggle between “civilization and barbarism” (the title of the best known book by Sarmiento); later on, the massive influx of immigration led the elite to consider education as a necessary tool to establish and consolidate a national identity. However, economic considerations were also very much part of the discussions. The National Constitution sanctioned in 1853, explicitly ruled on public education, giving the Provinces the responsibility for its management in the corresponding jurisdictions. However, the intellectual leader of the constitutional movement, J. B. Alberdi, clearly cautioned against too much emphasis on formal “instruction” before the economy had developed: “Our first publicists said: 'in which way is culture promoted in the great European states? Mainly through instruction: then, this must be our starting point'. They did not see that our nascent peoples were in a state of being made, formed, before being instructed....Regarding the instruction that was given to our people, it was never adequate to its needs. Copied from that which is received by peoples in different conditions, in our case it was always sterile and without profitable results. The primary education provided to our people was rather counter-productive. What good is for the man of the people to know how to read?...The higher instruction in our Republics has been no less sterile and inappropriate to our needs...Instruction, in order to be fruitful, must concentrate on applied sciences and arts, in practical things, on live languages, on knowledge of immediate and practical utility...Industry is the great instrument of moralization. By facilitating the means for a livelihood, it prevents crime, most of the times the product of misery and leisure...In vain you will fill the intelligence of youth with abstract notions...: if you leave it poor and unemployed...it will be dragged towards corruption through the taste for comforts that it cannot obtain for lack of means” (complete works, pp. 417-419, translation by the authors).

The Argentine educational drive was noticeable, especially by Latin American standards; starting from quite low levels by the middle of the century, the average literacy rate in the country rose to 65% in 1914. However, the progress of education was not immediate, and it went along with the growth of the economy and, implicitly, with a growing demand for skills. In 1869, the rate of illiteracy was still 77% (Martínez Paz, 2003). Sarmiento was President of the country (between 1868 and 1874), and did promote education. However, only in 1875 did the Province of Buenos Aires pass a comprehensive law on public instruction, while the corresponding national instrument was introduced in 1884. Law 1420 (which has become a cultural icon in the country) made primary education mandatory and gratuitous for all children between the ages of six and fourteen, instituted lay education, set limits on the maximum distance that a student could travel to attend school, and required one school for every 1,500 inhabitants in any given town. However, the large regional differences in rates of scholarization and literacy indicate that, directly or indirectly, spending on education depended very much on the economic configuration of the localities. In 1895, in the city of Buenos Aires, almost 60% of the children of ages 6-14 attended school, more or less double the national average; the rate of illiteracy in the city was 20%, against 57% in the country as a whole (and nearly 80% in poor jurisdictions far from the central agricultural regions, like La Rioja, Corrientes and Neuquén). Also, the type of education that was provided seemed to correspond more to the economic incentives perceived at the time than to the vision of people like Sarmiento. This author had written (with reference to Chile): “The State...should leave to the upper classes the increase in the number of physicians and lawyers according to the demand, reserving its strength and initiative to develop national prosperity, which those professions maintain, but do not increase. The country... needs thousands of geologists, chemists, botanists, physicists and mechanics; it needs captains, pilots, machinists for its ships; and since the upper classes will not provide that education, the State must supply it to whoever wishes to receive it”. Complete works, vol. XIX, p. 103 translation of the authors). However: “the later unfolding of events disappointed the hope of Sarmiento, since the State...oriented its action in the traditional sense” (Tedesco, 1972), so that education tended to qualify individuals for work in services, rather than forming them towards industrial employment.

From a modeling point of view, we use an overlapping generations framework (similar to that in Galor and Moav (2006)) to represent an open economy with a particular specification of the commodity and factor spaces: two tradeable goods (agricultural and industrial) and one non-tradable (services), and four factors (land, physical capital, labor and skills). In this simple model, we focus on the basic properties of comparative advantages, capital accumulation of capital, and diversification of consumption as income increases, while abstracting away issues related to technological change. The starting point in our analysis is a simple agrarian economy, where the capital stock is accumulated by landlords, while the rest of the population is in the subsistence sector. At first, even landlords only consume agricultural goods, although they leave bequests. In such a setting, the first countries where capital accumulation in agriculture reaches the point at which a significant demand for manufactured goods arises would be early-comers to industrialization. Once there is a well-developed international market for manufactured goods, labor-abundant economies may develop industrial activities for the world market, even when their income levels are too low to induce a widespread domestic demand for those goods. These cases (where public education can be rationalized as a result of the interests of industrial capitalists, as in Galor and Moav (2006)) can be represented within the basic framework of our model, as it is briefly discussed in the appendix. However, in this paper, our focus is on land-rich economies where the demand for industrial goods is initially satisfied by imports (see Leamer, 1987), and where the accumulation of human capital would only be triggered by the consumption of services. Thus, while the basic model seems capable of being adapted to analyze different development experiences, we concentrate on that particular pattern and stage of economic growth.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the setup of the model. In section 3 we analyze the evolution of an agrarian economy and briefly comment on possible alternative paths that may be followed by economies of different structural configurations. Section 4 deals with the case where large-scale educational systems appear in land-rich economies, which have not gone through a previous stage of industrialization. Conclusions are then presented in section 5.

2. Setup of the model

We consider an overlapping generations economy, where agents live for two periods, and there is no population growth (that is, each agent has a single descendant). At the beginning, there are two kinds of dynasties, landowners and workers, who differ in their factor endowments only (a set of industrial capitalists may emerge if the economy develops a manufacturing sector). The first group has initially an endowment of land, which is not traded in equilibrium, and some physical capital; for simplicity, members of this class are assumed not to supply labor. Workers are endowed with a basic set of labor skills, which can be increased by acquiring (public or private) education.

In every period, the young agent of each dynasty receives a non-negative (but not necessarily strictly positive) bequest from the old agent of his lineage. Those bequests are potentially taxable and, in the model, such taxes fund the spending on public education. The land owned by an individual landlord is automatically transferred to his offspring (this transfer is not included in the definition of bequests). Young agents use their after-tax bequests to accumulate assets: either physical capital for productive activities or, in the case of workers, to acquire human capital which can be purchased by spending on (supplementary) private education. Old agents carry out work and production, they consume, and decide whether and how much to transfer to their offspring as bequests.

In the first period of their lives individuals who receive a nonnegative (after-tax) bequest from the previous generation decide investments on assets, which generate income in the next period. In the second period of their lives, all individuals allocate their income between consumption and the bequest they leave to the following generation. Workers also participate

directly in production and receive a wage. Young agents do not consume (or, equivalently, their consumption is included in that of their parents).

There are three types of consumable commodities: agricultural and industrial goods, and services. Agricultural and industrial goods may be traded internationally, while services are non-tradable. Agricultural goods can be produced with a subsistence technology, employing unskilled labor only, or by combining physical capital and land. Agricultural goods may be consumed or used as physical capital. Services are provided by skilled (educated) workers. Manufacturing production uses labor, capital and skills.

a. Technology and production

Agricultural goods are denoted, A , industrial goods, I , and services, N . The factors of production are: raw labor, L , land, T (in fixed supply), physical capital, X (which is homogeneous with the agricultural good) and human capital, h . Markets for goods and factors are perfectly competitive.

We assume that there are no international capital movements. Therefore, young generations must finance physical investment and education with the bequests transferred by the previous generation. Thus, the trade balance is zero in every period.

i) The agricultural sector

We assume that good A may be consumed or used as physical capital. Agricultural output can be produced with two alternative technologies. The first, that we label “subsistence” production, is a constant returns to scale technology with unskilled labor as its only input, generating output \tilde{w} per worker. If this technology operates in equilibrium, \tilde{w} will be the prevailing wage.² This representation would be relevant for the Argentine case of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.}. We assume that an agent with income \tilde{w} consumes agricultural goods only and does not leave bequests, so that the group of subsistence workers does not trade or accumulate assets.

The second way of producing agricultural output is with a technology that uses land and capital as inputs. For simplicity, we suppose that each production unit, owned by a landlord, must occupy a fixed surface of land, \bar{T} . The output of a farm with that amount of land is given by:

$$y_t^A = f(X_{t-1}^A)$$

where X^A is the capital stock used in agriculture (made of goods A), which has been carried over from the previous period. Capital fully depreciates in the period. The production function $f(\square)$ has the traditional properties that assure the existence of an interior solution to the profit-maximization problem.

ii) Human capital and skill formation

Human capital (interpreted as skills) is produced through education. For simplicity, the inputs of this activity are assumed to consist solely of good A . The skills of an individual in period $t+1$ are a function of the resources spent on the agent's education (e) in period t :

$$h_{t+1} = h(e_t)$$

² The individuals in this “subsistence” sector do not play an active role in the model, but they provide a reservoir of workforce (as in the traditional argument of Lewis) which, we assume, is not exhausted in the relevant range of variables. In principle, there is no presumption that the wage in that sector is necessarily very low (although, by assumption, it does not induce a diversified consumption or bequests). The reservation wage could also be interpreted without changing the model as the income required to induce immigration.

with $h' > 0$, $h'' < 0$

iii) The manufacturing sector

Industrial goods are assumed to be produced with labor, capital and human capital:

$$y_t^I = g(L_t^I, X_{t-1}^I, h_t^I)$$

where L^I is the number of workers employed in manufacturing, h^I their average level of skills, and X^I the amount of capital used in the sector, and carried over from the previous period. For the sake of concreteness, we adopt the following Cobb-Douglas specification:

$$y_t^I = z_t (L^I)^{\rho_L} (X^I)^{\rho_X} \varphi(h^I)$$

with $\rho_L + \rho_X = 1$ and $\varphi'(h^I) > 0$. $z_t \varphi(0) > 0$ indicates the productivity coefficient when only unskilled labor is employed. If $w(h)$ is the wage of a worker with skills h , it can be shown that, starting from $h^I = 0$, a firm would not choose to employ workers with marginally higher skills when:

$$\rho_L \frac{w'(0)}{w(0)} > \frac{\varphi'(0)}{\varphi(0)}$$

That is, the manufacturing sector will not demand skilled labor when the increase in wages as h increases from zero is steeper than the corresponding increase in productivity. If this is the case, and manufacturing production was to start, industrial labor would be drawn from the pool of subsistence workers, at a fixed wage \tilde{w} . Then, given the elastic supply of labor, and, for a given price p_I , the value of the marginal productivity of capital at the optimal level of benefits when $h = 0$, would be:

$$r_I(p_I, \tilde{w}) = s \left[z_t \varphi(0) p_I \tilde{w}^{-\rho_L} \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho_X}}$$

where s is a constant that depends on the share parameters ρ . Industrial activities would not be initiated in the open economy for an aggregate capital stock X if the marginal product of capital in agriculture exceeds the rate of return in the manufacturing sector:

$$r_I(p_I, \tilde{w}) < f'(X)$$

In the rest of the paper, it will be assumed that this condition holds for all relevant values of X , implying that the international price p_I is too low and the productivity of capital in agriculture too high to induce industrialization in the late-comer land-rich economy we are considering. The case of the economies that industrialize is schematically addressed in the appendix.

iv) The service sector

The third consumable good, N , is interpreted as an urban, relatively sophisticated service, the production of which requires only skilled labor.³ An individual who demands services hires skilled workers competitively, and consumes the output they produce, which depends on the

³ The assumption here is that, if the economy does not develop an industrial sector, the production of consumer services would be the only source of demand for skills. This is clearly a strong simplification, which disregards other important activities which require the input of skilled workers, such as the public administration and education itself; however, it may be thought that those "intermediate" demands for skills would appear when the economy has reached a stage of sophistication and diversified consumption that induce a significant "final demand", like that emphasized in the stylized argument of the text.

number of persons who participate in the supply of the services as well as on their average level of human capital:

$$y_t^N(n_t, g(h_t)) = \psi(n_t) \int h_t g(h_t) dh_t$$

where y^N is the volume of services, produced by n workers with a distribution function of skills $g(h)$, which are supplied to a given customer. Given the wage $w(h)$ associated with a level of skills h , the value of services consumed per individual is given by $p_N c_N = n \int w(h) g(h) dh$.

Consumers are assumed to care about the quality of the suppliers of services (and output is assumed to grow unboundedly with h), but to a limited extent on the number of workers who contribute to production. The intuition behind this assumption is simply that, for a wide range of services (from medical attention to entertainment, say), when a certain plateau of suppliers is reached, additional workers make little difference for the utility of the resulting consumption, but this is enhanced with an increase in the skills applied to production. The function ψ would then be strictly concave. Although this condition is sufficient to define the qualitative features of our argument, we make the stronger assumption that the marginal contribution of additional workers goes to zero at a finite number \tilde{n} of suppliers per customer. Thus, ψ is increasing in n up to a maximum \tilde{n} . For simplicity, we will use the following specification:

$$\psi(n) = \min[n, \tilde{n}]$$

The demand for services of an individual consumer is such that, for low levels of spending, both the number of workers and their qualification rise with the value of consumption up to the point where \tilde{n} workers are employed. All the subsequent increases in consumption result by augmenting the average skills of the pool of suppliers. Moreover, it can be shown that, if the wage function, $w(h)$ is convex, an individual demands only one type of workers, with skills equal to the optimal average as given by the consumption optimum. These statements are summarized in the following proposition.

Proposition: Given a value of expenditure in services, denoted by $p_N c_N$, and defining the average level of wages and skills of the workers that participate in the production of those services: $\int w(h) g(h) dh = \bar{w}$, and $\int h g(h) dh = \bar{h}$, with the elasticity of wages with respect to skills:

$$\varepsilon_w(h) = w'(h) \frac{h}{w(h)}$$

- If the function $w(h)$ is convex, then the agent will demand only one quality of labor, with skills $h = \bar{h}$
- If there exists h^* such that $\varepsilon_w(h^*) = 1$ and $\frac{p_N c_N}{w(h^*)} = n^* \leq \tilde{n}$, then n^* and $\bar{h} = h^*$ are, respectively, the number of workers hired by the consumer and their level of skills.
- Otherwise, if either no h^* verifies $\varepsilon_w(h^*) = 1$ or, if there exists such h^* , but $\frac{p_N c_N}{w(h^*)} \geq \tilde{n}$, then the optimal amount of labor is \tilde{n} while the average \bar{h} verifies that $\frac{p_N c_N}{\tilde{n}} = w(\bar{h})$.

Proof: The maximal production of services for a given cost solves:

$$\max \psi(n) \int hg(h) dh \quad (*)$$

$$\text{s.t. } p_N c_N = n \int w(h) g(h) dh$$

$$\int g(h) dh = 1$$

The dual problem is,

$$\min n \int w(h) g(h) dh \quad (**)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \bar{y} = \psi(n) \int hg(h) dh$$

$$\int g(h) dh = 1$$

Since $w(\square)$ is convex, $\int w(h) g(h) dh > w\left(\int hg(h) dh\right)$ for every skill distribution $g(h)$. Cost minimization implies that the optimal demand is concentrated at skills \bar{h} , so that $g(h)$ is non-zero only at \bar{h} . Problem (*) reduces to:

$$\max \psi(n) \bar{h}, \text{ subject to } p_N c_N = n w(\bar{h}), \int hg(h) dh = \bar{h}$$

The variables of choice are n and \bar{h} . The first order conditions for a solution are:

$$n: \psi'(n) \bar{h} \leq \lambda w(\bar{h})$$

$$\bar{h}: \psi(n) = \lambda n w'(\bar{h})$$

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the cost constraint. Then we have that:

$$\varepsilon_\psi(n) = \frac{\psi'(n)}{\psi(n)} n \leq \frac{w(\bar{h})}{w'(\bar{h})} \frac{1}{\bar{h}} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_w(\bar{h})} \quad (1)$$

with equality for an interior solution.

Recall that $\varepsilon_\psi(n)$ is either 1 (for $n \leq \tilde{n}$) or 0 (for $n > \tilde{n}$). Then, according to condition (1) the optimal amount of n must verify that at an interior solution $\varepsilon_\psi(n) = 1$ while \bar{h} must be such that $\varepsilon_w(\bar{h})$ is also equal to 1. On the other hand, the expenditure on services ($p_N c_N$) is given. Therefore, the amount h^* such that $\varepsilon_w(h^*) = 1$ must verify that $\frac{p_N c_N}{w(h^*)} = n^* \leq \tilde{n}$. If so, the

optimal amounts of labor and average human capital are $n = n^*$ and $\bar{h} = h^*$. Otherwise, condition (1) verifies with strict inequality, and the optimal amount n is not interior, that is $\varepsilon_\psi(n) = 0$, implying that $n > \tilde{n}$. Then, the choice problem of the agent is just to maximize $\tilde{n} \bar{h}$, subject to

$p_N c_N = nw(\bar{h})$. The solution to this problem obtains at $n = \bar{n}$ while \bar{h} is simply the value h^{**} such that $\frac{p_N c_N}{\bar{n}} = w(h^{**})$.

b. The agents

Individuals, within as well as across generations, are identical in their preferences and innate abilities.

i) Preferences

Preferences are defined over consumption-bequest bundles, $c = \langle c_A, c_I, c_N, b^o \rangle$, $c \in \mathfrak{R}_+^4$, where c_j is the quantity consumed of good j , while b^o is the bequest (measured in terms of agricultural goods) left to offspring (we reserve the notation b for the bequest received by the agent when young).

These preferences capture the intuition that consumers prefer a diversified bundle, but there are certain consumption thresholds to be reached before adding an additional degree of diversity. We partition the consumption space into four subsets (which may be thought of as “stages”), according to which thresholds have been exceeded (or equivalently, what degree of consumption diversification has been reached). Within each stage, preferences are described by a (stage-specific) Stone-Geary function. Preferences and the associated demand curves have implicit an ordering of the goods which are part of the consumption basket at different levels of income. There are four stages: i) consumption of agricultural goods (A) only; ii) consumption of A and positive bequests; iii) consumption of A and industrial (I) goods as well as positive bequests; iv) consumption of goods A , I and services (N), and positive bequests.

Specifically, preferences are represented by the following expression:

$$u(c) = \begin{cases} c_A & c_A \leq \tilde{c}_{A1} \\ (c_A - \tilde{c}_{A1})^{1-\beta} (b^o)^\beta + k_1 & c \in C^2 \\ \left[(c_A - \tilde{c}_{A2})^{\alpha_{A3}} c_I^{\alpha_{I3}} \right]^{1-\beta} (b^o - \tilde{b}_2^o)^\beta + k_2 & c \in C^3 \\ \left[(c_A - \tilde{c}_{A3})^{\alpha_{A4}} (c_I - \tilde{c}_{I3})^{\alpha_{I4}} c_N^{\alpha_{N4}} \right]^{1-\beta} (b^o - \tilde{b}_3^o)^\beta + k_3 & c \in C^4 \end{cases}$$

$$C^i = \{c \in \mathfrak{R}_+^4 : \tilde{c}_{J,i-1} < c_J \leq \tilde{c}_{J,i}, c_J = c_A, c_I, c_N, b^o; i = 2, 3, 4\}$$

$$\alpha_{A3} + \alpha_{I3} = 1; \quad \alpha_{A4} + \alpha_{I4} + \alpha_{N4} = 1$$

$$k_1 = u(\tilde{c}_{A1}, 0, 0, 0); \quad k_2 = u(\tilde{c}_{A2}, 0, 0, \tilde{b}_2^o); \quad k_3 = u(\tilde{c}_{A3}, \tilde{c}_{I3}, 0, \tilde{b}_3^o)$$

Proposition: u represents a rational preference ordering.

Proof: We have to show that the ordering (\succ) defined by $u(c)$ over C is complete and transitive, as well as monotonic.

Completeness follows immediately. If two bundles c and \bar{c} belong to C two cases are possible:

- $c \in C^i$ and $\bar{c} \in C^j$ with $i \neq j$. Then, by definition, if $i > j$, $\bar{c} < c$, while $j > i$, $c < \bar{c}$.

- $c, \bar{c} \in C^i$. Then, either $u(c) \leq u(\bar{c})$ and therefore $c \preceq \bar{c}$ or $u(\bar{c}) \leq u(c)$, that is $\bar{c} \preceq c$.

Similarly for transitivity: consider $c, \bar{c}, \bar{\bar{c}} \in C$, where $c \preceq \bar{c}$ and $\bar{c} \preceq \bar{\bar{c}}$. Four cases are possible:

- $c, \bar{c}, \bar{\bar{c}} \in C^i$. Then, by definition $u(c) \leq u(\bar{c})$, while $u(\bar{c}) \leq u(\bar{\bar{c}})$. Therefore $u(c) \leq u(\bar{\bar{c}})$, that is $c \preceq \bar{\bar{c}}$.
- $c, \bar{c} \in C^i$ and $\bar{\bar{c}} \in C^j$, $i \neq j$. By definition, since, $\bar{c} \preceq \bar{\bar{c}}$, $i < j$. Therefore $c \preceq \bar{\bar{c}}$.
- $c \in C^i$ and $\bar{c}, \bar{\bar{c}} \in C^j$, $i \neq j$. Since $c \preceq \bar{c}$, $i < j$. Therefore, $c \preceq \bar{\bar{c}}$.
- $c \in C^i$, $\bar{c} \in C^j$ and $\bar{\bar{c}} \in C^k$, $i \neq j$, $j \neq k$ and $i \neq k$. Then, since $c \preceq \bar{c}$, $i < j$, and since $\bar{c} \preceq \bar{\bar{c}}$, $j < k$. Therefore, $i < k$ and $c \preceq \bar{\bar{c}}$.

Finally, to show monotonicity, just consider $c \preceq \bar{c}$. Again, we can analyze this by cases:

- If $c \in C^i$, $\bar{c} \in C^j$, with $i \neq j$, by the definition of C^1, \dots, C^4 , given $1 \leq k \leq 4$, for every $c^k \in C^k$ there exists $c^l \in C^l$ such that $c^k \preceq c^l$, while for every $c^l \in C^l$ there is no $c^k \in C^k$ such that $c^l \preceq c^k$. Therefore, if $c \preceq \bar{c}$ then $i < j$, that is $c \prec \bar{c}$.
- If $c, \bar{c} \in C^i$ then, since each u is monotonic, $u(c) \leq u(\bar{c})$. This implies that $c \preceq \bar{c}$.

In all cases, whenever an income threshold is crossed (when the individual can purchase the minimum consumption quantities of a certain stage), the agent prefers the most diversified consumption bundle attainable (that is, consumption corresponds to the highest feasible stage). Regarding the incentive for leaving a bequest, individual welfare varies directly with the amount of resources left to an offspring, independently of the use of that bequest by the next generation. This implies, in particular, that savings depend only on the income of the adult agent, and not on the expected return on assets.⁴

Although this particular formulation of preferences has features that are not altogether appealing (like potential jumps in quantities demanded in the transition from one stage to another, see below), it captures a differentiation between “basic needs” and “luxury goods”, and generates a “consumption ladder” where new goods get included into the basket as income grows.

ii) Demand functions

Demand curves arise from maximizing welfare subject to a budget constraint, which in its most general form is given by:

$$c_A + p_I c_I + p_N c_N + b^o \leq i$$

⁴ This form of bequest motive (that is, the “joy of giving”) is common in the recent literature on income distribution and growth (see, in particular, Galor and Moav, 2006). The assumption that the rate of return is irrelevant in the decision to leave bequests does not greatly affect the qualitative results emphasized in the paper. However, it may have strong implications in some contexts. In particular, this type of savings function allows the existence of states where the marginal net product of capital is negative. Also, initial differences in endowments may have no effect on steady state consumption, while that would not happen, say, with standard Euler equations if all agents face the same interest rate, since the ratio of marginal utilities of any two agents would be preserved over time.

where i is total income of the old agent. With the particular functional form we have adopted for preferences, optimization will yield threshold income levels, determining the transition from one diversification stage to the following. From standard methods we obtain:

Lemma: The consumption-bequest baskets of an agent are as follows:

$$\text{In } C^1: c_A \leq \tilde{c}_{A1} = i_1 : c_{A1} = i.$$

In C^2 :

$$c_A = (1 - \beta)(i - \tilde{i}_1) + \tilde{c}_{A1}$$

and

$$b^o = \beta(i - \tilde{i}_1)$$

In C^3 :

$$b^o = \beta(i - \tilde{i}_2) + \tilde{b}_2^o$$

$$c_A = \tilde{c}_{A2} + (1 - \beta)\alpha_{A3}(i - \tilde{i}_2)$$

$$p_I c_I = (1 - \beta)\alpha_{I3}(i - \tilde{i}_2)$$

where $\tilde{i}_2 = \tilde{c}_{A2} + \tilde{b}_2^o$.

In C^4 :

$$b^o = \beta(i - \tilde{i}_3(p_I)) + \tilde{b}_3^o$$

$$c_A = (1 - \beta)\alpha_{A4}(i - \tilde{i}_3(p_I)) + \tilde{c}_{A3}$$

$$p_I c_I = (1 - \beta)\alpha_{I4}(i - \tilde{i}_3(p_I)) + p_I \tilde{c}_{I3}$$

$$nw(\bar{h}) = (1 - \beta)\alpha_{N4}(i - \tilde{i}_3(p_I))$$

where $\tilde{i}_3 = \tilde{c}_{A3} + p_{I3}\tilde{c}_{I3} + \tilde{b}_3^o$.

Proof: Immediate, from the maximization of $u(c)$ subject to the budget constraint.

Notice that while there is no jump in agricultural consumption when making the transition from the first to the second stage, there may be jumps in either consumption or bequests when making any of the subsequent transitions. To fix this idea, consider the case of the transition into industrial consumption. As soon as $i \geq \tilde{i}_2$, it must be the case that $c_A \geq \tilde{c}_{A2}$ and $b^o \geq \tilde{b}_2^o$. However, it could be that, for instance, $\lim_{i \rightarrow \tilde{i}_2} c_A^* > \tilde{c}_{A2}$ and $\lim_{i \rightarrow \tilde{i}_2} b^o \leq \tilde{b}_2^o$. This would imply that after crossing the threshold, consumption of agricultural goods has a discrete drop, and bequests go up. The opposite situation, where consumption increases and bequests (hence, capital accumulation) fall after the transition, is also feasible. Since this last case would imply that the economy may get trapped in an oscillation around transitions, we will impose conditions such that this possibility is avoided.

Once having eliminated the possibility of having oscillations at the transition thresholds, the structure of demands can be used to distinguish between two economies with the same amounts of land and aggregate capital but exhibiting different income distributions. More precisely, calling these economies $\varepsilon_1(\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{X})$ and $\varepsilon_2(\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{X})$, where \mathbf{T} and \mathbf{X} are the given amounts of land and capital, if the number of landlords in them are, respectively, m_1 and m_2 , with $m_1 < m_2$ we have:

Lemma: If the consumptions in $\varepsilon_1(\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{X})$ and $\varepsilon_2(\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{X})$ are c_{ε_1} and c_{ε_2} , with $c_{\varepsilon_1} \in C^i$ and $c_{\varepsilon_2} \in C^j$, then, $i \geq j$.

Proof: A representative landlord in ε_1 has, according to our characterization of the agricultural sector, an income:

$$i_1 = f(X_{t-1}^A) = \frac{1}{m_1}(\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{X})$$

while an average landlord in ε_2 earns:

$$i_2 = f(X_{t-1}^A) = \frac{1}{m_2}(\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{X})$$

Since $m_1 < m_2$, $i_1 > i_2$. Then, by the definition of demands, $c_{\varepsilon_1} > c_{\varepsilon_2}$. Then if $c_{\varepsilon_1} \in C^i$ and $c_{\varepsilon_2} \in C^j$ either $i = j$ or $i > j$. It can also be noticed that, since bequests increase with income, economy ε_2 will reach a given level of the capital stock at an earlier date than the economy where property is more subdivided.

3. Growth and structural evolution

a. An agricultural economy

We start by analyzing an economy where only good A is produced and consumed. Here, unskilled workers work in the subsistence sector, consuming \tilde{w} and have no other choices available. Landlords invest in physical capital all the bequest they receive, and choose their consumption/bequest bundle in the second period. By assumption, in this stage, only the agricultural good is produced and consumed. Then, if the initial capital stock (received by the first generation) is X_0 , the demand functions discussed before induce the following dynamics:

Proposition: Let $\tilde{i}_1 = \tilde{c}_{A1}$, $\tilde{i}_2 = \tilde{c}_{A2} + \tilde{b}_2^o$, assume that $f(0) < \tilde{i}_1$ and that there is at least a value of X such that $X = \beta(f(X) - \tilde{i}_1)$. Then:

- there will be two fixed points for $\beta(f(X) - \tilde{i}_1)$, \hat{X}_1^l and \hat{X}_1^h (low and high, respectively),

- the economy will reach a steady state in C^2 (where landlords leave positive bequests and consume only agricultural goods) if and only if $\tilde{i}_2 > f(X_0) \geq f(\hat{X}_1^l) > \tilde{i}_1$ and $f(\hat{X}_1^h) < \tilde{i}_2$.

Proof: By assumption, $f(0) - \tilde{i}_1 < 0$ and there exists X such that $X = \beta(f(X) - \tilde{i}_1)$. Then, since $\beta(f(X) - \tilde{i}_1)$ is strictly concave, it has two fixed points, \hat{X}_1^l and \hat{X}_1^h , with $\hat{X}_1^l \leq \hat{X}_1^h$. The fixed points are steady states of the dynamics of the capital stock (and, equivalently, bequests). \hat{X}_1^l is unstable, while \hat{X}_1^h is stable under the dynamics defined by b_2^o on C^2 .

If X_0 is such that $\tilde{i}_2 > f(X_0) > f(\hat{X}_1^l) > \tilde{i}_1$ and $f(\hat{X}_1^h) < \tilde{i}_2$, there will be capital accumulation, and the economy will not be trapped in a subsistence equilibrium where bequests are zero. Furthermore, capital accumulation will stop at \hat{X}_1^h while the economy is still in C^2 . Conversely, if the economy reaches a steady state in C^2 , it must be at either one of the fixed points, be it because $X_0 = \hat{X}_1^l$ or because the dynamics leads to the stable value \hat{X}_1^h .

b. The transition to industrial consumption

If capital accumulation proceeds, landlords would start consuming manufactured goods. Some properties for this stage can be summarized in the following proposition:

Proposition: If $f(\hat{X}_1^h) > \tilde{i}_2 = f(\tilde{X}_2)$ and $p_I < \frac{1}{s^{\rho_X} z_I \varphi(0)} \tilde{w}^{\rho_L} (f'(X))^{\rho_X}$:

- the economy will enter stage 3 (with consumption of goods and bequests of landlords in C^3),
- the manufactured goods consumed by landlords will be supplied from imports, and there will be no domestic production.

Proof: If the capital required for entering stage 3, \tilde{X}_2 is less than \hat{X}_1^h the economy will not get trapped in stage 2. The expression on p_I just restates the condition for no production of good I discussed before.

This result indicates the conditions for the economy to enter C^3 , with consumption of industrial goods, obtained through imports. However, there may be the possibility that in the transition to that stage, consumption rises as much as to lower the bequests (and therefore the capital for the next period) to levels below the transition point, forcing the economy to return to stage 2. A condition to avoid that trap is summarized in the following:

Theorem: A sufficient condition for not returning to stage 2 is that $\beta(\tilde{i}_2 - \tilde{i}_1) < \tilde{b}_2^o$.

Proof: The economy enters stage 3 once the capital stock exceeds \tilde{X}_2 , with $f(\hat{X}_1^h) > f(\tilde{X}_2) > f(\hat{X}_1^l)$. But in order to ensure that it does not return to C^2 , the unstable steady state at C^3 , \hat{X}_2^l , must be such that $f(\hat{X}_2^l) \leq f(\tilde{X}_2)$.

The functions that characterize the dynamics of bequests at C^2 and C^3 are:

$$C^2: b^o = \beta(i - \tilde{i}_1) = \beta i - \beta \tilde{i}_1$$

$$C^3: b^o = \beta(i - \tilde{i}_2) + b_2^o = \beta i - (\beta \tilde{i}_2 - b_2^o)$$

Since the only variable is i , the latter is a parallel displacement of the former. Then, if we take the difference between them, say b^o in C^3 less b^o in C^2 , suppose that:

$$-(\beta \tilde{i}_2 - b_2^o) + \beta \tilde{i}_1 > 0 \quad (\text{II})$$

If the sign of this expression is positive, there is an upwards displacement of bequests in going from C^2 to C^3 . If so, the fixed points at C^2 , $\hat{X}_1^l \leq \hat{X}_1^h$, and those at C^3 , $\hat{X}_2^l \leq \hat{X}_2^h$, will be such that $\hat{X}_2^l \leq \hat{X}_1^l$ and $\hat{X}_1^h \leq \hat{X}_2^h$.

In fact (II) is equivalent to $\beta(\tilde{i}_2 - \tilde{c}_{A1}) < \tilde{b}_2^o$, in which case we have that:

$$f(\hat{X}_2^l) \leq f(\hat{X}_1^l) \leq f(\tilde{X}_2)$$

which ensures that capital will not decrease down from \tilde{X}_2 .

We are modeling a “late comer” economy, where consumption of industrial goods grows significant after other countries have already developed a manufacturing sector and participate in international trade of goods. This means that industrial goods are available for trade. The international price of good I is assumed to be sufficiently low (relative to domestic factor prices) to discourage production: the assumption held also in the previous stage (of pure agricultural consumption), and will be supposed to continue holding if the economy enters into the next stage, where landlords consume services. We explore in the appendix the alternative scenarios of “early industrialization”, where the economy produces the industrial goods consumed locally, or manufacturing activities get started “for export” before there is a domestic demand for those goods.

4. The rise of public education in a land-rich economy

a. Demand for services in a late-comer economy

As seen in the previous section, some economies may not go through a phase of industrial production, even if their income is such that they include manufactured goods in their consumption bundle. Then the economy may reach a stage with a significant demand for “sophisticated” services before undergoing industrialization. The following proposition describes the dynamics in this stage.

Proposition: Let $\tilde{i}_3 = f(\tilde{X}_3) = \tilde{c}_{A3} + p_1 \tilde{c}_{I3} + \tilde{b}_3^o$. If $\hat{X}_2^h > \tilde{X}_3 > \hat{X}_2^l$, the economy will enter into stage 4, where \hat{X}_2^h and \hat{X}_2^l are, respectively, the high and low steady states when the dynamics of bequests is determined by dynamics on C^3 .

A sufficient condition for no having a downward-jump in bequests once in C^4 is that
$$\beta(\tilde{i}_3 - \tilde{i}_2) < (\tilde{b}_3^o - \tilde{b}_2^o)$$
.

Proof: Immediate. $\hat{X}_2^h > \tilde{X}_3 > \hat{X}_2^l$ simply establishes that accumulation in C^3 has reached the point where the consumption basket diversifies to include services (the condition depends on the price p_1) before attaining the stable steady state at that stage. To obtain the sufficient condition for continued accumulation it is enough to recast the proof of Theorem 1 for C^4 .

The evolution of the consumption and production structure need not end there. The possibility that an economy develops an industrial sector after services, for example, may be of special interest. However, we shall not pursue the analysis here, and concentrate on the question of how the supply of educated workers to produce services is generated.

b. The emergence of the demand for skills

The demand for services will induce a demand for skills. We assume that the skills required for the provision of services require some kind of formal education, which must be acquired when young. Thus, at any given time the number of (adult) skilled workers is fixed: subsistence workers cannot migrate into the service sector. This implies that different wages can prevail in both sectors, since there is no arbitrage opportunity, and therefore that there are potential gains for a young unskilled worker considering whether to acquire human capital. But young subsistence workers are credit-constrained, and individual landlords will not have incentives to finance the education of young workers who, by assumption, can freely choose their employment and cannot commit to the repayment of potential “education loans”.

As a consequence, some kind of collective action mechanism might improve the welfare of the elite. As in Galor and Moav (2006), but through a different channel, young landlords who anticipate their future demand for services might accept to finance the necessary education system by way of a tax on the bequests they receive.

i) Public education

Adult agents with an income above a certain threshold will demand services. These will be provided by skilled workers. Here, the education of those skilled workers is assumed to be provided by public school system financed by taxes on the bequests received by young landlords. The characteristics of this public system are decided upon by a central authority who internalizes the optimal behavior of the group of young landlords, and can perfectly enforce tax collection (for simplicity, a balanced budget is assumed). Education is supposed to be convenient for the worker (that is: the wage of skilled labor is higher than \tilde{w}). We assume that the authority can limit the size of the set of individuals who receive education (in practice, this may be done by varying the geographical coverage of the education system, or by determining conditions of schooling such that some groups have preferential access). The planner internalizes the quantity-quality choice of individual consumers (which would be established in the manner discussed above). Here we will assume, for simplicity, that the solution of the policy problem will be such that number of workers per landlord has reached the saturation point \tilde{n} , so that the number of individuals that receive

education is determined by that condition, and the margin of decision of the authority is on the level of skills to be supplied.

Then, taking into consideration the consumption behavior of the set of landlords (denoted group A), the authority will establish taxes on bequests (which, in this framework, operate as lump-sum transfers from landlords to the government), and choose a distribution of human capital ($g(h)$) that young workers to be educated will receive. This distribution (which, in the optimum will be concentrated on a single point) results in an average level of skills \bar{h} . As stated above, skills are produced with (agricultural) inputs according to the function $h = h(e)$.

The results of the optimization of the policy-maker are summarized in the following proposition.

Proposition: The education system will provide a single level of education e to all the set of individuals who receive training. If for some e^* , the function $h(\square)$ has an elasticity $\varepsilon_h(e^*) = 1$ then the optimal amount of workers that receive education is $n \leq \tilde{n}$ and the level of education will be e^* . Otherwise, if $\varepsilon_h(e) < 1$, \tilde{n} workers will be educated and e will verify the following condition between the marginal utilities of income (derived from holdings of land and physical capital) and education for service suppliers:

$$(1 - (1 - \beta)\alpha_{N4})\tilde{n} \frac{f'(b - \tilde{n}e)}{i^A - \tilde{i}_3} = (1 - \beta)\alpha_{N4} \frac{\bar{h}'(e)}{\bar{h}(e)}$$

Proof: Let n be the number of workers who receive education per unit landlord, and $l(e)$ the proportion of those agents who receive an education corresponding to spending e ; $\int l(e)de = 1$. Total spending in education will be $n \int el(e)de = 1$, and the income of the average landlord, when old, will be: $i^A = f(b - n \int el(e)de)$, given that the bequests received when young have been taxed in the amount necessary in order to finance education expenditures. Given the demand functions in the stage C^A , the utility of the landlord can be written as (ignoring constants):

$$u^A = (1 - (1 - \beta)\alpha_{N4}) \ln(i^A - \tilde{i}_3) + (1 - \beta)\alpha_{N4} \ln \int h(e)l(e)de$$

Remembering that $i^A = f(b - n \int el(e)de)$, maximization with respect to $l(e^k)$ subject to the constraint $\int l(e)de = 1$ results in the following, if in the optimum $l(e^k) > 0$:

$$-(1 - \gamma) \frac{f'}{i^A - \tilde{i}_3} ne^k + \gamma \frac{h(e^k)}{\bar{h}} - \lambda = 0$$

where $\gamma = (1 - \beta)\alpha_{N4}$, λ is the multiplier of the constraint, and the average level of skills is: $\bar{h} = \int h(e)l(e)de$

Considering the condition for a level of education $e^k + \Delta e$

$$-(1 - \gamma) \frac{f'}{i^A - \tilde{i}_3} n(e^k + \Delta e - e^k) + \gamma (h(e^k + \Delta e) - h(e^k)) \frac{1}{\bar{h}} = 0$$

that is $\frac{\Delta h(e^k)}{\bar{h}}$ is constant for every e^k with non-zero demand. Therefore, h' must be the same at every optimal level. That is, there exists just one value e^* at which this is true, since h is strictly concave.

Then, $l(e)$ is a degenerate distribution that yields a single value $h(e)$, which, according to the preferences of the A agents, must be equal to \bar{h} .

The expression of u^A can be rewritten as:

$$u^A = (1-\gamma) \ln(i^A - \tilde{i}_3) + \gamma \ln n \bar{h}(e)$$

Maximizing the utility with respect to the single variable e results in:

$$(1-\gamma) n \frac{f'}{i^A - \tilde{i}_3} = \gamma \frac{\bar{h}'(e)}{\bar{h}(e)}$$

while the first order condition for n is:

$$(1-\gamma) \frac{f'}{i^A - \tilde{i}_3} e \leq \frac{\gamma}{n}$$

with strict equality if the interior solution is such that $n \leq \tilde{n}$. In that case, the ratio between the two first-order would be e^* such that $\frac{h'(e)}{h(e)} e = 1$. With $e = e^*$, if the optimal value of n for $\psi = n$ was larger than \tilde{n} , then the solution would correspond to the level of e that satisfies the corresponding FOC with $n = \tilde{n}$; this value would be such that $\varepsilon_h(e) < 1$ and $e > e^*$.

The proposition establishes that, if \tilde{e} is the level of education such that the elasticity of skills with respect of education is one, as long as the optimal spending in education is $E \leq \tilde{n}\tilde{e}$, education per worker will be fixed at \tilde{e} and the expansion of education will be “extensive”, through the increase in n . After that threshold is reached, $n = \tilde{n}$, and the additional spending will result in proportional increases in e .

In what follows we will assume for simplicity that education has already “saturated” the level of workers, although the model seems capable of rationalizing the existence of a stage where a growing number of workers receives “basic” education, followed by another where the size of the educated set stops increasing and the average level of skills rises. Also, if the elite is subdivided, in the sense that the education system is destined to satisfy the demands of groups with different incomes and demands for services, there can be a distribution of people who receive different “levels” of education; the size of the members of each level would be a function of the size of the set of landlords that demands services requiring those skills. In any case, if all landlords require the services of \tilde{n} workers, the size of the group of educated workers would be proportionate to the size of that elite.

In the transition where members of group A start to demand services, the number of workers who receive education is bounded at \tilde{n} per landlord. While we assume this for any economy, the distribution of land ownership affects the aggregate number of educated workers. To see this

consider, again, two economies (ε_1 and ε_2) with the same amounts of land but different number of landlords, m_1 and m_2 , respectively, with $m_1 < m_2$. Then we have:

Corollary: In economy ε_2 , the start of education would occur later than in ε_1 , but the number of individuals who receive education would be larger.

Proof: Since in ε_1 services will be consumed earlier, the educational system has to be created before than in ε_2 . On the other hand, once the critical number of educated agents, \tilde{n} per landlord, is reached, and maintaining the assumption that only landlords consume services, the number of educated agents will be $m_1\tilde{n} < m_2\tilde{n}$, that is, the number of educated individuals will be larger in ε_2 .

The emergence of taxation to finance education modifies the dynamics of bequests, since these are determined by income, which is reduced by taxation through its effects on capital. However, it can be shown that the condition for accumulation to proceed in the stage with consumption of services is the same as the condition found before, when taxation was not considered:

Proposition: The same conditions on \tilde{X}_3 established before for accumulation to proceed after the transition to stage 4 hold also with an optimal level of taxation on bequests, except if $\tilde{X}_3 = \tilde{b}_3 = \hat{X}_3^l$ with $e > 0$.

Proof: For the proposition to hold, we have to consider a new transition value $\tilde{X}_3' = b - ne$. If $f(\hat{X}_2^h) > f(\tilde{X}_3')$ and $f(\hat{X}_3^l) \leq f(\tilde{X}_3') \leq f(\hat{X}_3^h)$, the accumulation process will continue. To see that this can in fact be so, recall that these conditions are verified by \tilde{X}_3 . So, if \tilde{X}_3' is close enough to \tilde{X}_3 we are done. In fact, expenditures on education will start from values near zero, since when $f(\tilde{X}_3')$ is very close to \tilde{i}_3 , $\frac{\bar{h}'(e)}{\bar{h}(e)}$ grows unboundedly large. That means that e is very close to 0. So, the only possible problem arises if $\tilde{X}_3 = \hat{X}_3^l > \tilde{X}_3'$.

ii) The price of human capital

We are interested in analyzing the conditions that link the price of human capital to other parameters in the model. A first, and intuitive, result is that holding international prices constant, all the relevant quantities depend on the level of capital accumulation in the economy, as summarized in the level of bequests, b . Since the capital stock increases with b , and the value of spending in services is proportional to the income of landlords in excess of the threshold ($i - \tilde{i}_3$), if the number of service workers remains constant at \tilde{n} per landlord, the wages of those individuals grows directly with b . Such wages result from the level of skills of the workers and the unit “price of skills”. The evolution of that price (or, in other words, the rate of return on education) is described in the following proposition.

Proposition: The wage per unit of skills is given by:

$$w_h = \frac{w(\bar{h}(e))}{\bar{h}(e)} = \gamma \frac{f(b - \tilde{n}e) - \tilde{i}_3}{\tilde{n}\bar{h}(e)}$$

where, as before: $\gamma = (1 - \beta)\alpha_{N4}$

Let $z = f(b - \tilde{n}e) - \tilde{i}_3$, and let $\hat{f} = \frac{f'(x)}{f(x)}$ denote the logarithmic derivative of the function

f . Education and the capital stock vary as a function of b according to:

$$\frac{\partial e}{\partial b} = \frac{\hat{z}' - \hat{z}}{\tilde{n}(\hat{z}' - \hat{z}) + (\hat{h}' - \hat{h})} > 0$$

where $\hat{z} = \frac{f'(X)}{f(X) - \tilde{i}_3}$, $\hat{z}' = \frac{f''(X)}{f'(X)}$, $\hat{h} = \frac{h'(e)}{h(e)}$, $\hat{h}' = \frac{h''(e)}{h'(e)}$

$$\text{and: } \frac{\partial X}{\partial b} = 1 - \tilde{n} \frac{\partial e}{\partial b} = \frac{(\hat{h}' - \hat{h})}{\tilde{n}(\hat{z}' - \hat{z}) + (\hat{h}' - \hat{h})} > 0$$

Then, the sign of the change in the unit wage is governed by:

$$\text{sgn}\left(\frac{\partial w_h}{\partial b}\right) = \text{sgn}\left(\frac{1}{w_h} \frac{\partial w_h}{\partial b}\right) = \text{sgn}\left((1 - \gamma) \frac{f''}{f'} - \gamma \frac{\bar{h}''}{\bar{h}'}\right)$$

Proof: The characterization of w_h just recasts the demand function of services:

$$\tilde{n}w(\bar{h})h = \gamma(i^A - \tilde{i}_3)$$

$$\text{or: } w(\bar{h}) = \frac{\gamma}{\tilde{n}} \frac{z}{h}$$

On the other hand, $\frac{\partial e}{\partial b}$ obtains by differentiating with respect to b the semi-elasticity condition of arbitrage between investments:

$$(1 - \gamma) \frac{f'(b - \tilde{n}e)}{f(b - \tilde{n}e) - \tilde{i}_3} = (1 - \gamma) \hat{z} = \gamma \hat{h} = \gamma \frac{\bar{h}'(e)}{h(e)}$$

The characterization of $\frac{\partial X}{\partial b}$ follows from the specification of $\frac{\partial e}{\partial b}$.

The condition on the sign of $\frac{\partial w_h}{\partial b}$ is obtained by differentiating with respect to b the characterization of w_h .

Thus, the evolution of the returns on skills depends on the technological features of the agriculture and education sectors. For example, if the productivity of education falls less quickly

than the productivity of investment in sector A then, for a given rise in bequest, investment would be increasingly directed towards education, and at some point the wage per unit skills would.⁵

c. Moving ahead: brief comments on subsequent phases

Certainly, the creation of a large public school system might affect the way in which a late-comer land-rich economy would evolve. Here, we briefly mention some alternative paths that may be followed, and which seem capable of being analyzed using the basic framework of this paper.

i) Possible emergence of manufacturing

At some point, the effect of decreasing returns in the primary goods sector and the expansion of the supply of skills could result in the emergence of a manufacturing sector. This may also occur if, for some reason, the international price of industrial goods increases relative to those of agricultural commodities. That is, industrialization may take place through a price shock or, possibly, as a consequence of the accumulation of factors.

In any case, capital would flow to manufacturing. This may change the political economy in several ways. One issue would be whether landlords transform themselves into entrepreneurs with interests in both tradable sectors, or whether they are lenders of resources to a new group of industrial entrepreneurs (the division of the elite has been an often emphasized feature of resource-based economies with an incipient industrialization). Also, it is likely that the group of educated workers gains political influence. With the emergence of manufacturing, these agents would have mixed interests as suppliers of services, as workers in the manufacturing sector and, if their income is sufficient, as consumers of industrial goods. In addition, the inflow of workers from the subsistence sector to the (mainly urban) industrial sector may also create a new significant group of influence, with interests in raising the demand for industrial labor. That configuration is likely to raise issues related to industrial protection and the public spending in education.

ii) Diversified consumption by skilled workers

If skilled workers get rich enough in the process of economic growth, they would start to diversify their consumption-bequest basket. If educated workers leave bequests to their offspring, the accumulation of resources would take a different form. The specification of the investment options of those workers may vary: if there is an active capital market, they could act as lenders of funds to owners of physical capital, as well as potential purchasers of private education. From the point of view of the landlords, the emergence of a privately financed education sector would represent a positive development, since that would lower the price of skills without taxation on the elite. This development may lead to a crowding-out effect against public education.

The appearance of a demand for industrial goods by skilled workers does not vary noticeably the pattern of evolution in the land-rich economy: this will become more open as demand shifts from locally produced agricultural goods to imported manufactures, without much change elsewhere. The case would be different if the wage of skilled workers rises to the point where they also demand services. There would then be a “secondary” demand for skills (and for new skilled workers), on the part of the agents who previously were selling services to landlords/capitalists. Also, the incentives of policy-makers would change, since an A planner would recognize that there are no exclusive goods any more, consumed only by landlords. An increment in the supply of skills would benefit the educated workers as consumers. However, the A planner would likewise internalize the fact that a lower supply of skills increases the wage of educated workers, and raises

⁵ As a consequence of the assumption that the production of skills depends only on the input of goods, the result ignores a potentially important effect: education itself can be a (maybe large) source of demand for skills. In the context of the model, this may introduce a wedge between the interests of young landlords (who want education to increase the future supply of services) and the older generation, who would have their consumption opportunities reduced as skilled labor is drawn from the direct production of services to the education sector.

their demand for services, which would crowd out the demand by landlords. The two effects would be weighted when considering taxation and spending in education.

5. Conclusion

We have presented a model that can rationalize different patterns in the emergence of educational systems, in a way that can be pertinent in accounting for contrasts between the experiences of countries in the American continent in the nineteenth century. As a representation of economic development, the range of validity of the model is limited by the fact that we have disregarded phenomena like capital movements and, especially, technical change, which should be central elements in a more general analysis. However, as it is the model seems useful to highlight different motives for the elite to finance the education of low-income workers, and to point out possible alternative paths of economic evolution.

The model focuses on the demand for human-capital-intensive services of high-income groups. This channel can generate a demand for education, and appears because we adopt a setup with multiple goods, where consumption preferences are non-homothetic and the demand for skill-intensive commodities emerges at comparatively high levels of income. We also assumed that the quantity and quality of labor are not perfect substitutes; consequently, the number of high-income agents may have strong effects on how many individuals are subsidized to accumulate human capital.

Several classes of economies, with different qualitative behaviors, were identified. The first kind is that of early comers to industrialization. These are economies where, in the process of capital accumulation, agricultural productivity is high enough to generate a widespread demand for manufactured goods, which must be produced internally. The growth of the agricultural-industrial economy (with a bias towards industry, due to the higher income elasticity of the demand for the corresponding goods) may lead to the emergence of a demand for skills.

A second class of economies are those which are well endowed with labor, and where agricultural productivity is not enough to trigger industrialization for the domestic market, but can engage in labor intensive manufacturing for exports if and when an international market for those goods develop. In this basic setup, we merely refer to the first steps of industrialization for these economies. Further work should certainly consider with more detail the processes of technical change and the incentives to supply and demand for human capital in production. Preliminary results suggest that in order for education to emerge as a result of a capitalist-led political choice, the wages of unskilled workers should be sufficiently high (see the appendix).

Our focus was on resource-abundant economies where income growth is such that a large demand for industrial goods appears at a time when the supply by early comers is already well developed. Straightforward comparative advantage implies that those economies will import manufactures. If the demand for “sophisticated” services starts for incomes above a certain threshold, increases in the value of the output of primary goods can imply that, at some point, a demand for skilled labor may appear in order to satisfy that consumption by high-income groups. These groups, then, would not oppose the emergence of public education to increase the skills of a set of workers, the number of which would depend on the number of landlords who demand services. Hence, the diffusion of education would depend on the size of the elite and, indirectly, on the degree of concentration of land ownership. The growth of an educated class can change the political balance, and the incentives to provide public education, by incorporating into the picture a new influential group, and also by giving rise to a population who in some cases may self-finance the acquisition of skills of descendants. A large manufacturing activity may or may not arise “spontaneously”. Over time, a new political economy of industrial protection is likely to result from the interplay of the interests of landlord, capitalists, skilled workers (at first, mainly occupied in

services), and unskilled workers, if they participate in political decisions. Quite different paths seem possible according to how the implicit conflicts are processed.

The model we have presented was inspired in part by the Argentine experience, where a strong public education movement appeared well before the demand for skills in manufacturing acquired importance. Of course, the political decision to make substantial investments in education had several motives, and cannot be simply attributed to the wish to “lower the costs of services for the landlords”. Clearly, the desire to integrate immigrants to the national society and, in general, to promote “civilization” (a much cited and discussed concept at the time) played a very large role. However, training a large number of individuals for “civilized” presupposes, at least implicitly, the expectation that the resulting skills will find demand in “civilized jobs”. In fact, for several decades, the newly educated workers were readily absorbed in a growing economy and, particularly, in the service sector.

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Appendix

a. Early industrialization: a preliminary sketch of an argument

Consider an economy that accumulates agricultural capital *before* there is a significant international supply of industrial goods. If capital accumulation proceeds to the point where landlords start demanding industrial goods, they must be produced locally since the economy is closed for all practical matters. Then, it is clear that production would diversify into manufacturing as a result of the new composition of consumption demands. Thus, if and when the income of landlords reaches the threshold where their consumption diversifies, there would be a shift of capital into manufacturing, and the dynamics would change compared with the agricultural stage. Now, the logic of capital-skills complementarity would apply. With certain technologies, manufacturing skills may be acquired through on-the-job training (apprenticeship). At some point, the provision of public education may be in the interest of capitalists, as in Galor and Moav (2006).

Once the early-comers to industrialization have engaged in that path, the economies that lag behind in capital accumulation need not follow the same sequence: when there is an active international market where manufactures trade for primary goods, the late-comers may industrialize “prematurely”, or alternatively, become producers of services for high-income groups without first developing manufactures. Regarding the first possibility, standard international trade arguments indicate that an economy with suitable factor endowments can produce industrial goods for the world market, independently of domestic consumption. This would be more likely if landlords are sufficiently frugal and entrepreneurial while agriculture is not-too-productive (which speeds up the arrival of the moment where investment in manufacturing becomes profitable at the margin relative to accumulating agricultural capital) and there is a large supply of labor capable of moving from a subsistence sector to manufactures (à la Lewis). Also here the provision of education would be likely to be predicated on a perceived demand for more skilled industrial workers.

b. Export-led industrialization

This case would represent an economy which, with suitable factor endowments, produces good I for the world market, even without a widespread consumption of that good. Given the specification of the production function and the assumption that uneducated labor is supplied elastically at wage \tilde{w} , and assuming that capital is perfectly mobile between sectors:

Proposition: Capital X is allocated to sector I , when workers have no skills acquired through education, if:

$$f'(X) \leq r_I(p_I, \tilde{w}, h_0)$$

where $r_I = \tilde{w} \frac{\rho_X}{\rho_L} \frac{L}{X}$ is the return on capital in manufacturing and the (subsistence) wage is \tilde{w} ,

while labor has the basic (zero-education) level of skills. At \tilde{X}_I , the minimal level of capital accumulation that verifies this condition, the economy will enter into the manufacturing stage. A sufficient condition that ensures that the economy will not return to agricultural stage, once it entered into the manufacturing stage is that $\beta(\tilde{i}_2 - \tilde{c}_{A1}) < \tilde{b}_2^o$.

Proof: Given that \tilde{X}_I , the minimal value that verifies the condition is lower than the stable steady state in the agricultural stage, \hat{X}_1^h , capital will also be invested in manufacturing. The

sufficient condition to avoid the return to the agricultural stage is the same as for the economy without production of manufactures, as described in the text.

The condition above will be more easily satisfied with low subsistence wages, not-too-productive agriculture and frugal capitalists. High productivity and/or high prices of good I do as well induce production.

If the workers do not save or educate and only agricultural goods are consumed, the system can be described by:

$$\begin{aligned} i_K &= f(X_A) + (X - X_A)r \\ f'(X_A) &= r = r_I(p_I, \tilde{w}, h_0) \\ b^o &= \beta(i_K - \tilde{i}_1) = X = X_A - X_I \end{aligned}$$

The first equation defines the income of the capitalists (agents K , who are at the same time the landlords) as the output of the agricultural sector plus the return on capital invested in manufacturing. The second equation specifies the equilibrium allocation of the capital inherited from the previous generation and the rate of return. The third equation establishes the bequest, and specifies that it must be used to install future capital in both sectors.

In order to consider the incentives to start an educational system in such an economy, consider now the existence of a social planner representing the capitalist-landlord agents (K). This authority may tax agents K (the agents who leave bequests) in order to finance public education, as a representative of that group. The incentive would be to educate individuals will work in industry I . In principle, it may be the case that the industry hires educated and uneducated workers. Let μ be the fraction of the labor force (L) that is skilled, and let $\bar{h}(e)$ be their average level of human capital, which corresponds to a per-individual expenditure in education denoted by e . Then, total spending in education would be:

$$E = \mu L e$$

The allocation of resources would be driven by the maximization of the total returns to agents K derived from agriculture and industrial activities.

Then, it may be shown that:

Proposition: Spending in education will not start as long as:

$$f'(b - X_I) = r_I(p_I, \tilde{w}, 0) > \frac{1}{\rho_L} \frac{\varphi'(0)}{\varphi(0)} \bar{h}'(0) \tilde{w}$$

and this condition can be expressed as:

$$\left(\frac{p_I}{\tilde{w}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho_x}} > v \frac{\varphi'(0)}{\varphi(0)^{1+\frac{1}{\rho_x}}} \bar{h}'(0)$$

Proof: Skilled workers must earn at least \tilde{w} . Otherwise they will not accept employment in manufacturing. Consider now a K planner contemplating an investment in education, starting from a situation where all industrial workers are unskilled. The problem of the planner can be stated as:

$$\max_{X_I, \mu, L, e} f(b - X_I - \mu L e) + p_I \varphi(\mu \bar{h}(e)) L^{\rho_L} X_I^{\rho_x} - \tilde{w} L$$

The expression indicates the aggregate (future) income of a (now) young capitalist, given that the level of bequests is b , a fraction μ has received skills \bar{h} , so that the average level of skills is $\mu \bar{h}$, and all workers L receive a wage \tilde{w} . Clearly, all choice variables must be non negative. A solution would satisfy first order conditions given by:

$$X_I: \quad -f' + \rho_X \frac{p_I y^I}{X_I} \leq 0 \quad \text{(i)}$$

$$\mu: \quad -f' L e + \frac{\varphi'}{\varphi} \bar{h}(e) p_I y^I \leq 0 \quad \text{(ii)}$$

$$L: \quad -f' \mu e + \rho_L \frac{p_I y^I}{L} - \tilde{w} \leq 0 \quad \text{(iii)}$$

$$e: \quad -f' \mu L + \frac{\varphi'}{\varphi} \bar{h}'(e) \mu p_I y^I \leq 0 \quad \text{(iv)}$$

For $\mu = 0$ we obtain from (iii) that $\rho_L \frac{p_I y^I}{L} = \tilde{w}$ (at an interior solution for L).

On the other hand, (ii) is equivalent to:

$$-f' + \frac{\varphi'(e)}{\varphi(e)} \frac{h(e)}{e} \frac{p_I y^I}{L} \leq 0$$

and replacing by the expression for \tilde{w} we have:

$$-f' + \frac{\varphi'(e)}{\varphi(e)} \frac{\bar{h}(e)}{e} \frac{\tilde{w}}{\rho_L} \leq 0$$

Taking the limit of this expression for $e \rightarrow 0$, for $\mu = 0$ we have that:

$$\frac{\tilde{w}}{\rho_L} \frac{\varphi'(0)}{\varphi(0)} \lim_{e \rightarrow 0} \frac{\bar{h}(e)}{e} \leq f'$$

which recalling the L'Hopital rule ($\lim_{e \rightarrow 0} \frac{\bar{h}(e)}{e} = h'(0)$) yields the desired result.

On the other hand, from $r_I = (s \varphi(0) p_I \tilde{w}^{-\rho_X})^{\frac{1}{\rho_X}}$, with s a constant, we have the equivalent expression sought.

c. Early industrialization for the domestic market

The discussion in the previous exercise assumed that the price p_I was determined in the international market. But, if there is no developed world market (or the country is the “first comer”), industrial goods cannot be purchased abroad, but must be produced internally when the demand arises. Production diversifies in parallel with consumption. Assuming that the no-education condition holds, the economy would now be described by the following equations:

- Demand for industrial goods:

$$p_I y^I = (1 - \beta) \alpha_{I3} (i^K - \tilde{i}_2)$$

where the notation is as before, and i^K is the income of the landlord/capitalists.

- Income of agents K :

$$i^K = f(X_A) + r_I (p_I, \tilde{w}, \bar{h} = 0) X_I$$

where, as before, X_A, X_I are the capital stocks in each sector, r_I the rate of return of capital in manufacturing.

- Supply of good I :

$$y^I = y^I(p_I, \tilde{w}, h)$$

- Allocation of capital:

$$f'(X_A) = r_I(p_I, \tilde{w}, 0)$$

- Allocation of bequests:

$$b = X_A + X_I$$

- Employment in manufacturing:

$$L = X_I l(p_I, \tilde{w}, h)$$

where l is the labor/capital ratio.

- Dynamics of bequests:

$$b^o = \beta (i^K - \tilde{i}_2) + \tilde{b}_2^o$$

The system can be completed by specifying the choices on education, which could be determined, as before, by a government that optimizes on behalf of group K .

II. Studies on development economics: notes for an agenda

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Abstract

Economic development implies concrete transformations in the social system. Tracking such processes and representing them in a fairly precise way poses major analytical and practical challenges. This document is a preliminary reflection based on existing literature. Rather than a detailed or exhaustive review, it is a brief exercise aimed at identifying some of the main issues and questions as a prelude to subsequent studies on economic development. A natural starting point for this analysis is a consideration of the proximate sources of economic growth, that is, variables that have a more or less direct effect on the expansion of aggregate production volumes. This topic is the subject of section 2. The intensity of the accumulation and the form it takes, along with its level of productivity, all depend on the opportunities generated by the economy's structure and the way these are perceived and processed by agents. In turn, the way in which agent interactions are organized affects incentives and restricts or guides behaviour. At one time, the literature stressed the link between economic development and structure; now the emphasis is on institutional issues; these matters are briefly discussed in section 3. Lastly, section 4 deals with empirical research into determining factors of development and examines criteria for analysing specific case studies on the basis of the foregoing discussions.

1. Introduction

Economic development implies concrete transformations in the social system. Substantial quantitative growth of an economy over a long period of time is not the same phenomenon as a mere scale expansion of the original state. Higher income tends to imply diversification of inputs, products and consumption, which in turn generate changes in the structure of supply and demand, with a more elaborate division of labour. Such changes, along with technological developments in response to various economic incentives, affect the way in which agents interact and even their attitudes and behaviour. At the same time, the relative prices of goods and factors change, which alters income distribution as a result. The interest matrix, the configuration of coalitions and the level of influence of various groups are modified accordingly. The resulting forces can act upon the characteristics and functioning of institutions and therefore, modify the behaviour and the relations of economic and political agents. Incentives, behaviour and the patterns of interactions among individuals and groups all have effects on the pace and direction of economic growth. Meanwhile, other economies are also evolving, and this also leads to changes in opportunities, restrictions and even visions and beliefs. Eventually, even the natural environment undergoes modifications, thereby opening up or closing off opportunities and options.

Tracking such processes and representing them in a fairly precise way poses major analytical and practical challenges. This document is a preliminary reflection based on existing literature. Rather than a detailed or exhaustive review, it is a brief exercise aimed at identifying some of the main issues and questions as a prelude to subsequent studies on economic development.

Traditionally, the various theories of economic development have stressed the significance of structural factors based on conditions such as abundance of natural resources, specialization in activities that offer good opportunities for technical improvements, the existence of high saving rates and levels of capital formation, extensive markets or other circumstances that may encourage a faster pace of technological change (see, *inter alia*, Chenery and Syrquin, 1975). More recently, a high rate of accumulation of human capital has also been identified as an important factor in economic development (see, for example, Barro and Lee, 1994, Mankiw and others, 1992 and Lucas, 1988). Currently, however, emphasis has shifted to social factors, particularly the effects of institutions and culture on incentives (see, *inter alia*, North, 1981, Landes, 1998, Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000 and Acemoglu and others, 2004).

There is clear evidence that incentives (in the economic, social and political areas) and the institutions that mould them are important for development. However, institutions themselves are influenced by political and economic structures, that is, they are endogenously determined. Furthermore, the economic structure seems to be a central factor in specific growth mechanisms and in the interest matrix that in turn affects politics. Thus, a better understanding of the process of economic development requires consideration of the joint determination of economic structure and social institutions (Ocampo, 2001).

A natural starting point for this analysis is a consideration of the proximate sources of economic growth, that is, variables that have a more or less direct effect on the expansion of aggregate production volumes.⁶ One of the basic components in any development process is the persistent and sizable increase in the quantity of goods and services produced and made available to the population. It is therefore crucial to specify the effects and mechanisms which directly or indirectly generate such growth. This topic is the subject of section 2. Of course, there is an

⁶ Hoffman (2001) has argued that proximate causes are the channels through which “ultimate causes” operate, and thus should not be interpreted as independent from the latter. In turn, the effect of potential ultimate causes would depend on the configuration of the economy.

abundance of literature on the direct determinants of “the wealth of nations”. Yet despite the progress made in understanding economic growth, many major questions remain unanswered.

Several issues are well established. Although the accumulation of physical capital and an increasingly skilled workforce are central factors for growth, they only explain some of the differences between countries in terms of levels and growth rates of income. Movements in resource productivity seem to be quite important, which draws attention to the mechanisms and incentives that generate knowledge and techniques for subsequent application in production. The accumulation of factors and productive knowledge in turn depends on the opportunities and incentives offered by technological, structural and institutional factors and the international environment. In addition, the growth rates of different economies are interdependent, linked by a complex set of influences which presumably vary according to the economic structure. This structure is in turn shaped by external trade, knowledge flows and the effects of the movement of goods and investment on skills and incentives to innovate, imitate and apply technologies. Therefore, even if the accumulation of resources is a basic and crucial element of growth, there remain questions about what determines this accumulation and the factors that affect productivity and interactions between economies.

The intensity of the accumulation and the form it takes, along with its level of productivity, all depend on the opportunities generated by the economy’s structure and the way these are perceived and processed by agents. In turn, the way in which agent interactions are organized affects incentives and restricts or guides behaviour. At one time, the literature stressed the link between economic development and structure; now the emphasis is on institutional issues; these matters are briefly discussed in section 3. Lastly, section 4 deals with empirical research into determining factors of development and examines criteria for analysing specific case studies on the basis of the foregoing discussions.

2. Determinants of economic growth

Available evidence suggests that rapid increases in worldwide per capita output (implying visibly different standards of living from one generation to the next) are typical of the last two centuries (Maddison, 2001). During this time, in which the population also expanded considerably (and despite the fluctuations, crises and blatant inequalities among regions and individuals), there has been a large, and so far uninterrupted, upward surge of the aggregate capacity to produce goods and services in comparison with previous periods. This rise has been associated with a much more frequent emergence of major technological changes (see Fogel, 2004).

However, there remain major differences in the state and performance of different economies. Between 1960 and 2000, real per capita income in the developing world grew at an annual average rate of 2.3%. An expansion of this order of magnitude is far from negligible, as it means a doubling of real per capita income every 30 years. The observed growth also went hand in hand with improvements in social indicators (such as literacy, child mortality and life expectancy), although income distribution remained strongly biased, and poverty levels quite high. During the same period, however, the annual per capita growth rate of developed countries was 2.7%. In other words, aside from emblematic cases of intense growth –mainly in Asia– there has been no strong narrowing of the gap between developing and developed economies. Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa grew significantly until the decade of 1970 but then their growth stalled, with somewhat of an upturn in the decade of 1990. These experiences show that the convergence of levels of income and output is far from being inevitable or automatic. While income and output tend to converge among rich countries as a group, there is no such convergence between groups of rich and poor countries (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). Therein lies the special importance of growth analysis from the point of view of relatively low-income economies.

The theory of economic growth has evolved considerably, particularly in terms of modelling strategies and methods. Aside from changes in emphasis and representation techniques, however, some issues and discussions have remained relevant over time. Traditionally, growth was represented as a result of the accumulation of physical capital and exogenous increases in productivity. Levels of income and growth rates during the transition were associated with the frugality of the population, as expressed in average savings rates. These arguments implicitly disregard the potential problems (identified in traditional Keynesian literature) of transforming the disposition to save into actual investment, and tend to view such issues as factors that may influence the pattern of business cycles, but not primarily the growth trend.⁷

In any event, there appears to be a natural association between economic growth and willingness to save (either represented by a propensity to save out of income or as an impatience rate in optimizing-agent models): if, for any reason, a society has a strong preference for immediate consumption and therefore acts in a way that sacrifices the availability of resources in times to come, it can hardly expect the future to be more prosperous than the present. Though it might sound trivial and the temporal precedence of frugality and higher incomes can be debated (see Rodrik, 1998), growth requires agents to be willing to weigh up the future in their decisions, and conditions that enable that willingness to be translated into concrete actions. The point clearly raises social and institutional issues, as they affect the expected returns on savings and investments.

A continued process of capital accumulation and increases in the level of production must overcome potential decreasing returns on the use of resources. It was not always considered possible for this to happen indefinitely: some classic theories maintain that economies eventually tend towards a steady state with more or less fixed values of per capita output and capital (see J. S. Mill, 1848 and Baumol, 1951). Of course, Solow's basic growth model (1956) also generates convergence towards a steady state in per capita output, unless there are persistent exogenous increases in productivity. Much of the recent literature has sought to modify this result by means of arguments that may rationalize persistent growth as an economic outcome, with no continuous decline in the returns on capital, and therefore on investment incentives (Aghion and Howitt, 1998).

The literature has identified different ways of avoiding decreasing returns on investment. The mechanisms that can sustain productivity include: (i) technical spillovers (external to firms) that boost capital productivity as accumulation proceeds (Frankel, 1962; Romer, 1986); (ii) constantly generating "learning by doing" effects in production (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Young, 1991; 1993); (iii) increasing supplies of human capital, which raise the productivity of physical capital (Nelson and Phelps, 1966, Lucas, 1988); (iv) continuous increases in the quality of inputs through profit-motivated innovation (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992); and (v) a persistent widening in the variety of inputs used in production as the scale of the economy gets larger (Romer, 1990).

All these growth channels have common features. In particular, in one way or another, they are based on steady increases in knowledge applied to production. Total productivity increases because, through various means, agents learn to improve and diversify the supply of inputs and increase the returns on resources used. Another similarity is the hypothesis (necessary for unlimited-growth models) that innovation capacity facilitates cumulative increases in productivity at a constant rate. This hypothesis can be expressed in several forms, for instance by suggesting that

⁷ The distinction between short term and long term is not strictly valid from an analytical or practical point of view, given that both types of phenomena occur as a result of the same sets of decisions. Macroeconomic instability or the perception that activity can undergo sudden declines seem capable of seriously discouraging investment and the adoption of more productive techniques (through channels determined, for example, by a preference for flexibility). Also, certain major fluctuations in output (especially in solvency crises) could be a reflection of errors in agents' forecasts of production and income trends (see Heymann and Sanguinetti, 1998). It would be a matter for discussion in concrete instances whether and how these effects are relevant (and therefore when it is necessary to deal explicitly with beliefs and risk perceptions about long-term macroeconomic performance), or when it is acceptable to use stylizations that, as in much of the literature, discount issues of coordination and formation of expectations in order to represent growth.

there are externalities such that, as a reduced form, aggregate output is proportional to aggregate capital stock, the application of a certain amount of human capital in education increases total human capital at a constant pace, or a given amount of research generates fixed proportional increases in the range or quality of inputs.

Aside from these general similarities, however, there are considerable differences between the various mechanisms, as reflected in the contrasting visions on what drives and restricts growth. For instance, infant industry arguments would be relevant if “learning by doing” were the engine of productivity increases, but not if the priority were the variety of inputs available for production. If the accumulation of physical capital is what generates positive spillover effects for the economy as a whole, the conclusions to be drawn would be different from those reached if productivity increases occur in response to a greater intensity in terms of human capital. Stressing the use of knowledge physically incorporated in objects, or the imitation and adaptation of methods, techniques and equipment is not the same as technology creation in the true sense of the phrase. In Leibenstein’s X-efficiency argument (1976), the competitive environment stimulates productivity, while the prospect of monopoly revenues is what promotes innovation in Schumpeterian analyses. In other words, means of generating and propagating technical progress may, in principle, differ considerably, and have varying implications in terms of conditions for boosting or restricting productivity increases.

The models also differ regarding the importance they assign to scale effects. Some arguments place strong emphasis on such effects. According to Romer (1990), if potential innovators face fixed costs of resources in order to extend by a certain proportion the range of inputs (sold in monopoly conditions with isoelastic demand), the aggregate growth rate will increase in line with the size of the market. This would result in divergence rather than convergence between opportunities for raising productivity and between growth rates of (closed) economies of a different scale. Other arguments weaken the general applicability of this conclusion. In Young (1998), although innovation may be used to increase the quantity or quality of inputs, it is the increases in quality that govern aggregate growth. A larger economy that produces a greater variety of inputs must therefore use more resources to generate a homogenous growth rate in the quality of inputs. As a result, the growth rate does not depend on the scale. Nevertheless, the level of productivity and per capita income does increase with the aggregate volume of resources in the economy. Other analyses (see Burgess and Venables, 2004) identify various clustering effects that can generate a concentration of activities in certain locations and promote and sustain income differentials by geographical region (although regions should not be automatically interpreted as having the same relevance as countries).

Scale effects are also potentially linked to “strategic complementarities”, namely situations in which the expansion of certain agents’ activities raises the marginal returns on the expansion of others’ (see Cooper and John, 1988). These situations are in turn conducive to multiple equilibria or coordination phenomena in which the decisions of agents motivated by observing or predicting that others are acting in the same way could in principle generate a collective “big push” that rescues the economy from a “trap” and produces an upsurge in growth. This features in many models or arguments in the form of mechanisms such as complementarities in the productivity of capital, human capital, research and development, productive linkages, transaction costs associated with the density of market exchanges or even the choices that agents make to engage in either innovation or rent-seeking activities.⁸ Yet the existence of strategic complementarities does not necessarily imply multiple equilibria, it simply means that they are a possibility. It is therefore particularly important to establish the validity and significance of an effect in specific cases, rather than its mere potential.

⁸ See, for instance, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Hirschman (1958), Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Krugman (1991), Rodrik (1996), Acemoglu (1996) and Hoff and Stiglitz (2001).

The issue is a general one. The literature has identified many plausible effects that may play a role in determining development patterns. Each model emphasizes a subset of effects, and treats them as responsible for the economy's growth throughout its development. Although this is perfectly natural from an analytical point of view, certain mechanisms are probably particularly relevant in some circumstances and less so in others. Identifying when and how certain mechanisms have visible effects, and what conditions determine their intensity probably requires combining statistical and historical methods, and using both aggregate and microeconomic evidence (see, for instance, Pack, 1994, Mokyr, 2002).

Although the mechanisms described in the literature are not necessarily mutually exclusive, any attempt to represent them simultaneously could easily result in unmanageable analytical complexity. It is therefore extremely difficult to formulate a general model of development or economic growth capable of generating precise propositions. At the same time, the range of validity of each model seems limited. It has been traditionally suggested that the activities that serve as "conveyors" of technical progress vary according to time and place (Prebisch, 1952). The challenge therefore lies in strategic simplifications for interpreting and discussing concrete processes, while bearing in mind that the range of validity of specific arguments is likely to be limited. In terms of the construction of models, it should be acknowledged that their relevance depends on certain characteristics and parameters of the economy. Growth patterns would then feature some elements typical of a given production structure and moment in time, variable according to economies' histories and consequent changes in their structure. It seems important for these factors to be recognized and explicitly explored if progress is to be made towards more general propositions.

3. Social coordination: institutions

The study of development has particular characteristics within the field of economic analysis. Almost by definition, development is a non-repetitive process that, apart from its general logic and conditions, is marked by features of time and place. One possible analogy could be speculation about which organisms have good prospects of prospering and reproducing in biological evolution: the answer cannot be found in isolation of the environment, which is itself in flux (see Nelson and Winters, 1982, Nelson, 1994). Development processes also involve aspects of the social system, which (to simplify the analysis) economics tends to place under the heading "all else being equal". This is particularly the case for institutions, which are generally assumed as given constants in the usual day-to-day analysis and whose influence is therefore implicitly subsumed in parameters of agent behaviour.

The traditional theories of economic development (put forward by the "magnificent dynamics" of such classics as those of Smith or Marx, post-war pioneers such as Hirschman, Prebisch and Myrdal or, more recently, North) have always been concerned with the links between economic development and social organization. In one form or another, expanding the productive base was seen as part of a process of social evolution, with the corresponding changes in the structure of economies, group relations and interactions and political rules and arrangements. This evolution was not necessarily perceived as orderly or harmonious: development could be marked (and affected) by conflicts and tensions between social and political conditions and those that could make a better contribution to economic growth. In some cases, it was even argued that those very tensions could generate the incentives and opportunities conducive to institutional change, and to the development of productive activities. These changes were seen as the result of the actions of social groups, and of their cooperation or conflict as driven by their respective interests, beliefs and values, given the current situation and history of the system. Common threads running through these theories with their differing ideological approaches included: a vision of institutions as part of a system composed of interrelated elements with possible local dynamics (certain elements being separately modifiable, with some effect on the functioning of the whole), and the notion of

institutional change as a process in which economic components (in the strict sense) shift along with social and political elements.

Economic development usually implies increases in the complexity of the system of exchanges and relations between agents, which tend to manifest themselves in higher levels of division of labour and greater specificity in many skills and tasks. More advanced systems (in this sense) therefore also have greater requirements in terms of coordinating multiple aspects of the behaviour of large numbers of agents. As a prerequisite for development, systems must establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination at different levels, such as the use of resources in production units, exchanges, delivery of public goods and the definition and operation of State machineries. These mechanisms obviously have many significant distributional implications, which can make them the subject of disputes and bargaining among social groups. In any event, coordination failures imply economic costs. Development problems (reflecting dynamics that fail to take advantage of existing opportunities, in the light of resources and external conditions) usually seem to be associated with problems in how individual decisions are made and interlinked, that is, institutional issues of some sort. However, it is no mean feat to identify the precise nature and effects of institutional limitations in concrete cases.

Institutions, in the broad sense of the word, are clearly important for economic performance. This is reflected in the fact that development patterns are nearly always and unquestionably analysed at the national level:⁹ the division between economies is perceived as being naturally associated with the division between nations, each with its own characteristics in terms of political organization and patterns of social behaviour. Also, the oft-cited emblematic experiences of countries divided up following the Second World War point to the relevance of institutions,¹⁰ and cast doubt on simplistic alternative theories based solely on geographical determination or cultural background (see Acemoglu and others, 2004). However, theories based on the importance of institutions have their own simplifications.

There is also a question mark over the basic definition of what institutions are. A useful starting point is the ubiquitous definition of institutions put forward by North (1990): “the rules of the game in a society, or, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. This notion clearly highlights the social character of how institutions emerge and their role as generators of behavioural constraints and incentives.¹¹ Institutions also have a major role in providing information as a means of reducing the difficulty of decision-making for agents who, in fact, perform less well when confronted with complex decision-making problems. Thus, institutions act as a set of rules that provide structure and predictability for interactions between individuals in society.

The “rules of the game” define what is being played by establishing a system of rewards and penalties and instilling in participants beliefs about other people’s behaviour in various circumstances.¹² “Rule failures” bring down the quality of the game, either because they induce the wrong incentives, or because they complicate the formation of expectations and decision-making.

⁹ An exception would be the literature on economic geography, which emphasizes the potential clustering effects or externalities generated in urban areas or regions (see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; Baldwin, Forslid, Martin and Ottaviano, 2003).

¹⁰ In such cases, there is a sharp contrast in the performance of originally similar economies that then develop separately under different political regimes. However, even assessments based on how systems perform over a relatively short period of time (such as a decade) have observed considerable changes. During and following the United States Depression in the decade of 1930, it was widely considered that, in strictly economic terms, planned economies had an advantage over decentralized economies –an opinion that could not be further removed from subsequent viewpoints–.

¹¹ Another interesting vision is that of Searle (1995), who states that the creation of “institutional reality” is associated with a primitive logical operation along the lines of: “We accept (S has power (S does A))”. This formulation is useful for what it establishes, but also for what it leaves implicit, namely how the subject (“we”) is defined, how the collective acceptance of the proposition is established, and what is the concrete content of the acceptance or obligation.

¹² The image of the game highlights the fact that the right rules depend on the characteristics of the game itself. In the economic field, for example, the institutional requirements are likely to be different for an economy seeking the immediate mobilization of resources to exploit an opportunity provided by natural endowments, compared with those of an economy whose current development depends on its ability to generate and disseminate cutting-edge technological innovations.

The game analogy also enables us to visualize the trade-offs between lax and strict rules: total laxity (actions follow no pattern and injuries are common), at one extreme, versus a minutely predetermined ritual with no room for player initiatives or “interesting” tactics, on the other. What constitutes a useful compromise between predictability and flexibility might vary, and achieving it may be a matter of trial and error. This kind of opposition occurs in many economic contexts. The development potential of economies probably has more to do with their capacity to flexibly adapt to the environment than with efficient resource allocation (see North, 1994). An important characteristic of institutions would therefore be their contribution (or otherwise) to this “adaptive efficiency”, although there is much uncertainty about how this is generated.

Institutions may be formally defined or may develop informally as social norms, conventions and codes of behaviour. The effect of institutions depends on how they operate together: certain sets of rules can boost, constrain or counteract other rules. In some cases, there can be complementarity as well as substitution and conflict between formal and informal rules (see Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982). Differences also exist in the effectiveness and cost of mechanisms used to encourage or deter certain behaviours. All institutions, formal and informal, have mechanisms for implementation and rewards or penalties (to be applied by an agent, social group or the legal system). The responsibility for operating these mechanisms lies with other institutions, and so forth.¹³ From this point of view, it is possible to define a hierarchical order of institutions.¹⁴ The institutional structure is influenced by agents’ expectations, beliefs and perceptions (North’s “social beliefs”, 2004), and the way these were formed on the basis of agent experiences and learning processes.¹⁵ All of the above suggests that transplanting the successful rules of one society onto another would not necessarily have the desired effect, and uncertainty would surround the outcomes of such “institutional engineering”.

Within the set of rules and behaviour patterns that come under the concept of economic institutions, emphasis has generally been placed on the definition and scope of property rights and their enforcement mechanisms (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; North and Thomas, 1973). The structure of property rights certainly affects incentives and behaviour, and ambiguities in how these rights are defined generate distortions and transaction costs. In terms of the growth capacity of a national economy, a country where individual and corporate assets may be randomly seized by a State authority, or where political instability gives rise to considerable variations in rights and obligations, will have little chance of setting up a process to accumulate capital and incorporate technology into production. As a prerequisite for such a process, decisions to invest in physical goods or generate and implement new production methods must be based on expectations of suitable benefits.

However, this argument is by no means tantamount to an extreme statement linking development with an unbounded and unconditional perpetuation of all existing property rights. The

¹³ Although the issue is too complex to enter into within the present discussion, this clearly raises the question of “who will watch the watchers” and the possibility of circular arguments such as: laws are not respected due to failures in enforcement mechanisms, and this is because those in charge of enforcement follow their own interests and not those corresponding to their duties, and this is due to the lack of appropriate incentives, and this is because the laws are not applied. During economic and political crises, the issue of the origins and the mechanisms that determine the (self-)sustainability of institutions becomes immediate and concrete: “When the rules for how to deal with the violation of rules come themselves to be broken, what rules will then apply?” (Leijonhufvud, 2003). The enforcement mechanisms for the rules and regulations that restrict the actions of those that have “public authority” are linked to the availability of “commitment technologies” for governments and social/political groups, which can significantly affect the functioning of the economy (cf. Acemoglu, 2005; Heymann, Navajas and Warnes, 1991).

¹⁴ Acuña and Tommasi (1999) make the distinction between a basic level of rules consisting of policies (rules that potentially affect individual behaviour and the distribution of the results of social activity), intermediate-level rules (that determine incentives and constraints for modifying low-level institutions) and high-level rules.

¹⁵ Some of these attitudes and beliefs can be part of “routine” sets of behaviour that tend to be deep-seated and resistant to change (see Nelson, (2002)).

“initial” definition of rights clearly has an effect on the potential for economic growth.¹⁶ For some historically determined set-ups of rights, preserving the status quo may preclude potentially achievable improvements, while implementing reforms would imply denying previously recognized property rights. The distributive issue is unavoidable. One aspect of safeguarding property rights is protecting the small private agent in the face of potentially arbitrary State power, but another one may imply “freezing” the distribution of resources in a very uneven configuration. In particular, if low-income groups are to benefit from relinquishing options to enact distributive measures in their favour, in order to promote accumulation, they would have to gain enough from growth to make it worth their while. In societies where poorer individuals have a significant say in policy decisions, the acceptability of property distribution probably depends on the concrete perception that maintaining the existing configuration would induce an economic expansion whose benefits would then be realized throughout the income scale.

There seem to be two antipodal attitudes to institutional change. One is the “organic” viewpoint, according to which institutions are the outcome of the system’s unguided evolution and in each moment express some form of social equilibrium. In this vision, any attempt to interfere in the course of institutions would be useless or counterproductive. At the other extreme, the “constructivist” perspective holds that institutions are the products of design, and that they emerge and function due to acts of political will. Both versions have their problems: one denies all possibility of change (and ignores the fact that institutions are created and operated by agents that have decided to effect change and succeeded in doing so), while the other posits a capacity for institutional engineering that seems hard to identify in practice, and tends to trivialize social decision-making processes (by somehow suggesting that “where there is a will, there is a way”). Working out the limits of the deliberate construction of institutions is definitely complex, and involves considering, *inter alia*, the extent to which certain behavioural patterns are entrenched.

Prior to recent reconsiderations, the last few decades have seen much of policy-based analysis adopt an approach close to institutional engineering, whereby countries were encouraged to redesign their institutions on the basis of a general predetermined pattern, either in the form of a decalogue or a consensus. Aside from the pros and cons of specific recommendations for concrete cases, the usefulness of any “list of recommended reforms” (regardless of its nature or orientation) is dubious since the proposals are not based on precise arguments (which is understandable, given the difficulty of fitting the development process into a simple set of arguments) and they claim to be general while ignoring the conflicts inherent in their implementation. This very lack of reference to conflicts and priorities is a sign of analytical weakness.

Institution-based arguments aim to explore “ultimate” determinants of levels and variations of economic prosperity, in contrast with proximate determinants such as capital accumulation and the adoption of new technologies. At the same time, institutions are endogenously defined as the result of a series of “social interplays”, where the features and the evolution of the economy are likely to play a considerable part. That means that the relationship between development and institutions may not be one of direct or ultimate determination. To give the subject its due, it seems important to consider both the concrete way in which institutions affect the mechanisms of economic growth, and the fact that institutions themselves have their dynamics. Putting forward solid propositions would require such accurate and deep knowledge of the economic functioning and interactions between social and political groups as to be probably beyond reach. Acknowledging the qualitative gap between analytical aspirations and the capacity for establishing

¹⁶ For instance, highly concentrated ownership of certain resources may restrict their use and reduce investment opportunities (see North and Thomas, 1973), while the distribution of wealth might affect the elites’ incentives to support the diffusion of public education (Engermann and Sokoloff, 2000; Galiani and others, 2005). The discussion on the effects of patents as catalysts of technological innovation but also as a barrier to the use of existing technology also illustrates that the definition of exclusion rights implies far from negligible trade-offs.

reliable causal links may be useful for nuancing any statements and putting them in their right context.

Both from an analytical and practical point of view, however, it is important to attempt to identify the contribution (negative or positive) of various types of institution to the capacity to generate economic growth. The existence of “institutional bottlenecks” would point to critical restrictions and lead to the identification of priorities that could be reflected in policy actions based on the characteristics and specific circumstances of economies (see Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 2004). Questions also arise about complementarities or substitutions between rules, mechanisms and forms of organization. A complicated issue, and at the same time one that tends to emerge in concrete situations is the extent to which institutions make up a system in which modifying one component has significant effects on the whole, or whether institutions can be subject to incremental changes, the effects of which would be more or less independent of one another.¹⁷

In the discussion on the endogenous nature of institutions, it has become clear that a country’s institutions depend on the conditions that determine the nature of social conflicts and the power structure that affects their outcome. Economic institutions are chosen on the basis of the interests of the powerful groups (Acemoglu, 2005; Mallon and Sourrouille, 1975). This puts the emphasis back on the structure and evolution of the economy as factors affecting various group interests, their economic and political influence and their incentives to either form coalitions or enter into conflict. Economic decisions and political attitudes also depend on expectations and beliefs. Structure, institutions and beliefs would thus interact in dynamics that could be subject to elucidation, or at least to mapping in an orderly fashion, by development analysis (see Nelson, 1994). This clearly does not seem an easy task since, in order to generate sufficient degrees of depth and precision, it would require a complicated integration of quite different types of specific knowledge.

4. Remarks on empirical and case studies

The study of economic development gives rise to a variety of demands and problems for empirical study. One such issue concerns the chain that links a set of “ultimate causes” with economic outcomes. If this outcome amounts to measuring per capita GDP (as a rough approximation), then the accumulation of resources in the form of physical capital, skills or human capital, and productive knowledge, would be the main determining factors.¹⁸ However, that accumulation is clearly an endogenous effect of behaviour based on the perceived opportunities arising at a given time and place, and governed by incentives that depend on the institutional framework. This raises the question of how decisions regarding accumulation are made and implemented, which in turn relates to indirect mechanisms, leading, in principle, to “truly” exogenous variables operating as ultimate impulses.

Econometrics has developed precise concepts for the notions of causality, which are specifically related to the estimation of structural equation systems. The parameters of a structural

¹⁷ To refer to one recent example in the region, the widespread opinion that the public management of enterprises generated undesirable incentives that were difficult to change within a State-run system led to the proposal of privatization as a “cure for all”. Subsequently, greater importance was given to the effect of regulatory frameworks on the functioning of privatized companies, how those frameworks were managed and, more generally, the effect of the legal system and the public sector’s capacity to design and implement standards and policies. These analytical developments made it necessary to qualify the initial propositions (which had often been presented unconditionally) and indirectly raised questions about whether to attribute efficiency problems in the respective sectors to a certain form of ownership or management, or to generic limitations in terms of public-sector capabilities, both applicable to direct management and to regulation.

¹⁸ In some cases, incorporating the economic use of non-produced primary resources can represent an important factor for growth (as it was for Latin American countries in the nineteenth century). In such situations, there can be a period of major increases in output above and beyond the contribution of growth in physical capital and human skills. These processes are presumably subject to decreasing yields and would have different characteristics and dynamics compared with processes based on increases in capital and technology.

equation thus refer to a shifting of the estimated variable (y) in a conceptual experiment that involves modifying (by means of an external intervention) the value of an “explanatory” variable (x), all else remaining constant.¹⁹ However, experience has shown that it is difficult to identify these systems in the field of development economics, even assuming homogenous and stable patterns of behaviour among countries and over time.

The abundant literature devoted to the identification of the causes of economic growth (usually based on the estimation of cross-section models) has not produced conclusive results. Stumbling blocks include the difficulty of formulating credible contrafactual hypotheses, and the size of the reference population: development processes are long-term phenomena and, therefore, the available set of relevant observations is not large. Given that theory does not specify strong restrictions on the how many potential causes to consider, the number of potentially relevant variables rapidly becomes comparable to the number of cases (or episodes) observed. In this regard, some studies have identified causes not considered important in others, thereby modifying the set of variables in question (see Levine and Renelt, 1992).

More recent literature, on the other hand, has focused more on identifying causal relations in reduced form, although without necessarily defining “ultimate determinants”.²⁰ Examples include studies that attempt to identify the causal effects of institutions (see Acemoglu and others, 2001; 2002), thereby providing valuable information on the effects of certain causes.

This suggests that development studies would benefit from combining the use of theoretical models of direct, intermediate and indirect causes with quantitative and qualitative methods aimed at exploring how causal processes come about in specific instances.²¹ Although it would not be possible to accurately establish causes of development (let alone identify a single final determinant), it does appear feasible to aim at defining certain causal links, while recognizing that they may have a limited range of validity.

Heuristically, defining a starting point would require an effort to simplify the problem and to narrow down the set of questions to be considered. The foregoing discussion suggests that a general approach may not be feasible. Hence, one may conceive of an iterative process in which preliminary information from theories, the history of economies and existing econometric research can help to raise and formulate questions and outline potential chains of causality relevant to the case, as a way of focusing efforts. This specific basis may make it possible to posit more or less precisely defined questions that can be addressed with (formal or informal) modelling to identify empirically comparable behaviour patterns and critical parameters that would affect the validity ranges of hypotheses. These exercises may help to identify critical parameters that determine the direction and scope of economic evolution from certain initial conditions, and tend to generate major economic and institutional transformations (such as the emergence of significant education systems in Galor and Moav, 2001, 2004, and Galiani and others, 2006). This analytical support may guide the data analysis to be used in estimation exercises or in ordered narratives attempting to stylize decision-making processes, dynamics of economic performance and structural and institutional characteristics, which in turn might constitute the initial conditions for new analysable episodes. In any case, the final products will justify the methods and procedure used.

¹⁹ This coincides with the interpretation of Haavelmo (1943), who specifically refers to structural equations as statements on hypothetical controlled experiments.

²⁰ Another question that is important from a practical point of view is the time scale of the causal effects identified: “secular” influences are obviously not the same as ones that operate in the shorter term. The empirical literature under consideration has tended to concentrate on the former type of effect: properties of long-term evolution.

²¹ An interesting reference is that of the analytic narratives (see Bates and others (1998), Rodrik (2003)).

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