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Henry Kellerman

# Psychoanalysis of Evil

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Henry Kellerman

# Psychoanalysis of Evil

Perspectives on Destructive Behavior

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*For  
beautiful  
Maria Oliva Van De Mark  
forever friend*

## Preface

In the winter of 2013, I was invited to attend a conference on the issue of evil. A symposium was featured, composed of several professionals representing the fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy, and psychiatry. With the exception of one thorough overview on the literature on evil (presented by Anna Aragno, Ph.D., in her paper entitled: *The Devil Within: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Evil*, 2013)) it seemed to me that most of the remaining presentations and discussions boiled down to several people agreeing that what was needed was a conclave of philosophers, theologians, psychoanalysts, and other interested specialists to join hands and perhaps learn how to finally develop the program to annihilate evil. This would be accomplished by virtue of understanding the mystery of evil; that is, to gather their cumulative intellectual mastery in order to produce an exorcism so that then, good-bye forever to such a mystery of evil.

It would not be incorrect if one were to suspect some disenchantment on my part. Although much was covered at the symposium, actually, I noticed that there was an absence of any suggestion about how to begin a thinking process regarding an entry point (any entry point) on the subject of evil. An appreciable amount of time at this symposium was devoted to discussing World War II, in which it was agreed that Nazi objectives (and of course, the actual accomplishments of Nazi aims) were uniformly evil.

In my opinion presenters and attendees were stating a variety of self-evident truths (axioms) in the form of what I would consider clichés, and then also focusing on the psychopathology and sociopathology of evil by referencing the diagnosis of psychopathic personality and correlating it to evil behavior. Along with this, other comments were heard in the variety of ways one can focus on the concept and importance of “empathy” (or rather the lack thereof with respect to evil), as well as on the obvious idea of “being a good person.” Yet, I thought: ‘Does the self-evident truth that empathy is the necessary antidote to cruelty and sadism (under the overarching umbrella of evil) tell us anything at all about the deep structure of evil, about the essence and deepest source of evil—about its genesis?’ The answer I gave myself was a resounding “No.”

However, the references to World War II at this symposium and its genocidal vicissitudes, brought to mind another act of the war that might shed some light on how

to approach the issue of evil, and who it should be that finally does this approaching. It occurred to me that there is one specialty or intellectual domain that is perhaps better primed to do such analysis in contrast to other intellectual domains—even in contrast to those that claim some special perspective on the entire issue of evil. Despite such assumed claims, it is my sense that the infrastructure of evil remains insufficiently understood, not entirely parsed, nor thoroughly unraveled. This is true even in the face of such certainty from a variety of intellectual, philosophical, and/or theological provinces regarding the assurance of having already produced prodigious amounts of theoretical abstractions and perhaps, empirical data leading to an already assumed effective penetration into the issue of evil.

However, it is simply not enough to examine the issue of evil and then arrive at a point of only reiterating the axioms: namely, referring to the necessity of empathy, extolling the value (and virtue) of being a good person, and in terms of the necessary psychoanalytic concept in the study of evil—that is, in a positive sense of having an uncontaminated superego, or in a negative sense of having an underdeveloped or punitive superego.

It might be interesting to find an example that shows that rather than convening individuals representing a conclave of various scholarly domains to tackle the particular subject—matter of evil, it might be more efficacious to find the one domain that possibly has the technology, the understanding of psychological infrastructure to perhaps suggest a path that permits a more penetrating and discerning entry into the psychology of evil.

As I thought about it, I was reminded that during the symposium, the Second World War was mightily discussed and so it further occurred to me that the Second World War might be an example of an arena in which representatives of one domain only (not a conclave of concerned domains), unraveled something that desperately needed unraveling.

During the Second World War, Nazi U-boat submarines were playing havoc with all allied shipping, especially and relentlessly with the shipping of supplies from the United States to our European allies. In this sense, the North-Atlantic became a lamentation—an unforgiving egregious graveyard to allied shipping. The U-boats were successfully torpedoing everything in sight, so that during the war these U-boats sank 2779 ships comprising a total of more than 14 million tons of cargo. This figure is roughly 70% of all allied shipping losses in all theatres of the war.

However, one of the U-boats was captured by a British submarine and was boarded. Its objective was to secure the German High Command code used on these U-boats that were encrypted in a code-machine known as *Enigma*. Ultimately it was British military intelligence with the aid of information from Polish and Swedish cryptologists that first broke the code. Nonetheless, the British code-breakers also worked with their American counterparts on all sorts of code-breaking tasks. In later developments, other U-boats were boarded and again Enigma machines, codes, and ciphers were taken (liberated).

It was in May of 1941 that the German U-boat submarines U110 and U201 were attacking a British convoy in the Atlantic. U110 surfaced and was abandoned by its crew because after taking some depth charges it was decided that the submarine was



sinking. Then it was the submariners from the British HMS *Bulldog* who boarded the U110 and seized its code books, ciphers, and the submarine's *Enigma* machine. The *Enigma* machine and code books enabled the British code-breaker encryption/decryption experts at Bletchley Park in England to then solve the German/Nazi code, ultimately and essentially contributing to the course of ending the war. Bletchley Park was Winston Churchill's secret intelligence and computer headquarters—an encryption/decryption government code and cipher school.

The point of all of this is to underscore the evident issue that it was cryptologists who were the ones with the necessary virtuosity, training, education, and experience in code-breaking-technology to do the job. In this respect, it was not necessary to consult with philosophers, theologians, historians, or any other particular interested parties. The reason for not consulting with these others was that these others obviously knew next to nothing (actually, nothing) about the task at hand—encryption/decryption.

Now we come to the breaking of the code of evil. So, who should break the code? Have philosophers done it despite centuries of considering it? Have theologians done it despite claims that the province of evil is more than likely in their domain, and who have also given us two millennia of analysis and writing on evil? Have psychoanalysts done it with their assumed intellectual capital that having expertise in the psychology of evil makes it clearly and actually a candidate for such a psychoanalytic excavation within the specific psychoanalytic domain? The answer to these questions is a resounding No! None of these respective intellectual disciplines has done it, despite the unalloyed fact that each has considered it, discussed it, and published breathtaking mountains of literature about it.

Thus, even after centuries of considering the ins and outs of evil we are all still confused. It seems evident that after having centuries of access to the writings of philosophers, theologians, and others, we are all still wondering: What in the world is evil all about? It would not be far-fetched to state that to this day, there has not been developed nor even suggested a systematic understanding of how to parse evil and in so doing, how to analyze it, and finally, how to see it synthesized—to carefully observe its architecture, its engineering, and its operation. Thus, to summarize, it is my distinct impression that the infrastructure of evil remains insufficiently understood; that is, not even close to being unraveled.

The question becomes, how to ascertain the core elements of evil—how to penetrate and finally see these presumed core elements? And importantly, what this all means is to see that evil does in fact contain core elements that are coalesced into an infrastructure. In this sense, (as will be presented in this volume), the unequivocal answer is a resounding “Yes”—evil does indeed contain a deep underpinning, a specific and identifiable infrastructure.

When evil (as a conceptual construct and as a behavior) might be so systematized and its infrastructure understood, presumably only then will we be able to know its derivation (the fount and basic source of evil), and why and how it, evil itself, very frequently and with vile and dreadful effects, just about always either threatens to, or actually manages, to gain the ascendancy. And without a doubt, as a historical incontrovertible fact, evil does indeed threaten, and does also very definitely (and quite successfully), manage to gain the ascendancy.

Of course by referring to evil as an “it” can miss the point. Evil is not an inanimate object (or even something anthropomorphized); that is, evil is not a table or a chair. Rather, on an individual psychological basis evil will always be related to a “*who*” not to an “it.” One can only refer to evil as an “it” when relating evil to sociological events such as the Nazi-led Holocaust against Jews and others, the Armenian genocide, the Cambodian carnage, African-American slavery along with the catastrophic slaughter of native Americans—also including all sorts of ethnic-cleansing across the globe—from tribal and ethnic/racial clashes in Africa and Asia to ethnic cleansing in Europe.

In addition, and in my opinion, despite the rather vainglorious attempts of psychoanalytic excavations into the understanding of the nature of evil, in this volume, I will attempt to show that the concept of evil in fact and assuredly can be revealed in its essence (regardless of past rather failed and even tepid attempts at deriving such essence) by applying psychoanalytic constructs to the entire course of evil—especially to its absolutely existing infrastructure. Such a psychoanalytic excavation will unfold here, and claim to uncover the code-breaking revelation in the understanding of behavior, deemed, defined, seen, or even intuited as evil. We will show that evil does indeed have an infrastructure and that this infrastructure is located and organized in:

**the person’s psyche.**

Thus, I am taking aim at evil through the application of psychoanalytic metapsychology. I believe it is there that the definition, nuances, and variations in the understanding (even sensation) of evil will be revealed. And in this pursuit, we will review material on evil offered by philosophers, theologians, and others but we will not consult them on the infrastructure of evil as it operates in a person’s psyche, because these other virtuoso thinkers from these other domains may not understand the language of the psyche—and even if they do understand it, usually probably not to the extent necessary. Of course, although in the past evil certainly has been a subject considered by psychoanalysts, nevertheless and unfortunately, and as I’ve stated, the code of evil has remained essentially un-breached.

In the spirit of the cryptologists and decryption experts during the Second World War who only consulted with other kindred spirits, so too here, will we enter the journey into the world of evil generally, evil-intent more specifically, and evil-doings quite specifically, by relying more or less, solely on the psychoanalysts—the presupposed encryption/decryption experts of the psyche. It must be remembered, that evil is not a descendant of a chair or a table. Evil emanates *only* from a person’s psyche.

It is in this sense that the challenge of this volume is to identify and reveal the infrastructural elements of evil in order to see such structure in detail, as well as with respect to its origin. Yes, evil as an “entity” has an origin. If the assumption of psychoanalysts as cryptologists of the psyche is a true reference to their identity (composed of education of the psyche along with “the treating of psyches”), and if psychoanalysis is what it claims to be, then this psychoanalytic journey into the very nature of evil and on the basis of such a psychoanalytic meta-psychological investigation, should be an exciting one—and exceedingly valuable.

## How the Book is Organized

In Part 1 of this volume, I will review samples of the literature on evil from the vantage point of authors of various disciplines who have ventured into the realm of considering and discussing the nature of evil. This will include philosophers such as Arendt (who actually considered herself a political theorist), theologians such as Augustine, social psychiatrists such as R. J. Lifton, psychoanalysts such as Freud, as well as sociologists such as E. A. Ross. In addition, questions regarding the basis of evil, biblical references to evil and finally the elemental infrastructure of evil will be considered.

In addition, in Part 1 of this volume we will also need to examine various questions that naturally arise in such discussions. For example: Is evil absolute or is it relative? Is an adversary's definition of an evil enemy equal to the enemy's notion (the other's notion) of the corresponding adversary as evil? So, which one is truly evil? Is it one and not the other or is it both, or since if it were related to combat, perhaps is it neither? Is it that the Taliban Islamic Militia of Afghanistan who toppled ancient Buddhist sandstone statues, evil, or is it that they felt the presence of such carvings in itself was evil so that they also believed it was not they who were the evil ones? Rather, perhaps they felt the Buddhists were the evil ones and that products created by Buddhists needed; therefore, to be erased in order to nullify the so-called evil of Buddhism which apparently was perhaps experienced by the destroyers of these statues as an affront to Islam. Yet, in this volume I believe we will see it is possible to solve the riddle; that is, that it is one of the adversaries who qualify as evil, and not the other. We will identify which one it is, and why.

Hint: the Buddhist carvings were not an aggression against anyone nor were they intended to inflame anyone. They were an expression of Buddhist culture which is not based on the defilement of any "other." On the other hand, the Taliban Islamic Militia of Afghanistan who destroyed these sandstone carvings, were not merely doing a Taliban Islamic modern dance to celebrate its own culture. No, the destruction and deliberate desecration of the Buddhist carvings were aggressive and *against* "those others." One was not an evil act and the other was. Which do you, the reader, think was the adversary committing evil? Another way to see it is in the example of a slave, who in the process of escaping his slavery kills the slave-master who was trying to foil the escape. Of course the question becomes: Is the escaping slave evil because he killed the slave-master? The answer again is No. The slave is not evil because the slave-master was always in the position as the aggressor-master. The key in such examples concerns the dominant one who is the aggressor against the disempowered one insofar as the aggressor's power becomes the arbiter of so-called law—that is, the dominant aggressor's *wish* becomes the arbitrary law.

In addition, in Part 1, we will also consider psychological elements involved in the gestation of evil as for example: clusters of defense mechanisms utilized in the service of releasing impulse, concepts such as psychopathy, punitive superego, sadism, rationalization, projection and projective identification, splitting, empathetic absence, and so forth. We will relate evil to the psychological enumerations embracing the concept of psychological/emotional symptoms and as such, we will dissect the innermost components of evil thinking, intent, and behavior. We will try to accomplish this by analyzing what we will propose as the forces that combine

to create that which we see as “evil”: *wishes, anger, repression*, and perpetrators whom we shall refer to as the *who*, and all in an attempt to see the inner architecture in the nature of evil. As an analogy, this is akin for example to the translation of Hieroglyphics into modern English; that is, translating an indecipherable so-called antediluvian language into a modern understandable one.

In Part 2, of this volume we will investigate the diagnostic composition of various individuals and societies who have been defined as “nefarious” by many, and have been seen to be evil-doers. We will examine these individuals and societies alike by using available data to gradually accrue a presumed diagnostically relevant analysis of their thinking and behavior. We will examine Hitler of the genocidal Nazi era, Stalin of the genocidal Soviet era, Pol Pot of the Cambodian genocidal “Killing Fields,” the Turkish societal genocide of Armenians, as well as the Pakistani genocide against Bengalis, and Rwandan Hutu genocide against Tutsis.

In both Parts 1 and 2 of the book also will be considered how the psychoanalyst can describe, or actually construct the compass that might potentially get us out of the “confused woods-of-evil” provided we actually use the directional opportunity such a compass possibly offers—and then ask the truly important question: Do we as a people, as *Homo sapiens*, have the energy to walk out of this “confused woods-of-evil” following the specific directionality offered by the compass—this metapsychological compass?

This “walking out of the confused woods-of-evil” means never again to follow the trajectory of evil to its eventual dreadful destination. In addition we will consider some of the various expressions of nefarious, self-serving, exploitative behaviors that comprise a cluster of processes that together, form a taxonomy of evil. Various of these processes are provided by Aragno’s paper: *The Devil Within: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Evil* (2013, pp. 102–103), and include: “talionic responses, scapegoating, sibling rivalry, tribalism, the *wish* for dominance and power, greed, prejudice, extremism, exploitation, and, *uniquely* human, the pleasure in causing pain.” As can be seen, Aragno has her sights set on understanding evil in all its nuances including “sibling rivalry” and the issue of “retaliation” as defined by “talionic responses.” In addition, we will be perusing the psychological mechanisms of defense such as projection and projective identification, denial, reaction-formation, splitting, and so forth, as well as the proximal, or even intimate relation of defenses to the operation of emotion—with a focus on the few primary emotions and the few basic defenses implicated in the formation of evil behavior.

The specific components of the infrastructure of evil indeed will be identified with an attempt to have each component thoroughly explained. In this sense, the promise here is that identifying such an infrastructure may have the power to unveil and thereby divulge the lurking secrets of evil.

It becomes rather clear, that in discussing evil it would be impossible not to consider the vicissitudes of destructiveness. In this sense, if the objective in life is to do good things and not to hurt people, then what we are up to here is to understand the story of how the Serpent managed to slip into Paradise—to then display its ghastly arsenal of despair.

Or did it slip in?

## Language Usage Note

In order to sustain the focus throughout this volume on the entire issue of the nature and structure of evil, certain constant terms will be consistently capitalized (upper case letter), while others will be consistently *italicized*; that is, in all instances, special “attention must be paid” to these terms by assigning them particular importance—that is, spelling certain terms with an upper case letter while consistently *italicizing* others.

The terms capitalized with an uppercase letter include:

Serpent; Paradise.

The terms consistently *italicized* include:

*wish*; *repression*; *anger*; the *who*.

# Acknowledgments

First and foremost I must acknowledge Dr. Anna Aragno who had originally invited me to attend the symposium on evil presented by the *Washington Square Institute for Psychotherapy and Mental Health* in New York City. As it turned out, Dr. Aragno's paper at the symposium held at the conference was a stellar contribution. The paper was erudite and entirely thorough, and it synthesized a great deal of information and ideas. And to top it off her presentation was eloquently presented.

As I had for the past many years begun to forego my attendance at conferences (mostly for the sake of working on the books I was writing), nevertheless, as friend and colleague, my respect for Dr. Aragno enabled me to gather my energies and indeed at least to attend the symposium at the conference. It was there at the symposium that I was inspired to write a book on the nature of evil.

I began to gather materials and actually started my research into the literature on evil from the vantage points of science, history, theology, philosophy, and psychoanalysis. During this period, I happened to have a discussion with my dear friend Ms. Sarah Barnett. In passing, Sarah referred to some issue we were discussing and called it "Serpent in Paradise." Of course, I instantly knew that I now had a theme for this book. Thank you Sarah for always cueing me.

Then, in discussing a therapy case with my psychoanalytic colleague Ms. Jean Aniebona, other issues of the vicissitudes of relationships emerged in our discussion that also contributed to energizing my thinking of an important issue regarding the subject-matter of evil.

And finally, in a discussion regarding this book with my son Jack Kellerman, his incisive thinking helped me see a facet of the issue that was not yet quite clear to me. As usual, thank you, Jack.

# Books by the Author

## Authored Books

- The Psychoanalysis of Symptoms
- Dictionary of Psychopathology
- Group Psychotherapy and Personality: Intersecting Structures
- Sleep Disorders: Insomnia and Narcolepsy
- The 4 Steps to Peace of Mind: The Simple Effective Way to Cure Our Emotional Symptoms.  
(Romanian edition, 2008; Japanese edition, 2011)
- Love Is Not Enough: What It Takes To Make It Work
- Greedy, Cowardly, and Weak: Hollywood's Jewish Stereotypes
- Hollywood Movies on the Couch: A Psychoanalyst Examines 15 Famous Films
- Haggadah: A Passover Seder for the Rest of Us
- Personality: How It Forms
- The Discovery of God: A Psycho/Evolutionary Perspective
- A Consilience of Natural and Social Sciences:  
A Memoir of Original Contributions
- The Making of Ghosts: A Novel
- There's No Handle on My Door: Stories of Patients in Mental Hospitals
- Anatomy of Delusion
- Psychoanalysis of Evil: Perspectives on Destructive Behavior

## Coauthored Books (with Anthony Burry, Ph.D.)

- Psychopathology and Differential Diagnosis: A Primer
  - Volume 1. History of Psychopathology
  - Volume 2. Diagnostic Primer
- Handbook of Psychodiagnostic Testing: Analysis of Personality in the Psychological Report. 1<sup>st</sup> edition, 1981; 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1991; 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 1997; 4<sup>th</sup> edition, 2007.  
(Japanese edition, 2011).

## **Edited Books**

Group Cohesion: Theoretical and Clinical Perspectives  
The Nightmare: Psychological and Biological Foundations

## **Coedited Books (with Robert Plutchik, Ph.D.)**

Emotion: Theory, Research, and Experience  
Volume 1. Theories of Emotion  
Volume 2. Emotions in Early Development  
Volume 3. Biological Foundations of Emotion  
Volume 4. The Measurement of Emotion  
Volume 5. Emotion, Psychopathology, and Psychotherapy



# Contents

## Part I The Garden

<b>1 Entering the Domain of Evil</b> .....	3
Introduction .....	3
Is Good Always Good and Never Evil? .....	4
Hedonism: On the Philosophy of Pleasure .....	8
The Essence .....	11
<b>2 The Nature of the Serpent in Paradise: <i>Who or What is the Serpent?</i></b> .....	15
Acting-out .....	16
Evil and the Issue of Personality .....	19
The Psychopathic Personality .....	21
The Serpent .....	22
Does Acting-Out Reflect Cowardice of the Psyche? .....	25
The Basic Definition of Evil .....	26
<b>3 Theological References to Evil</b> .....	29
Introduction .....	29
<i>Anger</i> and Paradise .....	32
The Personality of <i>Anger</i> .....	32
The <i>Wish</i> and Deliverance from Evil Spirits .....	33
Variations on the Issue of the <i>Wish</i> .....	36
<b>4 Philosophical References to Evil</b> .....	41
Introduction .....	41
Gods .....	42
The Thwarted <i>Wish</i> .....	44
The Issue of “Choice” and “Symptom” .....	47
Sample Literature Regarding Philosophies Relating to: A “God,” the “Good,” and to “Evil” .....	48
Conclusion .....	50

**5 Psychoanalytic References to Evil** ..... 51

Introduction ..... 51

Introduction to the Infrastructure of Evil ..... 52

Psychodynamic Elements of the Psyche: Relation  
to the Infrastructure of Evil ..... 56

Core Elements of the Infrastructure of Evil: ..... 59

The Code of Evil Decrypted ..... 61

Hannah Arendt’s “Banality of Evil” Revisited and Re-defined ..... 64

Summary ..... 65

Emannual Kant: Is There an Exception to the Rule? ..... 65

**Part II Individuals and Societies**

**6 Hitler and Genocide** ..... 71

Introduction ..... 71

Hitler’s Program as a Function of his Personality:  
A Psychoanalytic Perspective ..... 75

The Key Characteristic: Megalomania ..... 77

Context ..... 80

The Influence of Martin Luther and the New Testament  
in Relation to Jews ..... 82

Enter, the Revered Martin Luther of the Protestant Reformation ..... 83

Adolph Hitler: Formative History ..... 85

Personality, Psychodiagnosis, and Psychodynamics ..... 87

    German Society and its anti-Jewish Sentiment: Hitler’s  
    Psychology Toward Jews ..... 87

    The Psychology of Hitler’s Megalomaniacal Grandiosity ..... 89

    Hitler’s Psychosexual Identification ..... 93

    Hitler’s Personality Organization: Psychodynamics and Defenses ..... 95

    Diagnostic Summary ..... 99

Conclusion: Evil ..... 100

    Hitler and Acting-Out as Evil ..... 107

Thus, Evil... ..... 108

**7 Stalin and Genocide** ..... 109

Introduction ..... 109

Stalin’s Paranoia ..... 111

Prelude to a Life of Crime: Stalin’s Early and Then Later History ..... 112

Stalin and Jews ..... 114

**8 Turkey’s Genocide Against Armenians** ..... 117

Introduction ..... 117

History ..... 118

**9 Sample of Other Twentieth Century Genocides: Bangladeshi, Cambodian, and Rwandan**..... 123

    Pakistani Genocide Against Bengalis ..... 123

    The Cambodian Genocide: “The Killing Fields” ..... 125

    The Rwandan Genocide: “Hutus Killing Tutsis” ..... 127

**10 Summary and Conclusion: The Drama of the Garden** ..... 129

    Introduction ..... 129

    Re-interpretation of God and the Serpent in the Garden of Eden ..... 133

**Epilogue** ..... 141

**References**..... 143

**Index**..... 151

**Part I**  
**The Garden**

# Chapter 1

## Entering the Domain of Evil

### Introduction

In examining evil from a philosophical vantage point, Taylor (2000), in his book *Good and Evil*, first considers what is traditionally among philosophers considered to be “good.” In this way, Taylor approaches the issue of evil essentially by the process of identifying basic elements of “good,” that is, Taylor states that philosophical conceptions of what is “good” specifically include the consideration of virtue, pleasure, and happiness (p. 19). He means that we need to understand “virtue, pleasure, and happiness” to get to the true meaning of what “good” means. As a specific start, the Greeks identified “good,” with well-being.

To start off then, pleasure and virtue are surprisingly not at all necessarily in lockstep or inevitably reciprocal and, in addition, perhaps more surprisingly, pleasure and virtue are not entirely, absolutely, or even necessarily always considered to be good. The Greeks even added a qualifier to this conflation of nouns (pleasure and virtue) by considering that being good ultimately relates to being “efficient” especially with respect to function. The idea of “efficiency” and “function” in such thinking concerns the satisfaction of goals. Taylor then joins it all by indicating that these early Greek thinkers (in the time of Socrates) correlated the satisfaction of goals, with the adjective “good.” Such an alignment means that goal satisfaction is a synonym for the gratified *wish*.

Of course it is obvious that obtaining pleasure by satisfying the *wish* (the goal) is at times not at all correlated to virtue. As a matter of fact, gratified *wishes* probably are as much negatively correlated to virtue as they are possibly positively correlated. This brings us to an important notion of contemporary language usage in the formulation of psychopathological concepts. For example, in psychoanalytic thinking, “goals” and “ends” along with “satisfaction” are typically assessed, as hinted, with respect to the person’s *wish*, that is, getting one’s “goal” met, or satisfying “ends” is really another way of referring to a principle of the psyche that in itself has far-reaching implications. This principle of the psyche, first proposed by Freud (1926), is also explored in many publications including in several of my publications (Kellerman 2007; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2014). It is a principle that translates “goals” and “ends” to this rather central idea of *wishes*.

Since we are all *wish*-soaked creatures, the idea is that the pleasure principle (the mother of the wish) captures our undivided attention. It is the pleasure principle represented by the wish that conflates the idea of “efficiency,” “goals,” and “ends” discussed in the tradition of language usage as for example among early Greek philosophers. Then, again, as an encrypted code (particularly operationalized in a person’s psyche), the ideas of “efficiency,” “goals,” and “ends” are rendered mostly by psychoanalysts as encrypted messages translated into the pleasure principle’s chief derivative representative: that of the *wish*.

What Freud proposed was that although in life *wishes* are frequently thwarted or unrequited, nevertheless:

*In the psyche, no wish will ever be denied.*

In the psyche, *wishes* always prevail. However, the trick of the psyche is that such *wishes* prevail in disguise, in the form of psychological/emotional symptoms that come to represent each *wish*. Therefore, in the psyche, *wishes* become expressed symbolically as symptoms—as psychological/emotional symptoms. This is why Freud proclaimed that this sort of symbolic representation of the *wish*-as-symptom is correspondingly why we all love our symptoms—even those that are painful—because the symptom represents our *wish* fully gratified, albeit in symbolic form.

In addition, the Greeks associated goodness with rationality and considered virtue and rationality also to be intimately connected. Nevertheless, and perhaps even not so surprisingly, it seems quite clear in the light of historical hindsight that such a correlation of virtue and rationality is not at all rational, that is, that things can be done with rather perfect rational acuity, and yet these rational things can still be of a negative or nefarious nature, and not at all virtuous. It is not simply that vice is the corruption of reason. There are times when the corruption of reason is also exemplified in an “evil” attempt to rescue the so-called civil social fabric. This can be seen in the highly rational strategies in all sorts of genocides where certainly it would have been a “good” thing for any nefarious strategic genocidal “reason” and “rationality” to be overturned—to have that genocide be completely contaminated in order to *end* the genocide.

Therefore, is good always good and never evil?

## **Is Good Always Good and Never Evil?**

Taylor also cites Socrates insofar as Socrates claimed that if one knows “good” then that person can never choose evil (p. 76). On the face of it, such a statement seems noble and even correct. Yet, the statement seems clearly not sufficiently scrutinized by Socrates. The point is that it depends on who it is that is proclaiming the “goodness.” From a perpetrator’s genocidal point of view, the victim-target is an entirely justified target, that is, to eliminate the one judged to be subhuman is considered “good” by the accuser or by the accuser’s group and yet we see that in this particular

example, “good” and “evil” can be one and the same—just as Paradise and the Serpent are also apparently one and the same—hinging on whether one’s *wish* is gratified or thwarted. Even then, it depends on whether the *wish* is reflective of the aggressor’s *wish* or of the *wish* of the victim. If the aggressor/oppressor’s *wish* is gratified, it would simply mean that the Serpent triumphs in Paradise. If the victim (the one who is discriminated against) prevails, then Paradise remains pure and the Serpent is nullified.

Socrates apparently felt that “no one ever voluntarily chooses evil” (Taylor 2000, p. 77). In the contemporary literature of social theory—especially for example, in the social psychiatric literature, Robert J. Lifton (1979), in his towering study of the underpinnings of evil (*The Broken Connection*)—analyzes in detail this entire issue of the vicissitudes of good and evil, Lifton enlarges the issue by introducing the idea of “death imagery”. This entire analysis by Lifton leads to a more elaborate understanding of Socrates’s pronouncement that “no one ever voluntarily chooses evil”.

Again, of course, it seems that Socrates was not quite on his game with the proposition that “no one ever chooses evil.” This is seemingly a naïve yet hopeful peroration on the issue of evil. For example, I have pointed out elsewhere (Kellerman 2013), that Dennis Rader, who was for 30 years a member of the Christ Lutheran Church, serving as President of its Congressional Council, took pleasure in strangling women to death while simultaneously participating in sustained devotional supplication at his church (p. 29). Rader knew exactly what he was doing. He knew what “good” meant and yet he chose “evil” (while also knowing what evil meant). He knew what he was doing was wrong, immoral, cruel, sadistic, and monstrous, and yet he infused all of it within what he chose he wanted (*wished*). He *wished* for “pleasure” so then pleasure triumphed over any other consideration. In this sense, Dennis Rader voluntarily knowing (or conscious of what he was doing and what he wanted), seems—no matter how one turns it—to have chosen evil in the face of knowing the difference between good and bad!

Rader’s compulsion to strangle women while knowing it was an impossible wrongness, did not at all prevent him from doing it. In this sense, we can say that awareness of his strangling compulsion did not neutralize the decision to follow through on the evil act. Rader could have sought various ways to control it all—whether through psychotherapy, or especially medication, or through a decision to enlist church assistance and so forth, or in a combination of all of these. However, and apparently, what he knew was not as compelling as what he felt. His *wish* was consistently triumphant over his knowing. The best one can say about this idea of “no one ever voluntarily choosing evil” is that in some cases, the monstrous act is one of involuntary voluntarism—the choice determined by powerful psychological forces that are always arranged in the psyche in the form of the *wish*. As proclaimed earlier, it is the *wish* as the chief representative of the pleasure principle that triumphs. And to the person who acts on such impulse, compulsion, and desire, the evil act itself is of course and without a doubt in such a self-same person’s contaminated and pathological psyche, considered to generate a feel-good circumstance and certainly a feel-good experience.

Therefore, the democratic assumption (and impulse) is to proudly state that one has a choice as to whether to do the righteous thing or not, that is, in the active sense, not to hurt others or at the other end, in the passive sense, not to exploit or manipulate others. Yet, with all the persuasive forces exerting their abundant power and influence, the issue of “choice” can be a very complicated concept indeed. It takes a resilient ego, a warm historical family structure, personal courage, and so forth to make it possible for any person to resist mass pressure to conform or even to resist the invitation to support apparent or unmistakable tyranny. It would be naïve to think otherwise. And yes, the presence of sufficient empathy and compassion in the personality is very definitely essential not only to choice-making, but instead, rather to “correct” any potential evil choice-making (Baron-Cohen 2013; Bloom 2011).

In this sense, *good* can sometimes be good and sometimes be *evil* depending on the rationale one gives oneself in concert with all sorts of other variables—some of which include ideological persuasions, psychological forces, and even in the sense of being obviously co-opted by others. In fact frequently, the sense of righteous indignation can become (and usually does become) the assumption driving evil (wrong) acts; this, notwithstanding the truth that righteous indignation also is often based upon one’s sense of the violation of fair play. In addition, ideology can have hypnotic effects. Ideology can even synthetically offer individuals and/or groups an opportunity to generate new *wishes* and then finally to give to these newer *wishes* the reward of perfect gratification. This can be so even though the ultimate gratification of this *wish* (or *wishes*) may inevitably end in harm to another, or in larger sociological terms, end in harm to masses of others.

Of course people are also persuaded to believe in demons, or in *the* demon, and when propagandized to believe that certain subgroups of people represent this demon, then it becomes possible to perform heinous evil crimes against such a targeted “other” group. As a matter of fact, the predator group can even obtain gratification because those considered as the evil ones (who are denoted as demon possessed) are correspondingly considered to be thankfully reduced in numbers as they are murdered.

In a related discussion but somewhat digressively, Socrates states that people who cause deleterious ends are acting from ignorance, and that usually these people are not very happy. However, in this proposition, again, it seems that Socrates is not fully appreciating the issue of the power of “suggestion” with respect to how people can behave, and that such people can be as happy as others because good or bad, if they attain satisfaction of the *wish*, then this sort of satisfaction equates, at least somewhat with happiness. And like all happiness (as a result of good *or* bad behavior), such happiness needs to be consistently reinforced.

Therefore, the cluster of variables including ideological persuasions, psychological forces such as a rather high “suggestibility-quotient,” and especially ideological group affiliation, lends credence to the eighteenth century pronouncement by Voltaire who famously said:

*Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.*



This implies that the *wish* can be intrinsic to the person, or then again, in the absence of such indigenous *wishes*, faux *wishes* can be imposed through suggestion, persuasion, peer-pressure, and identification with authoritarian iconic figures. The so-called romance with authoritarian iconic figures and its effect on what people will do to others on the basis of such identification or affiliation was detailed in mid-twentieth century studies by Adorno et al. (1950). In addition, in a work on *The Genocidal Mind* edited by Klein et al. (2005), these authors cite many studies illustrating the point that rational individuals were frequently the instrumentalists and leaders in the forefront of genocidal activity. This point is again also scrutinized by Robert J. Lifton in his study of Nazi doctors (1986).

Lifton posits the “double self” or “psychic doubling” (p. 418). The “double self” becomes a precept reminiscent of the psychological defense of “splitting” in which good experiences are separated (compartmentalized) from anxiety-provoking bad ones. “Splitting” enables a person to idealize one object while demonizing another. The proposition can be made that well-educated Nazi doctors were psychologically controlled by such mechanisms enabling them to commit atrocities. The theory is that such “doubling” or splitting also neutralizes empathy.

Aragno (2013, p. 103), reflects on the evil inherent in the Black and Satanic Masses where free rein was given to depraved priests who reveled in “sexual abuse, torture, and human sacrifice.” Further, Aragno also reports that this decline into demonology and the belief in demonic possession “...confused astronomy, philosophy, and cosmology with sorcery, alchemy and astrology....” All of it was a refutation of knowledge in order to control the populace so that only “the literal reading” of scripture was permitted. Aragno also sees that compliance, as she states, was beyond even the contrast between good and evil. The only important objective was to establish what the rules were for the appearance of cardinal sins in relation to raw evil. Of course, heresy, as Aragno states, “became the new cardinal sin” (p. 104).

Aragno goes further and cites Shakespeare’s *Macbeth* that she says “encapsulates the grip on popular belief that powerful supernatural forces may overcome moral judgment” (p. 104). Therefore, the eternal challenging question is asked: “Are there evil people, or do people do evil things; are we bad or mad?” The answer to Aragno’s challenge is that people indeed do evil things—especially with the rationale that it is all in the service of gratifying one’s so-called philosophy of life, a philosophy that always, but always, justifies the *wish*. It is an issue of the ends justifying the means, or that anything goes as long as it accomplishes your aim (your *wish*).

Further, our prideful democratic belief—actually an assumption—claims that decisions or choices we make are usually objective, and therefore that we have complete conscious control over such choices. However, as cited earlier, in view of certain psychoanalytic precepts (such as the definition of *acting-out*), we can see that our decisions and choices can be definitely compromised (in the absence of even knowing or realizing it). This is particularly true in circumstances that we perceive to be distasteful, so that in order to truly make objective choices, one necessarily would need to be sufficiently introspective and ego-strong. It requires strength to face up to one’s shortcomings, dissatisfactions, and defeats of life without needing to conceal it all by invoking compensatory fantasies, beliefs, and behaviors.

This sort of courage to face up to things is, in the present state of human evolution, seemingly quite underdeveloped, and actually rather thin. Not having the necessary resilience or courage will result in an incapacity in great masses of people to having limited understanding, or not at all understanding various phenomena of personality that need to or that should be understood. The question becomes: What are these phenomena that need to be understood? The highly probable answer concerns various psychological precepts including the psychological defense of *repression*. As it turns out, *repression* is a crucial variable with respect to one's ability to "know." *Repression* is an avoidance—an avowed avoidance—and becomes the foundation of the psychoanalytic definition of acting-out—to wit:

Acting-out is *doing* something rather than *knowing* something.

In this sense, the acting-out is always justified by the compulsive feeling of wanting to do something—*wishing* to have whatever it is you want to have and then feeling the inexorable impulse to go ahead and *do* it. The doing of it then feels good. Such an entire episode of the inexorable impulse to *do* it rather than *know* it becomes a narcissistically solipsistic and possibly even a megalomaniacal phenomenon of personality that can justify any action, and that consequently has the imprimatur of pure hedonism. It is what Kernberg (1981; 1992, p. 77) refers to as "malignant narcissism." In this part of the definition of acting-out, the focus is on the psychiatric conception of "behavior" (the *doing* part). The second part of the acting-out definition (the *repression* of the *knowing* part) is the psychoanalytic reveal, and will be further explored in Chap. 2, "The Nature of the Serpent in Paradise: What or *Who* is the Serpent?"

## Hedonism: On the Philosophy of Pleasure

In discussing the romance with pleasure that has a ubiquitously gripping affect on each person's imagination, we first need to refer to the Epicureans (341 B.C.—270 A.D.) and to the Cyrenaics that preceded them. The philosopher Epicurus focused on nature and declared that pleasure was simply a good thing based upon the natural order of things—so that pleasure does not depend on what people say it is. Rather, pleasure is a given (as a result of the evolutionary process) as expressed in nature. Taylor (2000, p. 109) notes that according to Epicurean philosophy: "If a good life is a life filled with whatever is good, and if pleasure is the only thing in nature that is good, then clearly a good life is a life filled with pleasure."

Taylor also cites the Cyrenian philosophy, which actually proclaimed that one needs to live for momentary pleasure. This implies that *wishes* have no process. Since we here are positing that gratification of the *wish* is what absolutely defines pleasure and that this *wish*-gratification exists and is embedded in a temporal process, then the Cyrenaics actually deny the issue of the *wish* as embedded in the process of time. What we as contemporary beings need to consider is that the gratification of any particular *wish*, although satisfying can with elapsed time,

change. Therefore, we would need to conclude that a Cyrenian, or for that matter, an Epicurean whose experience is focused on momentary *wish*-gratification (in the service of attaining pleasure), is psychologically governed by the expectation of events as discrete units, and therefore as eschewing any temporal process whatsoever in the appreciation of concatenations—that is, the linkages and flow of experience.

This brings to mind the age-old folklore maxim heard, more or less, in just about all cultures. This maxim or wisdom states:

*Be careful of what you wish because you will get it.*

This means that the *wish* is not merely reflected by a moment in time. If the *wish* was represented by a moment in time, what you then would get would be permanently etched in what you wanted, and exactly how you wanted it. However, the *wish*—any *wish*—when gratified is also subject to the slings and arrows of life’s vicissitudes—of contact and interaction with a whole host of variables, and so what is defined as gratifying at one time may actually be even revolting at another time—at some elapsed time.

The entire Epicurean and Cyrenian position on pleasure (and pleasure of the moment) flies in the face of what Paradise means. Yes, if you get what you wanted, when you wanted it, and to the fullest measure, then we might define such a particular condition as *Paradise*. And this would be a Paradise of the moment, or even moments—lasting even perhaps more than moments—perhaps even days, or months, or even years. And parenthetically, and as cited previously, this kind of Paradise (defined by attaining perfect pleasure) can perhaps be good in the sense of the ostensible absence of evil, or in contrast can be entirely evil in the sense of feeling pleasure and gratification of the *wish* by aggressing and hurting others. In other words, one’s Paradise can be another’s Hell, and perhaps even that *one’s pleasure can also be one’s hell!*

The singular fact however is that possibly attaining that yearned-for *wish* has virtually no bearing on what happens in reality. It only has a bearing on your *wish* as though everything else exists in a vacuum and in the absence of any other of life’s conditions. Instead, the *wishing* you have and how it works in life is affected by a continuing and ever-changing host of factors. In reality, the *wish* does not exist in a vacuum. The *wish* is always therefore affected by circumstances, some of which, of course, can contain contaminants.

Eventually, one may even have regrets about what the *wish* in fact ultimately yielded. For example, the divorce rate in the USA is somewhat over 50%. What happened to that wonderful romance with your partner and the Paradise you felt in the falling in love with the greatest person on earth—the one you *wished* for and got? In fact, I have mentioned elsewhere (Kellerman 2009, p. 6) that in order for a marriage to remain intact, at least one of the partners needs to be able to suffer inordinately. If both partners can suffer inordinately and have the ego-strength to withstand the frustrations that accompany long-term relationships, then in all likelihood the marriage can survive—whatever may be the numbers of the years of the past so-called bliss (somewhat realized or actually imagined). Unfortunately where this is not the case, many acrimonious divorces necessarily include the per-

son who you originally had as a *companion-in-Paradise* but who is now the one you may either feel neutral about, or perhaps feel some antipathy toward, or at the extreme, even hate! Even in a successful long-term marriage, people suffer with one another's foibles, idiosyncrasies, and so forth. One true example occurred at a 60th wedding anniversary where the invitation read: "*We are celebrating our 60th wedding anniversary. We've survived 60 years of wedded bliss.*"

Thus, the issue of the *wish* in the attainment of pleasure along with a hedonic orientation in one's personality becomes, as a result of daily living with another person, a matter of stress and strain—actually code words for feeling *angry*. In this sense, people accrue both immunities and allergies toward one another. With respect to empirical evidence, a long-term relationship also requires fortitude, resilience, and hope, and therefore such relationships, defined in the vernacular, are definitely not for sissies. The hope in such relationships is having the wisdom, insight, and ability to always try to struggle better. It is no different than what we try to do in life generally: to hopefully continue to struggle better.

In hedonistic type personalities, the romance of pleasure is a major and ultimate aim. True hedonists insist that pleasure is always good. In addition, the opposite of pleasure is defined at least, as discomfort, or as emotional deprivation, or even as out and out pain. In the simple definition (or even in the philosophy of hedonism), this discomfort or deprivation or pain are considered to be bad. Of course, and in contrast, in contemporary understanding for example, masochistic personalities would challenge this consideration of the simple sense that pleasure is good, and pain, bad. Even in nonmasochistic individuals, as for example in those who need to accomplish important aims requiring arduous and extraordinary effort, pleasure is seen as something remote, residing somewhere at the distant goal. In this respect, the implementation of activity directed at such a goal-destination comprised a series of continuing deprivations, aggravations, sleepless nights, drudgery, laborious requirements, and so forth—all for the sake of, and in the service of long-term aspirational goals. Much of it is typically painful not pleasurable. This sort of pain tries one's patience—and often to the extreme.

These sorts of long-range pursuits are not always pleasurable because they frequently deprive people of momentary "closure" experiences. In contrast, in many instances, all of this deprivation and even suffering is not considered to be bad. Rather, in many cases, these deprivations and sufferings are considered to be good. Such arduous work can in memory ultimately acquire the hue of pleasure that usurps, even deposes the past sense of discomfort or the memory of deprivation, or even the past memory of any previous sensation of pain.

Pursuit of a goal requires persistence—which is perhaps *the only omnipotence*—and in turn, such pursuit offers tangible as well as intangible rewards. It is then, at the reward stage that the success of the accomplishment validates the value of work and the importance of postponement of immediate needs for gratification (or of the postponement of the original *wish*) and, of course, then justifies the enjoyment of pleasure—the satisfaction of a job well done. As a matter of fact, and to reinforce the idea that in time the memory of pain can become transformed into a memory of pleasure or satisfaction, it is the arduous work itself toward distant

goals that can also become habituated; with repeated projects, such work becomes experienced not merely as good, and not merely as solely physiologically pleasurable, but as simply having value in the actual work toward the goal, and not necessarily solely in the goal itself. This is true of a whole host of examples as in the experience of researchers, scientists, writers, laborers, filmmakers, as well as even bodybuilders or pugilists to cite a range of examples.

Since in our definition, pleasure as inherent in the *wish*, is the choice measure of Paradise, then even if the pleasure is not immediately forthcoming, eventually reaching it offers precisely the same reward of Paradise as if the pleasure was indeed immediately forthcoming. This is so because in accomplishing one's aim, a person will have satisfied the ubiquitous all important *wish*. And again, this *wish* may be a good one in the sense of benefitting others, or it may be a bad one in the sense of hurting others. Therefore, especially with respect to "valence," the issue of Paradise needs to be always carefully examined.

## The Essence

And this leads us to the essential question in need of an analysis, as well as in need of an answer, that is:

*Is Paradise the gratified **wish**?*

*If so, then evil may be the thwarting of the **wish**—  
in the form of the Serpent.*

*or*

*Perhaps evil may be reference to another level of the **wish**—  
that is, a **wish** emanating from a different part of the psyche;  
from a repressed unconscious part of the psyche.*

*or*

*Perhaps Paradise is the gratified **wish** that conveys the sense of **safety**, and  
evil is the thwarting of the **wish**—the Serpent—that conveys a sense of **danger**.*

*or*

*Perhaps the sense of Paradise needs to be carefully examined as  
to the nature of the **wish**; is it a **wish** for uninterrupted pleasure,  
or is it a **wish** for the control or calibration of pleasure?  
and this perhaps means that:*

*Paradise and the Serpent possibly can be seen as transfigurations of one another.*

Stone (2009, p. 21) points out that the root meaning of evil is derived from the Anglo-Saxon word (spelled *yfel*) meaning "over" or "beyond." This means that the evil is an act and not merely a thought. This evil act then is "over" the bounds of normalcy, and "beyond" the pale of normal expectations. In addition, Masters (2011, p. 187) states that "good and bad are co-existent and part of one another, and harmony emerges from the correct and decent balance between the two." In this particular formulation by Masters, here we must if not disagree, then perhaps offer an amended way of understanding "good" and "bad," or "good" and "evil."

First, yes, we agree that good and bad are of the same mother (or father). This parent is named Paradise (others might call it mother, or father, or, God, or "it").

When the *wish* is gratified, this mother/father/God/“it” gestates the good feeling, the pleasure. However, when the *wish* is thwarted, a transmutation occurs where the bad feeling is gestated—becoming then, the Serpent. However, as suggested above, it is necessary to see whether the gratified *wish* was one of helping or hurting others. And as stated, the gratified *wish* can be about hurting as well as about helping. In this sense, the concept of Paradise and the Serpent as having the ability to produce a transfiguration one from the other may be derived.

In a possible alternate title of this book: *Serpent in Paradise: On the Nature of Evil*, the last sentence of the Preface asks the question as to how the Serpent managed to slip into Paradise. And then the final issue of the Preface enables us to wonder:

“Or did it slip in?”

This all really means that the Serpent *never ever* slipped in, that is, here there is an axiom forming a defined self-evident truth:

*Where there is Paradise, there is the Serpent.*

Thus, the serpent never slipped in. As long as the context in which Paradise exists remains extant, so is the extant existence of the Serpent assured. And here we maintain that it all hinges on whether the *wish* is gratified as well as what kind of *wish* it was—to hurt or to help. Even there, it becomes additionally important to understand that retaliatory aggression in order to defeat a provocative original aggressor, and then getting that particular *wish* met would not be evil.

In practical terms and with respect to the nature of evil, it is here further suggested that a focus on empathy, the psychology of psychopathy, the practice of generally being a good person along with having a decent superego, are truly all very important variables in the consideration and management of one’s motives and behavior, but this cluster of variables also only reflect a surface or descriptive manifest understanding of evil/non-evil or good/bad. In contrast, what is needed—especially from a psychoanalytic perspective—is the input from experienced *psychoanalytic encryption/decryption experts of the psyche* in order to unravel the true essence of evil. It is simply not enough to define evil (or its absence) in the descriptive terms of “empathy,” “psychopathy,” “superego,” or “being a good person.” These references to evil do not at all lead us to understand the infrastructure of evil at its core.

In most of the published studies regarding evil, focus remains on these issues of empathy, the psychology of psychopathy, the instruction and value of being a good person, and along with other givens, of developing a decent superego, and again, of course, of having compassion (Baron-Cohen 2011; Bloom 2013). The hoped-for contribution of this present volume makes the perhaps outlandish claim that we need to go further and deeper. In this respect, we intend to penetrate into the deepest core of evil—into its foundational infrastructure. This was promised in the Preface. With respect to this infrastructure and with respect to the promise cited in the Preface, as well as in terms of this first chapter, *Entering the Domain of Evil*, it is proposed that the *wish* is the essential component of this infrastructure, and that Paradise and the Serpent—simply defined—revolve around the *wish* as electrons

revolve around the nucleus of the atom. The important addendum involved in this search for the deepest decryption of evil concerns the nature of all living things—a *wish* for *safety* and a corresponding antipathy regarding *danger*. When there is a certainty of safety along with a certainty in the absence of danger, then is when pleasure is assured. This is true even among individuals who challenge or even court danger but who work to transcend it, e.g., mountain climbers.

To understand evil therefore, is to have a firm grip on the psychology of the *wish* (as it is organized in the psyche) along with all of its attendant defenses, as well as in terms of the primary emotions supporting the psyche's demands. These demands concern the psyche's regard for all aspects in the needs of the *wish*, but always keeping in mind the psyche's underlying and ever-present concern with *safety*.

Thus, the *first* component in the infrastructure of evil is the *wish* as the pleasure principle's chief representative in all of nature. In Chap. 2, we will suggest the *second* component of the infrastructure of evil.

## Chapter 2

# The Nature of the Serpent in Paradise: *Who* or What is the Serpent?

In discussing the entire issue of evil, it was suggested in the Preface of this book that what is not needed in the approach to understanding the infrastructure of evil is a conclave of individuals from scholarly and scientific domains such as philosophers, theologians, and others *who* are not particularly trained or experienced in encryption/decryption techniques—especially not equipped in the knowledge of encryption codes of the human psyche. Over many centuries, these specialists claiming province in a host of domains—perhaps especially in the province of evil behavior—have given us prolific amounts of speculations and formulations on the nature of evil, and yet, it seems that the encrypted code regarding the infrastructure of evil has still not been decrypted. As cited earlier, it simply has not been enough to state the corollaries, or the clichés or the axioms of evil such as evil is of a psychopathic nature, or in evil is the lack of empathy and compassion, or even evil is bad!

In this sense, another approach to understanding the deep structure of evil is necessary.

The approach suggested here concerns the attempt to identify (decrypt) the psyche's code in the construction of evil intent and evil behavior, that is, it becomes necessary first to announce that there exists, in fact, an infrastructure of evil, and then to reveal the core components of this infrastructure.

In this volume, the decoding or decryption of the psyche's code—a code that actually obscures the presence of such an infrastructure of evil will be presented. An analysis of the Garden of Eden story—of God versus the Serpent (as it relates to good and bad, and good and evil)—and correspondingly to the “what” of understanding Paradise (“What is Paradise?”), as well as to the “what” of understanding the Serpent (“What is the Serpent?”), and then of course also in relation to understanding the “*who*” (“Is there a ‘*who*’ as in: *Who* is Paradise?”), and along with this, is there a “*who*” (as in: *Who* is the Serpent?), are issues that will be undertaken as the challenge of this particular chapter.



## Acting-out

In order to effectively approach this problem of identifying the path that will lead us to the point of entering the domain of evil (with respect to its infrastructural organization), it becomes necessary for us to use a compass that will perhaps enable us to unearth, to discover the hidden codebook, the very cipher of the encryption machine named:

The Psyche's Architectural Code—  
Its Engineering of the Infrastructural Components of Evil Acting-Out.

Once in possession of this encryption of this so-called Psyche's Code, we will use the essential codes of psychoanalytic understanding to decipher, to decrypt the deepest psychological and structural essence of evil—its emotional constituents, its psychological defensive supports, its level of intelligence that seems to consistently outsmart everyone, its cause(s), as well as the reason for its unusual life span.

We will use the technology and metapsychology of psychoanalysis because despite the failure of psychoanalysts as well as the seeming failure of others (philosophers, theologians) to crack the code of evil, it seems that the psychoanalysts, as the encryption experts of the psyche, *who* as suggested in the Preface and in the previous chapter perhaps will be the most likely to do the job.

The psychoanalytic path we will navigate begins with the use of the psychoanalytic compass of "acting-out." As mentioned in the previous chapter, acting-out has historically been conceived as delinquent behavior almost always incongruent with typical rules and regulations of civil living. Acting-out therefore was always seen as a condition in which individuals can do whatever they want—whatever they *wish*—either based upon an impulse of the moment or, as well, as based upon some preconceived idea of any planned illegality. As a strictly psychiatric definition of evil (as it is based solely on a person's behavior), this definition has proven to be a major obstacle in the thinking about the morphology of evil—about its most basic nature, about its cause and effect, and about its deepest encryption with respect to acting-out and overall emotional/psychological symptomatology.

However, in contrast, the psychoanalytic definition posited another approach to revealing the constituents of evil. This other approach introduced a dynamic understanding of the psyche's instrumentality utilized in understanding the psychology of *acting-out*. This structure of acting-out includes the salient idea of *repression* as the critical variable in the entire acting-out endeavor, that is, to *do* something rather than to *know* something immediately implicates the defensive power of *repression* as the most important force involved in the psyche's process that therefore enables acting-out to do its job. And what exactly is the job of acting-out one might ask? The answer (as was defined in Chap. 1) is that acting-out serves the purpose of *not to know something*. And this need of *not to know something* requires *repression*. In addition, an entire panoply of personality-functioning characteristics, including the operation of emotion (the management of particular emotions by particular defense mechanisms), is also an outgrowth of this psychoanalytic template that services the acting-out need.

As discussed above, the psychiatric descriptive definition of acting-out is one that is entirely focused on the metric of a person's behavior. However, the psychoanalytic model of acting-out portrays the phenomenon of acting-out as one that concerns: knowing, *repression*, conflict, and only finally, doing (behavior). In this sense, the *only* psychoanalytic decoding cipher (*definition*) of acting-out, as it was stated in Chap. 1, and as it implicates *repression* (as well as the vicissitudes of the *wish*), is again reiterated here:

Acting-out is the attempt to **do** something rather than **know** something.

This necessarily means that when a person acts-out the *repressive* mechanism has already been successfully activated. What the person does not want to know is the message to the self; it is a message *from* that person's psyche to the person's consciousness. It is a psyche operating out of, or away from the person's consciousness. It all means that there is something that the person feels it is better *not to know*. Hence, part of the psychoanalytic excavation here unearths a profound connection between the issue of "knowing" and the issue of "doing."

An important but subtle implication of the person not wanting to "know," and about which the psyche then engineers a "doing" thing (so as to accommodate the *repressive* force that has been activated in order for people "not to know"), can, with a bit of cognitive consideration, actually be understood as the person's *psychic cowardice*, that is, "not wanting to know" is the same as not wanting to face something unpleasant that would presumably cause the person to feel bad, or guilty, or shamed, or in some other way, defeated.

The person's psyche is the so-called location where such a connection—"knowing" vs. "doing"—becomes animated. Decisions a person makes regarding the direction of emotion, the instrumentality of defenses, or the reason, or cause for action, are filtered for protective purposes through the filigree of the psyche. Such decisions made by or within the psyche are, strictly speaking, based upon the person's general sense of what that person feels should be, or should not be, seen or known. It is actually about persona—about that person's sense, knowledge, or information that would in all likelihood create untoward anxiety were certain things to be known. It is about depressive, guilt-ridden, and angry feelings as well as about other untoward emotions such as revulsion, terror, and even simple anticipated disappointment that the psyche manages as the named protective gendarme of what its personality job description calls for. And the psyche's job description calls for the continuing message agreed upon both from the conscious as well as from the unconscious mind: "protect me."

Psychoanalytically understood, it is then in the person's unconscious mind (controlled and calibrated by the psyche) to take over and to see to it that this self-same person (through the psyche) makes all sorts of conscious decisions that are perceived to possibly avert danger and assure safety. It is a psyche, that from its "control room" controls the personality (keeping it organized and consistent), controls the person's thinking (with respect to ideological cognitive underpinnings), and more or less controls behavior (based upon what the person wants to know, and what the person does not want to know). Such personality organization can also be

viewed with respect to Freud's genetic theory that relates a person's current behavior to that person's history, all of it mediated by the particular component of that person's mind—the psyche.

Parenthetically, this complex human thinking and feeling process containing both conscious and unconscious spheres, calls into question the typical cliché that assumes that we are all free to always make choices for which we remain forever responsible. Thus, the question becomes: Are our choices really free choices and consciously completely objective? The answer, as previously discussed, is that given the vicissitudes and impact of psychological and social variables, our so-called assumption of “free choice” may not at all be free.

Therefore, in discussing and trying to understand the innermost workings of so-called evil thinking and evil doing, it is the proposal here that considers this entire discussion of evil as one that must concern the vicissitudes of acting-out. In addition, the influence of other psychological variables (as well as social context variables), absolutely and necessarily implicate *repression*. As such, in discussing evil, we must now consider the constituents of acting-out—especially that of *repression*. In other words, where acting-out is concerned, in order for people *not to know something* but rather to *repress* it, means that *repression* then becomes a vital element in the discussion of acting-out and therefore, also in the discussion of evil.

This all reveals that in order for people *not to know* certain things the person's psyche will invoke the power of *repressive* forces. And, in place then of *not knowing*, individuals will instead engage in behavior characterized by a *doing* thing that is essentially based upon trickery (*repression*), subterfuge (deceit), and deception (pretense). Thus, what such individuals *do* constitutes a deceitful trick based upon some pretense that is designed to fool others—but more actually and essentially to deceive the self. To deceive the self concerns the self-imposed crucial issue of the attempt to avoid dis-ease, alarm, anxiety, fear, dread, and danger.

Once a repressive process along with end-behavior in acting-out is completed, the person will now behave perhaps minimally in a low-level delinquent fashion that does actual but perhaps, only low-level harm to particular others (or to the self), or maximally, as in the form of massively horrible acts that hurt others—even great numbers of others.

It is in this psychoanalytic decrypted sense, that evil must be, strictly-speaking, defined as acting-out behavior.

Thus, we are now in the grip of perhaps penetrating our psychoanalytic encrypted definition of evil—or we are now in the actual grip of penetrating the universality of the true definition of evil. Acting-out behavior is different than the nature of behavior in the absence of *repression*. This means there is of course behavior that is free from contamination or free of ulterior motives—free of tricks, deceit, and pretense. Thus, evil, in addition to conscious cruelty and brutality, must also be considered a product of the psychological process of *repression*, and as stated, resulting always in acting-out. All of it also implicates psychosocial phenomena of scapegoating, sadism, needs for purification, obsessive perfectionism, continued assurance of superiority, as well as the cumulative effects of the powerful force of affiliation which, in addition to its useful application, also can be used for acting-out (evil) ends.

Affiliation is an important force because acting-out individuals will frequently need to automatically (unconsciously) reassure the psyche that *repression* will remain intact. Affiliation with a like-minded group of people qualifies as this sort of support. Reassurance is based upon such a person's elemental need to avoid tension, anxiety, and danger. In this sense, as it does in the psychotherapy session, "resistance" to change becomes the main line of defense supporting *repression*.

## Evil and the Issue of Personality

Aragno (2013, p. 111) makes an eloquent statement with respect to the deleterious, and of course concrete destructive acting-out of individuals. She asks:

What has gone wrong at the heart of the fabric of their social commitment to provoke a total disengagement from human relations, and what is the marker in the potential for evil in the collapse of the human connection, for this is what we are looking at—the breakdown of interpersonal sentiments so complete as to leave a ravaged inner life and a compulsion to compensate by acting-out destructive impulses?

Of course, Aragno is considering the high intensity end of the acting-out dimension of evil. A low-end intensity level of this evil of acting-out may on the individual level include behavior of deceit, manipulation, and a skilled prestidigitation. On the more serious level of acting-out (as discussed earlier), we see torture, sadism, and a whole host of other grotesque behaviors, ending with social destruction as in genocides.

It can be readily surmised that in practical terms we are looking at a stratified phenomenon. In this sense, there are acting-out individuals *who* remain low-level acter--outers (deceit, manipulation, low-level charlatanism), those *who* remain rather in the mid-range of acting-out (stealing, threat, and aggressive behavior), and those *who* become severely socially deranged. This latter group may not necessarily become what is considered to be clinically psychotic, and yet they demonstrate clear social derangement defined in the most general "Aragno" sense as having the entitlement to create their own rules—even to the decisive point of choosing *who* lives and *who* dies. However, in the face of clinical criteria that would disqualify psychosis as a diagnosis simply on the basis of the criterion of such behavior as cruel or evil, nevertheless, it would not be hyperbolic to identify such acting-out behavior as grotesque.

With respect to personality organization, in order to assess when such evil behavior does indeed qualify as psychosis, we must look at the behavior of the person especially in concert with that person's inner life. On a nuanced closer look, it becomes clear of course that in addition to historical formative influences, such individuals are driven to diabolical deeds also and based largely upon the final form of such a person's psyche, that is, based upon how the person's inner life is structured. The usual clinical diagnostic designation given to such individuals *who* become defined as acter-outers is that of *psychopathic or sociopathic disordered personality*.

Psychopathic or sociopathic personality is a disorder chiefly characterized by what is usually referred to as the vacuous inner life. It is presumably an impoverished inner life in which much silence exists. With such an impoverished and silent inner life, individuals with this sort of psychic organization need to create a steady stream of external stimulation presumably in order to prevent panic and disorientation regarding the absence of sufficient inner stimulation. This is different from the kind of inner life that offers the security and safety of structure readily based upon the kind of inner life that is flush with abundant, engrossing, creative, and imaginative thinking and feeling preoccupation. In contrast, the psychopath will focus on a human target or a targeted subgroup (also including the strategy and tactics to aggress toward the identified victim-target) as a rather fulsome and displacement substitute either for a taciturn inner life, but actually and more accurately for a hushed and muted inner life.

Such focus on creating external stimulation as a balm for the deafening inner silence and overall impoverished inner landscape is one also based on a diseased narcissism that seeks desperate proof of one's adequacy by constant and uninterrupted compensatory acts. This is a diseased narcissism again, synonymous with Kernberg's "malignant narcissism" (1981, 1992). It means a sole focus on all of one's needs, compensatory aggrandizement (usually by devaluing specific others), and by the general acting-out of continuous self-absorption regarding one's impulse-hungers.

Since there is no such thing as unemployment in the psyche, these sorts of de-ranked individuals *who* are seeking such constant and uninterrupted compensatory acts are therefore also constantly searching for targets—all in the hope of satisfying the need for external stimulation as defined by control over the other. This is the perennial full-employment occupation of psychopaths. And even during sleep, the search is an ongoing one. Once such a diagnosis is consolidated—even at a low-level of acting-out—then it becomes rather more possible to understand what Arendt (1963) posits as the "banality of evil." Arendt intends to make the point that evildoing can be achieved by just about anyone—especially since one's psyche is drawn to compensatory and displacement behaviors. It is the question of *who* becomes homogenous with a particular punitive ideology or *who* becomes persuaded regarding any sort of a possible punitive social condition toward others. This is where Kernberg (1981) includes in this conversation about acting-out and compensatory behavior that such individuals are not merely narcissistic, rather they are actually malignantly narcissistic.

Yet, Arendt's thesis of the "banality of evil" still needs more discussion. At this point, it is important to note that Arendt's "banality of evil" is very much a descriptive and manifest definition of her observation regarding a particular phenomenon, regularly referred to as evil behavior. In contrast, the psychodynamic understanding of such "banality" is quite different than its descriptive and behavioral phenomenological characterization. This difference between the surface descriptive level of such a definition versus its presumed (or proposed) deeper well will be presented as we proceed to unfold the infrastructural essence of evil—its core—managed by the individual's psychology and exemplified by the operation of that person's psyche.

In addition, Arendt's "banality of evil" will be further analyzed at the end of Chap. 5 in the main section titled: *Psychoanalytic References to Evil*, relegated to the subsection titled: *Hannah Arendt's "Banality of Evil" Revisited and Redefined*.

## The Psychopathic Personality

An examination of the psychopathic personality will reveal that such individuals have really and essentially nothing to do. And even if they are in fact dutifully employed, nevertheless they unequivocally always feel as though existing in an arid place. Because of this sense of inner and abject "absence," such individuals correspondingly seek always to be involved in projects. As Aragno states (p. 115), they are entirely compensatory so that the compensatory state reflects a truer underlying feeling of worthlessness. In order to escape this sense of worthlessness, such individuals utilize a grandiose sense of self as a main ego support. It is this particular rescue mechanism of the psyche that then propels such a person to attach inner impulses for action toward specific "larger" projects—as for example in a larger scale social act. For example, it would not be uncommon for such an individual to participate as a provocateur and/or aggressor in a genocide, or in the more close-up solitary act, as in engaging serial killing!

In addition, individuals *who* are socially psychopathic (for all intents and purposes, equivalent to sociopathic) will likely seek to form associations or to join associations with other like-minded individuals in order, with righteous indignation, to implicate still others as those targeted for elimination. Those targeted will be seen as the inferior ones while the self and the affiliated self-group will be experienced in all of its compensatory glory as superior.

All of it, the sense of inadequacy, the compensatory reaction to it in the form of grandiose and superiority rituals, and the sense of an impoverished inner life—presumably derived from a life of dramatic and almost complete thwarting of *wishes*—necessarily generates terrible acting-out impulses. In place of a normal superego, there then exists a projected punitive urge to punish others, and then in place of the expropriation of whatever can be extracted (taken) from those others, a subsequent inverted sense of justice occurs—punishment meted out to those others. Empathy is then reserved only for the self. It is a blatant diseased narcissism that permits only leniency for the self and sole criticality toward other individuals or subgroups *who* are targeted in the least for exile, and at most, for punishment—or even worse (Baron-Cohen, 2011).

Aragno (2013, p. 113), again eloquently states:

Consider then, how certain primitive defenses must contribute to the deterioration of this primary emotional connection, gradually destroying the very neural threads out of which deep human bonds are woven. For this powerful relational weave to tear there must have to be overwhelmingly negative emotions at play.

Examples of such negative emotions include: aggression, greed, deceit, defiance (for its own sake), rancor, and hatred, all of which become compressed into an underlying consistent presence of *anger*. And it is a steady-state *anger* that keeps giving. For such a cluster of feelings to exist in a repetitive continual cycle, it is presumed psychoanalytically that the psyche in turn also arranges a cluster of defense mechanisms to manage such emotions in a way that permits these emotions freedom of expression. These defenses include: denial, displacement, projective-identification, regression splitting, and symbolization. Although these are what are known as ego-defense mechanisms, it may be more accurate to identify them as emotion-defense mechanisms (Kellerman 1997, p. 323). These emotion-defense mechanisms are designed to manage emotion (in this case, designed to release emotion), or defenses designed to reinforce personality inclinations.

How defenses work to permit acting-out may be understood by the following:

Denial—Permits the individual to operate in a functional way insofar as such a person may then be only persuaded by what they want to see as in the process identified as *selective perception* as well as in the process identified as *perceptual defense*. In other words, you see what you want to see and don't see what you don't want to see.

Displacement—A defense mechanism designed specifically to enable a person to direct *anger* in a transference sense to the targeted "other." Usually it is the emotion of *anger* that is managed by the defense of displacement.

Projective identification—Seeing disavowed qualities of the self in the other that are unconsciously repudiated, and then distastefully identifying with them.

Regression—Keeps superego responses in check thus permitting impulse to be released.

Splitting—Dividing others (other objects [people]) into good ones and bad ones according to the subject's needs. Characteristic of the borderline and psychopathic personalities.

Symbolization—This particular defense is one that enables any person (subject) to identify with emblems or persons *who* seem congruent with the subject's needs.

## The Serpent

It is, of course, not far-fetched to understand that the *Serpent* is the surrogate reference to evil. Whether it is the Serpent in the Garden of Eden, or whether evil as defined in dictionaries includes Serpent, devil, and even "sin"—all are essentially one and the same. A random look at any dictionary under the adjective "evil" will produce definitions or characterizations regarding statements of evil such as profoundly immoral, malevolent, wicked, depraved, and the evil-eye seen as one designed as a supernatural force to cause harm. For example, with respect to evil, one can find specific references to the "Devil" (*The Concise Oxford Dictionary* 1995). In *The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology* (1995), evil is referred to with its old English "yfel" meaning, "bad, wicked, vicious." In the same *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, the noun *Serpent* is defined as "a biblical name for Satan."

In contrast, evil in the spirit of Arendt's "banality of evil" (1963) is meant to indicate that even dastardly mass phenomena can be perpetrated by ordinary individuals. In this light, the innocuous or ordinary has been theoretically connected even to vast human conflagrations such as the Holocaust against Jews, the Turkish genocide against their

Armenian citizens (of the early twentieth century), and the Cambodian carnage in the mid-to-late twentieth century. However, as noted earlier, the ongoing question regarding Arendt's concept of "banality" will be further examined as our discussion leads to an analysis of what it is that enables anyone at all to be involved in evil behavior.

The psychoanalyst Arthur Feiner (1993, pp. 285–286), also referring to Morson (1986), states that:

Evil usually results from something very simple like irresponsibility, unaccountability, or negligence, sort of looking the other way. It happens, not because we become part of a grand design, or even give in to banal desires, but because we do not pay attention, we simply do not evaluate and exert the energy to make corrections. We then become part of a grand, evil movement as an end-product.

This idea of "looking away" as an example of how one can be involved in the implementation of evil brings to mind the mesmeric idea of "misdirected attention" as the psyche's technique utilizing a high suggestibility index in persons *who* harbor hysteric impulses, largely in the service of malevolent evil-minded ends. Such a conceptualization thereby implies that engaging in activity defined as evil can perhaps also be a function of some latent hysteric personality proclivity of which high-index suggestibility is its chief characteristic. That is to say, individuals *who* can engage in evil or destructive behavior determined by malevolent *wishes* and indeed, venomous motives, may be under the influence of a self-inflicted hysteric so-called hypnosis or even a self-inflicted post-hypnotic-like suggestion. Although this is of course quite hypothetical, nevertheless it is quite likely that such a highly suggestible hysteric process is part of what is involved in the person perpetrating or partnering in acts deemed to be evil. Such individuals therefore, can be subject to joining cults, sects, or militaristic associations; some such individuals would likely be interested in gun-idolatry and would possibly also, necessarily and inexorably, be attracted to scapegoating and the locating of groups to be targeted.

In another sense, this "misdirected attention" is possibly related to taking the wrong path in life, and is referred to by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (*who* was also steeped in Christian theology). In his book *The Symbolism of Evil* (1967), Ricoeur states:

When we have traced the roots of the symbolism of the Adamic myth back to the more fundamental symbolism of sin, we shall see that the Adamic myth is a myth of 'deviation,' or going 'astray,' rather than the myth of the fall. (p. 233)

Thus, it is the idea of "going astray" that seems related to the idea of "misdirected attention" so that according to Ricoeur, the Garden of Eden story did not mean the end of everything—it only meant that evil, or sin, or even defilement is a side effect or perhaps even an error into sin, into evil, into iniquity.

Ricoeur continues:

The etiological myth of Adam is the most extreme attempt to separate the origin of evil from the origin of the good; its intention is to set up a radical origin of evil distinct from the more primordial origin of the goodness of things.



Ricoeur then points out that the origin of evil directs one's attention to what is deemed to be "the adversary, the Serpent, *who* will become [or is?] the Devil. In addition, Eve then represents an adjunct object *who* represents "that Other, Serpent or Devil." Here, Ricoeur begins to consider sociological variables in which symbols attach to more than one object. Then in a psychologically based reference, he states that the Serpent is representative of a part self-object—"a seduction of ourselves by ourselves...we might say that the Serpent represents the psychological projection of desire" (pp. 256–257). "Seduction," of course is highly related to "suggestion," which in turn contains the important force in the formation of hysteric reactions.

The question this chapter asks is: Did the Serpent slip into Paradise or not? Our answer is that the Serpent was always in Paradise, fused with Paradise, and inextricably twinned with Paradise. Why? Because whether it is Paradise or the Serpent, it all hinges on whether the *wish* is, or is not met. And as noted earlier, even gratified *wishes* can be the province of evil-doers so that when such evil gratification is obtained, then Paradise itself becomes suffused with a Serpentine aura. Thus, Paradise and the Serpent can be seen as transfigurations of one another depending on *who* is having the *wish* satisfied—the aggressor evil-victimizer one, or the struggling victim?

Ricoeur hints at this answer by stating:

In the first place, the Serpent represents the following situation:  
In the historical experience of man, every individual finds evil already there; nobody begins it absolutely. (p. 257)

"Nobody begins it absolutely." "Begins it," becomes the operative phrase. And here, with respect to the nature of evil, is the key to our entire thesis regarding the Serpent in Paradise. The point is that all of it depends on the person's *wish*. It must be remembered that the *wish* is the pleasure principle's chief derivative representative in all human affairs. As such:

When the *wish* is gratified, there is Paradise. When the *wish* is thwarted, there is the Serpent. However, now the Serpent's *wish* has been gratified so that Paradise is necessarily redefined as a Paradise needing perhaps uninterrupted pleasure of any sort. In a way, it becomes nature's triumph over God insofar as in nature pleasure gains the ascendancy especially in the face of civilized living that requires calibration of pleasure. It also seems quite importantly, that at least in God's consciousness, he *wishes* both for calibration as well as control of pleasure.

And it all pivots on whether or not the *wish* is gratified. Therefore, the Serpent never slipped into Paradise. The Serpent was always there because Paradise and the Serpent are mutually metamorphosed phenomena—one able to instantly become the other. In the case of a gratified *wish*, safety is guaranteed; in the case of when the *wish* is thwarted, danger lurks. The ultimate question is: *Who* gets the *wish* gratified—the Paradise of God (meaning that the victim escapes victimization), or the Paradise of the Serpent (meaning that the evil one triumphs)?

It becomes rather clear why Paradise hinges on the *wish* as well as on the *who*. It also gradually becomes clear that in the anatomy of evil (its framework, its infra-

structure), the *wish*, the *repression*, and the *who* comprise three of the essential components of the psyche's arrangement of forces in the gestation of a symptom—in this case, evil behavior. The question now asked concerns whether a person's need to activate a *repressive* defense in order for people *not to know* something, and then to instruct one's psyche (through an unconscious communication) to arrange for such *repression* to occur, and then instead of *knowing*, rather to *do* something symbolically representing the *knowing*—does this metapsychological sequence reflect a cowardice habituated in the subject's self-same psyche, and perhaps even reflecting the current state of evolution (as it applies to *Homo sapiens*), as a sequence that is not quite evolved well enough?

## Does Acting-Out Reflect Cowardice of the Psyche?

Here, we finally arrive at the core of the problem regarding the definition of evil. This subhead regarding the issue of cowardice of one's psyche (also of course meaning cowardice of the self) is actually a reference to any person's need to *repress*. It should be remembered that *repression* is usually called upon to conceal something the subject would rather not have publicly revealed. In fact, the subject would not even want the self to consciously know what the self does not want to know. This entire concealment is a drama that is played out in the person's psyche. Thus, we may wonder that since the psyche is the psychological engineering mechanism that arranges defenses to manage emotion and thereby creates what the subject sees as the psychological control room generating safety measures, then is it possible to equally propose that such a psyche can become habituated to as well as also reflect at best the person's reluctance or better yet *resistance* to know certain unpleasant things, and at worst, to reflect the person's cowardice, or shall we say, absence of probity? Of course in psychoanalytic parlance, we have already pointed out that *resistance* is the first line of defense supporting *repression*. Therefore, in any psychoanalytic or psychotherapeutic endeavor, the patient's resistance in *knowing* something (nee, remembering) is really a phenomenon that reveals the certain presence of *repression*.

In a sense, it is very likely that whatever the person needs to conceal will likely contain material that generates tension and fear regarding possible consequences of revelation. Yet there may be a more profound meaning to what is being concealed by such *repression*. It is usually the case that what is fearfully anticipated is correspondingly underpinned by a more elemental emotion, that of *anger*. It may well be that in the absence of *repressed anger*, there cannot be pathology, or conversely, that in all pathology resides an underlying and out-of-awareness unconscious *anger*. This proposition regarding *anger* and pathology has been proposed in my published work, *The Psychoanalysis of Symptoms* (2008) and *Dictionary of Psychopathology* (2009b).

Along with this proposition of the relation of *anger* to pathology, Freud declared that consciousness is curative. I have suggested elsewhere (Kellerman 2014), that

consciousness is only curative if the *repressed* element of *anger* is made conscious. Therefore, it might be hypothesized that all *repressed* material contains the element of *anger*. Similarly, it may also be proposed that in *wishes* also resides—especially in virtual state—the potential for an *angry* reaction, provided, of course, if the *wish* were to be thwarted.

This, then, brings us back to the Garden. The essential characters of the Garden story include God, Adam, Eve, the Serpent, and the anthropomorphized *Tree of Knowledge*. I identify the Tree of Knowledge as anthropomorphized because of its powerful influence (presence) in the story. It may just be that because God instructed Adam and Eve not to take of the *Tree of Knowledge*, that he put his *wish* on the line. That is to say that the seriousness with which He instructed Adam and Eve also contains the impression that there was always the chance He would not be obeyed—that His *wish* might be thwarted. Of course, that is exactly what is reported to have happened. In other words, God's *wish* was definitely thwarted. It may be more accurate to say that God's *conscious wish* was thwarted. Does this imply that God has *wishes* that may be unconscious? Does God have an unconscious, and a psyche? Does this then mean that in every *wish*, there is a potential for it to be thwarted? If so, then necessarily *anger* will be the natural response to such a thwarted *wish*. And finally, does this mean that God may, in addition to having an unconscious, also have unconscious *anger*?

It all may mean that since the *wish* is the pleasure principle's chief derivative in all human affairs, then it also must necessarily mean that the pleasure principle (the principle that influences all organisms—from amoeba to man), when thwarted, will even chemically (or shall we say anthropomorphically) become distressed, disturbed, disappointed, dissatisfied, dismayed, disaffected, disheartened, dispirited, discouraged, disenchanting, and disillusioned—all the disses—not of course withstanding “upset” and “stressed.”

By definition, therefore, it might be hypothesized that in God's *wish* was contained a secreted and shrouded virtual condition in which “*anger*” was always necessarily awaiting its call. And this is likely the main point in the basic definition of evil.

## The Basic Definition of Evil

**It may just be that the pleasure-principle of all life contains the “*wish*” for gratification (of all “*wishes*”), along with a potential rage in the thwarting of such gratification of “*wishes*.” Thus, “*repressed*” “*anger*” or rage will, in every case, generate symptoms of acting-out. Therefore, all of acting-out is in this conceptual framework defined as a psychological symptom. The psyche's process in the formation of such an acting-out symptom creates the ground out of which evil can take shape; that is, once the acting-out symptom appears, it then remains to be seen in what way the mores and prejudices of the sociological context in which the subject (person)**

exists will facilitate this person's so-called "choice" as to the content of such acting-out.

It is the psyche that creates the acting-out syndrome and it is the social context that will enable the actor-outer to give the acting-out its design—particularly with respect to determining how to express the "repressive" content within that person's psyche's unconscious. This means that the person's "doing" rather than "knowing" will now acquire its measure of pleasure, as for example in targeting specific victims as a way of compensating for what such a person needed to "repress" in the first place.

In this sense, here we have an explanation regarding the infrastructure of evil as it operates in its exact form as an acting-out phenomenon. In its form as an acting-out phenomenon, the "act" itself is governed by unconscious forces involving the person's basic "wish," the person's "anger," and the person's "repression." These are the basic elements of any symptom. In addition, the specific content (the subject matter) of the acting-out will be a reflection, (a microcosm) of the person's broad social context; that is, that the person's psyche (psychology) gives to the symptom its structure as well as the direction of its impulse (what the person "wishes"). Along with this "psychology of the psyche," the person's "sociology" (personal history as well as the person's socio-political context), finally lends to the symptom a rationale for its content.

The infrastructure of evil with respect to each of its components of acting-out and the metapsychology embracing this process will be detailed in Chap. 5, *Psychoanalytic References to Evil*. At the end of the book will be a final peroration regarding a re-interpretation of the Garden story that reduces the basic five characters of the story (God, Adam, Eve, the snake, and the Tree of Knowledge) to a hypothesized truer four characters.

## Chapter 3

# Theological References to Evil

*And God said: 'Let there be light.' And there was light. And God saw the light that it was good.... (The Holy Scriptures 1917, Genesis, p. 3).*

### Introduction

For our purposes here, the question becomes: What might be the operative phrase in part of this Godly introduction to the start of the world? The answer to this question could possibly be that the operative phrase is: “*that it was good.*” Why did God say of the light “*that it was good?*” How did He know it was good? Apparently, it could be that He knew it was good because seemingly and perhaps obviously He *wished* it to be good and because He was God, He knew it would be good. Otherwise, why did God make light in the first place. We certainly wouldn’t attribute such an act to God’s motive to make light and identify it as God’s willy-nilly random choice. In other words, does God make random choices without specific Godly plans or motives?

No, God made light and of course it was good—it had to be good. God made the light and it was good based on His original intent that light would be, and then is, good. Because God began the project of starting the world then His/Her direction was to go forward, not backward. Therefore, the forward direction concerns His/Her/Its design concerning seeing. And seeing what was around you—your context—was apparently, and according to God, of need of light.

Dr. Ann Ulanov (1999, pp. 228–235) says it eloquently and with implication:

When light floods into darkness, we really see darkness.  
We see the invincible power of goodness in the light of evil.

Thus, God seeing that the light was good seems to be a reflection of His *wish*. Yes, it seems that God had (has) *wishes*. To this point, another of God’s commandments (*wishes*) concerned His admonition to His consorts, His associates at the beginning—Adam and Eve. And it started this way:

Then the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul. And the Lord God planted a garden eastward, in Eden; and there He put the man whom He had formed. The tree of life and the tree of knowledge of good and evil was also put there by God.

And the Lord God commanded the man, saying: Of every tree in the garden thou mayest freely eat, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it, for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.

(The Holy Scriptures 1917, pp. 4–5)

In this passage, it becomes rather clear that God intended the world to be one of Paradise. That was God's *wish*. And Paradise would be defined as all good and nothing evil. And God seemed adamant about having that *wish* gratified, or at least adhered to. And in the event that God's *wish* was, in fact, going to be gratified, then correspondingly, an eternal state of Paradise was to be assured. This idea of assurance and of having God's *wish* gratified also was a nod to the associated idea of empowerment, that is, a gratified God's *wish* places Him at the helm of the world—at the apogee, the absolute definition of the highest—the highest empowerment.

Now we come to the Serpent. The Serpent was as much a part of the Garden as was Adam and Eve. Thus, it could be conceived that the Serpent implicitly existed in Paradise. And as pointed out in the Preface, the question regarding how the Serpent slipped into the Garden is therefore answered in seeing that the Serpent never slipped in at all. The Serpent was intrinsic, as was Paradise.

Thus, as suggested in Chaps. 1 and 2, it seems that Paradise and the Serpent are metamorphosed facets of the various constituents of the Garden. Because God's *wish* becomes a paramount variable in the entire "beginning," then it follows that such a gratified *wish* permits Paradise to exist and to remain as a permanent and extant condition of the world. However, should that particular first, so-to-speak social *wish* of God's be thwarted, then rather than an extant and persistent Paradise, we rather get (or remain) with the Serpent—with evil! And apparently, it all hinges on whether:

God's *wish* is, or is not gratified.

Now the Serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field. . . . and he said unto the woman 'yea hath God said: ye shall not eat of any tree of the garden?' And the woman said unto the Serpent: 'of the fruit of the trees of the garden we may eat; but of the fruit of the tree which is in the middle of the garden, God hath said: ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.' And the Serpent said unto the woman: 'ye shall not surely die; for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened and ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil. And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit

thereof and did eat; and she gave also unto her husband with her and he did eat. And the eyes of them both were opened....And the Lord God said unto the woman: 'What is this thou has done?' And the woman said: 'The Serpent beguiled me and I did'. (p. 7)

Here we see that God's *wish* was thwarted by the Serpent (through the woman) thereby bringing forth God's wrath—essentially, on the world. The circumstance of the thwarted God's *wish* revealed God's disempowerment. It was a disempowerment, but not perhaps of surprise. It was seemingly not assumed by God that just because he instructed his subjects not to eat of the tree that under no circumstance would they eat. On the contrary, from the story, it appears that God did not assume that absolute obedience or adherence would be the defining characteristic of these, his “formed” creatures. Instead it seems that as it turned out, free-will was an original implicitness.

In Desmond Tutu's book, *No Future Without Forgiveness* (1999), Tutu acknowledges Hannah Arendt with regard to Arendt's concept of the “banality of evil.” Evil, says Tutu, becomes the equivalent of spitting in God's face (p. 97). Yet, despite evil, Tutu also opines that humans have the capacity for much good. The hope of this good is in the ability and willingness of the assailers to apologize and ask for forgiveness—and for the victims to forgive (p. 253). A possible question arises: How does the Serpent interpret this? Of course sincere entreaty for forgiveness is inviting *wish*-fulfillment which basically in this case translates into an invitation to the venue, to the original condition of Paradise. Simultaneously, the corresponding sincere act of forgiveness presumably enables *anger* to be relinquished. In such a case, the *anger* is replaced with love—a corresponding invitation to the crystallization of Paradise and the dematerialization or evanescence of the Serpent.

This is all well and good. However, is it possible to forgive an unfeeling attacker (perhaps a soldier) who took your 1-month-old baby out of your arms and while swinging it by its feet smashed its head against a stone wall? Can the torture of a helpless being be forgiven? Well, it possibly could not be forgiven—unless with help from a context of community, or from an edict from God. Even then, it becomes a questionable issue as to whether it could or could not be forgiven. However, since Tutu cites Arendt, and since Tutu promotes forgiveness and apology, then it becomes quite obvious that Tutu is in tune with Arendt's observation that ordinary individuals can be ordinarily involved in evil behavior. The issue becomes one that begs the question regarding what it is in the psyche of an ordinary individual that permits evil behavior. Is the person hypnotized, tacitly terrorized, seeking to create safety for the self at the expense of the danger for the other, or, is it the banality simply of blood thirstiness? Are “banality” and “simplicity” synonyms? The answer that will be developed herein is that No, “banality” and “simplicity” and “ordinariness” and “evil” do not constitute a syndrome. Therefore, it will be proposed further that “banality of evil” is not banal at all, and that “evil” is a condensation for a more processed syndrome controlled by the person's psyche.

## ***Anger and Paradise***

A hardcore psychological principle considers that disempowerment always, in every person in the world (even perhaps in God), creates *anger*—in this case, the example of God’s wrath to his thwarted *wish* in the Garden. Furthermore, the reason that disempowerment generates *anger* concerns the irrevocable psychological principle that defines one of the functions of the emotion of *anger* as containing the power that permits the feeling of re-empowerment to become reanimated, to again exist (Kellerman 2008, p. 14). That is to say that when one feels disempowered and when there are seemingly no other alternatives to action, the expression or explosion of *anger* frequently becomes the only way to feel or to actually become re-empowered.

In this sense, *anger* has a personality, as suggested in my book: *The Psychoanalysis of Symptoms* (2008, p. 14):

### ***The Personality of Anger***

*Anger* is an attack emotion.

*Anger* is not shy.

*Anger* has an aggressive drive.

*Anger* has an explosive potential.

*Anger* has a confrontational inclination.

*Anger* has an entitled frame of mind.

*Anger* helps one regain the ascendancy.

*Anger* is experienced as an empowerment.

Thus, when the *wish* is thwarted, and the person (or entity) feels disempowered, the response of *anger* is naturally formed in the psyche (derived in evolution itself) as a way of becoming re-empowered. Of course we see this in the Garden where God became angry about the infraction—of His/Her/Its *wish* being thwarted. In this sense, in Paradise, as suggested above, everything hinges on whether the *wish* is gratified. If it is gratified, Paradise is assured. If the *wish* is not gratified, rather than having Paradise, we become “serpentine.” *The Serpent in Paradise* means just that; the Serpent is in Paradise. And when God is disempowered, the Serpent is happy. When God is angry, it means that the Serpent is automatically materialized because God has been disempowered.

Karen Armstrong in her book, *The Case for God* (2009), seems, in spirit, to be thinking similar thoughts regarding the issue of the metamorphosis of good and evil as hinging on a single major variable. In the case of the beginning, regarding the Garden, Armstrong states:

Eden ... (the) story shows that good and evil are inextricably intertwined in human life....In Eden the divine and the human are not estranged but are in the same place. (p. 29)

Accordingly, Armstrong also states that Paradise was not meant to be interpreted literally. It was seen as, or meant to be myth. Of course, mythic literature is also



by definition symbolically based. The question becomes: Of what is Eden a symbol? The very possible answer is that in the case of the Eden narrative, Eden in the overarching sense becomes a symbol, no more and no less, of the hinge of *wish*-gratification, and in addition, Eden means “delight,” or “perfect *wish*.” And to this point, Armstrong states that “Eden was a land of pleasure.” This is exactly the point, that is, that “pleasure” is always the *wish*, fully gratified. In addition, the myth of expulsion offers an opportunity to discuss the travails of life, and therefore, the Serpent represents “...different facets of our humanity.”

Here, in Armstrong’s sense of what Paradise means (along with what the Serpent means) is in direct, though perhaps oblique agreement regarding the metamorphosed phenomenon of good and evil—of the gratified *wish* named “good,” and the thwarted *wish* named “evil.” Paradise means: “Why can’t I have whatever I want?” The Serpent means: “No, you can’t—unless it’s something against what God wants. And if it’s against what God wants, then, and only then can you can have it!”

Therefore, according to Armstrong, Eden is a Paradise myth. It is an imaginary account of the infancy of the human race. Adding to this conception of the Paradise myth and what it could mean is the attribution by Robert Wright in his book, *The Evolution of God*, (2009a).

Here, Wright states that “...exilic theology was a solution to the problem of evil...” (pp. 166–167). This means that the issue of exile explained the problem of evil or even that of suffering. It made sense of such suffering and was also perhaps an associated message regarding some kind of deliverance from evil.

Yet, the complication, as referred to earlier, is that it all depends on whose *wish* is being gratified. If it is God’s *wish* that is being gratified, then Paradise means “goodness” forever. If, however, God’s *wish* is disempowered, thereby crystallizing and then seeing by virtue of God’s disempowerment, the consequent presence and empowerment of the Serpent (in Paradise), then Paradise begins to mean “badness” forever; or, Paradise begins to mean that depending on whose *wish* prevails—God’s *wish* or the *wish* of the Serpent—will determine the definition of Paradise as a context of transfiguration. This is precisely Armstrong’s reference to the Garden:

...(the) story shows that good and evil are inextricably intertwined in human life....

## The *Wish* and Deliverance from Evil Spirits

The *wish* may be inextricably connected to the evil inclination. This connection is perhaps obliquely suggested by Shoshanna (2008) in her book, *Jewish Dharma* (2008, p. 39). Shoshanna actually calls it “the evil inclination.” In addition, and in keeping with this theme of the inextricable connection between good and evil, Noss, in his monumental book, *Man’s Religions* (1956, p. 81) quotes Euripides. Euripides states:

For good comes in evil’s traces,  
And the evil, the good replaces;

And life mid the changing faces,  
Wandereth weak and blind.

If God is a *wishful* God, then He is possibly also an intervening God—a God who wants things to happen in a certain way. This is certainly more definite than if in the Book of Genesis the *wishfulness* or intentionality were only merely implied. Of course, in the Book of Genesis, God pledges Adam and Eve not to eat from the tree of knowledge. For sure, this means that God is an intervening God and, therefore, wants things a certain way. Yet, it is also possible that God is an impartial one, who does not intervene, still and all, *wishes* the things to happen in the same particular way as if He were an intervening God. Whichever way one turns it, God, it seems, wants (*wishes*) things.

This idea of an intervening God is also implied by the sense that as Morse (1994, p. 211) states: “Evil...becomes defined as that to which God never says, ‘Let it be’.” This is an interesting way of putting it because it means that the ‘Let it be’ refers to God’s essential *wish*—whatever that *wish* happens to be at any given time. But Morse indicates that evil is more equivalent to a thwarting of God’s *wish* insofar as with respect to the thwarted *wish*, the Devil says ‘Let it not be.’” Thus, “Let it be” is God’s *wish*—that which is equivalent to and represents Paradise—and “Let it not be” is God’s thwarted *wish*—that which is equivalent of, and represents evil—the Devil’s *wish*.

According to J. L. Martyn (1979, pp. 135–137):

One needs to understand God with stereoptic vision; that is, that God created heaven and earth and that even though dramas are occurring in both places, nevertheless these are really a single drama because the story from above, as well as the one from below are taking place on the earthly stage, and are therefore, in an epistemological sense the here and now along with what is to come.

To say then that God had (has) a plan is to profoundly underestimate God’s *wish*. According to Martyn, not only did God create what is, but God is also thinking about what will be, or what will come. Therefore, His *wish* is one of the maximum proportions. Here, with Martyn, we see that God is revealed as not only intervening but perhaps also as choreographing—as well as, perhaps, plotting scenes.

We see this intervening God along a wide range of theologies as for example in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic studies. In the Judaic Old Testament Saul/David story, the intervening God is blatant—as in the First and Second Book of Samuel:

And when Samuel saw Saul, the Lord said unto him, Behold the man whom I spake to thee of! this same shall reign over my people....And Saul said unto Samuel, I have sinned: for I have transgressed the commandment of the Lord, and thy words.... And Samuel said unto Saul....thou hast rejected the word of the Lord and the Lord hath rejected thee from being king over Israel.... But the spirit of the Lord departed from Saul, and an evil spirit from the Lord troubled him. (Kokoschka 1969, pp. 12, 36, 41)

In addition, it seems that God can emit rays of goodness but also rays of evil spirits. This point is noticed by MacNutt (1995) who cites I Samuel 16: 14–16 of the Old Testament as when David in Saul’s court played the harp when Saul was tormented by evil spirits. Samuel says:

....He will play when the evil spirit from God comes upon you,  
and you will feel better. (p. 35)

This reference to the “evil spirit from God” suggests the same metaphor as does Serpent in Paradise insofar as Paradise, by virtue of how God’s *wish* is handled, also can be meant as a reference to how it is counteracted by the Serpent, that is, God has the power to send good but also has the power to send evil, or evil spirits. And it all hinges on God’s *wish* as one that is gratified as in his pact with Saul, or thwarted by Saul as in Saul’s sin of disregarding God’s commandment to Him specifically.

According to the novelist Jerome Charyn (1987, p. 101), Saul “seeks God but finds only demons.” Charyn considers that humanity is more like Saul, and so Charyn laments:

...we, all the modern fools—liars, jugglers, wizards without  
song—still have Saul. (p. 105)

It becomes clear, that we all have Saul because in theological terms, we thwart God’s *wish*, that is, we are all descendants both of God and of the transfigured God, that is the Serpent in Paradise who becomes transfigured on the horns of a thwarted *wish*. Since the Serpent never slipped into Paradise but rather was an intricate part of the fabric of the Garden (and specifically as hinging on whether or not God’s *wish* was adhered to by his first creatures), then whether the transfiguration is personified in one instance as God or in another instance by the Serpent, is again, determined by the *wish*—whether on the one hand it, the *wish*, was gratified, or on the other, not.

In Christian theology and with the spread of the New Testament culture, evil seemed to become more rooted in the supernatural insofar as Satan was seen to be its progenitor (MacNutt, pp. 45–46). In Christian theology, Jesus was chosen by God to free us from the power of the Devil (Acts 10:38). And this was the good news. It all means that: “Evil is at its root, demonic and too great for us to overcome” (MacNutt, p. 46). Correspondingly, in Christian theology, only through Jesus, can we overcome evil.

We can interpret this in our own terms to mean that we can’t always exist with gratified *wishes* so that most frequently because of thwarted *wishes*, we are usually controlled by the Serpent—that is, by our disappointments and our *angers*. Jesus, then, is in essence the antidote for our *angers* and our disappointments. The entire narrative begins to weave the fabric that reveals the *wish*—deliverance from evil spirits, that is, in the face of disappointment, nevertheless we retain the yearning for Paradise (the good), where God’s *wish* prevails.

Of course, Christopher Hitchens (2007) comes along with his book, *God is Not Great*, and throws in a monkey-wrench. Hitchens (p. 254) makes a persuasive argument stating that the entire discussion of evil is the evil done in God’s name, especially when it even concerns sacrifice rituals, including human sacrifice. Such

primitive rituals are events designed by so-called primitive peoples that are attempts to make God's *wish* a gratified one. In so doing, these perpetrators of sometimes daily human sacrifice feel that they are receiving the residual and emitted so-called sun-beams (goodness) from the Paradise that God deemed to be necessary—of course by virtue of His gratified *wish* or *wishes*. For example, in pre-Columbian Aztec culture, the sacrifice of the actual tearing-out of a live person's heart was done daily in supplication to God and therefore as a way of inviting God's favor.

Further, in pursuing answers to the relation between the *wish* and deliverance from evil spirits, Dorothy Martyn (2007, pp. 120–121), in her book, *Beyond Deserving: Parents, Children and Responsibility Revisited*, hypothesizes that the Serpent symbolized the bringing of evil into human affairs. Martyn points out that the Serpent uses “blame” as an instrumentality of evil. She states:

Finding out who is culpable becomes the urgent matter  
at hand when hurt or *anger* and suffering appear.

Martyn's focus on “blame” and “culpability” perhaps makes it all a direct derivative of the thwarted *wish*. Further, Elaine Pagels, in her book *The Secret Gospel of Thomas* (2005), states the problem starkly. Pagels says:

By nature man belongs to God but the devil ‘the apostasy’  
captured the human race and separated us from God. (p. 147)  
Therefore, ... whatever trespasses canonical guidelines must be  
‘lies and wickedness’ that come either from the evil of the human  
heart or from the devil. (p. 113)

## Variations on the Issue of the *Wish*

In the vast history on the conceptions of evil, the most general abstraction of the subject-matter of evil is created as a polarity. This polarity is composed of the good spirit versus the bad one. And these opposing spirits are usually considered to be primal. A good example is seen in Zoroastrian ideology in which this sort of polarity is exactly what transpires, that is, that simply understood, a defined good spirit is opposed by a defined bad spirit. The bad spirit was so-to-speak a follower of the lie (the bad one), and the good spirit (the right one) was led into Paradise (Noss 1956, p. 443). As an aside, William Blake (1992, pp. 368–369) also tells us that the truth is not entirely enough, that is, Blake states in poetic form that even in tone, the truth needs to be embraced by a context that is unsullied and undefiled. Within a poem titled, *Auguries of Innocence*, Blake intones:

A truth that's told with bad intent  
Beats all the lies you can invent.

The bad spirit (the evil one) as a follower of the lie, and even as a telling of a truth fashioned for insidious purposes, was in later times called *Shaitin*, or Satan. In this sense, conceptually, evil was considered to be in close proximity to “good.”

All of it can be equated with the thesis proposed in this volume, namely that the Serpent is always exactly proximal to Paradise, that is, as cited above, that Paradise and the Serpent are transfigurations. This idea is cited in Noss's terms (1956) as well as in Hebrew lore:

Evil is co-ternal with God—that is, essentially housed within the same boundary. In a similar conception, Hebrews also used the name Satan and located him in the Garden of Eden, in Paradise—exactly proximal, or at least as near as might be possible to the point of attachment.

This seemingly inextricable (or almost inextricable) connection between good and bad, God and evil, and the Serpent in Paradise, is also essentially proclaimed in the story of Jesus meditating in the wilderness for 40 days. There, Satan tempted Jesus. This Satanic temptation of Jesus is an example of how the issue regarding the *wish* can either be gratified or thwarted. Satan's threat to Jesus, and what it really means in our translation here in this volume, concerns the simple idea of whether Jesus, on God's watch, will ultimately gain the ascendancy or not. The question implied is: Who wins, God or Satan? And what this means with respect to the presumed mission given to Jesus is that Jesus' *wish* during the time of his wilderness meditation was to know what to do with regard to his mission. He was contemplating it, meditating on it.

In a somewhat contrasting narrative, Pagels and King (2007) explode the century's old accepted story of Judas as the traitor. These authors proclaim that Jesus was the choreographer, the maker of his own death so that the entire enterprise leading to the crucifixion was prescribed and ordained—preordained. How it would happen and who the agent would be—the one appointed by Jesus to set off the process of the eventual crucifixion—therefore was a foregone conclusion. Here, we have a profound contrast in how Jesus is seen. On the one hand, he is seen as not quite knowing how to think about his mission, and then Pagels and King tell us that essentially he always knew, and in fact, was and is able to preordain history. This, of course, is the apogee of an intervening master.

Apparently, the other Master is Satan, the prevaricator. In Islam, Iblis, the Devil was originally an angel who was ultimately undermined because of a personality flaw—pride! The Devil's job is to lead all astray and away from God. However, when all rise at judgment day, then Allah judges. Apparently, Allah keeps records and, therefore, heaven and hell become crucial designations, and destinations. Allah therefore is both an impartial non-intervener but then at judgment day becomes the quintessential and absolute intervener—some go to heaven, some to hell (Noss 1956, p. 701).

In the sense of leading away from God, Guirdham (1959), also points out that the sin of Adam and Eve was separating from God, and thus Guirdham states: "They themselves created good and evil by separating themselves from God" (p. 190). And when one is separated from God, then one is recreating a condition of thwarting God's *wish*, that is, a condition that is thought of as sin. It means that anything against Godly *wishes* constitutes sin.

Along with this issue of the thwarting of God's *wishes* and the appearance of sin is the importance attributed to the role of Satan, the role of the Devil. According to Byron (Frye 1982, p. 49), history is "...the record of what man has done as, 'the devil's scripture.'" In the Bible, the voice of the accuser is Satan, a name that "...means enemy or adversary" (p. 164). It means the adversary of the gratified *wish*, of course correspondingly meaning a reference to God's *wish*. It is the enemy and adversary of Paradise the "good." It is Satan who is the enemy and adversary.

In the sense of heresy and because of the issue of possible transfiguration in the Garden:

God can become Satan, the Serpent, transmogrified because of God's thwarted *wish*—whenever it becomes thwarted.

As far as the *wish* is concerned, it seems that there may be a conflict in God's ability to see ahead. Yet, according to Pagels and King (2007), God can predestine or preordain things—his own crucifixion for example. However, as related in Alter (1996, p. 28), God can also regret his preordained decision and decide, for example, to destroy the human. Therefore one *wish* can replace another, thereby invoking the folk wisdom: "Be careful of what you want because you may get it." This means for example, that in a relationship, each partner can develop reflexive allergic reactions to the other so that what was attractive at first becomes eventually perhaps intolerable. The initial *wish* is to merge but the eventual *wish* (replacing the first one) is perhaps to replace that initial *wish* to merge, with the eventual *wish* to separate. This all also means that *wishing* is "process" and not necessarily solely "event." And as is obvious, the change of emotion and feeling for the partner (as a variable of experience through elapsed time with the partner) concerns the influence of emotion. This essentially means that personal *wishes* can even be defined as personal *wishes* to the extent or criterion of satisfying the feeling of self-interest or selfishness. This focus on the self with respect to emotion (to the extent of selfishness) becomes a primary motivator as well as a powerful influence over the person's entire *wish* system. Could it then be that:

It is our selfishness which creates evil?

Wilson (1997, pp. 122–123) refers to the letter of James in the New Testament. Wilson indicates that one is tempted by one's own desire. The odd default point is that to do good we must turn to God's will. All of it seems to lead to the conclusion that the pleasure principle of nature—from amoeba to man—through desire (the *wish*) seeks *wish* gratification. This focus on the *wish*, as noted earlier, is the pleasure principle's chief derivative manifestation as such *wishes* affect human affairs. However, in all of these samples of theological perspectives, it becomes clear, that to do good man must turn to God's will and not depend solely on one's self-interest. Therefore, God's will is the only sure thing of creating the condition whereby the Serpent only exists in Paradise in virtual state—and therefore is, for all intents and purposes, actually shut-out of the reality of Paradise. The message becomes that doing God's will (and with the Serpent annulled from Paradise, that is "in virtual state"), sin and whatever other of various defilements cannot exist.

Notwithstanding the Hobbesian philosophical orientation (1972, p. 51), that man's *wish* is primary, nevertheless, in a fascinating implication in such cases where God's will is what is followed, then the *wish* (whether God's *wish* or the human *wish*) becomes no longer one that is relative. In such cases it is God's will (*wish*) that is absolute and is what counts. Thus, in an uncontaminated Paradise, it is not the pleasure principle (self-interest) that will determine human behavior. If God's will (*wish*) is followed (thereby gratifying God's *wish* as the only derivative of the pleasure principle and only allocated to God), then thinking, feeling, and behavior in all of humanity becomes a rectification of the Serpent's original presence in Paradise. It is the phenomenon that erases the Serpent entirely from its permanent Paradiseal transfigurational or transmogrified presence.

Therefore, in this adherence to God's *wish*, Eve does not succumb to the Serpent, and so the Serpent is no longer a figure of transfiguration, and so necessarily is never any longer a part of the story. The story of the Garden of Eden therefore begins anew and includes solely those who inform the population of the Garden and who and what is associated with the Garden: God, Adam, Eve, and the Tree of Knowledge.

Evil therefore, in the world, correspondingly goes the way of the Serpent. Evil vanishes!

# Chapter 4

## Philosophical References to Evil

### Introduction

In this volume, it is clearly established that the *wish* is identified as a key constituent of the infrastructure of evil. In philosophical references, this *wish* or will is consistently discussed throughout the recorded history by a wide variety of philosophers. For example, Durant (1927, p. 351) indicates that Schopenhauer framed it in an absolute way:

Desire is infinite, fulfillment is limited....At bottom.... the will must live on itself, for there exists nothing besides it, and it is a hungry will.

In the same vein, Durant explains that Voltaire examines God's *wish* as to its relative nature. Is God's *wish* strong and irrevocable, or is it weak and infected with profound disappointment? Voltaire wonders about God's powers and is pessimistic. He says:

Either God can prevent evil and he will not; or he *wishes* to prevent it and he cannot. (Durant, 1927, p. 247)

Again in keeping with a dialogue among philosophers regarding God's strength (or relative strength, especially where the *wish* is concerned), the thinking of Plato does (or perhaps does not) illuminate the issue. Plato said:

How is it possible that God could be good with a "...universe so manifestly squealing with misery and steeped in sin? (Wilson, 1997, p. 155)

In a similar sentiment, Michael Shermer (2004, p. 107) quotes C. S. Lewis (1963):

The tortures occur. If they are unnecessary, then there is no God or, a bad one. If there is a God, then these tortures are necessary. For no even moderately good being could possibly inflict or permit them, if they weren't.

Yet, Plato felt that God was only responsible for the good things in the universe. But Plato possibly created a problem because he also identified God as an "impassible



God who could not move” and also characterized God as “ineffectual.” (Wilson, 1997, p. 155).

The question quickly becomes one of examining the power of the *wish* as it might be easily deduced from seeing what kind of God it is that can or cannot implement *wishes*. In a treatise I published entitled: *The Discovery of God: A Psycho/Evolutionary Perspective* (2013), I considered this issue by examining the various God possibilities—the intervening God, the impartial God (non-intervening), the irrelevant God, and the inexistent God.

A discussion of this amalgam of Gods follows.

## Gods

The search to define God or to encounter God, by necessity, is a search for security and safety and for the nullification of danger. Of course the God that is encountered needs to be an understanding one who empathizes with man’s search for such understanding, as well as for appreciation, protection, and certainly for security. This need for security and safety underscores the need for tension relief, especially from the apprehension of death. It appears that the idea of a soul serves the purpose of negating death as a defined final end. For believers, therefore, a belief is generated that there is no end. In this sense, the search for God (or conversation with God) becomes a profound endeavor that can be employed to achieve these *wishes*—a sense of physical safety, emotional balance and security, and finally, peace of mind.

In the history of philosophy and to the question of evil, of course the nature of God (or of a presumed God) becomes an important issue to examine. The question is: How to characterize God? In the following are some of the ways God might be characterized. It is a focus on hypothetical Gods with respect to the issue of implementation of *wishes* as discussed in my book, *The Discovery of God: A Psycho/Evolutionary Perspective* (pp. 31–48).

1. *The Intervening God*. This is a God to whom people pray for the purpose of answering a request, or satisfy a *wish*. In the major religions (Christian, Islamic, Jewish), believers understand that such a God is in fact responsive to prayer. In these religions, God, in turn, is not shy about asking of believers that they listen and obey. For example, God said to Abraham: “Obey me and I will protect you.” Another example is Jesus instructing his disciples to do certain things and on how to reach the Father. Along with this, the noun “Islamic” translates as “submission,” implying deference to God’s *wishes*. These are references to a God that intervenes and who could possibly satisfy one’s ever present *wish*.

2. *The Impartial God (non-intervening)*. This is the God who looks and sees—watches, as it were—but remains neutral. This God settles scores either in a way other than with immediate punishments, or somehow (and in some way), perhaps in the hypothesized afterlife. Prayerful people consider

that asking favors of such a God is not relevant and even not appropriate. These people presumably feel in communion with this impartial God and report personal *wishes* as concerns (presumably without expectation of response), feeling finally that the act of prayer is an act of homage and not one of request.

3. *The Irrelevant God.* Robert Wright (2009b) defines the irrelevant God as one that "...did His work remotely—that his role in the creative process ended when he unleashed the algorithm of natural selection...." This irrelevant God can be identified as the Anxiety God. It is a God whose function it is to reduce the worshipper's tension. Nevertheless, individuals, still in all, will pray to this so-called irrelevant God in the hope that the irrelevancy is in some mysterious way, actually relevant.

4. *The Inexistent God.* The inexistent God is the God that does not exist. And considering *wishes* and how they contribute to magnificent obsessions, an example of such *wishing* can be seen in the Babylonian Talmud. This Talmud contains 300 arguments presuming to validate the resurrection of the dead. In an irreverent observation, some say that if you could produce one good argument you would not need three hundred, and if you do not have one good argument, then three million won't help. The answer, of course, is that when *wishes* are intense even 300 arguments do not at all seem unusual.

Of course Christopher Hitchens (2009, p. 268) sees it all as a triumph for the Serpent and as a defeat for Paradise. Hitchens cites Hume who in turn turns to Epicurus: The following questions regarding God are then attributed by Hume to Epicurus:

1. Is He willing to prevent evil but not able? Then He is impotent. The issue here implies that if He is not able, then His *wish* cannot gain the ascendancy and therefore the Serpent (evil) controls Paradise—controls the world—debases the world.
2. Is He able but not willing? Then He is malevolent. In this case, the *wish* has been entirely usurped by Satan creating a negative image of God—implied as though God is possibly perhaps, even cruel.
3. Is He both able and willing? Whence then is evil? This means if God is both willing and able then why is His *wish* not triumphant? If He is willing and able then why, based upon the vast evils in the world, does it obviously seem that Satan is in control—that the successful metamorphosed bold-relief element of the Garden is the Serpent, while the goodness of the Garden is, or seems to be, defeated.

John Gray (2013), in his book *The Silence of Animals*, refers to theologian Reinhold Niebuhr who seems infused with the spirit of Epicurus when he intones that: "We are cursed with original sin," concluding with the very serious meaning that Paradise was lost and that the Serpent prevailed. Along with this, Desmond Tutu, in his book, *No Future Without Forgiveness*, (1999, pp. 144–147) acknowledges the deep meaning of forgiveness in the context of courage. His is the minority optimistic view—one not willing to concur in the opinion that it was the Serpent who

triumphed in the Garden. Yet, despite the majority pessimistic view of God's *wish* as thwarted, (that is, the story of the Garden seems to be a story of the Serpent's triumph), along comes the psychologist and psychotherapist, Dr. Dorothy Martyn with yet an expanded and quite brilliant conception regarding the *wish* and its psychological implication. It is Martyn's direct rejoinder to the ostensible triumph of the Serpent.

## The Thwarted *Wish*

Dr. Dorothy Martyn, in her brilliant and eloquently written 2007 book, *Beyond Deserving*, (a book on therapy with children and their parents) brings us to another infrastructural element in the machinery of evil. Martyn takes us to the polar arena of "blame, indictment, and incrimination" versus in a general sense, the issue of "hope." Martyn's book is a treasure trove with respect to the entire issue of "respect," and in a sense, is a treatise on "goodness." She cites Karl Barth as the influential voice who proclaimed truths regarding what could be considered this umbrella of "goodness"—authentic love (p. xvii).

Several factors comprise this sort of love:

1. Genuine love—"Givenness", like the dew, just comes, unsummoned. It is itself a love that moves first and cannot be earned.

[This idea of "cannot be earned," is the essential element of Martyn's book, *Beyond Deserving*].

2. "Participation with"—This is a form of love that enters into the other's distress. This "withness," so different from "againstness," is the deep meaning of "mercy."

[The "withness" represents the deepest sense of empathetic compassionate sharing].

3. "Patience"—This is the kind of love that knows how to wait, how to accompany and sustain the child, allowing space and time for the other's own being to emerge without coercion.

[Here, the issue is larger than simple problem-solving].

Martyn (p. xiv), quotes Matt. 20: 1–16. "...all received the same pay from the master, though some had worked a long day, some a half day, and some just a short part of the day." Martyn further explains "...that the major biblical message is about something that cannot be earned. In this parable, 'fairness' and 'merit' utterly disappear in an in-breaking of a powerful force that transcends 'deserving' altogether." In developing this idea of "beyond deserving," she continues:

The justice idea of reward according to what is deserved is replaced by the much more powerful force of non-contingent, compassionate alliance with the essential personhood of the other, however small that part may appear to be, against the destructive forces opposing the person's good. (p. xv)

In a way, this orientation regarding the “good” is not entirely unlike Karl Marx’s 1875 declaration that: “From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.” Further, perhaps a new meaning to “fairness” concerns this Martyn “in-breaking of a powerful force that transcends ‘deserving’ altogether.” And so Martyn contemplates that “It is all ‘a radical declaration of the end of ‘merit’ altogether.” She says, “As uncongenial as this may be to our sense of justice, anyone who has ever been touched by a relationship that is not dependent for its mercy on deserving knows its power to alleviate rage and *anger*.” (p. 79). Therefore, a very probable new definition of “fairness,” must then contain the spirit that the only fairness is that which is generated by the in-breaking of the powerful force of “giveness,” “participation with,” and “patience”—the goodness of authentic love. It is beyond merit and beyond deserving.

In this sense, the challenging message of current wisdom, along with a more optimistic message of the future, is that the thwarted *wish* that always generates *anger* doesn’t perhaps necessarily need to always or even ever generate *anger*. Thus, Martyn’s calling is to a higher state of consciousness and communion. In a parallel way, in my book *The Discovery of God: A Psycho/Evolutionary Perspective*, p. 42) is stated:

This hopeful theological message suggests that Christianity’s fundamental philosophy concerns a utopian vision of the future in which Godliness permeates everything—beyond deserving—and where there is hope that the future can, at any moment, exist as the present”....in a state of “Godly love.” And this not only means the enshrinement of “fairness”....(actually a new meaning of “fairness”)....“It also implies the enshrinement of” goodness.

The point is that feelings of impotence and disempowerment will result when one’s *wish* is thwarted. And frequently when one is disempowered, the only way to be re-empowered is to be *angry*. However, Martyn is insisting that if looking at the Garden of Eden, where God’s *wish* had been ostensibly thwarted by the Serpent, doesn’t necessarily need to mean that God is, by default, *angry*—despite the actual narrative of the Eden story. And this is so because in a larger sense (as noted by Martyn), God is of a love that moves first and therefore it is a love that is not earned, that this is a form of love that enters into the other’s distress, and that this is the kind of love that knows how to wait.

In this sense, it could be possible that figuratively, God is not replying in kind to the Serpent’s action, so that in the story of the Garden, the evil of the Serpent may not have been congruent with any corresponding so-called evil of God (despite the literal story in which God is in fact visibly *angry*, specifically at Adam and Eve, and of course, implicitly, at the snake). Nevertheless, Martyn observes (p. 120) that the story of the Garden is, “....the most famous crime and punishment story of our culture....” and that it symbolizes “....the introduction of evil into the human scene.” “....The reptile’s presence” generates the idea of “blame.” “....Finding out who is culpable” takes center stage. The issue is: “*Who* is at fault?” And therefore, *who* is

to blame? To illustrate this point, we see that Adam blamed Eve, and Eve blamed the snake.

Martyn (2007, p. 121) begins to analyze the issue of “blame.” Even Sophocles in the Greek tradition looked to blame someone with respect to the health of the city. In addition, Oedipus Rex, concerned the *who*, the one who did the wrongdoing? Then again, Eve said: “The Serpent beguiled me, and I did eat.” (Genesis 3:12–13, KJV). Thus, the snake represented the thwarting of God’s *wish*. It is the *wish* that is symbolized by the idea of the health of the city. The actual health of the city is obviously the actual *wish* fully gratified, and therefore, “health of the city” is a surrogate—a symbol for Paradise.

Martyn asks: “Where does the snake hide?” The probable answer is that the snake is hiding in the psyche’s domain of emotion, waiting for a moment of someone’s disempowerment when the person’s *wish* is thwarted, disappointed, when therefore Paradise becomes instantly transmuted into the reptile. It is an idea of *anger* where the emotion of *anger* is generated from disappointment regarding the thwarting of *wishes*. It is the idea of *anger* generated from disappointment, really from disempowerment. Thus, the snake becomes a symbol of an always thwarted *wish*, specifically of the good *wish*, God’s *wish*.

In the sense of the infrastructure of evil—of the machinery of evil—of course, a person’s *wish* becomes a cardinal factor in the psyche’s process initiating evil intent. The thwarting of that *wish*, or more specifically, the thwarting of that *wish*, the miscreant-thwarting, the *who*, becomes a second crucial factor in the gestation of evil because in a tit-for-tat world, an eye-for-an-eye is what is demanded. Revenge wants to be exercised.

With this sort of process in, and of, mind and assuming the *wish* can verbally express what the psyche wants, it becomes important to note that the *wish* is a demanding and impatient taskmaster. It wants what it wants, when it wants it, and to the fullest measure. It has no patience, it comes very impatiently summoned, and it wants gratification because it feels it deserves it. The entire impulse of the *wish unbridled* as it derives from the pleasure principle, and how it works in life, is quite opposite to the Martyn conception of “beyond deserving,” “beyond merit,” being in concert with “patience,” with “givenness,” and in terms of “withness.”

Thus, with respect to the theme of this book: *Serpent in Paradise: On the Nature of Evil*, how we manage *wishes* becomes a highly relevant issue. Freud recognized this and stated the astounding proclamation that the *wish* is indestructible (1900, pp. 577–578). In life, we know that *wishes* are frequently adumbrated, denied, frustrated, and also entirely thwarted. However, as cited earlier, psychologically speaking, in the psyche, no *wish* will be denied. The question becomes: How does the psyche gratify the *wish*? The psyche gratifies the *wish* by deflection. It is the deflection represented by the person’s defense against knowing something (a something that the person does not want to know) and transferred to the psychological and behavioral equivalent—that of doing something, e.g., acting-out. And this deflection is at all possible with the action of *repression* ultimately vividly displaying the power of a radiating acting-out. Given the template of acting-out (doing rather than knowing), it all raises the question as to whether or not “choice” reflects objectivity in human affairs.

## The Issue of “Choice” and “Symptom”

Elaine Pagels in her book, *Adam, Eve, and the Serpent* (1988, p. 108), refers to Augustine who explained that obedience and not autonomy should have been Adam’s true glory. This is Pagel’s entry into the issue of voluntary human “choice.” Augustine sees that through an act of will, Adam and Eve did change the structure of the universe, that this single willful act permanently corrupted human nature as well as nature in general (p. 133). In line with the same view of the scene in the Garden, Pagels (p. xiii) refers also to Clement of Alexandria (c. 180 C.E.) who said: “Adam’s sin was not sexual indulgence but disobedience.” Clement, therefore, agreed “...that the real theme of the story of Adam and Eve is moral freedom and moral responsibility.” Pagel further states that the “point is to show that we are responsible for the choices we make—good and evil—just as Adam was.”

However, assuming Adam was an innocent, then to expect a good “choice” that he might make in the face of insufficient nurturing and lack of sufficient experience in life, becomes rather a questionable judgment. Therefore, such an expectation of good choice-making is not something to which one could really hold such a person as Adam responsible. In addition, and for example, in Adam’s psyche, (or in anyone’s psyche), it may be that the role of the unconscious and the psychological phenomenon of perhaps not wanting to know something is definitely a possible dimension to consider when judging choice-making as one that is justifiably either always rewarded for proper outcomes or always to be punished for improper ones. Given this implication of the possibility of repressive forces operating in the psyche that can act to prevent the self from knowing something, then the absolute validity of “objectivity” in choice-making (in the absence of the consideration and role of other influences) can become a very iffy axiom. This issue has been discussed in Chaps. 1 and 2. The point is:

The idea that we actually have the unmitigated freedom to make choices becomes a complex issue. “Choice” is complex because of all the influential psychological variables that are involved. “Choice” simply becomes transformed because the person simply didn’t want to *know* something. Rather than knowing, the person *represses* the knowing and in its place does something untoward (evil), something symbolic of the *knowing*. This *doing* is defined psychoanalytically as acting-out. Thus, the idea of “choice,” seemingly representative of a theological province may actually be more a citizen of a psychological domain—concerning both conscious as well as serious and powerful unconscious forces.

In continuing this discussion of “choice,” and with respect to original sin, Martyn (pp. 122–123) considers that one face of the Devil is equal to “severe judgment itself,” as in “self-accusatory impulses.” Here, Martyn is shifting to a psychoanalytic orientation in essentially translating the reference to the Devil into a more psyche-directed personality dynamic. For example, in practical social interaction, this sort of accusatory experience can be said to contain an extra force, that is, this

extra force is defined as the accusation of the accuser plus the accusation of the self against the self. It becomes a two against one scenario—the accuser and the self against the self (Kellerman 2009a, p. 34).

In view of this psychological explanation regarding accusation, the accusation itself is the ever-present reptile in the Garden. In a practical everyday sense, it is the accuser, the seducer, who is allied with the person's self-doubt and even self-accusation. This two against one scenario can be another variable affecting "choice."

Out of all of this roaring theological and philosophical hue and cry—traced over millennia—regarding how to understand evil, it may be that what was always missing was a psychoanalytic decryption process that basically understands the machinery of the psyche, and therefore, of the engineering mechanisms of the individual's personality. But first, before a discussion ensues regarding such psychoanalytic decryption understanding, a small sample-review of basic philosophical and theological tenets communicated over millennia in many thousands of books, discussions, scholarly papers, and symposia follows.

## Sample Literature Regarding Philosophies Relating to: A "God," the "Good," and to "Evil"

This review is of material in John B. Noss's classic volume: *Man's Religions* (1956), in which the philosophy of good and evil are focused upon, are here listed in designated ideological categories:

Platonic—Young people should only hear virtuous thoughts because they are incapable of analysis....evil messages will affect them (p. 82).

[You have to be taught to hate, to be evil.]

Brahmaerism—"Why have I not done good? Why have I done evil? He who knows this, saves himself from these thoughts." (p. 138).

[You can only know why you have done evil if you understand the infrastructure of evil; that is, what do you *wish* for and is the *wish* gratified or thwarted?]

Janist—To escape evil one must be purified of dependence on worldly contents of animate or inanimate objects (p. 150).

[The seeds of *anger* are sown toward objects on whom one is dependent. For example, the *sturm und drang* of adolescence can be seen as at least in part, as derived from years of dependency on parents.]

Buddhist—Desire can be good or bad. The wise man knows how to discriminate between them. The eightfold path leading to control over desire. "Everyone is potentially a Buddha." (p. 203).

[There are good and bad wishes meaning perhaps that with respect to the "good," everyone can be God.]

Hindu—Three ways of salvation (from evil; pp. 226–235):

1. Karma Marga (the Way of Works)—carrying out rites and duties adding to one's merits.

2. Samadhi (the Way of Knowledge)—the cause of evil is ignorance. Mental error is the root of evil.

3. Bhakti Marga (the Way of Devotion)—hopeful devotion to a deity for deliverance of something promised.

[Knowing the infrastructure of evil can neutralize it.]

Taoist—Focus on the impersonal and what is “not,” and therefore one will be invulnerable to evil—including that of death (pp. 319–322).

[If one touches reality then evil can infect.]

Confucion—“Man’s practices had grown corrupt, but man himself had not yet become corrupt; he was still apt to do good as to evil.”

Man failed morally to adhere to the ideal of social and religious conduct. It is called “Li.”

Li regulates primary human relation-

ships: ruler and subject; father and son; husband and wife;

oldest son and younger brothers; elders and juniors. Leads to

cosmic harmony and the will of heaven (pp. 347–360).

[Basically an attempt to control all *anger*. Implicit

is the sense that *anger* is the culprit in all of evil.]

Shinto—Means “The way of God.” It is a reference to respect for the

past of Japan, a loyalty to familiar ways of life. Also a

reference to patriotism and solidarity, and a story of various

Gods. For example, the *Bushido ethical code* includes eight attitudes (p. 399):

1. Loyalty—to Emperor and Lord who one serves;

2. Gratitude—of a right life;

3. Courage—life can be surrendered gladly in service of the Lord;

4. Justice—duty above all;

5. Truthfulness—no lying;

6. Politeness—to all people;

7. Reserve—don’t show feeling;

8. Honor—death is preferable to disgrace.

[Evil is evaded by strict adherence to the Bushido Code.]

Zoroastrian—Each man’s soul is the seat of a war between good and evil.

In the creation of man was “the freedom to determine his own

actions and hence the power to choose between right and wrong

(p. 443).

[The issue of “choice” with regard to good and evil is

quite iffy given the psychological mechanisms at work—especially with reference to unconscious *repressive* forces.]

Mozaic—The higher ethical code—the ten commandments and the

covenant with Jews. Requires ethical conduct along with the

implication of “or else!” (p. 472).

[Implies reward for good behavior and

punishment for bad behavior.]

of Jesus—“Nothing is so important to you as that you should hear me,

every one of you: by me God speaks!” Put moral obligations

above all social, legal, or ceremonial demands (p. 574).

[Upholding only “Godness” assures Paradise.]

of Qur’an—“The high level of inclusive brotherhood instead of the lower

level of divisive organization.” Allah makes known his will

through angels (p. 706).

[“Will” equals *wish*. People need to heed or else

no salvation.]



## **Conclusion**

In the history of the philosophy of good and evil, no real answer has touched on the infrastructure of evil although at least the theologians and philosophers have been concerned with the importance of defeating evil and have suggested codes of behavior to accomplish this end. In the following chapter on references to the psychoanalytic understanding of evil, the basic infrastructure of evil shall be proposed. It is a proposal based upon a decryption process of mechanisms of the psyche revealing the claimed true infrastructure of evil.

## Chapter 5

# Psychoanalytic References to Evil

### Introduction

In the discussion of evil presented throughout Part 1 of this volume, it becomes evident that “evil” has been considered both as “intent” as well as “action.” Yet, as “intention,” however dastardly its content, such intent still needs to be materialized into action in order for it to be considered as behavior. This sort of behavior is defined as abhorrent, malevolent, vicious, sinful, immoral, iniquitous, and bad—or plainly evil. Therefore, evil is largely identified through the actual behavior of individuals and groups. Apparently, and philosophically speaking, we are what we do, not necessarily what we think.

In discussing the roots of evil, many authors, theologians, philosophers, and social theorists have crafted eloquent descriptions and definitions regarding some of the ins and outs of this subject matter. Yet, as has been proposed here, the deep structure of evil—actually its infrastructure—has remained without an analysis of what could be considered its core structure. In this sense, and as has been referred to throughout the first part of this volume, the actual infrastructure of evil has essentially remained a mystery. Generally, theologians (and especially devout religious people) frequently either ascribe or attribute to evil supernatural origins and conflate evil with the imprimatur of sin, the responsibility of the Devil, a resistance and effrontery to God, and of course, such individuals utilize the Garden of Eden as a basic symbol of the genesis of evil.

Philosophers, theologians, psychoanalysts and sociologists also point to definitions of evil, that include references to morality, social conditions, group behavior, individual choice in determining behavior, act of will, and even resort to expressing clichés such as: “cursed with original sin,” or “one needs to be wise to distinguish between good and bad,” or “God is responsible only for the good things,” or even “to escape evil don’t be dependent.” In each case, it seems that the best offer by these specialists (representing their respective domains of discourse), is, as a last resort (especially in the face of insufficient theoretical data, or even necessary scientific knowledge regarding evil), more or less, a simple repetition of an exercise in the stating of axioms. Nowhere do we get down to the nature of evil—its psychological nature—with respect to the basic machinery of evil, to its infrastructure. This basic

machinery of evil is here proposed to be actually gestated in the person's psyche. It is there in the person's psyche that the infrastructure of evil is processed—to then eventually appear in raw form—in disastrous behavior.

Psychologist and science historian Dr. Michael Shermer (2004, p. 69) puts it quite succinctly:

“To call something ‘evil’ does not lead us to a deeper understanding of the cause of evil behavior.” Earthquakes are not evil.

## Introduction to the Infrastructure of Evil

Dr. Ervin Staub, in his volume, *The Roots of Evil* (1989, p. 25), makes a bold although largely descriptive step in elucidating the relative nature of evil as well as thankfully suggesting the presence of psychological variables that can affect one's descent into evil. It all involves the extent of a person's consciousness and its affect on one's moral stance. Staub states:

“By evil I mean actions that have....consequences....of the destruction of human beings”....destroying or diminishing people's dignity, happiness and capacity to fulfill material needs....We cannot judge evil by conscious intentions because psychological distortions tend to hide even from the perpetrators themselves their true intentions. They are unaware, for example, of their own unconscious hostility or that they are scapegoating others. Frequently, their intention is to create a ‘better world,’ but in the course of doing so they disregard the welfare and destroy the lives of human beings. Perpetrators of evil often intend to make people suffer but see their actions as necessary or serving a higher good. In addition, people tend to hide their negative intentions from others and justify negative actions by higher ideals or the victim's evil nature.”

This sentiment is also expressed by Dr. Elaine Pagels, in her book, *Adam, Eve, and the Serpent*. (p. 72). Here, Dr. Pagels focuses on the issue and importance of insight and introspection that is free of *repression*. She quotes from the Gospel of Philip:

As for ourselves, let each one of us dig down after the root of evil which is within one, and, and let one pluck it out of one's heart from the root. It will be plucked out, if we recognize it. But if we are ignorant of it, it takes root in us and produces its fruit in our heart; it masters us....it is powerful because we have not recognized it.

Here we begin to enter the domain of the psyche. In the Gospel of Philip is stated, “....dig down....and....pluck it out....” Of course this is easier said than done because here one is dealing with *repressive* forces. And *repressive* forces always, but always implicate *anger* toward specific individuals. Again, the *anger* will never be about a table or a chair. It will always be about a person. This is how the psyche works—concerned about people, about individuals, and expending energy

managing the vicissitudes of a person's *anger* and a person's psychological and emotional interaction in response to such thwarted *wishes*. To this must be added Freud's brilliant discovery that differentiates the psyche's concerns and contrasts it with the concerns of reality. Essentially, and as referred to earlier, Freud recognized that the *wish* is indestructible (1900, pp. 577–578). This means that in life we know that *wishes* are frequently, denied, frustrated, and also frequently entirely thwarted. However, the Freudian idea is that in the psyche, no *wish* will be denied. If the question is that in the psyche all *wishes* become gratified, then the further basic question becomes: How does the psyche gratify any particular *wish* that in reality was thwarted? And this is all related to the issue of consciousness—"in order to pluck it (evil) out."

Yes, in order to "pluck it out," requires specific aims within one's psyche. First, the *wish* that was thwarted needs to be made conscious. Second, the *who*, the person *who* thwarted the *wish*, must be identified. That *who* is the individual toward whom the *anger* was directed, and yet it all remains unconscious. Material remaining unconscious requires an inquiring mind to surface such unconscious material into consciousness. That will be the way we recognize "it"—that is, how we recognize that which we need to "pluck out." We "pluck it out," by undoing *repression*—by gaining consciousness of the entire acting-out syndrome and therefore being able to consciously identify the crucial elements in the psyche's synthesis; that is, in the psyche's engineering of the acting-out syndrome. In this sense, it becomes important first, to be aware of the thwarted *wish*. Second it becomes equally important to identify the *who*, the person *who* thwarted the *wish*, and, third, the *anger* toward that *who* needs also to be made conscious. Remaining ignorant of these forces will enable the *anger* to become transformed into hateful behavior toward objects identified and symbolized as surrogates for the original *who* (Kellerman 2008, pp. 9–24).

Hsun Tzu (2000, p. 214), states it strikingly:

Man's nature is evil; goodness is the result of conscious activity.

Thus, with respect to the theme of this book: *Serpent in Paradise: On the Nature of Evil*, the following reflects the fundamental structure of evil, engineered in the psyche and expressed in a paroxysm of acting-out behavior.

The thwarted *wish* in human affairs is at the bottom of the gestation of evil! Evil develops as a process. It is not solely event related—even though of course, we see it in events. But when we see the event of evil what is it we see? Do we see a Devil? Is Satan standing there observing? No. That's not it. What we see is an **acting-out** moment; it is a psychological construction made by a person with a thwarted *wish*. That is the evil, and in this volume we will see the **acting-out** behavior and its inner workings, its infrastructure. Yes, the infrastructure of **acting-out** is also the infrastructure of evil. This is how we will decrypt the mystery, the age-old elusive definition generally referred to as "evil."

Freud then goes ahead and makes a challenging hypothesis that translates the issue of religion into the secular world of child development. In his *New Introductory*

*Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1965), Freud postulates that religion was an attempt to master “the *wishful* world.” This is also referred to in Struhl and Struhl (1972, p. 211), quoting Freud:

“...religion originated from the helplessness of children...” as it relates to their *wishes*. Religion attempts to master ‘the wishful world,’ which cannot be done.”

In our world here, thwarted *wishes* will convert Paradise into the Serpent, whereas gratified *wishes* will institutionalize God’s exemplary Paradise and forever erase diabolical evil. Of course, as described earlier, this all depends on whether the gratified *wish* is God’s *wish* or the Serpent’s *wish*. Thus, *who* has the gratified *wish* becomes a qualifier as to how, and in what way, the Garden, becomes one of Paradise. And therefore, what is known as evil is not at all derived from any supernatural source. What we call evil is really an abundance of *anger* that people feel regarding what they want and what they feel is being deprived by a world that does not really correlate with the immediate needs of the individual. And usually, this *anger* or dissatisfaction is actually *repressed* and out of awareness. Yet, it lies there as a festering contagion in the reservoir of the unconscious radiating up into one’s behavior and affecting this behavior negatively.

And therefore, here is the familiar dilemma referred to in this volume:

*Wishes* are infrequently met—especially when we want them met. If a *wish* is met, it’s usually not when we want it, and even if the *wish* is met when we want it, it’s not usually met to the fullest measure. Thus, it is in the nature of the world that the plethora of variables confronting people day-in and day-out are confounding, so that it is not really possible to control them all.

Enter maturity!

The psychological principle that lobbies for the postponement of immediate gratification is an acknowledgment that one’s maturity can be measured by one’s ability to tolerate frustration and therefore to postpone such immediate needs for gratification—all in the service of longer range goals. This ability for “postpone-ment” requires a lifetime of first, early decent nurturing, then education and mentoring, and finally, because of such care and hard work, it becomes natural for such a maturing individual to bear the burden of waiting and waiting while working and working, and still not feel *angry* (or abundantly *angry*)—even not be *angry* underneath—again all in the service of longer range goals. The seeming truth is that we are still in a very primitive stage of evolution and most of the world’s population is not fortunate enough to experience all that is necessary (in healthy developmental terms) that makes for the mature response in life. Hence, actually most people walk around feeling *angry* and frequently enough, behaving badly. Whether it’s the seven deadly sins we are warned about, or whether it’s the acting-out of underlying rages, all of it is what has been known as “evil.” And it all hinges on whether we get *wishes* met or not. It’s not a mystery and it’s not supernatural.

Dr. Dorothy Martyn (2007) knows this, and writes about it especially well. She allows us to shift from the unknowing supernaturally influenced general definition of demonic evil into a psychological orientation regarding developmental consid-

erations—what it takes to grow into a mature human being. Her understanding is captured in her everlasting love affair with the poetry of Emily Dickenson. She points to a verse by Dickenson about the flowering of plants (p. xvi):

To pack the bud—oppose the worm—  
Obtain its right of dew—  
Adjust the heat—elude the wind—  
Escape the prowling bee.

Martyn explains (p. xix):

pack the bud (stoke future potentialities)  
oppose the worm (wrestle with gnawing conflicts)  
obtain the right of dew (procure nourishment)  
adjust the heat (of—and of sexual strivings)  
elude the wind (of inner and outer pressures)  
escape the prowling bee (of overweening conscience and what  
the child experiences as unneeded intrusion by parents).

Therefore, when the bud remains unpacked, when the worm is not opposed, when the right of dew is not obtained, when the heat is not adjusted, when the wind is not eluded, and when the prowling bee is not escaped, all becomes the ground in which so-called “evil” can grow. In such an arid ground, unconscious *anger* will rule and its profound influence on derivative behavior will be at the root cause of destructive behavior—what is known as “evil.”

In this sense, Martyn continues her commentary by referring to the “Devil” as:

“...nothing other than severe judgment...the Snake in the Garden”  
...is but...”severe accusatory judgment of the self?...and...”we  
are now prepared to consider the notion that psychotherapy is a new  
kind of garden for some of those *who* have been deprived of dew,  
beset by devils of self-accusation, or troubled by heat they can’t  
manage to adjust.” (p. xx)

And so Martyn offers us an introduction into the world of psychological decryption of which she is obviously an expert. And she uses Karl Barth, Herman Melville, and Emily Dickenson, as well as her psychoanalytic and theological insights (along with her own synthesizing brilliance) to turn the page from a history of the understanding of evil as supernatural, to a final enlightened decrypted message of personal psychological concerns as the foundational basis of destructive (so-called “evil”) behavior. With Martyn, we are now in the domain of the psyche. As such, the Devil, the Serpent, or evil as such, is nowhere to be found! What is to be found is the infrastructure of what has been known as evil, but in the treatise here is now occupied with phenomena of the psyche. Alice Miller (1990) in her book’s title says it all, *For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-Rearing and the Roots of Violence*.

Others have also suggested this transition in an understanding from the supernatural explanation of evil to the psychological one. Michael Shermer (2004, p. 103) for example, in his book *The Science of Good and Evil*, states:

...the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of  
every human being.

Of course, we know what Shermer means, but what he really means is that such a line not only cuts through the heart of every human being, but that the line really cuts through the psyche of every human being.

Michael Stone (2009, p. 286), in his book *The Anatomy of Evil*, begins a dialogue that takes us into more psychological detail regarding this issue of evil. Stone states:

There is no evil gene and no master key that opens all doors to the mystery of evil.

Of course, the question is: What is the mystery? The moment we understand that it all hinges on whether the *wish* is gratified or not (and *who* gets it gratified—God or the Serpent?) such ostensible mystery evaporates. Stone indicates that a salient criterion for evil behavior to exist can be considered intense narcissism. It is what Otto Kernberg (1992, p. 77), refers to as “malignant narcissism,” and what Raine and Variables (1984, pp. 123–132) refer to as evil behavior committed by schizoid sadistic psychopaths. The reference to “schizoid” is actually an oblique reference also to total psychological self-absorption in a way equivalent to narcissism. However, rather than the self-love of the narcissist, the schizoid individual is self-absorbed as a result of extreme difficulty in initiating contact with others. Such a person suffers with an exceedingly underdeveloped sense of entitlement—quite opposite to that of the narcissist. The reference to “psychopaths” relates to individuals *who* have only meager and essentially insignificant development of “conscience” or in psychoanalytic terms, underdeveloped and primitive superego. These are the sorts of individuals *who* are sensation-seeking and risk-taking as a way to compensate for an otherwise “boring and flat life,” or a so-called deadened inner life. Along with this, Wilson (1993, pp. 29–54), in his book, *The Moral Sense*, by an implied definition indicates that as the opposite of psychopathic behavior and malignant narcissism stands “compassion” composed of “sympathy, fairness, self-control, and duty.”

In the sense of an analysis of evil from the point of view of social psychiatry, the outstanding social psychiatrist Robert J. Lifton (1979, p. 302), quotes the American historian C. Vann Woodward (1974, p. 64) from Woodward’s book, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*. Woodward declares that absolute evil is related to “animus of aggrandizement.” Lifton goes right to it and reports that his research shows that it is all related to the aggressor’s assumption of self-immortality based upon targeting a “death-tainted group of victims.”

## **Psychodynamic Elements of the Psyche: Relation to the Infrastructure of Evil**

With respect to Lifton’s “self-immortality” aim as it relates to evil acts, and to a targeted “death-tainted group,” and in concert with the issue of what Raine and Variables refer to as “schizoid sadistic psychopathic” behavior, as well as Kernberg’s attribution of “malignant narcissism,” we can see a personality picture forming containing a context of psychological mechanisms (and emotions) operating in those *who* perpetrate evil/destructive acts.

Dr. Anna Aragno, in her paper *The Devil Within: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Evil*, (2013), joins this chorus of psychological experts (in their general sociological analyses, and more specifically in the analysis of personality) and again refers to the acting-out of individuals *who* can be diagnosed as psychopathic. Aragno (p. 121), states that the nuanced personal examination of such a personality will reveal that such individuals have substantially nothing to do. They feel always arid. They are entirely, as Aragno infers, compensatory. Therefore, the compensatory state reflects an underlying feeling of worthlessness. In order to escape this sense of worthlessness, such individuals utilize a grandiose sense of self and it is this particular rescue mechanism of the psyche that then propels such a person to attach inner impulses for action to specific “larger” projects—i. e. serial killing, or forming associations with other like-minded individuals in order, with righteous indignation, to implicate a targeted group for elimination. Those targeted, in the Robert J. Liftonian sense, will be considered the inferior ones while the self and the affiliated group will be experienced in a compensatory glory, as superior.

All of it, the sense of inadequacy, the compensatory reaction to it (in the form of grandiose and superiority rituals), the sense of an impoverished inner life (based upon the Dorothy Martyn and Alice Miller understanding of impoverishment in developmental terms)—all presumably derived from a lifetime of dramatic and almost complete thwarting of *wishes*—necessarily generates in such individuals terrible acting-out impulses. In place of a normal superego, there exists a projected punitive urge to punish these targeted others. Empathy is reserved only for the self. It is a blatant diseased narcissism that permits only leniency for the self and criticality toward groups targeted for punishment, with animus and destructive aims and urges. Further discussion of this issue can be found in Simon Baron Cohen’s 2011 volume, *The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty*, and in Paul Bloom’s 2013 volume, *Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil*.

Of course, examples of such negative emotions include: aggression, greed, deceit, defiance, rancor, and hatred, all of which are composed also of an underlying consistent presence of *anger*. And for such emotion to consistently exist in a repetitive cycle, the psyche arranges defenses to manage these emotions. Some defenses are designed to contain emotion while other defenses are designed to release emotion. In these psychopathic, malignant narcissists, defenses are specifically designed to release emotion.

The defenses designed to release emotion include:

- Denial—You only see what you want to see.
- Projective identification—Disavowed self-qualities are given to another.
- Splitting—Objects are all good or all bad.
- Displacement—*Anger* is directed to weaker individuals.
- Symbolization—One thing represents another.
- *Repression*—Drop into the unconscious realm that which you perceive to be at the very least, uncomfortable, and at the very most, dangerous to the self.

Although evil is here defined as action, as behavior, nonetheless, “intent” is quite important. Acquisitive psychopathic narcissists and paranoid pathological schizoids



(with evil intent toward another) are the dangerous culprits. In such individuals nothing about their behavior is banal. These are individuals with *wishes* characterized by “power-hunger.” And when the *wish* is met (especially the *wish* of aggression toward the other), the gratification of the power need, will be further fortified first by the anticipated disempowerment of the other, and then by the actual disempowerment.

Yet, there is a banality of evil that expresses itself when individuals are co-opted into a destructive paradigm and then simply do the killing in an experienced and approved procedural and uninterrupted manner. In contrast, for example, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) hyperactive children *who* are impulsive and motorically driven may be getting into all sorts of trouble but not necessarily with nefarious intent toward others. In contrast, evil intent is the insidious unseen source of any actual evil behavior. This includes behavior by individuals *who* do indeed have empathy (for the self), but without compassion (for the other). These individuals understand the feeling of helplessness but rather revel in the helplessness of the other because in such a condition and by default, the helplessness of the other enables the power of the self to gain the ascendancy.

Therefore, one’s disempowerment crystallizes into another’s empowerment. In this sense, one’s empowerment produces gratification of that person’s *wish* as a Paradise but simultaneously and instantly also incubates the Serpent; that is, one person is in Paradise because of gratification of the *wish* for empowerment, whereas in a self-empathetic compassionless projective identification, that person also sees and is gratified by the disempowerment of the other. This gratification is characterized by a thwarting of the disempowered one’s *wish*—also thereby seeing the disempowered one as the actual Serpent that must be eliminated. However, and strikingly, it is the aggressor *who* is the power-hungry one and *who* is the real actual Serpent. Of course, in such a circumstance, again, it is this one *who* is in Paradise *who* is the one believing (in an illusory way, of course) that such an ascendancy that gratifies the *wish* for power, thereby, and only in this self-interested way, classifies the disempowered one as the Serpent. Therefore, the Serpent will have usurped the position of gaining control of Paradise. In such a case, the negative transfiguration has occurred and God is nowhere to be found.

Thus, in the vicissitudes of human interaction, evil only becomes relative insofar as the gratified *wish* and the thwarted one (as a polarity) can be seen between two individuals (one whose *wish* is satisfied and one whose *wish* is thwarted) as only equal in terms of apparent geometric equivalence. However, evil is not relative. The one *who* initiates unprovoked destructive behavior is the perpetrator—the evil one. The unprovoked aggression also can be, and frequently is arranged by an insidious behind-the-scenes person—and this one too, is the evil one, the power-hungry one. The assessment of power discrepancy is crucial in such a matter.

In the Preface of this volume, the example of the escaping slave *who* slays the master trying to prevent the slave’s escape was not considered to be evil. It was not the slave *who*, at the outset of their master/slave contact, was the one *who* initiated the aggression implicit in their power difference. No, it was the slave-master *who* initiated the power difference and its implicit (and often explicit) example of the

“or else;” that is to say, you do as I say, or, “or else!” Fettered in chains, the slave was powerless. The killing of the slave-master *who* tried to foil the slave’s escape is collateral damage in the absence of evil intent, that is, in the absence of acting-out. With respect to evil behavior, there was nothing unconscious in the slave’s plan to escape concerning his not wanting to know something, so that the killing of the slave-master is not an equivalent symbol of something the slave didn’t want to know. Therefore, the infrastructure of evil (as an example of an acting-out symptom), is not inscribed in the slave’s act of killing the slave-master.

Yes, each one, the slave and the slave-master, has a *wish*. To say the least, the slave *wishes* to escape from his miserable and brutal slavish restriction. The slave-master on the other hand, *wishes* to keep the slave enslaved insofar as it is to the slave-master’s advantage to support the institution of slavery generally, and also especially specifically, because of the slave-master’s advantage in personally “owning” slaves. In fact his rationale generating a righteous justification to own that slave, and therefore to feel justified by implementing any means necessary to sustain their slave/slave-master relationship (including whipping, imprisonment, starvation, hanging, and the ownership of the slave’s woman or wife—even to the point of rape), becomes fair game, and the slave is helpless to do anything about it.

However, assumed righteousness or not, the slave-master is the aggressor. He didn’t, either in the present or originally, ever ask the slave whether he wanted to, or agreed to be a slave. In the end, this is an example of evil as an absolute and not as something relative.

We now arrive at the point of examining the core elements of the infrastructure of evil itself, of which, as suggested above, the *wish* qualifies as a chief core element.

## Core Elements of the Infrastructure of Evil:

After presumably and hopefully having demystified the issue of evil, evil intent, evil behavior, Paradise, and, the Serpent, and rather attributed such concepts solely to psychological as well to sociological considerations, we now can identify as well as define the specific and core elements in the infrastructure of what has been mystically referred to over millennia as the supernatural nature of Satan, of the Devil, and of “evil.”

This entire dissertation on the nature of evil indicates that evil is not supernatural and as such, there is no relationship of evil to any entity known as an alleged Satan or an ostensible Devil. The entire enterprise of understanding the deep structure of evil lies rather in understanding the psyche and its derived manifestations that are expressed in thinking and in behavior, and in the relationship of thinking to behavior.

Throughout Part 1 of this volume, we have gradually referred to each element in the infrastructure of evil which in essence is the exact infrastructure of the elements in the gestation of psychological/emotional symptoms. Destructive behavior (not in self-defense) is usually acting-out behavior—the function of which is not

to know something. And the something that is not to be known concerns deeply rooted *anger* at a particular person (a *who*), or of a particular group. The targeted victimized group comes to represent any individual of that group insofar as the group is seen to possess the same hated characteristics of any of its individual group members. From a psychological developmental point of view, the hatred or feelings of aggression toward such a person or group stems from experiences in early childhood (and thereafter) of the aggressors although not necessarily in terms of any personal contact or experience with anyone from the particular targeted group. Such displaced attribution is the beginning of displacement behavior; that is, expressing hatred and aggression in the transmogrified form of scapegoating and clear transference reactions—that is, in such cases, reacting negatively to someone in the present as representing another from the past.

The deprived or disregarded or cruel treatment during childhood (and thereafter) in such aggressors, is possible prophetic or inferred testimony, that *wishes* of such aggressors were typically and most frequently denied. And it is not only that the *wish* is consistently disregarded that creates the problem—it is also how it is denied or disregarded. Style of treatment or parenting is often as bad or even can be worse than the content of particular cruel treatment. Content can be composed of physical punishment, whereas style can refer to the tone and attitude of the punishment. It is usually a style of humiliation that heightens and even brands, or institutionalizes the helplessness of the victim. This is what is meant by the historical agony of those *who* ultimately engage in scapegoating and cruel behavior.

At this point all the elements in the infrastructure of acting-out, of evil, and of psychological/emotional symptoms have been identified. Herein, the proposed infrastructure of evil is related to the entire formulation of the infrastructure of symptoms. This infrastructure of psychological symptoms has been published in my book, *The Psychoanalysis of Symptoms* (2008, pp. 3–28). The elements of this infrastructure are:

- The person's *wish* is thwarted.
- The *who* is the one *who* thwarted the *wish*.
- *Anger* toward that *who* may not be conscious.
- If not conscious, then the emotion/defense of *repression* is at work.
- The use of *repression* is to conceal the *anger*—especially from the self.
- The appearance of a symptom is a result of this process.
- Finally, the symptom represents the *wish* as gratified in the psyche albeit in perverse or neurotic form.

The point here is that constant terms exist in the symptom equation, the application of which will lead to the unfolding—to the crystallization of the symptom. Of course it is hypothesized that in this particular conception the presence of the *wish*, the reference to a designated responsible *who* (*who* thwarted the *wish*), the importance of the primary emotion of *anger* and the operation of the defense mechanism of *repression* are all identified as the key constant terms of the infrastructural mechanisms comprising the symptom-code. These constant terms reflect the architecture of the symptom-code—a code that abstracts and traces the psyche's engineering of these constants to form the symptom.

## The Code of Evil Decrypted

And here is the final peroration:

Destructive (evil) acting-out is proposed here to have this kind of psychological and emotional machinery that reflects its deep structure. Of all the theoretical formulations discussed, this particular formulation presented here of the *infrastructure of symptoms* claims therefore, to be:

**The decryption of the code of evil.**

In addition, the fact that evil-doers need to entirely erase their targeted victim-population reflects that part of the psyche's arrangement that generates the need for obsessional purity and obsessional completeness. It is an obsession-syndrome focused on the concept of "closure."

Interestingly, the need for "closure" reflects the obsessive *wish* for a resolution to the victimizer's original agony that became ultimately expressed in paroxysms of aggression toward others. A psychoanalytic understanding of obsession concerns its function as one that is devoted to keeping *anger repressed* (Kellerman 2012, pp. 280–288). In the process of evil-doing as an acting-out phenomenon, most consequential *anger* is required to be *repressed* in order for the evil-doer not to know what is psychologically happening to the self. This *repression* acts as a way to displace hatred (*anger*) from former past individuals to current individuals *who* then become selected as scapegoated objects. It is all a compensational act to disguise fundamental feelings of inferiority in persons *who* need power for the self and disempowerment for the other.

And this is a basic tenet of the infrastructure of symptom-formation of which evil-doing is an example. This basic tenet or axiom (in all its forms—Kellerman, 2008, p. 21), relates equally to symptom-formation and to evil:

"Where there is *repressed anger*, not only will there be a symptom, there *must* be a symptom."

and,

"Where there is a symptom not only will there be *repressed anger*, there *must* be *repressed anger*."

and,

"Where there is no *repressed anger* not only will there not be a symptom, there *cannot* be a symptom."

and,

"Where there is no symptom not only will there not be *repressed anger*, there *cannot* be *repressed anger*."

All of these axiomatic or propositional forms of symptom-formation are designed to illuminate the crucial role of the psyche in the management of *anger*, becoming then instrumental in symptom-formation. The following axiom (Kellerman 2008, p. 22), illustrates the dynamic operation of the psyche's management of *anger*:

When *anger* cannot be directed at the object toward whom it is intended, then the subject, the self, becomes the target, and thus the *anger* is *repressed*, and attacks the self. Hence symptom birth!

Our focus on the elemental and pivotal role of *anger* in symptom-formation also implies that all of psychopathology contains in its core, a rock-bottom-most basic undercarriage of *repressed anger*. In this sense, of all primary emotions, *anger* is elemental. This is so because *wishes* are infrequently met, thereby possibly setting off the process of *anger* being *repressed* to the condition of the thwarted *wish*. Aragno (2013, p. 105) refers to Melanie Klein's thesis on evil-acts in Klein's paper titled: *Criminal Tendencies in Normal Children* (1927, pp. 170–185). In discussing “punitive power” in this paper, Klein is implicitly referring to the specific emotion of *anger*, even though rather than discussing the issue in terms of *anger*, Klein refers to it as “punitive.” Aragno (p. 106), explains:

Klein's emphasis on primitive aggression and guilt leading to persecutory anxiety reoriented the goal of therapy to diminishing the punitive power of an overly strict superego.

Further, Aragno (p. 106), states:

“...Freud's important point”...is that...”guilt *antecedes* delinquent acts which are carried out as a result of a preexisting *primary* sense of culpability. The problem in delinquency is not the absence of a super-ego but its primitive, punitive nature. One might speculate that the concept of “original sin” stems from just such a primordial predisposition toward guilt feelings.”

The idea that guilt as a preexisting emotional disposition is at the bottom of any acting-out (delinquency) is perhaps constructed on the diagnostic condition referred to as either pseudomania (known as a shame psychosis) or as an enosiophobia (the conviction one has of being guilty of some profoundly immoral or unlawful act). An enosiophobia is a diagnostic reference to living with a false belief. These definitions can be found in the *Dictionary of Psychopathology* (Kellerman 2009, p. 193, and p. 70, respectively). Yet, despite this concept of guilt as presumably basic, nevertheless the amount of data on the foundational role of *anger* (*repressed anger*) as the basis of symptom-formation becomes a challenge to the age-old acceptance that it might be guilt that is basic.

To this point, Aragno also refers to the book by Erich Fromm titled: *Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (1973). Here, Aragno illuminates an important distinction that Fromm makes regarding the psychology of evil. Aragno (p. 108), states that Fromm:

...stressed that in psychoanalysis we do not study behaviors separately from the genetic history, context, and structural dynamics of the person's character: less interested in *behavior* per se than in the unconscious motives and psychodynamics of *character* that have lead to them, no single behavior is labeled as evil or good *in and of itself* but must be understood in context and situation, considering the underlying motives and impetus from which it issues.

Of course, the underlying conditions from which evil is derived relates to the components of symptom-formation of which *anger* (not guilt) is primary. It could be asked as to whether any, or even every symptom, could qualify as evil, since as a

certainty, in the theoretical foundation of this volume, every evil intent or act, is identified with the exact infrastructure of a symptom (including of course the essential presence of the role of *repressed anger*).

Most psychological/emotional symptoms are not at all appreciated or understood as reflecting evil. Nevertheless, all evil behavior (destructive behavior basically hurtful to others) is formed in the furnace of the psyche as it gestates the acting-out symptom with exactly the identical infrastructural components (and process) seen in the construction of any psychological/emotional symptom.

Thus, how a symptom is composed is the same for everyone and for every symptom. There is no difference in the inner workings of a psychological symptom, of a simple phobia, or an un-welcomed intrusive thought, or a magnificent obsession (as in an obsessive love toward someone), than there is in a psychotic encapsulated dysmorphophobic delusion (believing something in the face of concrete evidence to the contrary), or even perhaps additionally manifested perhaps in a negative hallucination (not seeing something that is actually there).

With respect to characterology (basically meaning character formation in the sense of the construction of personality patterns), Levenson (1993, p. 133) posits that characterology has a hard time explaining evil since because “character is relatively fixed, evil must be done by evil people.” This, of course stands in contrast to Arendt’s thesis that evil can be “...done by ordinary people” The answer is that even people *who* are diagnosed as character-disordered individuals also have symptoms. Schizoid individuals can have eating disorders, paranoid character-disordered individuals can have dermatological outbreaks (presumably caused by tension of one kind or another), and compulsive character-types can develop hypertension despite the compulsive person’s ability to control and bind anxiety. The upshot here is that no matter the psychological diagnosis, all people can develop accumulated tension that can break through all defenses and reveal psychological symptoms (of course with *repressed anger* underpinning it all). In another book (Kellerman 2007, p. 19) I point out that *anger* is the emotion with the largest glossary of code words; “stress,” or “upset,” or especially “tension,” are such code words for *anger*. These *anger* code words reflect onto the surface the *anger* beneath.

Therefore, based upon one’s *wish* for power (and the corresponding disempowerment of another in the context of aggression toward the other), no matter what is the diagnosis of the person in question, the underpinnings in the construction of any symptom—evil included—is composed of *repressed anger*, a *repressed wish* and a *repressed who*, and indeed, this construction is engineered in and by the psyche; this, especially in the context of the *wish* for one’s ascendancy in the subsequent disempowerment of the other, or with respect to impulses that lobby for aggression toward the other.

Similarly, in other terms, in terms of the Eden story, the Serpent wants to outdo God. This essentially means that the Serpent is in a quest for the triumph of unbridled pleasure (as it seems to appear in nature, or as in Adam and Eve having whatever will give pleasure—fruit of the Tree), whereas God seems to be at least tacitly and seemingly consciously interested in calibrated pleasure (Adam and Eve not eating from the Tree). This is the essential struggle between God and the Serpent,

and it all seems to hinge on the issue of pleasure. And this struggle between the Serpent requiring unbridled pleasure versus God *who* seems to need to calibrate pleasure seems to be the struggle of evil versus civilized living—of absolute unbridled pleasure gratification (no waiting) versus civilized living especially in terms of the postponement of immediate gratification in the service of long-range goals. And, further, this is not a struggle that can be characterized as “banal!”

## Hannah Arendt’s “Banality of Evil” Revisited and Re-defined

On the surface, and to earlier comments regarding this subject of the “banality of evil,” Arendt’s “banality” is actually only a descriptive reference to the phenomenon of mass murder. Given the analysis of the infrastructure both of evil (as thinking, feeling, and doing) and of the psychological/emotional symptom, hatching in the person’s psyche, it could be said that evil (on the larger scale of genocidal behavior, as well as on the smaller scale of cruelty, and on even a smaller scale of simple thievery), is defined as an acting-out of *repressed anger*. In addition the *repressed anger* has a companion. The companion is a thwarted *wish*. This thwarted *wish* is always perceived to be another’s responsibility; that is, the subject’s original *wish* would have been thwarted by a *who*, by another person. When seen as a psychological/emotional symptom gestated in the person’s psyche, then none of it is ever ordinary (as in the sense of perhaps, boredom), and the evil—actually the symptom—is also therefore, not “banal.”

In this sense, the so-called “banality of evil” is actually on a deeper psychological and emotional level a process resulting from one’s cognitive and emotional disappointment in not gratifying the actual *wish* along with *angry* feelings about an abject sense of disempowerment—all of it congealing in the person’s psyche and ultimately emerging as a symptom. In this case, the symptom would be a result of the condensation of the process gestated in the person’s psyche and then emerging as a way of doing something rather than knowing something. The doing is what will be expressed in the acting-out and the acting-out will be a psychological/emotional symptom and not at all an expression of any kind of “banality”—especially in the sense of a “banality of evil.”

This entire process is not “banal,” nor is it “ordinary.” Therefore, Arendt’s “banality of evil” especially with reference to mass murder (as in genocide) is probably better formulated as a translation of one language to another. This translation of language would apply, as Arendt suggests, to any ordinary person *who* finds himself as participating in what would be considered from a surface descriptive point of view—evil. This translation is a way of re-categorizing genocidal activity as something that is actually quite the opposite of “banal”:

The language of the “**banality of evil**” is hereby translated (or deciphered) into the psyche’s language of “**profound acting-out.**”

## Summary

In my book, *The Psychoanalysis of Symptoms* (2008, pp. 23–24) the infrastructural dynamic is summarized:

“A psychological/emotional symptom is the transformation of a thwarted *wish* (experienced as disempowering), into an involuntary symbolic configuration (a symptom). The symptom is formed by a reflexive *anger* response (as an attempt at re-empowerment) toward the *who*—the person *who* thwarted the *wish* in the first place,” [or is accused of having thwarted the original *wish*]. “Instead of being consciously expressed to this *who*, the *anger*, along with the connection to this *who*, then becomes *repressed*. In this way, the transformed *wish* into the symptom satisfies Freud’s discovery that in the psyche no *wish* will be denied—so that since the symptom is the *wish* (albeit in perverse or neurotic form), then indeed, we all love our symptoms (including those that are unpleasant or even painful), because they are informed in the unconscious as gratified *wishes*.”

As mentioned earlier, when acting-out “evil” behavior is examined through this psychoanalytic “decryption” lens of the psyche, then the definition of evil itself becomes, as stated earlier, demystified. As a result of this conception, all supernatural simplicities evaporate. This cauldron of the psyche’s dynamic with respect to *repressive* forces and the operation of these forces in the unconscious domain, begins to offer a further possibility of examining how those victimizers *who* have never developed normal empathy can find it easy to target others—even ultimately in the service of genocidal ends. The evil acting-out is an echo of an earlier time when the empathy-less victimizer was also disempowered and naturally developed a deep reservoir both of inadequacy feelings and corresponding compensatory strivings for power, and, of course, a deep reservoir of *rage*—all of it finally wending its way to the point of expressing a never ending search for targets. These are especially the targets that are themselves disempowered. Then the victimizer—the one *who* has never had a chance to develop normal empathy, or even those *who* simply are fellow-travelers searching for a home in the form of an affiliation—now have a way of releasing the *anger/rage/hatred* that had been forever stored within.

All of this is perhaps the beginning to the hopefully and subsequent more pervasive understanding of evil, and therefore, with educated intervention, even to the eventual antidote to evil behavior—that is, the antidote to acting-out!

Of course, how all of it relates to the Garden and God’s role in the Garden (as the first role-model of thinking and behavior), will be considered at the end of Part 2 of this volume.

## Emmanual Kant: Is There an Exception to the Rule?

A question arises as to whether conscious lying can lead to acting-out evil especially in the absence, or ostensible absence of *repression*? In essence, conscious lying can be categorized as information that a subject can maneuver consciously by falsifying,



by using omissions or commissions, or even by utilizing “suppression” instead of *repression*. The importance of this distinction between *repression* on the one hand, and suppression on the other, along with the possible conscious maneuvering of information toward the “other,” concerns our clear conclusion in this volume that evil is encrypted as an acting-out psychological symptom, the content of which is largely determined by one’s personal psychological “demons” (negative life experiences), along with the social context in which one finds oneself. Thus, the question is really about the possibility that without the key defensive operation of *repression*, can evil, as an acting-out phenomenon actually exist. The answer of course, is a resounding no! Conscious lying can also be seen to reflect thwarted *wishes* leading to *anger* that has been *repressed*, and resulting in evil behavior—lying. In the case where *repression* is thought to be absent, the question becomes, is the *repression* really absent? The true answer seems to be that even though the individual may be consciously deceitful or duplicitous or out and out bald-face lying, this sort of behavior is still in all, an example of acting-out whereby the underlying *repressed* material is presumably causing the lying behavior.

Emmanuel Kant insists that lying is not permissible—even under the most dire of circumstances as in saving one’s life (or even in saving the life of another). Kant’s (1797), *The Doctrine of Virtue* (1964) introduces the phenomenally challenging idea that lying “...annihilates...[one’s]...dignity as a human being.” Phillip Stambovsky of New Haven, CT., writing in the *Jewish Review of Books* (Fall, 2013), quotes Kant’s 1785 *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1969): “If everyone were well disposed, it would not only be a duty not to lie, but nobody would need to do it....” Kant continues and refers to man as “malicious,” meaning that the nature of man, for sure, contains evil stuff.

In Kant’s comment that being “well disposed” implies that no one would need to lie, also correspondingly contains the crucial notion that in the absence of *repression* (unconscious), or even “suppression” (conscious), people would need to face difficult matters in an authentically forthright manner. Therefore, under such circumstances, there is the possibility that any action of evil could be a thing of the past—that is, a “duty” as Kant would say, not to be evil (or even not to have evil intent). Certainly, with respect to such civility, at the very least, the “malicious” nature (attributed to man by Kant), would, in the consciousness of man, as well as in the conscience of man, contain conscious challenges to “it”—meaning conscious challenges to the evil gradients inherent in maliciousness, in acting-out.

A rather decent example to this idea of elevating one’s consciousness as well as one’s conscience can be seen in the intellectual development and emotional process of E. A. Ross, the early 20<sup>th</sup> century sociologist. At the beginning of his career, Ross was racist in his thinking, opposed to ethnic differences, and so forth. Later in his life, he completely renounced his earlier theoretical preferences and adopted almost completely opposite positions (Ross, 1936). This turn of events was attributed by him to increased consciousness (and a clearer conscience) regarding what he then eventually considered to be his calling in life as a sociologist; that is, to better the lives of others.

In this sense, we can see that greater consciousness as well as a clearer conscience can alter one's typical attitudes. Ross's negative attitudes in his early career was most likely a candidate for entry into the category of illusion, and illusion is always subject to change based upon new information, new experience, and the presentation of logical facts. In contrast, symptoms formed by *repression*, are not illusional—they are delusional, are not subject to change, not influenced by new information, and not affected by experience or the presentation of logical facts. To approach delusion, one can only do it by going inside, by identifying and by “working” with the person's *wish*.

So it was for example with Stalin. His idea of a doctor's plot was a delusionally based symptom, and therefore not subject to change, not able to be influenced by information, and not at all determined by previous or even newer experience, and certainly not challenged by contradictory facts. With Stalin, the delusion was not able to change also because no one could go inside, and with Stalin, examine the *wish*.

One general behavioral characteristics of evil can be seen in the cross-sections of genocides to be addressed in this book. Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson (1975), Buss, (1966), along with other researchers have made the point which Staub (2013, p. 578) also illuminates; that is:

Prior aggressive behavior makes later and greater aggression more likely both by individuals and by groups... As they progress, they appear to exclude their victims from the moral realm... Moral exclusion can turn into a reversal of morality.

Lifton, (1986) continues with this analysis by stating that this sequence of aggression and moral decay will essentially produce: “The lessening of empathy and the ensuing moral transformation can expand...”

The entire issue of aggression and moral decay, along with all constituencies of genocidal behavior will be presented in the samples of genocides of the 20<sup>th</sup> century including genocides of Nazis, Soviets, Turks, Pakistanis, Cambodians, and Rwandan Hutus.

It is a history of the unequivocal acting-out content of evil.

**Part II**  
**Individuals and Societies**

# Chapter 6

## Hitler and Genocide

### Introduction

Before turning to the catastrophe called Adolph Hitler, we begin by quoting Nietzsche as related in Erwin Staub's volume: *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (1989, p. 112).

Strength of will and the will to power are outstanding virtues.  
Compassion and weakness are to be combated...What happens  
to the mass of people is of no consequence; only what happens  
to the superior few count.

Staub also quotes Bertrand Russell (1945, p. 763) on Russell's understanding of the gaining of power and what it can do:

The object is to attain the enormous energy of greatness which can  
model the man of the future by means of discipline and also by means  
of the annihilation of millions of the bungled and botched [ordinary  
human beings], and which can yet avoid going to ruin at the sight of  
suffering created hereby, the like of which has never been seen before.

Such is the broad philosophical context embracing societies struggling with poverty, disempowerment, high unemployment, and any specific sense of national humiliation. Of course, national humiliation is typically based upon hierarchical global assessments, as well as on a contrasting yearning in any specific populace for gaining a sense of national pride. In addition, a broad definition of genocide will contain a variety of cause and effect components including the variables of racial, ethnic, religious, political, economic, and tribal factors, as well as the national personality issue, of "pride in the country." Staub (2013, p. 577) also points out that a person's authority orientation in the face of child-rearing practices has a profound bearing on eventual behavior, implying also that such eventual behavior becomes a reflection of the particular society's cultural traditions.

An example of how a country responds to feeling humiliated rather than prideful can be seen in how the German populace felt about the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I (in 1919), which declared Germany as the cause of the war, and caused a feeling of humiliation that Hitler used to fuel his righteous indignation.

And it was this sense even of exquisite righteous indignation that Hitler used in the service of igniting the populace because of his prideful message and defiant intonation. It all struck a chord with the German/Austrian populace and constituted the single most powerful tool in his oratorical repertoire—incrementally promoting his rise to power.

This was the case in the Nazi-sponsored genocide particularly for example against the Jews but including many others as well. This includes the same sort of defiant self-justification process (of course implemented by scapegoating) also seen in the Turkish sponsored genocide against Armenians, the Rwandan genocide of Hutus against Tutsis, the Cambodian Pol Pot catastrophe, the Pakistani genocide against the Bengalis, and, of course, also related to Stalin's insanity.

This was the kind of grotesque vessel into which Adolph Hitler dipped his pen and wrote *Mein Kampf*, adopted with his Nazi ideology and infused in his political agenda named National Socialism. "Adopted" is the operative term to use with respect to Hitler's basic tenets—or better said, his scattered assortment of ideological variants. I put it this way because Hitler amalgamated his Nazi orientation from a wide variety of sources. These sources included things he read as well as heard from supporters. It all really meant that whatever fit into his paradigm—based upon experiences of his personal life, especially upon experiences during his formative years—that felt right to him was then immediately incorporated into this paradigm.

Such thinking, feeling, and even intuition validated for him what he was gradually planning. Hypothetically it would seem it all satisfied a deep need to latch onto the so-called evidence ostensibly affirming what he considered to be his legitimacy—perhaps even justifying for him his importance in the world. Psycho/sociologically speaking, it was all a solipsistic compensatory paradigm, first based upon Hitler's personal history, then further, based upon the mores of the social context in which he lived, and finally based upon his need as an unforgiving grieving adult with the notion to "fix it" his way.

For example, it could be said that in philosophy, Nietzsche provided an overarching rationale regarding the socio-psychological approach to the understanding of power. In addition, from the vantage point of psychology itself, it could be said that Hitler was not at all unaware or at least was made aware of Jungian ideas regarding issues such as the "collective unconscious"—a concept that would appeal to a leader interested in racial eminence or racial elitism. Further, social Darwinism provided the slogan reflecting what Hitler wanted for Germany (for greater Germany), that is, a slogan that had scientific backing but also could be used to inflame the spirit and belief in racial dominance—that of "survival of the fittest."

Abraham Foxman who wrote the introduction to the 1999 edition of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, (first published in 1923) also indicates that much of Hitler's ideological synthesis was influenced by "...lowbrow racists and nationalists as Adolf Lanz (a.k.a. Lanz von Liebenfels), the author of the *Ostara* gutter-press pamphlets, and Houston Steward Chamberlain, who wrote *Foundations of the Twentieth Century*, a popular racist interpretation of world history" (Adolph Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, p. xix). It needs also to be noted that during Hitler's childhood, virulent anti-Semitism was unbridled and widespread in Europe as perhaps exemplified at least in central Europe—in Germany and Austria, not to mention, as also prominently seen

in the eastern European countries such as in Russia, Ukraine and others—and of course promulgated by 2,000 years of innumerable and proliferating church anti-Jewish scathing screeds that permeated the Western world (as exemplified in Martin Luther's writings of the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation (Michael 2006, pp. 111–113).

Such ideology becomes institutionalized in the culture of whatever country, and because of dreadful economic conditions as well as extreme pressures to conform, apparently makes such ideology difficult to resist. The ideology then takes root in the mainstream of that society and becomes a reflection of the mores of the larger culture. As a first criterion of liberation from such accepted and tacit propaganda, those individuals who become free of such discrimination must have the opportunity, and also be able to experience necessary consciousness-raising. For example, racism in America gained traction by the slaughter of native Americans (an expansionist phenomenon), and then for centuries with the industry of African slavery (with the economic advantage it provided) that created race-conscious distinctions that couldn't help but have a deeply racist affect on white Americans both toward native Americans (so-called Indians), and on black slaves (Negroes). It was a matter of one group identified as superior and the other as inferior.

In such a situation, it would be natural to expect that in the oppressed group, a sequence of identity searches would begin. With African-Americans, it contained a historical process of such an identity-search (from colored, then Negro, then black, and now, African-American). These were evident designations broadly defined as a search for personal identity cohesion, legitimacy, and citizenship. This upsurge of consciousness and action motivated by black people and in many cases joined by like-minded white citizens was all underpinned by a ubiquitous belief in democratic ideals, which although contaminated to whatever extent by a racist impregnation of American culture was nevertheless encouraged by an adherence to what is generally known as American exceptionalism—in this case, the fight for equality and a one for all and all for one American unity. It seems that in America, although progress sometimes may be slow, the positive is that redress is absolutely possible, especially because of practical application of traditions steeped in democratic traditions. And despite certain historical events to the contrary, nevertheless, the USA is wrapped in the theory and belief of eminent fairness and individual liberty. This was not the case in the history of the Aryan, especially as seen in Germany.

Yet, specifically, the evil of racism (as well as generally, the evil of evil) is a stubborn one. It needs constant nudging toward greater societal and individual awareness and it needs to be consistently and especially relentlessly addressed so that all inequities are effectively redressed. Such a socio/economic/psychological/historical dilemma is faced by all peoples who are oppressed, beaten down, and finally, all too frequently erased in genocides. To cite some examples, this kind of held prejudice applies to German Nazis and other European Nazis along with all other anti-Semites against Jews, Turks against Armenians, Cambodian communists against other Cambodians, Rwandan Hutus and Tutsis against one another, Muslims and Christians against one another, and both, at one time or another, against Jews, Shia and Sunnis in the Middle East also against one another, ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by Serbian forces against Albanians, Pakistani's toward the Bengalis (of east Pakistan), as well

as a historical plethora of other examples. These referred to here are a sample of such examples where democratic ideals were obliterated in the face of racism and other wretched rationales.

With respect to democratic ideals, Foxman (1999) further points out that Hitler's antipathy to democratic ideals was influenced by Italian fascism, and that his infected fixation on Jews was, at least in part, influenced by a historical and church-based anti-Semitism of Western world culture. Foxman reminds us that it wasn't until 1921 that the trumped-up claims of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* was finally and officially discredited. These so-called protocols were a hoax and were fraudulently designed in Russia, early in the twentieth century (in 1903), to enable populations far and wide to imagine that world Jewish leaders met and conspired to conquer the world. The "Protocols" was a carefully crafted plan insidiously but successfully designed. The Protocols proved that "conspiracy theories" in all instances and without fail can be instruments of powerful propaganda, especially where there is a universal recoil, to danger, and an equivalent intensity attraction, to safety.

In these invented Protocols, individuals who were labeled as "Jewish leaders" were then designated as *The Elders of Zion*. Correspondingly, fictitious minutes of the alleged meetings of these fabricated *Elders* were made to seem that such individuals spent their days conjuring devious plans.

The Protocol documents were widely distributed, and consisted of 24 such "Protocols." Norman Cohn (1966, pp. 32–36) labeled the Protocols a "warrant for genocide," and it is reputed that Hitler used the Protocols as a rationale and basis for undertaking and successfully implementing the Holocaust—torturing and murdering 6 million men, women, and children who happened to be Jewish—not counting countless others (millions) who were not Jewish.

Even more of an underpinning to Hitler's frenzied but nevertheless controlled infantile tempestuousness was the unleashed rage expressed by Martin Luther who was the inspiration of the Protestant Reformation of the mid-sixteenth century. Luther was a German monk and a catholic priest. He believed that Jews would eventually convert by virtue of his, Luther's benevolence. When this did not occur, and so Luther's *wish* (along with his megalomaniacal insistence) was thwarted, he then became the perfect example of an exact anti-Christian rather than the pure Christian that he thought he was, and presented himself to be. He became vicious, and proclaimed in a 60,000 word treatise that Jews were to be tortured and even worse. He based this on the age-old canard, or better said, the age-old misinformed dissimulated and out-and-out Christian-led evil against Jews—the insidious claim that Jews had killed Christ. It has been a claim against Jews that the church has sustained for centuries as its determined way to keep the threat against Jews as viable as possible.

With Luther leading the way, with Nietzsche lending philosophical tactics in the sense of how to engineer power, with Lanz and Houston Chamberlain joining the chorus, along with the Russian fictionalized Protocols of the Elders of Zion, as well as the history of church-sponsored pogroms in eastern Europe and with respect to the Spanish Inquisition, as well as millennial support from *New Testament* pejorative remarks against Jews—here-in steps Adolph Hitler.

The lesson here that Foxman finally presents is that:

Never should our eyes be closed to the evil around us.

## Hitler's Program as a Function of his Personality: A Psychoanalytic Perspective

Hitler was the leader of Germany essentially from 1933–1945. In the 1920s when Hitler was in his early 30s (born April 20, 1889), he became the Chairman of the German Worker's Party. This was an inconsequential nationalistically inclined group functioning in or about 1921. In the mid 1920s, Hitler led an unsuccessful coup against the Bavarian government and was imprisoned. There, from 1923–1924, he dictated his book *Mein Kampf* (*My Struggle*, or *My War*, or more accurately and perhaps in a slightly more figurative sense, *My Crusade*). He did this dictation to his aide, Rudolph Hess, along with continuing it later at an inn at Berchtesgaden.

Foxman states that Hitler was megalomaniacal and presented his entire life in *Mein Kampf* "...as the chronicle of an incipient Messiah waiting for the moment to redeem his people." In addition, "...his efforts were devoted to stirring the German people with his anti-democratic message of militant ultra-nationalism, economic conservatism, and racial superiority" (p. xvii). Further, Foxman also states that "Hitler's racial theories cemented together all of the disparate aspects of his philosophy, Pan-Germanism, ultra-nationalism, rabid anti-Semitism and anti-Marxism, along with theories of racial conflict [leading] to his Manichean philosophy of Aryan versus Jew..." (p. xxi). To this is also added Hitler's "...program of...territorial expansionism"...and "disdain for democracy and human rights."

Borofsky and Brand (1980) point out the starkly retrogressive ideological content encasing Hitler's obsessional focus (based obviously on his "inner rage"), which he projected and then directed toward others, Jews in particular, and again, as well as on others he considered to be imperfect or inferior. In this sense, he felt that racial purity and racial principles were biological givens and that therefore since he himself needed to feel perfect (psychologically suspect as actually concealing the sense of feeling imperfect or inferior), he projected this need for purity and perfection onto the German folk. According to Mosse (1966, p. 4), Hitler's "racial principles [were] fundamental to all life: race [according to Hitler] is the foundation of all cultures." This sort of philosophical/political/anthropological position, seemingly, again, and from a psychological point of view, acts to validate Hitler's own obsessional focus on his personal need for perfection and purity.

Dorothy Martyn, in her book *Beyond Deserving* (2007, p. 122), observes that self-doubt or its synonym, "inferiority feelings" most often will generate a persecutory complex. This sort of persecutory complex can be identified as an unfortunate pathological process that transforms the suffering of feeling inferior (and therefore of probably feeling persecuted) to a feeling of hating others. Here, Martyn would probably use the Garden of Eden symbol of the Serpent, the snake, as equivalent to this pathology of hatred. The snake then would mean something akin to an evil effluvium (an aura of evil). Martyn actually indicates that the snake is clever because "self-doubt triggered by the sting of devaluation from without" is based on a persecutory presence which in turn invites vigilance (to be alert and clever) on the part of the subject (the snake), and perhaps also on the part of the object.



Referring to our earlier cited revelations that Hitler was quite negatively impacted by what he considered to be vivid rejections in his life, it is seemingly not particularly far-fetched to propose the predictable psychological truth that a person who experiences the presence of inner persecutory forces will, through the psyche's unconscious instructions, externalize or project such feelings of persecution and hatred onto others. This psychological process acts then to imply to the self that such persecutory feelings have been extirpated or at least extruded. It all simply means that because of the need to rid oneself of one's inferiority feelings (that become accented as feelings of persecution attributed to one, and derived from the outside experience with others), then one's psyche responds in kind, by correspondingly similarly externalizing such persecutory feelings to others.

In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler made outrageous and utterly illogical retrogressive claims along with germinating the beginnings of Nazi ideology. Staub (1989, p. 94) quotes Mosse (1966, p. 6), regarding Hitler's purification obsession that Hitler applies to Aryans—essentially meaning the German, white, non-Jewish, masses:

In this world human culture and civilization are inseparably bound-up with the existence of the Aryan. His dying off or his decline would again lower upon this earth the dark veils of a time without culture. The undermining of the existence of human culture by destroying its supporters [e.g. Aryans], appears as the most execrable crime.

In Hitler's book, *Mein Kampf*, he addresses all of these sentiments:

- Jews brought negroes into the Rhineland in order to contaminate white people, and then because the negro would, of course, by assumption, lower the cultural level of whites, Jews would then take over the social landscape. The good thing, Hitler felt, is that Jews would make the Aryan more conscious of his own race.
- Jews wanted also to contaminate the blood of German girls by seducing them. By accusing Jews of coveting German girls, Gordon Allport, the American psychologist (1954, p. 40) concluded that Hitler was convinced that such indignant accusations — among others — would create “a common enemy in order to cement an in-group.
- Only healthy children should be born and nourished. Others should be discarded. This was a precursor to Master Race ideology. Along with this, Hitler felt that lying was good. It would be good for National Socialists (Nazis) to lie, but the point was to exaggerate the lies. Hitler announced that bigger lies are more credible.
- “Swarms” of foreign people (Eastern Europeans) are hateful. Their presence degrades German culture. Further, the German people are entitled to more land. This was a reference to the notion of “Lebensraum.” Taking the land from Russia was in Hitler's plans. He believed this would be received by Germans as validating their entitlements.

From a psychoanalytic point of view, it would seem that Hitler needed anything to reinforce, or more, to try to fortify his claim and justification of his indignance. This possible psychodynamic can reveal a central theme of Hitler's life in which retribution gives him the ascendancy, the triumph over all those who rejected him during his life, especially during his formative years, and in his experience of it all, and by default, this rejection forced him to feel humiliated and inferior. Killing Jews and others on the scale of genocide became Hitler's retribitional vehicle. However, once started, his obsessional stubbornness, and his brittle sense of never accepting that he could be wrong, made it impossible for him to entertain (at least at any length) any self-doubt. Therefore, it is possible that this inherent rigidity made it impossible for Hitler to consider an alternate path that avoided genocide. In fact, Hitler's original genocidal plan seemed to need acceleration, thereby ever increasing the inexorable scale of the genocide.

Hitler's inability to concede "wrongness" about whatever he was thinking or doing, contains important implications regarding his personality and his diagnosis. This issue shall be discussed in the later subsection of this chapter titled: *Personality, Psychodiagnosis, and Psychodynamics*.

## **The Key Characteristic: Megalomania**

Already as an adult, Hitler's history is marked by several failure experiences. He was rejected by the Austrian army as physically unfit, he was rejected more than once from the Academy of Fine Arts, and as mentioned earlier he was also imprisoned after failing in an attempted coup in Bavaria. Of course, the world had not yet discovered what he himself knew—that he was obsessively single-minded, was compulsively persistent, as well as having exceptional powers of oratory.

Hitler's oratorical power could easily be seen by insightful individuals such as by psychoanalysts educated to see such things as being clearly a highly compensatory and exquisitely exaggerated element of his social repertoire; of course, and even more importantly, this oratorical ability may have been his most important weapon, a uniquely potent one with respect to his general political motives and grandiose leadership aspirations. With Hitler, this virtuoso skill in oratory was correlated with personality features, characterized by what is identified as an example of a Messiah complex. Along with this Messiah complex is probably the psychological truth that "persistence is possibly the only omnipotence." Hitler obviously felt it.

Such a person cannot help but understand (think, feel, and sense) the power of this oratorical virtuosity and then be entirely convinced of its exceptional value (power). In non-insidious individuals such talent is seen as a contribution to art or to whatever is the person's passion or so-called calling. In others such as Adolph Hitler, oratory serves the purpose of high propaganda. Rather than such talent reflecting achievement in the sense also of contribution for the good of others (and in the absence of violence), instead such achievement, as in Adolph Hitler's case, especially serves Serpentine evil ends.

Psychologically, and in a diagnostic sense, with respect to Hitler, his malignant megalomaniacal narcissism fueled his source of energy in the gestation of a compulsive persistence. It was this megalomaniacal narcissism that was wrapped in an ideological obsession. In such a person, and because of this megalomaniacal quality of personality, it becomes psychologically possible to develop extraordinary powers of perseverance. It is a persistence that eventually becomes an omnipotence—a certainty of omniscience. In Alice Miller's book, *For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-rearing and the Roots of Violence* (1983), Miller discusses Hitler's record as a poor student, and cites Heiden (1944) and Olden (1936) who also point out that Hitler's lack of achievement in school was essentially based upon his decision to study or concentrate on whatever interested him but, by default, neglected most studies about which he literally cared nothing (Miller 1990, pp. 158–159, 164).

As an only child in a special affectionate relationship with his mother, the cited quality regarding his prideful sense of oratory is not terribly surprising. It is a case where the child's extraordinary talent is presented as a gift for the adored mother. However, another ingredient of his personality that propelled him forward and enabled him to become arguably the greatest orator of the twentieth century (or arguably perhaps of any century) is a quality that needs to be identified. The question becomes: What is that ingredient, that quality?

The key characteristic of Hitler's personality that accounted for his sense of personal, social, and historical entitlement, also leading to his personal sense of eminence, was a pronounced and convinced *righteous indignation*.

From a psychoanalytic point of view, and from the standpoint of identifying the power theme of Hitler's life (which became the most vivid facet of his behavior as a Führer), was his sense of entitlement encapsulated in a persistent expression of such righteous indignance. It was this righteous indignation that nourished what he considered to be his self-appointed mission in life, and from which, day in and day out he drew sustenance. This screaming, confident righteousness, and how Hitler wrapped such righteousness in a cloak of indignance was his one-chord note that he used in all of his speeches (with varying degrees of emphasis), along of course, with his assumption of absolute personal rectitude. It was an oratorical style that did not concern itself with the specific content of whatever was the theme of his particular speech. Rather, this style of his, of assuming rectitude and then underlining it with righteous indignation, was always either implicit or explicit regarding his antipathy to the criticism of Germany and what it meant to Germany's image. He attributed criticism of Germany as a fabricated, exaggerated, and instigated one, promulgated and promoted by the Western democracies—and, of course, and in some way, the responsibility of world Jewry.

This was Hitler's one-note hypnotic mantra that mesmerized an entire nation (and others) to join him in whatever was the agenda he *wished* to promote—no matter the extent of its execrable iniquity, it's evil. This sort of malevolence invokes and again continues to remind us of Voltaire's wisdom regarding catastrophic heinous undertakings and their deleterious consequences:

Those who can make you believe absurdities  
can make you commit atrocities.

But what does it really mean that making one believe absurdities enables behavior that can be consigned to the category of “atrocities” so that individuals and groups involved in such behavior do, in fact, commit these atrocities? The answer always seems to be that the polarity between danger and safety is one that reveals the fundamental issue of life and of evolution, that is, that all living things (from amoeba to Homo sapiens (flora and fauna)), are always aware of, or sense danger, and are also by implication, naturally given to seeking safety.

Psychologically, Hitler’s mantra (the content of his complaints and his certainty regarding what he planned to do about these so-called self-defined complaints or problems) along with his declarative and mocking intonation when proclaiming his righteous indignation became a self-perpetuating *angry*/raging motive that contained its own momentum and therefore that needed to continue to justify itself, reinforce itself, and to fortify and fuel its continuing advance. It is equivalent to an itch that must be scratched that then eventually exacerbates the itch creating a greater urge to scratch, until the original itch evolves into an infection eventually threatening the person’s health—in this case affecting Hitler’s judgment and behavior.

This entire process is psychologically equivalent to an underlying stratum of *anger* that creates thinking that turns into obsession which in turn translates into compulsion. Compulsion then produces behavior that is composed of tunnel vision so that the person who acts on such a compulsive impulse becomes unable to see the broader context, and rather bores straight through despite all sorts of possible contradictory data that may continue to stream in. In such a relentless obsessional grip, this leader, this Fuhrer, cannot be influenced by anything other than his own ideological momentum driven by a contaminated megalomaniacal delusional certainty. Under it all, and in straightforward terms, he simply cannot ever consider being wrong.

Such was the case with Adolph Hitler, whose leadership managed to create a nation (as well as associated like-minded individuals and nations), all smitten with the effect of Hitler’s oratorical tirades resulting in a population the equivalent of automatons, although automatons with pride! Yes, Hitler did it by tacitly tyrannizing masses of populations to believe that to follow him was to move away from their imagined dangers and instead, to be sheltered in a future of complete safety. And his doing it, at least lent some credence to the manifest message of Arendt’s “banal of evil” contention. Of course historical cultural prejudices against one group or another (prejudice against Jews in particular) contributed to the illusionary delusion—the mesmerized belief in his message. In addition, the force of such a message contains an implicit threat:

You follow me, or else!

All of this “going along with things,” or, “not looking,” or, “being co-opted,” or, becoming a soldier in the army of “evil banality,” or subverting all thinking to a prideful motive that elevates one’s ego is also seen through the examples of social-psychological experiments on cruelty of one group toward another. These studies

were based upon obedience to the instructions of the authority famously reported by Milgram (1974), where subjects were instructed to perform acts—and did perform them (even though these acts conflicted with personal conscience), and by Zimbardo (1970, 1991) who used students as subjects where one group played the role of guards and another played the role of prisoners. Here, cruelty was strictly a result of instructions from the authority.

The writer and editor, David Kupelian (2005, p. 58), in his book *The Marketing of Evil*, sums it all up in a strikingly profound statement that there is no neutral ground between good and evil. Where people are being tortured and killed Kupelian says:

.... neutrality is not neutral – its collaboration.

Examples of such evil, includes belligerence and discrimination because of:

- Race (slavery of Africans mostly from Ghana down through Liberia, — transported to the Americas);
- Religion (Crusades of the 11th century and thereafter, — Christians/Muslim wars);
- Physical or other attributed defects (Nazi intolerance of so-called inferiors);
- Tribal differences (East African Rwandan genocide of Hutus against Tutsis);
- Sectarian violence (Shia vs. Sunni conflict in Middle East countries such as Syria and Lebanon),
- Genocides (for example perpetrated by Germany [Nazis] against Jews, by Turkey against Armenians, by Cambodian communists against their own Cambodian citizens, by Rwandan Hutus against Tutsis; by the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo where Serbian forces killed Albanians; and, by Pakistanis against Bengalis).

Of Hitler's early history, reviewed by Binion (1976); Bromberg and Small (1983); Miller (1990); Staub (1989); and Waite (1977), these authors point to various conditions and events that together form a syndrome of social and psychological factors comprising the general picture of Hitler's personality. Such social and psychological factors shall be reviewed throughout this chapter.

## Context

Ervin Staub, in his book *The Roots of Evil* (1989, p. 235), points out that as monolithic societies go, the mainstream group becomes highly suggestible to "...narrow ideology and a highly specific blueprint for society." It's a blueprint containing an ideology glorifying "...the nation, its purity, and greatness...." This point of glorifying a nation's spirit with a sense of its putative purity and greatness intersects also with principles of group behavior elaborated in my book, *Group Psychotherapy and Personality: Intersecting Structures* (1979, pp. 43–45). In this book, I detail the importance of "central figures" that emerge in small goal-oriented groups either as

individuals who become the emotional leader, or, the task-oriented leader of such a group. These leaders imbue the membership with momentum, aspiration, and very importantly, pride.

In broad social movements, it frequently occurs that the central leader begins to occupy both roles—emotional leader as well as task-oriented leader. Such was the case in Germany with the incremental and encroaching growth of the Nazi movement led by Adolph Hitler who as it seems, inexorably occupied both roles—the emotional leader as well as the task-oriented leader.

Of course, in Germany as reviewed earlier, after World War I, the economy was crumbling and the condition of poverty began to impact the populace with tensions regarding the prospect of more, permanent unemployment, resulting perhaps in danger for self and family. Staub (p. 237) continues to tell us that under such conditions can arise a mass movement that "...attracts and holds a following not by its doctrines and promises, but by the refuge it offers from the anxieties, barrenness, and meaninglessness of individual existence." This point is also supported by Hoffer (1951), and by Toch (1965), who discuss the issue of how people are co-opted. The entire issue is further developed in my book, *The Discovery of God: A Psycho/Evolutionary Perspective*, in which I discuss the relinquishment of one's ego to the group (p. 54), as well as in the galvanizing of group emotions (p. 59).

Once such conditions exist, Rosenbaum (1998) and Gilbert (1947) explain that eventually, as exemplified in the Nazi movement led by Hitler, high ambition, low ethics, and a strong sense of pride and nationalism (meaning essentially intense chauvinism), as well as felt justification in the face of such ideology, confirmed that doing anything necessary in the name of Germandom was permissible.

In this sense, the cultural pre-conditions of eventual Nazi genocide against Jews and others satisfied certain criteria. These criteria are listed by Staub (1989, p. 233):

- Cultural self-concept, goals, and values were considered in Nazi Germany to be a stance of superiority by German nationals as well as [supporting] their newly reinforced strong sense of nationalism;
- Devaluation of subgroups especially focused on Jews in the historical context of German and European anti-Semitism was then adopted as a major tenet of Nazi propaganda;
- Orientation to authority reflected an overall culture of obedience to authority – ultimately meaning obedience to Hitler;
- Monolithic versus pluralistic cultural values resonated with the German population as only desirous from the monolithic, authoritarian, and totalitarian points of view; and,
- Ideology was only approved as Nazi-defined ideology with racial theory, and absolute leadership assigned to Hitler.

With these tenets in place, Staub (p. 99) continues to describe that comradeship among the German population consolidated around Hitler and his Nazi agenda in which there existed mutual support as well as shared danger. It all became more specific when it was declared through Nazi propaganda that the polluters of the eco-

conomic and national life occurred especially from the work and presence of Jews, socialists, and communists, and that “...to combat this pervasive pollution, Germans had to subordinate themselves to the community and give up their individuality.”

In this context, Staub further states that Hitler was the charismatic leader “to whom Germans could resign their fate, absolving themselves of responsibility for the difficulties of their lives.” In other words, faith in Hitler and his Nazi agenda would assure the German citizenry of eventual complete peace of mind regarding their safety, as well as offering the assurance that averting ultimate danger was in their destiny.

## The Influence of Martin Luther and the New Testament in Relation to Jews

In my novel, *The Making of Ghosts* (2012), I point out that during the Nazi era, from the early 1930s to the mid 1940s, the ethnic and racial context of German society with respect to its cultural mores is a very good example of a scapegoating culture and its program of derision of subgroups, especially Jews. As referred earlier, this kind of propaganda was a common staple throughout Western civilization and driven by the authorities of the Christian church, specifically designed to nourish and fortify hatred of Jews. This can be seen even in Christian *New Testament* literature, in the Russian produced fictionalized *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, in the practice of pogroms—violent attacks on Jewish-populated little towns of Eastern Europe—and essentially against Jews over all of Europe, and even in Central and South America. And again, it was all church-sponsored, or church-influenced, or directly church-directed. Severe criticism of this circumstance is given by many authors. A. Roy Eckardt who was active in the field of Jewish-Christian relations has asserted: “...that the foundation of anti-Semitism and responsibility for the Holocaust lies ultimately in the *New Testament*” (1998, p. 519). In addition, scholars have pointed out that verses in the *New Testament* have been used to inculcate prejudice and even violence against Jewish people generally. Professor Lillian C. Freudmann, author of *Anti-Semitism in the New Testament* (1994) has published a study of such verses and pointed out that these verses have had deleterious effects in negatively affecting parishioners of the Christian community against Jews and throughout history. Along with this, Rabbi Michael J. Cook, who is Professor of *Intertestamental and Early Christian Literature* (2008) at the Hebrew Union College, has also pointed out various themes in the *New Testament* that validate the claims in these verses of discrimination against Jews. Among such examples are included:

- Jews are guilty of deicide in their culpability for crucifying Jesus;
- God has punished Jews for killing Jesus;
- Christians are now the new chosen people having replaced the Jews;
- Jewish people have been disloyal to God; and,
- With the appearance of Jesus, Judaism became unimportant.

As far as the Spanish Inquisition was concerned, I report (Kellerman 2012, pp. 143–144).

- It officially started in the early 13th century with a document of Pope Gregory IX called *constitution Excommunicannus*;
- That carrying it out was the duty or honor primarily of the Dominican Friars;
- That twenty years later the use of torture was legitimized by Pope Innocent IV;
- That the killing went on and on and even at the end of the 14th century, four thousand Jews were killed in Seville alone;
- That in 1478 King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella legally established the Inquisition in Spain with Tomas de Torquemada as its Grand Inquisitor;
- That by this time the priests had so poisoned the Spanish people with anti-Jewish hatred that pogroms became a normal occurrence;
- That the expulsion of the Jews was held in 1492;
- That it was only in 1834 (six centuries after it started) that the Spanish Inquisition was finally halted;
- Generally however, with respect to the overall persecution of Jews, the church (and royalty) tortured and killed Jews for much more than these six hundred years.

## Enter, the Revered Martin Luther of the Protestant Reformation

In the mid 1500s, Martin Luther, a German monk, a Catholic priest, and a professor of theology, was also the key individual in the development of the *Protestant Reformation*. It was Luther's plan that with his good offices toward Jews, that all Jews in the warmth of his embrace, would naturally want to convert to Christianity. Luther believed that for sure, his *wish* would be satisfied. However, when one's certainty intoned with such anticipation and encased in grandiosity is disappointed, the following is what can occur. Jews did not convert and our revered Luther, without a doubt, decidedly and conspicuously displayed a diseased aspect of his personality. From a psychological diagnostic point of view, this afflicted part of his personality was characterized by a hysteric-frenzied and megalomaniacal-obsessional/paranoid tirade against all Jews. Luther condemned Jews for what he considered to be their effrontery, their presumptive and audacious insolence in defying him—in defying Luther, the God. This infantile temper-tantrum revealed the megalomaniacal pathological underpinning to his personality. It was a monumental grandiosity in which he felt perfectly imparted with the right to proclaim guilt or innocence and then death to the Jews because they simply didn't do what he wanted! In psychoanalytic parlance, this is identified as one's *wish* emanating from a God – and in this case, from a punitive God.

In this facet of his personality, Luther became unhinged with rage. It revealed him as a true megalomaniacal narcissist—and a Christian one at that. What was worse was that Luther's uncontrolled tirade was obviously the so-called justified addendum to the logical future construction of Nazi ideology that literally contributed to making the Holocaust possible—devised of course by Luther's inheritor,



Adolph Hitler. What made Martin Luther unable to control himself was a thought he might have had reflecting his grandiose megalomaniacal narcissism—his egoism (treating self-interest as the foundation of morality). It was as though he was saying: “I, the great Martin Luther, will now punish you.”

The following is from:

*Luther's Works*, Vol. 47, On the Jews and their lies.  
Muhlenberg Press. Quoted in Hilberg. *Destruction*, rev.ed, (1955–1975),  
Vol. 1, pp. 15–16.

Identical Luthor quotes may also be found in:

Luther, M. (2006). On the Jews and Their Lies. Cited in Michael, R.  
*Holy Hatred: Christianity, Anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust*. New York: Palgrave  
Macmillan. 111–113;

and

Michael, R. (Autumn 1985). Luther, Luther Scholars, and the Jews.  
*Encounter*, 46:4, 342–343.

and

Luther, M. (1971). On the Jews and Their Lies, Luthers Werke. Trans.  
Bertram, M. H. In: *Luther's Works*. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press.: 47: 268–271).

Hear now Luthor's acting-out evil condemning tirade:

...they [Jews] are thirsty blood-hounds and murderers of all Christendom, with full intent, now for more than 1,400 years, and indeed they were often burned to death upon the accusation that they had poisoned water and wells, stolen children and torn and hacked them apart, in order to cool their temper secretly with Christian blood.

It is more than 1,400 years since Jerusalem was destroyed, and at this time it is almost 300 years since we Christians have been tortured and persecuted by the Jews all over the world so that we might well complain that they had now captured us and killed us—which is the open truth. Moreover, we do not know to this day which devil has brought them here into our country; we did not look for them in Jerusalem.

Yes, they hold us Christians captive in our country. They let us work in the sweat of our noses, to earn money and property from them, while they sit behind the oven, lazy, let off gas, bake pears, eat, drink, live softly and well from our wealth, sweat, and work. They curse our Lord, to reward us, and to thank us. Should not the Devil laugh and dance, if he can have such Paradise among us Christians, that he may devour through the Jews—his holy ones—that which is ours, and stuff our mouths and noses as reward, mocking and cursing God and man....

Thus, here we see the obviously dual identity of the sixteenth-century protestant reformer, Martin Luther; the immature, solipsistic and virulently paroxyst Martin Luther, contributing lunacy to the dreadful context into which was nourished Adolph Hitler. This is the unalloyed evil context that historically underpinned and embraced the entire Nazi era with its Jew-hating ideology, notwithstanding the millennial Jew-hatred by thoroughly contaminated evil atavistic and reprehensible Christian priests and theologians—even to the point of having this Jew-hating poison seep into the very narrative of *The New Testament*, which to this day in the early twenty-first century has not been rectified.

Then, as a concluding peroration, and in the same stylistic bitter righteous-stance of an Adolph Hitler, Luther continues:

...the Jews are a base, whoring people, that is, no people of God, and their boast of lineage circumcision, and law must be accounted as filth. They are full of the devil's feces...which they wallow in like swine. The synagogue was a defiled bride, yes, an incorrigible whore and a evil slut...they should be shown no mercy or kindness, afforded no legal protection, and these poisonous envenomed worms should be drafted into forced labor or expelled for all time...we are in fault in not slaying them.

Thus, in addition to favoring that synagogues and schools be set on fire, prayer books destroyed, rabbis forbidden to preach, homes razed, and property and money confiscated, Luther also more than merely suggested that the murder (“slaying”) of Jews was at least, a distinct thinking possibility, and therefore something to palpably consider and possibly, even very possibly, to do.

It is patently clear that Luther was disturbed. Suffice it to say, we know that there are good and decent Christians as well as Christians who are evil (acting-out) miscreants. And, there are those Christians who are simply ignorant, or others who are split personalities. It seems that Martin Luther of the *Protestant Reformation* should be located in one or more of these miscreant categories.

## Adolph Hitler: Formative History

In her excellent volume, *For Your Own Good: On Hidden Cruelty in Child-rearing and the Roots of Violence*, Alice Miller (1983) states:

I have no doubt that behind every crime a personal tragedy lies hidden.

So it is in the formative years of Hitler's life. More or less, two key family characteristics can account for all of this rooted-in-memory of violence. Of Hitler's family count, Stierlin (1976) in his book, *Adolph Hitler: A Family Perspective*, reports that Hitler had five siblings; three died of diphtheria very early on, and another died at 6 years of age. Hitler's sister, Paula survived. In addition to his mother and father,

apparently Hitler's mother Klara had a hunchedback schizophrenic sister, Johanna, who lived with them during all of Hitler's childhood.

Hitler's father, Alois, twenty-three years older than his wife, was a violent, frequently drunken man who mercilessly and frequently beat his children, especially and repeatedly beating Hitler, who it was reported, also defied his father, leading to more severe and frequent beatings. It was so bad that Miller (1983, p. 146) wonders: "What did this child feel, what did he *store up* inside when he was beaten and demeaned by his father every day from an early age?" Miller also states that the entire family was subservient to the father's will, so that humiliation ruled in the Hitler household.

It all began with members of the previous third generation—with Adolph's grandparents. Apparently, Adolph's grandmother, Maria Anna Schicklgruber began working for a Graz Jewish man named Frankenberger. Ostensibly, she became pregnant by Frankenberger's 19-year-old son, and so begins the perhaps (or perhaps not) apocryphal story of a Jewish ghost in Hitler's past—a maternal Jewish grandfather. Despite the fact that several authors (Hamann 2010, p. 50; Kershaw 1999, pp. 8–9; Toland 1992, pp. 246–247) did not locate the name Leopold Frankenberger in Graz, nevertheless it has been speculated that Hitler had the name excised from Graz records. Apocryphal or not, this hypothetical Jewish relative of Hitler's was confirmed as real by none other than Hans Frank, who was Hitler's lawyer and later, governor general of Poland (Miller 1983, p. 148).

Of course, it is reasonable to expect that Hitler distanced himself from such history, but later decided that when Jews were to be eliminated from German soil, data on each person would need to clear them of Jewish blood going back three generations! To further remove any trace of a Schicklgruber relation to a Frankenberger, Alois Schicklgruber, Hitler's father, changed his name to Alois Hitler. Miller (p. 150) also notes that a correspondence between the Frankenbergers and Hitler's grandmother (that ensued for 14 years) strongly implies that because Hitler's father "...had been conceived in circumstances which rendered the Frankenbergers liable to pay a paternity allowance..." that therefore, it seems highly likely that Adolph Hitler, despite his protestations to the contrary, did indeed have a Jewish grandfather.

As for Adolph's relationship with his mother, it has been accepted by scholars that Klara dearly loved her son and spoiled him. This was all occurring after her three younger children had died. Interestingly, and as reported by Miller (p. 182), Klara (Potzl was her maiden name), "...was 16 years of age when she moved into the home of 'Uncle Alois' where she is to take care of his sick wife and two children." Alois then impregnates her even before his wife dies, and at the age of 48, Alois marries Klara, who at the time is 24. Of course this is a parallel to the purported events concerning Hitler's grandparents in which Hitler's grandfather (at the time the 19 year old Frankenberger) also impregnated Hitler's grandmother, Maria Anna Schicklgruber, who was similarly retained to work for the Frankenberger Graz Jewish household.

In terms of Hitler's relationship to his father, it is also reported that Klara, his mother, insisted that Adolph forgive his father for all of the beatings and whip-

pings and to be “a good boy.” Ironically, Adolph surely must have experienced this request as a challenging one (a conflicting one) insofar as Klara apparently never interceded in Alois’s brutality toward Adolph so that Adolph, by definition, would necessarily have felt abandoned, perhaps even betrayed by his mother—the one person he loved—for not interceding on his behalf.

## Personality, Psychodiagnosis, and Psychodynamics

### *German Society and its anti-Jewish Sentiment: Hitler’s Psychology Toward Jews*

It is not possible to understand Adolph Hitler’s personality and psychodynamics, both embraced by his psychodiagnosis, without first identifying his socio-historical context. In previous sections of this book, it has been mentioned that in central Europe especially in both Germany and Austria anti-Jewish sentiment was at an all-time high. In this, more or less homogeneous Christian society, to be Jewish was experienced as shameful, and a low-class disgrace, (a consequent isolation of the targeted Jewish person), and yes, as evil.

This was a significant part of Hitler’s formative social/emotional/psychological internalization. In my co-authored volume on psychodiagnosis and personality-structure (Kellerman and Burry 2007, p. 117), this concept of “internalization” is defined as a psychological defense mechanism—to wit, internalization is:

...built on the foundation of identification [with parents and other authority figures], and adds to an imprinting of values. Imprinting takes place through the individual’s unconscious adoption of the standards and attributes of another significant figure....the individual comes to feel controlled by emotions as a result of internalizing values....

For example, given the grotesque anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, it is interesting to note that it has become increasingly clear that Adolph Hitler’s biological grandfather was the Graz Jew named Frankenberger, and that Hitler’s first racial law implemented by the Nazi government stated that in order to clear anyone of having Jewish ancestry, their family history would need to be checked going back three generations. As pointed out earlier, it was the same number of generations counting from Hitler’s Frankenberger Jewish grandfather down to Hitler’s birth.

The issue here relates to Hitler’s personality inclination, that is, his obsession with purity—pointedly, his specific obsessive focus on the need he had for an Aryan purity. Hitler’s insistence on his right, his entitlement to express righteous indignation, needed this sort of purification rite—the absolute assurance that no one in his country was a Jew by eliminating anyone who had Jewish ancestry covering three generations. In this way and as an acting-out genetic-checking instrument, Hitler was able to reinforce his delusion that there was no “Jewish blood” in his

own personal history. Of course, the phenomenon of “delusion” is not the kind of psychological disorder that listens to logical discussion and, in fact, delusion cannot even understand anything regarding the language of logic or of the presentation of contrasting and disparate facts that oppose whatever it is that the delusional person does not want to know (Kellerman 2014, p. 44, identifying delusion as “psychotic”; and, Teitelbaum 1999, p. 4, stating that delusion is “unmodifiable”). In other words, the delusional person cannot ever be wrong—and will not permit anyone to invoke “wrongness” as it may apply to the self.

And so it was with Adolph Hitler. As far as he was concerned, he could not be wrong! Therefore, the doing based on decision-making becomes the actor-outer’s chief behavioral characteristic in which such a person’s *modus operandi* is to avoid anything that is seen as noxious to the self. Any accusation of “wrongness” is one such example of Hitler’s refusal to even hear such an accusation, especially because it would mean something noxious to the self, which of course would stand in contrast to Hitler’s need to be pure and perfect.

In the society in which Hitler was nourished (and therefore with respect to his own internalizations), he obviously acted out his social and psychological revulsion regarding issues of his personal history (or what he may have considered his conflict regarding whether it was his ostensible history or real a one) of having so-called Jewish blood. It was an acting-out by planning to entirely erase all traces of anything at all that was Jewish in the society he ruled, and further, in any society he would rule in the future. This kind of acting-out of his *wish* to be pure (as he defined such a *wish*), seems to be an absolutely important factor that led to the Holocaust in which 6 million Jews were murdered solely on the basis of their ethnicity. Hitler’s idea of ethnicity also included the notation of country of origin, or race (considered by Hitler that to be Jewish was to be of a race), or language (spoken in Yiddish mostly by Ashkenazic Jews of Eastern Europe, and in Ladino, by Sephardic Jews mostly of the Iberian countries of Spain and Portugal, as well as by Turkish Jews), or, to be based simply on ancestry—three generations back.

In this sense, Hitler’s purity obsession was an obsessive intrusive theme that for all intents and purposes plagued him. In order for the Aryan to live, to thrive, and to conquer, the Jew must die—meaning each and every Jewish person—including women and children. Thus, Hitler’s purity obsession also contained his sense of entitlement encapsulated in the assumption of righteous indignation that profoundly touched a nerve in a Jew-hating society where most of the populace was struggling for employment and sensing personal danger resulting from the real threat of their poverty, along with the humiliation of their loss in the first world war, and finally, in how they felt about the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, ending the first world war. The cause of this humiliation ostensibly felt by the German people was a result of this particular Treaty that required Germany to demilitarize the Rhineland, and relinquish territory as well as be responsible for economic sanctions and reparations. In this respect, the era of the most visible scapegoat was in the making. And in that German society, the easiest and most visible scapegoat was the Jew.

To further accent this point, Miller (1990, p. 155), also professes that “...Hitler’s justifiable childhood hatred of his father found an outlet in hatred of Jews.”

This hatred toward his father surfaced rather vividly in or about 1938 when he first learned of his father's probable Jewish ancestry. Miller (1990, p. 162) states: "It was impossible for Hitler's father...to remove the stain [of his Jewish ancestry]... just as it was later forbidden the Jews to remove the stigma of the yellow star they were forced to wear." This was Hitler's attempt to make the Jews helpless just as he *wished* his father to be. To eliminate all Jews was thus a psychological displacement phenomenon that meant the erasure of his father. And to the question of why Jews were hated in German society, is thus answered by Miller (p. 166):

....Jews are hated because people harbor a forbidden hatred and are eager to legitimate it. The Jewish people are particularly well-suited objects of this need. Because they have been persecuted for two-thousand years by the highest authorities of church and state, no one ever needs to feel ashamed for hating the Jews, not even if one has been raised according to the strictest moral principles and is made to feel ashamed of the most natural emotions of the soul in other regards... [Even a] child...will seize upon anti-Semitism (i.e., his right to hate), retaining it for the rest of his life.

Another most important psychoanalytic point that Miller (p. 191), makes is that:

....the persecution of Jews permitted [Hitler] to persecute the weak child in his own self that was now projected onto the victims.

Thus, exterminating Jews is equivalent to avoiding depression by acting-out the elimination of one's own weakness. This means, in accordance with the definition of acting-out, that Hitler did what he felt he had to do in order not to know that which he didn't want to know—to avoid knowing or acknowledging his own sense of inadequacy and weakness.

### ***The Psychology of Hitler's Megalomaniacal Grandiosity***

It was this particular sense of weakness that spawned Hitler's psychological defense of grandiosity and megalomania. It was a megalomania generated in his psyche as a compensatory defense enabling him to be distracted from his apparent entrenched and underlying sense of disempowerment. It was such a defense that made it possible for him to focus on the certainty of his vicious projections onto others such as Jews. Thus, it was Hitler's projection onto Jews of his own sense of weakness. In this respect of the effect of his grandiosity, Hitler was always concerned with issues of immortality, infallibility and invincibility (a defense of paranoid omniscience against feeling vulnerable). Yet, he was actually afraid that it would be friends of his that would one day stab him in the back—a nod to his own projections regarding his own untrustworthiness.

Such a psychological projection was based on Hitler's need to erase any trace of helplessness. He did this self-appointed erasure task by proclaiming that everything was wrong with Jews, but nothing wrong with him. In his psyche, the equation that kept his personal problems regarding his own dreadful self-image *repressed*, likely

produced an iron-clad formula forming the basis of his acting-out—his evil. The equation he formed into a formula of acting-out (acting-out with the subject matter of sociopolitical evil scapegoating ideology) was this particular idea of projection as he very likely felt it:

Because everything is wrong with Jews, then nothing  
is wrong with me!

And to boot, Hitler’s psyche was prescient because the German/Austrian society at large was viciously anti-Semitic making it relatively easy to enlist such society into his burgeoning genocidal German/Austrian/Fellow-Travelers Nazi-citizen’s army. And as far as Hitler’s need to be seen as pure and perfect, Fuchs, in his book, *Show-down in Vienna* (1939) quotes Hitler:

Do you realize that you are in the presence of the greatest  
German of all time.

Then, with respect to his defense of such projection, here was a prime example of Hitler’s grandiose megalomaniacal romance with himself—as, for example, if we include and compare him with the tiniest sample of other notable Germans of whom he thinks he is greater than, we derive:

In philosophy: Kant, Marx, and Nietzsche;  
In literature: Goethe, Heine, and Grass;  
In science: Copernicus, Einstein, and Helmholtz;  
In music: Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms.

Thus, with respect to Hitler’s grandiosity, Price (1937, p. 262) refers to Hitler’s feelings that he often displayed about himself: a sense of “invincibility,” a belief in his “omnipotence,” and a posture in which he believes he is “Providence, the Messiah, and Christ” condensed into one. It was in this respect that Hitler refused to admit that he could possibly be wrong about anything. And this posture was crucial because it was then virtually impossible for him to compromise; when he made up his mind about something, it became impossible for him to tolerate a different opinion.

Yet, Hitler’s grandiosity doesn’t necessarily mean that he was always certain about what he wanted to do. There are reports indicating that he often procrastinated and squandered time waiting for the inevitable “something,” that made him feel the “rightness” of it—whatever the “it” was. In other words, he had to wait for the idea to hit him. Hitler reported that when the idea did indeed hit him, then he knew it validated whatever was his schema—always a validation of any component of his ideological framework. At times when the idea resisted the moment of crystallization—the aha moment—is when Hitler needed to be alone and away from any so-called contamination, or even boredom. This sort of so-called solipsistic recharging was Hitler’s attempt to regain some alignment with respect to his singular focus. It was a “wait” that was characterized by indecision, by essentially waiting for the voice in his gut that would make him feel if the “it” fit right. The psychological hypothesis is that when he felt it fit right, it resonated with his schematic algorithm: to compensate for his own personal core sense of “wrongness” and then to project

this self-accused “wrongness” onto Jews, and then further, to feel absolutely positive about eliminating Jews.

It is important to understand how a person’s algorithm in the core of personality comes to be. The key point here is that the algorithm grows out of the person’s major *wish*. The question then becomes: What was Adolph Hitler’s major *wish* that constituted the encapsulation of his algorithm? The answer is written wherever we look. In other words, it became obvious that Hitler needed to be a pure unadulterated Aryan. But he had a problem. Apparently, his grandfather was a Jew. He therefore needed to erase what he considered to be “the stain.” Thus, the personality construction in any person, arising from the existence of this algorithm, will depend on the content of the basic *wish* that is solely responsible for creating the nature of the algorithm. The psychological sequence of factors in this personality construction occurs in a way such that the algorithm informs the person’s unconscious mind of the *wish*’s imperative, that is, the imperative to achieve whatever the *wish* desires, or needs gratified. Then the unconscious mind instructs the person’s psyche to engineer whatever thinking and behavior needs to be implemented by the conscious mind in order to achieve the algorithm’s goal. It is in the person’s psyche therefore that a ready-made template is engineered that emerges as the consciously crystallized blueprint for the person’s thinking and ultimately, the person’s behavior.

In Hitler’s case, the *wish*, leading to the insistence to be purely Aryan, could only be achieved if the person’s algorithm informed Hitler’s unconscious mind to instruct his psyche to engineer thinking and behavior used by Hitler’s consciousness to achieve his need, his insistence, his *wish* to be unstained, pure. It all ended in implemented action—cold-blooded murder—that eliminated 6 million Jews along with millions of others considered to be inferior. With that in mind, Hitler could feel that the stain of having Jewish blood was being erased.

However, the further question becomes: What was generative in the first place ending in the creation of the algorithm’s *wish*? And the putative answer exists in both the intersection and interaction of sociological influences on psychological constructions, that is, that in Europe generally, and in this case, in Germany/Austria in particular, anti-Semitism was pervasive. It is of course not far-fetched to understand that this anti-Jewish hysteria was so to speak the disease of sociology propagated all over Europe—essentially by the church. The appellation of “Christ Killer,” over centuries, morphed into an injected and virulent anti-Jewish sociological/psychological underpinning of Europe’s Christian population. It meant that Christian was good, but Jew meant bad. But, what it really meant was even worse. Ultimately what it really meant was that “Christian” translated as pure and “Jew” translated, as evil. And it was an evil that needed to be avoided. However, even that wasn’t enough. In the end, avoided meant: the Holocaust.

All of it, points to the sequence of events of a sociological effluvia, in the form of general “belief.” This belief becomes an easy and fundamental transmission into each person’s psychological makeup. With respect to psychological constructions therefore, Hitler needed to keep himself pure, and further, he projected this purity obsession into the sociological blood-stream of the German/Austrian population—a population already quite ready to hear it. Thus, this sociological-psychological sequence starts with general sociological “belief” influencing a person’s “*wish*”-agen-



da, as in: belief → *wish* → algorithm → unconscious → psyche → consciousness → thinking → behavior.

Hitler's accompanying ideological stance was to attain lebensraum (more territory for Germans). And this too, because of his underlying closed-in feeling (a claustrophobic inner feeling of "wrongness") then gave him a personal sense that with such lebensraum, he could finally breathe. It is in this sense that Hitler's thoughts proceeded from the emotional to the factual. In fact, he insisted that facts were validated by his emotional reactions and not the other way around. K. G. W. Ludecke, in his book *I Knew Hitler*, details a reportage of the author's personal experience that seems to validate the essence of our psychological analysis.

In the diagnostic profile given here, it is usually the case that such persons (especially when referring to tyrannical personalities) validate their own grandiosity when history presents them as individuals working diligently on their own grandiose plans. In Hitler's case, it had been known that he had extraordinary powers of concentration and focus, and when he would have his "aha" moment, it was then that he demanded absolute obedience from those around him. If any of his associates dawdled, it would imply that they were doubting him, and so such doubt would further indicate that they thought he could be wrong about whatever it was he was working on. Of course, given his psychology, Adolph Hitler would not tolerate such doubts from any of his subordinates.

Shirer (1941), in his book *Berlin Diary*, relates this sort of megalomaniacal and grandiose posture to Hitler's relationship with his mother. He was considered to have been a spoiled child who insisted on having his own way and correspondingly of course, who would not tolerate being wrong and therefore, in his own mind, could not be wrong! Shirer, suggests that it all rather relates to an identification with his father. Hitler's father would have rages for the identical reason of absolutely needing to have everything his own way. Psychologically, this is typically considered to illustrate infantile arrested-development where such persons simply cannot wait to have their *wish* gratified—immediately. This immediate need for gratification of any *wish* (and the inability to tolerate frustration or thwarting of the *wish*) was true of his father in his father's exaggerated and insistent manner with respect to requiring adherence from those family members immediately in his presence. In turn, this was also even truer of Adolph with respect to requiring adherence from the entire German family—the nation—of which he was now, the father.

There is a stark discrepancy between Hitler's pose as a figure of monumental importance to himself versus his pose to others. Along with this, much anecdotal evidence exists that shows just the opposite—that Hitler would be a supplicant to authority, would weep with inordinate sobs, and would have sleep-disordered nights where he needed young men to sit with him in order to fall asleep. Thus, under certain conditions, Hitler's grandiosity could be rendered ineffective. When rendered ineffective his cloying behavior may implicate Hitler's libidinous sexual orientation which seems to contain elements at least of homosexual interest if not the actual acting-out of homosexual pursuits—a nod to the need of an analysis of Hitler's psychosexual orientation.

## ***Hitler's Psychosexual Identification***

A psychoanalytic view claims that sexual confusion develops as a result of an acting-out abusive brutal father toward the male child, along with a loving although helpless mother of that same child. Such was the case in the Hitler family. Fest (1974), McVay (1955), Miller (1990), Rauschnig (1940), and Stierlin (1974), among many others, report this history in detail.

Regarding Hitler's psychosexual "nature," Rauschnig (p. 276), states his view of it in stark terms:

Most loathsome of all is the reeking miasma of furtive, unnatural sexuality the fills and fouls the whole atmosphere around him like an evil emanation.

Of course the disparaging attitude in German society regarding anything concerning homosexuality or its variants such as bi-sexuality (and only condoning heterosexuality), was, at least during the early to mid twentieth century, an aspect of the guiding mores of Aryan mainstream sensibility. This, despite the widespread homosexual sub rosa stratum of German social life. Because of a sobering antipathy to homosexuality in German/Austrian, or in other affectatious societies, it would be likely that psychopathology and associated abnormal/hostile homosexuality in these societies would reveal a quite high correlation. Such correlation correspondingly would reveal suppressed *anger* in such ostracized individuals—who, in turn, would most likely seek displacement figures onto whom they could wreak havoc as a release of pent-up hostility resulting from the culturally imposed need to be closeted.

What Rauschnig refers to as Hitler's "miasma" refers also to Hitler's reported addiction to pornography, to his viewing of lewd movies, and to his proclivity to be in attendance at social gatherings populated mostly by men and women known to revel in homosexual gala affairs. For example, it was known in Hitler's inner circle that at the home of a Mrs. Hoffmann, Hitler attended all parties specifically populated by homosexual men and lesbians. In addition, during the early days of the Nazi party, many of the Nazi inner circle were well-known homosexuals. For example, Rohm, the leader of the Storm Battalion (SA), made no attempt to hide his homosexual activities, and Rudolph Hess, Hitler's deputy Fuhrer, was generally known as Fraulein Anna (McVay 1955). In addition, Hermann Goering, head of the Luftwaffe (the German air force, along with other of his responsibilities), was known as someone who would often dress up in drag and apply makeup to his face (Rector 1981).

Some in Hitler's coterie believed that in Hitler's case it may have been an attraction to homosexual activity but only as a vicarious experience and not reflecting actual homosexual experience, although others swore to his homosexual involvement with young men (Igra 1945; Knickerbocker 1941). It was also reported by many of his closest associates that Hitler seemed quite awkward around women, and that of the few women with whom he had more than just a passing acquaintance, several committed suicide. As an example, Frau Renarte Mueller committed suicide by

throwing herself from a Berlin hotel. In addition, his unusually close and intimate relationship with his niece Geli, who, it was rumored, had been ordered by Hitler never to leave his apartment, was eventually found shot to death. Hitler's pistol was the weapon used. Her death was attributed to her own hand but any investigation to the matter remained suspended. Hitler was suspected to have perhaps pulled the trigger but the reputed evidence ruled it a suicide.

Further, Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda minister, was identified as the one whose house parties became homosexual orgies (Grunberger 1971), and Reinhard Heydrich, the mastermind of the Nazi death camps, was also named as a practicing homosexual (Calic 1982). In fact, Desmond Seward (2013) indicates that the Viennese police records have Hitler on their records as an apprehended homosexual. To this point, Walter Langer (1972), a psychiatrist, prepared a psychological profile of Hitler that in 1943 was commissioned by the Allies. Langer presented a lengthy biography of Hitler in which is also cited that Hitler's personal bodyguards were "...almost all homosexual." In a bombshell revelation, Langer also states that Hitler was without a doubt a coprophile (sexually stimulated by human urine and excrement), a report also supported by Bromberg and Small (1983), in which these authors describe in detail that "...the only way in which he [Hitler] could get full sexual satisfaction was to watch a young woman as she squatted over his head and urinated or defecated in his face." They added that Hitler groveled and wanted to be kicked. Such behavior or predilections are usually correlated to and psychoanalytically understood as generated within a sado-masochistic context and defined rather simply as a secret need to be dominated. Again, psychoanalytically, such behavior is understood to have its genesis in early experiences with an especially brutal father and a mother who is acquiescent and pliant in relation to her husband—precisely the pattern of Hitler's family.

A collection of unflattering and even feminine characterizations of the physical appearance of Hitler has been reported by a multitude of authors (Smith 1932; Thompson 1932). Hitler's close friends, and well as some of the party faithful, have at various times, drawn such pejoratives. These so-called pejoratives included comments regarding Hitler's general physicality—also including his particular physical-expressive style. With respect to these observations it was agreed that Hitler's height was below average, hips were wide, legs short, thin, and spindly, that he had a large torso, a hollow chest, a lady-like walk, and that he took dainty little steps which in all facilitated the coining of the attribution or designation of "the little man."

It was also Shirer (1941) who described Hitler as someone who would frequently sob and weep like a child. It is also reasonably clear that Hitler could not be belittled or challenged because such humiliation would be tantamount to being accused of the worst—the possibility of being wrong or undereducated, or feminine—just about equal to being a Jew. To be wrong therefore, revealed what being wrong really meant. It meant to have one's feminine side revealed. This absolute resistance to being wrong therefore, in all probability was an obsessive regulatory device meant to guard against any public display of such revelatory expressive qualities of personal-

ity. Further, the process involved in reinforcing this rigid insistence on always being right also was always a fortified one and particularly reveals Hitler's guardedness.

### ***Hitler's Personality Organization: Psychodynamics and Defenses***

Hitler's rigid insistence on being always right (and never wrong) can be psychologically considered a defense against submissive latent urges (even homosexual urges). It is a search for supplicatory opportunities that one may need in order to be deeply satisfied. For example, Ludecke (1937) and Lania (1942) reinforce the report that Hitler's most cherished *wish* was to be a supplicant in a strictly boyish submission to an older woman. This is a variant of a relationship in which the supplicant is scolded and punished by the dominatrix while at another propitious time stroked and even adored. Simultaneously, and in contrast, Hitler's notion was that sex makes fools of men because for men it means nothing but submission. In a contemptuous moment about sex, Raushning (1940) heard him to say that sex was: "the Jewish Christ-creed with effeminate pithy ethics."

For a man in Hitler's position, with respect to how the public sees him (as a person with absolute authority, as the most powerful individual of the nation), the disparity of his public persona in contrast to his personal predilections (to be whipped, humiliated, and scolded, especially by an older woman) must be to the untutored eye, an astonishing incongruity. Yet, although on the surface this disparity is seemingly incongruous, the subterranean psychological truth reveals such contrasts as very possibly knitted together and as eminently logical partners. The need for the older woman creates a discrepancy in power in what then appears to be the difference between the woman who is older, and the man who is now the boy. It is a condition whereby the young boy virtually has no ability to protect himself and must be at the mercy of the older adult woman.

Surprisingly, such a need to be in the supplicant's role seems to reflect three facets of Hitler's need system: first and foremost to be the absolute rigid, brutal, unfeeling leader; second, to be a generous person with women, children, and animals; and, third, to be the dominated scolded boy. It is a personality configuration very much reflective of the personality of narcissists. For example, Lania (1942) makes the point that when faced with persons of noble lineage, Hitler would become vividly and cloyingly deferent. This kind of behavior was seen in Hitler's relationship with Frau Helena Bechstein, who was the wife of a businessman. Frau Bechstein often scolded and dominated him. Hitler would fall at her feet or occasionally lay his head on her bosom hoping for a word of support. This example of Hitler's deferent or even groveling behavior would also occur with others who were of defined or confirmed noble heritage.

Miller (1990, p. 163) correlates early experiences with later behavior. It is pointed out that a parent's consistent rage and beatings create in the child (later as an adult), sadomasochistic needs for a partner who will repeat this same kind of interactive dominance-submission drama. But, it is the *wish* for the partner to be kind,

and in Hitler's case, presumably as an antidote to the brutality of the original father figure. The *wish* is of course dashed, and so the Freudian "repetition-compulsion" (to repeat the early pattern) is the one that obtains. Yet, this impulse to repeat the early pattern is an attempt to master it. Such an attempt is never successful because repeating it is of course not the same as working it out, resolving it. Rather, it is in the practice of the repetition compulsion that "anticipation" in the hope of mastering the original trauma becomes habituated—hence, repeated repetitions.

In a blistering psychological pronouncement, Miller states that such behavior (such need) signals "permanent destruction of the self." Further, Miller (p. 161) then postulates what could be an obvious and psychoanalytic conclusion:

Through the agency of the unconscious repetition compulsion,  
Hitler actually succeeded in transferring the trauma of his family  
life onto the entire German Nation.

As referred earlier, this "transference" also included the introduction of racial laws (traced back three generations), so that in this psychoanalytic understanding, Hitler wanted to entirely erase his brutal father—the Jew. Since his father was clearly brutal, and "cursed" with Jewish heritage, then by further implementation of racial laws, Hitler could eliminate both the "brutal" and the "Jewish" in a psychoanalytically speaking, transference perfect resolution. In addition, laws against homosexuality enabled Hitler to feel consciously cleansed also of what in German society was considered a stain. Yet in Hitler's unconscious, however, nothing at all was cleansed.

Because of all of his self-accused and self-assumed negatives, it becomes psychologically relevant to appreciate the extent to which compensatory defense mechanisms were utilized by Hitler to distance himself from any disclosure of information that could tend as he would see it, to contaminate him. To the greatest attempt possible, this necessarily meant disguising his past. Thus, he wouldn't permit his half-brother, Alois, to even come near him, and "...he made his sister Paula (who kept house for him) to change her name" Miller (1990, p. 186). Further, Miller refers to much of Hitler's behavior as it related to his family as an oedipal drama or even, oedipal fear. What this means is in Hitler's case specifically, his loving relationship to his mother (a symbiotically adherent love) needed to be *repressed* because it would in Hitler's unconscious, in his psyche, it would presumably generate fear of his father in the form of a psychoanalytically understood so-called castration fear. Psychoanalytically, castration fear includes anticipatory tension regarding any number and any array of punishments and disempowerments, and in a more simple-minded, concrete way, meaning dismemberment.

With this particular psychological drama in his life, Miller also proposes that Hitler's *repression* and helplessness, which he tried to escape, was aided by the development of his megalomaniacal grandiosity. It led to what Miller interprets as Hitler's stance regarding a holocaust against Jews, that is, "...after he had already had six million Jews put to death, that it was still necessary to exterminate the last remnants of Jewry" (p. 188). This means that the killing of all Jews would psychologically be equivalent to Hitler's "final solution" of his own experienced misery in

which all of his childhood demons and catastrophic experiences would be cured—would be erased.

In this same interpretive vein, Miller (p. 157), suggests that Hitler “...was forced to repress these feelings [of rage] in order to rescue his pride, or that he did not want to show his suffering and had to split it off.” Usually, “splitting off” refers to developing an ability to compartmentalize empathy. In doing so, there can be empathy for one subgroup, but not for another—a neat psychological partition or a psychological solution.

Therefore, from an enlightened psychological vantage point it begins to look like Hitler was truly psychopathic (needing constant external drama/stimuli), and ultimately and easily able to resist loyalty to any other person—saving his loyalty-energy only for and to himself. This psychopathic diagnostic texture of his personality was obviously embraced by diagnostic accompaniments of hysteric components (as in his bouts of crying and even screaming along with his brittle infantile inability to countenance differences of opinion) as well as a result of his sense of deluded entitlement, whereby he would simply ignore anything that didn’t interest him.

In contrast, but in a surprising diagnostic association, Hitler also had opposite obsessive proclivities (needing his bed to be made up only in a certain way, and only by a man). In addition he seemed to be afflicted with behavior that was surprisingly passive, inactive, and at times he was seen as being even shy. Yet, when it, the insight or the feeling hit him, and therefore he decided he knew what to do, the inactivity would disappear and then he would stay up and work all night. All of these facets of his personality were witnessed and eventually reported in published works such as in Binion’s, 1976 book, *Hitler Among Germans*; in Ludecke’s, 1937 book, *I Knew Hitler*; in Raushning’s 1940 book, *The Voice of Destruction*; in Stras-ser’s 1940 book, *I and Hitler*; and in Waite’s 1977 book, *The Psychopathic God*.

Hitler’s *anger* was terribly acute and the hysteric/psychopathic aspect of his diagnosis made it so that these authors were enabled to describe what could be considered his psychosomatic or psychophysiological reactions as well. Such psychophysiological disorders suggested a heavily repressed *anger/rage* syndrome. In this respect, Hitler was known to frequently complain of stomach ailments (McVay 1955). Hitler’s history of psychophysiological complaints is documented by Evans (2008, p. 508) who lists conditions such as irritable bowel syndrome as well as irregular heartbeat, by Redlich (2000, p. 129) who points out that Hitler suffered with tinnitus, by Bullock (1962, p. 717) who points out the obvious hand-tremors suspicious of Parkinson’s disease, and by Kershaw (2008) who discusses Hitler’s stomach problems.

It could be hypothesized that these stomach ailments, in addition to their *anger/rage* triggers, reflected the pain in his gut whenever he couldn’t find the right intuition about whatever problem was confronting him—the intuition that fit his schemas. In other words, the ambiguity of not being sure of what to do simply created in Hitler an amorphous sense of existence which in turn was much too disempowering and which would make him furious.

Hitler’s definite as well as his insistent major personality schema (the importance he gave to absolutely “knowing” what to do) is exceedingly important to understand

because this iron-clad structure of certainty raises the question of the extent to which history will accept that Hitler was truly a delusional megalomaniacal psychotic person—encapsulated though the psychosis may have been. All of it implies “splitting” as a major personality contaminant. The “splitting” dimension of his personality is concrete diagnostic evidence of his need to see himself as all good and others as all bad. This raises the issue of Hitler’s full diagnostic picture. “Full” is the operative adjective here because Hitler displayed a truly mixed diagnostic picture reflective of the borderline personality. This “full” diagnostic picture included the tortured mentation of an obsessive person with compulsive behaviors. In addition, Hitler also displayed severely passive behavior along with an agitated feverish hysteria. Yet, all of it was encompassed within a classic psychopathic and “borderline” organization, that is, the primacy of a psychological agenda which he needed to always fill with external action. This was external action and the generativity of stimuli that would serve the purpose of filling the void and consequent absence of a rich and valued inner life. In terms of the genesis of such psychopathology, there can be no doubt that Hitler’s experience at the hands of a relentlessly brutalizing father had the unmitigated effect of arresting a better emotional development that might have been.

According to my own diagnostic formulations (Kellerman 2009b, pp. 252–253), Hitler seemed to show what might be considered Janusian thinking. This kind of thinking was named after “Janus, the Roman god who could look in opposite directions simultaneously.” Almost in a bipolar sense, this Janusian reference is to account for Hitler’s diagnosis as containing in its entire configuration seemingly opposite dispositional tendencies, sometimes obsessional and at other times, hysterical, sometimes severely passive and withdrawn, and at other times impossibly compulsively driven. Of course, the entire diagnostic picture illustrates a plethora of problems to the extent of implying a latent psychotic underlay and an always possible and corresponding disorganization of his personality. In this latent psychotic underlay lies his delusional *wishing*.

Illusion was not Hitler’s problem. Delusion was his problem. As discussed earlier, delusion is different from belief. In belief, the illusionary person can be persuaded by contradictory facts or by appeals to logic. Yet, delusion does not understand the language of logic—or of contradictory facts. Delusion only understands details of the *wish* such a person has, and is first and foremost, and without question, a psychotic product (Kellerman 2014). Therefore, if Hitler, in fact, was delusional, then in reality the question as to whether he was actually psychotic is answered in the affirmative. So, the answer is yes, Hitler had a bona fide delusion along with associated little sister delusions, and so yes, Hitler was psychotic. And here is the almost final knot of his diagnosis—the existence of a tightly wired and fundamentally ingrained paranoid character. The personality of this kind of paranoid character can also contain elements of obsessive, passive, and psychopathic features, as well as a prissy hysterical accompaniment that only understands one’s self-entitlement; it is in the end and in a diagnostic summarizing statement, a person suffused and saturated with persistent righteous indignation.

Taken comprehensively, Hitler's array of cognitive plus emotional disturbances along with identifiable paranoid characteristics, resulting periodically in psychotic petulant outbursts place him in the disturbed diagnostic category of a traumatized borderline personality, that is, someone unpredictable, unstable, and essentially feral. And this is the final diagnostic knot!

### ***Diagnostic Summary***

The dizzying array of diagnostic dispositions of Hitler's personality that have been implied here can be dissected and even just about bisected on the basis of his thinking side on the one hand and his emotional side on the other. With respect to his cognitive-thinking side (and its vicissitudes), he is seen to be delusional, obsessive, compulsive, and paranoid. With respect to his affective emotional side, he is seen to be passive, passive dependent, hysteric, and to suffer with psychophysiological reactions.

In terms of broad diagnostic considerations, his personality is clearly underpinned with paranoid character-structure composed of intense criticality toward specific targeted groups—Jews and others—along with a projected severe punitive superego toward these others. In addition, overall narcissistic psychopathic behavior is obvious as ascertained by the absence of empathy along with a contaminated conscience. By and large, all of it is encased in a delusional psychotic framework containing also profound psychosexual confusion.

With respect to delusion, it can be said that delusion is really software of the psyche and is basically an affliction of the presence of a spate of defense mechanisms, especially that of “splitting” (he's all good, others, all bad). Delusion is the implementation of extreme and overpowering compensatory behaviors. Thus, Hitler would not surrender even when Germany was crumbling, e.g., cities like Dresden flattened, hundreds of thousands of German soldiers dead, wounded or captured, and the entire German industrial complex, along with the German air force, destroyed. The only thing left for Hitler was the incontrovertible presence of his delusion. Basically this delusion was his prevailing *wish* as the last remnant of anything resembling a normal mind. Of course the delusion was baked in his psychotic/delusional oven labeled:

“I cannot be wrong.”

In this respect, Hitler's *wish* was imprisoned in his psyche, that is, his delusion about Germany (and his place in it) along with his schema about who lives and who dies (and why), was the institutionalization, actually the incarceration of his childhood algorithm's insistence on purity, about which he was completely and even tyrannically dependent, that is, this adhesion to his childhood traumas (especially because of the unrelenting brutal beatings at the hands of his father) apparently led Hitler, as an adult, on an unwavering course to straighten it all out by doing compensatory “undoing” rituals: kill all Jews, and all disabled people. It is a splitting



phenomenon, that is, “they are all bad, I am all good.” Of course, in order to defend against focusing on his childhood trauma and on any depressive feelings regarding such trauma, Hitler’s uncompromising compensatory stance fueled his persistent and impenetrable megalomaniacal grandiosity. Thus, it was this super grandiosity that he could not relinquish. He even sought confirmation from astrologers and other pseudo-scientists (as well as being strongly attracted to the occult), and often proclaimed that he was the chosen one to redeem Germany. In the *Nizkor Project: Hitler as he Believes Himself to Be*, McVay (1955) quotes Hitler as saying:

I carry out the commands that Providence has laid upon me.

It seems clear that Hitler needed to feel that he was under Divine protection—actually feeling that he was of regal or divine lineage. At rock-bottom, however, this entire enterprise was, as pointed out earlier, a sociological/psychological phenomenon figuring fundamentally into Hitler’s personality and then projected into the German/Austrian population. To this point, McVay also points out that Hitler liked that he was referred to as “the Fuhrer,” and thought of himself more and more as the Messiah, and as stated, even made numerous allusions to Christ as a self-identifier. As such, Hitler’s grandiosity was apparently of a typical delusional paranoid character—within the embrace of a rather pernicious borderline personality.

## Conclusion: Evil

Evil, as defined in this volume concerns behavior originally engineered in a person’s psyche. Psychoanalytically understood, evil is formed as a bona fide symptom of the person’s psyche. This symptom contains the precise structure of any emotional/psychological symptom, and so evil can be examined with respect to its infrastructure, the same way that any symptom can be examined. In the case of personality construction, and as discussed earlier, the person’s algorithm contains that person’s basic *wish* based on the person’s belief. Any particular algorithmic theme that a person may have will be that which informs the person’s unconscious mind about the importance of the *wish*. It is the unconscious mind therefore that then instructs the psyche to engineer thinking and behavior, enabling the conscious mind to give the person the necessary template for achieving the goal of the *wish*.

And that is exactly how evil gets to be!

Since, in this volume we have concluded that “evil” itself is a symptom of acting-out, then it is a small step to state that since acting-out is psychoanalytically encrypted as a person’s attempt to do something rather than to know something, then we can instantly see that the chief defense mechanism of the entire process (utilized by or within the person’s psyche) to assure a not-knowing condition (in order to do something instead), concerns the ubiquitous defense mechanism of *repression*.

In the final analysis, it becomes gradually clear that *repression* and “not-knowing” is a civilization-marker, that is, it may be that evil itself (as an acting-out phenomenon), can indeed be entirely eliminated with the corresponding final elimination of acting-out. This necessarily means that in the event that evolution takes *Homo sapiens* to the point of greater moral courage (as well as ego-strength), to face what is seemingly difficult to face, and not need to repress information (and memories) that confirm the thwarted all-important hovering and attendant *wish*, then by definition, acting-out will no longer be an ascendant phenomenon in one’s affective/emotional/psychological/cognitive life.

Since acting-out in our present evolutionary existence is definitely prominent (genocides are currently and obviously endemic), then this tells us that the current state of our evolutionary development is apparently still quite primitive. Therefore, in order to assess the state and stage of evolution with respect to the relative degree of progress of *Homo sapiens* development, we would necessarily need to conclude that given the ubiquitous, the universal appearance of acting-out, that as stated, we are still in a quite primitive evolutionary stage. And in this primitive or less than sophisticated current state of evolution, it is patently clear that at present, in the early part of the twenty-first century, evil has more access to the real vicissitudes of life than it has to any virtual existence.

Copernicus told us that we are not that special because the earth revolves around the sun and not the other way around. Darwin did the same. He told us we are simply in a line of development from lower forms of life—not far from ape-like. Then Freud arrived and told us we don’t even know what we’re thinking. Now, we must add to this not-such-good-news, and conclude that perhaps the quintessential oxymoron is:

Modern Man!

To understand Adolph Hitler as a personality who was embedded in his larger social context, we can see that in turn, Hitler’s behavior was underpinned by a broad consensus of the moral traditions of his culture. This culture was the result of decades (even centuries) of deciding “what is good and what is bad,” and “who we are” and “*who is the other.*” To this point, Hopper and Weinberg (2013) edited the volume, *The Social Unconscious in Persons, Groups, and Societies*, the essential formulation of which is exemplified by the work of S. H. Foulkes (1990). Foulkes presents what he describes as the “group unconscious.” This group unconscious is stated as: “...the hidden, shadowy, perturbing, traumatic, and often unspoken aspects of social experience, that form part of the individual’s and the group’s self and identity.”

In addition, Gantt and Agazarian, in a chapter of this same volume entitled: *The Group Mind, Systems-centered Functional Sub-grouping, and Interpersonal Neurobiology*, (Hopper and Weinberg 2013), similarly state that “groups have minds like individuals, so that the group mind interacts with the individual minds” (p. 610). In my own book, *Group Psychotherapy and Personality: Intersecting Structures*, (Kellerman 1979), the title of the volume itself faithfully reflects the contents of the book conveying this identical concept that social context is a crucial variable in an

individual's internalizations and derived attitudes and ideology—all of it playing a key role in the final form of “the self.”

Ervin Staub, in his book, *The Roots of Evil* (1989, pp. 56–57) also examines this idea of specific morality corresponding to particular population contexts and reminds us that societies typically have moral traditions which he calls “orientations.” These orientations are key influences on the behavior of the populace. Then the daily lives of individuals—especially of the mainstream—are conducted on the basis of moral codes directed specifically to the mainstream group but are not expected to, or necessarily desired to be applied to various kinds of subgroups—in this case, out-groups as a whole, or applied to various kinds of out-group people specifically.

Staub states:

Sparta subordinated individual dignity and freedom to the interests of the state; Athens elevated individual freedom and dignity and human reason, and creativity. The institution of slavery in Athens demonstrates that dominant value orientations need not apply to those outside the boundaries of the in-group. Indians and blacks in America, Jews in many places, Armenians in Turkey, and those defined as enemies by ideology or other criteria have been traditionally excluded from the domain of dominant moral orientations; otherwise unacceptable acts become acceptable when directed at them.

In this sense, Staub continues to tell us that Hitler created the possibility of generating “...shared explanations and imagery of the world” (p. 51). This was an example of cultural influences that supported Nazi ideology, about which one part was the idealizing of violence—of course toward those who were on the outside of the mainstream populace. With respect to attacking those on the outside, Lifton (1979) would refer to such acts of violence toward out-groups as based upon the psychological phenomenon of “psychic numbing.”

In addition to “psychic numbing”—a numbing that permits individuals to behave in sadistic ways—Carol Gilligan (1982), in her book *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, indicates that distinctions are to be made with respect to gender orientation:

...a distinction between typical male orientation to morality [is based on rules and logic], and female orientation to morality [which is characterized by caring and responsibility]....  
Hitler used rules and logic for destructive ends and caring and responsibility ostensibly for Germans.

In my book on relationships (Kellerman 2009, pp. 27–28), I propose the idea that in general, men are usually unable to tolerate humiliation (along with its variants) while women (although of course not favoring it) tolerate this sort of insult better. In contrast, I also propose that in general, women usually find it difficult to admit being wrong while men find being wrong less difficult. These are acculturated gender differences, based upon the fundamental male and female defense against feeling inferior. In the case of Hitler and Germans, the righteous indignation that Hitler displayed in all of his speeches had the affect of elevating the so-called German ego.

Therefore, vast numbers of men of the German population were co-opted in part by allying themselves in a prideful way with Hitler, and also as a way of nullifying any even remote notion of humiliation or embarrassment. In addition, his adoration of his mother and his kindness toward women (those he didn't know personally), and also from a public relations point of view, was all in all a seductive invitation for women to join his cause, which they did.

With respect to group affiliation, the individual's relationship to a group also has its particular psychological bridge that just about automatically connects that particular person to that particular group. This psychology creates a "cohesion" (rather instead perhaps a sick "adhesion") of the person to the group. In such cases, rather than honoring the idea that truth trumps ideology, the person begins to be so swayed by ideology, that truth never has a chance to gain the ascendancy. In this respect, in my book on group psychotherapy and personality (Kellerman 2009a, p. 59), I state:

Individuals who become affiliated with particular groups that support their own value system achieve a sense of greater security and peace of mind. The person's need for affiliation is one that seeks reciprocal validation of identity (you and I are alike), and gathers such validation partly through the ego reinforcement that membership in a group offers. Thus, according to Shaffer and Galinsky (1974), and Tobach and Schneirla (1968), identity-affirmation becomes increasingly secured through the bonding of members within the ever-developing group cohesive social structure...[there] exists a mutual and accepted euphoria because of the certainty that God, or the God-head, approves.

In this sense of certainty, members of strongly ideologically based groups absolutely feel that they cannot be wrong about anything! And the preposterous implication is that no matter how many times their practical positions based upon such ideological grounds actually turn out to be visibly and patently wrong, nevertheless rationalizations regarding the ideological and prevailing stance of their affiliative connection to the group simply obtains and abounds. Therefore, even in the face of concrete evidence to the contrary, such individuals rigidly and repeatedly maintain their correctness about issues that correspond to their particular ideology; this, even when empirically such ideology has generated genocide!

It is in this sense that where there is a strong God-head (such as Hitler)—also necessarily implying an equally strong ideology—then this sort of God-head is psychologically (and even unconsciously) considered to be male, and the constituency of the group following this God-head is unconsciously, whether actually male or female, considered to be female (where "wrongness" is not tolerated). In addition, contributing to this gender analogy is the fact that in its male-guise such a God-head never tolerates humiliation.

This aversion to subverting any implication of humiliation was Adolph Hitler's core appeal to Germans. Hitler was successful in negating any feeling or reference to the humiliation Germans experienced as a result of losing World War I and then because of the loss, needing to heed the terms of their surrender. In all respects and

apparently, the surrender and especially the requirement to adhere to the Versailles Treaty felt to the German psyche as equivalent to being forced into a female submission. Hitler identified with this assigned female role and naturally responded in a compensatory way via his thunderous and retaliatory stance of righteous indignation. In fact, in his book *Mein Kampf* (1923), Hitler, states:

The psyche of the broad masses does not respond to anything weak or half-way.  
He also says that an emotional longing exists for fulfilling power, and that the masses prefer to submit to the strong rather than the weak.

Therefore, Hitler's unifying emotional call is to a sense of righteous indignation. And such righteous indignation was his emotional signature to everything he spoke.

In this sense, Hitler's message comes across as an absolute truth and he himself appears to feel the injustice of all interference with his goals. It even could be hypothesized that because of Hitler's focus on such righteous indignation, his elevation as the God-head was assured and in this sense, individuals, after joining the Nazis were apparently mesmerized by what could be considered Hitler's delusional "justification-rite." Therefore, Hitler's voice was identified as the voice of Germany (McVay 1955, Nizkor Project: *Hitler as the German People Know Him*). Thus, the greater mass of the German populace:

- became faith-wise, co-opted into Hitler's delusion;
- developed psychic-numbing regarding cruelty toward others, and a neutralization of empathy;
- believed in an us-them distinction;
- were elevated in self-esteem;
- behaved psychopathically – knowing right from wrong was not as compelling as following orders;
- used projection as the psychological mechanism enabling a paranoid focus on blaming others; and
- exemplified obedience to authority.

In terms of Hitler's history, the literature published about him (Binion 1976; Waite 1977), with respect to the cause and appeal of his aggression, include references to:

- his displacement of feelings toward his father to outside transference figures (and situations) such as against Jews and others whom he considered to be inferior. (Hitler believed it was the Jewish doctor who caused the death of his mother, his most important person);
- a compensatory defense in the service of elevating his self-esteem;
- an increasing frustration and consequent impatience with reaching whatever were his goals;
- his strong need for retaliation in order to justify his sense of righteous indignation;
- his overall need for power which was his primary defense against his confused psychosexuality as well as his absolute defense against any personal sense of vulnerability; and
- his persistent defiant stance.

In his own words, Hitler conveyed what would be essential to his own leadership.

In *Mein Kampf*, p. 138, he states that in order for him to lead in Germany, the following are some elements of what would be needed:

- identify with the masses and gain acceptance;
- recognize that the masses want an organizing principle and that they, in fact, want to sacrifice themselves to higher values;
- recognize that the masses crave to belong;
- recognize the role of women and support youth;
- use imagery in speeches and be dramatic because style is important;
- cloak base instincts with nobility;
- be aware of the unconscious and that emotions need to be deeply involved;
- create a coterie of devoted aides.

In my book on group psychotherapy and personality (Kellerman 1979, pp. 43–46), I discuss differences in roles of the group's central figures. Essentially, the group's central roles are divided into an emotional leader role and a task-oriented leader role. In Hitler's calculus, he encompassed both roles although assigning tasks to devoted aides. And with respect to Nazi group behavior and Hitler's authority to assign tasks to aides, his use of terror enabled individuals to actually repudiate individual conscience in the carrying out of the Nazi major genocide against Jews and others.

In the treatise by McVay (1955), as published in the *Nizkor Project*, Hitler was also diagnosed by the interpreters of his personality (Langer 1972 in his book, *The Mind of Hitler*) to be a borderline psychotic personality with strong paranoid proclivities. Hitler was practically obsessed with the distinct possibility that his own friends would want to kill him. Psychologically speaking, this kind of anticipatory fear seemed to reflect Hitler's doubt concerning his grandiosity, that is, was this grandiosity fool proof? In contrast, Hitler's need for the infallibility of such grandiosity was an obsessive-compulsive and iron-clad insistence on the justification for his egotism (his self-importance), as well as for his egoism (his sense of his own self-interest as the foundation of morality). For Hitler, this meant that his personal sense of morality needed to be the model for the exact form of German/Nazi/Aryan morality.

Therefore, the reason for Hitler's insistence on always being right and never wrong was, according to such personality interpretation, related to what was considered by many to be his fragile ego. This reference to a fragile ego implied the possibility that in the face of possible defeat, he was perhaps almost entirely vulnerable to a personality collapse. In Hitler's mind, presumably the only way to avoid such a collapse would be either to maintain his insistence on being right and never wrong, or at the end, to commit suicide.

And at the end, Hitler did both. When he had become quite infirm, he still insisted on enlisting even young boys to fight when even the remotest chance of winning was obviously impossible, and then, did, in fact, commit suicide.

In addition, in the post-Hitlerian world a whole host of clinical psychodiagnostic impressions permeated the Hitler literature. These included assumptions and deductions by diagnostic experts surmising that Hitler was a psychologically repressed personality whose perfectionism and concern with purity would not tolerate any challenge to his decisions. Further, his concern with inviting agreement from the German masses (as well as from fellow travelers in other countries), led him, almost by definition, to increasingly intensify his righteous indignation during his speeches—to a crescendo of rage.

In Hitler's defense against humiliation, he was reputed to continuously repress fears such as vigilance against syphilis and castration anxiety (its emotional derivatives) related to his oedipal conflict, especially with respect to fear of his brutal punishing father.

Finally, with respect to the so-called hysteric part of his personality, Hitler was obviously considered to be labile (severe mood shifts in the sense of dyscontrolled emotion), infantile, narcissistic, grandiose, feminine, non-athletic, and smothered by mother-love. Along with this relationship to parents, in his nightmarish sleeps, Hitler raged against his father—the Jew—and then in his wake-state, he wanted to kill the Jews unconsciously meaning that finally he would kill the Jew—his father. With the father gone, and then with respect to the mother figure, Miller (1990, p. 189) states that children can then act to save the mother so she can finally be the mother they have always wanted. In Hitler's case this would be a mother who eschewed complicity and passivity, and rather, would stand up for him and not tolerate the sadism of such a brutal father. The fact that Hitler's mother did the opposite, lends incredulity to the proposition that he simply only very much loved her. Yes, he surely loved her, but deep down, he necessarily was also *angry* with her; she never protected him from his father's rage and brutality.

As a companion facet of this meta-psychoanalytic analysis of Hitler's personality, Miller refers also to Helm Stierlin's (1976) work from his book, *Adolph Hitler: A Family Perspective*. Miller agrees with Stierlin and hypothesizes that "... the liberation of Germany and the destruction of the Jewish people...i.e. the complete removal of the bad father, would have provided Hitler with the conditions that could have made him a happy child growing up in a calm and peaceful situation with a beloved mother."

The psychoanalytic literature on narcissistic rage, especially as articulated by Kohut (1971), suggests that the German people were led by a pouting disturbed child, an infantile hysteric who in his guise as a compulsive obsessive figure, formulated and implemented World War II and the Holocaust, murdering 6 million Jews and generating the deaths of more than 50 million people. In this sense, what is brought to mind concerns the ethological work of Konrad Lorenz (1966) who showed that in removing the forebrain of a cichlid fish, the school of fish that would follow this lesser "intelligent" fish were therefore not able to discern the difference between light stimuli and food particles. As a result the adaptational quotient of this particular school of fish was not expected to have any chance of survival.

It has been said that Hitler had faith in the masses. This may be true, but the greater truth may be that because Hitler indoctrinated the masses with his own *wishes*, then it was they who had faith in him because in the end, they shared his

delusions of the assumed injustice that reflexively breeds rage, and finally they then identified with his righteous indignation. Like the brain-dead cichlid fish, Germany was destroyed.

### ***Hitler and Acting-Out as Evil***

Yes, Adolph Hitler's evil was no more and no less than a clear picture of acting-out. It was a psychological symptom formed in his psyche. This manufactured evil product of his psyche contained all of the constituents of a symptom. Namely, he held in a repressive grip, information about his feelings which he himself needed to avoid knowing. In this sense, he needed to stave off any consistent conscious realization regarding several key issues, most of which related to his father. These key issues included what he considered to be his father's part-Jewish "stain," and what he experienced as his father's brutality. This relentless brutal treatment at the hands of his father obviously had a life-long affect on him. Hitler's solution was to keep his strongly compensatory defense system in tact by needing to be always right and never wrong and then always insisting on reinforcing this need as a way of supporting his grandiosity. It was this grandiosity which in turn kept his personality relatively cohered and motivated.

Further, and importantly, Hitler's *wish* was not to be identified as inferior. This *wish* was repressed because it was underpinned by Hitler's dreaded certainty that he was, indeed, insecure, replete with self-doubt, and in his subjective experience feeling quite inferior. However, his compensatory defense against such feelings was to be pure, perfect, and superior in order to finally erase any sense of those dreaded intuitive and visceral feelings of inferiority, and even perhaps, feelings of depression. Because of his ongoing need to rid himself of doubt, and the sense of innate inferiority, he was always obviously fighting against a feeling of dissatisfaction. The feeling of trying to turn his dissatisfaction into satisfaction required Adolph Hitler to also repress a great deal of *anger* related to his father's so-called "Jewishness" as well as to his father's behavior that displayed the all-important and implicit paradigm imprinted into Adolph's personality. This paradigm was a blueprint of a lifelong contrast between his father as the role-model of the authority (victimizer/punisher), and Adolph as the absolute role-model of the tortured child—one deserving to be the victim-suppliant.

Thus, we have here the making of a classic psychological infrastructural symptom of acting-out. This infrastructure contains a *wish* (not to be Jewish/eliminating his father), the thwarting of the *wish* (his father, in fact, had the stain of Jewishness), and the *repression* of *anger* toward his father (generated by the thwarting of the *wish*), as well as identifying the *who*, (his father by virtue of having Jewish "blood") who thwarted the *wish*. Once the symptom appears, we can derive its evil nature by understanding the sociopolitical context in which Adolph Hitler lived. He lived in a German/Austrian culture that was virulently anti-Semitic, and this culture saw membership in "Jewishness" as in itself, evil. Thus, Adolph's sociopolitical persuasions gave to the acting-out symptom its evil subject-matter—that of removing all such "Jewishness" from Aryan purified deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) endowment.



Erasing Jews became the transference way to erase his father on both major counts: (a) erasing the stain of “Jewishness,” that he inherited from his father, and (b) in erasing his father he also erases the memory of his father’s brutality that foisted upon him whatever inferiority feelings and rage he most certainly felt.

Here we see that the acting-out symptom will derive its subject matter from the broad sociopolitical culture in which the person is embedded. The acting-out will always contain some degree of evil motivation because evil is germinated out of a *repressed wish* along with *repressed anger* toward a specific culprit (the person who thwarted the *wish*).

In the case of Adolph Hitler and his German/Austrian society, the subject-matter determining the psychological engineering of his acting-out-evil was quite extensive and quite intense, and in addition, was a steady state product of his psyche!

### **Thus, Evil...**

Evil, therefore, as suggested throughout this volume, does not come out of the thin air. Evil is engineered in a person’s psyche. Evil does not form out of an inanimate object. Evil is made in the psyche, and therefore, it seems, can at some point be ameliorated. No acting-out equals no symptom equals no evil. This is more an optimistic Kantian future with respect to the possible nature of mankind no longer needing to repress (lying to oneself), and less a Freudian one in the sense that Freud was most pessimistic about man’s basic nature—or, as he might think of it, as the kind of nature that in order to be at its best, must repress!

Essentially, with Kant, the future holds the promise that *Homo sapiens* can be good without *repression*, while with Freud, the future holds the promise that *Homo sapiens* will be good with it. In either case is perhaps implied that evil (as an acting-out symptom) at least can be controlled, and at best, entirely eliminated.

## Chapter 7

# Stalin and Genocide

### Introduction

Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili alias Joseph Stalin (born, Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili), a Georgian, and the tyrannical leader of the Soviet Union who ruled with an iron-hand (fist) from 1920 to his death in 1953, was 5 ft 4 in. tall. His official titles were General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as well as Premier of the Soviet Union. Stalin rose to Soviet eminence after the death of Vladimir Lenin who was the implemental inspiration and leader of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.

In theory, the essential difference between Hitler and Stalin concerned the difference between “race” and “class,” respectively. Of course, Hitler’s Nazi, National Socialist ideology was largely based on “race” but also bled into biological criteria determining who lives and who dies. Yet, in the broadest outlines of Hitler’s racial program, the definition of race simply also meant anyone who subtracted from Aryan purity, including of course individuals who were physically deformed, or newly born “imperfectly,” or who were mentally unbalanced in any number of ways. In addition, Hitler also had many individuals killed on the basis of how he defined treasonous behavior, or even because of some personal motive toward them.

On the other hand, Stalin’s communist ideology theoretically was based solely, or perhaps ostensibly, on “class,” so that the core of class-*anger* toward targeted groups, especially in the early phase of the Soviet experiment, implied the existence of a dangerous bias toward the affluent. But, under these respective regimes in Germany or in Russia, nothing was benign, especially when it concerned eliminating those considered as anathema to the ruling ethic—race or class. And this meaning of “nothing was benign” relates to the reality of genocide. Genocide is not benign!

Rough estimates count approximately more than 50 million deaths due to Hitler’s racial imperatives, plus any number of other Nazi-whimsical reasons to erase so-called suspicious types, plus wartime casualties, whereas under Stalin’s Soviet communist rule, estimates of deaths based upon ideological considerations of “class,” plus tortured ideas regarding ethnic reasons for their erasure, plus wartime casualties, puts the number Soviet-caused deaths anywhere from 15 to more than 50 million people as well (Brent 2008, p. Intro.; Conquest 1991, p. xvi; Montefiore

2004, p. 649; Naimark 2010, p. 11; Rosefielde 1997, p. 321–333; Yakovlev et al. 2004, p. 234).

An expeditious answer to these illustrations of understanding the implicit danger of power, or even the power characterized by the “cult of the individual,” becomes eminently understandable in light of the corresponding danger inherent in the effects of absolute power over others, especially as such absolute power equates to the severe dangers of totalitarian rule. Stalin was one such leader who satisfies the definition of “cult of the individual.” This means that Stalin could gratify almost whatever was his *wish*, from the least significant to the most disastrous. The novelist, Jerome Charyn fleshes out this kind of power that Stalin assumed by illustrating it in his novel, *The Green Lantern: A Romance of Stalinist Russia* (2004). What Charyn does in this novel sets one’s heart aflame, especially during the scene in which Stalin sits at his desk near the window of his Kremlin office, composing lists of names by the light of his lamp and the glow of its green shade!

The green glow from the green shade of his lamp could be seen from the ground below. It is almost as though Charyn is suggesting that Stalin wanted the world to know that it was time to wonder whose names were to be on that list—or, rather, whose *name* is already on that list whenever the glow of the lamp was extruding green light! This was the power that Stalin wielded. It was the power to take your life in his hands, and for whatever reason, then crush you. This power of his was not simply relegated to the domain of the internal politics of Soviet life. The truth is that after World War II, the Soviets under Stalin became the dominant force of all of Eastern Europe. This, along with the advent of their own nuclear weaponry put Stalin and the Soviets on the world stage as it had never before been.

Stalin’s class war and his scattered notions of how to run his universe (as well as to how to run his satellite countries) began to create economic chaos. For example, the agricultural catastrophe in the way food production was planned (manipulated) directly created the Ukrainian famine of the early 1930s. Of course, someone had to be blamed. And this is where simple “class” distinctions became amorphous with respect to the pure definition of parameters, that is, what are clear class distinctions versus seeking targets willy-nilly in a frenzy of paranoid concern? Given such a situation, Stalin was surely expending great psychic energy in trying to avoid even any remote possibility of a crippling anxiety overtaking him. Due to a preternatural antediluvian and entirely atavistic management of the economy (especially with respect to agriculture), it becomes highly probable that Stalin certainly could not have avoided feeling vulnerable to criticism for his “mistakes” (what others in the communist heresy vernacular would define as “errors”). Thus, as a result of this economic catastrophe Stalin then began a program of self-protection by going on the attack.

Getty et al. (1993, pp. 1017–149), along with Gleason (2009, p. 373) cite the various punishments dispensed to these “others.” Such punishments included: exiling hundreds of thousands, even millions of people to labor camps spread here and there throughout the country (his gulag archipelago)—and especially to Siberia. Then his paranoia deepened and he began to kill people outright. The killings,

probably in the numbers of hundreds of thousands (and perhaps even millions) were eventually named: *The Great Purge*.

In the face of all of Stalin's behavior as it pertains to his absolute power advantage over just about anyone, nevertheless, he was becoming iconosized in the Soviet Union and essentially also self-assigned the designation of what it means to be a "cult of personality." He accepted numerous national awards (which, of course, he himself arranged). In other instances, awards were given to him by heads of organizations, who joined the chorus of Soviet leaders that wanted to make sure they were not "next" on his list! One of the titles named for him was "Gardner of Human Happiness." This could be viewed humorously were it not for the sobering truth of his sadistic killer acting-out evil.

## Stalin's Paranoia

Despite the fact that Stalin's initial social program necessitated incarceration of masses of people (rather than outright slaughter as was the case as Adolph Hitler's implementation), nevertheless, such prisoners were used free labor in the service of his industrialization policies. Eventually, it all led to more indiscriminate killing. At first, Stalin dethroned or had those he considered political enemies killed, especially among his closest Politburo colleagues. Some of these included: Zinoviev, Kamanev, Bukharin, Trotsky, Rykov, and Tomsky. Then he began purges, famines, and anti-Semitic killings as well. The purges were designed to erase those specific groups of people whom he expected might do him harm. These included especially Jewish doctors and Jewish (Yiddish) poets. One of these poets, Itzik Feffer who wrote the Yiddish poem "*I am a Jew*," and who was a devoted Soviet communist, and who, in that poem declared at the end of each stanza, that he will dance on Hitler's grave, for whatever reason was imprisoned by Stalin, declared a traitor, tortured, and killed. Steven T. Katz, in his chapter: "Mass Murder and the Holocaust in the Twentieth Century," of the book edited by Klein et al., (*The Genocidal Mind*, 2005, pp. 14–30) states:

"Stalin held that the forced acceleration of industrialization had to be 'aided' by reducing a significant percentage of Russia's population into, effectively, 'slaves,' if by any other name."

Stalin, like Hitler created a slave empire. In Stalin's case, his paranoia was consistently percolating and as the novelist Charyn imagines, he was each evening making his lists. Gradually, lists were insufficient because he could not match listing with pen and paper, the massive amount of names that then were eventually rounded up and slaughtered. However, at first he practiced such erasure of individuals with his Politburo members as a way of consolidating his power, and so his so-called Great Purge came in 1930, already 13 years after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 (Figs 2007; Gellately 2007).

Thus, with Stalin's paranoia in the palpable forefront of Soviet life, suspicion, terror, and intrigue became the toxic existential staples of everyday Soviet political existence, mostly consisting of purges, deportations and executions. Along with this was the 1932–1933 famine in Ukraine (ostensibly perpetrated by Stalin), the Great Purge of 1936–1939, and the 1939 non-aggression pact with Hitler. Similar treachery included the assassinations of Kirov and especially, Trotsky, (not to mention the doctors' plots and the killing of the Yiddish-speaking Jewish poets). In addition, with the nefarious and iniquitous early history of Stalin, characterized by earlier killings, as well as also the plethora of sinister plots originating in Stalin's corrupted psyche and widely known in Soviet political circles, all of it swept over the image of Soviet life as though a miasma had overpowered the otherwise clean, sweet air believed to be actually characterized as the communist hope for the future that was fervently believed by communist sympathizers (and hopeless devotees) the world over. Even in the face of Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 revelations of the Soviet 20th Congress (essentially defining Stalin as the genocidal paranoid he was), these acolytes still refused (some even to the present, in the early part of the twenty-first century) to renounce him, to specifically acknowledge Stalin's evil behavior, and therefore finally to be able to see that totalitarian governments whether fascist to the right (Hitler's Germany, Franco's Spain, or Pinochet's Chile) or fascist to the left (as Susan Sontag proclaimed: "Fascism with a human face" (1992; as in Stalin's Russia, or Kim Jong-un's North Korea, or Pol Pot's Cambodia) can never be trusted.

## **Prelude to a Life of Crime: Stalin's Early and Then Later History**

Montefiore (2007, p. 23), in his book, *Young Stalin*, enumerates various experiences during Stalin's formative years that in a nutshell lends validity to any prediction of Stalin, who in his future as an adult, would, as a matter of certainty, be involved in any numbers of violent acts. Stalin was not a healthy child. Smallpox left him with a scarred face, he had two adjoined toes on his left foot, due to an accident, and one arm was left shorter than the other. However, the most telling experience of his childhood concerned his family relationships. His mother was a housekeeper among other various and sundry jobs and his father a cobbler. His father was the problem because he was a violent man and an alcoholic. Both Stalin and his mother, Ketevan Geladze, were apparently reported to have been viciously and continuously beaten by this man (not unlike the brutality of Hitler's father in his continual vicious beatings of Hitler). Stalin's father, Besarion Jughashvili, was eventually reported to have abandoned his family.

Later, after joining the Bolshevik's, Stalin participated actively in paramilitary programs, bank robberies, kidnappings, and other nefarious actions. Much of this history is reported in Montefiore (2007, pp. 1–16). In 1905, Stalin participated in the *Bloody Sunday* massacre where more than 1,000 people were shot by the Tsar's guards at the Winter Palace. It was the 1905 Revolution in which an uprising of the

Russian people rebelled against the Tsarist government of Nicholas II. Apparently, the Tsar's troops fired on peaceful protesters in St. Petersburg. Contemporaneous with this, Stalin's participation in the bank robberies and other such activity was designed to gather as much money as possible to support the revolution. In his Tiflis bank robbery, about 40 people were killed and Stalin and his cohorts made off with what today would be equivalent to several million dollars.

Stalin kept rising in the ranks of the Bolshevik hierarchy and largely because in the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the revolution he was close to Lenin, then eventually with political skill and ruthless cold-blooded manipulation overrode Trotsky's influence and felt therefore empowered to begin his renewed killing spree, eventually also having Trotsky assassinated (Gleason 2009, p. 373). Stalin had not forgotten that at an earlier time (in 1920), Trotsky had criticized him at the Ninth Party Congress. Stalin felt forced to resign his military position. After some time however, Stalin proceeded to accuse many former comrades of counter-revolutionary activity and had them shot, as well as consigning other officers of the army to the same fate. In fact, those who were considered traitors to the cause were publicly executed (Service 2006, p. 172).

It was only a blink later, in 1922 that Lenin arranged it so that Stalin became *General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. Yet, soon thereafter, Lenin regretted his decision, and according to historical accounts (Service 2006) wanted Stalin removed. After many power struggles, Stalin prevailed. As is the case with many dictators, they manage to execute one or two of their previously loyal allies. It is a tradition that generates in the population an especially strong image of the leader, the God-head. This sort of tradition worked so well that Stalin continued it by appointing Nikolai Yezhov as head of the important secret police (the dreaded Narodnyĭ Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del or People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, NKVD). Of course, nevertheless, at the end of the purges in 1938, Stalin had Yezhov (perhaps as one of the names on his green lantern list) executed. Before that, however, in the so-named *Great Terror of the 1930's*, Stalin blamed the Kulak's for their resistance to collectivization that he claimed assured the failure of Soviet agriculture to meet planned quotas. These Kulaks were more affluent peasants who did indeed resist collectivization, and then who with others did indeed pay the consequences of such accusation. Many were executed (Kuromiya 2007, p. 2).

Stalin's killing spree never abated. He was obviously acting-out a terrible paranoid fear of his own demise by projecting such intentionality to others and then seeing even close comrades as enemies or potential enemies. This kind of paranoia underpinned the famous Moscow Trials about which Tucker (1992, p. 456) and Overy (2006, p. 182) discuss at length. All of it also included mass murder of communist party functionaries of various European countries. Counting the multitude of millions killed by Stalin's insistence, in a massive continuing genocide, is by all accounts perhaps equal to that of Hitler's or perhaps even more (Wheatcroft 1996, pp. 1319–1353; Wheatcroft 1990, pp. 355–367).

From a psychopathological point of view, apparently brutal punishing fathers produced an absence of empathy both in Hitler and Stalin. As adults, they killed indiscriminately, especially at those designated as immediate enemies, or those

considered to be eventual enemies. Was it all a likely but unconscious transference acting-out of the cleansing oneself of the internalized brutal father that led Hitler and Stalin to commit such atrocities, and all in the disguised name of ideology?

Thus, whether it was outright thievery such as bank robbery (and, in addition, murder at the robbery scene), or executions, or trumped-up trials, or an engineered famine in Ukraine, or the murder of any opposing voice on the Politburo, Stalin was most skilled at such evil-doings, and his bloodlust was especially reinforced after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. During that invasion, Stalin ordered any soldier retreating (even if he had nothing with which to defend himself) be immediately shot, and he even sent waves of soldiers into battle who were surely going to be slaughtered for lack of proper sufficient weaponry.

In contrast, as is the case in these totalitarian fascist states, although encouraged, arts and literature nevertheless become strictly controlled by the government, and health care along with education become state subsidized. It is this ostensible “giving” to the people in arts and literature, and in health care and education, that such governments invite support and allegiance from a wide variety of the population. Along with this, nefarious acts are kept secret.

Anthony Eden, in his book, *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Earl of Avon—The Reckoning* (1965), points out that Stalin’s ruthlessness was covered by a veneer of circumspection, cool temper, tranquil demeanor, and that he was never seemingly irritated. This cool demeanor of Stalin’s was entirely different from Hitler’s. Apparently, from a psychological vantage point, Stalin had somewhat of a schizoid streak in his personality. This means that a pronounced detached or remote quality was evident in his overall demeanor. It would also mean that the killing of another person might not be in any way worrisome to him.

## Stalin and Jews

Although the Soviet adversary was presumably “class-conflict” as in class-determined, nevertheless, with Stalin’s paranoia controlling his every waking moment, it would be expected that the Jews were also in for an awakening with regard to what would be in store for them. And what was in for them came in intermittently defined doses.

The “doctor’s plot” is a good example of such paranoia. Yaacov (1995, pp. 103–106) reviews this so-called plot. Apparently, Stalin’s personality defenses and inclinations for dramatic proof of his suspicions as well as his need for accusation necessitated his continual search for targets. These personality defenses included:

Denial—not seeing or acknowledging information that is perceived to be distasteful;

Rationalization—adjusting one’s thinking in order to justify one’s motivation and behavior;

Projection—attributing qualities that you yourself possess (but are not noticed in the self) and then attributed to others;

Projective identification—seeing qualities of the self in the other that are unconsciously repudiated and then identifying with them;

Reaction-formation—generally seen as having an opposite emotional reaction to an original feeling, but more specifically meaning having an aversive reaction to any stimulus that is attractive to the subject such as a forbidden pleasure;

Splitting—managing inner tension by compartmentalization, the object (person) can be split into “good” or “bad.”

All of these defenses seem germane to understanding Stalin’s entire emotional life. In large part, these defense mechanisms were invoked to manage his *anger*, and to keep him in a remote emotional position so that there would be no empathy toward others. The only empathy Stalin displayed was for himself—and apparently according to his associates, to their dismay. The operation of such a cluster of defenses enabled Stalin to give vent to his impulses composed mostly of violent responses whenever he needed to rationalize whatever he did. Thus, Stalin was able to behave psychopathically generally, and moreover, specifically sadistically. In this sense, and according to Yaakov (1995, pp. 103–106), Stalin deliberately created a drama in which he declared that a number of doctors (more than half were Jewish) were plotting in one way or another to kill Soviet officials. This new purge was an echo of an earlier one in which, in 1952, 13 members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were put on trial, the end result of which was their execution. These were the Jewish communist poets, and the executions were labeled: *Night of the Murdered Poets* (Rubenstein et al. 2001; Malyshev 2005, pp. 461–462; Brent and Naumov 2004, p. 288). This entire plot was a perfect example of Stalin’s paranoid conspiratorial personality and is also a good illustration of how his defense syndrome was used to utilize projection, projective identification, denial, rationalization, and reaction formation, all to service Stalin’s underlying *anger* and need to destroy any numbers of family members; in this case, family members refer to politburo members, communist devotees, and anyone else who was a Soviet supporter and so could be classified as an extended “family” member. In this case, it was Stalin’s paranoid rationale that it was not he who wanted anyone killed—rather it was the doctors, the poets—anyone who could predictably be a target of scapegoating. In most cases, Stalin accusations landed on many of his compatriots. He called them traitors. When that was not enough, he turned to Jews because he could see that given entrenched anti-Semitism of the Russian population, it would be quite convenient and very possible to create the rationale also for their erasure (Brent and Naumov 2004, p. 184) also quote Stalin as stating that “...every Jew is a potential spy.” Stalin died on March 5, 1953 ostensibly of a cerebral hemorrhage. Yet, in this same discussion, Brent and Naumov report that warafin, a rat poison, was found in his system. Since Beria and Khrushchev were the last to see him the night before he was found dead, some said that it was either one or both of them to have added warfarin to his wine. Montefiore (2004, p. 571) reports that Beria was heard to boast to Molotov that he himself poisoned Stalin. According to Harry Truman, Stalin was “a little squirt” (McCullough 1992, p. 507). Yet, it was this little squirt that controlled and used the



power, he assumed to lord it over nations and as Hitler did, to mesmerize millions of people to follow him, to love, and adore him, all the while during which time he was consistently implementing genocide.

So, here we have both Hitler, who was a so-called borderline hysteric frenzied psychopathic murderer with obsessional imperatives as well, and Stalin who shared the “murderer” moniker but rather than any hysterical component to his personality, was rather paranoid and schizoid (remote). However, he was not remote with respect to his paranoia. His paranoia trumped his Marxist-Leninist assumed hope-for-the-future ideology. In fact, the content of his paranoia reflected his actual ideology which was: “Get them before they get me!”

Hitler had a grandiose world-salvation fever in which defined groups would thrive and other defined groups would perish in genocidal acting-out evil programs ending of course in genocide. This obsessional megalomaniacal and driven ideology superseded even his consideration of himself. That is why he could, and did, commit suicide. In contrast, Stalin was strictly speaking a paranoid character with iron-clad delusional ideas about who will live and who will die, and at the same time, his projections were that it is the others who must die in order for him to live. And for Stalin, to live was most important. Thus, Stalin could never, and did not commit suicide.

In the end, their acting-out behaviors were in the maximum sense, evil. Even though they both eventually died, they took approximately 100 million people with them. The implicit general message here for all people is to try to be conscious of thwarted *wishes*, and try to sustain them consciously rather than *repressing* the *anger* toward the person *who* was the depriving person with respect to gratifying such wishes. If one can do that then acting-out will be a thing of the past so that Arendt’s banality of evil will never apply.

## Chapter 8

# Turkey's Genocide Against Armenians

### Introduction

In this chapter, we shall examine the Turkish genocide against Armenians. It remains a genocide that is relatively fresh in the minds of many people who have either personally experienced the terror of such events, or had family and/or friends eliminated by such events, or, simply followed such events through the media.

Steven T. Katz, in his paper, "Mass Murder and the Holocaust in the Twentieth Century," in the volume edited by Klein, Libowitz, Sachs-Little, and Steeley, entitled, *The Genocidal Mind*, vigorously attacks the Armenian genocide perpetrated by Turkish society against their Armenian population beginning seriously in 1915 and coming to a slow end in 1923 (Dawidowicz 1981). Yet, this conflict perpetrated by Turkey actually has its roots during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when the Ottoman Empire conquered and absorbed Armenia (Barsoumian 1997, pp. 175–201; Hambaryan 1981, p. 22).

Katz (2005, pp. 31–32), states:

The Armenian tragedy was an enormous historical outrage...the controlling ambition, the collective civic agenda behind Turkish inhumanity was primarily nationalist in character....The Armenian massacres were an indecent, radicalized manifestation of a most primitive jingoism activated by the exigencies of war from without and the revolutionary collapse of the Ottoman Empire from within.... Turkish nationalism...envisioned and pursued...the eradication of the Armenian community from the national context....Of course, mixed into the noxious brew that represented itself as national destiny were other obsessions: a loathing of Christians...xenophobia, greed, jealousy, fear....the war against the Armenians was a vulgar and desperate manifestation of raw nationalist politics.

Katz makes the further point that this holocaust against the Armenian's was in essence not designed to erase all Armenians. Rather, the aim of it all was to destroy Armenian national identity. It should be remembered that Armenians were the first Christians. In Turkey, however, Islam ruled. Katz points out that an Armenian person could avoid, so-to-speak, "a final solution" by converting to Islam. In fact, Turkish pressure to convert became impossible to resist for many Armenians

because the obvious alternative was deportation or death. And to this point, many Armenian citizens did, in fact—willingly or unwillingly—convert. In many cases, the conversions were forced. Nevertheless, despite this beneficence of the Turkish government (convert, leave, or die), still in all, estimates place the number of Armenians who were slaughtered or deported, at about 1.5–2 million.

The assumed leader of this Holocaust against Armenians was the Turkish War Minister, Enver Pasha (1881–1922), along with the spirit of Sultan Abdul Hamid, and supported by the so-called Young Turk Movement. Pasha and his pan-Turkish nationalism kept accelerating the momentum of this catastrophic erasure of Armenian identity with step-by-step mass killings. The message was that Turkey would be entirely a Muslim hierarchical society. Actually, and in more realistic terms, the objective here in this hierarchical society was to have the ultimate form of the society as monolithic, authoritarian, and therefore, necessarily repressive.

## History

Staub (1989, p. 10), in his book, *The Roots of Evil*, (also with reference to the work of Toynbe 1916), describes one event in the midst of World War I:

...during the night of April 24, 1915, the religious and intellectual leaders of the Armenian community in Constantinople were taken from their beds, imprisoned, tortured, and killed. At about the same time, Armenians in the Turkish army, already segregated in 'labor battalions,' were all killed. Over a short time period Armenian men over fifteen years of age were gathered in cities, towns, and villages, roped together, marched to nearby uninhabited locations, and killed.

It is a ubiquitous phenomenon in all genocides that a focus on “purity” acts as a compensatory measure against what the mainstream population considers their misfortune. Therefore, the mainstream population can be driven to excess in their screeching calls for the elimination of whoever is their scapegoated sub-group. In Germany, it was the Jews. In Russia, it was based upon Stalin's paranoia regarding those he considered insidiously and possibly dangerous to him. In Turkey, because of the acute decline of the Ottoman Empire—ultimate loss of territory it had previously conquered, and then the shame of the nation's official bankruptcy—the mainstream Muslim population, who for decades were averse to their Armenian citizens, were stampeded into homicidal compensatory recrimination and redress, that is, there is historical and absolute evidence of mainstream populations needing to attack their main successful sub-group, in this case, the Armenians.

In fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, it was the successful Jewish population of Spain that, with the hateful response of the Catholic Church toward Jews, as well as the unmitigated fact that the Jewish population of Spain, was better educated in any number of professional arenas, and as a percentage of the population, more affluent than the average Christian Spaniard, so that with short and limited understanding (and instead with hatred), Jews in Spain like the Armenians

in Turkey were either forced to convert, ordered to be killed, or if fortunate, permitted to be deported. Of course, in eliminating their Jewish population who were essentially the intellectual and commercial leaders that fueled the power of Spain, and despite the fact that in erasing their Jewish population for the ostensible objective of purifying their Catholic Christian country, instead, the very possible true objective of the Spanish nobility of the court, and of the church itself, was to enrich themselves—which they did—by appropriating all of the property and wealth of those they eliminated. In other words, they split the proceeds. It could be that in the end, the entire Spanish Inquisition against the Jews was an excuse for a heist. As a footnote to this particular Spanish Inquisitional genocide against Jews, Spain apparently then suffered a brain drain, and went straight downhill to never again regain its prominence as a world cultural, economic, and military power.

This analogy of the treatment of Jews in Spain to the treatment of Armenians in Turkey holds in almost all respects. The answer to what happened to the wealth of the Armenian population, a population that was erased in Turkey, is exactly the same as what happened to the wealth of the Jewish population in Spain, or for that matter, what happened to Jewish possessions in Germany. All Armenian wealth was shared between the Mullahs and the Pashas. Thus, it can be seen that the quest for “purity” can be a code for “purloined,” for out and out larceny! Parenthetically, along with this, what is often heard in conversations is that given scientific discoveries historically made by Jewish scientists, that what went up in the Nazi crematoria was the cure for cancer and who knows what else.

Staub (pp. 173–177) presents an incisive history of the Turkish genocide against the Armenians. Accordingly, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Turkey lost a war to Russia and Russia annexed parts of Turkish Armenia. For this reason, the Turkish government under Sultan Abdul Hamid began to hold to the position that Armenians would be more loyal to Russia than to Turkey. In the early part of the twentieth century, the “Young Turks” under the original moniker of: *The Committee of Union and Progress* was formed. Originally convened as an organization supporting progressive ideas, eventually these “Young Turks” joined the anti-Armenian movement, participated, and even urged it along. It needs to be remembered that commerce, trade, and finance was never in the hands of the Muslim Turkish majority. Such arenas of professional competence were always conducted by “non-Muslim minorities such as Greeks, Armenians, and Jews” (Karpas 1985).

The Turkish population began to devalue their Armenian neighbors and, according to Toynbe’s research (p. 177), began referring to Armenians as “rajah” or translated in English as “cattle.” This is interesting in view of Staub’s characterization of the Turkish Armenian population:

The Armenians were hardworking, capable, and intelligent. Many were successful, and some wealthy. They became essential for the maintenance of the country.” Yet, they were “seen as of low character, as cunning and treacherous, and as parasites, exploiters who plotted against Turks.

Thus, in Turkey, the mainstream Muslim population needed to create a reason for their national disgrace with respect to their downfall within the world's hierarchy of nations. They were searching for a sociopolitical reason that could account for their economic bankruptcy, and decided that "purity" was the answer. Of course, this answer was psychodiagnostically speaking an obsessive, psychopathic, and paranoid constellation containing horrible consequences for the Armenians of Turkey. The obsession with purity was an obvious although infantile attempt to regain some sense of superiority. It was a search for a patina of self-respect at the expense of others.

The actual acting-out of the murder of Armenians was in essence a psychopathic blood-bath. It was a mass murder based upon the absence of social conscience. In the unearthing of social dynamics, Robert J. Lifton, the award-winning social psychiatrist, tells us that in making the target-group sub-human, it gives to the society a feeling of justified freedom to murder (Lifton 1979, 1986). With this dynamic in mind, then the joyful abandon of murdering people, especially with the sense of righteous indignation, underpinning it becomes, it seems, rather easy to do.

The obsessive part, as well as the obsessive past of the tormentors, concerns their individual and collective sense of the thwarted *wish*—of regaining gratification of the *wish* for superiority. Thus, the so-called Serpent's presence (the need for *wish* gratification at the expense of others) becomes the pervasive permeating spirit of the country. In the case of Turkey as an example, a scapegoat was needed. In this sense, the genocide was under control of the Talat—the internal ministry. Documents revealed secret orders:

All Armenians were to be killed...show no mercy to women and children, or the sick and to dispose of Armenian orphans who were retained by Muslim families. (Staub, pp. 183–184)

In all, in addition to the construction of many concentration camps and the methods of murder, Armenians were shot, drowned, and poisoned, not to mention having died from starvation on long marches to relocation centers. In the last part of the twentieth century and into the present early part of the twenty-first century, calls have gone out inviting, suggesting, protesting, and negotiating for the Turkish government to apologize for the Armenian genocide and perhaps even to consider reparations. To date, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has only insisted that the phrase "Armenian genocide" is incorrect and rather the events of the early twentieth century in Turkey be identified only as "event." No apology has been forthcoming!

It would seem that political realities usually take precedence over personal courage. In this sense, with Turkey vying for regional hegemonic influence, with Turkey's sensitivity regarding the Kurdish drive for an independent state in the mountainous regions of Turkey (contiguous with the Kurdish area in Syria) with the President of the USA, Barack Obama, who for apparent political reasons never refers to the Armenian genocide as a "genocide," Turkey, indeed, is buffered and therefore, continues to deny "wrongness." Rather, the world makes it convenient

for Turkey to avoid facing the need for any apology. Governments are “things,” and individuals frequently find it easy to hide behind things. This question of the “why?” is fervently asked by many (Peroomian 2005, pp. 225–243). Peroomian (1987, p. 22), quotes from a poem by Diana Der Hoveanessian titled: *Diaspora*:

Children of massacre,  
children of destruction,  
children of dispersion,  
oh, my diaspora...  
someone was calling  
in my dream.

Yes, the Serpent rides high in the saddle.

## Chapter 9

# Sample of Other Twentieth Century Genocides: Bangladeshi, Cambodian, and Rwandan

### Pakistani Genocide Against Bengalis

It should be noted that genocides develop in two distinct ways. First, a so-called God-head personality such as Hitler or Stalin leads it. Second, there are genocides that occur out of decades of societal events and processes that gradually gain traction in the political climate of the country without any single or major tyrannical person leading it—although, of course, someone does indeed become at least a titular leader.

Whatever is the genesis of a genocide, or the particular nature of it is evil such as issues of class, race, or chauvinism in its guise as political nationalism, whereas many in the name of the evil ideology or purpose of the genocide are being killed, still others are obtaining gains, that is, satisfying their *wishes*. A genocide therefore, is an example of how the *Serpent in Paradise* triumphs. In this sense of the Garden story where “good” versus “bad,” again, the “good” loses, and the “bad,” wins.

Now we arrive at a later genocide perpetrated in 1971, in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Initially, after the civil war in India (1947–1948), Hindus of India remained largely in the center of the country and radiating out to its borders, whereas Moslems of India moved to what became known as Bangladesh (initially termed East Pakistan), and to the west (known at first as West Pakistan). It was in 1971 that East Pakistan was finally termed Bangladesh.

The partition that enabled the creation of Pakistan occurred in 1947. Of course, sooner or later, with the disparity in distance between both Pakistans (with the vastness of India in the center), and with cultural, religious, economic, and political differences at work as well, it was not a surprise that a festering dissatisfaction in East Pakistan (as well as a simultaneous exploitative government in West Pakistan) was going to erupt in some destructive form. And as might be expected, the more powerful—militarily and economically more advanced—was West Pakistan, which correspondingly sought to control East Pakistan for as long as might have been possible. To this end, Sheik Mujib-ur-Rahman (the Bengali leader who along with his political party, the Awami League, won the election for leadership of East Pakistan) was arrested by General Afgha Muhammad Yahya Khan of West Pakistan. Yahya Khan then proceeded to “crush the Bengalis.” This is what started the genocide.

As it turned out, the conflict became a Bengali liberation war. On the Bengali side, estimates of casualties in this conflict totaled 3 million (a figure also noted by the Pakistani General, Yahya Khan, (Payne 1973, p. 50). On the Pakistani side, estimates of the dead as a result of the conflict was estimated at below 50,000. Many other outside investigations put the figure of the dead at about under half a million, but Aziz (1974) claims a fantastic figure of between 8 and 10 million killed, and Johnson (1975) provides an even greater figure of as many as 12 million. Of course the dead counted would refer to Bengalis, and the vast numbers, at least in terms of estimates, certainly qualify this disaster as genocide (Totten et al. 2004, pp. 295–321). Yet there is no doubt that West Pakistanis also suffered losses. Of course, murder and torture were rampant, as was rape—the victims were Bengalis.

As was the case with Stalin, the Pakistani plan that was carried out included the murder of Bengali intellectuals including professors, artists, writers, journalists, and other professionals. And as was the case with Stalin, lists of names of such individuals in the arts, humanities, and sciences were continually compiled. In order to demoralize the populace, the aim was to strip Bangladesh of its soul. In addition, the Hindus living in Bangladesh were treated as were the Jews by the Nazis (Rummel 1994, p. 2).

Funk (2010, p. 3), refers to this genocide as a “...systematic destruction, in whole or in part, of an ethnic, racial, religious, or national group.” Along with this declaration of atrocity is the fact that sectarian violence was also part of this genocide and included many of the minorities living in Bangladesh. The Serpent here was trying to economically devour the Bengalis. These Pakistani generals were entirely running the government and deciding, according to their economic interests, who lives and who dies. It became the gratification of the national *wish* that translated into an acting-out evil blood-lust. This acting-out knew no limits and had no humanity. All it had was the *wish* and the blind rage that fueled its political, economic, religious, and social motive. It was a conquest objective which in Robert Jay Lifton’s terms first reduced the image of the Bengalis into sub-humans which then made it emotionally possible for the Pakistanis to feel no need whatsoever to have any empathy for their fellow human beings.

Dexter Filkins, in a review of the book by Gary J. Bass titled *The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide* (Filkins 2013, p. 15), reports that Bass cites evidence that the White House, both tacitly as well as with actual military supplies, helped the Pakistanis and avoided intervening in what President Nixon as well as Secretary of State, Kissinger plainly knew was an ongoing genocide. The support for Pakistan by the USA, Bass reports, was based upon White House political reasons involving a calculus that included the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, India, and Pakistan. Apparently these US White House leaders were not able to feel any sympathy with the victims of the genocide. It was only when a war broke out between Pakistan and India that India defeated Pakistan, and that then East Pakistan declared independence.

All in all, and again, the Serpent rode high in the saddle.



## The Cambodian Genocide: “The Killing Fields”

Craig Etcheson in his book, *After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Killing Fields* (1984, p. 11) states:

Parents were killed in front of their children, brothers in front of brothers. About two million people died from execution and starvation between 1975 and 1979.

This was a program essentially carried out with a frenzied ideological eruption of maximum homicidal extent in which a “no prisoners taken” policy generated the corresponding maximum extent of impatience (Rosefield 2009, p. 119). It was an impatience of satisfying this particular Khmer Rouge communist version (and vision) of an ideal Cambodian society.

The stark reality of this crazed Khmer Rouge communist regime (that assumed power in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979) was to essentially bring the society as they proclaimed “to year zero.” Thus, the plan was to begin again in a new “just society” characterized by the new communist person who would be building an industrialized country characterized also by agrarian reform. They then claimed that such a new country would gain an agricultural base with its production-level able to feed all of its people and as well therefore, to provide full employment to its entire population. Cambodia was renamed, Democratic Kampuchea.

According to many agreed upon estimates (Locard 2005, pp. 121–143), 2 million lives were lost in this massive and compulsive killing-spree. The entire lunatic plan was to forgo all necessary steps to build a country—infrastructure, institutions as well as the economy. This mindless stampede in the absence of any concern whatever for the lives of Cambodians was the brainchild first of Pol Pot (whose nom de guerre was “man with the gun”), along with some close associates such as Leng Sary, Nuon Chea, and especially Khieu Samphan. It was Khieu Samphan who was the Cambodian equivalent of mainland communist China’s Chou En Lai. Samphan was the contact person equivalent to an American Secretary of State—the face to the outside world. It was Khieu Samphan who was heard to say that Cambodia, under the regime of the Khmer Rouge, would be “...the first nation to create a communist society without wasting time on intermediate steps” (Jackson 1992, p. 63).

The Khmer Rouge became notoriously infamous because of two startling programs; the first was the extent of massive arbitrary genocidal killings, and the second was how this political tyrannical group actually emptied the capital city of Phnom Penh, sending the populace into the countryside. The poor and the peasants remained in the countryside but the city people known as the bourgeoisie capitalists were driven out of the cities, either into work camps, or killed (Heuveline 2001). As a result, the economic condition of the country came to a standstill and began to only function on the funds supplied by other countries.

In view of such dire conditions, the Khmer Rouge became paranoid, suspicious of just about anyone, and as a result, their vigilance led to indiscriminate executions without any judicial proceedings whatsoever. People were shot on the spot even if they “looked” wrong. Even people who wore glasses (spectacles) were often

shot primarily because wearing glasses apparently meant “intellectual.” In contrast, nepotism ruled the day. Relatives of all Khmer Rouge leaders held major offices in the government and this was as much an example of elitist advantage-taking as much as it was a function of a pervasive paranoia regarding in essence, the idea that no one else could be trusted.

At the same time that the common tradition of conducting the country’s commerce with its standard currency was abolished by the Khmer Rouge, so was the tradition of education. And in this sense, teachers were also eliminated in mass killings. The rationale for this was that young people needed to be educated (indoctrinated) with revolutionary rather than bourgeoisie sensibility, and even young teenagers were so politically poisoned that they were frequently involved in humiliating their elders and even in slaying them.

Those killed in this genocide included physicians, intellectuals, artists, literary people, members of the old regime, military personnel, businessmen, Buddhists, and journalists. At its worst, this paranoia became so frenzied with hysteria and mad delirium that executions began to bleed into the actual cadres of the Khmer Rouge leadership itself, many of whom were also targeted and killed—not unlike, and actually just about identical to Stalin’s purges of Politburo members.

Eventually, the staggering figure of 20,000 mass graves were uncovered of murdered individuals; more than 15,000 people were killed in a locale known as Choeung Ek—the famed *Killing Fields*—where some time after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, a sea of human skulls was found. The death toll was estimated anywhere from almost a million to more than 3 million (Heuveline 2001; Sharpe 2005; Shawcross 1985).

Minorities in Cambodia were usually, in a number of ways, somewhat more successful than the indigenous Cambodians. In this respect, these minorities were all designated as capitalists, and were slain; they included Chinese and others. Hinton (2005, p. 54) points out that the scapegoating and killing of sub-groups contained obvious racist motives. For example, the Khmer Rouge resented the Chinese because of their success as so-called capitalists and also because of their lighter skin color. This was akin to Hitler’s rationale as well, in his destruction of much of European Jewry. Instead of skin color, it was religion, culture, stereotyping, and even success that sufficiently satisfied criteria for the extermination of the Jewish population.

Eventually, in 1979, the Vietnamese army defeated Pol Pot, who had been aggressively challenging their Vietnamese neighbors for ownership of border terrain. Pol Pot died in 1998, and thereafter Khieu Samphan surrendered in the name of the Khmer Rouge. Hardly any of the perpetrators of the genocide were ever jailed. Some served light sentences and were released. Even Samphan was spared. This profound genocide went entirely unpunished.

The complexion of Cambodian society, meaning political, economic, and all other kinds of cultural establishments of its national character included a history of invasion by its neighbors, a political division between left and right ideologies, a strict separation of standing between urban and rural populations (both encouraged by as well as a cause of ideological differences that were built on societal divisions),

worship of a King, and therefore an orientation to authority, hierarchical structures of “place” in the society, a feudal-like system, and among the Khmer Rouge, a monolithic totalitarianism, leading to autogenocide—Cambodian genocide against Cambodians.

Again, the Serpent emerges triumphant!

## **The Rwandan Genocide: “Hutus Killing Tutsis”**

In 1994—in the penumbral shadow, in the first glimmerings of the twenty-first century—the East African state of Rwanda was the site of a genocide. Hutus murdering Tutsis became a hideous, monstrous reality. This genocide satisfied the very definition of genocide, that is, as it is defined by Evin Staub (2011, p. 100):

...as the attempt to eliminate a whole group of people—a racial, ethnic, religious, or political group—which can involve varied means, ranging from murder to making it impossible for the group to reproduce.

Adding to this definition, Staub includes the variables of competition for economic resources, identity conflicts, nationalism, and even the advent of global warming as a factor in the scarcity of resources that can contribute to underlying causes of genocide (Staub 2013, p. 576). Generally speaking, Staub also indicates that overall difficult life conditions in a society as well as political disorganization and acute changes in the society characterize just about every genocide referred to in this volume—as a sample, Hitler against Jews and others considered imperfect, Stalin’s paranoia spewing in all directions within Soviet society and beyond, Turkish mainstream Moslems against their Armenian Christian citizens, Cambodian Pol Pot communists against fellow Cambodians considered bourgeois, Pakistani’s against Bengalis, and tribal genocidal warfare of Rwandan Hutus against fellow Tutsis.

In addition, other resonant variables concern persistent group conflict (Fein 1993), specific conflicts about land ownership and boundaries, conflicts between groups considered dominant who target those groups considered subordinate, and according to Zartman and Anstey (2012), the prospect of genocide even with respect to whether a group feels threatened, despite the fact that such perceived threat may not be real.

Glick (2002) also points out that enmity can become invoked if the so-called outgroup is successful in most endeavors —economic as well as professionally—and, in addition, is more affluent than the aggressive mainstream group. Jealousy is not to be ruled out as a motivator of violence against those others (Glick 2002). Of course, revenge motives are also compelling and Prunier (2009) reports that in Rwanda, the Tutsis were in the dominant position for quite a long stretch of time (1916–1959), in which the Belgians used the Tutsis as proxies in the oppression of the Hutus.

According to Human Rights Watch (1999), in the period of about 100 days, Hutu genocide against the Tutsis ranged from a half million to 1 million victims killed. The history of conflict between them has been described by Lemarchand (2002, p. 1) in which for decades is described the Tutsi control of political power over, and violence toward the Hutus. This all changed after 1959–1962 and eventually the Hutus gained power and the violence was then directed toward the Tutsis represented by a Hutu power organization known as the Akuzu.

Jared Diamond (2005, p. 318) points out that both Hutu and Tutsi speak the same language and share the same culture. However, Melvern (2004) explains that by and large, the Hutus accelerated their hatred of the Tutsis through the influence of the journal *Kangura*. Apparently, the *Kangura* published what was called the *Hutu Ten Commandments* calling for the Hutus to refrain from having any mercy toward the Tutsis. In this respect, Des Forges (1999) states that the genocide against the Tutsis was a well-organized government-led Holocaust. Further, Diamond (2005) explains that the brutality was accented by the Hutu use of machetes on their victims because machetes apparently were cheaper than bullets. In this sense, Tutsis were hacked to death by the hundreds of thousands.

Racial profiling was also displayed by skin color. The lighter colored Rwandans were Tutsi, and the darker-skinned Rwandans were Hutu. Such racial differences were highlighted in the media which often skewed hatred toward the Tutsis, all the while reminding their Hutu readers of the past atrocities committed by the Tutsis toward the Hutus. *The Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF)*, and the *Army for the Liberation of Rwanda*, along with the *Interahamwe*, went on a rampage bent on killing as many Tutsis as could be found. Buss (2009, pp. 146–163) identifies various factors used by Hutus to characterize and prepare Tutsis for extinction. These included ideology and appeal to nationalism (actually chauvinism, essentially the pride of group identity).

According to Sarkin (2001), the judicial system of Rwanda did in fact put on trial more than 3,000 accused genocidal victimizers out of 130,000 held in prisons. Of these, defendants, 20% received death sentences, 32% received life in prison, and 20% were acquitted. A surprising statistic reported by Powers (2011, pp. 1–6) indicates that the Gacaca court system has already tried over 1 million cases.

No matter who killed who in this Rwandan catastrophic history, it is obvious that it was tribal warfare and tribal genocide. In fact, during the years of the genocide, several top leaders of both Hutu and Tutsi were killed, and yet the genocide continued unabated. Therefore, this was a clear example of an evil societal-influenced genocide first of Tutsis against Hutus, and then of Hutus against Tutsis. It was racial, ethnic, and an insistence on superiority of one or the other. The crime of it all was a need for superior identity based upon the degradation of the other. At rock bottom, it was a fight for economic advantage.

# Chapter 10

## Summary and Conclusion: The Drama of the Garden

### Introduction

In all of these examples of genocides, it becomes gradually clear that they are based on scapegoating, on identity needs, on group affiliation, on propaganda, and of course on political and economic grounds. However, those individuals who permit themselves to become co-opted into genocidal acts are those who, in the majority of cases, have felt deep hostility either derived from a childhood experience of being brutally treated, and/or later in life based upon jealousy and envy of some subgroup that the mainstream or those in power find it easy to attack. Thus, genocides can be classified generally into two distinct categories. The first example of a typical genocide is, of course, driven by a so-called madman. Hitler and Stalin are examples. The second type of genocide arises not necessarily with a definite God-head figure leading the way, but rather by committee of “severals”—out of the pervasive tone of the overall society and culture of a particular nation in which a defined subgroup has been designated to be deserving first of ostracism and later of punishment.

Such a subgroup is usually different than the mainstream population either in economic affluence, greater success with respect to education, different either racially, ethnically, or with respect to religious affiliation, or in any number of other ways, as for example, in different language usage or different particular cultural practices. Examples of such difference is sharply drawn in all the samples of genocides presented in this volume: Germans versus Jews and others in a racially, religious, cultural vast genocide, Soviets versus so-called bourgeois others in a so-called class-conscious vast genocide, Turks versus Armenians, Kurds, and other non-Turks essentially in an economically driven and theologically based religious genocide, Pakistani’s versus Bengalis also in an economically driven genocide, Pol Pot communist Cambodians versus other so-called bourgeois Cambodians in a frenzied ideological auto-genocidal objective of pure, instantaneous, and unmitigated extinction, and in Rwanda, Hutus, and Tutsis in reciprocal tribal-based genocides (with the Hutus, finally, and in a revenge grotesque mode, similar to all kinds of other genocides), employing killing in the absence of any mercy whatsoever. Of course, a commonality in all genocides concerns another underlying typical

motive—economic, that is, in all of the examples offered here, and as is the case in all genocides, to the victor, go the spoils. All those who triumph enrich themselves.

Staub, in his volume, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (1989, pp. 13–14), incisively presents the problem and visibly displays the components of genocide both from a broad sociological point of view as well as from a vantage point that illustrates the psychology of individuals who join genocides as perpetrator participants. Staub quotes Kuper (1981) in defining “genocide.” Kuper, in his volume, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the 20th Century*, points out that the jurist Raphael Lemkin “...proposed the term *genocide* to denote the destruction of a nation or an ethnic group, from the ancient Greek word *genos* (race, tribe) and the Latin *cide* (killing)” (Staub, p. 7).

In his book, Staub shows how individual psychology and social forces join and just about define first the potential birth, and second, the actual birth of genocide. Here he identifies some specific components in this marriage of individual psychology with that of social forces as follows:

- *Compartmentalization of functions and euphemistic language*—  
People doing their jobs without seeing the “whole”; in addition, euphemistic language tends to obscure reality both from outsiders as well as from the perpetrators themselves (Hillberg 1961). Staub also points out that compartmentalization and euphemistic language serve to deny reality and distance the self from violent actions and their victims (p. 28);
- *Obedience to authority and the authoritarianism of culture*—  
Those who willingly accept the authority of leaders are likely to have also accepted their views and ideology. They are guided by shared cultural dispositions. A society’s strong respect for authority is one source of genocidal violence. A tendency to like and obey authority is one characteristic of perpetrators (pp. 29–30);
- *Psychosocial consequences*—  
German youth were influenced by World War I after which deprivation of food as well as the absence of fathers, along with the experience of overall chaotic conditions made for the need of a leader who promised empowerment. In this sense, it was a long-standing characteristic of German culture to intensify the need for authority and the security it would provide (p. 30);
- *The role of the family*—  
How children are raised (with severity or with benevolence) are important aspects of the culture (pp. 30–31). In this sense, Charny (1982) points out that “the role of the family and the experience of the child in it [can] make him a “genocider.”

With respect to the role of family experience in eventual acting-out of violent behavior, Miller, in her study of hidden cruelty in child-rearing and the roots of violence (*For Your Own Good*, 1990), explicates such connections (as also reviewed on Miller's work cited in Chap. 6 of this present volume) in which Miller examines the personality and personal family history of Adolph Hitler. Further, on the analysis of "groupthink," such phenomena are discussed at length in Staub's *Roots of Evil* book, Chap. 5 on *The Psychology of Perpetrators: Individuals and Groups*, and in my volumes, *Group Psychotherapy and Personality: Intersecting Structures* (1979), as well as in my volume, *The Discovery of God: A Psycho/Evolutionary Perspective* (2013). Suffice it to say, that perhaps family experience and its affect on future behavior can be all summed up by the work of Steiner in his analysis of Schutzstaffel (SS) members of the Nazi program (1980, pp. 405–457). Steiner points out that these SS members grew up in authoritarian families and that their experiences in such families contributed mightily to incorporating these authoritarian proclivities, including perfect compliance with authority demands.

Miller (1990, p. 197) also reminds us that a person is not born a criminal. Further she implies that the infrastructural mechanism of *repression* is intrinsically implicated in the proposition that acting-out with a socially imposed subject matter of "destructiveness," is really the basis of evil consequences. She says that: "Those who persecute others are fundamentally warding off knowledge of their own fate as victims." This means that the warding off of self-knowledge, of introspection, is at the very root of the problem. According to Miller, this warding off of self-knowledge is basically an indictment of *repression*. Miller states that:

Consciously experiencing one's own victimization instead of trying to ward it off provides protection against sadism; i. e. the compulsion to torment and humiliate others.

Of course, again, here is an admonition against *repression* of self-knowledge. Thus, Miller concludes by warning: "Living out hatred is the opposite of experiencing it." Here, she is referring specifically to the proposition (or perhaps the axiom) regarding acting-out—that doing is the replacement for knowing—the basic and specific psychoanalytic definition of acting-out.

In my volume on *Group Psychotherapy and Personality: Intersecting Structures* (1979, p. 300), I propose that: "...[a] predispositional personality program may be an opaque and faintly inked one onto which cultural experiences impress themselves only to then reveal those impressed parts of the program." Here, I am suggesting that early formative developmental experience—family life—is very definitely affected by the broad social/cultural environment in which the family is embedded. Eventually, the adult will necessarily express the values that were internalized from such experience.

To this concept of the admixture of social forces, the family role, and individual personality, Staub (p. 234) posits that: "Cultural self-concept is the most complex of the cultural preconditions. It involves high self-esteem, a sense of entitlement, and underlying insecurity." In addition must be added that righteous indignation drives it all based upon a subjective sense of justice expected (biased though it may

be), and punishment warranted. This means that in all likelihood, those perpetrating genocidal acts must erase any sense of humiliation by projecting it onto members of particular subgroups.

It is clear, that in such cases, superiority needs and feelings of purity comprise an amalgam of gratifications that were understood or perceived by such individuals, to have been thwarted. Thus, a scapegoat will be needed. In the psyche, the thwarted *wish* is then translated into a gratified one—especially so long as the scapegoated group continues to be erased. Such a *wish* is actually incarcerated in the individual's psyche as well as in the so-called social/cultural psyche of the majority group. And this incarceration of the *wish* (to be superior, pure, safe, and accepted) is an obsessional *wish* and will continue to obtain until the “job” is done, is completed—when “they’re” all dead! It is all a shared cultural value.

In terms of a diagnostic cluster of the victimizer's personality type (as referred to in Chap. 6, on the summary of personality factors, as for example in Hitler's personality), the amalgam of personality inclinations, such as psychopathic (absence of empathy), obsessional (need for perfection and purity), and paranoid (with a persistent critical focus toward the “other” while only seeing goodness and purity in the self) is typical of the charismatic God-heads who are able to invite adherence from those who follow them. Of course, Hitler, Stalin, and perhaps Pol Pot can exemplify these types, that is, seeing everything wrong in the other in order not to see anything wrong in the self. This particular projection is also true with how societies rationalize their practices and prejudices. In the case of Hitler or Stalin, this sort of diagnostic complex has been widely reported as referenced in Chap. 6 on Hitler and in Chap. 7 on Stalin. In addition, both Hitler and Stalin were consistently and brutally beaten by their fathers—a fact that would not at all surprise Alice Miller who has poignantly predicted that cruelty in child-rearing is highly correlated to the roots of violence later displayed in the child as adult (Miller 1990).

The attack on whatever subgroup is always going to be based upon ideological purity whether cultural, ethnic, tribal, theological, political, racial, or economic, and in such an iron-clad insistence of the victimizer class, this purity must be maintained—exactly! In the most general sense, such exactitude with respect to maintaining ideological purity is what Thomas Hobbes calls the pursuit of self-interest. With respect to the vicissitudes of the pleasure principle, Freud apparently agrees with Hobbes. In contrast, Rousseau feels people are basically good but that society corrupts. Niebuhr, more or less agrees with Rousseau but also considers groups to be inherently self-serving or selfish (Staub 1989, p. 26). It would seem that both conceptions are correct, that is, that self-interest is, of course, an important consideration of individual psychology, and groups, in terms of their punitive psychology are also quite self-serving (Kellerman 2013).

So, all in all, it seems that on the basis of the material presented in this present volume, the key to understanding how to assess the current state of our evolutionary stage (with respect to the relative degree of progress of *Homo sapiens* development), we would need to conclude that given the ubiquitous, the universal appearance, and *success* of the vast incidence of acting-out (especially with regard to its subject matter of evil behavior) that we, as a species, are quite obviously struggling



even inordinately, in our quest for a better world. Yet, without any doubt, we find ourselves still in this relatively primitive state. Therefore, in this presumed relative primitive state of our evolutionary stage, evil has more access to the real vicissitudes of life than it has to any virtual existence.

It all can take us back to the Garden of Eden where simply said, the Serpent seems to win. Even in the struggle between God and the Serpent, the Serpent wins. Does this mean that evil is inevitable in the world? The answer, I believe, is a resounding no! However, as long as people repress what they don't want to know and act out their *anger*, then evil cannot help but win. This is true even if the evil, in the form of genocides, are conducted by seemingly ordinary people, a God-head, or, in the absence of such a charismatic God-head, the evil may then be sustained by various organs of the society itself, with help from individuals who happen to lead such attack groups.

How then may we understand how to arrest the work of the Serpent—that is, how to stop the evil—arrest it, arrest its development and process? This question seems to invite a reexamination of the Garden story itself. To start with, it needs to be remembered that the noun Eden translates as “perfect *wish*” (of a perfect place).

## Re-interpretation of God and the Serpent in the Garden of Eden

As cited in earlier chapters of this volume, the story of the Garden of Eden contains five major characters: God, Adam, Eve, the snake, and the Tree of Knowledge. Herein, I will claim that the story of the Garden really only contains four characters. The one character not bona fide as standing on its own is the Serpent, the snake. This is possibly so because we will now postulate that God indeed (as is implied or portrayed in Genesis) functions with both a conscious and unconscious mind, and also gives to his psyche an unconscious instruction to keep any untoward needs for pleasure, *repressed!* Yes, I am proposing that God, the God connected to Genesis and the Garden of Eden, had a psyche, and that this psyche, in addition to its conscious/cognitive facility, also contained an unconscious dimension.

In Genesis, there is an implied contest between the power of God versus the power of nature. Nature of course is entirely governed by the pleasure principle. Even each cell of our bodies wants, or “*wishes*” to be nourished. For example, an amoeba will eject any noxious stimulus that has been ingested. All of nature, including even flora and fauna seek pleasure, the comfort of safety, and any harbor against danger.

According to the Rev. C. I. Scofield as described in *The Scofield Reference Bible* (1909/1917, pp. 3–9), even in the New Testament:

Genesis enters into the very structure of the New Testament, in which it is quoted above sixty times in seventeen books. In a profound sense, therefore the roots of all subsequent revelation are planted deep in Genesis, and whoever would truly comprehend that revelation must begin here.

In the story of Genesis, it needs to be remembered that God did not write the story down as in writing with ink on papyrus. It was men who actually wrote the story as in someone sitting at a table or writing desk and writing the story. In this sense, God, of course would need to be male—a man, not a woman. If it were a woman/women who was/were writing the story, it would be more likely that God would have made Eve the first being in the class of *Homo sapiens*. Thus, the story quotes God:

And God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness’....  
 so God created man in His own image, in the image of God created  
 He him; male and female created He them....And the rib, which the  
 Lord God had taken from man, made He a woman, and brought her  
 unto the man.

Prehistoric history along with recorded ancient societies were not always male-dominated. Many were female-led. It was the rise of male social dominance as, for example, expressed in the Old Testament—especially in the story of the Garden—that ostensibly began the so-called modern acceptance of male social dominance. This was also reinforced by observation of behaviors of animal groups where the male of the group was most frequently dominant.

Thus, the following, quoted from the Genesis story regarding the Garden, especially with respect to the theme of male dominance was dictated presumably by a male God:

“Unto woman,” He said, ‘I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy  
 conception; in sorrow thy shalt bring forth children; and thy desire  
 shall be to thy husband, *and he shall rule over thee*.

“He shall rule over thee.” The answer to the question as to whether that quote was written by a woman or by a man seems patently obvious. Of course another quote seems to confirm this answer:

And God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness’....  
 So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created  
 He him....

If we examine the entire process of who wrote the story from the perspective of this sort of possible male social-dominance need, then we can enter the Garden story with an entirely different interpretation than the one that has been for centuries accepted at face value. The point is that it is possible to deconstruct the Garden story from the psychological vantage point of the men who wrote the story, that is, the unconscious needs of such men (in the context of male dominance) will actually and necessarily reflect how they understood what God wants or *wishes*. In this sense, such understanding perhaps needs to go one step deeper. This so-called deeper step concerns the parallel that must be drawn between the psychology of such men who wrote the story and the psychology of God. Therefore, because such men contained a mind in their human cognitive/emotional construction, and that such a mind contained a typical unconscious dimension regulating the apparatus we identify as the psyche, the same must be assumed about the organization of the mind of this perceived God about whom men were conceiving and writing. Apparently, they “wrote” God in their own image.

Thus, again, it seems obvious that this perceived God also must have had an unconscious repository regulating its psychic apparatus. This means that the mechanism of *repression* was also available to such men as well as therefore, to God. In this sense, the men who wrote the story of the Garden, wrote it from the male dominant position vis-a-vis the female, and then unconsciously deconstructed their own entire psychological drama regarding men and women—in the form of this God’s psychological drama—and doing it piece by piece in terms of identifying characters of the story: God, Adam, Eve, the Serpent, and the Tree of Knowledge.

To then unravel this five-character story is to possibly tell it in the following way—a way that displays man’s unconscious motivation expressed in the form of God’s unconscious motivation. All of it involves phenomena reflecting the presence of the *wish*, the mechanism of *repression* as it operates to repress the thwarted *wish*, along with repressing the *anger* toward the *who*, who thwarted the *wish*. In other words, the entire descriptive story line is one of the Serpent (the snake) winning and God losing. The operative phrase in this previous sentence is: “descriptive story-line.” This necessarily means that in the Garden story, there also exists an underlying latent story.

Because the snake wins, the story is also one of tacit acting-out where evil in the form of the triumph of unbridled pleasure (represented by the accepted defined nature of the snake—the evil pursuit of unbridled pleasure) reflects perhaps the conquest of pleasure over reason. The Serpent as the symbol of pleasure was first referred to this way by Philo Judeus (50 B.C.), and can be read in the treatise: *On the Creation of the World* (Colson and Whittiker 1922–1932).

To amplify this issue of God and the Serpent vis-à-vis pleasure, we must ask the seemingly interesting question as to what it means that God loses, and the Serpent wins? To answer this question of God losing and the Serpent winning, and to understand what it all possibly means, here is a re-interpretation of the Garden story from the point of view in which is conceptualized a latent and more underlying and different or alternate story to the originally portrayed Garden drama. To begin, and suffice it to say, the meaning of “Eden” from Latin, Greek, and Hebrew derivations means (or refers to) “delight” or more specifically, as mentioned above, “the perfect *wish*.” As the symbol of “the perfect *wish*,” Eden represents the quintessential absolute of nature’s basic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)—that of the tropistic and elemental need for pleasure. Therefore, the entire Garden drama played out in Eden hinges on an analysis of how the issue of pleasure figures into it all.

Society at large finds it necessary to regulate pleasure; that is, it becomes clear that capricious addiction to pleasure is to be avoided. In contrast, nature is constructed so that pleasure is continuously sought and is so sought in every organism. Thus, there is a contrast (and contest) between the descriptive story of the Garden as a disparity on the one hand between “God the Good,” and on the other as “Serpent the Bad.” In translation, we could say that the descriptive disparity is between good and evil. Perhaps another way to put it is that pleasure calibrated and controlled is “good,” but unbridled pleasure is “bad.”

And so it was that Sigmund Freud considered this same issue, no less in his examination of the future of civilization as this future rests on how pleasure is

managed as well as on the function of *repression*. In his tract of *Civilization and Its Discontents*, (1927–1931), Freud discussed implications regarding the calibration of pleasure in terms of how impulses should be controlled by *repression*, that is, the hope for civil society according to Freud, seemed to depend upon the control of pleasure sources—impulses (lust or wanton sexual pursuits, or any of the variants of *anger* or rage or violence). According to Freud, this control of impulses needs to be either sublimated (translated psychologically into productive work energy) or needs to be *repressed*.

Yet, it seems that *repression* might not be the best solution to this problem of controlling pleasure. Parenthetically, it needs to be remembered that the expression of the aggressive impulse (the emotion of *anger* or rage) is considered to be a pleasure release, perhaps akin to a volcanic eruption that releases pent-up energy.

Therefore, a possible amendment to how incremental levels of *repression* might be necessary to enhance the progress of civil society, is proposed here as a clearly opposite view; namely, that facing one's demons (and therefore not repressing) might just be a better way to raise consciousness so that people can have a better chance to successfully struggle with their impulses rather than repressing it all. It is the hypothesis here that the story of the Garden, is heavily based upon *repression* of one of the so-called five characters: God, Adam, Eve, the Serpent, the Tree. A clue to understanding the possibly hidden story of the Garden lies perhaps in the greatest disparity between any two of the characters. In this sense, the apparent greatest disparity between any two characters of the Garden story concerns the polarity of God and the Serpent (the snake).

This difference or disparity can also be understood as the fundamental reason that the writers of the Garden story placed the snake in the Garden (in the first place) perhaps in order for God to externalize all such capricious pleasure pursuits onto the character of the snake rather than God acknowledging or "owning" this self-same need or desire or *wish* for such extant brimming pleasure himself.

This prohibition against owning one's *wish*, or one's secret predilection is reminiscent of the patient who reports a dream in which he is walking down a street and passing by an alleyway. In the alley is a crouching raging and stalking leopard about to viciously attack the dreamer. The dreamer awakens because the dream instantly transforms into a nightmare. The dreamer is terror-stricken. The interpretation of the dream is quite simple. The dreamer owned his fear, but not his *anger*. The leopard is the dreamer's *anger* externalized or projected so that the dreamer is protected from acknowledging the *anger*. This same *repression* of *anger* is akin to God not acknowledging his own need for pleasure. Rather, God becomes focused on rules and regulations, e.g., "Do not eat from the Tree."

Thus, God is seen as feeling disempowered because His instruction (His *wish*) to Adam and Eve not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge was disobeyed. All disempowerment generates *anger* and so God is seen in the genesis story as quite angry with Adam and Eve. In addition, the snake wins at *who* gets their *wish* gratified. The answer is that the snake's *wish* is the one gratified and God's *wish* is the one ostensibly thwarted.

However, I say “ostensibly” because the key here is the rather challenging suggestion that the snake is really God’s *repressed wish* for pleasure which He Himself cannot consciously acknowledge. Thus, the presence of the Serpent in Paradise was the writer’s unconscious statement regarding this self-same writer’s own response to the seductive nature of pleasure and therefore in terms of this sort of psychoanalytic calculus, God is also seduced by pleasure but must repress such desire and therefore attribute it to another—the snake! The attribution to the snake of one’s own *wish* is akin to a Freudian phenomenon in which (especially in the understanding of the nature in which dreams are constructed in the psyche) one will choose an unlikely surrogate as a self-representation. This surrogate is disguised in the extreme precisely in order to not have the insight of the surrogate as an exact self-representation.

To continue with this alternate interpretation of the Garden story, implicit in God’s *wish* for pleasure was His psyche’s self-imposed thwarting of His own *wish*. God, then feels betrayed, disobeyed, and more importantly, disempowered. God therefore loses and the Serpent wins. But the Serpent is what God refuses to “own” in Himself. God can only “own” what He considers to be good and must repress that which He considers to be bad. And apparently, unbridled pleasure is bad—at least in the psyche of the writer which very possibly reflected a microcosm of the broader social context in which the writer lived.

And here is where we can see that in the story of the Garden, God was, yes, acting-out. All the ingredients of acting-out obtained:

God’s *wish* for pleasure was visible but thwarted and then *repressed*;  
Disempowerment resulted which generated *anger*;  
God both expressed and *repressed* the *anger* as well as the *wish*, and naturally, a symptom appeared in the form of the Serpent’s triumph.

And, since the Serpent triumphed, we can now see that acting-out always has some metric of evil in it. And although we know that God is not evil, nevertheless, repressing *anger* and the *wish* and not realizing who the *who* is, creates the infrastructure of acting-out. God, did it all. God was the *who* who thwarted his own *wish* for pleasure, and because of his *repression*, didn’t know it.

Well, was God really acting-out, and therefore was this evil? Again, the answer must be seen as one of an unconscious proclivity regarding what is right and what is wrong germinated in the mind of the writer. It is the writer who would necessarily be projecting his own sociopolitical and psychological makeup that becomes infused in the story about God and His Garden.

Therefore, yes, it was indeed the triumph of evil in the form of the snake’s victory. Yet, *who* or what is the snake? The snake representing evil is really the acting-out

*repression* of the *wish* (as well as the *anger*) about which God, through *repression*, must keep unconscious. Thus, rather than knowing it, the snake as a surrogate displacement figure for God's unconscious *wish* for pleasure does the acting-out by logic; that is, seducing Eve into biting into the apple.

Of course, because the story was written by men then it stands to reason that it would be a woman who is hoodwinked and seen to be rather weak and even perhaps dimwitted. In addition, this new interpretation of the Garden story includes the idea that between nature and God, nature basically triumphs insofar as in nature, pleasure is always sustained to the maximum, especially in the absence of any calibration of such pleasure. The symptom in the Garden story (as it is here a transformed story) is represented by the action of the Serpent who seduces Eve thereby symbolizing the gratification of God's *wish* to also have pleasure. It is in this sense that nature wins. God simply didn't want to know what His impulse was or even that He had an impulse. And of course, the impulse was the attraction to, and need of pleasure.

Insofar as this obsessive pleasure-search may represent the unconscious needs as well as prohibitions of the writers of the Garden story, then it could be said that unconsciously God wanted Eve to eat the apple. This might be so because basically God unconsciously really didn't want the Serpent in Himself to be continuously *repressed*, that is, God wanted pleasure, but because of His need to conceal this *wish* (especially from Himself), the remaining story line became a fable with a typical core moral, that is, that *repression* and the process of symptom-formation results in an acting-out of an underlying need for pleasure, also implying that the calibration of pleasure-pursuits perhaps need to be calibrated and accepted rather than *repressed*.

Further, because of the need not to know, a doing took place. In this psychoanalytic definition of acting-out, the need not to know, is assured by *repression*, and the doing (in the place of knowing) appears in the form of the presence of a Serpent, a snake, as well as in the creation of a woman who would be seduced—all in the service of God's unconscious *wish* for pleasure (perhaps maximum pleasure) to be ultimately realized. This acting-out symptom is attributing evil to the snake simply because in this case (at that time of the writing of the Garden story) and from a devotional point of view, these writers of the Garden story needed to deny any excessive attraction to pleasure. To this point as Freud so correctly surmised, we love our symptoms (feeling disempowered and angry because the snake wins) because these symptoms are our *wishes* fully realized albeit in neurotic or perverse form—the snake's triumph is actually God's *wish* realized albeit in neurotic or perverse form.

In the context of the theme of this book, such neurotic or perverse form as is reflected by the psyche's condoned operation of *repression*, lobbies against what in a mature sense should be a necessary psychic investment in introspection and understanding. This sociopsychological condoned defense of *repression* as it relates to the person's *wish* and *anger* ultimately then reveals the equivalence of acting-out with evil. This is true especially insofar as the mores and folkways of one's broad sociopolitical context will give to the acting-out its particular content (subject-matter)—in this case, the writer's sensibility that brings him to feel pleasure as a dangerous emotional state, or at least as an unsettling one.

This psychically condoned defense of *repression* over the *wish* (and the *anger*) is the reason that the Garden story is one of God and man as reflections of one another containing both “good” and so-called bad. Thus, we may consider the Serpent in Paradise and God as transmogrifications of one another. Yet, despite it all—despite God’s unconscious psychologically determined duplicitous sleight of hand—it may be that nature cannot be fooled (defied). In this sense, pleasure necessarily will be sought and man will or will not be conscious of it. If conscious of one’s *wish* along with having the maturity to regulate such pleasure needs, introspection and maturity will reign. Otherwise, acting-out as the progenitor of evil will be the measure of one’s immaturity and relatively thin level of understanding—with the consequence that the acting-out of evil content will as usual, command the field!

In this alternate story of the Garden presented here, God is seen as suffering the fate of limited introspection. Because of this, God can be considered less than maturely conscious. Yet, of course, this is completely and solely a reflection of the measure of immaturity of the Garden’s writer, as well as a commentary on the level of understanding and mores of people of the time period in which the Garden story was written.

Of course, social context is important. Just as the citizens of Germany/Austria were subject to the seductions of Adolph Hitler, especially with respect to the typical stereotyping characteristic of the social context regarding Jews—so too, are we all subject to the manifest descriptive story of the Garden where five characters are portrayed rather than the four that are here proposed, that is, these four as according to the reinterpretation of the story’s actual composition of characters: God, Adam, Eve, and the Tree.

# Epilogue

This volume, *Psychoanalysis of Evil: Perspectives on Destructive Behavior*, is generally a disquisition on “pleasure” and how such a need for pleasure is managed both by individuals and by groups. It is this theme of how pleasure is managed that seems to reveal the basic theme of the Garden drama. And profoundly implicated in this natural quest for pleasure (derived by gratifying the *wish*), our discussion and analysis herein seems to have led us to the astounding conclusion that such pleasure-seeking is also perversely infused in the underpinning to genocides. It is in a derived sense that the *wish* for gratifying whatever are the objectives of the individual (as well as groups of individuals) with respect to what would make them happy, safe, and secure concerns an implication regarding the entire disquisition of evil presented in this volume.

More specifically, the Garden drama offers a template to examine the difference between what nature wants, and what man might need. It seems obvious that for evolution to advance in a way that enables civilized living (in the absence of acting-out which is the vehicle for evil to exist), *Homo sapiens* need to reach the point of offering the psyche different psychological instructions typically the unconscious mind. Rather than instructing the psyche to aid *repression*, to make *repression* possible, these instructions from the unconscious regarding the protection of personal secrets need to be dissolved in favor of disclosure, as well as in the favor of courage to face even those personal “demons” or “acts” that would rather be negated or “forgotten.”

Freud’s profound psychological truth is enlightening. Freud said:

“That which is not spoken and heard is reenacted instead.” Along came another of his disciples who added: “And if it continues to be reenacted, it will become your fate!”

That says it all. Aim to confront that which is difficult to confront. Apparently, to resist *repression* is the direction in which we may be able to guide evolution. This is done by honoring self-disclosure. When self-disclosure becomes an internalized prized value, then the psyche’s power to invest energy in *repression* (and artifice—always, of course, resulting in acting-out evil), then the intent in the psyche will have an entirely different focus. This means that the presence of evil seems to lead to an inexorable conclusion that because of habituated *repressive* measures of the



psyche, as well as with respect to the entire infrastructure of acting-out, that in order to be happy, safe, and secure the maximum extent of the acting-out—the evil—leads to the “life” of *repression*, and as well to the current need of one’s unconscious to instruct the psyche with how to arrange the coalescing of its acting-out encrypted infrastructure. Unfortunately, under such a rather primitive evolutionary emotional/cognitive circumstance, genocides may continue to be inevitable.

In this sense we should listen carefully to Freud who said: “Consciousness is curative.” Along with this we may add that yes, consciousness is definitely curative provided that what is made conscious contains the element of *anger* that had been *repressed*. We will apparently evolve to a more advanced and decent evolutionary stage when we no longer need to *repress* what we should have the courage to face, to know. At that point, consciousness triumphs and truth trumps any defensive ideologies.

Otherwise, it seems that at this present stage of evolution, to be happy, safe, and secure could mean that one, in the throes of sensing danger, or, in a state of simple protracted apprehension, or, with a history of experiencing brutality, very possibly can be subject to mass persuasion implying that Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil (not so banal at all) gains the ascendancy enabling one to be prepared—to kill!

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# Index

## A

Accusation, 48, 76, 84, 114, 115  
Acting-out, 16, 19, 53, 57, 61, 66, 88, 90, 100, 101, 120, 131, 137–139  
  approaches towards, 16  
  definition of, 7, 8, 17  
  evils of, 18, 19, 65  
  in genocides, 116  
  of *repressed anger*, 64  
  outcomes of, 25  
  syndrome, 53  
Adam and Eve, 26, 29, 30, 34, 37, 45, 47, 136  
African slavery, 73  
Aggression, 12, 22, 57, 58, 60–63, 67, 104  
Algorithm of personality, 43, 91, 100  
Animus-of-aggrandizement, 20, 56  
Anti-Semitism, 72, 74, 75, 82, 87, 91, 115  
Armenian genocide, 117, 120  
Aryan, 73, 75, 76, 87, 91, 93, 108, 109  
Authority, 80, 81, 92, 95, 105, 107, 127

## B

Banality of evil, 20–22, 31, 58, 64, 116  
Bengali, 72, 73, 80, 123, 124, 127, 129  
Blame, 36, 44, 45  
Bloody Sunday massacre, 112

## C

Cambodian, 23, 72, 73, 123, 125–127, 129  
Central-figures, 80, 105  
Chauvinism, 81, 123, 128  
Christians, 73, 82, 84, 85, 117  
Communist ideology, 109  
Compartmentalization, 115, 130  
Compulsive character, 63  
Cruelty, 18, 64, 79, 131, 132  
Cultural self concept, 81, 131

## D

Death, 49, 128  
  camps, 94, 109  
  imagery, 5, 42  
  tainted group, 56  
  of victims, 56  
Defense mechanisms, 16, 22, 96, 99, 115  
Delusion, 63, 67, 79, 87, 88, 98, 99, 107  
Demon, 6, 66, 97, 136  
Denial, 22, 57, 114, 115  
Deserving, 44–46, 107, 129  
Destructiveness, 131  
Devil, 22, 24, 34, 37, 47, 55, 59, 85  
Devil *See also* Satan, 22  
Disempowerment, 31, 32, 46, 58, 63, 64, 71, 89, 96, 136  
Displacement, 20, 22, 57, 60, 89, 138  
  figures, 93  
Domination, 94, 95, 134  
Double self, 7  
Dysmorphophobic  
  delusion *see also* Delusion, 63

## E

Emotional balance, 42  
Emotion-defenses, 22  
Empathy, 132  
Empowerment, 30, 32, 33, 58  
Encryption/decryption, 12, 15  
Enosophobia, 62  
Exilic theology, 33

## F

Fairness, 44, 45, 56, 73  
  definition of, 45  
Famine, 111, 114  
  of the 1930's in Ukrainian, 110

Forgiveness, 31, 43

## G

Garden of Eden, 15, 22, 23, 37, 39, 45, 51, 75, 133

Genocide, 64, 77, 101, 117–119, 123, 124, 126–130, 133

against Jews, 77

definition of, 71

due to evils, 67

during the Nazi era, 73, 81

Pakistani, 72

rational strategies for, 4

Turkish, 22

(Warrant for genocide), 74

German, 71, 73–76, 81, 82, 88, 90, 92, 96, 99, 102, 103, 106, 129

God, 30–32, 34–38, 41–43, 45, 48, 49, 63, 82, 83, 133–137

and Serpents, 135, 139

creates *anger* concept, 32

creations, 29

Garden of Eden story of, 15, 26

head, 103, 104, 129, 132

the Adam and Eve story, 37

types of

Impartial, 42

Inexistent, 43

Intervening, 42

Irrelevant, 43

Good and evil, 30, 33, 135

Aragno's conceptions on, 7

Karen Armstrong's perceptions on, 32

philosophies of, 48, 50

study of, 5

Good and Evil (book), 3

Grandiosity, 83, 89, 90, 92, 96, 100, 105, 107

Great Terror of the 1930's, 113

Gulag archipelago, 110

## H

Hedonism, 8, 10

Hitler's Jewish grandfather, 86, 87

Hitler's personality, 78, 80, 87, 95, 99, 100, 106, 132

Holocaust, 22, 74, 82, 84, 88, 91, 96, 106, 117, 118, 128

Hope, 10, 44

Human Rights Watch, 128

Human sacrifice, 7, 35

Hutus and Tutsis, 73, 129

Hutu Ten Commandments, 128

## I

Illusion, 67, 98

Infrastructure of evil, 12, 13, 15, 27, 46, 50, 51, 59, 60

core elements of, 59

## J

Jesus, 35, 37, 42, 49, 82

Jews, 22, 49, 72–76, 80–83, 86, 89, 91, 96, 104, 114, 119, 129, 139

Judas, 37

## K

Khmer Rouge, 125–127

Killing Fields of Cambodia, 125, 126

## L

Luther, Martin, 73, 74, 82–85

## M

Megalomania, 89

key characteristics, 77

Mein Kampf (book), 72, 75, 76, 105

Messiah, 75, 77, 90, 100

Moscow Trials, 113

Muslim, 73, 80, 118–120

## N

Narcissism, 20, 21, 56, 84

malignant, 8, 56, 78

Nazi, 7, 72, 73, 76, 80–82, 84, 85, 87, 93, 109, 131

New Testament, 35, 38, 74, 82, 85, 133

## O

Obedience, 31, 47, 80, 92, 130

Obsession, 43, 61, 63, 76, 78, 79, 87, 88, 91, 120

Old Testament, 34, 35, 134

## P

Pakistani, 73, 123, 124, 127, 129

Paradise, 5, 9, 11, 12, 15, 24, 30–33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 54, 58, 84

Paranoia, 110, 116, 126

Stalin's, 111, 112, 114, 127

Peace of mind, 42, 82, 103

Personality, 6, 37, 57, 71, 75, 77, 78, 83, 87, 97, 98, 101, 103, 105–107, 114, 116, 123, 132

functioning-characteristics, 16

- hysteric impulses in shaping, 23  
 issue of, 19  
 job-description, 17  
 megalomaniacal phenomenon of, 8  
 megalomaniacal quality of, 78  
 of *anger*, 32  
 role of stress and strain in, 10  
 sociopathic, 20  
 understanding of, 8  
 with respect to characterology, 63
- Pleasure, 3–5, 10, 11, 135, 137–139  
   Epicurean and Cyrenian position on, 9  
   philosophy of, 8  
   principle, 26, 38, 46, 132  
   role of *wish* in, 10  
   Taylor's perceptions of, 8
- Projective identification, 22, 57, 58, 114, 115
- Protestant Reformation, 73, 74, 83, 85
- Psychic numbing, 102
- Psychoanalysis, 16, 62
- Psychopathic, 15, 57, 97, 98, 116, 120, 132  
   personality, 19–21
- Psychosexual nature, 92, 93
- Psychosis, 19, 62, 98
- Psychosocial consequences, 130
- Punishment, 21, 42, 45, 57, 60, 96, 110, 132
- Purity, 61, 75, 80, 87, 88, 91, 99, 106,  
   118–120, 132
- R**
- Repression*, 8, 16–19, 25, 57, 61, 66, 96, 107,  
   131, 135, 136, 138, 139
- Righteous indignation, 6, 21, 57, 71, 78, 79,  
   87, 88, 102, 104, 106, 120, 131
- Rwanda, 123, 127, 129  
   genocide of, 72, 80, 127  
   judicial system of, 128
- S**
- Sadism, 18, 19, 106, 131
- Satan, 22, 35–38, 43, 59
- Scapegoating, 18, 23, 52, 60, 72, 82, 90, 115,  
   129
- Sectarian violence, 80
- Self-immortality, 56
- Selfishness, 38
- Serpent, 13, 24, 30–33, 35–38, 54, 58, 63, 124,  
   133, 135–139  
   and the Paradise, 5, 12  
   vs. God, 15, 22
- Snake *See* Serpent, 45
- Social context, 18, 27, 66, 101, 137, 139
- Spanish Inquisition, 74, 82, 119
- Splitting, 7, 22, 57, 98, 99, 115  
   regression, 22
- Stalin, Joseph, 67, 110–115, 132  
   biography of, 109  
   communist rule, 110  
   evil behavior, 112  
   in communist ideology, 109  
   political image of, 113  
   slave-empire, 111
- Superego, 12, 21, 56, 57, 99
- Symbolization, 22, 57
- Symptom, 26, 61–63, 107, 137, 138  
   acting-out, 59  
   by *repressions*, 67  
   code, 60  
   delusionally based, 67  
   formation, 61, 136  
   issue of, 47  
   of acting-out, 107, 108  
   of evil behavior, 25  
   psychological/emotional, 4, 59, 60, 63, 64
- T**
- The Great Purge, 111, 112
- The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 74
- The “*who*”, 15
- Transference, 96
- Tree of Knowledge, 26, 27, 30, 34, 39, 133,  
   135
- Turkey's genocide against Armenians, 117
- W**
- Will, 49
- Wish*, 7, 12, 16, 24, 45, 46, 54, 58, 74, 92, 96,  
   100, 124, 136  
   assessment of, 3  
   for safety, 13  
   for superiority, 120  
   Freud's conceptions of, 53  
   gratified, 54  
   of Adolf Hitler, 91, 107  
   of aggressors, 5  
   of God, 29–32, 34, 37, 39, 41, 46  
   *repression* of, 138  
   satisfaction of goals, 3  
   soaked creatures, 4  
   thwarted, 45, 120, 135
- X**
- Xenophobia, 117
- Y**
- Yiddish poets, 88, 111, 112