Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate

Historical and Sociological Perspectives

Joseph P. Smaldone

WARFARE IN THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE

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WARFARE IN THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE

HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

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For Judy and the two boys

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Illustrations and Tables

Preface

This book, a study of warfare in the emirates that constituted the Sokoto Caliphate in nineteenth-century northern Nigeria, was originally prepared as a doctoral thesis at Northwestern University (1970). Since then it has been revised by adding an introductory essay on the evolution of Sudanic warfare; deleting a short chapter on Islamic military practices, and distributing much of that material throughout the book; and incorporating the results of more recent research.

Regrettably, this work went to press without the benefit of research in Nigeria. Three times between 1969 and 1973 I had planned for such research, but in each instance unforeseen problems precluded its fruition. Fortunately the abundance of other accessible materials permitted the writing of a book of this nature.

Grateful acknowledgments are due to many persons. Ivor Wilks encouraged my early research into Sudanic warfare and suggested several fruitful areas of inquiry. Previous drafts of this work benefited from the comments and criticism of Margaret Priestley Bax, Paul J. Bohannan, Ronald Cohen, R. Ann Dunbar, A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, D. Murray Last, Nehemia Levtzion, Paul Lovejoy, and D. J. M. Muffett. I am especially thankful to Victor N. Low for providing me with military data on Hadejia, Katagum, and Gombe; and to M. G. Smith, who made available to me his voluminous fieldnotes and unpublished manuscripts on several emirates. The Council for Intersocietal Studies at Northwestern and the Naval Academy Research Council supported part of the research. Last but not least, Colin Jones of Cambridge University Press is to be commended for his extraordinary patience and understanding.

J. P. SMALDONE

October 1976

Conventions and Abbreviations

A few explanatory notes are in order. First, although the principal subject of this study is the Sokoto Caliphate, comparative data for other Central Sudanic states have been given occasionally. Military practices in the independent Hausa states of Abuja, Gobir, Maradi, and Zinder (mixed Hausa and Kanuri, with Hausa as the predominant language) were similar in many respects to those of the emirates of Sokoto, and provide data that both complement and supplement material available for the caliphate.

Second, in matters of style, the following conventions have been adopted. Arabic and Fulani words have been used sparingly, and are indicated by (A.) and (F.) respectively. Hausa words (H.) appear frequently, particularly in Chapter 3. Unless indicated otherwise, all technical military terms in the text are Hausa; these generally appear in parentheses after the English form. An extensive glossary of such terms is provided on pp. 220–4, below. In the spelling of personal names, the more familiar Hausa forms have been used rather than Arabic.

Following the precedent of Polly Hill's *Rural Hausa* (Cambridge, 1972), the Hausa "hooked" *b*, *d*, and *k* have not been used; nor is the glottalized *y* denoted. Perfectionists and pedants may lament this editorial decision, but the absence of such linguistic technicalities is of no great moment: the specialist will not need them, and the general reader will find them pedagogically useless.

Victor Low's fieldnotes are cited simply, as for example, Hadejia Fieldnotes. On the other hand, M. G. Smith's fieldnotes are cited by book and page; for instance, data from book 4, page 10a, of Sokoto fieldnotes, are cited as Smith, Sokoto Fieldnotes, 4/10a.

The following abbreviations have been used in footnotes and bibliography.

BSOAS   *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
JAH   *Journal of African History*
JAS   *Journal of the (Royal) African Society*
JHSN   *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*
JRGS   *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*
NNAR *Northern Nigeria Annual Reports*
PRGS   *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*

General Glossary

-awa	Hausa suffix meaning "people of"; thus Kanawa, the people of Kano
dan	Hausa for "son of," e.g., Usuman dan Fodio
dar al-harb	Arabic expression to denote non-Muslim territory, legally "enemy territory"
dar al-Islam	Arabic for the abode of Islam or Muslim territory, as opposed to *dar al-harb*
dhimmi (A.)	Protected non-Muslims residing in *dar al-Islam*
emir	Familiar form of *amir* (A.), meaning chief, ruler, commander
hijra (A.)	Flight or emigration of Muslims, especially from religious and political persecution
jama'a (A.)	Muslim community
jihad (A.)	Muslim holy war
jizya (A.)	Poll tax paid by non-Muslims living in *dar al-Islam* who have accepted *dhimmi* status
malam (H.)	Learned one, teacher, scholar
mujaddidun (A.)	Islamic reformers
mujahidun (A.)	Muslim warriors, soldiers of Islam
murabitun (A.)	Garrison troops of a *ribat*
-n	Hausa suffix which forms the genitive of masculine nouns: e.g., Sarkin Kano, chief or emir of Kano
nuwwab (A.)	Deputies, lieutenants (*na'ib*, singular)
ribat (A.)	Frontier stronghold to defend *dar al-Islam*
sarki (H.)	Chief, king, ruler, commander, emir
Shehu	Hausa form of the Arabic, Shaikh, meaning scholar, learned one; the familiar title of Usuman dan Fodio
Waziri (H.)	Hausa form of the Arabic, Wazir, the chief minister of a Muslim state

A Ï R

Timbuktu
• Gao

• Agades

Tekrur

Ghana

Songhai

R. Senegal

R. Gambia

Kaniaga

Mali

R. Niger

Kangaba

Gobir
Alkalawa •

Daura

Bornu
Birnin Gazargamu
•

Kanem

Kuka •

L. Chad

Katsina

Garun Gabas

Zamfara • **Kano**

• **Rano**

Zazzau (Zaria)

White Volta

Mossi

Black Volta

R. Volta

R. Niger

Nupe

Jukun

R. Benue

Cameroon
Mountains

Gulf of Guinea

Fernando Po

0 ——— miles ——— 300
0 ——— km ——— 500

Map 1. The Western Sudan

PART ONE

Historical Perspectives

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Sudanic Warfare and Military Organization to c. 1800

The Sudanic Environment

The West African Sudan refers to the broad expanse of savanna or tropical grassland lying south of the Sahara between the Atlantic Ocean and Lake Chad. This extensive geographical zone is essentially a great plain characterized by lightly wooded rolling terrain. Most of the savanna lies below 1500 feet above sea level, and exceeds 4000 feet only in the highlands of modern Guinea and Cameroon and in the central Nigerian Jos Plateau. In these highlands the headwaters of the major river systems of the Western Sudan are formed: the Gambia, Senegal, and Niger rise in the Guinea highlands; the Benue and its tributaries flow out of the Nigerian plateau and the Cameroon mountains.

The geography and history of the Western Sudan have been influenced to a considerable degree by its climate. The winds of the annual monsoon bring alternating dry and wet seasons to the savanna. Dust-laden northeast winds from the Sahara – the *harmattan* – prevail during the dry season between October and April, and the moist southwest monsoon from the Gulf of Guinea brings up to sixty inches of rainfall between May and September. The northern savanna experiences a longer dry season and receives less rainfall than the south; and the grassland gradually turns to dry steppe or *sahel* before yielding to the true desert. In the southern latitudes, where a longer wet season and heavier rainfall support denser vegetation, moist woodlands give way to tropical rain forest along the Guinea coast.

In historical times the pattern of human life in the Western Sudan has been governed by this alternation of seasons. During the wet season the sedentary population practiced agriculture for local consumption and commercial exchange. The dry season, on the other hand, provided the opportunity and conditions necessary for craft production, long-distance trade, slave raiding, and warfare. The alternating seasons also affected the nomadic habits of the pastoral population. The Fulani, the most numerous of the Sudanic pastoralists, to this day follow a regular pattern of seasonal movements known as "transhumance." In the wet season they move north with their cattle into drier country to avoid the pestilential tsetse fly, and during the dry season they turn southward in search of watered pastureland for their stock. Over the years these orbital movements,

which frequently exceed one hundred miles, have shifted in response to changing political, economic, and ecological conditions, and their cumulative effect has produced migratory drift and migration.[1]

Historically the Western Sudan has been receptive to influences generated from both external and internal sources. The savanna's lack of natural frontiers and major geographical divides encouraged human intercourse and facilitated the transmission of ideas and techniques. The formidable Sahara desert to the north was more a filter than a barrier, channeling rather than obstructing communication. Indeed, one of the main themes of Sudanic history has been its interaction with the civilizations of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The history of the Western Sudan has been characterized by continuous cultural adaptation and innovation, mediated principally through commerce, travel, migration, war, and conquest.

Sudanic Civilization and Warfare to c. 500 B.C.

During the late Stone Age of the first several millennia B.C. the foundations of human civilization were established in the Western Sudan.[2] Archaeological investigations indicate the widespread occurrence of hunting and fishing communities in the savanna after 5000 B.C. Three principal changes that occurred in this period were the development of a microlithic tool complex as the technological basis of society, the introduction of domesticated animals, and the "agricultural revolution." By the fifth millennium the technology of these denizens of the grassland had advanced beyond simple multipurpose tools to specialized and composite implements including the bow and arrow, throwing stick, club, spear and hand ax for hunting, and a variety of scraping, cutting, and pulverizing tools for the preparation of food and the making of clothing, shelter, weapons, and other instruments.

Although the origin of many domestic animals of Africa is still the subject of academic controversy, the recent publication of H. Epstein's monumental study has done much to resolve problems of evidence and interpretation.[3] Epstein argues convincingly that many animals domesticated in southwestern Asia, including cattle, chickens, dogs, goats, pigs, and sheep, were introduced into the Sudan between the fifth and third millennia B.C. To this list can be added the ass, apparently domesticated in Egypt.

The "agricultural revolution," that is, the domestication and cultivation of indigenous food plants, seems to have occurred in the Western Sudan in the third or second millennium B.C. It is uncertain whether the practice of agriculture in West Africa is to be attributed to independent invention or to diffusion from an original center of plant domestication in the Middle East. Most authorities, however, accept the diffusion thesis as being more

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compatible with existing botanical evidence and with the known spread of domestic animals from southwestern Asia. The cumulative effect of these technological and economic developments in the Sudan was to encourage the growth, concentration, and settlement of population, and to intensify the dual processes of social differentiation and stratification.

Violent forms of intercommunity conflict in this period probably resembled what anthropologists commonly call "primitive warfare."[4] Lacking specialized military technology, army organization, and command structure, these neolithic communities necessarily employed the techniques and weapons of the hunt in their "wars." All able-bodied males participated in combat under the informal leadership of individuals skilled in hunting and fighting. Warriors were self-equipped with weapons available to all: the bow and arrow (perhaps poisoned[5]), spear, throwing stick, and hand ax. Regular tactics were nonexistent, and individual fighting rather than organized unit combat prevailed. The tactical principles of mass and maneuver were unknown. There were no sieges or wars of attrition. Raids and ambushes – resembling the hunt in their emphasis on mobility, surprise, and stealth – were the common modes of attack. Little if any protective armor was worn, as this was incompatible with the prevailing conception and methods of combat. The rudimentary nature of Sudanic "warfare" in this period reflected the relatively low levels of social differentiation and organizational complexity of these communities. As Herbert Spencer noted of primitive societies, "the army is the mobilized community, and the community is the army at rest."[6]

The Formation of States, c. 500 B.C.–A.D. 1000

The 1,500 years between 500 B.C. and A.D. 1000 may be appropriately called the formative period in the evolution of Sudanic civilization. During this era there occurred three distinct but related developments that together constituted the prerequisites for the emergence of the prototype of Sudanic state organization: (1) the beginning of regular and extensive commercial contacts with North Africa, (2) the introduction of ironworking technology, and (3) the introduction of camels and horses, the former for transport and the latter for war.

The first indirect evidence of regular trans-Saharan contacts is found on the famous Saharan rock paintings depicting two-wheeled horse-drawn chariots. These pictures date from the late second millennium B.C. and are distributed along two well-defined "routes" that converge across the western and central Sahara on the Niger bend. Although the possibility of a trade in slaves after the middle of the first millennium B.C. is suggested by the presence of black slaves in Carthage, the development of extensive trans-Saharan commerce in slaves, gold, and ivory did not occur until the Roman period in North Africa.[7]

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On the other hand, the introduction of ironworking techniques into Africa dates from Hittite invasion of Egypt in the seventh century B.C.[8] By the sixth century iron technology had reached Napata and Meroe, but the use of iron did not become general (i.e., replacing bronze) until the third century B.C. In the Western Sudan the earliest evidence of ironworking occurs in the central Nigerian Nok culture between the fifth and third centuries B.C., and within the next several centuries the Sudan entered the Iron Age. It is uncertain whether this knowledge of ironworking was introduced into the Western Sudan from Egypt (via Meroe) or from Phoenician North Africa. These possibilities are not mutually exclusive, and further research may confirm both Egypt-Meroe and Carthage as centers for the diffusion of iron technology to sub-Saharan Africa.

Whatever its origin, this superior technology made possible more efficient means of food production, exploitation of natural resources, hunting, and warfare. In other words, the spread of this new technology was accompanied by the increasing ability of its possessors to control their natural environment and to conquer, absorb, or displace neolithic societies. Archaeological excavations have disclosed the widespread occupation of defensively organized habitation sites located in terrain that also afforded protection and camouflage. This technological change is also recorded on the Saharan rock paintings, which depict large iron spears, round shields, and wrist daggers replacing the bow and arrow as the predominant weapon complex.

Like ironworking, the domestication and use of horses and camels did not originate in Africa, but rather were introduced into the Sudan via North Africa and Egypt.[9] Horses were first domesticated in the Ukraine of southwestern Russia early in the third millennium B.C. In the early second millennium horses were hitched to chariots, and by the late second millennium riding had developed as a distinctive equestrian technique. However, the use of cavalry did not become general in the Middle East until the ninth century B.C.

The equines of the Western Sudan are descendants of two major types of horses, the Oriental (or "Arab") and the Barb-Dongola group.[10] Horses of the Oriental type, found today in their purest form among North African Berbers and Tuaregs of the *sahel*, were introduced into Egypt by the Hyksos conquerors in the seventeenth century B.C. From Egypt the Oriental spread south and west, reaching Libya in the twelfth century and the Maghreb during the next few centuries. As noted above, horses at this time were used for drawing chariots rather than as cavalry mounts. Oriental horses never became abundant south of the Sahara; their influx into North Africa dates only from the Arab invasions of the eleventh century A.D.

It was the Barb-Dongola group of horses that became significant in

Sudanic history. The Barb and Dongola were introduced into North Africa from Iberia about the eleventh century B.C. Rock paintings dated to the early first millennium B.C. attest to the spread of the Barb southward across the western Sahara to the *sahel* and savanna during Carthaginian times. The present-day distribution of the Barb lies between Senegambia and the Niger bend. It is probable that the development of cavalry occurred among the chariot users; this technique appeared in the Sahara about the sixth century B.C., and was later adopted in the Sudan.

The present distribution and physical characteristics of the Dongola suggest that this subtype spread eastward across the Maghreb, interbred with Orientals in Libya and Egypt, and arrived at Dongola on the Upper Nile during the Roman period. Dongola became the principal breeding enclave of this horse, and during the next several centuries it spread southwestward across the savanna as far as the Niger bend, where it intermixed with the Barb. The Dongola has survived in its purest state in the environs of Sokoto and Bornu.[11]

The camel seems to have been domesticated in the Arabian peninsula during the fourth millennium B.C. Camel nomadism developed in the Syrian desert about the twelfth century B.C., and the use of camels for transport several centuries later. Although there are sporadic indications of camels in Egypt since the end of the fourth millennium, it is generally agreed that the Romans introduced camels into North Africa on a large scale sometime between the first and fourth centuries A.D. The adaptability of the camel to the desert soon resulted in its employment as the principal means of transport in the trans-Saharan trade and as cavalry for the desert tribes. Again, the Saharan rock paintings, in which camels supplant the equine groups, testify to the prevalence of these changes by the seventh century.

Thus the introduction of camels and the use of horse cavalry in the Sudan coincided broadly with both the development of commercial contacts with Carthaginian and Roman North Africa and with the introduction of ironworking technology. The mutually reinforcing effects of these innovations converged during the first millennium A.D. and provided the stimulus and means to generate a state organization. State formation in the Sudan may be seen as a response to an economic stimulus that encouraged the elaboration of complex political structures capable of mobilizing human energy for the extraction of marketable commodities such as slaves, gold, and ivory. The introduction of horses and Iron Age technology, both of which could be monopolized by privileged minorities who controlled access to them, made possible the raiding and enslavement of those not so privileged.

By the middle of the first millennium A.D., therefore, iron, horses, and the camel-borne trans-Saharan trade had begun to transform the charac-

ter of Sudanic civilization. It is no mere coincidence that the emergence of the original Sudanic states – Tekrur, Ghana, Mali, Songhai (Gao), the Hausa states, and Kanem – can be traced to the period between the fourth and eighth centuries.[12] In each case a military aristocracy using iron technology and cavalry dominated the state and maintained its ascendancy by the control of strategic trade routes. In the next section we will examine the nature of these new forms of political and military organization.

The Sudanic State System, c. 1000–1800

The second millennium, which may be called the "golden age" of Sudanic civilization, was ushered in by the introduction of Islam. The first penetration of Islamic influence in the Sudan may have occurred in the seventh century as a consequence of the Arab invasion of North Africa. During the next few centuries it is difficult to trace the spread of Islam; however, the eleventh century appears to have been a "turning point" in the history of the Western Sudan, for by this time the ruling house of every important Sudanic state had adopted Islam.[13]

Islamic influences reinforced the Sudanic state organization and contributed toward its further development. Islam was closely associated with the trans-Saharan trade and the commercial penetration of the forest regions to the south, for the principal agents in this economic enterprise were Muslim merchants. In addition to its alleged religious and moral superiority, the adoption of Islam by the rulers of Sudanic states admitted them to the league of Muslim North African states whose friendship could be exploited for diplomatic, commercial, and military advantages. Internally, Islamic law, custom, and literacy in Arabic offered means and standards for administrative efficiency. Islam also had a considerable impact on Sudanic warfare, army organization, and military technology by providing an ideological justification for conquest and enslavement, and access to horses, weapons, and armor from North Africa. Islamic law and practices were also applied to the conduct of war, including battle formations, tactics, logistics, military recruitment, the seizure and distribution of booty, the disposition of captives, and frontier defense.[14]

Despite differences among them, the classical Sudanic states exhibited salient common structural characteristics. These Sudanic states did not evolve from local communities by a process of internal growth and accretion, but rather expanded as systems of control, imposed by conquest and maintained by military superiority and the exaction of tribute. In essence the classical Sudanic state was a political structure composed of two virtually discrete layers: (1) a ruling lineage and its administrative apparatus monopolizing special ritual, political, and military functions, which was superimposed on (2) a conglomeration of local village organizations.

As Fage concluded, the Sudanic state can be characterized as a "parasitic growth" that affixed itself to the economic base of sedentary agricultural societies, to which it contributed new ideas and techniques of political organization, commerce, religion, metallurgy, and methods of warfare.[15]

This dual character of the Sudanic state was the source of both its strength and weakness. Local villages were linked by few integrating mechanisms, for ethnic, cultural, and linguistic heterogeneity inhibited the formation of enduring translocal identities and organizational linkages. This lack of institutionalized horizontal linkages between the diverse elements of the Sudanic population increased their vulnerability to conquest by more unified groups possessing superior military organization and technology. The openness of the savanna permitted mobile armies of mounted warriors to extend their dominion over the relatively defenseless sedentary agricultural population with ease and effectiveness. Terrain and technology provided conditions favorable to the creation, expansion, and administration of empires.

On the other hand, there were inherent structural weaknesses in Sudanic state organization. Conquered groups had little in common with each other or with the ruling class. The ruling aristocracy made few attempts to integrate these diverse social elements into a unified state structure. Local laws, customs, cults, and social organization were only marginally affected by imperial rule. The range of relationships between the political center and the peripheral subject population was confined principally to the exaction of taxes and tribute, and the levying of conscripts for conquest or imperial defense. There was no integrating ideology or national identity to compete with or supplant parochial loyalties. Even Islam, which would have fulfilled the function of a unifying ideology, was more an exclusive imperial cult to be held in awe by the subject population rather than shared with it. Prior to the Muslim holy wars (A. *jihads*) of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, only a few Sudanic rulers like Askiya Muhammad I of Songhai (1493–1528) attempted to establish Islam as a state religion and unifying force. Conditions for the creation and maintenance of enduring multiethnic political entities were lacking in the Western Sudan. Vertical linkages in Sudanic state organization were as weak as the horizontal.

Structural instability and malintegration were salient characteristics of the classical Sudanic state system. Territorial aggrandizement was achieved by mobile armies, and imperial rule was established by the installation of provincial governors or the reduction of native chiefs to vassalage, and the levying of tribute on the conquered population. Communication between the rulers and their governors and vassals was slow, and control correspondingly difficult to maintain. Centrifugal tendencies were built into the system. Lacking adequate means of vertical and horizontal integration, Sudanic states were susceptible to sudden collapse.

Fission in the ruling superstructure was as much a threat as a breakdown in the layered administration. Imperial superstructures came and went, but local community organization remained relatively undisturbed. Palace revolutions, coups, dynastic changes, and political turmoil at the top did not affect the mass of the population. Even the heralded reforms of Askiya Muhammad I were short-lived, and Songhai disintegrated in the wake of the Moroccan invasion of 1591.

The fortunes of Sudanic states were dependent largely on military considerations. An active, efficient, and mobile army was the principal instrument of territorial expansion, security for strategic trade routes, and political control of far-flung but loosely knit empires. Continuous campaigning was necessary for conquest and reconquest, imperial defense, and internal control. Annual expeditions were dispatched to stabilize frontier regions, suppress revolts, and overawe ambitious viceroys and vassals.

During the second millennium Sudanic military organization and warfare also achieved their classic expression. In contrast to the "primitive" military practices of Sudanic communities prior to the introduction of iron, cavalry, commerce, and Islam, the classical Sudanic mode of warfare was characterized by a complex army organization, larger military forces, a specialized panoply of weapons and equipment, and tactics of mass and maneuver. Many elements associated with this military complex resembled the feudal institutions of contemporaneous medieval Europe, including the presence of vassalage, fiefs, the fusion of military and political functions in the ruling superstructure, and similar military technology.

In the Sudanic "feudal" system there were no standing armies, and military forces were mobilized by the rulers through the agency of their fief holders, vassals, and provincial governors only as required for specific campaigns.[16] These dry-season expeditions were of short duration, usually lasting a few weeks to a few months, after which the forces disbanded. Unlike the simply armed and undisciplined war parties of earlier primitive societies, the armies of Sudanic states consisted of tactically organized infantry and cavalry forces. The foot soldiers were the most numerous and were formed into specialized units of archers, spearmen, and swordsmen, each unit being outfitted with weapons and defensive accouterments appropriate to its tactical function. Mounted warriors generally carried javelins, swords, and shields, and some wore chain mail and quilted armor as well.

It is difficult to estimate the size of such "feudal" armies; in fact, military recruitment varied with such factors as the nature and importance of campaigns, the territorial extent of empires, and the loyalty and military assets of individual warlords. In the eleventh century al-Bakri reported that the army of Ghana numbered 200,000, including 40,000 archers; the number of cavalry was not indicated, but the horses were very small.[17] The Almoravids, whose army sacked Ghana in 1076, used both horse

cavalry and camels, but it was their fearsome infantry, organized into several ranks with pikemen in the vanguard and javelin hurlers behind, that bore the brunt of the fighting.[18] Mali was reported by al-Umari to have 100,000 warriors, 10,000 of whom were mounted. Its horses were half-breeds, and camels were used for transport rather than as cavalry mounts.[19] Such numbers as 200,000 and 100,000 are undoubtedly exaggerated, and probably represent conventional figures intended to convey greatness.[20] On the other hand, the reported strength of Songhai armies is more plausible. Apparently, the largest army assembled on a single occasion was that of Askiya Ishaq II (1588–91) at the fateful battle of Tondibi: the *Tarikh el-Fattach* records 18,000 cavalry and 9,700 infantry,[21] while the *Tarikh es-Soudan* estimates 12,500 cavalry and 30,000 infantry.[22] Although inconsistent, both sets of figures are within the limits of credibility. In addition, Tuareg allies often augmented Sudanic armies with large contingents of camel cavalry.[23]

Among the greatest conquerors and rulers in Sudanic history were those who realized the inherent weakness of such "feudal" levies and attempted to replace them with permanent armies. Both Sundiata, the famous empire builder of Mali, and Askiya Muhammad I, who ruled Songhai at its zenith, created standing armies to provide regular military forces and reduce their dependence on irregular "feudal" levies. However, these standing armies were essentially personal creations and did not become institutionalized features of Sudanic military organization. Although the significance of such innovations for the reigns of Sundiata and Muhammad must be recognized, they were but transient variations from the persistent "feudal" mode of Sudanic military organization. In a sense, though, these innovations established a precedent for the increasing use of standing armies that characterized nineteenth-century Sudanic states.

The armies of successive Sudanic empires seem to have relied increasingly upon cavalry. Cavalry mounts may be regarded as part of the technology of war, for horses were *par excellence* "delivery systems" that increased the range, speed, accuracy, and destructive capability of warriors' weapons. The development of this new military technology as the principal "means of destruction" had a profound effect upon patterns of economic, political, and military organization in the Sudan.[24] Unlike the "democratic" weapon complex characteristic of primitive warfare, cavalry was an "aristocratic" weapon system which could be controlled by a privileged minority. Horses were expensive to import and maintain. Moreover, the physical degeneration and high mortality among horses in the Sudan meant that continuous importation of Barbs and Dongolas from the north was necessary to ennoble and enlarge the available reserve of war-horses.

This dependence upon a continuous supply of horses was apparent among all Sudanic states. It has been noted already that the horses of

Ghana were very small and those of Mali were inferior half-breeds. Kani-
aga, one of the successor states that emerged after the collapse of Ghana,
demanded tribute principally in the form of horses to meet its military
requirements.[25] The horses of Kanem in the early fifteenth century were
also reported to be "small in size."[26] The constant demand for the larger
and more powerful breeds stimulated the development of a unique
exchange system in which horses from the north were traded for slaves
from the Sudan. It is difficult to determine when this peculiar exchange
system originated (perhaps as early as the first millennium B.C.?). How-
ever, it is sufficient to note here that by the early second millennium it
had become an institutionalized pattern of trans-Saharan commerce.[27] In
the fifteenth century Portuguese sources relate that horses were in great
demand in Senegambia, and that most of the local animals had been
imported from North Africa at the rate of nine to fourteen slaves each.[28]
By the early sixteenth century Portuguese merchants were also conduct-
ing a brisk and profitable horse trade there,[29] but in the interior of the
Sudan expensive northern imports continued to predominate.[30]

The exchange system was but a single manifestation of the basic trans-
formation that had occurred in Sudanic civilization, and signalled the
emergence of what may be called the "war complex" of the Western
Sudan. The war complex was essentially an institutionalized set of rela-
tionships that developed between predatory warfare and Sudanic state
organization. Slaves were exchanged for horses, which became the cav-
alry mounts employed in war and slave raids, which in turn produced
more slaves for internal use and commercial exchange. This circular proc-
ess served to establish slavery as a pervasive institutional feature of the
Sudanic state system. As Fage has observed, slavery and the slave trade
were "effective means of mobilizing labour for the economic and political
needs of the state," and "part of a sustained process of economic and
political development" that entailed the conquest of segmentary societies
and their absorption into larger political structures.[31]

The operation of this predatory war complex can be illustrated in the
following account of Bornu by Leo Africanus. In the early sixteenth cen-
tury Leo reported that the *mai* ("king," "chief") of Bornu possessed a for-
midable army including 3,000 cavalry, but was deeply indebted to the
North African merchants who supplied him with horses at the rate of
fifteen to twenty slaves each. These merchants had sold their horses on
credit and were then obliged to remain in Birnin Gazargamu, at the *mai's*
expense, while he conducted slave raids to accumulate enough captives to
satisfy his creditors. In fact, some of the horse traders Leo met had been
resident there more than a year without receiving sufficient compensation
for their valued shipment, and vowed never again to bring horses to
Bornu.[32]

The consequence of this premium on horses and cavalry was that mili-

tary functions increasingly became a matter of class. Since possession of a horse was beyond the means of the average warrior, cavalry mounts became the exclusive property of the wealthy. The importation of horses and the collection of slaves were functions performed by the state: political power generated wealth, and the ruling class and its clients were the principal beneficiaries of the war complex. The differentiation of cavalry from infantry became the basic principle of stratification in military organization. Economic, political, and social inequality were reflected in, and reinforced by, this military system, which maintained a fundamental distinction between cavalry and infantry, between the ruling class and the subject population, between aristocrats and commoners. Cavalry was the key to dominance in the predatory Sudanic state system.

The Hausa States to c. 1800

The origin of the Hausa states is still the subject of considerable speculation and debate among historians. According to the conventional interpretation of Hausa historical sources, the seven original states were formed about the turn of the second millennium by the offspring of a prince of Baghdad and the queen of Daura.[33] Hausa state formation has usually been associated with the influx of a dominant group of Saharan nomads, perhaps Berbers, who married into local chiefly lineages and by virtue of their superior political and military organization (perhaps including cavalry) imposed themselves over the indigenous agricultural population. Recently this external migration theory has been challenged by Abdullahi Smith, who argues that the formation of states in Hausaland predates the second millennium and was occasioned by two critical factors: the emergence of walled towns, and local migrations of Tuareg, Kanuri, Hausa, and other native groups.[34]

Whatever the cause may be, other contributing factors can be cited as well in explanation of the appearance of the Hausa states. The original Hausa states emerged in a small triangular enclave about 200 miles square, midway between the Niger bend and Lake Chad, in the north central part of Nigeria. It is important to note that prior to the fifteenth century this region was geographically remote from the major Sudanic empires, and therefore secure from the threat of depredation and conquest by Ghana, Mali, and Songhai to the west, and Kanem-Bornu to the east. Not only did the Hausa states enjoy the security of strategic isolation from predatory empires, but they also remained relatively isolated from each other until the fourteenth century. History and geography therefore provided favorable conditions for the emergence, development, and consolidation of states in this region of the Central Sudan.[35]

By the fourteenth century there began a period characterized by the transformation of these petty Hausa chiefdoms into elaborate state organ-

izations. Two factors already mentioned in connection with the development of the classical empires were also prominent in the process of Hausa state formation, namely the introduction of Islam, and the economic integration of the Hausa states into the international market system linking the North African, Saharan, and Sudanic emporiums. And as in the case of the first empires, Islam and commercial expansion did not produce radical changes among the mass of the population; rather they provided the means to effect political centralization, intensified warfare and slave trading, territorial aggrandizement, and the importation of horses and new military equipment. Thus in the power vacuum between Bornu and Songhai there emerged a number of states organized along the lines of the classical Sudanic state model and sustained by the same functional relationship among cavalry, warfare, slavery, and tributary exactions.

This transformation of the Hausa states can be best observed in the case of Kano, where it is possible to discern a steady development over several centuries in the complexity and variety of weapons, tactical innovations, state structure, and military organization.[36] The use of the spear and bow and arrow in Kano are doubtless of great antiquity, while the introduction of iron technology dates from about the middle of the first millennium. Horses and saddles were probably introduced from Bornu, perhaps in the late first or early second millennium.[37] Shields were first used in Kano during the reign of Sarki Yusa (1136–94), by which time the city was fortified also by a defensive wall and gates.[38] By the early fourteenth century a specialized military officialdom had appeared, and later Sarki Kanajeji (1390–1410) introduced quilted armor, iron helmets, and coats of mail to protect his cavalry.[39] Thereafter, the use of cavalry assumed increasing prominence in Hausa warfare.

The fifteenth century marked a watershed in Kano history. Trade relationships were expanded with Bornu, Gonja, and North Africa. Predatory raids for slaves were intensified, especially under Sarki Abdullahi Burja (1438–52), whose Galadima Daudu is reputed to have campaigned in the south for seven years. These raids were so successful that Kano itself became saturated with slaves, and Daudu founded twenty-one towns and populated them with war captives. In the late fifteenth century Sarkin Kano Muhammad Rumfa (1463–99), perhaps under pressure from Bornu and Songhai or attempting to emulate their imperial example, reorganized the government, made extensive use of slaves and eunuchs in state administration, instituted the practice of forcible requisitioning of peasants' property, extended the town's fortifications, and introduced new military formations.

Rumfa's appropriation of additional powers by arbitrary action, administrative genius, and military reforms transformed the nature of rulership in Kano. From his time onward increasing autocracy and militancy characterized this Hausa state system. Warfare among the Hausa states had

become endemic, and the acquisition of larger and more varied military stores became a paramount concern of their rulers. By the early sixteenth century Kano was renowned for its "mighty troupes of horsemen."[40] Fire-arms, first reported in Kano in the fifteenth century, were imported from Nupe in the early eighteenth century by Sarki Muhammad Kumbari (1731–43). Kumbari also imported new shields from Nupe, and his successor, Kabe (1743–53), waged war so constantly that there was "no peace in Kano" during his reign.[41] Babba Zaki (1768–76) organized a regular bodyguard of musketeers and ruled as a despot, extorting his chiefs and slaves and forcing them to go to war.

After the fourteenth century, therefore, Hausa state structure and military organization evolved toward the classical model of the predatory Sudanic state. An extensive and intricate pattern of trade in weapons had developed to satisfy the military requirements of the state: horses were imported from Bornu, mail and other military equipment from the north, guns and shields from the south. Politico-military organization, dominated by a mounted warrior aristocracy, had since the fourteenth century also assumed the central characteristics of the Sudanic "feudal" system. Endemic warfare became the foundation of a highly unified political, social, and economic edifice erected on the supporting structure of slavery. This system survived the *jihad* of the nineteenth century and remained remarkably intact until the European conquest of the Sudan at the turn of the twentieth century.

The changes that occurred in the internal structure of the Hausa states after the fourteenth century were accompanied by an equally marked transformation of the interstate system in the Central Sudan. The emergence and consolidation of the Hausa states occasioned increasing interaction among themselves and with other Sudanic states. By this expansion and intensification of their external relationships, the Hausa states were progressively incorporated into the Sudanic interstate system. This process of incorporation entailed two important consequences. First, the Hausa states lost the security afforded by their previous condition of geostrategic isolation; and second, the "power vacuum" or "buffer zone" between Songhai and Bornu ceased to exist.

The appearance of these new states immediately beyond the frontiers of Songhai and Bornu must have provoked a considerable dilemma for these imperial powers. On the one hand, the Hausa states may have been regarded by Songhai and Bornu as threats to their outlying provinces and perhaps ultimately to their imperial heartlands; such fears would have encouraged preemptive defensive wars. On the other hand, the obvious economic and strategic advantages to be gained by reducing the Hausa states to protectorates or incorporating them into their respective empires may have impelled Songhai and Bornu to military aggression. Whatever their respective motivations, the outcome was the same in both cases: suc-

cessive efforts by Bornu and Songhai to conquer and incorporate the Hausa states into their imperial domains.[42]

The first and most prolonged threat to the independence of the Hausa states came from the ancient empire of Bornu to the east. Originally established in the northeastern Chad basin (Kanem) in the late first millennium, Bornu began to turn its attention toward the region southwest of the lake during the thirteenth century. In the late fourteenth century the Muslim *mais* of the ruling Sefawa dynasty, having suffered military defeat by the pagan Bulala branch of the royal house, fled to Kaka and there reestablished its rule over the indigenous inhabitants. By the fifteenth century local resistance was overcome and, relieved of Bulala pressure from the east, the *mais* began to shift their interest to the west, raiding and exacting tribute from territories as far west as Kano.

Thus after the fifteenth century Bornu emerged as the major foreign influence in the affairs of the Hausa states. However, the extent and degree of this influence varied considerably during the next three centuries. Although the Hausa states were reduced to the status of tributary clients in typical Sudanic fashion, the *mais* were never able to annex and incorporate them into a universal empire or unitary state structure. This period of Bornu hegemony was interrupted by the brief intrusion of Songhai into Hausaland in the early sixteenth century, and then by the short-lived ascendancy of Kebbi among the Hausa states. In the seventeenth century Bornu entered a period of decline, suffering Tuareg depredations from the north, internecine conflict among its Hausa dependencies, and serious inroads into both Hausaland and its own southwestern territories by the Jukun kingdom of Kwararafa. Early in the eighteenth century Bornu briefly regained its position of preeminence and again exacted tribute from Kano, Zazzau, Gobir, Katsina, and Zamfara; but in the second half of the century the Hausa states, taking advantage of Bornu's ineffective leadership and preoccupation with Tuareg raids, threw off their allegience in their own quest for regional empire.

The second major attempt to establish a universal empire in the Central Sudan was that of Songhai. As the first Sudanic empire whose center of gravity was fixed about the Niger bend, Songhai was also strategically located to pose a genuine threat to the Hausa states from the west. Early in the sixteenth century Askiya Muhammad I (1493–1528), after securing his western and southern flanks by a series of successful military campaigns, turned his attention toward the east. In alliance with the ambitious and aggressive Kanta ("chief," "ruler") Kotal of Kebbi, Muhammad attacked and imposed tribute upon Gobir, Kano, Katsina, Zazzau, and other states. But Songhai's ascendancy was short-lived. In 1515, after a successful expedition against Agades, Kanta Kotal fell out with the *askiya* over the division of the war spoils and declared his independence of Songhai. Thus ended the brief Songhai intrusion into Hausaland.

After his defection, Kanta Kotal successfully resisted subsequent Son-
ghai efforts to conquer Kebbi, and embarked on a series of adventurous
military campaigns in what appears to have been the first systematic
quest of regional empire along the Hausa states.[43] The *kanta* raided over
a vast territory, from Air in the north to Nupe in the south, from Songhai
to the western marches of Bornu, subjecting Zaberma, Zamfara, Zazzau,
Katsina, Yauri, Gurma, Gobir, Nupe, and southern Air. Although Kebbi
stubbornly resisted attempts by both Songhai and Bornu to subjugate it,
this first Hausa empire was a personal creation of Kanta Kotal and did
not long survive him. During the second half of the sixteenth century
Kebbi declined until it was just another relatively small state struggling to
maintain its independence from external domination of other contenders
for empire.

Kebbi's unsuccessful attempt to establish a lasting multistate political
entity can be regarded as the Hausa variation on the theme of the quest
of universal empire in the Central Sudan.[44] For almost a century after
the period of Kebbi ascendancy, the other major Hausa states – Kano,
Katsina, and Zazzau – were engaged in a series of debilitating wars in
which none achieved more than temporary advantage. Then, after the
brief irruption of the Jukun into Hausaland in the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury, and the resurgence of Bornu in the early eighteenth, it was Zamfara
that emerged as the paramount local power among the Hausa states. By
the mid-eighteenth century, after a series of wars with Kano, Katsina,
Gobir, and Kebbi, Zamfara had become the dominant state in the Rima
river valley.

But Zamfara's preeminence was as brief as that of its predecessors, and
was eclipsed by the rise of Gobir. Following a period of warfare with
Kebbi, Air, Kano, Katsina, Zaberma, Gurma, and Zamfara itself, the Gobi-
rawa sacked Birnin Zamfara c. 1764 and then established their own capi-
tal at Alkalawa, strategically located at the confluence of the Rima and
one of its tributaries draining northern Katsina. Bornu was apparently
unable to check Gobir's aggression; one by one its nominal Hausa client
states were detached or withdrew from the tributary orbit, effectively
ending three centuries of intermittent imperial suzerainty exercised by
Bornu. Gobir, like its forerunners, enjoyed a position of preponderant
power among the Hausa states only for a short time. By the end of the
eighteenth century constant warfare had drained the state treasury, Zam-
fara was in revolt, Katsina raided its southern territories, and Kebbi
refused to acknowledge Gobir overlordship.

Thus in the late eighteenth century the Hausa states appeared to be
entering the period of turbulence or time of troubles that typically
attended the decline of the locally predominant power and the rise of
another. The cycle of Hausa regional empire building seemed to be on
the verge of repeating itself. The Hausa states had survived the quest of

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universal empire by Bornu since the fifteenth century and by Songhai in the early sixteenth, and successive attempts by Kebbi, Kano, Katsina, Zazzau, the Jukun, Zamfara, and Gobir to create an enduring regional multistate empire.

Indeed, the quest of empire, or as Adeleye put it, "the search for larger and more secure political entities,"[45] was a dominant theme of Central Sudanic history from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century. If this history had demonstrated anything, it was that attempts to create a universal or regional empire by force alone were destined to fail. Bornu and Songhai were unable to subdue the unruly Hausa states. For their part, the Hausa states failed to cohere in the face of external aggression or to form among themselves alliances for collective security. Internecine conflict and warfare were endemic, and no single foreign power or regional leader was able to impose a lasting pax. And in the late eighteenth century the cycle of regional empire building among the Hausa states appeared to be entering that critical period of disturbance that preceded the emergence of a new power.

But a recurrence of the empire cycle was by no means a logical or historical necessity. Although political and economic rivalries and ethnic and religious heterogeneity had for centuries inhibited the formation of enduring empires in the Central Sudan, these conditions did not preclude the possibility of such an empire. The essential ingredient, lacking during these centuries of tentative empire building, was the existence of a common interest and a common ideology. As Adeleye has argued:

In the absence of any powerful state or group of states willing and able to act together to impose a common pax by military means over the numerous states and peoples, a common need or unifying ideology was a prerequisite for guaranteeing the cohesion of any multi-ethnic or multi-state political entity.[46]

It was the growth of Islam that, after several fits and starts in Sudanic history, finally provided this "unifying ideology," permitting for the first time the creation and maintenance of a multistate empire in which these diverse elements were integrated. The coincidence of this religious theme and that of the quest of empire culminated in the *jihad* of 1804, the subject of the next chapter.

The *Jihad* Period, c. 1790–1817

Political conditions in the Central Sudan in the late eighteenth century were in a state of extraordinary flux. Bornu had relinquished effective control of its Hausa clients, and Gobir's quest of empire served only to increase the level of internecine conflict. In the absence of a stable universal or regional imperium, the Sudanic interstate system was especially vulnerable to external and internal pressures. This breakdown of interstate political order coincided with a remarkable Islamic revival in the Central Sudan, and the convergence of these political and religious forces produced a radical departure from its historical pattern of empire building. Unlike the classical Sudanic pattern of foreign conquest or the ascendance of a single regional power, the early nineteenth century witnessed a massive series of civil wars that originated within and quickly spread beyond the Hausa states. These internal wars, motivated and legitimized by Islam, entailed far-reaching consequences: the overthrow of the Hausa states; the displacement of some of their ruling dynasties to successor states in exile (e.g., Daura, Maradi, Gobir, Abuja); the destruction of Bornu and its ancient Sefawa dynasty, and the re-formation of the state by al-Kanemi; the establishment of several new states on the southwestern frontiers of Bornu (Katagum, Hadejia, Missau, Bauchi, Gombe, Muri, and Adamawa), the conquest of Nupe and Ilorin, and the incorporation of all these along with the Hausa states into a single political entity. Thus the *jihad* that began in 1804 transformed the structure of the interstate system in the Central Sudan by its destruction of the old order and the creation of a new multiethnic and multistate empire – the Sokoto Caliphate. Islam provided the "common need or unifying ideology" necessary for the formation and integration of an enduring pluralistic political system.

Militant Islamic revivalism, regarded by one authority only a little more than a decade ago as a "neglected theme of West African history,"[1] has since become one of its most prominent aspects. The *jihad* in the Hausa states in particular has engaged the interest of the academic generation of Western African historians that came of age in the 1960s. Despite the abundance of historical studies that now exists, the military aspects of the *jihad* have received relatively little attention. In examining the military and strategic factors that contributed to the success of the *jihad*, this

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chapter will in some measure help to fill this lacuna in the historical literature.[2]

Historical Background

The *jihad* in the Central Sudan was in a special sense the culmination of a militant tradition of Islamic reform that originated in the Almoravid movement of the eleventh century. This tradition was revived and expounded in the writings of al-Maghili in the early sixteenth century, and received political expression in the attempt by Askiya Muhammad I (1493–1528) to establish Islam as the state religion of Songhai. Al-Maghili emphasized the messianic and martial strains of Islam: that a reformer (A. *mujaddid*) would appear at the beginning of every century to renew the faith and expunge impure practices; that *jihad* against unbelievers and political oppressors was meritorious; and that force was a legitimate means to establish divine rule on earth.[3]

By the late eighteenth century conditions in Hausaland, and in Gobir in particular, again favored a recrudescence of this Islamic reform impulse. Popular discontent with misgovernment, corruption, and oppression in the nominally Muslim Hausa states was widespread. Although these grievances involved overtones of political, economic, and ethnic conflict, they were articulated in religious terms. Itinerant Muslim scholars preached reform and intensified their proselytizing efforts among the population. Islam again became a vehicle for the expression of social and political discontent. As early as the 1770s a call to *jihad* was issued by the uncompromising scholar Jibrilu dan Umaru, but his call went unheeded. Although unsuccessful, Jibrilu's premature efforts were not wasted; some thirty years later his student, Shehu Usuman dan Fodio, elaborating the militant Islam of al-Maghili and his mentor, launched the most important *jihad* in West African history.

In this Islamic reform movement, which culminated in the *jihad* of 1804, a prominent role was played by Fulani. By the late eighteenth century, after several centuries of migration, the Fulani were widely distributed throughout the Hausa states, constituting perhaps one-sixth or one-fifth of the total population.[4] Many had abandoned their original pastoral habits, and in fact four distinct groups could be distinguished.[5] The true nomads (F. Bororo'en; H. Bararo) remained a large minority, but others had made a partial or complete transition to sedentary life. The largest Fulani group was the Fulbe na'i, the semisedentary pastoralists who practiced both agriculture and stock raising. A third group, the Toroobe, had become specialists in Islamic learning and religion, education, law, and administration. Many served the Hausa ruling class as court officials and professional government servants. Lastly, a small group, Fulbe siire, had abandoned pastoralism altogether, settled among the local peasants, and

became almost indistinguishable from them. Although these four groups were differentiated by their vocational specialization, they shared important bonds of ethnic affinity maintained through intermarriage.

The Tuareg also were important agents in the transmission of Islamic learning. While internally fragmented by caste and clan divisions, many Tuareg scholars were linked with their Fulani counterparts by their mutual interests. Learned Fulani and Tuareg shared a common religion and used Arabic as a common tongue. It was by these ties of religion and scholarship that the larger ethnic communities of Fulani and Tuareg were linked. And it was the celebrated Shehu, Usuman dan Fodio, who galvanized this community for reform and ultimately for war.

The Shehu was born in 1754 into a family with a long tradition of Islamic learning. After studying with his father and local scholars like Usuman Binduri, Muhammadu Sambo, and Jibrilu, the Shehu began his own public ministry c. 1774–5 from his home base at Degel. Situated some sixty to seventy miles west of Alkalawa, Degel was relatively isolated from Gobir authority and soon became an active center of Islamic learning; here the Shehu studied, taught, and wrote; from Degel he traveled abroad to preach in Kebbi, Zamfara, Zaberma, and Daura; and to it he attracted a large following, receiving scholars and students from as far away as Bornu. Thus the Degel Muslim community grew in numbers and established contacts with the local leaders of many other Muslim communities (A. *jama'a*) throughout Hausaland and beyond. These scattered *jama'a* became the nuclei of a reform movement that transcended traditional political boundaries, and later provided the leadership as well as the core of the armies that responded to the Shehu's call for *jihad*.

At first the Shehu's community enjoyed considerable autonomy within the state of Gobir. The aged Sultan Bawa (died c. 1790) was preoccupied with external problems, and in 1788/9 the Shehu took advantage of this situation to extract several concessions from him, including freedom to preach and to be received by the populace, a guarantee of equal rights for Muslims, tax relief for the peasants, and the release of prisoners. However, as the Muslim community grew in size and continued to assert itself, Bawa's successors took measures designed to curb its influence. Militarily preoccupied with Kebbi, Zamfara, and Katsina, the sultans could ill-afford an internal menace. Sultan Nafata (c. 1794/5–1802) moved decisively to dissolve the emerging Muslim "state within a state." Soon after his accession, he revoked the special privileges enjoyed by the Muslims and imposed several restrictions upon them. Preaching, except by the Shehu, was forbidden; new conversions to Islam were prohibited; and Muslim men were ordered to remove their turbans and women their veils. Nafata also forbade Muslims to carry arms. These new discriminatory regulations reversed the status of immunity granted by Bawa and imposed severe disabilities upon the Muslim community. By limiting its size and activity,

and denying it the privileges of distinctive dress and the bearing of arms, the new sultan hoped to reassert his control over the Muslim community and to reintegrate it into the state.

However, the implacable hostility of Nafata's son and successor, Yunfa (c. 1802–8), further alienated the Muslims and ultimately provoked their rebellion. First, Yunfa attempted to murder the Shehu in c. 1803. Failing in this, his army attacked the Muslim settlement of the Shehu's disciple Abdu Salami at Gimbana and took many captives. However, the Shehu intercepted the Gobir column and forced the release of the Muslim prisoners. This direct attack on the Muslims and their resolute resistance precipitated a major crisis. Yunfa threatened to retaliate, and the Muslims sought refuge in flight. In February 1804 they began the historic emigration (A. *hijra*) from Degel to Gudu, signaling their irrevocable withdrawal of allegiance from Gobir. In their new secure locale the community declared the Shehu *Amir al-mu'minin*, Commander of the Faithful, and prepared for war. The crisis had passed the point of a peaceful resolution. Reform had given way to revolt, and the reformers (A. *mujaddidun*) became warriors in the service of Islam (A. *mujahidun*). The *jihad* had begun.

Several related factors appear to have been of crucial significance in contributing toward the outbreak of the *jihad*.[6] The first was the relative weakness and decline of Gobir. Since the mid-eighteenth century Gobir had been at war almost constantly, especially with Zamfara and Katsina. Birnin Zamfara had been sacked, but the Zamfarawa remained in rebellion. Katsina continued to raid Gobir territory aggressively into the early nineteenth century. To these external problems was added the threat to Gobir's internal security offered by the growing Muslim reform movement. The Shehu's base at Degel may have seemed threatening to the sultans; and his itinerant preaching in Kebbi and Zamfara, both of which resisted the Gobir imperium, must have appeared treasonous. In addition, Gobir suffered from a lack of continuity and stability in its leadership. Sultan Bawa died in c. 1790, and his brother and successor Yakuba was killed c. 1794/5 in a battle with Katsina. Yakuba's brother, Nafata, ruled only about seven years, and was succeeded by his son Yunfa in c. 1802. Yunfa faced formidable internal and external problems. As the new sultan, he had little time to consolidate his position and may have encountered opposition from rival claimants to the throne. Moreover, the state itself was insecure. Kebbi and Zamfara remained in revolt, and in the first year of his reign Katsina had made a major incursion into southern Gobir. In attempting to suppress forcibly the "subversive" activities of the Shehu's Muslim community, he provoked an internal war.

The second important factor that favored the occurrence of the *jihad* was the strategic advantage of isolation enjoyed by the dispersed Muslim communities. By 1804 the Shehu had been active for about thirty years,

and had attracted a considerable local following at Degel and throughout Gobir. He had also established contact with prominent Muslim leaders in the other Hausa states and in the western marches of Bornu. When the *jihad* was proclaimed, these scattered *jama'a* became the focal points of revolt. They provided an immediate source of manpower for military forces, and their leaders became regional commanders. The dispersion of these communities in remote areas far from the major centers of government afforded the rebels the time, autonomy, and security necessary to organize for war.

Third, the Muslims enjoyed a decided psychological advantage. In the late eighteenth century the Muslim literary tradition in the Sudan experienced a remarkable renaissance. Numerous treatises, books, poems, and propaganda tracts deplored the decadence of Islam in the Sudan and called for its revival.[7] The increasing militancy of these works and the activism of local preachers increased popular awareness of social grievances and offered a means to alleviate them by reform. These scholarly and proselytizing activities prepared the Muslims psychologically for the *jihad* and motivated them to fight. Moreover, this psychological readiness was reinforced by the messianic and millennialist strain of Islam which, at the beginning of the thirteenth Islamic century (A.D. 1785), manifested itself in widespread Mahdist expectations.

Fourth, important ethnic tensions contributed toward the outbreak of civil violence. Although the *jihad* was not exclusively an ethnic war between Hausa and Fulani, ethnic differences doubtless intensified the conflict. Fulani clerics were the principal agents of the Islamic revival. They represented an elite distinguished by its education, religious devotion, administrative skills, and sedentary life; but bonds of kinship and ethnicity linked them to other Fulani communities, including the pastoralists. The interests of this Fulani elite were fundamentally different from those of the rural agricultural Hausa population. The nomadic Fulani also had little in common with the Hausa peasantry and, indeed, conflict over land usage may have been common. On the other hand, the learned Fulani made common cause with their Tuareg counterparts, who, like the Fulani, also maintained close relationships with their nomadic kinsmen. The nomads, both Fulani and Tuareg, regarded the peasants with contempt, and the scholarly elite had few ties with rural Hausa cultivators. Ethnic affinities thus reinforced other socioeconomic divisions. In the *jihad* itself all the major regional commanders except Yakubu of Bauchi were Fulani. Consequently the consolidation of the Sokoto Caliphate entailed the consolidation of Fulani rule in the conquered territories.

Finally, the *jihad*, at least in its early stage, appealed to all dissatisfied elements of the population and therefore attracted support from such diverse groups as Islamic scholars, certain Fulani, Tuareg, and sedentary Hausa groups, slaves, and mercenary adventurers as well. Although the

leadership of the *jihad* was predominantly Fulani, its supporters repre-
sented a cross section of local society. Such mass support was a prerequis-
ite for the success of the *jihad*.[8]

Military Organization and Tactics in the *Jihad*

Even a cursory survey of the military organization and practices of the
jihad period reveals several interesting historical parallels with the first
Muslim armies in seventh-century Arabia. To be sure, some of the similar-
ities are simply historical accident or coincidence; but others reflect a
conscious effort by the nineteenth-century *mujahidun* to emulate the life
of the Prophet Muhammad and classical Islamic customs, and to interpret
their mission and fortunes as a repetition of a cycle in Islamic history. For
example, the Shehu's flight from Degel to Gudu was viewed by the Mus-
lims as the parallel of the Prophet's *hijra* from Mecca to Medina in A.D.
622. Likewise, the first major battle of the *jihad* at Tabkin Kwotto was
compared with the Prophet's victory over the Meccans at Badr in A.D. 624.
Moreover, the armies of both Muhammad and these nineteenth-century
Muslim warriors were at first composed largely of nomadic pastoralists:
lacking cavalry in their first battles, both armies relied upon infantry
forces fighting in close ranks. Finally, the increasing use of cavalry
resulted in important changes in military organization, tactics, and battle
formations of these two armies.[9]

Unfortunately, however, there is little extant evidence regarding the
organization of the Muslim forces prior to the outbreak of the *jihad* in
1804. At first the Shehu's scholarly community at Degel was not organized
for war and the town itself was unfortified. There was no formal military
command structure, no specialized army organization or equipment, no
training in tactics, no strategic planning. It seems that military prepara-
tions did not begin until the mid-1790s, that is, about twenty years after
the Shehu began his public life and about ten years before the *jihad* itself.
The critical event that marked this transition from a pious religious com-
munity to a potential military force was the call to arms issued by the
Shehu c. 1795, after a series of mystical visions in which he was handed
the "Sword of Truth" and commanded to use it against the enemies of
God. As his brother Abdullahi later recalled,

Our *Shaikh'Uth*man—may God perpetuate the glory of Islam through him—when he
saw the greatness of the community, and their desire to break away from the unbeliev-
ers, and commence Holy War, began to incite them to arms, saying to them "verily to
make ready weapons is *sunna*," and we began to make weapons ready. . . .[10]

The circumstances in which this decision to arm was taken, and its
immediate consequences, are uncertain. As men at this time generally car-
ried such weapons as bows and arrows, knives, and perhaps swords, the
Shehu's public call to arms may appear anomalous or superfluous. It is

probable, however, that this exhortation was directed toward the scholars, who themselves did not habitually carry weapons. Moreover, the timing of this event was not entirely adventitious. Sultan Nafata had issued his ominous anti-Muslim proclamation soon after ascending the throne c. 1794/5. And in addition to these restrictions placed on the Muslims' freedom of religious expression, some Fulani groups today maintain that Nafata also forbade the Shehu's followers to keep horses or to carry weapons of any kind.[11] It is possible that Nafata acted to disarm the Muslims in response to their military preparations. Alternatively, the Shehu's call to arms may have been issued in defiance of Nafata's edict. Whatever the actual motivations and sequence of events were, the decision to arm and fight if necessary was crucial. It marked a determination to resist the sultan's authority and a willingness to resort to force rather than submit. Although armed hostilities did not occur until 1804, the *jihad* may well have appeared inevitable to many ten years before.

As indicated above, the composition of the groups that answered the Shehu's call to *jihad* was heterogeneous and fragmented. It consisted of Islamic scholars like the Shehu, his brother Abdullahi, and son Muhammadu Bello, and the other local leaders of the dispersed Muslim communities; Fulani and Tuareg groups whose motives ranged from genuine religious devotion to calculated opportunism and the hope for war booty; and certain segments of the sedentary Hausa peasantry whose grievances against their rulers were sufficient to cause them to rebel. It is impossible to draw clear lines on the basis of ethnicity between those who supported the *jihad* and those who opposed it. Certainly the Fulani were overrepresented, especially among the leadership; but their allegiance was rooted more in personal loyalty to the Shehu and an ideological commitment to Islam than in mere ethnic affinity. Other Muslim leaders and Fulani, Tuareg, and Hausa groups remained loyal to their governments and fought the insurgents. The *jihad* as an instrument of Islamic reform attracted a variety of adherents whose motives, individual and collective, were complex. Extraordinary leadership was essential to bring unity to such diversity, and herein lies the genius of the Shehu. In the personal leadership qualities of Shehu Usuman dan Fodio the diffuse Muslim protest movement found the crucial central focus necessary to galvanize its scattered and heterogeneous constituency into a coherent community.

The leadership provided by the Shehu, however, was essentially spiritual and religious rather than military. From the beginning he preferred to remain a noncombatant and to delegate actual positions of military command to others. The Shehu chose as lieutenants capable members of his own family and individuals who usually had ties with local Fulani clan leaders. These men were given flags (*tuta, tutoci*) blessed by the Shehu to signify their appointment as deputies (A. *nuwwab*), and were elevated to the status of *amir al-jaish* or commander of the army. The flag was the

ensign of Muslim leadership and the insignia of command rank, symboliz-
ing at once recognition of the Shehu's preeminence and the authority to
raise an army and wage war. Without a flag, no man could legitimately
claim to be a lieutenant of the Shehu. The original flag bearers thus
became provincial or territorial commanders responsible for broadly
defined military regions. These senior commanders in turn deputized sub-
alterns of their own who were also entitled to carry flags signifying both
their authority and subordination.

The status of these lieutenants was more that of loyal clients with large
personal followings than a formal hierarchy of titled military officials.
Although the Shehu appointed Aliyu Jaidu commander-in-chief, the office
was titular and his authority in practice was limited to the Sokoto area.
The several other commanders who operated either independently or in
mutual support were essentially local leaders who enjoyed widespread
prestige and could mobilize large followings. Such were Muhammadu
Bello and Abdullahi, respectively the son and younger brother of the
Shehu; Moyijo, leader of the Kebbi Fulani; Muhammadu Namoda, a
leader of the Alibawa Fulani of Zamfara; and the regional flag bearers
who, in carrying the *jihad* throughout Hausaland and into Bornu, Ada-
mawa, Nupe, and Ilorin, later became the founders of ruling dynasties of
the various emirates that were to comprise the Sokoto Caliphate. Thus the
leadership of the *jihad* was composed of many figures, both major and
minor, who were closely linked by ties of kinship, scholarship, and per-
sonal allegiance; and their armies were essentially local, mobile militia
forces capable of both independent and joint operations.[12]

Like command structure, organization and equipment were at first
rudimentary. The insurgent Muslim communities constituted themselves
as irregular armies equipped with the weapons commonly in use at the
time. It is probable that tactical organization, following the Sudanic prac-
tice, was characterized by small units composed of warriors differentiated
by weapon complex and tribal or regional origin. In the 1820s Richard
Lander reported that the Shehu had divided his followers "into bands, or
companies, and nominating a captain to each fifty, bade them go forth
and conquer in the name of the Prophet."[13] While this account is not to
be taken literally, it is noteworthy that among the Hausa states it was cus-
tomary to organize the infantry into squads of up to fifty men.[14] Archers
were undoubtedly the largest single contingent; other units carried a
combination of javelins, swords, shields, knives, and battle-axes. In the
beginning, especially in the Sokoto area, there was a remarkable absence
of cavalry and heavy armor among the rebels. The first Muslim armies,
therefore, were essentially lightly armed and mobile infantry forces that
could move quickly either defensively or on the offense; but, lacking
cavalry, they were vulnerable to enemy horsemen on open ground.

As related above, the hostility of Sultan Yunfa (c. 1802–8) forced the

Shehu and his followers to flee from Degel to Gudu in February 1804, sig-
naling the commencement of the *jihad.* Time was a critical factor at this
juncture. Yunfa immediately dispatched patrols to keep the Shehu's move-
ments under surveillance, began to raise an army, and sought to bring the
other Hausa states and loyal Tuareg groups into an alliance to suppress
the Muslim insurrection. Although the hilly terrain surrounding Gudu
offered protection from harassment of the Gobir cavalry patrols, the Mus-
lims recognized that a passive defense would only postpone the inevitable
armed confrontation with the sultan's army. Exploiting the respite
afforded by Yunfa's military and diplomatic preparations, they seized the
initiative and moved to the offensive. In early June the Muslims sallied
forth from Gudu, defeated a small Gobir skirmishing force, and went on
to capture the important towns of Matankari and Konni to the north.

    These early victories were crucial for several reasons. Psychologically,
the effect of these first victories must have been a tremendous boost in the
Muslims' morale. No longer were they an intimidated, defenseless, and
beleaguered community awaiting the sultan's coup de grâce; they had
struck the first decisive blows and proved their military effectiveness.
Strategically, the fall of Matankari and Konni secured the northern flank
of the Shehu's area of operations and established the seizure of key towns
as the central objective of the *jihad* campaigns. It also permitted greater
freedom of movement in that direction, and later in the month prevented
the Gobir army, which was approaching from the south, from enveloping
the Muslim forces. Finally, the booty captured in these towns provided
additional supplies and military equipment so desperately needed to con-
tinue the struggle.

    By the third week in June Yunfa had raised an army and marched
toward the scene of the Muslim insurgency in western Gobir. Fortunately
for the rebels, the sultan's efforts to effect an alliance with the other
Hausa states failed, and Gobir was left to cope with the revolt alone.
Despite the absence of reinforcements from the other Hausa states, Yunfa
had marshaled an impressive army of 100 heavy cavalry in chain mail and
quilted arrowproof armor, a large force of light cavalry, an allied Tuareg
camel corps, and (probably) several thousand infantry armed with bows
and arrows, swords, shields, lances, throwing spears, battle-axes, and a
few firearms. The Muslim army, on the other hand, was basically a light
infantry force composed largely of archers. There was no heavy cavalry,
no firearms, and only a small unit of about twenty light cavalry hastily
formed by a few deserters from the Gobir army and some additional
mounts captured by the Tuareg *malam,* Agali. In terms of sheer strength
in numbers and equipment, the Gobirawa commanded superior forces
and held a decided advantage.

    Being warned of the approach of this formidable Gobir army, the Mus-
lims acted quickly. Rather than await a siege at Gudu, they left their

defensive position and sought more favorable ground toward the west. After a long night march to Lake Kwotto they rested, refreshed themselves, and prepared for battle. As the Muslim forces assembled in the wooded area near the lake, the Gobir army, hoping to catch them by surprise and cut off reinforcements or retreat toward the west, made a circuitous approach from the south. But by now the initiative and element of surprise may well have passed to the Muslims, for the Gobirawa, finding their enemy fully prepared for battle, were forced to engage them on their terms. The two armies formed into battle order in line-abreast formation. Although heavily outnumbered and poorly equipped, the Muslims enjoyed a psychological and perhaps a tactical advantage as well, and took the offensive: sounding their war cry, they charged the Gobir army. Thus began the battle of Tabkin Kwotto, the first major engagement of the *jihad*.[15]

Initially the battle went badly for the Muslims. The large Gobir cavalry force enveloped both wings of the army and pressed them into a small tight cluster around the center of the line. But the center, enlarged and reinforced by the contraction of the flanks, stood fast. The tactical advantage now seems to have passed decisively to the Muslims, for the numerical superiority of the Gobir army was offset by the close ranks into which both battle lines were compressed. The Gobir cavalry was unable to break and penetrate the dense ranks of the phalanx or "square" formation into which it had squeezed the enemy. This enabled the Muslim archers to maximize the long-range, rapid-shooting capability of their weapons, which now began to take a heavy toll on the Gobirawa. The tide of battle turned against the sultan's army. Its superiority in numbers and cavalry had been neutralized. In fact, its very size may have become at this point a decided disadvantage in combat at close quarters. The Muslims had withstood the first onslaught and successfully exploited the tactical situation. In economizing their forces and massing their fire, the Muslims had turned the contest from a near-rout into a battle of attrition. Suffering heavy losses, the Gobir army broke ranks and fled the field, leaving behind much of its equipment to the Muslims as booty.

This resounding Muslim victory at Tabkin Kwotto has sometimes been attributed by historians to the facility of the lightly armed Fulani bowmen in opposing the slow-moving and encumbered heavy cavalry of Gobir.[16] This is clearly not the case. Certainly the Fulani archers were skilled in the art of skirmishing in defense of their cattle camps against intruders, and raiding their enemies. But the heavy cavalry of the Gobir army was not a decisive factor in this battle. Muhammadu Bello, whose personal account of the *jihad* is remarkably dispassionate and reliable, records the presence of only about one hundred heavy cavalry at Tabkin Kwotto.[17] Furthermore, it is likely that most of this heavy cavalry formed the personal bodyguard of the sultan and therefore was not committed to

the battle at all (see below, pp. 41, 46–7). On the other hand, the Gobir light cavalry, infantry, and Tuareg cameleers together must have numbered in the thousands. Bello claimed the Gobirawa had "war horses not to be numbered except by God,"[18] and it is probable that the infantry was several times the size of the cavalry (see below, p. 59). It was this large force of infantry and cavalry, and particularly the latter rather than the heavy cavalry, which first enveloped the Muslim flanks and then fell back before their devastating archery. This victory must be attributed to the tactical supremacy achieved by the assumption of the "square" formation; this effectively neutralized the cavalry and the greater numbers of the Gobir army, and permitted the Muslims to gain firepower superiority by employing their long-range missile weapons to maximum advantage. The battle of Tabkin Kwotto is a classic example of the effective application of two basic and complementary principles of war: mass and economy of force.

Under the prevailing circumstances, however, the use of the "square" formation should be regarded as an unintended consequence of the initial Gobir assault. It was more an instinctive survival reaction on the Muslims' part than an ingenious tactical innovation. The shock of the Gobir cavalry charges and the envelopment of both flanks had forced the Muslim army to close ranks into a sort of phalanx formation. The Muslim forces, whose principal offensive capability lay in missile weapons, depended on firepower. On the other hand, the Gobir army, using light cavalry as its principal attack element, depended on mobility and shock tactics. But when its advantage in superior numbers and its specialized capability for shock action and mobility were neutralized, the sultan's army fell victim of its own inflexibility. The pattern of the battle at Tabkin Kwotto recurred elsewhere during the *jihad* when the insurgent Muslim infantry forces faced enemy cavalry, as in the battle of Dan Yahaya, for example, at which Sarkin Kano Alwali allegedly marshaled an army of ten thousand horsemen.[19] In historical perspective, the Muslim victories of the early *jihad* period represented a temporary triumph of firepower over shock tactics in Sudanic warfare.

The Development of Cavalry Warfare

As a result of its successful dry season campaign of 1804–5, the Muslim army in northwestern Hausaland acquired a large number of horses, cavalry accoutrements, and weapons of all kinds. The fall of Birnin Kebbi in the spring of 1805 was particularly important, for here the Muslims seized "more plunder than was ever captured before or after" during the *jihad*.[20] The acquisition of such booty not only served to replenish depleted supplies but also provided the capability to mount and equip a regular force of cavalry.

Map 2. The *Jihad* in the Sokoto Area

More detailed maps of the *jihad* have been prepared in D.M. Last, *The Sokoto Cali-phate*, p. 25, and M. Hiskett, *The Sword of Truth*, facing pp. 94 and 95.

Embedded in Muhammadu Bello's account of the *jihad* in northwestern Hausaland is sufficient material to reconstruct the evolution of cavalry warfare after 1804. We have observed already that the twenty horsemen at Tabkin Kwotto were too few to contribute significantly to the Muslim victory. Shortly thereafter, however, the procurement of additional horses from mounted allies and as booty permitted the organization and employ-ment of an effective cavalry arm. At first the limited availability of mounts restricted their functions to foraging for food and water for the near-starving Muslim army, and patrolling as reconnaissance scouts. Bello, for example, led a small patrol to discover the position and strength of the Gobir army prior to the battle at Tabkin Kwotto.[21] For the rest of that year (1804), the small but increasing Muslim cavalry force extended the range of its operations and functions in enemy territory. But its objectives were still primarily defensive: as Bello recalled, "our principal task was to forage for food and watch the enemy."[22]

Occasionally, as opportunities arose, the cavalry engaged small isolated enemy units, and conducted surprise raids at dawn on towns and villages.[23] The horses taken as booty in these raids were quickly orga-

nized as cavalry reinforcements, some perhaps becoming mounts for Fulani bowmen.[24] As the cavalry increased, so also did the mobility and striking capability of the Muslim forces. By early 1805 – only a year after the forced emigration to Gudu – the Muslim army included several hundred horsemen, and on the march assumed a regular order of battle in which the cavalry was deployed as flank patrols and shock forces in the vanguard. Bello describes the formation as follows:

We made preparations to march; if an attack was certain, we would face to the front and watch for the attack from a distance; our picked horsemen in front about two hundred in number, behind them we marched on foot. Out of our strongest warriors we chose one to be a commander. We collected our footmen round us in a mass with the flag bearers in the midst of the host. Then we sent horsemen to [the] right and left of us and behind us and appointed one in each party to command them. In this way we marched fully prepared.[25]

Although the infantry constituted the bulk of the army at this time, the horsemen had increased to a point where they were contributing measurably to the outcome of large battles. In the expedition against Kanoma (1805) Bello was stationed in the left wing of the army with many cavalry.[26] After suffering 2,000 dead in a terrible defeat at Tsuntsuwa in December 1804, the Muslims rallied less than a year later to overcome the Gobirawa and their Tuareg allies in the Alwassa-Gwandu campaign.[27] The Muslim cavalry again played an important role in a successful thrust into Katsina.[28] In 1806 several towns were raided in Zamfara, and a large Tuareg force was defeated at Fafara by Muslim horsemen operating in conjunction with the supporting fire of bowmen.[29] The next year a mounted Muslim war party routed the enemy at Kannu.[30]

Within a very short time, therefore, the insurgents' cavalry had come to play a major role in the *jihad*. Whereas the Muslims mustered only a handful of horsemen at Tabkin Kwotto, a year later they were able to organize an integrated battle order of cavalry and infantry. Thereafter they depended increasingly on the horsemen to provide reconnaissance and flank security for the army on the march, and mobile shock power in pitched engagements. The possession of horses enabled the Muslim army to enlarge the scope of its operations during the early *jihad* when it was on the defensive, and to procure the provisions necessary for its sustenance through the first critical dry season of 1804–5. From its original role as a defensive patrolling unit, the Muslim cavalry progressively broadened its functions until it became an integral part of an effective offensive military organization.

As the *jihad* spread from Gobir throughout Hausaland and beyond, cavalry became more important. During the *jihad* in Zaria (1808), Dan Madami's large herd of horses provided valuable mounts for the rebels, who were reinforced also by a cavalry contingent from Kano.[31] In Adamawa the horsemen of Modibo Adama gave the Muslim warriors a con-

siderable advantage over the local pagans.[32] On the Bornu marches the cavalry of the *mujahidun* was also instrumental in the establishment and consolidation of Gombe, Hadejia, and Katagum emirates.[33] Likewise, in Nupe and Ilorin in the 1820s and 1830s, cavalry played a prominent part in the *jihads*.

The development of regular cavalry forces entailed a fundamental change in the nature of the insurgents' military organization. No longer was the Muslim army simply a light infantry force; it was now a complex and integrated military system composed of both cavalry and infantry. This basic organizational change also entailed a major tactical shift from the static "square" or phalanx formation of infantrymen toward a more dynamic and flexible employment of horsemen and foot soldiers in coordinated action, as exhibited by the tactics of close support of cavalry by the archers at Fafara in 1806. As such developments occurred, tactics of mobility, maneuver, and shock action in close combat supplanted tactics of attrition wherein masses of troops sought firepower superiority with long-range missile weapons.

It is impossible to date this transformation with precision. Its earliest manifestations in the Gobir area occurred in the first year of the *jihad*, and it was certainly completed by the time of Bello's accession as caliph at Sokoto in 1817. Elsewhere the extent and impact of cavalry employment was variable and difficult to document. Nevertheless, in general it is probably fair to say that the importance of cavalry increased as the *jihad* spread.

In making this fundamental shift to cavalry warfare, the irregular armies of the Muslim insurgents came to resemble in structure and tactical methods their Hausa and Sudanic counterparts. Viewed from the perspective of the *mujahidun*, the adoption of cavalry constituted a revolution in military organization and the technology of war. But in broader historical perspective, the development of cavalry warfare in the emergent Sokoto Caliphate ensured the perpetuation of the classical patterns of Sudanic army organization and state structure. Although the Hausa states were overthrown, the essential elements of the Sudanic war complex were reconstituted in the Sokoto Caliphate. As we shall see later, this ancient war complex survived the introduction of firearms in the late nineteenth century and remained remarkably intact until the British conquest.

Strategy of the *Jihad*

In addition to the tactical and organizational changes discussed above, a strategic analysis of the *jihad* discloses other aspects that help to explain its military success. There is no indication that the Shehu's initial *jihad* proclamation involved any sort of master plan or grand scheme for the

conquest of the Hausa states. In fact, the beleaguered Muslim insurgents in Gobir remained remarkably conservative and defensive in their military posture until the dry season of 1805–6, when Gwandu was established as a permanent redoubt and the Shehu commissioned several regional Muslim leaders as his flag bearers. As Last has argued, the early Muslim campaigns in northwestern Hausaland may have been governed principally by the necessity of finding food, pasture, and water.[34]

Despite this absence of a systematic strategy, the general strategic conditions in which the *jihad* took place contributed toward its outcome. The *jihad* had begun in a remote and desolate region of western Gobir, but within a few years it had engulfed the other Hausa states. It was essentially a series of local insurrections whose leaders made common cause and ultimately recognized the supreme authority of the Shehu. The elaborate defenses of the walled Hausa cities provided excellent security against invading armies that operated along extended lines of communication; but such strongholds offered only a passive defense in internal war. In the prevailing strategic and military conditions, the *jihad* was an unconventional war that could not be contained and suppressed by conventional means. It was a war without front lines or regular lines of communication. On the other hand, the stationary fortified strongpoints of the Hausa chieftains were vulnerable to surprise attack or seige. Moreover, the "feudal" mode of military organization that existed among the Hausa states further inhibited their defensive capability. Lacking standing armies, the Hausa states relied upon their irregular territorial levies which, because of the time required to mobilize, precluded a rapid and sustained response to the Muslim insurgency.[35]

In some respects the *jihad* exemplified a classic guerrilla war. Many of the Fulani groups that participated in the *jihad* had moved into the hinterland of the major Hausa states during the eighteenth century, and there increased their numbers and resources in relative peace and security. These dispersed communities of the Fulani diaspora in the inaccessible countryside later served as the foci of the *jihad*. The migratory habits of the Fulani pastoralists also contributed a natural mobile defense, and their scattered settlements acted as wedges between the concentrations of sedentary population in and around the cities. When the *jihad* erupted, the walled fortresses of the Hausa states were isolated and encircled by the mobile insurgents. With their lines of communication severed, concerted action among the beleaguered city states was impossible and their positions soon became untenable. The imposing Hausa fortifications, so admirably suited for defense against a conventional external attack, fell one by one to the irregular Muslim insurgents.

The Muslim forces, on their part, skillfully exploited the possibilities presented by the strategic situation. Operating on interior lines, the insurgents were able to protect their own movements and at the same time to harass the enemy. The theater of the *jihad* soon embraced an area so vast

that the Hausa states were unable to coordinate their efforts to strike decisively at a single Muslim army simultaneously. The Hausa armies were virtually immobilized and the initiative remained with the Muslims. The isolation of the Hausa states left them vulnerable to attack, either one by one or simultaneously.

From the outset the insurgents in northwestern Hausaland adopted as their strategic objective the isolation and seizure of major, towns.[36] Their surprise attacks on Matankari and Konni in early June 1804 have already been mentioned. The following spring the Muslims carried the *jihad* to Birnin Kebbi, located at the confluence of the Rima and Zamfara rivers. The fall of this key citadel left the rebels in a position to control both Kebbi territory and southwestern Zamfara. In 1806 Gwandu was established as a permanent fortified base on a strategic site between Kebbi and Zamfara. In the same year the Muslim victory at Fafara, some sixty-five miles south of Alkalawa, prepared the way to the ultimate objective, the Gobir capital, and denied the Gobirawa their traditional Tuareg support. It is for these reasons that Hiskett regards Fafara as "the decisive battle of the war." Finally, as we shall relate below, the Gobir citadel at Alkalawa fell to the rebel armies in October 1808. This fundamental strategy, in fact, served the Muslim insurgents throughout the vast theater of the *jihad*.

Coupled to these strategic conditions was the political disunity that existed among the Hausa states. We have seen that since the mid-eighteenth century Gobir had been engaged in a series of debilitating wars with Kano, Katsina, Zamfara, and Kebbi. These prolonged hostilities were not forgotten. Although several states responded to Sultan Yunfa's appeals for alliance and assistance with promises of support, no joint action or aid materialized. By the time the *jihad* spread throughout Hausaland, the beleaguered states were too preoccupied with their own defense to form a league for mutual security. In contrast to the political disarray among the Hausa states, the insurgent armies fought under the common banner of Islam and owed a common allegiance to the Shehu.

Another factor that contributed toward the inability of the Hausa states to collaborate or regroup their forces was the rapidity with which the *jihad* spread. Within two years after the battle of Tabkin Kwotto, the Shehu had commissioned lieutenants to carry the *jihad* throughout Hausaland and beyond, and by 1808 all the major Hausa states had fallen. Although resistance to conquest continued in many areas for years thereafter, the main lines of defense had been irreparably broken and the Sokoto Caliphate had begun to take form. The state of internal war into which all the Hausa states were plunged so rapidly precluded their taking adequate defensive measures or concerted action.

The *jihad* resembled a guerrilla war in other respects as well. As we have seen, the Muslim insurgents originally relied on the two classic guer-

rilla sources of armaments: local domestic production, and weapons captured from the enemy. The tactics and strategy of the Muslim armies were characterized by mobility, flexibility, surprise, adaptability, and audaciousness, especially as cavalry mounts became increasingly available. The Muslim guerrillas capitalized on their familiarity with the terrain of the countryside, taking refuge when necessary and sallying forth when the opportunity presented itself. In this way the rebels retained the initiative, avoided direct encounters in unfavorable conditions, and attacked when they were prepared for battle on their own terms. General wartime deprivation and, in the Sokoto area, frequent food shortages as well, encouraged the virtues of asceticism and endurance. Finally, the Muslim leaders and their armed followers constituted a highly politicized community of reformers with an extraordinary ideological commitment. Believing in the divine ordination of his mission, the Shehu regarded his *mujahidun* as the "vanguard of the people," and claimed to speak for all true Muslims. In the *jihad* there were no neutrals: those who opposed the Shehu were ipso facto non-Muslims.[37]

It is possible to distinguish two phases or periods of the *jihad*, each differentiated by broad strategic and geographical differences.[38] The first phase, from 1804 to c. 1808, was characterized by a series of independent (i.e., not mutually supporting) campaigns conducted by the various regional flag bearers appointed by the Shehu. Although these lieutenants owed common allegiance to the Shehu, there was little or no overall coordination or direction of military operations; each emir was free to wage war with whatever resources were available to him. Although the *jihad* spread throughout Hausaland and beyond during the dry season of 1805–6, the Hausa states remained the principal focus of the *jihad* until 1808, by which time they had all fallen. In fact, after Tabkin Kwotto had thwarted Gobir's objective of suppressing the Muslim insurgency in a single decisive campaign, the period 1805–6 stands out as a strategic watershed in the *jihad*. During that time Kebbi was taken, a major revolt in Zamfara was put down, Gwandu was established as a fortified permanent base, and flags were issued to the Shehu's deputies. With the conquest of the Hausa states completed in 1808, so was the first phase of the *jihad*.

There are several likely explanations for the high degree of strategic and tactical independence that characterized the early *jihad* campaigns. During this first period the Shehu's objective was to attract and retain as large a following as possible; details of coordination were relatively unimportant. Moreover, conditions of communication made it difficult to provide central direction to the campaigns of many armies scattered across thousands of square miles of territory. The vast theater of the war, and the different geostrategic and tactical situations prevailing in diverse districts, required considerable flexibility and local initiative in the planning and conduct of military operations. Lastly, since each of the Shehu's lieu-

tenants was fighting to secure his own position, mutual support at this early stage was virtually impossible.

The second phase of the *jihad,* from c. 1808 to c. 1812, witnessed the emergence of several emirates in the conquered territories and a greater degree of coordination among the previously independent armies. During this period campaigning continued in Hausaland, but its purpose was consolidation rather than expansion. In 1809 Sokoto was established, and the theater of war shifted toward the regions to the west, south, and east of the Hausa states. In the west, expeditions were dispatched into Zaberma, Arewa, Gurma, and Dendi. Toward the east and south new emirates were being formed in the Bornu marches. By 1808 Bi-Abdur (died c. 1806) and his brother Muhammadu Sambo had established Hadejia; Ibrahim Zaki founded Katagum c. 1810; Yakubu laid the foundations of Bauchi c. 1811, and Buba Yero founded Gombe about the same time. Although Yola was not established as the permanent capital of Adamawa until c. 1841, its territory also was carved out in these early years. In these emirates especially, as well as in Nupe and Ilorin after the 1820s, wars of conquest and consolidation against the multifarious and often intractable pagan inhabitants continued throughout the nineteenth century. Nevertheless by 1812 these emirates beyond the Hausa states had been established. And equally important, the division of responsibilities between Sokoto and Gwandu in that year provided the basis for the territorial administration of the dual empire.

In contrast to the relatively simple strategic posture assumed by the insurgents in the first few years of the *jihad,* their military operations after 1808 became more complex, controlled, and coordinated. By this time local bases had been established in the Hausa states, and others were in the process of formation along southern and eastern frontiers. It was then possible to plan strategy over wider areas, and larger armies could be summoned in mutual support or for joint operations. During the dry season of 1807–8, for example, a contingent of cavalry from Kano provided reinforcement for the Muslim army in Zaria. In Adamawa and Bauchi, the protracted *jihad* drew mercenary adventurers and devout *mujahidun* from areas already conquered in the northwest, namely Katsina, Kano, Gobir, Kebbi, and Zamfara.[39] Later, the Muslim insurgents in Nupe and Ilorin received military support from Gwandu, and from each other.[40]

The successful campaign against the Gobir capital at Alkalawa in October 1808 provides an excellent example of this new strategy of mutual support. Three times previously, in 1804, 1806, and 1807, armies under the *waziri* Baba, Aliyu Jaidu, and Bello had failed in their respective attempts to take this strategically located fortress. Now the Muslims planned their fourth attack for the end of the wet season in 1808. Two columns commanded by Aliyu Jaidu and Namoda, both under the supreme command

of Bello, advanced on the city from the west and east, respectively. Umaru Dallaji approached with a large Katsina force from the southwest, while Aliyu turned north to attack from that direction. Alkalawa thus became the object of a three-pronged pincer movement and was quickly reduced.[41] If the battle of Tabkin Kwotto was the turning point of the *jihad*, the fall of Alkalawa was its clincher. The Gobirawa were decisively defeated, resistance to the Muslims was broken, and many who had previously held back now openly supported the *jihad*. The new strategy had proven its value, and henceforth became the regular strategic doctrine of the Sokoto Caliphate.

· When did the *jihad* period end? Certainly several dates suggest themselves, but considering the nature of the *jihad* as an ongoing process, none can be wholly satisfactory. By 1808 Gobir and the other Hausa states had fallen to the rebels. In 1809 Sokoto was established. By 1812 most of the new emirates were taking form and the Shehu divided responsibility for the administration of the emerging empire between his son Bello, who was to govern the eastern districts from Sokoto, and his brother Abdullahi, who was to rule the western region from Gwandu. Yet we have chosen 1817 as the year to delimit the original *jihad* period from the period of consolidation that followed. In that year the Shehu died and Bello succeeded him as head of the new Islamic state. By 1817 the Hausa heartland was firmly under Muslim control, and the new border emirates were securely established. Abdullahi's recognition of the primacy of Sokoto, and the wise leadership, energetic administration, and brilliant generalship provided by Bello during his twenty-year reign, were decisive in giving character and unity to the new multistate empire. The caliphate of Bello was a fitting sequel to the *jihad* of the Shehu.

Military Organization in
the Sokoto Caliphate, c. 1817–1860

In the preceding chapter we traced the evolution of military organization and strategy in the *jihad* period. At the outset, it will be recalled, the following of the Shehu and his lieutenants constituted a community in arms rather than a professional army. Weapons, tactics, and military organization were rudimentary. There was little or no differentiation between military and civil roles: the acknowledged leaders of the scattered Muslim communities were also their military commanders. The notable exception, of course, was the Shehu himself, who preferred to remain a spiritual leader rather than a war chief.

But during the *jihad* and the years of consolidation that followed, the empire won by conquest presented formidable problems of administration and defense. These requirements of administration and defense, coupled with the long tradition of hierarchical state organization in Hausaland, both demanded and facilitated the establishment of elaborate governmental structures in the new emirates of the caliphate. This reconstitution and modification of traditional institutions, and the creation of new ones, also entailed a fundamental transformation of the structure of military organization. The Muslim armies grew rapidly in size and complexity, adapting especially to the increasing use of cavalry. By the mid-nineteenth century the emirates of the caliphate had developed an elaborate form of army organization that included both an offensive force structure composed of cavalry and infantry, and an advanced static defense system of central and frontier fortifications. Indeed, these impressive features would rank high on a military sophistication scale for historical preindustrial societies.[1] In this chapter we will examine the offensive capabilities and military organization of these emirates, leaving for Chapter 4 a consideration of the defensive system of fortifications.

Military Organization in the Emirates

There was no overall army organization embracing the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. Rather, the emirate was the fundamental unit of administration and military organization. Although contingents from the various emirates were called upon frequently to join the major military operations of the caliph, the emirs maintained independent armies (*run-*

duna, rundunoni) and conducted their own wars (*yaki, yakoki*) with considerable freedom. The following description of military organization and panoply in the emirates is a composite picture rather than a precise account of a particular emirate. Although variations existed across time, both within and between emirates, the characterization presented here is broadly accurate for the "typical" emirate in the mid-nineteenth century.

The several emirates of the caliphate were governed through hierarchies of titled officials (*sarauta, sarautu* or *masu sarauta*) appointed by the emirs. Most of these titled officials were remunerated by a share of the annual taxes collected from the fiefs that were attached to their offices. Each fief holder (*hakimi, hakimai*) was assigned general military responsibilities, including the requirement to train and maintain a small armed force for service in the emir's army on specific campaigns, and to ensure the construction and periodic repair of the walls of towns under his jurisdiction.

Although all fief-holding officials had these general military obligations, there was a special class of titled officials who served as regular military officers. This group was functionally differentiated from the civil administrators and constituted the emir's professional officer corps. The responsibilities of this military elite included the general administration of military affairs, the maintenance of the army and its logistic requirements, and the planning and direction of wars. It was they who assumed command of the army when the "feudal" contingents of the entire emirate assembled for campaigns. The titles of this military officialdom varied among the emirates, but in function and structure they were highly specialized and remarkably similar. It was common for a major emirate to have at least twenty titled military officials, each of whom rated a staff of several junior officers.[2]

The emir's hierarchy of military commanders was duplicated on the local level. Individual *hakimai* maintained their own contingents and a corps of subordinate titled officials with specialized military roles. While the *hakimai* had general military functions in the military organization of the emirate, they did not actually command their troop levies in battle. When their forces were mobilized by the emir for specific campaigns, the territorial fief holders acted as liaisons between their own officers and the emir's commanders. The fiefs' contingents were commanded by the military officials of the *hakimai*, who were subordinated to their respective counterparts in the emir's professional officer corps.

Likewise, the emir himself rarely took personal command of the army in the field. The functions of military leadership were usually performed by the emir's officer corps, with his senior commanding general directing field operations. However, close relatives or favorites of the emir were occasionally chosen to command particular campaigns or expeditions. Thus, for instance, Emir Usuman Yero of Zaria (1888–97) commissioned

his brother Ja'afaru to attack the Kadara people of Shara,[3] and Emir Lawal of Adamawa (1848–72) also dispatched his brothers as leaders of large expeditions.[4] Toward the end of the century slave generals were increasingly given command of armies.

The recruitment and social composition of the emir's professional officer corps were crucial to the distribution of political power within the state. This subject will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 7 and 8; here it is sufficient to note that the officer corps was recruited mainly from three social groups: the royal lineage(s), clients from aristocratic families, and royal slaves. The changing composition of this military officialdom had significant consequences for political structure and military organization throughout the nineteenth century.

In classical Islamic legal theory the obligation of *jihad* was considered to be a conjoint duty of the Muslim community as a whole. This implied that not every individual Muslim was obliged to participate in the *jihad*. The sick, lame, blind, and women and children were exempted from military service, except to defend Muslim territory from an unexpected attack. Normally, then, the obligation of military service was universal and compulsory only for adult male believers.[5] Abdullahi, the younger brother of the Shehu, exhorted his chiefs and subjects to adhere to this regulation:

When I, the Lamido, give an order that all men are to go to war, let no man pause and consider reasons for staying behind. When I give the order to fight, all must fight. When I send to my Laminabe the order to fight they must obey; they and all their followers. There must be no excuses for this one or that one remaining behind in his compound. All are to obey these orders; all must dash forward to attack those who are making war on me. There must be no holding back among my soldiers.[6]

In practice, however, the obligation of permanent military service in the Sokoto Caliphate fell upon all officials, their mounted clients, and selected slaves. The free peasantry was under no specific military obligation, but thousands usually volunteered for campaigns. The motivations of these volunteers were undoubtedly mixed, including but not limited to social pressures, the hope for booty, the quest for adventure, and religious devotion. On the other hand, it was titled officialdom, possessing a virtual monopoly of war-horses (s. *ingarma,* that is, a stallion), that formed the basis of the army and ensured the availability of a ready force of cavalry to meet the military requirements of the state. The emirs, *hakimai,* and their subordinate officials also mounted some of their chosen slaves, and distributed horses and cavalry accouterments (*kayan doki*) among free clients (*bara, borori*) who thereby contracted a military obligation. It was this control over the distribution of horses that allowed the ruling class to control the incidence, extent, and duration of military service among the slave and free client population; the possession of a horse entailed an

explicit military obligation. Compulsory conscription (*gayya*) for the infantry was limited to selected royal slaves and those of officialdom. As we have noted above, however, the ranks of the foot soldiers were also swelled by peasant volunteers. The slave units and the free mounted clients and courtiers (*bafada, fadawa*) received their arms and equipment (*kayan yaki* or *kayam fada*) from the state and formed the nucleus of its army. Volunteers were expected to carry their own weapons (*makami, makamai; makashi, makasai*) and rations sufficient for two or three weeks in the field.

In the characteristic mode of Sudanic military organization, there were no standing armies in the caliphate during most of the nineteenth century. Military forces to augment the slave cadres of the emir were mobilized from the territorial reserves of the fief holders only as required for specific expeditions. This strategic posture emphasized mobilization potential rather than forces-in-being. As M. G. Smith has pointed out, this type of military organization and strategy was best suited for offensive purposes. Reserve mobilization capability relieved the state of the economic burden of maintaining a regular army; but the absence of such a force also imposed severe constraints on defense.[7]

Force Structure and Armaments[8]

The emir's army and its reserve consisted of cavalry and infantry equipped with a large assortment of offensive weapons and defensive armor. This weaponry was variously employed by specialized units of the army according to their tactical functions and organizational principles. Heavy and light cavalry constituted the mobile striking and shock forces, while light infantry units provided firepower with missile or projectile weapons. Smaller heavy infantry units complemented and reinforced the foot soldiers with weapons designed for shock and piercing effect in close combat. Most warriors (*mayaki, mayaka*) in both the cavalry and infantry alike wore protective gear of some kind.

Cavalry

The cavalry (*dawaki*), which represented the elite corps of the emir's army, was recruited largely from the ranks of officialdom and its dependents. Titled officials, *hakimai*, and their free clients and selected slaves, composed the bulk of the horsemen. Mercenaries and men of wealth who could afford to mount themselves also contributed to the ranks of the cavalry.

The heavy cavalry, of which the emir's personal bodyguard (*barde, barade*) was a large component, was called *yan lifida* after the quilted

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Figure 1. Suit of Chain Mail. Courtesy Federal Department of Antiquities, National Museum, Jos, Nigeria.

Figure 2. Fulani Shield. Smithsonian Institution, Photo No. 73-2053.

Figure 3. Hausa Shield. Smithsonian Institution, Photo No. 73-2054.

Figure 4. Hausa Swords and Scabbards. Smithsonian Institute, Photo No. 73-2056.

Figure 5. Hausa Sabers and Scabbards. Smithsonian Institution, Photo No. 73-2058.

Figure 6. Assorted Hausa Spears. Smithsonian Institution, Photo No. 73-2062.

Figure 7. Hausa Quivers and Arrows. Smithsonian Institution, Photo No. 73-2060.

Figure 8. Hausa Daggers and Sheaths. Smithsonian Institution, Photo No. 73-2061.

cotton arrowproof armor (*lifidi, lifida*) worn by both rider and mount.[9] This type of armor, manufactured locally from the loose fiber of the silk-cotton tree, was fitted to the horseman's body in pieces: the *bantan lifidi* covered the loins, thighs, and abdomen, the *safa* the upper torso, and the *kumakumi* was worn as a corselet. Such quilted armor was used by horsemen either alone or in combination with chain mail (*sulke*), the finest variety of which was known as *badaudi* or *daudiyya*.[10] The war-horses themselves were sometimes outfitted with breastplates (s. *dan gaba* or *gabba*) as well. Recruitment to the ranks of the *yan lifida* was restricted almost exclusively to slaves.[11] The heavy cavalry was the armored division of the emir's army. Although slower than the light cavalry, it was a formidable unit capable of penetrating enemy battle lines and assaulting lightly fortified positions. These dragoons also served as an effective mobile shield for the emir and his field headquarters in battle. One hundred heavy cavalry seems to have been the average size of this unit in an emir's army.[12]

Other protective armor and essential gear of the *yan lifida* included helmets, shields, saddles, and horse trappings. The helmet (*kwalkwali*) was a padded headpiece made of bound rags, sometimes covered by a tin or brass receptacle or chain mail (*buke*), and decorated with the feathers of an ostrich or other brightly colored bird. The shields (generically *garkuwa*) carried by the heavy cavalrymen were of two basic types: either large circular shields (s. *kutufani*) about five feet in diameter, or large rectangular implements (*garkuwa*) about five feet high by two or three feet in width. These shields were made of the tanned hide of elephant, buffalo, antelope, or other suitable animal. They were extremely durable, light, and supple, yet superior to metal or wood in proportion to their weight.[13] A variety of saddles (s. *sirdi*) was used, a common one being high-peaked before and behind (*dan dumbulum*), employed by both heavy and light cavalry.[14] Along with these items went a remarkable ensemble of horse trappings (*kayan doki*), including bridle and bit combinations (*linzami, linzamai*), spurs (*kaimi, kayame*), quilted saddle covers (s. *dauki saka*) and lighter decorated outer covers (s. *jalala*),[15] and stirrups (*likkafa, likkafu*). The latter existed in two general forms, either small toe stirrups, or large shovel-shaped instruments (*wangami*) with sharp edges that served not only to protect the riders' legs from scrub and brush but were "in themselves weapons of offense and defence."[16]

The main offensive weapon of the *yan lifida* was the heavy metal lance about six feet long. Its butt end was shaped like an axhead and rested in the stirrup; the head was about eight inches long and barbed. The shaft was inlaid with brass and sometimes bore a brass knob about two-thirds of the way down to balance the weight of the head.[17] A variety of swords

(s. *takobi; kansakali*), war clubs (s. *kulki; gulme; gwarmi; gwama*), and battle-axes (s. *gantama; gatari; gafiya; masari*) were also used by the heavy cavalry when fighting at close quarters.[18] With the exception of chain mail, all of the protective accouterments, weapons, and leather or metal horse trappings, were of local manufacture.[19]

Units of light cavalry numbering many times the *yan lifida* comprised the mobile striking and shock forces of the emir's army. These horsemen and their mounts were more lightly equipped and armed than the heavy cavalry, allowing for considerable flexibility in tactical maneuvers. The riders wore loose-fitting white gowns of coarse cotton material, and sometimes over this a mail suit or a band of plaited leather (*kutufi*) covering the shoulders and chest. The mail armor, always rare and highly treasured, was worn by both slaves and free clients or officials. The horsemen's heads were protected by the several folds of their turbans (s. *rawani*) and perhaps straw hats (s. *malafa*) as well.

The offensive and defensive armament of the light cavalry consisted of a variety of javelins or spears, swords, cudgels, maces or battle-axes, knives or daggers, thrusting lances, and shields. If spears (s. *mashi*) were carried, the horseman would normally have two or three. These were hurled as soon as the enemy troops came within range. The lance and sword were the principal weapons for close combat. Swords (s. *takobi*) were slung over the shoulder by the *hamila*, or sling, and daggers carried in a sheath affixed to the left forearm.[20] Large round shields up to five feet in diameter, or small shields (s. *kunkeli*) between two and three feet in diameter, completed the outfit of the light cavalrymen.

In addition to this personal equipment, the light horsemen were accompanied by special detachments of foot soldiers (*zagi, zagage*) who carried and cared for other accouterments. These aides or runners carried extra tethering ropes, blankets, and weapons to resupply the horsemen as required. A British officer who witnessed the Nupe army in action in 1897 compared the function of these attendants to that of the squires of feudal Europe: "Like the knights of old days, every horseman seemed to be followed by two or three squires carrying his gun and some spears, and, where the horsemen were banded together, they were usually followed by similar parties of footmen."[21] Whereas the heavy cavalry was a small unit in the emir's army, the light cavalry numbered in the thousands. One thousand light horsemen seems to have been the minimum for a major emirate, whereas a wealthy one like Kano or Nupe could raise between five and ten thousand (see Table 1, shown on p. 60). It must be recalled that military recruitment varied with several factors, and for important campaigns joint operations among several emirates could be undertaken.

The light cavalry was a flexible and multifunctional force. Not only did it provide shock power in the front ranks of the battle array, but it was

also well adapted for raiding, reconnaissance, flank protection for the army on the march, and pressing the attack on retreating enemy troops. Conversely, if disaster on the battlefield were imminent, the horsemen were the only warriors whose salvation lay in flight; the infantry was sometimes left to face almost certain annihilation. In the case of one such rout of the Bulala by Bornu in the late sixteenth century, for example, the Bulala "spurred their horses, and left the infantry behind like a worn-out sandal abandoned and thrown away, and there was no means of safety for those on foot save the providence of God, or recovery from a wound after crouching in the darkness."[22]

For the Sokoto Caliphate, as for the classical Sudanic states, the acquisition of horses for cavalry was a paramount concern. During the nineteenth century there were three principal means by which horses were obtained: direct appropriation as taxation and tribute from subject people, or as war booty from the vanquished; selective and systematic local breeding; and finally, both interstate and interemirate commerce.

During the early *jihad* period the Muslim insurgents acquired many horses as booty from successful raids and campaigns. After the victorious Muslims had seized control of the Hausa states and extended their territorial domain, horses were demanded as part of the taxation or tribute accruing from the subject population. Perennial wars of consolidation against recalcitrant peoples may have provided additional horses as booty. Sokoto itself sometimes received horses as part of the annual tribute forwarded by its subordinate emirates. Although taxation, tribute, and booty must have provided a considerable number of horses for Sokoto and its emirates, their yield was insufficient to meet overall military requirements, and positive action had to be taken to ensure an adequate supply of horses.

Caliph Muhammadu Bello (1817–37) recognized the need for more and better cavalry mounts. Bello's military requirements were prodigious: in his twenty-year tenure he conducted 47 major campaigns.[23] To protect the newly organized cavalry he introduced *lifidi*, and at the same time made efforts to augment the available reserve of war-horses. For example, Bello bestowed the title of *banaga* on the leader of a group of Fulani horse breeders at Masu in return for a regular supply of horses.[24] He also made a major attempt to induce nomadic Fulani and Tuareg herdsmen to adopt sedentary habits and to raise horses and camels for the Sokoto army. This policy proved unsuccessful among the Tuareg, but many Fulani groups abandoned their migratory habits for residence in permanent settlements. Bello provided them with tools, an agricultural program, and war captives to do the farm labor. Moreover, he instructed them to reduce their cattle herds and to emphasize instead the breeding of horses and camels. The increased supply of horses for the Sokoto army made it possible to provide better defense for the newly settled areas: economic prosperity, terri-

torial control, and military security were thus enhanced by the sedentarization of the Fulani.[25]

The third, and perhaps the main source of horses, was trade. The best horses in Hausaland were imported from the area north of Adamawa, and in particular from Bornu, "which country," claimed Lander, "supplies every other in the interior with that useful animal; and these are handsome, powerful beasts."[26] These were probably the Dongola horses which, as we have seen, were highly prized in Bornu, where they had been imported and bred for centuries. Another important source of horses was the *sahel* region to the north of Hausaland, especially Azbin, where Tuareg breeders raised a local variety of the Oriental. One such northern breed, known in Hausaland as the Sulebawa, was considered by the British to be "closely akin to the English thoroughbred."[27]

It is impossible to determine the number of horses involved in this commerce. It is clear, however, that the trade in horses was closely regulated because of its obvious military value. Bello's policy of encouraging self-sufficiency in horse breeding may have been related to a Bornu embargo on the trade in horses, imposed perhaps during the *jihad* when the Bornu capital was sacked and its western provinces detached. In 1854, however, the embargo was lifted and, as the horse trade again gravitated westward into Hausaland, the price of horses in Bornu itself increased sharply.[28] Sokoto also regulated the horse trade to deny its enemies a source of cavalry mounts. In the 1850s, for example, Caliph Aliyu Babba (1842–59) prohibited the export of horses and swords to Nupe and Ilorin, fearing that these military supplies might fall into the hands of Umaru Nagwamatse, a grandson of the Shehu, whose independent conquests in southwestern Zaria and northern Nupe were undertaken without official authorization.[29]

Although the caliphate obtained many horses by foreign trade, it seems that from the time of Bello onward the Sokoto area itself became the most important internal source of horses for the other emirates. By the early 1830s Laird and Oldfield noted that the finest horses in Nupe were brought from Sokoto by Arab traders.[30] Two decades later this horse trade between Sokoto and the southern frontier emirates of Nupe and Ilorin was still flourishing.[31] At the same time the finest horses in Zinder, north of the caliphate, were also being imported from Sokoto.[32] By the end of the nineteenth century horse breeding was a major source of wealth in Sokoto and Gwandu; and Kano itself, reputed to have the largest cavalry force in the caliphate, was importing horses from Sokoto.[33]

In summary, the emirates of the caliphate relied on taxation, tribute, war booty, domestic breeding, and trade for horses. The impetus toward self-sufficiency in horse raising can be attributed to Caliph Bello, whose program for settling the Fulani in Sokoto was successfully undertaken. Whether the Bornu embargo on the exportation of horses encouraged

Bello's program is uncertain; however, by the end of the century Sokoto not only had achieved self-sufficiency in horse breeding, but also had become the major exporter of horses among the emirates.

Infantry

The infantry forces (*dakare, dakaru; karma, karame* or *yan karma*) were the most numerous and least prestigious units in the emir's army. They consisted principally of bowmen, although smaller specialized detachments of spearmen, pikemen, sappers, swordsmen, archers armed with incendiary arrows, and, toward the end of the nineteenth century, musketeers, were also integral parts of the army. Whereas the cavalry was recruited from the ruling class and its privileged dependents, the foot soldiers were composed of social elements drawn from the subject population: free Muslim peasant volunteers (s. *talakawa*); protected subject pagans (A. *dhimmis*) who paid the required poll-tax (*jiziya;* A. *jizya*); foreign mercenaries who enlisted in the service of the emirs and their chiefs; and slaves (*bawa, bayi*), the majority of whom were either native-born (*bacucane, cucanawa*) or recent war captives.[34] These divisions were trained by the senior-ranking military commanders of the emirs and their *hakimai*. The infantry officers (s. *sati*) were either free clients or slave captains, and were sometimes mounted.[35] The pagan detachments and units of slave captives were organized according to their tribal origin and commanded by their own leaders.[36]

The archers (*yam baka* or *masu baka*) were generally the largest single component of the infantry forces. They carried bows (s. *baka*) about five feet in length with a "pull" of up to forty-five pounds. The bows were generally fashioned in the recurve form to obtain maximum thrust and resiliency.[37] Bowstrings (s. *tsirkiya*) were made of twisted animal hide from kob, bush buck, hartebeeste or other antelope. Up to two dozen arrows (s. *kibiya*) were carried in quivers (s. *kwari*) made of leather or from the wood of a certain tree whose nodal structure permitted molding to the required shape. The two-foot arrowshafts (s. *kyarmo*) were cut from the reeds of various grasses, notched at one end for insertion of the bowstring, and bound just above the notch with animal tendon to prevent splitting. The arrows were unfletched, that is, without feathers, and were tipped with iron heads bound to the shaft by animal or plant fibers. Arrowheads were made in a variety of shapes and averaged six to seven inches in length; some were barbed (s. *kunne*) to rip the flesh when removed, and almost all were poisoned.[38]

In addition to bows and arrows, the archers' accouterments included several other basic items. Some bowmen wore an iron or wooden ring on the right forefinger or thumb to facilitate the drawing of the bowstring, and padded their left inner forearm with a leather sheath to protect it

from the twang of the string.[39] Like most soldiers in both the cavalry and infantry, the archers carried a hand knife attached either to the left forearm or to a cord (*damaro*) about the waist.[40] A length of rope to bind captives was also common among the footmen.[41] Finally, devout Muslim warriors wore one or more amulets (s. *magani*), some inscribed with Koranic verses, to protect them from harm and wounds.[42]

Most archers could be classified as light infantrymen. Although some carried small shields (s. *kunkeli*) and swords (s. *takobi*), they rarely wore body armor of any kind. In fact, they usually wore only a loincloth of leather (*warki*) or cloth (*bante*), or at most a loose-fitting knee-length gown (*taguwa*) and sandals (s. *takalmi*). As one veteran warrior recalled, they "purposely fought as light as possible so as to be able to use the cover of houses or trees or thickets to the best advantage."[43] On the other hand, there were sometimes smaller units of heavy archers who carried the bow as well as a large shield, a sword, and two or three spears. In some emirates they even wore a suit of *lifidi*.[44] In battle the spears were most likely hurled first; then arrow fire would follow until the quiver was empty or the fighting became so intense that individual close combat with the sword and shield was necessary.

A primary function of the archers was to disorganize the cavalry of the enemy. Although the bow is man's oldest complex missile weapon, it was very effective in Sudanic warfare, especially in contests of attrition. Its versatility and rapid-shooting capability provided not only an adequate defense against cavalry, but also a means to disrupt the horsemen's charges. In such engagements, accuracy and penetrating power were of lesser importance than the potency of the arrow poison; and, as a mounted cavalryman presented a sizable target, a direct hit on either horse or rider was sufficient to destroy them as a fighting unit. The tactics of the archers against cavalry are vividly described in the following account by a veteran Kebbi horseman of the nineteenth-century wars:

A staunch bowman who was being attacked by a horseman would stand his ground until his adversary came into range. He would then make a feint, as if he were shooting, in the hope that the horseman would throw up his shield to protect himself. If the horseman did this, the bowman could often get in a telling shot underneath the shield. As arrows were usually poisoned, and as the poison acted very quickly, the bowman did not have to hit a vital spot, but could aim at any part of the horse or rider.[45]

Local poisons varied in their potency, and the archers of Daura[46] and Bauchi[47] were renowned for the strength of their arrow poisons. Indeed, the bowmen of Bauchi were reported by Barth to have been the "best known in Sudan."[48]

Two different kinds of arrow poison (*dafi*) were utilized – vegetable and animal. The *Strophanthus* plant (*kwankwani*) was the basic source of vegetable poison. Frequently, arrows were coated with vegetable-based poison, allowed to dry, and then smeared a second time with a

toxic animal or insect fluid; actually, either poison alone was probably sufficient to cause a fatal wound.[49] However, remedies and antidotes (s. *makari*) to the poisons were generally known and were fairly effective when applied.[50]

Both poisons and their antidotes were prepared in the prescribed manner by ritual specialists, whether a single family within a village or a single group within a region or emirate. This specialization is particularly interesting because some Muslim armies relied upon pagans to concoct their arrow poison. In Adamawa, for example, the poison was bought from local pagans.[51] In the independent Hausa state of Abuja – one of whose emirs, Abu Ja (1825–51), had among his symbols of office a quiver with two hundred poisoned arrows – it was the Burum people who annually prepared the poisoned arrows.[52] Although the use of poisoned arrows was technically illegal for Muslims, military necessity and cultural tradition sanctioned this practice in the Sudan.[53] Moreover, the fact that these poisons were prepared by pagans may have been considered to mitigate the nature of the transgression.

Besides these units of archers, the emir's army also included smaller divisions of spearmen and swordsmen among the infantry. Like the bowmen, these units were differentiated into light and heavy troops. The light spearmen carried two or three javelins, a shield, sword, and perhaps a short thrusting spear.[54] In some areas the javelins were poisoned and barbed, and the heads were sheathed when not in use to protect them from the elements.[55] There was considerable local variation in the design of the spearheads, which in some regions were multipronged.[56] As in the case of the cavalry, the spearmen in the infantry carried heavy-duty shields, and swords suspended from the shoulder by a *hamila*.

The heavy spearmen carried no javelins but rather a long heavy metal lance (*asigiri*), a large shield, and a sword. Like the other heavy infantry and cavalry, they wore a suit of quilted armor. The main function of these armored foot divisions was to provide shockpower for smashing enemy ranks, and conversely, to give strength to their own battle lines. The metal-shafted spears were especially well suited to withstanding the charges of cavalry, and, like the famed Swiss pikemen of the sixteenth century, these lancers offered a dense mass of sturdy spears and the threat of impalement to charging horsemen.[57]

Warriors armed with swords and shields were also organized as light and heavy infantry forces. The size, shape, and quality of both shields and swords varied widely. The most common type of sword, used by cavalry and infantry alike, was the broad-bladed two-edged straight *fate-fate;* other swords were modifications of the straight pattern or of the curved saber type.[58] A variety of large and small shields also served to differentiate the heavy and light swordsmen.[59] Such specialized units

added considerable flexibility to the infantry and were the mainstay of the army in close combat.

Finally, detachments of musketeers completed the combat infantry elements of the emir's army. During the first half of the nineteenth century gunmen (*yam bindiga*) were rare, but after about 1860 they became more important as the emirs gained access to firearms from European traders. Musketeers on foot, like the mounted *yan lifida,* were always either slaves or servants.[60] The formation and significance of these units of slave musketeers will be examined later in Chapters 7 and 8.

Organization for Defense and Security

The elaborate military organization and technology described in the preceding chapter were well suited for offensive purposes, but it was strategic problems of defense and internal security that were overriding concerns in the Sokoto Caliphate throughout the nineteenth century. Several conditions contributed to the emirates' preoccupation with these problems. First, as we have already observed, the *jihad* was an ongoing process of conquest and consolidation rather than a completed event, especially in the non-Hausa areas. Second, the enormous geographical extent of the caliphate made it impossible to defend its domain by means of a centralized security organization. Sokoto and Gwandu, the dual capitals of the caliphate, were located in the western part, leaving the eastern emirates beyond the protective perimeter of any defensive arrangement that could have been provided from the capitals. In addition, the mobilization and movement of territorial reserve armies of cavalry and foot soldiers, accompanied by spare mounts and a baggage train of human porters plus camels, oxen, and donkeys, was a relatively involved and slow process. Furthermore, as campaigns were generally undertaken in the dry season, the route of march was tied to requirements of food and water for the livestock and soldiers. Finally, the absence of standing armies in Sokoto or the constituent emirates of the caliphate contributed toward the development of parochial and ad hoc security arrangements. It is in the context of these limiting conditions imposed by territorial expanse, means of transportation and communication, and military organization, that the strategic posture of the Sokoto Caliphate must be examined.

Strategic Organization in the Sokoto Caliphate

As Adeleye has noted, the "problem of expansion and consolidation . . . [was] the most outstanding single problem which the caliphate had to face throughout its existence."[1] We have already observed that by 1812 the Hausa states had fallen, Gwandu and Sokoto were established, and the major emirates of Hadejia, Katagum, Bauchi, and Gombe were founded. But in each case continuous campaigning was necessary to consolidate and defend territorial gains. During the next two decades Nupe and Ilorin were established, and several smaller emirates were created by

Map 3. The Sokoto Caliphate

— — —	Hostile enclaves
· · · · · · ·	Gwandu
– – –	Emirate boundaries

Based on Hodgkin, ed., *Nigerian Perspectives*, Map 3; Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy*, p. 67; and Johnston, *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto*, Map 2. Johnston's map is the only one that delineates the boundaries of emirates and hostile enclaves, and they have been reproduced here. Johnston includes Aïr and Gurma within the caliphate. There is no proof of this, and these areas are shown here outside. Lafiagi, Pategi, Agaie, and Lapai were subemirates of Nupe. Jema'a, Keffi, and Nassarawa were subemirates of Zaria. Lafia was subordinate to Bauchi.

Caliph Bello either in recognition of faithful military services by local leaders, or in an act of arbitration between feuding parties (e.g., Jama'are, Kazaure, Lafia, Lapai, Missau, and Muri). The *jihad* in Adamawa remained a mobile war until Yola was built c. 1841. Kontagora was carved out of the pagan bush northwest of Nupe after the 1850s. This uneven process of expansion and consolidation was widely resisted, and throughout the century defensive considerations posed major problems to the emirates of the caliphate.

A principal preoccupation of many emirates was the requirement to maintain adequate frontier defense. Gwandu and Sokoto shared responsibility for the defense of the western and northwestern frontiers. These were the most stable frontiers during the nineteenth century, but, as we shall note below, Sokoto and Gwandu were often preoccupied with problems of internal security as well. Along the northern and eastern borders of the caliphate were the emirates of Katsina, Daura, Kano, Hadejia, Katagum, Missau, Gombe, and Bauchi. In the extreme south-southeast was Adamawa, partially separated from Bornu by a pagan buffer zone. To the south, Muri, Bauchi and its vassal Lafia, and the southern Zaria vassals Jema'a, Keffi, and Nassarawa, held a relatively fixed frontier along the Benue, although Muri straddled the upper reaches of the river. Finally, in the extreme southwest, Nupe and Ilorin pushed outward as if to counterbalance the thrust of Adamawa into the Cameroon highlands.

A broad distinction can be made between the southern "frontiers of expansion" and the northern "frontiers of defense." Unlike the northern emirates of Katsina, Daura, Kano, and Zaria, where a pre-*jihad* Islamic tradition existed among the Hausa states, the eastern and southern emirates of Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, Muri, southern Zaria, Nupe, Ilorin, and Kontagora were founded in non-Muslim areas characterized by cultural and ethnic fragmentation. While the southern emirates expanded progressively at the expense of the multifarious fragmented pagan people, the northern emirates became locked in the perennial defense of relatively fixed frontiers against hostile states. Sokoto, Katsina, Daura, and Kano were periodically invaded by armies from Maradi and Tessawa, the Hausa successor states founded by exiled loyalists from Katsina. Such invasions were often made in league with Gobir and/or Zinder. A vassal of Bornu, Zinder was the principal threat to the emirates of Katsina, Daura, Kano, and Hadejia. For much of the nineteenth century Zinder remained an implacable enemy of the caliphate, making several deep incursions into these northern emirates, once to the very gates of Kano. Bornu itself was the major military threat to the eastern frontier emirates until 1826/7 when al-Kanemi marched on Kano; thereafter, Bornu engaged only in intermittent hostilities and border clashes with Hadejia, Katagum, Jama'are, Missau, Gombe, and Adamawa.

In addition to the problem of frontier defense, most of the emirates

were simultaneously preoccupied with pockets of resistance and unsubju-
gated enclaves within the perimeter of the caliphate. These scattered but
intractable states and peoples successfully resisted conquest and forced
integration into the Muslim emirates. While its peripheral northwestern
frontiers were relatively peaceful, the Sokoto-Gwandu hinterland was fre-
quently plagued by revolts and raids by Gobir, Zamfara, and Kebbi, often
in league with their Tuareg allies and the Hausa of Tessawa and Maradi.
In fact, Gobir, Zamfara, and Kebbi constituted "states within a state" and
remained intermittent but potent sources of insecurity in the heartland of
the caliphate until the British conquest. Between southern Zamfara and
northern Nupe were several thousand square miles of pagan territory out
of which Umaru Nagwamatse carved Kontagora, but the new emirate
itself was separated from Sokoto by the Zuru enclave. Kano, Bauchi, and
Zaria were often raided by the Ningi who occupied a triangular pocket
between them. The Gwari confederation, situated in a similar enclave
between Kontagora, Nupe, and Zaria, also proved intractable. Bauchi was
separated from its vassal Lafia by an assortment of unconquered tribes
that inhabited the rugged southern plateau. Although these and other
centers of resistance rarely posed a major threat to the emirates, their
recurring irruptions were distracting and debilitating.

Although most emirates were obliged by their strategic situation to con-
front the dual problem of insecure external frontiers and unsubjugated
enclaves, no common defense policy or formal alliance system was
evolved in the Sokoto Caliphate. Each emirate faced a unique set of
obstacles to the expansion, consolidation, and defense of its territory, and
this absence of common threats left little common ground for mutual
defense leagues. Instead the emirates remained preoccupied with their
own peculiar security problems, and cooperated only on an ad hoc basis.
Thus the emirates' preoccupation with parochial security matters inhib-
ited the formation of enduring military alliances among them. As Adeleye
has shown, this "marked localism imposed on each emirate by its defence
problems was a barrier to effective centralism" in the caliphate.[2]

The local nature of these military problems did not favor the develop-
ment of a centralized defense policy or alliance system, but it did not pre-
clude less formal arrangements. Rather, it might be said that a rudimen-
tary strategic organization for defensive purposes existed. This organiza-
tion rested on the twin pillars of mass mobilization and static defense.
The remainder of this section will be devoted to a discussion of the capa-
bilities and limitations of mass levies. The subject of static defense will be
taken up in the following sections.

As we noted in the previous chapter, each emirate maintained its own
army composed of a small permanent nucleus based in the capital, and a
large irregular force of territorial reserves that was mobilized as required
through the agency of the emir's *hakimai* and their subordinates. This

"feudal" system itself had several inherent limitations, but some emirates occasionally joined together in mutual support and partially offset this organizational weakness. Each emirate was capable of mobilizing its military reserves to come to the assistance of its neighbors. The actual operation of this decentralized system of mutual support depended, of course, on the willingness and ability of the various emirates to act in unison. In general, Sokoto and its subordinate eastern emirates formed a single league of mutually supporting military bases. Almost annually, Sokoto called up troop levies from these emirates to join the imperial army for the purpose of waging war against implacable enemies like Maradi, Zinder, or Gobir, or against recalcitrant people like the Kebbawa. On the other hand, the eastern emirates could appeal to Sokoto for assistance to meet their military requirements. Usually, however, this assistance only took the form of instructions from the caliph to certain emirs to aid the emirate(s) in distress. In a similar manner, Gwandu and its dependents, the most important of which were Nupe and Ilorin, constituted a loose defense organization. In addition, individual emirates of the Sokoto and Gwandu leagues sometimes supported each other on an ad hoc basis.

Although collaboration of this sort occurred, the important point is that Sokoto and Gwandu themselves were incapable of providing adequately for the defense of their subordinate emirates, and for the most part the latter were left to their own devices. Whatever cooperation in security matters that did occur among the emirates was informal rather than institutionalized. A formal alliance structure was incompatible with their parochial preoccupation with the exigencies of local defense which prevented the diversion of military forces to other areas on a regular basis.

The inherent restrictions of this parochialism in defense matters were clearly demonstrated on several occasions during the nineteenth century. The insecurity of the static northern frontiers, the resistance of the intractable Kebbawa in the Sokoto-Gwandu hinterland, the depredations of the Ningi in the central emirates, the scattered pockets of resistance, and the southern frontier pagan belt, were never entirely eliminated. The emirates were able to contain most of this resistance, but only at the price of constant war. The limitations of these rudimentary defensive arrangements were also shown in the successful defiance of the caliph by Buhari of Hadejia (c. 1848–63), Yusufu of Kano (1893–4), and in the Mahdist revolts of Hayatu in Adamawa and his disciple Jibrilla in Gombe in the 1880s and 1890s. The task of suppressing these revolts was delegated by Sokoto to the emirs immediately affected by their ravages, but such ad hoc combinations proved ineffective. In these areas, far removed from Sokoto, the caliph had no choice but to order a local response. This inability to organize a centralized and effective defense system for the caliphate as a whole proved fatal in the face of British aggression after 1897.[3]

Not only was localism a distinguishing mark of the caliphate's security arrangements, but there also appear to have been interesting variations in the military capabilities of each emirate. Daura and Bauchi, as noted in Chapter 3, were renowned for their archery, and in particular for the virulence of their arrow poisons. On the other hand, the armies of Jama'are and loyalist Kebbi were well known for the prowess of their spearmen.[4] In Katagum, swordsmen were the most numerous and valued warriors.[5] Kano was important because of its wealth, its central strategic location as the second line of defense toward the north and east, and its large cavalry force with which it regularly reinforced the army of Zaria.[6] Troops from Kano and Katsina, reputed to be the best in the caliphate, respectively formed the van and rear guard of the imperial battle order when summoned by Sokoto.[7] During the second half of the nineteenth century Sokoto was a major exporter of horses, and Nupe the principal purveyor of firearms, to the other emirates of the caliphate.

As in the case of the classical Sudanic empires, the military capability of the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate varied across time and locale. It is possible, however, to give some reasonable estimates for the size of their armies. Several nineteenth-century European sources contain such estimates, but in most cases only for the cavalry. The most comprehensive estimates of the cavalry forces of the emirates are provided by Barth, who traveled widely through the caliphate. Barth never witnessed its armies on campaign, and his estimates are secondhand reports based on the testimony of his informants. Nevertheless, compared with other independent estimates, Barth's figures seem credible. His first list, published in 1851, was prepared on the basis of information he received prior to his extensive travels in the caliphate. The second is a revised set of estimates derived from local inquiries. The two lists, together with comparative estimates derived from other sources, are reproduced in Table 1.

Although it is impossible to provide a similar list of the emirates' infantry forces, a rough estimate can be extrapolated from the ratio of infantry to cavalry, which usually varied between 3:1 and 10:1.[8] Formidable as these forces were, the "feudal" military organization of the emirates and the ad hoc character of the interemirate security arrangements meant that combined armies were difficult to raise. Moreover, geostrategic and logistic constraints imposed additional limitations on the maintenance of combined armies in the field. Major emirates were able to mobilize armies of 5,000 to 10,000 cavalry and infantry for major independent campaigns, while joint operations under the caliph sometimes brought to the field 50,000 warriors.[9] The military potential of these emirates, individually and collectively, compared favorably with that of the other states of the Central Sudan in the nineteenth century.[10] Although war and defense were continuous preoccupations of the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, its territorial integrity was not seriously threatened during the greater

part of the nineteenth century. The military capabilities of the emirates were sufficient for self-defense in most contingencies, and together with mutual defense arrangements, irregular and transitory as they were, generally proved successful in maintaining the frontiers, repelling invaders, and containing internal pockets of resistance.

Table 1. *Estimated cavalry forces in the Sokoto Caliphate*

Emirate	List 1	List 2
Sokoto[a]	10,000	5,000
Kano[b]	7,000	5–7,000
Bauchi	2,000	1,500–2,000
Zaria[c]	3,000	3,000
Adamawa[d]	2,000	2,000
Katsina[e]	1,000	1,000
Missau	1,000	1,000
Katagum[f]	1,500	1,200
Marmar	700	500
Shira	500	500
Boberu	600	600
Daura	400	400
Kazaure	–	200
Hadejia	2,000	–
Zamfara	3–4,000	–
Ilorin[g]	5,000	–
Nupe[h]	2,000	–
Total[i]	42,700–43,700	21,900–24,400

[a] T. J. Hutchinson, *Narrative of the Niger, Tshadda, & Binue Exploration* (London, 1855), p. 70, also gives 10,000.

[b] Staudinger estimated 6,000: J. E. Moody, "Paul Staudinger: An Early European Traveller to Kano," *Kano Studies*, No. 3 (1967), p. 49.

[c] Hutchinson, *Narrative*, p. 73, estimated 2,000.

[d] A Fulani account, obviously exaggerated, puts Adamawa's cavalry at 8,000: R. M. East, *Stories of Old Adamawa* (Lagos, 1935), p. 63.

[e] But in *Travels*, II 480, Barth gives 2,000.

[f] In 1824 H. Clapperton estimated 4,000: *Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in 1822, 1823, and 1824*, 4 vols. (London, 1831), III, 248.

[g] In 1897 Ilorin mustered only about 1,000 cavalry against the Royal Niger Company force: S. Vandeleur, *Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger* (London, 1898), p. 244.

[h] In 1830 R. and J. Lander estimated 1,000: *Journal of an Expedition to Explore the Course and Termination of the Niger*, 2 vols. (London, 1837), II, 71. A few years later M. Laird and R. A. K. Oldfield reported 5,000: *Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of Africa*, 2 vols. (London, 1837), II, 86. By the end of the century Nupe mustered about 10,000 horsemen: Vandeleur, *Campaigning*, p. 212.

[i] Hutchinson, *Narrative*, p. 70, estimated a total of 24,000 cavalry for the Caliphate as a whole.

Source: List 1. H. Barth, "Progress of the African Mission . . . ," *JRGS*, XXI (1851), 192. List 2. H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa . . . 1849–1855*, 3 vols. (Franklin Square, N.Y., 1857), III, 117–18.

This capacity for the mobilization of reserve forces was essential to both the offensive and defensive posture of the emirates, but constituted only part of a larger strategic organization. The second and complementary element in the strategic organization of the caliphate was a highly developed and integrated static defense system consisting of an intricate chain of fortifications for frontier defense and central walled towns for internal security. The frontier stronghold (A. *ribat*) was the principal means of protecting and stabilizing the frontiers, and the walled city-fortress (H. *birni, birane*) was the mainstay of local internal security. Each of these elements in the static defense system of the caliphate will be examined in turn.

The *Ribat* and Frontier Security

The *ribat* was a walled stronghold situated on the frontier of Muslim territory. It served as an outpost to warn of attack and to delay the enemy's advance, and was also used as a base for clandestine operations and offensive strikes into enemy territory. In classical Islamic history the use of *ribats* was regarded as a type of *jihad*, for the Koran did not distinguish between the offensive and defensive purposes of warfare. However, as the Muslim world was put on the defensive in later centuries, the use of the *ribat* received emphasis among legal theorists and military thinkers.[11]

In the Sokoto Caliphate the extensive use of the *ribat* dates from the reign of Muhammadu Bello, when the Sokoto area was frequently harassed and attacked by Tuareg, Gobir, and Kebbi raiders. Bello was unable to contain their depredations by ad hoc responses, and therefore sought a more permanent system of territorial defense. Taking as his model the classical practice of the early Arab caliphs, Bello inaugurated a policy of stationary frontier defense by establishing a chain of fortifications along the insecure northern and northwestern flanks of the Sokoto hinterland. These redoubts either grew out of strategically situated villages, or were built where required. The new *ribats* were entrusted by Bello to the command of his sons and relatives. Each *ribat* commander and his garrison (A. *murabitun*) were charged with closing the frontiers, protecting the local area from raids, sending out spies to reconnoiter enemy territory, conducting night sorties, receiving travelers, and administering their districts in accordance with Islamic standards.

In addition to the obvious military advantages, an important social consequence followed from the caliph's policy of establishing *ribats*. Many of these new frontier outposts were populated by slaves and mixed ethnic groups. Others were settled by Fulani who, as was mentioned in Chapter 3, were induced to abandon their migratory habits and take up agriculture, and the breeding of horses and camels for the army. As these major *ribats* grew, they threw off smaller *ribat*-settlements which in turn grew

and proliferated. This self-sustained process of *ribat* proliferation throughout the north and northwestern Sokoto perimeter not only stabilized the frontiers and protected the hinterland, but also brought about the settlement of the nomadic population. In short, the result of this policy was to increase population control, frontier security, economic growth, and military potential. The significance of these changes has been ably summarized by D. M. Last:

The Sokoto *ribats* were both frontier posts and local capitals, headquarters for supplies, bases for expeditions, strongpoints to over-awe local attempts to rebel and to protect local villages. The warrior-scholars . . . were expected to have arms practice and keep in a state of readiness; each autumn after the harvest they were to take part in the major campaign under the Caliph. The *ribat* was responsible for the administration as well as the security of a large area left under a local ruler. Later, however, as the population of the *ribats* increased and the numerous children born to the *murabitum* grew up, greater integration into local society was possible. New independent *ribat*-villages were founded for younger brothers and cousins, and the isolation of the main *ribat* decreased. This was not only inevitable but desirable. . . . It meant in Sokoto that the Fulani were for the first time assimilated into the state in which they lived.[12]

Unfortunately there is a dearth of data on the construction of *ribats* in other areas of the caliphate. Numerous references to the existence of walled settlements along the outer frontiers of the emirates can be found in nineteenth-century sources, but it is difficult to determine if these represented a conscious effort to construct an integrated system of *ribats* in the classical Islamic sense. However, as Last has pointed out, virtually any fortified frontier redoubt could be considered a *ribat*.[13] Certainly the existence of these strategic strongholds enhanced the frontier security and territorial defense of the emirates. As we observed in the previous section, the situation of several hostile states along the northern borders of the caliphate necessitated extraordinary defensive measures to stabilize the frontier regions. Indeed, considering the frequency and intensity of interstate warfare on the northern frontiers in the nineteenth century, it is remarkable that there were so few territorial changes. The general frontier stability of the Sokoto Caliphate must have been attributable in part to the *ribat* policy inaugurated by Bello and continued by subsequent caliphs and emirs.

Fortifications and Internal Defense

The existence of imposing fortifications and walled towns (*birni, birane*) had been a characteristic feature of the Hausa states for centuries before the *jihad*. The origin of this tradition of wall building and military architecture is not certain, although as we have seen, recent speculation suggests that *birni*-like settlements appeared in the early first millennium and were a major factor in the emergence of the original Hausa states.[14]

Extant Hausa chronicles contain frequent references to the construction, extension, and improvement of the walls of the principal Hausa cities, and to the foundation of new *birane*. This impressive tradition of military architecture was elaborated and progressively refined during the long history of the Hausa states, and reached its culmination in the Sokoto Caliphate.[15]

The importance of fortifications and walled towns was recognized by the Muslim insurgents early in the *jihad* period. In their exhortations, writings, and practice, the leaders of the *jihad* stressed the necessity of constructing strongholds for security from attack, and as bases from which to undertake offensive actions. For example, the Shehu himself wrote in *Kitab al-farq* that "every governor of a province should strive to fortify strongholds and wage holy war against unbelievers, and the warmakers and the oppressors, and set up a military station on every frontier."[16] At Gudu the Shehu ordered the building of defensive ditches, while the construction of walls at Gwandu (1806) and Sokoto (1809) marked their establishment as permanent bases. Bello and Abdullahi also enjoined their subordinate war captains and emirs to build fortifications.[17]

In the Sokoto Caliphate some of the emirates' fortified capitals, such as Kano, Katsina, and Zaria, were seized during the *jihad* from their Hausa overlords. On the other hand, the principal towns of many other emirates were built in the nineteenth century, either on the site of smaller preexisting settlements or at another favorable location. Among these new walled cities were Bauchi, Bida, Gombe, Gwandu, Hadejia, Katagum, Sokoto, and Yola. In each case, geographical and strategic considerations were paramount in the selection of a site for the central *birni*. These fortresses were usually located near rivers, marshes, hilly terrain, or other prominent topographical features which afforded natural strategic advantages by protecting one or more of the towns' flanks and approaches. The main defenses of these fortresses, however, were the great walls (*garu, garuka*) and ramparts (*ganuwa*) that surrounded the towns. The circumference and mass of these walls varied with such factors as size, wealth, population, political control, and local military or strategic conditions. The extent and dimensions of some of these fortifications are listed in Table 2.

These extensive walls not only offered protection to the permanent residents of the cities but also enclosed a large uninhabited space to accommodate the local suburban population, which took refuge within the walls whenever enemy raiders plundered the countryside. These refugees came from distances of up to fifty miles, with their belongings and livestock, and lived in temporary quarters during the state of emergency. Wealthy families who lived outside the cities sometimes maintained a second compound within the walls always ready for the same purpose.[18] The actual residential area within the towns was usually between one-fourth and

Table 2. *Dimensions of selected town defenses in the Sokoto Caliphate*

Town	Circumference (in miles)	Height (in feet)	Width (in feet)	No. of gates
Bauchi[a]	4.5	24		9
Bida[b]	9–10	20		9
Gombe[c]	2.5			7
Hadejia[d]	3.7			5
Ilorin[e]	9			
Kano[f]	12	30–50	20–40	13
Katagum[g]	1.8			6
Katsina[h]	13–14	35–40	30	8
Keffi[i]	7	10–12		
Sokoto[j]	7	24		8
Zaria[k]	9–10	16–18		8

Sources:

[a] C. O. 446/7, "Report on Bauchi County," in No. 6348, 14 March 1899.

[b] S. Vandeleur, "Nupe and Ilorin," *Geog. Jour.*, X, 4 (1897), 360; C. Larymore, *A Resident's Wife in Nigeria* (London, 1908), p. 25; C. Knowles, "Ascent of the Niger in September and October, 1864," *PRGS*, IX, 2 (1865), 74; J. Milum, "Notes of a journey . . .," *PRGS*, III, 1 (1881), 28.

[c] V. N. Low, *Three Nigerian Emirates* (Evanston, Ill., 1972), Appendix IV, p. 220.

[d] *Ibid.*, Appendix VI, p. 228.

[e] Vandeleur, "Nupe and Ilorin," p. 367: A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *British West Africa*, 2nd ed. (London, 1900), p. 255.

[f] H. L. B. Moody, "Ganuwa – the walls of a city," *Nigeria Magazine*, No. 92 (1967), pp. 19–38, "The walls and gates of Kano city . . .," *Kano Studies*, No. 3 (1967), pp. 12–26 and *The Walls and Gates of Kano City* (Lagos, n.d.; Preface dated November 1969).

[g] Low, *Three Nigerian Emirates*, Appendix V, p. 224..

[h] H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa*, 3 vols. (Franklin Square, N.Y., 1857), I, 458, 467, 476, 477; M. J. E. Daumas and A. de Chancel, *Le Grand Désert*, 4th ed. (Paris, 1860), p. 183.

[i] C. H. Robinson, "A journey to Kano," *Niger and Yoruba Notes*, I, 11 (1895), 39, and *Hausaland* (London, 1896), p. 60.

[j] D. M. Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (London 1967), p. 183; Mockler-Ferryman, *British West Africa*, p. 329; W. Wallace, "Notes on a journey through the Sokoto Empire and Borgu in 1894," *Geog. Jour.*, VIII, 3 (1896), 218.

[k] M. H. Campbell, 'The walls of a city," *Nigeria Magazine*, No. 60 (1959), p. 94; E. Vogel, "Notes from the Mission to Central Africa," *PRGS*, II, 1 (1858), 32–33.

one-half of the total area enclosed, leaving the large uninhabited tracts available for cultivation during sieges to provide a food supply for the isolated population. Barth's diagrams of the town plans of Kano and Katsina in the mid-nineteenth century, Figures 9 and 10 respectively, illustrate this pattern of a defensive walled perimeter, central habitation site, and open-field reserve space for emergency use.

Figure 9. Town Plan of Kano. From H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa . . . 1849–1855*, I, 496. Compare Barth's sketch with Figure 11.

Figure 10. Town Plan of Katsina. From H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa . . . 1849–1855*, I, 477.

The basic material used in the construction of the walls themselves was sun-baked mud bricks (*tubali, tubala*). These bricks were fashioned in the shape of a cone, laid in a pattern to the desired height and mass of the wall, and plastered on the exterior with a smooth finish of mud cement. Along the top of the walls, ramparts, loopholes, and crenelations were built to enable defenders to take up battle stations during sieges. An excellent illustration of these ramparts and battlements at Kano is provided in the British sketch reproduced in Figure 11. The actual construction and maintenance of fortifications was the responsibility of the emirs and their *hakimai*. Subordinate officials were assigned segments of the walls and required to mobilize their clients and slaves for such communal labor (*gayya*). Since heavy seasonal rains weathered the mud walls, construction and repair were perennial concerns; and each autumn, after the rains had ceased and the crops were harvested, levies of able-bodied male clients and/or slaves turned out to perform this considerable task.

The gates (*kofa, kofofi*) of the towns were made of thick hardwood, covered with tanned animal hide, and sometimes reinforced with sheets of iron or other metal. Formidable as they were, the gates were also the most vulnerable points in the towns' defensive perimeter, and consequently were the principal objectives of attacking forces. For this reason, additional measures were taken to protect them. For example, some of the towns' gates were designed in a reentrant angle to expose their approaches to enfilade or flanking fire from the nearby walls. Also, the roads leading to the towns narrowed as they neared the gates, and were lined by wide low walls to channel attacking parties into a small space. This arrangement permitted only a few assault troops to advance together and exposed them to concentrations of fire from the battlements (*yam badala*).[19] Furthermore, the gates were set deeply into the walls, forming dark recesses to confuse attacking forces that penetrated the outer defenses, and to conceal defenders stationed there to repel them.[20] As one awed British visitor described the impressive defenses of Hadejia,

The gateways were huge, and so cunningly arranged with rectangular approaches that no armed force could possibly rush them, – indeed, no more than three or four men at a time could cross the narrow bridges, and, were any attempt at defence being made inside, these would probably not cross them alive.[21]

Surrounding the fortified walls and gates on the outer perimeter were one or more ditches, or "moats," whose depth added to the height of the walls. These ditches were usually filled with dense thorn thickets (*sarkakkiya; sako; kurma; surkuki*) to impede the movement of enemy troops toward the walls. The ditches precluded the use of cavalry near the walls, and the thorn hedges entangled the foot soldiers attempting to reach and scale the walls. Although it was possible for the assault troops to overcome these obstacles, the ditches and thickets necessarily served to hinder the advance of the attacking parties, and to render them more vulnerable

Gates

Roads

mile

0   1

0   1 km

N

Pond

Settled
area

King's
Palace

Open

Cross section of Wall of Kano

0   10   20 feet

+29

2'6"

+25   2'0"

Loopholes
D=8"   2'6"   5

8'6"   +20 2'6"

+15

Ground level +4

+5 2'

16'

Ground
level ±0   32'0"   12'   8'   32'0"

-1

-2

-9   19'   +9

-11

Interior elevation of Wall of Kano

(to the same scale)

2'

2'6"   Loopholes   8"
diameter   8"

5'   5"

Steps   4'

5'

10'   11'

12'

Gate   8'

Ground level

Figure 11. Defensive Plan of Kano City, 1903. From Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Northern Nigeria Annual Reports,* No. 409, 1902.

to the weapons of the defenders sheltered behind the battlements in the walls above.

Finally, some fortresses were also protected by a distant passive defense perimeter consisting of a series of concealed holes and ditches to act as cavalry traps along major avenues of approach. As Barth remarked about such a system a few miles north of Katsina, these ditches "formed a sort of outer defense for the cultivated fields and the pasture-grounds . . . against any sudden inroad."[22] The dual capitals of the caliphate, Sokoto and Gwandu, were also ringed by such anticavalry defenses.[23]

Alarms to warn of the approach of an enemy force were sounded by messengers and the beating of drums. The peasants in the local country-side, thus alerted, took refuge within the walls. Frequently, prominent vantage ground either near or within the towns' walls served as observation posts to detect the approach of an enemy at a distance. Inside the walls of Kano, for example, were two famous hills, Goron Dutse and Dala, which were the highest points for twelve miles around the city. It is also pertinent to recall here that *ribats* and other frontier strongholds were an integral part of this early warning system.

Overall, military organization in the emirates of the caliphate was both flexible and formidable. It combined an elaborate offensive force organization of cavalry and infantry, an imposing static defense system composed of frontier outposts and central walled towns, and an advanced technology manifested both in weaponry and the art of fortification. The offensive and defensive capabilities of the caliphate proved sufficient to defend territory gained during the *jihad*, to enlarge its domain, especially in the southern region, and to contain its most irreconcilable enemies.

However, the inherent weaknesses of this mode of military organization were apparent. The lack of standing armies and the concomitant delay in mobilizing "feudal" levies meant that wars were generally seasonal and therefore inconclusive. Moreover, the absence of institutionalized defense arrangements among the emirates precluded coordinated and decisive responses to external threats. Passive defense measures in the vicinity of walled populations centers were adequate for local security needs, but the distant rural population was left to absorb the ravages of enemy incursions. It was this seasonal nature of warfare, the reliance upon irregular armies, and the ad hoc and transient character of military coalitions that prevented the caliphate from eliminating pockets of resistance and hostile states like Kebbi, Gobir, Maradi, and Zinder.

The Theory and Practice of War

Warfare cannot be fully understood apart from the historical and socio-cultural context in which it occurs. In the Sokoto Caliphate, army organization and the actual conduct of war evolved within the framework of Sudanic military traditions. These traditions, partially Islamic in inspiration and practice, provided a composite model for the *mujahidun* to emulate. Indeed, the rapid transformation of the irregular Muslim armies into more permanently organized and highly integrated military establishments, with specialized cavalry and infantry forces, and the equally remarkable adoption of the Hausa patterns of fortified settlements and siege warfare, both testify to the pervasive influence of these military traditions. In particular, the Islamic content of these traditions was revived and further elaborated during the nineteenth century. The classical Islamic legal literature, so widely studied and applied in the caliphate, also afforded sage counsel for the conduct of military affairs.[1] In this chapter we will first consider briefly the classical Muslim conception of war; then discuss the different types of wars fought in the nineteenth century; and finally, against the background of Sudanic military traditions modified by Islam, examine the actual conduct of war in the Sokoto Caliphate.

Islam and Warfare: The *Jihad*

The classical Muslim view of the world was formulated in terms of a fundamental doctrinal dualism: people resided either in *dar al-Islam* (the abode of Islam; Muslim territory) or in *dar al-harb* (the land of unbelief; enemy territory). It was the solemn duty of the caliph, as head of the Islamic state, to wage holy war (*jihad*) incessantly by all permissible and practicable means until *dar al-Islam* embraced the entire world. *Jihad* was thus conceived as a state of permanent war, to be prosecuted by psychological and political means when military hostilities were suspended because of overriding strategic considerations.[2]

The enemies of Islam were not necessarily victims of preemptive or relentless Muslim attack. In fact, it was obligatory for the Muslim sovereign to proffer conversion to the True Faith prior to the initiation of hostilities. Even if this offer was refused, there was still another alternative to

war: acceptance of the status of a non-Muslim residing in *dar al-Islam*. This status (A. *dhimmi*) entailed political submission to Muslim authority and incorporation into the Muslim state as a tolerated but disenfranchised minority community. These tolerated non-Muslims living within the frontiers of *dar al-Islam* were required to accept certain social and legal disabilities and to pay the prescribed poll tax (A. *jizya*); in return they enjoyed protection and freedom of religion under Muslim rule. On the other hand, the refusal of non-Muslims to accept either conversion or *dhimmi* status meant that war was the only relationship that could exist between them and the Islamic state.

As *jihad* was the only type of collective armed violence permitted Muslims by their faith, the Islamic concept of war was both flexible and broad. Traditionally a casus belli was held to exist and holy war was obligatory in defense of the frontiers (*ribat*) and against polytheists or pagans; against apostates; against dissenters; against deserters and highway robbers; and against Scripturaries (i.e., Christians and Jews). It was therefore possible to legitimize war against nonbelievers as well as Muslims who dissented or apostatized, both within and beyond the domain of *dar al-Islam*. Historically *jihad* served as the principal instrument of Islamic states for territorial aggrandizement and the defense of that territory against both internal and external foes.

This conception of *jihad* had important consequences for the conduct of war in the Sokoto Caliphate. First, as recent scholarship has shown, the intense religious and intellectual ferment in Hausaland in the late eighteenth century was concerned precisely with the crucial problem of defining the nature of true Islam and nonbelief in this African environment; that is, determining whether a casus belli existed. It therefore helps to account for the elaborate legal arguments and uncompromising doctrinal positions ultimately propounded by the Shehu to justify his *jihad*, and the righteous militancy of the Muslim insurgents. Second, although warfare had been endemic for centuries among the Hausa states, the increased admixture of religious zeal in the nineteenth century intensified this condition. As we have noted, the strategic imperatives of continued expansion, consolidation, and defense were perennial preoccupations of the emirates of the caliphate. These military requirements must be seen in the context of the caliph's duty to maintain a state of permanent war against recalcitrant non-Muslim people and Muslim states that deviated from Islam. The important point here is that Islam prescribed the institutionalization of warfare as a religious obligation.

Types of Wars

Wars can be classified into types according to many different criteria. However, one relatively simple typology constructed by Hans Speier is of particular interest for this study. Speier classified wars into three types

corresponding to different social definitions of the enemy: (1) absolute, or unrestricted, war; (2) instrumental war for calculated limited ends; and (3) agonistic fighting, that is, ceremonial or ritual combat regulated by shared cultural norms.[3] The distinctions between these "pure" social types of war are useful in attempting to understand warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate.

First, absolute war is characterized by the absence of normative constraints on the application of organized violence. Such unrestricted war is fought not to attain limited objectives or values controlled by the enemy but to annihilate the enemy himself. The enemy is usually regarded as the epitome of strangeness and evil; his very existence violates the natural order as perceived by the ingroup. The enemy is barbaric, sacrilegious, and lawless, a subhuman species to be exterminated. The primeval feeling of revulsion toward this enemy, intensified perhaps by moral indignation and religious fanaticism, precludes the perception of mutual interest or obligation and encourages the use of unrestrained violence and terror.

Instrumental war, on the other hand, is waged for limited ends. Defeat rather than annihilation of the enemy is the objective of instrumental war. More precisely, defeat of the enemy is the means to the attainment of specific political, economic, or strategic advantages. Such wars may approach the intensity and ferocity of absolute war if the enemy is unconditionally committed to the defense of the desired values, and if the other side is equally determined to wrest them away at any cost. But inherent restrictions on the application of violence stem from the warring parties' vital interest in retaining or obtaining these values intact. The restrictions derive not from shared cultural values but from the expedient character of instrumental war itself.

Finally, the antithesis of absolute war is agonistic combat under closely controlled conditions. Such wars are fought neither to destroy the enemy nor to appropriate coveted values, but to achieve a symbolic victory. Agonistic contests are regulated by customs, norms, and rules that are shared and ceremoniously respected by the combatants. In fact they assume the character of rituals or plays in which the antagonists act out rather than exhibit their aggression. Victory is achieved by symbolic demonstration of superiority. Restrictions are rooted in shared cultural norms rather in expediency.

Although the differences between absolute, instrumental, and agonistic war are those of degree rather than of kind, the analytical distinctions between them appropriately draw our attention to the effect of social structure and values on the conduct of war. Warfare in the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate generally took two basic forms, both of which displayed a distinctive mixture of Speier's social types of war. In the first category were those wars against relatively small, tribal, pagan, stateless societies. These non-Muslim peoples were often raided with impunity by the large and well-equipped armies of the emirs, although some offered

stiff resistance to the Muslim raiders. The second type of warfare was that waged against hostile states like Abuja, Bornu, Gobir, Ibadan, Maradi, Tessawa, and Zinder. This latter category entailed large-scale operations in which vital interests were at stake.

In general the wars and raids against small pagan societies were characterized by a mixture of absolute and instrumental warfare. Speier's delineation of absolute war closely approximates the Muslim conception of *jihad* against intractable heathens. Such people were regarded as barbarous and godless idolators whose existence was a perversion of the divinely ordained order. As we have seen, Muslims were obliged by their faith to wage incessant war against such heathens until *dar al-Islam* embraced the entire world. In the absence of common cultural or religious bonds, these *jihads* approached the ferocity of absolute war.

On the other hand, a major objective of this type of *jihad* was the seizure and enslavement of the vanquished. Slavery was a pervasive social institution of the emirates, and slave labor was an essential part of their economic system. Such wars or raids were conducted not only in fulfillment of a religious injunction but also to sustain the crucial institution of slavery. Women and children were systematically enslaved, but adult males were often slaughtered. There was thus a balance of values that regulated the intensity and scope of these slave wars, a compromise between the theoretically unrestricted nature of hostilities and the economic requirement for live captives.

If the pagan wars represented a combination of absolute and instrumental warfare, interstate armed conflict exhibited characteristics of both instrumental and agonistic war. The instrumental aspect of interstate warfare in the caliphate derived from its objectives: the control of strategic terrain and trade routes; territorial aggrandizement; the appropriation of booty and tribute; the gaining of political and diplomatic advantage, and the like. Yet it is also important to recognize the agonistic quality of many interstate wars. The addition of this dramatic, heroic, and ritual element can be attributed to two factors – one cultural and the other technological.

The first factor, which infused interstate warfare with agonistic qualities, was the cultural homogeneity of the Central Sudan. Despite their political differences the caliphate and its enemies shared many common cultural traditions of Sudanic civilization; these bonds tended to restrain the degree of interstate violence. In particular, the common military tradition of a mounted warrior aristocracy impressed a mark of mutual respect and "sportsmanship" on organized combat. In other words, the sense of brotherhood among military professionals implied respect for a code of honor instead of unrestrained ferocity.[4]

The second factor, which encouraged threat behavior and ritualized fighting rather than savage combat, was the inferiority of siege technology relative to the art of defense. As we will learn later (see pp. 85-9,

below), it was virtually impossible for the emirs' armies to reduce large-walled fortresses by siege or assault. These massive fortifications were impervious to the comparatively primitive weapons of horsemen and foot soldiers, and therefore virtually impregnable. The strategic and tactical superiority of the means of defense over the prevailing technology and techniques of attack accounts in part for the remarkable stability of the Central Sudan during the nineteenth century. Even in areas where inter-state warfare was endemic, major territorial changes were uncommon. Lacking heavy siege craft and firepower necessary to reduce central cita-dels, campaigning armies resorted to the practice of investing these walled cities while their raiding parties ravaged the countryside. In such circumstances a real test of strength rarely occurred. Decisive military actions were avoided; rather, sieges were resolved by an extended show of force that effectively confined the enemy to his stronghold while his territory was devastated. The aggressor therefore achieved symbolic vic-tory with much bravado and ceremony, while the defenders suffered psy-chological defeat, frustration, and humiliation.[5]

The Conduct of War

It is difficult to generalize about the conduct of war in the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. Extant sources are fragmentary, diverse, and sometimes inconsistent or contradictory. Regional variations existed in military organization, tactical methods, weapons, and strategic problems. Further-more, during the nineteenth century changes occurred in these and other aspects of warfare. Yet despite this regional and historical diversity, cer-tain patterns of army organization and warfare remained relatively con-stant, many of them deriving from well-established Sudanic military tradi-tions. In the remainder of this chapter we will examine general patterns of military mobilization, the selection of commanders, logistical practices, common battle formations, the organization and functions of war camps, tactics of pitched battles and sieges, and the distribution of booty. The approach here is essentially schematic, topical, or synchronic, rather than chronological, historical, or diachronic. However, brief references to his-torical precedent and change will be made where appropriate, and a more extensive analysis of salient developments in nineteenth-century mil-itary organization and warfare will be presented in chapters 7 and 8.

Military Mobilization

The natural cycle of alternating dry and wet seasons in the Sudan imposed basic limiting conditions upon the conduct of war. Offensive operations were usually planned for the autumn to coincide with the onset of the dry season. During these several dry months, from about October to April, weather and terrain conditions were favorable for

large-scale military maneuvers. Additionally manpower and logistic considerations were linked to the semiannual change of season. After the spring and summer rains the harvest was gathered; by fall, the peasant population, freed from the land, was available for military service. On the other hand, the newly harvested produce provided rations for the campaigning armies, and the existence of full graneries in enemy territory offered ready targets to plunder or ravage.

Elaborate preparations, sometimes lasting up to two months, were required to raise and outfit a major expedition.[6] In successive meetings the emir and his war council of senior civil and military officials planned all aspects of the proposed campaign. Once the basic requirements were estimated, the emir's military staff, fief holders, and vassals were ordered to raise and provision a specified number of cavalry and infantry. These troops were mobilized, trained, and equipped through the agency of local village chiefs and ward heads. Old weapons were repaired and new ones made; pack animals were requisitioned, and logistic supplies stockpiled. If Sokoto or Gwandu called up war levies from subordinate emirates, or if individual emirates required reinforcements, messengers and letters were dispatched indicating the type and quantity of troops, animals, and supplies necessary, and the rendezvous location.[7] Subject or allied Tuareg and Fulani groups also participated in some of these expeditions.[8]

Islamic customs and rites permeated not only the preparations but also the actual conduct of entire campaigns. Divine blessings were frequently invoked by *malamai*, whose advice was also sought in the selection of a propitious day on which to commence an expedition. Prayers accompanied every stage of campaigns, and for Muslim soldiers such frequent religious practices had important ceremonial, psychological, and instrumental functions. As Humphrey Fisher has concluded, the cumulative effect of these religious observances was the achievement of an "almost unparalled discipline" among Muslim warriors.[9] While this assessment may be somewhat exaggerated, the morale and sense of self-discipline induced by communal religious observances may have compensated for the weakness of organizational control in these "feudal" armies.

On the appointed day, the fief holders' forces assembled at the designated place(s) to begin the march into enemy territory. The route of march and specific military objectives were not divulged in advance for fear that this intelligence might reach the enemy and vitiate the element of surprise, or worse still, enable the enemy to prepare an ambush en route.[10]

Commanders

The duties of Muslim military commanders, as prescribed in Islamic legal treatises, are generally as follows: to employ the army only in the service

of God; to provide for the security of the army; to protect warriors against surprise attack; to select a favorable battle site; to equip and maintain the army properly; to dispose military forces in battle order and to guard their flanks; to encourage the *mujahidun* to fight for Allah, and if necessary, to embrace death in His service; and to reward faithful soldiers with booty.[11] Islam therefore enjoined sound tactical doctrine as a religious obligation.

In the Sokoto Caliphate the selection of military commanders depended on the nature and importance of specific campaigns. The caliph himself sometimes led the joint armies whose contingents he summoned from among subordinate emirates. More commonly, however, the caliph only accompanied such expeditions to provide moral support rather than field generalship. On two occasions the Wazirin Sokoto led campaigns that required combined action against common enemies. In 1826 Caliph Bello dispatched Waziri Usuman Gidado to repel a major Bornu invasion under al-Kanemi; however, before the waziri arrived, the Bornu army was turned back by the bold action of the Bauchi forces under Emir Yakubu. And later, c. 1853, Waziri Abdul Kadir was commissioned by Caliph Aliyu (1842–59) to lead a combined army against the rebellious Emir Buhari of Hadejia.[12] On other occasions the caliph appointed either a capable official, a subordinate emir, or one of the latter's military commanders to take charge of major expeditions beyond Sokoto. Thus Ahmadu, the *Dan Galadiman Waziri*, son of Waziri Gidado and younger brother of Waziri Abdul Kadir, led the Sokoto forces in an earlier unsuccessful effort to crush Buhari. Caliph Abubakar (1873–77) called on Emir Haji of Katagum (c. 1868–96) to turn back a joint Maradi-Gobir invasion.[13] And in 1898 Caliph Abdur Rahman (1891–1902) gave overall command of combined operations to Dan Waire, the renowned Katsina general, who routed another Maradi-Gobir force.[14] These examples were among the few instances in which an imperial army operated outside the vicinity of Sokoto. In most cases, Sokoto was preoccupied with the security of its own frontiers and hinterland, and mobilized reinforcements from the emirates to meet its local defense problems. Command of military operations related solely to the internal security of Sokoto was traditionally reserved to the *jihad* leader, Aliyu Jaidu, and his descendants.

At the emirate level military command was the prerogative and responsibility of the general of the army. However, ad hoc appointments were sometimes made for specific expeditions. As we noted in Chapter 3, the emir's relatives, officials, and throne slaves were occasionally dispatched on special military missions. The emirs themselves, like the caliph, rarely assumed direct command of their armies. When emirs did accompany expeditions to the field, they were well protected by elite personal bodyguards consisting of *yan lifida* and footmen, and viewed the action from a distant vantage point. Nupe armies were commanded by their emir only

as a last resort after successive generals had failed to break an impasse or retrieve imminent defeat.[15] As the *Chronicle of Abuja* explains, the emir "was not permitted to take part himself in the fighting lest any harm should come to him, for then his people would lose all heart and the battle be lost."[16] Indeed, a threat to the inviolability of the emir's person was the ultimate source of inspiration and the final appeal to rally.[17]

Logistics

The provisioning of large armies for extended operations was a major problem. The development of a regular logistics system in the emirates was obviated by the traditional means of transport and communication, the absence of standing armies, and the seasonal nature of warfare. The existing rudimentary arrangements for the provisioning of armies in the field, however, were well suited to the predominant modes of "feudal" army organization and seasonal warfare. These arrangements consisted of three complementary means of logistic support. The first of these was individual or private provisioning, that is, the requirement for free volunteers and conscripts to carry their own weapons, equipment, and rations sufficient for two or three weeks. These troops, fully accoutered, must have appeared much like the group of archers Barth described as being "characteristically dressed, and armed in the native fashion with bows and arrows – knapsacks, water-bottles, and drinking-vessels all hanging around them in picturesque confusion."[18]

The second means of logistic support comprised three distinct but related forms of state-supplied matériel. First, through the institutions of slavery and clientage, the bulk of the military stores of the state – including war-horses, armor, weapons, and other accouterments – was distributed directly to selected slaves and freemen. Slavery of course was a compulsory "total" institution that entailed military service as one of its requirements. Clientage, on the other hand, was a voluntary institution in which the mutual rights and obligations of the superior-subordinate relationship were limited and clearly articulated. However, a client's acceptance of military equipment from his patron involved a compulsory military obligation. The second type of state provisioning included the military stores carried in the baggage train of the expeditionary force. The logistics train of the army on the march was composed of a reserve of horses for the cavalry, as well as donkeys, camels, oxen, and human porters laden with medical supplies, extra weapons, foodstuffs, tents, and sundry items. And third, settlements that lay along well-traveled campaign routes were sometimes designated as victualing stations from which supplies could be requisitioned; thus in 1897 Lieutenant Vandeleur reported that a certain village on the southern outskirts of Nupe territory served as a food depot for the Nupe army.[19]

Finally, the systematic plundering of enemy territory by campaigning

armies, which provided both booty and provisions for warriors, was the third major method of logistic support. This practice must be viewed in the broader context of Sudanic military organization and warfare. First of all, individual and state-supplied matériel was inadequate to satisfy the requirements of thousands of soldiers, war horses, pack animals, and camp followers. Campaigns usually lasted for several weeks, and sometimes months. In the absence of organizational means of large-scale requisitioning and transport to meet the prodigious needs of armies operating along extended lines of communication, plundering was a logistic necessity. Second, mobility was of critical importance in Sudanic warfare, and this principle would have been sacrificed to cumbrous baggage trains. And third, such depredation of enemy territory achieved the logistic and military advantages of yielding slaves and other booty, denying resources to the enemy, and enhancing the morale of the invading army.

Conversely, however, it must be recognized that these logistic considerations imposed natural limits on the scope and duration of military operations. Plundering and devastation were functional as long as the expedition's needs did not exceed local food supplies, and provided that retreat through the recently ravaged countryside was unnecessary. Regardless of the outcome of this seasonal warfare, it was the rural population that suffered its worst depredations. Several contemporary observers have commented on the terrible despoilation wrought by these Sudanic armies, which, lacking a regular system of remuneration and commissariat, lived off the land and pillaged local villages that lay along campaign routes.[20]

Battle Formations

The typical march and battle order of field armies was relatively uniform throughout the Central Sudan, and conformed closely to the classical Muslim pattern. During the first few centuries of the Muslim era, the regular military formation of the Arab armies in parade, march, and battle consisted of five main divisions: the vanguard, center, right and left wings, and rear guard. This formation is believed to have been introduced by the Prophet Muhammad himself at the battle of Badr in A.D. 624, and for centuries afterward it remained the "recognized formation in Islam."[21] In this classical and distinctive Muslim battle order, the tactical divisions were organized along tribal lines. The emir and his retinue were posted in the center, with subordinate commanders on the wings to either side. The advance guard was separate from the main battle line composed of the center and wings, and had its own commander and flag. The rear guard protected the army's supply train. In addition lightly armed cavalry units were posted as scouts and flank patrols for the main battle force. This disposition of military forces was flexible, and varied with changing tactical conditions and terrain.

Several sources contain descriptions of the battle formations of nine-

teenth-century Sudanic armies. From these accounts, which provide details of varying quality on the battle arrays of Abuja, Bornu, Daura, Gobir, Hadejia, Maradi, Nupe, Sokoto, Zaria, and Zinder, it is possible to reconstruct the "typical" battle formation of these armies. The earliest description of a nineteenth-century battle formation appears in Muhammadu Bello's account of the *jihad*, which was quoted in Chapter 2. More detailed accounts relating to later periods, especially that of Zaria at mid-century by M. G. Smith, demonstrate that the military formation adopted by the original *mujahidun* remained the basic pattern for most of the century. After about 1860, however, this battle-order pattern was modified in several states as an adaptation to the increasing use of firearms. In this section we will be concerned only with the tactical organization of the army on the march prior to the impact of firearms; the reorganization of the battle order to accommodate musketeers will be examined in Chapter 7.[22]

Like the classical Muslim armies, the typical array of nineteenth-century armies on the march was basically a tripartite formation composed of a vanguard, a main battle force of cavalry and infantry in the center, and a reserve rear guard. This pattern, it will be recalled, was adopted by Bello's army after c. 1805 when cavalry had become numerous enough to be integrated into the battle order as a regular tactical unit. This basic structure, which may well have been the traditional Sudanic pattern, remained intact for decades thereafter.

The army on the march was organized in column formation with its wings collapsed, except when battle was imminent. The close-in-wing column formation facilitated control of the army's movement and maximized its maneuverability. The main body of the army was preceded by a party of pathfinders, either nomadic Fulani or Tuareg cameleers, whose duty it was to clear the route of obstacles that would impede the progress of the march. Following them at a distance were scouts or guides who maintained the direction and pace of the column. Then came the main force of cavalry and infantry under the field commander. Small parties of light cavalry were used also as flank patrols and skirmishers. The emir, his bodyguard and staff, and liaison officers followed the main body of troops. Behind the emir's official retinue came the musicians with big brass trumpets, flutes, horns, and drums; these instruments were used to sound signals and to accompany the praise sings (s. *kirari*) and war songs of the emir and his chiefs.[23] Finally, the reserve forces and the baggage train, protected by a cavalry convoy, brought up the rear.

The high degree of functional specialization within the typical battle order reflected the complex military organization and stable tactical doctrine that had evolved in the Central Sudan. This disposition of forces was designed to achieve optimum security, march discipline, mobility, and tactical flexibility. The actual deployment of forces on campaign

doubtless varied somewhat with the nature of the terrain, the proximity and composition of the enemy army, and a multitude of other tactical contingencies.

War Camps

Armies in the field constructed temporary war camps (s. *sansani*) when-ever they halted for any length of time, and especially within marching distance of the anticipated battlefield or town to be invested. Although the history of Sudanic war-camp construction is largely unknown, Bornu chronicles attribute the introduction of a regular war-camp organization and defense to Mai Idris Alooma (c. 1570–1603). According to Ahmed Ibn Fartua, the mai's biographer, Idris Alooma began the building of stockaded war camps during the protracted campaigns of the Kanem wars. Among the advantages of these field fortifications enumerated by Ibn Fartua were the provision of a means for corralling horses and pack animals; security against thieves and enemy attacks; the confinement of captives and the safekeeping of booty; and, last but not least, the preven-tion of "any one from leaving the camp on errands of immorality, debauch or other foolishness." Indeed, as Ibn Fartua concluded, the "advantages of a stockade cannot be numbered."[24]

The use of war camps in the Sokoto Caliphate may represent a contin-uation of a Hausa practice borrowed from Bornu; certainly in organiza-tion and function they were similar. Generally the organization of war camps in the caliphate was based on the relative territorial position of the regional contingents participating in the campaign. On major expeditions under the banner of the caliph, the various emirs situated their army units in the encampment according to their geographical location in relation to Sokoto. Similarly regional sections of the war camp were organized on the same principle: the *hakimai* of each emir established their camps in posi-tions homologous to those which their fiefs occupied with respect to the capital; and so on until all subdivisions were settled. Even the emirs' officials arranged their tents and shelters according to the location of their residences in the capital with respect to the emirs' palaces. During inde-pendent campaigns also, the emirs followed the practice of assigning posi-tions in their war camps on the basis of territorial organization. Captain Hugh Clapperton, who accompanied Caliph Bello's large combined army at the siege of the Gobirawa at Konya in 1826, described this typical arrangement of the war camp:

The only regulation that appears in these rude feudal armies is, that they take up their ground according to the situation of the provinces, east, west, north, or south; but all are otherwise huddled together, without the least regularity. The man next in the rank to the governor of each province has his tent placed nearest to him, and so on. I always found out my quarters, which were close to the Gadado [first *waziri*], by inquiring what province the people belonged to.[25]

Within these war camps, which sometimes sprawled over hundreds of acres of ground, the warriors sheltered beneath thatched grass huts or tents. If a pitched battle were expected, the war-camp site was established several miles from the anticipated battlefield (*fada*), and here the noncombatants and provisions were left during the fight. Surveillance was maintained at night by posting a special guard of mounted sentinals, and patrols were kept out to ensure against a surprise attack by the enemy. During siege operations, spies and reconnaissance parties (*magewayi, magewaya*) were sent to survey the enemy's fortifications and to probe for vulnerable points in the town's defenses. Within the confines of the camp, warriors prepared themselves and their equipment for battle; horses were saddled at sunset on the night prior to the planned attack. If an extended siege rather than a decisive battle occurred, additional defenses such as ditches, thorn hedges, and timber stockades were constructed around the perimeter of the war camp. In this fashion many war camps were slowly transformed into permanent settlements or towns with mud walls and large populations. In fact it was by this very process that many of the emirates' capitals were established during the *jihad*.

Tactics in Pitched Battle

A fundamental tactical consideration in Sudanic warfare was the problem of integrating cavalry and infantry units into a single battle force of mutually supporting elements. The coordination of cavalry and the various specialized infantry divisions in open battle (*daga*) generally was achieved by the disposition of these forces in line-abreast formation, with units in close ranks, or "phalanxes." The use of the basic line formation (*bata*) had several advantages. The line was the simplest tactical formation and afforded built-in security for each soldier and unit, excepting of course those on the extreme flanks. The tactical line also provided its warriors a vital incentive to hold their positions, for to surge forward or fall back in disorder would be to isolate themselves and expose a vulnerable flank to the enemy. Hence the instinct of self-preservation was wedded to a military principle, and served to maintain the integrity of the entire line as a tactical device.

Although the line-abreast formation had the advantages of simplicity, security, and unity, it was not without severe limitations. Well suited to defense, the line was a conservative offensive instrument: victory could be achieved only by overpowering the enemy by sheer force or attrition, rather than by bold decisive thrusts. Furthermore the line was vulnerable to penetration, and once broken, tended to disintegrate quickly and expose unprotected flanks. Thus one of the main objectives of cavalry charges was to break enemy lines, isolate foot soldiers, and attack them one by one. Whereas deep formations of infantry could hold their own

against cavalry – as did the Muslim armies of the early *jihad* – security and combat discipline in a line will be lost if the formation is broken.

As in the classical Muslim battle order, the deployment of forces within the basic line formation generally conformed to the three-wing pattern, with the emir or his general in the center with his colors. This attack formation was used by the *mujahidun* as early as the battle of Tabkin Kwotto in June 1804. Bello described the action as follows:

Then as we approached the enemy we marched in lines. The enemy, too, prepared and took up their positions. . . . They drew up in line . . . and made their preparations. We formed our line of battle against them. We gazed at each other, and each man's eye looked into his enemy's. Then we shouted three times "Allah Akbar" and charged them. They beat their drums and charged to meet us. The lines met. Their right wing over-bore our left wing, and was mingled with our men and pressed them back into the centre. Their left wing overbore our right wing and pressed our men back to the centre. Our centre stood firm.[26]

Other nineteenth-century Arabic sources attest to the use of the three-wing line formation, not only in Sokoto but throughout the Central Sudan.[27]

The actual disposition of forces and configuration of the battle line naturally varied with the tactical situation. However, it is possible to distinguish two common variants of the basic line formation, illustrated in Figure 12. Prior to the widespread use of firearms, the cavalry was the main shock force and accordingly was usually assigned the attack position in the front of the battle order. Infantry units formed the second echelon, supporting the horsemen as opportunity permitted, and seizing captives and booty. Alternatively the infantry was sent into battle first with the cavalry in general support. Possession of a large cavalry force favored the first option; on the other hand, the positioning of the relatively undisciplined infantry between its own cavalry and the enemy minimized the danger of panic and desertion among the foot soldiers.[28] But as we shall see in Chapter 7, the increasing availability of firearms in the late nineteenth century favored the deployment of gun-carrying foot soldiers to the vanguard and the relegation of the cavalry to support roles.

The second variant of the basic line formation was employed for the purpose of executing single or double envelopments. In this pattern infantry units were arrayed in the center of the battle order, with the cavalry stationed on the wings to make flanking movements. In Gobir the introduction of the envelopment formation is attributed to Sultan Ali (c. 1816–36), who used the new tactic to win many brilliant victories.[29] Considering the antiquity of cavalry warfare in the Sudan, however, it is difficult to believe that such an innovation appeared in Gobir only in the nineteenth century.

But whatever degree of organization and coordination existed in the battle order prior to a pitched battle was quickly lost in the fury and din

(a) Typical Attack Formation

(b) Attack Formation for Envelopment

Figure 12. Common Battle Formations.

of combat. Foot soldiers and cavalry inevitably became intermixed once the battle was joined. The *zagage* sheltered among the horsemen, as did archers among the heavy cavalry.[30] The battlefield quickly became a colorful and confused spectacle, with warriors, drummers, and singers "all mixed up together."[31]

A graphic description of cavalry tactics was related to the late H. A. S. Johnston by an aged veteran of the Kebbi wars, and is worth quoting at length:

Our weapons in the cavalry consisted of two or three javelins, normally held in the left hand, a lance or spear, a sword, and sometimes a cudgel. There were very few fire-arms and in any case these were seldom used by horsemen. When one body of cavalry was attacking another they usually hurled their javelins as they were closing in and then fought with swords when they had got to close quarters. Cudgels were only used as a last resort.

On the other hand if horsemen were attacking infantry they usually relied on the speed and weight of their charge to break up the enemy's formation or overrun his position. After that foot soldiers could be attacked singly with lance or sword and if

they took to flight over open ground, as often happened, they stood little chance to escape.[32].

It is difficult to assess the relative tactical importance of cavalry and infantry in the nineteenth-century emirates. Contemporary sources differ in their evaluations, and data on individual battles are sparse, incomplete, and report variable outcomes. Although the infantry constituted up to 90 percent of these armies, Barth claimed that "victory depends almost always on the cavalry."[33] On the other hand, Major Dixon Denham, who personally observed the Bornu army of al-Kanemi on several occasions, estimated its strength at 30,000 cavalry and 9,000 Kanembu spearmen. Yet Denham implied that this basically equestrian army suffered because it was "very deficient" in foot soldiers, "who ever have been the sterling commodity of a warlike nation."[34]

Although the advantages of cavalry in the savanna environment are obvious, especially in slave raiding, numerous examples can be cited to attest to the ability of infantry forces to withstand and even inflict decisive defeat on mounted adversaries. The battles of the early *jihad* period are instructive in this regard, as is the rout of the Bornu army by the archers of Bauchi c. 1826.[35] The Yoruba wars also provide instances in which the Ilorin cavalry was defeated by foot soldiers.[36] Furthermore, in some cases more mobile and lightly clad horsemen were able to overcome the emirs' cavalry. The bareback mounted spearmen of the Bata and Sura were often more than a match for raiding Muslim cavalry.[37] And the highly mobile cavalrymen of Abuja, clad only in coats and knee-length trousers, prided themselves upon their ability to outmaneuver Zaria horsemen, "for it was the arrogant custom of the Fulani to go out to battle dressed in their finest Feast Day robes, voluminous garments which prevented them from moving fast."[38]

Finally, mention should be made of the use of clever tactics in Sudanic warfare. Historically Muslim military thinking stressed cunning, deceptive tactics, and stratagem as the essence of successful warfare. Following the Prophet's dictum that "War is trickery," Muslim strategists and tacticians have consistently regarded the ambush and surprise attack as the best tactics.[39] Indeed, Abdullahi echoed this military tradition in the guidelines issued to his chiefs, reminding them that "war is deception; success in war is not great numbers or speed."[40] Sheer force was a last resort, to be employed only when cunning tactics failed to achieve their purpose. As the Hausa proverb counsels, "Stratagem is better than brute force."[41]

An interesting example of the successful use of such clever tactics is provided by a late nineteenth-century ambush laid by Katsina troops for a Maradi force. On this particular occasion the Katsinawa were greatly outnumbered and particularly disadvantaged by the superior Maradi cavalry. But the wily Katsina troops, reaching the likely battleground before the enemy, tied the heads of tall shrubs together across the approaches to

this area. When the Maradi army arrived on the scene, its cavalry charged unsuspectingly into this clever trap, became entangled in the knotted grass, and many horsemen fell victim to the Katsina archers. This ingenious method was probably a common tactical ruse.[42]

The conclusion that emerges from a review of the diverse sources pertaining to nineteenth-century warfare is that cavalry, generally the most important arm of Sudanic armies, never enjoyed an absolute advantage in battle. Surely, other things being equal, horsemen possessed a certain advantage over foot soldiers; but warfare rarely, if ever, occurs under controlled conditions. Tactical conditions varied considerably across time and locale, and military success depended on a combination of many factors appropriate to the specific circumstances of each engagement.

Siege and Assault Tactics

Siege operations and assaults on fortified positions probably were more common in Sudanic warfare than pitched battles. This form of offensive operation was conducted according to well-developed and time-tested techniques. In general two types of such operations can be distinguished: (1) attacks on small stockaded settlements or villages, and (2) attacks on larger walled towns. The first category comprised raids and punitive expeditions against recalcitrant subjects and required close mutual support between the infantry and *yan lifida* to breach the fortifications. The second type of siege operation occurred during major campaigns and was conducted by a variety of tactics, including isolation and starvation of the invested town, deceptive diplomacy, and direct assault. Each of these will be discussed in turn.

Stockaded Settlements Raiding (*hari*) and punitive expeditions were generally undertaken with little danger to the emir's large and well-equipped armies. In this class of military operations terrain often presented the most formidable obstacle, especially to the use of cavalry, for many acephalous tribal groups took refuge on densely wooded and virtually unassailable hilltops. To such people concealment and inaccessible terrain offered the best defense against horsemen. During the nineteenth century numerous mounted assaults in such environs were put to flight, particularly in the eastern and southern emirates.

If direct assault on a fortified hilltop was not feasible, the usual practice was to lay siege to the isolated settlement, interdict its water supply, and ravage its cultivated fields. In this manner many were forced to capitulate. Vogel reported the outcome of one such siege in Zaria.

The country between Bautshi [Bauchi] and Salia [Zaria] is entirely inhabited by heathen tribes. . . . Their villages being on the top of the steepest rocks, the Sultan adopted the following plan of catching slaves: he occupied with an imposing force the fields in the valley, driving all his horses in the then green harvest, until the poor

fellows on the mountains surrendered for fear of starvation, and send down the number of boys requested of them. The Sultan thus obtained in three weeks 200 fine slaves, who were marched off immediately to Sokatu [Sokoto] for sale.[43]

On the other hand, if the objective was a thorn-fenced or timber-stockaded settlement in relatively open country, a surprise attack (*farmake*) was the favored technique. Incendiary arrows were sometimes used to ignite the combustible timber and brush enceinte, and the dwellings within. This method was employed either alone or in combination with a direct assault in which foot soldiers advanced along with the *yan lifida*, under the covering fire of archers and gunmen. As soon as the sappers had made a negotiable breach in the barricade, the cavalry, followed by the infantry, swept into the village and carried the assault to the dwellings.[44] The special advantage of heavy cavalry in such attacks was, of course, the padded armor protecting riders and mounts from arrow fire. Yet even these dragoons were vulnerable at times to a well-organized defense. In the Ganda campaign of Emir Zubeiru (1890–1901), for example, skilled bowmen overwhelmed the Adamawa *yan lifida* and put them to flight.[45]

Although heavy cavalry was especially suited for close combat and undermining stockade defenses, light cavalry could also be used in assaulting light fortifications. Such tactics, emphasizing surprise and mobility, are exemplified by the Ilorin cavalry at the siege of the Ibadan war camp at Offa in the 1880s. According to the Yoruba historian Samuel Johnson, the "method of the cavalry men was to gallop round and round beyond the range of bullets, and then watch the opportunity for seizing a weak point or take their enemies unawares and endeavor to pull down the walls or spear the foe."[46]

Walled Towns If the emirs' formidable armies were usually able to carry lightly defended positions, their operations against the massive walled fortifications of larger towns were undertaken with greater circumspection. In the latter case a long siege was frequently a more prudent and more certain, if not more spectacular and decisive, means of achieving military objectives. A passive offense was preferred to direct assault for the simple reason that the imposing defenses of these citadels were all but impregnable.

As we noted earlier, these expeditions were accompanied by certain customary practices. Marauding armies usually devastated the populated areas of the countryside on the way to their main objectives. If the invaders were not met by the enemy in pitched battle, they advanced to within a few miles of the walled stronghold, erected their war camp, and prepared to conduct siege operations. Sometimes it was possible to lure the town's inhabitants out from behind their fortifications and engage them in the open. This was reportedly the favorite stratagem of Mai Idris

Alooma of Bornu in the late sixteenth century. According to his biographer, Mai Idris regularly divided his army into two unequal parts, sending the smaller war party to advance directly toward the enemy fortress while the main flying column moved in a wide arc around the flank or behind the town. The small decoy force feigned an attack and then retreated, drawing out the defenders in hot pursuit. But as soon as the townsmen had sortied out into the open bush, the main force fell upon them, cut off their retreat, and annihilated them.[47] In the nineteenth century this same method was used by Caliph Muhammadu Bello to deceive the people of Karo into an ambush set by his horsemen.[48]

Failing such stratagems, it was then customary for the invading emir to send a messenger, usually one of the *yan lifida,* to deliver an ultimatum of unconditional surrender to the inhabitants. After an exchange of epithets and other forms of verbal and ritual abuse, the townsmen usually rejected the terms and prepared to defend themselves; the aggressors then commenced offensive operations in earnest.[49] These offensive operations against walled towns often entailed a combination of active and passive tactics. A wide range of options was available to the expeditionary force, including deceptive diplomacy, direct assault, and protracted siege operations. The choice of techniques naturally depended on the specific circumstances attending each campaign.

Guileful diplomacy and deception were less costly and sometimes more effective means of gaining military objectives than direct attack. The Muslim coups in Nupe and Ilorin in the 1820s and 1830s were achieved by intervention in their civil wars on the pretext of supporting one of the contesting parties. Bribery was also employed to fix the outcome of battles,[50] or to gain entrance to fortified towns.[51] The use of deceptive tactics is well illustrated by the infiltration and seizure of Panda in 1854 by Zaria agents. W. B. Baikie heard of this subversion from the recently exiled royal family of Panda:

The enemy, they said, did not come on openly; but for several days many of them had been arriving at Panda in small bands, apparently for trade, when suddenly one morning they arose and assaulted the place, so unexpectedly that but little resistance was made.[52]

If turncoats or collaborators could not be found, and if the defenses of the town appeared negotiable, a direct assault was the likely plan of action. A variety of assault techniques, including the use of incendiaries, rushing the gates, and scaling the walls, were widely practiced.

As in the case of smaller stockaded settlements, several types of incendiary devices were commonly employed when the habitations within the walls were within range. For instance, combined armies from Gwandu and Sokoto fired the towns of Kimba (c. 1823) and Argungu (c. 1831) with incendiary arrows, but in both cases failed to gain entrance.[53] During the Kebbi revolt of the late 1820s, however, the rebels' town was

successfully reduced by means of fire arrows.[54] Long-barreled "Dane gun" muskets, with a maximum range of up to 400 yards, were also used at times to discharge flaming arrows at the combustible thatch of enemy habitations.[55] Another peculiar and ingenious method of setting towns ablaze was reported by Clapperton, who observed the recently burned and abandoned site of Algi north of Old Oyo. His guides informed him that the Fulani had released burning pigeons into the town. "The mode of doing it was," they related, "by making combustibles fast to the tails of the birds, which, on being let loose from the hand, immediately flew to the tops of the thatched houses, while the Fellatas kept up a sharp fire of arrows, to prevent the inhabitants extinguishing the flames."[56]

The most direct method of assaulting towns was to rush the walls and gates in the coordinated cavalry and infantry attack. Such bold actions were undertaken only if the defenses were in a state of disrepair or had been gradually reduced by sappers. The gates, of course, were the primary objectives of such assaults; the attackers either concentrated their efforts against one gate or stormed several portals simultaneously, hoping to force an immediate entrance. On the other hand, the sallies directed toward the walls were more difficult. In these instances special infantry units were usually tasked with clearing away obstacles like thorn hedges and filling in the surrounding ditches with dirt and debris. As in attacks on smaller settlements, the heavy cavalry engaged the defenders on the walls to draw their arrow fire, while supporting units of archers and musketeers attempted to clear the parapets. With the defenders thus preoccupied, the lightly armed pioneers and sappers cut footrests and scaled the walls.[57]

Unfortunately, in the accessible literature there are but two contemporary nineteenth-century accounts of such direct assault actions against large walled towns: Clapperton's detailed eyewitness account of Bello's unsuccessful attack on the Gobir capital of Konya (1826), and Richard Lander's secondhand report of Bello's expedition against the Igbira town of Panda (c. 1824). At Konya, following the customary practice, the *yan lifida* were sent against the defenders; but the sole musketeer among the Gobirawa did "wonderful execution" in bringing down the van of the heavy horsemen, and effective archery kept Bello's large army at the respectful distance. This particular engagement ended in dismal humiliation when part of the caliph's army deserted in terror as rumors of a counterattack swept through the war camp.[58] In the case of Panda also, the defending musketeers, shooting through small loopholes in the walls, sent Bello's army fleeing in disarray.[59] These accounts serve to exemplify the dangers inherent in direct assaults against imposing citadels.

Many of the conventional methods of siege warfare discussed above had been used in the Central Sudan for centuries,[60] but occasionally

more unorthodox stratagems were used in attacking walled towns. Perhaps one of the most unusual of these was adopted by the rebellious Emir Buhari of Hadejia (c. 1848–63) during his siege of Marmar. Buhari enlisted the services of a notorious housebreaker named Gado to engineer tunneling operations beneath the town walls, and by means of this resourceful technique he was able to carry out a surprise attack at dawn, massacre many of the town's inhabitants, and annex Marmar to Hadejia.[61]

The inability of an expeditionary force to carry a walled town by these traditional assault techniques left only one viable alternative: prolonged siege operations. In such cases the town was surrounded, isolated from supplies and reinforcements, and its people cut off from retreat. Siege operations usually lasted several weeks or a few months. However, there are records of extraordinary sieges that continued for years. The latter was a rare but ancient practice in the Central Sudan. Both Sarkin Kano Kanajeji (c. 1390–1410) and Mai Idris Alooma (c. 1570–1603) were reported to have kept armies in the field for years, laying waste to the farmlands of their enemies and preventing them from planting and harvesting new crops. These perennial sieges effectively disrupted the agricultural cycle of their hapless victims, who were ultimately starved into submission.[62]

Whatever the duration of siege operations, the application of the "strangulation" technique was widely practiced and fundamental to this mode of warfare. And it was, perhaps, the most successful method of reducing smaller walled towns. During the *jihad* the Muslim forces often employed this tactic of isolation and starvation. Daura, for instance, was taken "after a siege by means of cutting off the corn supplies from the eastern villages."[63] In the 1820s Caliph Bello used this technique of constriction to force the rebellious Gobirawa into submission. As Lander reported,

Bello had reconquered several of the mutinous districts at the period of our arrival. . . . The towns whose gates were not instantly opened to their summons, the Falatahs surrounded, and intercepting all communication between the people residing in them and those of the neighboring country, prevented any provisions being obtained by the besieged, and in a manner starved them into capitulation.[64]

The foregoing survey of siege and assault tactics has occasionally anticipated the tentative conclusions that will be advanced here, preparatory to our brief discussion in the next section of defensive tactics. First of all, in the case of stockaded settlements, the means of attack were generally superior to the means of defense. Raids, punitive expeditions, or other forms of offensive action in which the objectives were small villages defended by terrain and relatively rudimentary fortifications were usually successful. In the second place, attacks and sieges of walled towns of intermediate size probably resulted in mixed outcomes,

with successes and failures approximately equal. And finally, it seems safe to say that the imposing fortifications of the major citadels were generally sufficient to withstand assault and siege under the prevailing strategic and tactical conditions. Lacking the siege technology and firepower to reduce the virtually impregnable walled cities, armies on the offense resorted to ceremonial combat and secondary actions designed to enervate and over-awe their enemies. As Bello's efforts at Konya show, direct assaults on heavily defended positions usually proved abortive.

Yet prolonged siege operations, regardless of their ritualistic and inde-cisive character, were not without military effect. Ravaging armies caused considerable economic, social, and political dislocation, especially in the countryside. True, sieges were usually abandoned when supplies and plundered matériel were exhausted, or when threatened by the arrival of a relief force for the beleaguered garrison. But again, weeks or months of unyielding economic blockade, armed attack, and psycho-logical warfare were certainly debilitating for the invested central town. Therefore, even if the maximum result was the temporary containment of the enemy (which, of course, could be perpetuated indefinitely by annual campaigns), such siege operations, "while inconclusive, were not ineffective."[65]

Tactics of the Defense

Lest the reader forget that siege operations entailed a defensive as well as an offensive effort, we must now turn to a consideration of protective measures practiced by siege victims. Hopefully, it is superfluous rather than belated to point out here that a state whose capital was besieged one year might field a large army the next to conduct its own siege operations. Thus the employment of offensive or defensive tactics was determined by circumstances, and it is not our concern now to focus on the conditions of chronic defensive or offensive warfare that may have been prevalent in particular emirates and states.

We have already observed that the *ribat* chain along the frontiers and the central walled fortresses constituted a formidable system of pas-sive strategic defense. Although campaigning armies often seized the initiative and laid siege to the large citadels, their defenders were by no means helpless. Not only were besieged warriors capable of spir-ited defense; their resourceful tactics sometimes turned the siege into a rout of the attacking force. In this section we will consider the principal techniques of active defense: surprise counterattacks, combat at the walls, and relief columns from overlords, vessals, or allies.

As in pitched battles, siege and countersiege operations fre-quently relied on stratagem rather than on massive force. During the *jihad*, for example, Bello's first expedition against the Gobir stronghold

at Alkalawa was aborted when mounted troops unexpectedly sallied forth from behind the walls, attacked the Muslims' left flank and caught them between the defenders on the walls.[66] According to M. G. Smith, the Hausa of Maradi also preferred to initiate pitched battles rather than submit to prolonged sieges, their favorite tactic being a surprise attack on the rear of the enemy army or on its war camp.[67] Surprise attacks by Ibadan forces on Ilorin war camps likewise were decisive in breaking the Fulani sieges at Oshogbo (c. 1840) and Ikirun (1878).[68] Another ruse that successfully routed an enemy is recalled in a Hausa story recorded by F. W. Taylor. In this incident the chief whose territory was invaded hurriedly collected all the cattle in the area and, in the dark of night, drove them toward the aggressors' war camp. The encamped warriors, fearing that the great commotion signaled the approach of a large cavalry force, panicked and broke camp.[69]

If conditions precluded such preemptive surprise attacks, the defenders of besieged fortresses had little choice but to engage the enemy in heated combat at the walls. When siege operations commenced the defenders took their positions in the battlements and attempted to drive off the assault troops with volleys of arrow fire and gunshot, and by hurling spears, sticks, rocks, and debris. As we have seen, these contests frequently took place at or near the gates and exposed portions of the walls. Inside the walls, reinforcements or reaction forces, including parties of horsemen, were stationed at critical locations from which they could rush to any point where a breakthrough had occurred.

In these battles the use of incendiaries was certainly not monopolized by the assault troops: the defenders often used these terrible weapons with great effect. During the reign of Emir Haru of Hadejia (c. 1865–85), for instance, the people of Adaini repulsed an assault by a combined army from Hadejia, Katagum, and Jama'are by throwing firebrands (s. *bakin wuta; bantarma*) from the walls at the scaling parties in the ditch below.[70] And early in the second reign of Sultan Tanimu of Zinder (1854–84), the defenders of Myrria threw red-hot swords into the quilted armor of his assault forces.[71] The elderly Kebbi veteran, whose testimony had been cited on several occasions already, also provides a summary account of the use of incendiary weapons by both attackers and defenders in these siege operations:

Whenever they could, the attacking side used to use fire. If the houses nearest the walls were close enough, they did this by shooting flaming arrows into the thatch until it caught alight. A good conflagration always distracted the defenders and sometimes made them panic and desert their posts altogether. For this reason, of course, houses were usually set well back from the walls, so that they could not be set on fire.

Where fire could not be used, sieges became duels between the defenders sheltering behind their fortifications and the assault troops protected by their quilted armour. In these duels the defenders too made use of red-hot arrows and if they managed to

plant a few into the quilting of the *yan-lifidi* they could sometimes make horse and rider burst into flames.[72]

In addition to the human and material resources immediately available for defensive purposes, besieged towns were sometimes reinforced by vassals, overlords, or allies. Thus when metropolitan Maradi was attacked or invested, relief forces were dispatched by the *kaura* (general of the army) from his fief at Gezawa, or by Sarkin Gobir.[73] In general, *hakimai* and vassals were expected to furnish military support to emirs in times of danger; and the emirs likewise owed a reciprocal military obligation to the constituent districts of their domain. Furthermore emirates occasionally acted jointly to assist one another against invaders. These informal multilateral arrangements, activated as additional measures in support of besieged towns, contributed toward the general preponderance that the defense enjoyed over the offense.

Distribution of Booty

The conclusion of a military campaign was marked by the division of war spoils (*ganima*) among the victorious warriors. Looting was customary in African warfare, and in the Sokoto Caliphate Islamic law both sanctioned the seizure of booty and regulated the manner of its distribution. In this sense the Muslim concept of *jihad* enjoined warfare as a solemn religious obligation and also provided a material incentive for fighting. The *mujahidun* who died in the service of Allah were assured immediate admission into the Divine Presence; survivors were rewarded in the form of war booty. This dual incentive, promising the best of both worlds, must have been very strong among devout Muslims. Abdullahi captured the essence of this double motivation in a poem celebrating the defeat of the Gobirawa:

> . . . He who dies goes to Paradise
> He who comes back alive will enjoy the booty.[74]

Circumstances permitting, Islamic law and custom required that the actual apportionment of the booty take place at the battle site. This practice had the important psychological effect of immediate positive reinforcement for the victorious warriors, and added to the humiliation and demoralization of the vanquished foe. As a standard text of Maliki law prescribed, "all booty must be divided among the soldiers in the enemy's own country, provided that this can be done with reasonable security. . . . Booty so distributed makes a painful impression on the enemy and gives satisfaction to the Believers."[75]

In addition, Islamic law contained specific provisions for the division of the war spoils: one-fifth (*humushi*) of the booty was alloted to the

state treasury and the remainder was to be apportioned among the warriors, with the cavalry receiving triple the share of the infantry, "for horses are the mainstay in battle."[76] Prisoners of war could be executed, ransomed, exchanged for Muslim prisoners, or reduced to slavery.[77] In Sudanic warfare the usual fate of war captives was enslavement, for in the institution of slavery they were most profitably disposed of. Both Islamic law and economic considerations therefore acted as constraints on wanton slaughter of captives, especially women and children.[78]

In actual practice, however, the division of the spoils of war in Sudanic warfare varied somewhat from state to state, and rarely followed the Islamic prescriptions. Even during the *jihad*, when the Shehu was most anxious to observe Islamic law, wartime exigencies precluded the rigorous enforcement of the proper distribution of booty. After the battle of Matankari (1804), for example, there was such confusion and disorder that the Shehu appointed Umaru al-Kammu as treasurer (*Ma'aji*) and charged him with supervising the distribution of booty.[79] Yet the problem persisted, and shortly afterward the booty seized at Konni was also divided under conditions that caused Bello to doubt its propriety.[80]

Although legally entitled to one-fifth of the war spoils, most Muslim states of the Central Sudan claimed considerably more than that. Special weapons and certain "strategic materials" such as tempered swords, chain mail, quilted armor, and horses were appropriated directly by the emirs. The state also compelled the surrender of about one-half of all war captives taken by the army. Booty seized by royal slaves was regarded as state property, although a small share was returned to them as personal reward. Likewise, slaves of officials yielded most of their booty to their masters. Free clients, on the other hand, were required to relinquish a portion of their spoils to their patrons as a condition of their relationship. Subject to the special entitlement of the state to the classes of booty mentioned above, free volunteers were permitted to retain their personal plunder. It is clear, therefore, that the distribution of booty was directly correlated with social status and official rank, and that the emirs and their officials took the bulk of the spoils of war. As we noted in Chapter 1, slaves in particular were versatile economic instruments that could be exchanged for horses and weapons. It was this sanctioned seizure of war booty which, in effect, paid for warfare itself and contributed considerably to the state treasuries.[81]

Summary

After this lengthy survey of military practices in the Sokoto Caliphate, it might be useful to summarize some of its basic characteristics. His-

torians of the cavalry-using Sudanic states have often stressed the nature of mounted warfare: speed and mobility, and its special role in slave raiding and state building. We do not contest the fundamental importance of cavalry; indeed, we have emphasized throughout this work the implications of cavalry warfare in Sudanic history. However, this preoccupation with cavalry – *par excellence* a means for attack – has sometimes obscured the defensive value of the extensive walled fortifications throughout the Central Sudan. The foregoing analysis of military organization, strategic considerations, and the tactics of nineteenth-century Sudanic warfare has attempted to differentiate among the varied possible combat conditions, and to assess the relative value of the prevailing means of attack and means of defense in those conditions.

Despite the widespread use and advantages of cavalry, Sudanic warfare exhibited several conservative features. Such conservatism in the waging of war can be attributed to several factors. First, the preindustrial technology of war set inherent limits on the scope and intensity of armed conflict. In particular, the superiority enjoyed by the defense was an effective check on the destructiveness of interstate wars. True, the *jihad* resulted in a reorganization of the interstate system in the Central Sudan; but during the nineteenth century, although warfare was intensive and endemic, no major alterations were effected. Second, the "feudal" form of military organization in the emirates was capable only of incomplete mobilization of resources, and therefore imposed severe organizational limits on the conduct of war. Moreover, the rudimentary logistics system placed additional constraints on the scope and duration of campaigns. Third, the economic value of slaves and booty also served to limit wanton plunder and loss of life. Indeed, as we shall argue later, warfare in the Central Sudan was more an instrument or process of *redistribution* than destruction. Finally, the cultural homogeneity of the Sudan imposed social restraints on violence in interstate warfare and thus further limited casualties and human slaughter. This conservative pattern of warfare was perceptibly modified in the late nineteenth century, however, as firearms became available in unprecedented quantities. It is with this important subject – the availability and impact of firearms – that the next two chapters are concerned.

The Firearms Trade in the Central Sudan: The Expansion of the "Gun-frontier"

A Problem of Interpretation

A definitive study of the role of firearms in the history of Africa has yet to be undertaken. In the past decade, however, this subject has engaged the attention of an increasing number of historians.[1] It is clear that, with few exceptions, the impact of firearms prior to the nineteenth century was limited to the coastal areas of Africa, where local rulers took advantage of their strategic commercial position to monopolize the European arms trade. But in the nineteenth century the trade and use of firearms spread to the interior of the continent, contributing to the state-building efforts of such well-known figures as *al-hajj* Umar, Samori, Rabeh, Tippu Tib, and Msiri.

Yet even in the nineteenth century, when the impact of firearms in other areas of Africa was sudden and dramatic, the states of the Central Sudan remained relatively unaffected by this new military technology. This apparent anomaly, together with the reversion to the traditional pattern of Sudanic military organization in the Sokoto Caliphate after the *jihad,* has led some scholars to conclude that the ancient mode of warfare was incompatible with the use of firearms. Their proffered explanations involve either the assumption or postulation of an overriding sociocultural resistance to change. It has been suggested, for instance, that guns were not employed extensively in the Sokoto Caliphate because the nature of cavalry warfare has "little place for firearms."[2] Another theory to account for the relative scarcity of firearms in Sokoto contends that the ascendancy of the Fulani ruling class, which rested in part on its control of cavalry as the principal instrument of military force, would have been seriously undermined if firearms had been introduced on a large scale.[3] A more recent review of this problem by Humphrey J. Fisher and Virginia Rowland avoids simplistic monocausal explanations and cites instead several related factors to account for the ephemeral impact of firearms in the Central Sudan: unfavorable trading conditions, the inferior quality of imported guns, the diversity of these weapons and the attendant difficulty in obtaining compatible ammunition and replacement parts, the shortage of skilled local repairmen and facilities, and the lack of regular training in gun handling, marksmanship, and tactics.[4]

Taken together with the presumed resistance to firearms stemming from tradition and cultural attitudes, these objective conditions help to explain the failure of the Sudanic states to achieve maximum utilization of the new weapons. It can be argued, however, that among all these factors it was unfavorable trading conditions that were predominant and also the principal determinant of the others. In other words, the several other factors discussed by Fisher and Rowland were contingent upon the *supply* of firearms; the possibility of a pronounced cultural aversion to the *use* of firearms is a separate question that will be evaluated shortly. Suffice it to say here that it was the nature and volume of the arms trade rather than the assumed conservatism of Sudanic military institutions and attitudes that determined the overall impact of firearms in this region.

The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the firearms trade in the Central Sudan in the nineteenth century. In general there were two sources from which the states of the Central Sudan imported guns: the Muslim states of North Africa, and European merchants trading on the Guinea coast and Niger River to the south. As we shall see, however, neither the trans-Saharan nor the seaborne commerce yielded sizable quantities of firearms until the late nineteenth century, only a few decades before the European conquest.

The Trans-Saharan Firearms Trade

Reference to the earliest use of firearms in the Central Sudan occurs in a Bornu manuscript that relates an attempt by the Bulala to obtain guns during their wars against the Sefawa in the late twelfth century.[5] But this date is so early that it must be regarded as an error. On the other hand, the first credible reference to guns appears in the *Kano Chronicle*, which recounts the arrival in Kano, during the reign of Dauda Bakon Damisa (1421–38), of a Bornu prince with firearms.[6] Such isolated incidents, even if their datings were accurate, provide no evidence or reason to suggest that guns were available in large numbers or that they were of decisive value in warfare. In the late sixteenth century, however, there is abundant evidence that Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu acquired musketeers from Ottoman sources and organized his own slave detachments trained in the use of these new weapons.[7] Historians differ in their assessments of the military value of Mai Idris's innovations, but the subsequent decline of Bornu and the absence of further references to firearms until the nineteenth century suggest that their impact was transitory.

In Hausaland also it is clear that firearms were rare prior to the late nineteenth century. In this context the fifteenth-century appearance of firearms in Kano mentioned above is less significant than the association

of the guns with the prince from Bornu. This meager evidence suggests that firearms were introduced to the Hausa states from the north via Bornu, and is corroborated by the linguistic derivation of the Hausa word for gun (*bindiga*) from Kanuri.[8]

In the nineteenth century the states of the Central Sudan competed for the favors of the North African states to gain access to a source of firearms. Sudanic rulers were anxious also to establish firm relations with European powers in the hope of obtaining arms, artillery, and other munitions. The Denham-Clapperton-Oudney expedition of the early 1820s, the first European mission to the Sudan, distributed munitions of various kinds at the courts of Bornu and Sokoto, arousing keen interest in these marvelous weapons and whetting the desire of their rulers to procure more. Rockets created a particular sensation in Bornu,[9] and when Clapperton reached Katagum in the Sokoto Caliphate, the emir had heard reports of these fabulous weapons and requested his European guest to supply him with similar war materials.[10] Caliph Bello also persistently entreated Clapperton for muskets, powder, ammunition, and rockets,[11] and later addressed a personal letter to King George IV requesting two cannon, powder and shot.[12] Indeed, one of the most revealing aspects of this European exploratory mission was the "great demand in the interior for arms of all kinds."[13]

The importance attached to the acquisition of firearms by the Sudanic rulers also impressed later European visitors. In 1851 Emir Muhammadu Bello of Katsina (1844–69) asked Barth to give him two things: "a medicine to increase his conjugal vigor" and some rockets as "a medicine of war" to frighten his enemies.[14] The vizier of Bornu told Barth, perhaps facetiously, that Shehu Umar would abolish slavery if H. M. Government would supply him with one thousand muskets and four cannon.[15] And in 1889 the emir of Nassarawa begged H. M. Commissioner Major Claude MacDonald to intercede for him and induce the British Royal Niger Company to sell him modern rifles and ammunition so that he could raid the pagan tribes on the southern bank of the Benue River.[16] These instances support beyond reasonable doubt the argument that the Sudanic rulers, far from demonstrating a fear of military innovations, showed themselves anxious to seize every opportunity to obtain new and advanced weapons.

Despite the obvious interest of these Sudanic states in importing firearms, the northern route did not become an important source of guns until the last decades of the nineteenth century, and even then only for Wadai in the east. As we shall see, for the greater part of the nineteenth century the factors that affected the flow of arms to the Central Sudan were beyond the control of the states of that region, and the "gun-frontier" remained stabilized along the Mediterranean littoral.

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Saharan

entrepots of Fezzan and Ghat were involved in the transshipment, from the Mediterranean ports into the desert, of guns, gun barrels, gun and pistol locks, small shot, powder, and flints.[17] It is clear, however, that these munitions were not among the major commodities in the trans-Saharan trade, and that most of the guns and ammunition were purchased and used by the Arab and Tuareg merchants who controlled the trade as well as the desert trade routes. This restriction of a trade that was in itself small meant that very little if any war material reached Hausaland or Bornu.[18] During the *jihad* in northwestern Hausaland in the first decade of the century there appears to have been only a handful of guns.[19] In the early 1820s Shehu al-Kanemi's arsenal at Kuka contained only about 200 muskets and pistols.[20] And in 1826 Clapperton counted only 42 muskets among some 50,000 of Caliph Bello's troops besieging the Gobirawa at Konya, whereas the latter had but a single gun.[21]

In the 1830s changing political conditions in North Africa rendered it even more difficult for the Central Sudanic states to obtain firearms from this source. In 1830 a French expeditionary force occupied the Ottoman province of Algiers, and five years later the Ottoman Turks, in an effort to reassert their power in North Africa, reoccupied Tripoli.[22] Both the French and Ottoman authorities proceeded to extend their control over the desert hinterland in the next decades and to regulate the arms trade. In many of the towns and oases of the Algerian desert there existed domestic industries for the manufacture of gunpowder with local materials and imported ingredients like sulfur and saltpeter, and the repair of firearm mechanisms.[23] There was also a limited local trade in firearms and related munitions in the desert hinterland of Algiers; this commerce was, as in the Tripolitan interior, carried on by Tuareg merchants.[24] But as the French progressively extended their control over these areas, they proscribed the trade in firearms and registered those guns that were possessed by the native population.[25] Most of the traffic in firearms was thereby regulated, except for a small trade in munitions that emanated from Tunis and Morocco, over which the French had no control.[26]

A similar set of circumstances prevailed in Tripoli and its hinterland after 1835, when an Ottoman force reoccupied Tripoli, abolished the Karamanli dynasty, and incorporated Tripoli as a province (*vilayet*) of the Ottoman Empire. This reassertion of Ottoman power in North Africa was an attempt to compensate for the loss of Algiers to France, to forestall any further annexations of Ottoman territory by European powers, and to serve as an object lesson to refractory dependents like the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali. Like the French in Algiers, the Ottoman overlords sought to extend their dominion over the lands in the interior. In 1841 the desert entrepot of Fezzan was conquered and

annexed to Tripoli; Ghadames and Ghat followed in the next few years.[27] The Turks also imposed an embargo upon the export of fire-arms outside the *vilayet*,[28] thus preventing the savanna states of the Central Sudan from acquiring these weapons from Tripoli.

The effectiveness of this prohibition against the trade in firearms from the Tripolitan province may be demonstrated by comparing both the trade of Tripoli and the nature of Arab and Tuareg armaments in the periods before and after the Ottoman occupation. We noted above that during the half-century before the Ottoman intervention there was a small trade in guns and ammunition to the south. But after 1835, accounts of the trans-Saharan trade from Tripoli are conspicuously lacking in any reference to munitions,[29] except for a small contraband trade in gunpowder.[30] As we might expect, the Arab and Tuareg merchants and desert tribes reflect this change in the nature of their weapons. In 1818–20 Captain G. F. Lyon described the Tuaregs as "sure marksmen" with the long guns they generally carried,[31] and the large Arab escort that accompanied the Denham-Clapperton-Oudney mission to Bornu a few years later was armed with muskets.[32] But by mid-century the embargo had serious effects among the desert peoples. In 1850 Richardson reported that the local population south of Tripoli had been disarmed by the Turks, that munitions were contraband items, and that consequently the arms traffic to the Sudan was negligible.[33] Whereas Lyon had observed that the long gun was a common weapon among Tuareg tribesmen before the embargo, Barth found that only a few Tuareg possessed muskets in 1850;[34] even the forty Kel Owi gunmen who escorted Barth and Richardson across the desert were forced to rely on their European clients for powder and shot to defend the party against marauding Hoggar Tuaregs.[35]

Thus the French annexation of Algiers and the Ottoman reoccupation of Tripoli virtually closed the northern source of firearms to the states of the Central Sudan. Throughout North Africa in fact the pattern was the same: the Mediterranean powers, Muslim and European alike, regarded the Sudan as a region for economic exploitation and potential conquest, and, not wanting to increase its capacity for military resistance, restricted the trade in munitions to the south.[36]

Local geopolitical conditions also affected the ability of the Sudanic states to obtain firearms. The Sokoto Caliphate, for instance, was surrounded by hostile states along its northern and eastern frontiers, the most important of which were Zinder, Maradi, Gobir, and Bornu. These states took advantage of their strategic location with respect to the North African trade routes to control the irregular supply of munitions and to prevent the shipment of war material to Sokoto.

During the mid-nineteenth century Zinder was tributary to Bornu and pursued a policy of intermittent hostility toward the Fulani emirates to

the south. Sultan Tanimu of Zinder (1841–43; 1854–84), during the later years of his second reign, is reported to have built up a large army equipped with 6,000 muskets and 40 muzzle-loading cannon. The firearms were purchased from Tripoli, as was sulfur for powder, and some of the brass for the cannon. Saltpeter and carbon were obtained locally; and gunpowder, muskets, cannon mounted on carriages, and projectiles were manufactured at Zinder.[37]

The independent Hausa state of Maradi was established after the ruling dynasty of Katsina fled northward after being ousted by the Fulani during the *jihad.* In the reign of Dan Baskore (1854–75),[38] which coincided with that of Tanimu at Zinder, Maradi purchased flintlocks and ammunition from Zinder.[39] Gobir, another independent Hausa state that successfully resisted the *jihad* and subsequent efforts by Sokoto to eliminate it, remained throughout the nineteenth century a close ally of Maradi, and they frequently joined forces in military campaigns against the emirates of the caliphate. The situation of Zinder, Maradi, and Gobir astride the main caravan routes from the north enabled them to monopolize the sporadic and contraband trade in firearms.

To the east of the Sokoto Caliphate was the state of Bornu, the southern terminus of the principal caravan route from Tripoli, whence the Shehus also strictly controlled the irregular northern firearms supply.[40] Bornu also received several hundred guns from its client state, Zinder, and two cannon to serve as models for Bornu blacksmiths to copy.[41] However, Bornu's access to firearms was restricted by the unwillingness of the Turkish authorities in Tripoli to sell guns to the Sudanic states[42] and by the general commercial depression that beset the trans-Saharan trade in the 1850s.[43] By the 1870s Shehu Umar's army included about 1,000 or 2,000 gunmen, but it is possible that the bulk of their muskets were acquired from Zinder, the local munitions industry, and the growing southern arms trade.[44]

In the state of Wadai the situation with respect to commerce and firearms was similar. Unlike the states of Hausaland and Bornu, whose trans-Saharan commercial contacts were of great antiquity, Wadai seems to have opened regular trade with North Africa in the early nineteenth century.[45] Yet even in the 1850s trade between Benghazi and Wadai was insignificant,[46] and the arsenal of the sultan was estimated by Barth to contain only about 300 guns.[47]

Thus at mid-century trading conditions in the Central Sudan were not conducive to the importation of firearms. The North African states had rather effectively enforced a prohibition against the sale of munitions to the south, and the trans-Saharan trade had fallen off considerably. The states of Zinder, Maradi, Gobir, Bornu, and Wadai were able to obtain small quantities of firearms from private traders or contraband shipments,

but the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate were isolated by these hostile states and denied access to the already restricted firearms supply. The northern "gun-frontier" was still intact in 1850.

But at the same time changes were occurring in North Africa that would drastically alter these conditions. The introduction of the Muslim Sanusiyya in Cyrenaica in 1843 and its subsequent spread throughout the Libyan hinterland had important consequences for the commercial and political situation in the eastern Central Sudan. Members of this new religious order engaged in trade and transport, and intensive missionary efforts in Fezzan, Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi, Baghirmi, Wadai, Darfur, and among the desert Tuareg. The Sanusi lodges (*zawiyas*) formed a network of commercial posts, and Kufra, the "capital" of the order, became by the 1890s a great desert emporium for monitoring trade throughout the eastern Chad basin.[48] In Wadai the sultan acknowledged the spiritual authority of the Grand Sanusi and instituted a regular direct caravan traffic between Wadai and Cyrenaica, in which the ivory and slaves of the Sudan were exchanged for arms and ammunition from the north.[49]

Thus one of the results of these changes was that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century munitions became for the first time important wares in the trans-Saharan trade, and the "gun-frontier" began to expand southward into the Central Sudan. Most of this arms trade was contraband and confined to the Cyrenaica–Wadai route. Some of this contraband originated at Alexandria and certain towns in the Egyptian interior, but most of the munitions were carried from Greece and the Mediterranean islands of Malta, Crete, and Cyprus. The Mediterranean arms trade was carried mostly by Greek sponge fishers who took advantage of the lack of coastal surveillance in North Africa to disembark their stores of smuggled munitions at various points on the long coastline. Benghazi and Tobruq were the most important ports of entry for the illegal trade, but Misurata, Derna, Tokra, and Tripoli itself also served as points of debarkation. Certain Ottoman maritime vessels were involved in the illicit commerce also, transshipping the smuggled munitions at sea to smaller boats that then put in along the unprotected coast. The Turkish police and customs agents were notoriously inefficient and corrupt, and overlooked the arms shipments that came through regular import channels. Even Turkish soldiers, who were supposed to enforce the prohibition against the trade in munitions, participated in the arms smuggling. It was therefore relatively easy for well-known professional smugglers to conduct the contraband trade with impunity by means of bribes.[50]

Once the smuggled munitions arrived on the Tripolitan coast they were transported to the hinterland and sold. It seems that Sanusi adherents dominated this trade; the guns were stored in their *zawiyas* and carried to the interior by Sanusi caravans. These were weapons of every conceivable make and description: old flintlock muskets, double-barreled fowling

pieces, assorted handguns and pistols; and, after the 1880s, modern repeating rifles such as Remingtons, Winchesters, Martini-Henrys, Lebels, Mausers, Gras, and Sniders. Most of the firearms trade was directed toward Wadai, where the sultan's arsenal increased rapidly from about 4,000 flintlocks in the 1870s to 10,000 guns thirty years later, one-quarter of which were modern repeaters.[51]

Some of the munitions carried in this trade inevitably were sent farther afield. The desert Tuaregs were able to arm themselves with precision weapons in some quantity. At Murzuk in 1906 Vischer noted the large traffic in firearms with the coast and observed that the Azgar Tuaregs were armed with modern repeating weapons.[52] In the late 1890s the Hoggar Tuareg, armed with newly acquired rifles, launched many successful raids against the Ulemiden and Azaouac, and extended their domain as far south as Adar.[53] In the Algerian hinterland also Tuareg groups equipped themselves for the first time with modern rifles.[54] Guns and ammunition found their way even as far as the Niger bend and Tuat in the western Sahara.[55]

Although there was a general expansion of the northern arms trade in the Central Sudan in the late nineteenth century, the Sanusites and Wadai controlled most of this traffic to the disadvantage of Bornu and the Sokoto Caliphate. We noted above that by the 1870s Shehu Umar of Bornu had increased his arsenal to more than 1,000 muskets. Rabeh himself, after his conquest of Bornu in 1893, continued the policy of the Shehus by controlling the flow of firearms into Bornu and preventing the export of munitions from his domain.[56] Nevertheless, Rabeh had difficulty in obtaining firearms and ammunition. His ravages in the Chad basin shut down the Tripoli trade for several years,[57] and despite his early collaboration with the Sanusi, both the latter and Wadai severed his contacts with Benghazi by refusing to trade with him.[58] There is no evidence that Rabeh's supply of guns increased measurably after his conquest of Bornu, and of the 2,000 or 3,000 firearms possessed by his army only a few hundred were modern repeaters.[59] The scarcity of firearms in Bornu is also suggested by the prices current in Rabeh's capital at Dikwa in 1895: Martini-Henry rifles were selling for one hundred Maria Theresa dollars, and double-barreled fowlers for fifty dollars, whereas slaves cost only three to seven dollars.[60]

In the emirates of Sokoto the situation with respect to the northern arms trade was even more unfavorable. Kano, which enjoyed the most direct and substantial commercial contacts with Tripoli, was unable to import large quantities of firearms because of the control of this trade by its northern hostile neighbors, especially Zinder, and because of Rabeh's similar policy in Bornu. Moreover, in the late 1890s the caravan trade with Tripoli was seriously disturbed by desert marauders.[61] In 1897 it was estimated that only about eight to fifteen Winchesters reached Kano

from the north.[62] At about the same time in Zaria there was a great demand for modern rifles and ammunition, but almost none could be found.[63]

In summary, the firearms trade from the north during the nineteenth century was not very important for the Central Sudan. In the first quarter of the century the trade was small, and it was monopolized by Arab and Tuareg merchants. After the third decade of the century Algiers and Tripoli ceased to export munitions, except for a very small contraband trade. Furthermore the general unwillingness of the North African powers to supply the states in the interior with military stores ensured that the flow of munitions to the Central Sudan was minimal. In the last decades of the century there was a remarkable expansion of trade between Cyrenaica and Wadai, but neither Bornu nor Sokoto was able to tap this Sanusi-controlled commerce to any real advantage. As we will see in the next section, the Sokoto Caliphate depended principally on the southern source for munitions.

The Southern Firearms Trade

As we noted in the preceding section, firearms were first introduced into the Central Sudan from the north in the fifteenth or sixteenth century, but subsequent trade was irregular and did not reach measurable proportions until the late nineteenth century; even then its volume and direction were highly localized in the eastern Chad basin. On the other hand, the trade in munitions from the south began much later but its volume and distribution were of greater significance for the western Central Sudan, especially the Sokoto Caliphate. Although European merchants had been selling firearms on the Guinea coast since the fifteenth century, it was not until the eighteenth century that guns from the south were reported in the Sudan. The *Kano Chronicle* records that Sarki Muhammad Kumbari (1731–43) first imported guns from Nupe, and later Sarki Babba Zaki (1768–76) organized a personal bodyguard of musketeers.[64] This increasing availability of firearms from southern sources accompanied the general commercial revolution that began in the eighteenth century.[65]

Until the mid-nineteenth century, however, the southern firearms trade was subject to the same limitations as that from the north. That is, the Sudanic states were denied direct access to the seaborne arms traffic by the commercial monopolies maintained by the forest kingdoms of the Guinea coast. The emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate did eventually gain access to this southern source of guns, but it was due more to British enterprise that broke the coastal monopoly than to the willingness of the forest states to sell munitions in the hinterland.

From the Gold Coast to the Cameroons, the valuable trade in European firearms was controlled by the coastal kingdoms whose access to these

weapons was a principal factor in their local ascendancy. The effectiveness of this restriction by the coastal states of the exportation of firearms to the northern interior was noted by Europeans before the nineteenth century. Simon Lucas, on the basis of testimony from North African traders, reported that:

Fire arms are unknown to such of the nations on the Niger as the Shereef has visited; and the reason which he assigns for it is, that the Kings in the neighbourhood of the coast, persuaded that if these powerful instruments of war should reach the possession of the populous inland states, their own independence would be lost, have strictly prohibited, and by the wisdom of their measures have effectively prevented this dangerous merchandize from passing beyond the limit of their dominions.[66]

In Ashanti the monarch monopolized the firearms trade and forbade the exportation of munitions to the north.[67] Likewise in Dahomey the firearms trade was controlled by a royal monopoly.[68] Farther to the east the riparian states of the Niger, Cross, and Nun rivers also monopolized the trade and distribution of firearms purchased from European merchants.[69] Under these conditions, it was virtually impossible for the states of the northern hinterland to obtain a direct access to the southern supply of munitions.

In the 1820s, however, the Yoruba states began to acquire firearms, the Ijebu coastal Yoruba who traded with Europeans being the first to so arm themselves.[70] Richard Lander observed at this time that "quantities of muskets are procured from the coast, but they are of comparatively little use to the [Yoruba] people, who know not how to handle them with effect."[71] Thus, during the third decade of the nineteenth century, the southern "gun-frontier" began to move inland from the coast. As Lander's remarks indicate, the number of firearms in the immediate interior increased but did not as yet affect materially the character of warfare. Guns were still scarce in the northern emirates and Bornu, and virtually nonexistent in Nupe, where the Fulani troops were armed only with spears, swords, and bows and arrows.[72]

But by the middle of the century most of Yorubaland had been brought within the "gun-frontier" and muskets were the standard weapons of Yoruba warriors.[73] In the early 1850s it was reported that "most of the [Yoruba] people have inferior smooth-bored guns, which are sold to the Guinea negroes by European traders, and sent off to be sold again in the interior";[74] yet even by the end of the decade the use of guns had not become general north of Abeokuta.[75] The firearms trade in the Yoruba states was an overland commerce, originating on the coast and being carried largely by traders of Lagos and Ijebu, and after the Ijebu monopoly was broken by the Egba, through Abeokuta.[76] However, with the Yoruba states engaged in intensive trade competition and internecine warfare after the breakup of the Oyo empire, the Muslim emirates to the north were unable to acquire munitions via this overland route.

After 1830, though, when the Lander brothers opened the Niger River to European trade, European merchant vessels began to bypass the coastal states' commercial monopoly and sell directly on the inland markets. These radically new trading conditions enabled Nupe to emerge after the 1840s as the principal source of munitions for the emirates farther to the north. The Niger mission of 1841 found that gunpowder was being sold in the main Nupe market at Egga,[77] and so great was the local pagans' fear of the Nupe army that they told the European visitors that "every Fulatah is armed with a gun."[78] Ten years later, Richardson, while in Zinder, was told of South American traders who were exchanging powder and shot for slaves in Nupe.[79] At about this time Nupe began to export muskets and powder to the north; guns and powder were shipped to Kano,[80] and English and American gunpowder to Bornu.[81] Guns from the coast were reported also to be reaching Air in the Sahara.[82] In the 1850s and 1860s muskets were selling in Nupe at ten to twelve thousand cowries, or about one-sixth the price of slaves.[83]

Although the quantity of munitions reaching the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate was still small, it is evident that a regular trade was developing. By the 1850s the "gun-frontier" had almost absorbed the Yoruba states and had begun to advance through Nupe. The importance of Nupe is that it was the first emirate to fall within this widening zone of gun warfare, and became the main port of entry and distribution of munitions for the northern emirates. During the next decades Nupe itself fell within the "gun-frontier" and the other emirates began to be engulfed by the steadily northward-moving gun belt.

William B. Baikie's establishment of Lokoja in Nupe territory in 1859 further enhanced the position of Nupe as middleman in the arms trade. Emir Masaba (1841–50; 1859–73) welcomed the British connection and the advantages to be derived from the permanent European trading post in his territory. As one British trader reported of Masaba:

His great virtue was his attachment to white traders. He gave them every accommodation, encouragement, and protection, to facilitate the establishment of trading factories on his part of the "Kwara"–the native name here for the Niger.[84]

In 1870 Masaba signed a decree officially encouraging the settlement of Lokoja, hoping it would become the most prosperous market at the confluence of the Niger and Benue.[85] By the late 1870s there were four British commercial firms trading regularly up the Niger,[86] and eight or ten steamers did business at Nupe each year.[87] Masaba also sold slaves down the Niger at Idda in exchange for gunpowder, at the rate of one good male slave for a small keg.[88]

The British post at Lokoja also served as a diplomatic channel for the emirs of Sokoto to establish contact with Britain in the hope of obtaining firearms. Masaba wrote many letters to the British consuls at Lokoja and Lagos, and to Queen Victoria herself, asking repeatedly for muskets,

rifles, powder, and ammunition.[89] Ilorin also opened direct contact with Britain through the consular authorities at Lagos.[90] Emir Abdullahi of Kano (1855–82) wrote to the English queen through Baikie, requesting a skilled technician to manufacture firearms and ammunition for his army, and offering to pay the expenses of his transportation.[91] Baikie communicated with Gwandu and the caliph at Sokoto, expressing his desire to open extensive commercial contacts and to sell guns and powder.[92] Baikie also opened Abuja and Zaria to British trade.[93]

The military power of Nupe was expanded considerably under the direction of Masaba. Munitions constituted a large portion of its imports, and by 1871 the army of Nupe was reported to have rockets, 2,000 firearms, and 8 cannon, two of them six-pounders. The cannon were mounted and Masaba's gunmen had been trained to fire them by members of the Niger mission.[94] Masaba and his successors enforced a strict monopoly on the arms trade, and prohibited the unauthorized reexport of munitions. According to John Whitford, Masaba forbade "his subjects, on pain of death, to purchase powder or guns, keeping deadly weapons and war material only for his regular army" at Bida.[95] Nupe also supplied its allies with munitions to subdue mutual enemies. In 1878, for example, the traveler Burdo observed canoes "full of arms and ammunition" being sent by Nupe to aid its tributary ally Imaha in an offensive against the pagan village of Amara.[96] Moreover Nupe provided Sokoto, Gwandu, Missau, Zaria, and Abuja with muskets.[97] Thus in the 1870s the southern "gun-frontier" began to expand throughout the Sokoto Caliphate.

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century futher changes in the commercial situation on the Niger brought concomitant changes in the nature of the trade in war materials. French commercial competition with Britain on the Niger and Benue became acute after 1880, and by 1884 the *Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Equatoriale* seriously challenged the British trading position. This commercial rivalry was finally resolved at the Berlin West African Conference of 1884–5, at which Britain was awarded the exclusive right to administer the provisions of the Conference on the lower Niger. In 1886, Sir George Goldie, who bought out the French interests on the eve of the Conference and thereby engineered the British coup, succeeded in obtaining a royal charter for his Royal Niger Company and with it a de facto monopoly of European commerce on the Niger and Benue.[98] Trading stations now extended from the Niger delta to the upper reaches of the Benue, thus providing such emirates as Nassarawa, Zaria, Bauchi, Muri, and Adamawa with direct access to the arms trade.

Nupe took full advantage of the European competition in the early 1880s to exact concessions from the rival parties. Emir Umaru (1873–82) continued the policy of military expansion inaugurated by his predecessor, Masaba.[99] In 1882, with the assistance of British and French steam-

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ers, he crushed the Kedde revolt with an army that numbered in its ranks at least 550 gunmen.[100] Umaru also employed rockets and an unknown European military adviser in an attack on Igbirra country.[101] Emir Maliki (1882–95) was equally concerned with military affairs. In 1882 he demanded and received 200 barrels of powder and 200 guns from Commandant Antoine Mattei as the price of a trading concession for the *Compagnie Française*,[102] and in 1886 alone he received at least 400 guns and 400 barrels of powder as trade goods.[103]

The arms trade on the Benue, hitherto of little importance, reached considerable proportions after the 1880s. The emirs of the eastern caliphate began to purchase muskets and powder directly from the Royal Niger Company trading stations on the river. A regular caravan traffic developed from the Benue River posts, through Bauchi and Missau, to Dikwa in Bornu, providing Rabeh with a source of guns and powder.[104] Tibati and Banyo, both vassals of Adamawa, entered direct trade relations with Europeans and began to import larger quantities of guns;[105] Rabeh also sought to trade with Yola to purchase munitions from the Niger Company post there.[106] Emir Haji of Katagum (1868–96), defying the instructions of Caliph Abdur Rahman (1891–1902) to deny Rabeh access to trade, moved his main market to Gamawa on the Bornu-Kano road, and opened an extensive trade with Dikwa. Gamawa specialized in trade with the conquerer of Bornu, and under the stimulus of the new commercial prosperity doubled in size; gunpowder was among the most important items exchanged for horses, slaves, and weapons from Bornu.[107]

After about 1880 also the political situation in Yorubaland provided the occasion for Ilorin to acquire firearms from several new sources. Ilorin had joined the Ekiti Confederation against Ibadan about 1880, and by exchanging troops with its Yoruba allies had gained a temporary access to the musket supply from Benin.[108] After 1888, however, Ilorin opened direct trade with Abeokuta and the coast and began importing American-made Snider breech-loading rifles to use against Ibadan.[109] In 1889 the Ilorin army of 2,000 troops besieging the Ibadans at Offa was reported to have many muskets, but only 28 Sniders without ammunition. The besieged Ibadans, on the other hand, were believed to have 300 Sniders with ammunition, but were untrained in their use.[110] By the early 1890s weekly caravans were moving between Ilorin, through Abeokuta, to the coast;[111] and the British Colonial Office authorities in Lagos, hostile to the Royal Niger Company, turned a blind eye to the arms trade with Ilorin.[112] The Brassmen, also angered by the policies of the Niger Company, smuggled rifles into its territories.[113] Nupe too participated in this contraband trade in rifles and undertook to supply Ilorin with guns from its own stockpile.[114] Finally, the *alafin* ("ruler") of Oyo, fearing the power

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of Ibadan's General Ajayi, and therefore anxious to keep the Ibadan army occupied in the field, was reported to be providing arms secretly to both Ibadan and Ilorin to prolong their wars. [115]

The Firearms Trade: A Summary and Evaluation

In this chapter we have shown that external conditions determined the sources, nature, and volume of the firearms trade in the Central Sudan throughout the nineteenth century. The states of the Central Sudan were unable to import large quantities of firearms until the last decades of the century. The munitions trade from North Africa, mostly contraband, became important only after the 1870s, was controlled by Sanusi adherents, and flowed mainly between Cyrenaica and Wadai. The firearms traffic from the Guinea coast began to penetrate the Sokoto Caliphate in the mid-nineteenth century and expanded considerably in the 1870s, with Nupe acting as the principal port of entry and distribution. In the 1880s the Benue regions gained direct access to the gun trade as a result of Anglo-French commercial rivalry; Nupe and Ilorin also benefited during the last two decades of the century from the overland route opened to the coast.

Whereas the northern trade in firearms after 1890 consisted largely of modern precision weapons, the southern trade yielded only muskets, the traffic in repeating rifles having been banned at the Brussels Conference that same year. The Sokoto Caliphate depended almost entirely on firearms imported through Nupe. Wadai obtained most of its firearms from Cyrenaica, and Bornu its guns from Tripoli, Zinder, the Niger trade, and perhaps local manufacture. Rabeh seems to have acquired the bulk of his firearms before conquering Bornu; afterward, although he was able to import some munitions from the Niger Company posts on the Benue, the northern source of guns was cut off by the refusal of Wadai and the Sanusites to trade with him.

This remarkable expansion of both the northern and southern arms trade in the late nineteenth century was significant, not only in its unprecedented scope and volume, but also in its changing character. For the first time in history, the Sudanic states were no longer isolated from the international trade in firearms by middlemen who monopolized it for their own military advantage. Although Wadai in the eastern Central Sudan controlled most of the northern trans-Saharan arms trade, the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate in the west successfully exploited the European arms trade from the south. Bornu, in the middle, seems to have tapped both sources. Regarding the volume of this munitions trade, complete statistics are not available, but it is clear that the quantity of guns sold in the interior was in the tens of thousands. And more important, this commer-

cial revolution introduced to the Central Sudan the most modern weapons on the world market.

Prior to the end of the nineteenth century the arms trade had consisted almost exclusively of flintlock muskets, that is, smooth-bored, single-shot, muzzle-loading, iron-barreled, ball-shooting weapons. This type of gun, the standard firearm in Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, was superseded by more advanced weapons in the 1850s, and large quantities of muskets were dumped on the African market. It was this type of obsolete weapon that pushed the southern "gun-frontier" through Yorubaland and the emirates of the caliphate, and the northern "gun-frontier" into the eastern Central Sudan. By the 1880s, however, breech-loading repeating rifles with rifled steel barrels and metallic cartridges were appearing on African markets, and a second wave of military technology – the "rifle-frontier" – began to sweep over the same territory traversed by the "gun-frontier" only a half-century before. Wadai cornered most of this northern trade. In the south, modern rifles of the Snider type first became important in Yorubaland during the Ekiti wars (1878), reaching Ibadan in 1881, but costing £10–15 each.[116] As we have seen, this new "rifle-frontier" reached Ilorin by the late 1880s. But here the northward expansion of the "rifle-frontier" was abruptly halted.

In 1890 at the Brussels Conference a decision was taken by the participating European states to regulate the arms trade to Africa. The fifteen signatories of the Brussels Act, in an effort to eliminate the remnants of the slave trade, pledged to forbid the sale of modern precision rifles in tropical Africa; however, flintlocks, unrifled guns, and common gunpowder were exempted from this restriction. Although the northern contraband trade to Wadai increased in the 1890s, in the territories of the Niger Goldie's Company enforced these provisions so stringently that C. H. Robinson, after his excursion through Hausaland in 1894–5, was able to boast that "in the course of a journey of over a thousand miles through the Hausa States, I do not remember seeing . . . more than half-a-dozen rifles."[117] A small number of muskets and common gunpowder continued to be exported to the northern emirates until the beginning of the twentieth century,[118] but the trade in modern firearms from the south had ceased.

This sudden containment of the "rifle-frontier" before it reached most of the Sudanic states precluded a thorough revolution in their traditional patterns of warfare and military organization. The armies of these states could acquire only limited numbers of outmoded muskets, which were, in the words of F. D. Lugard, "the very worst and most rotten class of flint locks, more dangerous to the owner than to the enemy, and less dangerous than bows and poisoned arrows."[119] Likewise, R. W. Beachey, in his study of the arms trade in East Africa, has also pointed out that so "perilous were . . . [these firearms] to the user that a plausible defence of gun-

running was that the natives were being led to exchange their effective spears and assegais for a decidedly less dangerous if more noisy weapon."[120] It was the relative scarcity and inferior quality of muskets and the restriction of the trade in modern firearms that prevented the states of the Central Sudan from adopting the technology of gun warfare. The "gun-frontier," advancing from the north and south, did not begin to spread across large areas of the Central Sudan until the 1870s, and the "rifle-frontier," following in its wake, was delimited just as it reached this region. Considering the vagaries of the nineteenth-century firearms trade, and the European conquest at the end of the century, it is not surprising that the effect of firearms on traditional Sudanic military institutions and practices was not profound. Nevertheless it is possible to discern in several Sudanic states the inception and gestation of a revolution in military technology, army organization, and warfare, a revolution that was aborted by European intervention. The next chapter will examine the character and extent of this incipient revolution in the Sokoto Caliphate.

CHAPTER 7

Firearms in the Sokoto Caliphate, c. 1860–1903

In earlier chapters we noted that the revolution in army organization and warfare that occurred in the emerging emirates of the caliphate during the *jihad* period actually involved the adoption of traditional Sudanic military institutions and practices. Despite the general increase in the availability and use of firearms in the late nineteenth century, these traditional modes of warfare and military organization remained remarkably intact until the European conquest of the Sudan. Recalling the similar transient appearance of guns in sixteenth-century Bornu, Fisher and Rowland have contended that the limited effect of firearms in the late nineteenth century represented merely the recurrence of a cyclical historical pattern that periodically manifested itself in the Sudan: a sudden impact of firearms that was sustained nowhere, whose potential significance faded quickly into history without a trace. In their own words, "Had the imposition of European rule not radically altered the position, it is possible to imagine that firearms, even on Rabih's scale, would not have altered the long-standing central Sudan pattern, of dramatic impact followed by rapid decline into nearly total ineffectiveness."[1]

As we observed in the last chapter, a combination of factors, particularly the nature and volume of the firearms trade, precluded the occurrence of a fundamental transformation in Sudanic military organization and warfare. Nevertheless the attribution by Fisher and Rowland of only a marginal and transitory impact to firearms has obscured the *potential* significance of these weapons. It is our contention that the introduction and use of an increasing number of firearms did in fact produce an *incipient revolution* in Central Sudan. The full import of this new military technology and its effects on warfare, army organization, and political structure have not been generally recognized by historians. The internal changes generated by the exploitation of these instruments of military force were only beginning to become manifest when the European conquest sealed their fate. Although this nascent revolution did not mature – and for this reason has been either overlooked or underestimated – it is possible to discern in the Central Sudan the beginning of a process of conversion from a "feudal" to a "bureaucratic" type of politico-military organization based on standing armies and the use of firearms. In the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, the focus of our investigation, the radi-

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cal character and demonstrable extent of this embryonic revolution in military technology, warfare, army organization, and state structure reveal the inadequacy of the static cyclical theory proposed by Fisher and Rowland.

This second, incipient, revolution presaged a reversal of the organization and tactical characteristics of the earlier *jihad* revolution. The *jihad* period had been marked by a shift from an infantry-based to a cavalry-based military organization, from long-range fighting to close combat, from missile weapons to personal contact weapons, from firepower to shock action, and from linear tactics to mass and maneuver. The period after c. 1860, on the other hand, was marked by a perceptible shift from a cavalry-based to an infantry-based army organization, from close combat to long-range fighting, from personal contact weapons to projectile weapons, from shock action to firepower, and from mass and maneuver to linear tactics. It was the British conquest of the caliphate between 1897 and 1903, rather than internal resistance to these changes, that aborted this nascent revolution. In this chapter we will be concerned chiefly with the impact of firearms on military organization and warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate during the late nineteenth century, reserving to Chapter 8 an examination of the concomitant developments in political structure.[2]

Firearms, Warfare, and Military Organization: The Incipient Revolution

Although known in Hausaland centuries before, firearms did not become generally available until the last decades of the nineteenth century. This advent of guns did not at first have a marked effect on warfare and military organization. It appears that these new weapons were incorporated into the existing "feudal" army structure by the formation of small musketeer forces composed of slaves. The tactical possibilities for the employment of these gunmen were limited by the small quantity and inferior quality of the weapons. Such slave units probably served as little more than a complement to the rulers' personal bodyguard.

By the late nineteenth century, however, increasing access to firearms, especially from European and American traders via Nupe, provided the opportunity for the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate to acquire a considerable number of these weapons. Nupe itself, it will be recalled, was reported to have 2,000 firearms. In Zaria, Emir Usuman Yero (1888–97) armed several hundred slaves with muskets imported from Nupe.[3] Gombe is reported to have had more than 1,000 firearms,[4] and Katagum, engaging in a lucrative but unauthorized arms trade with Rabeh's Bornu in the 1890s, could muster some 800 musketeers.[5] Emir Ibrahim Nagwamatse of Kontagora is reputed to have commanded about 1,000 gunmen,[6] while the arsenal of Emir Aliyu at Kano (1894–1903) reportedly con-

tained 3,000 guns of all kinds.[7] Sokoto and Katsina could outfit about 300 and 100 musketeers respectively.[8]

Although the number of firearms in the Sokoto Caliphate appears small when measured by contemporaneous European standards, the increasing use of these weapons began to have notable effects on warfare and military organization. The presence of musketeers sometimes conferred a decided tactical advantage in combat, and particularly in slave raiding. Curiously enough, it appears that muskets were valued especially for their noisemaking capability, which, in some instances, was more important than the accuracy or penetrating effect of their shot. In this regard the observation of William Baikie, the British consul at Lokoja, is instructive. Writing to the Foreign Office in 1864 on behalf of Emir Masaba of Nupe (1841–50; 1859–73), Baikie requested a shipment of Enfield rifles and muskets, the former for firepower and the latter "for noise, a very important element in warfare here."[9] The loud report of a discharge of musketry was particularly effective in frightening enemy cavalry. In 1898, for example, a Zinder army with a full complement of musketeers routed the forces of Kano when the latter's cavalry became terrified by the repeated volleys of gunfire and fled from the battlefield.[10] In another instance, the 1,000 musketeers of Emir Ibrahim of Kontagora contributed to the defeat of a joint Maradi-Gobir army by causing the horses to panic and throw their riders.[11] Similarly, the gunmen of Hadejia rarely scored direct hits on enemy troops, but fired instead to frighten the enemy horsemen.[12]

In general the available evidence supports the thesis of Fisher and Rowland that the actual impact of firearms on Sudanic warfare was not profound. Although the data are sparse, several examples can be adduced to illustrate that the possession of firearms was not a crucial factor in determining the outcome of pitched battles. In 1823, for instance, Major Dixon Denham accompanied a force of Bornu cavalry and sixty mounted Arab musketeers in their attack on the stockaded Fulani settlement at Musfeia.[13] The Arabs were ecstatic over the opportunity to display the superiority of their weapons and disparaged the Fulani defensive capability, boasting, "Never mind their numbers! arrows are nothing! and ten thousand spears are of no importance. We have guns! guns!" The confident Arabs stormed the Fulani palisade without the support of the Bornu cavalry, and drove back the defenders. But at this point the tide of battle was reversed. The Fulani quickly regrouped, mounted their horses, and launched a devastating counterattack. The Bornu cavalry panicked, and 100 were speared, while the Arabs "suffered terribly," for "most of them had two or three wounds, and one dropped . . . with five arrows sticking in his head alone."

Other instances also suggest the subordinate role of firearms in open battle. The famous contest between al-Kanemi's army and the Bauchi

forces under Yakubu in 1826/7 is depicted in some accounts as a clash of Bornu musketeers and Bauchi archers and spearmen. According to these sources, the Bornu gunmen repelled the initial Bauchi attack, but then were unable to gain the upper hand.[14] Emir Ibrahim of Abuja (1877–1902) defeated a Nassarawa army and captured its musketeers.[15] These scattered references to the use of firearms in pitched battles suggest that the possession of guns rarely, if ever, conferred an absolute advantage. The limited number and inferior quality of muskets, and the mechanical and logistic problems associated with their use, meant that the where-withal to conduct sustained and decisive attacks was often lacking. In fact, in these conditions the overall performance of muskets was scarcely supe-rior to that of the versatile bow and arrow.[16]

Although firearms were frequently indecisive in open battle, their use by besieged warriors appears to have reinforced the defensive capability of the walled towns. The ability of gunmen to hit assault troops from a distance naturally favored the defense of these citadels. True, coordinated attacks by *yan lifida* and supporting elements on stockaded settlements and small towns were often successful, but the use of such forces against the imposing fortifications of large towns was more symbolic than destructive. A contingent of gunmen among the assault forces could be employed to provide covering fire; but if the defenders had firearms as well, they could shoot at will from their crenellated and loopholed para-pets. We have noted elsewhere the inadequacy of Bello's musketeers at the siege of Konya in 1826; on the other hand, the single sharpshooter among the Gobir defenders brought down the van of the heavy cavalry before it reached the walls. The musketeers of Panda were also instru-mental in routing Bello's army as it prepared to assault that town.[17] Like-wise, the Ibadan Yoruba successfully defended Offa against Ilorin attacks by their skillful deployment of riflemen around the walls. According to the Yoruba historian Samuel Johnson, one of these slave marksmen, Babare by name, "was always in demand at whatever point the battle was hottest, and by dropping two or three horsemen he always caused the Ilorins to decamp."[18] All things being equal, therefore, it can be conjec-tured that the use of firearms increased the superiority that the means of defense already enjoyed over the means of attack.

Although the possession of firearms enhanced the military capability of Sudanic states only to a limited extent, the increasing use of guns was associated with certain tactical innovations. The first such modification was the rearrangement of forces in the battle formation. In Chapter 5 we observed that the typical battle array of Sudanic armies in the nineteenth century was basically a tripartite formation composed of cavalry, infantry, and a reserve rear guard. Prior to the widespread use of firearms, the cav-alry was the main shock force, and was appropriately assigned the attack position in the forward echelon of the battle order. This pattern was

modified in the second half of the century as the expanding musketeer forces began to demonstrate their effectiveness as shockpower and fire-power elements. Detachments of gunmen and supporting units were then moved forward from the center of the formation to the vanguard, where they would be more effective in opening battle with volleys of fire at long range. Thus the disposition of forces in the battle array of armies possess-ing large numbers of musketeers was re-formed in the order of infantry, cavalry, and reserve, in a tactical innovation designed to maximize the impact of the infantrymen equipped with firearms.[19] This new method of deployment is illustrated in Figure 13.

The second tactical change associated with the increasing use of firearms was the development of linear tactics and closer coordination between the cavalry and the various specialized infantry units. This new mode of warfare was dictated not only by tactical considerations of utiliz-ing these forces to greatest advantage, but also by the premium placed upon the security of gunmen. Musketeers on foot were organized in com-pact linear formations to ensure maximum effectiveness of their timed vol-leys and security for themselves, and depended also on a protective mobile shield of horsemen on their flanks, and the fire support of archers. In battle these infantrymen armed with muskets advanced toward the enemy in rows or lines, firing simultaneously.[20] If there were a sufficient number of gunmen to permit the formation of several ranks, each would alternate firing and reloading in sequence, thereby providing a continuous


Figure 13. Late Nineteenth-Century Battle Order.

volume of fire and affording protection to the units reloading in the rear. In any case, during the reloading time of one to three minutes, the gunmen were more vulnerable to enemy fire or attack, and required the close support of the cavalry and other specialized infantry units. The "typical" tactical encounter in this new method of fighting is probably exemplified by the engagement of the Kontagora army with a British force on 31 January 1901, in which the emir's musketeers and riflemen moved against the British front while the cavalry and other infantry attempted to outflank the enemy and attack from the rear.[21]

The third tactical innovation was the formation in some states of new units of mounted gunmen. Although it is clear that muskets were usually employed by slave infantrymen, selected cavalry units, also composed principally of slave troops, sometimes carried guns as well. The few musketeers whom Barth observed in the Katsina army were among the horsemen.[22] It is reported also that some cavalrymen in Nupe, Zinder, Maradi, and Adamawa were equipped with firearms.[23] On the other hand, the cavalry of Kebbi, Hadejia, and Katagum rarely, if ever, used guns.[24]

The use of such mounted musketeers posed a new tactical problem because the combination of firearms and cavalry as an integrated weapon system is basically an incompatible one: the inherent advantage of cavalry – mobility and shock effect in close combat – is precisely the opposite of that of firearms – firepower at long range. The employment of mounted gunmen would tend to neutralize the advantages of cavalry without offering superior tactical possibilities. Perhaps it would have been feasible at times for cavalrymen to discharge their weapons in battle and then retreat quickly to reload at a safe distance, but this would have been a complicated, inefficient, and indecisive use of both horses and firearms. It is probable therefore that this fundamental incompatibility was resolved in the Central Sudan by the creation of "mounted infantry" forces, such as those in the Zinder army, whose gunmen rode into battle, dismounted, and fought alongside the other foot soldiers. In this way the distinct advantages of both cavalry and firearms were preserved in their essential integrity, the horse being used primarily for transportation and mobility, and the gun for firepower.[25]

Although the introduction of firearms had not fundamentally changed the military balance in the Central Sudan by the time of the European conquest, the accumulation of these weapons under centralized state control had significant consequences for military organization. The increasing availability of firearms provided the occasion for the emirs to organize detachments of slave gunmen and thereby to control these potentially superior instruments of force. In Nupe, as we noted in the preceding chapter, Emir Masaba (1859–73) imposed a strict monopoly on the arms trade and reserved the new weapons "only for his regular army." In Zaria, Emir Usuman Yero (1888–97) also acquired a monopoly of the firearms

supply from the Nupe emporium at Lokoja, and organized slave detachments trained in the use of these weapons. These slave musketeers were commanded by slave officers and stationed near the palace as a ready reserve for use against both internal and external threats. They were employed to intimidate disaffected officials and political rivals, to collect overdue taxes, and to terrorize the subject population. On one occasion in particular this new force of gunmen proved crucial to Yero by suppressing a plot by a senior official, the *galadima*, to usurp royal authority. By creating a force of slave gunmen loyal to himself, Yero was able to reduce his dependence on "feudal" levies and to restrain the power of political enemies.[26]

It is clear that such efforts to assert and maintain royal control over the supply and use of firearms were not isolated incidents, but rather represent a pattern that recurred elsewhere in the Central Sudan. For example, the creation of regular units of slave musketeers in the eastern border emirates of the caliphate took place at about the same time: Emirs Haru of Hadejia (c. 1865–85), Haji of Katagum (c. 1868–96), and Muhammadu Kwairanga of Gombe (c. 1844–82) are each credited with the formation of these slave forces under slave captains in their respective states.[27] Emir Abubakar of Katsina (1877–1905) had three slave officials in charge of some one hundred gunmen,[28] while in Fulani Daura there were two musketeer units under slave commanders.[29] In Sokoto itself there emerged after 1880 the outstanding military leader, Muhammadu Maiturare, a son of Caliph Ahmadu (1859–66) who bore the title *marafa*. Arming a group of immigrant Azbinawa Tuareg with guns, he created an effective military force and pacified the area north of Sokoto, which hitherto had been raided with impunity by the intractable Kebbawa. The military genius and overriding force of the *marafa* enabled him to arrogate the prerogative of military command in Sokoto, which traditionally had been reserved for the descendants of the *jihad* commander, Aliyu Jaidu.[30] Similar developments are observable also in the independent Hausa state of Abuja and in Zinder during the late nineteenth century.[31]

Closely associated with the formation of these units of slave musketeers in several emirates, but not necessarily dependent upon it, was the creation of standing armies. This innovation, entailing a gradual shift from the "feudal" type of military organization that had existed in the Central Sudan for a millennium, was introduced in several states after the 1860s. We have observed already that John Whitford reported the existence of a standing army in Nupe during the second reign of Emir Masaba (1859–73).[32] In Zaria the development of a standing army was initiated by Emir Abdullahi during his second reign (1873–8), when he stationed small forces under the command of slave officers at Kacia and Kadaru in the southern part of the state. The purposes of this new deployment of mili-

tary forces were to police the caravan routes in these areas, to ensure the prompt collection of taxes and tribute from subject pagan tribes, to protect the southern regions against Ningi raiders, and finally, to enhance the emir's position vis-à-vis that of his political rivals. During the reign of Abdullahi's successor, Muhammadu Sambo (1878–1887/8), the force at Kacia was enlarged until it became an effective standing army serving as a formidable instrument of royal power.[33] A similar development occurred in Ilorin after 1878, when an army of 2,000 warriors was formed at Offa as a forward outpost or war camp from which to maintain a permanent state of war against Ibadan. Although it is not certain whether this deployment at Offa was originally intended as an innovation, the continuous occupation of the site by Ilorin soldiers until British intervention in these Yoruba wars in the 1890s must be regarded as the development of a standing army.[34] Finally, the formation of a large force of slave musketeers under slave officers by Sultan Tanimu in Zinder (1854–84) also may have represented the appearance of a regular standing army in that state.[35]

The sources available do not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate the presence of standing armies in other emirates; however, certain observations can be made about the nature of these military innovations. First, the introduction of firearms provided the occasion for the emirs of the Sokoto Caliphate to organize units of slave gunmen and thereby to control these potentially superior "means of destruction." This exercise of royal control over the supply and disposition of firearms tended to counteract the growing independence of the fief-holding nobility, to check the ambitions of court officials and dynastic rivals, and to reduce the emirs' dependence on "feudal" military levies. Second, the increasing availability of firearms created new tactical problems and possibilities that can be discerned in the augmentation of slave musketeers to royal bodyguards, the use of gunmen both in the infantry and in "mounted infantry" units, the introduction of new tactical formations, and the reorganization of the battle order. Lastly, the development of regular standing armies represented a significant structural change in the military organization of these Sudanic states. The full implications of this radical departure from the historic "feudal" mode of Sudanic warfare and army organization will be explored in the next chapter.[36]

The End of the Revolution, 1897–1903

The incipient revolution in military technology, army organization, and the techniques of war associated with the increasing use of firearms in the Sokoto Caliphate was never fully realized. The European regulation of the arms trade inhibited this process of internal change, and the British conquest of the caliphate between 1897 and 1903 effectively ended it. In fact even a cursory survey of this period reveals that, for the most part,

the emirs responded to this final military threat by resorting to the traditional methods of attack and defense. The military and diplomatic history of the last years of the caliphate has been treated adequately elsewhere, and our purpose in this section is simply to summarize the salient factors relative to the failure of the second revolution.[37]

The last decade of the caliphate was a time of crises. Internal insecurity was a critical problem in several regions. Mafara and Anka in southern Sokoto revolted in 1891, and Kebbi scourges preoccupied both Sokoto and Gwandu throughout the 1890s. The Kano civil war of 1893–4 not only disrupted that state but provoked hostilities with Sokoto. A succession dispute in Zaria in 1897 threatened civil war and nearly occasioned military intervention by Sokoto. Political instability and domestic insecurity prevailed in Ilorin during the mid-1890s as a result of a generals' revolt. In the late 1890s Katagum and Missau fought a territorial dispute, which was settled by the caliph's diplomatic intercession. Between 1899 and 1901 the Galadiman Gombe, Ako, was in revolt against Emir Umaru. The Mahdist insurrections in the 1880s and 1890s by Hayatu in Adamawa and Jibrilla in Gombe caused widespread devastation and threatened the integrity of the eastern emirates. Although none of these security problems posed a grave threat to the caliphate as a whole, their local impact was considerable. The cumulative effect of these internal disturbances was debilitating to the emirates directly involved, and to Sokoto and the other emirates whose intervention and assistance were required.

External threats were even more pressing, and ultimately brought down the caliphate. Commercial, diplomatic, and military penetration from the south by the British, and from the west and north by the French, placed the caliphate between avaricious European powers. Rabeh's conquest of Bornu in 1893, his alliance with the Adamawa Mahdist, Hayatu, and rumors of his plans to invade the caliphate caused great fear in the eastern emirates. This sudden encirclement and isolation of the caliphate caused some concern and perhaps consternation in Sokoto, but a direct military confrontation did not occur until 1897.

The year 1897 was a fateful one for the Sokoto Caliphate. In January and February a small well-armed force outfitted by the British Royal Niger Company invaded and defeated the strategic southwestern emirates of Nupe and Ilorin, accepted their submission, and detached them from the caliphate.[38] This short campaign was brilliant in its conception and execution, and ominous in what it portended for the caliphate: a few hundred troops armed with modern weapons defeated thousands armed in the traditional manner. And, just as the Muslim seizure of Matankari and Konni early in 1804 had set the strategic pattern of the *jihad*, so also did the fall of Nupe and Ilorin presage the British strategy of piecemeal conquest of the caliphate.

The battles at Bida and Ilorin were decided by the sheer preponder-

ance of British firepower. The Royal Niger Company marched on Nupe
with some 500 native soldiers (mostly Yoruba and Hausa) equipped with
modern repeating rifles and commanded by British officers. In addition,
these troops were supported by six .45 Maxim guns, two Whitworth guns
(nine- and twelve-pounders), and five seven-pound rifled muzzle-loading
artillery pieces. Nupe, on the other hand, mustered about 30,000 troops,
including 10,000 cavalry and only a few hundred gunmen, mostly musket-
eers. The battle of Bida raged for two days (26–27 January), with the
British shelling the city with the big Whitworth gun every two hours
during the night of the 26th. As Lieutenant Vandeleur remarked, the dev-
astating effect of these barrages was "undeniable, and without them Bida
would very probably not have been captured at all." The Nupe cavalry
was able to do little more than distract the small British "square" forma-
tion which, bristling with repeating rifles on all sides and Maxim guns on
the corners, dispersed the daring horsemen at long distances. One of the
Nupe cannon was brought into action, producing only "a great deal of
noise but little result." The emir's gunmen were forced to resort to sniping
tactics, and their fire was ill-directed anyway. After the one-sided battle,
the conquerors seized ten muzzle-loading cannon, 350 rifles and guns, 550
barrels of gunpowder, and 25,000 cartridges of all kinds from the emir's
arsenal. The Company's losses were only eight killed and nine wounded,
whereas Nupe casualties amounted to several hundred.

Two weeks later a diminished Company force achieved an even easier
two-day victory at Ilorin, where resistance was offered by about 1,000
cavalry and 5,000 infantry. The Ilorin cavalry attempted to make a sur-
prise attack on the enemy column before it had formed its invincible
"square," and almost succeeded in penetrating it. As Vandeleur related,

The action was brought on precipitately by this body of cavalry, and there can be no
doubt that the intention was to draw us in column of route to the Oyon River, where
the main body of the enemy was posted, and then fall upon us from all sides.

Forming square upset all their arrangements, and in the contest which ensued they
showed a lamentable disregard of the deadly effect of modern firearms. One could not
but admire the daring courage these fanatical Fulah horsemen displayed in galloping
up close to the square, which they did at the opening of the fight, in the face of a ser-
ried line of fixed bayonets and the very muzzles of rifle barrels.

They waited too long, and lost their opportunity. If the charge had been made
whilst the square was still unformed and the carriers were hastening up from the rear,
the result would have been disastrous.[39]

The battle at Ilorin was a repetition of that at Nupe: Ilorin gunmen
proved themselves poor marksmen; the horsemen were unable to break
the British "square"; large quantities of munitions and modern rifles were
left unused in the emir's arsenal; an old cannon performed pathetically,
propelling its projectile "along the ground like a rabbit"; and again, the
Maxim guns and artillery proved decisive, doing "tremendous execution."

It is not difficult to account for the failure of Nupe and Ilorin to employ

their cannon more effectively. These guns were probably more than thirty years old and, until 1897, had served only ceremonial functions. On the other hand, the ineffective use of firearms by the emirs' gunmen presents a problem. Surely the machineguns, artillery, and modern rifles of the British force overawed the Nupe and Ilorin warriors. Since a pitched battle would have been suicidal, the gunmen could do little except engage in delaying actions, sniping, and skirmishes. But the recovery of such large stores of munitions at the emirs' arsenals suggests that not enough men had been trained in the use and tactical employment of these weapons.

The fall of Nupe and Ilorin was the prelude to a series of British expeditions against the other emirates of the Caliphate between 1901 and 1903. In some cases the emirs submitted peaceably; in others armed resistance was slight and the emirates were brought under British control with minimal violence. But at Adamawa in 1901, and at Kano and Sokoto in 1903, the British forces encountered considerable military resistance. The critical difference between Nupe and Ilorin on the one hand, and Adamawa, Kano, and Sokoto on the other, was that in the latter cases a more organized defense was made, including a more effective use of firearms and trained gunmen.

While Nupe and Ilorin were taken by surprise and therefore were unprepared for the British invasion, the manner of their defeat was a pointed object lesson to other emirates, many of which eagerly sought to increase their military capabilities. The critical need for firepower and skilled gunmen was apparent. In the last years of the nineteenth century this need was partially met by the emirs' acquisition from several sources of both firearms and marksmen, but of course it was not fully satisfied. As we noted in the last chapter, the emirates participated in the general expansion of the arms trade. Ironically, the French conquests in the Western Sudan also contributed indirectly to the military capability of the caliphate. In 1890, for example, the French drove Shehu Ahmadu from Segu, the seat of his Tukulor empire on the upper Niger. Ahmadu emigrated eastwards to Sokoto with an army of 10,000 or more, including 500 riflemen.[40] After Ahmadu's death in 1898, his followers remained in the caliphate, and many enlisted in the service of the caliph and his emirs, and fought with them against the British. To these forces were added the armed following of the Wolof chieftain Ali Bori, who also fled his country in 1890, followed Ahmadu to Sokoto, and augmented the emirs' military forces.[41] Another source of trained gunmen was the disbanded army of Rabeh, who was killed in battle with the French in 1900. Many of his troops fled to Zinder, but others took their weapons to Adamawa, Katagum, and Kano.[42] Katagum was reinforced also by many Kanuri refugees from Rabeh's ravages in Bornu.[43]

Muri and Adamawa exploited the European commercial and diplomatic rivalry on the Benue to acquire increased military stores. Emir Muham-

madu Nya of Muri (1874–96) cordially received the French agent-adventurer Lieutenant Louis Mizon in 1892 and secured his assistance in reducing the refractory town of Kona. Mizon distributed rifles among the emir's officials, and placed his own Senegalese riflemen and two fieldpieces at Muhammadu's disposal. This formidable force quickly ended the six-year resistance of Kona's pagan inhabitants.[44] In the next year the emir transferred his capital from Muri to Jalingo, on the southern bank of the Benue. Jalingo was constructed from the outset as a permanent war camp, and was surrounded by high mud walls with loopholes for guns every two feet.[45]

Adamawa, for its part, permitted the British Niger Company to establish a trading station at Yola and thereby obtained direct access to a supply of firearms; these weapons were used with great effect during the 1890s on pagan tribes such as the Ntem.[46] Emir Zubeiru (1890–1901) also welcomed Lieutenant Mizon and received two nine-pound cannon as a sign of French goodwill. Local traditions report that Zubeiru occasionally took these fieldpieces on campaign, carrying them on camels, but apparently never fired them with effect.[47]

In 1901, however, when the British marched against Adamawa, these field guns inflicted considerable casualties on this column under the command of Colonel Morland, despite the latter's four 75-mm guns, four Maxims, and 365 repeating rifles. After Zubeiru's cavalry charges against this formidable firepower were aborted, the emir regrouped his forces near the palace for a final desperate stand. Reinforced by sixty riflemen from Rabeh's army, Zubeiru repulsed Morland's first assault with a well-aimed volley from his two cannon crammed with grapeshot, at a range of only thirty yards. Although temporarily stunned and disorganized, Morland's force re-formed and overwhelmed the emir's troops before the cannon were reloaded. It was a bloody engagement: Zubeiru's men took some 150 casualties, while Morland's troops suffered 41. Zubeiru fled, leaving behind the 2 nine-pounders, 105 fuzed shells, 60 French rifles and cartridges, and a ton of gunpowder.[48]

After the conquest of Adamawa, the only major military resistance to the British occupation of the caliphate occurred at Kano and Sokoto in 1903. Kano in particular appeared capable of effective armed defense, and British intelligence reports between 1900 and 1903 abound with ominous references to Emir Aliyu's military preparations. Arab merchants resident in Kano urged the emir to import more guns from the north and to fight the British.[49] Prior to 1897 Aliyu had received some repeating rifles from Nupe;[50] and later, he was reported to have sent his slaves to Lokoja to enlist in the British Royal West African Frontier Force (WAFF), become skilled in the use of modern rifles, and then desert and return to Kano as drill instructors.[51] F. D. Lugard, High Commissioner of "Northern Nigeria," received news that Kano was in contact with the Sanusi and

the Ottoman sultan, and that every male in the city was compelled under pain of death to carry arms.[52] Lugard also believed that Kano was importing large quantities of munitions from Tripoli, that many rifles were being stolen from Lagos and Lokoja and smuggled to Kano, and that Aliyu was offering rewards to WAFF deserters.[53] Furthermore, it was suspected that many deserters from French armies operating to the north of the caliphate had brought their guns to Kano.[54]

However, these intelligence estimates proved to be exaggerated in 1903, when Kano, and then Sokoto, fell to the British. The details of the battles need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that although gallant efforts at defense were made in each case, it is evident that the reorganization and rearmament of their armies had not advanced far by 1903. As at Nupe, Ilorin, and Yola, the arsenal at Kano yielded large stores of gunpowder, 350 firearms, and 20,000 rounds of ammunition to the British;[55] the marksmanship of the several hundred musketeers and riflemen was ineffective;[56] and intrepid cavalry charges against the British "square" failed to penetrate the wall of kneeling riflemen. The lesson of Nupe and Ilorin may have been learned, but it was not mastered. Again, a few well-disciplined soldiers armed with modern repeating rifles proved superior to hordes of horsemen and infantry fighting in the traditional fashion. As one cynic put it, "The Fulani's weapon was the sword; the White Man fights with the earthquake and the lightning."[57] Thus the Sokoto Caliphate was absorbed into the British Empire.

It is interesting to speculate about the possibility of a successful resistance to British imperialism if the armies of the caliphate had enjoyed unrestricted access to the weapons and methods of modern warfare. The initial impressive performance of Emir Zubeiru's troops and cannon at Yola serves as an example of the kind of resistance that could have been offered. But history is irreversible and such speculation will forever remain a matter of conjecture. The important point is that between 1897 and 1903 the nascent revolution in military technology, army organization, and techniques of warfare that was occurring in the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate was forcibly suppressed. The process of military modernization which had begun only a few decades earlier was interrupted by the Brussels Act, and then abruptly terminated by British conquest. The failure of this revolution is to be attributed to events and circumstances beyond the domain and control of the Sokoto Caliphate: the closure of the firearms supply from the north, European regulation of the trade in modern rifles, and British military occupation.

In this thwarted process of military modernization Nupe was the key to the caliphate. It was Nupe that first began to convert to the technology and methods of gun warfare, and transmitted the new weapons to the other emirates. And it was Nupe whose defeat in 1897 set the bloody precedent for the other emirates to follow. In a larger sense, the fate of this

incipient revolution and of the caliphate itself was bound up with Britain long before the conquest. It was British enterprise that opened the caliphate to European trade, and provided the firearms that could not be obtained from North Africa. It was also Britain, mixing humanitarian concern with acute political and strategic vision, that enthusiastically supported and enforced the Brussels Act. And finally, it was Britain that conquered the caliphate and obliterated its emerging military reforms.

In retrospect, it is ironical that in some ways the military situation had come full circle in the hundred-year history of the Sokoto Caliphate. The caliphate had emerged after 1804 by a strategy of piecemeal but rapid conquest; its original armies were composed principally of infantry; its tactical formation was the "square"; it depended on firepower to overcome the shock power of enemy cavalry; and its ruling class was ethnically distinct from the subject population. By 1903 the situation was similar in these respects but the caliphate was now the victim of defeat. Britain also imposed its military control by a strategy of piecemeal but rapid conquest; its armed forces consisted of infantry; its tactical formation was the "square"; it relied on firepower to overcome the shock effect of enemy cavalry; and the new imperial regime was dominated by an ethnic minority.

Although the failure of the second revolution is not attributable to the caliphate, the fall of the caliphate can be attributed to the failure of the revolution. The British conquest was not a protracted war, but rather a series of sporadic lightning campaigns that pitted all the means of modern warfare against the ancient military traditions of the Sudan. The outcome was a foregone conclusion. The failure of the second revolution ensured the preservation of the traditional military system and thereby sealed the fate of the caliphate in its final struggle.

The means and methods of the British conquest were radically different from anything in the previous military experience of the caliphate. In the first place, traditional warfare was an extended process: offensive strategy required large-scale mobilization of territorial reserves, and that of the defense was predicated upon the ability of walled citadels to endure long sieges. But the British strategy depended on surprise, deep thrusts, quick strikes, devastating firepower, and decisive engagements; battles were decided in a matter of hours, if not minutes.

Second, British weaponry was infinitely superior to that of the emirs' soldiers. The impressive panoply of traditional Sudanic warfare was quite adequate for the prevailing military conditions, but was hopelessly and pitifully incommensurate to the task of defense against the European invaders. True, the increasing use of muskets, rifles, and even cannon began to have a telling effect on late nineteenth-century warfare; but the comparative quantity and quality of modern weapons were vastly inferior to those of the British, whose long-range capability effectively under-

mined the emirs' principal military arm, the cavalry. Awesome firepower concentrated in the hands of a few easily routed the many.

Third, the organizational superiority of the British forces must be stressed. Although self-discipline and perhaps even a rudimentary sense of unit discipline were not unknown in Sudanic warfare, the incredible combat discipline displayed by the small British "square" had no counterpart among the emirs' armies. Drill, training, and precision movements were the hallmarks of the conqueror, next to which the emirs' troops appeared hopelessly outclassed.

The failure of the second revolution left the caliphate to face the British threat with little more than the traditional strategy and techniques of war. Lacking a central standing army, the caliph issued the customary military instructions to his emirs to close the roads and wage *jihad* against the infidel aggressors. And lacking a central alliance structure, the emirates responded to the threat each in its own way. This localism in matters of defense proved fatal. No interemirate defense force was raised, no common strategy was evolved, no joint campaigns were mounted. Preoccupied with self-defense, the emirates fell one by one as the Hausa states had done a century before.

In short, the conquest of the caliphate represented the triumph of a total sysem of war radically different and superior in its concept, organization, technology, methods, and strategy. It cannot be said that the emirs of the caliphate were ignorant of, or oblivious to, this system and its implications. They had tried, within the limits of time and means, to emulate this system. The Sokoto Caliphate had barely embarked on its path toward military modernization when external forces overcame it en route.

PART TWO

Sociological Perspectives

CHAPTER 8

The Evolution of Politico-Military Organization
in the Sokoto Caliphate, c. 1790–1903

In Part One we surveyed certain prominent aspects of the military history of the Sokoto Caliphate from its inception until its conquest by the British. We noted that (1) during the *jihad* period the Muslim armies were composed largely of foot soldiers; (2) during the mid-nineteenth century a more complex military organization was evolved to accommodate the increasing use of cavalry forces; and (3) in the late nineteenth century the introduction of firearms, the formation of new corps of slave musketeers commanded by slave officers, and the creation of regular standing armies constituted an incipient revolution in the technology, organization, and techniques of warfare.

It is possible therefore to distinguish three stages in the evolution of military organization in the Sokoto Caliphate, each stage being characterized by a peculiar weapon complex, mode of organization, and tactical methods. During the *jihad* period (c. 1790–1817) the bow and arrow was the principal weapon, infantry units were the basis of military organization, and long-range fighting with reliance on firepower was the usual method of warfare. During the second phase (c. 1817–1860) swords, spears, and lances comprised the predominant weapon complex, light cavalry supported by specialized infantry units was the basic mode of army organization, and close combat with reliance on shock effect was the common tactical method. And finally, the third stage (c. 1860–1903) was characterized by the increasing use of firearms, a reversion to infantry forces as the fundamental element of military organization, and a concomitant return to the tactical supremacy of firepower in long-range combat.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine these three phases in the evolution of military organization in the emirates of the caliphate in a more systematic fashion. We will be concerned in particular with the changing relationships among military technology, army organization, and state structure during the nineteenth century. As we shall see, these three variables assumed different configurations in each of the three successive stages. The methodological device employed in this chapter to organize and present the pertinent data is a three-stage diachronic or process model. The utility and applicability of such models to the study of African history have been demonstrated elsewhere,[1] but some preliminary

qualifying remarks are appropriate in this case. First of all, as in any temporal historical sequence, our periodization is somewhat arbitrary. The three stages of development identified in this study are each approximately thirty or forty years in length; they constitute broad chronological divides rather than precisely defined periods. Likewise, none of the three phases of the model existed in the "pure" forms outlined in this chapter; rather, the ideal type of politico-military organization described in each stage serves to specify its distinctive features. It is the constellation of distinguishing characteristics of military technology, army organization, and state structure peculiar to each period that is important for our purposes.

Phase I: The Raiding Citizen Army and the Combatant State, c. 1790–1817

During the *jihad* period the military forces fighting under the banner of the Shehu can be described as a "raiding citizen army."[2] As we noted in Chapter 2, this type of military organization was characterized by a high degree of egalitarianism and nonprofessionalism. All able-bodied male members of the Muslim community fought to defend that community and to propagate Islam. Although the motivations of the diverse social elements that composed this community were complex, their loyalty to the Shehu was demonstrated by their participation in his *jihad*. Indeed, the distinguishing mark of the insurgent Muslim community at this time was its combatant posture.

The authority structure of this community was extremely decentralized and democratic. Military leadership was informal and incidental to the overall functions of community leadership. The Shehu himself was not a warrior but a charismatic leader whose authority rested on his personal sanctity and exemplary character.[3] The other leaders of the *jihad* were at once military commanders, scholars, and administrators, who claimed no special privileges for themselves and endeavored to uphold the egalitarian and millenarian spirit in which the *jihad* was originally conceived. As M. G. Smith has written,

all owed their position, like Abdullahi and Bello themselves, to their pre-eminence as scholars and lovers of Islam. None of these men were crowned, and all ruled as mallams (clerics and Islamic scholars) rather then kings, administering war, justice, religion and civil affairs equally . . . leaders were thus first among equals and entitled to no special rights on personal grounds.[4]

Although the Muslim community during the *jihad* period lacked differentiated and autonomous political and military institutions, it possessed a remarkable degree of integration and cohesion. Initially, religious fervor and general enthusiasm for the Shehu's program of social reform provided the source of community consensus. This cohesion was reinforced during the *jihad* by the generation of intense communal solidarity required to

meet the demands and deprivations of wartime. Egalitarianism and social integration were also sustained by the sharing of booty and the use of similar weapons by all warriors. Lacking a permanent territorial base and elaborate political institutions characteristic of formal state organization, the integrated politico-military structure of the incipient Sokoto Caliphate may be regarded as a "combatant state."[5]

In summary, the mass mobilization of the Muslim community for war, the fusion of roles in the persons of the Shehu's deputies, and the organization of this community along egalitarian lines gave the armies of the *jihad* period the distinctive features of the raiding citizen army.

The establishment and consolidation of the Sokoto Caliphate in the first half of the nineteenth century entailed the elaboration of formal institutions patterned after the Sudanic model and modified by Islam. As we pointed out in Chapter 3, this process of institutional development included the transformation of the irregular armies of the *jihad* period into more permanently organized and professionalized military forces in the various emirates. In the following section we will examine the way in which this transformation occurred, the nature of this second stage of politico-military organization, and how it differed from the first.

Phase II: The Palace Army and the Feudal State, c. 1817–1860

During the second period in the evolution of military organization in the Sokoto Caliphate, the military forces of its constituent emirates resembled in both structure and composition what has been called the "palace army."[6] This type of military organization, described in detail in Chapter 3, was characterized by a professional officer corps and a small permanent nucleus of garrisoned warriors that could be augmented by territorial levies, conscripts, and volunteers. The army and its leadership generally lacked independent political power and functioned as an instrument of the ruler. The officer corps was composed of men from aristocratic backgrounds, and the rank and file was drawn largely from low-status groups. During this period the political structure of the Sokoto Caliphate exhibited many characteristics of a "feudal state."

The use of the word *feudal* in this context is not intended as a definitive attribution of feudalism to the Sokoto Caliphate. Debate over the meaning and applicability of the term *feudal* has long absorbed the energies of scholars, and more recently Africanists have joined in this academic melee. It is not necessary to engage in such debate here. Rather, attention must be directed to the institutions peculiar to the Sokoto Caliphate during this period, namely the integrated institutions of vassalage, fief holding, and a military organization based on the use of cavalry. These institutions comprised the basic politico-military conformation that has been designated "feudal" for the purpose of this study.[7]

Fief holding was the central institution of politico-military organization in the Sokoto Caliphate. The emirs were the vassals of the caliph, and their emirates were administered as fiefs attached to the emirship. Likewise, the emirs' *hakimai* enjoyed the status of fief-holding vassals in relation to their respective overlords. A clearly articulated set of rights and duties governed the relations between subordinate and overlord at each level of this simple hierarchy.

The military aspects of fief-holding vassalage are particularly salient for our analysis. As we saw in Chapter 3, the provision of military contingents by the emirs and their *hakimai* was an essential obligation of fief holding. This explicit association of military service with the institution of fief holding was intimately related to the development of an army organization based on the use of light cavalry. In fact the development of cavalry warfare during the *jihad* may have borne a causal relationship to the development of the institution of fief holding in the Sokoto Caliphate: the increasing requirements for cavalry during the period of conquest and consolidation in the first half of the nineteenth century were satisfied by the creation of cavalry-producing fiefs.

While this argument does not account entirely for the prevasiveness of fief holding, there are both logical and empirical grounds for accepting it as a partial explanation. Fief holding was particularly suited to the conditions of cavalry warfare. As we noted in Chapter 1, war-horses were expensive to acquire, outfit, and maintain, and required considerable grazing area. Unlike the "democratic" weapons prevalent in the early *jihad*, cavalry forces were "aristocratic" weapons accessible only to men of wealth and property. Inherent also in the use of cavalry was a necessary territorial dispersion rather than concentration of horses. The requirements of wealth, grazing area, and military security precluded centralized control of cavalry by the caliph and his emirs. The optimum solution therefore was the distribution of fiefs to loyal vassals who in turn assumed specific military obligations, including the provision of a cavalry force.[8]

The extensive use of cavalry in the Sokoto Caliphate and the associated development of feudal institutions had important implications for both political and military organization. The allocation of fiefs, from which emirs and their officials drew their sustenance and military forces, entailed a necessary devolution of power. The pyramidal system of fief holding vested control of the instruments of administration and coercion in the hands of subordinate vassals. The institutional complex of fief holding, vassalage, and cavalry was the crux of the territorial and jurisdictional decentralization that marked the Sokoto Caliphate.

In addition to this decentralization of power and authority, the use of cavalry also induced a rigid stratification in military organization between the horsemen and the infantry. While the infantrymen were generally equipped with "democratic" weapons made of common materials accessi-

ble to all, cavalrymen required a wide range of expensive horse trappings and military accouterments. In fact the *initial* expense of outfitting a single cavalryman was at least the same as the cost of five slaves.[9] And the expense involved in the maintenance of cavalry ensured that the control of horses remained a virtual monopoly of the wealthy fief-holding officials. The broader socioeconomic implication of cavalry, therefore, was that military service and prerogatives became a matter of class: the control of the principal "means of destruction" was preempted and monopolized by the ruling class of fief-holding aristocrats. Political, social, and economic inequality were manifested in and perpetuated by this form of military organization in which the basic differentiation was between cavalry and foot soldiers, the ruling class and the subject class, the aristocrat and the commoner.

Inevitably the development of a cavalry-based military organization in the Sokoto Caliphate destroyed the egalitarianism that existed during the *jihad.* Unlike the *jihad* period, when warfare was the obligation of the entire Muslim community, the adoption of cavalry forces promoted the professionalization of warfare and military organization. Although in theory every man could still be a warrior – and indeed, many did volunteer for campaigns – his role and status were inferior to those assigned to the cavalry. The obligations and privileges of war were virtually monopolized by officialdom and its professional cavalry forces. This fundamental change in the pattern of social recruitment for military service reflected and reinforced the broad social division between the different strata of the population. Not only did the cavalry enjoy an elite status, but, as we observed in Chapter 5, the conventions governing the distribution of booty also guaranteed that officialdom would obtain the bulk of the spoils of war. This monopoly of military functions by one social class, and the identification of fief-holding officialdom with this class of professional warriors, constituted the essential elements of the feudal state.[10] The control of superior military techniques was the foundation of the coercive, and hence ultimately, the political dominance of the warrior class. Indeed, one of the fundamental processes at work in these nineteenth-century emirates was the progressive differentiation of the ruling class from the mass of the population, and the control of military functions was one of the principal mechanisms by which the separation was achieved.

It is evident from the foregoing analysis that military organization in the emirates of the caliphate was characterized by rigid social divisions along both vertical and horizontal lines. A vertical division existed between the officer corps recruited from officialdom and its clients, and the rank and file drawn from low-status groups. On the other hand, a horizontal division was maintained between the aristocratic cavalry corps mounted by officialdom, and the infantry forces recruited from the unprivileged strata.

These internal divisions in the structure of the palace army entailed two important consequences for its political role in the various emirates. First, these cleavages tended to preserve the army as an instrument of the ruling class to maintain its position of dominance. The vertical division ensured the retention of command authority, and indirectly, social control over the subject population. The horizontal division perpetuated the virtual monopoly of cavalry as the principal "means of destruction" by the aristocratic ruling class.

The second important consequence of this dual pattern of differential social recruitment was the assurance of firm political control of the army by the ruling elite. On the one hand, this subordination of the palace army to "civil" authority was a function of its social heterogeneity which effectively neutralized, or at least diminished, its ability to act as an independent political force. On the other hand, the high degree of social and functional integration within the ruling class, which provided the political as well as the military elite, produced a common conception of the role of the army in the state. In this respect the palace army conforms to the "feudal aristocratic model" of civil-military relations developed by sociologist Morris Janowitz. In this model, Janowitz writes,

the narrow base of recruitment for both [civilian and military] elites and a relatively monolithic power structure provided the civilian elite with a comprehensive basis for political control of the military. . . . Birth, family connections and common values insured that the military embodied the ideology of the dominant group in society. Political control was civilian control because there was a unity of interests between aristocratic and military groups.[11]

Phase III: The Standing Army and the Bureaucratic State, c. 1860–1903

In Chapter 7 we argued that in the period after c. 1860 the increasing use of firearms in the Sokoto Caliphate induced an incipient revolution in military technology, army organization, and the techniques of warfare. The full realization of the potential consequences of the employment of firearms and standing armies was precluded by the British conquest at the turn of the century. Nevertheless, as we shall attempt to demonstrate in this section, the formation of standing armies and slave musketeer corps – significant in their own right – also had important effects on political organization and development.[12]

If the adoption of cavalry was central to the formation of the palace army and the feudal state, the increasing employment of firearms was closely related to the development of bureaucratic politico-military structures. It was suggested in the preceding chapter that the expanding use of guns enhanced the importance of infantry at the expense of cavalry, and that the newly formed standing armies and musketeer forces tended to

displace feudal levies. Historically the cavalry had been not only a symbol of aristocratic status but also an instrument that served to perpetuate the dominance of the feudal ruling class. The devaluation of this military institution after c. 1860 and the concomitant ascendance of low-status foot soldiers represented a situation similar to that which occurred in modern European history when the emerging monarchies employed standing armies and firearms to undermine the feudal class and its cavalry.

These changes in military organization reflected, and were part of, a broader tendency in the political development of the emirates of the caliphate: the increasing bureaucratization of the structure of government as slaves and freemen of nonaristocratic origin gradually came to dominate high office. This reversal of the pattern of political recruitment served to centralize royal power and authority and to reduce that of the feudal nobility.

Historically the decentralized politico-military organization of the classical Sudanic states and of the Sokoto Caliphate during its feudal period – characterized by the integrated institutions of vassalage, fief holding, and cavalry – was marked by an inherent structural tension between rulership and feudal officialdom, each attempting to maximize its powers at the expense of the other. The nature of this kind of political conflict has been characterized by the German sociologist Max Weber as

a *struggle* between the political or hierocratic lord and the owners or usurpers of prerogatives . . . [in which the] ruler attempts to expropriate the estates, and the estates attempt to expropriate the ruler. The more the ruler succeeds in attaching to himself a staff of officials who depend solely on him and whose interests are linked to his, the more the struggle is decided in favor of the ruler and the more the privilege-holding estates are gradually expropriated. In this connection, the prince acquires administrative means of his own and he keeps them firmly in his own hands.[13]

Weber's summary of the state of tension inherent in this type of political structure suggests the essential difference between feudal and bureaucratic states. The primary attribute of a feudal state is the control of the material means of administration and coercion by the fief-holding "estates"; the principal characteristic of a bureaucratic state is the control of these means by a ruler who employs a "staff of officials who depend solely on him and whose interests are linked to his." In the feudal model the executive functions of government are concentrated in the hands of the fief holders; in the bureaucratic model executive functions are concentrated in the bureaucracy (the "staff of officials") and exercised by it as the agency of the ruler. In a broad sense, therefore, it is the separation of the means of management and coercion from the feudal estates and their transfer to the ruler that constitutes the process of bureaucratization.[14] Bureaucratization can occur quantitatively, by the creation or enlargement of an administrative staff; and qualitatively, by the transformation of feudal vassals into functionaries of the ruler. In this section

we will attempt to show that this dual process of bureaucratization occurred in both army organization and state structure in the emirates of the caliphate, and was encouraged by the new military technology that became available in the late nineteenth century.

In order to increase the scope of their power, it was necessary for the emirs to remove the control of the army from the feudal nobility. This was progressively effected in two ways. At first it was possible only to sep-arate military command functions from the fief-holding class; later, when firearms became available in considerable quantities, it was also possible to separate the control of the instruments of force from aristocratic officialdom. Although it was virtually impossible to remove the control of cavalry from the fief-holding vassals, it was possible for the rulers to retain an exclusive monopoly over the use of the new "means of destruction" – firearms.[15]

Military command was the first prerogative to be separated from the aristocratic fief holders. The commissioning of slave officers to command the newly created standing armies and slave musketeer forces in several emirates has already been noted. Indeed, during the second half of the nineteenth century, the ascendance of slave officials, especially as military commanders, seems to have been universal throughout the Sokoto Cali-phate. By the last decades of the century most of the titled military officials in the eastern border emirates of Hadejia, Katagum, and Gombe were slaves.[16] In Kano this development dates from the reign of Emir Abdullahi (1855–82), during which time, reports the *Kano Chronicle*, "the palace slaves became so great they were like free men."[17] Abdullahi created additional slave offices and exalted the power and status of royal slaves over that of the Fulani fief holders. Emir Aliyu (1894–1903), the son of Abdullahi, intensified this process of centralization. During the Kano civil war of 1893-4, the resident Arab merchants supported Aliyu and supplied him with guns with which he successfully contested the emirship. Upon his succession to the throne, Aliyu disarmed his rivals and organized detachments of slave gunmen under slave captains. In addition he redistributed the fiefs of several of the most powerful officials and removed some of the fief-holding privileges from others. As Lord Lugard later noted, Aliyu's strategy was "to substitute favourite slaves for the chief officers of the state," so that these "head slaves absorbed most of the power, and supplanted the Hakimai (fief holders)."[18]

In other emirates for which data are available, it appears that similar policies were pursued by their rulers. In Katsina, for example, Emir Muhammadu Bello (1844–69) also increased the power of his palace slaves and circumscribed that of the fief holders in various ways. This practice was continued and elaborated by Abubakar (1877–1905) who, like his contemporary Yero in Zaria, organized a force of throne slaves, equipped some of them with firearms, and employed them to overawe

political rivals and refractory subjects. Abubakar also elevated to important military commands non-Fulani generals such as Dan Waire and Muhammadu Dikko, who depended for their position and rewards upon the emir alone.[19]

The reign of Aliyu at Sokoto (1842–59) was also marked by a reorganization of the army designed to strengthen the position of the caliph. Aliyu purchased a large number of horses and built up a sizable arsenal of war material, mounting more than 100 *yan lifida* and 700 slave horsemen. Two important advantages accrued from this force of slave cavalry. First, it provided the caliph with a regular military contingent. Second, since slaves customarily surrendered captured booty to their masters, it ensured him a larger share of the spoils of war. Aliyu also bequeathed these benefits to his successors by leaving this slave inheritance intact and attaching it directly to the throne. Furthermore, Aliyu established the practice of conscripting the pagan Hausa (*Maguzawa*) on a regular basis for military service.[20]

Although detailed information about every state is not immediately accessible, there is evidence to suggest the prominence, if not the predominance, of slave officials in late nineteenth-century Jama'are, Adamawa, Nupe, and Ilorin.[21] In each of the cases cited above there occurred an enlargement and qualitative change in the composition of the military and administrative hierarchy by the appointment of titled slave and nonaristocratic officials whose position and sustenance depended entirely upon the ruler. In some instances this new elite was granted fief-holding privileges, with both the titles and fiefs reverting to the ruler upon the death of the incumbents. This proliferation of slave titles and general manipulation of officialdom tended to strengthen royal power and to reduce that of the feudal aristocracy. The emirs' increasing reliance upon court slave officials also served to extend their control over the critical institution of fief holding. In each of these states, as Nadel has observed of Nupe, the "rise of slave officials at the Fulani court" was "the counterpart of the rise of a powerful, dangerously independent feudal nobility."[22] As slave officials gradually displaced the fief-holding nobility, the traditional feudal–bureaucratic conflict tended toward a resolution in favor of bureaucracy: government by feudal aristocracy yielded slowly to government by royal autocracy.[23]

These were general centralizing tendencies in which the bureaucratization of the armies was but a part. There was a special means by which the armies were bureaucratized, however, and this in turn had a direct effect upon the generic process of centralization. This development was occasioned after the 1860s by the introduction of a considerable quantity of firearms that provided the opportunity for rulers to organize slave musketeer forces and thereby to maintain exclusive control over the new instruments of force. The adoption of these weapons made it possible for

the first time to effect the extensive bureaucratization of military organization. Although the nature of cavalry necessitated a decentralized mode of politico-military organization, the nature of firearms permitted its centralization. The institutionalized relationships among vassalage, fief holding, cavalry, and military functions presumed and sustained a dispersion of power; on the other hand, firearms – the supply, distribution, and employment of which could be controlled effectively from the center – created the possibility for, and strengthened the tendency toward, the concentration of power. Moreover, since firearms were potentially superior to cavalry, it is probable that this development, if it had been allowed to mature, would have spelled the demise of cavalry as it did in Europe, Japan, Mamluk Egypt, and elsewhere.[24]

The effective control over the trade, distribution, and use of firearms by the emirs of the caliphate had two important implications for military organization. First, the self-equipped cavalry forces of the feudal aristocracy were gradually displaced by infantry units armed and equipped by the state. This is an essential feature of bureaucratized armies which, in Weber's words, "are characterized by the fact that their equipment and provisions are supplied from the magazines of the war lord."[25] Second, the creation of standing armies including slave musketeers represented a reversal of the social and economic status associated with military service. Historically, as we have seen, military functions and prerogatives were monopolized by aristocratic fief-holding officials and their clients. But in the late nineteenth century, as standing armies and detachments of slave gunmen began to supplant levies of feudal cavalry, military service and command increasingly became the functions of low-status groups that derived their sustenance not from their control of land and wealth but from the stores of the central government. This transformation of the socioeconomic basis of military organization is also an essential characteristic of the bureaucratization process. As Weber concluded, "the bureaucratization of the army has everywhere been realized along with the transfer of army service from the propertied to the propertyless."[26]

In summary, the bureaucratization of military organization in the emirates of the caliphate occurred as a twofold process. In the first instance, military command was progressively removed from the fief-holding aristocracy, and in the second phase the employment of the new instruments of force became the exclusive prerogative of the rulers. By creating independent military forces loyal to themselves, the emirs were able to reduce their reliance upon feudal contingents and to enlarge the scope of royal power and authority. If the palace army and its cavalry were the instruments of the feudal nobility to control the lower strata of the population, the standing army and firearms were the instruments of the autocratic ruler to control aristocratic officialdom. The creation of standing armies that served the central government alone and superseded armies of the

feudal type has been a recurring historical phenomenon.[27] History is irreversible, but is it not conceivable that in the absence of European intervention and conquest the states of the Central Sudan would have followed this historical pattern rather than that supposed by Fisher and Rowland?[28]

At this point it might be useful to summarize the content of this chapter in tabular form in order to describe succinctly the nature of the changes that occurred in the politico-military organization of the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate during the nineteenth century (see Table 3). It must be reiterated that these are "pure" abstractions of very complex phenomena and are at best modal characteristics rather than comprehensive and mutually exclusive categories. Each stage, and particularly the last one, is a simplified delineation of the prominent features or tendencies of that period.

Table 3. *The evolution of politico-military organization in the Sokoto Caliphate*

Selected variables	Phase I 1790–1817	Phase II 1817–1860	Phase III 1860–1903
Military organization	irregular infantry	regular infantry and cavalry plus territorial reserves	professional infantry – standing army
Military technology	bow and arrow	swords and lances	firearms
Type of warfare	long-range	close-combat	long-range
Basis of tactics	firepower	shockpower	firepower
Military participation	high	medium	low
Military command	informal	professional-aristocratic	professional-royal slave
Method of equipment	self-equipped	self- and state-equipped	state-equipped
Military recruitment	voluntary	voluntary and conscription[a]	conscription[a]
Political organization	democratic	feudal	bureaucratic

[a] Conscription here refers to the compulsory military obligation borne by selected slaves and clients.

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The Functions of War in the Sokoto Caliphate

In previous chapters we examined selected aspects of warfare and military organization in the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, particularly the changes that attended the adoption of cavalry early in the nineteenth century and the introduction of firearms toward the end of the century. In other words, warfare and military organization have been generally regarded as dependent or regulated variables to be explained in part by technological change, the independent or regulating variable. This perspective was broadened and occasionally reversed in Chapter 8 in an attempt to explain the developments in state structure (dependent variable) induced by changing military technology and organization (independent variables). The purpose of this chapter is to identify, describe, and explain in a more systematic manner the complex relationships between military factors and the political, economic, and social structure of these emirates.

This examination may be considered as an exercise in sociological history. Our study has already drawn upon some common sociological concepts and techniques, but in this chapter the adoption of an interdisciplinary mode of analysis is more explicit. Two considerations have suggested this methodological approach. The first is this writer's view that the progress of history as a discipline is dependent on the extent to which it emulates the social sciences.[1] Second, a sociological approach is most appropriate to this investigation because in recent years sociologists (and their allies in anthropology) have engaged in considerable cross-historical and cross-cultural research on the functions of war. The growing corpus of their theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of war and military organization provides the general methodological foundation of the present inquiry.[2]

War can be examined from several points of view or perspectives; for our purposes it will be regarded "as a social institution with sociological functions and linkings with the rest of the 'parts' of the society and culture."[3] In adopting this functional approach, our attention is directed toward the relationship between war and other social structures, institutions, and cultural patterns. We do not propose to construct a formal model or conceptual framework, but rather we assume the general utility

of two closely related approaches that enjoy currency among social scientists: systems "theory" and functional analysis.[4]

Political-Military Relationships

The condition of endemic warfare that accompanied the emergence and consolidation of the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate left a permanent imprint upon their political structure. War was the principal instrument for the establishment and extension of political authority over subject people and foreign territory, and for the organization, maintenance, and reinforcement of that authority. The demands of perennial war evoked institutions to subordinate the sectors of society crucial to the interests of these militarized polities. The permanent requirement to mobilize human and material resources for military purposes intensified tendencies toward the monopolization of power and the elaboration of auxiliary institutions of social control.

As we have seen, warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate, on both the imperial and emirate level, was virtually an annual occurrence and took the form of punitive expeditions against recalcitrant subjects, slave raids on non-Muslim people, and interstate hostilities. Such military activities took place during the dry season, when the population was not tied to agricultural pursuits and therefore was available for military service. Levies of able-bodied freemen and slaves were raised for the purpose of repairing town walls after the rains, producing war materials, and campaigning with the emirs' armies. These armies of between 5,000 and 50,000 warriors, and the auxiliary forces engaged in war-related activities, consumed the energy of a large proportion of the adult male population. During the dry season, therefore, the mass mobilization of human resources by the state for military purposes was a regular occurrence.

This centralizing effect of war is clearly shown also in the organization of the various craft industries in the nineteenth century. In each emirate the craft industries operated under direct state control, each craft being organized under a chief responsible for quality and price control, tax collection, and production for the needs of the emir. The leather industry provided saddles, shields, sheaths, quivers, horse trappings, and baggage cases. Blacksmiths made swords, spearheads and arrowheads, horse trappings, flintlocks and shot for the gunmen; brass workers produced more exquisite and expensive varieties of these items. The weaving industry prepared "uniforms," blankets, tents, baggage, and suits of *lifidi*. As Nadel has written of Nupe, this organization of the craft industries

amounts to a full control of the political system over all the more important industries . . . this control was dictated by the needs of the state: based on constant warfare, committed to uphold the splendour of a huge court, the political system has to guar-

antee a dependable, uninterrupted supply of all that is needed – arms, tools, clothes, saddles, as well as the many symbols of wealth and status.[5]

Warfare and military organization also functioned in several ways as mechanisms of political integration, providing a means by which the authority of the caliph and his emirs was asserted in their respective domains. The caliph's *jihad*, in which contingents from the subordinate emirates participated, reaffirmed the expanse and solidarity of the caliphate. Likewise, the emirs' annual mobilization of feudal armies for slave raids or major offensive campaigns was an institutionalized expression of the emirates' political integrity. Individual *hakimai* were not permitted to wage war independently, and in the emirs' wars their subordinate status was emphasized by their augmentation to the emirs' armies under the command of royal professional military officers. Lacking the authority, and, indeed, usually the resources, to conduct war on their own, the fief-holding vassals' only means of obtaining war booty was their active participation in the emirs' military operations: the system of rewards thus served to maintain the integrity of the state.

As we noted in Chapter 4, the defensive organization of the Sokoto Caliphate consisted of a hierarchical system of mutually supporting units. In each of the emirates the capital district, fiefs, and subordinate chiefdoms constituted a single system in which each element shared defense responsibilities. In the caliphate itself the constituent emirates were units of political-territorial organization, and also formed a league of mutually supporting military bases. These ties of mutual security and defense, although loose and rarely activated, also acted to sustain the unity of the caliphate.

Military organization and practices both manifested and contributed toward political integration in other ways as well. For example, the war-camp organization as a model of the territorial configuration of the participating contingents expressed the breadth and solidarity of the caliphate and its emirates. In the battle order also, the position of the sovereign or his deputy at the center reflected the preeminence and honor of that status. For the individual warrior the dual incentive of Paradise or handsome reward of booty ensured that military recruitment was never difficult. As Smith has suggested, the very "frequency and success of these military adventures may have persuaded many people to support the system of government."[6] The institution of war and its associated practices, therefore, were important means of regulating the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a feudal system and providing the subject population with a stake in the political order.

Some of the points made in the previous chapter regarding the changing relationships among warfare, military organization, and political structure in the Sokoto Caliphate are worth recapitulating in this connection. The development of politico-military organization in the caliphate

during the nineteenth century was characterized by increasing structural differentiation, social stratification, and centralization. During the *jihad* period, when weapons and military organization were rudimentary, political organization was relatively democratic. In the second stage, during which military functions were virtually monopolized by the aristocratic Fulani ruling class, political organization was feudal. And finally, in the third phase, characterized by the increasing reliance on firearms and standing armies, politico-military organization tended to become more bureaucratic. Throughout the nineteenth century changes in warfare, military technology, and army organization were associated with basic changes in political structure.

The principal overall function of war in the Sokoto Caliphate, therefore, was the extension of territorial boundaries and the establishment within those boundaries of a new political and socioeconomic order. The *jihad* of 1804 inaugurated a continuous process of conquest and territorial aggrandizement that was accompanied by the erection of a political structure capable of enforcing order within that territory, and by the establishment of a militant Islamic ideological regime that legitimized both the conquest and the newly imposed order.[7]

Military factors were related to the general distribution and organization of political relationships in the emirates of the caliphate in two other important ways. First, the army was often an avenue of advancement to high office for exceptional warriors and commanders. Martial ability was regarded as an essential prerequisite for titled office, and incumbents were expected to demonstrate their military prowess by waging or participating in frequent and successful warfare. Since titled office and associated fief-holding privileges were among the chief rewards for personal service at the disposal of emirs, outstanding military achievement offered excellent opportunities for claim to official rank. Certain military commands, in fact, became the main channels of advancement to the emirship itself. In Zaria, for instance, the title of *madaki* or general-of-the-army and commander of the cavalry, was created by Emir Musa (1808–21) and given to his son Yamusa. Yamusa was permitted considerable freedom in the conduct of war, proved himself an able general, and amassed enormous booty from his campaigns. When Musa died his son possessed overwhelming wealth and political support, and succeeded as Emir (1821–35). Thereafter the title of *madaki* was preeminent among the dynastic titles in Zaria and was usually bestowed upon the reigning emir's first son. The political implications of this arrangement are revealed clearly in the division of the spoils of war, whereby the emir and the *madaki* took the largest share. Such wealth was used to obtain more military equipment and to attract more clients, thus strengthening their position against the out-dynasties. Competition for the madakiship was intense, and when an emir died his successor frequently replaced the

incumbent with an appointee of his own. It is significant that half of the twelve emirs who reigned in Zaria during the nineteenth century had previously held the title of *madaki*.[8] Evidence could be cited in the case of the other emirates as well, including Sokoto, where almost all of the caliphs had commanded a *ribat*. It is sufficient to note here that advancement from military command to high office was a well-established pattern of political recruitment in the Sokoto Caliphate.

The other major military factor in the emirates derived from the ability of military commanders to use their positions to exert a direct influence on domestic politics. The range of their political activities can be conceptualized in terms of the four "levels of intervention" by the military in politics distinguished by S. E. Finer: influence, blackmail, displacement, and supplantment.[9] Examples of each "level of intervention" can be found in the Sokoto Caliphate.

The first level, that of mere influence, refers to the ability of military leaders to persuade the political authorities to adopt policies favorable to their institutional interests. Such institutional interest articulation is characteristic of political systems in which specialized and professional group interests exist. In the Sokoto Caliphate the special interests of the military were represented in the emirs' state council. The composition of these councils varied among the emirates, but usually it consisted of four to six key advisers, including the senior military officer. Since problems of war and defense were of such magnitude during the nineteenth century, the influence of the military must have been considerable.

But the influence of the military went far beyond the formulation of policy related directly to its institutional interests. In some of the emirates the general of the army was a permanent member of the council of "kingmakers" that selected successors to the throne. The influence of the military party at Sokoto in the selection of caliphs was often decisive. On the death of Bello in 1837, for example, a succession dispute arose between the supporters of his brothers, Muhammadu Buhari and Abubakar Atiku. Sarkin Yaki Aliyu Jaidu and the army at first supported the former; only reluctantly did the general finally yield and accept the choice of Atiku.[10] When Atiku died in 1842 another dispute arose between Aliyu Babba, a son of Bello, and Ahmadu Rufa'i, a son of the Shehu and brother of Bello. The Sokoto council was split in its support for these candidates, and only when Aliyu Jaidu was persuaded by his son, Abu'l Hassan, to shift his support from Ahmadu to Aliyu was the latter installed as caliph (1842–59). That Aliyu Jaudi's move was again decisive is shown in the following statement addressed to him by the Waziri Abdul Kadir:

The decision belongs with you, because you are the general of the army, and it was you who previously made the decision concerning the Shehu, Bello, and Atiku. Therefore decide this case also. As for me, I will be the humble servant of whomever you would give the crown.[11]

A third instance in which the military proved to be the crucial factor occurred in 1902 during the selection of a successor to Caliph Abdur Rahman. The chief contestants, both named Muhammadu Attahiru, were sons of the former caliphs, Aliyu Babba and Ahmadu Zaruku (1859–66). Although the son of Aliyu appeared to be the popular choice, the son of Ahmadu was chosen: the decisive factor in his accession was the intervention of his brother, Marafa Muhammadu Maiturare, with his contingent of Azbinawa gunmen.[12]

The second level of intervention by the military in politics is "blackmail," or the coercion of the political authorities by the threat or actual use of force. As defined here, blackmail is directed toward the achievement of specific objectives favored by the military but not willingly conceded by the authorities. In a situation of blackmail, the existing regime becomes the instrument of the military to achieve its self-defined objectives. Some poignant examples can be used to illustrate the occurrence of such intervention in the Sokoto Caliphate.

Mutinies and revolts were the principal methods of blackmail employed by dissident military forces. For example, when Caliph Muhammadu Bello (1817–37) attempted to enforce the Islamic prescriptions for the division of booty, the army resisted and refused to fight, demanding a return to the old custom whereby each warrior retained whatever he seized. Confronted by this overwhelming opposition, Bello was forced to concede.[13] During the reign of Bello's successor, Atiku (1837–42), there occurred several mutinies of a more serious nature, directed apparently at the caliph himself rather than at his policies. It will be recalled that Atiku became caliph only after Sarkin Yaki Aliyu Jaidu reluctantly acquiesced to his accession. During Atiku's five-year reign the army remained a source of rebelliousness, often expressing its lack of confidence in the caliph, and endangering his life more than once by deserting him on the battlefield.[14]

An extreme example of the capacity of the military to employ blackmail is provided by the case of Ilorin, where the emir was reduced to a mere instrument of the generals. As early as 1860 Robert Campbell, perceiving that the military commander (*balogun*) of the non-Muslim Yoruba faction was a powerful force in the state, reported that

the people of Ilorin are not all Mussulmans, there being also a large, almost equal proportion of Yorubas, heathens; these, headed by a powerful Balagun, occasion King Shita considerable trouble, and might one day remove him and his party from power, an object openly avowed.[15]

Twenty years later factional strife erupted over military policy toward Ibadan. The emir and his supporters opposed the then two-year-old war against Ibadan, whereas the "war party" headed by the chief *balogun* favored an aggressive posture. This cleavage of interests in the state marked the ascendance of the military party in Ilorin. The war against

Ibadan continued through the 1880s and into the next decade. In 1893 Emir Momo, unable to restrain his generals, was forced to call for British intercession. The Lagos authorities managed to achieve a cessation of hostilities between the two Yoruba states, but, as we shall see, the internal conflict in Ilorin escalated.

In the third level of political intervention, the military forces the displacement of the existing regime and installs a new, more tractable and responsive political leadership. Under the new regime the degree of military control over policy may be no greater than that exercised by means of blackmail alone; the distinguishing feature of this level of intervention is the act of regime displacement. We return to Ilorin to illustrate this form of military intervention. As noted above, British diplomatic intercession brought an end to the fifteen-year war between Ilorin and Ibadan in 1893, but did nothing to mitigate the internal strife in Ilorin itself. The rebellious *baloguns,* led by Alanamu and Adama, continued to dominate Emir Momo and finally removed him from the throne, installing Sulimanu as a puppet of their own. The generals continued to rule through Sulimanu until 1897, when the Royal Niger Company force defeated Ilorin and restored Momo as emir. Despite Ilorin's acceptance of British suzerainty, for several years Momo reigned in fear and remained dependent on his *baloguns.*[16]

Finally, in the fourth level of intervention the military resorts to the supplantment of the existing regime by a direct assumption of power. In the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate there occurred several coups d'état involving the forcible appropriation of the throne by military commanders. Such coups typically took the form of either military intervention during an interregnum, or a general's deposition of the emir and seizure of power for himself. In Kano, for example, Galadima Abdullahi, who commanded a loyalist army, took the throne by force when Emir Usuman died in 1855.[17] During the Kano civil war of 1893–4, Aliyu, a son of the same Abdullahi who seized the throne some forty years earlier, took the city by assault and drove away Emir Tukur, who had recently been appointed at the behest of the caliph himself. Aliyu later ordered Tukur to be executed, and continued to reign as emir until the British conquest of Kano a decade later.[18]

In Zaria there were several attempts to seize the throne, but the only one to succeed was that by the Madaki Muhammadu Kwassau. Kwassau commanded the army and the units of slave musketeers organized by his father, Emir Usuman Yero (1888–97). When the latter died the Hausa *galadima* persuaded the Wazirin Sokoto to appoint a mute candidate as emir, thereby ensuring that the *galadima* himself would be the effective ruler. Kwassau, with Fulani support and the army at his disposal, threatened civil war if he were not appointed emir. The *waziri* was anxious to avoid a crisis such as that precipitated by similar circumstances in Kano only four years before, and yielded to Kwassau's demand.[19]

In Sokoto itself, it will be recalled, the accession of Muhammadu Atta-hiru as caliph in 1902 was guaranteed by the intervention of his brother, the *marafa*, with his Azbinawa gunmen. In the Hausa successor state of Maradi, the self-proclaimed *kaura*, as commander of the army and its riflemen, unilaterally deposed the *sarki* in 1894 and ruled from his own fief some forty miles from Maradi city.[20] The final instance of a military coup to be discussed here took place in Nupe in the 1850s, when General Umaru revolted against Emir Masaba, drove him into exile, and pro-claimed himself the new ruler. After three years of fighting, however, loy-alist forces under General Umaru Majigi, with Masaba's aid, defeated the rebel pretender. The grateful Masaba, restored to his throne, promised Umaru Majigi that he would succeed as emir; and he did, reigning from 1873 to 1882. Nupe thus provides an interesting case of one general who seized the throne by force, and another whose steadfast loyalty was rewarded with the emirship.[21]

Although the history of both the pre-*jihad* Hausa states and the Sokoto Caliphate is replete with instances of revolt, rebellion, civil war, deposi-tion of rulers, and military coups, institutionalized praetorianism did not emerge. Certainly the types and cases of intervention cited above repre-sented important political roles of the military and at times constituted distinct patterns in some states; but the development of self-perpetuating cliques of military rulers and kingmakers did not occur. The explanation of the absence of praetorianism is to be found in the nature of the palace army itself, the predominant form of Sudanic military organization until the late nineteenth century. First, in this "feudal aristocratic model" of civil-military relations the high degree of social and functional integration within political and military officialdom ensured the shared acceptance of common values and interests. And second, whereas praetorianism occurs most frequently among mercenary or socially homogeneous armies, the vertical and horizontal divisions along mutually reinforcing organizational and social lines in the palace army inhibited the development of political autonomy. Praetorianism presumes a degree of institutional differentiation and autonomy that did not exist in these states. Although military func-tions were distinguished from political or civil functions, these functions were performed by a highly integrated and socially homogeneous elite structure.[22]

Military intervention in politics has been a dominant theme in the his-tory of Islamic states and empires, and indeed, Muslim jurists often justi-fied the forcible usurpation of political power by the military. Because martial ability was regarded as an essential qualification of the Muslim sovereign, the failure to demonstrate this ability was ipso facto a cause for deposition. The caliph or emir who failed to defend the Islamic state lost his legitimate claim to office, such claim being transferred to another who successfully arrogated power. As Khadduri explains, the Muslim jurists "conceived of military power as an instrument in the hand of the caliph

for fulfilling his public duties, but when the authority of the caliph had waned and his deputy commanders became in fact more powerful than he was, the jurists often justified the assumption of authority by force. To many jurists, military force was regarded as a basic qualification for authority."[23] In this sense, military intervention in the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate may have been attributable in part to this aspect of Islamic political culture. Thus military intervention may have been encouraged by this cultural conception of the relationship between force and authority; conversely, however, the institutional characteristics of the palace army arrested tendencies toward praetorianism.

In this connection it is relevant to continue our conjectural reasoning regarding the increasing employment of firearms and standing armies in the late nineteenth century. If the arguments advanced in the previous chapter are accepted, then this incipient revolution in military technology, army organization, and state structure in the Central Sudan may have begun to force a breakdown in this delicate cultural–institutional balance that induced military intervention but inhibited praetorianism. In the first place, the possession of firearms tended to become monopolized by the rulers and their slave musketeer commanders. As control of the principal instruments of force shifted from cavalry-based feudal official-dom to royal gunmen, so also did the propensity for military intervention rooted in Islamic political culture. If control of superior "means of destruction" was a prerequisite for the attainment and retention of ruler-ship, it was the gunmen who were now the main claimants to power. Hence in Bornu in 1884, Zinder in 1893, Maradi in 1894, Zaria in 1897, and Sokoto in 1902, it was the intervention of the musketeers that deter-mined succession to the throne; and in three of those five cases the con-trol of overriding force permitted the execution of a coup d'état.

Secondly, as slave musketeers and standing armies commanded by slave officers supplanted levies of feudal cavalry, the social and functional integration of the ruling elite was necessarily undermined. The process of bureaucratization in the late nineteenth century produced increasing structural differentiation and autonomy in political and military organiza-tion. Military functions were detached from the institutional matrix of vassalage, fief holding, and cavalry and transferred to the rulers' regular armies and gunmen. The predominance of slaves among the emirs' new military commanders and musketeers meant that the instruments of force were now controlled by social elements outside the feudal aristocracy. Whereas political and military functions in the feudal system were monopolized by a socially homogeneous class of aristocratic warrior officials, the bureaucratic system transferred these functions to a new class of elite slaves created at the behest of royal authority. This radical change in the social composition of the military provided a necessary con-dition for the development of praetorianism, namely a social, functional, and institutional division between the dynastic political elite and its slave

armies. Therefore, the changes in political and military organization asso-
ciated with the increasing use of firearms in the Sokoto Caliphate may
have intensified the interventionist tendencies of the military and
removed the institutional inhibitions to praetorianism: the recruitment of
slave armies equipped with superior military technology carried with it
the potential for both centralized autocracy and praetorian regime
instability.[24]

Warfare and Political Economy

The economic system of the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, based on
industrial productivity, intensive agriculture, and commercial exchange,
was also dependent on the fortunes of war for its continued prosperity. As
we have seen, many of the craft industries relied upon the state almost
entirely for their existence as suppliers of war materials. Agricultural pro-
duction, which satisfied local needs and generated a substantial commod-
ity surplus for export, depended upon the defense of rural farmland from
predatory incursions. And finally, the extensive domestic and international
commerce of the emirates required the maintenance of relatively secure
frontiers and a vast network of internal trade routes.

Although the crucial industrial, agricultural, and commercial sectors of
the emirates' economies were linked to the degree of internal security and
external defense, it is not necessary to examine each of these sectors inde-
pendently. Rather, it is proposed here that an examination of the institu-
tion of slavery, which cut across virtually every other sociocultural institu-
tion, is sufficient to demonstrate the functional relationship between war-
fare and political economy in the Sokoto Caliphate. Slavery was a perva-
sive institution in Sudanic society, and warfare was the principal means of
recruiting the slaves whose manifold roles interlaced and linked its entire
structure.

Slavery is, and must be studied as, a sociocultural phenomenon.[25] In
this section we will be concerned principally with the economic aspects of
this institution; the broader sociocultural aspects of slavery will be taken
up in the following section. Scholarly literature on the subject of slavery
in the emirates of the caliphate is abundant and can only be summarized
here.[26] Briefly, slaves were employed as laborers and skilled workers in
the various craft industries. Other slaves were settled in slave villages as a
plantation-agriculture labor force. Slaves were bought and sold domesti-
cally, serving as both commodity and currency; many others were
exported, creating an important source of foreign exchange. Still others
became domestic servants, warriors, administrators, and even high-rank-
ing officials. Slaves as a form of war booty were used to purchase
firearms, horses, and other military stores. In short, as E. A. Ayandele put
it, the Sokoto Caliphate exemplified a "thoroughly slave-ridden society."[27]

Scholars are generally agreed that domestic slavery rather than interna-

tional trade absorbed the bulk of the slaves.[28] Slave farms in particular were important forms of capital investment and insurance for the wealthy. During the nineteenth century there was a remarkable increase in the number of such slave plantations. This increase was attributable not only to the availability of war captives, but also to the Hausa laws of property inheritance. Since these laws provided for the division of the estate of the deceased man among his sons, the size of any inheritance was reduced accordingly. Such practices encouraged competition over inheritance rights and further slave raids and purchases.[29] Extensive tracts of land were taken up in this type of capital investment. In some areas of Adamawa, for example, the population of entire provinces was composed solely of slave settlements belonging to the emir and his chiefs.[30] By the end of the nineteenth century domestic slaves constituted between one-third and one-half of the Hausa-speaking population of the Sokoto Caliphate.[31]

Aside from these domestic uses, slaves were also an important commodity in both internal and international commerce. The major suppliers of slaves for the domestic trade, and perhaps for the international market as well, were Adamawa and Bauchi. Both of these emirates, it will be recalled, were carved out of non-Muslim lands that continued to serve throughout the nineteenth century as slave reservoirs. From these and the other southeastern emirates war captives were distributed throughout the caliphate, especially to Kano and Sokoto.[32] In addition, many of the emirates paid a portion of their annual tribute to Sokoto in the form of slaves.

Slaves were also a universally accepted currency for large commercial and credit transactions in domestic and regional trade. Cowrie shells, the only other common currency, were unsuitable for such transactions because of their bulk and the consequent costs of porterage. The unique advantage of slaves was their simultaneous economic role as currency, commodity, and porter. The utility of slaves as currency increased during the nineteenth century because of the progressive devaluation of cowries.[33]

The international trade in slaves from the Sudan was of great antiquity and, although it suffered a marked decline in the nineteenth century, it remained a source of profit to the emirates of the caliphate. The slaves involved in this commerce were shipped either northward across the Sahara, or southward to the Guinea coast where they were purchased by merchants bound for the Americas. The subject of the international slave trade, especially the trans-Saharan component, still awaits definitive study; but recent research suggests that the Atlantic trade, although not as large as previously conjectured, consumed a great number of Sudanic captives.[34]

It is evident from the foregoing summary that slavery and the slave

trade were essential to the structure and operation of the economic system of Sokoto. Aside from the captives produced in interstate warfare, slaves were recruited systematically in many emirates by raids on local non-Muslim people. Slave-raiding territory within the jurisdiction of these emirates was regarded as a preserve for exclusive exploitation by the emirs. In fact many of these states were composed of two domains differentiated on the basis of social, economic, and military considerations, but nevertheless functionally integrated: the subject territory in which the Muslim population resided, and the outlying "protected" slave reserves. "Historically," Smith writes of this territorial division in Zaria, "the Emirate may have been an economic unit in the sense that the pagan tribes under the domination of Zazzau acted as a slave reservoir from which the dominant Hausa-Fulani drew their supply of farm labour for subsistence and exchange."[35]

War and the accumulation of booty were integral parts of the entire economic process, and were among the most important functions performed by these states. War produced booty, especially slaves, which stimulated and sustained the economic system. Indeed, war itself was a business, an oligopoly dominated by professional warriors for their own political and economic advantage. The ruling class of Fulani officialdom controlled the instruments of war — cavalry — and took the bulk of its spoils as profit: the "means of destruction" were easily employed as "means of production." The state monopoly over the production of slaves provided a means to manipulate the labor market, control currency supply and exchange rates, and to regulate commodity supply and distribution. War, booty, and political dominance constituted an integrated system of mutually reinforcing elements. As Carlston expressed it, these emirates were "political economies directed to the recruitment of slaves through war . . . and the use of slaves as a means for the preservation of political power," and the state "was an instrument which the ruling class used to achieve economic benefit in the accumulation, sale and use of slaves."[36]

Warfare and Sociocultural Attributes

The Sokoto Caliphate was a conquest state established by an ethnic minority that quickly transformed itself into a ruling elite. Although the original *jihad* had been conceived in a spirit of revolutionary egalitarianism and drew its support from a socially diverse population, its leadership was predominantly Fulani. It was this Fulani leadership that constituted itself as the ruling class of the emirates and justified that rule by virtue of conquest legitimized by Islam.[37] This ruling elite reserved to itself and its clients the wealth-producing military functions, which in turn reinforced the new system of social stratification. In this respect the Sokoto Cali-

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phate was a classic conquest state in that a small ruling stratum preempted critical military functions and drew from the subject population the requisite but inferior infantry forces.[38]

The ethnic differentiation between ruler and ruled in the Sokoto Caliphate reinforced the traditional stratification system of pre-*jihad* Hausa society. Basically, this society consisted of two broadly but sharply defined political and social strata, one clearly subordinate to the other. The upper stratum consisted of chiefs (*sarakuna*) and officeholders (*masu sarauta*) who enjoyed high status by virtue of their authority; in the lower strata were the subjects or commoners (*talakawa*). After the *jihad* the basic categories of rulers and ruled remained intact, but the differentiating criteria were reformulated to reflect the new social composition of the ruling stratum. In addition to the explicit cultivation of Islamic legitimacy, the Fulani conquerors restated the traditional principle of stratification in ethnic terms: rulership was identified with the Fulani, and the term *Habe* was employed to denote their non-Fulani Hausa-speaking Muslim subjects. During the course of the nineteenth century the entire structure of government in many areas, down to the village level, was penetrated by Fulani functionaries.[39] So thorough was this displacement of Hausa and absorption of Fulani into officialdom that rulership came to be identical with being Fulani regardless of the actual origin of the incumbent.[40]

However, this relatively rigid system of political and ethnic stratification was not inconsistent with a high degree of sociocultural integration in these emirates. If such integration can be measured in terms of social interaction, functional interdependence, and value congruence,[41] Hausa-Fulani society became increasingly integrated during the nineteenth century. Historically Hausa society has exhibited a remarkable capacity to incorporate and assimilate new members. It was through the institution of slavery more than any other single institution that this process was mediated, and it was in this regard that warfare and military organization contributed most to sociocultural integration.

As we noted in the previous section, institutionalized warfare was the principal means of recruiting captives to satisfy the demands of domestic slavery and the slave trade. Enslaved captives, and especially their offspring, were assimilated into Hausa society and culture through intermarriage, conversion to Islam, the adoption of the Hausa language, and participation in other agencies of socialization. As Smith concluded, "the function of slavery in Hausa society was "integrative, and it operated as a channel of acculturation."[42]

Military service in particular was an agency of socialization, integration, and mobility for slaves. First, the recruitment of slave troops and the employment of slaves in war-related industries facilitated the transmission of social, cultural, and technical skills to ethnic minorities and hastened

their ultimate incorporation as Hausa. Secondly, frequent warfare conducted under the banner of Islam served to revitalize the norms and values of Muslim Hausa society. The annual *jihad* evoked a common Muslim identity and unity of purpose that minimized differences in ethnic origin among warriors while conversely deflecting hostility toward non-Muslim enemies. The religious solidarity exhibited on these occasions between rulers and ruled, between Fulani, Hausa, and the enslaved ethnic minorities in the process of incorporation, enhanced their integration and mitigated the overtones of Fulani domination. In this way, warfare may have been an institution for the resolution of social and ethnic tensions. Finally, military service provided an important channel of upward social mobility for slaves. The martial ability of warriors, both slave and free, was rewarded with prestige, booty, and in some cases titled office as well. Many slave warriors were able to acquire considerable property of their own and advance to the highest ranks of officialdom. Indeed, Nadel's claim that war was "the paramount factor of promotion and inter-class mobility" in Nupe may well apply to the other emirates as well.[43]

If warfare served to integrate the conquered population into the dominant Hausa sociocultural system, so also did it integrate the Fulani ruling class itself. The Fulani conquerors, by virtue of their permanent settlement in towns and intermarriage with Hausa women, became acculturated to urban Hausa society. As we have seen, considerations of military security also prompted Caliph Bello to induce the sedentarization of Fulani pastoralists which entailed their adoption of Islam and integration into Hausa society. In language, culture, and patterns of social organization, the Fulani elite became increasingly indistinguishable from the conquered Hausa majority, until little more than an image of Fulani separateness and superiority remained. Yet this image, assiduously cultivated by the rulers and widely accepted by their subjects, was essential to the maintenance of Fulani hegemony.

While warfare and army organization performed important sociocultural functions in these emirates, social structure and cultural attitudes also governed military conventions. We have already observed in Chapter 5 the correspondence between types of wars and the social definition of the enemy, as well as the influence of Islam on various military institutions and practices. Here we wish merely to point out the relationship between the social structure of the army and certain attitudes toward the conduct of war.

The peculiar attitudes in question had to do with the Sudanic conception of war as a manly art to be performed in close combat with spear and sword, that is, short-range and personal contact weapons. These attitudes were part of the sociocultural complex surrounding the use of horse cavalry. Among the aristocratic cavalrymen there was, as in medieval

Europe, a "stigma which attached to missile weapons as a class."[44] This prejudice against projectile weapons may explain why the bow and arrow, used so effectively by such famous mounted archers as the Mamluks and the American Plains Indians, never became an acceptable weapon for Hausa cavalry. The bow and arrow was associated with the slaves, peasant volunteers, and conscripts that formed the infantry forces, and was also the principal weapon of pagan tribes. The cavalry, on the other hand, was the elite corps of the army, differentiated from the infantry by its selective recruitment, armaments, and ethos. In other words, a distinction was maintained between those who fought on horseback with "manly" weapons in close combat and those who fought on foot with missile weapons. Personal combat was the only "proper" way to engage an enemy. These attitudes are expressed also in Hausa proverbs that exalt face-to-face martial contests.[45]

Moreover, this social bias against the use of missile weapons extended to firearms as well. If the privileged cavalry did not adopt the bow and arrow because it violated the conventions of manly warfare, so also did the horsemen regard firearms with a haughty disdain. Like the bow and arrow, the gun was an undignified weapon; hence the widespread practice of reserving the use of firearms for slave warriors. While the traditional cavalry weapons were suited for personal combat, the gun was a treacherous, dishonorable, and contemptible instrument of death that depersonalized warfare by killing at a distance. The attitude of the mounted Hausa-Fulani aristocracy toward the use of firearms was probably the same as that expressed by the old Tuareg chief who complained to Barth that Europeans were "dreadful barbarians for slaughtering without pity such numbers of people in their battles, using big guns instead of spears and swords, which were . . . the only manly and becoming weapons."[46]

Warfare, Demography, and Ecological Organization

Warfare, in the form of both slave raiding and interstate conflict, was endemic in the Sudan for centuries. The predominant mode of warfare was based on the use of light cavalry, whose mobility, striking range, and capacity for widespread destruction produced a condition of perpetual insecurity in the savanna. The territorial distribution of population, therefore, assumed a pattern of relatively isolated clusters within which human settlements were organized to achieve maximum security. On the one hand, slave raids depopulated large areas of the Sudan and forced the regrouping of many pagan tribes in rugged hilly country which afforded refuge from the depredations of mounted Muslim armies. On the other hand, in areas under Muslim control, the requirement for security from the ravages of interstate warfare, and from occasional plundering and

enslavement by capricious rulers, was satisfied by the concentration of population in walled settlements.

During the nineteenth century the perennial wars of conquest, consolidation, and defense occasioned by the *jihad* intensified this process of population redistribution. In general this process entailed the development of a distinctive ecological pattern in which the relationship between human population and its environment was determined largely by the incidence of war. This dual process – the depopulation of outlying areas and the concentration of population in secure clusters – produced a demographic pattern of overlaid ethnic and religious boundaries: the peripheral "bush" areas were inhabited by a variety of small pagan tribes, while the central walled towns and settlements were occupied predominantly by Muslim Hausa-Fulani.

Demographic and ecological change in the Sokoto Caliphate is a subject worthy of extensive study in itself, but so far has attracted little interest among scholars.[47] Certainly warfare was only one of many variables affecting patterns of Sudanic population and ecology, but the scope, intensity, and frequency of war provide some measure of justification for attributing to it a considerable role in demographic and ecological change. In this brief section we can do no more than cite several discrete instances of such changes attributable directly to the incidence of war.

Nineteenth-century sources as well as contemporary studies contain frequent if sporadic references to the widespread insecurity that existed in and around the Sokoto Caliphate. The well-known slave raiding by the southern emirates of Kontagora, Nupe, Zaria, Gombe, Bauchi, Muri, and Adamawa depopulated wide tracts of territory, especially in the northern Benue valley. The Bassa Komo people, for example, were forced to flee across the Benue by Nupe raiders,[48] who also depopulated Kabba country and drove its inhabitants into hilly refuges.[49] During the *jihad* in Nupe many previously independent villages amalgamated to form single walled settlements.[50] Even the districts near the dual capitals of the caliphate, Sokoto and Gwandu, had been subjected to such intensive depredations by the Kebbawa in the late nineteenth century that the settled areas were reduced to small perimeters around strongly fortified towns.[51] This dual demographic pattern is best seen in Zaria, which is noted for both its sparse population and the largest number of walled settlements in Nigeria.[52]

While endemic warfare resulted in the concentration of population in relatively secure areas, pacification by the British reversed this process. In Nupe, fortified settlements were depopulated as people moved outside their walls to take up farming under the security of British rule.[53] In Zaria also, within a few years after the British occupation, it was reported that people were "showing an increased tendency to leave the walled towns and live permanently on their farms."[54] The British residents in

Muri likewise noted in 1906 that "the general tendency at present is emigration from the towns on to the land, owing to increased security."[55] In the Sokoto/Gwandu area seventy-four new villages were built and occupied within three years of the British conquest.[56] Throughout the peripheral pagan enclaves, many people abandoned their hilltop refuges and moved down onto the fertile plains.[57] The cessation of Maradi raids was partly responsible for the movement of some twenty thousand people from the western part of Kano into southern Katsina in the year 1907 alone.[58] New settlements also sprang up in the uninhabited zone between Katsina and Zamfara, "which formerly screened the Maradi and Gobir robbers," and in Katagum and southeastern Kano, where the Ningi bush was slowly being brought under cultivation.[59]

In summary, then, the demographic and ecological pattern of the Hausa states and the Sokoto Caliphate was determined largely by the incidence of war. Although warfare was endemic before the nineteenth century, the establishment of the caliphate intensified the processes of depopulation and repopulation and the hardening of ethnic and religious boundaries. The net effect of war and slave raids was to depopulate wide areas of outlying districts and to increase the density of population in and around walled settlements. Outlying frontiers became sparsely inhabited buffer zones, used by armies raiding to and fro. Pagan tribes were forced by relentless military pressure to seek refuge in inaccessible terrain far from the urbanized areas under Muslim control.

Warfare was the principal instrument employed by these Muslim emirates for territorial aggrandizement. The expansion of the secure Muslim core areas by perennial warfare was accompanied by the resettlement of enslaved war captives in the newly conquered lands. The proliferation of slave farms, discussed earlier in this chapter, was the means of organizing new lands under Muslim control. Territorial expansion, therefore, was followed by a system of territorial organization based on slave colonization and intensive plantation agriculture. The settlement and cultivation of new land depended on the exploitation of the outlying slave reservoirs. While the peripheral regions were depopulated and depleted of resources, central Muslim territory was progressively enlarged, repopulated, and developed. The two processes were inextricable. Indeed, the premier function of war in the Sokoto Caliphate was distributive, effecting the transfer of population from marginal to productive areas, and the incorporation of heterogeneous minority groups into the dominant Hausa culture and society.

Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate:
Summary and Conclusions

The historical and sociological significance of warfare and its appurtenant institutions in the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate has generally been overlooked or underestimated. In part, this neglect is attributable to the conventional preoccupation of historians with political history, which relegates military factors to the background. Additionally, historians of Muslim polities in Africa have often been engrossed in the study of their distinctive Islamic institutions. These and other preoccupations, although understandable and defensible in themselves, have obscured the possibilities for research in African military history.

In this study we have examined certain aspects of the military history of the emirates that comprised the Sokoto Caliphate in the nineteenth century. In particular, our central concern has been the elucidation of the two important revolutions in warfare, military technology, and army organization. The first revolution, the development of a military organization and tactical methods based on the extensive use of light cavalry, took place during the *jihad*, as mounted combat with swords and lances eclipsed the earlier technique of long-range fighting with missile weapons (bow and arrow) by infantry forces. By the middle of the century the emirates established during the *jihad* had evolved an elaborate feudal military complex of considerable offensive and defensive potential. On the one hand, this military system included a mobile offensive organization composed of specialized cavalry and infantry forces. The emirs retained only a small permanent force at the capital and relied on mass mobilization of territorial reserves to constitute a field army. Combat units were equipped with a remarkable assortment of armaments and armor, and were capable of executing rudimentary tactical maneuvers in battle. On the other hand, there existed an advanced static defense organization based on the dual system of imposing central citadels and a security perimeter of fortified frontier strongholds. After about 1860 a second revolution in the technology, organization, and techniques of warfare began to occur with the increasing use of firearms, the formation of slave musketeer corps, and the development of regular standing armies. However, from the start this incipient revolution was inhibited by the generally inferior quality and limited supply of muskets and the unavailability of modern firearms, and was ultimately aborted by the British conquest of the caliphate.

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Military organization and the perennial conduct of war itself were important factors affecting the political, economic, and social structure of these Sudanic states. Structural changes in military organization were accompanied by concomitant changes in political organization; and increasing centralization and bureaucratization were the most notable tendencies in the politico-military development of the emirates. The institutionalization of warfare to satisfy political, economic, and religious imperatives had profound consequences for every aspect of Sudanic society. The incidence of war influenced to a considerable extent the demographic structure and spatial distribution of population; the allocation and exploitation of human, natural, and material resources; the location and architectural construction of settlements; the organization and production of the craft industries; patterns of social stratification, integration, and mobility; the political legitimacy and hegemony of the Fulani ruling class; and the production of wealth in the form of booty, especially slaves whose manifold functions were essential to the economic system of these states. The conditions and requirements of endemic warfare were met by the mass mobilization of the population. During the dry season in particular, when thousands of men were engaged in the repair of fortifications, the production of war matériel, and actual military operations, a combatant posture was the "structural pose" of Hausa-Fulani society.[1]

Perhaps even more than the classical Sudanic empires, the character of the Sokoto Caliphate was shaped by cavalry warfare and the associated feudal institutions of vassalage and fief holding. By preempting crucial political and military functions, the feudal ruling class effectively secured its dominance over the conquered population. This militarization of officialdom, that is, the assumption by the Fulani ruling class of the obligations and privileges of war, reinforced its exclusivity and provided permanent justification of its domination. Moreover, the employment of cavalry placed a premium on raiding for booty and slaves rather than on wars of attrition and annihilation. War was a conservative economic enterprise, with its peculiar forms of investment, risk, and profits or losses. Officialdom accumulated and invested its wealth in the institutions of slavery, clientship, cavalry, and war, and expected handsome returns on its capital outlay. In short, the political economy of these emirates was organized around and dependent upon the fortunes of war. The functional interdependence of cavalry, war, wealth, and political dominance constituted a veritable "military-industrial complex."

During the nineteenth century there was a discernable and increasing tendency toward militarism in the Sokoto Caliphate. For our purposes militarism can be defined as "the compound of militancy, preponderance of the army in the state, adulation of military virtues, and militarization."[2] While the values of these four variables of the "compound" fluctuated throughout the century, an examination of each will reveal that there was an upward composite trend in militaristic attributes and behavior.

Militancy, or combativeness, can be assigned a quantitative definition as the frequency with which a given state has been engaged in warfare over time. Unfortunately, in the case of the Sokoto Caliphate it is not possible to calculate the exact number of wars fought during the last century. Slave raids and offensive or defensive military actions were conducted by each emirate on its own initiative, and usually occurred annually. For Sokoto itself, however, the number of major expeditions undertaken by the caliphs is known and will serve as an illustration of the incidence of war.[3] (See Table 4.)

This pattern is revealing. During the reigns of the first four caliphs, a total of fifty years, there were eighty major expeditions, or an average of 1.6 per year. On the other hand, there were only fifteen major campaigns conducted during the thirty-six-year combined reigns of the last six caliphs, or an average of about 0.4 per year. In other words, the early caliphs waged war about four times more frequently than the later ones, reflecting perhaps a process of continuous conquest and consolidation during the earlier period and increased security and stability during the second half of the century. However, this general downward trend subsumes an overall distribution of 95 expeditions in 86 years, or an average of 1.1 per year. Moreover, it must be emphasized that we have enumerated *only major offensive campaigns*. If the number of raids, minor expeditions, and various forms of defensive military actions were known and included in this distribution, the militancy "score" of Sokoto would necessarily be higher. In general, it is probably a reasonable and perhaps even conservative estimate that there occurred an average of one major military operation per emirate per year. Such a record of intensive and frequent warfare can be matched by few states, and the emirates of the caliphate must be ranked among the most militant states in history. Indeed, warfare may have been the "primary institutionalized pattern" of Hausa-Fulani culture.[4]

Table 4. *Distribution of the caliphs' military campaigns by reign*

Caliph	No. of campaigns	Average per year
Muhammadu Bello (1817–37)	47	2.3
Abubakar Atiku (1837–42)	6	1.0
Aliyu Babba (1842–59)	20	1.2
Ahmadu Zaruku (1859–66)	7	1.0
Aliyu Karami (1866)	0	—
Ahmadu Rufa'i (1867–73)	0	—
Abubakar (1873–77)	3	.75
Mu'azu (1877–81)	4 (?)	1.0
Umaru (1881–91)	3	.3
Abdur Rahman (1891–1902)	5	.5
Total (1817–1902)	95	1.1

While it is not possible to be as precise in measuring the second variable, the preponderance of the military in the state, some general observations are appropriate. First of all, the preemption of military functions by aristocratic officialdom created in effect a permanently militarized polity, a state dominated by a feudal warrior class. Moreover, as related in Chapters 8 and 9, there were prominent cultural and institutional tendencies that led the military to assume independent political power, to influence and decide the succession of emirs and caliphs, and to appropriate rulership by force. This predominance of the military was in part a function of changing technology and army organization. As the complexity of armaments and military organization increased with the successive transformations of the infantry-based raiding citizen army, to the cavalry-based palace army, and finally to the gun-equipped infantry of the standing army, the ability of the military to assume a commanding position in domestic politics was enhanced. By virtue of their control of the instruments of force, military commanders were able to overawe their rivals, manipulate the functions of government, and occasionally to seize the throne itself. These tendencies became particularly pronounced after the introduction of firearms.

Third, the exaltation of military virtues in the Sokoto Caliphate also increased during the nineteenth century. During the *jihad* period, and perhaps in Sokoto itself throughout the century, the cherished values were scholarship and devotion to Islam. As Last has written,

Ideally those who thought only of fighting were not complete members of the Community. The characters of the Shaikh and Bello were the models; and in the early histories, such as those written by the Viziers, the virtues stressed are learning and piety.[5]

But with the passage of time the egalitarian, pious, and millenarian spirit of the original *jihad* gave way to increasing autocracy in the emirates. Many uncanonical and exploitive practices of the eighteenth-century Hausa kingdoms, which the Shehu had condemned, reappeared among the emirates in various forms. The ideals of the *jihad* were submerged beneath the increasingly secularized and autocratic government of the emirates. Martial virtues and abilities were extolled and naked displays of violence became commonplace, while the moderating virtues of Islam were progressively disregarded.[6]

Finally, in addition to the tendencies toward militancy, the predominance of the military in the state, and the glorification of martial virtues, there was a significant level of militarization in the emirates of the caliphate. In contrast to militarism and militancy, militarization refers to a condition of extensive military control over social institutions and organization. A militarized polity therefore is one in which values and resources are distributed in favor of the army and its interests. In the emirates of the caliphate we have observed that warfare was a multifunctional insti-

tution that affected to a remarkable extent the entire sociocultural complex of these states. In particular, armies and their commanders controlled the means to operate the "war complex" to their own advantage.

The militarism exhibited by the emirates of the caliphate was related closely to the two revolutions in military technology, army organization, and state structure that have been the central subjects of this study. During the period of the palace army and the feudal state associated with the predominance of cavalry, there existed certain cultural and institutional constraints on the waging of war, the political role of the military, and the exercise of political power itself. As we observed in Chapter 5, warfare displayed conservative characteristics attributable to its preindustrial technology, the superiority of the means of defense over the means of attack, the feudal mode of military organization, the economic value in seizing booty and live captives, and the cultural homogeneity of the Central Sudan. Moreover, the socially and functionally integrated official elite, at once a ruling class and warrior aristocracy, reserved for itself control of the principal instruments of force, thereby securing its collective dominance against military usurpation by other social elements. And for its part, the decentralized political system of the feudal state was also subject to inherent limitations on its ability to cajole, control, and coerce the population.

On the other hand, after about 1860 the large-scale introduction of firearms and the emergence of standing armies and centralized bureaucratic states began to erode some of the cultural and institutional inhibitions that prevailed in the earlier period. The devaluation of cavalry undermined the aristocratic horsemen's concept of a warrior brotherhood that for centuries had served to restrain their hostilities. The growing reliance on slave musketeers and regular armies commanded by slave officers increased the autonomy of the military, its estrangement from society at large, and its potential for oppression. Warfare could be conducted with fewer cultural restraints on the treatment of both enemies and the subject population. The institutionalized "civil control" of the military in the palace army was also destabilized by the development of standing armies, slave musketeer forces, and a slave military officialdom, all of which encouraged instead military intervention and even praetorianism. The bureaucratization of state structure was accompanied by tendencies toward centralization, royal autocracy, military coups, and increasing exploitation of the subject population. Standing armies and slave gunmen were employed to repress and inflict violence on political enemies, and to terrorize the population.[7]

In the previous chapter it was argued that, in general, warfare and military organization functioned as institutions of integration in the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. War was the principal instrument to expand the frontiers of *dar al-Islam* and to procure the captives who were resettled in

the newly conquered territory and gradually assimilated in Muslim Hausa society. This process of expansion, consolidation, acculturation, and integration appears to have been continuous during the greater part of the nineteenth century. Toward the end of the century, however, this trend toward integration exhibited signs of saturation and even reversal in several emirates. In Zaria, for example, the gunmen of Emir Yero (1888–97) conducted a reign of terror, despoiling the property of his political rivals, collecting taxation by force, and otherwise extorting and overawing the populace.[8] In Nupe also the incidence of civil violence became severe when Emir Abubakar (1895–7) found the state so depleted of taxable resources that he began raiding his own subjects to obtain the slaves so necessary to the political economy of the emirate.[9] At the same time the reign of Emir Aliyu (1894–1903) in Kano was characterized by the brutalization of political life. Aliyu disarmed his rivals, imposed a death penalty for the theft of military equipment, and ruled the state in an exacting and ruthless fashion.[10] A similar style of government was practiced in Katsina by Emir Abubakar (1877–1905), whose intensified wars and slave raids wreaked terror and insecurity upon the rural peasantry. Like Yero at Zaria, Abubakar dispatched his special armed slave force to intimidate his political enemies and confiscate the property of his subjects.[11] This widespread eruption of civil violence and the wanton enslavement of the subject population served only to break down the traditional distinction between the protected inhabitants of the state proper and the raidable denizens of the outlying slave preserves.

Thus at the end of the nineteenth century several emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate were experiencing violent internal disturbances wrought by arbitrary royal command. Whether these extreme outbreaks were simply coincidental occurrences rather than systemic reactions to changing conditions, or whether such violence was characteristic only of the late nineteenth century, is uncertain. Depending on one's point of view, this incidence of civil disorder can either be explained away or adduced as evidence in support of certain hypotheses. Without prejudice to alternative interpretations, but consistent with the functional and systemic approach to war adopted in this study, it can be suggested that economic conditions were paramount in bringing on this widespread internal violence. During the second half of the nineteenth century the economy of the caliphate suffered from severe inflation which devalued cowries as currency and increased the demand for slaves as an alternate medium of exchange. The trans-Saharan trade also declined in volume and value after mid-century, and in the 1890s entered a depression from which it never recovered. Faced with declining revenues, successive emirs raised tax rates and introduced new forms of taxation, but the marginal revenue was insufficient to offset inflation. Finally, in the late 1880s a rinderpest epidemic destroyed a considerable portion of the livestock in the Central

Sudan. This natural calamity intensified the already depressed economy, reduced many wealthy stock breeders to a state of poverty, and increased rural insecurity.

It is perhaps in this context of general economic depression that the disintegration of civil order in several emirates may best be explained.[12] In these states political economy depended on the continuous recruitment of slaves, whose value increased during the nineteenth century. But by the end of the century the slave reservoirs may have been depleted, or their population pushed into such inaccessible areas that raiding was unprofitable under existing economic conditions. As the demand for slaves increased and the traditional means of procuring them proved inadequate, the emirs were forced to turn upon their own subjects and reduce them to slavery. This incidence of exploitation and oppression was exacerbated by the new forms of military organization and technology at the disposal of the emerging bureaucratic states.

If this conjectural interpretation has some measure of validity, the increasing level of civil violence in the Sokoto Caliphate at the turn of this century may have been symptomatic of a fundamental systemic transformation. If indeed slave raiding was becoming unprofitable, the institution of slavery itself and the socioeconomic structure of the emirates may have been subjected to severe internal strains. New institutions and new forms of wealth would have been required to adapt to these strains, and in this connection the enslavement of the subject population assumes increased importance for our argument. Such oppression may have been but a transient manifestation of system stress; on the other hand, the continued resort to violence would have hastened the disintegration of the system itself. The basic questions of whether fundamental systemic transformation was occurring, and if so, whether this system of political economy exhibited symptoms of adaptation or maladjustment, remain unanswered. We have merely explored some of their implications.[13]

The prevailing view among contemporary historians of the Sokoto Caliphate attributes overriding significance to its Islamic character. Perhaps the most articulate exponent of this view is D. M. Last, whose important study, *The Sokoto Caliphate*, minimized the martial qualities of Sokoto in favor of its Islamic legal and moral attributes. Specifically, Dr Last argued that "the qualities valued in Sokoto were not military," and that "prowess in fighting was of low prestige."[14] Statements such as these appear at first difficult to reconcile with the arguments advanced in this book. However, the major differences in emphasis and interpretation relate chiefly to differences in respective research strategies rather than to disagreements on identical issues. Dr Last was concerned only with Sokoto itself and formulated his conclusions principally on the basis of official sources, both written and oral, available to him there. Therefore, Last may have exaggerated the extent to which the official ideology and

professed values in Sokoto served as an adequate description of actual behavior; but more importantly, his interest in the Islamic character of Sokoto naturally excluded from his research other attributes that would appear salient to a different research design. The orientation of this study, on the other hand, has been extensive rather than intensive, surveying not only Sokoto but its constituent emirates as well. Moreover, the central focus of our inquiry has been the historical development and sociological implications of warfare. Without denying or underestimating the influence of Islam, we have attempted to demonstate that war was a multi-functional institution that affected significantly the entire sociocultural system of these Sudanic states. As Last insists, clearly there was a sense in which the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate constituted a "Community"; but they were also predatory states organized for war.

Notes

Chapter 1

1 D. J. Stenning, "Transhumance, migratory drift, migration: Patterns of pastoral Fulani nomadism," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (1957), reprinted in Simon and Phoebe Ottenberg, eds., *Cultures and Societies of Africa* (New York, 1960), pp. 139–59.

2 See J. D. Clark, *The Prehistory of Africa* (New York, 1970), chaps. V and VI, pp. 148–223. Much of the remainder of this chapter is based on J. P. Smaldone, "Military organization, warfare, and Sudanic state structure: Some sociological aspects of technological change," paper presented at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Philadelphia, 10 November 1972.

3 H. Epstein, *The Origins of the Domestic Animals of Africa*, 2 vols. (New York, 1971).

4 See M. Davie, *The Evolution of War* (New Haven, Conn., 1929); H. H. Turney-High, *Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts* (Columbia, S.C., 1949); Q. Wright, *A Study of War*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1965); A. Vayda, "Primitive warfare," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1968), vol. 16, pp. 468–72; K. F. Otterbein, *The Evolution of War: A Cross-Cultural Study* (New Haven, Conn., 1970).

5 The first clear evidence for the presence of the bow occurs in a northern European site dated to the ninth millennium B.C. In sub-Saharan Africa the use of the bow was widespread by the sixth millennium, and poisoned arrows may have been in use as early as the third millennium: Clark, *Preshistory of Africa*, p. 157.

6 H. Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, 3rd ed., rev. and enl., 2 vols. (New York, 1892), II, 473.

7 R. C. C. Law, "The Garamantes and trans-Saharan enterprise in classical times," *JAH*, VIII, 2 (1967), 181–200.

8 See the papers by P. L. Shinnie, R. Mauny, and F. Willett in Shinnie, ed., *The African Iron Age* (Oxford, 1971).

9 This section on horses and camels, admittedly tentative, is based largely on Epstein, *Origins of the Domestic Animals of Africa*. The introduction of horses is particularly problematic. Cf. also G. Doutressoulle, *L'Élevage en Afrique Occidentale Française* (Paris, 1947), pp. 237–62; D. F. McCall, "The horse in West African history," paper presented at the International Congress of Africanists, Dakar, 1967; and H. J. Fisher, " 'He swalloweth the ground with fierceness and rage': The horse in the Central Sudan – I. Its introduction," *JAH*, XIII, 3 (1972), 369–88.

10 A third, smaller type, generically "ponies," is today widely distributed throughout the southern Sudanic latitudes. Authorities differ on the question of its origin and use. McCall, "The horse in West African history," pp. 17–20, and Fisher, "The horse in the Central Sudan," pp. 373–8, argue that ponies are

descendants of small chariot-pulling horses that appeared in the Sahara c. 1000 B.C. R. Mauny also holds that ponies are a distinctive ancient breed that was gradually displaced southward by the later importation of North African Barbs: *Tableau Géographique de l'Ouest Africain au Moyen Age*, Mémoires de l'Institut Français d'Afrique Noire, 61 (Dakar, 1961), 284. Epstein, on the other hand, contends that ponies are descendants of larger types of horses that degenerated in the tropical savanna: *Origins of the Domestic Animals*, pp. 463–74.

11 Although McCall and Epstein agree that the Barb spread southward across the western Sahara, McCall argues that the horses depicted on the central Saharan rock paintings were Dongola: "The horse in West African history," pp. 15–16.

12 These dates are conventional and approximate. McCall suggests the intriguing possibility of Sudanic states in the first millennium B.C.: "The horse in West African history," pp. 17–20.

13 D. F. McCall, "Islamization of the Western and Central Sudan in the eleventh century," in McCall and N. R. Bennett, eds., *Aspects of West African Islam*, Boston University Papers on Africa, V (Boston, 1971), 1–30. These states are Tekrur, Ghana, Kangaba, Mali, Gao, and Kanem.

14 See Chapters 4 and 5, for the Islamic influences on nineteenth-century warfare.

15 R. Oliver and J. D. Fage, *A Short History of Africa*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, 1966), p. 51. See also the analyses of Sudanic state structure in Fage, *An Introduction to the History of West Africa*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 16–17; R. O. Collins, ed., *African History: Text and Readings* (New York, 1971), pp. 6–10; J. Maquet, *Civilizations of Black Africa*, trans. and rev. Joan Rayfield (New York, 1972), pp. 151–3; and K. S. Carlston, *Social Theory and African Tribal Organization* (Urbana, Ill., 1968), especially chap. 6. The best historical treatments of the early Sudanic states are N. Levtzion, "The early states of the Western Sudan to 1500," and A. Smith, "The early states of the Central Sudan," in J. F. A. Ajayi and M. Crowder, eds., *History of West Africa*, 2 vols. (London, 1971), I, 120–57 and 158–201, respectively.

16 On the use of the term *feudal* see Chapter 8, pp. 129–32 and n. 7.

17 Abu Ubayd al-Bakri, *Description de l'Afrique Septentrionale*, trans. MacGuckin de Slane (Alger, 1913; Paris, 1965), p. 332.

18 Ibid., p. 314.

19 Ibn Fadl Allah al-Umari, *L'Afrique, moins l'Egypte*, trans. M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes (Paris, 1927), pp. 61, 67.

20 Similar exaggerations occur in the case of Kanem-Bornu. Mai Dunama ibn Hume (c. 1098–1150) was reported to have had 100,000 horses and 120,000 soldiers at his disposal: "Diwan of the sultans of Bornu," in H. R. Palmer, ed. and trans., *History of the First Twelve Years of the Reign of Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu* (1571–1583) (Lagos, 1926), p. 85. An unpublished manuscript cited by A. Smith also mentions 100,000 horses of Mai Dunama Dibbalemi in the mid-thirteenth century: "The early states of the Central Sudan," p. 173. In another work Palmer cites al-Maqrizi's early fifteenth-century report that the *mai* of Bornu commanded an army of 100,000 cavalry and infantry: Introduction to *Sudanese Memoirs*, 3 vols. (Lagos, 1928), II, 6.

21 Mahmud al-Kati, *Tarikh el-Fettach*, trans. O. Houdas and M. Delafosse (Paris, 1913), p. 264. The author states that these figures were given to him by a reputable person who heard them from veterans of the battle. N. Levtzion argues convincingly that *Tarikh el-Fettach* was written by Ibn al-Mukhtar, not by al-Kati as commonly believed: "A seventeenth century chronicle by Ibn al-Mukhtar: A critical review of Ta'rikh al-Fattāsh," *BSOAS* (1971).

22 Abd al-Rahman al-Sadi, *Tarikh es-Soudan*, trans. O. Houdas (Paris, 1898; 1964), p. 219.

23 Ibid., p. 178. Askiya Daud (1549–82) is here reported to have had two Tuareg allies who provided him with 12,000 camel cavalry each.

24 This expression, "means of destruction," is borrowed from J. Goody, *Technology, Tradition, and the State in Africa* (London, 1971). The availability of horses was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the use of cavalry. Equally important was the panoply of horse trappings and weapons required to transform this domestic animal into an instrument of war. Goody's exaggerated emphasis on horses per se is corrected by H. J. Fisher, " 'He swalloweth the ground with fierceness and rage': The horse in the Central Sudan – II. Its use," *JAH*, XIV, 3 (1973), 355–79. Robin Law has argued more recently that this combination of horses with the technology of war did not occur until about the fourteenth century, only then revolutionizing Sudanic warfare: "Horses, firearms, and political power in pre-colonial West Africa," paper presented at the African History Seminar, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 5 December 1973. I am grateful to Dr Law for permission to cite this fine paper.

25 Kaniaga was reputed to have an impressive battle array of 2,000 troops in line plus cavalry: al-Kati (Ibn al-Mukhtar), *Tarikh el-Fettach*, pp. 70, 71.

26 Al-Maqrizi, quoted by Palmer, "Introduction" to *Sudanese Memoirs*, II, 6.

27 On the horse trade in the early Sudanic empires, see Mauny, *Tableau Géographique*, pp. 283–6, 361, 368–9, 422–4.

28 Alvise da Ca'da Mosto, *The Voyages of Cadamosto*, trans. and ed. G. R. Crone, Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, vol. 80 (London, 1937), p. 49.

29 Mauny, *Tableau Géographique*, pp. 285–6. The exchange rate in the Portuguese trade was about the same as that reported earlier for northern imports, that is, nine to fifteen slaves per horse. In general, Mauny estimates that the value of horses in the early Sudanic empires was ten to twenty slaves, pp. 422–4.

30 Leo Africanus, *The History and Description of Africa*, trans. J. Pory (1600), ed. R. Brown, Hakluyt Society, 3 vols. (London, 1896), III, 825, 833–4. Leo's comments here refer to Songhai and Bornu.

31 J. D. Fage, "Slavery and the slave trade in the context of West African history," *JAH*, X, 3 (1969), 400. For a sharp critique of this view, see C. C. Wrigley, "Historicism in Africa: Slavery and state formation," *African Affairs*, LXX, 279 (1971), 113–24. The multifunctional institution of slavery is discussed briefly in Chapter 9, pp. 147–9.

32 Leo Africanus, *History and Description of Africa*, III, 833–4. The *damel* of Cayor made slave raids for the same purpose: Mauny, *Tableau Géographique*, p. 285 (citing Valentim Fernandes, a Portuguese contemporary of Leo).

33 The seven original states, the *Hausa Bakwai*, were Daura, Kano, Rano, Katsina, Zazzau, Gobir, and Garun Gabas. Actually, Garun Gabas was supposedly founded by a scion of the prince's union with a daughter of the *mai* of Bornu. See W. K. R. Hallam, "The Bayajida legend in Hausa folklore," *JAH*, VII, 1 (1966), 47–60.

34 Abdullahi Smith, "Some considerations relating to the formation of states in Hausaland, *JHSN*, V, 3 (1970), 329–46, and "The early states of the Central Sudan." Smith suggests that this process of state formation occurred during the first few centuries A.D., varying from place to place.

35 As defined here, the Central Sudan refers to the savanna zone between the Niger bend and the eastern Chad basin. On these formative centuries in Hausa

history, see M. G. Smith, "The beginnings of Hausa society, A.D. 1000–1500," in J. Vansina, R. Mauny, and L. V. Thomas, eds., *The Historian in Tropical Africa* (London, 1964), pp. 339–57.

36 Unless otherwise noted, the following account of politico-military developments in Kano is based on the *Kano Chronicle*, in H. R. Palmer, trans., *Sudanese Memoirs*, III, 101 ff. See also the excellent synthesis by R. A. Adeleye, "Hausaland and Bornu 1600–1800," in Ajayi and Crowder, eds., *History of West Africa*, I, 485–530.

37 Several authorities cite Bornu as the source of horses, and linguistic evidence suggests that saddles also are of Kanuri origin: J. H. Greenberg, "Linguistic evidence for the influence of the Kanuri on the Hausa," *JAH*, I, 2 (1960), 211.

38 The origin of brick-walled fortifications in the Western Sudan is a major historical problem. Standard texts credit al-Sahili with the introduction of burnt-brick architecture in Mali under the patronage of Mansa Musa (1312–37). In Hausaland, widespread wall building is traditionally associated with the far-reaching conquests of Queen Amina of Zazzau, whose reign is variously dated to the early fifteenth or sixteenth century. Some scholars have suggested that wall building may have been introduced to Hausaland from Mali along with Islam in the fourteenth century. We noted earlier, however, that A. Smith prefers to date the appearance of walled settlements to the early first millennium. On the other hand, A. D. H. Bivar and P. L. Shinnie suggest that baked brick architecture may have reached Hausaland from the Nile valley (Dongola?) via Kanem-Bornu by the fourteenth century, but admit that a date a millennium earlier is possible: "Old Kanuri capitals," *JAH*, III, 1 (1962), 1–10.

39 These items were obviously obtained from North Africa, perhaps Mamluk Egypt in particular. Some of this gear may have been taken as booty during the Crusades; however, since European chain mail began to become obsolete in the thirteenth century as it was supplanted by plate armor, it may have been surplus military equipment sold as regular trade items. See A. D. H. Bivar, *Nigerian Panoply: Arms and Armour of the Northern Region* (Apapa, 1964), a short but incisive study of weapons and their provenance.

40 Leo Africanus, *History and Description of Africa*, III, 830.

41 Palmer, *Kano Chronicle*, in *Sudanese Memoirs*, III, 125.

42 See J. O. Hunwick, "Songhai, Bornu and Hausaland in the sixteenth century," in Ajayi and Crowder, eds., *History of West Africa*, I, 202–39, and Adeleye, "Hausaland and Bornu 1600–1800." Due partly to problems of incomplete and inconsistent sources, the authorities differ in their interpretation on several points. Although some of the details in our account of the relations between Bornu, Songhai, and the Hausa states are subject to debate and revision, the broad outlines are clear and generally accepted among scholars.

43 Some scholars would attribute this distinction to Queen Amina of Zazzau. Zazzau chronicles place Amina in the mid-sixteenth century. This is unlikely because her reputed empire building is inconsistent with the more reliable dating and confirmed activities of Songhai and Kebbi at this time. The *Kano Chronicle* refers to Amina in the early fifteenth century, more likely chronologically but unfortunately uncorroborated by independent evidence. Amina may even be a legendary figure: H. A. S. Johnston, *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto* (London, 1967), Appendix I, no. 4, p. 260.

44 This theme is developed by Adeleye, "Hausaland and Bornu 1600–1800."

45 R. A. Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804–1906* (New York, 1971), p. 5.

46 Ibid., p. 7.

Chapter 2

  1 H. F. C. Smith, "A neglected theme of West African history: The Islamic revolutions of the nineteenth century, *JHSN*, II, 2 (1961), 169–85.

  2 The history of the *jihad* has been treated by R. A. Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804–1906* (New York, 1971), pp. 23–38; H. A. S. Johnston, *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto*, pp. 35–91; and D. M. Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (New York, 1967), pp. 23–45. Last's datings are more accurate and have been adopted here. An excellent analysis of the military aspects of the *jihad* has been incorporated as chap. VI of M. Hiskett's *The Sword of Truth: The Life and Times of the Shehu Usuman Dan Fodio* (New York, 1973), pp. 81–104.

  3 M. Hiskett, "An Islamic tradition of reform in the Western Sudan from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century," *BSOAS*, XXV, 3 (1962), 577–96.

  4 Johnston, *Fulani Empire*, p. 25.

  5 Ibid., pp. 21–2; C. E. Hopen, *The Pastoral Fulbe Family in Gwandu* (London, 1958), pp. 1–3.

  6 See Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, "Introduction," lix–lxxxii, and Hiskett, *Sword of Truth*, chap. V, pp. 70–80.

  7 See, for example, Hiskett, "An Islamic tradition of reform," and "Material relating to the state of learning among the Fulani before their *jihad*," *BSOAS*, XIX, 3 (1957), 550–78; A. D. H. Bivar, "Arabic documents of Northern Nigeria," *BSOAS*, XXII, 2 (1959), 324–49, and "The Arabic literature of Nigeria to 1804: A provisional account," *BSOAS*, XXV, 1 (1962), 104–48.

  8 M. R. Waldman, "A note on the ethnic interpretation of the Fulani *jihad*," *Africa*, XXXVI, 3 (1966), 286–91, and "The Fulani *jihad*: A reassessment," *JAH*, VI, 3 (1965), 333–55; M. G. Smith, "The *jihad* of Shehu dan Fodio: Some problems," in I. M. Lewis, ed., *Islam in Tropical Africa* (London, 1966), pp. 408–24; and Hiskett, *Sword of Truth*, pp. 74–6.

  9 The military organization of the first Muslim armies is described by R. Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*, 2nd ed. (London, 1957), pp. 407–8, 428–30, 454–5.

10 Abdullah ibn Muhammad, *Tazyin al-waraqat*, trans. and ed. M. Hiskett (Ibadan, 1963), p. 105. The dating of this event is discussed in F. H. El-Masri, "The life of Shehu Usuman dan Fodio before the *jihad*," *JHSN*, II, 4 (1963), 444, n. 3. On the Shehu's mystical experiences, see Hiskett, *Sword of Truth*, pp. 63–9.

11 Hopen, *Pastoral Fulbe Family in Gwandu*, pp. 10–11. Although there is no independent evidence to support this particular oral tradition, indirect confirmation may exist in other oral sources. Local traditions in both Gobir and Maradi claim that the Fulani attempted to disarm the conquered population after the *jihad* and forbade blacksmiths to make weapons. In both cases, however, the people succeeded in making arms secretly and rebelled: A. Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho* (1906–1909), II (Paris, 1911), 461–2, 475. The disarming of dissident elements of the population may have been a common practice; and Nafata, fearing the increasing strength of the disaffected Muslim community within his kingdom, may indeed have ordered it to disarm. Furthermore, the fact that the *mujahidun* had virtually no cavalry at the outset of the *jihad* lends credibility to the assertion that the possession of horses was prohibited as well. However, the omission of explicit reference to such prohibitions in the extant *jihad* literature cannot be mere oversight, and tends to sustain doubts about the veracity of these alleged prohibitions.

12 The *jihad* leadership is discussed in Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, pp. 52–4, and "A

solution to the problems of dynastic chronology in 19th century Zaria and Kano," *JHSN*, III, 3 (1966), 462–6.

13 R. Lander, *Records of Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa*, 2 vols. (London, 1830), II, 28.

14 Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques*, II, 526.

15 *Tabki* is the Hausa word for pond or lake. The details of this important battle, fought on 21 June 1804, are recorded in Muhammadu Bello's *Infaq al-maisur*, trans. E. J. Arnett, in *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani* (Kano, 1922), pp. 55–60, and in Abdullahi's *Tazyin al-waraqat*, pp. 107 ff. The reconstruction of the battle here is based largely on these two works, supplemented by the accounts in Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, pp. 26–7, Johnston, *Fulani Empire*, pp. 44–6, and Hiskett, *Sword of Truth*, pp. 82–9.

16 See, for example, S. J. Hogben and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria* (London, 1966), p. 121, and Johnston, *Fulani Empire*, p. 45.

17 Bello, *Infaq al-maisur*, p. 56. On the historical reliability of Bello's works, see Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, xxx–xxxii. If anything, one would suspect that Bello exaggerated the enemy strength in order to make Muslim victory appear even more impressive.

18 Bello, *Infaq al-maisur*, p. 57.

19 W. F. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province* (London, 1921), pp. 11–12.

20 Bello, *Infaq al-maisur*, p. 72.

21 Ibid., p. 56.

22 Ibid., p. 69.

23 Ibid., pp. 69, 74, 75, 76.

24 Anon., "Katsina," *Nigeria Magazine*, no. 51 (1956), p. 317. The use of mounted archers was rare, but such a unit seems to have existed in Sokoto in the nineteenth century: M. G. Smith, Sokoto Fieldnotes, 3/19. See Chapter 9, pp. 151–2, for a more detailed discussion.

25 Bello, *Infaq al-maisur*, p. 69.

26 Ibid., p. 76.

27 Ibid., pp. 82–3.

28 Ibid., p. 78.

29 Ibid., p. 89.

30 Ibid., p. 93.

31 M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau 1800–1950* (London, 1960), pp. 137, 140. Smith dates the fall of Zaria as 1804, but the correct date is 1808: see Alhaji Junaidu, *Tarihin Fulani* (Zaria, 1957); H. F. C. Smith, "The dynastic chronology of Fulani Zaria," *JHSN*, II, 2 (1961), 279–81; and Last, "A solution . . . Zaria and Kano," p. 467.

32 B. Hepp, "Coutumes des Peuls de l'Adamaoua," Doctorat en Droit thesis, University of Paris, 1948, p. 23.

33 V. N. Low, "The border states: A political history of three Nigerian emirates, ca. 1800–1902," Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1967, *passim*, revised and published as *Three Nigerian Emirates: A Study in Oral History* (Evanston, Ill., 1972).

34 Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 27; see also Johnston, *Fulani Empire*, pp. 46, 52.

35 See D. J. M. Muffett, "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," in M. Crowder, ed., *West African Resistance* (New York, 1971), pp. 280–1.

36 See Hiskett, *Sword of Truth*, pp. 87, 91–2, 96.

37 This was the position the Shehu finally arrived at. See Hiskett, *Sword of Truth*, chaps. IV and VIII; D. M. Last and M. A. Al-Hajj, "Attempts at defining a Muslim in nineteenth century Hausaland and Bornu," *JHSN*, III, 2 (1965), 231–40.

38 These are to be regarded only in very broad terms. Although the fall of the Hausa states can be accepted as a "turning point" in the *jihad*, the *jihad* elsewhere was a more protracted process. In Bauchi, Adamawa, Hadejia, Katagum, and Gombe, wars of expansion and consolidation went on for years; Nupe, Ilorin, Missau, Muri, and several of the minor emirates were not founded until the 1820s and 1830s, and Kontagora in c. 1859; and large areas remained in rebellion or unconquered throughout the nineteenth century. As Adeleye has noted, "in terms of territorial expansion and consolidation, the *jihād* was an uncompleted revolution which virtually persisted until the overthrow of the Caliphate" in 1903: *Power and Diplomacy*, p. 54.

39 Johnston, *Fulani Empire*, p. 82.

40 For convenient summaries, see ibid., pp. 133–44, and Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy*, pp. 34–7. A different perspective is provided in P. Morton-Williams, "The Fulani penetration into Nupe and Yoruba in the nineteenth century," in I. M. Lewis, ed., *History and Social Anthropology*, A.S.A. Monographs, no. 7 (London, 1968), pp. 1–24.

41 Bello, *Infaq al-maisur*, pp. 94–5; Johnston, *Fulani Empire*, pp. 58–9.

Chapter 3

1 Such a scale has been developed by K. F. Otterbein in his quantitative cross-cultural study of warfare in fifty preindustrial societies: *The Evolution of War: A Cross-Cultural Study* (New Haven, Conn., 1970), chap. 2, especially pp. 70–6. Much of what follows in the present work regarding military organization and equipment applies also to the pre-*jihad* Hausa states.

2 M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau 1800–1950* (London, 1960), p. 47, and Appendix C, p. 351; S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria* (London, 1942), p. 101. See pp. 216–18 below for a list of nineteenth-century military titles.

3 Smith, *Government in Zazzau*, p. 99. See D. M. Last, "A solution to the problems of dynastic chronology in 19th century Zaria and Kano," *JHSN*, III, 3 (1966), 467, for the dates of Yero's reign.

4 H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa . . . 1849–1855*, 3 vols. (Franklin Square, N.Y., 1857), II, 153.

5 U. F. H. Ruxton, ed. and trans., *Maliki Law* (London, 1916), p. 74; M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 83–7.

6 *Diya al-sultan*, trans. M. D. W. Jeffreys, "Two Arabic documents: Diyyâ s-sultan and Tazyîn l-waraqat," *African Studies*, IX, 2 (1950), 80.

7 Smith, *Government in Zazzau*, p. 96.

8 The following description of combat organization and weapons is culled from a wide variety of primary and secondary accounts. The only other systematic and comprehensive treatment of this subject is that by D. J. M. Muffet, "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," in M. Crowder, ed., *West African Resistance* (New York, 1971), pp. 276–80, which is based largely on field data collected in Nigeria. Professor Muffett kindly made available to me a prepublication typescript of his paper in 1969 when I was preparing my version from published sources. However, this account is independent of Dr. Muffet's and more detailed on several points. See also, "A Glossary of Hausa Military Terminology," pp. 220–4.

9 As noted in Chapter 1 above (p. 14), the first recorded use of padded armor in Hausaland dates to the reign of Kanajeji at Kano (c. 1390–1410). During the *jihad* the Muslims took pride in their light armaments and derided the

heavy cavalry of the Hausa armies; but afterward military necessity forced the adoption of *lifidi*, and Caliph Bello officially authorized the practice: D. M. Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate*, (London, 1967), p. 72.

10 Sarkin Kano Kanajeji is also credited with the introduction of chain mail. Mail varied considerably in its style, construction, and function. Most mail suits were either waist-length shirts or knee-length coats. Such armor was well suited to tropical wear and offered effective protection against glancing blows, but was more vulnerable to piercing by missile or thrusting weapons. Nigerian mail was usually made of riveted links, whose manufacture required much skill, labor, and expense. This type of mail, superior in construction and impervious to most blows, was imported largely through Egypt and was of medieval European or Mamluk design. Other mail made from butted links or split rings was also worn; but because such armor was rare and more vulnerable than riveted links, it may have served more for ceremonial than military use. Extant specimens in Nigeria may have been imported from Omdurman, where the making of butted link and split ring mail persisted into the twentieth century. A. D. H. Bivar found "absolutely no tradition of the manufacture, or even the systematic repair, of mail in Nigeria itself," in *Nigerian Panoply: Arms and Armour of the Northern Region* (Apapa, 1964), p. 11. In the mid-nineteenth century Barth estimated that 1,000 of the 7,000 cavalrymen of Wadai were clad in mail, and reported a regular trade in mail suits from Benghazi, each costing one or two female slaves: *Travels and Discoveries*, II, 658. See Bivar, *Nigerian Panoply*, pp. 10–13, 30–8, and 59–66 for a discussion of several mail suits from Nigeria.

11 Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 72; Nadel, *Black Byzantium*, p. 109; M. G. Smith, Sokoto Fieldnotes, 2/49a, 2/50, Katsina Fieldnotes, 5/16a, unpublished Kano manuscript, unpublished Katsina–Maradi manuscript, pp. 123, 129, unpublished Daura manuscript, p. 173; V. N. Low, Katagum Fieldnotes.

12 Nadel, *Black Byzantium*, p. 109; M. G. Smith, Katsina Fieldnotes, 2/28a, Sokoto Fieldnotes, 3/19a–20, 3/37a–38. The Gobirawa also had about one hundred *yan lifida* at Tabkin Kwotto: see Chapter 2 above, pp. 27, 28.

13 Bivar suggests that the large rectangular shields were borrowed from the Tuareg: *Nigerian Panoply*, p. 9. Tuareg shields are described by F. Rennell Rodd, *People of the Veil* (London, 1926), pp. 234–5. Perhaps there is also a historical connection between these widely used shields and the famous Saharan *lamt* or oryx-hide shields mentioned by Arab chroniclers as early as the tenth century: see R. Mauny, *Tableau Géographique*, pp. 345–6, 380; Ibn Hawqal, "Description de l'Afrique," *Journal Asiatique*, XIII (1842), 241. See n. 59, below.

14 Other saddles included the *talaha*, an expensive and ornate North African import; the *bagariye*, a curved-pommeled Bornu saddle; *cucana*, an inferior *bagariye*; *kwarda*, another Bornu saddle. Pommels (s. *kwacciyar gaba*) were also highly sculptured and decorated. See Muffett, "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," p. 279, n. 22.

15 *Jalala* (in Katsina, *yifi*) was the basic type of lightweight, colorfully embroidered saddle cover. Variations included the *bishir* or *bishiri*, a red-and-white saddle cloth; the *fantama* and *ka ki Bima*, saddle covers with tinsel edges; the *balliya*; and *alkashafa*, any flimsy saddle cover. In addition, a pad (*zubka*) was normally placed under each half of the saddle, and another type of padding (*huhu* or *madaburo*) on the upper side. When a saddled horse was left standing for any length of time, a burnooselike cover (*yifi*) was placed over the saddle to keep the leather dust-free and cool.

16 A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger* (London, 1892), p. 211, n. 1. Muffett

records a dramatic example of the terrible lethal effect of such stirrups on a native agent of the British at Keffi in 1902. In this instance Audu Timtim, the agent of the British Resident Captain Moloney, was attacked by the Magajin Keffi, Dan Yamusa, who "slashed him across the belly with the knife-edge of his fighting stirrups and ripped his bowels out": *Concerning Brave Captains* (London, 1964), p. 66. Actually, the circumstances of Audu Timtim's death are uncertain. Muffett relied on oral testimony, whereas R. A. Adeleye concludes from other sources that Audu was shot by the *magaji* and then dispatched with a sword by one of the latter's followers: *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804–1906* (New York, 1971), pp. 265–6.

17 See C. K. Meek, *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria*, 2 vols. (London, 1925), I, 307.

18 C. G. Widstrand argues that these war axes were all-purpose instruments that were used also in battle: *African Axes*, Studia Ethnographica Upsaliensia, XV (Uppsala, 1958), 102–4. Cf. Meek, *Northern Tribes*, I, 308. Whether these axes were made specifically for military purposes is an academic question; they were formidable weapons that could hack easily through both mail and *lifidi*. See n. 58 below on the types of swords.

19 Leather- and metal-crafts were important native industries. Although many sword blades (s. *ruwan takobi*) were made locally by the *ciré-perdue*, or "lost wax," method, imported tempered blades were superior and preferred to the more brittle domestic variety. Barth estimated that Kano imported annually about 50,000 sword blades, mostly from Solingen. These were mounted and sheathed by native craftsmen and sold throughout the Sudan: *Travels and Discoveries*, I, 519–20.

20 Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, I, 454.

21 S. Vandeleur, *Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger* (London, 1898), p. 206. In Kano the *dawakin zagi* was introduced by Sarki Rumfa (1463–99): *Kano Chronicle*, pp. 111–12.

22 Ahmad ibn Fartua, "The Kanem wars," in Palmer, ed., *Sudanese Memoirs*, I, 24; see also pp. 32, 38–9.

23 Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 71.

24 J. A. Burdon, *Northern Nigeria: Historical Notes on Certain Emirates and Tribes* (London, 1909), p. 70.

25 D. M. Last, "An aspect of the Caliph Muhammad Bello's social policy," *Kano Studies*, no. 2 (1966), p. 59; see also Chapter 4, pp. 61–2.

26 R. Lander, *Records of Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa*, 2 vols. (London, 1830), II, 13–14. On the Bornu horse trade, see also ibid., I, 140; Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, II, 194; NNAR, no. 476 (1904), p. 297; H. Clapperton, *Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa* (London, 1829), p. 93; A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *British West Africa*, 2nd ed. (London, 1900), p. 207; F. W. H. Migeod, *Through Nigeria to Lake Chad* (London, 1924), p. 88.

27 Meek, *Northern Tribes*, I, 119.

28 Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, II, 58. Barth does not mention when the embargo was originally imposed. Although it seems likely to have been ordered during the *jihad* or the period of intermittent hostilities afterward, this speculation appears inconsistent with Lander's claim, quoted above, that Bornu supplied "every other [country] in the interior" with horses. It is possible that Lander was referring to the historic Bornu horse trade rather than to conditions prevailing in the 1820s specifically; alternatively, the embargo might have been imposed much later, in the 1840s or early 1850s.

29 S. A. Crowther and J. C. Taylor, *The Gospel on the Banks of the Niger* (London, 1859), pp. 422–3. Umaru, a son of Caliph Abubakar Atiku (1837–42), may have been viewed as a rival, or at least a threat, to the throne by Aliyu, who was a son of Bello. Ultimately Caliph Ahmadu (1859–66), Umaru's brother, gave de facto recognition to his conquests by entitling him Sarkin Sudan; Umaru became the first emir of Kontagora.

30 M. Laird and R. A. K. Oldfield, *Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of Africa*, 2 vols. (London, 1837), II, 88.

31 Crowther and Taylor, *The Gospel*, pp. 94–100, 148–9, 207, 209.

32 J. Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa . . . 1850–51*, ed. Bayle St. John, 2 vols. (London, 1853), II, 316.

33 *NNAR*, no. 476 (1904), pp. 251, 297. The region northwest of Sokoto and Gwandu, i.e. Arewa, was the principal breeding area of the "Hausa horse," the local subtype of the Dongola: H. Epstein, *The Origins of the Domestic Animals of Africa*, 2 vols. (New York, 1971), II, 456; and G. Doutressoulle, *L'Élevage en Afrique Occidentale Française* (Paris, 1947), pp. 239–41, 248.

34 Maliki law explicitly forbids the participation of infidels in a *jihad* except as mercenaries who perform menial tasks: Ruxton, ed., *Maliki Law*, p. 75; see Khadduri, *War and Peace*, p. 84. On the other hand, *dhimmis* were not required to take part in a *jihad:* see Khadduri, *War and Peace*, pp. 175–201 on the status of *dhimmis*. In the Sokoto area some pagan groups fought with the Shehu during the *jihad;* later Caliph Aliyu (1842–59) began the regular conscription of the pagan Hausa (*Maguzawa*) for military service: Smith, Sokoto Fieldnotes, 5/34. In Maradi, the post-*jihad* Katsina successor state, the ruling council sometimes summoned pagan archers to assist them in deposing the *sarki:* Smith, Maradi Fieldnotes, 2/10.

Liberated slaves played an important role in the *jihad* in Ilorin, Nupe, and perhaps in Hausaland as well: see Lander, *Records*, I, 96–7; R. and J. Lander, *Journal of an Expedition to Explore the Course and Termination of the Niger*, 2 vols. (New York, 1837), II, 71; Laird and Oldfield, *Narrative of an Expedition*, II, 87; Last and Al-Hajj, "Attempts at defining a Muslim," p. 236, n. 2; Hiskett, *Sword of Truth*, pp. 77–9.

35 A reference to mounted infantry officers is found in P. A. Clive, "Notes on a journey to Pali and Mamaidi, in the kingdom of Bauchi," *Geographical Journal*, XIV, 2 (1899), 180.

36 R. and J. Lander, *Journal*, II, 71; Meek, *Northern Tribes*, I, 300.

37 A description and illustration of these bows is contained in C. K. Meek, *A Sudanese Kingdom* (London, 1931), pp. 443–4; cf. *Northern Tribes*, I, 303–4. Detailed studies of African bows and arrows have been done by L. Frobenius, *Morphology of the African Bow-weapon* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1932), and L. S. B. Leakey, "A new classification of the bow and arrow in Africa," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, LVI (1926), 259–300. An interesting comparison of the mechanics and casting power of aboriginal and modern bows was done a half-century ago by S. T. Pope, *A Study of Bows and Arrows*, University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, XIII, 9, 2nd ed. rev. (Berkeley, 1930; original 1923). D. M. Last, who has examined several Hausa-Fulani bows, informed me that most were in the range of 30–40 pound pull: personal conversation, 26 August 1969.

38 See Muffett, "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," p. 277, n. 16, and p. 296; Meek, *Northern Tribes*, I, 304–5; W. D. Hambly, *Culture Areas of Nigeria*, Field Museum of Natural History Anthropological Series, XXI, 3 (Chicago, 1935), 411; E. A. Brackenbury, "Notes on the 'Bororo Fulbe' or nomad 'Cattle

Fulani'," *JAS*, XXIII, 91 (1924), 216. Arrowheads were designed for specific purposes. Blunt arrows (s. *adullu* or *kunda*) were used principally for bird hunting, but could have considerable concussive impact on exposed parts of a warrior's body. Broad arrows (s. *bakin maiki*) produced massive bleeding. Deep penetration of the flesh was achieved best by unbarbed arrows (s. *tsiko*), and strong narrow heads could crack bone as well. Each archer carried one *gazara*, a small-barbed arrow with a shaft longer than the others for ready removal from the quiver.

39 Meek, *Northern Tribes*, I, 306; W. B. Baikie, *Narrative of an Exploring Voyage . . . in 1854* (London, 1856), p. 114.

40 Laird and Oldfield, *Narrative of an Expedition*, II, 86–7; Muffett, "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," p. 277; T. J. Hutchinson, *Narrative of the Niger, Tshadda, & Binué Exploration* (London, 1855), p. 77; C. Maistre, *A Travers l'Afrique Centrale du Congo au Niger* (Paris, 1895), p. 240.

41 Meek, *Northern Tribes*, I, 312.

42 Such charms were common among both cavalry and infantry. Specialized charms were worn to protect warriors from different sources of potential injury or death; for example, one type of Koranic charm was antipoison (*laya*); another was a charm against weapons (*maganin karfe*), etc.

43 These are the words of an elderly Kebbi man describing his precolonial military experiences, in H. A. S. Johnston, ed. and trans., *A Selection of Hausa Stories* (London, 1966), p. 143.

44 Photographs of these heavy archers appear in *Abbia*, no. 4 (1963), facing p. 50.

45 Johnston, ed. and trans., *Hausa Stories*, pp. 142–3. See also Denham's eyewitness account of the deadly effectiveness of Fulani bowmen on a joint Bornu-Arab cavalry force: D. Denham, H. Clapperton, and W. Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in 1822, 1823, and 1824*, 4 vols. (London, 1831), II, 64 ff. A summary of this incident is related in a discussion on p. 112.

46 Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission*, II, 221, 239.

47 Johnston, *Fulani Empire*, p. 120; Muffett, "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," p. 277; A. Schultze, *The Sultanate of Bornu*, trans. P. A. Benton (London, 1913), p. 302, n. 1.

48 H. Barth, "Progress of the African Mission . . . ," *JRGS*, XXI (1851), 192.

49 See L. W. LaChard, "Arrow-poisons of Northern Nigeria," *JAS*, V, 17 (1905), 22–7; Muffett, "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," p. 277 and n. 17, p. 296; C.O. 446/7, no. 12358, 15 May 1899. LaChard claims that death normally ensued within fifteen or twenty minutes of being struck by a poisoned arrow.

50 Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission*, II, 270. Types of antidotes included *kirni* (*Briedelia Ferruginea*) and *katala*.

51 Brackenbury, "Notes on the 'Bororo Fulbe'," p. 216.

52 M. Hassan and M. Shu'aibu, *A Chronicle of Abuja*, trans. F. Heath (Ibadan, 1952), p. 12.

53 On the legal status of arrow poison, see Ruxton, ed., *Maliki Law*, p. 75; Khadduri, *War and Peace*, p. 104; Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 73 and n. 57.

54 Brackenbury, "Notes on the 'Bororo Fulbe'," p. 216.

55 Hutchinson, *Narrative of the Niger*, p. 109; W. B. Baikie, *Narrative of an Exploring Voyage . . . in 1854*, p. 164; R. M. East, trans., *Stories of Old Adamawa* (Lagos, 1935), pp. 65, 135; W. D. Hambly, *Culture Areas of Nigeria*, Field Museum of Natural History Anthropological Series, XXI, 3 (Chicago, 1935), 411; V. N. Low, Katagum Fieldnotes.

56 Hepp, "Coutumes des Peuls," p. 23; Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 73. The Keb-bawa favored the *kambari; bursu* was a Sokoto spear. Muffett mentions several others: "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," p. 296, n. 15. Another type of spear was the *kuyi-kuyi;* and *kwiyi-kwiyi* was a multibarbed spear. At the end of most spear shafts was the *daddaga,* an iron band or pointed ferrule to prevent split-ting and give added balance and strength. For the use of multiple-headed spears elsewhere in Africa, see A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, "A note on some spears from Bornu, Northern Nigeria," *Man,* LXIII, 220 (1963), 174–6; K. G. Lind-blom, "Spears with two or more heads, particularly in Africa," in E. E. Evans-Pritchard et al., eds., *Essays Presented to C. G. Seligman* (London, 1934), pp. 149–81, and *Spears and Staffs with Two or More Points, in Africa,* Ethnologi-cal Museum of Sweden, Monograph no. 14 (Stockholm, 1937).

57 Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* Appendix A, p. 335; R. Miller, "Katsina, a region of Hausaland," *Scottish Geographical Magazine,* LIV, 4 (1938), 217. See the photographs of heavy infantry in *Abbia,* no. 4 (1963), facing pp. 24, 30; and no. 6 (1964), *passim.*

58 Other straight swords included the *dunhu,* a plain unmarked weapon; the *tam-ogas* or *tamogashi,* a sword with three lines cut along the blade; the *tama,* a cheap sword; and the *zabo.* Muffett also lists the *lafaranji,* a single-edged weapon: "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," p. 297, n. 20. Scimitars, or slightly curved one-edged swords, were less common and used principally by the cav-alry. Swords of this type were first used in the Islamic world in the early four-teenth century, and reached North Africa by the early sixteenth century: Bivar, *Nigerian Panoply,* pp. 15–16, 27. Among the sabers used by the Hausa were the *bisalami* or *almulku;* the *hindi* was probably of Indian origin, and the *han-katilo* was Kanuri (Bornu). See Bivar, pp. 13–27, for a detailed discussion of some examples of these straight and curved swords, and his photographs, figures 1–11, pp. 45–55.

59 Shields also were similar to those carried by the cavalry. The *dungi* (giraffe hide) and *warwaji* (white oryx hide) were smaller shields of the *kunkeli* vari-ety. The *kulumbuwa* was a large hide shield, and the *kwangwara* a large white oblong-shaped *garkuwa.*

60 Clapperton, *Second Expedition,* pp. 185 ff.; Nadel, *Black Byzantium,* pp. 109, 110; Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* pp. 99, 190–1; Last, *Sokoto Caliphate,* p. 73; Low, Katagum Fieldnotes; C. N. Ubah, "Kano Emirate in the nineteenth century: A study of political developments," M.A. thesis, University of Ghana, May 1965, p. 44.

Chapter 4

1 R. A. Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804–1906* (New York, 1971), p. 53. Adeleye's book is the best general treatment of this subject: see especially chap. 3, pp. 52–76, and pp. 109–113. See D. J. M. Muffett, "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," in M. Crowder, ed., *West African Resistance* (New York, 1971), pp. 273–5.

2 Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy,* p. 109.

3 See Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy,* pp. 94–109, for a summary of these revolts. See also Chapter 7, pp. 117–24.

4 J. M. Fremantle, "A history of the region comprising the Katagum Division of Kano Province" Part II, *JAS,* X, 40 (1911), 398; D. M. Last, *The Sokoto Cali-phate* (London, 1967), p. 73. Fremantle claims the Jama'are spearmen played

an important role in the battle of Gawakuke (1836), in which the forces assembled under Caliph Bello routed the Gobir army and killed Sultan Ali.

5 V. N. Low, Katagum Fieldnotes.

6 M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau 1800–1950* (London, 1960), p. 76.

7 M. G. Smith, Sokoto Fieldnotes, 4/41.

8 D. Denham, H. Clapperton, and W. Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in 1822, 1823, and 1824*, 4 vols. (London, 1831), III, 248, and Clapperton, *Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa* (London, 1829), pp. 185 ff.; J. Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa . . . 1850–51*, ed. Bayle St. John, 2 vols. (London, 1853), II, 194, 232, 238; H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa . . . 1849–1855*, 3 vols. (Franklin Square, N.Y., 1857), I, 480; S. Vandeleur, *Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger* (London, 1898), pp. 212, 244.

9 Clapperton, *Second Expedition*, pp. 185 ff.

10 Cf. Baghirmi – 5,000 fought Bornu in 1824: Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries*, III, 41; and in the 1850s Barth estimated 3,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry: *Travels and Discoveries*, II, 560. Bornu – 30,000 cavalry and 9,000 infantry: Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries*, III, 195. Wadai – 5,000–6,000 cavalry: Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, II, 560. Zinder – up to 5,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry: Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission*, II, 194, 232, 238.

11 M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, 1955) p. 81. This section on *ribats* in Sokoto is based largely on Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, pp. 74–80.

12 Last, "An aspect of the Caliph Muhammad Bello's social policy," *Kano Studies*, no. 2 (1966), p. 58.

13 Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 79.

14 See Chapter 1 above, nn. 34 and 38.

15 A useful study of this defensive architecture has been done by R. A. Kea, "Fortifications and siegecraft in the Fulani Empire," unpublished paper, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, 1966.

16 M. Hiskett, "*Kitab al-farq*: A work on the Habe kingdoms attributed to Uthman dan Fodio," *BSOAS*, XXIII, 3 (1960), 570.

17 Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 75. As we have seen, Bello was especially concerned with *ribats*. A statement by Abdullahi on fortifications is contained in *Diya al-hukkam* (c. 1808); see the Hausa translation, *Liya'ul Hukkami* (Zaria, 1964), pp. 82–3.

18 H. C. Hall, *Barrack and Bush in Northern Nigeria* (London, 1923), p. 147; M. J. Campbell, "The walls of a city," *Nigeria Magazine*, no. 60 (1959), p. 48.

19 J. R. Raphael, *Through Unknown Nigeria* (London, 1914), p. 87.

20 C. Larymore, *A Resident's Wife in Nigeria* (London, 1908), pp. 25, 70.

21 Ibid., pp. 91–2.

22 Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, I, 452.

23 Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 88; *NNAR*, no. 437 (1903), p. 175.

Chapter 5

1 The familiarity of the Shehu and his followers with the classical legal literature is well known. However, the specialized Arabic treatises on military affairs appear to have been unknown in West Africa. Some of these tracts are discussed in A. R. Zaky, "Military literature of the Arabs," *Islamic Culture*, XXX,

2 (1956), 163–72. A Moroccan manuscript on archery, written c. 1500, has been studied and translated by N. A. Faris and R. P. Elmer, *Arab Archery* (Princeton, N.J., 1945).

2 This section is based largely on M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, 1955).

3 H. Speier, "The social types of war," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI, 4 (1941), 445–54; see A. Gladstone, "The conception of the enemy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III, 1 (1959), 132–7.

4 See S. Andrzejewski, *Military Organization and Society* (London, 1954), pp. 116–18, on the relationship between the social composition of the military and ferocity in war; and his later work, published under his changed name (Andreski), *The Uses of Comparative Sociology* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965), chap. 7, pp. 107–28. See A. T. Hatto, "Archery and chivalry: A noble prejudice," *Modern Language Review*, XXXV, 1 (1940), 43.

5 H. Clapperton, *Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa* (London, 1829), pp. 185 ff.; H. C. Hall, *Barrack and Bush in Northern Nigeria* (London, 1923), pp. 147–9.

6 S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria* (London, 1942), p. 111.

7 One such letter, from Caliph Bello to Emir Yakubu of Bauchi (1805–43), is translated in A. D. H. Bivar, "Arabic documents of Northern Nigeria," *BSOAS*, XXII, 2 (1959), 337–43. See also D. M. Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (London, 1967), p. 74 and n. 60, 205–6; W. H. Brooks and L. H. Nott, *Bātū na Abūbuan Hausa* (London, 1903), pp. 20–1.

8 D. M. Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (London, 1967), pp. 107–14; M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau 1800–1950* (London, 1960), pp. 80, 142; cf. Chapter 1 above, p. 11 and n. 23. Tuareg groups variously fought with and against the caliphate. During the *jihad* the Tuareg were undependable allies of the Muslim insurgents. In Zinder, Tuareg cameleers were an important military contingent in the early nineteenth century during the establishment of that state; later in the century the Tuareg were supplanted by special units of slave troops: R. A. Dunbar, "Damagaram (Zinder, Niger), 1812–1906: The history of a Central Sudanic kingdom," Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1970, pp. 164–76, and personal communication, 18 October 1969.

9 H. Fisher, "Prayer and military activity in the history of Muslim Africa south of the Sahara," *JAH*, XII, 3 (1971), 405.

10 J. Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa . . . 1850–51*, ed. Bayle St. John, 2 vols. (London, 1853), II, 238; M. G. Smith, "A Hausa kingdom: Maradi under Dan Baskore, 1854–75," in D. Forde and P. M. Kaberry, eds., *West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1967), p. 119, and unpublished Daura manuscript, p. 172; H. K. W. Kumm, *The Sudan* (London, 1907), p. 122. Abdullahi also admonished his chiefs against divulging this information beforehand: M. D. W. Jeffreys, "Two Arabic documents: Diyyâ s-Sultan and Tazyîn l-Waraqat," *African Studies*, IX, 2 (1950), 81.

11 R. Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*, 2nd ed. (London, 1957), pp. 455–6; M. Khadduri, *War and Peace*, pp. 87–8.

12 Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, pp. 153, 159, 206; on the Sokoto vizierate in general, see chaps. 7 and 8, pp. 145–226.

13 V. N. Low, *Three Nigerian Emirates: A Study in Oral History* (Evanston, Ill., 1972), p. 187.

14 R. W. Hull, "The development of administration in Katsina Emirate, Northern Nigeria, 1887–1944," Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1968, pp. 63–5.

15 Nadel, *Black Byzantium*, p. 112.

16 Malam Hassan and Malam Shu'aibu, *A Chronicle of Abuja*, trans. F. L. Heath (Ibadan, 1952), p. 18.

17 Ibid., pp. 18–19.

18 H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa . . . 1849–1855*, 3 vols. (Franklin Square, N.Y., 1857), I, 530; cf. C. K. Meek, *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria*, 2 vols. (London, 1925), I, 162.

19 S. Vandeleur, "Nupe and Ilorin," *Georgraphical Journal*, X, 4 (1897), 356.

20 S. A. Crowther and J. C. Taylor, *The Gospel on the Banks of the Niger* (London, 1859), p. 134; Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, II, 323, 340, 354; E. Viard, *Au Bas-Niger*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1886), p. 218.

21 Levy, *Social Structure of Islam*, p. 428. This formation was modified somewhat by the Umayyad Caliph Marwan (744–50); details on this formation and subsequent changes are reported by Levy, pp. 427 ff., and H. W. Glidden, "A note on early Arabian military organization," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LVI, 1 (1936), 88–91.

22 For Abuja: Hassan and Shu'aibu, *Chronicle of Abuja*, pp. 18–19; Bornu: Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, II, 348; Daura: Smith, unpublished Daura manuscript, p. 173; Gobir, Maradi, and Zinder: A. Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1910–1914), II, 524–6; Hadejia: Low, Hadejia Fieldnotes; Maradi: Smith, Maradi Fieldnotes, 1/21a; Nupe: Nadel, *Black Byzantium*, p. 111; Sokoto: M. Bello, *Infaq al-maisur*, trans. E. J. Arnett, *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani* (Kano, 1922), p. 69 (quoted in Chapter 2 above, p. 31), and Smith, Sokoto Fieldnotes, 3/19a-20, 3/37a-38; Zaria: M. G. Smith *Government in Zazzau 1800–1950* (London, 1960), pp. 96–8, and "Field histories among the Hausa," *JAH*, II, 1 (1961), 97. On firearms and the reorganization of the battle formation, see pages 113–15. When Sokoto summoned contingents from the eastern emirates for combined operations, the imperial battle order was formed as follows, from front to rear: Kano, Zaria, Hadejia, Katagum, Jama'are, Missau, Shira, Gombe, Bauchi, and Katsina (Smith, Sokoto Fieldnotes, 4/41). The emir of Kano held the title, more honorary than functional, Sarkin Yaki – chief of war of the caliphate: Smith, Kano Fieldnotes, 5/27.

23 See M. G. Smith, "The social functions and meaning of Hausa praise-singing," *Africa*, XXVII, 1 (1957), 26–44.

24 Ahmad ibn Fartua, "The Kanem wars," in H. R. Palmer, ed., *Sudanese Memoirs*, 3 vols. (Lagos, 1928), I, 48–9.

25 Clapperton, *Second Expedition*, p. 181; cf. Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques*, II, 527. Tilho's account of the Zinder war-camp organization differentiates between war camps in subject territory and those in enemy territory. In friendly regions the war-camp layout resembled that of the Sokoto army, but in enemy territory all regional contingents were integrated into a unitary army structure. Such a practice was tactically sound, but apparently not universally followed, for the regional units of the Sokoto army at Konya remained intact in the war camp. Nupe war camps seem to have followed the Sokoto pattern: see the detailed description of one such encampment of Emir Umaru (1873–82) in Viard, *Au Bas-Niger*, pp. 211–16.

26 Bello, *Infaq al-maisur*, pp. 56–7.

27 *Al-hajj* Sa'id, *Tarikh Sokoto*, trans. O. V. Houdas in *Tedzkiret en-Nisian* (Paris, 1901), pp. 330–1; al-Tunusi, *Voyage au Ouaday*, trans. N. Perron (Paris, 1851), pp. 420–1; D. J. M. Muffett, *Concerning Brave Captains* (London, 1964), pp. 132–3.

28 In the standard Bornu battle order during the reign of Mai Idris Alooma, the shield bearers on foot formed the front ranks with the horsemen behind: Ibn Fartua, "The Kanem wars," p. 35, and *History of the . . . Reign of Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu (1571–1583)*, ed. and trans. H. R. Palmer (Lagos, 1926), pp. 16–17, 42; R. Cohen, *The Kanuri of Bornu* (New York, 1967), p. 23. The implacable enemy of Bornu, the Bulala of Kanem, also sent their infantry into battle first, "fully accoutred and driven from behind by their cavalry" (Ibn Fartua, *History*, p. 56). Al-Tunusi reported this formation was typical of nineteenth-century Darfur: *Voyage au Ouaday*, p. 423.

29 M. Abadie, *La Colonie du Niger* (Paris, 1927), p. 123.

30 D. Denham, H. Clapperton, and W. Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in 1822, 1823, and 1824*, 4 vols. (London, 1831), IV, 24–5.

31 Hassan and Shu'aibu, *Chronicle of Abuja*, p. 18. The professional female beggars of Abuja went "into the middle of the battle singing and shouting encouragement to the men."

32 H. A. S. Johnston, ed. and trans., *A Selection of Hausa Stories* (London, 1966), pp. 142–3.

33 Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, I, 524.

34 Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries*, III, 195. Denham ignored, of course, such "warlike nations" as the Mamluks and Central Asian tribes who were renowned for their horse cavalry.

35 Al-Kanemi's force was turned back before the Wazirin Sokoto Gidado arrived to take command of the joint caliphal army. Sources differ on the dates and details of this battle. Dates for the battle are variously given as December 1826 or February 1827. The outcome of the battle is regarded as a rout by H. A. S. Johnston, *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto* (London, 1967), pp. 119–21; but other sources claim it was a draw, both sides retiring after neither gained a decisive advantage: Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques*, II, 363, and A. Schultze, *The Sultanate of Bornu*, trans. P. A. Benton (London, 1913), pp. 260, 302. Louis Brenner has studied these and other primary sources and concludes that the main Bauchi and Bornu armies never met; rather elements of each army met and defeated small contingents of the other, enabling both to claim victory: "The Shehus of Kukawa: A history of the al-Kanemi dynasty of Bornu," Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1968, pp. 79–82. Most sources mention a dust storm that engulfed the battlefield, during which the Bauchi archers continued to shoot their arrows, taking a heavy toll of the enemy.

36 S. Johnson, *The History of the Yorubas*, ed. O. Johnson (London, 1921), *passim*; J. F. A. Ajayi and R. S. Smith, *Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1964).

37 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *Adamawa Past and Present* (London, 1958), p. 133; *NNAR*, no. 476 (1904), p. 257.

38 Hassan and Shu'aibu, *Chronicle of Abuja*, p. 18.

39 Khadduri, *War and Peace*, p. 88; Levy, *Social Structure of Islam*, pp. 456–7.

40 *Diya al-hukkam*, quoted in M. Hiskett, *The Sword of Truth* (New York, 1973), p. 102.

41 G. Merrick, comp. *Hausa Proverbs* (London, 1905), p. 19.

42 R. W. Hull, "The impact of the Fulani *jihad* on interstate relations in the Central Sudan: Katsina Emirate – A case study," in D. F. McCall and N. R. Bennett, eds., *Aspects of West African Islam*, Boston University Papers on Africa, V (Boston, 1971), 99, quoting W. Nicholas, "Kaita Assessment Report,"

Katprof/1, HIS/26, 1948, p. 51. The tall *geza* shrub (*Combretum*) was partic-
ularly suited for his purpose: R. C. Abraham, *Dictionary of the Hausa Lan-
guage,* 2nd ed. (London, 1962), pp. 316, 550.

43 E. Vogel, "Notes from the Mission to Central Africa," *PRGS,* II, 1 (1858), 33.

44 See Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques,* II, 526, 527; R. M. East, trans., *Stories of
Old Adamawa* (Lagos and London, 1935), p. 93; Johnston, ed. and trans.,
Hausa Stories, p. 143; A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger* (London,
1892), pp. 169–70.

45 East, *Stories of Old Adamawa,* p. 99.

46 S. Johnson, *The History of the Yorubas,* p. 505.

47 Ibn Fartua, *History of the . . . Reign of Mai Idris Alooma,* pp. 21–2.

48 *Al-hajj* Sa'id, *Tarikh Sokoto,* pp. 304–5; also cited by Boubou Hama, *Histoire
du Gobir et de Sokoto* (Paris, 1967), pp. 100–101.

49 See Hall, *Barrack and Bush,* pp. 147–9.

50 Johnson, *History of the Yorubas,* p. 218.

51 Meek, *Northern Tribes,* I, 300.

52 W. B. Baikie, *Narrative of an Exploring Voyage . . . in 1854* (London, 1856),
p. 86. The same account is recorded in S. Crowther, *Journal of an Expedition
up the Niger and Tshadda Rivers* (London, 1855), p. 156.

53 E. J. Arnett, "History of Sokoto," in *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani,* pp. 11, 12,
and *Gazetteer of Sokoto Province* (London, 1920), p. 17.

54 Johnston, ed. and trans., *Hausa Stories,* p. 127.

55 Meek, *Northern Tribes,* I, 309; Smith, Katsina Fieldnotes, 3/24.

56 Clapperton, *Second Expedition,* p. 62. R. Lander also reported that al-Kanemi
used ensnared vultures with burning rags tied to their claws to set fire to towns
during his invasion of the caliphate in the mid-1820s; *Records of Captain
Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa,* 2 vols. (London, 1830), II, 43.

57 Smith, "A Hausa kingdom: Maradi," p. 120; Brooks and Nott, *Bātū na
Abūbuan Hausa,* p. 22; Low, Hadejia Fieldnotes; Smith, Katsina Fieldnotes,
2/20, 3/24; Johnston, ed. and trans., *Hausa Stories,* p. 143.

58 Clapperton, *Second Expedition,* pp. 185–8.

59 Lander, *Records,* II, 47–54. Lander obtained this account from the emir of
Bauchi, who attributed a decisive role to the Panda musketeers. A later attack
on Panda by Nupe in c. 1830 was also thwarted when the Nupe army with-
drew because "they saw, or thought they saw, to their amazement, a large
army armed with muskets, clothed after the manner of foreigners in blue and
white dress" (R. and J. Lander, *Journal of an Expedition to Explore the
Course and Termination of the Niger,* 2 vols. (New York, 1837), II, 70.
Although this report, also secondhand, appears to corroborate the effectiveness
of Pandas' gunmen, there remain grounds for skepticism regarding the accu-
racy of these reports. The strength of Panda's army and the value of its
muskets can be better estimated on the basis of Laird's personal observation
made in the early 1830s – less than a decade after the alleged victory over
Bello's army, and only two or three years after the alleged Nupe venture: M.
Laird and R. A. K. Oldfield, *Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of
Africa,* 2 vols. (London, 1837). Laird noted that the bodyguard of the Igbira
king of Panda consisted of fifty archers and six musketeers, and that the entire
army contained only three hundred bowmen and thirty horsemen. Regarding
the muskets, only three of the six were serviceable and even these were so dan-
gerous to their bearers that they could be fired only from the hip! (*Narrative
of an Expedition,* I, 226–9). On the basis of this direct testimony, the second-

hand accounts of the Lander brothers must be regarded with great suspicion. We have already noted that Panda did eventually fall to Zaria infiltrators in 1854.

60 These tactics were common in Sudanic warfare at least as far back as the sixteenth century. Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu used musketeers to clear the walls of besieged towns, sometimes erecting high platforms to give his gunmen clear zones of fire over the walls: Ibn Fartua, *History of the . . . Reign of Mai Idris Alooma*, pp. 26–28, 30, 40, 41, 42, 44.

61 *Low, Three Nigerian Emirates*, p. 142; J. M. Fremantle, "A history of the region comprising the Katagum Division of Kano Province," Part II, *JAS*, X, 40 (1911), 409, 412; W. F. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province* (London, 1921), p. 23.

62 *Kano Chronicle*, in H. R. Palmer, ed. and trans., *Sudanese Memoirs*, III, 107; Ibn Fartua, *History of the . . . Reign of Mai Idris Alooma*, p. 17 and *passim*.

63 "History of Daura," in Palmer, ed. and trans., *Sudanese Memoirs*, III, 139.

64 R. Lander, *Records*, II, 34–5.

65 Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 74; cf. Hall, *Barrack and Bush*, p. 149.

66 Bello, *Infaq al-maisur*, pp. 66–7.

67 "A Hausa kingdom: Maradi," p. 120.

68 Johnson, *History of the Yorubas*, pp. 285–9, 427–36; J. F. A. Ajayi and R. S. Smith, *Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1964), pp. 33–6, 44–8.

69 F. W. Taylor, *A Practical Hausa Grammar* (Oxford, 1923), pp. 105–6. The *Tarikh el-Fettach* records another interesting use of cattle stampedes in the fateful battle at Tondibi (1591), where the Songhai drove some 1,000 cattle toward the Moroccan battle line to absorb the gunfire. But the cattle became terrified by the din of the musketry, turned about and ran blindly through the *askiya*'s army. The Moroccan cavalry executed a turning movement and easily overwhelmed the disorganized Songhai forces (pp. 264–5).

70 Fremantle, "A history of the region comprising the Katagum Division," Part III, *JAS*, XI, 41 (1911), 73.

71 R. A. Dunbar, "Damagaram (Zinder, Niger), 1812–1906: The History of a Central Sudanic Kingdom," Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1970, p. 47.

72 Johnston, ed. and trans., *Hausa Stories*, pp. 143–4. As in the case of many other tactics we have described, the use of incendiaries was common in Sudanic warfare for centuries. In the late sixteenth century pots of boiling ordure and bunches of flaming thatch were hurled at the assault troops of Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu during their attack on the town of Amsaka: Ibn Fartua, *History of the . . . Reign of Mai Idris Alooma*, pp. 26–8.

73 Smith, "A Hausa kingdom: Maradi," p. 120.

74 "The reign of Ousman dan Fodio," trans. A. Tanbary and M. Tahe, *Présence Africaine*, XI, 4 (1961), 95.

75 Ruxton, ed., *Maliki Law*, p. 81.

76 Ibid., p. 80; cf. Khadduri, *War and Peace*, p. 123.

77 Ruxton, ed., *Maliki Law*, p. 77; Khadduri, *War and Peace*, pp. 126–30.

78 Muslim jurists agreed that women and children should not be separated: Ruxton, ed., *Maliki Law*, p. 77; Khadduri, *War and Peace*, p. 129. On the economic constraints, see above, p. 72, and M. G. Smith, "Slavery and emancipation in two societies," *Social and Economic Studies*, III, 3/4 (1954), 252–3. Booty and slavery will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, particularly on pp. 147–9.

79 Bello, *Infaq al-maisur*, pp. 53–4.

80 Ibid., p. 54.

81 Specific information on the distribution of booty in Sudanic states can be found as indicated. Zaria and Abuja: Smith, *Government in Zazzau*, pp. 39, 44, 98–9; Nupe: Nadel, *Black Byzantium*, p. 112; Maradi and Katsina: Smith, "A Hausa kingdom: Maradi," pp. 113–14, unpublished Katsina-Maradi manuscript, pp. 125–6, 331, and Katsina Fieldnotes, 3/24, 5/16–16a; Zinder: Richardson's journal in F.O. 2/6, vol. VII, pp. 153, 154, vol. VIII, pp. 8, 12, and Dunbar, "Damagaram," p. 170, and "Economic factors in the development of Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) in the nineteenth century," paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Denver, Colorado, 4 November 1971, p. 15; Bornu: L. Brenner, "The North African trading community in the nineteenth-century Central Sudan," in D. F. McCall and N. R. Bennett, eds., *Aspects of West African Islam*, Boston University Papers on Africa, V (Boston, 1971), 142–3; Sokoto: Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 106, and Johnston, *Fulani Empire*, p. 176.

Chapter 6

1 See, for instance, the several articles on firearms in the *JAH*, XII (1971); B. Ogot, ed., *War and Society in Africa: Ten Studies* (London, 1974); and pertinent references in J. P. Smaldone, "Materials for the study of African military history," *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs* (Series II), IV, 3 (1971), 177–91.

2 J. O. Hunwick, 'The nineteenth century *jihads*, in J. F. A. Ajayi and I. Espie, eds., *A Thousand Years of West African History* (Ibadan, 1965), p. 277, n. 10.

3 See R. A. Kea, "Fortifications and siegecraft in the Fulani Empire," unpublished paper, Institute of African Studies, Univ. of Ghana, April 1966.

4 H. J. Fisher and V. Rowland, "Firearms in the Central Sudan," *JAH*, XII, 2 (1971), 215–39.

5 "The Bulala Wars," in *Sudanese Memoirs*, ed. and trans. H. R. Palmer, 3 vols. (Lagos, 1928), II, 52.

6 Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs*, III, 109.

7 Ibn Fartua, *History of the . . . Reign of Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu (1571–1583)*, ed. and trans. H. R. Palmer (Lagos, 1926), pp. 11–12. On Bornu-Ottoman relations, see B. G. Martin, "Kanem, Bornu, and the Fezzan: Notes on the political history of a trade route," *JAH*, X, 1 (1969), 22–6.

8 J. H. Greenberg, "Linguistic evidence for the influence of the Kanuri on the Hausa," *JAH*, I, 2 (1960), 211.

9 D. Denham, H. Clapperton, and W. Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in 1822, 1823, and 1824*, 4 vols. (London, 1831), I, 258, 272–3; II, 132, 140; III, 54.

10 Ibid., III, 253.

11 Ibid., IV, 107, 111–12, 132.

12 H. Clapperton, *Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa* (London, 1829), pp. xii–xiii; the letter is translated in E. W. Bovill, ed., *Missions to the Niger*, 4 vols. (London, 1966), IV, 725.

13 A. A. Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan 1788–1861* (Oxford, 1964), p. 67.

14 H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa . . . 1849–1855*, 3 vols. (Franklin Square, N.Y., 1857), I, 468.

15 Ibid., II, 327.

16 A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger* (London, 1892), pp. 72–3; C. Mac-Donald, "Exploration of the Benue and its northern tributary the Kebbi," *PRGS*, XIII, 8 (1891), 456.

17 *Proceedings of the Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa*, 2 vols. (London, 1810), I, 188, and II, 136; G. F. Lyon, *A Narrative of Travels in Northern Africa in the Years 1818, 19, and 20* (London, 1821), pp. 114, 153–4, 159; F. Hornemann, *The Journal of Frederick Hornemann's Travels, from Cairo to Mourzouk . . . in the Years 1797–8* (London, 1802), ed. E. W. Bovill, *Missions to the Niger*, 4 vols. (London, 1964), I, 100.

18 *Proceedings*, I, 154, 180–81, and II, 194; Lyon, *Narrative of Travels*, pp. 110–11; Hornemann, *Journal*, pp. 114–15.

19 See the context in which guns are mentioned in Muhammad Bello, *Infaq al-maisur*, trans. E. J. Arnett, *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani* (Kano, 1922), p. 59; Abdullah ibn Muhammad, *Tazyin al-waraqat*, trans. and ed. M. Hiskett (Ibadan, 1963), pp. 108, 112 and "Two Arabic documents: Diyyâ s-Sultan and Tazyîn l-Waraqat," trans. M. D. W. Jeffreys, *African Studies*, IX, 2 (1950), 80.

20 Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries*, II, 218, 233.

21 Clapperton, *Second Expedition*, pp. 185 ff.; forty-one of these guns were among the Kano contingent, and the other was a French *fusil* used by a Zaria musketeer.

22 In 1714 Tripoli achieved the status of a nominal dependent of the Ottoman sultan as a result of a coup by Ahmed I against Turkish authority. The new Karamanli dynasty ruled Tripoli until the sultan's troops reoccupied the province in 1835.

23 M. J. E. Daumas, *Le Sahara Algérien* (Paris, 1845), pp. 61, 94, 148–9, 150–3, 221.

24 Ibid., pp. 68, 85–6, 96, 108, 136, 148–9, 200, 231, 266–8.

25 V. Largeau, *Le Pays de Rirha, Ouargla, Voyage à Rhadamès* (Paris, 1879), pp. 105, 110–12; E. Cat, *A Travers le Désert* (Paris, 1892), p. 93.

26 Daumas, *Le Sahara Algérien*, pp. 85–6, 108, 137, 148–9, 200, 266–8, 296; H. Duveyrier, *Sahara Algérien et Tunisien*, ed. C. Maunoir and H. Schirmer (Paris, 1905), p. 140.

27 E. Rouard de Card, *La France et la Turquie dans le Sahara Oriental* (Paris, 1910), pp. 11–12, 14–18.

28 C. W. Newbury, "North African and Western Sudan trade in the nineteenth century: A re-evaluation," *JAH*, VII, 2 (1966), 237.

29 See Daumas, *Le Sahara Algérien*, pp. 168, 172; C. H. Dickson, "Extract from Vice-Consul C. H. Dickson's report of his journey from Tripoli to Ghadames," *JRGS*, XXII (1852), 131–6, and "Account of Ghadamis," *JRGS*, XXX (1860), 255–60.

30 Daumas, *Le Sahara Algérien*, p. 200.

31 Lyon, *Narrative of Travels*, p. 111.

32 Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries*, I, 38.

33 J. Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa . . . 1850–51*, ed. Bayle St. John, 2 vols. (London, 1853), I, 19, and his report on Saharan and Sudanic commerce in F.O. 881/59, p. 24.

34 Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, I, 289–90, 337–8.

35 Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission*, I, 212, 226–7.

36 S. Comte d'Escayrac de Lauture, *Le Désert el le Soudan* (Paris, 1853), pp. 434, 551. France used Algiers (after 1830) and Tunis (after 1881) as bases

for southward expansion. Even before the Turkish intervention in Tripoli, the pasha in 1820 expressed his desire to conquer Bornu and the Sudan: F.O. 76/24, Warrington to Bathurst, 7 August 1820, cited by K. Folayan, "Some economic aspects of the history of Tripoli in the reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanli, 1795–1832," unpublished paper, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, February 1969. We have seen already that the Ottomans also pursued an imperial policy toward the hinterland of Tripoli. Later in the century the Egyptian khedives monopolized the firearms trade as a means of controlling the slave trade in the southern Sudan and preventing the local states from mounting formidable resistance: H. J. Fisher and V. Rowland, "Guns and gunpowder in the Central Sudan," unpublished paper, School of Oriental and African Studies, February 1969, p. 6. I am grateful to the authors for permission to cite this paper.

37 A. Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1910–1914), II, 444–5; M. Abadie, *La Colonie du Niger* (Paris, 1927), pp. 125–6. These guns (6,000 is probably an exaggeration) must have been obtained during the later years of Taminu's second reign, because although Richardson heard reports of cannon at Zinder (*Narrative of a Mission*, II, 258), he personally observed that the army of Sultan Ibrahim was equipped with swords, spears, and bows and arrows (p. 194), and that none of the troops had guns (p. 239). It is significant that Tanimu did not get his firearms from the regular caravan trade, but instead he purchased about 1,000 camels from Tuareg herders and organized his own caravans for Tripoli and Egypt: Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques*, II, 446. He also encouraged Arab and Tuareg merchants to smuggle arms from the north. The gun trade was conducted early in the nineteenth century by a Tripolitan Arab named Hawali, and later by Malam Yaro, whose connections were among the Tuareg: R. A. Dunbar, "Damagaram (Zinder, Niger), 1812–1906: The history of a Central Sudanic Kingdom," Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1970, p. 193, and "Economic factors in the development of Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) in the nineteenth century," paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Denver, Colorado, 4 November 1971, p. 6. Taminu's successors were unable to maintain the continuous supply of guns. When the French occupied Zinder in 1899, Sultan Ahmadu's force included only 800 gunmen: J. Joalland, *Le Drame de Dankori* (Paris, 1930), p. 107; Commandant Chailley, "La mission du Haut-Soudan et le drame de Zinder," *Bulletin de l'Institut Française de l'Afrique Noire*, XVII, 1/2 (1955), 37.

38 These are the dates given by M. G. Smith, "A Hausa kingdom: Maradi under Dan Baskore, 1854–75," in D. Forde and P. M. Kaberry, eds., *West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1967); but Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques*, II, 463, gives 1858–79.

39 Smith, "A Hausa kingdom," p. 114.

40 Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries*, IV, 111–12. Dr Louis Brenner of Boston University confirmed this point in a personal communication, 12 February 1968.

41 Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques*, II, 445, 447.

42 See B. G. Martin, "Five letters from the Tripoli archives," *JHSN*, II, 3 (1962), 354–9. One of these letters, from the pasha of Tripoli to his son, the governor of Fezzan, refers to a Bornu request for firearms that could not be honored without authorization from the Ottoman sultan.

43 In 1869, G. Nachtigal reported that "the direct trade between Bornu and the coast of the Mediterranean had for many years been greatly reduced": "Jour-

ney to Lake Chad and neighbouring regions," *JRGS*, XLVI (1876), 398. See also A. A. Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan 1788–1861* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 107–8, and "The caravan trade in the nineteenth century," *JAH*, III, 2 (1962), 351–2.

44 In 1866 G. Rohlfs estimated that Shehu Umar had 1,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry armed with flintlocks, and 20 cannon, some of which were cast in Kuka: R. E. Ellison, "Three forgotten explorers of the latter half of the 19th century with special reference to their journeys to Bornu," *JHSN*, I, 4 (1959). 323. Several years later Gustav Nachtigal, who visited Umar's arsenal personally, estimated that it contained about 1,000 guns of all kinds: *Sahara et Soudan*, trans. J. Gourdault (Paris, 1881), p. 351. O. Temple claims there were sixteen units of gunmen in the Bornu army: *Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria*, ed. C. L. Temple, 2nd ed. (Lagos, 1922), p. 437. Bornu seems not to have been able to increase its supply of firearms after this time, for at the end of the century the army was still reported to have about 1500–2,000 guns: C.O. 879/58/580, Wallace to Chamberlain, encl. 1 in no. 44, 5 March 1901, p. 104; C.O. 879/72/684, Lugard to Chamberlain, no. 22, 17 May 1902, p. 55. We noted above that Zinder supplied Bornu with several hundred muskets. It also seems that local blacksmiths were able to fabricate firearms; an eyewitness reported that when Rabeh entered Kuka he found very few European guns, but 1,100 *native* guns: F.O. 101/86, Jago to Salisbury, encl. in Africa no. 2, 10 April 1896.

45 Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, II, 645.

46 J. Hamilton, *Wanderings in North Africa* (London, 1856), pp. 176–7; cf. p. 197.

47 Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, II, 658.

48 See E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (London, 1949); N. A. Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah* (Leiden, 1958); Boahen, *Britain*, pp. 110–11, and "The caravan trade," pp. 352–4; and E. A. Tarverdova, "The role of Senussites in monitoring caravan trade of people of Chad Basin with the countries of North Africa in the second half of nineteenth century," paper presented at the Second International Congress of Africanists, Dakar, 1967.

49 Hamilton, *Wanderings*, p. 197; A. S. White, *From Sphinx to Oracle* (London, 1899), pp. 119–21; H. Méhier de Mathuisieulx, *A Travers la Tripolitaine* (Paris, 1903), p. 188; R. Forbes, *The Secret of the Sahara: Kufara* (London, 1921), pp. 14–15, 63, 228, 324–7.

50 This paragraph on the contraband arms trade is based largely on the detailed reports in the F.O. 101 Tripoli files for the 1890s, and it would be tedious to document them individually. These files contain a wealth of information on the Central Sudan, most of it coming by way of caravan traders who had recently been to Kano, Kuka, Dikwa, or Abeche in Wadai, and who were questioned by British consular officials in Tripoli and Benghazi upon their return to the Mediterranean coast. More accessible data on this arms traffic can be found in White, *From Sphinx to Oracle*, pp. 123–4; Méhier de Mathuisieulx, *A Travers la Tripolitaine*, pp. 6, 13–14, 89; Forbes, *Secret of the Sahara*, p. 327; H. K. W. Kumm, *From Hausaland to Egypt* (London, 1910), pp. 112–15, 170 ff.; H. Vischer, *Across the Sahara from Tripoli to Bornu* (London, 1910), pp. 168, 187.

51 G. Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan*, 3 vols. (Berlin and Leipzig, 1879–89), III, 240; H. Carbou, *La Région du Tchad et du Ouadai* (Paris, 1912), p. 263 (both cited by Fisher and Rowland, "Firearms in the Central Sudan," p. 223, n. 60). See Kumm, *From Hausaland to Egypt*, pp. 112–15, 170 ff.; and R. Chudeau, *Missions au Sahara: Sahara Soudanais* (Paris, 1909), pp. 293–4.

52 Vischer, *Across the Sahara*, pp. 168, 187.
53 Captain Fonferrier, "Études historiques sur le mouvement caravanier dans le Cercle d'Agadez," *Bulletin du Comité d'Études Historiques et Scientifiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*, VI, 2 (1923), 307; Y. Urvoy, "Histoire des Oulliminden de l'est," ibid., XVI, 1 (1933), 81, and *Histoire des Populations du Soudan Central (Colonie du Niger)* (Paris, 1936), p. 210.
54 Cat, *A Travers le Désert*, p. 231.
55 L. Binger, "Les routes commerciales du Soudan Occidentale," *La Gazette Géographique*, XXI, Part 1, 11 (1886), 204; C. Sabatier, *Touat, Sahara et Soudan* (Paris, 1891), p. 191.
56 C. H. Robinson, "News from Kano," *Niger and Yoruba Notes*, II, 14 (1895), 15.
57 After 1885 the Tripoli–Bornu caravan traffic suffered a severe depression, partially as a result of the siphoning off of much of the trade to the Cyrenaica–Wadai route to the east. The invasion of Bornu by Rabeh in 1893 dealt the death blow to this ancient caravan route. Trade remained completely paralyzed until 1896–7, when the first caravans since the fall of Bornu were reported on the move. But the commerce never revived, for by the turn of the century the French conquered the regions north of Bornu and effectively terminated the caravan trade. See the F.O. 101 Tripoli files, and the commercial reports of the British consuls at Tripoli and Benghazi that were published annually in *Parliamentary Papers*.
58 F.O. 101/88, Alvarez to Salisbury, Africa no. 4, 12 July 1898; C.O. 446/2, Alvarez to Salisbury, encl. to letter of 1 June 1898, Northern Nigeria no. 12314, 12 April 1898.
59 F.O. 101/86, Jago to Salisbury, encl. in Africa no. 2, 10 April 1896, and Jago to Salisbury, encl. in Africa no. 4, 2 May 1896. After Rabeh's death in 1900, his army was depleted by desertions, disbanding, and casualties, but his son and successor, Faderalla, continued to command about 2,000 gunmen: C.O. 879/58/580, Wallace to Chamberlain, no. 44, 12 April 1901, and encl. 1 in same, 5 March 1901; and Wallace to Chamberlain, encl. 1 in no. 82, 28 July 1901. Some estimates of Rabeh's force of gunmen, such as that of Sir Alan Burns, which puts the number at 5,000, must be regarded as exaggerations: *History of Nigeria*, 6th ed. (London, 1963), p. 57.
60 F.O. 101/86, Alvarez to Salisbury, Commercial no. 6, 19 September 1896.
61 F.O. 101/88, Jago to Salisbury, Africa no. 2, 1 December 1898; Jago to Salisbury, Africa no. 3, 16 December 1898; F.O. 101/91, Jago to Lansdowne, Africa no. 1, 20 April 1901; F.O. 101/92, Jago to Lansdowne, Africa no. 5, 6 October 1902; C.O. 446/5, encl. in Northern Nigeria no. 481 (Confidential), 4 January 1899.
62 F.O. 101/88, Consul-General Jago's Supplementary Report for the year 1897 on the Vilayet of Tripoli (Confidential, printed for use of the Foreign Office), June 1898, p. 20. The evidence is conflicting on this point. Although the Kano–Tripoli trade was affected adversely by the insecurity of the trade route in the late 1890s, and Rabeh controlled the gun supply in Bornu, Mai Maina na Jega, the Hausa spy sent by Lugard to investigate Kano's defenses in 1902, reported that Emir Aliyu had many guns brought from Tripoli: *Labarin Mai Maina na Jega, Sarkin Askira*, ed. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (Zaria, 1958), p. 14; also translated into English in Kirk-Greene, ed., *West African Travels and Adventures* (New Haven, Conn., 1971), p. 143. See Chapter 7, especially pp. 121–2.
63 C. H. Robinson, *Hausaland, or Fifteen Hundred Miles Through the Central Soudan* (London, 1896), p. 87.

64 In Palmer, ed. and trans., *Sudanese Memoirs*, III, 124, 126.
65 P. E. Lovejoy, "The influence of monetary expansion on the development of Hausa trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries," paper presented at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Philadelphia, November 1972.
66 S. Lucas, *Proceedings of the Association*, I, 179; also quoted in R. Hallett, ed., *Records of the African Association 1788–1831* (Edinburgh, 1964), p. 99.
67 S. Tenkorang, "The importance of firearms in the struggle between Ashanti and the coastal states, 1708–1807," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, IX (1968), 1–16; J. Dupuis, *Journal of a Residence in Ashantee* (London, 1824), L, LI, cxxxii; T. E. Bowdich, *Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee* (London, 1819), p. 335; I. Wilks, "Ashanti government," in Forde and Kaberry, eds., *West African Kingdoms*, p. 218.
68 Dupuis, *Journal of a Residence in Ashantee*, LI; J. Lombard, "The kingdom of Dahomey," in Forde and Kaberry, eds., *West African Kingdoms*, pp. 89–90.
69 K. O. Dike, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830–1885* (London, 1956), p. 107; G. I. Jones, *The Trading States of the Oil Rivers* (London, 1963), pp. 72, 88; E. M. Chilver, "Nineteenth century trade in the Bamenda grassfields, Southern Cameroons," *Afrika und Übersee*, XVI, 41 (1962), 242–3.
70 S. Johnson, *The History of the Yorubas*, ed. Dr O. Johnson (London, 1921), p. 208; J. F. A. Ajayi and R. S. Smith, *Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1964), p. 17.
71 R. Lander, *Records of Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa*, 2 vols. (London, 1830), II, 222.
72 M. Laird and R. A. K. Oldfield, *Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of Africa*, 2 vols. (London, 1837), II, 86–7; see also nn. 18–21 above.
73 Ajayi and Smith, *Yoruba Warfare*, p. 18.
74 T. J. Bowen, *Adventures and Missionary Labours in Several Countries in the Interior of Africa from 1849 to 1856* (Charleston, S.C., 1857), p. 319.
75 R. Campbell, *A Pilgrimage to My Motherland* (New York, 1861), p. 66; see Ajayi and Smith, *Yoruba Warfare*, p. 20.
76 Ajayi and Smith, *Yoruba Warfare*, p. 20.
77 W. Allen and T. R. H. Thomson, *A Narrative of the Expedition . . . to the River Niger in 1841*, 2 vols. (London, 1848), II, 99; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1843, xlviii, p. 127.
78 J. F. Schön and S. A. Crowther, *Journals . . . of the Expedition up the Niger in 1841* (London, 1842), p. 207; and *Parliamentary Papers*, 1843, xlviii, p. 125. Schön and Crowther also reported the Nupe army to have "a great number of horses, guns, cutlasses, bows, and arrows" (pp. 138–9). Allen and Thomson record the same story of Nupe firearms: "Fire-arms are used by the Filatahs: each has his musket" (*Narrative of the Expedition to the River Niger*, II, 116), These are certainly exaggerated reports, but the point is clear that the possession of guns was giving Nupe a decided advantage over its enemies.
79 Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission*, II, 278, 349. Richardson also reported that many slaves from Zinder were sent to Kano (p. 274) and Nupe (pp. 203, 228–9), whence American merchandise was beginning to drive out the goods of the north. Barth also complained that South American goods were flooding the Sudan: *Travels*, I, 516–17).
80 Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission*, II, 260; Barth observed that a few firearms were being imported to Kano from Nupe and that pistols and blunderbusses were sold only privately to wealthy men: *Travels and Discoveries*, I, 520.
81 Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission*, II, 264.
82 Ibid., I, 316.

83 F.O. 97/334, Baikie to Russell, no. 4 of 1862, 13 February 1862; S. A. Crowther and J. C. Taylor, *The Gospel on the Banks of the Niger* (London, 1859), p. 393; W. B. Baikie, *Narrative of an Exploring Voyage . . . in 1854*, pp. 294, 317; Dike, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1831–1885* (Oxford, 1956), Tables A and B, pp. 105, 106.

84 J. Whitford, *Trading Life in Western and Central Africa* (Liverpool, 1877), p. 218.

85 The text of the decree is in F.O. Confidential no. 1871, pp. 15–16; for the history of Lokoja, see H. J. Pedraza, *Borrioboola-Gha* (London, 1960).

86 Pedraza, p. 72.

87 A. Burdo, *Niger et Bénué (The Niger and the Benueh)*, trans. Mrs. G. Sturge (London, 1880), pp. 244–5.

88 Whitford, *Trading Life*, pp. 218–19.

89 See, for example, F.O. 97/435, Masaba to Victoria, 20 April 1865, and Victoria to Masaba, 20 July 1865; F.O. 97/436, Glover to Clarendon, encl. 3, 4, and 5, 19 April 1866.

90 See F.O. 97/436, Glover to Clarendon, encl. 1 and 2, 19 April 1866.

91 F.O. 97/334, Baikie to Russell, encl. in no. 26 of 1862, 25 July 1862.

92 F.O. 2/32, Baikie to Malmesbury, encl. 2 in no. 55 of 1859, 6 August 1859.

93 M. Hassan and M. Shu'aibu, *A Chronicle of Abuja*, trans. F. L. Heath (Ibadan, 1952), p. 28. Baikie's own account was published as "Notes of a journey from Bida in Nupe, to Kano in Haussa, performed in 1862," *JRGS*, XXXVII (1867), 92–108.

94 F.O. Confidential no. 1871, p. 8; F.O. Confidential no. 2023, W. H. Simpson's *Report of the Niger Expedition, 1871*, pp. 17, 19 (also extracted in T. Hodgkin, ed., *Nigerian Perspectives: An Historical Anthology* [London, 1960], pp. 294–5; also cited by J. E. Flint, *Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria* [London, 1960], p. 25); S. A. Crowther, *Niger Mission: Report of the Overland Journey from Lokoja to Bida . . . 1872* (London, 1872), p. 13.

95 Whitford, *Trading Life*, p. 250; cf. also F.O. Confidential no. 2023, p. 7; J. E. Flint, loc. cit., and "The chequered history of Nupe," *West African Review*, XXX, 382 (1959), 588; A. Mattei, *Bas-Niger, Bénoué et Dahomey* (Grenoble, 1890), p. 141; J. Thomson, "Niger and Central Sudan sketches," *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, II, 10 (1886), 586; J. Milum, "Notes of a journey from Lagos up the River Niger to Bida, the capital of Nupe and Illorin in the Yoruba country, 1879–80," *PRGS*, III, 1 (1881), 31.

96 Burdo, *The Niger*, pp. 222 ff.

97 Sokoto: F.O. Confidential no. 2023, p. 17; Gwandu: Arnett, "History of Sokoto," p. 41, and *Gazetteer*, p. 41; D. M. Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (London, 1967), p. 73; Missau: J. M. Fremantle, "A history of the region comprising the Katagum Division of Kano Province," Part IV, *JAS*, XI, 42 (1912), 188; Zaria: M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau 1800–1950* (London, 1960), p. 190; Abuja: Hassan and Shu'aibu, *Chronicle of Abuja*, pp. 15–16. In the latter case a regular trade developed between Abuja and Nupe and Ilorin, Abuja selling slaves and purchasing muskets and powder: *Chronicle*, p. 79. Viard also reports that Nupe traders were the middlemen in the European/American–Sudanic trade, and took guns and powder to the interior by caravan: *Au Bas-Niger*, pp. 89, 92.

98 On the Niger Company and the French competition, see Flint, *Sir George Goldie;* C. W. Newbury, "The development of French policy on the Lower and Upper Niger, 1880–98," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXI, 1 (1959), 16–26; T. H. M. Kirk-Greene, "Expansion on the Benue 1830–1900," *JHSN*, I, 3 (1958), 215–37.

99 S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria* (London, 1942), p. 86. Nadel gives the dates of Umaru's reign as 1873–84, and that of his successor, Maliki, as 1884–95. This is an error, for Umaru's death and Maliki's succession occurred in 1882: Mattei, *Bas-Niger*, p. 55. Nadel states further (pp. 82, 86) that Emir Umaru's guns were flintlocks imported from the north. This too is erroneous: as we have seen, Nupe's guns and powder were southern imports that became common during the reign of Masaba.

100 Ibid., p. 110. See Flint, *Sir George Goldie*, pp. 38–9, for the background and details of this rebellion. The Kedde are treated separately by Nadel in "The Kede: A Riverain state in Northern Nigeria," in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., *African Political Systems* (London, 1940), pp. 164–95.

101 C. R. Niven, "The Kabba province of the Northern Provinces, Nigeria," *Geographical Journal*, LXVIII, 4 (1926), 300.

102 Mattei, *Bas-Niger*, p. 55.

103 D. J. M. Muffett, "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," in M. Crowder, ed., *West African Resistance* (New York, 1971), p. 286.

104 F.O. 101/86, Jago to Salisbury, encl. in Africa no. 2, 10 April 1896; and Jago to Salisbury, Africa no. 4, 2 May 1896.

105 E. M. Chilver, "Nineteenth century trade in the Bamenda grassfields, southern Cameroons," *Afrika und Übersee*, XVI, 41 (1962), 233–4, 238, 242–3. Cf. Maistre, *A Travers l'Afrique Centrale*, p. 231; M. D. W. Jeffreys, "Some historical notes on the Ntem," *JHSN*, II, 1 (1961), 275–6; P. F. Lacroix, "Materiaux pour servir à l'histoire des Peuls de l'Adamawa," *Études Camerounaises*, V, 37/38 (1952), 36.

106 F.O. 101/86, Jago to Salisbury, encl. in Africa no. 2, 10 April 1896; P. L. Monteil, *De Saint-Louis à Tripoli par le Lac Tchad* (Paris, 1895), p. 346; cf. L. Mizon, "Les Royaumes Foulbé du Soudan Central," *Annales de Géographie*, IV (Oct. 1894–July 1895), 358–60.

107 J. M. Fremantle, "A history of the region comprising the Katagum Division of Kano Province," Part III, *JAS*, XI, 41 (1911), 64–5; V. N. Low, *Three Nigerian Emirates: A Study in Oral History* (Evanston, Ill. 1972), pp. 195, 197. The data here are confusing. Rabeh seems to have been importing munitions from the Benue trading posts of the Niger Company, and simultaneously exporting them to Katagum, where Gamawa alone acquired some 400 to 500 guns (Low, p. 197). However, Kano complied with the Caliph's instructions, cut off trade with Bornu, and obtained no guns from Rabeh.

108 C.O. 879/33/399, p. 101; Johnson, *History of the Yorubas*, p. 448.

109 C.O. 879/33/399, p. 40; Johnson, *History of the Yorubas*, p. 577; H. B. Hermon-Hodge, *Gazetteer of Ilorin Province* (London, 1929), p. 72; S. J. Hogben and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria* (London, 1966), p. 297; Flint, "The chequered history of Nupe," p. 589.

110 C.O. 879/33/399, pp. 12, 20, 21; Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*, p. 204, n. 2; cf. Johnson, *History of the Yorubas*, p. 505.

111 C.O. 879/33/399, p. 6; Johnson, *History of the Yorubas*, p. 649. In 1894 Lugard also noted this arms trade with Lagos: M. Perham and M. Bull, eds., *The Diaries of Lord Lugard*, 4 vols. (London, 1963), IV, 142, 149, 189, 196.

112 Flint, "The chequered history of Nupe," p. 589.

113 P. F. Teba, "Britain's role in regulating the arms traffic in West Africa, 1873–1919," M. Litt. thesis, Cambridge University, May 1967, pp. 201–21.

114 Flint, "The chequered history of Nupe," p. 589.

115 C.O. 879/33/399, pp. 1–2; Teba, chap. III.

116 Johnson, *History of the Yorubas*, p. 492; Ajayi and Smith, *Yoruba Warfare*, pp. 18, 21.

117 C. H. Robinson, *Hausaland* (London, 1896), p. 11.
118 See the import lists in C.O. 465/2 (1901); C.O. 465/3 (1902); *NNAR*, no. 377 (1901), pp. 52, 54, and no. 409 (1902), p. 166.
119 M. Perham and M. Bull, eds. *The Diaries of Lord Lugard*, IV, 109.
120 R. W. Beachey, "The arms trade in East Africa in the late nineteenth century," *JAH*, III, 3 (1962), 451.

Chapter 7

1 H. J. Fisher and V. Rowland, "Firearms in the Central Sudan," *JAH*, XII, 2 (1971), 239.
2 The arguments made in this chapter are based on J. P. Smaldone, "Firearms in the Central Sudan: A revaluation," *JAH*, XIII, 4 (1972), 591–600. In part, the difference between the Fisher–Rowland thesis and the interpretation offered here is that these authors, while defining the Central Sudan to include the Sokoto Caliphate and the eastern states of Bornu, Baghirmi, Wadai, and Darfur, in fact focus their attention almost exclusively on the eastern states; references to the emirates of Sokoto are infrequent and necessarily selective. The systematic review of the available data for the caliphate in the present work redresses the balance and suggests an alternative thesis. The reader is referred to the *JAH* article for the extension of this revisionist thesis to the other Sudanic states.
3 M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau 1800–1950* (London, 1960), p. 190. The dates for Yero's reign are based on D. M. Last, "A solution to the problems of dynastic chronology in 19th century Zaria and Kano" *JHSN*, III, 3 (1966), 467.
4 V. N. Low, *Three Nigerian Emirates: A Study in Oral History* (Evanston, Ill., 1972), pp. 165, n. 44, and 167. Gombe is here reported to have made a gift of 1,000 guns to Emir Sale of Missau, certainly a hyperbolism.
5 Ibid., p. 197; Katagum Fieldnotes. It will be recalled that Katagum participated in this trade with Rabeh despite explicit orders from Sokoto to the contrary.
6 Smith, Katsina Fieldnotes, 5/37a.
7 C. N. Ubah, "Kano Emirate in the 19th century: A study of political developments," M.A. thesis, Institute of African Studies, Univ. of Ghana, May 1965, p. 126. This too is probably an exaggeration, but it is certain that Kano did have several hundred guns and rifles, perhaps well over a thousand: see the discussion on pp. 121–2.
8 Sokoto: C.O. 879/58/580, Willcocks to Chamberlain, no. 9, 26 January 1899, p. 7, and Smith, Sokoto Fieldnotes, 3/37a-38; Katsina: Smith, Katsina Fieldnotes, 6/9.
9 F.O. 97/334, Baikie to Russell, no. 3 of 1864, 20 January 1864.
10 F. W. Taylor, *A Practical Hausa Grammar* (Oxford, 1923), pp. 98–100; C. G. B. Gidley, "Mantanfas – A study in oral tradition," *African Language Studies*, VI (1965), 36, 50.
11 Smith, Katsina Fieldnotes, 5/37a.
12 Low, Hadejia Fieldnotes.
13 D. Denham, H. Clapperton, and W. Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in 1822, 1823, and 1824*, 4 vols. (London, 1831), II, 64 ff.
14 See Chapter 5 above, pages 75, 83, and n. 35. This version is recorded in A. Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1910–1914), II, 363. Also translated in A. Schultze, *The Sultanate of Bornu*, trans.

P. A. Benton (London, 1913), p. 260. Al-Kanemi had no more than 200 guns at this time: Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney, *Travels and Discoveries*, II, 218, 233.

15 M. Hassan and M. Shu'aibu, *A Chronicle of Abuja*, trans. F. L. Heath (Ibadan, 1952), p. 26.

16 The relative merits of bows and muskets are discussed in G. Toutée, *Du Dahomé au Sahara: La Nature et l'Homme* (Paris, 1899), pp. 228–30.

17 See Chapter 5 above, especially p. 87 and n. 59. Although Lander's account may be apocryphal, it can serve as a hypothetical illustration of the effective use of muskets by besieged forces.

18 S. Johnson, *The History of the Yorubas*, ed. Dr O. Johnson (London, 1921), p. 505.

19 See Chapter 5 above, pp. 77–9. Cf. the Japanese case, in which gun-equipped infantry completely displaced the cavalry: D. M. Brown, "The impact of fire-arms on Japanese warfare, 1543–98," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, VII, 3 (1948), 236–45.

20 Alhaji Bello, *Gandoki* (Zaria, 1934), pp. 12–13.

21 C.O. 446/14, Lugard to Chamberlain, no. 14994, 21 March 1901, p. 806.

22 H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa . . . 1849-1855*, 3 vols. (Franklin Square, N.Y., 1857), I, 454.

23 Nupe: F.O. Confidential, no. 2023, pp. 17, 19; J. E. Flint, *Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigera* (London, 1960), pp. 25, 248, and "The chequered history of Nupe," *West African Review*, XXX, 382 (1959), 588; S. Vandeleur, *Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger* (London, 1898), pp. 205–6; A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger* (London, 1892), p. 169; Zinder: A. Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1910–1914), II, 526; Maradi: M. G. Cazemajou, "Du Niger vers le Lac Tchad," *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française*, X, 7 (1900), 243; Adamawa: R. R. Oakley, *Treks and Palavers* (London, 1938), p. 89.

24 H. A. S. Johnston, ed. and trans., *A Selection of Hausa Stories* (London, 1966), p. 142; Low, Hadejia and Katagum Fieldnotes.

25 Tilho, *Documents Scientifiques*, II, 526. This tactical solution was precisely the same as that used in modern European warfare, when the transition to gun warfare caused a revaluation of the role of cavalry. See the recommended employment of "mounted rifles" in G. T. Denison, *A History of Cavalry from the Earliest Times, with Lessons for the Future* (London, 1877), chaps. XXXII–XXXIV, pp. 513–58.

26 Smith, *Government in Zazzau*, pp. 90, 190–1.

27 V. N. Low, "The border states: A political history of three northeast Nigerian emirates, ca. 1800–1902," Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1967, Appendices C(1), C(2), C(3).

28 Smith, Katsina Fieldnotes, 6/9.

29 Smith, unpublished Daura manuscript, pp. 433–4.

30 D. M. Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (London, 1967), pp. 125–6, and 231, n. 1.

31 Hassan and Shu'aibu, *Chronicle of Abuja*, pp. 15–16, 76; Smith, *Government in Zazzau*, table facing p. 36, and p. 377; R. A. Dunbar, "Damagaram (Zinder, Niger), 1812–1906: The history of a Central Sudanic kingdom," Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1970, pp. 165–6, and "Economic factors in the development of Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) in the nineteenth century," paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Denver, Colorado, 4 November 1971.

32 J. Whitford, *Trading Life in Western and Central Africa*, p. 250; F.O. 97/436, Whitford to Hamilton, 19 December 1865. Masaba also had 400 troops sta-

tioned at Bidon, the "capital" of Kakanda: S. A. Crowther and J. C. Taylor, *The Gospel on the Banks of the Niger* (London, 1859), p. 68. It is possible that the development of a standing army began during the reign of Masaba's predecessor, Usuman Zaki.

33 Smith, *Government in Zazzau*, pp. 177, 185–7; for the dates of the emirs' reigns, see D. M. Last, "A solution to the problems of dynastic chronology in 19th century Zaria and Kano," 467.

34 Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger* (London, 1892), pp. 198–9, 204; C.O. 879/33/399, pp. 12, 20, 21. This prolonged war with Ibadan seems to have been undertaken by aggressive generals against the emir's will: see Chapter 9, pp. 133–4. In this instance the standing army was less an instrument of royal power than a tool of rebellious generals.

35 Dunbar, "Damagaram," pp. 165–6, and "Economic factors," pp. 14–15.

36 The skeptic may reject the arguments advanced here regarding the revolutionary nature of these military reforms. However, we again insist that these changes in military organization and warfare represented an *incipient* revolution that manifested itself only a few decades before the British conquest. Furthermore, the comparison with Europe itself is instructive, for the development of genuine professional armies did not take place until the seventeenth century – more than two centuries after the appearance of firearms! See J. A. Mears, "The emergence of the standing professional army in seventeenth-century Europe," *Social Science Quarterly*, L, 1 (1969), 106–15.

37 See D. J. M. Muffett, *Concerning Brave Captains* (London, 1964) and R. A. Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804–1906* (New York, 1971), especially chaps. 6–9, pp. 165–313. Adeleye's work is the most systematic, comprehensive, and balanced treatment of the overthrow of the caliphate, and I have relied extensively upon his conclusions.

38 This campaign is described in detail by S. Vandeleur, *Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger* (London, 1898), pp. 204–23, 270–85; G. Goldie, *Report on the Niger-Sudan Campaign (1897)*, printed for official use (London, 1897); J. E. Flint, *Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria* (London, 1960), pp. 248–53; A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, "The first battle of Bida," *West African Review*, XXVIII, 363 (1957), 1207–12, 1235, and "The Niger Sudan Expeditionary Force, 1897: A note on the logistics of a forgotten campaign," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, XLVI, 185 (1968), 49–56. The quotations below are from Vandeleur, *Campaigning*.

39 Vandeleur, *Campaigning*, p. 272.

40 E. A. L. Hourst, *The Exploration of the Niger*, trans. Mrs A. Bell (London, 1898), p. 313; H. A. S. Johnston, *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto* (London, 1967), p. 230 and n. 38.

41. On Ahmadu and Ali Bori, see Y. Urvoy, *Histoire des Populations du Soudan Central (Colonie du Niger)* (Paris, 1936), pp. 111–17; E. Lenfant, *Le Grand Route du Tchad* (Paris, 1905), p. 61.

42 C.O. 879/58/580, Wallace to Chamberlain, encl. in no. 44, 5 March 1901, p. 104; C.O. 446/16, no. 32418, 11 September 1901, pp. 594–5; *NNAR*, no. 377 (1901), pp. 32–3, and no. 409 (1902), pp. 87–8; Sir Alan Burns, *History of Nigeria*, 6th ed. (London, 1963), p. 57; S. J. Hogben and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria* (London, 1960), pp. 347–8; Low, *Three Nigerian Emirates*, p. 197.

43 Low, *Three Nigerian Emirates*, p. 197; J. M. Fremantle, "A history of the region comprising the Katagum Division of Kano Province," Part III, *JAS*, XI, 41 (1911), 64–5; Abdulmalik Mani, *Zuwan Turawa Nijeriya ta Arewa* (London, 1957), p. 83.

44 L. Mizon, "Les royaumes Foulbé du Soudan Central," *Annales de Géographie,* IV (1894–1895), 351–2; Kirk-Greene, *Adamawa Past and Present* (London, 1958), pp. 38, 45, 46, 158.

45 A Niger Company agent's report, cited by Kirk-Greene, *Adamawa Past and Present,* p. 153. *Jalingo* is the Fulani word for war camp.

46 M. D. W. Jeffreys, "Some historical notes on the Ntem," *JHSN,* II, 1 (1961), 275–6.

47 Kirk-Greene, *Adamawa Past and Present,* p. 142.

48 C.O. 879/58/580, Wallace to Chamberlain, nos. 80 and 81, telegrams of 13 and 14 September 1901, p. 192; C.O. 446/16, no. 32419, 3 September 1901, pp. 583–6, and no. 37793, 26 September 1901, pp. 673–84; *NNAR,* no. 377 (1901), pp. 32–3; Kirk-Greene, *Adamawa Past and Present,* pp. 57–8.

49 C.O. 879/72/684, Lugard to Chamberlain, no. 15, 15 March 1902, pp. 16–17.

50 Taylor, *A Practical Hausa Grammar,* pp. 98–100; Gidley, "Mantanfas,' pp. 45, 46, 50.

51 Mai Maina na Jega, *Labarin Mai Maina,* pp. 13–14; and also Kirk-Greene, ed. and trans., *West African Travels and Adventures* (New Haven, Conn., 1971), p. 143.

52 *Parliamentary Papers,* 1903, lxv, Cmd. 1433, p. 13. The Kano emissary to the Ottoman sultan was killed on his way to Tripoli by Tuaregs near Ghat: F.O. 101/91, Jago to Lansdowne, Africa no. 2, 27 April 1901.

53 *NNAR,* no. 409 (1902), p. 75; Mai Maina, *Labarin Mai Maina,* p. 14.

54 *NNAR,* no. 409 (1902), p. 75.

55 C.O. 879/80/718, Lugard to Chamberlain, no. 19, 18 February 1903, p. 26; C.O. 446/30, Lugard's Confidential Report, no. 10526, 8 February 1903; *NNAR,* no. 409 (1902), p. 88.

56 *NNAR,* no. 409 (1902), pp. 75, 87, 92, and no. 437 (1903), p. 174; Muffett, *Concerning Brave Captains,* pp. 92–3, 131–2, 168, 169, 172–8, 184, 200–203.

57 G. D. Hazzledine, *The White Man in Nigeria* (London, 1904), p. 9.

Chapter 8

1 See J. Vansina, "The use of process-models in African history," in Vansina et al., eds. *The Historian in Tropical Africa* (London, 1964), pp. 375–89. M. G. Smith employed this technique in his study of structural change in *Government in Zazzau 1800–1950* (London, 1960). The use of this method in the study of African military history has been demonstrated by K. Otterbein, "The evolution of Zulu warfare," *Kansas Journal of Sociology,* I, 1 (1964), 27–35; also reprinted in P. Bohannan, ed., *Law and Warfare* (Garden City, N.Y., 1967), pp. 351–7.

2 P. L. van den Berghe, "The role of the army in contemporary Africa," *Africa Report,* X, 3 (1965), 13. The raiding citizen army closely resembles the "Masaic" type of military organization proposed by Andrzejewski (Andreski), *Military Organization and Society* (London, 1954), pp. 119–23, 141. This type of army organization Andreski characterizes by high cohesion, low subordination, and high military participation ratio; the last variable is defined as "the proportion of militarily utilized individuals in the total population" (p. 33).

3 The classic study of charismatic leadership is, of course, Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* trans. A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons (Glencoe, Ill., 1947), pp. 328, 358–92; H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds. and trans., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, 1946), pp. 79, 245–52.

4 M. G. Smith, "Historical and cultural conditions of political corruption among the Hausa," *Comparative Studies of Society and History*, VI, 2 (1964), 174.

5 This term was suggested by Professor Ivor Wilks to characterize such highly mobile, mobilized, and militarized polities.

6 P. L. van den Berghe, "The role of the army," p. 13. M. Janowitz's "aristocratic model" of civil-military relations conforms closely to the palace army type: "Military elites and the study of war," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, I, 1 (1957), 10. See also the "Internal Dominance – Feudal" type proposed by M. D. Feld, "A typology of military organization," in C. J. Friedrich and S. E. Harris, eds., *Public Policy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 13–17.

7 See R. Coulborn, ed., *Feudalism in History* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), and two critical reviews of this work by B. F. Hoselitz, "On comparative history," *World Politics*, IX, 2 (1957), 267–79, and O. Lattimore, "Feudalism in history," *Past and Present*, no. 12 (1957), pp. 47–57. Two discussions of the relevance of feudalism to African history are J. J. Maquet, "A research definition of African feudality," *JAH*, III, 2 (1962), 307–10, and J. Goody, "Feudalism in Africa?" *JAH*, IV, 1 (1963), 1–18. S. Andreski has provided a useful analysis of the various definitions of feudalism in chap. 10 of *The Uses of Comparative Sociology* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965), pp. 149–62. He also proposes seven basic criteria for feudalism: (1) the division of the population into a ruling class of self-equipped warriors who monopolize military functions, and a subject class of disarmed peasants; (2) the relative unimportance of other social classes; (3) the individual authority of nobles over peasants; (4) the granting of fiefs on condition of continued military and administrative service; (5) the combination of such land tenure with jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the land; (6) a simple hierarchical structure characterized by a fusion rather than a functional division of authority; and (7) a pronounced dispersion of power.

Other conditions usually associated with feudal systems are a predominance of an agrarian economy, rudimentary means of transport, and a large territory relative to the means of administration. Andreski alleges that the political structure of the emirates of Sokoto was "entirely feudal" (p. 154). However, no society or polity is purely of a single type; it is the relative prevalence and predominance of specified characteristics and conditions that allow the use of typologies. In the case of the Sokoto Caliphate, each of the seven criteria listed above, as well as their associated conditions, existed to a greater or lesser extent, and their composite configuration was sufficiently prominent to justify the designation of the caliphate's political structure as feudal. See also the discussion on p. 133.

8 The association of cavalry with fief holding, of course, was characteristic of pre-*jihad* Hausaland, and their reconstitution in the Sokoto Caliphate therefore was no novelty. It is not possible to demonstrate that the introduction of cavalry in Hausaland *caused* the development of fief holding, but their relationship was intimate. In the case of Europe, L. T. White, Jr., has argued that the origins of feudalism lie in the development of cavalry in the eighth-century Frankish kingdom: *Medieval Technology and Social Change* (Oxford, 1962). Regarding the constraints on centralized control of cavalry in the Sudan, R. C. C. Law has argued that it was more the recurrent cost of maintaining cavalry than the initial capital outlay for horses and accouterments that prevented royal control: "Horses, firearms, and political power in pre-colonial West Africa," unpublished paper, African History Seminar, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 5 December 1973, pp. 7–8.

9 Although the relative value of slaves, horses, and cavalry accouterments varied

across time and locale in the nineteenth century, this estimate is reasonably accurate. Numerous contemporary sources indicate that a horse and mail suit were *each* equal in value to *at least* one slave. Saddles, *lifidi,* helmets, shields, swords, lances, and other assorted equipment were together worth *at least* three slaves.

10 R. A. Preston, S. F. Wise, and H. O. Werner, *Men in Arms* (New York, 1962), p. 65; M. Bloch, *Feudal Society,* trans. L. A. Manyon (London, 1961), p. 444; C. Stephenson, *Mediaeval Feudalism* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1942), p. 56; Andreski, *Uses of Comparative Sociology,* pp. 156–7, 161. On the basic conflict between populist revolutionary ideology and the requirements of military organization, see J. Ellis, *Armies in Revolution* (New York, 1974).

11 M. Janowitz, "Armed forces and society: A world perspective," in J. van Doorn, ed., *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays* (The Hague, 1968), pp. 24–5. See also G. Mosca, *The Ruling Class,* trans. H. D. Kahn (New York, 1939), pp. xxv, 222–3, 235; and the "subjective control model" formulated by S. P. Huntington, "Civilian control of the military: A theoretical statement," in H. Eulau, S. J. Eldersveld, and M. Janowitz, eds., *Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), pp. 380–5. See also Chapter 9, p. 145, and n. 22.

12 This section is based on Smaldone, "Firearms in the Central Sudan: A revaluation," 600–606, which argues that these changes in politico-military organization occurred throughout the Central Sudan in the late nineteenth century.

13 Gerth and Mills, eds., *From Max Weber,* p. 298.

14 In making this broad distinction between feudal and bureaucratic systems, I have relied upon Mosca, *The Ruling Class,* chap. III, pp. 70–102. The Weberian characteristics of bureaucracy are more formal and explicit, namely functional specialization, hierarchical authority structure, impersonality, technical expertise, recruitment based on achievement criteria, fixed remuneration for services, and so on; and indeed, they are assumed in the simplified definition adopted here. For an extended discussion of sociological thought on bureaucracy, see N. P. Mouzelis, *Organisation and Bureaucracy* (Chicago, 1968), especially chaps. I–III. See the excellent study by I. Wilks, "Aspects of bureaucratization in Ashanti in the nineteenth century," *JAH,* VII, 2 (1966), 215–32.

15 See J. Goody, *Technology, Tradition, and the State in Africa* (London, 1971), chap. 3, pp. 39–56. Historically, feudal and bureaucratic elements had coexisted and even become fused in Sudanic state structure. The relative strength of each element varied considerably across time and space, and it is tempting, as Fisher and Rowland suggest, to regard Sudanic history in terms of recurring cycles, shifting forces, changing balances, or other mechanistic metaphors, and to see in the centralizing tendencies of the nineteenth century simply a repetition of the bureaucratic phase. However, such a view fails to consider the possibility of alternatives. It is our contention that the increasing availability and use of firearms bore with it the *potential* for the decisive suppression of the feudal element and the consolidation of the bureaucratic.

16 V. N. Low, "The border states: A political history of three northeast Nigerian emirates, ca. 1800–1902," Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1967, Appendices C(1), C(2), C)3), and pp. 59, 207–8, 314–15; J. M. Fremantle, "A history of the region comprising the Katagum Division of Kano Province," Part I, *JAS,* X, 39 (1911), 314, and Part II, X, 40 (1911), 411; see *NNAR,* no. 516 (1905/06), p. 379.

17 H. R. Palmer, ed. and trans., *Sudanese Memoirs,* 3 vols. (Lagos, 1928), III, 131.

18 *NNAR*, no. 409 (1902), p. 89, no. 476 (1904), p. 240. See C. N. Ubah, "Kano Emirate in the 19th century: A study of political developments," M.A. thesis, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, May 1965, pp. 74 ff., for a more comprehensive study of the emirs' policies.

19 R. W. Hull, "The development of administration in Katsina Emirate, Northern Nigeria 1887–1944," Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1968, pp. 32 ff., and "The Impact of the Fulani *jihad* on interstate relations in the Central Sudan: Katsina Emirate – A case study," in D. F. McCall and N. R. Bennett, eds., *Aspects of West African Islam*, Boston University Papers on Africa, V (Boston, 1971), pp. 96–7; Smith, Katsina Fieldnotes, 3/26-26a, 5/50a, 6/9.

20 Smith, Sokoto Fieldnotes, 3/33-33a, 5/4a-5, 5/34.

21 Jama'are: Fremantle, "A history of the region comprising the Katagum Division," Part IV, *JAS*, XI, 42 (1912), 191; Adamawa: A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, "Von Uechtritz's expedition to Adamawa, 1893," *JHSN*, I, 2 (1957), 90; Ilorin: R. Campbell, *A Pilgrimage to My Motherland* (New York, 1861), pp. 61, 62–3, 101–2; and S. S. Farrow, "A visit to Ilorin," *Niger and Yoruba Notes*, I, 10 (1895), 29; Nupe: S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria* (London, 1942), p. 107.

22 Nadel, *Black Byzantium*, p. 107.

23 See D. M. Last, "Aspects of administration and dissent in Hausaland, 1800–1968," *Africa*, XL, 4 (1970), 345–57.

24 The decline of cavalry in European military history is well documented. On the impact of firearms in Japan and the Mamluk kingdom, see D. M. Brown, "The impact of firearms on Japanese warfare, 1543–98," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, VIII, 3 (1948), 236–53; and D. Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom* (London, 1956). That such a process was already occurring in the Central Sudan is suggested by the increasing abandonment of padded armor, lances and spears in favor of firearms in late nineteenth-century Wadai: G. Bruel, *L'Afrique Équatoriale Française* (Paris, 1918), p. 230. In addition, the changing relative values of horses and firearms in the Central Sudan at the end of the nineteenth century may have been a consequence of this transformation in military organization and warfare. As the price of guns declined with greater availability, the cost of horses rose, reflecting perhaps the growing prominence of firearms and the devaluation of cavalry: Allan G. B. Fisher and H. J. Fisher, *Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa* (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), pp. 82–3.

25 Gerth and Mills, eds., *From Max Weber*, p. 221; see Andrzejewski (Andreski), *Military Organization and Society*, pp. 87–8, 98–9.

26 Gerth and Mills, eds., *From Max Weber*, p. 222.

27 Ibid., chap. VIII, pp. 196–244; Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, chap. IX, pp. 222–43; S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York, 1963), pp. 130–1.

28 See Chapter 7 above, pp. 110–11. If the Fisher-Rowland thesis implies a deterministic cyclical historical pattern, we do not propose to substitute a necessary pattern of unilineal development. Although in theory rulers enjoyed an exclusive monopoly of the instruments of coercion, in practice the control of firearms sometimes devolved upon fief-holding officials who armed their own slaves with these weapons and occasionally asserted their independence of the throne. Likewise, the emirs' possession of guns enabled them to become more independent of the caliph's authority. The available evidence is insufficient to demonstrate conclusively either the Fisher-Rowland thesis or the interpretation offered in this book. Since the changes in military technology, army organiza-

tion, and political structure discussed herein were arrested by the British conquest, the possible alternative outcomes must forever remain a matter for speculation. The tentative nature of the thesis presented here is underscored by the use of such phrases as "incipient revolution," "nascent revolution," and "tendencies."

Chapter 9

1 Regarding sociology particularly, this methodological imperative has been forcefully asserted by S. W. F. Holloway: "history and sociology must become one," for "the advance of both sociology and history will be held back until sociologists become historians and historians sociologists." See "History and sociology: What history is and what it ought to be," in W. H. Burston and D. Thompson, eds., *Studies in the Nature and Teaching of History* (New York, 1967), p. 12.

2 See, for example, K. Lang, *Military Institutions and the Sociology of War: A Review of the Literature with Annotated Bibliography* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1972), and W. T. Divale, *Warfare in Primitive Societies: A Bibliography* (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1973).

3 A. Leeds, "The functions of war," in J. H. Masserman, ed., *Violence and War* (New York, 1963), p. 69. Much of the conceptual orientation and approach of this chapter was inspired by this article in particular, and by the following works in general: R. A. LeVine, "Anthropology and the study of conflict: An introduction," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V, 1 (1961), 3–15; R. E. Park, "The social functions of war: Observations and notes," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI, 4 (1941), 551–70; B. Malinowski, "An anthropological analysis of war," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI, 4 (1941), 521–50; A. P. Vayda and A. Leeds, "Anthropology and the study of war," *Anthropologica*, III, 2 (1961), 131–3; Vayda, "Hypotheses about functions of war," in M. H. Fried et al., eds., *War* (Garden City, N.Y., 1968), pp. 85–105, and "Primitive warfare," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 16, pp. 468–72; R. Harrison, *Warfare* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1973).

4 For excellent recent summaries and critical evaluations of these approaches, see M. M. Conway and F. B. Feigert, *Political Analysis: An Introduction* (Boston, 1972), chap. 9, pp. 193–220; A. C. Isaak, *Scope and Methods of Political Science* (Homewood, Ill., 1969), chap. 14, pp. 217–31; L. C. Mayer, *Comparative Political Inquiry* (Homewood, Ill., 1972), chap. 8, pp. 143–61; D. H. Everson and J. P. Paine, *An Introduction to Systematic Political Science* (Homewood, Ill., 1973), pp. 193–202; J. A. Bill and R. L. Hardgrave, Jr., *Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory* (Columbus, Ohio, 1973), chap. VII, pp. 201–28; and R. F. Berkhofer, Jr., *A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis* (New York, 1969), chaps. 8 and 9, pp. 169–210.

5 S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria* (London, 1942), p. 294; see also pp. 102–3, 259, 266, 268, 270, 279, 289.

6 M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau 1800–1950* (London, 1960), p. 100.

7 See Park, "The social functions of war," p. 570; G. Salomon, "A propos des sociologies de la guerre," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, XLVI, 9/10 (1938), 436.

8 Smith, *Government in Zazzau*, pp. 147, 149, and *The Economy of Hausa Communities in Zaria*, Colonial Research Studies, no. 16 (London, 1955), pp. 69–70, 75. A slight inconsistency occurs regarding the number of emirs who had

formerly been *madaki*. In *Economy*, pp. 77–8, Smith shows six, but in *Zazzau*, p. 118, the number given is five.

9 S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London, 1962). Finer's four categories have been adopted with some minor modification.

10 *Al-hajj* Sa'id, *Tarikh Sokoto*, in O. V. Houdas, trans., *Tedzkiret en-Nisian fi Akhbar Molouk es-Soudan* (Paris, 1966), pp. 323–6; but D. M. Last claims there was no dispute: *The Sokoto Caliphate* (London, 1967), p. 81.

11 *Al-hajj* Sa'id, *Tarikh Sokoto*, pp. 337–9 (translation mine); cf. Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, pp. 83–4; and H. A. S. Johnston, *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto* (London, 1967), pp. 148–9.

12 Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 175. Similar interventions occurred in Bornu (1884) and Zinder (1893). In the former case Ibrahim secured the support of the royal slave riflemen and forced his way to the throne against his uncle, Abba Masta Kura, who had already been selected to succeed Bukar as Shehu: L. Brenner, "The Shehus of Kukawa: A history of the al-Kanemi dynasty of Bornu," Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1968, p. 135. And in the latter instance the Zinder *kaigama*, the senior slave general, imposed his choice of ruler upon the disputing parties, giving Ahmadu the throne: R. A. Dunbar, "Economic factors in the development of Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) in the nineteenth century," paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Denver, Colorado, 4 November 1971.

13 *Al-hajj* Sa'id, *Tarikh Sokoto*, pp. 306–7.

14 Ibid., pp. 328–34; see Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, pp. 82–3.

15 R. Campbell, *A Pilgrimage to My Motherland* (New York, 1861), p. 107.

16 K. V. Elphinstone, *Gazetteer of Ilorin Province* (London, 1921), pp. 18–21; *NNAR*, no. 409 (1902), p. 107, and no. 476 (1904), pp. 273–4.

17 Smith, Kano Fieldnotes, 5/24a.

18 See Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, pp. 134–6; R. A. Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804–1906* (New York, 1971), pp. 97–103.

19 M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau*, pp. 100–101, 111, n. 1, 193–5.

20 R. W. Hull, "The development of administration in Katsina Emirate, Northern Nigeria 1887–1944," Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1968, p. 60.

21 The sources differ on the origins of the rebel general Umaru and the loyalist general Umaru Majigi. J. F. Schön records a Hausa story in which Umaru came originally from Kano: *Magana Hausa* (London, 1885), pp. 261–2. S. A. Crowther and J. C. Taylor, near-contemporaries of the rebellion, claim Umaru was Arabian on his father's side and Hausa on his mother's: *The Gospel on the Banks of the Niger* (London, 1859), p. 96. Another tale recorded by F. Edgar says he was Kanuri: *Litafi na Tatsuniyoyi na Hausa*, 3 vols. (Belfast, 1911–1913), trans. A. N. Skinner, 2 vols., typescript, 1965, I, 233. Nadel also identifies Umaru's origin as Kuka in Bornu: *Black Byzantium*, p. 80, J. A. Burdon is inconsistent, claiming in one place that Umaru was from Kuka, but in another place says he was Hausa: *Northern Nigeria: Historical Notes on Certain Emirates and Tribes* (London, 1909), pp. 54, 18, respectively. Elphinstone further confuses the situation by claiming that Umaru was a BeriBeri (i.e., Kanuri) from Katsina: *Gazetteer of Ilorin Province*, pp. 35–6. Regarding the origin of Umaru Majigi, who became emir in 1873, the following sources claim he was not of royal blood: A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *British West Africa: Its Rise and Progress*, 2nd ed. (London, 1900) p. 247; S. Vandeleur, "Nupe and Ilorin," *Geographical Journal*, X, 4 (1897), 358; and J. Milum, "Notes of a journey from Lagos up the River Niger to Bida, the capital of Nupe and Illorin in the

Yoruba country, 1879–80," *PRGS*, III, 1 (1881), 29. This is misleading. Umaru Majigi was a grandson of Malam Dendo, first emir of Nupe. Whereas Usuman Zaki and Masaba, the second and third emirs, were sons of Dendo, Umaru Majigi was a son of another of Dendo's sons, Majigi. Umaru's accession added a third line of dynastic descent, which rotated among the descendants of Usuman Zaki, Masaba, and Umaru. Schön, *Magana Hausa* (pp. 261–2) and Burdon, *Northern Nigeria* (p. 54) mistakenly claim that Umaru was a son of Masaba.

22 Useful discussions of praetorianism are contained in Andrzejewski (Andreski), *Military Organization and Society* (London, 1954), pp. 105–7; G. Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, trans. H. D. Kahn (New York, 1939), pp. 226–8; S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York, 1963), pp. 172–5; and D. C. Rapoport, "A comparative theory of military and political types," in S. P. Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York, 1962), pp. 72–4. In many respects the patterns of intervention in the Sokoto Caliphate are similar to those reported by W. E. Kaegi, Jr., "Patterns of political activity of the armies of the Byzantine Empire," in M. Janowitz and J. van Doorn, eds., *On Military Intervention* (Rotterdam, 1971), pp. 3–35.

The frequency of military interventions and coups in the Sokoto Caliphate may appear at first to conflict with the argument made in Chapter 8 above (see p. 132 and n. 11) that the palace army preserved "civil" control of the military. The phrase "civil control" follows the conventional but unfortunately imprecise usage, and is actually a misnomer in this context. Civil and military functions were mixed in the Sudanic states. Although there was a structural differentiation between the civil and military hierarchies in the emirates, all fief-holding officials had to perform both civil and military functions. The virtual identity of officialdom as a warrior aristocracy confuses any discussion of "civil-military relations." It is probably more accurate to say that the palace army secured the *collective political dominance of the official warrior aristocracy as a class* by precluding military intervention by other social elements. The coups that did occur originated within this homogeneous elite and were chiefly personal and dynastic in nature. The military was not a monolithic institution but a highly fragmented organization; as the emirs' forces were loyal to them, so also were the territorial reserves loyal to the *hakimai*. Military coups were conservative actions by ambitious generals and dynastic contenders to seize the throne and establish the legitimacy of their own rule.

On the other hand, the emergence of standing armies, slave musketeer forces, and a powerful slave officialdom created the possibility for military intervention by marginal social elements and the consequent overthrow of the traditional official aristocracy. In this sense, the displacement of the palace army opened the way for praetorianism. Presumably slave dynasties would have established their own principles of legitimacy and perhaps would have succumbed to their own dynastic coups as well.

23 M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, 1955), p. 87.

24 See J. Goody, ed., *Succession to High Office* (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 18–21, 41–3. Goody cites the deposition of the *kabaka* of Buganda in 1888 by his gunmen, and the coup d'état in the Bambara state of Segou in the mid-eighteenth century by slave gunmen who themselves ruled for two decades.

25 See M. G. Smith, "Slavery and emancipation in two societies," *Social and Economic Studies*, III, 3/4 (1954).

26 For example, E. A. Ayandele, "Observations on some social and economic aspects of slavery in pre-colonial Northern Nigeria," *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, IX, 3 (1967), 329–38; Allan G. B. Fisher and H. J. Fisher, *Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa* (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), and

A. Meyers, "Slavery in the Hausa-Fulani emirates," in D. F. McCall and N. R. Bennett, eds., *Aspects of West African Islam*, Boston University Papers on Africa, V (Boston, 1971), 173–84.

27 Ayandele, "Observations on some social and economic aspects of slavery," p. 333.

28 Ibid., pp. 330–6; however, the actual distribution of the various forms of slavery awaits systematic study.

29 See M. G. Smith, "Hausa inheritance and succession," in J. D. M. Derrett, ed., *Studies in the Laws of Succession in Nigeria* (London, 1965), pp. 230–81.

30 L. Mizon, "Les royaumes Foulbé du Soudan Central, *Annales de Géographie* IV (1894–1895), 362; C. Maistre, *A Travers l'Afrique Centrale du Congo au Niger, 1892–1893* (Paris, 1895), pp. 251, 255, 256–7, 279. See the similar pattern in Nupe: M. Mason, "Captive and client labour and the economy of Bida Emirate: 1857–1901," *JAH*, XIV, 3 (1973), 453–71.

31 Several contemporary nineteenth-century estimates as well as more recent studies are compared by Meyers, "Slavery in the Hausa-Fulani emirates," pp. 176–7. Statistics collected by Polly Hill in her case study of the village of Batagarawa, near Katsina, corroborate these estimates: *Rural Hausa* (Cambridge, 1972), p. 179, Tables XIII.1 and XIII.2.

32 H. K. W. Kumm, *The Sudan* (London, 1907), pp. 95, 102; *NNAR*, no. 337 (1901), pp. 32, 40; no. 409 (1902), p. 63; no. 476 (1904), p. 255.

33 This devaluation of the cowrie exceeded 100 percent: P. Lubeck, "The revenue system of pre-colonial Kano Emirate," unpublished seminar paper, Northwestern University, 1968, p. 14 and Appendix I, p. 34; P. Lovejoy, "The influence of monetary expansion on the development of Hausa trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries," paper presented at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Philadelphia, November 1972, p. 6 and Table I, charts A and B. On the convertability of slaves as commodity to currency, see Mockler-Ferryman, *British West Africa*, p. 371; C. H. Robinson, *Hausaland* (London, 1896), p. 131. It was also reported that the caliph paid debts to his creditors or gave rewards for personal services by issuing promissory notes payble at Yola (Adamawa) for a certain number of slaves: C. V. Boyle, "Historical notes on the Yola Fulanis," *JAS*, X, 37 (1910), 82.

34 P. D. Curtin and J. Vansina, "Sources of the nineteenth century Atlantic slave trade," *JAH*, V, 2 (1964), 185–208; Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison, Wisc., 1969).

35 Smith, *Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria*, p. 143.

36 K. S. Carlston, *Social Theory and African Tribal Organization* (Urbana, Ill., 1968), pp. 155, 173; see Smith, *Economy of Hausa Communities*, p. 106; Nadel, *Black Byzantium*, pp. 115–16.

37 See M. G. Smith, "Pre-industrial stratification systems," in N. J. Smelser and S. M. Lipset, eds., *Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development* (Chiago, 1966), p. 171.

38 Andrzejewski (Andreski), *Military Organization and Society*, pp. 32–3; L. A. White, *The Science of Culture* (New York, 1949), p. 380.

39 R. W. Hull, "The development of administration in Katsina Emirate," p. 24, and "The impact of the Fulani *jihad* on interstate relations in the Central Sudan: Katsina Emirate – A case study," in D. F. McCall and N. R. Bennett, eds., *Aspects of West African Islam*, Boston University Papers on Africa, V (Boston, 1971), 92; Johnston, *Fulani Empire*, p. 64, and Appendix I, no. 15; Nadel, *Black Byzantium*, p. 279.

40 M. G. Smith, "The Hausa system of social status," *Africa*, XXIX, 3 (1959), 240–1.

41 These are some of the conventional criteria used by social scientists to measure integration. See the editors' discussion of theories of interethnic relations in R. Cohen and J. Middleton, eds., *From Tribe to Nation in Africa: Studies in Incorporation Processes* (Scranton, Pa., 1970), pp. 5–10.

42 M. G. Smith, "Slavery and emancipation in two societies," p. 272.

43 *Black Byzantium*, p. 176; see also pp. 105, 133, 299, 300. See the story recorded by Schön in which an ivory merchant abandoned his trade to join a Nupe military campaign because war was more profitable: *Magana Hausa*, p. 258. Useful general discussions of the relationship between war and social mobility can be found in Andrzejewski (Andreski), *Military Organization and Society*, chap. IX, and P. A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York, 1927), pp. 164–6, 369–73, 466–72, 481–5.

44 A. T. Hatto, "Archery and chivalry: A noble prejudice," *Modern Language Review*, XXXV, 1 (1940), 41.

45 For example, "Only by fighting can the better man be found out": G. Merrick, comp., *Hausa Proverbs* (London, 1905), p. 31; and "Only when it is breast to breast does one know a great man": C. E. J. Whitting, comp., *Hausa and Fulani Proverbs* (Lagos, 1940), p. 100. On the cultural complex associated with cavalry in the Sudan, see Goody, *Technology, Tradition, and the State in Africa*, especially chap. 4, pp. 57–72.

46 H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa . . . 1849–1855*, 3 vols. (Franklin Square, N.Y., 1857), I, 385; see the similar remarks recorded by J. Richardson, *Travels in the Great Desert of Sahara in the Years 1845 and 1846*, 2 vols. (London, 1848), II, 104.

47 See M. Mason, "Population density and 'slave raiding' – The case of the Middle Belt of Nigeria," *JAH*, X, 4 (1969), 551–64; M. B. Gleave and R. M. Prothero, "Population density and 'slave raiding' – A comment," *JAH*, XII, 2 (1971), 319–24; and Mason's reply, pp. 324–7. Low's *Three Nigerian Emirates* also includes demographic material for Hadejia, Katagum, and Gombe. In addition to human geography, the effect of warfare on such demographic variables as fertility, and age and sex structure of Sudanic society have yet to be studied. For some interesting preliminary speculations on these aspects of demographic change, see Dunbar, "Economic factors in the development of Damagaram," pp. 17–21.

48 F. F. W. Byng-Hall, "Notes on the Bassa Komo tribe," *JAS*, VIII, 29 (1908), 13; *NNAR*, no. 516 (1905/06), p. 405.

49 A. Upward, "The province of Kabba, Northern Nigeria," *JAS*, II, 7 (1903), 242–3; *NNAR*, no. 476 (1904), pp. 278, 289.

50 Nadel, *Black Byzantium*, pp. 34–6.

51 *NNAR*, no. 437 (1903), pp. 175–6.

52 R. K. Udo, *Geographical Regions of Nigeria* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), p. 159; see Smith's remark on the economic bifurcation in Zaria, quoted above, p. 149 (n. 35).

53 Nadel, *Black Byzantium*, p. 36; *NNAR*, no. 594 (1907/08), p. 625.

54 *NNAR*, no. 551 (1906/07), p. 495.

55 Ibid., p. 496.

56 Ibid., p. 486.

57 J. R. Wilson-Haffenden, *The Red Men of Nigeria* (London, 1930), pp. 79–80.

58 *NNAR*, no. 594 (1907/08), p. 613.

59 Ibid.

Chapter 10

1 The term *structural pose* is borrowed from F. Gearing, "The structural poses of 18th century Cherokee villages," *American Anthropologist*, LX, 6 (Part I) (1958), 1148–75; see A. F. C. Wallace, "Psychological preparations for war," in M. H. Fried et al., eds., *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression* (Garden City, N.Y., 1968), pp. 173–82.

2 S. Andreski, "Militarism," in J. Gould and W. L. Klobb, eds., *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1964), p. 429. For other conceptualizations and studies of militarism, see A. T. Lauterback, "Militarism in the Western World: A comparative study," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, V, 4 (1944), 446–78; L. I. Radway, "Militarism," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 10, pp. 300–304; H. Speier, "Militarism in the eighteenth century," *Social Research*, III, 3 (1936), 304–36; and the classic by A. Vagts, *A History of Militarism, Civilian and Military*, rev. ed. (New York, 1959).

3 D. M. Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (London, 1967), pp. 71, 82, 85, 118, 119–20, 121, 123, 127. Although a comprehensive enumeration and classification of the types of military actions of all the emirates of the caliphate does not exist, a patient perusal of written sources combined with the use of oral history would undoubtedly yield a sample of military data sufficiently large to permit statistical tabulation and manipulation. The collection, coding, and analysis of such data would be a prodigious research project, but one that would greatly enhance our knowledge of Sudanic warfare, and confirm or falsify on empirical grounds many of the hypotheses advanced in this book. Unfortunately the possibilities of such quantitative research became apparent to the present author only after the original research had been completed, and thus too late to affect its scope and direction.

4 According to F. W. Voget, such was the case among the Crow Indians: see "Warfare and the integration of Crow Indian culture," in W. H. Goodenough, ed., *Explorations in Cultural Anthropology* (New York, 1964), pp. 483–509.

5 Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, p. 207.

6 M. G. Smith, "Historical and cultural conditions of political corruption among the Hausa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, VI, 2 (1964), 174 ff.

7 See G. Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, trans. H. D. Kahn (New York, 1939), pp. 141 ff., on the relative impact of feudal and centralized systems on the subject population. As this second revolution in politico-military organization was aborted, its potential historical consequences must remain a matter of conjecture. This discussion of the relationship among militarism, bureaucratic centralization, and political exploitation is admittedly speculative. Although some evidence is adduced below in support of this interpretation, it rests principally on appeal to historical analogy. In other words, it is suggested that some of the consequences of gun warfare on a massive scale in the Sokoto Caliphate would have been similar to those in modern European history, for instance. See also Chapter 8 above, pp. 131–2 and n. 11, and Chapter 9, pp. 145–7 and n. 22; and E. V. Walter, *Terror and Resistance* (London, 1969).

8 M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau 1800–1950* (London, 1960), pp. 190 ff.

9 S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria* (London, 1942), pp. 118–22.

10 C. N. Ubah, "Kano Emirate in the 19th century: A study of political development," M.A. thesis, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, May 1965, *passim*.

11 R. W. Hull, "The development of administration in Katsina Emirate, Northern Nigeria 1887–1944," Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1968, pp. 54–6; Smith, Katsina Fieldnotes, 3/26-26a, 5/50a, 6/9, and Maradi Fieldnotes, 2/11.

12 L. Brenner also contends that the forcible expropriation of peasants' property in Bornu by Shehu Bukar (1881–84) was a response to economic depression: "The Shehus of Kukawa: A history of the al-Kanemi dynasty of Bornu," Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1968, pp. 133–5, 184–7.

13 Cf. the production and export of palm oil in Dahomey as a substitute for the slave trade. This development was achieved with minimum structural dislocation, as the officials who formerly acted as the king's slavers put their human captives to work on palm plantations. The production and export of palm oil replaced the capture and sale of slaves, and liberated the state from the necessity of continuous warfare. On this subject, C. Meillassoux writes, "This was a remarkable adaptation: land was substituted for warfare. Military aristocrats were converted into planters, and slave merchandise into producers. . . . The incorporation of trading agents into the centralized administration of the state allowed the same ruling class to preserve their old privileges by taking over the new means of production and setting them to work for their own benefit": Introduction, in C. Meillaussoux, ed., *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa* (London, 1971), p. 59, summarizing the important article by C. Coquery-Vidrovitch in the same volume. In a similar vein, R. A. Dunbar has argued that the state slave plantations in Zinder also promoted the development and diversification of agriculture, freeing the state from the vagaries of the slave trade: "Economic factors in the development of Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) in the nineteenth century," paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Denver, Colorado, 4 November 1971, pp. 12, 20. The study of this subject in the Hausa-Fulani states awaits systematic treatment.

14 Last, *Sokoto Caliphate*, pp. 206, 72, respectively. More recently Last seems to have modified this view somewhat in "Aspects of administration and dissent in Hausaland, 1800–1968," *Africa*, XL, 4 (1970).

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A Glossary of Hausa-Fulani Military Titles

The following list of Hausa-Fulani military titles is provisional and selective rather than definitive and comprehensive. It reflects the state of the existing literature, not the product of original research. However, despite its deficiencies, this glossary serves certain useful purposes. First, it illustrates the complexity and functional specialization of nineteenth-century Hausa-Fulani military organization. Second, it shows both the uniformity and the variety of military titles that existed among these Sudanic states. And finally, it constitutes the most extensive glossary published to date, and the only one to compare military titles across several emirates. It is interesting also to note that many of these titles are still in use today, being borne by emirate council members, bureaucrats, district and (sometimes) village heads. Although now dissociated from military functions, the original connotations of these titles should not be overlooked.

The principal sources from which this glossary was compiled are listed at the end. I wish also to acknowledge the valuable comments and additional information offered by Professor D. J. M. Muffett.

Title	*States and Functions (if known)*
Bajamin Gabas	Zaria: slave commander
Bakon Barno	Zaria: slave officer
Banaga	Abuja, Sokoto: slave leader of pathfinders
Bara (= Barua, Barwa)	Hadejia, Katagum, Gombe, Zaria
Baraya	Zaria: stable official, commander of scouts
Barde (= Barada)	Abuja, Hadejia, Katagum, Gombe, Sokoto; Kano: general of the army; Zaria: commander of heavy cavalry
Barde Kankane	Abuja
Barden Maidaki	Abuja
Ciritawa	Abuja
Ciroma	Zinder: commander-in-chief (royal kinsman in mid-nineteenth century, replaced by slave Kaigama in late nineteenth century); Kano
Dallatu	Abuja: in charge of war-camp arrangement and administration
Durumi	Abuja, Kano
Galadima	Gombe, Hadejia, Kano, Katagum, Sokoto, Zaria
Garkuwa	Abuja, Zaria; Hadejia: slave chief of mounted sappers

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Garkuwa Babba	Abuja
Garkuwa Kankane	Abuja
Grema	Zinder: slave commander of musketeers
Hauni	Zaria: slave officer
Jagaba	Abuja: commander of heavy infantry; Zaria: captain of royal bodyguard; Zinder: war-camp maker
Jarma (= *Zarma*)	Katagum: commander of royal bodyguard
Jarmai (= *Zarmai*)	Abuja: reserve force commander; Kebbi, Sokoto
Kacalla	Abuja; Gombe: infantry commander; Adamawa, Zinder: slave officer, often in charge of musketeers
Kacallan Bindiga	Gombe, Hadejia, Katagum: slave officer in charge of musketeers
Kacallan Samari	Gombe
Kaigama	Adamawa: commander of advance guard; Zinder: slave commander-in-chief who replaced Ciroma in late nineteenth century
Karfe	Zaria: Madaki's chief assistant
Kato	Zaria: Fulani leader of pathfinders
Kaura	Katsina: commander-in-chief; Maradi: commander of the army, cavalry commander
Kunkeli	Abuja: commander of shield-bearing foot soldiers
Kuyambana	Abuja; Zaria: cavalry commander
Kwaramaza	Zaria: captain of the cavalry
Lawan	Adamawa: commander of the cavalry
Lifidi	Gombe, Hadejia, Katagum; Abuja: commander of heavy cavalry
Madaki (= *Madawaki*)	Gombe, Hadejia, Kano, Katagum; Abuja, Zaria: commander-in-chief of army and commander of its cavalry
Madakin Barde	Abuja: assistant to Barde
Madakin Jarmai	Abuja: assistant to Jarmai, the reserve force commander
Magayaki	Hadejia, Katagum: scout leader; Katsina: chief of the palace slaves; Zaria: leader of reconnaissance force
Mahari	Zaria: raider, attached to Sarkin Yaki
Maiyaki	Nupe: commander-in-chief
Majasirdi	Kano, Sokoto: responsible for all the horse gear
Majidadi	Zaria: head of emir's retinue
Makama	Gombe, Hadejia, Katagum, Nupe; Katsina: in charge of emir's horses
Makama Babba	Abuja, Zaria: chief lieutenant of the Madaki
Maradi	Maradi: chief of the archers
Masu	Katagum: slave officer
Rubu	Zaria: chief of the medical staff
Santali (= *Shantali, Sintali*)	Zaria: slave officer with commissariat responsibilities
Sardauna	Kano, Sokoto: commander of the vanguard

Sarkin Bai	Katsina: deputy chief of palace slaves; Kano, Zinder: commander of the cavalry
Sarkin Baka	Abuja, Gombe, Hadejia, Katagum, Maradi, Zaria, Zinder: commander of the bowmen
Sarkin Bindiga	Abuja, Katsina, Zaria: slave commander of the musketeers
Sarkin Ciyawa	Zaria: slave captain of musketeers, under Sarkin Bindiga
Sarkin Dakaru	Zaria: infantry commander
Sarkin Dawaki	Gombe, Hadejia, Kano, Katagum, Sokoto: commander of the cavalry
Sarkin Fada	Zaria: in charge of the rear guard
Sarkin Figini	Zaria: in charge of emir's bodyguard
Sarkin Fulani	Zinder: in command of baggage train
Sarkin Garkuwa	Zaria
Sarkin Karma	Abuja, Maradi, Zaria: infantry commander
Sarkin Lifidi	Hadejia, Zaria: captain of heavy cavalry
Sarkin Magudantai	Zaria: slave captain of musketeers, under Sarkin Bindiga
Sarkin Samari	Maradi: chief of age-grade infantry
Sarkin Sati	Katagum: leader of swordsmen
Sarkin Shanu	Kano: commander of oxen train with its supplies
Sarkin Yaki	Gombe, Hadejia, Katagum; Adamawa: commander-in-chief; Kano: commander-in-chief (honorific?); Zaria: commander of reserves stationed near the emir; Zinder: chief of Tuareg raiders
Sarkin Yaki Matchube	Adamawa: commander of conscripted war captives
Sarkin Yamma	Zaria: slave commander of standing army
Sarkin Yara	Zaria: slave captain of musketeers, under Sarkin Bindiga
Sarkin Zagi	Katagum: leader of runners who accompanied horsemen, carrying extra weapons and equipment
Sata	Abuja; Zaria: captain of scouts
Shamaki	Adamawa, Gombe, Hadejia, Kano, Katagum, Zaria: in charge of the emir's stables
Shenagu	Abuja
Wagu	Abuja, Zaria: slave officer
Wombai	Gombe, Kano, Katagum, Sokoto, Zaria
Yakudima	Zinder
Zagi	Katsina: chief of the emir's horses
Zannuwa	Katsina: in charge of repairing city walls

The principal sources used in the preparation of this glossary are:

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V. N. Low, "The border states: A political history of three northeast Nigerian emirates, ca. 1800–1902," Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1967, Appendices C(1), C(2), C(3); and Hadejia, Katagum, Gombe Fieldnotes.

M. G. Smith, *The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria*, Colonial Research Studies, no. 16 (London, 1955), pp. 73, 87; *Government in Zazzau 1800–1950* (London, 1960), chart facing p. 36, table 1 (p. 47), 96-7, chart facing p. 100, 131–2, Appendix A (pp. 334–8); "A Hausa kingdom: Maradi under Dan Baskore, 1854–75," in D. Forde and P. M. Kaberry, eds., *West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1967), p. 119.

Note: S. F. Nadel lists more than twenty Nupe military titles, almost all peculiar to Nupe and therefore omitted from this glossary: *A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria* (London, 1942), p. 101.

A Glossary of Hausa Military Terminology

The following glossary was compiled from a variety of primary and secondary sources, including some in Hausa. It represents a considerable enlargement of the basic glossarial notes provided by Dr D. J. M. Muffett, "Nigeria – Sokoto Caliphate," in M. Crowder, ed., *West African Resistance* (New York, 1971), especially pp. 276–80. Most of the military terms cited by Professor Muffett are included below, the exceptions being a few that were not identified in other sources examined in the course of research for this book. I am grateful to Professor Muffett also for the comments and corrections he furnished on an earlier version of this glossary.

R. C. Abraham's *Dictionary of the Hausa Language*, 2nd ed. (London, 1962), served as the standard for spelling. Where shown, plural forms are separated from the singular by a comma.

adullu, adullai	blunt arrow (= *kunda*)
agwa	cannon; artillery gun (= *igwa*)
akushi, akusa	wooden food bowl worn as a helmet under a *malafa*
albarus	gunpowder
alkarya, alkaryai	unwalled town
alkashafa	flimsy saddle cover
almulku	single-edged saber (= *bisalami*)
asigiri	metal-shafted spear
badala, yam badala	ledge inside a town wall on which defenders stood; battlements
badaudi	high-quality chain mail (= *daudiyya*)
bafada, fadawa	mounted courtier
bagariye	Bornu saddle with curved pommel
bage	great warrior
baka	bow
bakin maiki	broad arrow
bakin wuta	firebrand (= *bantarma*)
balliya	a type of ornamented saddle cover; a type of *jalala*
bantan lifidi	quilted armor covering the abdomen, loins, and thighs
bantarma	firebrand (= *bakin wuta*)
bante	loincloth for foot soldiers
bardan yaki	cavalryman
barde, barade	mounted attendants of chiefs; bodyguard

bata	line of soldiers; battle line
bindiga	gun, musket
birni, birane	walled town
bisalami	curved one-edged sword (= *almulku*)
bishir or *bishiri*	red-and-white saddle cover
bugudun	broad-bladed cavalry spear
buke	chain mail helmet
bursu	a Sokoto spear
cucana	an inferior *bagariye*
daddaga	iron band at the end of a spear shaft
dafi	arrow poison
daga	battlefront, battle line; pitched battle
dakare, dakaru	infantryman (= *karma, karame*)
damara, damaru	belt or cincture on which a hand knife was hung
dan dumbulum	high-backed saddle
daudiyya	high-quality chain armor (= *badaudi*)
dauki saka	type of quilted saddle cover
doki, dawaki	horse (pl. cavalry)
dungi	giraffe-hide shield
dunhu	plain sword, without markings
fada	battlefield
fagyam fama	battlefield; theater of war (= *fagyan yaki*)
fantama	saddle cover with tinsel edges (= *ka ki Bima*)
farmaki	sudden attack
fate-fate	broad-bladed, two-edged, straight sword
gabba or *dan gaba*	breastplate for cavalry mounts
gafiya	battle-ax (= *gaggafa* = *gantama* = *gatari* = *masari*)
gaggafa	type of ax
ganima	booty
gantama	battle-ax
ganuwa	rampart around a town
garkuwa	any shield (*yan garkuwa* = *yan kwarbai*, raiders or warriors)
garu, garuka	wall around a town
gatari, gatura	battle-ax
gayya	corvee levies, war conscripts
gazara	small-barbed arrow, longest in quiver
gidan makamai	arsenal .
gora, goruna	warrior's water bottle
gulme	cudgel, war club, mace (= *gwama* = *gwarmi* = *kulki*)
hamila, hamilu	sword sling (= *harde*)
hankatilo	scimitar of Kanuri origin (= *almulku* = *bisalami*)
harde	sword sling (= *hamila*)
hargi, harugga	fastening that secures a sword in its sheath
hari	raid; raiding
harsashi	bullet, cartridge; projectile, as, e.g., from a sling
hindi	curved single-edged sword
huhu	padding on the upper side of a saddle (= *mada-buro*)

humushi	the (Muslim) statutory one-fifth share of war booty set aside for the state treasury
igwa, igogi	artillery piece; cannon
jahadi	Muslim holy war (A. *jihad*)
jalala	decorative saddle cover
jan gwarzo	brave warrior (= *sadauki*)
jarmai, jarumai or *jarumawa*	brave man
kafi	stockade; town surrounded by a stockade fence (= *kafin gari*)
kaimi, kayame	spur
ka ki Bima	a type of *jalala* with tinsel edges (= *fantama*)
kallemu	tangs or barbs on an arrow
kambari	type of Kebbi spear
kansakali, kansakula	any sword (= *takobi*)
kar dangi	type of arrow poison
karma, karame	infantryman (= *dakare, dakaru*)
karo	attack; battle; campaign
katala	an antidote for arrow poison
kayam fada	arms, weapons; accouterments
kayan doki	horse trappings
kayan yaki	battle dress
kela	large circular shield
kibiya, kibiyoyi	arrow
kirni	poison antidote
kofa, kofofi	gates of a town
kube, kubanni	sheath for knife
kulki	cudgel or mace (= *gulme* = *gwama* = *gwarmi*)
kulumbuwa	large hide shield
kumakumi, kumakumai	quilted armor corselet worn by heavy cavalrymen
kunda	blunt arrow (= *adullu*)
kunkeli	small round shield
kunne	barb of an arrow (= *kunnan kibiya*)
kurma	thorn thicket used to fill ditches around the outer perimeter of town walls, (= *sako* = *sarkakkiya* = *surkuki*)
kutufani	large round shield
kutufi	plaited leather band to cover the shoulder and chest of horsemen
kuyi-kuyi	type of throwing spear, javelin
kwacciyar gaba	pommel of a saddle
kwalkwali	helmet made of brightly colored cloth rolls, adorned with ostrich feathers, and worn by heavy cavalrymen
kwangwara	oblong-shaped white shield
kwanto	ambush
kwarda	a Bornu saddle
kwari	quiver for arrows
kwiyi-kwiyi	type of multibarbed spear
kyarmo	arrow shaft (= *kyauro*)
lafaranji	single-edged sword

laya	charm or amulet on which Koranic verses are inscribed, worn especially as protection against poison
lifidi, lifida	quilted armor for heavy cavalry (horse and rider)
likkafa, likkafu	stirrup
linzami, linzamai	bridle, bit
madaburo	padding for upper side of a saddle (= *huhu*)
magani	charm, amulet
maganin karfe	charm against weapons
magewayi, magewaya	military spy, reconnoiterer
maharbi, maharba	one who shoots, e.g., archer
mahari, mahara	raider
majajjawa	sling for throwing missiles
makami, makamai	any weapon (= *makashi*)
makari	antidote
makashi, makasai	any weapon (= *makami*)
malafa, malafu	straw hat; helmet
masari	battle-ax (= *gafiya* = *gantama* = *gatari*)
mashi	spear
masu baka	archers (= *yam baka*)
mayaki, mayaka	warrior (pl. the army)
nasara	victory
ribadi	outpost duty (A. *ribat*)
runduna, rundunoni	army
ruwan takobi	sword blade
sadauki, sadaukai	brave warrior (= *jan gwarzo*)
safa	quilted armor for upper torso
sako	thorn bushes to fill ditches around town walls (= *kurma* = *sarkakkiya* = *surkuki*)
sango	harpoon-shooting musket
sansani	war camp
sarkakkiya	thorn thicket (= *kurma* = *sako* = *surkuki*)
shamaki	stables
sirdi	saddle
suku	barbless arrow with serrated shaft
sulke	chain mail suit
surkuki	thorn hedge (= *kurma* = *sako* = *sarkakkiya*)
takalmi	sandal, the standard footwear of warriors
takobi, takuba	any sword (= *kansakali*)
talaha	ornate saddle imported from North Africa
tama	type of cheap sword
tamogas or *tamogashi*	sword with three lines running parallel along the blade
tandawara, tandawarai	small waterskin made of tanned goat hide
tsawwila	flintlock musket
tsiko	arrow without barbs
tsirkiya	bowstring
tubali, tubala	egg-shaped, sun-dried mud bricks, for building town walls
tuta, tutoci	flag carried by army units

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uwar yaki	main body of troops
wangami	bucket-shaped stirrups with sharpened edges
warki	leather loincloth
warwaji	white oryx-hide shield
yaki, yakoki	war
yam badala	battlements
yam baka	archers (= *masu baka*)
yam bindiga	gunmen, musketeers
yan garkuwa	shield bearers; raiders or warriors (= *yan kwarbai*)
yan karma	infantrymen (= *karame = dakaru*)
yan kwanto	ambushers
yan kwarbai	light cavalry; raiders (= *garkuwa*)
yan lifida	heavy cavalry in quilted armor
yifi	a burnoose to cover a saddle when rider is dismounted
zabo	type of sword
zagi, zagage	horse holder; runners who accompany cavalry, carrying extra weapons and equipment
zubka, zubkoki	pad placed under each half of a saddle

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