AMBO UNIVERSITY WOLISO CAMPUS

COLLEGE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE

Department of Civics and Ethical Studies

Course Title: – **Environmental and Development Ethics**

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Course Description

This course introduces key concepts in environmental and development ethics and surveys a range of environmental and ethical theories. Topics covered include environmental ethics, development ethics, anthropocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism, deep ecology, social ecology, ecofeminism, the interdependence of facts and values in environmental decision-making, the relation of environmental ethics to traditional ethical theory, and problems of resource distribution and environmental justice, and ethics of economic development. Emphasizing the skills of critical thinking, value reasoning, and philosophical inquiry within an interdisciplinary context, this course guides students in the application of these skills to real-world examples requiring analysis and interpretation.

Course objectives:

After learning the course students will be able to:

- Familiar with some of the most important environmental and development ethical questions and issues;
- Understand and evaluate the present challenges and future prospect of environmental and development issues;
- Understand some of the major controversies and dilemma of environmental issues;
- Understand some of the major controversies and dilemma of development issues;
- Learn how to analyses and interpret these questions, issues, and debates from a philosophical perspective.
- To understand the philosophical issues and problems in environmental ethics.
- To become familiar with various attempts to deal with ethical issues concerning the environment.
- To evaluate approaches to environmental ethics in order to formulate a personal approach that is coherent and defensible.

Course outline

Chapter one: Introduction to Environment

1.1 Definition of Environment

1.2 Components of Environment

1.3 Elements of Environment

1.4 Global Environmental Problems

1.5 Environmental problems in Africa

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Chapter Two: Introduction to Environmental Ethics

2.1 Ethics and Environment

2.2 Moral Philosophy and Environmental Ethics

2.3 Development of Environmental Ethics

2.4 Why Environmental Ethics and Why now?

Chapter One: Introduction to Environment

1.1 Definitions of Environment

Before you start reading this topic, just look around and note the various things that surround you like clouds, paper, chair, friends, etc. It is impossible to be alone in this earth, isn't it? After all, no man is an island! Every organism in this earth is surrounded by a lot of things; say other organisms, plants, water, air, light, land etc. These surroundings of the organism, all the living and non-living things constitute its environment.

There are a lot of definitions for the word environment in the literal and scientific contexts, but the most acceptable definitions can be given as below.

1) Environment can be defined as the natural surroundings of that organism which directly or indirectly influences the growth and development of the organism.

2)Environment is defined as the surroundings in which an organization operates including air, water, land and natural resources, flora, fauna, humans and their inter relations"

3)Environment is the sum total of all living and non living factors that compose the surroundings of man. The word environment is derived from the French word "environ". The meaning of the French word is somewhat related to "encompass" "encircle" etc. with environment being such a generalized term, its classification and an understanding of its composition becomes a necessity.

4) A person's environment consists of the sum total of the stimulation which he receives from his conception until his death.' It can be concluded from the above definition that Environment comprises various types of forces such as physical, intellectual, economic, political, cultural, social, moral and emotional. Environment is the sum total of all the external forces, influences and conditions, which affect the life, nature, behavior and the growth, development and maturation of living organisms.

5) The term environment is used to describe, in the aggregate, all the external forces, influences and conditions, which affect the life, nature, behavior and the growth, development and maturity of living organisms.

1.2 Component of Environment

The environment consists of four segments as under:

1. **Atmosphere:** The atmosphere implies the protective blanket of gases, surrounding the earth:

(*a*) It sustains life on the earth.

(*b*) It saves it from the hostile environment of outer space.

(*c*) It absorbs most of the cosmic rays from outer space and a major portion of the electromagnetic radiation from the sun.

(*d*) It transmits only here ultraviolet, visible, near infrared radiation (300 to 2500 nm) and radio waves. (0.14 to 40 m) while filtering out tissue-damaging ultra violates waves below about 300 nm. The atmosphere is composed of nitrogen and oxygen. Besides, argon, carbon dioxide, and trace gases.

2. **Hydrosphere:** The Hydrosphere comprises all types of water resources oceans, seas, lakes, rivers, streams, reservoir, polar icecaps, glaciers, and ground water.

(*i*) Nature 97% of the earth's water supply is in the oceans,

(*ii*) About 2% of the water resources are locked in the polar icecaps and glaciers.

(*iii*)Only about 1% is available as fresh surface water-rivers, lakes streams, and ground water fit to be used for human consumption and other uses.

3. **Lithosphere:** Lithosphere is the outer mantle of the solid earth. It consists of minerals occurring in the earth's crusts and the soil *e.g.* minerals, organic matter, air and water.

4. **Biosphere:** Biosphere indicates the realm of living organisms and their interactions with environment, via atmosphere, hydrosphere and lithosphere.

1.3 Element of Environment

Environment is constituted by the interacting systems of physical, biological and cultural elements inter-related in various ways, individually as well as collectively. These elements may be explained as under:

(1) Physical elements

Physical elements are as space, landforms, water bodies, climate soils, rocks and minerals. They determine the variable character of the human habitat, its opportunities as well as limitations.

(2) Biological elements

Biological elements such as plants, animals, microorganisms and men constitute the biosphere.

(3) Cultural elements

Cultural elements such as economic, social and political elements are essentially manmade features, which make cultural milieu.

1.4 Global Environmental Problems

At the dawn of the third millennium, a powerful and complex web of interactions is contributing to unprecedented global trends in environmental degradation. These forces include rapid globalization and urbanization, pervasive poverty, unsustainable consumption patterns and population growth. Global environmental challenges require concerted responses on the part of the international community. Global climate change, the depletion of the ozone layer, desertification, deforestation, the loss of the planet's biological diversity and the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and chemicals are all environmental problems that touch every nation and adversely affect the lives and health of their populations. All of these global environmental trends have long term effects on people and societies and are either difficult or impossible to reverse over the period of one generation. Unless effective global actions are taken early, we will end up plundering our future in an unprecedented way. This chapter describes some the major global environmental problems and points to the potential impact on society and future generations.

Climate Change

It is now widely recognized that global warming over the past 50 years is largely due to human activities that have released greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The most recent assessment report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concludes that the global average surface temperature has increased by about 0.6 o C during the 20th century. The seemingly small rise of mean temperature is already showing adverse effects. One of the consequences has been a rise in the global average sea level. Another effect has been more frequent and intensified droughts in recent decades in parts of Asia and Africa. Additionally, in most mid and high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere continents, precipitation has increased by 0.5 to 1.0 per cent per decade in the 20th century.

The world's emissions of greenhouse gases, notably carbon dioxide, continue to increase. The most recent estimates are that atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2) will double or triple pre-industrial levels by the end of this century. As a result, global surface temperature is expected to increase by 1.4 to 5.8 degrees Celsius from 1990 to 21003.

The repercussions of climate change will disproportionately affect those who are least able to adapt – the poor and the most vulnerable sections of society. For example, Scientists project that this level of warming could, among other things:

- Greatly exacerbate the range, frequency and intensity of natural disasters, from flooding, to droughts, to torrential rains, ice-storms, tornadoes and hurricanes;
- Cause sea levels to rise by between nine and 80 centimeters by 21004, due to the expansion of warming waters and the melting of polar icecaps and other glaciers, which inturn may produce deadly flooding in many low-lying areas and small island States, displacing millions from their homes;
- Increase the number of environmental refugees resulting from weather-related disasters;
- Augment the risk of disease migration and disease outbreaks; and
- Render large areas of the world "uninsurable" due to the magnitude of property damage from disasters.

It is widely recognized that climate change, by altering local weather patterns and by disturbing life-supporting natural systems and processes, has significant implications for human health. While the range of health effects is diverse, often unpredictable in magnitude, and sometimes slow to emerge. Higher temperatures, heavier rainfall, and changes in climate variability would encourage vectors of some infectious diseases (such as malaria, schistosomiasis, dengue fever, yellow fever and encephalitis) to multiply and expand into new geographical regions, intensifying the already overwhelming threats to children from such diseases.

There is also evidence that El Niño – a vast natural climatic phenomenon that can bring intense floods and droughts in many parts of the globe – is becoming more frequent as a result of global warming and could further aggravate health problems in many parts of the world. Excessive flooding is, for example, a prime cause of cholera and other water-borne and food-borne infections to which children are particularly susceptible. While heavy rains will become more

frequent, there will also be more periods of drought and increased spreading of the deserts. Scientists predict that a lack of rain, warmer temperatures and increases in evaporation could have severe implications in terms of water availability and food security, reducing crop yields in Africa, further compromising child nutrition.

There are also numerous health effects, both in terms of disease and injury, associated with extreme weather events, such as heat waves, storms and floods. Extreme weather events can exacerbate health issues such as asthma and respiratory problems due to worsening air pollution, precisely those diseases that most significantly burden children.

Ozone Layer Depletion

Ozone in the atmosphere's upper layer, the stratosphere, protects humans, animals and plants from the damaging effects of UV-B radiation from the sun. Without it, all life on earth would cease to exist. However, the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-depleting substances (ODS) are slowly eating away at the stratospheric ozone layer, creating a major potential health hazard. While the concentrations of ODS in the lower atmosphere peaked in about 1994 and is now slowly declining due to worldwide efforts to phase out the use of CFCs and other damaging substances, significant health threats relating to ozone depletion persist. Past (and current) emissions of ODS result in increases of ultraviolet radiation reaching the Earth's surface which can pose several health effects:

- Increase of melanoma and non-melanoma skin cancers;
- Cause or acceleration of eye cataracts development;
- Reduce effectiveness of the immune system;
- Impact on nutrition (e.g. reduced plant yield);
- Damage to ocean ecosystems and reduced fish yield (by killing microbial organisms in the ocean).

Skin cancer is the most worrisome health impact of ozone depletion. Overexposure to the sun's harmful ultraviolet (UV) light may damage skin. In Europe, evaluations of ultraviolet-related skin cancers suggest that, despite the decline in ODS concentrations, skin cancer incidences will not begin to fall until about 2060. The international response to this issue is embodied in the

Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, which was concluded in Vienna in 1985. The Vienna Convention set an important precedent because nations for the first time agreed in principle to tackle a global environmental problem before its effects were felt. The Convention's 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer has been remarkably successful. Production of the most damaging ozone-depleting substances was eliminated, except for a few critical uses, by 1996 in developed countries and should be phased out by 2010 in developing countries. Thanks to these measures, it is currently estimated the CFC concentration in the ozone layer is expected to recover to pre-1980 levels by the year 2050.

Desertification

Desertification, resulting in part from deforestation, is a significant threat to the arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid regions of the world – which account for 40 per cent of the Earth's land surface. Throughout the world, dry lands still provide much of the world's food in the form of grain and livestock, yet close to 70 per cent of the world's dry lands are degraded, thus diminishing the productive land per capita and decreasing food security. The most common forms of unsustainable land use are over-cultivation, overgrazing, deforestation and poor irrigation practices. These susceptible soils – mainly located in the savannahs of Africa, the Great Plains and the Pampas of the Americas, the Steppes of southeast Europe and Asia, the outback of Australia and the margins of the Mediterranean – are particularly vulnerable due to the fact that they recover very slowly from disturbances and further deteriorate due to rain and wind erosion and chemical and physical deterioration of the soil structure. More than 250 million people are directly affected by desertification and 1 billion people in more than 100 countries are at risk.

These people include many of the world's poorest and most marginalized citizens. In Africa, land degradation is threatening economic and physical survival. Recurrent droughts increase soil degradation problems, which, in turn, magnify the effect of drought, both of which enhance the conditions that can cause widespread famines. The consequences of desertification include:

- Malnutrition and famine
- Changes of ecological ranges of infectious diseases

- Acute and chronic respiratory diseases and burning injuries
- Decreased agricultural productivity
- Increased water shortages
- Increased migration
- Increased forest and bush burning
- Loss of biodiversity
- Increased geographic isolation
- Increased poverty
- Reduction of the land's natural resilience to recover from climatic disturbances;
- Reduction of soil productivity;
- Damaged vegetation cover, such that edible plants can be replaced by non-edible ones;
- Increased downstream flooding, reduced water quality, sedimentation in rivers and lakes and siltation of reservoirs and navigation channels;
- Aggravated health problems due to wind-blown dust, including eye infections, respiratory illnesses, allergies and mental stress;
- Undermined food production; and
- Loss of livelihoods compelling affected people to migrate.

Deforestation

More than 110 million hectares of forest, about 11 million hectares a year, disappeared during the 1990s. Most of this loss was in developing countries. About 45 per cent of the world's original forests are gone. Major causes of deforestation and forest degradation lie outside the forest sector and include the need to create agricultural land and to harvest fuel wood for food and energy. Approximately half of the wood harvested in the world is used as fuel wood and charcoal, mostly in developing countries. In developed countries the main uses are for industrial products. The alarming rates of deforestation and the associated loss of environmental resources, social and cultural traditions – alongside the loss of the economic and productive capacity of forestland – account for the fact that forest preservation is now a major priority on the national, regional and global policy and political agendas.

The removal of trees decreases the ability of the soils to absorb and retain water; thus contributing to the depletion of the groundwater aquifers, which supply about one-third of the world's population. Aquifers are the sole source of water for many rural communities worldwide. Cleared lands stripped of their tree cover also are more susceptible to:

- Erosion, which degrades fertile lands and silts waterways, lakes, rivers and coastal waters, thereby degrades water quality for human consumption and disrupts ecosystem processes by choking fish hatcheries, coral reefs, etc.;
- Decreased groundwater recharge because the barren soils do not infiltrate water as effectively;
- Increased malaria transmission, bearing in mind that 90 per cent of the malaria disease burden is linked with underlying environmental factors; and
- Desertification and drought (see previous section).

Deforestation is also intrinsically linked to the loss of biodiversity as original rain forests host numerous species of precious fauna and flora.

Loss of Biodiversity

One hundred and fifty years ago, the Native American leader, Chief Seattle, is reported to have said we humans are but a thread in the web of life. He added, whatever we do to the web, "We do to ourselves."

The web is unraveling at an increasing rate. Both plant and animal species have been disappearing at 50 to 100 times the natural rate, due to such factors as the large-scale clearing and burning of forests, over-harvesting of plants and animals, indiscriminate use of pesticides, draining and filling of wetlands, destructive fishing practices, air pollution and the conversion of wild lands to agricultural and urban uses. Recent studies suggest that this high rate of extinction will accelerate even faster, taking an increasing number of living plants and animals away from us forever. This species loss and ecosystem disruption is causing a complex range of circumstances with consequences to human health. In response, governments and communities worldwide are now concerned with the purification of air and water, maintenance of soil fertility, mitigation of floods and droughts, detoxification and decomposition of wastes, maintaining

concentrations of vital gases and water vapor in the atmosphere, and controlling infectious agents in the environment. In addition, the loss of biodiversity obstructs the discovery of new medicines to treat various diseases.

Growing Population

A population of over thousands of millions is growing at 2.11 per cent every year. Over 17 million people are added each year. It puts considerable pressure on its natural resources and reduces the gains of development. Hence, the greatest challenge before us is to limit the population growth. Although population control does automatically lead to development, yet the development leads to a decrease in population growth rates. For this development of the women is essential.

Poverty

The vast majority of our people are directly dependent on the nature resources of the country for their basic needs of food, fuel shelter and fodder. Environment degradation has adversely affected the poor who depend upon the resources of their immediate surroundings. Thus, the challenge of poverty and the challenge environment degradation are two facets of the same challenge. The population growth is essentially a function of poverty. Because, to the very poor, every child is an earner and helper and global concerns have little relevance for him.

Evil Consequences of Urbanization

Urbanization and industrialization has given birth to a great number of environmental problems that need urgent attention. Hence, coping with rapid urbanization is a major challenge.

1. Air and water Population

Majority of our industrial plants are using outdated and population technologies and makeshift facilities devoid of any provision of treating their wastes. A great number of cities and industrial areas that have been identified as the worst in terms of air and water pollution. Acts are enforced in the country, but their implement is not so easy. The reason is their implementation needs great resources, technical expertise, political and social will. Again the people are to be made aware of these rules. Their support is indispensable to implement these rules.

1.5 Importance of Environmental Studies

The environment studies enlighten us, about the importance of protection and conservation of our indiscriminate release of pollution into the environment. At present a great number of environment issues, have grown in size and complexity day by day, threatening the survival of mankind on earth. We study about these issues besides and effective suggestions in the Environment Studies. Environment studies have become significant for the following reasons:

1. Environment Issues Being of International Importance

It has been well recognized that environment issues like global warming and ozone depletion, acid rain, marine pollution and biodiversity are not merely national issues but are global issues and hence must be tackled with international efforts and cooperation.

2. Problems Cropped in the Wake of Development

Development, in its wake gave birth to Urbanization, Industrial Growth, Transportation Systems, Agriculture and Housing etc. However, it has become phased out in the developed world. The North, to cleanse their own environment has fact fully, managed to move 'dirty' factories of South. When the West developed, it did so perhaps in ignorance of the environmental impact of its activities. Evidently such a path is neither practicable nor desirable, even if developing world follows that.

3. Explosively Increase in Pollution

World census reflects that one in every seven persons in this planted lives in India. Evidently with 16 per cent of the world's population and only 2.4 per cent of its land area, there is a heavy pressure on the natural resources including land. Agricultural experts have recognized soils health problems like deficiency of micronutrients and organic matter, soil salinity and damage of soil structure.

4. Need for an Alternative Solution

It is essential, especially for developing countries to find alternative paths to an alternative goal. We need a goal as under:

(1) A goal, which ultimately is the true goal of development an environmentally sound and sustainable development.

(2) A goal common to all citizens of our earth.

(3) A goal distant from the developing world in the manner it is from the over-consuming wasteful societies of the "developed" world.

5. Need to Save Humanity from Extinction

It is incumbent upon us to save the humanity from extinction. Consequent to our activities constricting the environment and depleting the biosphere, in the name of development.

6. Need for Wise Planning of Development

Our survival and sustenance depend on our environment. Resources withdraw, processing and use of the product have all to by synchronized with the ecological cycles in any plan of development our actions should be planned ecologically for the sustenance of the environment and development.

QUESTIONS

1. What is Environment? Discuss the scope of Environment.
2. Describe the importance of environment studies.
3. "The need for public awareness about environment is of vital importance." Discuss.
4. Discuss the various types of environment.

Short Answer Type Questions

1. Define environments.
2. Discuss the scope of environment.
3. Write a note on the importance of environment studies.
4. Write a note on the need of public awareness about environment.
5. Write a note on physical environment.
6. Write a note on biological environment.

Chapter Two: Introduction to Environmental Ethics

2.1 Ethics and Environment

Ethics is a normative study of the principles of human conduct in relation to justice and injustice, good and evil, right and wrong, and virtue and vice. It questions what ought to be done and the extent to which there is justification for a past action that had been done. By environment, we mean our surroundings, including the life support provided by the air, water, land, animals and the entire ecosystem of which man is but a part. Ethics has something meaningful to do with the environment. It questions humanity's relationship to the environment, its understanding of and responsibility to nature, and its obligations to leave some of nature's resources to prosperity. Environmental ethics is a field in applied ethics that asks fundamental questions about humans and the environment; it examines the moral basis of environmental responsibility. Environmental ethics is a diversified discourse with competing different ideas and perspectives.

Humans are the only self-reflective, deliberative moral agents. Ethics is for people. But are humans the only valuable, valuing agents in an otherwise value-free world? Humans co-inhabit earth with five to ten million species. Nature has equipped *Homo sapiens,* the wise species, with a conscience. Perhaps conscience is less wisely used than it ought to be when, as in classical enlightenment ethics; it excludes the global community of life from consideration, with the resulting paradox that the self-consciously moral species acts only in its collective self-interest toward all the rest. Environmental ethics claims that we humans are not so 'enlightened' as once supposed, not until we reach a more considerate ethic.

If someone had been attempting to foresee the future of philosophy at the middle of the twentieth century, one of the most surprising developments would have been the rise of environmental philosophy. Environmental ethics remained unknown until the mid-1970s. Philosophers have published dozens of anthologies and systematic works in the field, and courses are taught in several hundred universities and colleges on many continents.

Philosophers have thought about nature for millennia. Although there is an ethic implicit in many of these world views, this was never much developed in the West. Following the Enlightenment and the scientific revolution, in secular philosophies nature came to be regarded as a worthless realm, governed by mechanistic causal forces. Values arose only with the interests and preferences of humans. In the prevailing Judeo-Christian theologies, God created a good Earth

with myriads of creatures, and subjected these to human dominion. For four centuries, Western philosophy and theology were both dominantly humanistic, or, in current vocabulary, anthropocentric. Environmental ethics applies ethics to the environment, analogously to ethics applied to business, medicine, engineering, Law and technology. Such humanist applications may be challenging: limiting population growth or development, questioning consumerism and the distribution of wealth, advocating the inclusion of women or aboriginal peoples, or fearing global warming.

Environmental quality is necessary for quality of human life. Humans dramatically rebuild their environments; still, their lives, filled with artifacts, are lived in a natural ecology where resources—soil, air, water, photosynthesis, and climate—are matters of life and death. Culture and nature have entwined destinies, similar to (and related to) the way minds are inseparable from bodies. So ethics needs to be applied to the environment.

At depth, however, environmental ethics is more radical in 'applying ethics' (so many advocates claim) outside the sector of human interests. Contemporary ethics has been concerned to be all-encompassing: the poor as well as the rich, women as well as men, future generations as well as the present. Environmental ethics is even more inclusive. Whales slaughtered, wolves extirpated, whooping cranes and their habitats disrupted, ancient forests cut, Earth threatened by global warming—these are ethical questions intrinsically, owing to values destroyed in nature, as well as also instrumentally, owing to human resources jeopardized. Humans need to include nature in their ethics; humans need to include themselves in nature.

Somewhat ironically, just when humans, with their increasing industry and technology, seemed further and further from nature, having more knowledge about natural processes and more power to manage them, the natural world has emerged as a focus of ethical concern. Human power to affect nature has dramatically escalated, as with species loss or global warming. Exploding populations raise concerns that humans are not in a sustainable relationship with their environment. Nor have they distributed the benefits derived from natural resources equitably. Nor have they been sensitive enough to the welfare of the myriads of other species.

From the above discussion it is clear that the rational for incorporating ethics into environment. So let’s see what environmental ethics is and its concern? Environmental ethics can be defined

differently from different angles differently. The followings are some of the definition given by different scholars and institutions.

Environmental ethics is theory and practice about appropriate concern for, values in, and duties regarding the natural world. By classical accounts, ethics is people relating to people in justice and love. Environmental ethics starts with human concerns for a quality environment, and some think this shapes the ethic from start to finish. Others hold that, beyond inter-human concerns, values are at stake when humans relate to animals, plants, species and ecosystems. According to their vision, humans ought to find nature sometimes morally considerable in itself, and this turns ethics in new directions.

Environmental Ethics is concerned with the consideration of the variety and scope of ideas, beliefs, cultural backgrounds, and other anthropogenic factors that affect our decision making process. Taking consideration of how humans fit into that ecology of the world and "nature".

Environmental Ethics is concerned with the short and long term decisions that humans make in their interactions with the environment. It also includes the value placed on the use of land for purposes other than human interest.

Environmental Ethics is concerned with an understanding of the ecological and biological relationships within ecosystem(s) and their relationships within human cultures and societies, and with the ethical bases upon which decisions are made by humans that impact the environments in which we live.

Environmental Ethics is concerned with ethical decisions and values covering the environment for the purpose of sustaining that environment verses personal gain. To what extent does man damage the environment for achievement of personal goals and compromise his ethics at the expense of the environment.

Environmental Ethics is concerned with the wise use of global natural resources as to ensure the sustained yield of those resources in perpetuity. This can only be achieved by maintaining a healthy and devise global ecosystem, in which we (humans) realize that we are not apart from the ecosystem, but a part of it.

Environmental Ethics is concerned with living on and use of earth's resources and how we approach these. How we react to shortage, loss of habitat and resources, how land and environments are to be

allocated or left alone. How beliefs and needs modify ideas and opinions or how environmental issues are decided. How and who gets t decide is how conflicts are to be resolved.

Environmental Ethics is the moral thinking of acting participants over all the aspects of environment and population interrelations and find the best approach to the sustainability.

Environmental ethics is concerned with respect for all habitats and systems of all living things – The actions taken to "be environmental ethical" should be concerned with sustaining natural ecosystems and not interrupting natural process / evolution.

Environmental Ethics is the way of perceiving human activity and thinking in relationship to the natural world. An ethical relationship is in which recognizes and takes responsibility for the impact of human activity on natural systems and habitat.

Environmental Ethics means finding a reason of way to deal with the degenerative effect of human effects on the environment without putting human life into jeopardy.

Environmental Ethics is concerned with the decision-making process and the belief systems that support them in reference to the environment.

Environmental Ethics is concerned with… looking at the complicated issues that confront modern folks on a daily basis in dealing with their undeniable connection nature and humanity's ongoing movement intentionally or unintentionally away from the natural.

Environmental Ethics means, the approach we give to environmental issues according to our ethical principles. Everyone has a different approach to ethical issues, like what is good and bad. This gives us an insight to issues that affect people differently.

Environmental Ethics is concerned with the study of the various beliefs, values (economic, religious, etc.) that have to be taken into consideration to evaluate an environmental issue or proposed project.

Environmental ethics is concerned with the application of natural resources of a group of people with similar interests and concerns. It's how a common group sees the most efficient use of natural resources.

2.1 Moral Philosophy and Environmental Ethics

Philosophers are those troublesome individuals who "ask the next question." They look for, and then critically examine, concepts and assumptions that are generally "taken for granted."

Philosophers ask such annoying questions as "What do you mean by that?" "How come?" "So what?" (Short for "so what follows from your assertion?") And, most discomforting of all, "Why should I, or you, or anyone believe that?" The philosopher's job is primarily to ask questions, not to answer them. His task is not to comfort the afflicted but to afflict the comfortable.

Often the philosophers' attempts to rouse others "from their dogmatic slumbers" (as Kant phrased it) are icily ignored. Sometimes the philosophers' attempts to provoke active thought succeed all too well (Witness the case of Socrates).Within the general field of philosophy is ethics and moral philosophy -- the philosophical study of values ("good" and "bad") that are, to some degree at least, under the control of some responsible, rational and deliberative person or persons. Ethics deals with such general concepts as obligation, justice, rights, duties, virtue, beneficence, etc. Moral philosophy deals, in general, with the evaluation of personal acts, conduct, motivation and policy.

Viewed descriptively, the institution of morality is social in origin and orientation and essentially systemic. Like economic systems, moral codes evolve out of competition and cooperation: the competition for scarce goods, services, satisfactions and the security of personal interests, and cooperation to gain and enhance mutual welfare and security. Thus moral philosophy describes and prescribes constraints and liberties (duties and rights) that regulate social life so that all may fairly contribute to the just maximization of benefits and satisfactions for each.

The concept of a "person" is central to moral philosophy. While the list of criteria that identify "personhood" is in some dispute, most moral philosophers would include most, it not all, of the following characteristics in that list:

- Sentience or the ability to feel pain.
- Consciousness of external objects and events.
- Reasoning, the ability to solve problems.
- The capacity to communicate through the use of a complete, syntactic system of significant symbols (i.e., a language).
- A capacity to conceptualize and choose among alternative futures.

- A capacity to act on principle -- to deliberately govern one's behavior according to rules.

The reason that this definition is crucial to moral philosophy is that only such a being as that described above can be said to be "morally responsible" or "duty-bound" (as, for example, infants and animals are not). Because the only "persons" we know of are human beings, there is a widespread temptation to treat the terms "person" and "human being" as synonymous. This careless equation of meaning leads to a great deal of confusion and perplexity in moral arguments, most notably arguments over such issues as abortion, euthanasia, and environmental ethics.

The question of whether a being is or is not a person has fundamental bearing upon our moral conduct toward that being. Persons are afforded dignity, deserve respect, assume duties and responsibilities, and hold rights to a degree that non-persons do not. Thus, if we were to find that dolphins were, in fact, persons, our attitudes toward them would change at once, and we would (for example) require, by law, that tuna fishermen be much more careful about the dolphins' "personal" safety. The vocabulary and the rationale of moral philosophy have traditionally been applied to the community of human persons. Thus the attempt to extend ethical inquiry beyond human contexts to life communities (i.e., to ecosystems) introduces deep conceptual and methodological problems. The ecological moralist, who ignores these problems, does so at the risk of trivializing and even invalidating his moral theory.

The concept of a *person* leads directly to the distinction between moral and non-moral value. A "moral value" is a value that reflects upon the worth of a person (or, in other words, upon one's "moral virtue"). A "morally good act" is an act that is prompted by a praiseworthy personal will. The term "non-moral value" applies to anything else that might be "graded" (termed good or bad). "Non-moral values" include price (of goods and services), beauty (of art objects or landscapes), function (of machines), viability (of species or organisms), stability (of societies or ecosystems), and even (if somewhat confusingly) enjoyments (of experiences) -- in short, any values that do not reflect upon the worth of persons.

Axiology is the branch of philosophy that deals with values in general, while ethics, a subdivision of axiology, is concerned with moral values or with non-moral values as they relate to moral values. Environmental ethics is concerned with the issue of responsible personal conduct with respect to natural landscapes, resources, species, and non-human organisms. Conduct with respect to persons is, of course, the direct concern of moral philosophy as such. (Strictly speaking, "environmental ethics" could be interpreted more broadly to include questions of responsibility toward artificial environments, but such an interpretation is not directly our concern, and we will thus confine our attention to matters of moral significance regarding natural environments).

"Moral responsibility" normally implies knowledge, capacity, choice, and value significance. That is to say, if a person is morally responsible to do something, then he (a) knows of this requirement, (b) is capable of performing it, (c) can freely choose whether or not to do it, and (d) the performance thereof affects the welfare and/or liberty of other beings. Because one's response to these requirements reflects upon his value as a person, we say that this response has "moral significance." This analysis of "moral responsibility" might help to explain why "environmental ethics" has only recently attracted the attention and concern of moral philosophers. Quite simply, until recently our effects upon the natural environment were regarded as morally neutral since nature, we assumed, was both impersonal and too vast to be injured by our interventions, or else, at the very least, we were quite unable to foresee the harm resulting from our dealings with nature. Now, of course, we know better. We know that we can cause massive and permanent damage to natural landscapes, resources and ecosystems. Not only do we know that we can cause these insults, we also know how we can cause them, and how we can prevent or remedy them. Knowing all this exacts a moral obligation to act with care, foresight and, at times, with moderation and constraint. In our dealings with the natural environment, we are, in short, called upon to reflect, act, or perhaps to refrain from acting, in a manner which testifies to our worth as persons and as a culture -- in a word, to respond morally.

Environmental ethics, then, might include such issues as the following: Why care about nature "for itself" when only people "matter"? If you deny that "only people matter," on what grounds can you defend that denial? (After all, if no people are around to regret it, what difference does it

make if a species, a canyon, or even a planet is destroyed? If people who are around prefer to destroy natural objects and landscapes, then so what? Why not?

- When species or landscapes or wilderness areas are destroyed, what, of value, is lost to mankind?
- Will future generations "miss" what we have "taken from them"? (How could they if they never will know what they have "lost"?)
- "Should Trees Have Legal Standing?" On what grounds, if not for mankind's sake?
- Does "land ownership" make moral sense, or is it a morally absurd and disgusting concept in Western culture.
- Do human beings have a need for nature that implies an obligation to preserve it? What is the evidence for this?
- What are the ultimate grounds of an affirmation to protect the environment? Are they rational? Irrational? Non- rational? Mystical?
- What, basically, is wrong with the developer's anthropocentric and utilitarian land ethic? Why not treat land as a "commodity" rather than a "community"?
- Do future generations (who, after all, do not exist now) have a "right" now to a clean and natural environment when their time comes?
- Can man "improve" upon nature? How? What constitutes "improvement"?
- Do the facts of environmental science have moral implications?
- Are human beings psychologically capable of caring for nature and for future generations? If they have this capacity, are we morally obligated to nurture it? and so forth are the central questions in environmental ethics.

Unlike other “applied” or “practical” ethical concerns, environmental ethics is taken to be inseparable from a vigorous set of theoretical challenges. Environmental ethics requires that we reconsider the scope of morality, which things should be morally considerable, and the nature of the objects of moral concern, which kind of individuals and whether we should recognize more than individuals. Central to the examples above are questions as to what sorts of things are supposed to count, morally speaking. Traditionally, both in theory and as a pervasive cultural

norm, it has been assumed that humans count morally. But do only humans count morally? Should we include other animals in our moral deliberations? The moral significance of nonhuman animals and vegetative life is precisely what is questioned within environmental ethics, and this human centered bias epitomizes that attitude those motivated to form a “new” environmental ethics attempt to surmount.

2.3 Why Environmental Ethics, and Why Now?

Why? Because we can't sit this one out! "Not to decide" about issues of environmental ethics is "to decide" -- in favor of the status quo, and in favor of "business as usual." But our poor, battered, plundered and polluted planet cannot long endure a continuation of "business as usual." We have, in the past couple of centuries, achieved a cleverness that has far overshot our wisdom. The explosive growth of scientific knowledge, followed shortly by a parallel growth in technical ingenuity, has created an "explosive growth" in moral problems -- some unprecedented in human history.

Ethics is a very ancient human preoccupation (older, perhaps, than philosophy itself). And yet, environmental ethics is very new. In view of the recent dramatic growth in knowledge and technology, it is not difficult to see why this is so. Ethics deals with the realm of imaginable human conduct that falls between the impossible and the inevitable -- that is, within the area of human capacity and choice. And now, even within our own lifetime (and ever more so with each year), we have acquired capabilities and thus face choices that have never been faced before in the course of human history -- indeed, we now face many capabilities and choices never contemplated or even imagined before. These include choices of birth, life, and death for our species and others; choices that are rapidly changing the living landscape forever.

When the ecosystem was not understood, or even recognized or appreciated as a system; when the earth and its wilderness were believed to be too vast to be damaged by voluntary human choice; at such a time, there was no environmental ethics. But in our own time we have revalidated the myth of Genesis, for in our own time, with knowledge has come power, and with both knowledge and power, we have lost our innocence.

This knowledge and this power are due, of course, to the scientific revolution. And therein resides a puzzle and a paradox: The scientists, steadfastly and correctly, claim that their content

and methodology are "value neutral." In the narrow sense, they are right. As methodology, science is properly value-free and should be value-free (an evaluative reflection, you will notice). But this "properly value-free" methodology has opened up a bewildering array of capacities and choices to us evaluating creatures. And we are not equipped with the ethical insights and the moral restraints that are necessary to deal wisely and appropriately with these choices. Yet the choices are before us and we cannot evade them. "Not to decide is to decide."

The issues of environmental ethics are momentous, live and forced (to borrow William James' terms); that is to say, these issues involve moral choices of enormous importance that we can make and, even more that we must make. Our moral responsibility to nature and to the future is of unprecedented significance and urgency, and it is a responsibility that we cannot escape. In our heretofore careless and capricious hands lies the fate of our natural environment, our brother species, and the generations that will succeed us.

2.4 The Challenge of Environmental Ethics

Suppose that putting out natural fires, culling feral animals or destroying some individual members of overpopulated indigenous species is necessary for the protection of the integrity of a certain ecosystem. Will these actions be morally permissible or even required? Is it morally acceptable for farmers in non-industrial countries to practice slash and burn techniques to clear areas for agriculture? Consider a mining company which has performed open pit mining in some previously unspoiled area. Does the company have a moral obligation to restore the landform and surface ecology? And what is the value of a humanly restored environment compared with the originally natural environment? It is often said to be morally wrong for human beings to pollute and destroy parts of the natural environment and to consume a huge proportion of the planet's natural resources. If that is wrong, is it simply because a sustainable environment is essential to (present and future) human well-being? Or is such behavior also wrong because the natural environment and/or its various contents have certain values in their own right so that these values ought to be respected and protected in any case? These are among the questions investigated by environmental ethics. Some of them are specific questions faced by individuals in particular circumstances, while others are more global questions faced by groups and

communities. Yet others are more abstract questions concerning the value and moral standing of the natural environment and its nonhuman components.

In the literature on environmental ethics the distinction between *instrumental value* and *intrinsic value* (meaning "non-instrumental value") has been of considerable importance. The former is the value of things as *means* to further some other ends, whereas the latter is the value of things as *ends in themselves* regardless of whether they are also useful as means to other ends. For instance, certain fruits have instrumental value for bats who feed on them, since feeding on the fruits is a means to survival for the bats. However, it is not widely agreed that fruits have value as ends in themselves. We can likewise think of a person who teaches others as having instrumental value for those who want to acquire knowledge. Yet, in addition to any such value, it is normally said that a person, as a person, has intrinsic value, i.e., value in his or her own right independently of his or her prospects for serving the ends of others. For another example, a certain wild plant may have instrumental value because it provides the ingredients for some medicine or as an aesthetic object for human observers. But if the plant also has some value in itself independently of its prospects for furthering some other ends such as human health, or the pleasure from aesthetic experience, then the plant also has intrinsic value. Because the intrinsically valuable is that which is good as an end in itself, it is commonly agreed that something's possession of intrinsic value generates a prima facie direct moral duty on the part of moral agents to protect it or at least refrain from damaging it.

Many traditional western ethical perspectives, however, are *anthropocentric* or human-centered in that either they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone (i.e., what we might call anthropocentric in a *strong* sense) or they assign a significantly greater amount of intrinsic value to human beings than to any nonhuman things such that the protection or promotion of human interests or well-being at the expense of nonhuman things turns out to be nearly always justified (i.e., what we might call anthropocentric in a *weak* sense). For example, Aristotle (*Politics*) maintains that "nature has made all things specifically for the sake of man" and that the value of nonhuman things in nature is merely instrumental. Generally, anthropocentric positions find it problematic to articulate what is wrong with the cruel treatment of nonhuman animals, except to the extent that such treatment may lead to bad consequences for human beings. Immanuel Kant

("Duties to Animals and Spirits", in *Lectures on Ethics*), for instance, suggests that cruelty towards a dog might encourage a person to develop a character which would be desensitized to cruelty towards humans. From this standpoint, cruelty towards nonhuman animals would be instrumentally, rather than intrinsically, wrong. Likewise, anthropocentrism often recognizes some non-intrinsic wrongness of anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) environmental devastation. Such destruction might damage the well-being of human beings now and in the future, since our well-being is essentially dependent on a sustainable environment.

When environmental ethics emerged as a new sub-discipline of philosophy in the early 1970s, it did so by posing a challenge to traditional anthropocentrism. In the first place, it questioned the assumed moral superiority of human beings to members of other species on earth. In the second place, it investigated the possibility of rational arguments for assigning intrinsic value to the natural environment and its nonhuman contents.

It should be noted, however, that some theorists working in the field see no need to develop new, non-anthropocentric theories. Instead, they advocate what may be called *enlightened* anthropocentrism (or, perhaps more appropriately called, *prudential* anthropocentrism). Briefly, this is the view that all the moral duties we have towards the environment are derived from our direct duties to its human inhabitants. The practical purpose of environmental ethics, they maintain, is to provide moral grounds for social policies aimed at protecting the earth's environment and remedying environmental degradation. Enlightened anthropocentrism, they argue, is sufficient for that practical purpose, and perhaps even more effective in delivering pragmatic outcomes, in terms of policy-making, than non-anthropocentric theories given the theoretical burden on the latter to provide sound arguments for its more radical view that the nonhuman environment has intrinsic value (cf. Norton 1991, de Shalit 1994, Light and Katz 1996). Furthermore, some prudential anthropocentrisms may hold what might be called *cynical* anthropocentrism, which says that we have a higher-level anthropocentric reason to be non-anthropocentric in our day-to-day thinking. Suppose that a day-to-day non-anthropocentrism tends to act more benignly towards the nonhuman environment on which human well-being depends. This would provide reason for encouraging non-anthropocentric thinking, even to those who find the idea of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value hard to swallow. In order for such a

strategy to be effective one may need to hide one's cynical anthropocentrism from others and even from oneself.

Chapter Three: Environmental Ethics: The Main Approaches

3.1 Introduction

Environmental crises, such as species extinction, global warming, air and water pollution, and wild land destruction, are some of the most important problems currently facing our society. How we deal with these problems largely depends on how we perceive our relationship with the environment. Do we view nature as property for us to use however we wish for our own benefit, or does nature have intrinsic value, value aside from its usefulness to humans?

Environmental ethics is based on the idea that morality ought to be extended to include the relationship between humans and nature. There are a number of different ways to understand an extension of moral consideration to nature. For example, is the extension individualistic or holistic? In other words are individual plants and animals given moral consideration, or is morality only extended to whole species or ecosystems?

Another distinction is whether the extension is rights based or responsibility based; in other words does nature have the right to be protected or do humans simply have a responsibility to protect nature? Perhaps the most important distinction is whether the moral extension is anthropocentric, ecocentric and biocentrism because this determines what is the focus of the environmental ethic humans or nature.

Environmental ethics is the branch of ethics which deals with questions pertaining to man's relation to nature. This field is characterized by a wide variety of approaches, some of which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

3.2 Anthropocentric Approach

The term 'anthropocentric' was first coined in the 1860s, amidst the controversy over Darwin's theory of evolution, to represent the idea that humans are the center of the universe (Campbell, 1983). Anthropocentrism considers humans to be the most important life form, and other forms of life to be important only to the extent that they affect humans or can be useful to humans. In an anthropocentric ethic, nature has moral consideration because degrading or preserving nature can in turn harm or benefit humans. For example, using this ethic it would be considered wrong to cut down the rainforests because they contain potential cures for human diseases.

The essential feature of the anthropocentric dimension of the cosmological domain is the belief that humans are separate from and ethically superior to the rest of nature. As a result, humans consider themselves to be rightfully, the masters of nature subduing it for their own instrumental purposes. With the demystification of nature (Lewis 1973), through scientific and technological development, its manipulation and exploitation were assured and resulted in "the death of nature" (Merchant 1980).

According to some commentators, our exploitative and destructive attitude towards nature originates in an 'anthropocentric' attitude, widespread in Western societies. Hence, they argue, we need a fundamentally new ethic in order to introduce a new way of interacting with nature.

In his famous article: *The historical roots of our ecologic crisis*, the historian Lynn White argues that Christianity bears a heavy responsibility for the environmental crisis because it has promoted the domination of nature. White is representative of the abovementioned 'anthropocentric' approach. He assumes that all species disturb their environment (and have done so in the past), but notes that since the 19th and 20th centuries, something fundamentally new has been occurring: a world-wide destruction of nature. The proximate cause of this development, according to White, is the interaction of modern science with technology in the 19th century.

But the origin and development of science and, particularly, technology, have been determined by a specific pattern of values, which he calls the typically Christian 'arrogant' attitude towards nature. White asserts that this arrogance is the result of a particular view of the relation between God, man and nature _ a view typified by the book of *Genesis*, the first book of the Bible.

And God blessed Noah and his sons, and said unto them, be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth. And the fear of you, and the dread of you, shall be upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moves upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered (Genesis, 9, 1-2).

In *Genesis*, the earth is neither sacred nor divine. Earth is merely a creation, and so is man, but he is made in the image of God. It is not nature that is holy, but Man; to the extent he resembles the Maker. In this creation, Man is central and dominates the animals. Through this conception, White argues, constraints on intervening in nature – which are typical, for instance, of the animistic religions – are removed and, Man is encouraged to exploit nature. Christendom is said to be the most 'anthropocentric' religion in the world.

In White's view we need a fundamentally new cultural attitude: More science and more technology are not going to get us out of the present ecologic crisis until we find a new religion,

or rethink our old one … We shall continue to have a worsening ecologic crisis until we reject the Christian axiom that nature has no reason for existence save to serve man.

The importance of White's argument can hardly be overestimated. His main thesis regarding the impact of value-systems on our interaction with nature has been taken over by many environmental ethicists, particularly by representatives of the so-called 'deep ecology' movement. White's claim that our attitude towards nature is determined primarily by religion stimulated the interest in searching for alternative religions, including a search within Christianity for a new and more 'environment-friendly' interpretation of the Bible.

Lewis Moncrief wrote a reply to White (also in *Science*), entitled "The cultural basis of our environmental crisis". He observed that cultures which have not been influenced by the Judoaeo-

Christian attitude also had, and increasingly have, a destructive impact on the environment. The

only decisive factor seems to be that modern science and technology developed in the West. However, this fact may be unrelated to the Christian attitude towards nature. According to Moncrief, the real explanation can be found in political and socio-economic developments primarily the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution.

John Passmore presented yet another vision in his book *Man's Responsibility to Nature* (1974), one of the earliest major books on environmental ethics. He justly remarks that for a correct understanding of the West, one must take into account the two important inspirational sources of this culture, namely, the Judaeo-Christian and the Greek. The fact that nature has no sacred status in the Old Testament is not sufficient, according to Passmore, to explain the exploitative attitude with respect to nature. He believes that the clearly anthropocentric character of Christendom is co-determined by the influence of Stoicism. In the Stoic philosophy, Man is the only rational creature and the ultimate goal of nature. All other creatures are at Man's service. However, two interpretations remain possible. The first is that God has created nature for the sake of Man, and hence everything in nature is as it should be. The other interpretation emphasizes the creativity of Man – here Man is seen as a creature that intervenes in nature and 'cultivates' it through technical interventions. This view gained grounds in Western Christianity during the 17th century. It was shared, *inter alia*, by people like Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes and Robert Boyle.

Passmore's contribution to the debate is not limited to comments on White's thesis. He mentions the tradition of 'man as despot', which he considers to be the 'Graeco-Christian' arrogance, but he also refers to a minority opinion about 'stewardship', which dates back to the post-Platonic philosophers. This current of thought, however small it was in the West, gave rise to two traditions: The first is, in feeling, conservationist. It emphasizes the need to conserve the earths

fertility, by culling and pruning and good management. The second is rather bolder: it looks to the perfection of nature by man, but a perfection which always takes account of nature's own resources and of what man has already achieved in his civilizing of the world.

Passmore favors the notion of stewardship to that of a despotic attitude towards nature; he suggests a few minor revolutions in science, such as more interdisciplinary research and more respect for scientists working outside laboratories. As to the political and socio-economic problems related to the necessity of reducing economic growth, he has no clear solution.

Robin Attfield, in his book *The Ethics of environmental Concern* (1983), claims that Christianity is much richer than authors like White and Passmore presume. In his view, there is no need for a fundamentally new ethics as our traditions are sufficiently rich to teach us "that all worthwhile life is of intrinsic value". According to Attfield, the ecological problem is basically a problem of exponential growth. Judaeo-Christian views cannot be blamed for this phenomenon: its cause is rather a more recent tradition, the belief in progress: Rather than the beliefs of Judaism and Christianity, the attitude in large measure responsible for environmental degradation in East and West has been the belief in perennial material progress inherited from the Enlightenment and the German metaphysicians, as modified in the West by classical economists and sociologists, by liberal individualism and social Darwinism, and in Eastern Europe by the unquestioned deference to Marx and Engels. Attfield's view on the impact of Christian teachings is that: There has been a strong tradition in Europe and lands of European settlement, a tradition of Judeo-Christian origins but not confined to adherents of Judaism and Christianity, of belief that people are the stewards of the earth and responsible for its conservation, for its lasting improvement, and also for the care of our fellow creatures, its non-human inhabitants.

3.3 Biocentrism Approaches

In order to break radically with the anthropocentric ethics, non-anthropomorphic environmental

ethical theories emerged - the biocentrism and ecocentric approaches. Biocentrism (literally 'life-centered') has been broadly defined as an ethical outlook in which it is asserted that moral standing can be derived from a particular biological characteristic of individual members of a species. Specific biocentric outlooks may result in different views on the characteristic that forms the basis of a morally-relevant value, or obligations arising from recognition of that value. Some proponents of biocentrism would argue that animals have moral standing by virtue of being able to experience pleasure and pain (sentience), or due to self consciousness, while others would argue from the premise of the inherent worth or 'a good of their own' of all living things. A necessary consequence of all biocentric outlooks is a recognition that individual life forms other than humans can have value in themselves, and should be respected for what they are — not only

because they affect the situation of humans. Since biocentrism is focused on individuals rather than the diversity of species, these various outlooks have also been described as an 'individualistic' environmental ethic. Biocentrism maintains that all life forms are `moral patients' - entities to which we should accord moral consideration. We therefore have a duty towards all forms of life. It is their *telos* that gives each individual organism inherent worth and that all living organisms possess this worth equally because all individual living beings have a *telos* and a good of their own. The equal inherent worth of all living beings warrants equal moral status: therefore, we must respect all living organisms (Fadahunsi, 2007).

For biocentrists, being alive, rather than being sentient (or conscious, or having beliefs and desires), confers moral considerability upon an organism. Two important representatives of biocentrism are Kenneth Goodpaster and Paul Taylor. In his article *On Being Morally Considerable*, Kenneth Goodpaster contemplates the question 'what makes something morally considerable.' He argues that being a living thing is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for moral considerability. He links 'moral considerability' with 'having interests', for Goodpaster the prerequisite for having interests is not sentience but being alive.

In his argumentation on 'interests', Goodpaster distinguishes between 'preference interests' and 'welfare interests'. He maintains that an organism which lacks the psychological ability to *take an interest* in anything _ i.e., to have preference interests _ still has things which *are in its interests*, i.e. welfare interests. E.g., pot-plants don't take an interest in being watered; they don't have preference interests. But it is in their interests to be watered; they do have welfare interests.

According to Goodpaster, as far as moral considerability is concerned, it is welfare interests that matter, and plants as well as other non-sentient organisms have such welfare interests. They can be in better or worse states/conditions; they can be healthy or unhealthy, flourishing or not flourishing. It is in their interests to flourish, even if they can't take an interest in flourishing.

Another influential biocentrist approach to environmental ethics has been developed by Paul

Taylor. In his book *Respect for Nature*, Taylor develops a justification of human duties towards other living organisms. He advocates a human attitude of *respect* for nature. Such an attitude involves the recognition that humans are part of an interconnected and interdependent ecosystem to which they are not intrinsically superior; and that *all* living organisms are "teleological centers of life, in the sense that each is a unique individual pursing its own good in its own way".The term 'telos' is a Greek word meaning 'end' or 'purpose'. According to this view, all living beings pursue their own ends, their own good, and defend their own life. This provides the justification for the 'intrinsic value' or inherent worth of all living beings. The pursuit of their good, Taylor argues, is as vital to any living organism as the pursuit of a human good is to a

human being. On this basis, Taylor defends a position of 'biocentric equality': all organisms, of whatever species, have the same inherent value and ought to be treated respectfully.

Taylor develops four basic principles regarding human duties to the non-human natural world:

- Non-maleficence;

- Non-interference;

- Fidelity; and

- Restitutive justice

In brief, 'non-maleficence' refers to the duty not to harm any particular organisms.

'Non-interference' refers to the duty to refrain from constraining organisms and the duty to allow them to seek self-realization unimpeded.

'Fidelity' implies the duty not to break a trust placed by a wild animal in a human.

Finally, 'restitutive justice' refers to the duty to undo wrongs done to individual organisms through human action – i.e. to undo violations of one of the abovementioned three duties. The main problem with Taylor's theory is: how could one possibly live a life in accordance with the principles he defends? E.g., how could one deal with disease, if dealing with disease implies killing millions of bacteria, which all have the same worth as a human life? Or how could one be allowed to construct buildings, as this would inevitably involve killing plants which previously occupied the site? Or what to do about eating; which things would one be allowed to eat? Taylor has tried to deal with some of these problems by developing a series of 'priority principles' for settling conflicts. These priority principles allow, e.g., for self-defense, which includes medicine, as well as the construction of buildings of great cultural significance even if this would cause the mass extinction of living organisms.

3.4 Ecocenterism Approach

Proponents of Ecocentrism (termed here 'ecocentrists') reject the assumption that morally relevant value can be derived only from some biological attribute of individual organisms. Ecocentrists affirm that diversity of species, ecosystems, rivers, mountains and landscapes can have value in themselves, even if they do not affect the welfare of humans or other individual members of non-human species. All ecocentrists attach particular value to the diversity, dynamics and interactions within a healthy ecosystem, but differ in their views on the cause of

and solutions to modern environmental problems. Examples include humans' lack of proper respect for nature and their place within it; the social and economic structure of society; or the history of male dominance and sexist oppression of females. The general concern for the biotic and a biotic community as a whole leads to the alternative classification of the outlook as a 'holistic' environmental ethic.

Upon realization that biocentrism is not radical enough ecocentrism emerged and expands the definition of what is a `moral patient' to include nature as a whole. This implies respect for our fellow members and respect for the community as such. Ecocentrism focuses on the integrity of the ecosystem and the value of species. Under ecocentrism, we have the land ethic, deep ecology

and the theory of nature's value. Aldo Leopold (1966) summarizes the land ethic in the maxim: `A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise'.

In an ecocentric ethic nature has moral consideration because it has intrinsic value, value aside from its usefulness to humans. Using this ethic, for example, one could judge that it would be wrong to cut down the rainforests because it would cause the extinction of many plant and animal species. Ecocentrism considers nature to have inherent value regardless of its usefulness to humans. Ecocentric theorists postulate that the current ecological crisis stems from this over inflated sense of value, or, the "arrogance of humanism."

Leopold suggests that throughout the history of ethics there has been an underlying theme of moral extensionism. From this, an ethic for nature (i.e., the Land) can evolve. This ethic would be philosophically based but also, importantly, ecologically based.

Leopold says that "An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct."

Some might think that this view is somewhat simplistic and perhaps presupposes a particular conception of morality, but the definition looks good enough for our purposes. Following this, though, we get Leopold's definition of an ethic understood from the ecological point of view, namely: "An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence."

Leopold thinks that these are, in essence, definitions of the same thing, grounded in evolutionary modes of cooperation. Traditionally, ethics dealt with relations -- or more precisely, conflicts -- between individuals (and usually individual humans), and relations between individuals and society (i.e., politics). From this, within moral contexts, we can talk of both the individual good and the common good. Both need to be taken into account. Leopold's main concern is that there

is no ethic dealing with the relations between individuals and the Land. Such an ethic is both an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity, according to Leopold.

This ethic is the "Land Ethic". It arises out of a criticism of the conventional way of viewing the Land -- i.e., in purely economic terms. The key problem, here, is that most members of the Land community do not have an economic value. Because of this, there is no grounding for prohibiting or even restricting their destruction. We see this reflected in a number of ideas and attitudes we commonly have towards various non-economic pieces of the environment. Wetland areas, dunes, deserts, etc., are considered 'wasteland'. Further, there is a problem with Conservationist attempts at dealing with environmental concerns. Conservation, again, will focus primarily on economically valuable natural resources, without any consideration for other things and the interconnections between these that enable sustainable biological production of the resources we use/need.

Opposed to this view of the Land, Leopold suggests we adopt the ecological outlook. That is, we should see the Land as a pyramidal system with interconnected chains -- "a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soil, plants, and animals." The ecological point of view recognizes that all species are ecologically valuable, and that we are likely to never fully understand the relations between things that enable ecological systems to be sustained. The fundamental principle of the Land Ethic is this:

"A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."

With the Land Ethic, Humans' role is changed from conqueror to plain member or citizen of the biotic community. We see clearly that Leopold proposes a fundamental shift in the criterion of moral considerability, with the direct result of a considerable extension of the boundaries of the moral community. Further, that there is a move from an individualistic ethic to a holistic ethic.

Leopold thinks that once evolved the Land ethic is not likely to lead to ending of alteration, management, and use of 'natural resources' -- plants and animal included. However, it will lead to sustainable practices.

Leopold was somewhat pessimistic of the likelihood of the establishment of the Land Ethic. An ethical relation to the Land requires love, respect, and admiration for the Land, and a high regard for its value (moral value, not economic value). But the likelihood of many people coming to have this view seems not great. We are separated off from nature -- both physically or geographically, and conceptually -- and so do not have the required connection to the Land. Also, there still remains the rather strong view that the Land must be conquered and put to use, if

it not to be wasted. The development of the Land Ethic is an intellectual as well as an emotional process, and like all other similar things, it will take time.

Some Questions

- Is it legitimate to think of ethical systems as arising out of a process of 'social evolution'?
- How does the extensionism of the Land Ethic fit with other, more traditional, extensions?

Chapter 4: Radical Environmentalism

Environmentalism is a broad philosophy and social movement regarding concern for environmental conservation and improvement of the health of the environment, particular as the measure for this health seeks to incorporate the concern of non-human. **Radical environmentalism** is a grassroots branch of the larger environmental movement that emerged out of an eco-centrism-based frustration with the co-option of mainstream environmentalism. It is the ideology behind the radical environmental movement. The radical environmental movement aspires to what scholar Christopher Manes calls "a new kind of environmental activism: iconoclastic, uncompromising, discontented with traditional conservation policy, at time illegal ..." Radical environmentalism presupposes a need to reconsider Western ideas of religion and philosophy (including capitalism, patriarchy and globalization) sometimes through "resacralising" and reconnecting with nature.

The movement is typified by leaderless resistance organizations such as Earth First!, which subscribe to the idea of taking direct action in defense of Mother Earth including civil disobedience, ecotage and monkey wrenching. Movements such as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and Earth Liberation Army (ELA) also take this form of action, although focus on economic sabotage, rather than civil disobedience. Radical environmentalists include earth liberationists as well as anarcho-primitivists, animal liberationists, bio-regionalists, green anarchists, deep ecologists, ecopsychologists, eco-feminists, neo-Pagans, Wiccans, Third Positionists, anti-globalisation and anti-capitalist protester.

4.1 Deep Ecology

Deep ecology was born in Scandinavia, the result of discussions between Naess and his colleagues Sigmund Kvaløy and Nils Faarlund (see Næss 1973 and 1989; also see Witoszek and Brennan (eds.) 1999 for a historical survey and commentary on the development of deep ecology). All three shared a passion for the great mountains. On a visit to the Himalayas, they became impressed with aspects of "Sherpa culture" particularly when they found that their Sherpa guides regarded certain mountains as sacred and accordingly would not venture onto them. Subsequently, Naess formulated a position which extended the reverence the three Norwegians and the Sherpas felt for mountains to other natural things in general.

The "shallow ecology movement", as Naess (1973) calls it, is the "fight against pollution and resource depletion", the central objective of which is "the health and affluence of people in the developed countries." The "deep ecology movement", in contrast, endorses "biospheric egalitarianism", the view that all living things are alike in having value in their own right, independent of their usefulness to others. The deep ecologist respects this intrinsic value, taking care, for example, when walking on the mountainside not to cause unnecessary damage to the plants.

Inspired by Spinoza's metaphysics, another key feature of Naess deep ecology is the rejection of atomistic individualism. The idea that a human being is such an individual possessing a separate essence, Naess argues, radically separates the human self from the rest of the world. To make such a separation not only leads to selfishness towards other people, but also induces human selfishness towards nature. As a counter to egoism at both the individual and species level, Naess proposes the adoption of an alternative *relational* "total-field image" of the world. According to this relationalism, organisms (human or otherwise) are best understood as "knots" in the biospherical net. The identity of a living thing is essentially constituted by its relations to other things in the world, especially its ecological relations to other living things. If people conceptualize themselves and the world in relational terms, the deep ecologists argue, then people will take better care of nature and the world in general.

As developed by Naess and others, the position also came to focus on the possibility of the *identification* of the human ego with nature. The idea is, briefly, that by identifying with nature I can enlarge the boundaries of the self beyond my skin. My larger -- ecological -- Self (the capital "S" emphasizes that I am something larger than my body and consciousness), deserves respect as well. To respect and to care for my Self is also to respect and to care for the natural environment, which is actually part of me and

with which I should identify. “Self-realization”, in other words, is the reconnection of the shriveled human individual with the wider natural environment. Naess maintains that the deep satisfaction that we receive from identification with nature and close partnership with other forms of life in nature contributes significantly to our life quality. (One clear historical antecedent to this kind of nature spiritualism is the romanticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as expressed in his last work, the *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*)

Some critics have argued that Naess deep ecology is no more than an extended social-democratic version of utilitarianism, which counts human interests in the same calculation alongside the interests of all natural things (e.g., trees, wolves, bears, rivers, forests and mountains) in the natural environment (Witoszek 1997). However, Naess failed to explain in any detail how to make sense of the idea that oysters or barnacles, termites or bacteria could have interests of any morally relevant sort at all. Without an account of this, Naess early “biospheric egalitarianism” -- that all living things whatsoever had a similar right to live and flourish -- was an indeterminate principle in practical terms. It also remains unclear in what sense rivers, mountains and forests can be regarded as possessors of any kind of interests. This is an issue on which Naess has always remained elusive.

Meanwhile, some third-world critics have accused deep ecology of being elitist in its attempts to preserve wilderness experiences for only a select group of economically and socio-politically well-off people. The Indian writer Ramachandra Guha (1989, 1999) for instance, depicts the activities of many western-based conservation groups as a new form of cultural imperialism, aimed at securing converts to conservationism (cf. Bookchin 1987 and Brennan 1998a). “Green missionaries”, as Guha calls them, represent a movement aimed at further dispossessing the world's poor and indigenous people. “Putting deep ecology in its place,” he writes, “is to recognize that the trends it derides as “shallow” ecology might in fact be varieties of environmentalism that are more apposite, more representative and more popular in the countries of the South.” Although Næss himself repudiates suggestions that deep ecology is committed to any imperialism (see Witoszek and Brennan (eds.) 1999, Ch. 36-7 and 41), Guha's criticism raises important questions about the application of deep ecological principles in different social, economic and cultural contexts. Finally, in other critiques, deep ecology is portrayed as having an inconsistent utopian vision (Anker and Witoszek 1998).

4.2 Feminism and the Environment

Eco-feminism, which originated in the 1970s, is a diverse movement. It represents a wide range of perspectives from within the feminist movement and the environmental movement. The core shared idea of ecofeminism is that there is a link between the domination of nature and the domination of women and that both kinds of domination must be removed. According to some ecofeminists, the oppression of women and the natural world have the same cause. The two most important variants of ecofeminism are 'cultural ecofeminism' and 'socialist ecofeminism'. Cultural ecofeminism maintains that women are essentially different from men, that they have a 'nature' which involves particular traits, e.g. nurturing, and that this nature makes women close to nature (in another sense of nature, i.e. the living world). Socialist ecofeminism does not accept such essentialist claims. It holds that, although it may be widely thought that women are closer to nature, this is a social construction. Some women *don't* have such characteristics, some men *do*, and everyone is capable of learning them.

Ecofeminists have offered several criticisms of the mainstream approaches to environmental ethics. Their main points of criticism concern (1) the emphasis on rationality, (2) the emphasis on universalisability, and (3) the emphasis on criteria for moral considerability.

1. Ecofeminists point out that many of the main approaches to environmental ethics stress rationality and denigrate feeling. E.g., Paul Taylor, the abovementioned biocentrist, argues that: The attitude of respect for persons …is both a moral one and an ultimate one. It is a moral attitude because it is universalizable and disinterested. That is, each moral agent who sincerely has the attitude advocates its universal adoption by all other agents, regardless of whether they are so inclined and regardless of their fondness or lack of fondness for other individuals. Taylor clearly advocates disinterestedness, whereas ecofeminists emphasis the importance of feelings or emotions in our moral behaviour.

2. Many mainstream approaches to environmental ethics are based on abstract principles of justice which are taken to apply to all people everywhere, i.e. which are universalizable and thus impersonal. According to some ecofeminists, this kind of position ignores the complex and particular nature of ethical situations in which we might find ourselves. Different behaviours may be morally appropriate for different people in the same situation, depending on people's personal history and their relations to others.

3. Ecofeminists also criticize the fact that many environmental ethicists search for necessary and sufficient conditions for 'moral considerability' (see, e.g., Singer, Taylor). Ecofeminists argue that ethics should not focus on looking for ever broader and more inclusive criteria, an approach which is typically individualist, but on changing the terms on which things come to matter _i.e. focusing on contexts and relationships, e.g. relationships between humans and individual animals or between animals of a particular species.

Broadly speaking, a feminist issue is any that contributes in some way to understanding the oppression of women. Feminist theories attempt to analyze women's oppression, its causes and consequences, and suggest strategies and directions for women's liberation. By the mid 1970s, feminist writers had raised the issue of whether patriarchal modes of thinking encouraged not only widespread inferiorizing and colonizing of women, but also of people of colour, animals and nature. Sheila Collins (1974), for instance, argued that male-dominated culture or patriarchy is supported by four interlocking pillars: sexism, racism, class exploitation, and ecological destruction.

Emphasizing the importance of feminism to the environmental movement and various other liberation movements, some writers, such as Ynestra King (1989a and 1989b), argue that the domination of women by men is historically the original form of domination in human society, from which all other hierarchies -- of rank, class, and political power -- flow. For instance, human exploitation of nature may be seen as a manifestation and extension of the oppression of women, in that it is the result of associating nature with the female, which had been already inferiorized and oppressed by the male-dominating culture. But within the plurality of feminist positions, other writers, such as Val Plumwood (1993), understand the oppression of women as only one of the many parallel forms of oppression sharing and supported by a common ideological structure, in which one party (the colonizer, whether male, white or human) uses a number of conceptual and rhetorical devices to privilege its interests over that of the other party (the colonized: whether female, people of colour, or animals). Facilitated by a common structure, seemingly diverse forms of oppression can mutually reinforce each other (Warren 1987, 1990, 1994, Cheney 1989, and Plumwood 1993).

Not all feminist theorists would call that common underlying oppressive structure "androcentric" or "patriarchal". But it is generally agreed that core features of the structure include "dualism", hierarchical

thinking, and the "logic of domination", which are typical of, if not essential to, male-chauvinism. These patterns of thinking and conceptualizing the world, many feminist theorists argue, also nourish and sustain other forms of chauvinism, including, human-chauvinism (i.e., anthropocentrism), which is responsible for much human exploitation of, and destructiveness towards, nature. The dualistic way of thinking, for instance, sees the world in polar opposite terms, such as male/female, masculinity/femininity, reason/emotion, freedom/necessity, active/passive, mind/body, pure/soiled, white/coloured, civilized/primitive, transcendent/immanent, human/animal, culture/nature. Furthermore, under dualism all the first items in these contrasting pairs are assimilated with each other and all the second items are likewise linked with each other. For example, the male is seen to be associated with the rational, active, creative, Cartesian human mind, and civilized, orderly, transcendent culture; whereas the female is regarded as tied to the emotional, passive, determined animal body, and primitive, disorderly, immanent nature. These interlocking dualisms are not just descriptive dichotomies, according to the feminists, but involve a prescriptive privileging of one side of the opposed items over the other. Dualism confers superiority to everything on the male side, but inferiority to everything on the female side. The "logic of domination" then dictates that those on the superior side (e.g., men, rational beings, humans) are morally entitled to dominate and utilize those on the inferior side (e.g., women, beings lacking in rationality, nonhumans) as mere means.

The problem with dualistic and hierarchical modes of thinking, however, is not just that that they are epistemically unreliable. It is not just that the dominating party often falsely sees the dominated party as lacking (or possessing) the allegedly superior (or inferior) qualities, or that the dominated party often internalizes false stereotypes of itself given by its oppressors, or that stereotypical thinking often overlooks salient and important differences among individuals. More important, according to feminist analyses, the very premise of prescriptive dualism -- the valuing of attributes of one polarized side and the devaluing of those of the other, the idea that domination and oppression can be justified by appealing to attributes like masculinity, rationality, being civilized or developed, etc. -- is itself problematic.

Feminism represents a radical challenge for environmental thinking, politics, and traditional social ethical perspectives. It promises to link environmental questions with wider social problems concerning various kinds of discrimination and exploitation, and fundamental investigations of human psychology. However, whether there are conceptual, causal or merely contingent connections among the different

forms of oppression and liberation remains a contested issue (see Green 1994). The term “ecofeminism” (first coined by Françoise d'Eaubonne in 1974) or “ecological feminism” was for a time generally applied to any view that combines environmental advocacy with feminist analysis. However, because of the varieties of, and disagreements among, feminist theories, the label may be too wide to be informative and has generally fallen from use.

4.3 Social Ecology and Bioregionalism

Apart from feminist-environmentalist theories and Næss's deep ecology, Murray Bookchin's “social ecology” has also claimed to be radical, subversive, or countercultural (see Bookchin 1980, 1987, 1990). Bookchin's version of critical theory takes the “outer” physical world as constituting what he calls “first nature”, from which culture or “second nature” has evolved. Environmentalism, on his view, is a social movement, and the problems it confronts are social problems. While Bookchin is prepared, like Horkheimer and Adorno, to regard (first) nature as an aesthetic and sensuous marvel, he regards our intervention in it as necessary. He suggests that we can choose to put ourselves at the service of natural evolution, to help maintain complexity and diversity, diminish suffering and reduce pollution. Bookchin's social ecology recommends that we use our gifts of sociability, communication and intelligence as if we were “nature rendered conscious”, instead of turning them against the very source and origin from which such gifts derive. Exploitation of nature should be replaced by a richer form of life devoted to nature's preservation.

John Clark has argued that social ecology is heir to a historical, communitarian tradition of thought that includes not only the anarchist Peter Kropotkin, but also the nineteenth century socialist geographer Elisée Reclus, the eccentric Scottish thinker Patrick Geddes and the latter's disciple, Lewis Mumford (Clark 1998). Ramachandra Guha has described Mumford as “the pioneer American social ecologist” (Guha 1996, 210). Mumford adopted a regionalist perspective, arguing that strong regional centres of culture are the basis of “active and securely grounded local life” (Mumford 1944, 403). Like the pessimists in critical theory, Mumford was worried about the emergence under industrialised capitalism of a “megamachine”, one that would oppress and dominate human creativity and freedom, and one that -- despite being a human product -- operates in a way that is out of our control. While Bookchin is more of a technological optimist than Mumford, both writers have inspired a regional turn in environmental thinking. Bioregionalism gives regionalism an environmental twist. This is the view that natural features

should provide the defining conditions for places of community, and that secure and satisfying local lives are led by those who know a place, have learned its lore and who adapt their lifestyle to its affordances by developing its potential within ecological limits. Such a life, the bioregionalists argue, will enable people to enjoy the fruits of self-liberation and self-development (see the essays in List 1993, and the book-length treatment in Thayer 2003, for an introduction to bioregional thought).

However, critics have asked why natural features should significant in defining the places in which communities are to be built, and have puzzled over exactly which natural features these should be -- geological, ecological, climatic, hydrological, and so on (see Brennan 1998b). If relatively small, bioregional communities are to be home to flourishing human societies, then a question also arises over the nature of the laws and punishments that will prevail in them, and also of their integration into larger regional and global political and economic groupings. For anarchists and other critics of the predominant social order, a return to self-governing and self-sufficient regional communities is often depicted as liberating and refreshing. But for the skeptics, the worry remains that the bioregional vision is politically over-optimistic and is open to the establishment of illiberal, stifling and undemocratic communities. Further, given its emphasis on local self-sufficiency and the virtue of life in small communities, a question arises over whether bioregionalism is workable in an overcrowded planet.

Deep ecology, feminism, and social ecology have had a considerable impact on the development of political positions in regard to the environment. Feminist analyses have often been welcomed for the psychological insight they bring to several social, moral and political problems. There is, however, considerable unease about the implications of critical theory, social ecology and some varieties of deep ecology and animism. Some recent writers have argued, for example, that critical theory is bound to be ethically anthropocentric, with nature as no more than a "social construction" whose value ultimately depends on human determinations (see Vogel 1996). Others have argued that the demands of "deep" green theorists and activists cannot be accommodated within contemporary theories of liberal politics and social justice (see Ferry 1998). A further suggestion is that there is a need to reassess traditional theories such as virtue ethics, which has its origins in ancient Greek philosophy (see the following section) within the context of a form of stewardship similar to that earlier endorsed by Passmore (see Barry 1999). If this last claim is correct, then the radical activist need not, after all, look for

philosophical support in radical, or countercultural, theories of the sort deep ecology, feminism, bioregionalism and social ecology claim to be.

Chapter Five: Development Ethics: An Introduction

5.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to analyze development in a value-based context using a paradigm based on development ethics. For development ethicists the true indicator of development is the qualitative enrichment of human beings in all relevant aspects of human life. Above all, development, draw upon ancient ethical issues of the meaning of life, social justice, and the human stance towards nature. The development ethics paradigm consists on targeting the ethical goals of development and the ethical strategies of attaining these goals.

For many years development has been perceived as a straightforward economic issue. Orthodox economists, policy makers, governors, interregional organizations and so on, confront the problem of underdevelopment in an instrumental and administrational way. History has shown that this functional approach cannot provide answers to the issue of development. It is easy to measure the problem but difficult to solve it. Contemporary worldwide *status quo* proves that no considerable distance has been covered with regard to ordinary problems such as water scarcity, famine, and bad sanitary conditions in the non-developed third world.

At the same time, within developed countries, new problems come to the fore, with massive consumption on the one side and new massive social groups under the poverty line on the other. Moreover on an international scale, even in cases that development in terms of growth or industrial expansion has taken place, e.g. China and/or India, the ecological destruction is huge. Hence, development should be re- examined under considerations that arose from the ethical question of 'development for what?'

Development ethics aspires to show the road towards a new development paradigm that investigates development in light of fundamental ancient ethical queries on the meaning of the good life, the foundation of justice in society and the human stance towards nature. The study of development ethics attempts to discuss and codify the aforementioned ethical quires borrowing scientific instruments from economists, political studies, anthropologists, philosophy, environmental scientists and others. Thus, it can be characterized as an interdisciplinary area. To this effort, the contribution of Denis Goulet is distinctive. He offers the conceptual frame and gives the dimensions of a relatively new field of study.

This chapter present Goulet's life tribute and particularly to his theory on development goals and strategic principles of achieving these goals as well as the concept of authentic development.

In terms of structure and conceptual navigation of the chapter, after the introductory section, a discussion on the introduction of ethical study in development follows. This section talks about the rise of an ethical thought within social sciences. The third section considers the concept of development ethics by providing a definition and its origins. The fourth section demonstrates Goulet's noteworthy role in the formulation of a development ethics consensus. The fifth section analyzes the ethical goals of development and the ethical strategies in achieving these goals. The last section deals with the notion of authentic development in contrary to conventional concepts.

5.2 Definition and Origins of Development Ethics

Development ethics can be considered, in one sense, as a field of attention, an agenda of questions about major value choices involved in processes of social and economic development. It is comparable then to business ethics, medical ethics, environmental ethics and other areas of practical ethics. Each area of practice generates ethical questions about priorities and procedures, rights and responsibilities. In this case the questions include: What is good or 'real' development? What is the good life which development policy should seek to facilitate, what really are benefits? How are those benefits and corresponding costs to be shared, within the present generation and between generations? Who decides and how? What rights of individuals should be respected and guaranteed? When— in for example the garment trade, the sex trade, the 'heart trade' in care services, and the trade in human organs—should 'free choice' in the market be seen instead as the desperation behavior of people who have too little real choice? Besides such issues of policy-level ethics comes the innumerable ethical issues, stresses and choices in the daily work and interactions of development professionals. (Glover 1995, Goulet 1988, and Hamelink 1997 give fuller statements of agendas for development ethics.)

Development ethics work has arisen as a follow-on to the emergence of self-conscious professional fields—fields that cover public policy, programmes, organizations, careers, research, education, training, and sometimes proposed codes of practice—of 'economic development' and development economics, 'social development' and development sociology/anthropology, 'politics of development', and so on, and overall of 'international development' and 'development studies'/'international development studies'. So a preliminary type of answer to the 'Why?' question is that every field of practice requires a practical and theorized ethics. Such an ethics, in every case, spans from work which

is narrowly technical-professional, to work which is more theoretical-academic, to work which engages with wider publics.

The development field is so broad though, that there are limits to the analogy to other areas of professional ethics. The problem arise that development ethics might touch almost everything and so cohere less as an area than business ethics or medical ethics. The same might be argued for the field of human rights, because human rights relate to so many diverse areas of human life. This clearly forms no argument against the *activity* of thinking in an ethically careful way about problems and possibilities in development policy and practice. It means only that this activity may not form a tidy self-enclosed *field*. The all-encompassing scope of 'development' makes it less a particular specialist area and more a meta-area that aims to link and inform many others.

Second, development ethics can be considered also as the diverse body of work that has tried to address the questions mentioned above, and the various sets of answers that are offered. This includes work from long before the label 'development ethics' existed; for example, great 19th century writers like Saint-Simon, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx stated positions on some of the questions mentioned above. It also includes current work that may not use the name 'development ethics' but addresses various of its questions, for example the work of Amartya Sen or Joseph Stiglitz.

Third, more narrowly, we have work which uses the name 'development ethics'. Its founder, if any one person should have that title, was the socio-economist Louis Lebret (1897-1966) who led a group called *Économie et Humanisme*, which worked first in France and then in many other countries. The group was formed in 1941 and reflected the experience of the inter-war depression years and revulsion at avoidable deprivation and suffering in processes of societal advance from which many other people benefit greatly. It sought to contribute to a better postwar world through constructing and applying a more humane vision for economic systems.

Similar work emerged elsewhere, including much written in Spanish and Portuguese. Notable for articulating in English these Francophone, Hispanic and Lusophone traditions and connecting them to English language work and to new global networks was Lebret's student, the American existentialist and social planner Denis Goulet (1931-2006), for example in his book *The Cruel Choice* (1971). Development ethics, Goulet proposed, considers the contents of worthwhile development, the acceptable distribution of its costs and risks as well as of its benefits, and the ethical quality of its

methods of analysis and practice, including the questions of who should decide and who should act. So a distinct area of work in academic ethics and social philosophy has called itself 'development ethics' since the 1960s (Goulet, 1960; Goulet, 1965). It attempts to focus philosophy on fundamental human priority issues: *How* are we (as a society, as a world) going? Who suffers? Who (does not) gain? *Where* are we going? Some of this work looks largely only at low-income countries, though with reference also to their relations with high-income countries. Other work recognizes that high-income countries are not necessarily highly humanly developed; it looks at emptiness and malaise, poverty and exclusion, indignity and insecurity in rich countries too.

Nigel Dower distinguishes development ethics by its attention to evaluating societal paths. Traditional ethics has asked "How ought one to live as an individual?" Development ethics asks in addition, he suggests, "How ought a society to exist and move into the future?" (Dower 2008). It is thus a central part of social ethics, while clearly not all of it. Dower stated a similar question for world society, in order to define a sister field of world or global ethics (Dower 2007). One might perhaps equally call that field 'global development ethics'. In addition, 'development ethics' and 'global development ethics' are not really separable: development ethics includes questions of how different societies in the world relate to each other in the process of moving into the future.

Broader than Dower's definition of development ethics is Goulet's: the examination of 'ethical and value questions posed by development theory, planning, and practice'. Its mission is "to diagnose value conflicts, to assess policies (actual and possible), and to validate or refute valuations placed on development performance" (Goulet, 1997). Over time there has been growing such reference to ethics in discussions on long term and short term development policy: in human rights language and activism, the Human Development Reports, the Millennium Declaration, and concern with business corporations' responsibilities and with the interests of future generations. Many streams of work in this terrain—including usually the great river of human rights work, or the 'human-scale development' thinking of Manfred Max-Neef and collaborators—have not used the name 'development ethics' but certainly match its description.

Fourth, it is worth highlighting networks and organizations that have explicitly emphasized a development ethics agenda and tried to institutionalize the field, via publications, meetings, scholarly associations, networks and courses. http://www.development-ethics.org/), was inspired by Goulet.

The International Development Ethics Association (IDEA), for example, formed in 1984 (It has sponsored a series of conferences -- the latest were at the University of Valencia in 2009 and Bryn Mawr College in 2011 -- and provides encouragement and support to work in this field.

Development ethics comes to fill the gap in the ethical study of development by a holistic, defined in a macro level, normative and practical way. According to Nigel Dower, development ethics is the ethical reflection on the ends and means of local, national and global development (Dower, 2007). From the same perspective, Crocker (1991; 1998, 2008) defines development ethics as an ethical deliberation on the ends and means of socioeconomic change in poor countries and regions and mainly focuses on the element of poverty and the division between rich and poor countries – North and South – under moral issues.

Development ethics combines tasks and methodological instruments from a variety of scientific fields such as economics, political sciences, religious studies, anthropology, environmental studies, ecology and other. Thereby it can be characterized as a multidisciplinary area of study, or as (Gasper, 2006) states as an "interdisciplinary meeting place". For Goulet, through these traits of combining multidimensional knowledge and practices it can also be defined as a novel human development paradigm.

Regarding its origins, development ethics can be characterized as a relatively new field of study (Goulet, 1995, 1997; Clark, 2002). Even though the ethical question of 'what is a good life?' and the term 'eudemonia' –a synonymous of happiness - trace back to ancient Greek philosophers and particularly to Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics' (Aristotle in Crisp ed, 2000), the cultivation of moral and ethical issues regarding development studies and the formulation of development ethics such as came to the front with the rise of an economic and humanistic movement in 1950s. This humanistic approach of the economy and society is theoretically represented by the French economist Louis Joseph Lebret and his student American Denis Goulet and defines development "as the basic question of values and the creation of a new civilization" [cited in (Goulet, 1995, p. 6)]. Mohandas Gandhi in India and the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal could be labeled as precursors of development ethics (Goulet, 1997, pp. 1961-64).

5.3 A brief view to the Ethical Study of Development

During the 20th century, for many economists, particularly in lines of orthodox economics, development was viewed as a conventional problem of economic growth in terms of the increase of material goods. The technological expansion, the boost of the production, the sense that people could overcome nature, led many economists, government officials and planners to an 'engineering' approach to the concept of development. Development was perceived as an absolutely measurable matter, as a synonymous of economic growth- the variation of GDP for instance. Ethical inquiries on

the concept of development were viewed mostly as an affair for philosophers and humanists than economists. Regarding the debate within ethics and economics,

Robbins (1945, 148) asserts that "[u]unfortunately it does not seem logically possible to associate the two studies in any form but mere juxtaposition. Economics deal with ascertainable facts; ethics with valuations and obligations. The two fields of enquiry are not on the same plane of discourse". Robbins expresses the vein in economic study that perceives economics as a science which takes place after the elucidation of moral and ethical propositions.

On the other hand, there are those that advocate the coexistence of ethical justifications and humanistic ideas with rational economic methodology. This includes the discussion between means and ends in human development. Hardison and Myers [cited in (Goulet, 1995, p. 37)] underline that "there need be no conflict between the economists and the humanists…The development of man for himself may still be considered the ultimate end but economic progress can also be one of the principal means of attaining it". Clark (2002) also suggests a closer relation of philosophers and social scientists in the field of development. He argues that even a

great attempt has been made towards this direction; more empirical work is needed in order for ethical considerations (such as 'what is good life') to be adjusted to real development practices. For economists, the perception that economic policy as well as economic efficiency hinges on deontological ethics has gradually been established in works such as e.g. Polanyi (1944), Arrow (1974), Hirsch (1976), Sen (1974), Hirschman (1985), Hausman and McPherson (1993).

More precisely, Hausman and McPherson (1993, pp. 672-78) codify the reasons why economists should be interested in moral questions. Accordingly, i) the morality of agents affects their behaviour and as a consequence the economic upshots, ii) welfare economics lies on morals presumptions, iii) public policies are driven by moral commitments which should be linked with economic results, and finally iv) positive and normative economics are often intertwined, so that even positive concerns contain moral presuppositions. The authors argue that, "economists who refuse to 'dirty their hands' with ethical matters will not know what technical problem to investigate".

The contribution of Amartya Sen is crucial to the introduction of ethical justifications and humanistic approach to social sciences, economics as well as development studies [e.g. Sen (1974; 1980; 1981; 1984; 1989; 1999)]. Sen is one of the central figures having an influence to the equity issue within theories of justice. He also contributes to the ethical affairs by perceiving the expansion of freedom as both the primary end and the principal means of development. Sen (1989) in his influential book *On Ethics and Economics* draws a bridge across ethical matters and economic rationality. He advocates that the study of moral philosophy is inevitably necessary to the study of economics. Fine (2004)

highlights the significance of Sen's contribution to the ethical study of economics as well as development and the need for further investigation.

It would be unfair not to underline that in contemporary economic thought, development is broadly defined as economic growth plus social change. A strong supporter of this approach to development is the United Nations which speaks for economic and social development. The concept of a human development paradigm is extensively accepted. According to Haq , founder of the Human Development Report, "[t]he basic purpose of development is to enlarge people's choices... The objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives". In our times, as stated in the lines of the official planner of United Nations, humanness is at the core of the discussion.

Why development ethics?

Modernity 'promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world—and at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are' (Berman, 1983: 15). The rationale for attention to development ethics is that processes of social, political, economic and environmental development bring both enormous opportunities and enormous threats for humankind, individually and collectively, and that the associated benefits and costs are highly unequally and unfairly distributed. Many countries unfortunately match the description that a rich country full of poor people. Human powers to transform the human condition have grown astonishingly in the past three centuries, as have the differentials of power and good fortune between different persons and groups within countries and between countries and regions. Ten to fifteen million people a year, for example, are displaced from their place of residence in order to make way for development projects, with often little or no compensation and with severe harm to their well-being. Some drugs for debilitating and often killer diseases are controlled by business corporations that try to sell them at prices dozens of times their cost of production, beyond the reach of the majority of sufferers. 'Development' – whether understood as fundamental transformations including industrialization, urbanization, globalization, and more; as planned intervention; as improvement in human welfare; or as expansion of valued attainable opportunities – is correspondingly a strongly ethically-laden field. What is all the running and risk-taking for? What is the good life? Why are so

many of the materially affluent spiritually poor? Who benefits, who loses? Who decides, who is consulted, who is not?

Some key themes in development ethics have been that, first, the gains of some groups have been directly conditional on planned suffering for others—a theme for which we can take Peter Berger's label: 'pyramids of sacrifice' (Berger 1974); as for example in the suffering of slaves in the processes of generation of agricultural and mining wealth from the Americas, or of rural labourers displaced to become urban proletarians in the industrialization of Western Europe and Russia. More generally, long term societal development involves enormous investments by preceding generations—such as in the terracing of the Chinese landscape—to the benefit overwhelmingly of later generations, not of themselves. This has been induced in diverse ways besides voluntary contract: through forced labour, physical displacement leading on to capitalist wage-labour, or labour seen as loyalty, duty, honour or self-fulfillment.

Mainstream economics methods use variants and combinations of utilitarian and libertarian values, and a profoundly individualistic world view centered on markets seen as expressions of freedom. Many employ the utilitarian principle of maximizing net benefits—the sum of estimated benefits minus the sum of estimated costs, regardless of on whom the benefits or costs fall, sharing Lenin's readiness to 'break eggs in order to make omelettes'. Besides the disputes over that formal principle comes the question of how it is applied in reality. Michael Cernea, the first and leading sociologist in the history of the World Bank, remarks that: 'we find much in evaluation work that is totally ethically unacceptable' (Cernea 2006), for example studies that legitimated creating parks for rich tourists at the cost of removing the livelihoods of poor local residents, on the basis of projections of future numbers of tourists that were never plausible. We see here the combination of a cost-benefit analysis methodology that impresses through its apparent precision and sophistication but that can allow poor people to be made poorer for the benefit of richer people, and a practice that exacerbates this feature by its openness to manipulation and its frequent generation of highly unreliable scenarios. 'Some get the gains, others get the pains', remarked Cernea (2006), after a lifetime of observation of forced displacement of low-income populations. The creation of national parks, for example, has typically been comprehensively at the expense of the previous residents. Oliver-Smith records the more general 'abject failure of so many resettlement projects to produce tangible benefits for displaced

communities. …. [T]he record of dismal failures and concomitant pain and suffering for the displaced continues with depressing regularity.' (Oliver-Smith, 2009: 17). Even where compensation exercises are present: 'Overwhelming evidence documents pervasive and multidimensional distortions of compensation in practice' (Cernea, 2008: 56). Thirty-six out of forty-four dam-related resettlement cases reviewed by Scudder (2005) showed direct material losses to the displaced, quite apart from the psychological and social losses.

Second, good fortune can generate unplanned suffering for others, as when booming incomes in some sections of society or some parts of the world pull food resources out of poorer areas and out of the affordable reach of the poorest people, leading even to famine and death. Amartya Sen elaborated how famines are not necessarily caused by lack of food but by poor people's lack of market power to command food, which can occur partly as a side-effect of richer people's greater power to command resources (Sen 1981; Dreze and Sen eds. 1990). He analysed these mechanisms in a series of famines that cost millions of lives, in the 19th century in India and Ireland, the Bengal famines of 1943-4 and 1974, and the Ethiopian famines of 1973 and 1974. Mike Davis (2001)'s account of the late 19th century famines in India, China and Brazil which brought tens of millions of deaths takes Sen's insight further. Millions died, not outside the "modern world system," but in the very process of being forcibly incorporated into its economic and political structures. They died in the golden age of Liberal Capitalism; indeed, many were murdered, as we shall see, by the theological application of sacred principles of Smith, Bentham, and Mill. (Davis 2001: 8-9)

Davis recounts how the impacts of climatic shocks caused by el Niño currents in the Pacific Ocean were mediated by new systems of global trade connections and economic ideology. Comparable shocks in the 18th century in China and India had been managed with far less loss of life, by governments that did not believe that starvation reflected immutable economic and Malthusian law and that retained capacity to act on that belief. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with markets left free to determine allocation, some groups in drought-hit areas ended with no enforceable claims over food. Food flowed instead between regions and social groups purely in response to demand from those with money, locally and internationally, without any compensating public action and resulting in the malnutrition and premature death of millions. Such types of 'side-effect' and 'collateral damage' are

widespread in an interconnected world; they are marginal only in terms of the attention often given to them, not marginal in their occurrence and human significance.

Third, besides this 'calculus of pain' (Peter Berger's term), including between people and across generations, there is what Berger called a 'calculus of meaning': how far does the acquisition of and preoccupation with material comforts and conveniences bring or jeopardize a fulfilling and meaningful life? Material means, important as they are for a life of dignity, are insufficient for a truly human life; further, the meanings and use of material things depend on people's own values. In addressing the calculi of pain and meaning, the choices we face are not only between a first option called 'without development' and a second option called 'development', but between many different versions and styles of 'development', with reference both to end-destinations and the character of the paths towards them. Much of the suffering along past and contemporary paths of development is avoidable. Societaly and globally we have real choices. Attention to ethics is important not only in choosing directions but also in understanding options, because people use and are moved by ethical ideas, as we will see for example with reference to the growth and impact of human rights thinking.

Fourth, deserving special attention, given the growth of human powers to do well and to do harm, are the issues of pain and meaning concerning unborn generations and the already born children who are not yet able to participate in societal decision making.

Taking their interests fairly into account, and respecting environmental fragility and constraints, can be called the calculus of sustainability. The Great Transition Initiative, founded by the Stockholm Environment Institute, notes the following areas of critical uncertainties for sustainability: environmental risks, economic instabilities, and socio-political combustibility (Raskin et al., 2002). The three are heavily interconnected, which brings the danger of chain-reaction crises—triggered by climate change, pandemics, financial collapse, mega-terrorism, or key resource shortages—that contemporary institutions will be unable to manage. Karl Polanyi and many others analysed the great developmental transition from rural life to urbanism and from agriculture to industry and market society, and the eventual institutional responses to cope with those enormously productive yet enormously disruptive forces. We now require, concludes the Great Transition Initiative, a second great institutional and cultural transition, to more sustainable societies. Building on analyses done for the Earth Charter and elsewhere it identifies three required major types of value change: from

consumerism (the religion of salvation through buying) to a focus instead on quality of life; from individualism to human solidarity; and to ecological sensitivity away from attitudes of domination and exploitation of nature (Kates et al., 2006).

5.4 Ethical Goals and Strategic of Development

For development ethicists, development is perceived as a relative good which is subordinated to the meaning of life. Each society gives answers to the fundamental inquiries of 'what is good life' and 'what is good society' in a distinct and unique way which is chiefly determined by the value system wherein any society has adopted.

Goulet (1995, p. 27) writes, "[t]he discipline of development ethics is the conceptual cement that binds together multiple diagnoses of problem with their policy implications through an explicit phenomenological study of values which lays bare the value costs of alternative courses of action". What goals ought to be posed and which strategies can be applied in order for these goals to be achieved, depends on the value system of each society.

Goulet (1971) stresses the importance of the dynamic of value change in determining what is to be defined as the 'good life' and the 'good society'. In his words, "'development' is above all a question of values" (p. 205). Innovation and novel behavior patterns that development brings up usually embarrass the value system of a society. A convectional approach to development -in terms of social scientists' study and practices- confronts values either as aids or as obstacles to attaining its goals. In other words, development goals are predetermined and values are used under a functional way by subordinating them. On the contrary, development ethics looks into dynamics of value change in each society and builds its paradigm on this idea. For development ethicists, innovation and novel behavior patterns can be good only if they can be adjusted with the value change and the meaning of the "good life" that every society espouses (Goulet, 1971).

5.4.1 Ethical Goals of development

Despite the fact that development is a relative good in terms of value issues, Goulet (1975, 1995) argues that there are three common acceptable universal values, namely, *i) life-sustenance, ii) esteem,* and *iii) freedom* that societies and individuals ought to investigate within a value based context of the "good life". Theses universal accepted values compose the ethical goals of development.

i) *Life-sustenance* refers to the nurture of life. Goulet (1975, 88) points out that "one of development's most important goals is to prolong men's lives and render those men less 'stunted' by disease, extreme exposure to nature's elements, and defenselessness against enemies." The importance of life sustaining

goods (e.g. food, shelter, healing or medicine) is generally acknowledged by all societies (Goulet, 1975, 87-88; 1995, 41-43). Because of life-sustenance as a value of universal significance, life-sustaining indices are also used as a measurement of development.

ii) Esteem: All human beings in all societies feel the necessity for respect, dignity, honor and recognition. The discussion involves esteem values and material prosperity, and, particularly, how esteem contends with "development" (in a sense of high rate of well-being, economical and technological advance). The more the material prosperity becomes the centre task of the development of a society the greater is the subordination of esteem to material affluence. The reaction of a society to the aforementioned material approach to development and its need for esteem can lead these societies to opposite directions, either towards "development" or towards

resistance of it. In the first case, society tries to gain esteem via "development", while at the latter it try to protect its profound esteem from inward "development". Both acts seek to gain esteem. Therefore, esteem is a universal goal whether "development" is accepted or not.

iii) Freedom is valued both from developed and non-developed societies as one of the components of the "good life". Development ought to free humans from all servitudes. Even thought there is a vast philosophical discussion on the term and the claim that freedom is enhanced by development is not self-evident, freedom is widely accepted as something beneficial and desirable. The debate lies again between freedom and material well-being. In a consumer society it can be accepted that the degree of freedom rises by material expansion, and thus constitutes an increase of well-being. On the other hand, in traditional societies, the value system may adopt a completely different confrontation over needs and wants. In any case, the point is that the matter of opinion is freedom (Goulet, 1995, p. 47).

Furthermore, in the discussion over freedom, a significant distinction should be made between freedom *from* wants and freedom *for* wants. The former refers to the situation where human needs are adequately met, while the latter to the case where the gestations of new wants are controlled and individuals possess multiplied wants (Goulet, 1995, p. 50).

5.4.2 Ethical Strategies of development

In development ethics, strategic principles are normative judgments which provide both the notional and practical framework under within which development goals should be discussed and policy recommendations over those goals ought to be formulated. Accordingly, three ethical strategic are targeted (Goulet, 1975, 1995):

1) The *abundance of goods* in a sense that people need to have 'enough' in order to be more. In order to understand the notion of this principle, it becomes necessary to take into account the ontological nature of human beings. In an ontological sense, almost all organisms must go outside of them in order

to be perfect. Only fully perfect beings would have no needs at all. Totally imperfect beings on the other hand would be incapable of needing certain goods. Humans are perfect (or imperfect) to such a degree that "men have needs because their existence is rich enough to be capable of development, but poor to realize all potentialities at one time or with their resources…At any given time man is less than he can become and what he can become depends largely on what he can have" (Goulet, 1975, pp. 129-30).

Hence, men need 'to have enough' goods in order to be human. This must be investigated under the notion of a humanistic approach on how much is 'enough' for people in order to have a 'good life'. There is not an absolute answer to the above issue. The response to the aforementioned inquiry is found in the historical relation among men and societies. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that underdevelopment (poverty, misery, diseases, mass famine etc) diminishes humanity. Thereby, 'enough' should be, at the minimum, all these goods that lead to cover biological needs, and additionally to free part of human energy in order for it to be allocated to a wider range of life aspects beyond covering first order needs. Altogether with the concept of 'enough' goods there is that of 'superfluous' wealth. At the same time, whereas underdevelopment hits two thirds of the globe, rich classes and nations consume with a superfluous way by exploiting nature recourses. This can be characterized inhuman in twofold: First, the maintenance of superfluous wealth along with underdevelopment conditions is inhuman both for those who have it and those who not have it. Second, the hyper-consumption manner of life in "developed" nations has distorted the way that the "good life" is perceived: "having more" (material goods, wealth) leads to the notion of "being more" (successful, attractive, valuable) (Fromm 1999; 2005). Therefore, with regard to the strategic principle of the abundance of goods, three distinctive points are noteworthy. First, all individuals need to have

'enough' goods in order to realize themselves as human beings. Second, enough is not an absolutely relative measure but it can be defined in an objective basis. Third, both underdevelopment situations and superfluous wealth lead to dehumanization of life. *2) Universal solidarity*. It concerns an ontological and philosophical issue. It can be distinctive in three points. First, all people be in agreement that beyond differences (in nationality, race, culture, status etc) a common 'human-ness' is present. Second, the earth as a cosmic body is governed by identical laws (physical roles) and all men dwell on this planet. Humans share a common occupation of the planet. In spite of differences in geography or climate, all humans are linked directly or indirectly with other people due to the fact of cohabitation into this cosmic body. The third component of the universal solidarity is derived by the all humans' unity to destiny. In contrast, the existing state of affairs over the notion of universalism is in the opposite direction. People have not yet realized the need of solidarity.

Controversial perspectives of development focus on narrow mercantile, strategic and ideological interests. Under the present worldwide conditions, solidarity can be achieved only through conflict

against present rules and redefinition of the relations of power. Conflict is a prerequisite for solidarity. Here it is appropriate to state the importance of classes' struggle and the institutional building role to the problem of development. Development ethicists assert that no universal solidarity exists to consolidate unfair social relations. The rebuilding of social relations and institutions in a basis of equality is more than necessary.

3) *Participation*. Theories of participation possess an important issue in the study of development. In general, the elite theory (e.g. Burnham 1960; Putnam 1977; Bottomore 1993) claims that decision making into a society concerns a 'job' for specialists in each particular field of life. Elite theory is made in a basis of "competence" that leads to an alleged efficiency within a society. For development ethics, participation is a matter for discussion. In Goulet (1995, p. 97) words, "participation is best conceptualized as a kind of moral incentive enabling hitherto excluded non-elites to negotiate new packages of material incentives benefiting them". Even though development ethicists espouse that different kinds of development require different forms of participation, they argue that non-elite participation in decision-making enables people to mobilize and gives them control over their social destiny (Goulet, 1989).

5.5 The concept of the Authentic Development

This section puts forth the concept of authentic development and distinguishes it from the conventional notion of development or otherwise to the way that for many years the developed nations deal with the problem of underdevelopment. The adjective 'authentic' is used by Goulet (1996) to endow the term 'development' with all those traits that development should entail in order to be sustainable and human.

Authentic development refers to the means and ends of human action, or in other words, to the vision of a better life and the way that this life can be accessed. As it is previously mentioned, development ought to respond to long-standing philosophical inquiries concerning the meaning of the good life, the foundation of justice in society and within societies, and the stance of human individual and societies towards nature.

"Providing satisfactory conceptual and institutional answers to these three questions is what constitutes authentic development" (Goulet 1996, p. 197). For all people and any society in the world, authentic development ought to cover at least three objective aims that correspond to the aforementioned goals of development:

a) To pursue more and better life-sustaining goods for all human beings,

b) To create and improve the conditions that nurtures the sense of esteem of individuals and societies, and

c) To release humans from all forms of servitude (to nature, to others people, to institutions, to beliefs) (Goulet, 1995, pp. 47-48).

Any concept of human fulfillment is highly relative and as Goulet (1975, pp. 96-108) points out, development can be examined as a dialectical process. Development goals are usually interactive and no range exists among life protection, esteem and freedom. The essential point is that authentic development should not judge the abovementioned goals (as is conventionally the case) but these goals must become the criteria which authentic development itself must be judged (Goulet 1995, p. 48). In this mode, grading a nation high economic growth does not mean that it has followed an authentic development pattern. No authentic development can be achieved if massive consumption leads societies to an entirely material way of living emphasizing the notion of 'have' instead of 'be'; if structural relations between nations and within them (among classes and individuals) are competitive and there is not equal distribution of development proceeds; if the exploitation of material resources leads to the destruction of ecological balance, if technological advantages are used to abolish freedom.

Authentic development, namely sustainability and human development is at the center of discussion for the last decades. In an effort to define it, during the progress of a seminar entitled "Ethical Issues in Development" that took place at the city of Colombo in Sri Lanca in 1986 (cited in Goulet, 1996, pp. 197-198), it is agreed that any definition of development should take into account at least the following six conceptual propositions :

1) Economic component, related with wealth, material life conditions (amenities), and their equal distribution of them.

2) Social ingredient, connected with social goods as health, housing, education, employment etc.

3) Political dimension, in a sense of the protection of human rights and political freedom.

4) Cultural elements, with accord to the idea that cultures cultivate people's identity and self-esteem.

5) Ecological soundness, to promote a type of development that respects natural resources and forces for the restoration of the environment.

6) System of meaning, which refers to the way that a society perceives beliefs, symbols and values concerning the historical process and the meaning of life.

The aforementioned conceptual elements might reflect a consensus on what Goulet calls authentic development. Important element not fully described within the above analysis relate to issues of ethical value relativity and popular participation where overlap the notion of development. With respect to the first issue, societal value systems are threatened by changes and social change is one of the main components of development. If we accept that development affects values of society and vice

versa, the concept of 'existence rationality' should be investigated. However, what does this strange phrase mean? According to Goulet (1975, p. 188), "existence rationality defined as the *process* by which a society devices a conscious strategy for obtaining its goals, given its ability to process information and the constrains weighting upon it". In other words, existence rationality is considered to be the value system that exists in any society and determines the course of action undertaken to serve societal aims. The core value of existence rationality is to be concerned of the provision of those ingredients that ensure what any society defines as the good life. Thus, any change should be integrated in the principle of existence rationality determined by each society (Goulet, 1995).

Inasmuch as participation is one of the strategic principles of development as it is asserted in a former section, it is an essential constituent of authentic development. Elite problem-solvers (political elite, government officials, policy makers, specialists, executives of intergovernmental organization and so on) usually view development as a matter for competence. In contradiction to the conventional approach to issues of decision-making, authentic development offers a pluralistic alternative to it. The philosopher Ivan Illich underlines "Participation is de professionalization in all domains of life…so as to make *ordinary people* responsible for their own well-being" [cited in (Goulet, 1995, p. 91)]. For ethicists, participation is perceived in the sense that common people are involved not only as receivers of the privileges of development but also as agents of their destiny, building their model of development. To what extent populace participation should takes place is a matter for discussion, what is certain is that via participation at least three vital actions are performed: participation (i) offers to non-elites the ability to state goals independently of their social position, (ii) abolishes political patron, in a sense that ordinary people themselves become problem-solvers in their social environment, and (iii) launches individual and social formations to escape of the rationale of 'do-it-yourself' problems of micro level gaining access the macro arena of decision-making (Goulet, 1995, pp. 91-101).

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