Phraseology and Culture in English

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Phraseology and Culture
in English

edited by

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Preface

The proposition that there is a correlation between language and culture or culture-specific ways of thinking can be traced back to the views of Herder and von Humboldt in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. It was most explicitly formulated, however, by the German-American linguist and anthropologist Edward Sapir in various publications from 1929 onward (re-published posthumously in 1949 under the title *Selected writings of Edward Sapir in language, culture and personality*), and in the writings of his pupil Benjamin Lee Whorf (republished posthumously in 1956 as *Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, as it came to be called, expresses the notion that different languages lead their speakers to different conceptualizations of the same extralinguistic reality, which seems to be most evident in the way that reality is segmented by the lexicon.

Even though few linguists would fully agree with a strict reading of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis today, it is generally accepted that a language, especially its lexicon, influences its speakers' cultural patterns of thought and perception in various ways, for example through a culture-specific segmentation of the extralinguistic reality, the frequency of occurrence of particular lexical items, or the existence of keywords or key word combinations revealing core cultural values. Nevertheless, the exact workings of the link between language and culture are still poorly understood. The few specific theoretical frameworks that do exist are often felt to be inadequate, and the research methodology is only insufficiently developed (it is telling, in this context, that the methods employed by Whorf in particular seem to have had serious shortcomings).

The aim of this volume, then, is to explore the cultural dimension of a wide range of preconstructed or semi-preconstructed word combinations in English. These include highly opaque multiword units of the *kick-the-bucket* type, collocations, irreversible binominals, phrasal verbs, compounds, metaphorical expressions, similes, proverbs, familiar quotations, catchphrases, clichés, slogans, expletives, and discourse markers such as politeness formulae – all of which have been subsumed under *phraseology*, or under *idiom* in the Anglo-American linguistic tradition. The volume is divided into four sections, focusing on particular lexemes (e.g. *enjoy* and its

collocates), types of word combinations (e.g. proverbs and similes), use-related varieties (such as the language of tourism or answering-machine messages), and user-related varieties (such as Aboriginal English or African English). The assignment of the papers to these sections is, of course, not always clear-cut: Many of the papers address issues pertaining to more than one section, and the dividing lines between the sections are therefore permeable, rather than rigid. The sections are preceded by a prologue, tracing the developments in the study of formulaic language, and followed by an epilogue, which draws together the threads laid out in the various papers, and ends with a résumé of the research questions raised in the prologue. The epilogue also draws attention to good academic practice in a way that, it is hoped, will encourage other researchers to conceptualize their projects carefully, both in terms of procedures and assumptions, and also in terms of the potential theoretical import of their work.

There are a number of important works, published in the past fifteen years, that explore the relation between language and culture in general, but the study of the relation between English phraseology and culture in particular has been largely neglected. This volume is the first book-length publication devoted entirely to this topic. It should be of interest to all those interested in phraseology (or idiomatology) and variational linguistics, and to those interested in the interface between language and culture, which is a particular concern in cognitive linguistics and anthropological linguistics.

I would like to thank Penny Lee for reading an earlier draft of the typescript and making valuable comments toward its improvement. I am also grateful to Karin Stettler for competently preparing the typescript and for her endless patience over the years, and to Susanne Jantos for doing the hard work of compiling the index.

Paul Skandera
Innsbruck, Austria
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Andrew Pawley

> There continues to be a need for a model of natural discourse that pulls together the diverse cognitive and social factors responsible for the shape of language. (Chafe 1996: 49)

1. Introduction

A few years ago Anthony Cowie observed that, whereas in the early 1980s "it was still possible to dismiss phraseology as a linguistic activity of only minority interest and with poor prospects of recognition as a level of language or of linguistic description" except in dictionary-making (Cowie 1998a: 18), it "has now become [a] major field of pure and applied research for Western linguists" as it had earlier for scholars in Eastern Europe (Cowie 1998a: 1).[1]

In this essay I will review developments in the study of phraseology, focusing on the period since 1970. However, instead of "phraseology" I prefer to speak of the study of "conventional expressions" or "formulaic language". The class of (speech) formulae in its broadest sense is taken here to subsume all conventional multiword expressions and also to include single word expressions that serve speech act functions, such as *Hello!* and *Thanks!*

The date of 1970 is cited as a boundary chiefly because it was about that time that a number of structural linguists began to pay close attention to conventional expressions and formulaic language, a field already cultivated by practitioners of several other disciplines. By 1970, it is fair to say, scholars in at least nine different disciplines – literary studies, folklore studies, social anthropology, neurology, experimental psychology, educational psychology, microsociology, the teaching of English as a foreign language and lexicography – had done significant research on aspects of formulaic language. During the 1970s linguists established their own research agen-

das in this domain. I see the 1980s and 1990s as a period of expansion and strengthening of these agendas.

I feel some discomfort in attempting such a review. My own time of most intense involvement in this field was from 1972 to about 1977 and it is well known that people tend to see their own formative periods as particularly exciting and important. Publications in the field, especially during the past 15 years or so, have multiplied and there are several lines of research which I do not know enough about to be a well-informed commentator. Then there is the usual problem of selecting from a dauntingly large body of publications. Regrettably, I know very little of relevant literature published in languages other than English. So it is better to say at the outset that I will be presenting a personal view.

There have been some good general surveys of several aspects of formulaic studies (Wray 1999, 2002; Wray and Perkins 2000), as well as more specialised reviews (e.g. Code 1997; Cowie 1998a, b, c; Fernando 1996; van Lanker 1987, 1997; Weinert 1995; Yorio 1989). However, I am not aware of any survey that treats most of the different disciplines in which important work has been done. I will make an effort to do so here.

My own interest in formulaic language began at a very practical level. In the 1960s, after majoring in Anthropology at the University of Auckland, with minors in Psychology and Maori Studies, I became an anthropological linguist. My apprenticeship involved trying to learn to speak several Pacific Island languages. There are some language learners who in their struggle to gain conversational fluency instinctively try to memorise phrases and sentences that will be useful in particular contexts. I was one of these and I spent a lot of time recording such expressions.

Other events made me realise that formulaic language might bear on an issue of some theoretical interest: What does one have to know in order to be able to speak a language fluently and idiomatically? And where does such knowledge fit in a linguistic description? The New Guinea language that was the subject of my PhD thesis, Kalam, happens to be a language with about 130 verbs. To talk about actions and processes Kalam speakers rely heavily on some thousands of conventional phrasal expressions, most of them grammatically well-formed. But the standard "grammar-lexicon" model of language provided no place for well-formed phrasal expressions and I could not figure out how to capture this part of the genius of Kalam in my thesis.

It also happened that my mother, Frances Syder, was curious about what gives conversational talk its peculiar powers, which are so different from

those of written language. She began to think about this question while teaching English language and literature at high school. Her main interest in conversation was in its social dynamics and in how the conventions governing face-to-face meetings, of being in the company of others, shape speech behaviour. However, she noted that one ingredient of conversation that distinguished it from formal written discourse seems to be its more frequent use of lively, colloquial expressions. In the early 1960s she compiled a sizeable dictionary of Antipodean English colloquial phrases with notes on their contexts of use. In 1971 Syder and I began to record and transcribe a sizeable corpus of English conversational speech with the idea of looking at its phonological, grammatical, lexical and sociological characteristics.

Around that time I was asked to write some materials for the new English language syllabus for senior forms in New Zealand secondary schools. This syllabus, devised by John Pride, called for a strongly sociolinguistic approach. In the course of "reading up" for this task and for the conversation project we came across more and more references to formulaic uses of language. There was a network of connections that criss-crossed a number of disciplines in the humanities and the social and biological sciences. It was exciting to discover that scholars in diverse fields concerned with human behaviour or physiology had independently concluded that conventional speech played an important role in their particular domain.

2. Some research traditions which investigated formulaic language prior to 1970

A rough taxonomy follows of the various categories of researchers who during the 1960s or earlier did work on one or another aspect of formulaic language. At least eight distinct research traditions can be distinguished.[2]

(1) *Literary scholars working on epic sung poetry.* Most famously, Milman Parry in the 1920s and early 1930s did ground-breaking work on the role of formulae in the poems attributed to Homer. He and his student, Albert Lord, caught in the nick of time the South Slavic tradition of composing singing epic poems in public performances, which still flourished before World War II. Studying the extraordinary skills of the illiterate Yugoslav singer-composers provided them with a living laboratory in which to test hypotheses about the composition and transmission of Homeric poetry.

Parry himself was heir to an established international tradition of Homeric studies and to a Slavic tradition of work on modern epic poetry. Even so, Parry and Lord as a team can be considered the Darwin of research into Homer, inasmuch as they brought about a paradigm shift. Homer's epics were once considered written literature of the highest form. Parry put into a rigorous and testable form his theory that the poems came from an oral tradition (Parry 1928, 1930, 1932). Following Parry's early death Lord continued their researches and wrote the definitive work (Lord 1960).

Parry (1930: 80) defined a formula as "a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given essential idea". Parry and Lord recognised the paradox that formulae are at the same time memorised and flexible, and have the dual functions of ensuring that performance be fluent yet contain creative variations. Formulae may show special word order, enabling a word sequence to be adapted to the metrical requirements of a half-line of verse; they also show changes in rhythm and intonation different from those of ordinary speech. A "substitution system" is a group of formulae which show lexical substitutions expressing the same basic structure and idea, or which express the same basic idea with varying numbers of syllables, enabling the poet to meet a range of different metric conditions.

(2) *Anthropologists and folklorists concerned with ritual speech and song.* They represent a partly distinct tradition in the study of oral formulaic genres (Bauman 1975, 1986; Bauman and Sherzer 1974). There is a large literature on this field and I will refer to just a couple of representative works. In 1935 Malinowski published *Coral Gardens and their Magic*, the most linguistic of his several ethnographic accounts of the Trobriand Islanders of New Guinea. He observed that the magical incantations of Trobriand Islanders are composed of fixed formulae, spoken with singsong intonation and distinctive rhythm and pitch, with meanings that can only be interpreted non-literally, and with the purpose of trying to control the supernatural. Notice, once again, a combination of features attributed to formulae: fixed words, distinctive intonation, distinctive rhythm, and pragmatic function separate from literal meaning. Following a long tradition in Indo-European studies of collecting and comparing variants of particular folk tales and poems, Iona and Peter Opie published *The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren* in 1959 (their second major work, *The Singing Game,* appeared in 1985). The Opies' study demonstrated the role of 6 to 10-year-old children as carriers and creative manipulators of a remarkably persistent tradition of

nursery rhymes, game chants and sayings, rich in formulaic units of a kind quite similar to Trobriand magical incantations.

Dell Hymes' seminal essay on the ethnography of speaking and rituals of encounter (Hymes 1962) sparked a blaze of research in the 1960s by American linguistic anthropologists which focussed on "performance routines and on detailed ethnographic observation of how people actually use language" (Finnegan 1992: 42–43). Hymes (1968: 126–127) acknowledged that "a vast proportion of verbal behaviour consists of recurrent patterns, …[including] the full range of utterances that acquire conventional significance for an individual, group or whole culture".

(3) *Philosophers and sociologists concerned with ordinary language use as strategic interaction.* The role of speech routines as a key ingredient in social competence began to receive systematic study in diverse quarters in the 1960s. Philosophers of ordinary language and sociologists studying everyday encounters were in different ways concerned with the strategic use of utterances to perform speech actions. Among the sociologists Erving Goffman was an important pioneer in the study of face-to-face talk, as were the ethnomethodologists, whose work gave rise to the dominant approach to conversation analysis pioneered by Sacks and Schegloff. In particular, Goffman drew attention to the social norms that govern people's behaviour in public, norms that underlie established discourse structures and motivate choices of conversational moves. Some of his writings (e.g. Goffman 1971) also attend to the conventional forms of words and gestures used to carry out such moves.

The work of linguistic philosophers such as Austin (1962), Searle (1969) and Grice (1975) was to play a key role in the development of linguistic pragmatics in the 1970s. Austin and Searle used "speech act" broadly to refer to any utterance that performs a discourse function over and above those of referring and predicating, e.g. the functions of greeting, farewelling, introducing, welcoming, complimenting, insulting, apologising, complaining, criticising, refusing, blaming, cursing, forbidding, promising, lamenting, warning, naming, performing marriage, declaring a meeting open, and so on. Such utterances typically take the form of conventional expressions. Following Lyons (1968: 178) I will refer to conventional expressions for performing speech acts as a subclass of "situation-bound expressions" (on this topic see also Coulmas 1979, 1981; Kecskes 2000; Kiefer 1996).

(4) *Neurologists and neuropsychologists, concerned with localisation of language functions in the brain.* Work on brain-damaged patients by Paul Broca in the 1860s demonstrated left hemisphere dominance in speech processing. Soon after John Hughlings Jackson concluded that certain kinds of severe aphasia to Broca's area in the left hemisphere knocked out creative or "propositional" speech but left speakers with "automatic" speech, the ability to recall familiar expressions and texts. Since about 1960 there has been a dramatic expansion of research on language functions in the brain, with important contributions by scholars trained in linguistics. The journal *Brain and Language*, established in 1969, carries a considerable literature touching on this subject.

(5) *Psychologists concerned with learning and speech processing.* Lashley's (1951) paper on the problem of serial order in behaviour proved to be one of the most influential in mid-20th century psychology, arguing against a rigidly behaviourist account of how of elements of behaviour are connected and generated. Lashley argued that an essential characteristic of most serially ordered behaviour is that it conforms to a kind of "schema of action", a central determining event which selects elements and determines their order before generation. In the 1950s and 60s experimental studies of speech for different cognitive tasks showed that familiar or repeated word strings pattern differently from novel strings in terms of frequency and placement of hesitations and other variables, with greater fluency corresponding to automatisation or "chunking" of familiar strings (Goldman-Eisler 1968; Rochester 1973).

(6) *Research in educational psychology.* At the end of the 1950s Basil Bernstein (1958, 1960, 1961) put forward a controversial two-part hypothesis connecting patterns of language use with patterns of thinking. First, he distinguished two varieties of spoken English, initially called restricted and elaborated codes (later private and public languages), based partly on the frequency of what he called "precoded" or memorised utterances (formulae presenting stereotyped ideas or with highly contextualised functions) vs. "now-coded" utterances (freshly-minted, seeking to formulate original thoughts). In this matter he was much influenced by Goldman-Eisler's work (see (5) above). Second, Bernstein related these two putative varieties of English to class differences in habits of thinking and attitudes. In this second point, he was influenced by the work of Vygotsky. Bernstein's provocative proposals suffered from conceptual confusions and methodological

weaknesses which stopped them from being fully explored. Bernstein's ideas can be placed within a wider tradition of work on language, culture, cognition and personality by educational psychologists, anthropologists and linguists, one strand of which is concerned with the question of whether people's customary ways of talking correlate with particular perceptions and worldviews (e.g. Cole and Scribner 1974; Enfield 2002; Grace 1987; Lucy 1992; Wierzbicka 1986).

(7) *Grammarians.* Grammarians of earlier generations had acknowledged that conventional expressions play a part in language. Jespersen (1922), for example, distinguished between "free" and "fixed" expressions. However, it was not until the 1960s that grammarians began seriously to contemplate the difficulties that semi-productive constructions create for models of language that posit a sharp boundary between syntax and lexicon. Chomsky noted that derivational morphology is a grey area (Chomsky 1965: 184–192). Early attempts to derive nominal compounds by transformational rule were seen to be unsatisfactory (Zimmer 1964, 1971). Several influential works on the grammar and semantics of idioms appeared, including Chafe (1968), Fraser (1970), Makkai (1972) and Weinreich (1969). A few grammarians briefly considered the significance of a wider range of conventional expressions than canonical idioms, e.g. Lyons (1968) briefly discusses "situation-bound expressions" (see 4.4) and Weinreich (1969) discusses "familiar expressions".

(8) *Phrasal dictionaries of English.* Such dictionaries have been around for several generations, but until recently did not handle this domain very systematically. To the English-speaking public, the best known works of the mid-20th century were perhaps Eric Partridge's dictionaries of slang, cliches and catch phrases. However, technically much better grammatical treatments of multiword expressions appeared in small English phrasal dictionaries aimed at foreign learners, beginning with the pioneering work on collocations of H.E. Palmer (1933, 1938) and A.S. Hornby (Hornby et al. 1942). For a detailed history of English dictionaries for foreign learners see Cowie (1999). Cowie (1998b: 210) refers to Palmer and Hornby as "the founding fathers of EFL lexicography". Their work strongly influenced the handling of phrasal units in general-purpose dictionaries designed for EFL learners in the decades that followed (Cowie 1998c). However, until the 1970s most large phrasal dictionaries were fairly primitive affairs, containing a fixed phrase, a definition and perhaps an illustrative sentence.

Weinreich (1969) and Cowie (1981, 1998b) have drawn English speakers' attention to the fact that in Eastern Europe, especially the Soviet Union, phraseology has been a prominent field in linguistics and lexicography since the late 1940s. In the typology of "phraseological units" devised by Vinogradov (1947) and refined by Amosova (1963) and by Mel'čuk three major categories are distinguished: pure idioms, figurative idioms and restricted collocations. (As the terms for these categories vary from author to author, it is convenient to use those terms adopted by Cowie 1998a.) Pure idioms, e.g. *beat around the bush*, and *chew the fat*, are expressions whose literal meanings give no clue to their idiomatic meaning, and figurative idioms, e.g. *hold water*, *steal someone's heart*, and *run the gauntlet*, are expressions whose idiomatic meanings can be regarded as figurative extensions of their literal meanings. Restricted collocations, e.g. *pay one's respects / a compliment / court*, and *meet the demand / needs / requirements* are word combinations where the sense assigned to one partner (*pay* and *meet* in the above examples) is "bound to" or governed by its association with another word or phrase. The East European scholars also recognised an important functional and structural distinction between "word-like" expressions and "sentence-like" expressions, such as *I beg your pardon* and *I must apologise*.

For the most part, these studies of formulaic language in a range of disciplines represented separate islands of research, with comparatively little interchange of ideas between them. A coherent discipline (or subdiscipline) is recognisable as such by having a core subject matter, research questions and research methods that are generally accepted, and by having some of the associated institutional trappings, such as regular conferences, courses that give it a place in the curriculum, textbooks and readers, even its own journals. Phonology, syntax, and historical linguistics, for instance, were clearly disciplines in this sense. The study of formulaic language was not. Nevertheless, the sum of the diverse findings in these islands of research was impressive. The following is a brief summary of the more important conclusions that had emerged by about 1970.

1. In the typology of conventional expressions it is useful to distinguish (a) between word-like and sentence-like expressions, (b) between fixed and flexible (semi-productive) expressions, (c) between idioms and restricted collocations, (d) between true idioms and figurative idioms, and (e) between certain types of restricted collocations.

2. Certain specialised speech genres, where performers sustain exceptional fluency and coherence over extended stretches of discourse, depend almost entirely on formulae, including both fixed and flexible types.
3. In both everyday conversation and specialised genres, sentence-like formulae are used to achieve strategic (social, magical, etc.) ends.
4. Familiar combinations of words and ideas are spoken more fluently than novel combinations.
5. There is some evidence that once word combinations are well learned or automatised they are processed in the right hemisphere, whereas the production and comprehension of novel combinations are processed in the left hemisphere.
6. Those conventional expressions which reflect semi-productive morphological and syntactic processes present a problem for grammarians.

3.   The 1970s: Linguists establish research agendas in formulaic language

On to the 1970s. What are the grounds for regarding that decade as a watershed for work on formulaic language in Western linguistics and lexicography?

Two factors stand out. First, a significant number of linguists began to study formulaic language. (I include those lexicographers who brought a training in linguistics to the task of compiling dictionaries of idiomatic expressions.) Second, the main lines of most of the research programs in this field currently pursued by linguists began to take shape.

The chief business of descriptive linguistics has long been grammatical and phonological analysis. A central concern of theoretical linguistics in the 1960s and 70s was discovering universal principles of language structure to serve (among other purposes) as grounds for choosing between competing models of language and language acquisition. In the 1960s formulaic expressions were generally regarded as marginal to the proper subject matter of descriptive or theoretical linguistics. Several mindsets sustained that view. First, formulaic speech was considered to constitute only a small part of the normal output of native speakers. All the emphasis then was on the power of syntax to generate an infinite number of sentences. We learnt to chant the mantra that "most of the sentences that speakers utter are novel". Second (and here I follow Bolinger 1976), theoretical linguists were after a monolithic model, first of "language", later of "grammar", and bits that did not fit comfortably tended to be shunted off to one side. Idioms

are marginal to grammar because they are either frozen or grammatically or semantically anomalous. And well-formed formulae (such as proverbs, cliches and many restricted collocations) are of no interest to grammarians because they are merely conventional or commonplace expressions. Grammar is about rules and structure, and gives no place to the notions of "established usage" or "frequency of use" (although generative grammarians have sneaked conventionality on board in the guise of "selectional restrictions" in syntax and "blocking" rules in morphology).

In the 1,100 page *A Grammar of Contemporary English* speech formulae and formulaic constructions are described as "something of a museum of oddments" (Quirk at al. 1971: 411). To their credit, the authors include a brief but thoughtful discussion of several types of minor constructions such as those exemplified by *How do you do?*; *Why get so upset?*; *To think I was once a millionaire*; *May the best man win*; *Least said, soonest mended* and *I beg your pardon.* Each is considered to be formulaic, because it is grammatically anomalous (and in some cases also because it is used in "stereotyped communicative situations"). However, Quirk et al. devote less than three pages to this extremely numerous and diverse class of utterances. And that is probably more than most grammars did (and do).

A certain degree of reductionism is essential to scientific progress. The problem is always to know when it is time to extend the subject matter, to tackle the bits that don't fit the theory, and when it is time to modify or abandon the theory. After linguists had looked closely at formulaic constructions for a while these no longer looked quite so odd and marginal. Thus, Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor (1988: 501) were to conclude, in a paper in *Language*, that "the realm of idiomaticity in a language includes a great deal that is productive, highly structured and worthy of grammatical investigation".

This shift of perspective was well under way (in at least some quarters of linguistics) during the 1970s. During that period small but valiant bands of lexicographers painstakingly assembled evidence regarding the lexical and grammatical variability of thousands of formulae. Stimulated by the work of philosophers of ordinary language, grammarians wrote many papers on speech act semantics and pragmatics, some of which showed the conversational uses of certain conventional forms of words and construction types. From first and second language acquisition circles there came a steady flow of works treating the role of speech formulae or prefabs (prefabricated expressions) in language learning. Several projects investigating the encoding of thoughts in spontaneous speech were begun, each con-

cerned with the role of familiar expressions in enhancing fluency, allowing the encoder to overcome the severe limitations of human short term memory. Neuropsychology attracted some able scholars with a training in linguistics, who investigated the neurological status of automatic speech.

Within a few years formulaic language had gained a modest degree of status as a subject matter in linguistics. A foot was wedged in the establishment door when a course on speech formulae, taught by Charles Fillmore and Lily Wong Fillmore, was offered for the first time at the 1977 Linguistic Institute sponsored by the Linguistic Society of America. Another indicator was the appearance of analytic papers (e.g. Ferguson 1976) and doctoral theses tackling particular issues. The quantity of recent publications on the role of prefabs in L2 acquisition was sufficient to draw a review article by Krashen and Scarcella (1978) and a collection of papers on conversational routines appeared (Coulmas 1981).

By the end of the 1970s linguists working on formulaic language were pursuing a range of research questions fairly similar to those that engage us today. Some of these research questions were inherited from earlier work in other disciplines, as we saw earlier. However, linguists and lexicographers have brought new perspectives and methods to bear on these and their enquiries in turn generated some new questions.

There were questions concerning taxonomy and description:

1. *Identification*. How to identify well-formed conventional expressions in text?
2. *Classification.* How to classify conventional expressions? What structural and functional criteria are relevant?
3. *Transcription*. How to represent speech formulae in transcriptions of speech? What details are relevant to record?
4. *Description of variability*. What substantive concepts and notational devices are needed to describe the variability found within certain (more or less) productive formulae?
5. *The composition of pragmatic speech formulae.* What range of features sets apart discourse-strategic speech formulae (situation-bound expressions), such as *How are you?*, from word-like conventional phrases.
6. *Oral formulaic genres.* Which features of oral formulaic genres set them apart from "ordinary" language?
7. *Prevalence in "ordinary" language.* How formulaic are "ordinary" genres of speech and writing?

There were also general questions about linguistic competence, language use and language change that implicate formulaic language:

8. *Speech production and comprehension.* How do competent speakers of a language (or genre) manage to talk more fluently than (it appears) their limited processing capacity should permit? How do simultaneous interpreters manage to translate utterances with minimal time lag, and sometimes even finish ahead of the speaker?

9. *Idiomaticity, or native-like selection.* How do speakers know which grammatical strings are native-like?

10. *Appropriateness.* How do people know "the right thing to say" in particular social contexts?

11. *Language acquisition.* How do children and adults acquire language? What role do conventional expressions play in first language learning? Why are certain types of formulae particularly difficult for mature L2 learners to master?

12. *Grammaticalisation.* What is the origin of grammar? How do syntactic and morphological constructions come about?

There were questions to do with models of language:

13. *The grammar-lexicon boundary.* Where to put the "phrase book" in a grammar-lexicon description?

14. *View of language.* By admitting the machinery needed to describe speech formulae, are we not changing the goals of linguistics and indeed changing our view of what a language is?

  And finally, there were other issues, including:

15. *Localisation of function.* To what extent are conventional and free expressions processed in different parts of the brain? What do aphasics use speech formulae for?

4. Progress on particular research questions since 1970

The rest of this paper will comment on the progress that has been made in dealing with these questions. It is necessary to be selective. To review work on all issues and projects in the field would be an immense task. I will say nothing about the large body of research on locating language functions in the brain (reviewed in van Lancker 1987, 1997; Wray 2002) or about recent speculations on the role of formulaic utterances in the origins of grammar.

4.1. Oral formulaic genres

Any course on formulaic language would do well to begin with a study of one or more of highly developed oral formulaic genres, whether it be the singing of epic poetry in the Balkans or New Guinea (Rumsey 2001) or the selling routines of professional auctioneers (Kuiper 1996). In these we find long stretches of discourse where almost every utterance is a formula.

Oral formulaic speech traditions show five features that, taken together, distinguish them from other discourse genres:

(a) very strict discourse structure rules, specifying the topics proper to the discourse and their order of occurrence. For example, in stock auctions (Kuiper and Haggo 1984) there are four compulsory immediate constituents*: (1) De-scription of the lot*, (2) *Search for the first bid*, (3) *Calling the bids*, and (4) *Sale*. Most of these constituents in turn may consist of several constituents, e.g. *Description* can consist of *Provenance + Number, History, Preparation*, and *Potential*.

(b) a very high concentration of speech formulae (usually 90 percent or more of clauses), each associated with a particular discourse context or range of discourse contexts.

(c) special grammatical rules applying to formulae.

(d) special prosodic or musical patterns.

(e) exceptional fluency, i.e. fewer than average unplanned pauses within clauses.

These findings have come out of an impressive body of work on formulaic genres in English built up over the past 25 years by Koenraad Kuiper and his associates at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. Kuiper began by studying auctioneers' sales talk at livestock auctions in North Canterbury and then, with students and colleagues, went on to look at other kinds of auctions and several kinds of sports commentary and later, at a wider range of spoken and written genres (e.g. Flindell 1991; Hickey 1991; Hickey and Kuiper 2000; Ji et al. 1990; Kuiper 1992, 1996; Kuiper and Austin 1990; Kuiper and Haggo 1984, 1985; Kuiper and Flindall 2000; Kuiper and Tan 1989; Kuiper and Tillis 1986). Kuiper and his collaborators outline a framework for constructing generative descriptions of oral formulaic discourse. The descriptions are intended to be generative in two senses. First, they seek to be explicit, defining in a precise manner the object of inquiry and its structure. Second, they seek to be predictive, formulating rules for the production of acceptable utterances or texts which go beyond the corpus of recorded examples. The discourse structure is hierarchical and

can be formally represented by context-free rewrite rules (with a few extra notational conventions). Individual formulae are indexed to discourse contexts.

Kuiper and Haggo (1984) sought an explanation as to why the sale talk of livestock auctioneers has these characteristics. They concluded that the oral formulaic technique has evolved to allow the performer to maintain abnormal fluency while also achieving acceptable standards of content and delivery. They note the close parallels with the Yugoslav oral poets in the need to retain the attention of a mobile audience, in the heavy load placed on the short term memory, in the dense employment of formulae, in the methods by which neophyte practitioners learn their craft and become virtuosos. There are differences: the auctioneer interacts with his audience during the performance. There is less creativity of imagery in the auctioneer's talk. However, it is characteristic of both types that performers do not rely on verbatim recall. Perfect recall of long stretches of text requires exceptional concentration and can detract from other facets of performance (note that recall of text by stage actors is a very different task). A more efficient technique is to draw on memorised chunks but to be able to vary the text somewhat.

Hickey (1991) found that the New Zealand Meteorological Office scripted weather forecasts are highly formulaic, both in discourse structure and in choice of expressions. The general synopsis is always followed by district forecasts. The district forecasts and the kinds of weather information given for each always occur in the same order and the specific information is always couched in formulaic terms. Hickey and Kuiper (2000) conclude that in this case the speech routines are created for the listeners' benefit, so that the only variables listeners have to pay attention to relate to the weather itself. Wray (2002: 79–83) found that people's complaints about the incomprehensibility of British weather forecasts on Radio 4 reflected the lack of a strict order in presenting information.

In Auckland, following Kuiper's lead, my students and I looked at the structure of various kinds of radio sports commentaries, e.g. on cricket (Pawley 1991), rugby (Brown 1987), and children's playground rhymes (Smith 1982) and found that these conform to the basic oral formulaic pattern. For other kinds of oral formulaic genres, see Finnegan (1977) and Rumsey (2001).

4.2. Identifying conventional expressions

Given that most conventional expressions are not idioms but are well-formed grammatically, how does one identify them in text? This is not a trivial problem. For example there was debate over whether Wong-Fillmore (1976) had correctly identified "formulae" in her thesis, or had cast the net too wide and included some free constructions.

What defines a multi-word string as being conventional, formulaic, lexicalised? It has long been agreed that there are clear cases in principle: true idioms and stereotyped situation-bound utterances, and (in English) to a lesser extent verb + particle and nominal compounds. The disagreement has mainly been over where to draw the boundary between free (or novel) expressions and restricted collocations. In corpus studies, problems arise in picking out well-formed formulaic expressions. Automatic search procedures rely on a lookup list. The quality of results depends on the quality of the list plus the routine's ability to recognise discontinuous expressions. Cowie (1998b) and Hausmann (1979) have criticised some corpus linguists for their "insistence…that frequency of co-occurrence is the only significant measure of 'conventionality' in language" (Cowie 1998b: 226).

It is now widely acknowledged that conventionalisation (and therefore lexicalisation) of multi-morphemic and multi-word expressions is a matter of degree. A list of 27 diagnostics for identifying lexicalised expressions was proposed in Pawley (1986). That paper stresses that the importance of applying not only the usual range of syntactic and semantic tests, but also a variety of tests concerning social status (indicating, e.g. whether speakers recognise a particular word combination as the authorised "name" or "term" for a recognised entity), pause placement, prosodic patterns, writing conventions, ellipsis of final constituents, collocational restrictions, and so on. Lists of diagnostics are also proposed in Cowie and Mackin (1975), Makkai (1972), Moon (1998a), Zgusta (1971). Wray (2002) and Wray and Namba (2003) give a checklist of criteria for identifying formulaic chunks in a corpus.

4.3. "Transcribing" speech formulae

The task of describing speech formulae, or any other form of speech begins with the task of "transcribing". It has been a failing of much research on formulaic language by linguists and lexicographers that it treats only

the words and meanings of formulae. Anyone who wants to understand how spoken language works has to pay attention also to a range of suprasegmental and paralinguistic features, which in particular contexts may include tempo, volume, timbre, pauses and hesitations, fillers, false starts, laughter, feedback, accompanying gestures (Crystal and Davy 1969). They must try to construe the social context and motives of the participants. Scholars working on performance in oral formulaic genres have similarly been aware of the need to attend to many channels of behaviour. Bauman (1975) proposes that three levels of analysis are needed for the study of performance: textual, contextual and sociocultural. Musical scores offer a better analogy to transcribers than ordinary written language, as far as the non-segmental dimensions of speech are concerned. Conversation analysts soon realised the key role of transcription and developed notational systems for indicating at least some of these details (e.g. Jefferson 1985; Stenström 1994).

4.4. Classifying formulae. The division between formulae with word-like functions and formulae with discourse functions

Various taxonomies of conventional expressions are possible, according to the choice of criteria. We referred earlier to the widely-accepted classification developed by the Soviet phraseologists: *pure idioms, figurative idioms, restricted collocations*. Since then, more fine-grained taxonomies of idioms and restricted collocations, based on syntactic, semantic and functional criteria, have been proposed by various scholars, including Fernando (1996), Makkai (1972), Mel'čuk (1988, 1998), Moon (1998a), Nattinger (1980) and Wray (2002). The details are too intricate for us to take up here (but see also 4.7, 4.8).

There is a fundamental difference between lexeme-like and sentence-like formulae, a distinction recognised by the East European phraseologists (Gläser 1986) and by Palmer (1942). Minimal lexical units are bundles of perhaps just three inherent components: form, meaning and grammatical context (part of speech category). Certain conventional expressions resemble lexical units in most respects. Phrasal expressions such as *nasty piece of work*, *break up*, *feel antipathy towards*, *shirk responsibility*, *pearly white*, *out of bounds*, *for good* (*for ever*) differ from minimal nouns, verbs, adjective and adverbs, chiefly in having internal grammatical and semantic structure.

However, many conventional expressions cannot satisfactorily be treated as large lexical units. I refer to those formulae that have strategic functions in discourse and social interaction, such as *Hello!*; *Pleased to meet you*; *Dear X*; *Here's to X!*; *I declare this (meeting, etc.) closed*; *If it's good enough for X, it's good enough for Y*, or *Give me a break, will you!* Expressions of this type are quintessential speech formulae because they are tried and true ways of doing things, standard recipes for achieving social purposes. A partial description by Palmer of this major category appears in Bongers (1947).

More than any unit of language this class of expressions shows the need for a model of discourse that integrates the diverse cognitive, social and historical factors responsible for shaping language (to paraphrase Chafe's words quoted at the head of this paper). Such expressions are sometimes referred to as "situation-bound expressions". We might also call them "pragmatic formulae" or "discourse-strategic formulae". They are bundles of seven or eight components: (a) segmental phonology, (b) music – when spoken they require a certain tempo, rhythm, melody, voice quality, etc., (c) grammatical category, (d) grammatical structure, often a mini-grammar, (e) idiomaticity constraints, (f) literal meaning, (g) pragmatic function, associated with a particular place in discourse structure or with a particular social context or purpose, and often (h) body language. (The musical component applies also to written formulae insofar as people know how these should sound when read aloud.) Thus, the expression *(I'm) pleased to meet you* should be marked for its position as B's response in an introduction sequence, after someone has introduced A to B or after A has introduced himself, and for its function as ritually acknowledging A's status as a new associate. It should be spoken with "bright" tone, with main contour stress on *meet*, with eye contact with the addressee, with accompanying handshake (under certain conditions). It belongs to a construction type which allows limited lexical variation while keeping the function intact, e.g. for *pleased* a few near synonyms can be substituted (e.g. *glad*, *delighted*).

There have been surprisingly few studies of the full array of attributes exhibited by pragmatic formulae. Fragmentary accounts can be found in Pawley (1985, 1986, 1991, 2001), Pawley and Syder (1983a). Certain of the features have been noted in work on conversational routines (e.g. Goffman 1971; Lane 1978; Coulmas 1981; Aijmer 1996), and in work on construction grammar, referred to in 4.7 below. The ways in which formulae are indexed to discourse contexts in certain kinds of highly structured discourse has been made explicit in the work on Kuiper and his collaborators.

Wray (1999) and Wray and Perkins (2000) distinguish three main inter-actional functions of formulae, along with subtypes: (i) manipulation of others (e.g. commands, requests, politeness markers, bargains), (ii) asserting separate identity (e.g. story-telling skills, turn claimers, personal turns of phrase), and (iii) asserting group identity (e.g. group chants, ritual texts, proverbs, forms of address, hedges).

4.5. How prevalent are formulae in "ordinary" speech and writing?

How prevalent are formulae in "ordinary" speech and writing, i.e. discourse that is not obviously highly formulaic? Which types of formulaic expression are most frequent? Can genres or text types usefully be distinguished on the basis of the types of formulae they exhibit? To what extent does "ordinary discourse" resemble oral formulaic styles in having strict discourse structure rules with sentence-level formulae indexed to these?

Becker (1975) and Bolinger (1976) concluded, presumably on the basis of experience rather than careful statistical analysis, that prefabricated expressions are pervasive in language. The creation of electronically-stored corpora and sophisticated computer software has led to an explosion of large corpus-based studies over the past 20 years, and these have confirmed the pervasiveness of phrasal units in various genres of discourse, written and spoken, and have facilitated taxonomic studies of such units.

But just how pervasive? Altenberg (1998: 101–102) found that the London-Lund corpus of spoken English of just over half a million words contains over 201,000 recurrent word-combinations. He estimates that over 80 percent of the words in the corpus form part of a recurrent word combination in one way or another.

However, it is not necessary to study large corpora to show that everyday speech and writing depends heavily on conventional expressions. Analysis of quite small samples of spoken or written text are sufficient to show this (Cowie 1991, 1992, 2004; Cowie and Howarth 1996; and also (using a larger corpus) Howarth 1996). For instance, Cowie (1992) examined two articles in *The Times* and found that about 35–45 percent of all sequences of a given structural type consisted of restricted collocations. He noted a good deal of creative adaptation in the use of collocations. Cowie (1991) scanned two articles in *The Observer* for collocations of transitive verb plus object noun and found that about 40 percent of the instances were commonplace restricted collocations, but in this sample there was little creative manipula-

tion of collocates. Using a large corpus of written language, Moon (1998a) found that around 40 percent of phrasal lexemes consisted of verb plus complement.

A separate question is how many conventional expressions are known to the average native speaker of a language. Altenberg (1998) notes that the London-Lund corpus of spoken English contains over 68,000 distinct recurrent expressions. There remains the problem of when a recurrent expression can be considered to be lexicalised rather than free, or rather to what degree it is lexicalised (see discussion in 4.2).

4.6. The role of conventional expressions in fluent speech production and comprehension

At one level, the problems and solutions faced by all spontaneous speakers resemble those of auctioneers or commentators doing play-by-play reports on rapid sports. Formulae contribute to fluency and coherence. However, there is a significant difference. In these particular highly formulaic genres, there is little demand for syntactic integration across clauses. Most of the events and situations can be described by separate clauses and the order and content of things to be said is limited. In conversational speech, complex sentences are common and the order and content of topics is less predictable.

In the 1970s, Frances Syder and I and our assistants transcribed a corpus of around 300,000 words of spontaneous speech. The pattern of pause placements that Syder and I observed led us to propose "the one clause at a time hypothesis", which holds that in a single planning act it is not possible for a speaker to encode novel lexical combinations across independent clause boundaries (Pawley and Syder 1983a, 2000). When a speaker commits himself to a multi-clause utterance he gambles on being able to formulate a fluent and coherent continuation. Yet to attain native-like fluency, say in a narrative or debate, one must routinely be able to manage such continuations. The risks are reduced by the availability of a large store of familiar construction types and speech formulae, some of which span two or more clauses. However, when native speakers attempt complex sentence structures without being able to fall back on such formulae their speech is typically hesitant, though not necessarily incoherent. This conclusion is consistent with that of Goldman-Eisler (1968), who found higher levels of hesitation when speakers have to explain the point of a cartoon rather than describe the sequence of events. In the 1970s, Wallace Chafe and his stu-

dents carried out an experimental study of the relation between idea units and the flow of speech (Chafe 1979, 1980). This led him to propose (Chafe 1987, 1994) an encoding restriction on units of fluent speech that is even more severe than the "one clause at a time constraint", namely the "one new concept at a time constraint".

Wray (1992: 160) offers an explanation of why listeners should have a low tolerance to non-fluency in terms of the "focusing hypothesis". This hypothesis is based on the view that the brain cannot easily focus on two things at once. When processing speech, speakers and listeners have a choice of processing strategies: analytic or holistic. They normally prefer a holistic strategy because it is more economical, requiring minimal attention to be paid to low-level operations while paying attention to the larger unit. If listeners are processing clauses holistically, they are likely to be disturbed by mid-clause dysfluencies which require a shift of focus to a more atomistic level of analysis.

Wray and Perkins (2000) note that formulaic sequences do not have to be generated and so free the encoder to attend to concurrent tasks. They go on to identify different tasks performed by different kinds of phrases. First, a wide range of ready-made phrases increase speed and fluency of production. Second, there are formulae that buy time, e.g. fillers, turn-holders, discourse organisers, and repetitions. Third, there are mnemonics and memorised texts, which gain and retain access to information otherwise unlikely to be remembered.

4.7. The role of formulae in idiomatic command of a language. Rethinking the grammar-lexicon boundary

In a course he taught at the University of Hawaii in 1975 and in two subsequent books, George Grace (1981, 1987) argued that the key problem in understanding how language works is understanding how it is used to say particular things, for describing what happened, or who did what to whom. It seemed that the dominant linguistic theories did not formally recognise that anything is being said at all. This line of enquiry leads us to ask: What things can be said in a language? What apparatus do we need to describe established ways of talking about things? For example, why do languages have clauses? Clauses are good for saying things. They are well adapted to specifying conceptual events and situations. Speaking a language idiomatically is a matter of conforming to established ways of saying things.

Grace pointed out the limitations of what he called the "grammar-lexicon" view of language for handling idiomaticity and other facets of language. That phraseological expressions straddle the grammar-lexicon boundary awkwardly is part of the problem but only one part. There is something fundamentally wrong with dividing language up in this way. He proposed instead a basic division between what is said (content) and how it is said (form).

I attended that 1975 course and read Grace's ensuing series of "ethno-linguistic notes" and as I did so, a number of things that had puzzled Frances Syder and myself in our conversational studies fell into place. Next year we wrote the first draft of "Two puzzles for linguistic theory: native-like selection and native-like fluency" (Pawley and Syder 1983a). The first puzzle stems from the fact that there are many grammatically possible ways of expressing the same essential idea but most are not native-like. How does the native speaker know which are the "normal" ways and which are odd? It seems obvious that knowledge of specific conventional expressions is an important ingredient. However, it is also clear that knowledge of some quite abstract construction types must be part of the idiomatic command of a language. For example, English speakers conventionally tell the time by naming an hour and specifying a number of minutes before or after that hour. Ways of referring to the minutes are highly conventionalised. When using the *M/to/past H* formula, the minutes can be grouped in units of fives, tens or a quarter or half an hour, but not in thirds of an hour. One speaks of "half past one", but not of "half to two", of "a quarter past one" but not of "a third past one". One says "20 to two" but not "40 past one" or "half past one plus 10". We suggested (Pawley and Syder 1983a: 216–217) that every dictionary entry for a complex lexical form of literal meaning has its own mini-grammar.

Later, drawing on ideas in Grace (1981, 1987), Kuiper and Haggo (1984) and Syder (1983), I argued that to know a language we need to command many different "subject matter codes". A subject matter code consists of "conventions shared by members of a speech community that specify, in more or less detail, what things can be said about a particular topic, how these things are said, idiomatically, and when and why they are said, appropriately. That is to say, it is a code for binding linguistic content with form, context and purpose" (Pawley 1991: 339). While discourse genres with restricted subject matters, such as the language of weather forecasts, auctions or courtroom trials, provide the most highly structured examples of subject matter codes, "normal" talk or writing in any domain will conform to quite strict conventions of this type.

The challenge of making sense of selectional restrictions and semantic interpretations in grammatical constructions has led some grammarians to question models that treat grammatical competence as an autonomous system. Fillmore, Kay, Goldberg and their associates argue for a definition of "construction" that includes not only syntactic, but also lexical, semantic and pragmatic information, i.e. which can subsume much in the domain of idiomaticity (Croft 2001; Fillmore 1984; Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988; Fillmore et al. 1999; Goldberg 1995; Goldberg (ed.) 1996; Lambrecht 1984; Tomasello 2003). After investigating the properties of the *let alone* construction (as in *I wouldn't give five dollars for that, let alone ten*), Fillmore et al (1988: 534) conclude that

> in the construction of a grammar more is needed than a system of general grammatical rules and a lexicon of fixed words and phrases… [A] large part of a language user's competence is to be described as a repertory of clusters of information including, simultaneously, morphosyntactic patterns, semantic interpretation principles to which these are dedicated… and in many cases, specific pragmatic functions in whose service they exist. … A language can associate semantic information with structures larger than elementary lexical items and can associate semantic interpretations with structures larger than and more complex than those definable by means of single phrase structure rules.

Restricted collocations and idioms have figured in a variety of recent studies done under the rubric of "event structure". Levin, Rappaport, Hovav and others have investigated the semantics and grammar of verbs (simple and complex) and their arguments (e.g. Levin 1993; Levin and Rappaport 1995). They argue that the meaning of a verb largely determines its argument structure and, therefore, the core syntax of clauses. With particular complex predicates, such as *wipe off*, *wipe clean*, *shoot up, shoot down, shoot dead, go down*, the question arises whether the predicate should be regarded as a lexical unit or as a syntactic string. Using a somewhat different framework, Talmy (e.g. Talmy 1985, 2000) has compared constraints on the combination of verbs and their satellites in various languages. In their *Pattern Grammar* Hunston and Francis (2000) attempt to do something similar for English using the Cobuild corpus.

4.8. Conventional expressions in children's language learning

Clark (1974) wrote a pioneering paper on the role of prefabricated expressions in children's acquisition of, respectively, first language and second language. Soon after came Lily Wong Fillmore's (1976) influential thesis on how six year old L2 learners of English made strategic use of formulae, and Ann Peters' paper and subsequent book (Peters 1977, 1983) noting that children use two strategies, analytic-first and gestalt-first, in learning grammatical patterns, and that some children prefer one to the other, depending on personality and contextual factors.

   Since then there have been many further studies, taking up, particularly, the issues raised by Wong Fillmore and Peters. These are reviewed in some detail by Wray (2000, 2002). Wray and Perkins (2000) identify four stages in the use of formulae in first language acquisition: the child (1) begins with a fully holistic strategy, (2) moves to a strongly analytic phase as grammar and lexicon are acquired, (3) makes more and more use of processing shortcuts, through fusion of sequences that were once analytically processed, and (4) by late teenage years, reaches a balance that favours holistic processing, with a preference for metaphorical over literal interpretations.

4.9. Conventional expressions in language learning by adults

Most adult second language learners seem to have particular difficulty with certain kinds of formulaic language, not only during early stages of learning, but even when they are otherwise completely fluent. The literature on these matters is fairly limited (see reviews by Yorio 1989; Weinert 1995; Wray 2000, 2002). Yorio (1989: 68) concludes that "Unlike children [adult L2 learners] do not appear to make extensive use of prefabricated, formulaic language, and when they do they do not appear to be able to use it to further their grammatical development."

   However, some kinds of idiomatic expression present more problems than others. Howarth (1996) compared the written English proficiency of native and non-native university students, concentrating on verb + object collocations. He found that idioms present fewer problems for non-natives than restricted collocations do, presumably because idioms tend to be relatively fixed and salient. Non-natives make more sparing use of restricted collocations than natives (25 vs. 38 percent of total collocations) and make

many errors. However, collocational errors do not appear to correlate closely with other measures of a learner's proficiency. He suggests that EFL teachers, knowing little of the phraseological mechanisms of the language, lead learners to believe that English has two categories: free combinations and idioms, with little awareness of the middle ground occupied by restricted collocations.

Granger (1998) compared native and fluent non-native speakers' use of conventional phrases in a corpus of writings. Her non-natives had French as their mother tongue. She finds sharp differences. Non-natives overused individual amplifiers, like *completely* and *totally*, in places were idiomaticity conventions demand a specific adverb. When using certain "sentence-builder" formulae which can be formulated either as passive ("It is claimed that") or active ("I / we / you claim that") constructions, they massively overused the active. And non-natives overused certain lexical phrases, such as *the fact that*, and *as far as X is concerned*, a pattern which Granger viewed as showing over-reliance on a limited repertoire of "fixed anchorage" points. Finally, non-natives are much less able to detect deviations from standard collocations.

How should restricted collocations and other prefabricated expressions be taught to foreign learners? Cowie would include texts in which restricted collocations are first identified then imitated and finally judiciously varied. Methods must take account of "striking evidence of stability and repetition in [multiword] vocabulary use" (Cowie 1991: 114). Granger (1998) warns against the current vogue of basing EFL programs on first language models of learning, which would favour procedures that make heavy use of pre-fabs, and against relying on generic teaching materials, put together without regard to differences between the mother tongues of the learners. She calls for teaching materials to be based on language-specific contrastive research.

4.10.   Phrasal expressions in (mainly English) lexicography

The Euralex bibliography of phraseology www.ims.uni-stuttgart.de/euralex/bibweb/ shows that of the productive scholars at work in the 1970s, the majority were Eastern Europeans. Around 1970 several major publishing houses of English dictionaries began to get serious about phraseology. The penny had dropped that a very large part of the native speaker's linguistic knowledge consists of phrasal expressions of one sort or another and that in

the ever growing market of foreign language learners of English there was room for dictionaries that deal solely with idiomatic phrases and that give these systematic treatment. Some of the best lexicographers in the business put their minds to it and within a few years high quality phrasal dictionaries of English began to appear.

The new generation of phrasal dictionaries improved on their predecessors in various ways. A finer-grained taxonomy of types of idiomatic expressions was worked out. The main advances have been in the treatment of the largest class of multiword units, which are often termed "restricted collocations", in contrast to pure idioms and figurative idioms. In restricted collocations at least one element has a specialised sense that occurs only in combination with the other element(s), e.g. *break* in *break one's fall*, *meet* in *meet the demand*, *chequered* in *a chequered career / history*.

The *Oxford Dictionary of Current Idiomatic English* (ODCIE) vol 1 (Cowie and Mackin 1975) was the first large dictionary of English phrases produced by native speakers. Basically it treated phrasal verbs – multiword units consisting of a verb and a particle and / or a preposition, e.g. *back away*, *fall through*, *size up*, *abide by*, *run into*, *take to*, *put up with*, *set up as*, *take out on*. But some of its headphrases contained additional elements, as in *come in handy*, *come down to earth*, *come between somebody and something*, *when one's ship comes in*, *come into sight / view*, *come out of the blue*, *come to a dead end*, *come to terms with*. A second volume in the *ODCIE* series followed (Cowie, Mackin and McCaig 1983), dealing with idioms (pure and figurative) and with those restricted collocations that are invariable (*break one's journey*, *curry favour*) or which display limited variation (*a chequered career / history*).

Technically, the two *ODCIE* works were superior to earlier English phrasal dictionaries in various ways. Headphrases were richly illustrated with well contextualised examples. Variability in semi-productive expressions is expressed in a clear and precise way. Variation is usually shown by a stroke between alternant fillers of a slot, the collocates. Thus we find the headphrases: *Let into a / the secret*; *have an ear / eye / nose for*; *have the best / worst of*, and *keep a tab / tabs / a tag on.* Optional elements are shown in parentheses, e.g. *keep in touch (with)*, *protect (against / from)*, *stop (dead) in one's tracks*. *ODCIE2* was the first English dictionary to distinguish between pure idioms (like *spill the beans*), figurative idioms (*do a U-turn*, *keep a clean sheet*), and restricted collocations (*break one's journey*).

Other publishers soon followed suit: the *Longman Dictionary of English Idioms* appeared in 1982, *Selected English Collocations* (Kozlowska and

Dzierzanowska) in 1982, *The BBI Combinatory Dictionary of English* (Benson, Benson and Ilson) in 1986 and Kjellmer's three volume *Dictionary of English Collocations* in 1994. The BBI Combinatory Dictionary supplies information about word combinations on several levels, including syntax (complementation patterns of verbs). Lexical collocations are arranged by grammatical patterns, e.g. transitive verb + noun (*commit treason*), adjective + noun (*strong tea*).

In spite of impressive progress in this field phrasal expressions continue to be a hard nut for lexicographers, partly for the reasons outlined by Moon (1998a). There are problems of placement and ordering. Should a phrase such as *(be-TENSE not) the be-all and end-all* be alphabetised under **be**, **not**, **the**, or **be-all**? Should the phrase be given a separate entry or be registered as a subentry of one or more of its constituents? Most dictionaries place them as secondary entries under one or more single-word headwords with cross-references. Often, adequate data are lacking on the variability and use of such expressions. Which is the canonical form of a variable expression? How to represent variability? When are related formulae to be considered exponents of one basic formula or more than one (Stubbs 2001)?

None of the phrasal dictionaries of English give due attention to the special features of situation-bound expressions. "Speech-act expressions" are discussed in the introduction to the *ODCIE2*, but in the dictionary entries these are not given separate labels. The reader can, however, pick them out because the definitions of such phrases contain information about discourse function, as in (4), and sometimes also about discourse context, as in (5):

(4)   **how many times / how often do I have to do sth?** complaint that one's opinions, statements, requests have not been heeded or remembered; complaint that one has heard sth more often than is necessary or desirable.

(5)   **how about it / that?** (informal) exclamatory question asked about sth just done, discussed or discovered; challenging remark, often made to sb with whom one disagrees, or whose behaviour one wishes to change.

The definition given for **how about it / that?** points to two distinct discourse uses for this expression. A closer examination shows that, in fact, at least three functionally and formally distinct expressions have been combined in a single entry. The three distinct functions are associated with different

prosodic patterns. *How about it?* should be spoken with a melody that signals 'this is a challenge (to deliver on a promise or proposition)'. *How about that*, on the other hand, may be associated with at least two quite different prosodic patterns and functions. In one of its uses the phrase should be spoken with a tune that (by stressing and raising the pitch on the second syllable of *about*) expresses marvelling at or being pleasantly surprised by a discovery, similar to *Isn't that amazing?* In another use the speaker says, in effect 'I draw your attention to this matter and I want your opinion on it'. Here the main contour stresses are on *how* and *that* and there is no main stress on *about*. As this example shows, a shortcoming of the *ODCIE* is the lack of information about the various features here lumped together under the labels "music" and "body language".

The accounts given of function and context for situation-bound expressions tend to be skimpy. A look through *ODCIE2* shows that the number of expressions whose discourse functions and / or discourse contexts are indicated is probably less than five percent of the 7,000 entries. A good many other expressions that are certainly used as situation-bound expressions are included but their functions are not made explicit.

I referred above to useful devices introduced by recent phrasal dictionaries in order to describe variation in the lexical core of conventional expressions, i.e. those elements that are lexically fixed or that allow a very limited range of lexical choices. However, describing the lexical core of such expressions is not the hardest part of the job of describing their formal structure. More difficult is to establish which other lexical elements can enter into construction with the lexical core. Often the choice of subject or object of a verb, or of elements modifying the verb or modifying one of the nouns, is highly restricted. Sometimes there are severe restrictions on the choice of grammatical elements, such as determiners or tense or aspect markers. In such cases the *ODCIE* gives a list of the choices in each such variable element, placing the list(s) of possible fillers immediately after the definition and before the illustrative examples, using **S** for subject, **O** for object, **V** for verb, **A** for adverb, **det** for determiner, and so on. For example:

(6)   **hold water** be sound, valid… **S**: theory, argument, explanation, excuse, suggestion,…

This tells us that it is idiomatic to say: *the theory holds water*; *the argument holds water*, or *his excuse holds water*, but not, say, *the talk holds water* or *the novel holds water,* because *talk* and *novel* are not listed as possible sub-

jects. What about *that idea holds water? Idea* is not included in the list of possible subjects but it seems acceptable. There is other information that we are not given. Are there other restrictions on what you can do with phrases, e.g. can you negate *hold water*? The answer is yes. In fact, this expression usually appears in the negative. Can you vary the tense freely? Can you add modifiers? It turns out you can say *the theory doesn't / didn't hold water*, but it is not quite idiomatic to say *the theory isn't holding much water any more*, or *the theory will hold some water tomorrow*.

The next example is a noun phrase which typically occurs with one of just a few verbs:

(7)   **a howling success** [Comp (NP)] (informal) a very great success, sth
        that receives much praise and (loud) acclamation **V:** be; turn into;
        make sth. [A triangle enclosing an exclamation mark is placed after
        V to indicates that the set of collocates is restricted not open.]

Igor Mel'čuk and his Russian associates have done pilot studies of a special kind of phrasal lexicon which they term an "explanatory combinatorial dictionary" (ECD) (Mel'čuk 1988, 1998; Mel'čuk and Zolkovsky 1984). Its headwords are idioms and restricted collocations and it aims to rigorously describe collocational restrictions and syntactic patterns associated with such phrasal units.

Some of the technical shortcomings of current phrasal dictionaries can be put down to limitations of budget and market requirements. Commercial lexicographers work within tight constraints of time. They are simply not able to do really fine-grained research on the behaviour of every one of the thousands of headwords or headphrases included. The books they produce must be affordable and their contents accessible to readers with a limited knowledge of the technical vocabulary of linguistics and lexicography. The more important point is that works such as the *ODCIE* have gone some way towards developing the apparatus needed to do adequate descriptions of situation-bound expressions (SBEs).

However, not all the shortcomings of contemporary dictionaries of SBEs can be put down to time constraints. In particular, I doubt that we yet have the analytic and descriptive tools to handle all aspects of SBEs. As Austin and others pointed out some time ago, speech acts, like language use in general, are bits of social behaviour. To deal with speech functions and discourse contexts we need a well-articulated model of social behaviour, in which the rules governing face to face talk are seen to be subordinate to

more general conventions of social conduct. And we need an apparatus for describing the music and body language that is part of everyday speech.

4.11.   Grammaticalisation

A good case can be made that formulaicity is responsible for the very existence of grammar, for the emergence of grammatical constructions. Since the 1970s there has been a great deal of work on "grammaticalisation" but much of this has focused on how lexical words change into grammatical functors. There has been rather less done on how relatively loose discourse structure conventions are prone to develop into tighter multiclause sentence structures which in turn may become compacted into single clause structures which in due course may reduce to word-like structures. A pioneer in this regard has been Talmy Givón, who gave us the slogan "today's morphology is yesterday's syntax" (Givón 1971: 413) and proposed the grammaticalisation path: discourse > syntax > morphology > morphophonemics > zero. In a number of works (e.g. Givón 1979a, b) he has insisted that the processes of clause combining should be considered part of grammaticalisation, a view that has gained fairly general acceptance (Hopper and Traugott 1993).

   A striking example of discourse structure becoming clause structure, with the aid of speech formulae, is seen in certain verb serialising languages. There are some such languages that allow short narratives, reporting several successive events, to be compacted into single clauses with complex predicates. Such narrative serial verb constructions, containing a string of up to five or six bare verb stems under a single intonation contour, are found, for example, in certain languages of New Guinea (Durie 1997; Pawley and Lane 1998). The single clause narratives represent recurrent types of event sequences and are highly schematic in form; that is to say, they are formulae.

5.   Conclusions

The quantity of research on the structure and use of formulaic expressions has multiplied over the past 30 years. Has this led to the emergence of a new subdiscipline with its own core research agenda and methods, terminology, conferences, journal, textbooks, etc.?

In lexicography, to a degree, this has happened. As Cowie points out, phraseology now occupies a prominent place in lexicographical theory and practice. The problems posed by restricted collocations and idioms have stimulated dictionary-makers to think hard about how to produce linguistically more sophisticated analyses and to hold conferences where they can compare ideas. There are some differences in preferred methods and terminologies but there is much common ground. Regular conferences now take place under the auspices of the European Society for Phraseology (Europhras). There have also been four International Symposia on Phraseology (Leeds, Moscow, Stuttgart, Rome). Readers have been published in English, German, Russian and Spanish.

In linguistics generally there is no comparable cohesion, though we may note the recent launching of an electronic journal devoted to constructions, <http://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/constructions>. Perhaps it is a good thing that "formulaic language" has not become a field in itself, a specialised branch of linguistics. The beauty of conventionalisation is that it is a process which touches on many different facets of language structure and use: language learning, encoding and decoding, idiomaticity, grammaticalisation and the grammar-lexicon boundary, the workings of conversation and discourse, how and why particular speech genres arise, and so on. Thus, the study of the structure and use of formulaic expressions is most usefully pursued not as an end in itself but as one facet of a range of more general problems to do with language.

Two opposing views have dominated Western thinking about what languages are. There is the formal, mathematical view, which sees any natural language as an algorithm for specifying an infinite number of grammatically and phonologically well-formed strings. And there is the humanistic perspective, in which a language is regarded chiefly as a means for encoding a particular culture or world view, represented, for example, by the things that people say (or write) to achieve particular social and communicative purposes. To me, the most satisfactory thing about the study of speech formulae, especially productive speech formulae, is that this provides a broad bridge that spans these two views. In doing so it pushes us towards adopting a model of language that can have the best of both worlds.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a colloquium on formulaic language at the American Association of Applied Linguists conference, Vancouver, March 11–14, 2000. I am indebted to Wally Chafe, Tony Cowie, Kon Kuiper, and Alison Wray for much useful discussion and for thoughtful comments and corrections on the revised version.
2. There were still other domains of scholarship which treated formulaic language which I have not mentioned, e.g. work on text concordances, translation and decipherment.

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Focus on particular lexemes

Reasonably well: Natural Semantic Metalanguage as a tool for the study of phraseology and its cultural underpinnings

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1.   Introduction

Every society has certain evaluative words that provide a frame of orientation in daily life and guide people's judgment and behaviour. Sometimes speakers are conscious of some of these words and regard them as a badge of belonging. Sometimes, however, a "guiding word" is so ingrained in the thinking of the speech community that it is not perceived as distinctive, but rather taken for granted like the air that people breathe. A striking example of a powerful and yet relatively hidden guiding word is the English adjective *reasonable*. The fact that this word has seldom been the focus of special attention and reflection may have contributed to its enduring power.

But it is not only individual words which may guide unconscious assumptions and evaluations. Commonly used collocations are equally important. As Michael Stubbs (Stubbs 2001: 3) says in his valuable recent book *Words and Phrases* (to which I will return later), "our knowledge of a language is not only a knowledge of individual words, but of their predictable combinations, and of the cultural knowledge which these combinations often encapsulate". This applies, particularly, to guiding words like *reasonable* in modern English; often the power of individual words goes hand in hand with the power of collocations including those words. In the case of *reasonable*, it is enough to mention everyday phrases like *within reasonable limits*, *a reasonable amount*, *a reasonable time*, *a reasonable price*, *a reasonable offer*, or important legal concepts like *reasonable force*, *reasonable care*, and *beyond reasonable doubt* (cf. Wierzbicka 2003a).

In the case of the adverb *reasonably*, which is also very important in Anglo-English discourse, by far the most important collocations are *reasonably good* and *reasonably well*; and judging by their relative frequencies, the latter is even more important than the former. For example, in the COBUILD corpus (56 million words from the Bank of English), we find 113 examples of *reasonably well*, as compared with 42 of *reasonably good*.

The words *reasonable* and *reasonably* and the collocations based on them carry with them a framework of evaluation which plays an important part in Anglo-English discourse – and therefore, presumably, in the lives of its practitioners. This framework of evaluation is language- and culture-specific and historically shaped. The phrase *reasonably well* epitomizes this framework. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein (1953: 222), one might call this expression "a whole cloud of culture condensed in a drop of phraseology". To fully understand the framework of evaluation presupposed by speakers of English, we need to unravel the meanings of collocations like *reasonably well*; and to be able to do this, we have to have at our disposal an effective semantic methodology.

2.   *Reasonably well* – a first look

Here is a representative selection of examples of this common collocation from the COBUILD Corpus:

> They would only let you do it if you had done reasonably well right through the course.
> I know the area reasonably well.
> For the first eight months all went reasonably well.
> It is a pattern that suits the majority of people reasonably well for most of their lives.
> Eddie and I have always got on reasonably well.
> Most people marry someone they know reasonably well.
> Held lipstick in place reasonably well although it began to fade after eating.
> Although shops and services of industries are doing reasonably well, manufacturing output is falling.
> La Goudola [Italian restaurant] is doing reasonably well.

As well as being very common in modern English, *reasonably well* is also highly colloquial, as is illustrated by the relative frequencies of this collocation in three English corpora (all parts of COBUILD): 1.4 per million words in US Books, 2.1 per million words in UK Books, and 3.9 per million words in UK Spoken.

The use of *reasonably well* raises a number of interesting questions. First, why can one say *reasonably well* but not *reasonably badly*? For example, in the COBUILD corpus, there are 113 sentences with the expression *reasonably well* and not one with *reasonably badly.* This fact cries out for an explanation.

Second, why does this collocation have no counterpart in other European (let alone non-European) languages? For example, why doesn't one say in French *raisonnablement bien*? In the French COBUILD corpus there are 266 sentences with *raisonnablement* and not one with *raisonnablement bien*, whereas in the English corpus there are 954 sentences with *reasonably* and among them as many as 113 with *reasonably well* (by far the highest proportion of all collocations with *reasonably*). Again, this fact cries out for an explanation.

Third, why is the collocation *reasonably well* more common in spoken language than in written texts?

Fourth, what exactly does *reasonably* in the collocation *reasonably well* mean? Is it possible to assign an identifiable meaning to it at all or does one have to assign a single, global meaning to the whole collocation *reasonably well*? And if it is possible to assign a meaning to *reasonably* (in the collocation *reasonably well*), how is this meaning related (if at all) to that of the same adverb used ad-verbally or ad-adjectivally, as in the following examples:

Ad-verbal usage:

"Who?" Stan asked, reasonably enough, I thought. "What?"

Blake had held the King's commission, but his conduct was totally unbecoming to what must reasonably be expected of every officer in the British armed services.

One might reasonably expect a high IQ to be reflected in a high level of educational attainment.

Of all these women only St. Eugenia may reasonably be supposed to have existed, and even in her case few details of her legend have any historical accuracy.

It was just the ancient cross latch worked the way you wouldn't expect, as he ought to very well know – there she was in bed with Lambert, albeit with so many clothes on, or such was her story, she could not reasonably be supposed to be sexually motivated.

Ad-adjectival usage:

Haig went to bed reasonably confident, only to be awoken at 2 a.m. on the 24th with a telegram from GHQ ordering an immediate retreat towards Bavai.

Haig made one careful qualification: "This is, of course, on the assumption that the previous successes have been of such magnitude as will make it reasonably certain that by following them up at once we gain a complete victory and, at least, force the enemy to abandon the Belgian coast."

He left Calais reasonably satisfied.

On the first day of the battle, 9 April, the British were reasonably successful, though less so than Haig had expected.

Thus we can be reasonably certain that Pope Joan's monument, if it did indeed exist, was actually erected by an important Mithraic priest of the second or third century AD, many hundreds of years before Joan is said to have lived.

To her surprise she found that counselling sessions were provoking memories of her teenage years; a time which she thought had been reasonably happy yet which she often found herself crying about.

Without adding to the list of questions, let us stop to consider more carefully the last of them – the relation between the different meanings of *reasonably*.

3.   How many meanings does *reasonably* have, and how are they mutually related?

According to the *Collins COBUILD English Language Dictionary*, the word *reasonably* has two meanings, which are defined and illustrated as follows:

1.   *Reasonably* means to quite a good or great degree, e.g. I'm reasonably broad across the shoulders…

2.   If someone behaves *reasonably*, they behave sensibly and fairly. E.g. 'Well, you can't do that now', I said reasonably.

The collocation *reasonably well* is not mentioned in that dictionary at all, presumably because it was seen as an instance of the first meaning: 'to quite a good or great degree'.

According to the *COBUILD*, then, the different meanings of *reasonably* are not related to one another at all (there is no overlap between the two definitions). As I will try to show below, such an analysis misses the link between the different uses of *reasonably* – a link which is a key to the cultural significance of the collocation *reasonably well*.

It is also striking how inadequate the two definitions are, even regardless of the fact that they blur the link between the two meanings. To begin with the second meaning, *reasonably* is defined here via *fair* (as is also the adjective *reasonable*), whereas *fair* is defined in the same dictionary via *reasonable*: "Something that is *fair* is reasonable according to a generally accepted standard or idea about what is right and just." Obviously, a vicious circle (cf. Wierzbicka 1996: Chapter 9).

As for the first meaning assigned to *reasonably*, it is clear that it is not supported by substitution in context. For example, "I'm *reasonably* broad across the shoulders" does not mean that 'I'm broad across the shoulders to a great degree'; and "I'm *reasonably* good at writing" does not mean that 'I'm good at writing to a great degree'. It hardly needs to be added that "all went reasonably well" does not mean 'all went well to a great (or good) degree'. (Apart from anything else, none of the sentences resulting from such substitutions is felicitous in English.)

What does need to be added at this point is that while the meaning *reasonably* in *reasonably broad* is related to that of *reasonably* in *reasonably well*, the two are not identical: in *reasonably broad*, *reasonably* itself implies something positive (and applies to a degree of broadness as well as the degree of "goodness"), whereas in *reasonably well* a positive evaluation is expressed by *well* (and applies only to the degree of "goodness"). I will return to this point later.

The *COBUILD* dictionary is of course right in affirming that the meaning of *reasonably* in *behaves reasonably* is different from that in *reasonably broad* – an affirmation which can be supported with reference to the use of the word *unreasonably*: a person can be said to *behave unreasonably* but not to have *unreasonably broad shoulders*. But we still need to ask what exactly these different meanings of *reasonably* are, how many meanings there are, and how they are mutually related. The question about the meaning, and significance, of the collocation *reasonably well* has to be considered in that wider semantic context.

Incidentally, since I have distinguished earlier, for the sake of clarity, an ad-verbal and an ad-adjectival use of *reasonably*, it is interesting to note that *unreasonably* can be combined with both verbs and adjectives, but that nonetheless it appears to have only one meaning. To illustrate (from COBUILD):

> During the course of their marriage, she became *unreasonably* obsessed about matrimonial obligations, worrying, for instance, that she had failed him because she had not already given him a son.
> Paul had submitted himself to the "apostolic authority" of the Council, and not *unreasonably* expected others to do the same.
> I got *unreasonably* angry with John sometimes.
> In a variation of this defense, when they confront scientific evidence that healing can be done by ordinary individuals, they may erect *unreasonably* strict criteria in order to prove to themselves that healing is, after all, impossible for average folk.

Thus, one can be *unreasonably angry* or *unreasonably obsessed*, but not *reasonably angry* or *reasonably obsessed*. Or if one can be *reasonably angry*, this would not be the same sense of *reasonably* which has its opposite in *unreasonably*. For *reasonably*, therefore, the distinction between adverbal and ad-adjectival usage does appear to be useful as a guide to distinguish meanings. Nonetheless, it can of course be only a first step in an attempt to sort out and identify the different meanings of *reasonably*.

In this paper, I want to argue, above all, that the collocation *reasonably well* is culturally extremely revealing and that it promotes (as well as reflects) certain assumptions and values which are central to Anglo culture. At the same time, I will argue that here as elsewhere, insightful cultural analysis depends on rigorous semantic analysis; and that rigorous semantic analysis depends in turn on the availability of an adequate semantic framework.

As colleagues and I have argued for decades, such an adequate semantic framework is available in the "NSM" theory of meaning. The Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM), which is this theory's basic tool, allows us, inter alia, to decompose all the meanings of *reasonably* (and *reasonable*) in terms of a well-established set of indefinables and thus in a way free from any overt or covert circularity; and it allows us to show how these meanings are mutually related. Once we have revealed the links between these different meanings, we can appreciate the cultural underpinnings of the collocation *reasonably well* and its significance as a tool for transmitting certain key cultural assumptions.

4.   The Natural Semantic Metalanguage as a tool for the analysis of meaning

To show that two complex meanings are related we need to decompose them both into their constituent parts and to demonstrate that there is some overlap between the two configurations. For example, to show that the meanings of *assume*, *suppose* and *presume* are related we need to show that each of them includes the element THINK. To show the semantic relations between these words more precisely we need to identify the exact configuration of semantic elements encoded in each of them (cf. Wierzbicka in press a).

The process of semantic decomposition of complex concepts into their constituent parts cannot be an ad hoc substitution of unknowns for un-

knowns, but must depend on an independently established set of self-explanatory "indefinables" – elementary concepts out of which all complex concepts appear to be built. The failure of dictionaries which attempt definitions without having a set of indefinables at their disposal is well illustrated by the circular definition of *reasonable* and *fair* adduced above.

The analytical work done within the NSM semantic theory over the years (cf. e.g. Goddard and Wierzbicka eds. 1994, 2002; Wierzbicka 1996; Goddard 1998) has identified sixty or so conceptual elements which can be treated as elementary units of meaning and in terms of which all complex meanings can be represented. Empirical cross-linguistic investigations conducted over the years by many scholars have shown that the same set of hypothetical elementary units of meaning can be identified within every language. In other words, it is possible to identify for every language a set of elementary units of meaning isomorphic with respect to analogous sets identified for other languages. For example, the set proposed for English in Table 1 below is matched by isomorphic sets proposed for a number of other languages (cf. Goddard and Wierzbicka eds. 2002).

Table 1. List of universal semantic primes: English version

Substantives:	I, YOU, SOMEONE (PERSON), SOMETHING (THING), PEOPLE, BODY
Determiners:	THIS, THE SAME, OTHER
Quantifiers:	ONE, TWO, SOME, MANY / MUCH, ALL
Attributes:	GOOD, BAD, BIG, SMALL
Mental predicates:	THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR
Speech:	SAY, WORDS, TRUE
Actions, events, movements:	DO, HAPPEN, MOVE
Existence, and possession:	THERE IS, HAVE
Life and death:	LIVE, DIE
Logical concepts:	NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF
Time:	WHEN (TIME), NOW, AFTER, BEFORE, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME
Space:	WHERE (PLACE), HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE, TOUCHING (CONTACT)
Intensifier:	VERY
Augmentor:	MORE
Taxonomy, partonomy:	KIND OF, PART OF
Similarity:	LIKE (HOW, AS)

* exponents of primes may be words, bound morphemes, or phrases
* they can be formally, i.e. morphologically, complex
* they can have different morphosyntactic properties (including word-class) in different languages
* they can have combinatorial variants (allolexes)

Since the elementary units of meaning set out in Table 1 and its counterparts in other languages have their own syntax (i.e. their own combinatory characteristics) each table in effect represents the lexicon of a mini-language. As numerous NSM publications have shown, each mini-language can be used to analyse any complex meanings in any given natural language. Furthermore, since both the tables of elements and the rules of their combination match across language boundaries, the mini-languages epitomised by these tables match too, and can all be regarded as different variants of the same Natural Semantic Metalanguage.

For example, to show how the different meanings of the English words *reasonable* and *reasonably* are related, we can rely on a simple formula constructed out of words like THINK, GOOD (WELL), SOMEONE and SOMETHING. To show the meaning or meanings of the French words *raisonnable* and *raisonnablement* we can rely on simple formulae constructed out of PENSER, BON (BIEN), QUELQU'UN and QUELQUE CHOSE. Since the (relevant) meaning of THINK can be identified with the (relevant) meaning of PENSER, that of GOOD (WELL) with that of BON (BIEN), and so on, the Natural Semantic Metalanguage in either its English or its French version can be used to identify both the similarities and the differences between the meanings of, for example, *reasonably* and *raisonnablement*.

The methodology of semantic analysis based on the use of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage has been set out in numerous publications by NSM researchers, and cannot be fully presented here (see in particular Goddard and Wierzbicka eds. 2002). The NSM methodology allows us to articulate accurately and intelligibly not only the meanings of words and phrases but also the "cultural scripts" reflected in and transmitted by them.

Cultural scripts are representations of cultural norms which are widely held in a society and are reflected in its language. They constitute a certain "naïve axiology", that is, a naïve set of assumptions about what is good and bad to do or say, and even to think and feel. Any given speech community has such shared assumptions, and although not everyone necessarily agrees with them, everyone is familiar with them because they are reflected in the language itself.

As noted by Strauss and Quinn (1997: 3), such assumptions can be reasonably stable across generations. They can of course also change. But they do not change overnight, and when they do change, this also finds reflection in language. In any case, whether they stay the same for a long time or undergo a more or less rapid change, while they last they are real, and if they are encoded in language itself, they are familiar to everyone who speaks and understands that language. They constitute part of the shared cultural knowledge against which even counter-cultural currents have to define themselves. It is important, therefore, that they should be understood and articulated. The Natural Semantic Metalanguage gives us a means to do so. For example, it allows us not only to explicate the meanings of the words *reasonable* and *reasonably* and collocations based on them, but also to articulate the historically shaped assumptions (or "cultural ideology") reflected in, and transmitted by, those meanings.

5.   *Reasonably* **as a near-equivalent of** *it is reasonable*

In one of its meanings, the adverb *reasonably* is closely related to the adjective *reasonable* used in the frame 'it is reasonable to (verb)'. The two do not mean exactly the same, but they are very close, and for present purposes the differences between them can be ignored. For example, the clause "…what nurses can reasonably expect…" can be seen as equivalent in meaning to "…what it can be reasonable for nurses to expect."

Let us consider, then, the meaning of the frame 'it is reasonable to (verb)', with its modally and epistemically qualified variants (examples from COBUILD):

> it would be reasonable to suppose
> it seemed reasonable to assume
> it is reasonable to suppose
> it was quite reasonable to be worried
> it seems reasonable to say
> it is reasonable to speculate
> it seems reasonable to think
> it is reasonable to consider
> it is reasonable to ask
> it is reasonable to wonder

As these examples illustrate, the frame 'it is reasonable to…' takes verbs which are predominantly verbs of thinking. Furthermore, it is, charac-

teristically, *tentative* thinking – thinking associated with the limitations of a person's knowledge (collocations like "it is reasonable to suppose / assume / speculate" are more felicitous and certainly more common than, say, "it is reasonable to claim / assert / maintain") (cf. Kjellmer 1994). The prevalence of the copula *seem* is consistent with this uncertainty: it *seems* good to think like this, but since one doesn't really know one prefers to be cautious and tentative. For the same reason, no doubt, the copula tends to be hedged: not just "it is reasonable" or even "it seems reasonable" but often "it would be reasonable" or "it would seem reasonable". The tentativeness characteristic of the prevalent use of the frame 'it is reasonable to…' is also characteristic of the use of *reasonable* with the corresponding abstract nouns: "a reasonable hypothesis", "a reasonable guess", "a reasonable judgment".

In addition to verbs of thinking (especially tentative ones), some verbs of speaking or feeling can also occur as complements of the frame 'it is reasonable to…', but only if they can be understood as implying thinking – either inherently (as in *worry*) or in the given context. For example, one can readily say "it is reasonable to ask why…" – implying that the speaker has thought about the possible reasons or causes.

What does it mean, then, to say, that "it is reasonable to think (like this)"? First of all, there is a judgment concerning the compatibility of a given thought with someone's ability to think well: in the speaker's opinion, a person who thinks well can think like this. This does not mean that the speaker necessarily endorses the view assessed as "reasonable". Rather, he or she acknowledges that this view is consistent with an ability to think well – and stops there, denying any desire to go further in supporting that view: "I don't want to say more", that is, "I don't want to say: it's good to think like this".

At the same time, the epistemic reserve of the frame 'it is reasonable to…' does not commit the speaker to a position of complete uncertainty and a total lack of confidence. On the contrary, the phrase "it is reasonable to think" (even when modally qualified) implies a degree of confidence.

Apparently, this sense of confidence comes from two sources. First, the speaker ("I") has grounds for the expressed judgment – grounds which could if necessary be made explicit ("I can say why I think like this"). Second, my judgment, fallible as it is, but also justifiable as it can, I think, be shared by other people – if these people consider the matter carefully (as, it is implied, I have done).

These considerations bring us to the following explication:

I think that it is reasonable to think like this (about it) =
a. I know some things about it
b. when I think about these things well I think that it can be like this
c. I can say why I think like this
d. if someone else knows the same thing about it
     when they think about these things well they can think the same about it
e. I don't want to say more
f. I don't want to say: "it is like this "

Component (a) of this explication indicates that *reasonable* is linked with thinking; (b) shows that it lays claims to "thinking well", and thus, indirectly, to "reason" and to a potential consensus of people who can think well (component (d)); (c) refers to something like evidence (or grounds, or "reasons"); and (e) and (f) reflect the "moderate" and undogmatic character of the claims implied by *reasonable*.

It is particularly interesting to note that this use of *reasonable* as an epistemic hedge ("diminisher", "downtoner") appears to be a relatively recent development in English, and that a hundred or a hundred and fifty years ago a phrase like *reasonable assumption* did not imply the reserved non-commitment which it does now. Examples like the following one (from the *OED*) can be misleading in this regard:

> …the reasonable assumption would be that this bullet would range a greater distance if projected at the same velocity. (1877)

If *reasonable* as used here included the component 'I don't want to say more' then it could hardly be used in the following sentence (also from the *OED*):

> The conviction would be reasonable, for it would be based upon universal experience. (1877)

In contemporary English, "convictions" can hardly be described as "reasonable" – presumably because they are not compatible with the component 'I don't want to say more', which in the course of the last century and a half became incorporated in the word's very meaning.

As I have argued in more detail elsewhere (Wierzbicka in press a), while both *rational* and *reasonable* had their starting point in the concept of 'reason', two centuries ago (if not earlier), their paths parted and *reasonable* went its own way - in the direction of epistemic tentativeness and moderation, and the adverb *reasonably* followed suit. I will discuss the background of this development in the next Section.

6. *Reasonableness* **and the British Enlightenment**

The emergence of the modern concept of 'reasonableness' can be seen as causally linked with the British Enlightenment. The Age of Enlightenment was seen, and saw itself, as The Age of Reason; *reason* was clearly a key word and a key ideal of the period. Isaac Watts proclaimed in the early eighteenth century, "Reason is the glory of human nature" (quoted in Porter 2000: 48) and this statement was typical of his times. But the reason cherished by the most influential figures of the British Enlightenment was not "pure reason", the reason of syllogisms, the reason of metaphysics and aprioristic logic, the reason of Descartes' "homo rationalis". It was a reason focussed on empirical reality, on "facts", on "common sense", and on probabilistic thinking, not expecting absolute certainty in anything.

As in many other areas of modern Anglo culture, a key role must be attributed here to John Locke. As the British historian Roy Porter put it in his magisterial work *Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World*, "Locke was far and away the key philosopher in this modern mould" (2000: 60); "his philosophy proved a great watershed, and he became the presiding spirit of the English Enlightenment" (2000: 66). The fact that the word *reasonableness* appeared in the title of one of Locke's major works (The Reasonableness of Christianity) is symptomatic in this respect. In Locke's book, the word *reasonable* was not yet used in any of the senses which it now has in either legal or ordinary language; and yet his view of 'reasonableness', which linked it with 'mutual toleration' (2000: 120) and with 'diversity' ("since we cannot reasonably expect that anyone should readily and obsequiously quit his own understanding and embrace ours", *Essay*, 1959: 372), has left a noticeable imprint on the subsequent history of the word *reasonable*. To quote Porter:

> In stark contrast to Descartes, Hobbes and the other rationalists, Locke's truth claims were models of modesty. To the Galileo-idolising Hobbes, reason could range omnipotent; for Locke, any straying from the empirical straight and narrow led into mental minefields. While Hobbes proposed proofs modo geometrico, Locke saw no scope for Euclidian certainty. Man was a limited being, and reason just sufficient for human purposes. (Porter 2000: 60)

The various quotes that Porter adduces from Locke's writings sound almost like sketches for a semantic history of the word *reasonable* – the new, post-Enlightenment meanings of this word can be seen here *in statu nascendi*:

> …Locke shared Bacon's impatience with scholastic syllogisms which chopped logic 'without making any addition to it'. Empirical knowledge, by contrast, traded in honest matters of fact and though limited, could be cumulative and progressive. (Porter 2000: 63)

Empirical, "demonstrable" knowledge was only probable knowledge but it was nonetheless practically useful:

> While inevitably lacking the certitude of revelation or intuition, this formed the main stock of truth available to mortals. Locke agreed with Sydenhaus, Boyle, Newton, and their peers in stressing the limits of man's powers, but that was no insuperable problem: 'our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct.' (Porter 2000: 63)

> Though 'demonstrable' knowledge, the harvest of experience, could never be more than probable, it was nevertheless useful and progressive. (Porter 2000: 65)

Since the quotes from Locke adduced by Porter read like sketches toward explications of the modern senses of the word *reasonable*, it is not surprising that Porter's conclusion about Locke's impact is framed in precisely such terms: "*he replaced rationalism with reasonableness* in a manner which became programmatic for the Enlightenment in Britain" (Porter 2000: 66; emphasis added).

The British philosophical tradition that lies behind the folkvalue of "reasonableness" reflected in modern English is of course not restricted to Locke alone. It embraces several different (and often mutually critical) strands, including the seventeenth-century "constructive skepticism" of John Wilkins (the founder of the Royal Society), Hume's 'naturalism' (which made room for beliefs that are not rationally justifiable but that nevertheless leave no room for doubt), and the Scottish "common sense philosophy" of Thomas Reid. (cf. e.g. Ferreira 1986; Shapiro 1983, 1991; Van Leeuwen 1963; Livingston and King eds. 1976) But Locke's impact on the general intellectual climate in both Britain and America was clearly by far the greatest.

7.   *Reasonable* **and human interaction**

The word *reasonable* (as it is used in modern English) is crucially involved in a number of "cultural scripts". It is particularly noteworthy that it is linked with the central strategies for interpersonal interaction in modern Anglo society. In any society, one of the key problems is getting other peo-

ple to do what one wants them to do. In many societies, this problem tends to be solved on the basis of power differentiation. Hierarchical structures and accepted patterns of inequality often make it clear who can tell whom what to do. From the point of view of the powerless, the answer may often lie in begging, imploring, and the like, that is, in putting pressure on the powerful by appealing to their feelings. It may also lie in a system of asymmetrical relationships of "patronage", ie. a pattern of care and responsibility for others (one's "dependants") that is associated with a higher status.

In democratic societies like Britain, America or Australia, other patterns have come to the fore, patterns based on assumptions and values of equality, individual autonomy, voluntary co-operation, mutual concessions and so on. In this cultural climate, the scope for orders and commands is limited, and at the same time there is less room for patronage, for begging, imploring, pleading, appealing to mercy (cf. Wierzbicka in press b). The idea of "sweet dependency" (comparable to Japanese "amae", cf. e.g. Doi 1981; Wierzbicka 1997) is also culturally alien; on the contrary, value is placed on independence and self-reliance. But if one can neither give orders and commands, nor beg, implore, plead, or appeal for mercy, help, or patronage, how does one get others to do what one wants them to do?

The modern use of the word *reasonable* and of the phrases based on it suggests that Anglo strategies in this regard include limiting one's claims on others and at the same time appealing to reason. A sentence like "Be reasonable" appeals both to the ideal of limiting one's claims on other people and to that of acting according to reason. To reject such an appeal is to reject some of Anglo culture's central cultural scripts.

In her book *Let's Be Reasonable – A Guide to Resolving Disputes*, the Australian lawyer and community legal educator Margaret White recommends "being reasonable" as the most effective answer to the problems of "living and working together"(1997: vii). "Being reasonable" includes, according to this guide, "stating your case moderately", "trying to see the problems from their [the other side's] point of view", and using a "lubricant demeanor" in "the manner of your approach, the tone of your voice" (p. 5). The back cover describes the book as "an invaluable guide and reference for every household and business … a layperson's guide to resolving disputes of all sorts as quickly, efficiently and effectively as possible". Without disputing the publisher's description of the book, one might add that it is also an invaluable (if inadvert) guide to some key Anglo cultural scripts.

8.   *Reasonable* as *reasonably good*

Let us consider the following sentences from COBUILD:

> I am a reasonable left-handed player, with a good short game.
> The pacey wing, who also enjoyed a reasonable afternoon as goalkicker rat-
> tled up 19 points with flanker Markus Van Greunen the other tryscorer.
> 1986 was a reasonable year and the picturesque Erden village had produced
> a stylish wine from late harvested grapes.

Clearly, a "reasonable left-handed player" does not mean 'a reasonable person': *reasonable* means here, roughly, 'reasonably good'. A judgment is involved in all these examples, but it is the speaker's judgment, and it is a judgment concerning positive evaluation.

If we compare the meaning of *a reasonable year* with other common collocations including the adjective *reasonable*, such as for example *reasonable force*, *reasonable amount* or *a reasonable doubt* (diverse as the latter are), it will be clear that it differs from them all. The word *reasonable* always seems to carry with it some reference to a positive evaluation, but this evaluation does not always fit in the same way in the semantic structure of different phrases. For example, *reasonable force* is not exactly 'a good force', and *a reasonable doubt*, 'a good doubt'. *A reasonable year,* on the other hand, is (all things considered), 'a good year'. I would propose the following explication for *reasonable* in this sense:

reasonable year / location / attendance / health etc =
a.   when I think about it I think like this: I can say: "it is good"
b.   I think that if someone else can think well they can think the same
c.   I don't want to say more
d.   I don't want to say: "it is very good"
e.   at the same time I don't want to think that because I don't want to say "it is very good" I can't say "it is good"

In most respects, this explication is parallel to those of *a reasonable time* and *a reasonable amount* (cf. Wierzbicka in press a). Here as there, the speaker's attitude is guarded, cautious, deliberately restrained. Here, too, the speaker is weighing the words carefully and avoiding what could be seen as exaggeration ("very"). Here, too, the speaker uses the model of a hypothetical person who thinks well, and whose expectations and requirements are consciously limited. And here, too, the speaker is willing to see the situation in a positive light ("this is good").

And yet there does seem to be one respect in which the semantic structure of *reasonably good* diverges from that of *a reasonable time* or *a reasonable amount*: in the case of *reasonably good*, there seems to be an additional implication that the speaker is consciously choosing to be satisfied with something that is less than very good.

Arguably, the idea that it is good, and wise, not to want or expect too much was linked with the British philosophy of reasonableness from its inception. When Locke asserted that the limited certainty which can be derived from empirical knowledge is sufficient for ordinary purposes, he was effectively advocating this very attitude.

I have already quoted Porter's (2000: 60) observation that "Locke's truth claims were models of modesty. […] Man was a limited being, and reason just sufficient for human purposes." But although reason was only *just* sufficient, it was nonetheless *sufficient*. In fact, for Locke the awareness that human knowledge was only "probable knowledge" and that human access to truth was limited was not necessarily a bad thing, for it provided a protection against dogmatic thinking and intolerance. Thus, his ideal of reasonableness went hand in hand with his ideal of toleration ("those who have not thoroughly examined to the bottom of their own tenets […] are unreasonable in imposing that as truth on other men's belief which they themselves had not searched into", Locke 1953: 374). It was reasonable not to want and expect too much in one's quest for truth and knowledge, and it was reasonable to be satisfied with that which *can* be reached. The aura of wise and contented self-limitation became associated, in one way or another, with most, perhaps all, the uses of the word *reasonable*. To recall a characteristic example from the COBUILD corpus:

> To have been anything but satisfied would have been highly unreasonable, and Alistair, for a professor, was a rather reasonable man.

To say that something is "reasonably good" is to imply that, while it perhaps is not "very good", it would be "unreasonable" to expect more or to declare oneself dissatisfied.

Similarly, *reasonably well* is felt to be "less" than *very well*, as the following example illustrates:

> A brief survey of organizations that are performing reasonably well or even very well indicate that there is a wide range of leadership styles that are conducive to high performance.

But it is "unreasonable" to expect that things will be "perfect". It is "reasonable" to accept them as "good" even if they are not "very good":

While the measure certainly isn't perfect, it does a reasonably good job of indicating the type of responsiveness you can expect from a stock.

In fact, *reasonably good* is felt to be a little less than *good*, and *reasonably well* a little less than *well*:

Can you say anything about what it is about the goods in Marks and Spencer's that makes you head for it? One knows that they're normally reasonably priced and reasonably well made. And also reasonably well – more than reasonably, they tend to be well designed.

But if something is a little less than "good" one can still "reasonably" accept it as "good". Similarly, if something is done less than "well", one can "reasonably" say (and think) that it is done "well". It is "reasonable" not to demand or expect too much.

9. An internal reconstruction of the semantic history of *reasonable*

Leaving aside the collocation *reasonable man*, which I have discussed in detail elsewhere (Wierzbicka in press a), let us try to identify the main turns in the history of the word *reasonable*, and to suggest how changing ways of thinking and speaking could have crystallized into new meanings. I will represent this hypothetical history in stages, while noting that in actual usage the meanings assigned to different stages can co-occur, and also, that while the meanings assigned to stages I and II are no longer in use, those assigned to stages III, IV, V, and VI are all richly represented in present-day English. Thus, the hypothetical sequence outlined below is meant to be, above all, logical rather than demonstrably chronological: certain meanings are hypothesized to have developed out of certain other meanings.

Stage I The word *reasonable* is used in the sense of, roughly, 'endowed with reason', as in the phrase *a reasonable creature*.

Stage II The word *reasonable* starts to be linked not only with the ability to think, but more specifically with the ability to think well. For example, the sentence cited by the *OED* (and dated 1636), "Reasonable and judicious readers will not dislike the same digression", appears to refer to readers who "can think well". Locutions like *it is reasonable to conclude* (as used by Locke 1690) also link the word *reasonable* with the ability to think well, and in particular, to think well about what happens to one, and to draw inferences from this. At that stage (seventeenth to eighteenth cen-

tury), *reasonable* can be linked not only with thoughts that are hypothetical (assumptions, suppositions, and the like) but also with belief, conviction, certainty and substantial doubt. Christianity is defended as "reasonable" by those who wholeheartedly embrace it. At the same time, *reasonable* is seen as "*compatible* with reason" rather than "*required* by reason". The claim is that someone who thinks well *can* think like this, not that they *have to* think like this. Thus, the ideal of 'reason' is felt to be consistent with both conviction and toleration (tolerance for other people's convictions), and as inconsistent with dogmatism, absolutism, and intolerance. (This is the era of the British Enlightenment.)

Stage III The word *reasonable* continues to imply the ability to think well, but it becomes increasingly associated with an emphasis on the limitations of one's knowledge and on the lack of certainty. Conviction is no longer described as *reasonable*, and *a reasonable doubt* (with the emphasis on *reasonable*) becomes reinterpreted as *any reasonable doubt* (with the emphasis on *any*). The semantic component 'I don't want to say more' becomes part of the semantic invariant: the ability to think well becomes associated with the concern about not saying more than one has evidence or justification for.

Stage IV The self-limitation inherent in collocations like *it is reasonable to suppose* (where *reasonable* is no longer compatible with *conviction*) leads to the rise of *reasonable* as a more general tool of "moderation", as a device for avoiding an "excessive" (unjustified) use of words like *much* ('a lot') and *very*. As a result, we witness the spread of collocations like *a reasonable time* and *a reasonable amount* – clearly distinct in meaning from *a reasonable assumption* or a *reasonable hypothesis*.

Stage V *Reasonable* as an "anti-much" and "anti-very" device becomes linked, in a particular way, with avoiding "excessive praise": it becomes increasingly used as a device for not saying "very good". At the same time, however, it becomes associated with a willingness to say a qualified "good" even when one cannot say "very good", that is, to be satisfied with less, to be "realistic" and "pragmatic".

Stage VI The willingness to accept things as "reasonably good" even if they are not "very good" becomes linked in a special way with interpersonal relations, and, more specifically, with what one wants from other people. Collocations like *a reasonable request* and *a reasonable deal* spread, collocations like *reasonable demands* decline, and sentences like "Be reasonable" start to be interpreted as a call for a "reasonable compromise".

10. *Reasonably* **vs.** *raisonnablement*

When one compares the printouts of all the sentences with *reasonably* and those with *raisonnablement* in the English and French sections of the CO-BUILD Corpus one is struck by the differences between the two. To begin with, there are formal differences: the use of *raisonnablement* is predominantly ad-verbal, with only very few examples of ad-adjectival usage, whereas in the case of *reasonably*, it is the other way around. Leaving aside the collocation *reasonably well*, the vast majority of sentences with *reasonably* shows ad-adjectival usage (62 ad-verbal to 315 ad-adjectival).

Furthermore, in the French section, the rare examples of ad-adjectival usage are, for the most part, limited to just two combinations: *raisonnablement optimiste* and *raisonnablement possible*, which can both be interpreted as implying 'within reason'. For example:

> Philippe Boët, pour sa part, se veut raisonnablement optimiste: "Ne rêvons pas! Il n'est pas question de ramener la Seine à son état originel."
> ['Philippe Boët, for his part, wants to be "raisonnablement" optimistic: "Let's not dream! One cannot bring Seine back to its original state"']

> Autorités locales et régionales: publication, "dans la mesure où cela est raisonnablement possible", des textes officials dans les langues régionales.
> ['Local and regional authorities: publication, "to the extent to which it is 'raisonnablement' possible", of the official texts in regional languages.']

> Des cas d'une nouvelle variante de la maladie de Creutzfeldt-Jakob ont été détectés par la CJD Surveillance Unit (…), qui a conclu, aussi vite qu'il était raisonnablement possible, à un lien probable entre ces cas et l'ESB.
> ['Cases of a new variety of the Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease have been detected by the CJD Surveillance Unit, which concluded, as soon as it was "raisonnablement" possible, that there was a possible link between these cases and the ESB.']

> "Je suis raisonnablement optimiste, mais prudent", ajoute M. Contassot, qui, tout en jugeant une victoire de la gauche à portée la main, ne mésestime pas la difficulté.
> ['"I am reasonably optimistic, but cautious", adds Mr. Contassot, who regards a victory of the left as possible, but doesn't underestimate the difficulties.']

It is true that here and there, one comes across collocations which appear to imply a degree, such as *raisonnablement satisfait* ('reasonably satisfied'), *raisonnablement content* ('reasonably content'), and *raisonnablement confi-*

ant ('reasonably confident'). On closer inspection, however, sentences with such collocations appear to be, for the most part, translations from English (and they tend to be rejected by native speakers as strange and unidiomatic). For example, the following three passages come from an Australian context and are clearly "translationese":

> Même si M. Walter juge "raisonnablement confortable" son exposition en Russie, les engagements risqués dans ce pays se montent à 1 milliard de marks.
> ['Even if Mr. Walter sees his exposure in Russia as "raisonnablement comfortable", the investments at risk in this country now reach one milliard marks.']

> "Les Wallabies [sont] 'raisonnablement' confiants. Les Français ne peuvent pas nous faire le coup de la surprise", lance le deuxième ligne et capitaine australien John Eales, qui s'attendait pourtant à retrouver les All Blacks en finale.
> ['The Wallabies [are] "raisonnablement" confident. The French cannot surprise us', says the Australian second-row-forward and captain John Eales, who expected nonetheless to meet All Blacks in the finals.']

> Les Wallabies se sont avancés plus sûrs d'eux jour après jour. PAS TOUT à FAIT HEUREUX. Entrés dans la competition, dimanche 3 octobre, contre la Roumanie à Belfast (57-9), ils se sont appliqués à réussir leur premier match. "Je suis raisonnablement satisfait", a lance l'entraîneur australien, faisant de cette flegmatique affirmation le leitmotiv de tous ses commentaries d'après-match.
> ['The Wallabies are more confident every day. NOT ENTIRELY HAPPY. Starting in the competition on Sunday October 3 against Romania in Belfast (57-9), they made every effort to succeed in their first match. "I am 'raisonnablement' satisfied", said the Australian coach, making this phlegmatic statement the leitmotiv of all his commentaries after the match.']

By contrast, in the English printout, the vast majority of sentences include collocations where *reasonably* can be said to function as a kind of "adverb of degree". We will recall here the *COBUILD*'s definition of one sense of *reasonably* as 'to a good or great degree'. While I have argued that this definition does not fully capture the meaning in question, it does point to one important aspect of *reasonably* in its most common usage. But the choice of the word *great* ('to a great degree') is wrong, because *reasonably* denies rather than affirms 'a great degree' (I can't say "very"). The use of the word *or* is also wrong, because when *reasonably* is used as a degree adverb it *always* implies something good, as shown by the fact that the

collocations *reasonably bad* and *reasonably badly* are infelicitous and are not recorded in COBUILD.

As I have argued throughout this paper, however, *reasonably* in its ad-adjectival use is not simply a degree adverb, unrelated to its use as a word of positive intellectual assessment (that is, its ad-verbal use). *Reasonably* as a degree adverb, too, praises a certain way of thinking. No such praise, and no such way of thinking are reflected in the use of the French word *raisonnablement*.

Before moving to a closer examination of the Anglo 'cultural scripts reflected in the various uses of the word *reasonably*, and in particular, in the collocation *reasonably well*, I would note that the ad-verbal use of *raisonnablement* also differs in meaning from the ad-verbal use of *reasonably*, although here, the differences are more subtle. Consider, for example, the following sentence:

> On ne nourrit pas des animaux herbivores avec de la viande, pas plus qu'on ne peut *raisonnablement* nourrir les poulets avec de l'huile de vidange!
> ['One doesn't feed herbivore animals with meat, any more than one can reasonably feed chickens with waste oil.']

The English translation which glosses *raisonnablement* as *reasonably* sounds strange, because in English, *reasonably* (in its ad-verbal use) suggests 'moderation' – either in an epistemic sense (i.e. in one's claims to knowledge) or in what one wants, especially in relation to other people: one can "reasonably suppose (assume, expect, etc.)" or "reasonably request (require, offer, etc.)". Since there is no sense of 'moderation' in the sentence about feeding chickens waste oil, the sentence sounds odd.

As one reads through all the material with *raisonnablement* in the French section of the COBUILD, many sentences seem to be easily translatable with *reasonably*, but again and again one comes across sentences in which it would not be entirely felicitous. For example:

> "Les camions ne peuvent plus *raisonnablement* passer par ce tunnel", a insisté M.Chirac.
> ['Trucks can no longer "reasonably" pass through this tunnel', insisted Mr. Chirac [i.e. it would be foolish to do so].']

> … il correspond à un schéma de comportement heureusement répandu, celui de l'homme d'action, que l'on ne saurait *raisonnablement* condamner.
> ['… it corresponds to a pattern of behaviour, that of a man of action, which is luckily wide-spread, and which one couldn't "reasonably" condemn [i.e. it would be foolish to do so].']

> … elle avait menti. Et qu'en conséquence on ne saurait *raisonnablement* confier un B-52 à une menteuse.
>
> ['… she had lied. And consequently, one couldn't "reasonably" entrust a B-52 to a liar [i.e. it would be foolish to do so].']

As these examples suggest, to do something "raisonnablement" means to do something, roughly speaking, 'in accordance with reason', without any implication of epistemic or pragmatic 'moderation'. More precisely, one could propose the following paraphrase:

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on ne peut pas faire X raisonnablement =
one can't do X "raisonnablement" =
if someone can think well they will think about it like this: I can't do X

In the French NSM, this explication would look as follows:

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on ne peut pas faire X raisonnablement =
si quelqu'un pense bien cette personne pensera comme ça:
je ne peux pas faire X

Reasonably, on the other hand, always implies some 'moderation' – and this includes the collocation *reasonably well*.

Thus, while the idea of 'thinking well' links *reasonably* with *raisonnablement*, the idea of 'moderation' in one's attitude sets *reasonably* apart from its putative French counterpart. Once again, we must conclude that the cultural ideology of 'wise moderation' is embedded in the English language, and is not embedded in French. The absence of the collocation *raisonnablement bien* in the French corpus, and the high frequency of *reasonably well* in the English one, is another manifestation of this cultural difference: the stance of 'wise moderation' is an Anglo stance.

11. *Reasonably well* and Anglo cultural scripts

We can now return to the questions we started with. Thus, the question of why one can say *reasonably well* but not *reasonably badly* can be answered with reference to the key Anglo value of 'moderation', of 'not wanting too much'. One wants things to go well, not badly – and it is "reasonable" to say (and think) that they went "well" even if one can't say that they went "very well". 'Moderation' does not mean here 'avoiding extreme judgments'

(in which case the collocation *reasonably badly* could be useful), but rather avoiding the attitude of 'I want more' and being satisfied with a little less than one might regard as desirable.

It is interesting to note in this connection that among the ad-adjectival collocations of the adverb *reasonably*, perhaps the most frequent ones are those which refer to judgments: *reasonably confident, reasonably certain, reasonably sure* (see the examples in Section 1), and that the second most salient group is that which involves self-limitation in the area of 'wanting': *reasonably happy*, *reasonably satisfied, reasonably content*, and so on (see again the examples in Section 1).

As Locke and others argued, certainty is a good thing, but it is "reasonable" to be satisfied with less than complete certainty. Getting exactly what one wants is also a good thing, but it is "reasonable" to be satisfied with a little less. It is also good if things are "very good", but it is "reasonable" to accept that they are "good" even if they are not "very good". It is "reasonable" to think that things are going well ("reasonably well") even when one can't say that they are going "very well".

This pragmatic attitude of being satisfied with what one *can* get and achieve is linked historically, I have suggested, with the post-Enlightenment value of 'moderation' in thought and in speech. As Locke argued, our knowledge is necessarily limited, but this is no reason to despair. We should be moderate in our assertions and tolerant of other people's views because we do not have access to absolute truth and full knowledge. At the same time, it is "reasonable" to have a certain degree of confidence in our judgment, limited as our claim on knowledge must be.

The question of why one cannot say the equivalent of *reasonably well* in other languages (for example, why one does not say *raisonnablement bien* in French) can be answered with reference to the Anglo-specific character of the ideal of 'moderation'. This in turn can be linked with some specific features of the British Enlightenment, and in particular with the Lockean emphasis on 'moderation' as a requirement of reason – first of all, 'moderation' in judgments and assertions, but also in expectations and evaluation.

The question of how the different meanings of *reasonably* are related to one another is answered by means of explications which rely on elementary concepts like THINK, GOOD, MORE, NOT, and SOMEONE, and on their configurations such as, for example, I DON'T WANT TO SAY: I WANT MORE.

We can also return now to the question of how phrases like *reasonably broad shoulders* are related to the collocations *reasonably well* and *rea-*

sonably good. As we have noted, the adjective *reasonable* can mean in modern English 'reasonably good' (for example, *I had a reasonable day* can mean 'I had a reasonably good day'). The adverb *reasonably*, too, can sometimes be used in the sense of 'reasonably well', as in the following example (from COBUILD):

> And you personally - did you think that was reasonably explained in the package …? Yeah.

Judging by the data in COBUILD, however, such examples are very rare. On the other hand, *reasonably* is very frequently used in collocations with adjectives which imply a positive evaluation, such as the following ones: *reasonably easy, reasonably clear, reasonably intelligent, reasonably stable, reasonably elegant, reasonably friendly, reasonably reliable, reasonably clean, reasonably complete [data], reasonably safe, reasonably handy, reasonably bright [children], reasonably well-off, reasonably cheap, reasonably happy, reasonably content, reasonably accurate*, etc. If the adjective does not imply a positive evaluation by itself, it usually implies it in context, as in the following example: "I wanted my electric bills to stay reasonably low."

The phrase *reasonably broad shoulders* implies that while the shoulders in question cannot be described as "very broad" they *can* be described as *broad*, and that in the speaker's view this is good (good enough), and that it should also be seen as good enough by other "reasonable" people (i.e. people who think well and who do not want too much).

The collocation *reasonably well* embodies the same assumptions and in fact it makes them particularly obvious. For example, when one says that something "went reasonably well" one sends the following message: 'I can't say "it went very well"'; I don't want to say because of this that 'it didn't go well'. One is determined to be 'positive' if one can: 'if I can, I want to say that it went well'. These considerations can be summarized by positing the following cultural script (which can be called, for convenience, a script of "realistically positive evaluation"):

[people think:]
it is not good to think like this:
 when I can't say about something "it is very good"
 I can't say "it is good"
it is good to think like this:
 when I can say about something "it is good" it is good to say it

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This is perhaps the most salient script associated with the collocation *reasonably well* (and *reasonably good*), but it is not the only one. Another script can be called an "anti-exaggeration script".

The use of the collocation *reasonably well* suggests that one is carefully choosing one's words, and also that one is carefully considering the situation. This consideration reflected in the careful choice of words is linked with an effort to "think well" as well as "speak well". Hence the link to "reason" and "reasons". A "thoughtless, impulsive, emotional" person might say "it went badly". A "reasonable" person, on the other hand, may consider the matter "in accordance with reason", choose their words carefully, "psyche" themselves into appreciating the positives (such as they are), and accept the limitations that they cannot do anything about. Thus, the use of the collocation *reasonably well* can be seen to reflect scripts for careful speaking, as well as scripts for good thinking and for sensible wanting.

[people think:]
sometimes when people think like this about something: "it is good"
    they want to say more
because of this they say something like this: "it is very good"
it is not good to say things in this way
when I think like this about something: "it is good"
    it will not be good to say more
because of this when I want to say words like "very good"
    it will be good if I think about it before I say it

The use of *reasonably* as "anti-exaggeration device" may seem remote from the use of *reasonable* in political and legal discourse, as in the following passage from a newspaper referring to a case of a mother hitting her three-year old child in a supermarket:

> Civil libertarians say that the law is sensible, allowing parents to hit their kids in a reasonable fashion but not to beat them up.
> "I do not accept that the force [she] used was reasonable", was the finding of the magistrate in the current case.

Yet while the collocations *a reasonable fashion* and *reasonable force* imply a concern with, roughly speaking, "not *doing* too much", and *reasonably well* a concern with "not *saying* too much", the common thread is none the less evident. "It is good not to do more [than necessary]" and "it is good not

to say more [than justified]". In both cases one needs discernment, good thinking: it is good to think like this: "I don't want to do / say more".

12. Conclusion

In his book *Words and Phrases* to which I referred at the outset, Michael Stubbs (2001: 215–216) makes, inter alia, the following points:

— Evaluative meanings are conveyed not only by individual words, but also by longer phrases and syntactic structures … . Repeated instances of a collocation across a corpus provide objective, empirical evidence for evaluative meanings.
— Repeated patterns show that evaluative meanings are not merely personal and idiosyncratic, but widely shared in a discourse community.
— Evaluative and attitudinal meanings are often thought to be due to conversational inferences (Grice 1975); however, many pragmatic meanings are conventionally associated with lexico-syntactic structures.
— The over-emphasis on conversational inferences is probably due to a reliance on invented data, which have been stripped of markers of speaker attitude.

I believe that these are all valid and constructive points. (For an extended discussion of the misplaced faith in Gricean inferences, see Wierzbicka 2003b). Unfortunately, on the heels of these good points come two further ones which in my view are neither valid nor constructive:
— Semantics is inevitably circular, since some words are used to define the meanings of other words, and it is not yet clear what metalanguage should be used to describe evaluations.
— If descriptions of evaluative meanings and cultural stereotypes can be made reasonably precise, it seems plausible that this will tell us about the important meanings expressed in a discourse community, but speculations here are at an early stage.

If semantics were "inevitably circular", meanings could not be analysed in an illuminating way and the study of meaning would be doomed to failure. In the past, many linguists have thought that it is indeed doomed to failure and that it is best for linguists to stay away from it.

This is not Stubbs' stance. On the contrary, the opening sentence of this book reads: "The topic of this book is words and phrases: how they are used, what they mean, and what evidence and methods can be used to study their meanings." This is certainly a much more positive attitude to semantics than that expressed, for example, in John Sinclair's (1991) book *Corpus, Concordance, Collocation*, where one reads, for example, statements like the following:

> Working with lexicographers made it clear that there are no objective criteria available for the analysis of meaning … More recently, the whole idea of discrete units of meaning is called into question. At the moment, the mood is somewhat negative. (p. 7)

> There is a broad general tendency for frequent words, or frequent senses of words, to have less of a clear and independent meaning than less frequent words or senses. These meanings of frequent words are difficult to identify and explain; and with the very frequent words, we are reduced to talking about uses rather than meanings. (p. 113)

But if we didn't have "discrete units of meaning" to work with, we could identify neither the different senses of the English word *reasonable* nor the differences between the English *reasonable* (and *reasonably*) and the French *raisonnable* (and *raisonnablement*); and we could not reveal the cultural underpinnings of these English key words.

What lexicographers need is something more constructive than statements along the lines of "You are right, there are no objective criteria for the analysis of meaning"; and it is good to see that Stubbs (2001), for one, rejects such an anti-semantic stand, and asks what methods can be used to study meanings effectively.

Stubbs says that "it is not yet clear what metalanguage should be used to describe evaluations". As I have tried to show in this paper, and as colleagues and I have tried to demonstrate in many other publications (see NSM Homepage http://www.une.edu.au/arts/LCL/disciplines/linguistics/nsmpage.htm), evaluative meanings, like any other meanings, can be analysed very effectively in the Natural Semantic Metalanguage, based on empirically established universal human concepts such as, for example, GOOD and BAD.

Stubbs suggests that "speculations" about the important evaluative meanings expressed in words and phrases "are at an early stage". Although NSM researchers have tried to identify such meanings for years, and have published scores of books and articles with that aim in mind, we do, of course, have a long way to go. But the hundreds of specific semantic analyses pre-

sented in this body of NSM work are not speculations; and while no doubt far from perfect, they are certainly being tested on empirical material.

The availability of corpora has opened new perspectives for linguistics and has stimulated interest in the study of words and phrases, a study which was totally marginalised during the Chomskyan era. But the wonderful data available now through the corpora will not by themselves generate their own semantic analysis. Nor will such semantic analysis be generated by abstract semantic theories such as, for example, those associated with the term "formal semantics". A practical and effective methodology for studying the meaning of both words and phrases (or indeed, of any other aspect of language) is already available in NSM semantics. Using this methodology, hundreds of meanings have already been described – not perfectly, to be sure, but systematically, empirically, and, dare I say it, reasonably well.

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Australian perceptions of the weekend: Evidence from collocations and elsewhere

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1. Introduction

Back in 1997, in the weekend supplement of the *Sydney Morning Herald*, Tom Dusevic nostalgically reflected on some of the typical activities of the Australian weekend of yesteryear. "In Australia", he said, "the weekend once attained the status of the sacred". He then went on as follows:

> It was a time for mowing the lawn, sharing the Sunday roast, reading papers, pottering in the garden, retreating back to the shed, having a picnic or taking a leisurely drive to the beach. Perhaps it was a chance to worship – in the dress circle, the outer [ground, at a football match] or a pew. Saturday and Sunday had a different rhythm. The weekend was your own time, the rest of the week it was the boss's.[1]

Are Australian weekends no longer what they used to be? Has the Australian weekend somehow been "lost" – as pointed out in the title of Dusevic's article, "The *lost* weekend" (emphasis added)? Many would agree. Regardless, it is a time of the week which, apparently more so than in other parts of the English speaking world, continues to play an important role in the collective minds of Australians, as I will seek to demonstrate below. First of all, I will present the essentially linguistic data which have led me to the belief that, at least in Australian English, the word *weekend* is a key word (à la Wierzbicka 1997; cf. also Peeters 2004a). Then, I will provide a detailed semantic description of the word, using the now well-established conventions of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM; cf. Wierzbicka, this volume). The NSM explication will be further corroborated by means of supplementary data, both linguistic and cultural. In the process, I will demonstrate that my initial hypothesis was right: the description leads to the identification of a related communicative norm and a related cultural value. To study candidate key words, in the hope of finding relevant communicative norms and cultural values, is to engage in an exercise which I have dubbed elsewhere (Peeters 2004b) "cross-cultural semantics".[2]

2. Australia, "land of the {long / lost} weekend"

The claim that, in Australian English, the word *weekend* is a key word is underpinned by the finding that, among the numerous phrases proposed throughout the years to refer to Australia without explicitly naming the continent, there are two that actually include the word *weekend*. They are phonetically close, and both include an adjective. "In the late 1970s, Australia was described as 'the land of the long weekend'. Today, some have dubbed it 'the land of the lost weekend'."[3]

2.1. "Land of the long weekend"

"Australians often believe they live in the land of the long weekend. But they work longer hours, have less annual leave and fewer public holidays than workers in most other industrialised countries." Richard Dennis's claim figures prominently in an article by Adele Horin (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 July 2003) titled "Whoever said this was the land of the long weekend?" Clearly, the question was not meant to be answered – but we do know the answer anyway. In 1978, social commentator Ronald V. Conway published his *Land of the Long Weekend*, a book on Australian social life, mentality and customs. "Ronald Conway's immortal description of Australia", as Graue (2002: 18) puts it, is reminiscent of the phrase *Land of the Long White Cloud*, the English translation of the name given to New Zealand by its aboriginal Maori population. Conway had been guided in his choice by the finding that, at the time, Australia was "one of the highest-ranking Western societies in its number of public holidays" and "probably the only country which has arranged so many statutory holidays to fall on a Monday, thus establishing the hallowed convention of the long weekend", described a little further as "almost a national symbol" (Conway 1978: 187).

Conway's title soon developed into a collocation which is now part and parcel of the Australian English landscape. "Known for its public holidays, flexitime and rostered days off, Australia has adopted this title with pride", claims the *Dinkum Dictionary of Aussie English* (Antill-Rose 1990). One of its first occurrences as a collocation is in Hill's (1985: 11) endorsement of religious education "in a country so lacking in transcendent vision as the 'land of the long weekend'." Eventually, the association of the phrase with a perceived lack of vision, as well as with selfish leisure and pleasure, was

to gain considerable currency. "Three days of pleasure" and "seventy-two hours of leisure" are phrases used by the Cannanes, an Australian band, in a 1996 song titled, like Conway's book, "Land of the Long Weekend". The dust jacket of Light Source Films' 1998 video called *Bronzed Aussie Gods* dubs Australia "the land of the long weekend and the eternal suntan", undoubtedly an appropriate paraphrase in the case of the life savers on Australian beaches alluded to in the title. McCallum (1998: 208) describes the 1950s as years in which Australians "sat back and lived happily off the fat of the land, marketing natural resources for a living and tending their cars, their gardens and their children, in that order, on the weekends – in the land of the long weekend". "Getting away from things and a diminishing sense of community participation are growing factors in this land of the long weekend", writes Robarts (2000: 4), who also refers to indications, by social commentators, "that Australians are becoming more self-centred, materialistic, and disengaged". According to Jenny Wanless, one particular ideology which should "appeal to the land of the long weekend, where lazy days at the beach or the cricket ground have traditionally been treasured", is that of the so-called Slow Cities movement.[4]

In some cases, the phrase *land of the long weekend* has been used to little effect, except to add some stylistic variety. Thus, on 25 April 1999, in the ABC Radio broadcast *Books and writing*, poet Ron Price recited an autobiographical poem in which, after talking about his first twenty-seven years in Canada (where he was born), he elaborated on the next twenty-seven years saying:

> Then I moved to
> the Land of the Long Weekend
> where humour was, and is,
> a way of life and I learned to laugh
> and be the entertainer, the talker
> and I talked with the best of them.

Nothing in the entire text, as recited, reveals a preoccupation with either lack of vision, or selfish leisure and pleasure. A similar remark applies to the following excerpt:

> Even after the dotcom bust, the promise of greater opportunities and better pay is still luring Australian IT workers overseas. For many, months quickly become years, but many still dream of returning home to the land of the long weekend. (Adam Turner, "The grass is greener", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 May 2004)

These are no doubt instances of the plainly "jocular" use of the phrase, the only one referred to in the second edition of the *Macquarie Book of Slang* (Lambert 2000).

Strikingly, over the last ten years, it is the literal meaning of the collocation which appears to have been rediscovered. In the majority of contemporary occurrences, the use of an extremely serious tone undercuts the jocular aspect. The very existence of such a tone clearly signals that the phrase is mainly used in a transparent fashion (contrary to the name given to New Zealand), either to translate disapproval of the way things are, or to express nostalgia of the way they were. Disapproval is a clear component in a press release issued in October 1993 by the media office of Roger Pescott, a minister in the Victorian state government. It referred to a bill subsequently approved as the *Public Holidays Act*. The aim of this legal document was, on the one hand, to ensure that, in Victoria, Australia's National Day would be celebrated on the day itself (i.e. 26 January) rather than on the following Monday, and on the other hand to reduce the number of holidays and non-working days in the state.[5] The press release contained the following assertions, which demonstrate that, in the minister's opinion, the time had come to combat the lack of zeal in many Victorians:

> Mr Pescott said the change was designed to reflect the standards adopted in most Western nations and assist in moving toward uniformity [*sic*] with public holidays throughout Australia.

> "It will also be of significant benefit to business and marks a shift away from Australia's image as the land of the long weekend," he said.

In similar fashion, on 24 September 1997, Millicent E. Poole, the new Vice-Chancellor of Edith Cowan University (Western Australia), made the following solemn statement in an inaugural address called "Framing our future: change and differentiation":

> I accept that universities have a major role in supporting economic development and wealth creation. I positively embrace any attempt to shift Australian cultural values from the 'land of the long weekend' mentality in which sporting achievements are lauded while scientific achievements are ignored and entrepreneurial and creative achievements viewed with suspicion. I commend the shift from the 'Lucky Country' to the 'Competitive, Clever Country' but I will continue to fight for the recognition of the intrinsic value of higher education.[6]

It won't come as a surprise that vice-chancellors fail to get a lot of comfort out of the phrase *land of the long weekend*. Hardly anything else can be expected from them.

2.2. "Land of the lost weekend"

Another, much more recent, phrase surfaces in the mid-1990s. Rather than disapproval, the prevailing sentiment of those who use it is that things have changed. The new phrase plays on the phonetic resemblance of the words *long* and *lost*, and first appears, by the looks of it, in a critical assessment of a documentary ironically titled *Land of the Long Weekend*, produced by Film Australia and broadcast on ABC TV on 6 September 1995:

> *Land of the Long Weekend* attempts to explain why Australian workers were the first in the world to win the eight-hour day and to examine the legacy of that struggle today. In the process, this documentary uncovers an Australia no longer drunk on sunshine or living weekends to the full, but which has become the land of the lost weekend, of clocking on and off, of extraordinary roster systems, of the haves and have nots. (Cameron Parker, "Fanciful portrayal of workers' history", *Green Left Weekly* 200, 30 August 1995)

Two years later, Hannah (1997: 3–4) uses the two phrases (*land of the long weekend* and *land of the lost weekend*) in an editorial of the quarterly review of the Zadok Institute for Christianity and Society (Melbourne):

> Welcome to the land of the lost weekend where our hard earned Saturday and Sunday leisure time has all but disappeared. (...) We will need the courage of conviction and the company of others on the journey if, for our own good and for the common good, we are to rediscover that land of the long weekend.

Bittman (1998), on the other hand, uses the adjectives *lost* and *long* side by side, answering in the negative the question of whether Australia has become "the land of the *lost* long weekend". The author finds that the period under scrutiny (1974–1992) has seen an *increase* in free time. Others appear to claim the exact opposite; a case in point is that of Judy Esmond, who, in an address titled "From distressed to de-stressed" (second *National Respite Conference*, Perth, October 2000), states the following:

> It seems that the promises of the "technological age" have not resulted in increased leisure time, reduced stress and a more relaxed lifestyle. In fact, in some ways almost the opposite has occurred as we have become "the land of the lost weekend".

In recent years, many reporters and public figures have expressed the same conviction using different means, e.g. through an association of the phrase *land of the long weekend* with adjectival or adverbial phrases such as *well and truly dead* (or *well and truly over*), *once*, *far from*, *no longer* etc., or with a noun phrase such as *former incarnation* (emphasis added in all of the following examples):

> Any notion that Australia is the land of the long weekend and people are clocking on and off for a 35 hour week is *well and truly dead*. (Kathryn Heiler, "All work and no play", *Lateline*, ABC TV, 24 June 1999)

> Australia, *once* the land of the long weekend, has become a nation too engrossed in work, family and social activities to take holidays, tourism research has found. (Australian Associated Press [AAP], "Land of work and no play", *The Age*, 10 April 2000)

> Well, Australia may *once* have been dubbed "the land of the long weekend", but now the figures suggest the holiday is *well and truly over*. (Maxine McKew, *The 7.30 report*, ABC TV, 16 July 2001)

> *Far from* being the land of the long weekend, Australians now work longer hours than people in Japan. (Wendy Caird, national secretary of the Community and Public Sector Union, quoted in *Delegates @ work* [National bulletin of the CPSU] 7, October 2001)

> *No longer* are we regarded as the land of the long weekend; we are now fast being seen as the sweatshop of the developed world. (Richard Males, assistant secretary of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, quoted in the Australian media, Oct/Nov 2001)[7]

> People spend too much time at work doing too little, costing workers their health and businesses their profits. Those are the findings of two surveys of productivity and overtime released today, which indicate Australia has swung too far away from its *former incarnation* as the land of the long weekend. (AAP, "At work for too long", *The Age*, 6 August 2003)

Others have invited their fellow Australians to reassess their current thinking:[8]

> Forget the land of the long weekend. Australia has become the land of long working hours, grumpy partners too tired for sex, and families and communities under enormous stress. (Leonie Lamont, "ACTU launches long hours test case", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 September 2001)

> We found out that while Australians might think they live in the land of the long weekend, the facts are actually quite different. (Richard Dennis, Senior

Research Fellow at the Australia Institute, on ABC Radio National's *The Business Report*, 5 July 2003; cf. Section 2.1)

The notion of the laid-back Aussie worker taking it easy in the land of the long weekend is just one of our cherished beliefs about ourselves to be demolished by a book to be published next week, *How Australia Compares*. (Ross Gittins, "World champion workers", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 May 2004; an almost identical text was printed in *The Age*, the same day)

Some have gone so far as to suggest when the change may have occurred. Two examples will suffice. In a 1997 report on the screening and subsequent discussion of the documentary *40,000 Years of Dreaming*, Helen Martin questioned as follows the truth of some of cinematographer George Miller's assertions:

One may not agree with all of Miller's interpretations of Australian culture and film history. I would, for example, question statements such as "Australia in the 90s is the land of the long weekend". I think that attitude started to disappear in the 1970s. (*ASE* [Australian Screen Editors] *Newsletter* 15, May 1997)

On the other hand, in the ABC Radio broadcast *The world today* of 13 August 2001, Michael Brissenden observed: "In Australia, we grew up with the derisive notion that we were the land of the long weekend, a country that likes to relax". He went on: "But as we all know, the really long weekend went out with the Leyland P76". It is not entirely clear whether his statement is to be taken literally (the production of the P76, a true icon of the Australian automobile industry, ceased in 1975, and no other car has ever been designed and / or mass-produced in Australia) or whether it just means something like "a long time ago". However, it further underscores the characteristic habit that Australians have of associating cars with weekend activity. In a fairly recent Volvo advertisement for a new four-wheel-drive, mention is made of "five days of work, two whole days of play". The adjective *whole* underlines the importance of the two days of rest that follow five days of work. The text that contains this passage separates two photographs, the second of which has been edited and shows a car which looks like it is sent through its paces, driven at high speed through mud and water; the other picture shows the same vehicle, prim and proper and treated with respect. The shining Volvo has the word *week* printed above it in a huge font, the other one the word *ends*, in an identical font. The advertisement appeared in early 2002 on the back cover of the weekend supplements of the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Australian*, called respec-

tively *Good Weekend* (cf. above) and *The Australian Weekend Magazine*. Similarly, a commercial broadcast in February 2004 on various commercial TV channels portrays the new Mazda Tribute as "a tribute to long weekends".

And the reality is that these long weekends are coming back into vogue – thanks to the increased popularity of the flexi-time concept, a system which allows workers to bundle their working hours and to take additional leave (preferably on a Friday or a Monday). The most astute use all sorts of excuses to create more such occasions, if ever they feel they don't have them in sufficient numbers. In a report titled "Absence management in the land of the long weekend", Engleman (2001: 5) observes that, over the years, one of the functions of the term *long weekend* has been to refer to "the great Australian 'sickie'" (a hypocoristic abbreviation of the correct term *sick leave*). On Monday or on Friday mornings, workers "call in sick". The sickness is often not too serious, and at times even rather fictitious.[9] Talking about the "ubiquitous Australian sickie", Susan Muldowney, too, establishes a link between "sickies" (which she reports are now also referred to as "doona days") and living in the "land of the long weekend":

> Can't face work? Why not call in sick? You wouldn't be alone – around 3% of the Australian workforce would happily join you on an average day. And after all, you're entitled to around 10 days sick leave a year – use them or lose them.

> It's this line of thinking that has transformed the ubiquitous Australian sickie into something of a national treasure – a tradition to fall back on in times of personal need. But this unscheduled absenteeism comes at a cost, and if recent findings are anything to go by, the sickie may have developed into a serious condition in the land of the long weekend. (Susan Muldowney, "Sick of work", *Australian CPA*, March 2003)

Finally, here is a quote from reporter Max Walsh:

> What's happened to the land of the long weekend and the pseudo sickie? An international survey of hours worked per job per annum has thrown up the surprising result that Australians spend more time at the grindstone than just about anybody else. (Max Walsh, "And furthermore", *The Bulletin*, 30 July 2003)

Should we be surprised that lack of motivation to put in a full day's work on Fridays is a problem to which, according to Narelle Hooper in the regular radio broadcast *The world today* (ABC Radio, 7 July 2000), "in the land

of the long weekend, no one's come up yet with a reliable solution"? But perhaps Australia is no longer the land of the long weekend. "Australians work very hard. The myth of the land of the long weekend and other notions of Australian laziness are absolutely unfounded", claims Sam Levy, a graduate from the University of New England (New South Wales), writing in the institution's alumni magazine (*Afterthought*s 8:2, November 2000, p. 5). Similarly, Farah Farouque ("Farewell long weekend, it seems we're all desk-bound now", *The Age*, 5 July 2003) reports on the Australia Institute study by Richard Dennis (see above), a study which "shatters the myth that Australia is the land of the long weekend". Has it become the land of the lost weekend? Who is to say? Regardless of the view taken, the frequency of the two phrases (especially the first) shows that the weekend and the long weekend continue to play an important role in the collective minds of Australians, and to trigger a degree of fascination that, most certainly, they do not have to the same extent in other parts of the English-speaking world.

3.   A (very) polysemous derivation: The word *weekender*

According to Ramson (1988), the word *weekender* has only one meaning, viz. 'holiday house'; the compiler of the *Australian National Dictionary* adds that the word is in use elsewhere, but that it made its appearance in Australia before migrating to other shores. Let's quote a single example, taken from Terrill (2000: 309): "The land took hold of the consciousness of a rising middle class in the 1970s and 1980s. Rural retreats and weekenders became popular. Young professionals moved to small towns."

In reality, the word is quite polysemous. In Australian English, it has been used, and continues to be used, to refer:

— to weekly publications released on the weekend (e.g. *Western Weekender*, in New South Wales; *Adelaide Hills Weekender*, in South Australia; *Albany Weekender*, in Western Australia; *Gold Coast Weekender*, in Queensland, etc.);
— to Saturday newspaper supplements (*The Age*, *The Illawarra Mercury*, *The Townsville Bulletin*, etc.);
— to the title of a weekly overview of weekend activities printed in the *Good Weekend* supplement to the *Sydney Morning Herald*;
— to television broadcasts (e.g. *Sydney Weekender*, on Channel Seven);

— to weekend holiday packages or weekend-long sporting events (in chess, golf, etc.), practice sessions, professional or religious training sessions, reeducation schemes, music events, etc.;
— to caravans, tents, sleeping bags and luggage items;
— to clothing and accessories (e.g. jeans, shoes);
— to boxes of assorted chocolates;
— to petty offenders jailed for the weekend.

The list is not exhaustive. One might add that the musical act Youth Group has a song called "Weekender", released in 2000, and that there is a club in Melbourne going by the same name. It is somehow hard to imagine that a derivation in *-er* which, unlike its base, is so highly polysemous can be related to a word which is *not* a key word in Australian English.

4.   The Australian *weekend*: A description using NSM

At the outset, it was noted that the Australian weekend is perhaps no longer what it once was. Nonetheless, I have been able to show, on the basis of linguistic data, that Australians continue to attach considerable importance to their weekends. In the process, a number of aspects related to Australian culture were touched upon, and this is undoubtedly additional evidence for the claim that the word *weekend* is a key word. The cultural aspects will be further elaborated below, using an additional sample of words, phrases and conversational routines. First, though, I would like to propose a hopefully exhaustive description, in Natural Semantic Metalanguage, of the word *weekend* in Australian English:

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the [Australian] weekend

(a)   part of a week
(b)   there is no other part of the week like this
(c)   this part has two parts of the same kind
(d)   many people think of this part like this:

> I want this part to have more parts of the same kind
> this part is the part when, for a short time, I can do things
>> because I want to do these things
>> not because I have to do these things

(e)   after this part, many people feel something bad
(f)   before this part, there is another part

(g)   this other part has many parts of the same kind
(h)   this other part is the part when people do many things
             because they have to do these things
             not because they want to do them
(i)   they do not want to do these things for a long time
(j)   this other part is the part when many people think:
             after this part there will be another part
             this is good
(k)   when people think like this they feel something good

For those who are not used to thinking in terms of semantic primes, it may be useful to link this description to something they feel they can relate to a little better (even though there is a heavy price to be paid in terms of unwarranted cultural specificity). Components (a) and (b) locate the Australian weekend with reference to the week as a whole. Component (c) specifies that there are two days in the weekend. Component (d) includes two very common reflections on the weekend, viz. that it would be better if it were longer ("the land of the *long* weekend"), and that people can spend their time doing what they feel like doing, not what they have to do (to earn a living, for instance; cf. Dusevic). Component (e) refers to what people feel when they realise that another working week is upon them (they feel like taking or having a *sickie*). Components (f) to (i) describe the working week routine: it precedes the freedom that comes with the weekend, and it is spread over several days during which one has to do certain things one hopes not to have to do for too long. Components (j) and (k) express how the weekend is conceptualised as something people look forward to (what one feels like doing is always nicer than what one has to do) and talk about the emotions triggered by such anticipation.

   Care must be taken not to export as such into other varieties of English the description that has just been provided. It is important to recall that the meaning and the connotations of the word *weekend* are not necessarily the same everywhere in the English-speaking world. The available evidence shows that it is a key word in Australian English, but who is to say whether, in addition, it is a key word anywhere else? More research is needed to decide either way.

   Before we return to the data, it must be recalled that the word *week*, used at the start of the explication, needs to be explicated as well. It is *not* part of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage. Here is one possibility:

a week
a time
this time has two parts
one of these parts has many parts of the same kind
during this part people do many things
because they have to do these things
not because they want to do them
after this part, there is another part
the other part is not like this
the other part does not have many parts of the same kind
during this other part people can do many things
because they want to do these things
not because they have to do these things

Another possibility would be an explication along the following lines:

a week
a time
this time has many parts of the same kind
there can be no two parts of this time at the same time
there are names for these parts
one part is Monday
there are no parts of the same time before this part
the part after this part is Tuesday
the part after Tuesday is Wednesday
the part after Wednesday is Thursday
the part after Thursday is Friday
the part after Friday is Saturday
the part after Saturday is Sunday
there are no parts of the same time after this part

The two explications (or formulae, to use a different term in common use among NSM-practitioners) are by no means mutually exclusive. They merely correspond to two different conceptualisations of the week: either a succession of working days followed by a period of relaxation, or a set of days without any internal differenciation. No claim is being made that the definitions are valid only in the case of Australian English, and that the word *week* has a different meaning and different connotations depending on where one looks. There is always a possibility that this is the case. We sim-

ply don't know for sure at this stage and I will refrain from making any assertions one way or the other.[10]

5. "Friday on my mind"

Talking about what he refers to as the "hallowed convention of the long weekend" (see above), Conway (1978: 187) claims that, "needless to say, such weekends tend to become longer by virtue of the time wasted both anticipating them and recovering from them". Language and cultural context both confirm that this hardly veiled criticism of certain instances of typical cultural behaviour, not of all Australians but of a sizeable proportion among them, is largely founded. Sections 5, 6 and 7 present cultural and linguistic evidence that people tend to look forward not only to long weekends, but to all weekends; Sections 8 and 9 deal with linguistic manifestations of the weekend blues. It must be stressed again that what matters above all is the big picture. Elsewhere in the English-speaking world, one does find evidence of the sort we are about to explore – but only in Australia is that evidence so clustered and so clear.

The end of the working week has spoken to the imagination of song writers, musicians and audiences throughout the English-speaking world. However, there is nothing more Australian than the 1966 hit song "Friday on my mind" (dubbed "Australia's second national anthem" in an anonymous piece called "Setting the record straight", *The Age*, 8 April 2003), if only because on 28 May 2001, in Sydney, an APRA (Australian Performing Rights Association) jury consisting of about a hundred authors, musicians, music critics and distributors voted "Friday on my mind", by the Easybeats, the best Australian rock song ever. In the 1960s, the Easybeats were the most important Australian rock group, and the first to achieve international success (see McFarlane 1999 for details). "Friday on my mind" was to occupy for several weeks the top spot in the Australian hit parade and soon became part of Australian cultural heritage, the final consecration being APRA's decision referred to a moment ago.

For Bernard Zuel (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 29 May 2001), the decision to crown "Friday on my mind" was not unexpected:

> Australians still like to think of themselves as working class stiffs with half an eye always on the weekend to come. So it should come as no surprise that a song about working class stiffs waiting for the weekend was last night named as the best Australian song of all time.

Bruce Elder, senior music critic for the same daily, echoed that statement and then went beyond. What follows is an excerpt of an ABC Radio interview with David Mark, broadcast the same day:

> BRUCE ELDER: I think the appeal of "Friday on my mind" is simply that it is the ultimate working class song. It's the song for every kid who has ever been bored at work and who goes on Monday and dreams of what's going to happen on Friday, and the joys of what's going to happen on the weekend.
>
> DAVID MARK: Is it a great song, or is it just that it symbolises so much for so many people?
>
> BRUCE ELDER: I think it's probably a great song. It's beautifully crafted. Three minutes, or probably only two-and-a-half minutes. And it distils down – it's what pop music's all about – it's distilling down an entire life experience into two and a half minutes and saying something about the human condition. And amazingly enough I think it does that very well.

Mark's judgment, viz. that here we have a song that "symbolises so much for so many people", is quite accurate; Elder's opinion, viz. that the song "says something about the human condition" – in general – is much more debatable. Still, it is the latter kind of statement which resurfaces, at least in part, in the writings of other written media personalities. Do these people really believe that the whole world is more or less identical and adopts similar ways of thinking? Or is it the fear of international criticism that stops them from admitting that the weekend appeals to Australians more than it does to many other cultures in the world? In a review published in *The Australian* (29 May 2001), Iain Shedden, another music critic, explicitly *refused* to draw conclusions about *Australian* perceptions of the weekend from the APRA decision:

> "Friday on My Mind" is the best Australian song of all time. A poll conducted by the Australasian Performing Right Association says so.
>
> What that says about Australian culture is not particularly shocking or insightful, since the song, which would make many people's top 10 anywhere in the Western world, is about as quintessentially rock 'n' roll as you can get. We have all lived for the weekend, one way or another, at some time.

It is certainly the case that the success of one song does not necessarily entitle anyone to come up with generalisations about the culture in which it was produced. It is quite possible that the message contained in the lyrics is universal, or else that no message at all is being communicated. But it is

also the case that the culturally specific message which *possibly* hides behind a musical success story must not be ignored. If Shedden had looked beyond the APRA list, and if he had undertaken the research at the basis of this study, he might have preferred to be much less categorical. His conclusion ("So how come 'Friday on My Mind' made it to the top, a song about living for the weekend? Because, in the end, it's the quality of the song and not its Australianness that makes it a classic") would undoubtedly have been different. What has turned "Friday on my mind" into an Australian rock classic, a true anthem to the Australian working class, is *as much* the message in it as the quality of the product.

The first verse deserves to be quoted in full: it shows how, as early as Monday mornings, Fridays are impatiently expected.

> Monday morning feels so bad,
> Ev'rybody seems to nag me.
> Coming Tuesday I feel better,
> Even my old man looks good.
> Wednesday just don't go,
> Thursday goes too slow,
> I've got Friday on my mind.

In the second verse, reference is made to the Monday-to-Friday routine ("the five day drag"). One day, that routine will no longer exist (a clear reference to the frustration of Australian youngsters in the sixties):

> Do the five day drag once more,
> Know of nothing else that bugs me
> More than working for the rich man,
> Hey, I'll change that scene one day...

The hit has been recorded over and over again, in Australia by rock group Noogie, and in the United States by David Bowie, Peter Frampton, Gary Moore, and rock group Dakota, among others. In the year 2000, before the APRA decision, the chorus line "Monday I have Friday on my mind" became the title of an academic paper by two Australian authors (Barnes and Fieldes 2000), and on 22 November 2002 *The Age* newspaper printed an article with the same title by Sherrill Nixon reporting on some British research. Barnes and Fieldes do not refer to either the song or the Easybeats, which is probably not a surprise, if we bear in mind that the journal which published their paper is itself Australian based, and that the song title is well known by the public at large. Nixon, on the other hand, does provide a reference: "The Easybeats knew it in 1967 but it's taken 35 years to prove

it. Mondays are a drag and workers don't care much for Tuesdays, Wednesdays or Thursdays either. But they love Fridays".

6. "T.G.I.F."

The *G* in the abbreviation T.G.I.F., which is used in Australia but also widely known elsewhere, stands for either *God* or for the noun *goodness* (but see also below). Instead of the abbreviation, both *Thank God it's Friday* and *Thank goodness it's Friday* are heard.

Come Friday, what do Australians do? Judging by a 1944 photograph of three young females in the washrooms of a factory in Marrickville (New South Wales), they wash their feet (they may have been too busy to do it earlier). The picture has been included in an album published more than forty years later (Raymond 1988: 127), complete with a title no doubt selected by the compiler, viz. "Thank God it's Friday". But there are other activities as well.

— University lecturers, doctoral and other students, and sometimes even members of the public attend seminars which are commonly organised late on Friday afternoon. In several Australian universities (Charles Sturt, Macquarie, Sydney) there are (or have been) weekly seminars called *Thank God it's Friday*. They are usually the initiative of a department or a school, and combine serious scholarship with a relaxed atmosphere. There is often a drink and a nibble to start off with, then the speaker takes over. In the process, friendships are forged that go well beyond traditional links of collegiality. Afterwards, in many cases, the biggest devotees go for a meal together – or for more drinks.[11]
— A number of parishes and religious movements, in several Australian states (Victoria, New South Wales), capitalise on the fact that, in a literal interpretation of the phrase *Thank God it's Friday*, it is their God who is being thanked. On Friday evenings, they open their doors to the homeless, young and old, to the poor who are in need of a little warmth or attention, and provide them with a meal and with a few moments of compassion. In some instances, the programme is much more religious and includes prayers and / or bible classes. As for the name of these Friday meetings, quite often it is *Thank God it's Friday*. Bearing in mind the resumption of classes or the start of the new working week, and the need to get up early on Mondays, fewer people nowadays attend Sun-

day evening church services. But more and more volunteer to help out with the Friday meetings, thus giving themselves the opportunity to spend the last evening of the weekend with family, or in front of the television.

— Those who don't feel the need to either continue to learn or open their hearts to the less privileged often tend to go out: they meet friends or colleagues in cafés, bars, restaurants etc., many of which organise evenings called *Thank God it's Friday*. Such evenings are held throughout Australia, in all the regions. Many Irish pubs, for instance in Queensland (Brisbane and Cairns), in South Australia (Adelaide), in Victoria (Melbourne) and in Tasmania (Hobart), choose a slightly different name: in *Thank Guinness it's Friday*, the word *God* (or perhaps *goodness*, which in Australian English is phonetically close to *Guinness*) has to make way for the name of an Irish beer exported and much loved all over the world. Whatever they are called, these evenings are supposed to "kickstart" the weekend. They usually begin at about 5 or 6 pm, sometimes later, and last for at least two hours. Some go on until after midnight. Alcoholic drinks (wines and beers) are often offered at reduced price, there are performances or there is live music with or without dance, and occasionally there are free snacks, lucky draws, tastings, even sporting events.[12]

— Those who prefer to go home to listen to the radio or watch television with other members of the family may be drawn towards one of the many broadcasts called *Thank God it's Friday*. These broadcasts, which last from half an hour up to several hours in a row, either round up the week's events, or play music, or are religious in nature. Their success has been mixed: starting on 17 August 2001, a lighthearted summary of the week's current affairs was broadcast on ABC TV under the title *The Glass House*, one week after it had been launched as *Thank God it's Friday*.

Finally, if neither radio nor television have anything on offer that is likely to be of interest to the teaching staff of the University of Adelaide, the latter are able to borrow a staff training video, made available to them by their Human Resources department, and which bears the title *Thank God it's Friday*. After a week mainly spent in front of a computer screen, leaning over books, fiddling with test tubes in a lab, or in class rooms, this is obviously exactly the sort of thing they need.

7. "Poet's Day"

One doesn't have to be a poet, nor even an amateur of fine books, to be impatiently waiting for the weekend: even those who don't have their "Poet's Day" (or "Poets' Day"). Warrnambool residents, in Victoria, may want to go the Seanchai Irish Pub where, on Fridays between 5 and 7 pm, a *Poet's Day Pub Quiz* is being held. "Fridays were always known as Poet's Day, a crude way of saying 'Nick off early, tomorrow's Saturday'", claimed, on 7 July 2000, Narelle Hooper (on the ABC Radio's *The World Today*; cf. Section 2.2).

"A crude way"? What is so crude about the phrase *Poet's day*? Lyricist and singer Eddie Thunder Stealer knows everything about it. His true name is Tim Walmsley, and the last song on his first CD (*My first words of Australian*, 2001) is called "Poet's day". Contrary to the concept which hides behind the title, and which is far more universal (like T.G.I.F.), this is a very Australian song.[13] "Poet's day" opens with a list of the five working days: "Monday, Tuesday, Humpday, Payday, Poet's day". *Humpday*, sometimes spelled in two words, is not commonly heard in Australia. Obviously, it stands for Wednesday, and once Wednesday is over, or at least underway, one is over the hump (of the working week). *Payday* refers to Thursday, when workers traditionally get their pay. *Poet's day* will be clarified in a moment. The first verse refers to the routine of the first five days of the week ("the five day drag" of the Easybeats):

> Trudging through the working week
> 6 a.m., out of bed, on my feet
> Coco pops, cup of tea, vegemite
> Into the car, on my way
> Another day

Then, in the second verse of "Poet's Day", surfaces the other theme of "Friday on my mind", expressed in the line "Hey, I'll change that scene one day":

> A rich man, if my numbers fall
> Seven day weekender
> Sleeping in, surfing hard, party time
> Everyday will be Poet's day[14]

In the last verse, Eddie Thunder Stealer addresses six poets, whose names are linked either with a literary reference or with some biographical detail:[15]

I will say to all of them :
"Piss off early, tomorrow's Saturday"

The key passage is in the second line. *Poet's day* is an acronym, not for "Nick off early, tomorrow's Saturday" (Narelle Hooper), but for "*P*iss *o*ff *e*arly, *t*omorrow's *S*aturday". *The Macquarie Dictionary of Australian Colloquial Language* (Delbridge 1988) defines *Poet's day* as 'Friday, the day on which people often leave work a little early'. An almost identical definition appears in Johansen's (1996) *Penguin Book of Australian Slang*: 'Friday, the day when workers often leave a little early from work'. Why? Simply because, on Fridays, people are in a hurry to go home to spend the weekend with family and / or friends. "She's gone. She's taken a POETS day", is the answer given to Robyn Williams ("Line drop-out", *ABM* [*Australian Business Monthly*], January 1995) when, one Friday afternoon, on the phone, he asks for Janelle, whom he had spoken to a few moments earlier. "I knew all about POETS day. Piss off early, tomorrow's Saturday." Whether many Australians nowadays can still afford to take a "Poet's Day" is up for discussion. After the publication of *How Australia Compares* (Tiffen and Gittins 2004), Peter Shadbolt wrote in the London *Telegraph*, in an article titled "Strewth! Aussies give up the grog" (dated 4 May): "Once famous for referring to Friday as Poets day (standing for P*** Off Early Tomorrow's Saturday), the average worker Down Under now clocks up 1,855 work hours a year, 20 hours ahead of Americans on 1,835 and 34 more than the Japanese on 1,821".

8. "Mondayitis"

The following dialogue took place one Saturday in June or July 2001, just before 1 pm, in a CD shop near the University of Tasmania's Sandy Bay campus. The salesman whom I was talking to was in a hurry to go home, there were no other customers, and the business would be closed for the rest of the weekend. "I'm also looking for something by a guy whose name is Eddie Thunder Stealer. He's got something called 'Mondayitis'", I told him. The salesman kept on browsing through the title lists he had available to him, still looking for another title I had put to him moments earlier. His reply, however, was instantaneous. Without looking up, he said: "Don't we all?" Of course, he had understood that I was looking for a song called "Mondayitis". But I had been slightly clumsy in my choice of words, and he had seized the moment to play on words. He had immediately recog-

nised the term, which appears to be much more widely used in Australia than anywhere else, and he had replied knowingly.[16]

Morphologically, the word *Mondayitis* consists of a root referring to the first day of the week, and a suffix *-itis*, also found in words such as *bronchitis* and *appendicitis*. Unlike its learned counterparts, it doesn't denote a physical condition but a mental one. The *Macquarie Dictionary of Australian Colloquial Language* (Delbridge 1988) describes *Mondayitis* as a form of 'lassitude and general reluctance to work as is often experienced on Mondays'. The *Penguin Book of Australian Slang* (Johansen 1996) and the *Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English* (Moore 1997) talk about a fictitious disease, the former towards the end of its definition ('general lack of desire to go to work, often experienced on Monday after the weekend break; a fictitious illness due to this'), the latter towards the start ('a fictitious disease, the chief symptom of which is a marked reluctance to resume work after the weekend break'). "Sick or not, we just can't shake the Mondayitis", titles the *Sydney Morning Herald* (10 February 2003, article by Sherrill Nixon reporting on absenteeism in call centres). Mondayitis is something that, after "the weekend euphoria", "we all occasionally (more frequently for some) catch a dose of" (Jasch 1997: 4). As a result, one works less well on Mondays – unless one chooses not to work at all. In a poem called *Mondayitis*, Australian poet and high school teacher Kerry Scuffins relates her fear of getting stuck in mid-sentence in front of a classroom on a Monday morning (Scuffins 1995: 78); to avoid the problem, a "sickie" (see Section 2.2) appears to be called for...

But what if the condition lingers, as it sometimes does? According to the *Dinkum Dictionary of Aussie English* (Antill-Rose 1990), this is the rule: *Mondayitis* is 'how the hard working average Australian feels about going to work any day of the week'. On the other hand, "'Mondayitis', seven days a week" is the way Chung (1995), addressing an audience of lawyers, describes the well-known condition commonly referred to as "burnout"; one of the early symptoms is "Mondayitis occurring on Sunday night". Another comparison that has been made is with a phenomenon called "January Blues", experienced at the year's start and defined as 'a sort of overblown lengthy version of Mondayitis' (Harry Wiegele, "a special odyssey", *Perth Clinic Newsletter*, February 2002).

It is relatively easy to get over a bout of Mondayitis, even though some instances are particularly aggressive, and therefore harder to overcome. In that respect, it may be useful to quote the *Sydney Morning Herald* of 30 September 2000, the day before the Sydney Olympics closing ceremony. In

an article titled "Mondayitis? You ain't seen nothing yet", Sue Williams warned her readers against "the worst case of Mondayitis since they invented the weekend". As a giant party had been planned, rather than to give in to nostalgic reflections from as early as the last day of the Games, the risk of what Williams called "a wave of post-games blues" setting in the day after, viz. on Monday, 2 October, was extremely high. Even the foreign press talked about it. Uli Schmetzer (*The Chicago Tribune*, 2 October) signalled the existence of a virus "known here as Mondayitis". "Have you ever heard of 'Mondayitis'?" asked, the same day, in a report titled "'Mondayitis' set to hit Sydneysiders", *The Tribune*, a newspaper published in Chandigarh (India).[17] Not that there wasn't a cure. According to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, psychiatrists recommended focussing "on the next party, the centenary on January 1 when the country celebrates 100 years of federation, the birth of its nation". Other cures that have been suggested over the years, without reference to the Olympics, include cycling and singing. The Illawarra Touring Cycle Club (New South Wales) offers cycling trips called *The cure for Mondayitis*. "Need a cure for Mondayitis?" asks Sydney's Macquarie University *Staff News* in at least two different issues (22 March 2002, 7 March 2003). Answer: "Join the Macquarie University Singers!". Finally, there is a radio programme called *Mondayitis*, on Sydney's 2RSR-FM, every Monday morning, between 6 and 9 am; and, in Aspley (Queensland), a bowling championship called the *Mondayitis Tenpin Bowling League*.[18]

9.   "That Monday (morning) feeling"

"Sunday night is the eve of the working week and the time, it seems, when people start to get wound up about the week that lies ahead – the true onset, if you like, of that Monday morning feeling". It is not an Australian who is talking: these are the words of the spokesperson of a British website, quoted in the *Sydney Morning Herald* of 30 July 2001. The phrase to be noted is of course *that Monday (morning) feeling*; it is not very widespread in Australia, probably because of the very clear Australian preference for the word *Mondayitis*, which is shorter and therefore, presumably, more expressive (in the same way that *sickie* is more expressive than *sick leave*). Although the Australian word is spreading to other varieties of English, speakers of English worldwide tend to use *that Monday feeling*, or the longer *that Monday morning feeling*. The latter, without its demonstrative *that*, which

is however crucial, as none of *a*, *the* or *this Monday (morning) feeling* exist, is defined in the *Cambridge International Dictionary of English* (2001) as "the way people feel after the weekend when they do not want to go to work or school". The word *Mondayitis* is added in brackets, preceded by the abbreviation *Aus*.

Without going into detail, let's simply point out that, in Australian English, the word and the phrase are sometimes used together. The phrase, in one of its variants, appears in the title of an article or a text, and the word in the body. Thus, one of pastor Chris Appleby's (of the Anglican parish St Theodore Wattle Park, in Surrey Hills, New South Wales) sermons is titled "That Monday morning feeling", and starts off as follows:

> I trust you all know the old adage that if you are buying a car, make sure it is not a Monday car. In fact, they say the best cars to buy are Wednesday cars. Monday cars are the worst because of that endemic malady, "Mondayitis". It seems that most people have a problem moving from the relaxation of the weekend back to work on a Monday. Researchers have found that stress levels are always higher on a Monday. You are more likely to have a heart attack on a Monday than on any other day of the week, your blood pressure will be higher on a Monday, your stomach acidity is higher, so you are more likely to develop an ulcer and the probability of suicide is higher. Sounds like a good reason to have tomorrow off, doesn't it? Except that that just puts the problem back to Tuesday.

In all likelihood, pastor Appleby used the same source for his sermon of Sunday, 18 November 2001, as Victoria Button, who in an article of *The Age* (published on 16 February 2000) refers to the same risks (stress, heart attack, etc.), while quoting Gavin Lambert, a researcher at the Baker Medical Research Institute (Melbourne) who refers to "the old idea of Mondayitis where it's hard to get up on Monday, hard if you've had a hard weekend or even if you've had a restful weekend". The article in *The Age* is titled "That Monday feeling: it's a killer, researchers say".[19]

10. Friday send-offs and Monday morning greetings

Before we wrap up, it is important to say a few final words about two very Australian "salutations", both of which are commonly used throughout the continent. One of them is mentioned by Tom Dusevic, in the article quoted in our preamble. The switch from past to present tense is noteworthy (we repeat in part the excerpt reprinted above):

> Saturday and Sunday had a different rhythm. The weekend was your own
> time, the rest of the week it was the boss's. It's little wonder that the stan-
> dard Friday send-off between workmates is 'Have a good weekend'.

The same phrase, as well as variants with other adjectives such as *nice*,
great, *fantastic*, etc., are used by radio and television presenters, who often
embed them in larger, but highly routinised, discourse. The other one is
heard on Monday mornings; it is somehow surprising Dusevic didn't pick it
up. Those who, on Friday afternoon, wish one another a good weekend,
meet again on Monday and ask: "How was your weekend?" (variants: "Did
you enjoy your weekend", "Did you have a good / nice weekend?", or, ellip-
tically, "Did you have a good / nice one?").[20] It is a simple matter of creat-
ing a friendly atmosphere, a good understanding; and as in the case of that
other "greeting", *How are you?*, Australians prefer a "short and good" an-
swer given without too much enthusiasm:

> One usually avoids stating that the weekend went wrong (if indeed it did).
> But this does not mean that, alternatively, one is free to tell how absolutely
> fantastic it was (even in cases where it may have been quite special): the
> answer in fact usually amounts to variations on saying it was 'good'. (Béal
> 1992: 28)

Hence, there are typically Australian interactions such as the following
(ibid.):

> How was your weekend?
> Great.
> The wedding?
> A lot of fun.

If more detail is provided, it is usually on request – unless the detail con-
sists of fairly predictible events such as a day on the coast or in the country,
meals, barbecues, an evening spent in front of the television, etc. (Béal
1992: 30):

> How was your weekend?
> 'T was good, nice and quiet. In fact, I did nothing. We went to a party last
> night, did nothing on Friday night, all day Saturday, spent most of the day
> in bed, watched telly Saturday night, nothing yesterday. Then we went to a
> party last night, which I could have done without.

Walker (1996: 106) provides employers with a list of questions to assess
the "climate" within the company; very significantly, the first of these ques-
tions is: "When was the last time you asked your staff how they enjoyed

their weekend?" In Australian supermarkets and department stores, finally, check-out staff are likely to ask customers (whom they don't know) questions such as *How was your weekend?* or *Did you have a good weekend?*, without even the slightest interest in what really happened (for more detail, see Béal 1992 and Peeters 1999).

11. Summary

On the basis of all the data we have looked at, it seems hard to deny that the inhabitants of the "land of the long weekend" (or is it the "land of the lost weekend"?) are fascinated by the weekend and with its advent on Fridays, as further demonstrated by the polysemy, as yet unrecognised by linguists and lexicographers, of the word *weekender*, the fame of the Easybeats hit "Friday on my mind" and the existence of phrases such as *Poet's Day* and *Thank God it's Friday*. On Mondays, those fun-loving Australians suffer "Mondayitis" or else "that Monday (morning) feeling", also known in the rest of the English speaking world. All this clearly shows that the word *weekend* is a key word in Australian English, presumably more so than elsewhere. The cultural value hiding behind it, and behind all the cultural and linguistic data explored in this paper, is that of the importance of having "time off", time for oneself, time jealously guarded – as also shown by the typical parsimony of the culturally specific replies to conversational routines such as *How was your weekend?*

Notes

1. Tom Dusevic, "The lost weekend", *Good Weekend*, 5 April 1997. The name of the magazine is itself significant in a country whose people are as obsessed by the weekend as are most Australians.
2. The data used in this study were taken from various sources, including the world-wide-web, conversations with native speakers, readings and personal observation. I wish to thank the editor of this volume for correcting a handful of stylistic infelicities, as well as an anonymous reviewer for making a number of useful comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
3. Candace Sutton, "Stealing weekends from mum, dad and the kids", *The Sunday Herald*, 8 September 2002.
4. Writing in the February/March 2002 issue of *Nature & Society*, the magazine of an identically named forum based in Canberra, Wanless was guided by an

article titled "Slow cities", published in the *Canberra Times* on 8 January 2002.

5. It may be of interest to point out that, in 2004, Victoria and Tasmania were the only states where a replacement holiday for Anzac Day (the commemoration of the landing of Australian and New Zealand troops at Gallipoli, in Turkey, in the first World War), which fell on a Sunday (25 April), was *not* granted.

6. *Lucky Country* and *Clever Country* are other fairly widely used expressions referring to Australia. The former is the creation of historian Donald Horne (Horne 1964) and was meant to be ironical – until it started on a life of its own. The latter is due to Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke and goes back to the 1990 election campaign.

7. Cf. Paul Robinson, "Tired? You're at work longer", *The Age*, 8 October 2001; Frank Devine, "Overemphasis on overwork is a waste of time", *The Australian*, 29 November 2001.

8. The call for reassessment of current thinking can take a broader perspective, as in the following excerpt (Christopher Pearson, "Enemies at our doorstep", *The Weekend Australian*, 20 March 2004): "For years Australia has been a target for Islamic terrorists. Yet the surprise and outrage evident in last week's letters to the editor suggest that the lessons of Bali have not been learned and that the land of the long weekend lives on in the infantilised minds of many."

9. *The concise Australian National Dictionary* (Hughes 1992) defines *sickie* as "a day's sick leave; esp. as taken without sufficient medical reason". *The dinkum dictionary of Aussie English* (Antill-Rose 1990) goes even further: a *sickie* is described as "a day taken off work with pay because of illness, but more likely to go to the beach or the tennis". It is possible to be "too crook to take a sickie": "You don't want to waste a sick day by being at home in bed ill, you might just as well go to work" (ibid.).

10. There is a third way to define the week: in daily usage, one often talks about what one has done during the week, i.e. during the *working* week, from Monday to Friday.

11. The success of these talks is not guaranteed: "In a nutshell, we only did this once or twice. I think people are working such long hours these days that they just want to get home to family and friends rather than spend any more time at work than they have to" (Brian Spies, personal communication).

12. The *Thank God it's Friday* event organised by the South Tweed Bowls Club (The Tweed Coast, New South Wales) runs from 2 to 3.30 pm. In Wollongong (same state), there is a duo which visits all the pubs etc. in the region; their name is the Thank God it's Friday Duo. In Sydney, between 1993 and 1996, there was a branch of that world famous club of running drinkers or drinking runners called the Sydney TGIF Hash House Harriers. In Mel-

bourne's South Yarra, there is a pub called TGIF (not to be confused with the American fast food restaurant chain TGI Friday's, which has branches throughout Victoria and at Melbourne international airport).

13. Not to be confused with an instrumental piece of the Boola Boola Band (Gippsland, Victoria) called "Poet's day, smash the windows". This piece was written one Friday evening (Brian Strating, personal communication) and ends with the noise of breaking glass.

14. On the word *weekender*, see Section 3.

15. Australian poet Henry Lawson, author of a poem called *When I was king*, "will be king for the day". American poet Robert Frost, author of a poem called *After apple-picking*, "is out picking apples". American poet W.H. Auden, who was a stretcher-bearer during the civil war in Spain, is "stretching around in Spain". Australian poet Les Murray "writes a preamble" (a reference to the highly controversial preamble to a revised Australian constitution which he wrote in 1999 at the request of prime minister John Howard; the text was voted down shortly after in a national referendum). Etc.

16. What the salesman didn't know, and what I would only find out when checking through my notes, later that afternoon, was that I had made a mistake. The song I should have questioned him about was called *Poet's Day*, whereas *Mondayitis* is the title of a poem by Australian poet Kerry Scuffins (see below).

17. I am aware of one reference in the German-speaking Swiss press: the *St. Galler Tagblatt* of 2 October 2000 first uses the word *Mondayitis*, defines it, then translates it as *Montagitis* (cf. Feine 2003: 439).

18. Worth a mention, even though there is no link whatsoever with anything that has been said before: the existence of an Australian film production company called Mondayitis Productions Pty Ltd.

19. Cf. also Hassed, "Work, rest and play", *Australian family physician* 31, (2002: 565): "It has been known for some time that Monday mornings are the peak period for heart attacks but, it seems, this is only among the working population. It is also the peak time for strokes. (...) One study of general practice referrals also found a peak in cardiovascular events on Mondays and, interestingly, an increase in incidence of headaches on Tuesdays. Perhaps this was the hangover from Monday? So, it seems, there may be much wisdom in the commonly held view that people suffer from what we call 'Mondayitis'."

20. I am reluctant to call these phrases *formulae*, even though this would increase consistency and strengthen links with other papers in this volume (as pointed out by the anonymous reviewer). Within NSM semantics, the term *formula* is primarily used to refer to semantic explications relying on the lexicon and the grammar of the natural semantic metalanguage (cf. Section 4). In the end, a decision was made to avoid the term *formula* altogether, irrespective of its meaning.

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Enjoy!: The (phraseological) culture of having fun[1]

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1. Introduction

Since culture, like numerous other aspects of reality, is not given but perpetually and actively construed through language, it reveals itself in language. In the attempt to understand the culture of a society, one well-established approach is to focus on the vocabulary of its language with its dual function of reflecting and (due to its conceptualizing and hypostatizing power) also defining the cultural concepts of a society. Both functions are crucial in the establishment and, through perpetual adjustment and alignment, reinforcement of the system of ideological beliefs and values, which constitutes the society's cultural identity. In this paper, we focus on the cultural concept of (*having*) *fun* by investigating the usage of the related cultural keyword *enjoy* in corpora of US-American and British English. Of course, single words only reveal their cultural significance when seen not in isolation but as part of a lexico-semantic network of words. Rather than focusing on *enjoy* as a single word, we therefore focus on its textual environment in order to investigate its distributional patterns.[2] This procedure can tell us whether or not lexical expressions with *enjoy* serve as a kind of key to specific aspects of a fun-related ideology in US-American and British cultures.

We believe that to adopt such an extra-cultural position is generally a promising approach to our understanding of how intra-cultural patterns are encoded. The premise behind this approach is, of course, that the relevant social norms and thought patterns are culture-specific rather than universally shared (cf. Wierzbicka 1992). Anyone who is familiar with everyday life in the USA knows that the phrase *Enjoy your meal / visit / trip!* or the bare imperative *Enjoy!* are quite common, particularly in casual, informal communication, but also in some types of written texts (cf. below). For the outside observer, these forms appear to be somewhat unusual, not only from a grammatical but even more so from a pragmatic and socio-cultural point of view. Unlike other stative verbs such as *have* in *Have a nice day / weekend / journey!*, the verb *enjoy* allows the imperative even in those cases

(*Enjoy*!) in which it is used intransitively (but cf. **Have!*). Other grammatical and distributional characteristics (including colligation and collocation) will be inspected in detail below.

From a pragmatic point of view, expressions with *enjoy* are generally regarded as a pronounced feature of polite interaction. This needs explaining in view of the fact that both their preferred form, the imperative, and their functional use mark them as directive speech acts. They are thus slightly questionable with respect to their true politeness value in terms of the potential face-threat they present. No matter how well-meant, telling someone *to enjoy* (something or themselves) can be understood as an intrusion into the recipient's right to self-determination. After all, an individual's well-being, happiness or enjoyment is a decidedly private matter. Expressions with *Enjoy ...!* differ from other directive conversational routines (also in imperative form) such as *Help yourself!* in that they are not a means of guiding a person's normal participation in social interaction. Instead, they direct the recipient to achieve a status of *enjoyment* or *happiness*, a condition that, as a rule, cannot be achieved willingly, as the outcome of a decision. Only if we assume that in cultures in which *Enjoy ...!* is routinely used, happiness, fun or, indeed, enjoyment are not regarded as private and optional matters but as public and obligatory assets, can we explain the directive function (as well as the imperative form) of *enjoy*. In a culture in which it is expected and even taken for granted that people wish to enjoy something or themselves, to be happy, to have fun, such concepts are regarded as essential and beneficial. Under this assumption, the directive *enjoy ...!* is easily explained not as a face-threatening request benefiting the speaker but, on the contrary, as a wish which benefits and thus actually promotes the recipient's positive face or sense of well-being.[3]

To corroborate this hypothesis, the obvious first step is to find out what exactly *can be enjoyed* or, rather, *what* people are usually *told to enjoy*. To this end, we will analyse not only the collocates of *enjoy* but also its semantic preference below.

Our investigation will focus on the immediate phraseological and distributional environment of *enjoy* both in US American and British English. The currently available general corpora with their broad spectrum of sources and genres can rightly be considered as "windows on our culture", as Mike McCarthy recently pointed out.[4] Taking up his suggestion, we perused and juxtaposed corpora of British and American English in order to get access to the two societies' entrenched cultural patterns. Since it turned out that the subcorpora of spoken everyday casual conversation in both varieties (in

our data) are not large enough to provide a representative sample, it was necessary to turn to and thus to limit the analysis of *enjoy* to an examination of its usage in the 'ephemera' subcorpora of UK and US English, which are made up of a variety of persuasive texts (mostly related to public relations and advertisement, cf. below).

2. Methodology

Our data is taken from the British English (UK) and American English (US) subcorpora of the *Bank of English*.[5] In order to identify most of the relevant usages of *enjoy* that we were interested in, we searched first for (a) *Enjoy* (in sentence initial position) in the base form following either punctuation and blank space or punctuation without blank space, (b) *enjoy* (in mid-sentence and clause initial position) in the base form following either punctuation and blank space or punctuation without blank space. In total, this search found 1,007 occurrences in the UK subcorpus and 420 occurrences in the US subcorpus (which is smaller than the UK corpus). We then went through all of the concordance lines manually, identifying those that were (most probably) used as imperatives, and excluding identical and quasi-identical lines. The final result were 693 occurrences in the UK subcorpus, compared to 338 occurrences in the US subcorpus.

However, *enjoy* was not distributed equally among the various subcorpora of both UK and US English. In fact, the only subcorpora that yielded enough occurrences in both varieties for a thorough linguistic analysis were the ephemera subcorpora, which, according to Ramesh Krishnamurthy (p.c.), are made up of a large variety of texts from pamphlets, catalogues, newsletters, leaflets, and brochures (mostly public relations material and advertisements) from different sources (e.g. banks, post offices, museums, tourist sites, community groups, etc.).[6] As mentioned above, it was therefore necessary to limit the analysis of *enjoy* to an examination of its usage in these subcorpora. An additional search for *or enjoy* and *and enjoy* was then executed to yield more occurrences of *enjoy* used as a directive. The final result for the distribution of directive *enjoy* was as follows: 172 occurrences in the UK ephemera corpus vs. 306 occurrences in the US ephemera corpus. This result is surprising if we consider that the UK ephemera corpus (4,640,529 words) is in fact *bigger* than the US ephemera corpus (3,506,272 words). Some hypotheses concerning this finding will be advanced below.

In order to show how people use *enjoy* to routinely talk about a significant cultural aspect of their social life, and thus as a cultural keyword, we have to move from lexis to grammar, or rather, following Neo-Firthean linguistics, to an inter-level between lexis and grammar. Accordingly, we will focus on syntactically and semantically dependent co-occurrence patterns with *enjoy*, which have been described in different, though related ways, within lexico-grammatical theories (such as word grammar, construction grammar, pattern grammar etc.). Following them, we will now explore the colligation, semantic preference and collocation of *enjoy* in some detail.

3. Colligation

3.1. Overview

Colligation is defined by Sinclair as "the co-occurrence of grammatical phenomena" (2004: 142) and has similarities with the "patterns" identified by Hunston and Francis (2000) and the "schemas" analyzed by Stubbs (2001). A first glance shows that the different types of recurrent syntactic structures, i.e. the colligational patterns of *enjoy* are not distributed equally across the two subcorpora of UK and US English, as shown in table 1 below.

Without taking into account those structures which are too infrequent to be representative, it looks as if there is a preference in the UK corpus for the pattern *enjoy + the +* NP (41.9%), followed by *enjoy + a/an +* NP (20.9%), *enjoy +* NP (20.3%), and *enjoy +* unpremodified NP (8.7%). In the US corpus, on the other hand, the most frequently used patterns are *enjoy +* NP (35.3%), followed by *enjoy + the +* NP (26.5%), *enjoy + a/an +* NP (14%) and *enjoy +* unpremodified NP (13.7%) (see figure 1 below).

The first conclusion to be drawn from this comparison is that UK persuasive texts and specifically advertisements clearly favour definite noun phrases (*the +* NP), whereas in the US corpus premodified noun phrases without the definite article seem to be preferred. In order to explore the differences between the two corpora further, let us look at these colligational structures in more detail, focusing on their evaluative potential (which is, of course, the core function of the texts in the corpora: to evaluate the advertised products positively).[7]

Table 1. Colligational patterns

Pattern	UK (172 occurrences)	US (306 occurrences)
enjoy + Ø	5 = 2.9%	12 = 3.9%
enjoy + *yourself/ves*	3 = 1.7%	1 = 0.3%
enjoy + (premod/det) numeral	4 = 2.3%	19 = 6.2%
enjoy + *a/an* + noun phrase (NP)	36 = 20.9%	43 = 14%
enjoy + *the* + noun phrase (NP)	72 = 41.9%	81 = 26.5%
enjoy + unpremodified noun phrase (NP) consisting of a proper/common noun, *ing*-form or pronoun	15 = 8.7%	42 = 13.7%
Enjoy + noun phrase (NP)[8]	35 = 20.3%	108 = 35.3%
all	1 = 0.6%	8 = 2.6%
our	3 = 1.7	12 = 3.9%
its	2 = 1.2%	–
his	–	1= 0.3%
their	–	6 = 2%
your	3 = 1.7%	7 = 2.3%
that / this / these	4 = 2.3%	6 = 2%
Other (*some*, *no*, *every*)	2 = 1.2%	4 = %
adjective as premodifier	15 = 8.7%	49 = 16%
noun as premodifier	2 = 1.2%	13 = 4.2%
s- genitive as premodifier	3 = 1.7%	2 = 0.6%
and enjoy	87 = 50.6%	82 = 26.8%
or enjoy	10 = 5.8%	4 = 1.3%
Other	2 = 1.2%	–

Figure 1. Frequent colligational patterns in the AE and BE ephemera subcorpora

3.2. *Enjoy + the + NP*

In the UK subcorpus there are 72 occurrences of the pattern *enjoy + the + NP*. Of these, 56.9% (41 occurrences) are explicitly evaluative, using either contextually evaluative adjective + noun combinations (where either the adjective or noun or both are contextually evaluative) or the evaluative pattern *the* + (adj) + evaluative noun + *of* (21 occurrences). Here are some examples:

estate to industrial city. **Enjoy** the colourful brilliance of
italise those weary parts! **Enjoy** the natural beauty of this area and
o include this wonderland. **Enjoy** the freedom of this kind of
for more than 3,750 miles. **Enjoy** the splendour of the Forbidden City
esh with its edible seeds. **Enjoy** the delicate flavour sliced into
on, you take to the skies! **Enjoy** the magical scenery as you fly
lax on the large sun deck, **enjoy** the golden scenery drifting by, and
ohn Thaw in Home to Roost, **enjoy** the gentle humour of David Jason in
and and spectacular girls. **Enjoy** the electric atmosphere of a

The occurrences that are not as explicitly and clearly evaluative (43.1%) in systemic-functional terms either name the (object of a mental process or) "phenomenon" (Halliday 1994: 117) to enjoy, or pick out a certain aspect of it (*the* + noun + *of*). Compare:

ulous châteaux all around: **enjoy** the atmosphere of floodlit Saumur
p> And that's all for now. **Enjoy** the catalog and thanks for choosing
piste to discover locally. **Enjoy** the après-ski and sample the warm,
eet your favourite author. **Enjoy** the company of your friends over
een a feature at Culpeper. **Enjoy** the HERB HAMPER, a fine basket
oks xamp; gifts available. **Enjoy** the exhibitions on show and refresh
ic Olympic Schwimmhalle or **enjoy** the music of the street performers
<p> <p> Or just relax and **enjoy** the view! <!--photo--> <!--map-->

In the US subcorpus, the distribution is very similar: 55.5% of the occurrences of this pattern are explicitly (contextually) evaluative, compared to 44.4% of instances that are not. However, the evaluative pattern (*the + evaluative noun + of*), that is quite frequent in the UK corpus (representing 29.1% of all occurrences within this colligational pattern), is in fact rather infrequent in the US corpus (12 occurrences, or 14.8%, e.g. *the convenience of, the delights of, the ease of, the enchantment of*). There are, however, 33 occurrences of contextually evaluative adjective + noun combinations, for instance:

D over polenta or risotto. **Enjoy** the exceptional taste with Pinot
a wireless remote control. **Enjoy** the soothing treatment of a rolling
t. <p> VACATION EVERY DAY! **Enjoy** the beautiful ocean views from this
D rock walls of the caves. **Enjoy** the beautiful Caribbean sunset as
ately old captains' homes. **Enjoy** the panoramic views of Chilmark and
uarters for entertainment. **Enjoy** the relaxing Intermezzo Lounge,
rries. Or 100% pure cocoa. **Enjoy** the fresh home-made flavor, to your
may be available earlier. **Enjoy** the many wonderful resort

Thus, it seems as if evaluation by means of the evaluative noun + *of* pattern is more popular in the UK corpus than in the US corpus. In other words, in the British English ephemera corpus evaluation is preferably expressed through the head of a definite noun phrase (*the beauty of the mountains*), rather than through the premodifier(s) of a definite noun phrase (*the beautiful mountains*). The effect of this is difficult to pinpoint. When expressed as head, the evaluation seems to shift its focus slightly away from the target object (*mountains*) to the evaluative noun (*beauty*). This has to do with the well-known concept-defining function of lexemes together with the specific cognitive function of nouns to reify and hypostatize highly complex fragments of reality as *gestalt*-like entrenched concepts. The result of reification and hypostatization is that a category is called into existence not only

as an autonomous and neatly-bounded entity but also as a set of essential properties. Premodification with an adjective, on the other hand, is less stable and much more transitory. Thus, preferring the noun *beauty* as the head of the noun phrase *the beauty of the mountains* to the premodifying adjective *beautiful* in *the beautiful mountains* is a subtle but effective way of foregrounding the existence of the concept *beauty* (thereby weakening the relation to its scope, *the mountains*). The positive evaluation of *mountains* seems to be moderately 'stronger' when carried by a premodifier. The following analyses of the other patterns with *enjoy* will reveal that the tendency to prefer 'stronger' forms of evaluation is, in fact, a characteristic trait of US persuasive texts.

3.3. *Enjoy* + NP

Examining the next pattern (*enjoy* + premodifier etc. + noun) in more detail we see that, although this pattern is more frequent in the US corpus, the difference in terms of the evaluation expressed by this pattern is minimal:

Table 2.   Enjoy + premodifer etc. + NP

	UK (35)	**US** (108)
evaluation	19 = 54.3%	64 = 59.3%
	e.g.	e.g.
	cheaper, higher, total, stunning, splendid, superb, benefits	*greater, superior, full, splendid, breathtaking, spectacular, benefits, pleasures, beauty*
mention of phenomenon (no explicit evaluation)[9]	16 = 45.7%	44 = 40.7%
	e.g.	e.g.
	traditional and contemporary music, this brochure, that meal, its scenery	*Members-only discounts, emergency cash, German music and dancing, nightly entertainment*

In both subcorpora this pattern is used predominantly to evaluate the phenomena to be enjoyed with the help of comparative, intensifying or evaluative adjectives (rather than nouns), in contrast to simply mentioning the phenomena. This tendency is even higher in the US subcorpus.

3.4. *Enjoy + a/an* + NP

As to the pattern involving indefinite noun phrases, we found that in the UK subcorpus (36 occurrences) a majority of such instances simply mention the phenomenon to enjoy (20 occurrences or 55.5%), in contrast to explicitly evaluative patterns (16 occurrences or 44.4%). In the US subcorpus (43 occurrences), on the other hand, mention of the phenomenon is only a little more frequent (23 occurrences or 53.5%) than evaluative patterns (20 occurrences or 46.5 %). Here are some examples:

explicitly evaluative patterns

itional Italian ice cream, **enjoy** a mouth watering array of cakes and (UK)
l and apply to your teeth. **Enjoy** a pleasant, tingling, cleaning (UK)
s that look down on Veosc. **Enjoy** a leisurely drink on the pleasant (UK)
l anchor in a remote cove; **enjoy** a refreshing swim in the crystal- (US)
exico. Drive to Chihuahua. **Enjoy** a festive welcome dinner. \<p> Hotel (US)
y kinds of fruit and nuts. **Enjoy** a lovely walk of ornamentals, an (US)

mention of phenomenon

TASTED, NEVER FORGOTTEN. **Enjoy** a plate of moules in a quayside (UK)
immense, clear blue lakes. **Enjoy** a picnic in a flower-filled Alpine (UK)
rchase. \<p> Come along and **enjoy** a chat with friends and take pa (UK)
t" hot and cold salad bar. **Enjoy** a lunch buffet Monday through (US)
Radisson Hotels Worldwide. **Enjoy** a weekend for two at any of the (US)
ure. In the early evening, **enjoy** a trishaw ride for a close look at (US)

In this pattern the tendency that was observed in 3.3. is thus repeated, and more explicit evaluation is present in the US corpus than in the UK corpus.[10]

3.5. *Enjoy* + noun (*ing*-form / pronoun)

The final pattern which is examined in more detail concerns the co-occurrence of *enjoy* with a noun, an *ing*-form or a pronoun. The following table shows the distribution of this pattern in the two corpora:

Table 3.   Enjoy + noun / *-ing*-form / pronoun

	UK (15)	US (42)
noun	4 (Things) = 26.6%	30 (Things) = 71.4%
	e.g.	e.g.
	The Changing show, *Hythe's Victorian Pier*, *plays*, *sessions*	*dinner*, *upgrades*, *espresso*
ing-form/clause	6 (mental and physical activities) = 40%	9 (mental and physical activities) = 21.4%
	e.g.	e.g.
	star-gazing, *cycling*, *exploring*, *knowing*	*choosing*, *comparing*, *feeding*
pronoun	5 (cohesive) = 33.3%	3 (cohesive) = 7.1%
	them (1), *it* (4)	*it* (3)

Although the occurrences in the UK corpus are rather too infrequent to allow general conclusions, it appears as if identification by means of nouns is more important in this pattern in the US than in the UK persuasive types of text. Since nouns usually refer to 'things' in the corpus, rather than to 'activities' this suggests that the US corpus contains more references to commodities that can be enjoyed rather than to activities (which may be interpreted as pointing to a more 'passive' consumer-recipient in the US than in the UK, a conclusion, however, which, due to a lack of a representative amount of data, is sheer surmise). In the UK corpus this colligational pattern is only used once in connection with evaluation (*enjoy knowing its **exceptional** value*), whereas all other occurrences are used for identification. In the US corpus six of 42 instances are evaluative (14.3%), compared to 36 that are not (85.6%). Again, the tendency for more explicit evaluation in the US corpus is confirmed.

3.6. Other tendencies

There are other tendencies, not yet mentioned, that differentiate the UK corpus from the US corpus, among them a much higher tendency in the UK corpus for the pattern *and enjoy* (representing 50.6% versus 26.8% of all occurrences of *enjoy*) (and also for *or enjoy*, but here the occurrences are too infrequent to warrant any general conclusions). This pattern will be explored below, however, since it has more to do with collocation than with colligation. The following differences can only be stated tentatively, because the occurrences are below 20.

Firstly, it appears that there is a preference for the pattern *enjoy* + (pre-modified) numeral in the US corpus (19 occurrences in contrast to just four in the UK corpus). Within this pattern there is a distinction between the use of exact numbers (1, 5, 2, 100, 13, 12, 16, 16, 20, 8, 5, 6, 13, 5.9) and the use of approximations (2-3, thousands, over 330, more than 250):[11]

<div align="center">

seum. That's right… **enjoy** one year's worth of programming,
eave the beaten path, and **enjoy** one of the world's most specta
ll-color catalog today and **enjoy** $5.00 off first order. The Fish
amous. Visit a cabaret and **enjoy** two cocktails of your choice while
t the loss immediately and **enjoy** 100% protection. <p> 10)
The Toronto Star today and **enjoy** 13 weeks of seven-day home delivery
variety puzzle enthusiast! **Enjoy** 12 issues each of Variety Puzzles &
ords, and only crosswords. **Enjoy** 16 crossword puzzle magazines for
an Boat or an Antique Car. **Enjoy** 16 wonderfully themed rides and
INGS on days of low tides. **Enjoy** 2-3 hours of tidepool exploration,
e on retirement <p> zbull; **Enjoy** 20% off your first discount
cipes and much, much more! **Enjoy** 8 issues (1 YR). <!--photo-->
ss Bay Ecological Reserve. **Enjoy** thousands of puffins as they dive,
ople in 50 countries. Now, **enjoy** five new episodes in the career of
ndependent amusement park. **Enjoy** six themed areas of exciting rides,
ones, play mini-golf xamp; **enjoy** 13 rides including Sawmill,
an merchandise. <p> zbull; **Enjoy** a 5.9% Introductory Annual
est cryptogram value ever! **Enjoy** over 330 coded quotes and clever
dtangle&trade # <p> zbull; **Enjoy** more than 250 included puzzles that
work in both p

</div>

Secondly, there is a preference for structures with *all* (*of / the*) in the US-corpus (8 occurrences in contrast to just one occurrence in the UK corpus). Here are some examples:

<div align="center">

pply for your new card and **enjoy** all of these preferred cardholders
informed with Basic Cable. **Enjoy** all of the top-rated shows
unsets, easy beach access. **Enjoy** all of life's best in this 5 yr
Tyrol Plus club member and **enjoy** all the benefits! Also take
< on Chocolate Perfume and **enjoy** all the pleasures of this wonderful
added resistance and fun. **Enjoy** all the exercises you perform on
s. <p> But while a member, **enjoy** all the benefits of Club
of glistening city lights. **Enjoy** all this and more on our favorite

</div>

All probably works as a marker of intensity (Labov 1984) in such examples, and is used to heighten the positive evaluation expressed in the texts, in order to make them even more persuasive.

Thirdly, the phrase *enjoy yourself/yourselves* is more frequent in the UK than in the US subcorpus (1.7% versus 0.3%). This is a tendency that can also be observed across other registers, as becomes apparent from the following list of the most frequent occurrences for *enjoy yourself/yourselves* in the subcorpora of the *Bank of English*:

enjoy yourself/yourselves		
corpus	**frequency**	
brephem (BE ephemera)	3.0 per million	
brspok (BE spoken discourse)	1.5 per million	
brmags (BE magazines)	1.4 per million	British English
brbooks (BE books)	1.3 per million	varieties
sunnow (*The Sun*, *News of the World*)	1.2 per million	
usephem (AE ephemera)	1.1 per million	American English
usbooks (AE books)	0.9 per million	varieties
indy (*The Independent*)	0.7 per million	British English
times (*The Times*)	0.5 per million	varieties

Thus, it appears as if the higher frequency of *enjoy yourself/yourselves* as a directive in the British ephemera subcorpus simply reflects a general difference between American and British English (cf. Mittmann 2004 for a general comparison of prefabs in American and British spoken English).

Finally, *enjoy + our* and *enjoy + your* occur more often in the US subcorpus than in the UK subcorpus (3.9% vs. 1.7%), possibly pointing to a more personalised style of American advertising, though this also must remain a hypothesis.[12]

3.7. Summary

If we bring together the aforementioned findings and compare the two subcorpora both in terms of colligational patterns and in terms of the evaluation that is expressed, the picture looks as follows:

Table 4.   Colligational patterns and evaluation

	Explicitly evaluative		Mention of phenomenon	
	UK	US	UK	US
enjoy + *the* + NP	41	45	31	36
enjoy + NP	19	64	16	44
enjoy + *a/an* + NP	16	20	20	23
enjoy + (unpremod) NP	1	6	14	36
Other	1	9	13	23
All	78 = 45.3%	144 = 47.1%	94 = 54.7%	162 = 52.9%

As becomes evident from this table, the *proportions* in both corpora are roughly similar: there are more instances of *enjoy* which are *not* accompanied by explicit evaluation in the immediate context. This finding supports Gieszinger's conclusion that "[a]dvertisers now tend to illustrate the characteristics of products and services in detail instead of prescribing their evaluation" (2001: 155). However, because this analysis was limited to analysing concordance lines, there may still be evaluation present in the wider context, as in the following examples from the US corpus (evaluation underlined):

> ity's illuminated skyline. **Enjoy** dinner in a restaurant in Chinatown and stroll through its <u>bustling picturesque</u> streets

> select fresh vegetables. **Enjoy** dinner as the train rolls through Cape Cod's <u>picturesque</u> countryside

> <u>Wonderful</u> home w/<u>superb</u> curb appeal. Lg fenced backyard. **Enjoy** hardwood floors w/carpeting plus

In any case, the above numbers suggest that, as far as *enjoy* and evaluation in general are concerned, UK and US persuasive texts can be said to be very similar indeed, although there is a slightly but noticeably higher tendency for explicit evaluation in the US corpus. Judging from the distribution of the colligational environment of *enjoy*, to speak of a very similar or even common Anglo-American culture of persuasion does not seem to be too far-fetched, even though the actual *instantiation* of evaluation through colligational patterns varies to some degree, as we have seen above. To sum up the major differences again:

— There are considerably more instances of *enjoy!* in the US corpus than in the UK corpus;
— BE and AE prefer different patterns of evaluation:
  — BE: *enjoy + the + NP > enjoy + a/an + NP > enjoy + NP > enjoy + unpremodified NP*
  — AE: *enjoy + NP > enjoy + the + NP > enjoy + a/an + NP > enjoy + unpremodified NP*;
— within these patterns there are occasional differences concerning the sub-patterns preferred (the pattern *the* + evaluative noun + *of* seems more popular in BE whereas AE seems to prefer *enjoy + all*);
— BE also has a much higher frequency of the patterns *and enjoy* and *enjoy yourself/yourselves* whereas the patterns *enjoy* + numeral and *enjoy + our/your* are more frequent in AE.

4.   Semantic preference

4.1. *Fun* and *profit*

After examining in detail the colligational patterns of *enjoy* in the two corpora we shall now comment on its *semantic preference*. This is defined here as a purely collocational phenomenon: the term *semantic preference* refers to the (probabilistic) tendency of certain units of meaning to co-occur with items from the same semantic sub-set, "items which share a semantic feature, for example that they are all about, say, sport or suffering" (Sinclair 2004: 142).[13] The term is thus employed to identify a *specific kind of collocation*, and can easily be observed by extensive corpus analyses. For example, *suffer* collocates with lexical items expressing illness, pain, or unpleasant situations (cf. COBUILD).

   In order to identify the semantic preference of *enjoy* we have sorted all concordance lines according to the first right-hand collocate, i.e. the phenomenon that we are told to enjoy. But note that what we are told to enjoy is often a series of things. In both sub-corpora, the majority of Phenomena can then be grouped into four big categories: Food, Entertainment (music, theatre, games, sports, shopping …), Travel (trips, places, views, nature …) and Savings / Profits.[14] Some examples are given in the table below:

Table 5. Semantic preference of *enjoy*

Food

    exico. Drive to Chihuahua. **Enjoy** <u>a festive welcome dinner</u>. <p> Hotel (US)

    t" hot and cold salad bar. **Enjoy** <u>a lunch buffet</u> Monday through (US)

    aticket Highway, Falmouth. **Enjoy** <u>the very best pastries</u>, gourmet and (US)

    E Cod village of Sandwich. **Enjoy** <u>dinner for two</u> for only $12.00 with (US)

    ship sailing at 18.00hrs. **Enjoy** <u>a five-course dinner</u> and then relax (UK)

    to a sumptuous meal and **enjoy** <u>a drink</u> in one of the 14 Sept (UK)

    best French cuisine and **enjoy** <u>the finest wines</u>. <!--hours--> (UK)

    ompartment overnight and **enjoy** <u>breakfast</u> as we head north over (UK)

Entertainment

    n Boat or an Antique Car. **Enjoy** <u>16 wonderfully themed rides</u> and (US)

    yllacrostics Fans&ellips; **Enjoy** <u>a whole book of the puzzles</u> you (US)

    d His Dream Castles Book. **Enjoy** <u>the fantasy world of this storybook</u> (US)

    <p> German Alps Festival. **Enjoy** <u>German music and dancing</u>, food and (US)

    <!-- Come down to mac and **enjoy** <u>a range of children's entertainment</u> (UK)

    ks xamp; gifts available. **Enjoy** <u>the exhibitions on show</u> and refresh (UK)

    production of artefacts, **enjoy** <u>traditional and contemporary music</u>, (UK)

    r Copthorne Aberdeen and **enjoy** <u>a week-end fishing for wild salmon</u> (UK)

Travel

    onial El Fuerte. <p> squf; **Enjoy** <u>a cruise on Topolobampo Bay</u> in the (US)

    inch # Have 3 children. **Enjoy** <u>the beach</u>, movies, great wine etc. (US)

    VACATION EVERY DAY! **Enjoy** <u>the beautiful ocean views</u> from this (US)

    live show. Come aboard, **enjoy** <u>New York harbor</u>. <p> Established (US)

    Traditional gypsy caravan. **Enjoy** <u>the Cotswold scenery</u> in the company (UK)

    oining Natural Trust land. **Enjoy** <u>unspoilt countryside</u> and coastline (UK)

    and Colwyn Bay ... or **enjoy** <u>the Victorian elegance of Llandudno</u> (UK)

    ograph or simply relax and **enjoy** <u>the beautiful mountainscapes</u>. (UK)

Savings / Profits

    h non-deductible interest. **Enjoy** <u>the savings</u> from lower interest (US)

    spending, **enjoy** <u>retail savings</u> that help stretch (US)

    onger you remain a member. **Enjoy** <u>savings of up to 70%</u> off the music (US)

    each selection. <h> Plus, **enjoy** <u>extra bonuses and savings</u>. </h> <p> (US)

    hases! <p> REI Adventures: **Enjoy** <u>reduced land rates</u> on trips by REI' (US)

    cription of just £2.99 and **enjoy** <u>even more competitive rates</u> for (UK)

    £5.20 or £7.80 weekly and **enjoy** <u>higher cash benefits</u>. <h> One (UK)

    r person! <p> This Spring, **enjoy** <u>up to 40% off</u> published rates at (UK)

    spending each month -- and **enjoy** <u>up to 46 days interest free</u> (UK)

With respect to the semantic preference of *enjoy* there are no clear differences between the UK and US corpus so that we can again speak of a com-

common Anglo-American culture of persuasive writing. Besides the fact that the findings naturally reflect corpus compilation (i.e. what has been put in the corpus), there are several observations that can be made concerning the semantic preference of *enjoy* for both corpora.

Firstly, the data highlight the importance of food in the Anglo-American world. Normal, plain food, however, often does not do: it must be *terrific, the very best, exceptional, great, authentic, classic, outstanding, unique, superb, delicious, mouthwatering, delicate, best, good, sizzling, tasty, the finest* or in abundance (*huge portions of, a whole pound of*). Such exaggerated characterization can be seen as a reflection of a real or merely ostensible state of lavish affluence, which is difficult to envisage in certain communities of the developing world. It also considers *food* not as a normal, though vitally essential resource of human life (cf. German *Lebensmittel*) but it re-conceptualizes it as the object of a special, fun-connected activity.

Secondly, the phenomena in the *entertainment* category reflect the whole gamut of accepted pastimes in the Western world: arts, music, theatre, books (including catalogues, brochures), exhibitions, shows, parties, games, sports, shopping etc. But the semantic preferences of *enjoy* in our data also clearly reveal that in the Anglo-American cultures shopping is conceptualised as a pastime similar to the more traditional and less consumption-oriented activities such as sports and games. In this sense the persuasive use of *enjoy* might again be argued to promote an egocentric ideology of having fun, which is, furthermore, totally ethnocentric, because it promotes "consumption in a world which needs to save resources, and the acquisition of personal wealth in a global society which desperately needs fairer distribution" (Cook 1992: 199).

Thirdly, the phenomena in the *travel* category mostly refer to the (natural) scenery: what people can *see* (rather than *do*). The majority of travel advertisements here are not targeted on the 'active' tourist; there are only very few occurrences that imply the tourist's activity and some of these are even weakened (*enjoy sightseeing, shopping and a rest stop*; *enjoy a spot of easy beachcombing*).[15] There is also often a focus on the service that is provided (*a scheduled flight, easy-to-use maps, a welcome reception, choosing between, expanded lower deck with pool, huge pool* etc.), geared towards the addressees' well-being.

Fourthly, in the *savings and profits* category, *enjoy* is used in a different sense and appears to be largely delexicalised. Whereas you can certainly enjoy food, entertainment and nature (in the sense that you can more or less

actively consume them), it is questionable whether you can 'enjoy' savings in the same sense. To explain the difference in the usage of *enjoy*, we have to look at its different meanings.

4.2. *Enjoy doing* and *enjoy having*

Of the three definitions of *enjoy* given in COBUILD, *enjoy* in the *savings and profits* contexts is used in sense 3:

---

enjoy
1 enjoy enjoys enjoying enjoyed
> If you **enjoy** something, you find pleasure and satisfaction in doing or experiencing it.
> *Ross had always enjoyed the company of women.*
> *He was a guy who enjoyed life to the full.*
> *I enjoyed playing cricket.*
> VB

---

2 enjoy enjoys enjoying enjoyed
> If you **enjoy** yourself, you do something that you like doing or you take pleasure in the situation that you are in.
> *I must say I am really enjoying myself at the moment.*
> VB

---

3 enjoy enjoys enjoying enjoyed
> If you **enjoy** something such as a right, benefit, or privilege, you have it. (FORMAL)
> *The average German will enjoy 40 days' paid holiday this year.*
> *He enjoys a reputation for honesty.*
> VB

Some of the 'service' examples of *enjoy* in the travel category are probably also employed in sense 3. However, it is not always unequivocally clear whether *enjoy* is used in sense 1 or in sense 3, as there seems to be a cline of meaning involved. Let us look at these dictionary definitions in more detail. As far as their colligational patterns are concerned, *enjoy* 2 is clearly different from both *enjoy* 1 and *enjoy* 3, whereas *enjoy* 1 and *enjoy* 3 in fact share one pattern, namely Vn (verb followed by a noun phrase):

> **enjoy 1**: Vn, V-*ing*, V *it when / if*, general *it* as object
> **enjoy 2**: V pron-refl
> **enjoy 3**: Vn
> (Francis et al. 1996)

Perhaps this pattern-sharing is one possible explanation for the cline in meaning from *enjoy* 1 to *enjoy* 3. From the data we know that there are only two types of phenomena that are enjoyed: those that *people can do*, and those that *people can have*. As to the first type (sense 1 and, to a certain extent, sense 2 in COBUILD), it is evident that when we say that people enjoy a state or event (or even a thing), we do not mean that they enjoy them as such (i.e., *as* states etc.) but that they enjoy *doing* them as in *enjoy dancing* or *fishing*. In those examples in which the act is not encoded in the form of the object (as with the gerunds *dancing* or *fishing*), we have to supplement an action verb in order to specify the way the subject *participates* in the state or event denoted by the object. Hence, to *enjoy pastries* or *wine* is to *enjoy eating pastries* or *drinking wines*, to *enjoy a book* or *music* is to *enjoy reading a book* or *listening to music*, and to *enjoy the beach* or *scenery* is to *enjoy visiting / staying at the beach* or *looking at the scenery*. In this reading of *enjoy*, people are actively engaged in an act or performance. The phenomena they enjoy are not *per se* enjoyable, nor passively given as enjoyable, but are being actively turned into something enjoyable. Phenomena of the second type (sense 3 in COBUILD), on the other hand, seem to be enjoyable *per se*; if you *enjoy savings* you do not have to do something other than *having savings* (or *benefiting from* them). *Enjoy* is delexicalized in this much more passive sense, which, incidentally, can be applied to almost any object that people can own or possess.

The distinction between senses 1 and 2 and sense 3 is often indeterminate; we can observe a cline from the 'pleasure-in-doing' meaning to the 'pleasure-in-having' meaning. We would like to argue that this indeterminacy between the active and the passive reading of *enjoy* is exploited by the persuasion industry in general and the advertising industry in particular. Accordingly, by telling people that they *can enjoy* something it is subtly insinuated that (by enjoying it) they *can* and *will have* it (or *profit from* it). There is a clear shift from an act (of doing) to a state (of having) with the additional effect that the ideology of doing something for fun and pleasure is transferred to and encompasses objects or assets: it is fun to have something. Thus, due to pattern-sharing, the strong sense of enjoyment connected with the act of doing something 'rubs off' or is transferred

to the delexicalised and accordingly only weakly evaluative (or even neutral) sense of having something.[16]

5.   Collocation

The third phenomenon of co-selection examined in this paper is collocation, the co-occurrence of lexical items. Here we will look at lexical clusters involving *enjoy* as well as at its most frequent right-hand collocates.

5.1. Clusters

The term *cluster* refers to 'words which are found repeatedly in each other's company' (similar to the definition of *collocation*), but clusters "represent a tighter relationship than collocates", and allow the researcher "to see patterns of repeated phraseology" in concordances.[17] The results of an analysis of clusters involving *enjoy* with the help of Wordsmith Tools (Scott 1999) are as follows:

Table 6.   Clusters

UK ephemera			US ephemera		
N	*cluster*	*Freq.*	*N*	*cluster*	*Freq.*
1	and enjoy the	34	1	and enjoy the	29
2	and enjoy a	21	2	relax and enjoy	9
3	or enjoy the	8	3	and enjoy a	8
4	relax and enjoy	7	4	come and enjoy	6
5	along and enjoy	4	5	and enjoy our	4
6	come along and	4	6	enjoy all the	4
7	and enjoy it	3	7	today and enjoy	4
8	back and enjoy	3	8	and enjoy #	3
9	sit back and	3	9	and enjoy all	3
			10	enjoy a whole	3
			11	enjoy all of	3
			12	enjoy the beautiful	3
			13	enjoy the best	3

In both corpora, the aforementioned frequent pattern *and enjoy* is reflected in the cluster findings. Persuasive texts and, in particular, advertisements seem to tell us to *do X and enjoy Y*, with the enjoyment being presented as a consequence of an action related to the advertised product. Instantiations of this are *relax and enjoy*, *come (along) and enjoy,* and *sit back and enjoy.*

Relax and enjoy is a cluster found in both corpora, and does not seem to be restricted to ephemera texts, either. Looking up the pattern *relax and enjoy* in the *Bank of English* (without distinguishing between imperative and other usages of *enjoy*) we find 269 occurrences, most of which admittedly occur in the ephemera subcorpora (UK ephemera corpus: 4.7 per million words; US ephemera corpus: 4.5 per million words), but the pattern also occurs in British magazines (1.6 per million words), and in all other subcorpora from the *Bank of English* apart from *The New Scientist*, *The Economist* and UK business.

In contrast, the cluster *come and enjoy* (50 occurrences in the *Bank of English*) is much more frequent in American English than in British English. Most occurrences are in fact in the US news and ephemera subcorpora, and there is a much bigger difference between the frequency in the US ephemera corpus (1.7 per million words) and in the UK ephemera corpus (0.65 per million words) than with the cluster *relax and enjoy*.[18] This is reflected in the above finding that *come and enjoy* does not appear in the cluster analysis for the UK corpus. However, *come along and enjoy* seems to exist as an alternative. Overall, this is not a frequent pattern, but it appears to be more characteristic of British English than of American English: although there are only nine occurrences of *come along and enjoy* in the *Bank of English*, none of them occur in the American English subcorpora.

The cluster findings also reflect the greater frequency of *and enjoy* and *or enjoy* in the UK subcorpus (see above), and the aforementioned preference of *enjoy + all* in the US subcorpus, as well as the tendency of *enjoy* to co-occur with specific evaluative premodifiers in the US corpus (*enjoy the beautiful, enjoy the best*) (see below).

5.2. Collocates

Looking at frequent right-hand lexical collocates of *enjoy* (especially at position R1 and R2) (ignoring the tendencies that have already been observed), we find that the two corpora prefer different adjectives and nouns as collocates:

Table 7. Collocates of *enjoy*

	UK corpus (frequency ≥ 2)	**US corpus (frequency ≥ 3)**
adjectives	*best*, *fine*, *pleasant*	*beautiful*, *best*, *delicious*, *full*, *free*, *great*, *spectacular*
nouns	*scenery*	*dinner*, *music*, *ocean*, *ride*, *savings*, *views*, *year*

In both corpora the collocating adjectives tend to be evaluative, whereas the nouns tend to be non-evaluative. Additionally, some of the adjectives in the UK corpus seem less 'intense' (*pleasant*, *fine*) than the adjectives in the US corpus (*great*, *spectacular*).

6. The culture of *enjoying*

Our corpus analyses of *Enjoy ...!* have corroborated the thesis that grammar promotes the ideology of fun. Everything in the data embodies and proclaims the simple message: 'having fun' is good. The message is transferred to any act, event, state or thing that functions as the telic object of *enjoy*. And though the majority of examples in our corpora clearly belong to the category of 'Things that can be enjoyed (according to our Western, ethnocentric ideology)', the message is also attached to a few cases that, from a purely utilitarian point of view (*breakfast, shopping*), and maybe also from an extra-cultural perspective (*your car life,* BNC), can or should not be enjoyed. This is subtly achieved by increasingly delexicalizing *enjoy*, a process which is assisted by recurrently using the verb in the same phrasal environments. The resulting stable expressions or phraseological items with their fixed syntax and invariable semantic content lead (or rather, have led) to a gradual entrenchment of the cultural pattern of *having fun* as a natural and fundamental socio-cultural asset in US and UK cultures. A further message that one gets from the analysis of the persuasive corpora as well as from personal encounters with the cultures involved, is that people have a legitimate claim and are by right entitled to *have fun*.[19]

The formulaic character of *Enjoy!*, which presupposes both a far-reaching reduction of form and content (i.e. a delexicalization or semantic bleaching of the verb, as shown above), even warrants to talk of a *pragmatic idiom*. Bazzanella characterizes pragmatic idioms as well as other "fixed syntagmas" as cases of "*polyphonic* repetition" (1993: 285). And indeed, like repeated items, such stable patterns of routine are *mentioned*

rather than used in that they echo tokens constituting a repertoire of ready-made items typically used and expected in the genre given, here in persua-sive texts. This also provides us with a new facet of *enjoy* and its related patterns: since addressees interpret texts against a background of inter-textual expectations, they are familiar with the stock of routine forms regu-larly used; writers of persuasive texts exploit this familiarity to coherently align current phenomena with the set of usually enjoyable phenomena. Conventionalized fixed expressions are thus (mis-)used to bind people to a process of re-conceptualization. They reduce the language users' options to choose. Pragmatic idioms and related highly routinized and fixed expres-sions suggest one way of conceptualizing and simultaneously discard the possibility of an alternative choice. They are thus a crucial means of im-plementing cultural concepts.

Notes

1.   This paper is based on corpus analyses undertaken at the University of Bir-mingham by Monika Bednarek, who would like to thank the Department of English and the DAAD for their support as well as Collins for permitting use of the *Bank of English*. Some of the ideas expounded here were originally jointly developed with Uta Lenk.
2.   Other approaches are to study the (semantic) changes of lexical items in the history of the language or to contrast them with (allegedly) equivalent items in other languages (cf. Stubbs 2001: ch. 8; Wierzbicka 1997), which may or may not function as keywords indicating core cultural values (cf. also Edward Sapir's related views quoted in Wierzbicka 1997: 1ff).
3.   Cf. Leech on the use of the imperative: "in proposing some action beneficial to *h*, *s* should bias the illocution towards a positive outcome, by restricting *h*'s opportunity of saying 'No'. Thus an imperative, which in effect does not al-low *h* to say 'No' is … a positively polite way of making an offer" (Leech 1983: 109).
4.   In an address at the University of Birmingham on March 16, 2004.
5.   The *Bank of English* is a general corpus of spoken and written English from Britain, US, Canada and Australia, which stood at 450 million words at the moment of the analysis. The British English subcorpora comprise texts from *The New Scientist*, *The Sun / News of the World*, *The Guardian*, *The Econo-mist*, *The Independent*, *The Times*, BBC radio, business discourse, ephemera, magazines, books, and spoken discourse. The American English subcorpora include texts from academic books, ephemera, public radio, spoken discourse, books and newspapers.

6. This highlights the problem that even an extremely large corpus such as the *Bank of English* is not large enough when looking at genre dependent or relatively rare linguistic phenomena. Incidentally, *enjoy* in all its senses and word forms (*enjoy*, *enjoys*, *enjoyed*, *enjoying*) is most frequent in these ephemera subcorpora. The frequent usage of *enjoy*! in these texts probably relates to the IMAGINE function of advertisements identified by Stöckl (1997: 74) where the recipient imaginatively experiences the future resulting from his/her acquisition of the advertised product(s). Furthermore, the usage of imperatives is "the generic sentence type for the ad […], because all ads are urging us to some action" (Myers 1994: 47). However, it must also be pointed out that "advertisers use commands, not because telling you to do something really makes you do what they say, but because it will create a personal effect, a sense of one person talking to another" (Myers 1994: 47). On the diachronic development of imperatives and directives in advertisements see Gieszinger (2001: 106f, 220ff).

7. I.e., *enjoy* + noun phrase with predeterminer, determiner (other than definite / indefinite article), premodifer (adjective, *-s* genitive, noun) etc.

8. On evaluation and patterning see Hunston and Sinclair (2000) and on evaluation in general compare the contributions to Hunston and Thompson (2000) and Bednarek (2004).

9. The analysis of evaluative and non-evaluative meaning is always subjective to a large extent, as there is a cline between evaluative and non-evaluative meaning. However, there does not seem to be a methodological antidote to this problem. We have included intensifying adjectives (*full*, *complet*e, *whole*) as evaluative.

10. Some of the structures with the indefinite article in fact make up phrasal quantifiers (e.g. *a cup of*, *a plate of*). An analysis of these was beyond the scope of this paper, but might yield some interesting results.

11. Cf. Channell (1994) on the potential communicative effects of vague numbers.

12. Comparing the occurrences for the first and second person pronouns *I*, *me*, *mine*, *my*, *myself*, *you*, *yours*, *your*, *yourself/yourselves*, *we*, *us*, *ours*, *our*, *ourselves* in the US and UK ephemera subcorpora, this hypothesis is confirmed: the overall frequency of such pronouns is higher in the US corpus (31,705.5 per million compared to 28,616.1 per million), even though some pronouns are more frequent in the UK corpus (*I*, *we*, *myself*, *yourself/selves*, *ourselves*).

13. Compare also Hunston's definition of semantic prosody: "Briefly, a word may be said to have a particular semantic prosody if it can be shown to co-occur typically with other words that belong to a particular semantic set" (Hunston 1995: 137). Although she employs the term *semantic prosody* here, this definition corresponds closely to Sinclair's definition of *semantic preference*. In fact, there are several competing and overlapping terms used for this phenomenon: *semantic prosody* (Louw 1993; Stubbs 1995; Bublitz 1996,

1998; Hoey 2000; Hunston 2002), *evaluative polarity* (Channell 2000), and *semantic association* (Hoey 2003), although these terms are sometimes employed to refer only to the co-occurrence of lexical items with negative and positive lexical items, and frequently include the notion of connotation (which is specifically excluded in our definition of *semantic preference*).

14. However, it was sometimes difficult to classify the phenomena that were mentioned, as there is a cline especially between the travel and entertainment categories. A minority of phenomena do not fall into either of these four categories, e.g. *enjoy a long lie-in*; *enjoy the fragrance*; *enjoy total peace of mind*.

15. But remember that games, sports etc. are included in the entertainment category, although they may well relate to the travel category at times.

16. The rhetorical effect of using *enjoy* with reference to concepts which even in Western cultures are not something you usually enjoy, is some sort of sarcasm, cynicism or irony (in accordance with what has been suggested for semantic prosody by Louw 1993). Compare the following example from the *Guardian* subcorpus of the *Bank of English*, which is part of a review of Channel 4's *Psychos*: "I certainly didn't believe in Dr Kelly when he took Dr Nash to see a woman who'd just come in with slashed wrists: 'We treat for you, darling. You're going to love this. Haven't seen one of these in ages. (Janet Brown the unhappy woman), *enjoy*.' Shocking, sure. But real? Surely not."

17. See the help page of Wordsmith Tools (Scott 1999) for these quotations. The corpus that is taken as a basis for the following cluster analysis consists only of the concordance lines filtered out through the manual analysis (rather than the whole UK and US ephemera corpora).

18. The cluster does not occur in the spoken AE corpus, in the AE book corpus, in the AE academic book corpus, in AE public radio discourse, in BE business discourse and in the *Economist*.

19. Here, the use of *Enjoy!* is reminiscent of the use of *Rejoice!* in religious texts, which as an imperative is equally unusual from a semantic and pragmatic point of view.

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Hot, *heiß*, and *gorjachij*: A case study of collocations in English, German, and Russian

Doris Schönefeld

1. Introduction

This contribution aims at finding evidence for the interrelation between language and culture at the level of collocations. These have been found to be language-specific in a number of ways. That is why taking a cross-linguistic perspective might help to elucidate what exactly these language-specificities are, and what it is that motivates them. Since collocations as habitual co-occurrences of words seemingly reflect repetitive experiences of their users (i.e. culturally shared knowledge), I take these questions to be instrumental in discovering some interesting aspects of where language and culture meet.

The collocations serving as a basis for the analysis have been elicited for English (E), Russian (R) and German (G) from usage data available in computer-readable corpora of the respective languages. The sample node word is E *hot*, R *gorjač* / žark**, G *heiß*[1]. The analysis will focus on the syntactic and semantic characteristics of the data found, particularly so on the differences coming to the fore, and interpret the findings from the adopted perspective of getting at the cultural dimension implied in a language's wording.

2. Collocations

Before actually starting the discussion, I shall briefly determine my understanding of collocation. I use the term to refer to phrases or fragments in a sentence in which the selection of words is not free, that is, in which all or some lexico-syntactic choices are pre-empted. This gives room to subsume habitually co-occurring words of various degrees of stability, ranging from idioms at the one extreme to fragments with variable items at the other, with the proviso that the latter co-occur more often than chance would predict. The term goes back to Firth (1957: 11, 14), who established the concept of "collocation" to denote the syntagmatic relations between actual

words. My reading is slightly more extensive in that it focuses not only on a word's preferences for the company of particular other words, but also for particular syntactic categories they attract – a phenomenon that Firth termed "colligation" and that is perhaps better known as "grammatical collocation" (cf. Benson, Benson & Ilson 1986: x). Thus also such units as *consider sth* Adj (*important, wise, worthless...*) or *consider sb* NP (*a fool, an expert, a traitor...*) are members of the category of collocation (for a broad discussion of the term, see Schönefeld 2001: 228–237).

2.1. Language-specificity

One feature of collocations, especially obvious to the non-native speaker of a language, is their language-specificity, which makes them unpredictable from the learner's perspective. So it is not unusual that the non-native speaker transfers the collocational knowledge of his/her mother tongue to the language s/he is learning, thereby running the risk of being immediately recognized as a "foreigner". This is because collocations contribute to a language's or rather a language user's semantic accent, a term that Lucy (2000: xiiif) suggests (by analogy with a speaker's accent in pronunciation) to cover the fact that speakers in their encounter of other languages will expect to find their own semantic categories.

At first sight, the language-specific nature of collocations seems counterintuitive. For the existence of patterns or clusters (both structural and lexical) in language use is assumed to "reflect the recurrence of similar situations in human affairs; ..." (Sinclair 1991: 110), and it can further be assumed that recurrent situations are typically those that are basic and, hence, common, or at least similar, to all societies. So, if human beings experience similar situations, why should they be induced to understand and verbalize them differently? On closer examination, two things will, however, become obvious: (a) human affairs differ to quite an extent in different parts of the world, and (b) similar or comparable situations are not necessarily experienced, seen and understood in the same way. Thus, although it is true to consider the recurrent character of many phenomena, situations, and events which we experience and talk about to be the eventual motivation for collocations to arise, this does not imply that people end up with the same kinds of collocations. This lack of identity is only too natural for situation (a), where people are simply involved in and concerned with different affairs. Disparity in situation (b) follows from other considerations: experiencing

or recognizing reality as a particular event (state, phenomenon, etc.), i.e., structuring reality, is not universally given. The recognition of structure in the world (or the projection of structure onto the world) is influenced by what people already know about the world, by the (mental) models they have constructed for the sake of making sense of the world. These models are basically of two kinds: personal and cultural, the latter of which I would understand to arise from experience shared in and by a community. Shore (1996: 47) describes them as *conventional mental models* that "have been externalized as shared institutions as well as internalized by individuals [and] ... are a community's conventional resources for meaning making." They differ from personal models in that they "are constructed as mental representations in the same way as any mental models with the important exception that the internalization of cultural models is based on more socially constrained experiences than is the case for idiosyncratic models."

From this it follows that language-specific, conventional ways of wording – i.e. also collocations – can be considered an indication of specific underlying cultural models, or, conversely, cultural knowledge can be assumed to play a part in linguistic usage (cf. also Quinn & Holland 1987: 23f). That means that linguistic usage data can be employed as an informant on underlying conventional mental models, just as well as these models can be exploited to account for what people talk about and how they do it.

From the latter perspective, the language-specificity exhibited by collocations can be attributed to the fact that they do not necessarily arise from general (logical) principles of semantic compatibility, but that they emerge as a result of experiencing and conceptualizing particular situations (events, things and properties) in ways that are culturally determined.

The interrelation between verbal form and underlying cultural model can be seen as a consequence of frame evocation: an expression's meaning can be fully understood only when the understander has recourse to the background structure against which the concept named has been shaped[2] (cf. also Fillmore & Atkins 1992: 75) These frames are always culture-bound, with the "cultural load" ranging from considerable (and thus noticeable, especially for the non-native speaker) to very subtle.[3]

What I call the "cultural load" becomes especially obvious in a language's verbal formulae, since they, as Shore (1996: 58) notes, "encode traditional wisdom, specialized knowledge, or techniques in highly conventional forms of speech. Examples of verbal formulae are proverbs, sayings, traditional narratives, prayers, spells, and nursery rhymes." These types of expressions render in a condensed form socially constrained practices and experiences

of the people speaking the language at issue. Turning to collocations, I first have to explicate the coverage of the term. Collocations, as defined above, naturally include such fixed expressions as proverbs, sayings, idioms etc., but they also include (complex) expressions allowing for some variation, though still exhibiting some preference in their make-up. This subgroup of collocations gives the phenomenon of collocation its probabilistic flavour: words as constituents of a collocation *tend* to be used together, in a more or less rigid form and cannot, therefore, be understood as a language user's free selections on the basis of logical considerations. Apart from the feature of (limited) variability, definitions of collocation also draw on that of semantic opaqueness. My reading comprises the whole spectrum: expressions whose meaning is opaque (many idioms) and expressions whose meaning is "compositional" in that it can be gathered from the meanings of the partaking words.[4] The evocation of cultural knowledge (via frames, for example) can be understood to be variously strong with different types of collocations: it will be strong and obvious in the case of fixed, formulaic expressions, such as proverbs and spells, whereas collocations at the more "open" end of the scale (i.e. less fixed, less opaque expressions) will probably make their cultural load less explicit. Still, as my sample analysis will show, also these expressions are not culture-free, and a cross-linguistic analysis (even one of closely related languages) can help to identify cultural traits that might go unnoticed otherwise.

3.   Sample analysis

The data for my analysis are collocations into which the respective adjectives for the concept of HOT enter in language use. The usage data are available in the form of computer-readable corpora of the three languages at issue. The analysis aims at qualitative findings, quantification is considered as a means to an end.

3.1. The node word/s

The analysis starts out from an English adjective and its Russian and German equivalents: E *hot*, R *gorjač* / žark**, G *heiß*. The words denote, centrally and without any further (contextual) specification of the frame to be evoked for its understanding, a feeling or state of warmth that can be ex-

perienced as a result of (the bodily sensation of) a particular temperature. Any further sense the words may take is bound to contexts or scenes other than temperature, which in their turn are associated with other frames or mental models.

The words' etymologies suggest that the central sense of HOT was originally construed in a comparable way in English, Russian and German usage, which is one reason for the assumption of some overlap in its modern usage: Pfeifer (1989: 670) relates both G *heiß* and E *hot* to an Indoeuropean root IE *kăi-, kĭ-* ('heat' or 'to burn'). Also R *žark**, an adjective derived from the Noun *žar*, has been traced back to proto-Slavic *gērь ('heat') from IE *ĝhēr-, whereas R *gorjač** is the present participle of the verb *goret'* ('burning' – 'to burn') which is habitually used as an adjective. Having undergone different sound changes, this verb is related to the same IE root *ĝhēr- as *žar* (cf. Cyganenko 1970: 145; Černyx 1993: 205, 291; Vasmer 1976: 295, 410). That means that, in all three languages, the words go back to a noun meaning *heat*, and as the formal make-up of R *gorjač** suggests (derivation of a verb (R *goret'*), from the present participle of which (*gorjač**) we have the adjectival meaning 'burning'), we can hypothesize the meaning of the adjectives to be metonymically related to that of the respective verbs. By this (conceptual) metonymic extension (CAUSE FOR RESULT), we have the motivated meaning of 'sending off heat', which is what we – by default – associate with the adjectives *hot, gorjač* / žark*,* and *heiß* respectively. Since E *hot* (OE *hāt)* and G *heiß* (OHG *hei3)* are also related to OE *hætan* (> to heat) and OHG *heizan, haizſan* (> heizen), the forms can be assumed to be characterized in terms of the same (conceptual) metonymy: the adjectives express a property resulting from the process / event expressed by the verbs.

If we consider the association with temperature the 'default' sense, the temperature model must be understood to be the prototypical frame evoked by the words *hot, gorjač* / žark**, *heiß*. The mental model of temperature is the base that the user of the word evokes in order to fully grasp the meaning of HOT as the prominent substructure, the profile, within this base (see footnote 2). In other words, when we understand HOT, we need to access our concept of temperature, apparently a scalar model from freezing to burning, the upper part of which is profiled by HOT, so that understanding HOT presupposes knowledge of temperature.

Temperature, in turn, belongs to what Langacker (1991a: 544) calls "basic domains", by which he understands "a cognitive domain (such as time, three-dimensional space, the pitch scale, or color space) that is

primitive in the sense of not being characterizable in terms of other domains still more basic", or, in more general terms, "cognitively irreducible representational spaces or fields of conceptual potential." (Langacker 1991b: 4). Palmer (1996: 46) lists temperature as one type of imagery / images along with visual, auditory, kinesthetic, olfactory, and affective imagery of feeling states, with images being understood as "mental representations that begin as conceptual analogs of immediate, perceptual experience from the peripheral sensory organs. ... they are also, therefore, indirect conceptual analogs of the environment" (ibid: 47). This puts temperature in a close relation to what Johnson (1987: 28) calls "embodied" or "image schemas".[5]

Due to the basicness of temperature sensation to human beings, I expected the default sense to be the same in all three languages. This implies also similarity in the sensation of the temperature denoted by HOT as less or more comfortable, a fact which is guided by what object sends off the heat and in what situation. Compare such examples as *hot fat* vs. *hot sand* vs. *hot bath* vs. *hot chocolate* to illustrate this point.

Other senses, bound to other mental models, must be induced by the contextual (and co-textual) embedding of the word, which means that we understand HOT in one of its other senses only when there is a contextual clue to the respective base / underlying frame.

The dependence of the selection of a word's sense on particular frames might perhaps escape the language user's attention, since we always use language in particular situations or contexts and – more often than not – are unaware of the guidance context gives for the interpretation of an expression's meaning. The need for contextual embedding will, however, catch the eye of the dictionary user, since there, sense specification is usually (at least in dictionaries of a later date) signalled by an explicit reference to the underlying model by means of context words. Thus, E *hot* is defined in a dictionary (OALD 1992: 438) as follows "... 1(a) having a relatively or noticeably high temperature; giving off heat. ..." The entry contains another nine subentries, each giving another sense the word may take when it co-occurs with particular nouns, such as spices, news etc. These nouns are the clues to the frames in which the word at issue has a meaning deviant from the default reading.

It might be asked here why I then, in my argument, do not simply make use of the information provided by dictionaries on the senses of the word/s under analysis. One point against that is that I am interested in the senses that can be identified as occurring in actual language use, and secondly – as

will become evident in the data analyses – I think that dictionaries follow a strategy of sense differentiation that is meant to give their users the most direct access to the meaning of a word. As a result of this, commonalities between senses may however be overlooked, just as well as the registered senses may turn out to be contextual interpretations of one, though more general, common sense.

From my set of data, the "non-default" readings or senses of HOT are the first point to consider in my analysis, since cross-linguistic differences, if there are any, can be expected to show up here.

Recall that the base evoked by an expression is also understood in the sense of 'domain' (cf. note 2), and it is only a small step to recognizing the principle underlying the extensions from the default sense: it is metaphor, a conceptual process that is understood as a cross-domain mapping of an expression's profile, so that one (usually more abstract) concept can be understood in terms of another (usually more concrete one).[6] As cognitive-linguistic research has amply demonstrated (cf. Gibbs 1994; Lakoff 1987; Gibbs 1999; Cienky 1999; Kövecses 1999, 2000; to name just a few), it is here that a speech community's thought patterns leave noticeable traces: metaphor is culture-specific in that, for example, the metaphors found to be employed in the conceptualization of particular (more or less abstract) concepts may differ in different speech communities, thus highlighting particular aspects of these concepts, or in that conceptual metaphors can be specially elaborated in one or the other culture, whereas others are scarcely employed.[7] In other words, HOT (as source domain language), like any other metaphorically used expression, may take part in different metaphoric mappings, or it may be found to occur in more or less variable expressions reflecting one and the same conceptual metaphor, and thus exhibit culturally motivated cross-linguistic differences.

The clues to the conceptual metaphorical mappings are usually found in the linguistic expressions reflecting them. Metaphorically used words reveal the source domain of the metaphor by their literal meaning, and the linguistic environment will give hints at the target domain of the mapping.[8] Thus it makes sense to have a look at a source-domain word (in my case HOT) in its typical linguistic environment, that is at collocations of HOT. From the perspective of collocational analysis, it has been shown that polysemous senses of one word usually go with specific contexts, i.e. co-occurring words (cf. Biber et al. 2000: 26f; Moon 1998: 189, for example). That means that the words a node word attracts in a collocation, i.e. a node word's collocates, differ depending on the sense it is meant to render. For

my analysis, it follows that the collocates of polysemous HOT will reveal its intended sense, which – if not the literal one – is an extension by metaphor or metonymy. To close the argument, if speech communities employ different metaphors (as an effect of conventionalised ways of construing phenomena and events), these will show in and simultaneously motivate the occurrence of different collocations.

In what follows, I will present the corpus data which are meant to support the claims just made.

3.2. Corpus data

The analyses were carried out in a parallel way for all three languages.[9] The corpora available were searched for the words at issue, with the (compatible) concordance programmes producing lists of KWIC (*key-word-in-con*-text)-concordances, which could then be processed in various ways. The first ordering principle applied was the search word's grammatical functions, so that the data output could be analysed separately for

1.   attributive usage
2.   predicative usage, and
3.   adverbial usage

In the course of the compilation of the data, it turned out to be useful to have a further category, cross-cutting the other three: the usage of HOT in

4.   idioms (as the most invariable and opaque type of collocation).

3.2.1. Hot *in English usage*

The corpus used is the British National Corpus: World Edition (December 2000, SARA Version 0.98), which is a corpus of approximately 100 million words of running text of various text types (written (books, periodicals, magazines etc.) and spoken).

Table 1 gives an overview of the overall number of occurrences and the functional distribution of *hot*.

Table 1. Number of occurrences of *hot* in the BNC

Function of *hot*	Number of occurrences
Total	8,733[10]
Attributive usage	3,997 (of a frequency of N > 5)
Predicative usage	1,512 (of a frequency of V > 5)

Function of *hotly*	Number of occurrences
Adverbial usage	235

3.2.1.1.   Attributive use of *hot*

A survey of collocations of the type of *hot* + noun is given in the appendix (see appendix Table 1). In the following I focus on their semantic analysis, examples will be given where necessary.

A semantic analysis of the identified adjective-noun (AN) combinations in context has revealed the following senses of *hot*:

Literal sense:	(a)	Having a high temperature
	(b)	Causing the sensation of heat

I consider this to be just one sense. For, the (b) sense is a consequence of the (a) sense, both are related as cause and effect: only hot things can cause the sensation of heat, and they always do when there is a "sensor" around, though (a) and (b) can, of course, also be understood as two metonymically related senses. My decision rests on the fact that neither aspect can be separated clearly in the usage of *hot* + noun.

Hot in its literal sense co-occurs with concepts from the (semantic) field of weather and food, and with those whose temperature human beings are usually concerned with. Both the cause and the effect aspect of the literal sense is activated, though with a difference in focus as indicated by bold print.

Weather	(a/**b**)	*summer, weather, day, sun, afternoon, night, sunshine, spell*
Food	(**a**/b)	*meal, chocolate, drink, tea, coffee, milk, potato, dinner, dish*
Others	(**a**/b)	*water, bath, springs, tap, gas, metal, oven, plate, liquid*

The extended senses of *hot* can be arranged according to a hierarchy of metaphorical mappings: the mapping INTENSITY IS UPPER END OF SCALE is the most general one that can be abstracted away from all the expressions underlying my analysis. Lakoff & Johnson (1989: 80f) call such mappings "'generic-level metaphors' since they lack specificity in two respects: they do not have fixed SD and TD, and they do not have fixed lists of entities specified in the mappings." If one asks for the experiential motivation for the generic-level metaphor abstracted from the data, one will recognize at least one primary metaphor motivating this mapping: MORE IS UP (AFFECTION IS WARMTH may play an additional role in the more specific emotion mapping, such as LUST IS HEAT). Grady (1999: 80f) argues that a primary metaphor arises from our experience and thus is not completely arbitrary, which is supported by their wide cross-linguistic distribution: "The recurrence of particular metaphorical mappings across cultures is so striking that any experiences which could give rise to these metaphors must be fundamental to human life in general, rather than based on any particular, local, culturally bound type of experience."

In a similar argument, Lakoff & Johnson (1999: 56) conclude that "[p]rimary metaphors are part of the unconscious. We acquire them automatically and unconsciously via the normal process of neural learning and may be unaware that we have them. ... When the embodied experiences in the world are universal, then the corresponding primary metaphors are universally acquired." This does, however, not imply that they are culture-free. As Lakoff & Turner (1980: 57) put it "what we call 'direct physical experience' is never merely a matter of having a body of a certain sort; rather *every* experience takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions. ... Cultural assumptions, values and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our "world" in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself."

A second hierarchical level of metaphorical mappings at which cultural aspects are perhaps more easily noticeable is the level of what Lakoff & Johnson (1989: 81) call "specific-level metaphors".[11] Those have fixed domains involved in the mapping and also fixed lists of entities specified in the mappings. Lakoff & Johnson (1999: 60) discuss this type of metaphor as complex metaphors, which emerge when primary metaphors (atoms) are

put together to form molecules. These "complex, everyday metaphors are built out of primary metaphors and forms of commonplace knowledge: cultural models, folk theories, or simply knowledge or beliefs that are widely accepted in a culture", such as ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER. Whereas the content of the primary metaphors is highly schematic, these complex metaphors make use of highly structured rich images (cf. also Hampe 2005a).

It will be interesting to see from my data if there are any such complex metaphors traceable and if at that level of metaphoric mappings cultural differences can be identified. Since both the source domain (SD) and target domain (TD) concepts, can be instantiated at a lower, i.e. more specific, level (intensity of <u>something</u> and scale of <u>something</u>), we also have the resources for more specific mappings, drawing on such rich mental images.

The source domain in this case study is that of temperature, more specifically the upper part of its scalar sensation, that part which is covered by *hot* and *heat* respectively. Temperature is not only a basic cognitive domain (cf. above), but it is also a very basic human experience. Humans acquire the concept of temperature from everyday bodily experience from early on – we learn early that hot things burn and that very cold temperatures harm us as well. As regards the concept of heat, it should be added that in addition to its motivation by bodily experience it is also structured by metaphor: "Heat is a metaphorical construct; ... HEAT IS A FLUID with the flow properties analogous to water." (Brown 2003). This metaphor both structures the folk model English speakers have of *heat* and it serves as an explanatory model in physics.[12] As is evident from expressions such as *a pressing engagement* (pressure scale), or *(he's got) a quick temper* (speed scale), English also exploits other scales as SDs in metaphoric mappings when intensity is at stake, but with the search word *hot* in mind, they are presently no concern of mine.

The TDs of specific kinds of intensity are variable, thus we have those of emotion, sensation (perception, taste), close match, event structure and danger, giving us the following mappings:

1.   INTENSE EMOTION IS HEAT
2.   INTENSE SENSATION IS HEAT
3.   CLOSE MATCH IS HEAT
4.   FINAL STAGE OF EVENT IS HEAT
5.   DANGER IS HEAT

The evaluation of the TDs involved in these mappings is not invariably positive, as we could expect from the primary metaphor GOOD IS UP and from a potential, more general understanding of UP as positive, but it may also be negative (as in mappings (1), (2), and (5)).[13] This matches well with the possible sensation of high temperature as more or less comfortable (cf. Section 2.1). What holds all these mappings together is the common SD, a folk or cultural model of heat. The TD of intense emotions (1) is structured by cultural models of emotions. The mapping of heat onto intense emotions is naturally supported by the metonymic link between these emotions and their physiological effects such as the production of adrenalin causing increased heart rate, increased blood pressure, increased body temperature, excitement or agitation, redness of the skin (especially in the face) (cf. Fauconnier & Turner 1999: 80f, who explain the concept of anger as a blend of three input spaces, the SD "physical event", and a TD which consists of the two metonymically related spaces of "emotion" and "physiology"). As Gibbs (1994: 203) puts it: "The domains organized by such metaphoric relations comprise "experiential gestalts" that are the products of our bodily experiences in interaction with the physical environment and other people. Some of these experiences may be universal, others may vary across cultures."

Mapping (2) has a synesthaetic flavour: intense taste or visual perception is conceptualized as the touch of something hot.

Mapping (3) correlates heat, the upper end of the temperature scale, with the concepts of success and ideal, also drawing on the primary metaphor GOOD IS UP.

Mapping (4) maps heat on accomplishments, i.e. activities which have a goal or an endpoint. Both these TD concepts can be conceived of as scalar and aspectual respectively, and in both cases, heat profiles the upper or final parts: the higher the quality, the hotter it is, the closer one is to the accomplishment of an activity, the hotter it is.

The last mapping (5) can be understood to have arisen from a particular human experience of heat, namely fire: the heat of the fire can be dangerous, even deadly to human beings.

A large number of the expressions extrapolated from the corpus can be grouped into these 5 metaphorical mappings, and I think it plausible to assume for the polysemy of *hot* its literal sense and just these five extended senses, which are held together by the more general mapping given above:

hot	1.	having a high temperature / causing the sensation of a high temperature		
	2.	having / feeling / causing an intense emotion		
		a)	excitement	*summer;*
		b)	lust	*pants, flesh;*
		c)	commitment / involvement	*debate, dispute;*
		d)	passion	*tear, kiss, love, flush;*
		e)	excitement / topicality	*news, gossip*
		[f]	impatience	no examples]
		[g]	anger	no examples [but existing]]
	3.	having / feeling / causing an intense sensation		
		a)	taste	*pepper*
		b)	perception	*colour*
	4.	being close to match		
		a)	success	*favourite*, *tip*
		b)	ideal	*stuff*
	5.	being close to final stage of event		
		a)	goal	*pursuit*
	6.	dangerous		
				spot, potato, issues

As the examples show, the nouns co-occurring with *hot* tell the language user more than just what the domains are (the bases) with regard to which the expressions have to be interpreted or understood. They also give clues as to which kinds of emotions / sensations etc. are being talked about (as in *hot debate* or *hot colour*), and the way in which the conceptual whole (the adjective and the noun as a more complex profile) can be related to a more complex base: the base of *hot summer* is the domain of time when the intense emotion is experienced, the base of *hot pants, hot flesh* is the phenomenon causing the intense emotion, the base of *hot dispute* is the act in which the intense emotion is experienced etc.

For all the expressions in the corpus which have not (yet) reached the status of being highly entrenched or lexicalized, I assume that their meanings are not retrieved from the mental lexicon as fixed wholes, but are computed on-line in a process of conceptual integration, also known as blending. This leaves room for understanding aspects of meaning of the combination which are not associated with one of the constitutive parts: *hot* and *news* would contribute the ideas of "intense excitement" and "new piece of information", the whole phrase would in addition have "sensational".[14]

3.2.1.2.   Predicative use of *hot*

The copular verbs linking the concept of HOT to its "carrier" or "experiencer" mainly denote a change of state, with the resultant state being literally *hot* (sense 1) or *hot* in senses 2 and 5 i.e. emotion and danger respectively.

   Table 2 gives a survey of the copular verbs co-occurring with *hot* which have been found with a frequency > 5.

Table 2.   Copular verbs associated with *hot*

Verb	Number of occurrences	Sense
be	1,046	literal; emotion; danger; sensation; quality; taste; goal
get	185	literal: *sth/sb is getting hot*
		emotion: *sb is getting hot; sb is getting hot on sth*
		danger: *things are getting hot*
feel	77	literal; emotion
serve	73	literal: *serve sth hot*[15]
become	50	literal; emotion
keep	43	literal: *keep food hot* (cf. note 15).
look	20	literal; emotion
run	12	literal; emotion
turn	6	literal; emotion

As can be seen from the table, no sense could be identified that has not already occurred in the attributive use of *hot*.

3.2.1.3.   Adverbial use of *hotly*

It might be surprising to find the use of the adverb *hotly* included in a case study about the word *hot*. The reason why I also look at the formally distinct adverb is that of the comparability of the data, since both in German and Russian the adverb is not different from the adjective in its form (though, certainly, in usage).

   The English data present evidence for *hotly* being almost exclusively used in the sense of 'intense emotion' (i.e. sense 2 above) The only exception is the combination *hotly tipped* (as in *hotly tipped buzz-pop group,* or *hotly tipped newcomer*) and *hotly pursued* (*see him being so hotly pursued by a determined young woman*), where we find a realization of the sense of 'being close to goal' (i.e. sense 5 above).

Table 3 gives a survey of the more frequent forms extracted from the corpus.

Table 3.   (Adverbial) use of *hotly*

Function	Position	Modified words
Verbal modifier	preposition to modified verb	*contested, debated, denied, disputed*; *say*; *pursued*
Verbal modifier	postposition to modified verb	*blush, flush*; *cry, protest, return, say*; *inform*
Adj modifier	preposition to adjective	*contested, debated, disputed; tipped* °

° the use as quasi-adjectives (as in *a hotly contested tournament, a hotly debated topic, a hotly disputed penalty*) is much rarer as compared with the verbal uses.

The use of *hot* in idiomatic phrases of English, which are semantically opaque to variable degrees, brings to light a number of frames in addition to the metaphoric models already discussed. I will postpone their analysis to the end of the data section, since it is most convenient to do this in a direct comparison with the data from the other two languages.

3.2.2. Gorjač* / žark* *in Russian usage*

The corpus used for the case study is the Russian Corpus of Tübingen University. It is much smaller than the BNC, and its composition is also much less representative of the Russian language in general, but it was the only corpus available to me. It contains 36.5 million words of running text from written texts (press and literary texts).

The presentation of the data follows the sequence of the English data, the discussion will be pruned to those aspects that exhibit differences from what has already been revealed.

Table 4 gives a survey of all occurrences of the search word.

Table 4. Number of occurrences of *gorjač* / žark** in the Tübingen Corpus

Function of adjective	*gorjač** nb of occurrences	*žark** nb of occurrence
Total	2,018[16]	549 (cf. footnote 16)
Attributive usage	1,136	305 (of a frequency of N > 3/2)
Predicative usage	112	52 (of a frequency of V > 3/2)
Function of adj/adverb	*gorjačo* nb of occurrences	*žarko* nb of occurrences
Total	514	347
Predicative (adj)	34	295
Adverbial (adv)	480	52

3.2.2.1. Attributive use of *gorjač* / žark**

A survey of the results is displayed in the appendix (see appendix Table 2). A semantic analysis of the data allows for a specification of the following senses of *gorjač* /* žark*. The literal sense identified for the Russian words is the same as for the English search word:

(a)	Having a high temperature
(b)	Causing the sensation of heat

The AN combinations fall into the same groups as in English:

Weather	(a/**b**)	*den', solnce / den', solnce, leto, klimat, pogoda, kraj, veter, god,*
Food	(**a**/b)	*čaj, kofe, moloko, eda, pirožki, maslo, kartofel'*
Others	(**a**/b)	*voda, vanna, dus, ščeka, peč', ugol' / dyxanie, telo, plamja, po*

The extended senses were identified exploiting what had been found for the English data. It turned out that the senses fall into the same groups, though there are a few discrepancies noticeable in the individual sense group. In sense group 2, two additional types of emotion attract *gorjač** as a modifier: impatience and anger (cf. (f) and (g)). In sense group 3, no examples could be identified for the sensation of an intense taste, and in group 4, there is only evidence for (b) success. Comparing the two adjectives with each other, I found that *gorjač** is more frequent and more polysemous than *žark**. The latter adjective is more likely to be used literally, of the 29 AN combinations analysed, about two thirds have a literal reading, of the 73 AN combinations *gorjač** participates in, not even half have a literal reading. The senses expressed by the Russian data can be summarized as follows:

1.	having a high temperature / causing the sensation of a high temperature				
	gorjač *		see above	*žark* *	see above
2.	having / feeling / causing an intense emotion				
	*gorjač**	a)	*vremja* (time)	*žark**	a) *vremja*
		b)	no examples		b) no examples
		c)	*spor* (argument)		c) *debat* (debate)
			patriot (patriot)		
		d)	*poceluj* (kiss)		d) *poceluj, telo* (body)
		e)	*novosti* (news)		e) no examples
		f)	*lošad'* (horse)		f) no examples
		g)	*ruka* (hand)		g) no examples
3.	having / feeling / causing an intense sensation				
	*gorjač**	a)	no examples	*žark**	a) no examples
		b)	no examples		b) *svet* (light)
4.	being close to match				
	*gorjač**	a)	*sled* (trace)	*žark**	a) no examples
		b)	no examples		b) no examples
5.	being close to		final stage of		event
	gorjač	a)	no examples	*žark**	a) no examples
6.	dangerous				
	*gorjač**		*vremja,*	*žark**	no examples
			kartofel' (potato)		

3.2.2.2. Predicative use of *gorjač** / *žark**

This usage is difficult to extrapolate from the corpus, since Russian allows for copular sentences, with the copula being zero. The problem is that the concordance programmes available are intended for word-based searches, and that the corpora are not tagged for helpful information such as word categories or syntactic functions. As a consequence, I could only do a "hand" search, i.e. I searched the corpus for the prototypical predicative forms *gorjačo* and *žarko*, and then I scanned, though not exhaustively, the concordance lines for copula-free utterances. A qualitative analysis of the data reveals the following.

For *gorjačo*, the zero copula seems to be rare as compared with *žarko*. The few hits indentfied express an intense emotion, such as:

| (i) | *xotja menja gorjačo...* | (although I am hot (impatient)) |
| (ii) | *sliškom mne vse ehto gorjačo i vol'no...* | (that all is too hot and unbridled for me) |

In Russian, copular verbs are obligatory in the non-present tenses. The verbs found to co-occur with the two adjectives are *byt', est', javljat'sja* (be), *suščestvovat'* (exist), *stat' / stanovit'sja, delat'sja* (become), *ostat'sja* (remain) and *kazat'sja* (appear). *Gorjač** is found to render its literal sense as well as the extended senses of intense emotions, danger and "close to goal". This roughly compares to the English data, where the literal reading is found with all the copular verbs (for details, see Table 2).

Here are some examples:

(iii)	*čaj byl gorjačij*	(the tea was hot)
(iv)	*kofe byl gorjačim*	(the coffee was hot)
(v)	*tema byla gorjačaja*	(the topic was hot)
(vi)	*narod tam byl gorjačij*	(the people there was hot)
(vii)	*vozdux stal suxim u gorjačim*	(the air became dry and hot)
(viii)	*bitva stanovitsja gorjačee*	(the battle becomes hotter)
(ix)	*ona kazalas' emu nedostatočno gorjačej, ...*	(she appeared to him insufficiently hot (-headed))

The search for *žark** revealed the following. Its occurrence in verb-free clauses is more frequent than that of *gorjač**, expressing the literal sense of the word:

| (x) | *v studii žarko* | (It is hot in the studio) |
| (xi) | *tebe ne žarko v takim dlinnom plat'e?* | (Don't you feel hot in that long dress?) |

From the other copular verbs, *byt', stanovit'sja, ostat'sja* and *delat'sja* could be found to co-occur with *žark**, expressing predominantly the literal meaning of *žark** and, in few cases, an intense emotion:

(xii)	*den' byl žarkij*	(the day was hot)
(xiii)	*spor byl dolgim i žarkim*	(the argument was long and hot)
(xiv)	*b komnate stanovilos' žarko*	(it became hot in the room)
(xv)	*hoč'ju gorod ostavalsja žarkom*	(in the night the town remained hot)
(xvi)	*emy sdelaloc' nevynosimo žarko*	(he became unbearably hot)

As the wider contexts of the expressions revealed, *žark** seems to be appropriate in a literal sense also when reference is made to a less high temperature than that designated by *gorjač** (as in example (xi) or (xv)). Table 5 gives a survey of the corpus data.

Table 5.   Copular verbs associated with *gorjač** / *žark**

Verb		Nb of occurrences		Sense	
		gorjač*	*žark**	*gorjač**	*žark**
zero		no numbers	no numbers	emotion	literal
byt'	(be)	56	158	literal, emotion, danger	literal, emotion
est'	(be)	5	none	literal, emotion	
javljat'sja	(be)	none	none		
suščest- vovat'	(exist)	none	none		
stat' / stanovit'sja	(become)	24	38	literal, emotion, success	literal
delat'sja	(become)	none	1		literal
ostat'sja	(remain)	none	2		literal
kazat'sja	(appear)	1	none	emotion	

3.2.2.3.   Adverbial use of *gorjač** / *žark**

The Russian adverbs related to the adjectives at issue are formally identical with one particular form of the latter, namely with the short form of the neuter gender, an adjectival form that can be used predicatively as in examples (xiv), (xvi).[17] They can be identified on the basis of their invariability and their function as verb or adjective modifiers. Table 6 gives a survey of the adverbs' collocates, the function of the node words being almost exclusively verbal modifiers.

Table 6. Adverbial use of *gorjačo / žarko*

Function	Modified words
Verbal modifier	*govorit'* (speak), *sporit'* (have an argument), *voskliknut'/voskli-cat'* (exclaim), *(po)ljubit'* (love), *skazat'* (say), *vozrasit'/vozra-žat'* (object), *(po)blagodarit'* (thank), *pocelovat'* (kiss), *obnjat'/ obnimat'* (embrace), *podderžat'/podderživat'* (support), *privetst-vovat'* (greet), *prosit'* (ask), etc. *dyšat' (breathe), (pro)šeptat'/šepnut' (whisper), sporit' (have an argument), (po)celovat' (kiss), verit' (believe (in)), goret' (burn, glow), zašeptat' (whisper)*
Adj modifier	*ljubimyj* ((be)loved) *netoplenno (heated up)*

As was found for the English data, the adverbial usage in Russian is restricted to the expression of sense 2 – intense emotion, the only exception being a literal reading with the verb *goret'* (burn, glow), and the adjective *netoplenno* (heated up).

Russian idiomatic usage will be discussed after the presentation of the German data.

3.2.3. Heiß* *in German usage*

The corpus used is that from the IDS Mannheim: COSMAS II, Version 3.1.0.5. From the available material, a subcorpus was compiled that compares to the BNC in size: about 100 million words of running text. The texts it contains comprise newspaper texts, literary texts, official documents, manuals and news, but no spoken texts.

Table 7 gives an overview of the occurrences of *heiß** extracted from the corpus.

Table 7. Number of occurrences of *heiß*

Function of *heiß*	Number of occurrences
Total	10,162[18]
Attributive usage	4,046 (of a frequency of N > 5)
Predicative usage	221 (of a frequency of V > 5)
Adverbial usage	447

3.2.3.1.   Attributive use of *heiß**

A list of examples is given in the appendix (see appendix Table 3). The analysis of the senses *heiß* can take reveals the following. The literal sense exhibited by *heiß* is the same as that found in the other two languages:

(a)	Having a high temperature
(b)	Causing the sensation of heat

The categorization suggested for the English and Russian data is suitable here as well:

Weather	(a/**b**)	*Sommertag, Sommer*
Food	(**a**/b)	*Getränk, Würstchen, Kaffee, Wasser, Kartoffel, Wurst, Tee, Suppe*
Others	(**a**/b)	*Quelle, Luft (rare), Temperatur, Sand, Öl, Gas, Atem, Dampf, Ofen (rare)*

The extended senses in the attributive function fall into the same categories as already identified for the other two languages, so that we have:

heiß	1	having a high temperature / causing the sensation of a high temperature		
	2	having / feeling / causing an intense emotion		
		a)	excitement	*Sommer* (summer)
		b)	lust	*Tanz* (dance), *Rhythmus* (rhythm)
		c)	commitment / involvement	*Debatte* (debate), *Diskussion* (discussion)
		d)	passion	*Herz* (heart), *Träne* (tear)
		e)	excitement / topicality	no examples [but existing]
		f)	impatience	no examples [but existing]
		g)	anger	no examples [but existing]
	3	having / feeling / causing an intense sensation		
		a)	taste	no examples
		b)	perception	no examples
	4	being close to match		
		a)	success	*Spur* (trace), *Tip* (tip)
		b)	ideal	*Kandidat* (candidate)

5	being close to final stage of event	
	close to goal	*Phase* (phase)
6	dangerous	
		Eisen (iron),
		Kartoffel (potato),
		Pflaster (pavement)

3.2.3.2.   Predicative use of *heiß*

Also here we find data that are parallel to those discussed for English and Russian. However, in addition to the copular verbs denoting (changes of) states *sein* (be), *werden* (become), *bleiben* (remain), also the verbs *reden* (talk), *laufen* (run), and *machen* (make) could be identified in copular or complex-transitive constructions. Table 8 gives an overview.

Table 8.   Copular verbs associated with *heiß*

Verb	Number of occurrences	Senses
sein (be)	150	literal, danger, emotion
werden (become)	49	literal, danger
reden (talk)	7	emotion
laufen (run)	6	literal
machen (make)	5	emotion
bleiben (remain)	4	literal

As compared with English and Russian, the German data contain two additional verbs for which the complete expressions have no literal readings, *reden* and *machen*, in the (fixed) collocations *sich die Köpfe heiß reden* (be involved in a heated debate) and *sich nicht heiß machen* (not get excited). The verb *laufen* (run): *Maschinen / Telephone laufen heiß* (engines overheat, telephones buzz), also shows in the English data (where it can also render an emotional sense).

3.2.3.3.   Adverbial use of *heiß*

German adverbs are formally identical with their related adjectives. Similarly to the situation in Russian, they can be differentiated by their lack of

inflection and on a functional basis: whereas adjectives modify nouns, the adverbs modify verbs, adjectives and other adverbs respectively. Table 9 gives a survey.

Table 9.   Adverbial use of *heiß*

Function	Modified words
Verbal modifier:	*begehren* (desire), *ersehnen* (long for), *umkämpfen* (fight for), *umwerben* (court), *erkämpfen* (fight for), *diskutieren* (discuss), *hergehen* (sparks fly), *brennen* (burn), *glühen* (glow), *baden* (bath)
Adjective modifier:	*begehrt* (in demand)*, geliebt* ((be)loved), *umstritten* (debated)

The majority of the German data also show an emotional reading of *heiß*, with the exception of *glühen* and *brennen*, which take both a literal and an emotional reading.

3.2.4. Idioms in English, Russian and German

The last amount of data to be presented is the usage of HOT in idiomatic expressions. There are two criteria for listing them separately: firstly, they cut across the categories I used in the organisation of my data so far, and secondly, they are all entrenched with a meaning that is (more or less) opaque. The latter fact puts them at the frozen end of the collocational scale mentioned in Section 2.1.

As can be expected from what Shore said on a language's verbal formulae (cf. 2.1. above), idioms will at all probability exhibit distinctions between the languages at issue which can be traced back to differences in the cultural interpretation of the events to be verbalized.

It should be noted here that the basis for my discussion are the idioms that have been found in the corpus data, i.e. I did not draw them from dictionaries of idioms, which will certainly have a lot more.

The following idioms could be identified in the data:

English Idioms:	
hot rod	*hot dog*
hot line	*hot air*
hot war	*hot shot*

hot date	*hot brush*
hot cross bun	*hot pot*
hot head	*be hot off the press* (18x)
be hot on the heels of sb	*go / sell like hot cakes*
hop / be like a cat on hot bricks	*get / go / feel / become hot under the collar*

Russian Idioms:

delat' čto-l. pod gorjačuju ruku	do sth in an irritated way, be seething
(do sth under a hot hand')	
gorjačaja linija	hot line, agony aunt
(hot line)	
gorjačij telefon	" "
(hot telephone)	
po gorjačim sledam	– immediately
(on hot traces)	– (be) on a hot scent, have a good lead
kto-l. kak na gorjačix ugljach	be like a cat on hot bricks
(sb is like on hot coals)	
xvatit' gorjačego do slez	go through many unpleasant things
(the hot is enough to tears)	

German Idioms:

heißer Ofen	impressive, powerful, fast vehicle
(hot stove)	
heiße Luft	empty, boastful talk
(hot air)	
heißer Draht	direct link to an important person / ad-ministrative body
(hot wire)	
der Tropfen auf dem heißen Stein	well-meaning but ineffective action
(a drop on a hot stone)	
ein ganz heißes Eisen im Feuer haben°	
(have a very hot iron in the fire)	
um den heißen Brei herumreden	beat about the bush
(talk around hot mash)	
auf heißen Kohlen sitzen	be like a cat on hot bricks, be on tender-hooks
(sit on hot coals)	
mit der heißen Nadel stricken	do sth quickly and not carefully
(knit sth with a hot needle)	

auf einem/dem heißen Stuhl sitzen°°   be in the hot seat
(sit on a/the hot chair)

| ° | This is a blend of two idioms: *ein heißes Eisen* (be a hot potato) and *ein Eisen im Feuer haben* (have more than one/another iron in the fire), probably produced accidentally, since the intended meaning is the 2nd only have an iron in the fire. |
| °° | The German phrase is a fairly new loan translation of the English one. |

These data cannot be discussed exhaustively and in great detail. To make my point, I will look at a few phrases and idioms which make their cultural load especially obvious.

The first expression is an English NP with *hot* as noun modifier: *the hot seat*. The German data contain almost identical expressions: *der heiße Stuhl, auf dem heißen Stuhl sitzen* ('sit on the hot seat'), the only difference being the more specific word *Stuhl* ('chair') vs. English *seat*. Still, from my knowledge as a native speaker of German, I understand that the German expressions have been borrowed from English as a loan translation. The fact that idiomatic dictionaries of German do not (yet) contain this phrase hints at its fairly new emergence and usage in German. Being a loan translation, it also inherits the etymology of the English origin. Cowie et al. (1985) explain its meaning in the following way:

| the hot seat | – electric chair, a means of executing criminals |
| | – figurative: a position in which one is especially open and vulnerable to criticism, attack, questions etc... |

The second sense also served as the name of a TV-show on British television in which people were placed "in the hot seat". It is probably from this show that German imported the expression. More "habitual" German idioms expressing a comparable scenario are *im Kreuzfeuer der Kritik stehen* ('be under fire (from all sides)'), or *jmd an den Pranger stellen* ('to pillory someone'). For these we find identically motivated expressions in Russian: *podvergnut'sja perekrestnomy doprosy* ('undergo / be subject to a cross examination'), or *postavit' kogo-l. k pozornomy stolby* ('place someone to the pillory'). Expressions employing the concept of the *hot seat* could not be identified in the Russian data, and also Russian dictionaries do not have it. This suggests that the Russian way of construing a comparable scenario does not employ this conceptualization. In English usage, literal *hot seat* is motivated by a metonymic relation EFFECT STANDS FOR CAUSE (hot – elec-

tricity), the figurative meaning results from a mapping of the SD (a criminal sitting on the electric chair / being executed) onto the TDs of politics, public life, sports or, more recently, of this TV-show. As the examples suggest, German seems to borrow only the extended sense:

(xvii)   *Petz saß auf einem heißen Stuhl nachdem sein Team ... in den Abstiegssog geraten war.*

(xviii) *Doch weder waren der ‚heiße Stuhl' noch fragende Bürger da, die Wolters ins Schwitzen gebracht hätten.*

The second example I will discuss here is the English sentence fragment *sth sells like hot cakes*. It has an equivalent phrase in German *etwas geht weg wie warme Semmeln*. Russian is different again, this time Russian conceptualizes the respective scenario in a similar way, but it focuses on the speed with which something sells: *čto-n. idet / raskupaetsja narasxvat* (sth sells quickly), or *čto-n. prjamo iz ruk rbut* (sth is taken straightforwardly from someone's hands). This is different from both English and German, which both focus on a product that sells especially well: hot cakes and hot rolls, fresh from the baker's.

The last example to be cited here is English *get / go / feel / become hot under the collar*. In German, the concept of getting angry also attracts a number of idiomatic expressions. The ones closest to the English example are *da platzt einem der Kragen* ('the collar explodes'), or *da schwillt einem der Kamm* ('the (cocks)comb swells'). They both can be related to the same metaphor: ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER, but they focus on the extension in volume, which is different from the English expression's focus, the rise in temperature. The Russian equivalents *kto-n. zakupaet ot čero-n.* ('sb starts to cook from sth'), or *u kogo-n lopaetsja terpenie* ('at sb explodes the patience') exhibit both strategies: rise in temperature and extension in volume, though again the construals are slightly different. In the first case, the image is someone whose blood starts to boil, and in the second case, it is an emotion (i.e. the content in a container) that bursts, not the container itself.

4.   Summary of the results

The analyses aimed at spotting cultural traits in collocations of English, Russian and German. These were expected to show up in differences in

these languages' collocational repertoires and are understood to motivate the language-specific nature of the latter.

The results this corpus study brings to light are the following:

1. There is considerable overlap in what speakers of English, Russian and German associate with the respective forms of HOT.
2. The differences found are the consequence of the fact that the languages at issue do not all employ the same metaphorical mappings, which in turn suggests that they have different cultural and folk models as a basis for particular conceptualizations, or that – from the same cultural models – different aspects are selected for conceptualizing and verbalizing a comparable phenomenon or event.

4.1. Overlap in usage

The most obvious overlap can be noticed in the literal sense of the word at issue. Since this reading is associated with the domain of temperature, a simple, concrete and basic experience all people make in basically the same way, this is exactly what could be expected (cf. Section 3.1. above). However, what a careful analysis of the collocations in broader contexts (and also the discussion with native speakers) brought to light is a slight mismatch in the profile of HOT. I identified the profile of HOT to be the upper end of the temperature scale. This is undisputed. However, what is not identical in the languages under analysis is the range that is covered by "upper end". It turns out that E *hot* covers a broader range of temperature than G *heiß* in that it starts at a lower temperature than *heiß*. That means that in English usage, a *hot day* is not necessarily as hot as G *heißer Tag*, but can also be equivalent to G *warmer Tag*. Russian has two adjectives to offer for the expression of the literal meaning of HOT. The data reveal that also here, the range of "upper end" is not identical: *gorjač** is a more exact match of G *heiß*, whereas *žark** seems to be a more exact equivalent of E *hot*.

There is also overlap in the extended senses of HOT, that means quite a few of the metaphorical mappings identified are found to be employed in English, Russian, and German alike, such as DANGER IS HEAT, ANGER IS HEAT, for example.

As regards the functions in which the search words were found and the senses they render, there is also a tendency common to all three languages:

in both predicative and adverbial usage, there is much less variety in the senses displayed: predicative HOT is found in its literal sense, and in the senses of emotion and danger, adverbial HOT is found predominantly and almost exclusively in its emotional sense.

From the perspective of this paper, I will now focus on what the differences are.

4.2. Differences in usage

When we look at the extended senses realized by the individual languages' collocations, English displays the richest assembly of senses. They are compared with Russian and German usage in Table 10:

Table 10. Extended senses in a cross-linguistic perspective

Sense	English	Russian	German
1. literal sense (temperature)	x	x	x
2. intense emotion			
a) excitement	x	x	x
b) lust	x	Ø	x
c) commitment / involvement	x	x	x
d) passion	x	x	x
e) excitement / topicality	x	x	Ø
f) impatience	Ø	x	Ø
g) anger	Ø x (idiom)	x	Ø
3. intense sensation			
a) taste	x	Ø	Ø
b) perception	x	x	Ø
4. close to match			
a) close to success	x	x	x
b) close to ideal	x	Ø	Ø x (idiom)
5. being close to final stage			
a) goal	x	Ø	x
6. danger	x	x	x

The mappings having been found in the idioms make the list more complete: of all the mappings identified, English covers the most (12 out of 13), Russian comes next (9 out of 13) and German comes last (8 out of 13)

(though, from my native competence, I could add the mappings (2e), (2f) and (2g) to German).

The first thing that can be seen from the table is that the TDs specified for the more general mappings are not instantiated by the same range of more specific concepts: intense emotion is not verbalized by E *hot* when it is impatience; intense emotion is not verbalized by R *gorjač* / žark** when it is lust; intense sensation is not verbalized by R *gorjač* / zark** and G *heiß* when it is taste. However, from the lack of verbal data we can conclude only with caution that the mapping is also missing at the conceptual level.[19] For such a conclusion is inappropriate for mapping (2e) in German, for example. The blank there is due to the corpus data which lack expressions signalling this mapping, but they are there in German: *heiße Neuigkeiten* (hot news). Things like that need to be kept in mind in the further discussion.

A comparison of the individual mappings found in the respective data reveals that one mapping obvious in the English data (3a) is not instantiated in the data of the other two languages. Does that mean that it is not employed there? As my competence tells me, German uses it too, though in a "hidden" way: expressions such as *scharfes Essen brennt, brennender Geschmack* (sharp dishes burn, burning taste) make it obvious that the construal focuses on the cause of the sensation (*brennen* (burn)) rather than the effect. Russian has *ostryj vkys* (sharp taste), the verb *goret'* could not be found in this sense, so that this mapping is at least doubtful for Russian usage. Thus, though Russian seems to also use a synaesthetic sensation, it is a different one: intense taste and the tactile sensation of being cut.

Secondly and finally, I will topicalize an example of hidden mismatch between what looks identical. In both English and German, the data contain the expression *(a) hot iron / ein heißes Eisen*. Though formally identical, these expressions do not mean the same. In English, we have two literal meanings depending on the use of iron as a count or noncount noun. In the former case, the expression refers to the hot or heated tool for "smoothing" cloth, in the latter – to heated metal. The latter also occurs in similes, where its literal reading serves as a basis for an explicit comparison, as in example (xix), reflecting the mapping INTENSE SENSATION IS HEAT.

| (xix) | *... and the knife seemed to burn like hot iron ...* |

In German usage, *ein heißes Eisen* – reflecting the mapping DANGER IS HEAT – is the same as *a hot potato* in English: a tricky and awkward problem. Of course, the expression may also be used in its literal sense of hot iron (metal). In Russian, the nonliteral sense is expressed by *ščekotlivoe delo* (a 'tickling' thing). Apart from these differences, the mapping DANGER IS HEAT shows up also in English and Russian expressions, such as E *hot spot, hot issues, (get into) hot water,* R *gorjačaja tema* (a hot topic)*, gorjačaja točka* (a hot point). That means that particular mappings may be drawn on by all the languages under analysis, but need not show up in comparable verbal expressions. Or, the other way round, expressions that are formally alike need not always have the same meanings, especially when these meanings are the result of metaphorical and metonymic extensions or mappings.

4.3. Conclusion

From what has been extracted from English, Russian and German usage data, I put emphasis on (some of) those cases where the respective words for HOT are put to diverging usages, i.e. where they enter into "idiosyncratic" verbal combinations forming collocations in the widest sense of the word. The differences found suggest that there is also some divergence in the underlying conceptualizations HOT is associated with in the languages at issue. On the other hand, it turned out that in cases of identical usage we cannot necessarily conclude or assume that such expressions label the same concepts.

The collocational differences uncovered appear to be related to the cultural and folk models which people construct from experiencing their bodies and their (physical and social) environment and which they employ in the process of naming the phenomena they are concerned with. As my analysis showed, such models are implicit in the expressions in the form of the frames needed and / or triggered when processing the respective expressions.

As became obvious as well, taking a cross-linguistic perspective on collocations of the same node word helps to become aware of such frames and noticeably facilitates their identification. Having in mind the entrenched status of collocations, arising from repetitive usage, we can go as far as to claim that we can read from them what a language's (and a culture's) preferred or typical ways of making sense of the world are. The respective

language material reveals that, in talking about comparable phenomena, speakers in different speech communities may draw on different types of background knowledge (employ different models or frames) or construe it differently. This is also reflected in my results. Firstly, there are expressions (E *hot* pepper) which make it obvious that one language may reflect a particular conceptualization which one of the other languages, or both, lack/s (i.e. "gaps" turn up in the employment of particular frames or models). Secondly, there are quite a few expressions which, in the three languages, show a common underlying cultural model (constituted by a common underlying metaphor[20]), but the perspective taken on it, what is highlighted and what remains a background aspect, is different (i.e. diverging construals become apparent).

These two aspects – evident in the examples discussed – make it obvious that in fact cross-linguistic differences in collocations are motivated. They can plausibly be accounted for by (complex) metaphors: some metaphors are not employed at all (lacking mappings), for others the expressions verbalizing the mapping focus on different correspondences between the source and target domains (variable "coverage" of the mapping potential). This suggests that different speech communities have conventionalized different aspects of metaphorical conceptualization. As a consequence, collocations, reflecting a speech community's habitual ways of "seeing" the world, can be understood as carriers of cultural knowledge.

Notes

1. The asterisk is used for different purposes: at the end of a word it stands for deleted inflectional morphemes, placed initially it marks the following form as re-constructed.
2. Within Cognitive Grammar the same problem has been discussed as a figure-ground / profile-base phenomenon, figuring prominently in the cognitive-linguistic understanding of meaning as always implying a profile and a base. Writing about the 1st dimensions of imagery, the imposition of a "profile" and a "base", Langacker (1991b: 5) elaborates on the base as a domain and the profile as a substructure which – by the expression – is made prominent within this base. "The base is … essential to the value of each predication, but does not per se constitute that value: a hypotenuse is not a right triangle, ... An expression's semantic value does not reside in either the base or the profile individually, but rather in the relation between the two." As also pointed out by Cienky (1999: 190f), Palmer (1996: 186)

shows how the idea of profiling, i.e. the distinction of profile and base, allows for the anchoring of cultural knowledge in a (linguistic) semantic analysis.

3. Palmer (1996: 5f) – elaborating on Fillmore's claim (1975: 114) that "when you pick up a word, you drag along with it a whole scene" – suggests a classification of such frames or scenes, which also reflects these differences in "cultural load": "Words evoke mental images that range from sensory experiences as simple and concrete as a mouthful of hot buttered popcorn to conceptual structures as abstract and complex as the cultural postulates of true love. Some of the images called forth by words closely reflect the orientations, forces, and stuff of immediate experience. ... Other images and imagistic cognitive models, still structured, but even more schematic or metaphorical, as of love, friendship, and marriage, make up the social contents of our world views (...)."

4. This assumption deviates from other readings of the term "collocation". Benson et al. (1986: ix), for example, define collocations as "<u>fixed</u>, identifiable, <u>non-idiomatic</u> phrases and constructions" [my emphasis], whereas I attribute the feature of being fixed to rigid and highly established collocations only, and include idiomatic phrases, which is in line with Cowie et al. (1985: xii–xiii), for example, who produce a complex categorization of word combinations ranging from *pure idioms* to *open collocations* (for a similar view see also Partington 1998, ch. 1).

5. It is an interesting question if – and if so, in what way – from the rich images of temperature sensation more abstract, skeleton-like concepts of such an image-schematic nature can be generalised. To my knowledge, temperature sensation has not (yet) been analysed from this perspective. It is also not contained in Johnson's (1987: 126) (partial!) list of image schemata. Neither do we find any hint in Shore's (1996: 59ff) elaboration on linguistically coded and non-linguistic cultural models, where image schemas and models arising from almost all our senses are discussed. Temperature sensation seems to be related to the schema of SCALE, but it is not identical with it, since there is more to temperature, especially in terms of **sensori-motor** experience. Additionally, also a relation to the schema of BALANCE seems plausible.

6. Knowledge of the associated base or source domain is employed for the entailments that go with the mapping.

7. For a more detailed suggestion and discussion of potential sources of cross-cultural variation in conceptualizations of metaphoric concepts (of emotion) see Gibbs 1994: 192ff; Kövecses 2000: ch. 9.

8. This is seen from an analytical perspective. From the point of view of language use, such a process is in the user's awareness only for creative metaphors, i.e. those that are not (yet) entrenched.

9. I am very much indebted to Silke Höche and Klaus Heimeroth, who did a great deal of the time-consuming job of extrapolating and sorting the data from the huge corpora used. All shortcomings that might show up in the analyses presented here are, of course, my own.

10. The sum total of occurrences of *hot* is the result of an exhaustive search of the BNC. For reasons of feasibility, I included only frequencies of more than 5 in the functional analysis, which means that any occurrence of attributive *hot* with a noun / predicative *hot* with a verb that occurs less than 6 times would have to be added. This explains the difference between the numbers for functional distribution and the overall number of occurrences SARA extracts for *hot*.

11. Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 14) categorize such mappings as "structural metaphors".

12. The French physicist Sadi Carnot employed this metaphor in an influential treatise on heat (published in 1824), where he extended the analogy to explain the work being accomplished when heat is cooled down (cf. Brown 2003, online access March 08, 2004).

13. For a discussion of whether there is a plus-minus parameter in image-schemas, in my case UP, see Hampe 2005b.

14. The elaboration of the construction of meaning by blending goes beyond the scope of this article and I refer the interested reader to Fauconnier & Turner 1998, 2002 and Coulson 2001.

15. This is a complex transitive construction (referring to the classification of clause types in Quirk et al. 1985: 53f), where the predicative link is between the object and its complement.

16. The sum total of occurrences of *gorjač* / žark** is the result of an exhaustive corpus search. For reasons of feasibility, I included only frequencies of more than 3/2 into the functional analysis, which means that any co-occurrence with a noun or with a verb that occurs less than 4/3 times would have to be added. This explains the difference between the numbers for functional distribution and the overall number of occurrences extracted for the two adjectives.

17. The usage of an adjective's short form is predominant in the written language, especially in books, it is also semantically marked in that it may denote a temporary feature or state, or a feature in its relation to a particular subject / person. In contrast, the predicative long form may – if used in the past or future tenses – take either the nominative or instrumental, with the former being typical of spoken language, the latter – of written texts. If used in the present, the nominative is used. Semantically, no constraints are effective with its use (cf. Pul'kina & Faxava-Nekrasova 1968: 460).

18. The sum total of occurrences of *heiß** is the result of an exhaustive corpus search for the lemma *heiß*, i.e. inclusive of such forms as *heißen, heißt* etc. (be named). The latter had to be neglected, the functional analysis focused on co-occurring nouns or verbs with a frequency > 5 only. This explains the difference between the numbers for functional distribution and the overall number of occurrences extracted.
19. This is all the more important to remember considering my decision to restrict the data for the qualitative analysis to 5 or 3/2 occurrences of the nouns, although the expressions found in one language's data were cross-checked with the data from the other two languages.
20. For a discussion of whether (conceptual) metaphor constitutes or reflects cultural models, see Gibbs 1999 and Kövecses 1999.

Appendix

Table 1 lists all the nouns with which *hot* co-occurs as an attribute, and which have been found with a frequency higher than 9 tokens. With an MI (mutual information)-score of > 27, these combinations can be assumed to be not just accidental co-occurrences of the two words, but words which attract one another to a higher degree than chance would predict. The MI-score measures the association between two words. The calculations "compare the probability of observing the two words together with the probability of observing each word independently, based on the frequencies of the words. ...A score much greater than 0 shows that the words tend to co-occur at a rate much greater than chance" (Biber et al. 2000: 266).

Table 2 lists all the nouns with which *gorjač** and *žark** co-occurs as attributes, and which have been found with a frequency > 3 (*gorjač**) / 2 (*žark**).

Table 3 lists some the nouns co-occurring with attributive *heiß** with a frequency of > 5.

Table 1. Attributive use of *hot*

Collocate	Abs. Frequency	Collocation	Abs. Frequency	Collocation	Abs. Frequency
water	717	shower	32	rod	18
air	247	potato	31	wax	18
day	177	stuff	31	news	17
weather	133	water tank	28	work	17
summer	132	country	27	fusion	16
drink	109	oil	27	pants	16
spot	100	plate	27	pie	16
bath	88	grill	26	place	16
water cylinder	84	oven	26	breath	15
sun	78	liquid	25	evening	15
meal	74	colour	24	room	15
spring/s	73	gas	24	air gun	14
dog	60	cake	23	morning	14
food	60	face	23	topic	14
tea	60	line	23	fat	13
pursuit	57	tip	23	foot/feet	12
coffee	55	metal	22	mantle	12
chocolate	54	pepper	22	money	12
seat	53	snacks	22	toast	12
cross bun	52	tear	22	tub	12
afternoon	41	wind	21	bread	11
flush	40	iron	20	brush	11
milk	40	soup	20	sand	11
pot	39	sunshine	20	skin	11
tap	39	body	19	chips	10
climate	38	shot	19	fire	10
favourite	38	solution	19	hand	10
night	36	head	18	mouth	10
rock	33	press	18	steam	10

(MI-scores all above 27)

Table 2. Attributive use of *gorjač* / žark**

GORJAČ		GORJAČ		*ŽARK*	
voda (water)	192	telo (body)	9	*den' (day)*	96
čaj (tea)	82	vremja (time)	9	*leto (summer)*	36
točka (point)	81	zakuska (snack)	9	*solnce (sun)*	25
ruka (hand)	53	den' (day)	8	*klimat (climate)*	12
sled (trace)	37	ljudi (people)	8	*strana (country)*	11
kofe (coffee)	32	luč (beam)	8	*dyxanie (breath)*	10
golova (head)	28	maslo (butter)	8	*poluden'*	10
vanna (bath)	28	privet (greeting)	8	*(a halfday)*	
duš (shower)	27	veter (storm)	8	*pogoda*	9
vozdux (air)	23	vino (wine)	8	*(weather)*	
paren' (boy)	18	ščeka (cheek)	8	*kraj (region)*	9
serdce (heart)	18	diskussija (discussion)	7	*vozdux (air)*	9
storonnik (proponent)	18	guba (lip)	7	*spor (argument)*	7
volna (wave)	18	kartofel' (potato)	7	*veter (storm)*	6
slovo (word)	15	kartoška (small potato)	7	*luč (beam)*	6
krovq (blood)	14	bul'on (broth)	6	*sepot (whisper)*	5
linija (line)	14	buterbrod	6	*god (year)*	5
ljubov (love)	13	(bread & butter)		*večer (evening)*	5
poklonnik (admirer)	13	čuvstvo (feeling)	6	*ob''jatie*	5
slez (tear)	12	dyxanie (breath)	6	*(embrace)*	
moloko (milk)	12	par (steam)	6	*poceluj (kiss)*	4
eda (food)	11	peč' (stove)	6	*mesjac (month)*	4
narod (a people)	11	pišča (snack)	6	*sezon (season)*	4
pesok (sand)	11	razgovor (talk)	6	*telo (body)*	3
pirožki (pirogs)	11	solnce (sun)	6	*plamja (flame)*	3
struja (beam, current)	11	telefon (phone)	6	*svet (light)*	3
vzgljad (look)	11	patriot (patriot)	5	*boj (battle)*	3
čelovek (person)	10	pitanie (food, dish)	5	*sxvatka*	3
lošad' (horse)	10	poceluj (kiss)	5	*(skirmish)*	
učastie (sympathy)	10	rebjata (children)	5	*debat (debate)*	3
želanie (wish)	10	tema (topic)	5	*diskussija*	3
ugol' (coal)	9	dama (lady)	4	*(discussion)*	
asfal't (asphalt)	9	družba (friendship)	4	*pot (sweat)*	3
delo (thing)	9	kon' (horse)	4	*vremja (time)*	3
istočnik (springs)	9	lob (forehead)	4		
ključ (key)	9	novost' (news)	4		
spor (argument)	9	vera (belief)	4		

Table 3. Attributive use of *heiß**

Kollokation	Frequenz	Kollokation	Frequenz
Phase (phase)	165	Stuhl (chair)	19
Eisen (iron)	108	Tee (tea)	18
Spur (trace)	92	Sand (sand)	17
Wasser (water)	85	Tipp (tip)	15
Luft (air)	82	Öl (oil)	14
Sommertag (summer day)	73	Gas (gas)	14
Tanz (dance)	56	Favorit (favourite)	13
Kandidat (candidate)	53	Ofen (stove)	12
Rhythmus (rhythm)	48	Atem (breath)	12
Draht (wire)	43	Dampf (steam)	11
Thema (topic)	43	Pflaster (pavement)	11
Getränk (beverage)	41	Suppe (soup)	10
Sommer (summer)	38	Asphalt (asphalt)	10
Diskussion (discussion)	34	Träne (tear)	9
Würstchen (small sausage)	33	Scheibe (record)	9
Debatte (debate)	26	Duell (duel)	9
Temperatur (temperature)	25	Waffel (wafer)	9
Kaffee (coffee)	24	Maroni (chestnuts)	7
Quelle (springs)	23	Kohle (coal)	7
Herz (heart)	20	Blei (lead)	6
Kartoffel (potato)	20	Lava (lava)	6
Wurst (sausage)	19	Sommermonat (summer month)	5

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Focus on types of idioms

Collections of proverbs and proverb dictionaries: Some historical observations on what's in them and what's not (with a note on current "gendered" proverbs)

Charles Clay Doyle

The subspecialty of linguistics known as idiomatology or phraseology is just a few decades old. In contrast, the scholarly study of sentence-long expressions called proverbs (or adages) has a venerable lineage, extending back into antiquity. Paremiology (as the study of proverbs is learnedly termed) has been variously regarded as a branch of rhetoric, philology, or folklore; only recently, thanks to the emergence of idiomatology, have linguists begun taking note of such fixed superlexical locutions. As a category, proverbs are difficult to define with precision; nonetheless, they have proved easy to identify as such, on both the scholarly and the popular levels, and the compiling of proverbs into books is as old as printing itself.

1. Early modern collections

At the beginning of the modern age, the great Erasmus of Rotterdam compiled his magisterial *Adagia*, which consisted of Greek "sayings" with Latin translations and counterparts, and commentaries in Latin. It first appeared in 1500 as a modest *Adagiorum collectanea*, then in ever-expanding editions, now titled *Adagiorum chiliades*, "thousands of proverbs," from 1508 through Erasmus's death in 1536. Earlier collections of sayings had appeared, including an edition in English of *The Dictes and Sayengis of the Philosophhers*, translated by Edward Woodville, Earl Rivers (from the French, from the Latin, from the Arabic and from the Greek; published by Caxton in 1477, probably the first book printed in England, the second ever in English). However, Erasmus's *Adagia* was the first major endeavor that went beyond merely listing expressions to actually *studying* them – explaining their significations, citing and discussing variants and analogs. Some of Erasmus's glosses are brief; others, though, constitute what are in effect "personal essays" stretching over several pages, such as his famous anti-

war manifesto occasioned by the proverb *Dulce bellum inexpertis* [War is sweet to those who have not experienced it] and the wryly querulous discussion of his own tribulations as a proverb collector by way of commenting on the expression *Herculei labores* [the labors of Hercules].

Erasmus compiled and glossed, finally, some 4,151 sayings, and all educated Englishmen of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were acquainted with the *Adagia*. For the unschooled, translations were available, beginning with a condensed English rendering by Richard Taverner in 1539 (and four subsequent editions, the later ones containing 235 proverbs with Taverner's own commentaries). Even Erasmus's infrequent errors could determine the vernacular form of expressions: Pandora's proverbial *box* was actually a *jar* until Erasmus mistranslated Greek "pithos" as "pyxis" rather than (correctly) as "dolium"; and in Greek *call a spade a spade* actually referred to a small boat or tub ("skaphê"), but Erasmus, whether by mistake or intentionally (perhaps influenced by his awareness of a Greek verb "skaptein," [dig]), gave the Latin noun "ligo" in place of the accurate translation "scapha."

The first important collector of English proverbs was John Heywood, who left the sixteenth century's most extensive collection of English sayings – some 1,800 in all. However, Heywood's *Dialogue Conteynyng* […] *Prouerbes* (1546) and *Epigrammes upon* […] *Prouerbes* (1550–1562) were not mere compilations; nor did they include scholarly glosses of the sort that Erasmus lovingly presented. Instead, they were *poems* built largely out of proverbs. Heywood's poems employ proverbs playfully, dispelling any notion that the sixteenth century (or any other century) treated proverbs as sacrosanct epitomes of wisdom and rectitude. The verses call attention to vagaries and complexities in the perception and application of proverbs; for example, this couplet, one of Heywood's 600 epigrams: "*Better one bird in hand, than ten in the wood:* / Better for birders, but for birds not so good."

Neither Erasmus's excursive method nor Heywood's versifying typified what would become the main tradition in published collections of English proverbs. The increasingly extensive collections of vernacular proverbs that began to appear in print during the seventeenth century were, initially, intended primarily for the use of "rhetoricians" in bolstering their arguments and decorating their style.

Proverbs, by definition, are oral expressions. The effects that literacy, then the medium of print, may have had on the creation, dissemination, and application of proverbs (and other fixed sayings) are numerous and complex. Here, at least, it can be noted that writing and print created what we

may call secondary repertories of expressions – beyond those that an individual or his circle of acquaintances commonly would have uttered and heard; students were explicitly encouraged to draw from an ever larger store of sayings. Literacy and print made possible not only the preservation but also the presentation of proverbs in great numbers, compiled in a form that could be *searched* visually.

The publication of straightforward collections, with or without glosses accompanying the individual entries, soon demanded a consideration of how the entries should be arranged or sequenced for maximum utility, both for suggesting relationships among different expressions and for what we might (nowadays) call "data retrieval" – a reader's ability to locate given proverbs within the collection. In Erasmus's pioneering compilation, with its informal, often rambling commentaries on the individual entries, the adages had appeared in a gloriously random order. Had Erasmus's pre-eminent goal been presentation in a manner that would enable readers to "look up" expressions about which they desired information, he might have confronted the issue of practical arrangement; however, a more central purpose of the *Adagia* was to introduce the "modern" age to the culture and values of the ancient, classical world. Quite possibly Erasmus intended his book to be dipped into randomly, or read straight through at leisure – not a reference work but rather what has been called one of the world's biggest bedside books. Erasmus's purpose, though, extended far beyond the mere presentation of proverbs; his readers were expected, by peering at the individual commentaries (and, of course, the adages themselves), to see through them as windows onto the long-ago time that the Renaissance humanists were giving "rebirth" to, and to comprehend connections between the grand past and reborn present. Heywood's compilations of English proverbs, for quite different reasons, also failed to facilitate the ready "retrieval" of individual sayings.

2. Collections of English proverbs: Strategies for arrangement

Other than the perfectly random or unpredictable sequencing of compiled "data," from the sixteenth century till the present, two principal arrangements have been adopted: alphabetical and topical – the latter, of course, having some "analytical" value; by venturing a sort of taxonomy, it suggests relationships of a semantic nature (loosely speaking, at least). The original motive in grouping proverbs by topic, however, was simply to provide writers and speakers with material for "amplifying" their discourse – somewhat

in the way that preachers or banquet speakers in a later age could resort to books (or web sites) that make available anecdotes, exempla, and quips on various subjects or themes. Accidentally (as it were), that arrangement also assisted a person who knew a particular expression in locating it – in order to verify its customary form, compare analogous expressions, and peruse whatever additional information an entry might show. The arrangement is convenient even for modern researchers seeking to ascertain what the culture of a past time "had to say" about given subjects.

Two of the most extensive English proverb collections from the early decades of the seventeenth century followed the topical arrangement, otherwise without glosses or commentary: Thomas Draxe's *Bibliotheca scholastica instructissima. Or A Treasurie of Ancient Adages* (1616) and John Clarke's *Paroemiologia Anglo-Latina. Or Proverbs English and Latin* (1639). The intended educational function of both collections is apparent from the titles: Draxe was presenting schoolboys or older rhetoricians with sayings to use for "amplificatio," while Clarke was showing a similar readership, more specifically, how to translate English proverbs and use them to amplify discourse in Latin. The majority of expressions in Draxe's volume are Latin (a few Greek, French, Italian, and Spanish), but some 2,500 English proverbs are interspersed – those being distinguished (ironically?) by *italic* type. The sayings in all languages appear in groups beneath alphabetized topical headings in English (even though the preface appears in Latin!): "Abilitie or power"; "Absence"; "Absurdities"; "Abuse"; "Advancement"; and so on. Clarke gave, beneath alphabetized headings in Latin, about 4,000 English proverbs, with Latin translations or counterparts.

Languages that adopt a graphic alphabet have historically enjoyed considerable advantages in the storing, processing, and retrieval of information and texts – advantages that are, perhaps, only now receding with the availability of electronically searchable data stored in computerized forms. For most of history, a dictionary (or telephone directory) without the alphabetical sequencing of entries would have had little utility. Even Erasmus, whose unpredictable arrangement of adages was so notable (possibly even designed), in his later editions attached an alphabetical index of the sayings, in their Latin and (often) their Greek forms.

Draxe in 1616 had claimed (on the title page) that his proverbs were "ranked in Alphabeticall order," but he evidently meant only that the topical headings were alphabetized. Two years earlier, William Camden had added a section titled simply "Proverbs" to the 1614 edition of his *Remaines Concerning Britaine*. It was a straightforward collection of 389

sayings without glosses (expanded to 571 in the 1623 edition), introduced by a single sentence: "Whenas Proverbs are concise, witty, and wise Speeches grounded upon long experience, conteining for the most part good caveats, and therefore both profitable and delightfull; I thought it not unfit to set downe heerre Alphabetically some of the selectest, and most usuall amongst us, as beeing worthy to have place amongst the wise Speeches." The very first printed collection to present English proverbs in alphabetical order, however, was published by the Dutchman Jan Gruter (or Janus Gruterus) in Frankfurt-am-Main in 1611, as part of volume 2 of his *Florilegium ethico-politicum*. The earlier edition of 1610 had listed, in alphabetical sequence, hundreds of proverbs grouped by language: Latin, Greek, Dutch, German, French, Italian, and Spanish. Gruter lamented the absence of a list of "prov-erbia Britannica," a lack that was supplied for the 1611 edition by none other than Gruter's friend William Camden, who furnished a collection of 335 English sayings. If he submitted his proverbs as the alphabetical list that appeared in the second edition of *Florilegium ethicopoliticum*, then possi-bly Camden, rather than Gruter, can still get credit for initiating the long and useful practice of alphabetizing English proverbs. That list coincides very closely with the one that Camden himself published three years after-wards, with 54 sayings added (the contents of Camden's lists seem much indebted to John Heywood).

Of course, alphabetical sequencing can pose its own challenges, especially for an age in which spelling was not yet standardized. For instance, Gruter listed under the letter *Y* the proverbs "Yll gotten, yll spent" and "Ynough, is as good as a feast" – as did Camden, only Camden's entry actually spelled the former expression "Ill gotten ill spent."

A more troubling difficulty was the early alphabetizers' practice of us-ing the very first word in a proverb as the determiner of placement, even if that word was *a*, *an*, *the*, *there*, *he*, *it*, *you*, or other terms of no substantial significance. In actual usage, the same proverb can occur with or without such initial words, and the compilations' sequencing usually suggested no relationship of image or application among proverbs listed in proximity. On the other hand, the procedure could make obvious some structural similari-ties, like the *Better ___ than ___* pattern, of which Camden gave sixteen instances.

Essentially the same procedure of alphabetizing English proverbs that Camden and Gruter had initiated persisted (with compilations of various sizes) through the remainder of the seventeenth century – and well beyond. *Scottish Proverbs. Gathered by David Fergusson Sometime Minister at Dun-*

fermline (1641) listed nearly a thousand sayings (without glosses). David Fergusson had died in 1598; if the manner of presentation could safely be credited to him and not an anonymous editor, then Fergusson and not Camden or Gruter should wear the title "First Alphabetizer of English Proverbs"; however, Ferguson's precise relationship to the book that bears his name, published 43 years after his death, cannot be ascertained.

Other important alphabetical collections are *Proverbs English, French, Dutch, Italian, and Spanish*, attributable only to a certain "N. R., Gent." (1659), with about 2,000 sayings in English (despite the title, no proverbs in a foreign language are to be found); Robert Codrington's *Collection of Many Select, and Excellent Proverbs* (1664), with over 1,000 sayings (the collection first appeared, with a separate title page, as pages 183-231 of *The Second Part of Youths Behaviour, or Decency in Conversation amongst Women*; then, somewhat augmented, as a separate book in 1672 – where the proverbs are not only alphabetized but also numbered, 1–1,465); and *Adagia Scotica. Or, A Collection of Scotch Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases* by one B.R. (1668), with about 1,000 sayings, nearly all of them full sentences, notwithstanding the subtitle.

A monumental improvement in the practice of alphabetizing was effected in John Ray's masterful *Collection of English Proverbs*. First published in 1670, with a second edition in 1678, Ray's collection saw six further editions from 1737 to 1818 – and then, as reprinted to constitute the major portion of Henry Bohn's *Hand-Book of Proverbs* (1855), itself with 14 or so editions, it essentially remained in print through 1910. The collection was not remarkable for the sheer quantity of its entries, although the annotations that accompany almost half the entries are illuminating; rather, the usefulness of the collection consists in its manner of sequencing entries. Ray alphabetized proverbs not by the very first word but rather by the first *key term*. He based his collection on the most ambitious program of assembling and collecting to date – one of those "scientific" projects that flourished in Restoration England; Ray proudly announced himself on the title page as "Fellow of the Royal Society" (he was best known to his contemporaries as a botanist). Not only did he comb all the extant printed compilations but he also, according to the preface, "employed my friends and acquaintance in several parts of *England* […], who afforded me large contributions"; so he actually relied on folkloristic "field" research – if not with the rigor demanded nowadays, then at least in the fashion that prevailed in Great Britain well into the twentieth century.

Ray explicitly regarded his collection not as a textbook for fledgling rhetoricians but rather as a reference work – in which users of the book could locate specific sayings and the commentaries that frequently accompany them. He emphasized the facility with which readers might "look up" a proverb, explaining in the preface, "When I thought I had a sufficient stock [of proverbs], I began to consider of a convenient Method to dispose them in, so as readily and easilie to find any proverb upon occasion, for that I had observed wanting in all former Collections." The title page emphasized the same ideal of utility: "*A Collection of English Proverbs*. Digested into a convenient Method for the speedy finding any one upon occasion."

Concerning the plan of presentation, Ray noted in the preface: "Two presently occurd to my thoughts, both already practised by others, 1. The Alphabetical order. 2. The way of heads or common places." He rejected the second approach, in which either the compiler will select a limited number of "heads," so that many proverbs will necessarily be placed under "improper heads," or else he must introduce an unwieldy multitude of heads, with many proverbs appearing repetitiously under each of several heads, with some heads having "only one or two Proverbs under them." Categorization under heads, then, "is no way for finding any Proverb upon occasion." So, Ray opted for the alphabetical sequencing, but with a departure from the customary procedure, "not taking, as others heretofore have done, the first Letter of any though Syncategorematical particle that might happen to stand foremost in the Sentence, and which is both removeable and variable without any prejudice to the sense; but the first Letter of the most material Word, or if there be more words equally material, of that which usually stands formost." Those key (and foremost) "material" words he "caused […] to be Printed in different Character, that so with the least cast of an eye any man may find any Proverb."

That plan very much resembles the manner of presentation adopted for the best proverb "dictionaries" published in the last half of the twentieth century – except that Ray employed several separate alphabetical sequences for different categories of expressions, rather than compiling all the entries into a single sequence. First are listed about 500 "proverbial sentences" that were no longer in use. There follow three other categories of sayings that Ray seems to have regarded as possessing only minor interest: "Proverbs and Proverbial Observations belonging to Health, Diet and Physick"; "Proverbs and Proverbial Observations concerning Husbandry, Weather and the Seasons of the year"; and "Proverbs and Proverbial Observations referring to Love, Wedlock and Women" (those three sections mix true proverbs with

formularized superstitions or rules of conduct, and their contents are not alphabetized). In the somewhat expanded edition of 1678, there is inserted at this point a short miscellaneous section labeled "An Alphabet of Joculatory, Nugatory and Rustick Proverbs"; followed by a "Miscellany of Proverbiall Sayings" with several subsections, such as 24 "Proverbiall Periphrases of one [who is] drunk" and 14 for "A Whore." Then comes, in both the 1670 and 1678 editions, what must be regarded as the main body of the collection: over a thousand "Proverbs that are entire Sentences"; several hundred "Proverbial Phrases and forms of speech that are not entire Sentences"; several dozen proverbial comparisons, first "Proverbial Similes, in which the quality and subject begin with the same letter" ("As bare as a bird's arse," "As blind as a beetle or bat," "To blush like a black dog," "As bold as blind bayard," etc.); then "Others" (that is, non-alliterating proverbial similes); and a handful of "Proverbial Rhythmes [that is, rhymes], and old saws." There follow 39 pages of additional sayings that refer to the various counties of England; then 38 pages of Scottish proverbs, alphabetized not by key word but by first word, for which Ray cited Fergusson as the source; then a number of "adagia Hebraica," printed in Hebrew.

So, in the central section headed "Proverbs that are entire Sentences," in the enlarged 1678 edition, the alphabetical sequence begins (with the key words italicized), "Long *absent*, soon forgotten"; "*Adversity* makes a man wise, not rich"; "He that's *afraid* of every grass must not piss in a meadow"; and so on. The section devoted to "Proverbial Phrases" commences with "To bring an *Abbey* to a grange"; "To commit as many *absurdities* as a clown in eating an egg"; "*Afraid* of far enough"; and so on.

Although he may not have thought of it as a useful citation system, Ray employed another device that would become standard in the major proverb dictionaries of the twentieth century: beneath each letter in his alphabetical presentation, he numbered the individual proverbs. Therefore, a user of the book in its 1670 edition – if he wished to, or needed to – could cite the proverb "A man cannot live by *air*" as A8; "You can't make a *horn* of a pigs tail" as H51; "After a *storm* comes a calm" as S91. Regrettably, perhaps, the numbering was abandoned for the 1678 edition and subsequent ones. The insertion of additional proverbs would have rendered that system of citation clumsy anyhow, since the edition would have to be specified with each citation.

Ray's strategy of alphabetizing proverbs by their key terms had been anticipated by Giovanni Torriano's *Piazza universale de proverbi Italiani; or, A Common Place of Italian Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases*, 1666 (Torri-

ano's earlier and smaller *Select Italian Proverbs*, 1642, had alphabetized in the "old" way, by initial word). The compiler explained, "In each Alphabet [that is, 'proverbs' and 'proverbial phrases,' grouped separately] I make some main significant word to lead, usually the first Substantive, seldom the Verb, unless taken substantively […]. The *Italian* leading word hath an [*] *Asterism* to it, and the *English* Interpretation just opposite [that is, in a facing column] with the same *Asterism*." There is no evidence that Ray was aware of Torriano's massive collection; otherwise, Ray might have pondered the advantage of not employing so many different categories of proverbs, with separate alphabetizing; Torriano had just the two, "proverbs" and "proverbial phrases." In any case, Torriano's book is a dictionary of Italian proverbs, with English translations (few of which resemble English proverbs), for the use of Englishmen seeking to learn the language and the ways of Italy. Although it was published in London, it does not really belong to a survey of ways in which English proverbs have been compiled.

3.   Later collections

In the eighteenth century, the making of extensive collections of proverbs and proverbial phrases continued, though without much innovativeness in procedures for compiling them. In 1721 James Kelly published his *Complete Collection of Scottish Proverbs, Explained and Made Intelligible to the English Reader*, about 3,000 Scottish sayings, briefly glossed, occasionally with parallels in other languages. Since most of the Scottish proverbs are also "English" proverbs, the glosses have value for the ascertaining of the sense and functions of archaic sayings in both dialects. Kelly commenced the long and regrettable tradition of explicitly "purifying" the stock of expressions; he omitted not only ungodly "superstitious observations" and "those Proverbs that seem to make too homely with the Almighty," along with "proverbial Imprecations with which the *Scots* abound," but also sayings that "are openly obscene, and these are very many, pat, and expressive […]. [I]t does not become a man of my Age and Profession to write them." Presumably for reasons of economy rather than piety or purity, he also omitted "insignificant comparisons" (similes), "which can make no Man the wiser or better for using, or knowing them," and "trifling By-Words, and proverbial phrases, I mean such as are equally silly and useless."

For his arrangement of entries, Kelly resorted to the old practice of alphabetizing by the very first word of proverbs; he regretted having encoun-

tered too late the collection of "the ingenious Mr. *Ray*" (in print for 50 years at the time!), with its superior method of identifying proverbs by key terms: "Otherways I had certainly imitated him in his rational Alphabetical Method." To atone, Kelly attached an index of "principal" words. Several other collections of Scottish proverbs appeared during the next century-and-a-half. Allan Ramsay was said to be so displeased with Kelly's poor representation of the Scots dialect that he published his own compilation in 1736 (some 2,500 proverbs). Other collections of various sizes and arrangements (some with multiple editions) were published by Andrew Henderson (1832), Alexander Hislop (1862), Charles Mackay (1888), and Andrew Cheviot (1896), with little in the way of commentary or innovative presentation.

Thomas Fuller's famous *Gnomologia: Adagies and Proverbs; Wise Sentences and Witty Sayings, Ancient and Modern, Foreign and British* (1732) was notable for the sheer quantity of its entries; including addenda. The proverbs (mostly English but some in other languages) are consecutively numbered 1–6,496. Of the sequencing of the entries, without glosses or annotations, Fuller acknowledged, "I use the alphabetical Order of the initial Words, not as any help to the Reader, but to my self, that I might the better avoid Repetitions."

Even as late as 1869, W. Carew Hazlitt's *English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases* had improved on its predecessors only in regard to the numerousness of its entries, alphabetized in the old manner by first words, and its occasional citations of literary analogs or sources. The same was true of Vincent Stuckey Lean's multi-volume *Collectanea of Proverbs (English & Foreign), Folk-Lore, and Superstitions*, posthumously published (and poorly arranged) in 1902–1904. The most significant advance in the presentation of proverbial expressions since John Ray's collection of 1670 came with G. L. Apperson's *English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases: A Historical Dictionary*, 1929; the introduction calls the volume "a humble offshoot from the great parent stock of the Oxford English Dictionary." In the first place, Apperson followed Ray in alphabetizing proverbs according to key substantive words, with occasional cross-references in the case of expressions with multiple key words. In the second place, he followed the *O.E.D.* in quoting, in chronological sequence, contextualized instances of each saying from printed sources. Even the magnificent example set by Apperson, however, did not immediately change the course of proverb compilations. W. G. Smith, editing the *Oxford Dictionary of English Proverbs* in 1936, alphabetized by the first words, with 550 entries grouped by the initial article "A," 900 by "The," 920 by "He" (of those, almost half

begin "He that ____"). In 1948, however, the second edition alphabetized the entries by key words.

By the 1930s, as the discipline of folklore matured, a new generation of paremiologists was emerging (Apperson, for all his skill and wisdom, was neither a folklorist nor a philologist). Archer Taylor's ground-breaking monograph *The Proverb* appeared in 1931, the first comprehensive consideration in English of the nature of proverbs – their kinds, origins, structure, rhetoric, and applications. With the inspiration of Taylor and the example of Apperson, a new era of proverb "dictionaries" (as they were now called) dawned. Perhaps working independently, Bartlett Jere Whiting for a two-part compilation of early Scottish proverbs (1949–1951) and Morris Palmer Tilley for his *Dictionary of the Proverbs in England in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (1950) standardized the procedure that would prevail among American scholars: alphabetizing proverbs by their first noun – even if a preceding verb or modifier seems more "key." In the absence of any noun, a proverb is alphabetized by its first finite verb or (lacking one) by the first important word. Taylor and Whiting's dictionary of nineteenth-century American proverbs (1958) followed that procedure, as did Whiting's collections of medieval proverbs (1968), early American proverbs (1977), and modern proverbs, British and American (1989). The third edition of the *Oxford Dictionary of English Proverbs*, redone by F. P. Wilson (1970), alphabetized by an intuitively-determined first important word, with numerous cross-references from other significant words and citations of a proverb's corresponding entry in Tilley's collection. (Specialized dictionaries have extensively compiled English and American proverbs from every historical period, with the conspicuous exception of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England.)

In a sense, to call such collections of proverbs "dictionaries" is a misnomer, since few of them give "definitions" or explanations beyond what a user of the book can infer from the illustrative quotations. The early collections that merely listed sayings with no quotations or any other explanations are even less informative. A single sequence of words can have great variability in meaning. Once educated English speakers forgot their Latin, the ancient "Ars longa, vita brevis" – with its proverbial English translation "Art is long, but life is short" – stopped meaning "It takes many years to master one's craft, yet the time left in which to practice it is short" and came to be understood, rather, as meaning "Art [in the sense of artistic creations, like a Grecian urn] can last virtually forever, while individual lifetimes are brief and fleeting." The bellicose American slogan from Cold

War times, "Better dead than red," once its occasion and motivation passed out of memory, was still uttered but now by children taunting red-haired playmates. Not just over time but even synchronically the situation obtains. To cite a well-known example: whether a "rolling stone" is to be commended or reproved for gathering "no moss" (depending on what tradition the speaker of the proverb follows – Scottish or English). Or, is someone who utters the proverb "Time flies" having fun – or about to die? The *Oxford Dictionary of English Proverbs* often does include brief explanations, as do the three (expanding) editions of the *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs* (Simpson 1982; Simpson 1992; Simpson and Speake 1998), which culminated in the *Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs* (called the fourth edition; Speake 2003).

4.   Problems of inclusion

The compiler of a dictionary of proverbs must first *recognize* an expression as proverbial in order for it to gain entry, and that recognition can depend heavily on what previous compilers of proverbs have recorded. Not only will early proverbs that have seldom or never been collected as such likely be excluded from historical dictionaries of proverbs, but new proverbs are unlikely to be admitted. In preparing "regular" dictionaries – dictionaries of words – editors or publishers routinely engage whole squadrons of paid and unpaid logophiles who are ever vigilant for new coinages and new uses, taking as their data base the whole panoply of current language acts: newspapers, magazines, books, technical journals, television, radio, popular music, motion pictures, e-mail, s-mail, junk-mail, and oral discourse. Everyone knows that the lexicon of a language continually grows. But the case is different with dictionaries of proverbs.

Even B.J. Whiting's invaluable collection *Modern Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases*, published in 1989, was not particularly "modern" in its purview. It was based on notes taken by Whiting as he detected proverbs in the course of his lifelong "light" reading (especially mystery novels); most of the works cited date from the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, with some citations from as late as the 1970s and early 1980s.

All the twentieth-century compilations just referred to are "text-based"; that is, in the fashion of the *OED*, for each entry they illustrate the proverb with brief quotations (sometimes just citations), in chronological sequence, taken from printed sources. Often the historical citations in an entry will refer

to early printed collections of proverbs, dubiously attesting to the currency of a given proverb at the times the previous collections were published.

A different approach served as the basis for Wolfgang Mieder, Stuart Kingsbury, and Kelsey Harder's *Dictionary of American Proverbs* (1992). The entries derive from an extensive collecting project sponsored by the American Dialect Society and supervised by the late Margaret M. Bryant, in which academicians and laypeople were encouraged to write down and mail in expressions that they had heard and that sounded proverbial to them; mostly, the items were submitted between the mid-1940s and the mid-1970s.

5. Currency and newness

Even for an expert paremiologist like Whiting, and even more for the largely untrained contributors to the American Dialect Society's project, it takes time for the consciousness to register a new expression as proverbial and thus for it to be "collectable" from oral or written sources. So the proverbs that one period – including our own – has recognized as such nearly always entered traditional lore in an earlier period.

As a sort of experiment, a few years ago, I tested that aspect of "currency" in a dictionary that explicitly prided itself on the abundance of "new" proverbs it contained (Doyle 1996 and 2001). The dust jacket of the *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs* (Simpson 1982) proclaimed, "Every major proverb in use in the twentieth century, old or new, is included" (*major* being, I suppose, a wiggle-word in such a preposterous claim for a *concise* dictionary!). Yet the dictionary contained only 21 sayings for which it gave, as the earliest dating, the twentieth century. The second edition of the *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs* (Simpson 1992) made equally lofty claims for the inclusion of new proverbs, a "general history of all proverbs in common use in Britain in the twentieth century" (Simpson 1992: ix); however, it added to the 21 in the first edition only 11 proverbs that were (according to the earliest dates cited) new in the twentieth century – and just *one* newer than the newest entered in the 1982 edition. The third edition (Simpson and Speake 1998), according to the Oxford University Press's online catalog, was "updated to include every major proverb in use in the twentieth century." Now exactly 12 "new," twentieth-century proverbs had been added to those in the earlier editions. With no great effort, I listed some 200 additional proverbs that had likely been coined in the twentieth century, or expressions that became current as proverbs in that century.

Even the perceived "newness" or recency of coinage of proverbs can be illusory, an artifact of the incomplete information available in proverb dictionaries. "'Tis new *to thee*," as Shakespeare's Prospero muttered to Miranda. Perhaps the case is simply that no compiler previously thought to enter the proverb. The antedating of expressions as they are recorded in proverb dictionaries is often easy.

Whatever the "data base" used for a compilation of proverbs, then, the problem of *currency* obtains. Like all dictionaries, proverb dictionaries are out-of-date at the moment of their publication. Fixed data bases, obviously, contain only sayings that were proverbial in a past time. Once collections of proverbs proliferated in print, each relying on its predecessors, there began to emerge something like a *canon* of proverbs in the English language. An expression is certified as proverbial by its inclusion in a published collection of proverbs, which recognizes an expression as proverbial by its having been including in still earlier collections of proverbs. *New* proverbs need not apply for entry!

A corollary aspect of the problem of currency in proverb dictionaries is ascertaining just when the expressions *were* common in oral tradition, and among what groups of speakers. After all, a saying that was *once* proverbial may disappear from oral tradition – in which case it has ceased to be a proverb. Or, an expression that is proverbial among one group of speakers may have no currency in the oral traditions of other groups. Unlike regular dictionaries – which routinely label individual words as "obsolete," "archaic," "rare," or in some other way limited as to their historical, geographical, or social distribution – proverb dictionaries tend to imply that once an expression is designated a proverb, it remains proverbial forever – and that a proverb belonging to any group of English speakers is a proverb of the *English language* at large, as if English speakers constitute a folkgroup.

For compilers of proverbs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whose aim was (in effect) to widen students' repertory of sayings for rhetorical and argumentative use, the distinction was not so important. Even an unknown proverb (therefore, in a sense, not a proverb at all) could serve a writer's or an orator's purposes.

Despite the implied assumption of many later proverb dictionaries that proverbs entered in early published collections must have been current at the time the compilation was published, no claim of currency was regularly made by the early compilers themselves. Take, for example, Thomas Fuller's *Gnomologia* (1732) which was subtitled *Adagies and Proverbs; Wise Sentences and Witty Sayings, Ancient and Modern, Foreign and British*: Of the

6496 proverbs listed – without glosses or annotations – all we can really know, finally, is that, at least in one compiler's mind, a given expression was proverbial – or *had* been proverbial in some country, language, and era. Fuller himself confessed, "all that I take upon me here to do, is only to throw together a vast confus'd heap of unsorted Things, old and new, which you may pick over and make use of." Yet later scholars persist in citing Fuller as evidence that given proverbs were current in 1732.

John Ray was aware of the matter of currency; he gave, as the first of several categories of sayings in his collection, some 500 "Sentences and Phrases found in the former Collections of Proverbs, the most of them not now in common use for such, so far as I know." However, as with his advanced method of alphabetizing, Ray's recognition of proverbial obsolescence was largely ignored by other collectors.

6. Issues of province

To reiterate a crucial point: Even for a proverb whose meaning can be reliably determined and whose currency is demonstrable at a given point in history, there is seldom any good way, from the early published collections of English proverbs – and even some later ones – to identify what folkgroups within a culture, language, or nation the proverb has belonged to.

Prior to the late nineteenth century, when the folklore of individual counties of England began to be collected and published, and when American speech and American folklore came to be recognized as distinct from British, little effort was exerted to learn *which* English speakers knew and used which proverbs. The notable exception was Scottish proverbs; those, since the sixteenth century, had been regularly gathered into separate collections, most of them full of perfectly English proverbs rendered in a Scotch-looking dialect more colorful than believable. And the posthumous publication in 1640 of George Herbert's compilation titled *Outlandish Proverbs* did imply that the "outlands" of England had proverbs that were partly different from those encountered in London. In general, though, few collectors or commentators thought of proverbs as sayings that would be used – originally, if not principally – only by subgroups within a culture.

Initially, at the time of its entrance into oral tradition, *every* proverb belongs to a limited group within the amorphous populace that speaks the language. Archer Taylor's monograph *The Proverb* (1931), a cross-cultural and taxonomic study that blazed the trail for later investigations into the seman-

tics and cultural functions of proverbs, made it possible – indeed, necessary – to think of proverbs as sentences actually being *spoken* under specific circumstances: *performed*, as a later generation of folklorists would say. The oral performance of a proverb takes place, first, not in the culture or nation but in particular subgroups having common interests, perceptions, and formulations of experience. From there, a saying may migrate to different groups or more inclusive groups, sometimes being adopted, eventually, by a group comprising the majority of speakers of the language.

7. "Gendered" proverbs

To focus, by way of illustration, on some particular subgroups of English speakers: Given the profound effect that "gender" has on the way a person perceives and interacts with the social world, we may wonder why the very concept of gender-specific proverbs has attracted so little attention. Perhaps because we assume (no doubt rightly) that women are the principal transmitters of language itself – the "mother tongue" – from generation to generation, to children of both sexes. We have supposed that proverbs are taught indiscriminately, along with other sorts of language acts, to both boys and girls, who will then possess the same repertories of proverbs for their own use.

As for proverbs *about* gender-specific concerns, the easy and common assumption has been that proverbs express and help perpetuate prevailing codes of male dominance, including not only outright misogyny but also a patronizing fondness for the fair sex and her foibles. The fact that women and men have presumably used many of the same proverbs about women – used them in similar ways, with some of the same implications – would simply show how thoroughly women have been acculturated and unconsciously oppressed. So we have numerous scholarly articles and student papers and at least one full length book that examine proverbs in order to identify and analyze (and usually denounce) American culture's, or English-speaking culture's, or Western culture's attitudes toward women. (The book is Lois Kerschen's *American Proverbs about Women*, 1998.) Such discussions seldom stop to ask difficult questions: Just *which* speakers actually use given proverbs? With what frequency? How currently? With precisely what meanings? How often do so-called "sexist" proverbs, as they are actually used, imply skepticism or irony regarding the presumed attitudes expressed by the proverbs (as read out of context)?

Wolfgang Mieder (1987), while noting "the obvious antifeminism prevalent in proverbs," also identified an emerging trend, still "relatively rare," he said, which he called "liberated" proverbs, most of them being what he would elsewhere term *antiproverbs* – parodies or ironic applications of familiar sayings (Mieder 1982–1989, Mieder and Tóthné Litovkina 1999). Thus "A woman's place is in the home" was altered to become a political slogan of female candidates for Congress or state legislatures: "A woman's place is in the House." Proverbs in German, and less commonly in English, of the formula (often rhyming) "A woman without a man is like a _____ without a _____" (in English, for example, "A woman without a man is like a handle without a pan," which itself parallels "A man without a wife is like a fork without a knife") became the now-famous "A woman without a man is like a fish without a bicycle" (besides the grotesquery of the image, another parodic attribute is the pointed lack of rhyme). In the year 2005, I believe, such "liberated" proverbs are no longer rare: now we hear the adapted saying "A woman's place is any damned place she wants to be," while "A man's got to do what a man's got to do. A woman has to do what he can't." And, it turns out, "Size *does* matter" to women. Examples could be multiplied.

Not all "liberated" proverbs, however, are antiproverbs; some are simply proverbs, apparently of somewhat recent coinage. More proudly, even aggressively, matriarchal than "The hand that rocks the cradle rules the world" or "Mother always knows best" is the saying "If Mama ain't happy, ain't nobody happy" – or (Mama speaking downright belligerently) "I brought you into this world, and I can take you out of it!" The proverb "You have to kiss a lot of frogs before you find a prince" expresses the difficulty and frustration modern women may feel in locating a desirable male partner, and it warns against precipitous commitments, perhaps even licensing women to experiment physically in the course of their search (though the verb *kiss* must be construed metaphorically as well). In the process of their experimenting, safe-sex-conscious women are now free to insist, "No glove, no love." When the experimentation goes badly, a woman may lament, "Men are only good for one thing, and sometimes they aren't even good for that." While modern women may regret having been seen as mere sex objects, they need not feel inhibited: "If you've got it, flaunt it." And even among heterosexual women, sisterhood can be prized above the uncertain attractions of male companionship: "Chicks before dicks."

Some proverbs uttered by modern women are sad – and not very "liberated": College-aged women, with their "body-image issues" and their prone-

ness to eating disorders, say "A moment on the lips, forever on the hips," and "It's better to look good than to feel good."

The foregoing proverbs I have learned from my students, who are preponderantly female. Part of my point here is to caution that such proverbs do not necessarily belong to "Americans" at large (much less "English speakers") or even to "women" – but perhaps only to women of a particular age, social class, mindset, and geographical area. To illustrate how a proverb can be highly localized in its circulation and its reference: At the University of Georgia, where I teach, the number of female students is almost double the number of males, and the male students frequently gravitate to majors in business, agriculture, and the sciences. So unattached women in a liberal arts curriculum often lament the scarcity of potential male partners. Seventy miles to the west stands Georgia Tech, with its predominantly male student body. Women at the University of Georgia have a proverb on the subject: At Georgia Tech, the proverb notes, "The odds are good, but the goods are odd." (I wonder if the same proverb – or a similar one – can be heard in reference to Cal Tech or Texas A&M or other colleges that traditionally have enrolled more frogs than princesses.)

Men have their own proverbs, generally not spoken to women, often not known by women, usually not recorded in proverb dictionaries, many of them probably of recent origin. These proverbs seem to be obsessively sexual – and more brutally so than current women's proverbs: We men not only "Love 'em and leave 'em" (maybe we sometimes *prefer* such relationships); we even less delicately (though just as alliteratively) "Fuck 'em and forget 'em." Of course, it is possible that women, in the post-*Sex-in-the-City* age, have comparable expressions or similar attitudes, and that my female students have protected my own delicate sensibilities from knowing their hard-core folk expressions. Present-day men, I believe, most often assume a measure of irony when uttering flagrantly antifeminist proverbs; perhaps we have at least learned to be embarrassed about expressing certain attitudes. To reiterate the point: proverb scholars must take care to ascertain exactly *which* men use the sayings, under what circumstances, in what style, with what implications. A proverb authentically exists only in the process of its "performance."

Predictably, many male proverbs focus on genital concerns. The saying "You can swim in a red river, but you can't drink from it" helps us remember when (in the menstrual cycle of a partner) to perform which sex acts. The proverb "If she takes care of her feet, she keeps it neat" enables us to predict the degree of "neatness" that "it" may ultimately reveal – the ante-

cedent of *it* being a woman's pubic area; I think the proverb first referred to hygiene, but with the evolution of recent fads, it can now refer to the grooming of pubic hair. Now young men as well as young women have started shaving their pubic hair. Since adolescent males traditionally take pride in having acquired that token of their virility, the practice calls for explanation; one proverbial explanation reveals a fundamental male insecurity: "If the hedge is trimmed, the house looks bigger" – for (as we now know) "Size *does* matter" to modern women.

Certainly men are capable of satirizing the stereotype of themselves as sexist pigs. Many proverbs boast of males' indiscriminate sexual voracity: If a woman is homely, then "Cover her face with a flag and fuck for Old Glory." There are no age restrictions on sexual partners; the younger the better: "If there's no grass on the field, call it practice"; "If they're old enough to crawl, they're in the right position." It is hard to imagine that such expressions would be uttered "seriously" – as practical advice to gender-mates, or as the received wisdom of the ages! I have heard such proverbs spoken only in the manner of quips or jokes – for example, hyperbolically chiding a man seen in the amorous company of a much younger woman. Maybe there is even something redemptive in the undiscriminating attraction to all women; after all, how different, in its "meaning," is the wholesome proverb "Beauty is only skin deep" from the newer male proverb "It's all pink on the inside"? At least *that* is not the sentiment that gives rise to anorexia in young women.

Dictionaries of proverbs are rightly cautious about including expressions that may prove ephemeral. Yet such compilations register numerous old proverbs for which only one or two instances could be discovered in print. In general, proverb dictionaries are much more inclined to enter expressions that are archaic or obsolete than those that carry the aura of newness, thus ensuring that the compilation will be biased against "currency" on both chronological ends. Admittedly, my focus on "gendered" proverbs, so often sexual in imagery or application, may not be a good example of sayings that belong specifically to a delimited group within the larger culture. Collections that are text-based will inevitably record sexual proverbs more seldom – and with fewer attestations – than other sorts of expressions, however commonly sexual proverbs may have occurred in oral tradition; after all, prudery wields a heavy hand in the determining of what is printable in any genre. The prudish publishing industry and its employees, in turn, ultimately govern what proverbs will be deemed fit to print in proverb dictionaries. The Oxford University Press, especially, prizes modesty ("No

sex, please; we're English"!). So the expurgatory tradition in proverb compilations, explicitly adopted by James Kelly in 1721, still survives.

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Yankee wisdom: American proverbs and the worldview of New England

Wolfgang Mieder

It is a commonplace by now that proverbs are cultural signs for recurrent social situations. They are employed as verbal strategies to assure meaningful communication, albeit in a metaphorical and indirect fashion (Burke 1941). The wisdom contained in these pithy and formulaic utterances is based on observations and experiences that are believed to be of a general enough nature that they merit couching into memorable and repeatable statements. Over time these sentences gain general currency among people, from ethnic, professional, or social groups on to regions, countries, and continents. Some traditional proverbs have reached people throughout the world by means of loan translations and the powerful modern mass media, indicating that at least some proverbs like *Time flies*; *One hand washes the other* or *Big fish eat little fish* express truths that are universally recognized (Taylor 1931; Röhrich and Mieder 1977). But there are, of course, also countless proverbs that have not reached such broad geographic distribution. In fact, many proverbs have remained confined to nationally and linguistically defined areas. In a large country like the United States, one might indeed speak of proverbs that pertain primarily to certain minorities or regions. Nevertheless, there is bound to be much overlap, and it is an involved task to find those proverbs that "belong" to a certain group or area. Above all, scholars need be extremely careful in drawing generalized conclusions about the national or ethnic character of a people by simply amassing their proverbs. And yet, keeping that caveat in mind, proverbs can be interpreted as reflecting at least in part the social and moral value system or the worldview of those who use them. This would be especially true for those proverbs that are used with high frequency by most citizens of a region such as, for example, New England.

1. Proverbs as traditional signs of cultural values

Cultural and social historians, folklorists, linguists, and paremiologists have expended much energy in studying proverbs both as expressions of national

character and cultural worldview (see Mieder 1982, 1990, 1993, 2001; Mieder and Sobieski 2003). The former approach to proverbs has often resulted in proving a certain preconceived stereotypical view of a nation or an ethnic or social minority. It is relatively easy to put together small collections of proverbs that will describe typical Poles or Spaniards in a light that would not necessarily be very flattering. Before and during Nazi Germany, several books appeared that contained nothing but anti-Semitic proverbs at the exclusion of the many positive proverbs about the Jewish population (Mieder 1993: 225–255). Fortunately, there are also many studies that have looked at proverbs in a more balanced fashion, trying to ascertain whether folklore in general and proverbs in particular do express "folk ideas", "cultural axioms", "essential postulates", "worldview", or a certain "mentality", to use a term that has been applied to such investigations more recently. More than three decades ago folklorist Alan Dundes stated the task at hand quite clearly:

> What is important is the task of identifying the various underlying assumptions held by members of a given culture. All cultures have underlying assumptions and it is these assumptions or folk ideas which are the building blocks of worldview. Any one worldview will be based upon many individual folk ideas and if one is seriously interested in studying worldview, one will need first to describe some of the folk ideas which contribute to the formation of that worldview. Sometimes, folk ideas may be articulated in a particular proverb or exemplum, but if folk ideas are normally expressed not in one but rather a variety of genres, then it is imperative that the folklorist make the attempt to extrapolate such ideas from the folklore as a whole. To do this, the folklorist must of necessity escape the self-imposed bind of genres and categories. Once one has identified a number of folk ideas present in a culture, one may begin to perceive what the pattern, if any, of these ideas is and how each of the ideas is related to the total worldview of that culture. (Dundes 1972a: 96)

In a perfect scholarly world, this comprehensive approach would indeed be the ideal way to proceed. But most scholars have to limit themselves to a certain genre, let's say the proverb, leaving it to others to investigate additional areas of inquiry to complete the picture. Dundes himself has provided a rather inclusive folkloristic model in his exemplary study *Life is Like a Chicken Coop Ladder: A Portrait of German Culture through Folklore* (1984) that draws on proverbs, proverbial expressions, graffiti, children's rhymes, riddles, folk songs, fairy tales, folk tales, etc. On a narrower scope, there do exist numerous studies looking at proverbs as cultural signs of certain aspects of worldview, as for example A.A. Roback's "The Yiddish Proverb:

A Study in Folk Psychology" (1918), D.B. Shimkin and Pedro Sanjuan's "Culture and World View: A Method of Analysis Applied to Rural Russia" (1953), Joseph Raymond's "Attitudes and Cultural Patterns in Spanish Proverbs" (1954), Alpha C. Chiang's "Religion, Proverbs, and Economic Mentality [in China]" (1961), Huynh Dinh Tê's *Vietnamese Cultural Patterns and Values as Expressed in Proverbs* (1963), Matti Kuusi's "Fatalistic Traits in Finnish Proverbs" (1967), Austin J. Shelton's "Relativism, Pragmatism, and Reciprocity in Igbo Proverbs" (1971), and Ǧorǧ Mifsud-Chircop's "Proverbiality and Worldview in Maltese and Arabic Proverbs" (2001).

The titles of these publications reveal that they are meant to be no more than part of a larger mosaic. But proverbs are also especially suitable in the attempt to assemble a collective representation of the worldview or mentality of people bound together by a common culture. Semiotic proverb studies in particular can shed much light on the meaning and function of proverbs as cultural signs (Grzybek 1987), and this is particularly the case if scholars include historical data. After all, proverbs come and go, and it is of considerable relevance to ascertain, for example, which proverbs were of special importance to British people during the eighteenth century if scholars want to reach a conclusion about attitudes and mores during that time (see Obelkevich 1987). At the same time, it is important to know what proverbs are in actual and frequent use among the population of New England in order to reach at least some conclusions about commonly held values. As Zuzana Profantová has put it so aptly, "the proverbial tradition [must be understood] as a cultural-historical and social phenomenon" (1998: 302). In any case, proverbs and other phraseological units represent "a language of culture" (Telija 1998: 783) that permits scholars to draw valid conclusions about the worldview or mentality of those speakers who make vigorous and continued use of them.

In a fascinating article on "Proverbs and Cultural Models: An American Psychology of Problem Solving" (1987), Geoffrey M. White has shown that proverbs "accomplish both conceptual and pragmatic work" (1987: 151), i.e., they express generalities based on experiences and observations and are used to make moral or ethical recommendations in socio-cultural contexts. By means of numerous examples, he shows that Americans in general have a positive attitude toward solving problems, a trait that is epitomized by their frequent use of the proverb *Where there is a will, there is a way*. Some years earlier, Alan Dundes succeeded splendidly in illustrating that such proverbs as *Forgive and forget* and *Seeing is believing* indicate a future and visual orientation in the American worldview as well

(Dundes 1969, 1972b). And now there is also Kim Lau's detailed investigation that shows by means of thousands of proverb references found in giant databases of the mass media that the following proverbs are among the most frequently used: *Time will tell*; *First come, first served*; *Forgive and forget*; *Time is money*; *Time flies*; *Better late than never*, and *Out of sight, out of mind* (Lau 1996: 137). Clearly they must relate to American cultural values, indicating in particular that "time entertains a primary position in American culture and ideology" (Lau 1996: 146). It should not be surprising that these proverbs belong to the so-called paremiological minimum of those three hundred proverbs that are employed with high frequency both in oral and written communication in the United States (see Mieder 1993: 41–57; Tóthné Litovkina 1996: 365–372, 1998: 151–154).

It stands to reason that especially those proverbs with high familiarity ratings and frequent occurrences in speech acts and written sources express at least in part the worldview of those people using them. The proverbs help people to orient themselves in the environment where they live. Zuzana Profantová has spoken of the "image of the world" that is contained in proverbs, but she also points out that they represent a "system of values" (1996: 719) offering social norms, commands, prohibitions, etc. Peter Grzybek has echoed these observations, arguing that proverbs represent normative strategies for social conduct. In fact, proverbs are seen as social norms coupled with value judgments (Grzybek 1998: 138), thus in fact making them valuable cultural expressions of the worldview or mentality of those people who accept them as preformulated models of wisdom.

2.   American proverbs and worldview

The United States are a country of immigrants, and while the English language connects various ethnic and social groups linguistically, there is a plethora of native languages used in this giant land with Spanish gaining ever greater prominence. All of the people who came to America brought their proverbs with them, and it is thus difficult to speak of "American" proverbs as such, especially since a large number of those proverbs current in the United States go back to English sources. There are also proverbs from antiquity, various religions, and the Middle Ages that had entered English and other languages through loan translations for centuries before the new settlers carried them across the ocean. Proverbs like *Big fish eat little fish*; *Man does not live by bread alone* (Deuteronomy 8:3; Matthew 4:4), or

Strike while the iron is hot are known throughout most European languages (Paczolay 1997), and their currency is widespread in American communication as well. There are, of course, also typically English proverbs, as for example *The early bird catches the worm*; *Make hay while the sun shines*; *A penny saved is a penny earned*, and *A stitch in time saves nine*. And to be sure, America has its very own proverbs as well: *Paddle your own canoe* (expressing the spirit of independence), *One picture is worth a thousand words* (emphasis on the visual, see Mieder 1993: 135–151), *What is good for General Motors, is good for America* (big business), *Life begins at forty* (youthfulness), *Garbage in, garbage out* (world of computers), and even the scatological *Shit happens* (fate). In other words, proverbs are still being coined today, while others drop out since they do not fit modern attitudes and mores any longer. Proverbs like *A woman's tongue wags like a lamb's tail* or *Spare the rod and spoil the child* have disappeared or are on their way out, while such proverbs as *A woman without a man is like a fish without a bicycle* or *There is no free lunch* are steadily gaining in currency.

Regarding the proverbs of certain ethnic and social groups, the striking lack of proverbs among Native Americans remains a conundrum. While thousands of proverbs have been gathered for most peoples, the recorded proverbs of the indigenous peoples of the American continent barely reach a few hundred texts, among them *The road is still open, but it will close* (referring to behavioral etiquette) and *A deer, though toothless, may accomplish something* (don't judge by appearances) (Mieder 1989a: 99–110). In comparison, the African American culture is especially rich in proverbs, including the wisdom necessary to survive slavery: *De proudness un a man don't count w'en his head's cold* and *Dem w'at eats kin say grace*. But there are also more modern proverbs which have their origin among the Black population and which have entered general American folk speech: *What goes around comes around* and, of course, the truly liberating and quintessential American proverb *Different strokes for different folks* from the 1950s (Daniel 1973; Mieder 1989a: 111–128).

As expected, the large Spanish speaking population is having an ever greater influence on proverbs throughout the United States. With the Spanish language also gaining steadily in importance, many proverbs are in fact current in Spanish, among them *El que nace para maceta del corredor na pasa* (He who is born to be a flower pot will not go beyond the porch) and *A nopal nomás lo van a ver cuando tiene tunas* (People go to the cactus only when it bears fruit). Bilingualism will, over time, also result in loan translations into English, thus spreading these primarily Mexican, Cuban,

and Puerto Rican proverbs throughout the country and enriching the English-language repertoire. This has happened, for example, with two German proverbs which the Pennsylvania Germans and other German immigrant groups brought with them to the United States, namely *Man darf das Kind nicht mit dem Bade ausschütten* (Don't throw the baby out with the bath water) and *Der Apfel fällt nicht weit vom Stamm* (The apple does not fall far from the tree) (Mieder 1993: 193–224, 2000: 109–144). Immigrants from other countries have brought a wealth of new proverbs to North America, among them Chinese, Haitian, Irish, Italian, Russian, Scandinavian, and Vietnamese proverbs. And the Jews with their rich Yiddish proverb treasure have also had a great influence with such wise and revealing proverbs as *Laykhter tsen lender eyder eyn mentshn tsu derkenen* (It is easier to know ten countries than one man) and *Tsum shtarbn darf men keyn luakh nit hobn* (You don't need a calendar to die) (Mieder 1989a: 47–70).

Just as certain ethnic and immigrant groups have their own proverbs, the different professions have also formulated proverbs that fit their interests. Proverbs like *An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure* and *An apple a day keeps the doctor away* are old health rules, while *If you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras* is a modern piece of advice to young physicians who might be looking too hard for rare diseases rather than common ailments. Just as medical doctors, lawyers have legal rules to fall back on, such as *A man's home is his castle*; *First come, first served*, and even that infamous proverbial statement *If the glove doesn't fit, you must acquit*. But there are as well proverbs that are current among farmers, teachers, business people, artists, trades people, soldiers, athletes, politicians, etc. A few examples would be *If the farmer fails, all will starve*; *Experience is the best teacher*; *Business before pleasure*; *Art is long, life is short*; *Two of a trade seldom agree*; *Old soldiers never die*; *Winning isn't everything*, and *You can't beat city hall*. But aspects of the American worldview are also expressed in certain lines of popular songs that have become proverbs, as for example *The grass is always greener on the other side of the fence* (Mieder 1994: 515–542) and *It takes two to tango*. Popular culture, films, and the entire mass media use plenty of proverbs, and they certainly create new ones to fit innovative attitudes, as for example *Hindsight is twenty-twenty*; *Life is just a bowl of cherries*; *Shit or get off the pot*, and *You're only young once*. While proverbs continue to be cited in their standard wording in the modern age, they quite often get changed into so-called anti-proverbs that intentionally vary the wording of the traditional wisdom, as for example *No body is perfect*; *Curiosity grilled the cat*, and *Chaste makes haste*. Journal-

ists enjoy playing with proverbs in their headlines, and such altered proverbs are also often found in advertisements to draw attention to a special product. Some of these anti-proverbs do become new proverbs. After all, there is no reason why the playful thought of *Home is where the computer is* should not be a new insight in a world where everybody is connected to a computer most of the time.

What all of this means is that it is very difficult to speak of *the* American proverbs. Already in the early 1930s the American paremiologist Richard Jente was able to show that of a collection of 199 supposedly American proverbs only 10 or a mere 5% were in fact coined in the United States, among them *Don't kick a fellow when he is down*; *It pays to advertise*, and *Paddle your own canoe* (Jente 1931–1932; Mieder 1989a: 29–45). About the same time, the American poet Carl Sandburg (1878–1967) with his ear close to the ground of proverbial folk speech, composed his long poem *Good Morning, America* (1928) as well as his epic poem *The People, Yes* (1936) (see Mieder 1971, 1973). They are replete with hundreds of proverbs and proverbial expressions for all walks of life and ethnic minorities of the United States. He saw himself as the voice of the cross section of American life, being very well aware of the fact that proverbs, despite their conciseness and simplicity, make up the worldview of practical life. As he put it in section eleven of *Good Morning, America*, it behooves lay-people and scholars alike to "behold the proverbs of a people, a nation", for they are verbal and cultural signs of their worldview:

> A code arrives; language; lingo; slang;
> behold the proverbs of a people, a nation:
> Give 'em the works. Fix it, there's always
> a way. Be hard boiled. The good die young.
> [...]
> Aye, behold the proverbs of a people:
> The big word is Service.
> Service – first, last and always.
> Business is business.
> What you don't know won't hurt you.
> Courtesy pays.
> Fair enough.
> The voice with a smile.
> Say it with flowers.
> Let one hand wash the other.
> The customer is always right.
> Who's your boy friend?

Who's your girl friend?
O very well.
God reigns and the government at Washington lives.
Let it go at that.
There are lies, damn lies and statistics.
Figures don't lie but liars can figure.
There's more truth than poetry in that.
You don't know the half of it, dearie.

It's the roving bee that gathers the honey.
A big man is a big man whether he's a president or a prizefighter.
Name your poison.
Take a little interest.
Look the part.
It pays to look well.
Be yourself.
Speak softly and carry a big stick.
War is hell.
Honesty is the best policy.
It's all in the way you look at it.
Get the money – honestly if you can.
It's hell to be poor.
Well, money isn't everything.
Well, life is what you make it.
Speed and curves – what more do you want?
I'd rather fly than eat.
There must be pioneers and some of them get killed.
The grass is longer in the backyard.
Give me enough Swedes and snuff and I'll build a railroad to hell.
How much did he leave? All of it.
Can you unscramble eggs?
Early to bed and early to rise and you never meet any prominent people.
Let's go. Watch our smoke. Excuse our dust.
Keep your shirt on.
(Sandburg 1970: 328–330 [section eleven].)

This is a revealing composite of slang and proverbial speech to characterize American society, integrating phrasal elements almost at random from all segments of the American people. What a daunting task it would be to trace the origin of each expression of this collage, be they from other lands or actually of American coinage (Bryan and Mieder 2003). While it is difficult to prove a general American origin, the problem of establishing what prov-

erbs might have been coined in a particular state or region of the United States is an even more vexing proposition. In fact, the question of the origin of any particular proverb becomes a major research project in itself. It is thus extremely difficult to speak of American proverbs, New England proverbs, or even Vermont proverbs. Such designations are to a large degree mere constructs. However, the issue is, in any case, not so much one of origin but rather the fact that a particular proverb or a set of proverbs have been in use or are presently in common employment in a country or region. Such standard annotated proverb collections as Archer Taylor and Bartlett Jere Whiting's *A Dictionary of American Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases, 1820–1880* (1958), Bartlett Jere Whiting's *Early American Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases* (1977), and my own *A Dictionary of American Proverbs* (1992) are thus repositories of those proverbs that were or are in general use in North America. They are "American" proverbs in that the population has used or uses them frequently as concisely expressed traditional bits of wisdom. As such they belong in a dictionary of American proverbs, and as linguistic signs of the American culture in all of its diversity these proverbs contain elements of the American worldview (see Nussbaum 1998). More specifically, this is also true for the worldview of the New Englanders or, as the folk likes to call the people living in the Northeast of the United States, the Yankees.

3. Benjamin Franklin's proverbial construction of the American worldview

The early English-speaking settlers who colonized the original thirteen states brought much traditional proverbial wisdom with them, making use of the social norms expressed in them in their writings, in church sermons, in school books, in child rearing, in political discourse, and in economic intercourse. Such early popular books as *Old Mr. Dod's Sayings* (1673) or the sermons of the clergyman Cotton Mather (1663–1728) and his fellow preachers made ample use of Biblical and folk proverbs to spread so-called protestant ethics among their compatriots, encouraging them to lead moral and religious lives coupled with a healthy attitude towards solid work (Hayes 1997; Whiting 1972). But there was nobody more influential in exhorting his fellow citizens to adhere to the principles of protestant work ethics than the printer, publisher, inventor, scientist, businessman, and diplomat Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), who for twenty-five years, from

1733 to 1758, published his successful *Poor Richard's Almanack* for his fellow colonists. He sold about 10,000 copies each year, filling the small booklets of 24 to 36 pages with weather and planting information as well as various short instructional and entertaining tidbits. Next to the Bible, these almanacs were perhaps the most widely read materials in the colonies. In fact, while preachers were quoting Bible passages, the citizens of the day enjoyed citing the wisdom of the almanacs which to a large degree was expressed in common proverbs (Mieder 1989a: 129–142). And the proverbs were also picked up in other almanacs throughout the colonies, they were used on plates and mugs, and they were stitched enumerable times on samplers serving as wall decorations (Tolman 1962; Riley 1991; Robacker 1974) – a tradition that can still be observed in New England in particular to the present day.

Franklin was well aware of the success of his best-seller almanacs, and he also knew, of course, that most of the proverbs listed in them he had in fact taken from such well-known British proverb collections as George Herbert's *Outlandish Proverbs* (1640), James Howell's *Paroimiografia* (1659), and Thomas Fuller's *Gnomologia* (1732) (see Newcomb 1957). Altogether Franklin included 1,044 proverbs (about 40 each year) in his almanacs (see Barbour 1974), of which he chose 105 to be part of his celebrated essay *The Way to Wealth* (1758). As Stuart A. Gallacher has shown, only the following five proverbs in this essay were actually coined by Franklin: *Three removes is (are) as bad as a fire*; *Laziness travels so slowly, that poverty soon overtakes him*; *Sloth makes all things difficult, but industry all easy*; *Industry pays debts, while despair increases them*, and *There will be sleeping enough in the grave* (Gallacher 1949). But while these texts actually took on a proverbial status during Franklin's time and beyond, they are not particularly current any longer, except perhaps for *Three removes is as bad as a fire* and *There will be sleeping enough in the grave*.

In any case, Franklin's essay on *The Way to Wealth* was a "hit" among his compatriots, instructing them and later generations about virtue, prosperity, prudence, and above all economic common sense. The essay contained the so-called Puritan ethics expressed in proverbs that helped to shape the worldview of the young American nation, a view of the world that is prevalent still and especially so in the New England region. The masterful treatise thus became a secular Bible of sorts, spreading social wisdom in the form of folk wisdom to thousands of eager followers. There is no doubt then that *The Way to Wealth* is one of the truly significant documents in the history of proverbs as cultural signs, even if, as Franklin admitted already

in 1758 at the end of his essay, "not a tenth part of the wisdom was my own." Here is about half of this proverbial *tour de force*:

The Way to Wealth (1758)

[...] If you would have my advice, I will give it you in short; for *A word to the wise is enough*, as Poor Richard says. [...] Let us hearken to good advice, and something may be done for us; *God helps them that help themselves*, as Poor Richard says.

I. It would be thought a hard government, that should tax its people one-tenth part of their time, to be employed in its service; but idleness taxes many of us much more; sloth, by bringing on diseases, absolutely shortens life. *Sloth, like rust, consumes faster than labor wears, while the used key is always bright*, as Poor Richard says. *But dost thou love life, then do not squander time, for that is the stuff life is made of*, as Poor Richard says. How much more than is necessary do we spend in sleep, forgetting, that *The sleeping fox catches no poultry*, and that *There will be sleeping enough in the grave*, as Poor Richard says.

If time be of all things the most precious, wasting time must be, as Poor Richard says, *the greatest prodigality*; since, as he elsewhere tells us, *Lost time is never found again*; and *what we call time enough, always proves little enough*. Let us then up and be doing, and doing to the purpose; so by diligence shall we do more with less perplexity. *Sloth makes all things difficult, but industry all easy*, and *He that riseth late must trot all day,* and *shall scarce overtake his business at night*; while *Laziness travels so slowly, that Poverty soon overtakes him. Drive thy business, let not that drive thee*, and *Early to bed, and early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise*, as Poor Richard says.

So what signifies wishing and hoping for better times? We may make these times better, if we bestir ourselves. *Industry need not wish, and he that lives upon hopes will die fasting. There are no gains without pains, then help, hands, for I have no lands*; or, if I have, they are smartly taxed. *He that hath a trade hath an estate; and he that hath a calling, hath an office of profit and honor*, as Poor Richard says; but then the trade must be worked at, and the calling followed, or neither the estate nor the office will enable us to pay our taxes. If we are industrious, we shall never starve; for, *At the working man's house hunger looks in, but dares not enter.* Nor will the bailiff or the constable enter, for *Industry pays debts, while despair increaseth them*. What though you have found no treasure, nor has any rich relation left you a legacy, *Diligence is the mother of good luck,* and *God gives all things to industry. Then plough deep while sluggards sleep, and you shall have corn to sell and to keep.* Work while it is called to-day, for

you know not how much you may be hindered to-morrow. *One to-day is worth two to-morrows*, as Poor Richard says; and further, *Never leave that till to-morrow, which you can do to-day.* If you were a servant, would you not be ashamed that a good master should catch you idle? Are you then y-our own master? Be ashamed to catch yourself idle, when there is so much to be done for yourself, your family, your country, and your king. Handle your tools without mittens; remember, that *The cat in gloves catches no mice*, as Poor Richard says. It is true there is much to be done, and perhaps you are weak-handed; but stick to it steadily, and you will see great effects; for *Constant dropping wears away stones*; and *By diligence and patience the mouse ate in two the cable*; and *Little strokes fell great oaks.* [...]

II. But with our industry we must likewise be steady, settled, and care-ful, and oversee our own affairs with our own eyes, and not trust too much to others; for, as Poor Richard says [...] *Three removes are as bad as a fire*; and again, *Keep thy shop, and thy shop will keep thee*; and again, *If you would have your business done, go; if not, send.* And again,

> *He that by the plough would thrive,*
> *Himself must either hold or drive.*

And again, *The eye of a master will do more work than both his hands*; and again, *Want of care does us more damage than want of knowledge*; and again, *Not to oversee workmen, is to leave them your purse open.* Trusting too much to others' care is the ruin of many; for *In the affairs of this world men are saved, not by faith, but by the want of it*; but a man's own care is profitable; for, *If you would have a faithful servant, and one that you like, serve yourself. A little neglect may breed great mischief; For want of a nail the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe the horse was lost; and for want of a horse the rider was lost, being overtaken and slain by the enemy; all for want of a little care about a horse-shoe nail.*

III. So much for industry, my friends, and attention to one's own busi-ness; but to these we must add frugality, if we would make our industry more certainly successful. A man may, if he knows not how to save as he gets, keep his nose all his life to the grindstone, and die not worth a groat at last. *A fat kitchen makes a lean will*; and [...] *If you would be wealthy, think of saving as well as of getting.* You may think, perhaps, that a little tea, or a little punch now and then, diet a little more costly, clothes a little finer, and a little entertainment now and then, can be no great matter; but remember, *Many a little makes a mickle.* Beware of little expenses: *A small leak will sink a great ship*, as Poor Richard says; and again, *Who dainties love, shall beggars prove*; and moreover, *Fools make feasts, and wise men eat them.* [...]

These are not the necessaries of life; they can scarcely be called the conveniences; and yet, only because they look pretty, how many want to have them! By these, and other extravagances, the genteel are reduced to poverty, and forced to borrow of those whom they formerly despised, but who, through industry and frugality, have maintained their standing; in which case it appears plainly, that *A ploughman on his legs is higher than a gentleman on his knees*, as Poor Richard says. Perhaps they have had a small estate left them, which they knew not the getting of; they think, *It is day, and will never be night*; that a little to be spent out of so much is not worth minding; but *Always taking out of the meal-tub, and never putting in, soon comes to the bottom*, as Poor Richard says; and then, *When the well is dry, they know the worth of water*. But this they might have known before, if they had taken his advice. *If you would know the value of money, go and try to borrow some; for he that goes a borrowing goes a sorrowing*, as Poor Richard says; and indeed so does he that lends to such people, when he goes to get it in again. [...] When you have bought one fine thing, you must buy ten more, that your appearance may be all of a piece; but Poor Dick says, *It is easier to suppress the first desire, than to satisfy all that follow it*. And it is as truly folly for the poor to ape the rich, as for the frog to swell in order to equal the ox.

> *Vessels large may venture more,*
> *But little boats should keep near shore.*

It is, however, a folly soon punished; for, as Poor Richard says, *Pride that dines on vanity, sups on contempt. Pride breakfasted with Plenty, dined with Poverty, and supped with Infamy*. And, after all, of what use is this pride of appearance, for which so much is risked, so much is suffered? It cannot promote health, nor ease pain; it makes no increase of merit in the person; it creates envy; it hastens misfortune.

But what madness must it be to *run in debt* for these superfluities? We are offered by the terms of this sale, six months' credit, and that, per-haps, has induced some of us to attend it, because we cannot spare the ready money, and hope now to be fine without it. But, ah! think what you do when you run in debt; you give to another power over your liberty. If you cannot pay at the time, you will be ashamed to see your creditor; you will be in fear when you speak to him; you will make poor, pitiful, sneaking excuses, and, by degrees, come to lose your veracity, and sink into base, downright lying; for *The second vice is lying, the first is running in debt*, as Poor Richard says; and again, to the same purpose, *Lying rides upon Debt's back*; whereas a free-born Englishman ought not to be ashamed nor afraid to see or speak to any man living. But poverty often de-

prives a man of all spirit and virtue. *It is hard for an empty bag to stand up-right.*

IV. This doctrine, my friends, is reason and wisdom; but, after all, do not depend too much upon your own industry, and frugality, and prudence, though excellent things; for they may all be blasted, without the blessing of Heaven; and, therefore, ask that blessing humbly, and be not uncharitable to those that at present seem to want it, but comfort and help them. Remember, Job suffered, and was afterwards prosperous.

And now, to conclude, *Experience keeps a dear school, but fools will learn in no other*, as Poor Richard says, and scarce in that; for, it is true, *We may give advice, but we cannot give conduct.* However, remember this, *They that will not be counselled, cannot be helped*; and further, that, *If you will not hear Reason, she will surely rap your knuckles*, as Poor Richard says. (Franklin 1840, vol. 2, pp. 94–103; italics in original.)

This then was the secular Bible of eighteenth-century America, having a very fundamental influence on the worldview of New Englanders in particular. In fact, the so-called Yankees living in the Northeast of the United States are considered by cultural and social historians to be the direct heirs of the philosophy of life expressed in Benjamin Franklin's almanacs and his famous essay on proverbs expounding morality, frugality, industry, pragmatism, and common sense.

4. Ralph Waldo Emerson and the proverbial worldview of New England

The prolific nineteenth-century preacher, rhetorician, lecturer, essayist, transcendentalist, philosopher, pragmatist, humanist, and early paremiologist Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) from Massachusetts may serve as a representative figure for the obsession with proverbs in New England at his time. He was intrigued by the wisdom expressed in proverbs throughout his long and active life. The many comments that he made on proverbs throughout his voluminous writings add up to an impressive knowledge of this folklore genre (see La Rosa 1969; Mieder 1989a: 143–169). He went so far as to assemble small proverb collections, he theorized about the nature and meaning of proverbs, and this remarkable intellectual never shied away from using proverbs to underscore a particular observation or generalization. Metaphorical proverbs served him well, giving his demanding lectures and essays a refreshing and colorful style based on easily accessible elements of folk speech.

As early as 1822, at the young age of nineteen, Emerson wrote these keen remarks into a notebook appropriately titled "Wide World" since it was meant to include old ideas and new thoughts on an all-encompassing and global scope:

> [...] the proverbs and familiar sayings of all nations [...] are the first generalizations of the mind and have been repeated by the mouth of the million. As the peculiar language of experience, altogether independent of other purposes than as tried guides of life, proverbs demand notice. It was early found that there were a few principles which controlled society; that the mother of all the arts, the nurse of social feelings, the impeller of individual energies - was Necessity [i.e., the proverb "Necessity is the mother of invention"]. These truths, ascertained by the progress of society, and corroborated by the observation of each succeeding generation, were incorporated into these short maxims as rules for youth which maturity would establish. (February 16, 1822; Journals I, 87)

Certainly Emerson is aware of the fact that proverbs are generalizations, that they are repeated over time by the folk, that they usually serve as truthful and moral rules of life, and that these apparent truths couched in colorful folk speech have a definite purpose in both philosophical reflection and in everyday discourse.

Often Emerson starts one of his reflective fragments with a proverb, quickly turning from its folk wisdom to a comment on human behavior or social matters, as for example in his remarks on the proverb *Everything has its price*:

> Then every thing has its price. Little goods are lightly gained, but the rich sweets of tilings are in the ribs of the mountain, and months and years must dig for them. For example, a jest or a glass of wine a man can procure without much pains to relieve his trouble for a moment; but a *habit of Patience*, which is the perfect (cordial) medicine, he cannot procure in a moment or a week or a month. It will cost thought and strife and mortification and prayer. (December 7, 1829; Journals III, 169)

Even when the sermonic Emerson wants to elaborate on humankind's need to make a commitment to social involvement, he begins his short statement with a traditional proverb, citing it in a dialect variant to boot:

> One man may lead a horse to water, but ten canna gar him drink. It is so in the order of Providence with man. Heaven guards his freedom so carefully that nothing compels him to enter into the spirit of the festival to which he is invited. He may pout in the corner, if he will, and suck his thumbs. But

the loss is his own. The company is large and can easily spare him; but he
would do more wisely to conform himself to circumstances intended kindly,
and carry forward the brilliant game.
(April 23, 1831; Journals III, 250)

In addition to arguing for a *vita activa*, Emerson also points out by means
of the proverb *Half is more (better) than the whole* that in life it is often
better to be satisfied with half what one can acquire with safety than the
whole that cannot be obtained without danger. In other words, he argues for
the golden mean or moderation in all things:

A man is a method; a progressive arrangement; a selecting principle gather-
ing his like to him wherever he goes. "Half is more than the whole." Yes,
let the man of taste be the selector & Half is a good deal better than the
whole or an infinitesimal part becomes a just representative of the Infinite.
A man of taste sent to Italy shall bring me a few objects that shall give me
more lively & permanent pleasure than galleries, cities, & mountain chains.
A man is a choice.
(January 22, 1836; Journals V, 114–115)

Emerson clearly looks at proverbs as truthful generalizations and employs
them as analogies of human conduct and social rules as he experiences
them in his day. He certainly is aware of the fact that proverbs are handed
on from one generation to another, especially in oral communication:

[...] consider how much practical wisdom passes current in the world in the
shape of vulgar proverbs. These little maxims of worldly prudence are a
part of the inheritance that have come down to this age from all the past
generations of men. They have given us their institutions, their inventions,
their books, and, by means of conversation, have transmitted their commen-
tary upon all the parts of life in these proverbs. They were originally doubt-
less the happy thoughts of sagacious men in very distant times and coun-
tries, in every employment and of every character. No single individual,
with whatever penetration, could have attained by himself to that accurate
knowledge of human life, which now floats through the conversation of all
society, by means of these pithy sentences. We are all of us the wiser for
them. They govern us in all our traffic, - in all our judgments of men, - in
all our gravest actions.
(October 18, 1829; Emerson Speaks, 62–63)

Such comments reveal Emerson as a scholar with considerable interest in
the deeper meanings of proverbs (see Norrick 1985). His own paremiolo-
gical progression is truly remarkable though, as indicated in yet another
short comment in a lecture on "The Uses of Natural History":

[...] every common proverb is only one of these facts in nature used as a picture or parable of a more extensive truth; as when we say, "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." "A rolling stone gathers no moss." "'Tis hard to carry a full cup even." "Whilst the grass grows the steed starves." – In themselves these are insignificant facts but we repeat them because they are symbolical of moral truths. These are only trivial instances designed to show the principle.
(November 4, 1833; Lectures I, 25)

Two years later, Emerson returned to these thoughts in his first lecture on "Shakspear" [*sic*]. While repeating some of the proverbs, he adds some others and speaks of proverbs as "pictures" and of "the value of their analogical import". These comments foreshadow the modern theoretical interpretation of proverbs as signs (see Grzybek 1987). One could indeed speak of Emerson as a precursor to paremiological semiotics:

In like manner the memorable words of history and the proverbs of nations consist usually of a natural fact selected as a picture or parable of moral truth. Thus, "A rolling stone gathers no moss;" "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush;" "A cripple in the right way will beat a racer in the wrong;" "'Tis hard to carry a full cup even;" "Vinegar is the son of wine;" "The last ounce broke the camel's back;" "Long lived trees make roots first;" and the like. In their primary sense these are trivial facts but we repeat them for the value of their analogical import.
(December 10, 1835; Lectures I, 290)

With the addition of the proverb *Make hay whilst the sun shines*, Emerson also included this paragraph in his significant chapter on "Language" in his book *Nature* (1836), explaining that "the world is emblematic. Parts of speech are metaphors because the whole of nature is a metaphor of the human mind" (1836; Collected Works I, 21–22). Clearly then Emerson looks at proverbs as emblematic or analogic signs for nature in general and humanity in particular.

It is interesting to note that Emerson in his lectures and essays likes to amass proverbs into mini-collections as examples. He does so again in his important lecture on "Ethics" (see February 16, 1837; Lectures II, 152–153), repeating his many examples and comments more or less *verbatim* in his essay on "Compensation" four years later:

Proverbs, like the sacred books of each nation, are the sanctuary of the intuitions. That which the droning world, chained to appearances, will not allow the realist to say in his own words, it will suffer him to say in proverbs without contradiction. And this law of laws, which the pulpit, the senate

and the college deny, is hourly preached in all markets and workshops by flights of proverbs, whose teaching is as true and as omnipresent as that of birds and flies.
(1841; Collected Works II, 63)

When Emerson argues that proverbs allow people to express matters metaphorically that they would not dare to state directly, he is in fact alluding to one of the major purposes of proverbs, i.e., communication through indirection.

And just as his precursor Benjamin Franklin, Emerson gets around to solid New England work ethics, as he would have them practiced in his native Massachusetts. In his lecture on "Trades and Professions", for example, he argues for solid work ethics and emphasizes his didactic comments by the fitting proverb *Idleness is the mother of all mischief*:

> [...] this universal labor makes the globe a workshop wherein every man, every woman drives his or her own trade in companies or apart, teaches the other law of human nature, virtue. It not only gives man knowledge, and power which is the fruit of knowledge, but it gives man virtue, and love which is the fruit of virtue. The sense of all men expressed in innumerable proverbs brands idleness as the mother of all mischief [...].
> (February 2, 1837; Lectures II, 124)

How much "Franklin's proverbs" were on Emerson's mind can also be seen in one of the paragraphs that Emerson added to his lecture on "Prudence" when he published it as a considerably lengthened essay with the same title in 1841. Referring even to "the [proverbial] wisdom of Poor Richard", as Benjamin Franklin had recorded it in his almanacs, Emerson shows a progression from everyday prudent behavior to a prudence of a higher realm, concluding his comments with the appropriate Bible proverb *As you sow, so shall you reap* (Galatians 6:7):

> [...] The eye of prudence may never shut. Iron, if kept at the ironmonger's, will rust; beer, if not brewed in the right state of the atmosphere, will sour; timber of ships will rot at sea, or if laid up high and dry, will strain, warp and dry-rot; money, if kept by us, yields no rent and is liable to loss; if invested, is liable to depreciation of the particular kind of stock. Strike, says the smith, the iron is white; keep the rake, says the haymaker, as nigh the scythe as you can, and the cart as nigh the rake. [...] Let him [man] learn a prudence of a higher strain. Let him learn that every thing in nature, even motes and feathers, go by law and not by luck, and that what he sows he reaps. [...] Let him practice the minor virtues.
> (1841; Complete Works II, 234–235.)

Even though he merely alludes to the proverb *Strike while the iron is hot*, readers will certainly have understood the proverbial message. And seeing an agricultural economy around them, they would also have recognized the somewhat expanded variant of the proverb *Keep the rake near the scythe, and the cart near the rake*.

Always the moralist, Emerson in his famous lecture on "Ethics" (1837) called for a detailed treatise "to unfold a part of philosophy very little treated in formal systems, and only treated in the proverbs of all nations, [...], which for want of a more exact title may stand under the title of Ethics" (February 16, 1837; Lectures II, 144). Besides morality, Emerson also had a healthy pragmatism in mind. But all of this wisdom he saw contained in the proverbs of the world in general and those of New England in particular. In the right context, proverbs represent not only bits of folk wisdom but they also express the worldview or mentality of those people using them to deal with life as such.

5.   New England proverbs in the modern age

While there exist numerous primarily popular collections of proverbs, proverbial expressions, and idioms from different states or regions of the United States, such compilations are not very plentiful for New England. Three notable exceptions are Arthur H. Cole's *The Charming Idioms of New England* (1960), Robert Hendrickson's *Yankee Talk. A Dictionary of New England Expressions* (1996), and my own *As Strong as a Moose: New England Expressions* (1997). But while they contain many colorful expressions that illustrate Yankee humor and wit, they have purposely excluded *bona fide* proverbs. In fact, there is presently but one small volume available that has assembled about five hundred proverbs from this region, namely my *Yankee Wisdom: New England Proverbs* (1989b).

Having lived and taught at the University of Vermont for more than thirty years, I have had ample opportunity to collect these proverbs from oral and written sources. Many were recorded during years of listening to verbal communication of New Englanders. Others were found in books, almanacs, and folklore journals on New England in general or on specific states of the Northeast. Another major source for the proverbs were the literary works of such New England authors as Edward Taylor, Cotton Mather, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, John Greenleaf Whittier, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Harriet Beecher

Stowe, John Godfrey Saxe, David Henry Thoreau, James Russell Lowell, Herman Melville, Emily Dickinson, Louisa May Alcott, Rowland Evans Robinson, Mark Twain, Dorothy Canfield Fisher, and Walter Hard. These authors all used proverbs in their prose and poetry to mirror the regional folk language and wisdom of New England (see Mieder and Bryan 1996). Their literary works certainly provide a clue to ascertain which proverbs were in use by the Yankees of New England during their day.

New England encompasses so many different historical, cultural, geographical, and sociological aspects that it is difficult at times to understand how this relatively small region of the Northeast of the United States can be looked at as having any unity at all. Considered individually, the six states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont have their own distinctive characteristics. The Maine fisherman, for example, is certainly different from the Vermont farmer; the Bostonian executive has different concerns from the Portuguese immigrant to Rhode Island; and the liberal values of residents of Connecticut suburbs seem to clash with the values of the more conservative people of New Hampshire, whose state slogan is the proverb *Live free or die*. The populations of Boston, Providence, and other large cities with universities, cultural centers, and industries appear to conflict with those who live in the quaint villages, farmlands, and woods of the more rural states. In addition, New Englanders have always expressed a deep-rooted identity with their individual states, and one wonders how these Yankees can actually be brought under one proverbial hat.

But there is a definite thread that ties these distinct small states together into the so-called New England region. Without doubt, it is the common political history they share as the cradle of the United States. After all, it was on the Massachusetts shore that the Pilgrims settled, and it was there that they established the life-style based on Puritan ethics that prevails to this day. Common religious beliefs, high moral principles, and austere existences gave rise to a common worldview among New Englanders, emphasizing work, independence, thriftiness, ingenuity, ruggedness, tenacity, simplicity, taciturnity, and a particularly dry sense of humor. A common adherence to these traditional New England virtues constitutes the Yankee mind-set, and proverbs current in this region reflect, at least in part, commonly held attitudes and mores.

Of course, Yankees employ many proverbs that are known and used throughout the United States and in other parts of the English-speaking world. They will yield little as regards a distinct Yankee mentality. But there are, of course, also proverbs that are indigenous to New England, as

for example the weather sayings *If you don't like the weather in New England, just wait a minute and it will change* or *Snow on Mount Mansfield [Vermont] and in six weeks the valley will be white*. Emerson coined *Hitch your wagon to a star* in 1870, but the origins of other proverbs used in this region, such as *Money is flat and meant to be piled up* and *Out of old fields comes new corn*, are much less clear. One is inclined to think that proverbs like *Sap runs best after a sharp frost* and *The world is your cow, but you have to do the milking* might have originated in Vermont on account of their rural imagery, but they could also have been coined in neighboring New Hampshire or, for that matter, in upstate New York (see Mieder 1986, 1993: 173–192). Even the origin of the well-known proverb *Good fences make good neighbors*, used by Robert Frost in his 1914 poem "Mending Wall", is not certain (see Mieder 2003b). Summarizing both the landscape of stone walls and the reserved nature of some New Englanders, the proverb can fairly be considered a piece of wisdom befitting this particular agricultural and cultural area.

Having worked on Yankee proverbs for some three decades, I can at least offer the following sampler of proverbs that are *not* the run-of-the-mill proverbs in common use throughout the United States. These are proverbs which have been recorded in New England where they enjoy a considerable degree of familiarity and currency. As such, they may be understood to mirror the worldview or mentality of the average Yankee or New Englander. The proverbs represent traditional wisdom about life's concerns and tribulations, and they continue to be employed as fitting commentaries on human relationships and social concerns:

Ingenuity and Common Sense
Drive the nail that will go.
Use it up, wear it out, make it do, or do without.
The time to pick berries is when they are ripe.
If it ain't broke, don't fix it.
It takes a crank to start the wheel.

Independence and Perseverance
The toughest skin will hold out the longest.
Independence is better than riches.
Let every man skin his own skunks.
If you want to get to the top of the hill, you must go up it.
Step by step the ladder is climbed.

Thriftiness and Economics
Nothing should be bought that can be made or done without.
An empty purse puts wrinkles in the face.
A small home is better than a large mortgage.
Economy is the poor man's bank.
Debt is the worst kind of poverty.

Looks and Appearances
You can't tell whether an egg is good by looking at its shell.
Beauty does not make the pot boil.
You can never tell the depth of the well from the length of the han-
    dle on the pump.
All are not saints that go to church.
You can't judge a cow by her looks.

Character and Reputation
You can't expect anything from a pig but a grunt.
When all men say you are an ass, it is time to bray.
If you haven't enough to do, start cleaning your own backyard.
Boston folks are full of notions.
The man with no business is the busiest man.

Ignorance and Wisdom
A closed mouth makes a wise head.
When the well is dry, we know the worth of water.
There are many witty men whose brains can't fill their bellies.
Little minds run in the same ditch.
Knowledge is the best insurance.

Silence and Speech
Talking will never build a stone wall or pay taxes.
Turn your tongue seven times before speaking.
Talk less and say more.
A New Englander answers one question with another.
One deed is worth a thousand speeches.

Love and Marriage
A good wife and health is a man's best wealth.
Matrimony is not a word but a sentence.

It is well to be off with the old love before you are on with the new.
Faults are thicker where love is thin.
There's no help for misfortune but to marry again.

Opposites and Contradictions
It's better to be neat and tidy than to be tight and needy.
An egg today is better than a hen tomorrow.
A tinker makes two flaws in mending one.
Hope is a good breakfast but a sad supper.
An apple pie without cheese is like a kiss without a squeeze.

Work and Laziness
The hardest work is to do nothing.
A work ill done must be done twice.
The lazy dog leans to the wall to bark.
Hard work never hurt anybody.
The sleepy fox catches no chickens.

Prudence and Advice
A crooked road won't get you far.
An ounce of prudence is worth a pound of wit.
Don't throw away the bucket until you know if the new one holds water.
Live while you live, and then die and be done with it.
If you must kick, kick toward the goal.

Friends and Enemies
Old shoes and old friends are best.
Mud thrown is ground lost.
Friendship can't stand on one leg alone.
Better a certain enemy than a doubtful friend.
You have to summer and winter together before you know each other.

Problems and Frustrations
Don't swallow the cow and worry with the tail.
You can't mow hay where the grass doesn't grow.
Other people's eggs have two yolks.

> *You can't keep trouble from coming, but you don't have to give it a*
> *   chair to sit on.*
> *You can't get wool off a frog.*

Money and Wealth
Make money honestly if you can, but make money.
Money makes the mare go – but not the nightmare.
Dirty hands make clean money.
Nothing but money is sweeter than honey.
Banks have no hearts.

Chance and Fate
You'll catch your death just as sure as you live.
There is small choice in rotten apples.
Leaves have their time to fall.
Even a clock that doesn't run is right twice a day.
Dunghills rise and castles fall.

This small florilegium of seventy-five proverbs is at least in part representative of the general worldview of New Englanders. Some of these proverbs might well be known outside of this region, just as Yankees employ proverbs that are in common use throughout the country. However, these proverbs have a definite preponderance in New England, where they are frequently heard in oral speech and also found in the mass media and in literary works. As accepted pieces of folk wisdom, they are indeed cultural signs of social norms and values and together with other expressions of attitudes and beliefs make up the composite worldview of New Englanders. Clearly not everybody who lives in New England is a true-blooded Yankee, but for the most part they buy into the value system of independence, ingenuity, thriftiness, and taciturnity expressed in this treasure trove of traditional Yankee folk wisdom. There certainly is a lot of practical wisdom in these common-sensical proverbs that are definitely part of the worldview or mentality of the people of New England.

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Similes and other evaluative idioms in Australian English

Pam Peters

1. Introduction

Connections between the lexicon of a language and the culture of the speech community in which it is embedded have been noted since Herder (1772), and evidence has mounted through the twentieth century, with anthropological linguists such as Boas, Sapir and Whorf. The linguistic elements seen as cultural expressions have typically been open-class words, either members of a particular semantic set or individual "key words". More recent scholarship (Wierzbicka 2001: 209) has suggested that distinctive multiword expressions (including collocations, idioms and conversational routines) may also serve as reflections of culture, as indices of socio-cultural preoccupations and value systems. Meanwhile, current research on idioms has shown that they are not necessarily so fixed in their formulation, but may vary in terms of such things as number and tense without losing their idiomatic identity: *a red herring / red herrings; fell foul of / fallen foul of.* Some idioms tolerate a limited amount of lexical alteration e.g. *wreaked / wrought havoc.* Most scholars postulate a scale of idiomaticity for particular sets of idioms (Fernanado 1996: 31–37). Their status as idioms may depend, more or less, on the fixedness of their lexical formulation and the nonliteralness of their lexical composition, yet all share properties of compositeness and semantic unity. So despite some inherent variability in their wording, idioms are received as conventional modes of expression within the speech community. Knowing how to manipulate and apply them is part of native-speaker competence (Fillmore et al. 1988: 504–505).

Similes were included among the various types of idiom discussed by Smith (1925) and others after him. Like other idioms, similes present a range of more and less fixed expressions. Time-honored similes, for example *as keen as mustard* and *like a house on fire* are lexically fixed, and therefore "substantive idioms" in the terms of Fillmore et al. (1988: 505–506). Fresh similes of these types are continually created, because the grammatical structures that house them belong to the core grammar of English. The

terms of a simile can arise quite simply out of the narrative, hence for example "He hoisted Hans on to his shoulders, and galloped off like a horse, whinnying and cavorting in front of Anna" (ACE S11: 2028).[1] Alternatively, the simile may be coined imaginatively by the writer: "…with his lame legs nearly as useless as spent knicker elastic" (ACE PO8: 1443). Both these types of simile, those that arise out of the physical context, and those that provide an external reference point, can be created wherever English is spoken or written, to reflect the common circumstances of life. But some at least may be repeated often enough to become lexically fixed constructions, and to merit discussion as "cultural scripts" – using Wierzbicka's (1994) term in a different way, and without taking on her methodology. Their formative and adaptive stages, where recorded, may be expected to show something of their socio-cultural significance.

Both literature and journalism in Australian English present a rich store of similes used to project aspects of life and evaluate the people and phenomena encountered. Some of them put new wine into old bottles, as does the Australian *poor as a bandicoot*[2], recorded in 1845, a conscious variant of *poor as a church mouse*, first recorded in 1731 according to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1989). A few Australian examples are variations on North American themes, most obviously *as Australian as a meat pie* (*Sunday Australian*, April 1972) which provided a counterpoint to *as American as apple pie* before the McDonalds hamburger reached Australia[3]. Many others are construed in purely Australian terms (whether consciously or unconsciously), some with alternative formulations suggesting that their terms are still being reviewed and not fully conventionalized. They instantiate Fillmore et al.'s (1988: 505) notion of the lexically open idiom, in which a particular syntactic pattern is dedicated to particular semantic and pragmatic purposes (in this case comparison and evaluation). The similes we have mentioned so far are all couched in comparative syntax, where the point of comparison is introduced by *as* or *like*. They share some semantic / pragmatic properties with a set of idiomatic expressions prefaced especially by *can't*, *couldn't*, or *wouldn't*. For example *Wouldn't touch it with a forty-foot pole*, a variant of the British *Wouldn't touch it with a barge pole*. In this case and others to be discussed below (Section 4, p. 238), the prefatory negated modal sets up a frame for fresh idioms embodying new benchmarks from the local context. Like similes, their function is to evaluate something or someone in locally relevant terms. By articulating socio-cultural values of the Australian community in conventional phraseology, they would seem to qualify as cultural scripts.

2. Source materials

The data used in further discussion are a selection of similes and other evaluative idioms drawn from electronic and printed sources, primary and secondary. The Australian corpora held at Macquarie University, including the Australian Corpus of English (ACE), and the Australian component of the International Corpus of English (ICE-AUS) provided examples of both fixed and lexically open constructions, supplemented by Google searches of Australian documents on the internet, done in February 2004. Historical examples came from Baker's *The Australian Language* (1st ed. 1945; repr. 1953; 2nd ed. 1966; repr. 1978), from Wilkes's *Dictionary of Australian Colloquialisms* (4th ed. 1995), and from the *Australian National Dictionary* (1989), also referred to below as *AND*. The *Macquarie Dictionary* (3rd ed. 1997) has been used for additional examples and information. In the following discussion, examples which can be found in at least three sources are marked with an asterisk, and the asterisked form can be regarded as their canonical form. Those which show lexical variation are referenced to a particular source. Where the primary source can be fully specified, it is given within the text below; otherwise it is indicated by means of the secondary source. Most of the material is from written or published sources, but the data from ICE-AUS include some from transcriptions of Australian speech. The written source material (printed and electronic) embraces a wide variety of genres, from novels and short stories to nonfictional documentary writing, and including both monographs and serial publications such as newspapers and magazines.

From this range of sources, we will examine sets of conventionalized evaluative idioms, as well as lexically open idioms with variable formulation. Both contribute to the range of phraseology that expresses Australian culture and common experience. In what follows we shall first review similes and evaluative expressions whose terms invoke the land and its natural inhabitants, as well as the urban environment (Section 3). The recurrent social themes expressed are analysed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the various rhetorical elements embedded in them. Section 6 synthesizes the argument that such phraseologies can be regarded as Australian cultural scripts.

3. Reflections of the land and its inhabitants, rural and urban environments

Idioms projecting elements of the Australian landscape are particularly no-ticeable among older examples dating from the nineteenth and earlier twen-tieth century. The land of "droughts and flooding rains", in the words of poet Dorothea Mackellar ("My Country", 1918), is cast less romantically in references to ground that is either *wet enough to bog a duck* (Wilkes 1995) or *so bare that you could flog a flea across it* (*Sydney Morning Herald*, June 1972). Both idioms are now most used in those terse colloquial forms, though the key elements of the second appear much earlier in wordier Standard English: *you could hunt a flea across it with a stock-whip*, as ex-pressed by Rolf Boldrewood (*Cornhill Magazine*, 1866). The barrenness of the land also finds expression through the simile *dry as a chip*, used (1889) of the *thin and wiry kind of grass*, *white and dry as a chip*, an image which captures the brittleness of nature in the Australian interior. The dev-astation of bushfire is expressed through the image of being alone *like a bandicoot on a burnt ridge*, used by Henry Lawson (*Joe Wilson's Court-ship*, 1900). This was elaborated by *The Bulletin* (1904) in *miserable as an orphan bandicoot on a burnt ridge*, and refashioned by HR Williams (*Com-rades of the Great Adventure*, 1935) as *like a bandicoot on an ironstone ridge*, alluding to the dry sandstone outcrop that crowns many an Austra-lian peak.

The Australian *bandicoot*[2] has been mentioned in several of the similes quoted so far, and it seems to have attained proverbial status quite early on in the settlement of the country. Travel writers of the 1840s and 50s (R. Howitt, *Impressions of Australia*; Felix J. Askew, *Voyage to Australia and New Zealand*) both comment on how often the phrase *poor as a bandicoot* is heard. It picks up on another colonial commonplace said of land that is good for nothing: *A bandicoot would starve on it*. H. Kingsley (*Recollections of Geoffry Hamlyn*, 1859) gives us a specific example: *That Van Diemen's bush would starve a bandicoot*. The *bandicoot* thus became a symbol for eking out a miserable existence, hence also *miserable as a bandicoot**. Yet within two decades, the same simile could also be used to refer to emotional misery, as in *He hadn't a soul to talk to…and was as miserable as a bandi-coot* (Rolf Boldrewood, *A Colonial Reformer*, 1877). The balance between the two senses of 'miserable' seems to have shifted towards the second, judg-ing from the fact that late twentieth century reference dictionaries give pri-ority to the emotional sense. But it makes the simile more opaque. Densey

Clyne (*Sydney Morning Herald*, August 1980) suggests that the bandicoot's rather long nose makes it a symbol of unhappiness. Several other similes rather inexplicably associated with the bandicoot are reported by Baker (1978: 88), including *bald as a bandicoot / barm(e)y as a bandicoot / bandy as a bandicoot.* The three adjectives 'bald', 'barmy', 'bandy' would seem to be motivated simply by alliteration, rather than any known or proverbial characteristics of the bandicoot. A fourth, rather equivocal simile for the animal is *lousy as a bandicoot*, where the colloquial adjective dubs it 'miserly'. It represents a radical shift from the earlier more empathetic portrayal of the bandicoot.

No other Australian animal seems to be as deeply embedded in idiom as the bandicoot. The Australian macropods are strangely underrepresented in similes, though the kangaroo is the focus of the metaphorical phrase *kangaroos loose in the top paddock*, an Australian approximation to the British *bats in the belfry* (see also Section 4 below). Yet the possum figures interestingly in the simile *like a possum up a gumtree*, which in twentieth and twenty-first century Australian English connotes happiness and satisfaction with the situation – quite the opposite of the bandicoot. In fact the possum simile originated in nineteenth century American English, where it meant that the animal was entrapped in a tree (of the North American genus *Nyssa*, or other gum-yielding tree), and therefore in desperate straits. Citations in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1989) show that *possum up a gum tree* was probably the chorus line from a song and / or dance, and its use as a cry of approbation is noted in the *Australian National Dictionary* (1989). But the *AND* documents the transformation of the simile from the 1890s, with citations in which it means a speedy retreat to safety, or other expeditious movement. It evokes the Australian possum darting up a *Eucalyptus* tree, thus being in one's element and unassailable. This total reinterpretation of the American simile demonstrates the force of Lakoff's observation (1987: 451–452), that native-speakers of a language may have different understandings of the same idiom, and of the metaphor generated by a conventional image. Despite this, the phrase *up a gumtree* (minus the possum) still means 'in difficulties' for Australians (*Macquarie Dictionary*, 1997), as it does in the United States (*Webster's Third International*, 1986) and in the United Kingdom (*New Oxford Dictionary*, 1998). The phrase *play possum* 'pretend to be asleep or unconscious, feign ignorance', is also American by origin (*Oxford English Dictionary*, 1989), and current in British English. Australians use *play possum* in the same sense, but have coined their own counterversion of it with the

phrase *stir the possum**, meaning 'liven things up'. This usage, also worded as *rouse the possum*, is attested from 1900 *(AND)*. It is used especially of a verbal stimulus to a group of others, and increasingly of political controversy. Yet the possum's way of thumping across rooftops in the night gives *stir / rouse the possum* a naturalistic force as well. The fact that possums impinge so much on suburban life would help to explain its continuing popularity in Australian idiom.

Australian birds provide the reference point in similes for loneliness and madness, in *all alone like a shag on a rock**, and *mad as a gumtree full of galahs**.[4] Both similes are motivated by the bird's social behavior – solitary in the first case, noisily gregarious in the second – though the first (dating from 1845) is older by a century. The lizard's drinking posture is the focus of the simile *flat out like a lizard drinking** (also *as flat out as a lizard drinking*) – except that the simile embeds a kind of word play which is quite commonly vested in the key words of conventionalized Australian similes (see below Section 5). Here *flat out* carries the colloquial sense of working fast and furiously, and the reference to the drinking lizard becomes irrelevant, a rather opaque intensifier of the adjective.

If Australian fauna makea only occasional appearances in traditional similes and idioms, the built environment is even less evident. The one striking exception is iconoclastic: the rather frequent idiomatic references to the *country dunny* (or just *dunny*) i.e. 'privy'. In the usual configuration of buildings on a farm, the *dunny* stood apart from the main dwelling, a small shed on its own, hence the simile *all alone like a country dunny*, first reported in Baker (1953: 268). In its uses it refers to someone being alone, and sometimes to the fact that they stand out in some way (usually awkward). The country dunny is typically a wooden or iron construction, hence the journalist's comment, that the Australian movie star Paul Hogan (of *Crocodile Dundee*, 1988) was *as Australian as a slab off a dunny door* (*Sunday Telegraph*, September 1974). However a man[5] of unusually formidable physique is now said to be *built like a brick dunny* (or *shithouse*), with a play on the word *built*, as well as the British simile *built like a fortress*. The *dunny* was built into malevolent humor by Barry Humphreys (*Barry McKenzie Holds his own*, 1974) in lines of verse that ran *May all your chooks* ('chickens') *turn into emus / And kick your dunny down*. This far-fetched curse went further than it might otherwise through becoming the title of a song (*M7 Records*, 1975), and a focus of mystification for the newly arrived immigrant in Yasmine Gooneratne's novel *Change of Skies* (1991). The *dunny* has wider currency as a deprecating

element in the conventional simile *as cunning as a dunny rat* (*Sunday Mail*, October 1981), and the humorous / dismissive *couldn't train a choko vine*[6] *over a country dunny* (*National Times*, March 1981), an evaluative comment on an unsuccessful football coach. The play on the word 'train' makes the referent incompetent on the sportsfield and in the hypothetical garden, unable to cultivate even a plant which grows vigorously by itself.

These elements of the Australian rural landscape are still pervasive in twentieth and twenty-first century discourse, and the bush provided the largest number of similes and evaluative phrases of any of the domains surveyed by Baker (1978). However, suburban reference points increase noticeably with the advance of the twentieth century. Rural and urban imagery combine in the simile *like the cocky on a biscuit tin**, alluding to the rosella parrot[7] which was the trade mark of biscuit-maker Arnott's, and stamped on their distribution vans as well as the metal containers in which biscuits were then packaged. Because the bird was "on it not in it", the simile conveys the sense of being an outsider (Wilkes 1995). Urban street names appear in postwar idioms for confusion or being flustered: *doesn't know whether it's Tuesday or Bourke Street* (Melbourne), which becomes *doesn't know whether it's Pitt Street or Christmas* (Sydney) – or *doesn't know if it's Thursday or Anthony Horderns*, a reference to a former Sydney department store. The relexification of this originally Melbourne formula (Wilkes 1995) in Sydney is again a sign of the lively connections between phraseology and Australian oral culture – and of the endemic rivalry between Sydney and Melbourne! The names of the dominant local retailers are enshrined also in the similes *more front than Myers* and *more front than Foy and Gibsons*, where the play on "front" makes it a comment on someone's impudence or bravado. This is also the point of the Sydney-siders' simile *more hide than Jessie*, an allusion to a much-loved, long-lived elephant at the Sydney zoo, which puns on the word *hide* with its Australian colloquial meaning 'impudence'.

Yet another metropolitan idiom, *gone to Gowings** (referring to a men's department store in Sydney) is remarkable for its polysemy – or indeterminacy of meaning. The phrase seems to have originated in a series of 1940s advertisements for Gowings, showing scenes vacated in a hurry by those seeking bargains (Wilkes 1995). One of these scenarios (a church) focused on the explanatory note "Gone to Gowings" fastened to the altar by the bridegroom who had cut short the wait for his bride. This would account for it becoming a general excuse for someone's absence, doing something

else which cannot or should not be specified. Yet with the elusiveness of its denotation, it has acquired various other applications. In the *Macquarie Dictionary* (1997) it is associated with "going under" in three different ways: financial deterioration, the failure of a horse or sports team to win, and illness, especially a hangover (from overconsumption of alcohol). Baker (1978: 231) reported it as one of the many idioms for drunkenness. Meanwhile in citations obtained from a Google search of Australian internet documents in 2004, *gone to Gowings* is commonly used to refer to dementia. Both drunkenness and dementia are the focus of other Australian euphemistic paraphrases (see below, Section 4), and the pragmatic implications of *gone to Gowings*, used to cover unexplained absence and / or a dubious condition, have given it a life of its own. Gowings itself continues to trade successfully in everyday clothing, decades after the advertising campaign that made its name a household phrase.

Australian notorieties take their place in idiom, in *bet like the Watsons* – whose name became the touchstone for gambling, as they moved from Bendigo (VIC) to become shearers in outback NSW and Sydney hoteliers between 1880 and 1910 (Baker 1978: 273). *As game as Ned Kelly* features the well-remembered nineteenth century bushranger (1855–1880), much painted in his tin armor-plate by artist Sidney Nolan, and now heroized by author Peter Carey, in the prize-winning novel *The Kelly gang* (2000). Another ambiguous hero is remembered in *in like Flynn*, a simile for opportunism, especially of a sexual kind, alluding to the much-publicized escapades of Errol Flynn, Australian film star (1909–1959). Former Australian institutions enjoy an after-life in simile, like the Sydney tram network invoked in *shoot through like a Bondi tram*, though it and all other suburban routes were scrapped in the 1960s. The coinage (pounds, shillings, pence) used in Australia until decimal currency was introduced in 1966, is there in *silly as a two-bob watch / tuppenny watch*, and the pragmatic point of their being cheap and nasty still comes through.

Australian idioms like these are demonstrably connected with historical persons and institutions, with the built and the natural environment, with the earlier phase of settlement as well as twentieth century metropolitan life. They provide evidence of continuous lexical creativity in relation to the contemporary environment, finding socio-cultural benchmarks in everyday contexts. Some of this phraseology also taps deeper issues in Australian society and culture, expressing common values in consciously varied terms. Let us therefore discuss some of the recurrent themes, and their broader significance.

4.   Recurrent social themes in Australian idiom

Among the idioms reviewed so far, themes such as loneliness or rather aloneness have come up in examples from both the nineteenth and twentieth century. From the early similes referring to the bandicoot and the shag on a rock, to the country dunny and the cocky on the biscuit tin, they present increasingly complex issues. While the first two connect with the vastness of the landscape and are relatively value-free, the third and fourth arise out of human impact on the land, and project some of the issues in being alone. Is it self-imposed isolation? Does it connote powerlessness and lack of influence over others? Is there some unnecessary or unfortunate incongruity with the context? This last theme is more obviously there in similes such as *like a moll at a christening*, also *a streetgirl / gin at a christening* (Wilkes 1995). Baker (1978: 426) had it as *like a chromo at a christening*, where the key word abbreviates the dated slang "chromolithograph" for 'prostitute'). These are Australian calques of the British simile *like an old whore at a christening* recorded by Grose (1811), but typically used of men who are out of place in a given context, and on the back foot socially. The same theme is projected more light-heartedly in *happy / lucky as a bastard on Father's Day*, also phrased without irony as *unhappy* (or *miserable*) *as a bastard on Father's Day* (Wilkes 1995) – the discomfort of being there when everyone but you has something to celebrate.

Finding humor in the face of life's sheer bad luck is valued by the Australian "battler",[8] and stoicism is the driving force for a remarkable set of idioms prefaced by the phrase *if it was raining*. They seem to be modeled on a British figure of speech: *if it should rain porridge*, *he would want (i.e. lack) his dish*, which dates from 1670 according to the OED. Comic variants of this are reported in Wilkes (1995) from 1944 on, including:

> *If it rained soup, I'd be left with a fork*
> *If it was raining pea soup, he'd only have a fork*
> *If it was rainin' palaces, I'd get hit on the head with the handle of*
> *   the dunny door*
> *If it was rainin' virgins, we'd be washed away with a poofta*

The fixed elements of this lexically open idiom reside in (a) the remote conditional clause *if it rained/was raining* (there being no distinction in most Australian English between the hypothetical and impossible condition (Peters 1997)); and (b) the modality (*would*) of the main clause. The verbs

usually show colloquial contraction, with the use of *'d* for "would" and the substitution of /n/ for /ng/ on the participle of the conditional clause. Slang terms, such as *dunny* and *poofta* ('homosexual'), are at home in the idiom. Earthy humor combines with a farcical conceit in each variant of the idiomatic pattern, to express resilience in the face of adversity.

Problems of the human condition are addressed more directly in idioms that refer to poverty and the issue of unemployment. But the problems are contained, verbally at least, in a series of rhyming idioms that turn on placenames: e.g. *things are* (*is*) *crook* (i.e. 'bad') *at Musselbrook* (or *Tallarook*), and *things are* (*is*) *weak at Werris Creek* (or *Julia Creek*), reported by Baker (1978) and Wilkes (1995). Alternatively there may be *no work at Bourke*; *no feedin' at Eden*, and *nothing doin' at Araluen*.[9] All these find a rhyme for the name of an Australian country town, and suggest the resolute trudge from one place to another in the search for a job. It goes with sleeping *in the Star Hotel* ('under the stars') and *sleeping with Mrs Green*, in New Zealand idiom (Lawson, *The Romance of the Swag*, 1907). A man is then reduced (in Australian idiom) to a *bullocky's breakfast* or *bushman's breakfast*, which is variously defined in terms of a combination of 'a yawn', 'a stretch', 'a hitch in the belt', 'a piss', but always 'a good look around' (Wilkes 1995). The more suburban version is equally earthy: *a shave*, *a shit and a good look around*. Against such prevalent misfortune, those who strike it lucky and fail to share it are likely to be resented (*lousy as a bandicoot*) – especially if they make a show of their new resources, hence the deprecating comment on someone *flash as a rat with a gold tooth**. Expensive dress and being overdressed for the occasion are also deprecated in *dressed like a pox-doctor's clerk* (Wilkes 1995). The same level of overdress is noted in *dressed up like a Christmas tree* (ACE G08: 1501). There is however no merit in being *rough as bags**, also *rough as guts**, and *rough as buggery* (ACE R10: 2108). Roughness per se has no mitigating value (cf. *rough diamond*), and is censured against a notion of civilized behavior.

In times of trouble, alcohol is perhaps the most universal solace – though its consumption in Australia has not exactly declined in times of plenty[10]. At any rate there is a continuous stream of similes for intoxication, stretching from the nineteenth century *drunk as Chloe*, which may well be based on antecedents from Britain and / or America. Baker (1978: 239) notes the "English phrase '*drunk as Floey*'", as does Partridge (1984), while according to Chapman (1989), *flooey* itself is American slang for 'drunk'.[11] *Drunk as Chloe* was first recorded in 1832, in Jon Bee's *Slang Dictionary*, and

therefore too early to be a reference to much-visited Lefebvre painting titled "Chloe", which was hung in the Young and Jackson's hotel in Melbourne in 1875. So it seems that the painter was responding to a simile which was already current. References to drunkenness are often allusive, as in *drunk as an owl* (perhaps a short-circuit of the American *drunk as a boiled owl* (Chapman 1989)), and in the similes based on *full*, all of which exploit its colloquial Australian sense ('drunk') to provide a play on the standard sense of the word. The most elaborate example is *full as a State school**, a not-very-serious comment on overcrowding in the classroom, but possibly rhyming slang for 'fool'. Compare *drunk / full as a pissant*[12], i.e. 'fool' (Patrick White, *Riders in the Chariot*, 1961). Other Australian similes for drunkenness may also be paraphrases of those found in other varieties of English. The American *drunk as a coot* (a proverbially foolish bird) becomes *full as a goog** ('egg') or *full as a boot**, both providing a pun on the word *full* for Australians. It works in the same way as the northern hemisphere equivalent: *tight as a tick*, with the pun on *tight*. The indirectness of the numerous Australian references to intoxication suggest the common need for a code of silence, a sense that "people in glass houses shouldn't throw stones".

Extreme forms of social behavior, when not associated with alcohol, are cheerfully depicted in other types of Australian simile. Some show the value put upon unusual resilience and bravado, not only the *more front / hide than...* examples mentioned in Section 3, but also the set that vary the theme of *game as Ned Kelly*, such as *game as a pebble**, where *pebble* stands in its now obsolete colloquial sense of 'indomitable person / horse'; and *game as a pissant**.[12] Unusual busyness and frenetic activity are expressed not only through *flat out like a lizard drinking*, but also in the jokey simile *busy as a one-armed bill-sticker in a gale* (Dal Stivens, *Jimmy Bockett*, 1951), and *busy as a bill-poster in a high wind* (Frank Hardy, *The Outcasts of Foolgarah*, 1971). These seem to be variations of an earlier British simile (Grose 1811) *busy as the devil in a high wind*. Meanwhile *busy as a one-armed milker on a dairy farm* is on record (*Northern Territory News*, January 1983) as a more recent invention based on the Australian variant of the underlying pattern. All are rather far-fetched ways of depicting busyness, and show the hyperbole that is typical of many extended similes (see further below, Section 5). A down-to-earth addition to the set is *busy as a blowie* ('blowfly') *at a barbie* ('barbecue'), captured in a Google search of Australian internet documents, which casts a more negative judgement on frenetic energy, as characteristic of that despised insect. Being too busy at

one's work can put you out of step with your working mates,[13] in a country where solidarity is valued.

With solidarity goes social conformity, and anyone a little different may attract suggestions of insanity. Madness is imputed rather readily, via Australian animal images such as *barmy as a bandicoot*; *mad as a cut snake / a gumtree full of galahs*, and *(having) kangaroos loose in the top paddock.* This last one owes something to the British idiom *bats in the belfry* as well as *a tile loose.* In nineteenth century Australian English, the latter was relexified as *a shingle loose* or *a shingle short*, in terms of the wooden shingles used then as roofing material. The second formulation has provided the pattern for numerous twentieth century suburban examples embodying the word *short* and embellishing the concept*:*

> *a chop short of a barbecue*
> *a few sandwiches short of a picnic*
> *a few bricks short of a load*
> *a few beans short of a bag*
> *a paling short of a fence*
> *a few flagstones short of a patio*
> *a few shelves short of a display cabinet* (from Wilkes 1995)

These variations on a single theme represent one of the most productive formal idioms in current Australian English, and oblique ways of indicating dementia or insanity (real or imputed). The quasi-arithmetic keeps it at arm's length, and alternatives listed by Chapman (1989) and Partridge (1984) show that the topic is similarly tabooed elsewhere in the English-speaking world. The need for such paraphrases is all the greater for Australians since more direct idioms such as *mad as a cut snake** (also *mad as a meat axe**) are increasingly applied to fierce anger, blurring the line between passion and madness (Peters 2004: 335). Many of the examples returned from Australian internet documents (Google 2004) show this ambiguity. Though this use of "mad" to mean 'angry' is sometimes thought of as the "American" sense, the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1989) reports it being widely used in British dialects, so it may well have reached Australia in the nineteenth century. Apart from the use of paraphrases expressing madness ('insanity'), Australian idiom plays it down in similes such as *silly as a wheel** or *silly as a two-bob watch**, using dry mechanical images to limit the emotional impact of referring to mental disturbance.

Yet dysfunctional and ineffectual behavior are the focus of some of the most elaborate evaluative idioms in Australian English. These are the infinitely variable statements prefaced with *couldn't*, a pattern set by British examples such as *couldn't knock the skin off a rice pudding*. Australian examples seem to begin with *couldn't lead a flock of homing pigeons* (Fred Daly, *From Curtin to Kerr*, 1977), and thereafter there is a flood of them, including *couldn't train a choko vine over a country dunny* mentioned above (p. 227). Others among those reported by Wilkes (1995) are:

> *couldn't blow the froth off a glass of beer*
> *couldn't find a grand piano in a one-roomed house*
> *couldn't get a kick in a stampede*
> *couldn't pick a seat at the pictures*
> *couldn't fight his way out of a paper bag*
> *couldn't go two rounds with a revolving door*

These highly idiosyncratic statements consist of a single syntactic pattern: initial *couldn't* followed by a transitive verb, its object, and an adverbial adjunct. Though the idiom is lexically open, each example is put to the same semantic and pragmatic purpose, i.e. to provide a judgement on someone's competence, by depicting their inability to execute a simple task. The tasks vary from excessively humdrum to the far-fetched, but all serve to convey the negative evaluation.

A not dissimilar frontier of evaluation can be found in the lexically open set of similes prefaced with *useful*, and also *useless*. These are used to judge ideas as well as the value of people's contributions to an enterprise, as in *as useful as a pocket in a singlet*, i.e. undergarment (Sam Weller, *Bastards I Have Met*, 1976). Other far-fetched similes for uselessness refer to *a glass door on a dunny* (*National Times*, January 1981), and to *an ashtray on a motorbike* (*Sydney Morning Herald*, February 1984). These too form an idiomatic set with a regular grammatical pattern, where *useful / useless* precedes a noun with indefinite article in front and a prepositional phrase behind. The negative evaluation is explicit in *useless*, but rests on the ridiculousness of the whole phrase when it begins with *useful*. As with the phrases led by *couldn't*, the improbable is used to describe the incompetent.

Australian idiom also offers periphrastic ways of saying that someone comes off worst, or in colloquial terms is "done for". *Done like a dinner** is a well-attested simile in both nineteenth and twentieth century sources. References to food also figure in *all over the place like a madwoman's custard*

(or *lunchbox*), a simile used to refer to a battered human body (D'Arcy Niland, *Call me when the Cross turns over*, 1957). It puts a grim spin on the simile *all over the place like a madwoman's knitting / washing* (T. Hungerford, *Riverslake*, 1953), which simply refers to a state of disarray, like the proverbial *dog's breakfast / dinner*. References to a knockout blow (which puts someone "out cold") can also be couched in elaborate para-phrase, as in *cold as a polar bear's backside / bum* (Lawson Glassop, *We were the Rats*, 1944). Death itself is underscored in the simile *dead as a maggot** which first appears in Australia after World War II, no doubt with soldiers returning from tropical combat zones, and nightmarish experience of nature's way of dealing with corpses. Linguistically speaking it works by metonymy, yet it is among the plainest of the various Australian similes we have reviewed, confronting death without euphemism.

Death may be the one human theme which restrains the otherwise lively construction of lexical idioms and similes in Australia. Almost all the other themes discussed seem to embody word play at least, and far-flung rhetori-cal conceits at the other end of the scale. The scripting of Australian socio-cultural experience bears further analysis in rhetorical terms.

5.   Rhetorical aspects of Australian idioms

Australian similes and idiomatic phrases often give evidence of linguistic crafting. Some seem to owe their origins to alliteration, e.g. *bald as a ban-dicoot*; *bushman's breakfast*; *mad as a meat-axe*; *gone to Gowings.* In ex-amples like these, the sound effects make up for oddities or ambiguity in their lexico-semantic content, and help to underscore their syntactic pattern-ing, the formal structure that identifies their pragmatic purpose.

Many Australian similes work through a play on words, so that the in-tended sense of the key word is not the one elaborated on. Examples in-volving *done (like a dinner)* and *full (as a boot)* show how the simile de-flects attention from the colloquial sense being used, in much the same way as rhyming slang is used to mask its own referent. Other more extended examples in which the colloquial sense of the word provides the key to meaning are *cold as a polar bear's backside*; *flat out like a lizard drinking*; *more hide than Jessie*, and *shoot through like a Bondi tram.* The ordinary polysemy of words in standard usage has also emerged in various examples discussed. In cases such as *miserable as a bandicoot* and *mad as a cut snake* it seems to have affected their meaning over the course of time. For others,

it provides a stimulating tension between two divergent senses of the word, as with *charge like a wounded bull**, also *a herd of wounded buffalo / a stuck bear* (Wilkes 1995), as a comment on high prices.[14] The alternative version *charge like the light brigade* provides another kind of distractor, which is also played on in *charge like the heavy brigade* (*The Australian*, November 1978). The evaluative phrase *knows more than her prayers** (used of an experienced woman) is deft in its double-entendre, as is *in like Flynn** (for a womanizer). Their epigrammatic quality has no doubt contributed to their survival.

Alongside the tersely worded simile just quoted, we have seen many more elaborately worded examples, sometimes fanciful or farcical in their content. Comic hyperbole is evident in examples such as *scarce as hen's teeth** and *rare as rocking horse manure**, and in formal idioms like those constructed with *couldn't* and *if it was raining...*, discussed in Section 4. The individual scenarios constructed in each variant of those idioms might be likened to rhetorical tropes, used to express an absolute reference point. The trope itself creates a kind of bathos, most obviously in the *if it was raining...* set, which bring the flight of fancy firmly down to earth.

A pervasive aspect of Australian idiom is its exploitation of negative polarity. The negative is explicit in the set of idioms relating to unemployment: *No work at Bourke* etc., and its use is straightforward in *wouldn't touch it with a forty foot pole*. The negative value is sometimes implicit, as in *as useful as a pocket in a singlet*, which teases the imagination with the positive potential of the simile before allowing the inherently negative judgement to take over. Alternative versions of the simile tend to go straight for the negative, with *useless as...* In the same way, *happy as a bastard on Father's Day* tends to be paraphrased with *unhappy / unlucky / miserable as a bastard...*, thereby losing some of the allusiveness of the original. The most remarkable set of negative constructions are those with *couldn't...* (p. 238), where the simple task described makes it a kind of litotes, and sublime understatement is created through the negative formulation of an idea.

All these examples show a spontaneous rhetoric, and we note the use of rhetorical techniques which might otherwise be identified with literary tradition. The similes and idioms discussed are not unlike the oral formulae of ancient heroic poetry, in their rhythmic and structural properties, though they are less fixed – in fact highly adaptable to the prosaic discourse in which they are deployed. Many of the idioms discussed have oral roots, and were no doubt well used in nineteenth century Australia before being recorded by social commentators, such as those from the 1840s and 1850s noted in con-

nection with *bandicoot* (Section 3, above). Later nineteenth century novel-ists and short story writers who implanted them in their writing (e.g. Bol-drewood, Lawson), were no doubt capturing idioms heard in common par-lance. More recent examples come from journalists associated with Austra-lia's major newspapers (as indicated in many of the references). Journalists in their daily writing invoke the common idiom and embellish it. Though their articles are less permanent than the writing enshrined in published monographs, their writing is lively evidence of the verbal rhetoric in collo-quial and everyday Australian discourse – especially the pleasure in word play, and the use of both understatement and overstatement.

The play by writers on conversational idiom also involves conscious shifts of style or register. On rare occasions the language shifts up a gear, as when *lower than a snake's belly* is rephrased as *lower than a snake's duodenum* (*The Australian*, March 1979). Most often the language shifts downwards, as in the pathetic contrast between *palaces* and the *(handle of) the dunny* (door), in *if it was rainin' palaces* (Section 4). The incongruity of stylistically low language in what purports to be a serious curse is part of the fun in *May all your chooks turn into emus and kick your dunny down.* But the sense of stylistic incongruence is there wherever colloquial terms are used within the formal structure of simile, as in *full as a goog*; *lousy as a bandicoot*; *more front than Myers.* Informal language serves to anchor the simile and affirm its common relevance, with or without icono-clastic humor. The affirmative use of informal elements of style by Aus-tralian writers of both fiction and nonfiction is noted by Delbridge (2001: 313–314), for its rhetorical effect as well as an expression of national identity.

Whatever their stylistic and semantic contents, the idioms reviewed in this article have a clear rhetorical and pragmatic purpose: to underscore a point of reference. In similes it is the key word; in evaluative idioms, it is the concept paraphrased; but either way the idiom serves to intensify the reference. It seems indeed that the illocutionary force can be delivered whether their terms are very precise or rather blurred in their denotation (as in *gone to Gowings*). The shifting meanings we have noted in connection with various Australian idioms suggests that they would not be understood in exactly the same way by every member of the community at a given point in time. Yet their survival from the nineteenth through to the twenti-eth century, and from decade to decade, shows that they still serve their essential pragmatic purpose, of drawing attention to a word or concept by embellishment.

6.   Scripting Australian experience and Australian mores

The previous sections have provided several different perspectives on similes and evaluative idioms found in Australian sources from the nineteenth century on. Their status as idioms is not in doubt, since those that are not fixed in their lexical contents are unquestionably formed according to marked syntactic patterns, which invest them with distinctive semantic and pragmatic purposes. Their verbal connections with the Australian environment have been demonstrated, and the themes and values that they express. Many of the similes discussed involve aspects of Australian cultural history, with rural allusions giving way to more urban conditions of life. The indigenous idioms of Australia, like those of New Zealand, "convey aspects of everyday life of the language community that has coined them" (Glaser 1999: 167).

The adaptation in Australia of idioms shared with other varieties of English provides sharp insights into the settlers' thinking: what they found the same but different about the new continent and the new society established on it. They highlight the more abstract themes of Australian experience: loneliness in the physical setting as well as in terms of social integration – the need to fit in, and the impossibility of it at times *(like a streetgirl at a christening)*. A rank-and-file respect for bravado and putting on a brave front is paralleled by contempt for indecisiveness and incompetence. The frailty of the human condition is also acknowledged, however allusively: drunkenness, erratic states of mind and the ultimate defencelessness of the body. These essential themes are not unique to Australia, but highlighted in a pioneering society, and in Australian terms.

Idioms are at their most important in connecting with oral tradition, and with the discourse of an egalitarian society, where access to education and learning were to be played down. Though books were a much prized commodity from the earlier nineteenth century (Webby 2000: 54), and lending libraries established later supported autodidacticism (Lyons and Arnold 2001: 180ff, 210ff), in Australia it has never been advisable to show off one's command of letters ("talk like a dictionary"), let alone reveal one's interest in literary creativity, as writer David Malouf confirms from his Brisbane childhood in the 1950s. Australian idioms typically speak in plain language, in similes like *flat as a tack*; *full as a boot*; *silly as a wheel*, drawn straight from everyday life. The rhetorical flourishes of idioms such as those discussed in Section 5 are put to iconoclastic humor. The Australian preference for more informal and colloquial styles of speech is manifest in much of the phraseology discussed, from *couldn't pick a seat at the pictures* to

busy as a blowie at a barbie. They illustrate the Australian penchant for colloquial contractions and for abbreviations, noted by Wierzbicka (1992: 375–388), among others. Australians are more inclined towards informal usage, where there is a choice (Peters 2001: 175–176).

The colloquial and informal characteristics of Australian English have been strongly affirmed in its defining moments alongside those of national identity, as in the two decades preceding federation (1901) on the pages of the *Bulletin* magazine (Moore 2001). Likewise following World War II amid a new phase of cultural independence, there was strong interest in Australian idioms with the publication of Baker's *The Australian Language* (1st ed. 1945)*.* Baker's title is clearly modeled on that of H. L. Mencken's *The American Language* (1919)*;* and it is similarly concerned with amassing a body of distinctive idioms to establish one's independence from British English.

The inventiveness of Australian idiom (whether locally originated, or based on British or American patterns) is evidence of the general vitality of English down-under, and the particular productivity of the larger lexico-syntactic units of the language. Multiword units are demonstrably as productive or "profitable" (Bauer 2001: 213ff) as the morphology of the language, though the process must be as much analogical as generative. This very productivity also makes them better exponents of Australian culture than fixed idioms with sometimes faded meanings. Their adaptive formulation makes them lively expressions of Australian society as it is experienced (cf. Lakoff 1987: 266–268). As cultural scripts they are at least as important as the key words proposed for Australian English by Wierzbicka (1992, 1997, 2001), or by Ramson (2001, 2002). The conversation of the nation is certainly reflected in these highly significant components of the language.

Notes

1. Citations extracted from the Australian Corpus of English are identified by the acronym ACE, and those from the Australian component of the International Corpus of English as ICE-AUS (see Section 2).
2. The *bandicoot* is a small rat-like Australian marsupial. Its name is derived from Telegu, where it means "pig rat", and was earlier applied to an Indian mammal somewhat like the Australian *bandicoot.*
3. In the USA too, *as American as apple pie* may perhaps seem somewhat clichéd, judging from the cartoon (reproduced from the *New Yorker Collection*, 1992) in Tottie (2002: 72). It depicts the afternoon tea table at which husband in John Bull stripes says to wife in Statue of Liberty dress: "Not apple pie again!"

4. The *galah* is a medium-sized Autralian parrot, which roosts above ground in noisy flocks.
5. A rare instance of its use in reference to a woman can be found in ACE S12: 2121, where a doughty nun on night duty is said to be "built like a brick shit-house".
6. The *choko* is the fruit of a perennial vine of South American origin (Brazilian Indian *chuchu*), which grows without cultivation in Australian gardens, and is eaten as a vegetable.
7. *Rosella* is the name for several brightly colored kinds of Australian parrot, in this case the Eastern Rosella.
8. *Battler* is a byword in Australian English for a person who works persistently against the odds, e.g. the economic problems of small-farming (also *Aussie battler*).
9. The last example comes from a radio discussion of these phrases reported in OZWORDS (October 2003).
10. Baker (1987: 225) sees it as an endemic social issue, originating with "grog fever" in the early decades of colonialism, but intensifying after World War II with growing consumption of alcohol relative to the population.
11. American dictionaries such as *Webster's Third International* (1986) and *Random House* (1987) gloss *flooey* as meaning "awry, out of order", without mentioning drunkenness.
12. A *pissant* is Australian coarse slang for a foolish or foolhardy person. Lexicographers agree that it is a compound of "piss" and "ant" (not the suffix *–ant*), but the underlying semantics are disputed.
13. The solidarity of Australian laborers against being worked too hard is amusingly satirized by O'Grady in *They're a Weird Mob* (1966), where the recently arrived Italian immigrant is advised against laying too many bricks in an hour.
14. This simile is also worded as *charge like a Mallee bull* (ICE-AUS S2A-016 (c): 215), though the Mallee bull (toughened by living in the Victorian scrub country) mostly appears in the simile *fit as a Mallee bull.*

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Definitely maybe: Modality clusters and politeness in spoken discourse

Svenja Adolphs

1. Introduction

Over the past thirty years there has been a substantial interest in cross–cultural and cross-linguistic comparisons of politeness routines and markers (House and Kasper 1981; Blum-Kulka and Olshtain 1984; House 1996). The linguistic realisation of "hedges" or "downtoners" has been particularly well explored. Yet, previous research has either focused on the comparison of individual lexical items which are often modal in nature (Bublitz 1978), or taken a "macro-perspective" in analysing speech acts and events (Brown and Levinson 1987). However, recent studies, especially in the field of corpus linguistics, indicate that the unit of meaning frequently extends beyond the individual lexical item and that certain clusters combine to perform describable functions in a language (Sinclair 1991, 1996; Wray 2002). Using, as a basis, a five million word corpus of spoken English, this study attempts to bring together the two research traditions by exploring the conventionalisation of modality clusters, such as *might just* or *could possibly*.

2. Modality markers and politeness

According to Simpson (1993: 47), "modality refers broadly to a speaker's attitude towards, or opinion about, the truth of a proposition expressed by a sentence." As such, modality markers have the function of "shading" categorical assertions. There are a number of frameworks and terminologies which define this over-arching function further, resulting in categories such as discourse-oriented modality (Palmer 1975), epistemic and root modality (Coates 1983), as well as boulomaic and perception modality (Simpson 1993). However, for the purpose of this paper I shall refer only to the following two categories: deontic and epistemic modality. The former is related to the degree of obligation entailed in a proposition, while the latter is

concerned with the level of commitment towards the truth of a proposition (Simpson 1993).

Linguistically, modality is mostly realised through modal auxilliaries, modal lexical verbs and modal adverbs. Such markers of modality have also been discussed within pragmatic analyses of indirect and polite speech acts. House and Kasper (1981), for example, compare the frequency of politeness markers within complaints and requests in a corpus of elicited situations in German and English. They distinguish between eight forms for realising a speech act, some of which rely on the use of modal items for their inclusion into a particular category (e.g. "hedged performative").

With advances in corpus linguistics, the past two decades have also seen a number of corpus-based analyses of selected modal markers. Coates (1983) draws on the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen (LOB) corpus and the Survey of English Usage (SEU) to distinguish different meaning senses of modal items, and Farr and O'Keeffe (1996) examine the use of the item *would* as a hedging device in the Limerick Corpus of Irish English. Möllering (2001) studies modal particles in corpora of spoken German, and Barron (2003) carries out a longitudinal study of the acquisition of German modal items as part of a wider study on interlanguage pragmatics.

Different varieties of English have been explored in terms of the occurrence of modal items by Collins (1991), who studied the distribution of necessity and obligation modals in American, Australian and British English. All of these studies demonstrate a degree of variation in terms of the distribution and frequency of different modal items and the structures that surround the modals in question.

Corpus-based studies such as these, as well as those investigations that are based on elicited and invented data, have contributed to a better understanding of the pragmatic and discoursive functions of modal items, and they have demonstrated in detail the multi-functionality of individual modal items (Schiffrin 1987). However, a look at any stretch of naturally occurring discourse suggests that modal items often form part of relatively stable expressions (e.g. *could you just..*) and that they tend to cluster with other modal items. As such, they behave like a large proportion of language as a whole in that they are part of phraseological units which display a high degree of co-selection (Sinclair 1991).

3. Multi-word units and modality clusters

As outlined above, previous research on modal items has mainly focused on a description of individual words, both in the area of politeness theory and in corpus-based descriptions.

However, a number of mainly corpus-based studies have highlighted the occurrence of particular patterns when modality items are being used. Farr and O'Keeffe (1996), for example, identify the recurrence of 'pronouns + modals' and 'modals + pronouns' in their discussion of the word *would*. Kennedy (1996) uses the 100 million word British National Corpus as the basis for his discussion of modal verb phrase structures of different complexity.

However, the area of modality clusters remains relatively under-explored. Möllering (2001) studies the modal particle *eben* in a range of corpora of spoken German and finds that this particle takes on a particular temporal function when it collocates with the modal particle *ma*, the shortened form of *mal* often found in naturally occurring spoken discourse. A particular meaning of *eben* that carries a temporal function comes about when it collocates with *ma*. Thus, *ma* and *eben* combine in a stable construction to create a new meaning. Similarly, Barron (2003) studies the meaning of a number of German modal participles in terms of two-word units. The evidence presented in these two studies suggests, therefore, that certain modal clusters create a separate meaning.

We can then distinguish broadly between three types of clustering. The first type is the kind of clustering that occurs as part of relatively stable phrases, as discussed by Kennedy (1996). Examples such as 'Could you just + verb phrase' would come under this category. The second type of clustering is a mere accumulation of different modal items, often interspersed by other parts of speech. The third type describes a stable cluster of modal items that combine to form a particular meaning and that might be part of a larger variable unit. The kind of phrase structures outlined by Kennedy (1996) have been explored to some extent both in corpus-based research (Aijmer 1996) and in the area of pragmatics (Sadock 1974; Brown and Levinson 1987). They are often discussed in a speech act framework for analysis and related to particular illocutionary functions in discourse.

The second type of clustering is the seemingly random accumulation of different modal items and instances of vague language in certain types of discourse. This has also received some attention (Channel 1994). An example of this kind of clustering can be found in the following extract, which has

been taken from the five million word CANCODE corpus, a corpus of spoken discourse that will be described in more detail in the next section:

<S1>   Do you have any hopes and fears for the future for yourself
<S2>   Em. As you get older *perhaps maybe* about old age. I do I *think*
<S1>   About growing old or
<S2>   Yeah.
<S1>   *you know* not *necessarily* but you *may* not but *I'm just saying* do you

This type of clustering is extremely common in spoken discourse and acts as a means of hedging opinions and different kinds of speech acts.

   The third type of clustering is explored by Möllering (2001) and also Hoye (1997) and deals with relatively stable combination of a limited number of consecutively occurring modal items that leads to a particular meaning. It is this type of idiomatic modality clustering that will be the focus of the present study. In order to analyse such clusters, the study draws on a five-million word corpus of spoken English, outlined in the following section.

4.   The CANCODE corpus

CANCODE stands for the *Cambridge and Nottingham Corpus of Discourse in English* and is a collaborative project between the University of Nottingham and Cambridge University Press, with whom sole copyright resides. The corpus was assembled in the 1990s and consists of five different contextual categories, which are based on the relationship that holds between the speakers. The speaker relationships constitute a cline of proximity and distance between the participants in the recorded interactions (for a detailed description, see McCarthy 1998). The categories have thus been labelled as follows: intimate, socio-cultural, professional, transactional and pedagogic. The intimate category accounts for conversations between close family or partners while the socio-cultural category refers to casual conversations between friends. Interactions recorded at the workplace have been classified as professional and any type of "service encounter" was assigned to the transactional category. The pedagogic category sits somewhat uncomfortably with the others but it still describes a particular context which is perhaps more easily defined in terms of the contextual goal of the interaction than in terms of the relationship between the speakers. The CANCODE

categories tend to be mutually exclusive, but there is necessarily some degree of overlap and embedding when we try to label any process as complex as that of human interaction.

Nevertheless, the careful contextual annotation system that has been developed for CANCODE facilitates the extraction of patterns of modality in a set of different spoken contexts on a somewhat larger scale than many previous studies on politeness phenomena have been able to do. A concordance search of modality markers in a large spoken corpus reveals not only information about the use of individual markers in different contexts, but also allows for an analysis of patterns in their co-text. This makes it possible to analyse additional properties of the modal marker, such as collocation, patterns of syntactic integration and semantic prosody (Sinclair 1996).

5.   Identifying modality clusters

A range of approaches have been proposed which aim to define the form and function of different types of clusters or recurrent sequences in language use (Aijmer 1996; Manes and Wolfson 1981; Moon 1998). The frameworks that have been developed to describe the nature of such sequences vary widely, both in the definition of a unit and in the methodology used to identify a specific unit (Read and Nation 2004). Some studies have relied heavily on intuition in this process, sometimes accompanied by prior or subsequent corpus research (Nattinger and DeCarrico 1992). Others have used the criterion of frequency as the main starting point and produced lists of sequences according to their frequency ranks in a given corpus (Biber et al. 1999). Wray (2002: 9) defines a formulaic sequence as a sequence that is "prefabricated" and that is "stored and retrieved whole from memory at the time of use, rather than being subject to generation or analysis by the language grammar." Similarly, Moon (1997: 44) argues that institutionalization, fixedness, and non-compositionality are the main criteria of what she calls multi-word items.

The starting point of this paper has been the observation that a cluster of two consecutively used modal items can carry a particular function and meaning that is different to the meaning of the individual parts of this cluster when used in isolation. Prime candidates for this type of exploration could be identified intuitively and would probably include sequences such as *might well*, *couldn't possibly*, or *definitely maybe*. However, for the purpose of this study, a couple of two-word modality sequences have been

identified through reading a randomly selected stretch of spoken discourse in the CANCODE corpus: *might just* and *could possibly*. These two-word modality sequences form the basis for this study.

5.1. *Might just* and *Could possibly*

Previous research on modal items and their function in discourse has recognised the co-occurrence of certain modal items (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Trosborg 1995), but has not tended to discuss these as sequences in their own right. Instead, they have been seen as a re-enforcement of a certain type of modality and discussed in terms of the accumulative hedging effect they have as part of a given speech act.

Rather than describing these clusters as a random sequence of modal markers, the present study aims to explore whether or not particular modal combinations carry an additional meaning in their own right. The clusters identified above will thus be analysed in terms of their individual components, as well as in terms of their properties as a sequence.

5.1.1. *Might just*

While the word *just* can function as both an adjective and an adverb, it occurs most frequently as an adverb and is more common in spoken English than in written. In the CANCODE corpus the item *just* occurs 29,020 times and is the 32nd most frequent item, accounting for 0.6% for the entire corpus. In this corpus, *just* is used to express the following non-compositional meanings, listed by Carter and McCarthy (in press): *simply* often in declarative clauses and often introduced by *it's*, *only* and *a very short time ago, recently*. From a functional perspective, *just* is often used to minimise impositions and to downtone statements. Common collocates of the word *just* are *think*, *wonder* and *want* which further reinforce this function and tend to combine with personal pronouns and the word *just* to form a particular type of modality cluster, such as 'I was/am just wondering + conditional clause'. In terms of two word modality clusters, Carter and McCarthy point out that "the regular pattern of *just* with modals (usually epistemic modals) also shows how *just* helps a writer or (usually) a speaker to sound more tentative and polite." They give the following example, which also includes the item *might* taken from the CANCODE corpus: *I might **just** turn up at the party*

after all. However, it seems that the cluster *might just*, in this example, adds a meaning other than that of increased politeness. In this particular instance a degree of certainty and determination is added to the utterance which is in keeping with the phrase "after all" at the end of the utterance.

The modal item *might* is generally used as a downtoner in the CAN-CODE corpus. It occurs 4,091 times and accounts for 0.09% of the overall corpus. It tends to be used as an epistemic modal item which hedges the speaker's commitment towards the truth of a proposition, as in the following utterance: "that might have something to do with it". As a modal auxiliary verb, the item *might* often follows a personal pronoun. Common clusters include: "I might have.." (140 times), "you might have…" (80 times), "he might have…" (47 times). These clusters are often followed by past tense verb phrases and denote uncertainty with regard to a past event (e.g. "I think I might have told you this one").

The cluster *might just* occurs 94 times in the CANCODE corpus while the combination *just might* only occurs 9 times.

In 59 instances *might just* is preceded by a personal pronoun: I (28 times), they (11), we (7), you (6), she (5), he (1), one (1). In a further 5 instances there is an ellipsis of the personal pronoun, as in the following example:

<S2>   Now you can sit down if you want.
<S1>   Oh yeah. Might just do that actually.

In the majority of instances *might just* denotes certainty about a decision, rather than fulfilling a minimising or downtoning function. The following example illustrates this particular meaning:

<S1>   Are you going anywhere?
<S4>   No. No well I was gonna up to Glossop. I was gonna go camping or something but since the weather's so bad I think I *might just* hang round here and
<S3>   Bake.
<S4>   Mm?
<S3>   Bake lots of nice cakes.

Often the certainty is linked to a juxtaposition of different options, which tend to be made explicit by the speaker. The following concordance lines illustrate this tendency:

There's more more room I might just leave it like this and hope that

They're going out for a drink tonight so I might just pop out and see them

em thirdly if I don't get a job I think I might just go part-time at work and go back to

year because I don't really use it. Or I might just get it fixed. But my bike

Particularly local they might just do something. Yeah. I might

The overall pattern that emerges from the concordance search of *might just* then, suggests that this cluster is used to indicate certainty especially in the context of juxtaposing different possibilities of behaviour. However, there is one other prominent pattern which occurs when *might just* is followed by *be*. In these instances, which amount to a total of 13 occurrences, *just* retains non-compositional meaning of 'only' or 'simply', as is shown in the following concordance lines:

eed look= It might only be something simple it might just be she needs em pills for for er her

ask her. Because it might not be a problem. It might just be because it's like the first Sunday

mean cos he's thinking about retiring. But that might just be because he's ill rather than beca

Oh that might just be personal preference though.

works or anything. I thought it might just be cos that. I mean it does s

We could argue then that the pattern *it might just be* is a cluster in itself, one in which the modal items *might* and *just* retain their meaning, while the cluster *might just* outside of this construction tends to take on an additional meaning of certainty in expressing future actions.

In terms of contextual categories, *might just* occurs 29 times in the intimate category (0.0029%), 34 times in the socio-cultural (0.0019%), 5 times in the professional (0.001%), 20 times in the transactional (0.0017%) and 6 times in the pedagogic (0.0013%). Since the CANCODE categories vary in size, the figures above are expressed as a percentage in brackets following the number of occurrences. Considering the degree of determination and certainty expressed by *might just*, it is maybe not surprising that it is most commonly used in contexts where the distance between the speakers is at a minimum (i.e. in the intimate category). This is followed by the socio-cultural context, in which the relationship between the speakers is still marked by informality and often by directness. It is interesting to note that this modal cluster is used least in the professional context, where interactants are generally more on their guard and where it may be construed as inappropriate to voice strong opinions or emotions. The number of occurrences in the transactional category is remarkably high considering that the interactants

in this category do not usually know one another prior to the conversation taking place. However, it may be the case that the fleeting nature of service encounters allows for a more expressive way of conveying information.

5.1.2. Could possibly

The modal auxiliary *could* occurs 7,723 times in the CANCODE corpus and as such accounts for 0.16% of the whole corpus. *Could* carries a downtoning function in requests and in terms of recurrent phrases, this modal has been discussed as a stable part of an indirect request following the pattern of 'Could + you + verb phrase'. As such, it functions as part of a request in discourse (Aijmer 1996; Brown and Levinson 1987). Other common phrases include the syntactic structure 'Personal Pronoun + could + verb phrase', as in the following example "So maybe I could pick you up from work". Here, *could* is used to minimise the imposition of a suggestion and acts as a general marker of convergence between speakers. Another meaning is the past simple tense of *can*, but a randomised sample of 100 instances indicates that this meaning only accounts for 12% of all occurrences. As a modal auxiliary verb, *could* can be used to express both deontic and epistemic modality. In the example "I mean I have work that I could be doing", *could* implies a possibility and refers to the nature of the obligation involved. On the other hand, in the utterance "That could be a good plan", *could* is used in an epistemic context, as it hedges the truth value of the proposition.

The adverb *possibly* occurs 360 times in the CANCODE corpus. It is mainly epistemic in nature as it denotes degrees of certainty / uncertainty, as in the following example "I interact with all levels of staff which is possibly why I end up doing you know ending up…". It is also used to add emphasis to statements, usually in the context of achieving a particular goal, as the following utterance illustrates: "I mean it is a fact that you give the best you possibly can er at the lowest possible cost." In 17 cases, out of a random sample of 100 instances, this meaning carries a negative semantic prosody (Sinclair 1996), as in the following utterance from CANCODE: "They stink. I don't understand. How can men possibly give back something that smells this bad?"

There are 35 instances of the cluster *could possibly* in the CANCODE corpus and 4 instances of *possibly could*. It is interesting to note that in 31 out of 34 instances *could possibly* expresses certainty and adds emphasis,

rather than functioning as a politeness marker or hedging device. This pattern is illustrated in the following concordance lines:

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d watch videos in there. Everything that you could possibly want in a

was brand new but it was the cheapest you could possibly find.   It was the chea

it at the same time. It's the worst place you could possibly be ill like+   Mm.

very unlikely one the kind of worst case we could possibly imagine was if if all of the sto

the only other you know sort of suggestion I could possibly make is supposing we put in

it sounds awful for the life of one child you could possibly save the lives of hundreds of

---

It should be noted that two of the instances in which *could possibly* is used to express politeness occur in the context of pedagogic meta-discourse on politeness markers.

In 20 out of the 31 examples where *could possibly* functions to add emphasis to an opinion / statement, there is a clear negative semantic prosody as the following concordance lines illustrate:

---

t's not long-term like. There's no way in hell I could possibly live in Switzerland for the res

I just don't get it. I don't understand how it could possibly be a good night.

I just don't get it. I don't understand how you could possibly have a good time at

it at the same time. It's the worst place you could possibly be ill like+ Mm.

very unlikely one the kind of worst case we could possibly imagine was if if all of the sto

---

It can be noted then that the cluster *could possibly* does not retain the meaning of 'possibility' that is displayed by the modal verb *could* when it occurs outside of this cluster. Rather, *could* enforces a particular slant of the meaning of *possibly*, which is that of certainty and emphasis. As such the cluster takes on a particular meaning and function in discourse and is not merely an accumulation of individual modal items. As can be seen from the concordance output above, the use of this cluster in the CANCODE corpus is often part of a hyperbolic expression, i.e. "There's no way in hell..", "the worst place..", "the worst case.." etc. Hyperbolic expressions are a regular feature in spoken discourse. In their examination of hyperbolic expressions in the CANCODE corpus, McCarthy and Carter (2004) argue: "Examination of hyperbole in interactive contexts also underlines the expressive and interpersonal meanings foregrounded in its use: intensification, humour and banter, empathy, solidarity, antipathy, informality and intimacy, along with evaluative and persuasive goals, are all recurrent features" (2004: 28). Part of the function of the cluster *could possibly* may thus be the facilitation

of hyperbolic expressions, and thus the many discourse functions that these occupy.

In terms of contextual categories, *could possibly* occurs 7 times in the intimate category (0.0007%), 10 times in the socio-cultural (0.0006%), 5 times in the professional (0.001%), 9 times in the transactional (0.0007%) and 4 times in the pedagogic (0.0008%). The distribution of could possibly is not as varied as that of might just but it is striking that it is most commonly used in professional discourse. While could possibly tends to be used to voice an often negative opinion, this appears counter-intuitive in a genre where the distance between the speakers can be more substantial than in interactions between friends. The main difference, however, between *might just* and *could possibly* in this respect seems to lie in the nature of the opinion that is being expressed. In the case of *might just* this tends to be self-referential while it is directed outwards in the case of *could possibly*, which may be more acceptable in a professional context. This is reinforced by the different pronouns that precede the respective modal clusters.

6.   Modality clusters in the ELT context

There is a well established body of research which is concerned with the teaching and learning of pragmatic language features, including markers of modality (see Kasper and Rose 1999 for an overview). There seems to be a general tendency for learners of English to employ fewer modal markers than native speakers (Steinmüller 1981; Weydt 1981) and to judge the value of modal particles as not very high (Möllering and Nunan 1995). Furthermore, the fact that modality markers tend to realise a variety of different functions, depending on the discourse co-text and context, makes them difficult to teach and learn. Yet, these markers carry a substantial amount of information about how speakers position themselves towards the hearer and towards the utterance, as well as about the overall context in which a conversation takes place. It is the interpersonal content of such markers which makes them an important area to cover in the English language teaching context.

Research on the acquisition of multi-word units has shown that certain clusters are heavily relied on for efficient communication and as a means to speed up integration with the host community (Wong Fillmore 1976). Schmitt and Carter discuss the use of certain situational multi-word units, such as "cold, isn't it", and argue that they "have the purpose of acting both as a social lubrication and of actively co-constructing interpersonal com-

munication." (2004: 10). Such units tend to be acquired as a whole by L1 learners before the compositional organisation is fully grasped and there is a general consensus that learners in an L2 context may also benefit from strategic exposure to language "chunks" (Nattinger and DeCarrico 1992).

Considering the analysis of *might just* and *could possibly* above, it could be argued that the same principle should apply to the teaching and learning of modality clusters. A corpus-based approach would allow a suitable differentiation of meanings in context, as illustrated by Möllering (2001). It may be beneficial to expose students to modality clusters in their own right, rather than to teach these alongside their individual composites. However, further pedagogic research is necessary to determine effectiveness and use of different approaches in the classroom context.

7.   Conclusion

The study of modality clusters in a corpus of spoken English has illustrated that, in the case of the two clusters that have been discussed, they display a particular meaning that does not directly equate to the sum of their individual parts. Instead of enforcing the modal properties of the individual parts, both sequences display a pattern of meaning that is in opposition to the use of their respective composites. This observation gives supportive evidence to Hoye's (2005: 1502) argument that the investigation of modality in English "[…] is not simply a matter of creating an inventory of modal tokens – adverbs, adjectives, lexical verbs, prosody, and so forth – but of exploring how and when modal expressions combine in discourse, why they do, why speakers exploit the modal system the way they do, and what underlying cognitive mechanisms and motivations are for their choices within such an elaborate system."

The result of this study has relevance for research on politeness and indirectness, as well as for the teaching of modal markers. The accumulation of modal markers does not necessarily increase the level of politeness, nor does it add to the indirectness of certain speech acts. Rather, such sequences need to be studied in their own right by consulting a corpus of spoken discourse to ascertain whether any other meaning may arise based on their co-occurrence.

8. Acknowledgements

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Focus on use-related varieties: Registers

Lexical developments in greenspeaking

Melina Magdalena and Peter Mühlhäusler

1. Background

This article focuses on the new semantic domain of environmental language, also called "ecospeak" or "greenspeak" (Harré, Brockmeier and Mühlhäusler 2003). From its beginnings in specialist scientific literature, "environment" as a topic has become prevalent in discourses such as public policy, private citizens' concerns and advertising. Some of the morphological developments within greenspeaking, as described in this paper, have begun to enter into domains separate from what has usually been defined as the environment. This is a reflection not only of cross-domain generalisation, but also of the broader concept of environment as inclusive of everything in the world – natural, manufactured, abstract and concrete. The emerging disciplinary branch of ecolinguistics (Fill 1993; Mühlhäusler 2003) developed as a response to the environmental crisis and, in particular, the recognition of the interconnection between the languages used in talking about the environment and its deterioration. In contemporary German, this concept has become lexically embedded through the use of the new word *Mitwelt* ('with' + 'world' = 'the world of which we are part') in contrast to the more conventional word *Umwelt* ('around' + 'world' = 'the world around us'). A parallel lexical transformation is yet to emerge in English, but as this paper shows, English-speakers' acknowledgment of interconnection with and accountability for the natural world is reflected through lexical developments in Greenspeaking.

1.1. Data

One of the most important facets of ecolinguistics when contrasted with non-ecological linguistics is that "ecological argumentation considers a much larger number of parameters" (Mühlhäusler 2003: 9). Our data and findings reflect this directly. We employed a qualitative approach to analysing our data, in order to be able to highlight the diversity of lexical developments.

Our data were obtained through analysis of printed texts collected from (mostly Australian) newspapers, magazines and advertisements between 1993 and 2003; secondary data gleaned from publications on neologisms and political correctness; and a web search using the terms "ecological" or "environmental catch-phrases". Thus, we relied not only on what we ourselves observed in primary source material and labelled as being "environmental", but we also accepted the decisions of dictionary-makers and other linguists who incorporated and labelled neologisms as "environmental".[1]

When talking generally about "environment", certain domains such as particular branches of science (meteorology, biology and geography) or the language of activist protest fall rather easily into the category. Our data do contain some planned examples from the technical domains, especially where these appeared in newspaper and magazine articles. While analysis of texts such as lists of planned specialist terminology from technical domains would also yield interesting results, this paper focuses primarily on the unplanned emergence of new multiword units. Both phenonema, however, illustrate a principle, well known to language planners, that "language change tends to lag behind radical social and technological changes" (Mühlhäusler 1983: 71). Given the problem that the term "environment" can include almost everything, we extracted and sorted data according to the overall context in which the text samples appeared, as well as according to the emerging corpus of samples.

1.2. Length

Concepts that are culturally-central are generally expressed by short words (Zipf's Law 1949). Contrast, for instance, words used for domesticated animals ("cat", "pig", "cow"), by words for wild animals not encountered every day ("cockatoo", "hippopotamus", "buffalo"). Words for animals which become more central are frequently shortened, as in Australian English ("kangaroo" → "roo", "cockatoo" → "cocky" and "crocodile" → "croc"). Most of the words and concepts grouped in the domain of environmental language are not short, but are expressed by sometimes cumbersome multiword units. This reflects the comparative recency of the phenomenon of environmental language. However, the shortening of word bases was observed where concepts have acquired emotive meaning, or are becoming central to the discourse. The use of some acronyms as word bases such as *nimby* (from "Not in My Back Yard"), *GM* (from "genetically modified organisms"), and the

organisms"), and the shortening of "ecological" to "eco-" in words such as *ecosystem* exemplify this.

The transference of environmental multiwords in part or in their entirety to other domains indicates that these multiwords have attained meaning as a single concept which can be generalised metaphorically to other domains. For example, the affix *-friendly* was originally used in environmental language in multiwords such as *greenhouse friendly* and *environmentally friendly*, and cannot be traced back to scientific discourse. *Environmentally friendly* was originally used in activist boycotting campaigns to distinguish desirable products that were *environmentally sound*; with the implication that their purchase and consumption would not be deleterious to the environment, as opposed to other product choices. It has since acquired usage with words that are not strictly environmental, such as the general description "user-friendly". Such transference indicates the increasing centrality to discourse, of such environmental concepts. The *-friendly* affix is now widely used in mainstream advertising and political discourse to describe almost anything that is deemed beneficial or harmless towards the recipient: *planet friendly* (environment) or *size friendly* (consumer).

1.3. Resources

It is not surprising that people make use of available language resources in coining multiword units to express new environmental concepts. This involves meaning extension of existing units by combining existing material (e.g. "green", "greenhouse") or combining existing material into new units. Multiword units thus built, are not brand new and neutral, but they inherit the accumulated detritus of past connotations and past usage of each component. This involves the metaphorical extension of meaning.

A catch-phrase such as "Spaceship Earth" (Myers 1990), could originate only in a context where "Earth" has been recognised as part of a greater whole, with its own conditions of integrity. A spaceship must have the capacity to support and sustain life within a closed system or environment. The phrase connotes the idea that if our planet is like a spaceship, humans have the capacity to understand, build and maintain such a system on a planetary scale. Setting aside the hubristic question of whether humans really can do this, to depict our planetary home as a spaceship adrift in hostile, empty black space evokes a sense of urgency, inspires a sense of be-

longing and even ownership, and highlights the need to take responsibility and commit to maintaining the vessel's integrity. It implies that there is no hope of getting help from "outside" to do this. This single catch-phrase connotes all of these ideas and more, depending on the specific context in which it appears.

Expressing things in new ways takes a lot of effort (Fill 1996). Deep ecologists and ecofeminists are two groups of language users who have attempted to reframe mainstream perceptions by expressing them in novel ways (Mühlhäusler 2003: 39–40). The premise for doing this is to force speakers to conceptualise familiar situations differently from how they were previously understood. Through coinage of new terms which stand in opposition to, or parallel with existing terms, a prevalence of dualistic thinking within this process often prevails, but perhaps this is merely a reflection of the underlying dualistic structure upon which we humans build our understanding of the world.

Challenges which arise through the reversal of dichotomies can be usefully provocative. For example, the multiword blend *malestream thinking* replaces *main* with *male*, to highlight the feminist assertion that western culture is essentially patriarchal, excluding thereby, the views and needs of women. Through use of this new multiword, the term from which it is derived, *mainstream thinking*, stands in conceptual relief as not reflecting, after all, the thoughts of every human being. Understanding of this cleverly-blended word can only be reached through conscious analysis. This multiword serves as a good example of how difficult it can be to challenge, through planned language changes, concepts that are so thoroughly embedded in our culture.

Borrowing environmental terms from non-Western languages could provide a solution to the problem of reconceptualizing a language such as English. On a morphological level, language planners could induce lexical development by introducing into English a new level of classifying affixes, which would alter the meanings of words and make transparent the effect of what they denote on the environment. We note that in a place like Australia, to which English was transported two centuries ago, even borrowing whole words and phrases from Aboriginal languages very rarely occurs. As a consequence, Aboriginal knowledge of environmental management has not influenced white Anglo attitudes or practices.

1.4. Derivation

1.4.1. Scientific discourse

Most of the multiword units in our database are derived from Latin and Greek bases. This reflects the top-down emergence of many of these terms from scientific discourse ("conservation biology", "ecosystem delineation" and "human intervention"). Environmental awareness is nothing new, but study of how to address the environmental crisis began in earnest only over the last few decades. Along with our explosive entry into the information age, alarm bells have begun to ring, as bits of information are assimilated and compared across domains. We might observe environmental changes and disappearances from our own backyards in our everyday lives, but finding ways to talk about these phenomena often comes via scientific application.

1.4.2. Environmental movements

In contrast, the emergence of multiword units from grassroots environmental movements may originate from left-wing academics such as Lovelock ("Gaian citizen", "Gaian message", "Spaceship Earth") (Myers 1990), or earlier thinkers like Steiner ("biodynamic") (in German, 1924, first published in English 1993). Such multiword units are also coined by individuals and groups who are active in environmental projects and protest ("eco-moguls", "effluent living").

1.4.3. Indigenous movements

Thirdly, the language used by Indigenous people involved in movements towards reclaiming a different relationship with the land from that imposed upon them by colonialist invaders, can reflect their different understanding of environment. An example of this is the use of *belong*, when applied to land and humans. The western assumption that land belongs to the humans who own it is reversed by people who see themselves as belonging to the land. Metaphors to reframe the relationship between Indigenous people and land include land as a journey or land as a story (see Williams, Baines and Cels 1993). Using such metaphors can lead to new ways of expressing

essential differences in responsibility and relationship between humans and land.

1.4.4. Language planning

In Australia, environmental language planning has led to suggestions of renaming native plants and animals. Many of the multiword names for native flora and fauna emerged out of colonial settlement, when existing lexical resources that were brought from settlers' places of origin were applied to plants and animals found in their new environment. The list below focuses on Australian rodents, many of which are not biologically related to the rats found in other parts of the world. While this proposal has merits, it is important to also recognise that the proposed re-adoption of Aboriginal names for these animals does not recognise the possibility that the Aboriginal names themselves could be morphologically complex and rich. The proposal seeks. instead, to bypass negative connotations carried by the term *rat*, in the hope that this will lead to a more positive evaluation of these animals by those who encounter them.

A comprehensive proposal on renaming Australian rodents is found in Braithwaite et al. (1995) and includes suggestions such as:

Scientific Name*	Common Australian Name	Aboriginal Name	Linguistic Group or Area**
	Tree-rat	Jintimunga	Tiwi
Hydromys chrysogaster	Water-rat	Rakali	Murray River
Leporillus conditor	Stick-nest Rat	Mudluwaldu	Arabana / Wangkangurru
Rattus villosissimus	Long-haired Rat	Pardiki	Warlpiri
Conilurus penicillatus	Brush-tailed Rabbit-rat	Barkuma	East Arhem
Zyzomys argurus	Common Rock-rat	Jadarru	Wunambal
Mastacomys fuscus	Broad-toothed Rat	Tooarrana	Tasmania
Uromys caudimaculatus	White-tailed Rat	Thupi	Kuuku Ya'u
Rattus colletti	Dusky Rat	Kotin	Roper River

Rattus Tunneyi	Pale Field Rat	Pirlay	Murrinh-patha
Mesembriomys macrurus	Golden-backed Tree-rat	Koorrawal	Wunambal
Pogonomys sp.	Prehensile-tailed Rat	Djidjiparra	Jidjibawa / Jaabu-gay

* Scientific names would continue to be used in scientific discourse.
** The proposal does not recognise the plethora of names that exist for the same species, but privileges names from these particular language groups.

1.5. Language-calming

Jacobson writes of "the thingification of the world" (Jacobson 1988: 29). This process can be illustrated with the clear tendency in environmental language to disassociate action from multiword units. We observed through our data that most multiwords in environmental language are abstract nouns. They do not express processes in which humans or groups of humans are actively engaged, even where they were derived from verbs, (*manage* → *management*). As reflected in our data by the dominance of terms which have emerged from scientific discourse, this may be a side-effect from the scientific practice of seeking objectivity by removing human subjectivity from any processes described. Such reduction of action to abstract nouns makes it difficult to:

(i)   associate the action / process itself with a temporal context;
(ii)   describe and measure the action / process and its gradience, and
(iii)   ascertain who is performing an action / process and who has responsibility for the action / process.

The effects of these lexical developments are two-fold. Firstly, things to do with the environment tend to simply "happen". Neither a person, government or corporation is responsible for anticipating, observing or dealing with the consequences. Secondly, the environment is pacified through this process. It is not talked about as being active and dynamic, but is rendered a passive and static unitary "thing". Our language suggests simultaneously that humans can take action upon or on behalf of the environment, and that humans are distanced, and do not interact with the environment.

The idea that humans can control the environment through the application of appropriate management skills and technology is pervasive ("atti-

tude management", "effluent management", "fishery management", "land re-source management", "responsible management" and even "wilderness management" and "climate management"). Note the following quotation:

> Everyone these days is or aims to be a manager, and this may be why we talk of managing the whole planet. Could we, by some act of common will, change our natures and become proper managers, gentle gardeners, stewards, taking care of all of the natural life of our planet? (Lovelock 1992)

With this quote, Lovelock directly challenges what Jacobson has termed the thingification of actions and processes, suggesting that humans are agents, whose actions directly affect the planet. Implicit within this challenge for humans to become "planet managers" is the assumption that humans have the ability, know-how and willpower to take on the task of global management, perhaps thereby supplanting the role of a deity.

1.6. Value-adding

We observed a tendency within environmental language to load value onto components of multiword units, which reflects the ideological choices made by speakers. The choice of one term over another can also be indexical of who is speaking. Whether one chooses the term *ecological system* or *ecosystem* can thus indicate the group with which one identifies (e.g. "pure science" versus "environmental science").[2]

Similarly, one's ideological position becomes transparent in discussions of diet. Whether one refers to one's diet as being "vegetarian", "omnivorous", "ovo-lacto vegetarian", "vegan" or "carnivorous" connotes a great deal more than a diet choice.

With the topic of food and its origins, greenspeaking clearly enters the discourse of morality (Marko 2000). In a world with pockets of famine and drought, the use of water and land to produce foodstuffs can become a morally contested issue if one group believes there is a more productive way to use available resources to feed more humans at less cost to the environment. Product-labelling in reference to meat adds a further dimension to this ideological discourse. Meat itself may be referred to as "animal product", "corpse", "protein food" and so on. Within this spectrum lie further ideological choices to do with meat production such as "free-range", "hormone-free", "halal", "GM-free", "eco-kosher", "cruelty-free", "farm-killed", and so on.

2. Data

We shall briefly present some data illustrating the formal properties of multiword units within environmental language: affixes, compounds, phrases, collocations, catch-phrases, acronyms and blends.

Assessing the separability of the components of multiword units is one way to determine whether to define it as a compound, affix or lexical phrase. In written language, hyphens tend to disappear when the word is treated as a whole, and new words can then be generated according to normal lexico-grammatical rules. However, in many cases, our data include multiple occurrences of multiwords with variant spellings, again reflecting the fact that the lexical development of environmental language is still in process.

2.1. Affixes

Whilst it would be interesting to comment on the very heavy use of existing affixes for abstract noun formation (see Goatly 1996), we will comment, instead, on new, emerging affixes in the context of environmental discourse.

2.1.1. eco-

The most important environmental affix is *eco-* (pronounced either [ekç] or [ikç]) derived from the adjective *ecological*. Some former lexical phrases using this affix have been shortened because of their centrality to environmental discourse ("ecological system" → "ecosystem"). This shortening then allows the recursive use of "ecosystem" in compound and phrase formation ("ecosystem boundary", "ecosystem classification").

An interesting environmental multiword is *eco friendly*, formed of the prefix *eco-* plus the suffix *-friendly* (see Section 1.2). This unusual word formation is possible because both affixes retain a portion of their original meanings. The bleaching effect of affixation becomes noticeable during attempts to classify things as "eco friendly". It is difficult to define what *eco-* is, and what relationship the thing must have with *eco-* that determines whether or not it is, in fact, "eco friendly". We note that the use of "friendly" as an affix no longer permits stages of comparison, but is a fixed state of being.

Although *eco-*, like *-friendly*, has suffered some semantic bleaching through its wide usage, it has also acquired a specialist emotive meaning.[3] Unlike *ecological*, which is found more often in economic and scientific texts such as "Environmental Impact Statements", we encountered *eco-* predominantly in moral discourse ("eco-catastrophe", "eco-economy", "eco-feminist", "eco-tourism").[4] The choice of *eco-* often denotes ingroup / outgroup associations ("eco-citizen", "eco-dork", "eco-pioneers", "eco-freaks"), whereas *ecological* places more distance between "the environment" and whatever is associated with it ("ecological health", "ecological system", "ecological budget").

Close examination of one pair of terms, *ecological justice* and *eco-justice*, demonstrates the emotive difference inherent in the use of the *eco-* prefix, and provides a clear example of the in-group / out-group connotations. Whereas "ecological justice" is a fairly abstract term which places the responsibility for justice externally, by locating it within the environment, which itself metes out consequences, "eco-justice", which carries the value-loaded component *eco-*, is far more concrete, associated more closely with the intentions and actions of specific humans who mete out justice on behalf of the environment.[5]

2.1.2. bio-

A second prevalent affix is *bio-*, shortened from "biological". *Biodiversity* (biological + diversity) is a common environmental word, but *bio-* is also added onto many other words, with the effect of extending their meaning to 'environmentally acceptable'. A *biohome* is not a house in which living organisms may or do reside, but rather a dwelling which is certified as adhering to certain stringent ecological conditions (imposed by human authorities). Similarly, *bioeconomics* is not simply the economics of life, but economics based on ecological principles.

Bio- can also appear as a synonym for 'life', as in *biology*. However, in environmental language even here the majority of words thus formed have the connotation of being environmentally sound. This value-adding function of the prefix is not a complete replacement in meaning, but it is as if adding "life" to something enhances its value. Examples include *bioloo* (a toilet using bacterial lifeforms to break down sewage rather than artificial chemicals) and *biogas* (gas used to produce electricity which is manufactured directly through biological processes, rather than mining).

A further example is *biocide* ('bio' = *life* + 'cide' = *kill*), as proposed by Rachel Carson (1962), as a more truthful synonym for 'insecticide', because pesticides and insecticides are fatal for all lifeforms, not just pests and insects. This multiword has not caught on in popular environmental discourse, however, neither in the discourse of protest, nor in the marketplace, where forcing individuals to accept responsibility for product choices with the potential to destroy life might not be conducive to encouraging such purchases.

2.1.3. re-

From environmental language comes also a shift in connotation of the prefix *re-*, as found in the environmental catch-phrase "reduce, reuse and recycle", although these words are not very new. The semantic concept behind *re-* is that of thrift and preservation for the future. Thus, in addition to *reuse* and *recycle*, we find in our data also *regeneration*, *reintroduce*, *reclaim* and *revegetate*. This prefix has been added to *new* in several compounds, producing words that are closely linked with sustainability ("renewable energy", "renewable resource").

We note that the pre-existing word *resource* has in some cases been re-evaluated, in line with the idea that such things are limited, finite and countable. This curious phenomenon is an example of the unplanned emergence, lexical development and side effects of environmental language. It may not be possible to predict what term might eventually replace *resource*, but texts centred on oil, fresh water and topsoil provide clear examples of its re-evaluation, in discourse where these "unrenewable resources" are described as running out.

2.2. Compounds

The main criteria for identifying compounds as distinct from lexical phrases are phonological (single main stress) and semantic (single concept). Compounds are lexical units, i.e. they are not fully compositional. These criteria may conflict with one another (phonological words do not always equate with semantic words) and be gradient (more or less compositional).

2.2.1. Technical compounds

The bulk of our examples are compounds of the N + N type, where one or both nouns are abstract and combine to form a compound which may itslef also be abstract ("fisheries protection", "conservation program", "protection zone", "species richness"). Such compounds are derivationally very complex, and their meaning is not always transparent. These compounds are more frequently found in legal and scientific discourse than popular media. As has been discussed by Mühlhäusler (2003: 66), in dictionaries of Environmental Language, there is a "proliferation of scientific terms but a lack of terms that reflect popular understanding". Examples of N + N compounds from our data include "glasshouse crops", "lake ecosystem modelling" and "multiobjective environmental planning". Without access to specialised information, it is difficult to understand these terms or even place them accurately within environmental language.

Two examples of compounding patterns whose productivity stands out in our data involve the lexical units *resource* (*resource development*, *resource mobilization*, *resource use*) and *management* (*management actions*, *management strategy*, *wastewater management*). We note that through this kind of multiword formation action and agents become difficult to retrieve. This would seem to be intentional, and is a characteristic of the jargons used in many domains. The function of this kind of multiword formation is to highlight neutrality. In using such compounds, the person or group using such terms is not identified at all. Accountability and responsibility have thus disappeared, and the meaning of these compounds remains entirely abstract.

In terms of environmental language, use of such compounds is generally restricted to specialist discourse, whether this be scientific, political or bureaucratic. They are less often found in texts produced by environmental activists, as they do not readily fit a moral framework, where the possibility of taking action forms a vital part of activist discourse. By contrasting this process with the function of value-adding and emotional loading as described under affixation, the use of compounds could be described as value-reducing.

A list of samples from an environmental impact statement for a proposed "Solid Waste Balefill" (BONE & TONKIN PLANNERS PTY LTD, February 1996) offers ample illustration of this:

WASTE	
(where **WASTE** forms the first element of compound)	
N + (N)	
waste catchment areas	waste management technologies and practices
waste delivery	waste minimisation
waste depot	waste minimisation targets
waste depot locations	waste quantities
waste disposal	waste separation
waste disposal site	waste stream
waste handling area supervisor	waste stream components
waste industry	waste treatment methods
waste management strategy	waste types
(where **WASTE** is a component of the second or third element of the compound)	
adj + {adj + N + (N)} N and N + N	
baled waste	mixed domestic waste
building and construction waste	municipal solid waste
demolition waste	precompaction of waste
existing waste stream	prescribed wastes
exposed waste	radioactive wastes
garden waste	regional waste disposal site
industrial waste	shredded waste
inert demolition waste	solid waste
inert waste	solid waste balefill
licensed solid waste depots	solid waste landfill
liquid wastes	solid waste management plan

The meanings of these terms are context-sensitive, and are not easily retrievable. Neither can these words be easily transferred to other domains. It is worth noting the insider-outsider effect of using such jargon, which is generally contrived to prevent outsiders from gaining access to the information contained within such discourses. This diminishes the value of environmental impact assessments as tools for democratic decision-making. As noted above in relation to the pacification of the environment, interaction between humans and the discourse, let alone between humans and the processes occurring at such waste disposal sites is made less feasible through the use of such language. In terms of accountability, the corporation that runs the site is not shown to be actively engaging in very much at all. The distancing effect is broader than this however – what about involvement in the whole operation, of the householders whose waste is disposed of at the site?

2.2.2. Non-technical compounds

Compounds employed outside of specialist technical terminologies frequently include one component which carries emotive connotations, which can spread to the other. Thus, compared with the loosely synonymous term *land management*, where *management* of the abstracted land might be carried out by some abstracted person, "Landcare" becomes a highly emotive term which connotes real humans who act upon how they feel about the land with which they are connected.

In the following list of compounds, *land* is the central idea, while the other components are things that can be done to it. This highlights the assumption that land is a commodity which can be bought, sold and used by humans, who have no reciprocal obligations toward it.

(where **LAND** forms the first element of compound)	
N + (N)	
land acquisition	landowner
landcare	land ownership
landclearing	land resource indicators
land conservation	landscape gardener
land cover	land use
land degradation	land use plans
land evaluation	land use pressures
land husbandry	land user
land management	
(where **LAND** is a component of the second element of the compound)	
{V or adj} + N	
maintaining land	safeguarding land
threatened land	valuable land
private land	

Another productive component is *habitat* which tends to be used when discussing animals and plants endemic to a region. Those involved in programs which aim to conserve species use compounds containing *habitat* to describe areas where such species still survive, despite incursions into their territory. The use of *habitat* rather than *home* or *environment*, (which could be considered synonymous in certain contexts) arises, because in most environmental language, *habitat* includes flora and fauna, but excludes humans. As with *land*, where it is talked about as a commodity controlled by

humans, the *habitat* component sets humans apart and connotes the power-over relationship of humans to flora and fauna.

HABITAT + **N**		
habitat area	habitat destruction	habitat linkage
habitat change	habitat evaluation	habitat patches
habitat conditions	habitat fragmentation	habitat types
habitat corridor	habitat interiors	
adj + **HABITAT**		
human-created habitat	island-like habitat	rehabilitated bush habitat
human-modified habitat	natural habitat	space habitat

In such compounds, *habitat*, like *management*, connotes the idea that humans have a special protector status in connection with other parts of the environment inhabited by less powerful or prestigious species.

Cultural assumptions about the role of humans, as embedded in our language use, become powerfully clear when the list above is paired with multiwords built around *species*. Where do humans fit in? What is our habitat?

SPECIES + **N**		
species richness	species diversity	
{adj or N + N} + SPECIES		
ecological indicator species	existing species	threatened species
endangered species	focal species	understorey species
exotic species	native species	vulnerable species

2.2.3. Green- + *N*

Compounds of the ADJECTIVE + N-type such as *greenhouse* are less numerous in our data. However, in the case of *greenhouse*, we note the lexical development that in greenspeaking, greenhouse is used in forming lexical phrases (see below).

GREEN + **{N or V}**
greenhouse
Greenpeace
greenspeak
greenwash

2.3. Lexical phrases

Most lexical phrases in our data contain one or more abstract nouns. They are most easily organised along semantic lines into units with non-technical phrases and units suggestive of the scientific (technical) domain.

NON-TECHNICAL CONNOTATION

GREEN + {N}

green ban	green issues
green belt	green policy
green currency	green revolution
green department	green shift
green economy	green tax
green era	

SMART + {N or V}

earth smart car	smart fertiliser
eco-smart living	smart growth
smart bomb	

GREENHOUSE + {N or adjective}

greenhouse credits	greenhouse gas emissions
greenhouse effect	greenhouse pollutant
greenhouse friendly	greenhouse tax
greenhouse gases	

SCIENTIFIC (TECHNICAL) DOMAIN

OZONE + {N}

ozone layer	ozone hole
ozone depletion	

SCIENTIFIC + {N}

scientific agricultural research	scientific investigations
scientific assessments	scientific knowledge
scientific expeditions	scientific methods

{adj. or N} + **TECHNOLOGY**

alternative technology	spatial technology
inappropriate technology	

As greenspeaking becomes more and more a part of popular discourse, such phrases may be perceived as less and less scientific or technical. Through

this lexical development, phrases lose some of their specialised connotation, and become more generalised.

2.3.1. Native

One emotive descriptor, which appears in both semantic domains, is *native*. Such phrases appear in a variety of discourses in Australia, where *native* has an emotive connotation.

NATIVE + {N}	
native bushland	native title
native grasses	native vegetation
native scrub	

In Australia, the idea of *native* has entered popular discourse largely through the native garden movement, although it also hints at the protectionist attitude towards Indigenous people, who were also called "native". The idea that what is "native" is special and needs to be protected if it is to survive at all in the context of colonial imperialism and reconfiguration of the natural world is embedded within its usage.

2.3.2. Sustainable

Sustainable is a component which can be paired with a noun or an action-process. Like all of the components listed so far, it appears both in lexical phrases and in collocation. Although *sustainable* itself was formed from the verb "to sustain", lexical phrases formed around *sustainable* are fixed and static, similar to multiwords built around *management*.

SUSTAINABLE + N	
sustainable development	sustainable scale
sustainable forest	sustainable solutions
sustainable living	
adv. + **SUSTAINABLE**	
ecologically sustainable	economically sustainable

Sustainability is a hot topic in environmental language. Multiwords containing *sustainable* are found on both sides of the fence. As Alexander suggests:

> Everyday experience shows that *sustainable development* is used, on the one hand, by business people to refer to their industrial and business operations. On the other hand, environmentalists attempting to prevent further ecological devastation of global resources, such as air, water, forests and land, also use it. Against this background it is difficult not to agree with the British historian, Eric Hobsbawm's comment on the term as being 'conveniently meaningless'. (Alexander 2002: 248).

2.3.3. Environmental

One of the major groups of lexical phrases in our data includes *environmental* as a component which is used to organise anything and everything relating to this topic. Like the emotive affix *eco-*, *environmental* is a legitimising unit, which enables a myriad range of things and activities to be included with this discourse.

ENVIRONMENTAL + N	
environmental accounting	environmental justice
environmental altruism	environmental language
environmental art	environmental management
environmental audit	environmental movement
environmental benchmarks	environmental music
environmental biology	environmental organisations
environmental campaign	environmental philanthropy
environmental capacity	environmental policy
environmental concern	environmental preservation
environmental conditions	environmental problem
environmental degradation	environmental protection
environmental focus	environmental racism
environmental fundraising	environmental resources
environmental groups	environmental science
environmental impacts	environmental surprises
environmental improvement	environmental waste
environmental issues	

2.4. Collocation

It is difficult to distinguish clearly whether a multiword is a lexical phrase or a collocation. It depends to some extend upon how firmly the term is established in the discourse of a particular group of language users. Our examples reflect the language of those who are either greenies and / or work in the environmental domain. Like the spelling changes that occur with affixation and compounding, as indicated above, multiword formation in environmental language can be observed as a fluid and dynamic process which is still evolving. This section includes information specifically on a number of collocations noted in our data.

One way of analysing environmental language is to divide texts according to a number of topics, such as "climate" or "policy". Texts on these topics contain lexical items which are specific to the region under discussion, whether that be "the global community", "the developing world" or "the Australian desert". Specific collocations from economic, scientific or religious discourses can also be grouped topically.

CLIMATE + **N**	
climate change	climate evaluation
climate crash	climate patterns
climate decay	climate shock
{adj. or N} + **POLICY**	
best policy	dam building policy
environmentally-sound policy	national policy
free trade policy	wastewater management policy
management policy	

2.4.1. Resource

Groups of collocations are also built around concepts which are central to environmental discourse, such as 'awareness' (to be 'ecologically aware', 'socially aware', 'environmentally aware' and 'politically aware') and 'balance' (as in 'ecological balance' or the 'balance of nature'. Another group includes *resource*.

RESOURCE + N		
resource base	resource mobilization	resource use
resource development	resource survey	resource values
{N adj.} + RESOURCE		
diminishing resource	nonrenewable resource	significant resource
land resource	pooled resource	technological resource
mineral resource	prodigious resource	valuable resource
natural resource	renewable resource	water resource

Collocations tend to be formed specifically within discourses and texts for those topics under consideration. The language contained in texts of this nature, which refer continually to such topics with a range of collocations, can be dense and difficult to comprehend. Collocation thus functions in a similar manner to jargons such as that formed by the process of compounding.

2.4.2. Feral

Certain words signal "environmental topic" in collocations. It is an interesting exercise to ask people what kinds of things can be described as "feral". Although in the Australian context, the current use of *feral* came out of environmental language to distinguish "native" species from those that have become out-of-control after their introduction to Australia, like many environmental multiword components, its use has been extended beyond the borders of this discourse.

Exotic fauna such as pigs, horses, buffalo, foxes and rabbits are readily described as being "feral". With flora, the distinctions may be even finer, as particular "native" species may be described as feral if found growing in one area of Australia to which settlers imported them from another. "Feral olive trees" are an exotic species which adapt readily to environmental conditions in South Australia, but as the collocation suggests, they are not always welcome.

From this, it might be inferred that non-Indigenous Australians as a whole could be described as "feral", however, this is not the case. Groups of humans who are referred to as "feral" in Australia include "feral children", "feral teenagers" and "feral activists". These collocations, used with an attitude of despair and hopelessness, have dispensed with the connotation that the humans so denoted were originally cultivated and are potentially controllable. Is eradication really the only answer?

Our data contain a number of collocations which use *community* to refer to various activities to do with the environment. We acknowledge the specialised scientific use of *community*, for example within Botany, but the examples from our data arise largely out of popular discourse, which defines *community* somewhat differently. In environmental language, as in linguistics, the use of the word is vague. It is difficult to pin down the boundaries of a community; who is accountable; and who takes responsibility for the things that occur and for the things they happen to.

{**(adj)** + **N**} + **COMMUNITY**	
broader community	professional development community
healthy community	rural farming community
livable community	struggling community
local community	wider community
medical community	

Like *feral*, *community* may be applied to fauna, flora and humans, but in our data, the use of *community* is restricted to describing groups of humans.

2.5. Catch-phrases

Proponents of environmentalism have created a number of catch-phrases which summarize its key philosophies, concerns and sentiments. Such catch-phrases may originate from political platforms and environmental organisations. They often start off as slogans chanted at activist rallies, parts of formal campaign speeches and publicity, or emblazoned on posters, stickers and buttons.

"Think globally, act locally" is one of the best-known environmental catch-phrases, used to encourage humans to change their habits in order to do less damage to the environment. It can be seen that following the principle of Zipf's Law, the meaning of this rather long catch-phrase has been retained, and is encapsulated within shorter slogans such as the now common "global village".

In terms of consumer habit formation, another phrase which is now frequently trotted out by retailers is "Reduce, Reuse, Recycle", as referred to above. In the discourse about energy and fossil fuels an oft-touted lexical phrase revolves around the need to "reduce greenhouse emissions". The use of *reduce* in this phrase echoes the threefold slogan above. This catch-phrase

is used both by proponents of alternative renewable energies, and by promoters of fossil fuel consumption.

Specific catch-phrases can serve as a basis for the formation of more locally-bound catch-phrases. "Save the whales", for example, has many variants. Some are very general, such as "save the earth", but others are more specific and localised, such as "Save the Patawalonga". Catch-phrases built around "Save the –" are emotive, indicating not only an urgency, but again, the capacity of humans to alter circumstances for the better.

2.5.1. Pronouns

The degree to which speakers identify with and feel involved in the fate of what they are trying to save is indicated in the frequent use of the pronoun *our*, instead of the more generic *the*. Our data further suggest a slight trend to the choice of whether to use *our* in this set of catch-phrases, as shown in the table below. It almost seems as though this choice reflects a feeling about whether the general fate of humans is bound up with the fate of the subject under appeal. Perhaps human survival would be less impacted upon if koalas and whales disappeared, but we can hardly get by without "our climate".

V + article + N "Save the..."	
save the environment	save the trees
save the koalas	save the whales
save the oceans	save the world
save the rainforest	
V + pronoun + N "Save our..."	
save our climate	save our wilderness
save our forest	

2.5.2. Agency

The language of catch-phrases seems to encourage humans to take determined and specific action on behalf of the environment, but although verbs may be present (often in the imperative), the actors are usually unstated. Catch-phrases are almost always vague in terms of what humans are committing themselves to doing in order to address a perceived problem. As with

the other categories of multiwords, catch-phrases offer a way of talking about the environment, rather than interacting with it.

Furthermore, the imperative use of verbs in catch-phrases presents a two-edged sword in the sense that both environmental activists and commercial advertisers make use of this linguistic tool. A phenomenon of environmental language is its ready uptake by producers and retailers such as when a canvas shopping bag is advertised as "Save the Earth – $5 per bag", or promoted through slogans such as "every bag counts". Although this is not a study of the discourse of environmental advertising, it is noted that petroleum companies such as Shell Oil and fast-food corporations such as MacDonalds readily adopt environmental concepts and language to promote themselves and their activities. This is frequently implemented by marketers as a mere change in rhetoric rather than actual product improvement or change in processes.

A list of catch-phrases out of context will not necessarily belong obviously to either camp, but the direction of adoption is usually from activism to marketing, and not the other way around. An example of a catch-phrase which originated from activism is "beep for the boycott", which clearly exhorts the recipient through the use of an imperative verb to take a particular action.

2.5.3. Imperative

Another group of catch-phrases incites humans to stop, prevent or disallow circumstances. An Australian example is based on "No Dams", which was a campaign during the early 1980s to save the Franklin River in Tasmania. The "No –" catch-phrase has been taken up in many arenas since then, such as "No Mines" (referring to uranium mines).

Stop appears in our data as a strong catch-phrase component, used to create catch-phrases on many a theme.

STOP	
stop the Amazon forest destruction	stop ESSO
stop climate change	stop Star Wars
stop engine cruelty	stop whaling

2.5.4. Formulae

Catch-phrases tend to be formulaic, which can lead to blandness or semantic bleaching. A set of catch-phrases which appears with regular variants can be convenient in the sense that the referent is highlighted when the new variant is first encountered, but the other side of the coin is that such sets of catch-phrases can function as another jargon. Sets of catch-phrases can become stereotyped and repetitive, because the variant is just part of an almost meaningless set of assumptions and connotations. In addressing the use of slogans in the context of national parks and biodiversity, Brandon et al (eds.) (1998) suggest that:

> Catchy phrases, slogans, assumptions, and stereotypes have shaped conservation policy, to the detriment of both people and wildlife. Implementing these slogans and basing actions on stereotypes have not led to progress in conserving biodiversity either outside or inside of parks. Furthermore, such behaviours have constrained creative thinking on park protection and ways to solve the biodiversity crisis outside of parks. (Brandon, Redford, Sanderson (eds.) 1990: introduction)

The set of catch-phrases built around "Neighbourhood Watch" provides an example of the stereotypes and assumptions groups of catch-phrases can contain. In Australia, we have "Neighbourhood Watch", "School Watch", "Hospital Watch", "Farm Watch" and "Business Watch". We discovered in our data the catch-phrase "Trolley Watch". This is not, as one might assume, a program for keeping one's shopping safe from theft, but rather an environmental program which encourages consumers to make particular product choices about what they put into their trolleys.

Another example of this is built around the concept of 'care', a word which functions in English either as a verb or a noun. The meaning of 'to care' has developed new connotations in the last couple of decades, which entail quite specific physical actions and activities, rather than a vague emotional state. A person, group or company can care for other humans, industries, nursing homes, companies, parks, beaches and wildlife, to name a few. As these connotations have become familiar, *care* has been incorporated into the official titles of programs (*Landcare*, *Coastcare*), where its meaning, like 'watch' becomes bleached.

An interesting distinction appears when this process is employed with the adjective *safe* and the verb *saving*. If it refers to something that can be bought and consumed, such as toilet paper ("eco-safe"), or a tin of tuna ("dolphin-safe"), it is described as "safe". This is quite useful for marketers,

because it also employs a process of metonymy, in which mundane products are enhanced through their association with "the environment". However, products which themselves consume energy, for example a refrigerator or wood-burning stove, are more likely to be described as being "energy saving" than "climate safe" or "greenhouse safe".

The concept of 'efficiency', which comes out of economic rationalism, has also been employed to describe products which have the potential to consume energy and fuel, e.g. in the catch-phrases "energy efficient" and "fuel efficient". Described in this way, these products become more desirable to consumers.

2.6. Acronyms and blends

The formation of blends is where two or more lexical items merge into a new word to express a single concept. 'Smog' ('smoke' + 'fog') is a well-known example of this process. Examples in our data include *ecotage* (ecological + sabotage) and *twigloo* (twig + igloo = an abode constructed from twigs and branches in the shape of an igloo).

We also note the blend *guppie* (green + yuppie), formed of an acronym plus an adjective. *Yuppie* (Young Upwardly-mobile Professional) was a word taken up readily and disseminated through popular media during the 1980s. The resulting blend effectively merges the environmental era with the consumerist era, enabling the guppie, or the environmentally-conscious consumer to be born.

3. Conclusions

The new domain of greenspeaking has led to a rapid increase in lexical development and multiword formations over the last three decades. While some are clearly transient fashion, the issue of environmental degradation is not going to go away. As the day-to-day lives of more and more humans are affected, more specialised language will develop and become part of everyday discourse. Whether more language will become a basis for better environmental practice, or whether it will be a verbal substitute for action, remains to be seen.

Notes

1.   For example, the *Oxford Dictionary of New Words* (compiled by Sara Tulloch), divides its neologisms into discrete categories, such as "Business World", "War & Weaponry", "Music" and "Environment". Each word appears in the volume with one or more icons representing the categorisation of that particular neologism (Tulloch 1992: xi).
2.   In this case, the choice also be indexical of who is speaking. "Ecosystem" seems to have become the norm in more recent times, replacing the older "ecological system" in all but very formal scientific discourse.
3.   See Ketteman and König for a comprehensive list of eco- words (2000: 320).
4.   Some tour operators prefer the expression "nature based tourism" which does not suggest any obligation to avoid damage to nature.
5.   Note the anthropocentrism inherent in these concepts, as the sanctity of human life dominates over that of other lifeforms. In the past few years, seasonal bushfires in Australia's eastern states have sometimes been described as though they occur as a result of ecological justice to redress the ecological balance. For additional remarks on anthropocentrism see Jung 2001: 275–277.

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The phraseology of tourism: A central lexical field and its cultural construction

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1. Introduction

Assumptions about the relationship between language, cognition and culture have long been discussed from various angles. Corpus linguistic work has brought a new, empirical perspective to the discussion. Cultural experience is accessible through culturally shared cognitive schemata. Such cognitive schemata go along with habitual language use that can be documented with corpus linguistic methods. These routine linguistic patterns can be described as semantic schemata with their attendant pragmatic evaluation. This is a quantitatively based, qualitative approach, showing patterns and regularities in language use that would otherwise, without the help of corpus methods, hardly be perceptible and which therefore opens new views on cultural concepts and conventions.

Mobility is a cultural keyword these days, just as important as *globalisation*. The concepts of 'tourism', 'travel', or 'holiday' are a substantial factor in our cultural system of values. To be able to travel, or to go on a holiday, is not least a question of status. Our time is divided into work and leisure, accompanied by common expectations about possible ways to spend one's free time. A network of related language use represents and at the same time construes the topic in our culture. These linguistic representations are related with our views on good and bad holidays, fascinating or boring travel, ecological or detrimental tourism and, accordingly, how we evaluate people and institutions involved in one or the other.

We will investigate collocational patterns around the major keywords *tourist/tourists* and TRAVEL[1] and in particular those around the phrase *package holiday* in the British data. As database, we will use the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen (LOB) corpus (1960s), its corresponding, contemporary Freiburg-version, i.e. FLOB (1990s) and the British National Corpus (BNC) plus the internet (KWIC-Finder). This will cover the diachronic development of approximately 40 years from the 1960s to today.

2. Tourism: A very brief background

By the middle of the 18th century, the phenomenon of the nobility travelling to spas in their own country as well as to cultural and historic sites in southern Europe became known as "the tour" (cf. Graburn and Jafari 1991: 2). The people going on such tours (which at first took two to three years) for education and pleasure were accordingly called "tourists". They often wrote down their experiences and adventures, in some literary form or other. The most famous of these (in Europe) are probably Goethe's descriptions of his Italy travels in 1786–88.

After World War I, the predominance of the aristocracy travelling gave way to an increasing development of "ordinary" (still wealthy) people taking their holidays in contact with nature, sprinkled with the occasional "cultural interest". Sun- and sea-bathing became famous, just as skiing and hiking. This was partly a reaction to industrialisation (escaping the polluted cities) and later, notably after WWII, a demonstration of a more sophisticated life-style.

The tourism industry as we know it today is the third largest industry in the world. It emerged in the nineteenth century, notably under the influence of Thomas Cook, and has been growing rapidly since the 1930s, after the Great Depression in America and Europe. A new impulse came after the advent of jet travel in 1952. This was when mass tourism became an international enterprise. The decline in agricultural employment and loss of industrial jobs forced regions and cities to seek new sources of business to survive. Cities and regions intensively compete for tourist money. They often take upon themselves substantial transformations in order to become marketable tourist areas, which indeed affects daily urban life and the authenticity of a region.

Serious criticism of mass tourism emerged in the 1960s in economic and environmental studies. The tourist carrying capacity of regions was investigated in ecological terms as well as with regard to possible multiplier effects of tourist money, which were often counteracted by local inflation. Today, discussions of sustainable tourism or eco-tourism are still going strong, trying to steer *seasonal mass migration* into manageable channels and further to prevent tourist infiltration into sensitive natural areas. Sociological studies have criticised folk-representations of modernity and tradition meeting in tourism, asking whose traditions are more traditional or whose modernity is more modern, and in which terms. This is reflected in naïve tourist notions of experiencing "authentic" lives and rites of "natives".

3. Initial example

> "Tourism is still a form of colonisation, and our real holiday souvenir is, all too often, an attitude of superiority and control" (BNC).

As an initial example, to briefly document the methodological procedure, the collocational profiles of *tourist* and *tourists* will be discussed. The contexts in which these two words occur in the LOB corpus display several evaluative meanings (in order of frequency):

— Small, local business needs tourist money – there are only few occurrences of larger economic interests.
— Local people are slightly weary of tourists, who, however, have to be *humoured.*
— The main attractions are historical and cultural sights.
— Crime against tourists is still petty.

In the FLOB corpus, the most frequent sets of collocates concern the following areas:

— Mass tourism has established itself. There are numerous descriptions of tourists appearing in too large numbers *<droves, swarms, clustered, invading, sprawling, trampling, littering>.*
— Crime against tourists is increasing, in numbers as in severity.
— Tourists are identified as a major economic factor. Accordingly, infrastructures are built and extended.
— Issues of combining tourist interests and ecological protection are increasingly discussed.

In the BNC, the most prominent collocates are the following:

— Negative evaluations increase, in relation to regions and sights being invaded by tourists, with detrimental effects *<pervade, crowds, seasonal mass migration, swells, swelled, swelling tide, full of, sheer / large numbers, pressure, disturb, destroying customs and sights>.*
— The only positive evaluations around *tourist*/s to be found concern their absence, i.e. if a place is *free of* tourists.
— Historic sights are staged and cultural traditions and customs are acted out for tourists to visit and observe. In these contexts, tourists are often

represented as stupid enough not to perceive differences in quality and authenticity.[2]
— Danger for tourists is mentioned regularly, with respect to both accidents and crime.

Although there is a diachronic development visible in the meaning clustering around *tourist/s*, as the three different corpora show, several basic assumptions stay relatively similar over the years. It is obvious from all three data sources that tourist money is needed. The single tourist's behaviour as such is mentioned astonishingly little. They are not perceived as individuals, but as types, categories and masses; not to be liked but to be dealt with. Initial curiosity towards a potentially interesting foreigner, occasionally visible in LOB, gives way over the years (as documented in FLOB and BNC) to a sedate weariness over the necessity to cater for and entertain tourists. But, in general, even people living on tourist money just *groan and bear* impositions. Frequencies of such perceived disturbances increase significantly from LOB to BNC. The only "welcome" evaluations visible in the collocates of *tourist/s* concern commercial issues.

Frequently, the inhabitants of a touristic region ridicule tourists who visit sights they themselves wouldn't classify as a sight, such as other people's workplace <*the New York stock exchange, a farm, a building site*, etc.>. MacCannell (1976) aptly describes the absurdity of the London sewage system being marketed as a tourist attraction at the end of the 19th century. Individual attempts at ignoring "tourist attractions", i.e. "leaving the beaten tracks" do not occur in the contexts of *tourist/s*, but rather with TRAVEL.

If the above data document a certain recurrent discourse about tourists, we can probably conclude that people share certain schemata and concepts about the role of tourists in European / British culture. This is most easily visible in the following four sets of metaphorical representations around the nodes *tourist/s*:

— *droves, swarm/s, trampling* (tourists as animals)
— *invade, pervade, destroy, pressure* (tourists as hostile / warriors)
— *sprawling, SWELL* (masses of tourists are out of control)
— *crowds, mass migration, sheer / large numbers, full of* (overwhelmed by masses of tourists)

The negative evaluation given to tourist interference is framed in specific ways. While it is difficult to condemn individual people, their representa-

tion as masses of animals, warriors or natural forces out of control relates to culturally shared schemata of things and situations to be avoided.

4. Assumptions about the relationship "language – cognition – culture"

If we want to investigate the relationship between textual representation and society, we can start by focussing on the interplay of conventionalised, routine language use and its presumed attendant conceptual schemas based on a shared cultural background. Texts need to be analysed as expressions of culture where cultural experience is manifest in people's language use.

A useful theoretical approach is Foucault's (e.g. 1980) constructivist concept of discursive formations that places linguistic utterances in relation to social agency. Discourse, which is public and frequent, can construe new topics. It construes and defines people's knowledge and regulates communication about the respective topics. A discursive formation contains everything said and written about a particular topic, in a particular span of time, distilled into an abstracting model of knowledge and experience shared by the cultural community. Discursive formations are always intertextual in that elements, e.g. particular keywords in their collocations and phrases, fulfil functions in various texts and discourses. People construe cultural significance through shared (linguistic) agency; and they do this in conventionalised ways.

Searle's (1995) argument, which is also contructivist, goes further in discussing how institutional (i.e. cultural) facts always presuppose a semiotic system. Only if we can communicate about, agree on and integrate some experience into our discourse and cultural practice, can we accept conventions as institutional facts. His typical example is the status of items considered to be money, with all legal consequences, just because each individual member of a society has agreed on it to be so, largely on the basis of a net of linguistic representations. With respect to tourism, a rather abstract, though linguistically transmitted, element of trust in a system of buying services, maybe even "experience", is visible. The entire tourism branch is regulated by (a semiotically based system of) law and institutions.

Halliday's (1978) concept of "duality" captures the reciprocal relationship between this cultural-institutional and the individual-cognitive aspect. Against the background of the community and its shared language use, the

individual develops his or her social and linguistic competence, such as, e.g., views about, and means of communicating about, tourism. The individual's language use, within the boundaries of the language norm[3], then systematically re-enforces as well as gradually modifies existing institutions and the language system where continual use, with slight variations, shows the diachronic perspective (cf. Halliday 1992 and 1993). Significant parts of this meaning-making process are of course construed by, and hence can be traced in, discourse.

The concept of 'representation' serves as the uniting element between individual and cultural experience and cognition on the one hand and linguistic encoding on the other hand. Representation is discussed in different contexts. Hall (1997: 17, 28) refers to it as "the link between concepts and language which enables us to refer to either the "real" world of objects, people or events, or indeed to imaginary worlds of fictional objects, people and events"; or shorter: "Representation is the production of meaning through language". Representations construe versions of the world, they construe views on how a culture "functions". Although this might be a contested view of culture, it can be revealing to investigate pervasive everyday discourse that shapes – and is shaped by – the ordinary way a culture and its individual participants function.

Such intricate relations between language, cognition (knowledge) and culture (in a broad sense) can be accessed via instances of language use in texts. These are most conveniently handled in the computer-readable format of corpora. Corpus analysis can show norms, routines and deviances probably not obvious to the individual language user. Representative corpora are meant to cover large portions of a wide range of language use. Such corpora are repositories of a multiplicity of uses, providing a view on the variability and regularity of the system. In terms of a frequency distribution, we can see cultural routines and conventions emerging from the collected utterances. A large, balanced corpus therefore provides concrete material to investigate such common, conventional behaviour that, given its frequency, is presumably significant in a culture and, in a way, is inseparable from shared cognitive schemata and ways of conceptualisation. As will be discussed below, extended lexical units (units of meaning stretching over more than one word) are important linguistic representations of such conceptual and cultural schemata.

We take schemata here as the connecting and analysable elements between the linguistic and cognitive / psychological levels, which are interwoven with the cultural frame. Large parts of our everyday life are based

on shared (interpretative) schemata, where *schema* is used as an umbrella term for a set of related concepts (frame / script / schema), describing culturally shared knowledge about situations, events or structures. This includes institutionalised circumstantial elements together with regularly used forms of language. Bourdieu (1977: 72) uses the term "habitus", describing the internalised results of our experiences acquired on a daily basis, within the frame of our social conventions. On the linguistic level, this concept of "habitus" can be investigated in the form of "semantic schemata" (Stubbs 2001).

5. Semantic schemata

Semantic schemata are patterns in language use of habitually recurring multi-word units and grammatical structures that are variable but recognisably similar. They share a pragmatic intention or evaluation, visible in habitual semantic prosodies of related sets of collocates of the node word. Hunston and Francis (2000: 37) define patterns as "all the words and structures which are regularly associated with the word and which contribute to its meaning … if a combination of words occurs relatively frequently, … and if there is a clear meaning associated with it".

Two aspects are important here: The first is the generally applicable "idiomatic principle", that is the co-selection of lexical elements in syntagmatic structure, documented in detail by Sinclair (1996, 1998). He shows how normal native language use consists of a large number of semi-preconstructed phrases, which are chosen as one unit although they seem to be analysable as segments. This is based on the Firthian concept of 'the company a word keeps', i.e. the continuum from words co-occurring habitually with one or a set of related words to more unrestricted choices of word combinations. Below, this "idiomatic principle" is illustrated in the summaries of semantically related sets of collocates of the investigated node words. These sets each show a shared evaluation of the main concept underlying the phrases around the node. If, for example, the majority of the collocates of *tourist/s* are concerned with aspects of "masses of people being a nuisance", we can conclude that this is a central semantic aspect of the words in today's language use.

The second aspect concerns the more fixed end of the continuum of collocational stability. The terminology around such phraseological phenomena is manifold and differently used by different athors[4]. We will fo-

cus here in a less formalistic manner on "extended lexical units" (ELU) (Sinclair 1996). The term "lexical item", i.e. form-function units across word boundaries, that are habitually used and have a conventionalised meaning in a community of language users is preferred in Sinclair (1998). Sinclair's model of ELUs leaves enough descriptive scope to cover sets of semantically related collocates as well as more narrowly delimited (fixed) phrases.

Fillmore (1997) points out the relevance of such phraseological phenomena to their respective cultural background[5]. According to him, such pre-fabricated units of meaning fulfil a unifying function within a socio-cultural community, because people can rely on a common stock of concepts and references. This implies that a substantial part of our experience is categorized by, and organized into, cognitive schemata. They, in turn, are analysable as linguistic patterns and routines, which encode pragmatic attitudes and evaluations. These are visible in "discourse prosodies" (Stubbs 2001), i.e. habitual evaluations marked in sets of semantically related collocates of a node. A discourse prosody can be understood as the pragmatic motivation for choosing the particular ELU in the first place[6]. In its pragmatic function, this evaluative element can be compared to the illocutionary force of speech acts. Therefore, it plays an important part in structuring the communicative competence of the members of a society.

Cognitive schemata (i.e. concepts about the structure of culturally important situations and events), together with the inferences that are drawn from communication, plus the habitual language use in semantic schemata which encode pragmatic evaluation, open ways of empirically documenting culturally shared structures of meaning.

6. TRAVEL

The following is an investigation of how linguistic representations and therefore probably also concepts of 'travelling' have changed over time, in relation to general socio-cultural changes.

As the distribution of the lemma TRAVEL in the different corpora shows (Table 1), there is no difference in frequency of occurrence over time. However, the collocational patterns suggest that a shift of modes of travelling has taken place from the 1960s to today which will be discussed below.

Table 1. Frequency of occurrence of the lemma TRAVEL

TRAVEL	LOB	FLOB	BNC
travel, travels, travelled, travelling, traveller, travellers	total 139 = 0.14 times in 1,000 words	total 185 = 0.18 times in 1,000 words	total 14,788 = 0.15 times in 1,000 words

As Table 2 shows, it is obvious that people travel further because they can travel faster. The destinations have changed from going to a not so far city or country to a different continent, such as *<India, New Zealand, Australia>*. This goes along with technological development from travelling by train to travelling by car and then by air.

Table 2. Frequent examples of destinations and means of transport collocating with TRAVEL

Corpus	Destinations	Means of transport
LOB	Nice, London, Glasgow, Barcelona, Greece, Budapest, Berlin, British Isles	train, rail, bus, sea, air
FLOB	Denmark, London, France, Spain, Hamburg, Peking, Hong Kong, Ecuador, New World	bus, coach, train, air, ship
BNC	Europe, Western Europe, India, Alaska, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa	car, air, flight, bus, coach, train

Interestingly, the contexts of *tourist/s* and TRAVEL do not overlap in significant ways. Before the advent of mass tourism, most of the travelling was done by "travellers", not by "tourists". The difference between these two groups of people will be clarified shortly. In the LOB corpus, many contexts of the lemma TRAVEL still depict travelling as something special, with the people travelling described as educated, often wealthy[7]. Travelling is a facet of their sophistication, exploited to underline their social status. In these contexts, much stress is put on the degree of comfort (or luxury) in which the travelling can be done. Occasionally, the first lower-income holiday-makers are mentioned, who, for example, *<travel to Italy with their Lambretta>*. The sense of commuting is not yet frequent.

In the FLOB corpus, the majority of contexts, however, refer to travelling just as movement from one place to another, occasionally in a metaphorical sense, such as light or particles travelling through space or matter. The concordances around people travelling in their free time ascribe them a certain seriousness. Very often, these travellers are depicted as searching

for some mind-broadening enlightenment, scholarly knowledge or cultural experience.

In the BNC, there is a mixture of collocations; on the one hand, travelling is to more exotic places for which e.g. *vaccination/s* are needed and, on the other hand, travelling is merely a necessary movement due to one's job or profession, of whichever kind. Commuters and frequent travellers meanwhile have to live with *<traffic jams, delays, queues>* and related inconveniences.

Table 3 gives an overview of the people travelling, if this is specified in the concordance lines (very frequently, the actors are just anonymously addressed as "travellers" or "people"). As the table shows, the people who travel become more common or ordinary over the years. While travelling used to be expensive and time-consuming, it was mainly reserved for wealthy people, for those who could decide over their time freely and for officials whose costs of travelling were paid by an institution. This explains also why so many occurrences in LOB (and some in FLOB) show individually named travellers. Travelling was still something out of the ordinary. These days, everyone can travel, or maybe even has to travel on a regular basis. This increasing trend, in turn, might account for the fact that in the later data, travellers are mainly referred to as groups or masses, and hardly anymore as individual people.

Table 3. People who travel, according to LOB, FLOB and BNC.

Corpus	Travellers
LOB	Member of Parliament, Colonial Secretary, President, Royal Family, Duke, Duchess, Count, millionaire (name), students, poets, correspondent, (circus / exhibition people), (few business people), (individually named people)[8]
FLOB	Chief Inspector, presidents, diplomats, students, artists, league players, actors, hitch-hiker, business people, gypsies / "travelling people", researchers, commuters, (large groups of people), (few individually named people)
BNC	business people, aid-workers, President, Prime Minister, politicians, military, scientists, students, pensioners, athletes, back-packers, lovers, housewives, family, children, commuters, (few individually named people), (masses of people), (people addressed anonymously, not individually)

7. Package holiday

> "The package holiday is particularly appropriate to the personality traits of compliance and sociability which make up the typically British temperament" (BNC).

The fairly recently created phrase *package holiday* accommodates new trends in the structuring of leisure time and is maybe partly responsible for generating new models of consumption. In the LOB and FLOB corpora, the phrase *package holiday* hardly exists. A detailed analysis of the patterns accompanying the phrase *package holiday* in the BNC can document important aspects of socio-cultural structure, stratification, conventions and preoccupations. The most frequent types of representation concern five main semantic fields:

1. Package holidays are an important economic factor and a highly competitive market sector which concerns the operators on the one hand, and the customers on the other hand. This is obvious in frequent co-occurrences with *<market, industry, competition, business, commercial (success / failure), price/s, cost/s, (many individual sums of money)>*, adjectival classifications of these collocates, such as *<booming, plunging, (un)profitable>* and some figurative expressions relating to consumers' reactions to prices and purchasing a package holiday *<clinching a deal, beyond (the reach of) (someone's) pocket/s, grabbing a bargain>*.
2. Package holidays are a kind of ready-made product for consumption. Everything is taken care of; no personal planning effort and responsibility is needed. One simply chooses between several complete products according to personal tastes and financial possibilities. They are convenient and well structured. The three main collocational patterns here concern:
—   Events and activities that are declared touristic highlights, such as a *<gathering of whales / dolphins (etc), seeing tigers (etc), an eclipse of the sun, walks in vineyards>*.
—   Specifically prepared destinations and forms of holidays, such as *<beach-resorts, romantic getaways, snowy ski-resorts, golf-resorts>* and *<1 week shopping tour, 2 night weekend package, 3 night break in Italy, 14 day beach package tour, 2 day walking holiday, luxurious club holiday>*.
—   Relaxation and personal well-being, exemplified in collocates such as *<sun-seeking, sunshine, romance, relaxation, breaks, wholesome, sport,*

beach, museum, concert, opera, flee from reality, be away from home, travel away from stress, foster interests, broaden minds>.

3. The equipment and provision the resorts have to offer are of paramount interest. Almost of a cliché character are the following, high-frequency collocates: *<cheap, competitive, all inclusive, well arranged, free drinks, pool, sea view room, budget, (number)-star hotel, resorts, transport, mini-bus, meals, fare reduction, concession>*.

4. Although the product comes in different categories of price and comfort, there are similar stereotypes about the groups of consumers who buy package holidays. Somehow, it seems to be of superior value to plan our holidays ourselves. In doing so, one immediately reverts to the expression TRAVEL and collocations of *<independence, wealth, status, education, adventure>*.

5. The package holiday market, as a branch of the tourism industry, is a highly regulated market, with its legal framework firmly institutionalised in contemporary western culture: *<international / (worldwide) agreement, facilities, minimum, maximum, reduction, representative, office, insurance, appointed, approved, WTO, WTTC, ABTANTB [9]>*. This is also visible in the naming practice for the travel options that can be purchased. Every organised form has its own label, such as: *<Senior Citizen Railcard, Rail Europe Senior Card, Student card, Supersavers, Savers, Non-savers, APEX ticket, PEX ticket, excursion ticket, pre-paid ticket, bound, non-refundable>*.

Of course, there are also dangers and anxieties related to package holidays, not very different to the contexts of TRAVEL: *<death, murder, pickpockets, false arrest, prostitutes, beggars, robbery, accident/s, security,* ATTACK, TERROR*, vaccination, AIDS, disease, epidemics>*. The fear of terrorist attacks has spread dramatically in the last few years. A search in up-to-date internet data (KWIC-Finder) documents an almost exploding frequency after September 11, 2001, with temporarily detrimental effects on the tourism industry.

It is important to realize that these are the common and agreed-on ways of representing the topic of a package holiday. Although we do have the possibility to frame the events differently, the majority of language users chose the above documented expressions that, therefore, became visible as high frequency occurrences in the concordance data. We probably have not very widely differing expectations about a *<2 night weekend package>* or a *<14 day beach package tour>*. Such expectations are perpetuated by the respective, shared discourse in the speech community.

We see this in stereotypes coming to the fore: *Majorca* and *Costa del Sol* are still the most frequently bought destinations for European (British) package holiday travellers. These are almost the "default" destinations for the stereotypical 14-day beach package holiday. A certain status is attached to this choice. Collocates indicate that it is predominately a lower middle class choice. A few concordance lines, exemplifying other clichéd uses are:

— *<In a tragic testimony to the commercial success of the package holiday business over the last 30 years, melanoma now ranks as Britain's fastest growing cancer...>*
— *<Row upon row of sunburnt bodies, oiled like sardines, covered the beaches of Spanish resorts. The package holiday market had grown ...>*
— *<All the women have kinky underwear and perms. They are package holiday tourists>*
— *<... very easy to purchase>*
— *<you will be able to hold the package holiday organiser responsible for any shortcomings in the facilities and standards of the foreign hotel>.*

While the beach package is obviously restricted in its offers mostly to beach and water sports, the occasional excursion and the obligatory catering, the weekend package is usually marked by relatively high activity levels of the holiday-makers. Some of the more popular pastimes seem to be:

— *<hang-gliding, rapids-and waterfalls-viewing, walking, climbing>.*

While immersed in these activities, people expect the following experience:

— <LAUGH, *fun*, ADVENTURE, EXCITING, EXPLORE, *beautiful*>.

They want to stay in facilities such as:

— *<luxury hotels, best cabin, gracious surrounding, warm hospitality>.*

The choices of thematically specified weekend packages cater for the most varied interests:

— *<hen-(night / weekend), bridal weekend, chocolate-lovers weekend package>.*

This culture of a "mini-break"[10] shows in its collocational patterns strong links to a middle-aged, professional, slightly higher-income clientele. Comparatively speaking, weekend packages are more expensive than longer holidays and require more effort and general mobility on the part of the traveller. But still, package holidays, even if they seem to be adventurous and maybe even strenuous, are a kind of convenience product, to be consumed in a ready-made, planned and organised way.

This concept of a package holiday goes along with a trend in society to buy easy-to-consume, ready-made products. In cooking, this goes as far as pouring ready-made cake dough from a plastic pack into a baking mould to put it into the oven. You can retain the satisfaction of a freshly baked cake out of your own oven, without the hassle of preparing anything yourself. Equally, large parts of the do-it-yourself market are saturated with prefabricated products that fit into the tight time schedule of the consumers, who still want to say they worked it out themselves.

An analysis of the related key-expression *ready-made* shows that its overall frequencies are not significantly different in LOB, FLOB and BNC. Out of the total occurrences, those referring to convenience products such as food, clothing and furniture related elements, however, illustrate interesting differences in the representation of the concept. In LOB, these are approximately a third of all occurrences and they are framed in a very critical way, preferring hand-made products. While in FLOB, the percentage of occurrences is similar to LOB, the representations, in contrast, are overall positive, praising the convenience of ready-made products for consumers. In the BNC, the relevant percentage of *ready-made* is almost half of the total occurrences. We find a mixture of evaluations here: first of all, the amount of ready-made products has risen so steadily because people want and need them. Their quality is regularly praised while time efficiency is presupposed and therefore hardly explicitly mentioned. Without a substantial amount of the available ready-made produce, it seems hardly possible any more to handle our ordinary contemporary live. However, an astonishingly high proportion of the concordance lines around the node indicate more or less severe criticism directed towards ready-made products and the accompanying life style. In the field of nutrition, issues of *health* and *pleasure* in consuming *fresh*, *hand/home-made* products are discussed. In connection with other products, aspects of *quality* and *originality*, *extraordinariness* and *natural beauty* appear. Overall, there is a discourse prosody visible in this percentage of critical evaluations, emphasising the intrinsic value perceived in products which are not pre-processed.

In particular in the field of food, a strong aspect of quality and sophistication is implied, coupled with snobbish ridiculing of convenience food consumers.

Coming back to package holidays as one among the vast array of convenience products, they are described as a form of "New Tourism". This term indicates a variety of tourisms that emerge from what is referred to as the mainstream or conventional mass tourism. It closely relates to new types of consumers (the so called new middle class), and post-Fordism, a new form of economic organisation or mass production and consumption (Rojek and Urry 1997).

Practices of mass consumption concerning travel products are among the major cultural shifts in contemporary society.[11] Package holidays represent a change of convention, that is, consumption of services (cf. "ready-made") rather than goods, across a new horizon of lifestyles and activities. Products are produced that are in need of demands. Package holidays are created to serve consumer needs, offering different lifestyles for different people.

Parallel to the unbroken trend of cheap and good-value package holidays at not too far away beaches is, since the 1970s, a heightened interest that is visible in a growing market for (what seems to be a contradiction in terms) "individualized" package holidays, e.g. visiting a *museum* in *Paris*, going to an *opera* in *Rome,* attending a *concert* in *Moscow, white-water-rafting* in *Canada, fasting* and *walking* in *Tuscany*, etc.… These tours are still highly organised and standardised. Everybody can find their convenient product (even sex-holidays in Thailand, cf. Houellebecq 2003). However, people do not want to be stereotyped and put into categories, even if they act like it. The following extracts pick up this mood precisely:

— *<But most of all she loved the fact that it wasn't full of sun-seeking OAPs on tours. She knew it was snobbish, that she was just like any other package holiday-maker>* (BNC).
— *<from the lone backpacker who stuffs a volume of Descartes into the pocket of her shorts and forgets to take spare socks, to the package holidaymaker who packs a change of silk shirt for every evening he is going to be away>* (BNC).

These days, our average working hours are considerably fewer than in the early 1960s. We work less on a daily and weekly basis and have more holidays at our disposal. There is a weird mixture of discourse about bore-

dom and lack of excitement on the one hand and stress and burnout syndromes on the other hand. Package holidays cater for both moods – recreation and adventure. People can *<find their inner self, discover their abilities, become a new you>* or just *<flee from reality, be away from home, travel away from stress>*. This illustrates socio-culturally accepted values of liberation from the routines of one's life and to be *<free from social constraints>*. Such notions of escapism frame wishes of temporarily becoming someone else entirely or just to float in "sweet oblivion". To be able to do this, package holiday-makers, however, gladly accept the structures and strictures of the organisers, the tour itinerary and the rules of the resort. In the contexts of TRAVEL, where the travellers have to take care of the organisational frame themselves, there are hardly any occurrences of such issues of "freedom".

We can see mutually supportive effects in the analysis of *package holiday*. It is of course not possible to say which came first: Some desire to spend one's leisure time in a certain way, or a marketing idea and strategy. But we can investigate how certain language uses and the respective ideas developed over time. We can check this quantitatively with diachronic corpus research and qualitatively with regard to the particular sets of collocational patterns and their distributions and changes. Today, a package holiday is a fairly clearly delimited concept in Western affluent society, with fairly clearly delimited sets of connotations. There <u>are</u> opposing representations, trying to reclaim semantic ground for package holidays, but they are, statistically speaking, not successful enough in construing alternative views in the language users.

8. Conclusion

Issues of mobility have always been important for our culture. Mobility can be a drab necessity, but also a free time pleasure. On the basis of diachronic linguistic data we can observe shifts in cultural practices; from travelling as a privilege for the aristocracy and the rich to holidays as seasonal movements of the masses, to globalisation and travelling as a prerequisite to professional success.

We can also observe at each historical stage which role the different forms of mobility take in the value systems of a culture. The tourism industry is one of our economic as well as socio-culturally structuring pillars. Everyone is concerned about and has an opinion on what it takes to be a

tourist, a traveller or a package holiday-maker. We can document an inter-textual net where uses of the respective expressions are tightly linked. They derive their meaning partly from delimitation from their neighbouring concepts. Each choice, therefore, makes the differences in meaning clear; be it differences in personalities, social status, education, income or interests of the social actors.

Of course there can be no direct link presupposed between language use, cognition and culture. The point made here, however, is that frequently used linguistic routines in a particular area of meaning are as inseparably linked to the cognitive schemata the language users have formed about something, as to institutionalised cultural facts. There are always alternative ways of expression. Nevertheless, if particular forms are chosen habitually, this points to a cognitive preference. A cultural basis for such frequent, shared preferences seems plausible. As Giddens (1991) states, our knowledge and experience is gained and transmitted through a linguistically mediated process of socialisation. This leads us back to Halliday's previously mentioned concept of duality, which explains the dialectics of socio-cultural structure and individual and culturally agreed on agency.

Storey (2003) argues that activities and structures of popular culture are one of the principal sites where divisions such as social class are established and contested. Capitalist culture industries try to impose forms of culture which are taken up as well as opposed by the consumers. What develops is a "compromise equilibrium" (Gramsci 1971: 161) between the two; a mix of forces from both the commercial and consumer side, each with their own form of power, i.e. offer and demand, leading to a basically stable socio-cultural situation.

The analyses presented can form one module of a possible ethnographic study to discover the meanings people (partly linguistically) construe, which circulate and become embedded in people's daily experienced surrounding. The presented methodology can not only document the repertoire of products and services offered by industry, but also how people select, appropriate, and use these commodities, transforming them into shared cultural practices (Storey 2003).

Corpus linguistics has the possibility of documenting this relationship from the language side. As Allen (2000: 37) puts it: "Meaning … is always at one and the same time 'inside' and 'outside' the text". The textual basis, however, is the common stock from which we all draw, which is analysable and therefore accessible.

Notes

1. Words in upper case stand for the different word forms of the lemma. Word forms / collocations quoted from the corpus data are in italics. Sets of collocates are given in diamond brackets.
2. Sweet (1989) describes case studies of "natives" (Navajo Indians) playing at being "tourists", in order to revert existing hierarchies. The tourists' ignorance of and superficial enthusiasm for "authentic" rituals of the "natives" is dramatised.
3. *Norm* is taken here in terms of overall frequency and distribution of forms of language use, as described in very large, balanced (representative) corpora.
4. A few examples of the (not easily distinguishable) terminological multiplicity are the following: Bolinger (1976): "prefabricated chunks"; Pawley and Syder (1983): "lexical items"; Cowie (1988): "composites" or "formulae"; Nattinger and DeCarrico (1992): "lexical phrases" or "conventionalised form / function composites"; Moon (1998): "idiom schemas"; Erman and Warren (2000): "prefabs".
5. Teliya et al. (1998) go as far as calling phraseology "a language of culture", representing culture's "collective mentality".
6. As Sinclair (1998: 20) stresses, a discourse prosody "is a subtle element of attitudinal, often pragmatic meaning and there is often no word in the language that can be used as a descriptive label for it. What is more, its role is often so clear in determining the occurrence of the item that the prosody is, paradoxically, not necessarily realised at all."
7. "Although Thomas Cook had started the package tour to enable the masses to travel, it was still beyond the reach of most people's pockets" (BNC).
8. These items in brackets paraphrase semantically related elements and provide content summaries.
9. WTO = World Tourist Association, WTTC = World Travel and Tourism Council, ABTANTB = Association of British Travel Agents National Training Board.
10. The importance of a "mini-break" is most impressively parodied in Helen Fielding's *The Diary of Bridget Jones*. Bridget invests considerable effort in persuading her flashy new boyfriend to take her to a stylish resort for the weekend. She takes this event as visible proof of their relationship, to be shown off to friends and family.
11. See also Veblen (1973) who emphasises such aspects of conspicuous consumption within the "leisure class".

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Idiomaticity in a cultural and activity type perspective:
The conventionalization of routine phrases in answering-machine messages

Karin Aijmer

1. Introduction

In interaction we follow principles such as the Gricean maxims of conversation and turn-taking rules. There are also rules which are specific to particular activities or text types. Sometimes the utterance itself can carry with it a link or association with a particular activity. In that case there is an indexical link between a phrase and a particular event or function such as identifying the caller leaving the message on the answering machine. For example, when we encounter a phrase such as *this is* /name/ we know not only that it is used for identification but that it has something to do with telephone calls or with telephone answering machine messages. In this case there is a close link not only between the phrase and the function of self-identification but with a particular medium and a speech event. With other phrases the association is less fixed. For example, there might be a link between *thank you* and closing a discussion, conversation, etc., but *thank you* is also used to express gratitude and is then used in many types of texts. Moreover we begin a face-to-face conversation differently from a telephone conversation indicating that speakers know what to say in a particular situation and that events come in a particular order. In this article I want to try out some ideas about how such phrases come into existence as useful strategies and later become routinized and linked to a particular activity. Phrases such as *thank you* or *this is* /name/ ('routine phrases') have a fairly fixed form and bring up the question why and how we get routinization in language.

Many text types have a formulaic nature. Kuiper (1996) has for instance studied the speech of auctioneers and sports commentators and their use of formulae (routines). The aim of my paper is to describe the use of routine phrases used by callers leaving messages on answering machines. Routine phrases have been studied from many different perspectives. By investigat-

ing routines in a text type which is still new we can learn something about the meaning of routine phrases and the factors constraining their interpretation. Writers within ethnography of communication (Hymes 1972; see also Schiffrin 1994, chapter 5) have drawn our attention to the importance of cultural and social scripts, the 'blue prints' representing our knowledge of when, how and why we use language. I will show in the present paper that routine phrases need to be explained in terms of contextual issues such as the institution within which they are used, social activity (participants, setting, etc.), the constraints imposed by the medium and people's attitudes to mediated talk.

Messages on the answering machine represent a unique type of talk constrained by the medium and the conditions under which the communication takes place. They are characterised by a restricted number of acts (events) in a pre-determined order: you should, for example, identify yourself (by name or by telephone number) before leaving a message. The message can also contain acts which are less predictable and fulfil the function of social padding.

The users' conceptions about the answering machine may affect the form of the message. The fact that the intended recipient of the message does not share the same communicative space as the caller may result in more formality and indirectness than is common in telephone conversation. Conceptual conventions (cf. Clark 1996: 343f for this term) differ depending on whether the caller knows the recipient of the message or not and may change over time as the medium becomes more familiar.

The answering machine is a fairly new medium and it is possible to make comparisons between messages when the medium was new and messages recorded more recently. Messages on the answering machine can be expected to use different conversational routines and conventional patterns because of the constraints imposed by the medium (cf. Liddicoat et al. 1992). Messages on the answering machine can also be compared with restricted languages intended for special purposes. Seaspeak is, for example, specially designed for maritime radio communication. It has a fixed format and special routine phrases which can be explained by the constraints imposed by the context of use (poor radio reception, the importance of the message) (Strevens and Weeks 1985).

Conversational routines on the answering machine are difficult to describe because of their variability. After a section dealing with the material (Section 2), I will discuss some properties of leaving messages on the answering machine and look at some previous work (Section 3). In Sec-

tion 4 I will deal with conversational routines on the answering machine in terms of the situational frames they must be associated with. In Section 5, it is argued that messages must be represented as 'stems' since their form can vary systematically. Section 6 discusses conversational routines and theories of meaning. In Section 7 I discuss the conventional forms used to perform different functions on the answering machine. A comparison will be made with conventional forms in other text types. I will also compare messages recorded at different periods but otherwise similar to each other. The concluding Section 8 contains a discussion about the development and conventionalisation of routine phrases on the answering machine.

2. Material

Answering machine communication needs no detailed presentation. The machine is designed for use on the telephone when the intended recipient is not there and the communication is therefore delayed. The person leaving the message responds to a pretaped message which can also contain instructions to the caller how to answer; the message is addressed to the recipient of the telephone call but the structure and the content of the message are constrained by the fact that the recipient is not able to give immediate feedback. My material consists of only the caller's messages (cf. Liddicoat 1994 who studies both messages from the caller and the recorded message left by the answerer).

The messages which comprise my material were recorded at different times and it is therefore possible to make comparisons between them. The earliest messages (57 messages in all) are part of the London-Lund Corpus (LLC) and were recorded in the 1970s on institutional answering machines. The callers are mainly administrators, secretaries and professors. In the 1970s the answering machine was a comparatively new technical invention which was used above all in offices and commercial institutions.

More recent material has been used for comparison and consists of 70 messages recorded in the 1990s by university department answering machines in the UK (Surrey). In the 1990s the telephone answering machine was no longer a novelty: answering machines were used not only for business purposes but people started having them in their homes and therefore had more experience of them.

The messages in both corpora were usually simple (consisting of a single message), typically asking the other person to ring back. Other topics are settling bills, cancelling appointments, making arrangements to see students. In the Surrey material there were also messages from commercial institutions (travel agencies, local firms, etc.) and topics also concern courses and accommodation for students.

3.   Leaving messages on the answering machine

In a message left on an answering machine the speaker has a dialogue with an imagined or constructed recipient. Speakers can adopt an impersonal voice or they can choose to establish a social relation to the imagined participant by means of speech. The situation differs from both telephone calls and face-to-face conversation and we can therefore expect different conventions to come into existence. However, it takes time for new conventions to develop and speakers therefore use a variety of different routines which have been shown to be useful in other situations such as telephone calls or face-to-face conversations. Experience in using the new medium is acquired by effort, practicing and training rather than in the socialisation process. As a result, the conventions and the routine phrases used to cope with problems in the communication situation may be more or less successful (Dubin 1987).

In the messages on the answering machine speakers apologise and say *thank you* without getting any response from a hearer, but they do not, for example, ask about the other person's health (cf. *how are you, how are you doing* in face-to-face and in telephone conversation) (Liddicoat 1994). Greetings, confirming arrangements, making requests, asking for information, marking the closing of the message are other acts which need to be carried out without feedback from the hearer. Messages usually include a request or a question as their main topic. However, there are few direct questions or requests and a request can have a fairly conventionalised indirect form.

In previous work on answering machine messages (Dingwall 1992, 1995; Gold 1991; Liddicoat 1994) the focus has been on how this text type differs from telephone calls and from letter writing. Dingwall (1992), for instance, compared letters, telephone calls and messages on the answering machine and showed how they could be placed on the spoken-written dimension. However, she was not concerned with the conventional linguistic forms

used by speakers to perform different strategies and the extent to which these were the same as used in the same situations in other text types.

Looking at routine phrases in a text type (speech event) can help us to understand something about routine phrases in general. Routine phrases are sometimes treated as uniquely associated with a particular meaning. However routine phrases may be homophonous both between functions and situational meanings (Kiefer 1996); for example *thank you* is used both to express gratitude and to signal closing. It is used as a closing signal in discussions, debates, business calls but not in face-to-face conversation. The link between a particular situation and conversational routines can also be weak. The callers can for instance choose between many different phrases to identify themselves on the answering machine.

4.   Conversational routines and frames

All language is embedded in a social and cultural context. When we look at routinized phrases it is clear that the dependence on context goes deep. What makes routine phrases special is that the links to features of the social and cultural context are conventionalized.

Routine phrases in answering machine messages must be associated with a rich description of the context. We need to take into account 'who speaks what, why and under what circumstances' (cf. Fishman 1970: 364) in order to describe the context. The context also includes such factors as the user's attitude to the medium and knowledge about the medium and practice in using it. Although the cultural context seems to be of interest it has not been shown that the message form varies depending on culture. Dingwall (1995) collected receivers' messages from the German part of Switzerland, which she compared with messages in French and Romansch, also from Switzerland. She found no cultural differences between the messages in different languages which were recorded under the same conditions although there were some differences in style between the German and the French material.

The features of the social context can be organized as (social or situational) frames. Fillmore's notion 'frame' (1985) and Levinson's 'activity type' (1979) consider context in a broad sense and can be used as a model when one wants to describe how routine phrases are linked to particular speech events and to context. A frame is defined 'as a set of lexical items

whose members index portions of some actional or conceptual whole' (Hanks 1996: 243).

Hanks (1996) discusses how frames play a role for the description of a rich 'ethnographic context' needed for the interpretation of deictic systems. The frame can be conceived of as a list of strategically ordered questions (Who are participants in the event? In what setting does the event take place? For what reason? What is the preceding and subsequent speech act? How is it performed?). Speech acts often have a conventionalized form and are described as frames. The following frame (from Coulmas 1979) illustrates the factors needed to describe the meaning of 'congratulations':

I	Participants
	sex
	age
	social role
	hierarchy
	authority
	familiarity
II	Setting
	time
	place
III	The why and wherefore
	time
	reason
IV	Contextual restrictions
	sequentialization
	stylistic homogeneity
V	Concomitant activity
	e.g. gesture

The situational frame plays an important part in describing the association between form and situation which goes beyond the conventional link between form and an illocutionary force indicating device (cf. Searle 1969: 30) or generalised conversational implicatures as in Levinson's theory (cf. Section 6).

Fillmore (1985) was mainly interested in how frames could be used in lexical semantics for instance to establish lexical fields. The key idea is that we can only know the meaning of words in a frame by considering other words in the frame. For example, we can only understand the meaning of

buy and *sell* by considering the commercial transaction of which they are part.

There are also frames for telephone conversation, and many other events or transactions characterised by a sequential ordering of events. Kiefer (unpublished) discusses the association between 'bound utterances' and 'subevents of a frame'. A commercial transaction consists for instance of a number of subevents which may or must be accompanied by one or several bound utterances. I will also discuss other features which are part of the meaning or frames of conversational routines for example setting (institutionalised), social roles (Do the caller and answerer know each other?), goal (asking the other person to call later, asking for information, etc.).

4.1. Frames for answering machine messages

A frame (script or 'blueprint') for an answering machine message might look as follows. It consists of ordered (sub)events such as 'opening' (*what happens first),* the 'message topic' (*what is the goal of the communication?*), 'closing' (*how do we know that the message is closed*?). Other factors have to do with attitudes to the medium (conceptual restrictions). If people view the answering machine only as a machine they will use different strategies than if they address the other person as if he or she were actually present on the communication channel. For example a greeting phrase suggests that you are aware of addressing a person rather than a machine. Another factor has to do with whether people view the medium as spoken or written. For example, some messages are similar to letters in the way they end.

As shown by the example, a particular event may, but need not be accompanied by a routinized phrase (Kiefer 1996, 'bound utterance'). The frames on the answering machine have a special form depending on whether the fact that a greeting is not reciprocated, the identification is not acknowledged and the request is 'left in the air'. There are several different message forms as illustrated by messages from the two corpora:

A. Greeting + other identification:	Good morning Annie
Caller's identification:	This is John Marshall
Message:	Could you please phone me at X
Closing:	OK thank you bye

(Surrey)

Some frame features:
   Medium
   the answering machine
   Setting
   university department
   end of 90´s
   Participants
   caller (identity unknown)
   The caller is responding to a message left by a person of whom they
   know the identity of but not necessarily someone they actually know.
   The why and wherefore
   asking someone to call back
   Contextual restrictions
   sequentialisation
   Style
   formal
   Conceptual restrictions
   The caller views leaving messages on the answering machine as com-
   municating with a machine or with a real person.

An 'event' such as opening (cf. Kiefer 1996) can be broken up into the sub-
events greeting and identification. The events (and subevents) are sequen-
tially ordered. The caller's identification comes after the greeting and be-
fore the message (a request to call back). There are routines for greeting,
self-identification, asking the other person to call up and terminating the
message.

   Frames and the routines which go into them are largely routinized.
However they may be varied if this fulfils a purpose:

B. Greeting + answerer identification:	hi Peter
Caller's identification:	Henry
Message topic:	been some time
Closing:	ta

(Surrey)

When the greeting is followed by a name (*hi Peter*), naming identifies the
answerer. In the next variant answerer identification is not preceded by a
greeting:

C. Answerer identification:	Olive
Caller's identification:	Julian
Message topic:	I am here until you want to ring me
Closing:	OK

(Surrey)

The message, which is elliptic, could be spelled out as: (Hello) Olive. This is Julian. I am here until you want to ring me.

D. Answerer identification:	Maxwell
Caller's identification:	Tony
Message topic:	could you phone

(Surrey)

To sum up, messages on the answering machine seem to occur in a fixed sequence although there is some structural variation. The particular frame used to leave messages on the answering machine is structured in a way which is typical for the answering machine. Categories which are (almost) obligatory on the telephone (such as greetings) can be omitted when one leaves a message on the answering machine. The caller's identification is more important on the answering machine, since the answerer cannot verify who is calling (cf. *Is that Mrs X?*) The messages are generally short and they often have a fixed content ('asking the other person to call back'). What frequently differs is the form of the routine which is used in the situation. The elliptical form for self-identification has become routinized (in some) messages on the answering machine.

When the speaker uses phrases instead of whole sentences, the dependence on the context is maximal. The use of elliptical structures will be further discussed in Section 5.

5. Conversational routines as stems

Frames are linked to 'stems' rather than to sentences or words (Pawley and Syder 1983: 210). (Cf. the similar use of 'construction' in Fillmore et al. 1988.) According to Pawley and Syder (1983: 210):

A sentence stem consists either of a complete sentence, or, more commonly, an expression which is something less than a complete sentence. In the lat-

ter case, the sentence structure is fully specified along with a nucleus of lexical and grammatical morphemes which normally include the verb and certain of its arguments; however, one or more structural elements is a class, represented by a category symbol such as TENSE, NP or PRO. For example, in the conventional expressions of apology:

(20) I'm sorry to keep you waiting.
I'm so sorry to have kept you waiting.
Mr X is sorry to keep you waiting all this time.

a recurrent collocation can be isolated together with a grammatical frame:

(21) NP be-TENSE sorry to keep-TENSE you waiting.

There are stems for self-identification, for requests, questions and for closings (Aijmer 1996). For example a self-identification in the form of the name can be derived from a sentence stem, ie an abstract representation of the sentence permitting deletions, rearrangements and expansions.

Thank you has the form of a lexicalised sentence stem with optional elements (cf. Aijmer 1996: 44). From the stem below both *thank you* and *thank you very much* (*thank you so much*, etc.) can be derived. Stems can also combine with other stems (*thank you good bye*):

thank you (INTENSIFIER)

A stem has a form which can be varied depending on who the recipient is, how the situation is conceptualised and the degree of politeness which is required. Parts of the stem can be deletable. For example we can use the stem

(this is) NAME

to explain that the simple name can be used for self-identification ('This is Henry'-> Henry).

The stem can be associated with a certain prosody, a literal or strategic meaning and a function in addition to the situtional meaning.

6.   Conversational routines and conventionalisation

Conversational routines are defined in terms of what they are conventionally used to do rather than in terms of their literal meaning. When

we hear 'this is /name/' we expect the phrase to have the force of self-identification. Another way of saying this is that the phrase is automatized. 'Automatized linguistic expressions are those which are typical, expected, routine, and therefore immediately interpretable' (Hanks 1996: 238). The close association between form and meaning makes one alternative almost obligatory although several alternatives are grammatically possible:

> Why is it that I can introduce myself with *My name is Steve*, but not *I was given the name Steve*; that I can express sympathy with you with *I am sorry* but not conventionally with *That saddens me*; that I express outrage with *Really!* but not with *In truth*!; that I can say *I am delighted to meet you* but not idiomatically *I am gratified to meet you*; that I can choose a pastry by saying *I'd like that one* but not *I'd admire that one,* and so on. And to every specification of proper usage there tends to be a corresponding restriction on interpretation. (Levinson 2000: 23)

According to Levinson, we would have to specify for the routine *My name is Steve* that it is used for introducing oneself. The theory suggested by Levinson implies that we distinguish a special level where we account for the correlation between how language is used and its normal interpretation.

> It is … at this level naturally, that we can expect the systematicity of inference that might be deeply interconnected to linguistic structure and meaning, to the extent that it can become problematical to decide which phenomena should be rendered unto semantic theory and which unto pragmatics. (Levinson 2000: 23)

Such a theory (Levinson's theory of GCI 'generalized conversational implicatures') can deal with the representation of idioms and routines which cause problems in linguistics because of the split between literal meaning and function. In particular, the theory accounts for the fact that conversational routines are word-like and that they are acquired and used as wholes by analysing them on a different level of meaning from where utterances are created at the spur of the moment.

7.   Conversational routines on the answering machine

In the following sections I will discuss routine phrases in messages left on answering machines and their properties.

7.1. Greetings

The *hello* beginning a telephone conversation has often been seen as a response to the situation rather than a greeting (answer to a summons) (cf. Schegloff 1979). When *hello* is used in the opening on the answering machine it is more like a greeting. It is used together with a name to identify the intended receiver.

Table 1. Greetings in the LLC and the Surrey Corpora

	LLC	SURREY
hello + name	2	22
hello	2	14
name	–	8
hi + name	–	7
good morning	1	5
good morning + name	2	–
oh + name	–	3
good afternoon	–	2
hi	–	1
so hi	–	1
hello hello	–	1
no greeting	49	5

Greetings as the first move are typical of face-to-face conversation. On the telephone the greetings may come after the caller has identified himself.

When one compares the LLC and the Surrey corpus (Table 1) the main difference is that the messages in the LLC corpus[1] do not start with a greeting (49 examples). Instead of greetings you find for example:

(1)   CE> [@:m] . I ^have a 'message from . :Mr Pr\eston# .
         CE> ^who !isn`t w\ell tod/ay#
         CE> ^and is !sorry that he 'can`t [?] be /in# -
         CE> [@:m] but he "^sh\/ould be 'back# .
         CE> to^m\/orrow#
         CE> ^if you _could 'very 'kindly 'leave a 'note on his
         d/oor#
         CE> to ex^pl/ain this# -

CE> ^th\anks# (9.3 57)
(9. 3 571147–54)

The omission of a greeting in the London-Lund Corpus suggests that the caller does not address a constructed recipient for the message and that therefore no politeness is required. When the answering machine was new some people felt unease at speaking to the machine. This attitude has to a large extent been replaced by the acceptance of the idea that the message left by the owner represents the owner (a person) and not a machine.

7.2. Self-identification

Self-identification is important when one leaves a message on the answering-machine. Some type of caller identification was found in all the messages in the LLC (see Table 2).

Table 2.   Routines for self-identification in the LLC and the Surrey corpora

	LLC	SURREY
this is X	21	13
this is X speaking	10	2
my name is X	7	3
it's X here	3	4
the name is X	1	–
this is X here	1	3
name here	1	3
name	1	3
telephone number	1	–
name + organization + telephone	1	–
it is (it's) X	–	30
ø	–	8

There is however a difference between the London-Lund Corpus and the Surrey corpus with regard to the phrase which is used. The form of the identification phrase is typically 'this is X' in the LLC material and 'it is (it's) X' in the Surrey corpus of messages. Both phrases are typical of telephone openings but 'this is X' is more formal:

(2)   CF> ^this is 'Mr L\/yonson# .
         CF> [@:] my ^telephone 'number is :eight 'one /one# .
         CF> ^five 'five 'two "[/@u]# - -
         CF> I ^rang \/earlier# .
         CF> a^bout [@:] the re!sults . 'of . my
         ex'amin:\/ations# .
         (9.3 58 1155–59)

In (3) the caller identifies herself by means of 'the name is' rather than 'my name is' and the message is closed by 'end of message'. The caller refers to herself as 'his wife':

(3)   BG> the ^name 'is . !L\/erner# .
         BG> the ^message . is for Pro!f\essor [?]L/erner# .
         BG> ^t\/ell 'him# .
         BG> his ^w\/ife# .
         BG> will "^l/eave#
         BG> his ^w\/atch# .
         BG> and ^other 'things he 'has for:g\/otten# .
         BG> ^in 'his !r\/oom# -
         BG> ^some'time . be'fore :three o`cl\ock# -
         BG> ^\end of m/essage#
         (9.3 33 721–730)

In a single example, the caller has used the same identification formula as in ordinary conversation (*I'm Miss Traleman*). This suggests that the caller has not yet learnt the expected routine phrase for identifying herself or that such routines have not yet evolved:

(4)   BW> [@:m] - - "^[@u] 'five '[@u] \/eight# .
         BW> ^five eight tw/o# .
         BW> ^double four "=one# -
         BW> I`m [?] ^Miss !Tr\/aleman# .
         BW> and I`d ^like to 'know :whether or 'not - Miss
         !H\/alters#
         BW> ^=and# - -
         BW> [@:m] - ^Graham !B\/ateson#
         BW> ^will be . :in the uni:versity tod/ay#
         (9.3 49: 996–1003)

To sum up, we find a mixture of strategies borrowed from face-to-face interaction, telephone conversation and written messages in the identification section. In the LLC corpus *this is* (name) was most frequent and *it is* (*it's*) (name) did not occur at all (but compare *it's X here*). Self-identification was missing in 8 examples in the Surrey material indicating that the greeting phrase also served to identify the speaker implicitly as a voice sample.

7.3. The caller's message on the answering machine – requests and questions

Requests mainly occur in text types which are interactional. However requests also occur on the answering machine although no immediate response can be expected from the recipient. A request can be made in several forms, depending on the text type, what one is asking for, etc. Fraser, for instance, distinguished 20 different forms in which a request can be made (reported by Walters 1981) and Aijmer (1996) discussed 18 different strategies.

On the telephone or the answering machine, certain types of requests are recurrent and therefore tend to occur in a special form. Typical telephone requests are asking to speak to another person, leaving a message, asking another person to ring back, to give only a few examples (Aijmer 1996: 167; cf. Stenström 1984: 256). A recurrent request on the answering machine is 'asking someone to call back' and (less frequently) 'asking to leave a message'. The speaker uses a stem with a modal auxiliary which can be further varied depending on face considerations.

A

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Can you} \\ \text{Could you} \end{array} \right\} \text{ (possibly) VP (please)}$$

e.g. *Could you please ring me back*; *Could you please telephone....*; *Could you kindly ring me*; *Could you ring ...*; *So perhaps you could telephone me to arrange another appointment*; *Could you ask James please to telephone me straight away*; *Could you ring me and let me know*; *Please could you ask X to ring back*; *Could you ask him if he would mind ringing me*

If the stem is expanded, as in B, more politeness is expressed:

B
I would be (ADV) grateful if

e.g. *I would be grateful if you could give me a call*; *I would be most grateful if X could phone this number*; *I would be very grateful if you could ring me back at this number*; *I would be most grateful if you come back whether you could possibly ring me before you leave tonight*

C
if you (he) would mind (like to) VP

if he would mind ringing me up; *if you'd like to give me a ring*

D
(perhaps) you (he) would VP

Perhaps you would give me a telephone call; *Would he please ring me*

E
I would like to ask NP to VP

I would like to ask X to telephone me at home

The stem *can* or *could you* is the recurrent element in many conventionalized requests on the answering machine such as asking another person to call back. It was often embedded in a higher clause in which the speaker expresses gratitude.

Other requests on the answering machine are typically expanded by a clause in which the speaker downtones the imposition of the request:

$$\text{I (just) wondered} \begin{cases} \text{if} \\ \text{whether} \\ \text{when} \end{cases} \text{S}$$

(5) and I wonder whether you could help me out and see whether you could track down who they just quoted order number ….(Surrey)

(6) hello Jim it's Colin Good nine one seven four I see and I just wondered if I could remind you about my key for this door you said you'd get one for me some time (Surrey)

(7) I just wondered if you knew when the painters are going to be running around the all our rooms down here (Surrey)

(8)   I ^want to 'learn e:nough !just to 'do . [ts] 'sort/
        of :simple trans!l\/ations# .
        CG> and I`m ^wondering 'whether 'you . [@:m] - have
        !\any cl/asses# .
        CG> [@:m] . from ^now !\on# - -
        CG> [@:m - ?] ^sort of in the !h\/oliday((s))# -
        (9.3 59: 1182–84)

(9)   BT> ^and 'I [wo] ^trying to 'get 'hold of 'Doctor
        :S\/iomond# .
        BT> I ^wondered _whether per_haps he 'isn`t !\in
        to_day# .
        BT> as I ^haven`t been 'able to 'get an \/answer# .
        BT> ^could you 'ring me and 'let me kn\/ow 'please# .
        BT> ^th/ank 'you# (9.3 46)
        (9.3 46 950–954)

(10) I just wondered if you'd have time tomorrow em sometime for I don't know what quarter of an hour half an hour just to give her a little chat (Surrey)

Just to VP gives the reason or justification for the message:

(11) This is Max Wheeler from the Royal Grammar School. em just to say that we've been very pleased with Lars and Cornelia this term (Surrey)

Some conventionalized expressions which can be derived from this stem are illustrated in (12) and (13):

(12) oh Lydia this is Charles Charles Fillmore I hope you had a good Easter just to say that to hope that perhaps you've well to say that I should be coming in on the twenty-four (Surrey)

(13)   BP> ((^\/1 syll (name)#)) .
        BP> ^two 'four f\/ive# .
        BP> ^seven 'one 'three [\@u]# -
        BP> [@:] ^just to re!pl\/y# .
        BP> ^to Pro:fessor :C\/obley# .
        BP> a^bout intercol'legiate :l\/ectures# .
        BP> for ^next !y\/ear# .
        BP> [@:] ^my t/itle . {^/is#}# .
        BP> [@:] ^F/orm# .
        BP> and ^Style in !D\/elamore# - -
        (9-3 42: 899–908)

Also (14) and (15) use routine expressions in which a stem can be isolated to introduce the topic of the message:

(14) hello Anne Peter just returning your call <u>if you'd like to </u>ring me (Surrey)

(15) Hello Celia. It's Hazel. <u>Just a query about</u> your Kiel students (Surrey)

In (16) the speaker uses 'I hope it's OK if…' instead of asking a direct question which cannot be answered by the other participant (cf. Liddicoat 1994: 298):

(16) <u>I hope it's OK if </u>I come later on this afternoon somewhere between half past two and three something like that so I'll phone you up at that time if you could put a little corner aside for me that would be super. (Surrey)

7.4. Closing the answering machine message

At the end of the caller's message we find strategies from face-to-face conversation, telephone calls, letter writing and radio communication indicating the caller's confusion about the appropriateness of different strategies and phrases. In the Surrey material there is less variation than in the LLC indicating that conventionalisation has gone further.

Table 3 lists alternative ways of ending the message in the LLC and the Surrey corpus of messages:

Table 3. Types of conventional closings in the LLC (57 messages) and Surrey
material (70 messages)

	LLC	SURREY
thanking (thanks, thank you)	25	29
OK (right) + thanking + goodbye	2	12
thanking + goodbye	10	15
thanking + goodbye + thanking	1	1
OK + goodbye	1	3
OK + thanks	1	1
reference to the future (see you soon, see you shortly)	2	3
OK + reference to the future	1	1
goodbye	1	1
goodbye + thanks	1	1
apology + goodbye	1	2
thanking + well-wish	1	1
looking forward very much to seeing you + good bye	1	–
looking forward to hearing from you + thanking	1	–
that's all + thanking	1	–
that's all the message	1	–
thank you + end of message	1	–
all good wishes + yours ever + (identification) + thanking	1	–
hope all is going well	1	–
omission	3	–

The paradigm in Table 3 represents the association between a function
or event (closing a message) and routine phrases for this function. The set
of items is fairly large. However the link between closing the message and
a particular phrase can be strong, for example between thanking and closing
a message. On the other hand, the tie is weak between *end of message*, and
the closing of the message since it is not a conventionalized or routinized
way of ending the message.

The most characteristic phrase for terminating the message in institu-
tionalised contexts is thanking and *thank you+good bye.* Closing may also
be achieved by phrases which are less frequent and less routinized. In (17)
and (18), thanking has lost its ordinary meaning and is conventionalized as
a closing signal:

(17) hello it's Mrs Brown 32426 <u>thank you</u> (Surrey)

(18) Hello David Cornish here of Young Building in London. I received a message that you would like us take a Swedish student for the week of the 18th of March. I'm afraid we're fully booked with many pupils that week and can't help. <u>Thank you</u>. (Surrey)

Thank you was also used after a request (there is something to say 'thank you' for). In the London-Lund Corpus, thanking occurred only after a previous request, thanking the intended recipient for complying with the request:

(19)   AH ^give me a !t\ime when 'I can 'contact :h/im#.
          AH ^at . 'University 'College :L\ondon# -
          AH ^<u>th/\ank you</u>#
          (9.3 238–240)

In (20) the speaker expresses gratitude both in the request and in the closing signal:

(20) <u>I would be grateful if</u> you could telephone me this afternoon in connecting with Professor Warmleg's typescript
<u>Thank you</u> (Surrey)

The closings range from no closing at all to very elaborate ones:

thanking+farewell+thanking
(21) so I think that's what you need to know I'm our for a little while this morning but I'm back in at about eleven o'clock so I shall be in from then onward if I'm needed thanks ever so much and thank you for your help and all the rest of it so if you need me I'll be in after eleven o'clock <u>thanks ever so much bye bye now thanks</u> (Surrey)

gratitude+apology+farewell
(22) I'll collect later if you could guard them for me now <u>I'd be very grateful. Sorry about that. Bye bye</u>. (Surrey)

Thank you is used both to express gratitude and as a closing signal. The message below ends with a well-wish:

thanking, …., thanking + well-wish

(23) Oh Silvia. It's Sam Ward ringing to say I have not yet received a re-claim for my expenses form so I wonder if you could organise it for me. <u>Thank you</u> Sam. My address is… <u>Thanks</u>. <u>Have a good Easter</u>. (Surrey)

There were differences between the two corpora. *Looking forward to seeing you* was for instance only used in the Surrey material while *end of message* occurred only in the LLC. The most important difference is that the Surrey material used more elaborate strategies made up of combinations.

We also find confusion between different strategies, as in (24). The person leaving the message says *thank you*, which indicates that there is an addressee one thanks and 'end of message', which suggests a high degree of finality and does not express the wish to establish rapport with the receiver of the message.

(24)   AE [@: i] if [@] ^Mr !L\essin#
         AE and Pro^fessor :F\ord would 'like to 'get
         AE tog/ether# .
         AE a^bout (('syll syll s=yll))#
         AE they will be ^able to 'sort it {\out} be'tween
         AE thems\elves# .
         AE <u>thank ^y\ou# .</u>
         AE <u>^\end of m/essage#</u>
         (9.3 48–53)

That's all has got its literal meaning and functions as a way of closing the conversation abruptly:

(25)   AZ I ^think it((s)) [@:] 'might be :\/useful# -
         AZ ^for . [@:] the !staff at l/east#
         AZ [@:] to ^have !\/access [@] {to ^this b/ook#}# .
         AZ if ^\only to 'find /out# .
         AZ ^where our st/udents#
         AZ ^get their 'bad i:d\eas 'from# - -
         AZ [@:] <u>^th\at`s all 'thank you 'very ":m/uch#</u>
         (9.3 647–653)

In example (26) we find a conventional closing from letter writing together with thanking. The strategy is appropriate in personal letters and is

used on the answering machine in competition with other closing markers.
The speaker uses a routinized closing phrase ('all good wishes') followed
by the closing formula *yours ever* and self-identification. The message ends
by thanking:

(26)   AF to in:vesti'gate [@:] 'this 'alleg\ation# - -
        AF ^\all good w=ishes# .
        AF ^y\ours /ever# .
        AF [@:] ^Simon L\essin# - - -
        AF "^thank you very m\uch#
        (9.3 146–150)

Phrases introduced by 'looking forward to…' are associated with writing:

(27)   BL ^but . I 'would g\uess# .
        BL ^that it will be a'round :th\irty# -
        BL ^looking 'forward :very m\uch# .
        BL to ^seeing {y\ou} . to!m\orrow# -
        BL ^goodb\ye# (9.3 783–87)

(28)   BY ^looking 'forward to [s] :h/earing 'from you# -
        BY ^thank y/ou#
        (9.3 1100–1101)

Hope all is going well is another strategy borrowed from letter writing:

(29)   BI Iˋm ^not quite 'sure 'when Iˋll be :b\/ack# -
        BI ^possibly [@:m] tom/orrow#
        BI or ^certainly by W\ednesday# -
        BI ^\anyway#
        BI ^hope 'all is 'going w\ell#
        (9.3 743–47)

As in telephone calls various pre-closing signals (*right, OK, anyway*)
can be used in addition to closing. Pre-closing and closing occur together in
the same turn without any possibility of feedback:

(30)   AG but I ^think I m\ust# .
        AG [@] - ^honour my o:r\iginal# .

AG [@] pro^p\/osal#
AG and ^put [dhi] !th\/ird year 'chaps#
AG [@:] . ^on [@] 'Tuesday . [@] at tw\elve# .
AG ^r\ight#
AG ^thank you 'very m\uch# -
AG ^goodb=ye#
(9.3 204–211)

8.   Conclusion

Conventions do not come out of the blue. They evolve and become en-
trenched within the discourse community because of their usefulness in
solving recurrent problems (Clark 1996: 340). Over time, routine phrases
may become more fixed as has been the case with phrases used in tele-
phone conversations. However just as on the telephone there are competing
strategies and routines. The medium and its institutionalisation also plays a
role for what conventions develop. For example, it is important for the
caller to identify himself when leaving a message so that the recipient can
call back. The conventions emerging in the use of the answering machine
may be familiar to varying degrees depending on how experienced people
are in using the machine. Especially in the LLC material we find examples
of strategies and routine phrases reflecting the participants' uncertainty
concerning appropriate strategies and their realisation as routine phrases.
Just as in face-to-face conversation several factors play a role, for example
who the participants are, the setting, the degree of politeness expected,
constraints caused by how the participants conceptualise the situation, etc.
Users may address an imagined recipient although no feedback can be ex-
pected.

When the medium was new it was natural to use strategies typical of
face-to-face conversation and above all of telephone calls. Some strategies
used on the telephone were bypassed from the start as inappropriate, for
example asking about the recipient's health, while other strategies such as
greetings, questions and requests were adapted to the situation.

The caller who uses strategies from telephone conversations uses clos-
ings where the preclosing and the closing rituals occur together. New clos-
ings, more appropriate to the medium, may involve a simple *thank you*
where the function is not only to thank. However there is still an implicit
thanking function, e.g. for being allowed to leave the message in the hope

that a response will be forthcomng from the owner of the machine. Other strategies such as closing off without indicating a termination seem to be disappearing because they have, presumably, proved to be less useful.

Some strategies are the same on the telephone and on the answering machine. For example, phrases such as 'this is X' which are used for self-identification are appropriate in both communication situations but could not be used in face-to-face conversation. A phrase such as 'Looking forward to hearing from you' however is now mainly associated with a letter writing frame. There is still competition between strategies and the routines which are used. *Thank you* (in that form) is more strongly linked to closings on the answering machine at least in institutionalised settings than *good bye* as shown by its frequency as a closing signal.

Notes

1. For the transcription conventions used in the LLC, see Appendix. Both in the LLC and the Surrey material the names and telephone numbers have been replaced.

Appendix

Key to prosodic symbols used in the transcriptions

Type	Explanation
#	tone unit boundary
{ }	subordinate tone unit
' "	degrees of stress
^	onset
\	fall
/	rise
=	level
\/	fall-rise
/\	rise-fall
\ /	fall+rise
/ \	rise+fall
_ : !	degrees of booster
.	brief silent pause

-	unit silent pause
--(-)	longer than unit pause
* yes * + yes +	overlapping speech
(( ))	incomprehensible speech
> A A)	current speaker continues where he left off
A,B	A or B
A/B	A or B
VAR	various speakers
?	speaker identity unknown

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**Focus on user-related varieties:
Dialects and ethnolects**

Greetings as an act of identity in Tristan da Cunha English: From individual to social significance?[1]

Daniel Schreier

1. Introduction

Greeting routines and procedures have received considerable attention in anthropological linguistics, often in terms of their potential for turn-taking or as culturally determined formulaic routines. Like all speech patterns, pragmatic greeting procedures vary regionally and socially, and greeting formulae may occasionally serve as a linguistic demarcation of sociocultural identity of speech communities (e.g., *grüezi* in Swiss German, *howdy* in the southern and Midwestern US, *servus* in Austria and southeastern Germany, *gidday* in Australia and New Zealand). This paper looks into the local construction of insider vs. outsider identity in an insular community and discusses the symbolic value of the greeting formula *how you is?* on Tristan da Cunha, an island in the middle of the South Atlantic Ocean. It is argued that the usage of this greeting has individual significance for some members of the Tristan community. This manifests itself in reactions to outsiders using *how you is?* when addressing locals, which occasionally is interpreted as an unwarranted trespassing into local norms. On an individual level, this greeting formula therefore represents a marker of local identity and functions as a linguistic expression of group membership and insider status, symbolically standing for the islanders' traditional culture and beliefs. By the same token, it is suggested that this greeting formula does not carry social significance (yet), as most members of the community have comparatively neutral attitudes and do not openly object to outsiders using this local greeting formula. Nevertheless, usage and interpretation of *how you is?* is quite possibly in the process of change, inasmuch as it carries distinct symbolic values for islanders of different age groups. This has linguistic and pragmatic implications for recent developments and changes affecting the local dialect, which are contextualised with reference to similar processes elsewhere.

2. Greeting formulae: Variation and significance

Greeting routines and procedures are among the most widespread and tightly structured conversational exchanges. According to Foley (1997: 256), "[g]reetings are used to establish social contact among interlocutors; as such, the kind of routines used to perform this ritual can be expected to vary along with different cultures' understandings of social positions of any given interlocutors." Greeting exchanges have received considerable attention in anthropological linguistics, often in terms of their potential for turn-taking or as culturally determined formulaic routines (Kuiper and Flindall 2000), but also as a linguistic reflection of social (in)equalities (Irvine 1974; Brown and Ford 1964) or politeness strategies (Brown and Levinson 1987; Brown and Gilman 1972). Research on the ritual exchange of greeting procedures has shown that the formulae used are by no means monolithic or obligatory and that they may vary according to extralinguistic parameters of the interaction, such as the social status of the interlocutors, degree of formality / informality of the contextual setting, regionality, etc.

Formulaic expressions are therefore as much subject to variation (and hence to potential change, see below) as are phonological and syntactic features, and a few examples illustrate the dimension of local or stylistic significance of formulaic greeting expressions. For instance, some local Swiss German dialects display a wide stylistic dimension of greeting routines: *salli* or *hoi*, meaning 'hello', are used in interactions between mutually acquainted speakers, indicating intimacy and informality, whereas *guete daag* or *grüezi* / *griezi* (see below) are more formal expressions, usually between interlocutors who are not familiar or on formal terms. We find a very similar context-dependent usage in Australia and New Zealand (Kuiper 1991), where the formula *gidday* is not only a local greeting but also an emblem of the encounter's context and the speaker's social or regional provenience:

> If I use the New Zealand English formula *Gidday* with a wink and a characteristic quick southeast to northwest movement of the head, the conditions of use for such a greeting are relatively specific; it is an informal greeting to one with whom one is not intimate. It is not middle class but characteristically working class, and/or rural. It is often used when no response is expected. (Kuiper 1991: 200)

Of particular relevance for the present paper is the fact that greetings vary regionally and that formulaic and idiomatic expressions of this type thus have the potential of conveying local identities, not only of individual groups but, as in the case of *gidday* in Australia and New Zealand, of entire com-

munities or nationalities. Whereas it is often the case that local regionalised dialects have reflexes of formulae also found in more widely spoken Standard varieties (for instance, Swiss German *uff wiederluege* for Standard German 'Auf Wiedersehen'), some greeting formulae are exclusively used by individual groups and thus function as powerful indicators of regional origins and group affiliation. Thus, the Swiss German formula *grüezi* (or, in some dialects, *griezi*), meaning 'hello', is confined to speakers of Swiss German and not used in any other dialect of German; similarly, the greeting formula *servus* is predominantly found in Austria and Bavaria. Hence, greeting formulae such as *griezi*, *servus* and *gidday* are intricately attached to the communities and cultures in which they are used; they may thus be considered as more or less salient markers that express group identity and membership.[2]

This is further corroborated by the case of *howdy* in American English, a very common greeting formula in the rural US South and Midwest. Due to the fact that *howdy* is by and large restricted to these areas, it is perceived as a salient (even stereotyped) emblematic formula outside these areas, where it is commonly perceived as a hallmark of southern or Midwestern American English. Often, formulae restricted to few varieties are stereotyped and recognised as regional markers by those population groups who would not use them. Dennis Preston (personal correspondence, June 2002) confirms this assertion and outlines the stereotypical interpretation of *howdy* in the northern parts of the United States as follows:

(1) Western cowboy, tough but shy. John Wayne always says "Howdy ma'm," and cowboys always say "Howdy Pardner" (= partner) when they greet each other.

(2) Rural, countrified; seen as "Midwestern farm-boy" by the sophisticated bicoastal crowd.

(3) Southern, but only with the "modified" pronunciation which monophthongizes the first vowel (to [a:]) and tenses the second (to [i]). (In joke books you often see southern "Howdy" respelled as "Heidi").

Even though the greeting *howdy* can certainly be regarded as rural throughout the US (and can be heard in rural Delaware, as well as in non-metropolitan regions of Illinois or New Mexico), Midwesterners and Southerners, due to the fact that they are most commonly associated with rural farming pursuits, are most likely to be caricatured as users (of course, with the exception of stereotypical usage of the cowboys in Hollywood Western productions). As a consequence, *howdy* is commonly perceived to be a stereo-

typical marker of the speechways of those who are most likely to represent the associations attributed to those who use expressions like *howdy*. A linguistic expression and a socioculturally constructed stereotype reinforce both usage and common interpretation.

If we accept the fact that greeting formulae, like all phonological, syntactic and pragmatic language features, are subject to linguistic variation and change, and if we also agree that such formulae may serve as emblems of group membership and become subject to (occasionally strong) socially perceived stereotyping, then they offer the possibility to investigate not only how greeting procedures and routines develop in time and vary from group to group or from region to region, but also how they are constructed and used by individual speech communities as a symbol of local identity.

These issues are addressed with reference to the form, function and social significance of the greeting formula *how you is?* on Tristan da Cunha, an isolated island in the South Atlantic Ocean. The aim is to look into issues such as the local construction and interpretation of specific formulae, as well as their potential to mark and emblemise insider knowledge and membership, and also how social significance attached to linguistic expressions operates on individual and societal levels. These questions are discussed with reference to *how you is?* on Tristan da Cunha but contextualised and complemented with findings from similar communities in other parts of the English-speaking world.

3. *How you is?* on Tristan da Cunha

How you is? is an infrequent greeting formula and unknown in most areas in the English-speaking world, *how are you?*, *how you doin'?*, *how are things?*, etc. being much more widespread and common.[3] Whereas it is probably not restricted to Tristan da Cunha, *how you is?* is both structurally and socioculturally unusual. It is a salient and prominent opening of interactions involving Tristanians, and most outsiders to the island are unfamiliar with this formula. The pragmatic usage and function of *how you is?* offers thus the opportunity to explore the socially-constructed identity that is attached to such markers and at the same time allows to investigate whether the usage of salient markers of this kind continues when the community which uses them undergoes rapid transformation and change, or, in contrast, whether it dies out as a result of accommodation to and adoption of outside norms. This section highlights the social history of the Tristan

community and briefly deals with the historical origins of this marker. The main part is dedicated to the discussion of this formula's pragmatic function and social significance, particularly with reference as to how its usage is restricted to group members and how it may function as a symbolic linguistic demarcation between locals and outsiders.

3.1. Tristan da Cunha: A brief social history

The island of Tristan da Cunha lies in the heart of the South Atlantic Ocean and has a population of 285; it is 2,334 kilometres south of St Helena, 2,778 kilometres west of Cape Town, and about 3,400 kilometres east of Uruguay (Crawford 1945). It was first discovered by the Portuguese admiral Tristão da Cunha in 1506, but the Portuguese did not pursue a concerted settlement policy for the island. The English and Dutch, too, became aware of the islands; the Dutch were the first to effect a landing in 1643 (Beintema 2000), but none of the colonial powers developed an interest in establishing a permanent colony on the island. Things changed towards the end of the 18th century, when the American fishing and whaling industry expanded to the South Atlantic Ocean and Tristan da Cunha served as an occasional resort to the sealers and whalers fishing in the region (Brander 1940). The growing economic interest, as well as the strategic position of Tristan da Cunha along a major sea-route, attracted a number of discoverers and adventurers. The island was settled in 1816, when the British admiralty formally annexed Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha, apparently with the intention of blocking a possible escape route for Napoleon Bonaparte, who at the time was exiled on the island of St Helena (Schreier and Lavarello Schreier 2003). A military garrison was dispatched to the island, but they withdrew after a one-year stay. Some army personnel stayed behind with the intention of settling on Tristan da Cunha: two stonemasons from Plymouth (Samuel Burnell and John Nankivel), a non-commissioned officer from Kelso, Scotland, named William Glass, his wife, "the daughter of a Boer Dutchman" (Evans 1994: 245), and their two children.

The population increased when shipwrecked sailors and castaways arrived, some of whom settled and added to the permanent population. Augustus Earle, an artist and naturalist who was stranded on the island in 1824, reports that apart from the Glass family, the British colonisers consisted of Richard 'Old Dick' Riley (from Wapping, in the London East End) and Alexander Cotton (from Hull, Yorkshire), who arrived in the early 1820s

(Earle 1832). The late 1820s and 1830s saw the arrival of a group of women from St Helena and three non-Anglophone settlers (from Denmark and Holland). The population grew rapidly and by 1832 there was a total of 34 people on the island, 22 of whom were young children. The 1830s and 1840s saw a renaissance of the whaling industry and once again numerous ships called at Tristan da Cunha to barter for fresh water and supplies; this led to the arrival of a number of American whalers, some of whom settled permanently.

The second half of the 19th century witnessed a period of growing isolation, for a number of political and economic reasons: the American whale trade declined quickly, the increasing use of steam ships made bartering unnecessary, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 drastically reduced the number of ships in the South Atlantic. This affected the influx of settlers, and a weaver from Yorkshire (Crawford 1945) and two Italian sailors were the only new arrivals in the second half of the century (Crabb 1980). The sociocultural isolation of Tristan da Cunha peaked in the early 20th century; Evans (1994) notes that the community received no mail for more than ten years, and a minister reported in the mid-1920s that the children had never seen a football (Rogers 1925). When visiting the island in 1937, the Norwegian sociologist Peter Munch found that the Tristanians had not partaken in the massive changes that had occurred in the western world (Munch 1945) and that they lived in non-industrialized conditions.

This situation came to an abrupt end in April 1942, when the British admiralty ordered the installation of a naval station on Tristan da Cunha. Its main purpose was the construction of a meteorological and wireless station. The arrival of the navy corps entailed far-reaching economic changes; a South African company obtained exclusive rights to establish a permanent fishing industry on the island, employing practically the entire local workforce. The traditional subsistence economy was replaced by a paid labour force economy, and the traditional way of life was modified as a result of the creation of permanent jobs with regular working hours. Tristan da Cunha was an economic boomtown in the 1950s: the living conditions and housing standards improved and the changes brought about by the development scheme led to a complete transformation of the traditional Tristanian way of life within one generation (Schreier and Lavarello Schreier 2003).

In October 1961, unforeseen volcanic activities forced a wholesale evacuation of the entire population. The Tristanians were forced to leave the island and were transported to England, but virtually all of them returned from their exile to the South Atlantic in 1963. The dramatic evacuation and the two "volcano years" in England affected the islanders more than any

other single event in the history of the community. The unforeseen expo-
sure to the norms of the outside world changed the Tristanians in many
ways; the community underwent quick modernisation and adaptation to west-
ern culture, and they adopted modern dress, dances and entertainment. A
new fishing company provided all the households with electricity, which
improved the living conditions considerably, and the 1970s and 1980s were
a period of economic prosperity. In recent years the community has had
more extensive contacts with the outside world: in 1983, an overseas edu-
cation program became available in England and on St Helena (Evans
1994), allowing Tristanian teenagers to pursue secondary education off the
island and adults to leave the island for further job training.

3.2. Origins, form and function

Tristan da Cunha English (TdCE) is the result of linguistic contact proc-
esses that occurred in this particular setting and it displays developments
commonly found in contact dialectology (Trudgill 1986). TdCE does clear-
ly not represent a transplanted dialect brought to the island via one settler
or a group of settlers. As I noted in Schreier (2002: 23), "TdCE evolved out
of a mixing situation … Even though some varieties appear to have been
more significant than others … no single dialect (regardless of structural
and typological affiliation) served as a model *per se* for the first generations
of native Tristanians." The origins of the unusual structural properties of
how you is? are explained by two different (and in this particular case co-
occurring) processes, namely by leveling of the present *be* paradigm to *is*
(which is paramount in contemporary TdCE and found in all environments,
as in 'I is', 'they is', etc., see discussion in Schreier 2003) and also by lack
of word-order inversion in question-type sentences, which was brought to
Tristan da Cunha via the women from St Helena.[4]

　　There are several ways to trace the origins of the greeting formula *how
you is?* in the local vernacular. First of all, it could represent a direct legacy
of St Helenian English, where it still features as a minority form today, and
it is certainly possible that it was brought to the island as such via the group
of women who cross-migrated in the 1820s. An alternative explanation would
be that leveling to *is* and lack of word-order inversion in question-type
sentences were brought to the island via different inputs, and that they sub-
sequently interacted to yield this characteristic greeting formula when the
local dialect formed and evolved in the nineteenth century. It is noteworthy,

for instance, that both Yorkshire English and Saint Helenian English have "I is" forms, and that *is* concord with third person plural subjects ('they is', 'the houses is') is found in varieties of Scottish English (Miller 1993).

Notwithstanding its origins, *how you is?* is very frequent in contemporary TdCE and used by a vast majority of Tristanians in every-day communication. Due to its salient status, it has been commented on by various visitors from the "outside world", most notably by Crawford (1945). When stationed on the island during World War II, Crawford mentions that he was immediately greeted by Tristanians with *how you is?*, and that from the first meeting on the islanders used this local expression to address him and to inquire about his well-being. In recent years, however, this formula is less often used in interactions that involve outsiders, and expatriates are more often addressed with non-local greeting formulae (particularly *how are you?*). Not only has the usage of traditional *how you is?* with outsiders decreased, it has also changed its significance and there is some indication that the Tristanians differ in their attitudes as to when and whether it should be used with visitors and non-locals. These attitudes are particularly noticeable when non-Tristanians use *how you is?* to open a conversation, and the reaction ranges from total acknowledgment to mild amusement to downright rejection and open correction. These attitudes are important for an investigation of the social significance and context-related attitudinal values attached to greeting formulae, and they can thus offer important insights into the general motivation of such processes. With this aim, some specimen of the responses to this formula in interactional usage are briefly exemplified.

3.3. Interactional usage: Some examples

Most of the examples of *how you is?* in Tristan da Cunha English were collected when I conducted sociolinguistic and ethnographic fieldwork on the island in 1999, and I recorded some further instances of conversational openings using this formula on a shorter re-visit in 2002.

One point that was striking immediately was the wide range of reactions it evoked. Consider, for instance, the following exchange involving the author (DS) and N, a 47-year old Tristanian male:

DS: *How you is*? Everything all right?
N: I's fine, brother. *How you is?*

Here, there is no indication whatsoever that the usage of *how you is?* by a non-local is disapproved or considered as out of place or inadequate. The greeting formula is interpreted and returned before the conversation continues.

On the other hand, we also find the opposite, namely that locals do not comment on *how you is?* overtly, but use a more standard-type formula in return, as exemplified in the following exchange between myself and D, a 32-year old Tristanian male:

> DS: *How you is*?
> D: No complaints, brother, *how are you*?[5]

D uses *how are you?* even though prompted by a local greeting, and there is no open comment or reaction, and thus no indication that the usage of this formula by an outsider was noticed or judged as appropriate or not. This exchange occurred in a relaxed informal context, and the mutual usage of kinship terms suggests that both participants are well acquainted and on friendly terms. The present case is far from clear-cut, and the usage of D's *how are you?* does not yield information whether this is a case of code-switching to non-local language norms, a demarcation of sociolinguistic identity expressed by linguistic means, or an indication of disapproval that an outsider uses a salient local norm. What these two exchanges demonstrate is that Tristanians have the option to take up the formula and use it to address an outsider, or else to use a non-local type associated with the linguistic background of the addressee (we will consider value judgments below).

There are indeed cases where it is obvious that Tristanians switch between the two formulae, and where by doing so they display an obvious awareness with whom to use local norms and with whom not. This is exemplified in the following excerpt, taken from a tape-recorded interview conducted with G, an elderly Tristanian female. During the interview, G's daughter I stopped by for a surprise visit, and her impromptu appearance led to the following exchange:

> I: Hello.
> G: Who's this? Oh, it's you, I .. Danny, have you met I?
> DS: Yes of course we have met. What a nice surprise to see you here. *How are you?*
> I: It's nice to see you too. I's fine. *How are you?*
> DS: Oh, I'm fine.
> I: That's nice to hear. (<u>turning to her mother</u>) *How you is,* ma? Everything all right?
> G: I's still troublin' a bit with my back, you know, but it ain't too bad now.

Clearly, the pragmatic context of the interaction can – in some cases at least – influence intra-individual variability and therefore entail context-related switching between the two formulae. In this case, it is clear that I. imitates the exact wording of the person addressing her, and that she replies using an *echo expression*; the fact that she would not use this formula with Tristanians is corroborated by her switching to local norms the very next sentence, namely when addressing her mother and inquiring about her health. Within seconds a speaker may use a non-local form when talking to an outsider and the local form when initiating a conversation with another member of her community. Switching between distinct formulae may thus indicate a sense of awareness of distinct norms and also a sense of relatedness and social significance, namely with whom such formulae are associated and used and with whom not.

Even though these samples throw light on individual variability and give insights into the interactional usage(s) of various greeting formulae by Tristanians, they do not indicate value judgments on the part of the speakers, and it is not clear whether the fact that outsiders use local formulae is approved or not. This is different in cases where *How you is?* evokes metalinguistic reactions, which, needless to say, are particularly insightful for the purpose of this study. Indeed, we find several cases where there is amusement and open comment, which may be friendly and good-hearted or, on the contrary, openly challenging and disapproving. Such reactions are thus more informative and allow an identification of the reactions evoked, and a few selected exchanges illustrate this.

> DS: *How you is*?
> De: (laughing) Funny to hear a station fella say that![6]

This exchange shows surprise and mild amusement on the part of De, a 53-year old Tristanian male. His reaction is particularly revealing since his amusement to hear an unexpected expression overrides his impulse to take his (expected) turn in a conversational opening. Whereas De's comment is without doubt good-natured, other reactions are disapproving and entirely critical; this is illustrated in the following exchange:

> DS: *How you is*, B?
> B: You mean *how are you? How I am?* Well, I'm fine, thanks. You?

B, a 52-year old Tristanian male, openly corrects the wording of the question he is asked, and by doing so explicitly challenges the fact that an expatriate uses the local greeting formula. This strongly suggests that B is

fully conscious of the value of *How you is?* Strong reactions of this kind (which, by the way, make fieldworkers cringe) bear testimony to the interpretation that an outsider has crossed the line and ventured into sensitive territory. They reveal attitudes that local expressions are reserved for locals, and the open thematisation and correction implies this speaker's conviction that the usage of this formula should be strictly limited for interactions between members of the Tristan speech community and must not be used by outsiders. B's reaction is certainly a strong indication that he disapproves of outsiders using it.

The question pursued in the following is whether we can pinpoint external events and developments that overlap with these reactions, or, in other words, whether there is a tendency for such attitudes and comments to increase or decrease. Indeed, the recent social history of Tristan da Cunha has seen unprecedented changes, which started in the early 1940s and culminated with the 1961–3 exile in England. The Tristanians today are in more extensive and regular contact with outsiders than their grandparents were, as a result of which the awareness of local versus outsider norms is now more poignant than it was in previous generations (this can be measured and analysed quantitatively, as the morphosyntactic variables analysed in Schreier 2003 show). Have these social developments led to a more endocentric perspective on the part of the Tristanians, namely that they now comply with different views on the usage of local norms? I will address this question in more detail below, but first approach it from a more general perspective, by discussing similar processes in other isolated and post-isolated communities.

4.   Post-insularity and language change

Mobility and immigration are generally considered as most powerful leveling forces operating on and leading to language development and change, in particular dialect erosion and dedialectalisation (Chambers 1995). The effect of population movements on language change has increased dramatically in the last century, and there has been a recent upsurge in research on mobility-induced language change in formerly isolated communities. Due to their relative degrees of isolation and weakened ties with other dialects and their speakers, isolated communities are prone to develop and maintain local norms. On occasion, these features can attain psycho-social significance, namely when they are perceived as distinctive local traits (for in-

stance centralized diphthong onsets on the island of Martha's Vineyard, see below), in opposition to other (usually neighbouring) communities or to larger groups of outsiders who move to the area or spend time in the community. Several outcomes of such scenarios have been documented, and some of the most important findings are discussed in turn.

4.1. Dialect erosion

The most common scenario is one of thinning-out (and eventual loss) of specifically localised dialect features. Such patterns follow a similar trajectory: a local community is socially outnumbered (or "swamped", Lass 1990) by larger groups who come to the area for various reasons, and the loss of linguistic norms from formerly isolated and endocentric vernaculars is a direct consequence of population movements and shifts in local demographics.

This process of *dialect erosion* has been documented in various post-isolated places, for instance on the island of Ocracoke, one of the Outer Banks islands off the coast of North Carolina. Ocracoke was fairly isolated until World War II, and the community had few contacts with the mainland and was economically self-sufficient, based on fishing. Then, in the 1950s and 1960s, the island began to open up to the extent that it is now a popular holiday resort on the Atlantic Coast. More and more tourists came to spend their holidays on the Outer Banks, a regular ferry service was established with the mainland and other Outer Banks islands, and today Ocracoke attracts tens of thousands of visitors from all parts of the US east coast. Motels, restaurants, Bed and Breakfasts were established, along with a variety of shops and entertainment places.

As a result, the job market changed, and more and more locals were employed in the tourist industry, coming into contact with ever-increasing numbers of off-islanders. Consequently, traditional employment in the fishing industry declined and there are now very few O'Cockers (as the locals call themselves) who fish for a living. Moreover, hundreds of outsiders retired to the island and now live on Ocracoke permanently, which of course transformed the community's social life as well. Apart from contacts with tourists and visitors during the summer season, there is also an additional all-year contact with outsiders. All these changes had an impact on the language of the O'Cockers, and younger community members have far fewer traditional dialect features (such as an /oi/ sound in words like *high* and *tide*,

or *weren't* with all persons, such as *it weren't me*) than their parents and grandparents (Wolfram and Schilling-Estes 1997). Ocracoke is therefore a pertinent example of the effects of mobility on language change, and the linguistic consequences of economic transformation are so far-reaching that Walt Wolfram and his associates, who studied the dialect, are concerned that the local dialect erodes more or less entirely and warn that it is in danger of disappearing altogether in the foreseeable future.

4.2. Dialect intensification

An alternative outcome of mobility and increasing dialect contact is the attachment of social significance to salient local language features. In this case, local norms, instead of being lost due to shifting demographics and competition with other (oftern more socially valued) features, are re-evaluated and -interpreted, occasionally to an extent that they symbolize local values and thus serve as a linguistic emblem of insider group membership. This process has been documented in various locales, and the following two examples illustrate it.

Certainly one of the most seminal studies on the intensification of an ongoing language change in insular communities is Labov's (1963) landmark analysis of the social significance of raised onsets in /ai/ and /au/ diphthongs on the island of Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts. The onsets (or first elements) of /ai/ and /au/ diphthongs are commonly realized as mid-central variants [ɐ ~ ə] when followed by voiceless consonants and as fully open [a] in other environments. "Canadian raising" (Trudgill 1986: 32) is very common in most varieties of post-colonial English, particularly in the southern hemisphere. As Labov points out, this realization is a reflex of earlier forms of English rather than an innovation since "the first element of the diphthong /ay/ was a mid-central vowel in 16th- and 17th- century English" (Labov 1972: 10). Complementing his own findings with results from the *Linguistic Atlas of New England*, Labov found that the usage of centralized onsets was on the decline historically and that islanders had a strong tendency to accommodate to mainlanders by using more open onsets of /ai/. Then, however, the trend reversed and islanders born around and after WW II began to use significantly higher levels of centralized variants. Labov's in-depth quantitative analysis revealed that this linguistic change had a social motivation. Most notably, it emerged that the trend towards centralized variants was led by the local fishermen,

who traditionally represented local values and were held in high esteem by other Vineyarders, also by the comparatively more urban population groups on the island. Labov argued that the reversal of this language change, which in effect saw the revival or *intensification* of a feature that was in the process of dying out, was to be explained by the fact that raised /ay/ diphthongs became socially significant: "It is apparent that the immediate meaning of this phonetic feature is 'Vineyarder.' When a man says [rɐɪt] or [hɐʊs], he is unconsciously establishing the fact that he belongs to the island: that he is one of the natives to whom the island really belongs" (Labov 1972: 36). The intensification of Canadian raising on Martha's Vineyard is thus a direct consequence of an increase in tourists spending their summer holidays on Martha's Vineyard and mainlanders buying up property on the island (which led to antipathy and scepticism in the local population, as epitomized by an islander's claim that "You can cross the island from one end to the other without stepping on anything but *No Trespassing* signs", quoted in Labov 1972: 28). The more the local Vineyarders felt threatened by outsiders with more financial means, the more they oriented themselves towards local values and symbolically embrace local language features as an expression of solidarity and group membership.

Another case of dialect intensification comes from Smith Island, Maryland (as documented in Schilling-Estes 2002; Wolfram and Schilling-Estes 2003), which is situated in the Chesapeake Bay, southwest of Washington DC. The current island population is declining rapidly, from about 700 residents in 1960 to 364 in the (2000) census. Local employment opportunities decreased, as the island has no heavy industry and an island-based crabbing and oystering industry has continuously declined in recent decades. The decline of a local job market forced islanders to leave their homes in search of employment elsewhere. Moreover, significant areas of Smith Island may soon become uninhabitable as a result of soil erosion, and there is some speculation that the island may be physically sinking into Chesapeake Bay. The outflux of the local workforce is not countered by an influx of tourists and new residents coming to live on the island. Even though these conditions might favour the thinning-out, and eventually the loss, of the community's traditional dialect features, as they have in locales such as Ocracoke, Schilling-Estes (2002) and Schilling-Estes and Wolfram (1999) document an opposite scenario, namely a rapid increase in the usage of local features. Leveling to *weren't* increases to an extent that it "is near-categorical for the younger generations of speakers" (Wolfram and Schil-

ling-Estes 2003: 140), and younger Smith Islanders intensify the local realizations of /ai/ and /au/ diphthongs to [əɪ ~ ɒɪ] and [aø ~ aɛ], respectively. They thus display a strong tendency to intensify their local dialect features as a symbolic reaction against the economic threats and the island's uncertain future.

In sum, historically isolated communities may react differently when facing an influx of tourists and / or new residents, or when their cohesion and survival is threatened by economic hardships and increasing outmigration. Such developments may either lead to the dissipation and loss of local language features (as documented on Ocracoke, NC) or else to their intensification, as a symbolic reaction against the threat and perceived pressures faced by the community (as found on Martha's Vineyard and on Smith Island). This leads us back to the discussion of the pragmatic value and interpretation of the greeting formula *how you is?* on Tristan da Cunha, which now offers the opportunity to explore how localized greeting formulae develop in a community that is becoming increasingly mobile and whose social networks are constantly expanding.

5. Social or individual significance? A tentative conclusion

Greeting formulae are subject to variation and context-dependent usage, regardless of the language variety and also of the speech communities in which they are used. Due to their frequent and ritual usage, they may serve as indicators of different regional varieties, or else carry information on the formality of the context or the degree of intimacy and familiarity of participants involved in the interaction (e.g., Italian *ciao*, used in more or less informal contexts by speakers who are familiar, contrasting with *arrivederci*, used in formal environments by speakers who are less or not at all familiar).

By the same token, conversational contexts are constantly shifting, and the switch from formal to informal styles or vice versa entails a variety of linguistic options and consequences. For instance, Blom and Gumperz (1972) explored code-switching procedures involving standard and non-standard varieties of Norwegian in the small rural town of Hemnesberget and found a causal relationship between choice of code and the topic or social situation into which a conversational exchange was embedded. The interplay of context and language choice was, among others, observed in exchanges between clerks and residents in official settings, such as com-

munity buildings; while greetings and inquiries about private affairs were usually conducted in the local dialect (i.e. Ranamål), conversations about official, administrative or financial matters were held in standard Bokmål. Members of the Hemnesberget community therefore routinely opened interactional exchanges using local greeting formulae only to switch to a more standard variety when the topic changed and the context became more formal. We have seen a similar code choice above in the case of I. from Tristan da Cunha, who in the same frame uses a standard-like *how are you?* when addressing an expatriate but the local *how you is?* formula when addressing another islander present. Speakers thus display sensitivity towards language choice, and their use of language features, as in this particular case of various greeting formulae, depends on the evaluation and consideration of factors such as topic, context and participants present in the interaction.

The question is to what extent we can extrapolate and generalize these observations. Can we interpret these findings to explore when and how language forms attain social significance, and under what circumstances they are used as markers of local identity?[7] To what extent can the inherent variable usage of greeting formulae give rise to reinterpretation, so that they are used not only with reference to familiarity or topic but also as indicators of regional identity?

All communities, regardless of how much they are integrated or isolated, constantly readapt their speech patterns (Andersen 1988). Recent research, however, has clearly shown that increasing contact with other dialects and their speakers is a catalyzing factor in processes of dialect erosion and dedialectalisation. The various outcomes of such scenarios can be investigated post hoc, as evidenced in the literature discussed above. It is clear that the most salient features represent the most obvious symbols of linguistic differentiation and that they are therefore the first candidates to be noted as unusual and non-mainstream, most often by the population groups who are not familiar with them. As a result, features such as an /oi/ diphthong in "high tide" may erode from Ocracoke English, giving way to a more supralocal standardized norm, a process which is often accompanied by stigmatization of the distinctive regional variants. On the other hand, local features (such as centralized onsets in /ai/ and /au/ on Martha's Vineyard) may alternatively be reinterpreted as linguistic emblems of group membership and thus play a prominent role in the emerging construction of insider vs. outsider identities in post-insular communities.

The saliency of the local greeting formula *how you is?*, coupled with a quasi-instantaneous usage in introductory meetings with outsiders, would certainly make it a prime candidate for distinguishing islanders from outsiders. Two considerations are crucial, however. On the one hand, due to the extreme isolation of the island, the Tristanians have not been faced with ever-increasing groups of visitors and tourists as other communities have. Few expatriates reside on Tristan da Cunha, and the island is not in danger of being swamped like Martha's Vineyard or Ocracoke, NC. Tristanians thus have limited contact with outsiders in their own local environment, and this would not favour a socially significant reinterpretation of *how you is?*. On the other hand, the community has become increasingly open and exocentric (in the sense of Andersen 1988) since the 1960s, and the Tristanians are now spending more time in the "outside world" than ever before. While away from the island, they have become increasingly familiar with mainstream varieties of English (mostly South African, British and St Helenian Englishes), and this has strengthened their awareness of their local variety's distinctiveness.[8] Indeed, Section 2.3 has shown that Tristanians have distinct opinions on the user-related contexts of this formula, and that (at least some) members of the Tristan community interpret (and also, both consciously and unconsciously: use) this greeting formula as a marker of local identity. Some of the reactions documented above strongly indicate the opinion that *how you is?* should be reserved for insiders of the community and natives of the island; by implication, for some Tristanians, this greeting formula symbolically represents traditional culture and norms, and *how you is?* for them functions as a linguistic expression of group membership and insider status.

By the same token, there is evidence to suggest that the usage and interpretation of *how you is?* on Tristan da Cunha is in the process of change, namely that this greeting formula carries distinct symbolic values for islanders of different age groups. It is striking that different generations of Tristanians react differently to outsiders using local norms. Most notably, I have noticed that older members of the community, i.e., the generation born before WWII have no hesitation to use the local greeting formula with visitors and expatriates, and Tristanians belonging to this age group do not comment when addressed with this formula by outsiders. By contrast, it is the middle-aged Tristanians, born between WWII and the 1961–3 exile in England, particularly the men, who are most likely to react disapprovingly and to have strong opinions as to who may conform to local values and expressions and who may not (such as B.). Their reactions manifest atti-

tudes that *how you is?* by outsiders is considered as an unwarranted intrusion into their linguistic and cultural spheres. Younger islanders, in turn, are less critical but also more likely to use outside norms with non-Tristanians, i.e. to return a more mainstream *how are you?* (see above). Thus, whereas older members of the community display little sensitivity to user-related choice of codes and expressions, younger ones have a strong sense of awareness as to with whom local norms should be used. Usage of local expressions with fellow Tristanians is also very persistent: even younger Tristanians who have spent years in the "outside world" still use *how you is?* when talking to relatives and friends on the phone (interestingly, when asked why they would not say *how are you?*, the response is that this sounds "posh"). All this suggests that the significance attached to this formula is a relatively recent phenomenon on Tristan da Cunha and that it is the result of a widening linguistic awareness due to increasing outward mobility.

As a tentative conclusion, I would suggest that reactions to outsider usage of *how you is?* manifest the development of a certain linguistic awareness in the Tristan community, and that changes in social life have entailed linguistic and pragmatic consequences in the local dialect. A context-sensitive interpretation of this formula can already be found on an *individual* level, in that some members of the community react very strongly to what they regard as inappropriate usage; *how you is?* thus carries individual significance. However, it is as yet unclear whether it is indeed in the process of becoming a socially significant marker on a *community-wide* level. The neutral reactions of some speakers, the lack of open metalinguistic comment, speak against this. Notwithstanding, individual processes always provide the bottomline for eventually ensuing social processes, and individual significance always represents the forerunner of social significance (as witnessed for instance on Martha's Vineyard, where centralised onsets were mostly restricted to local fishermen before they were reinterpreted and adopted by larger groups in other parts of the island). In a sense, we may thus witness the beginning stages of a social reinterpretation of linguistic norms. Future research, with close attention to subsequent changes in the community, might detect the trajectory of these changing attitudes and clarify whether the reaction to outsiders using *how you is?* is indeed in the process of changing from individual to social significance. Similar studies could of course also be conducted in other communities, and a close examination of the social embedding of greeting formulae can certainly contribute to a deeper understanding of pragmatic reevaluation and change, both in individuals and across communities.

Notes

1. The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable input of Koenraad Kuiper and Dennis R. Preston, who kindly provided additional material and shared their personal views on greeting formulae, Penny Lee for comments on an earlier draft of the paper, and to Karen Lavarello Schreier, whose insider knowledge and native intuitions contributed considerably to the points discussed.
2. The fact that such expressions are group-specific becomes obvious by the reactions they evoke when they are used by outsiders. German tourists in Switzerland (or for that matter, northern German tourists in Bavaria, or Northern Americans in the US rural South) attempting to pronounce local greeting formula are immediately caught out, and the most common result is mild amusement on the part of the locals. On an anecdotal level, I noticed that one of our local Bavarian radio stations makes use of such ill-fated accommodation attempts for humoristic purposes. During the 2003 Oktoberfest in Munich (locally known as *Wiesn*), they air every day a conversation between locals and outside visitors (locally known as *Preissn*, 'Prussians') who dress in traditional Bavarian garments and desperately try to sound like Bavarians, using a variety of local expressions with a strong non-local accent. The popularity of the radio show is an attestation to the strong group-specific interpretation of language features, and also to the reactions such usage evokes when used by outsiders.
3. The list of candidates in such a list is of course much more extensive, particularly if we include recent formulae such as *what's up?/whassup?*, which represent of course a distinct and more extensive field of investigation.
4. Tristanians commonly display non-inverted question type sentences, e.g., "Where they was?" or "What she's doing out there now?"
5. The kinship terms *buddy* and *brother* are frequent in Tristan da Cunha English (Schreier and Lavarello Schreier 2003: 77).
6. The term *station fella* is used on Tristan da Cunha for visitors and expatriates staying on the island. It originally derives from soldiers and other army personnel stationed on the island during World War II. They were informally known as the "fellas what stay in the station" and finally as the *station fellas*. After the garrison was withdrawn in 1945, the term was maintained and semantically broadened to include all non-locals on the island.
7. This objective is based on the assumption that *all* linguistic features, no matter whether they are phonetic, phonological, morphosyntactic or pragmatic, may undergo transformation and change, and that *all* linguistic features therefore carry the potential of becoming socially significant for the speakers and communities who use them.
8. There are countless stories told by Tristanians who could not make themselves understood abroad, or who were asked about the whereabouts of their unusual (and to unfamiliar ears, curious) accent.

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Multiword units in Aboriginal English: Australian cultural expression in an adopted language

Ian G. Malcolm and Farzad Sharifian

1. Introduction

Aboriginal English has been defined by Rigsby (1998: 825) as "those distinctive varieties of English which have been vernacularized in Aboriginal communities." The process of vernacularisation has been a progressive one, drawing on elements maintained from Indigenous languages, from varieties of English brought by the colonists, from pidgins, creoles (some of which are still spoken in northern areas) and the non-English languages of trading and immigrant groups. The process has also drawn on the linguistic inventiveness of Aboriginal people, for whom their own dialect provides a liberating alternative to the heavily codified and institutionally imposed standard variety of English.

It is the intention of this paper to capture some of the creativity which has been shown by Aboriginal speakers in remaking English as a variety which serves their purposes as a culturally distinct group marginalised by the Australian English speaking majority. This creativity has its linguistic dimension, which will first be the object of our attention, but it is also driven by conceptual factors which we will consider in the latter part of the paper.

Although Aboriginal English has been investigated in many parts of Australia, and is characterised by many features held in common across widely separated areas, the focus of the present paper will be limited to Western Australia where the dialect has been under investigation for some 30 years, and where the authors' research has been carried out. The data which form the basis of the analysis which is to follow come from interviews and free speech involving child, adolescent and adult speakers recorded in the course of a succession of investigations carried out between 1973 and 2003 in rural and urban locations in Western Australia. They also incorporate material provided by research associates who are native speakers of Aboriginal English.[1]

2. Some aspects of the vernacularisation of English by aboriginal communities

When the British began to occupy Australia in 1788 the Indigenous population of perhaps 300,000 people spread unevenly across the continent were speakers of an estimated 250 languages and perhaps as many dialects. Language / dialect groups were relatively self-contained, although unified by a conceptual framework within which land, language and social organisation were mutually reinforcing. English did not at first readily gain a foothold in Indigenous communities. However, it was not long before the local populations in the vicinity of Sydney began to be outnumbered by the immigrants. Rapid expansion of the immigrant population to other areas led to the displacement of Aboriginal communities and the disruption of the ecology which had kept land, language and law in a mutually supportive balance. The strength of Indigenous languages, then, came under threat early in the colonial period (Walsh 1993: 2) and Indigenous communities came to be increasingly dependent on some form of English-based communication for their survival.

English and Aboriginal languages came together first in unsystematic jargons used by speakers, both Aboriginal and immigrant, who incorporated elements of both languages in their interactions. In different places, the jargon stage was succeeded by one or more of three other stages which Mühlhäusler (1986) has identified as typical of such language contact situations: stabilisation (or pidginisation), expansion (or creolisation) and restructuring (or de-pidginization / -creolization) (Mühlhäusler 1979) in the direction of the English superstrate.

It has been argued by Troy (1990, 1994) that, as the early jargons used in New South Wales began to stabilise around the beginning of the 19th century, a pidgin emerged in two sociolects, one used by Aboriginal speakers and showing more Aboriginal language influence and the other used by non-Aboriginal speakers. It was, then, already apparent at this stage that pidgin was able to perform the function of a medium of intra-group communication among Aboriginal communities. This function was an important factor underlying the widespread use of New South Wales Pidgin and its eventual movement north, south and west across the continent. This pidgin, adopted for Aboriginal communicative purposes, was, we would argue, (see further Malcolm 2000) the precursor of the Aboriginal English which was eventually to emerge, through processes of restructuring and leveling, as the Australia-wide medium of pan-Aboriginal communication.

What Rigsby calls "vernacularization" can, then, be seen as an ongoing process which has gone on as Aboriginal speakers have interfaced with English, employing it, in large part, in their own communities for new functions, and bringing about its modification through pidginisation, creolisation, restructuring and borrowing, as well as through normal language-internal processes of phonological, lexical and morpho-syntactic change. At every stage, the process has been informed by Aboriginal understandings of their shared history and worldview.

3.   Conceptual implications of linguistic dissemination across cultures

What happens when people in a given society adopt a new language or a language variety? Languages implanted in new contexts should serve the purposes of their speakers in expressing their experience, which is very much entrenched in their culture and environment. Thus, speakers of a new language are quite likely to change the language or come up with new linguistic forms and combinations that would accommodate their cultural experience. Some changes and innovations may relate to symbolizing a new identity that is different from that of the 'native' speakers of the language.

Linguistic changes and innovations in new varieties such as vernacularized varieties may surface as phonological, morpho-syntactic, or lexical features but are largely instantiations of conceptualisations that are culturally constructed by the new speech community (e.g. Wolf and Simo Bobda 2001). These conceptualisations include schemas, categories, metaphors, blends, etc. that emerge at the cultural level of cognition (Sharifian 2003). Schemas are units of knowledge that include concepts that are associated with each other thematically. On the other hand, concepts associated with each other under a category enter into an *x is a kind of y* relationship. Thus, 'food' and 'restaurant' are associated with each other schematically, but 'pasta' and 'food' are associated with each other categorically, in that 'pasta' is an instance of the category of 'food'. Conceptualisations that involve some form of mapping from one schema or category onto another are known as 'conceptual metaphors' and those that involve mapping from two schemas and categories onto a third new concept are known as "blends" (Fauconnier 1997). Other forms of conceptualisation include *perspectivisation*, or adopting a particular perspective with regard to what is being conceptualised (Verhagen, in press). For example, in terms of spatial configuration, two entities may be described as either 'X being over Y' or 'Y being below X'. All these

forms of conceptualisation appear to be mediated by people's cultural experience and worldview (e.g. Palmer 1996; Sharifian 2003).

The above-mentioned view that languages or language varieties that emerge from the process of linguistic dissemination largely embody cultural conceptualisations of the new speech community, has received due support from recent research on Aboriginal English (Malcolm 2001; Malcolm and Rochecouste 2000; Malcolm and Sharifian 2002; Sharifian 2001, 2002a, 2002b). At the discourse level, the analysis of more than 100 self-contained narratives from Aboriginal English speakers revealed that discourse in Aboriginal English is predominantly governed by schemas that are widely derived from the cultural experience of Aboriginal people (Malcolm 2001; Malcolm and Rochecouste 2000). The following cultural schemas were among the most frequently represented in the narratives that were analysed:

Travel	The representation of the experience of known participants, organized in terms of alternating travelling (or moving) and non-travelling (or stopping) segments, usually referenced to a time of departure and optionally including a return to the starting point.
Hunting	The representation of experience of known participants, organized with respect to the observation, pursuit and capture of prey, usually entailing killing and sometimes eating it. Success is usually associated with persistence expressed with repeated and / or unsuccessful actions (e.g. shoot and miss, look and never find). There are a number of sub-schemas associated with hunting, including Cooking, Fishing and Spotting.
Observing	The representation of experience, usually shared experience, in terms of observed details whether of natural or social phenomena.
Scary Things	The representation of experience, either first-hand or vicarious, of strange powers or persons affecting normal life within the community and manifest in the expression of appearance and disappearance or seeing or not seeing / finding evidence of the phenomenon in question.
Family	The representation of experience in relation to an extended family network.

Source: Malcolm (2001: 17)

Sharifian (2001) observed that Aboriginal English speakers often operate on the basis of widely shared schemas and as such do not find it necessary to produce complex verbal utterances. Instead, they largely appear to rely on the use of elliptical utterances, which he calls *minimal discourse,* to

report or describe a whole event, sub-event, etc. Another feature of Aboriginal English that supports the view that it clothes Aboriginal cultural conceptualisations is its non-reliance on the linear conceptualisation of 'time' in organizing discourse, which is a pervasive organizational principle in the discourse of Standard Australian English (Sharifian 2002a). Among the usual anchor points that Aboriginal people employ for the construction of discourse in Aboriginal English are place as well as events such as relatives' funerals. A good number of the texts in Aboriginal English that have been analysed by the authors begin with utterances such as *In Geraldton ...,* or *It was in Nanna's funeral ...*. These features are in consonance with Aboriginal cultural experience in which one's country, in the Aboriginal sense, and events such as one's grandmother's funeral hold a much more significant place than the linear conception of time.

Another feature of Aboriginal English which highlights the role of schemas in discourse processing is the frequent incidence of what Sharifian (2001: 129) calls *schema-based* and *image-based referencing*. This refers to the frequent use of deictic devices such as *that* or *dat* to refer to events and entities that do not appear to be present either in the physical context of speech or in the linguistic context of the deictic devices. In other words, the antecedents of these devices are neither 'endophoric' nor 'exophoric'. Rather, they appear to retrieve their antecedent from the image or the schema that is activated in the mind of the speaker at time of speech. For instance, an Aboriginal English speaker may produce utterances such as *I went to dat funeral* or *I seen that green snake* with no prior reference to the funeral or the snake (see further examples under 3a, below). This phenomenon, which is highly frequent in Aboriginal English, may arise from the widely held assumptions of shared schemas among the speakers. "Standard" varieties of English do not seem to operate on the basis of schema-based and image-based referencing to the extent that Aboriginal English does.

At the level of lexicon, it is observed that even everyday words such as *family* and *home* evoke cultural schemas and categories in the community of Aboriginal English speakers that largely characterize Aboriginal cultural experience (Sharifian 2002b, 2005). The word *family*, for instance, is associated with categories in Aboriginal English that move far beyond what is described as "nuclear" family in Anglo-Australian culture. Almost everybody who comes into frequent contact with an Aboriginal person may be referred to by a kin term such as *brother* or *cousin*. The word *mum* may also be used to refer to people who are referred to as "aunt" in Anglo-Australian culture. Such usage of kin terms does not of course stop at the

level of categorization but usually evokes schemas associated with certain rights and obligations between those involved. The word *home* in Aboriginal English usually evokes categories that are based on family relationship and not so much the possession of a building by a nuclear family. For instance, an Aboriginal English speaker may refer to one's Nanna's place as "home".

The vernacularization of English by Aboriginal people has, then, involved the use of English lexical items with semantic shift. It has also involved the modification of English lexical items, either by changing the form of individual items or by bringing together items which do not normally come together in the English of non-Aboriginal speakers. We will attempt to provide comprehensive evidence of this in what is to follow.

4.   Processes involving multiword units in the noun phrase in Aboriginal English

Comment will be made here on four kinds of processes which involve the distinctive use of multiword units in the noun phrase in the data which have been examined: compounding, suffixation, collocation and syntactic adjustment. In most cases it will be apparent that it is not the processes themselves which are innovative, but the elements to which they have been applied.

1.	Compounding	
	a)	Noun + Noun Compounding
		The most frequent form of compounding in the noun phrase in Aboriginal English, as in Standard English, is noun-centred (Bauer and Huddleston 2002: 1646). The data yielded six kinds of noun-centred compounding:
		Hyponymic
		This is the default form, in which the first noun is a hyponym of the second, as in:
		foot track 'track for walking, as opposed to driving;' also, 'footprint'
		finger ring 'ring worn on the finger'
		ink pen 'pen, for writing'
		cold sick 'a cold'
		cattle snake 'snake with markings like those on cattle'
		law man 'a person very knowledgeable in the law' (Arthur 1996: 42)
		roo dog 'a skilled hunter' (metaphor)

featherfoot (*tjina karpil*, 'foot bound', in Pitjantjatjara), 'an avenger who has feathers bound to his feet to cover his tracks'.

Three slightly distinctive cases are *eye glasses* 'spectacles', which is common to Kriol and probably also to an earlier dialect of British English; *dinner time* (as in *He had a dinner time*), which is a conversion of the Aboriginal English adverb compound *dinner time*, and *bunji-man*, 'a white man with a predilection for Aboriginal women' (Moore 1999), which is probably a hybrid, drawing on the same Aboriginal language or creole source as the Aboriginal English expression *bunjyin around* 'flaunting one's body.'

Possessive

In Aboriginal English, a possessive relationship may be shown by juxtaposition, so that *my cousin bike* means 'the bike belonging to my cousin' (Eagleson, Kaldor and Malcolm 1982: 85). This process results in multiword units such as the following:

my mum mum 'my maternal grandmother'

Marky boy 'Mark's son'.

Coordinative

Coordinative compounds are those where "the component bases are of equal status" (Bauer and Huddleston 2002: 1646). An example of this is *cousin brother* 'a cousin who, according to Indigenous kinship relationships, is a brother.'

Lexicalizing

Some compound nouns are paired items which, for expressive effect, have been lexicalised, as in:

man head   'precocious little boy' and

woman head   'precocious little girl,'

which are expressions which may be used to give credit to a child for the knowledge they possess, especially cultural knowledge, as in *e's a proper man head, that one.*

Another example is the metaphorical expression *foot Falcon*, which may be compared to the more longstanding English idiom *shanks's pony* as an expression of having no transport other than one's own legs. This nominal expression may be converted to a verb phrase, as in *Let's footfalcon.* Falcon/falcon in this case refers to a model of a Ford sedan.

Dephrasal

Dephrasal compounds result from fusion of elements into a single lexical base, rather than from the compounding of nouns in the normal sense (Bauer and Huddleston 2002: 1646). An example of a dephrasal compound is the use of racehorse to refer, metaphorically, to an athletic person. The expression derives from the word for the reptile *karda* (in Nyungar), which, in English is rendered 'racehorse goanna.'

Classifying

A commonly occurring feature of Aboriginal languages referred to by Dixon (1980: 272) is that they may use generic classifiers to accompany nouns. It is possible that some multiword expressions in Aboriginal English, such as *paper wrapping*, 'wrapping' and *waterflood* 'flood' represent some influence of this feature.

b) Adjective + Noun Compounding

Adjective + noun compounds in Aboriginal English, as in Standard English, are distinguishable from adjective + noun collocations in that the adjective carries the stress and the compound does not necessarily carry the meaning which would be carried by a syntactic construction with the same adjective preceding the same noun. Thus, for example, *old girl* is a compound which is used reciprocally as a form of address between grandparents and grandchildren and does not carry the stigma 'old girl' would carry in the usage of non-Aboriginal Australians. Some other examples are:

own mob   'one's family and relations'

claimin(g) cousin   'person claiming to be a cousin by blood (whether or not the claim is accepted)'

tough go   'a mishap'

little hairy man   'a visitant from the spirit world'

hairy man   'a man, by contrast with a younger person'

c) Preposition + Noun and Noun + Preposition Compounding

A preposition may form the first element in a compound with a noun, as in *outcamp* 'a camp located some distance away from a town or station'; more commonly, the nominal element is followed by the prepositional element, as in:

crash in   as in *they ad a crash in* 'they had a collision',

campin(g) out   which can function adjectivally, as in *a campin out spot*, and

dinner out   as in *a dinner out* 'a meal out in the open'.

2. Suffixing

a) Noun / Pronoun Suffixing

The suffix *-fella*, which may be applied to nouns, pronouns, numerals and adjectives in creole, is maintained on a limited number of noun bases in Aboriginal English, e.g. *blackfella*, 'Aboriginal'; *whitefella*, 'non-Aboriginal', and may, in certain areas of creole influence, also be used with pronouns, e.g.

youfella bin bring them cake 'you brought them cake' (Eagleson, Kaldor and Malcolm 1982: 87) and to distinguish a dual pronoun form, *twofella* or *tupela*.

b) Adjective Suffixing

The suffix *-fella* may also occur on adjectives (though it could be seen to have the effect of converting them to nouns), as in *little fella and a mother horse* 'pony and a mother horse'. Similarly, the suffix *-one*, which, in creole[2], regularly occurs on adjectives, may occur in a similar way in Aboriginal English, as in *really juicy one* '[it's] really juicy'; *Little birds. Grey one.* 'little grey birds'.

3. Collocation

There are many distinctive collocations involved in the noun phrase in Aboriginal English. Mention will be limited here to two kinds.

a) Determiner-noun collocations

The demonstrative adjective *this/dis*, *that/dat*, *them/dem* often collocates with the noun in contexts where an article, or else no determiner, would be used in Standard English, as in the following examples:

We went to dat Malcolm Dam	'We went to Malcolm Dam'
We 'as in that old house	'We were in the old house'
We 'as walkin along the pipe and...that tree was in the road and that leaf was sticking out of the...pipe	'We were walking along the pipe and a tree was in the way and a leaf was sticking out of the pipe.' [reference is to a water pipeline about 1 metre in diameter]
There was this ole man	'There was an old man' (This example, though not the others, may be seen to overlap with informal narrative style in Standard English).

A number of other determiner-noun collocations entail the use of lexicalised determiners expressing indefinite plural, derived from non-count quantificational nouns 'lot' and 'mob' fused with, or replacing articles, as in *lotta* and *(big) mob(s) (of/a)*. These are illustrated in the following:

They found lotta emu egg	'They found a lot of emu eggs'
mob a little cat	'a lot of little cats'
seen big mob of little 'airy fellas	'saw many little Spirit Beings'
there was big mobs of crows on the tree	'there were a lot of crows on the tree'
bi-i-i-ggest mob of emus	'a very big flock of emus.'

As the above example shows, *big mob* may be given greater emphasis (though not the superlative meaning) by the addition of the suffix *-est* to, and by the elongation of the vowel in, *big*.

Mob also functions distinctively in that it is not limited to use with count nouns. Hence, a comment like the following is unexceptional:

my mum used to buy biggest mob of yoghurt.

Another pervasive collocation is the use of 'all' and 'the' (sometimes fused to *alla*, as in Kriol) before a plural noun, giving a sense of indefinite plural, as in

all the hostel kid they was standing on the door	'a lot of hostel kids were standing on the door'
all the little pigs were running	'the little pigs were running'
e cutting all the fish tails off	'he is cutting the tails off the fish'.

The term *shame*, which functions as a noun in Standard English, is more likely to function as an adjective (possibly derived from the past participle 'ashamed', but also constituting a calque, since it has a direct equivalent in Nyungar, *tju*) in Aboriginal English, used in the complement position, although the *be* copula may not be present:

Don't be shame in front of me	'Don't embarrass me'.
e too shame	'he's too embarrassed'

The above glosses should not be taken as precise. The term 'shame' in Aboriginal English has no precise semantic equivalent in Standard English.

b) Prepositional phrases

Prepositions in Aboriginal English may collocate with nouns in distinctive ways, suggesting that time, space and certain causal / consequential relationships may be conceptualised differently from in Standard English.

Time

The expression of points or periods in time may not follow Standard English patterns. The prepositional relationship may be implied without the use of a preposition, as in *Only dark time they come around*, 'They only come around in the dark,' or the time point markers *in*, *at*, *on* may be interchanged, as in *and at morning I got the ball* 'and in the morning I got the ball.'

Place

Aboriginal English speakers use the expression 'go up (or down) *to*' for what in Standard English would not require the 'to', as in

I climb up to the pepper tree	'I climbed (up) the pepper tree'
Toyota was comin down to a big hill	'The four-wheel-drive was coming down a big hill'
We went up to another sand 'ill 'cross the road	'We went up another sandhill on the other side of the road'.

On the other hand, Aboriginal speakers omit the prepositions 'at' or 'in' when preceding them with 'out', as in:

This was out Wiluna	'This was out at / in Wiluna'
Dey was out bush.	'They were out in the bush.'

Cause / Goal

The preposition *for* functions in Aboriginal English to signal the intended prey / harvest, when used in connection with a hunting or gathering trip, as in:

then they went for kangaroos	'then they were hunting kangaroos'
we was goin for gwirra	'we were hunting [a particular bird]'
he went out there for bimba	'he went out to gather [a kind of berry].'
big tall Wongi, e rush for us	'a big tall Wongi [desert tribesman] rushed to catch us'

The same preposition carries the meaning of 'on account of' when used with reference to human relationships, as in:

all the people was just happy for us	'the people were happy to see us [when we returned after being lost]'
I cry for my cousin	'I missed my cousin' or 'I feel sad for my cousin'
I'm pregnant for you	'I am pregnant on account of you.'

4. Syntactic Adjustment

A number of other multiword units in Aboriginal English may be loosely grouped together as syntactic modifications of the English language which are occasioned by the expressive demands of Aboriginal speakers. Five such modifications which affect the noun phrase will be mentioned here.

a) Noun anticipation

Speakers of Aboriginal English may employ the noun *thing / ting / sing* as an anticipatory marker before the noun, as in:

you get a ting, stone	'you get a stone'
we lookin round for ting, Mavis	'we were looking around for Mavis.'

Perhaps this feature entered the language as a feature of interlanguage, to enable speakers to hesitate while hunting for a word. While it may be present in the speech of bilingual (and, to a limited extent, of some other Australian English) speakers, it now occurs more widely as well and is a stylistic marker of Aboriginal English. The use of *ting* before the noun may also reflect the enduring influence of the Indigenous language feature of using classifiers (cf. 1a, above).

b) Noun substitution

As in colloquial Australian English, but to a greater extent, the lexeme *thing* (and, in Aboriginal English, its allomorphs *ting / sing*) may also substitute for a common or proper noun when the speaker is not able to recall it, as in:

he pull the thing	'he pulled the thing'
he got stuck on top o' the sing an e couldn't get down	'he got stuck on top of the thing and he couldn't get down'
Mr Thing weren't there.	'Mr what's-his-name wasn't there'.

c)   Noun post-modification
      Thing, or one of its allomorphs, may also be placed immediately after a noun to provide some qualification to its meaning, suggesting that it has been used with some vagueness, (a feature also shared to some extent with colloquial Australian English) as in:

      e fell straight down into dis   'he fell straight down into a sort of hole.'
      hole thing

      The term *part* may occupy the same position, with the meaning that the noun which it follows is in a part-whole relationship to a larger entity, as in:

      I hit it on the tail part   'I hit [the creature] on its tail'
      we goin along this crossing part   'The part of the land where we were going was the crossing.'

d)   Noun phrase indefinite extension
      Aboriginal speakers of English often attempt to contextualize what they are saying against a background of which they want to retain awareness though it is not in focus. In order to do this, they use devices which enable an indefinite extension of the noun phrase, as in:

      We used to live next to all the criminals an everythink
      One time I went to Junction...and that
      an all dis limestone an dat
      this man came aroun wid all yoghurt an dat.

      For this purpose *and that* may have human referents, as in:

      Uncle Mark...an deir son Christopher an dat
      and no one could bring my cousins and friends and that.

      Since Aboriginal English is typically employed in oral communication among familiars, the indefinite extension may be intended to allude to shared schemas which do not need to be made explicit.

5.   Processes involving multiword units in the verb phrase in Aboriginal English

Some of the processes observed in relation to multiword units in the noun phrase are common to the verb phrase but there are also a number of different processes. Five kinds of processes will be discussed.

1.   Suffixing
      Suffixing affects the verb phrase in particular in relation to adverbial expressions, which may be formed with *-time*, in the case of time adverbials, and *-way*, in the case of manner adverbials. Both forms of suffixing show influence from Kriol.

Time adverbials

It is clear that adverbial compounds involving *-time* exist in Standard English (e.g. *sometimes*). However, Aboriginal English modifies these and also creates others, as shown in the following examples:

I forgettin all time	'I always forget'
an everytime I...forget to close my window at night	'and all the time I forget to close my window at night'
Long time we caught two down the river	'A long time ago we caught two down at the river'
We all know for long time	'We have all known for a long time'
Sometime they sing they Yamagee song, y'know	'Sometimes they sing their Yamagee [tribal] songs'
Only dark time they come around	'they only come around in the dark' or 'they only come around when it is dark'

In the case of *all time* and *everytime* there is no count / non-count noun constraint as in Standard English, so that both expressions are essentially synonymous. The expression *long time* in Aboriginal English may be used to convey the meanings that Standard English would express with either *a long time ago* or *for a long time*. The intended meaning is made clear by the word order. *Sometime* in Aboriginal English may carry the meaning of *sometimes* in Standard English, although *sometime* may also be used to mean (as in Standard English) 'at some time', as in *Project finishes this year sometime doesn't it?* The expression *dark time* is open to two interpretations, either as a prepositional phrase with the preposition omitted (as discussed above under Noun Phrase), or as an adverbial, analogically following the pattern of *sometime*, *all time* and *long time*.

Manner adverbials

In the same way that *-time* enables some time adverbials to be morphologically distinguished, *-way* may perform a similar function for manner adverbials, as in the following examples:

e just got up quick way	'he just got up quickly'
she jumped north way dere	'she jumped towards the north'
Had a ride then. Went long way	'Then we had a ride. We went a long way'
I went long way for holiday	'I went a long way away for a holiday'
[Where do they live?] *Long way*	'a long way away'
all the way follow the pipe up	'followed the pipe up all the way'
Nguluway	'fearfully / cautiously'

In the case of *quick way* the simplified adverbial form *quick* (from *quickly*) has been restructured according to an alternative morphological principle which draws on Kriol rather than Standard English. *North way* follows the same principle, although in Standard English 'north' in such a context would not carry any marking. The expression *long way* (as in Kriol) may function to

express what in Standard English requires one or the other of two phrases, *a long way* and *a long way away*. The expression *all the way*, although it carries essentially the same meaning as in Standard English, functions more like a self-contained adverb, in that it can be used before the verb. The expression *nguluway*, is an example of a hybrid which adds the Aboriginal English ad-verbial suffix to a Ngaanyatjatjara base.

2. Prefixing

There is one case, recorded only in children's speech in a community in the vicinity of Broome (a town in the far north of the state), where a verb may be prefixed with *lie-* to add the meaning of 'pretence.' Thus:

Mummy lie-say dis kine…	'Mummy said, pretendingly, like this…'
e bin lie-drop it	'He pretended to drop it'
we lie-go crosseyed	'We pretended to go crosseyed'
we lie-don't look	'We pretended not to look'

(all examples from Eagleson, Kaldor and Malcolm 1982: 98).

3. Phrasal Verbs

One of the most pervasive features of the verb phase in Aboriginal English is its productivity in the use of a number of particles to form distinctive phrasal verbs. By far the most frequently-used particle for this purpose is *up*, but there are at least five others.

***Phrasal verbs using* up**

we cook im up	'we cook it'
and I cooked up myself	'and I did the cooking myself'
roast it up	'roast it'
e chased im up	'he chased (and caught (up with)) him'
we bury im up	'we buried it'
block him up	'give him plenty of food'
you get jarred up by your coach	'you are reprimanded by your coach'
scorch him up	'be strict on him'
go and flog them up	'go and bash them up'
pet him up	'pet him', or 'cuddle him'
learn it up	'learn it'
busted up my nail	'broke my finger nail'
patchin up for money	'asking around for contributions' (e.g. *patchin(g) up for milk*)
share things up	'share things around'
I make up I belt 'em	'I pretend to belt them'
e was tired, being charged up	'he was tired, being drunk.'

According to Moore (1999) there are 25 distinct meanings of the particle *up* in Australian English. Of these there is one which predominates in its use in Aboriginal English: the sense of 'completely or effectively.' This accounts for

its use in the first twelve examples above. In the case of *patchin up* and *sharing up* the particle extends the sense of completeness to the inclusion of the group. The expression *charged up* is possibly a derivation from the phrase *charge your glasses.*

Phrasal verbs using **out**

an make out they was walkin	'and give the impression that they were walking'
[I] sing out to them two	'I called out to the two of them'
an e singin my name out	'and he's "singing" my name'
B was laughing out M...	'B was laughing and mocking M…'
M laughed out im	'M laughed and mocked him'
we wen' campin out dere	'we camped (out) there'

The case of *sing out* is complicated by the fact that it may carry two meanings. In the first example above, as in non-standard Australian English, it is essentially equivalent to Standard English *call out*; however, in the second example, because it collocates with *my name*, it carries an implication of the exercise of spiritual power. The use of the particle *out* with *laugh* adds the sense of public ridicule, something which is particularly offensive to Aboriginal people for whom it is shameful to be isolated from the group. The term *campin(g) out* is not redundant, since, in Aboriginal English, *camping* can mean 'stopping over' (staying) at the home of friends or relations.

Phrasal verbs using **in**

e punch in that ole fella	'he bashed that old man'
crying cause I bumped in	'crying because I had a collision'
got out dere [to the roller drome], paid in	'got out there, paid to go in'

In Standard English in the first two of these cases there seems to be a need for a prepositional phrase to follow *in*; however, in Aboriginal English this is unnecessary as the particle carries an adverbial sense. The third example is the only one of its kind in the data and can only be tentatively classified as a phrasal verb at this stage. It may illustrate an ellipsis, or an analogical form based on 'go in.'

Phrasal verb using **off**

the truck just- vroom- took off	'the truck just-vroom- made a rapid departure'
den we just took off home	'then we just fled for home'
she took off over the fence	'she escaped / fled over the fence'

The expression *took off* is the only case in the data where the particle *off* is used distinctively, but it occurs frequently, especially in contexts involving hunting or pursuit. It is also common in other contexts in colloquial Australian English, perhaps showing influence of Aboriginal English.

Phrasal verb using **down**

I chased that little one down	'I chased the little (e.g. Kangaroo) and captured it'

The expression *chase down* carries the same sense as *chase up*, and is used in the context of hunting or pursuit where the chase leads to the capture of the prey.

Phrasal verb using **away**

like he was leading him away   'as if he was stealing / leading / taking him away'

The sense of *leading away* is strongly coloured by Aboriginal culture, according to which either spirit beings or avenging parties can come to take people away. This sense has been generalised to cover also the actions of Australian authorities who, in the past, took Aboriginal children away from their parents to bring them up in institutions (the so-called 'stolen generations'). Another meaning of the term is to 'mislead' (possibly derived from the Standard English expression 'lead astray').

4. Collocations

A number of collocations typically occur in the verb phrase, especially involving such verbs as *go*, *walk*, and *get*.

Collocations involving **go**

they was goin singing on the way	'they were singing on the way'
me and Jody bin go and getting grapes	'Jody and I got some grapes'
[I was] standing on the pipe going along	'I was walking along the pipe'

The verb 'go' commonly collocates with another verb so that the activity implied in the second (and dominant) verb is associated with a sense of ongoing motion. This has been observed by Koch (2000: 48–54) to be characteristic also of Central Australian Aboriginal English and he has referred to it with the term 'associated motion.' Koch attributes this feature in his data to the influence of the Kaytetye language.

Collocations involving **walk** (*and* go)

We went for walk long way	'We walked for a long time'
They went walkin along	'They were walking along' or 'They started walking'
we 'as goin walking	'we were walking'
We went walkin along	'we were walking along'

It is apparent that *go* readily collocates with the verb *walk*, and also with another marker of ongoing movement, *long/along*. The term *walk* may, indeed, in Aboriginal English, be used to refer to land travel without necessarily implying that it is on foot and, thus, can be used synonymously with go. The salience of the *long/along* marker is made particularly apparent in some (more remote) areas through its highlighting with elevated pitch and vowel lengthening.

Collocations involving **get**

them two bin get scared	'the two of them were scared'
the little lamb was getting scared	'the little lamb was scared'
they get cheeky	'they behave aggressively'

e get stiffened out every time   'he/she is always getting hurt'
Are they gunna be get you doin goat 'Will they have you mustering goats'
mustering
S was getting big shame   'S was deeply embarrassed'

The verb *get* tends to collocate with some other verbs or with adjectival expressions to add an inchoative sense to the action described.

Adverbs **fairly, right**

they was fairly missin it   'they were (just) missing it'
it's fairly lookin at me   'it was looking straight at me'
got im right in the chest   'shot it precisely in the chest'
shot it right in the eye   'shot it precisely in the eye'

These expressions all come from discourse concerned with hunting and they do not seem to occur elsewhere, except, perhaps by extension, with reference to fighting, where *right* may be used as an intensifier, as in *he bashed him right up*. They highlight the sense of precision which is associated with hunting behaviour.

5. Syntactic Adjustment
    Some, though not all, of the syntactic modifications which occur in the verb phrase are the counterparts of those we observed in the noun phrase.

    a) Verb anticipation
        The term *thing*, or its allomorphs, may occupy the place immediately before the verb, thus providing a hesitation space similar to that noted with respect to the noun phrase:
        den we um thing, went inside   'then we went inside'.

    b) Verb phrase indefinite extension
        Devices also exist, as in the case of the noun phrase, to allow for indefinite extension of what has been expressed in the verb phrase:
        an so R, 'e started swearin an' all   'and so R started swearing and doing things like that'
        they was like...sneakin into our 'they were sneaking into our rooms
        rooms and stuff   and doing things like that'

    c) Deictic extension
        A further kind of extension occurs where the speaker provides or alludes to kinesic behaviours accompanying what is being referred to and uses what we may call "deictic extension" to direct the listener's attention to this non-verbal communication, as in:
        e'd jump up and turn like that there   'he'd jump up and turn, as you can see / imagine'
        he walks up with the boxing gloves 'he walks up with the boxing
        like that there   gloves, as you can see / imagine'
        then she looks like that here   'then she looks as you can see / imagine'

I was tryin to stay awake like this 'ere	'I was trying to stay awake as you can see / imagine.'

6. Tags

Aboriginal English has developed (from creole) a range of invariant tags which may be used for seeking information or confirmation:

You got a better car than that one, inna?	'You have a better car than that one, haven't you?'
You know when we got up to Big Bell, inna?	'You know, don't you, when we went to Big Bell'
Big one with big titties, unna?	'A big [udder] with big teats, eh?'

6. Some conceptual implications of these processes

We claimed earlier that the kinds of change which brought about Aboriginal English as a distinct dialect could not be accounted for in isolation from the shared sense of history and cultural identity of the speakers of this variety. It remains to make some further comments in support of this claim.

Aboriginal Australians have intimate links with their land, supported by their beliefs about the "Dreaming", when their Ancestor Beings created the various land forms, as well as by their history of several millennia over which they have gained subsistence principally by means of hunting and gathering. As we have already noted, land, language and social organisation were closely interrelated in the pre-contact life of the Aboriginal people. The coming of the British interfered with this sociolinguistic ecology by fracturing social organisation, distancing people from their traditional lands and practices and causing English-based contact languages to arise and supplant many traditional languages. However, the existence of Aboriginal English is evidence of the fact that, even in the face of this upheaval, Aboriginal people kept certain markers of their aboriginality intact. Aboriginal English draws on the English system only in a qualified way. The meanings it has to express derive from different conceptual resources from those of other English speakers and the system has to change to accommodate the conceptual system of its speakers.

6.1. Schema-related change

It was noted earlier that a limited number of cultural schemas had been found to be frequently in evidence in oral narratives recorded in Western

Australia, and that the influence of these schemas could be evidenced in lexical forms and discourse features employed by the narrator. Some of the multi-word units discussed in this paper perform a similar function.

Thus, for example, the Hunting schema can be seen to underlie such features of the noun phrase as:

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noun compounds such as *cattle snake, foot track, roo dog, racehorse*;

noun postmodification, as in *tail part*;

the prepositional phrase *goin(g) for ...*

Likewise, the following features of the verb phrase are related to this schema:

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get + NP to refer to the prey captured;

go for + NP to refer to the prey sought;

chase up and *chase down* to refer to pursuit and capture;

adverbials *fairly* and *right*, expressing precision of observation and aim.

The Travel schema is instantiated through such features as:

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collocations such as goin(g) bush, walkin(g) / goin(g) (a)long, camping out;

the metaphorical expression *riding the white horse* 'making damper';

the go + V construction to express ongoing movement.

The Scary Things schema can be seen to generate such forms as:

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compounds *featherfoot* and *little hairy man*;

singing out, and *leading away* with reference to sorcery.

The Family schema, and its entailments, is involved in such features as:

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possessive compounds *mum mum* and *Marky boy*;

compliment forms *man head* and *woman head*;

kin-related expressions *claimin cousin*, *old girl* and *own mob*;

the use of indefinite extension *and that* to refer to extended family.

6.2. Processes of blending, metaphor and metonymy

Aboriginal English gives evidence of active processes of linguistic innovation in response to conceptual motivation. There are many blends which bring together shades of meaning which do not converge in Standard English, as, for example, in *foot track*; *bunji man*; *law man* and *singin(g) out*. There are colourful metaphors, as in *riding the white horse*; *racehorse*; *roo dog*; *foot falcon*; *cry for*; *scorch up*; *block up*; *patch up and charge up*. There are also many cases of metonymic mapping, as in, for example, the use of *a dinner time* to refer to dinner; *man head* to refer to a precocious boy and *featherfoot* to refer to the avenger.

6.3. Perspectivisation

It seems possible from some expressions in Aboriginal English that certain forms of movement are conceived differently by Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal speakers. For example, in Australian English the sun is said to *go down*, but our data contains the expression *sun started comin down*; in Australian English one *climbs up* a hill but in Aboriginal English one *climbs up to* a hill; Aboriginal English speakers often use the expression *on top of* the ground where an Australian English speaker would say *on* the ground.

6.4. Integrative versus abstractive conceptual principles

It has been argued by one of the authors elsewhere (Malcolm 2003b) that it is possible to account for many of the divergencies between Aboriginal English and Australian English by invoking the principle of integration (in Aboriginal English) versus abstraction (in Australian English). Where Australian English often provides the means to look at life analytically and abstractly, Aboriginal English provides alternative means which enable experience to be viewed in an integrated way. Thus, for example, the suffixation of adverbs with *-time* is part of a tendency to mark time points experientially (e.g. *long time, dark time*) rather than abstractly (e.g. in years or hours); the attempt to anchor manner adverbs with *-way* and adjectives with *-one* or *-fella* represents an attempt to avoid using them abstractly and to integrate them into the experience from which they have been derived; the use of some phrasal verbs, such as *share up* and *patch up*, stresses the inte-

gration of the activity described into a communal behaviour pattern; the tendency of the Aboriginal English speaker to provide "indefinite extension" so that context can be acknowledged, even if inexplicitly, is an alternative to the more context-free means of expression which is typical of Australian English.

7.   Conclusion

Aboriginal English is marked, then, by a significant number of multiword units which distinguish it from Australian English and from "Standard" varieties of English. While these units can be described in linguistic terms and illustrate the operation of processes common to language change in other contexts, they can also be described with reference to the attempt of the inheritors of a distinctive conceptual system to make the English system serve its demands rather than those of a system which is still, in many ways, foreign to them. The ability of English to serve these demands is, in our view, the key to its maintenance as a distinct variety in Aboriginal communities.

Notes

1.   Particular acknowledgement is made here of the insights provided by Glenys Collard, Eva Sahanna, Louella Eggington and Angela Kickett.
2.   In Australia there are two main varieties of English-based creole spoken by Aboriginal people. The variety used in Western Australia is generally referred to as Kriol.

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Fixed expressions as manifestations of cultural conceptualizations: Examples from African varieties of English

Hans-Georg Wolf and Frank Polzenhagen

1. Introduction

In rough terms, in the debate on post-colonial English one finds two opposing poles.[1] Writers on one end hold English to be irreconcilably alien and destructive to the indigenous cultures of its second language (L2) speakers. In this "cultural alienationist" (cf. Schmied 1991: 104) or "exploitation" model (cf. Mair 2002), the view of English as a mono-cultural culprit is propagated. Different theoretical orientations unite in the belief that English is isomorphic with Western culture and is inextricably tied to Western beliefs and values. From this perspective, those who adopt English in other parts of the world will adopt the beliefs and values of the West as well.

Authors on the other end hold a more favorable attitude towards the global role of English and acknowledge the creative processes which English has undergone and is undergoing in different cultural settings. The terms *New Englishes* or *World Englishes* themselves attest to these changes and reflect the pluricentricity of English in the world. We espouse this position. However, we feel that sociolinguists have had difficulties coming to terms with "culture", and their examples of acculturation have rarely gone beyond the description of some grammatical patterns, loan words, and phonetic features induced by mother tongue interference or endonormative processes. In our paper, we argue for the application of two methodologies which supplement each other and can offer a systematic linguistic handle on the expression of culture in L2 varieties of English: corpus linguistics and cognitive linguistics (see Wolf 2004). One assumption of the latter is that a language or language variety reflects, by and large, the cultural context of the speech community it is used by (see Dirven, Wolf and Polzenhagen fc.). Much of the conceptual structure underlying a particular variety is heavily influenced by and reflects cultural realities, and, evidently, culture and belief systems differ. Thus, different languages can have a similar, and in turn, different varieties of one language may have an alto-

gether different conceptual base, as is the case, we argue, for some varieties of English. Here, corpus linguistic methods lend themselves to ensuring a reliable empirical basis of the cognitive analysis and to providing a comparative account across varieties. By way of describing linguistic expressions of the community model in African varieties of English, we hope to show that at least these varieties have indeed undergone a marked acculturation process.

   This paper is structured as follows. First, we will introduce the socio-cultural background of the cultural model in question, drawing from anthropological, political and theological studies. The main part of this paper is devoted to the analysis of some linguistic evidence for this model, as it is realized in African English (AE). This part will be divided into a) a cognitive-linguistic analysis of the conceptual structure of the model, and b) a corpus-based analysis, which elicits keywords and multi-word units. The authentic text examples we provide come from a variety of sources, in particular from computer corpora. Here, we used the Corpus of English in Cameroon (CEC)[2] and, as native-English reference corpora, FLOB and FROWN, which represent British English and American English, respectively. Many of the African English examples stem from a thematic text compilation (WCL),[3] which was compiled by one of the authors.

2.   The socio-cultural background of the African model of community

Before turning to the analyses of linguistic expressions, it is necessary to provide some background information on the belief system to which they relate, namely the African kinship or community model.[4] This model involves a holistic cosmology, in which community is central, and in which community extends from the immediate family and local context to the various social units, further to the spiritual world of the ancestors, and ultimately to God/the gods, (cf. Musopole 1994: 77; Mbiti 1990: 102; Wolf 1999). The spiritual dimension implicates witchcraft, a concept with negative associations to the Western mind, but which has an ambiguous status in the African community model (see Wolf 2001: chapter 5; Wolf and Simo Bobda 2002: 244–250).

   Kinship and witchcraft have long been identified as fundamental and common to traditional societies of sub-Saharan Africa. Contrary to the expectations of the popular Western-oriented modernization theory, the impact of the kinship model and of the occult has not diminished with the world-

wide drive to "modernity." Instead, one can observe a massive revival of these patterns in contemporary Africa. However, culture is not to be seen as a static reproduction of some fixed set of norms and values.[5] Recent anthropological and socio-political studies support the view that a particular contextualization of traditional concepts is taking place in contemporary African society.[6] Indeed, with respect to the model described here, one can observe a continuous process of adapting traditional norms and practices to historical changes and an incorporation of influences from outside, as, e.g., in the blend of "modern" Christian or Islamic elements with "traditional" African spirituality (see Wolf fc.). It is a sign of the model's vitality and flexibility that this incorporation can take place, while the basic conceptual structure remains quite stable. The community model is a historically grown and culturally coherent system with its own inherent logic and functions as a "sense-making device" for people.

The critical question may be raised if it is not too sweeping to treat sub-Saharan Africa as one cultural unit. We have discussed this issue elsewhere (see Wolf 2001: 275). Suffice it to say that we are in the company of many scholars who hold the opinion that fundamental concepts are indeed shared across the region, despite its heterogeneity. Our data from different varieties of AE fully support this view.

In what follows, we will turn to an analysis of this model from a linguistic point of view and will make suggestions as to how linguistic data can be used to elaborate and systematize its conceptual structure.

3. Linguistic evidence

3.1. A cognitive-linguistic analysis of the African kinship-based community model

Our analysis is situated in a newly emerging field called "cultural linguistics" (see, e.g., Palmer 1996; Sharifian 2003), which is an anthropologically oriented branch of Cognitive Linguistics. Cognitivists, be they linguists, psychologists, or anthropologists, share the assumption that language is part of thought and that by analyzing language, one can arrive at the underlying conceptual structure of its speakers.

The method applied in this paper specifically goes back to Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor (see, e.g., 1980 and Lakoff 1994)[7] and Quinn and Holland's (1987; also see Strauss and Quinn 1997) theory of "cultural

models".[8] According to the cognitivist view, a conceptual structure or 'conceptual domain' – and we can call it a metaphorical conceptual structure if more than one domain is involved – can generate countless linguistic expressions, which in turn can be systematically related to one another on the basis of this conceptual link and attest to its existence. We follow the convention to present the concepts / metaphors in small caps, and the linguistic examples in italics. To our mind, it is not always easy to decide if a concept is metaphorical or not. For the Western observer, it may be metaphorical, for an African, it may not. So, to avoid this trap, we prefer to speak simply of concepts or conceptualizations.

In order to understand the more specific aspects of the model, it is necessary to start out with a general explanation of the kinship concept and its ingredients. The kinship model of society may be taken as the extension of the family concept. As Schatzberg (1986: 10) notes, the African concept is not altogether congruent with the Western notion of family. For instance, though lineage is often crucial, it is not restricted to mere biological relationships. Aspects like age, particular duties (protection, nurture, etc.), and codes of behavior that transgress the biological borders are central components of the concept. The original reference point of the family concept is the traditional village, and it is extended to various social units. Elements and values of the kinship system that are immediately meaningful in the village are mapped onto newly emerged and emerging social structures. The resulting network is expressed in Mbiti's (1990: 102) statement that

> the kinship system is a vast network stretching laterally (horizontally) in every direction, to embrace everybody in a given local group. This means that each individual is a brother or sister, father or mother, grandmother or grandfather, or cousin or brother-in-law, sister-in-law, uncle or aunt or something else to somebody else. That means that everybody is related to everybody else.

This horizontal network of kinship relations anchors the individual in various social and regional communities. It establishes ties and, at the same time, cleavages. It thus constitutes a whole range of possible identities, each of which is determined by different criteria. Thus, kinship and community are interchangeable terms: COMMUNITY is metonymically conceptualized as KINSHIP, and vice versa. Linguistically, these metonymies find marked expression in the well-known use of kinship terms in African varieties of English. The following example should suffice to illustrate the complexity of the mapping:

> In as much as the Igbo nation is trying to unite with itself and with its South-South brothers because the Igbo people know that they cannot do without neighbouring brothers, non-Igbo brothers and non-brothers believe they cannot do without us. There must be a kind of marriage or rethinking between these two brothers. (WCL, from Nigeria)

As part of this model, on the vertical axis, LEADERS are conceptualized as FATHERS. Here is an example from Zambian English, which refers to the traditional village setting:

> It was a [...] song which talked about headman Mbakalungu's renowned generosity and his unwavering concern for the welfare of the people in his village [...] They tunefully sang [...] and likened him to a father and protector. (Luangala 1991: 16)

In modern African national politics, the recourse to the kinship model is a crucial aspect, too, as has been prominently shown by Schatzberg (1986, 2001). In particular, it is well known that African leaders are perceived and readily present themselves as FATHERS OF THE NATION, as an extension of the above traditional LEADERS ARE FATHERS conceptualization:

> The head of state is like a father, his children are crying for food, he cannot feed them grenades. (A Cameroonian protestor, on BBC 1992)

Such evocations of the kinship model are pervasive and systematic throughout sub-Saharan Africa. They are frequently used as an effective means of legitimating some leader's political power; in addition to or in the absence of other possible sources of justification (e.g. regular elections). The status related to the FATHER-role allows for a largely unchallenged exercise of power. Two particular aspects of the FATHER concept, and the kinship model as a whole, are crucial here: the spiritual dimension and the notion of nurture and care. Both these aspects shall be briefly outlined.

Within this model, the father is given the right to freely draw on the resources of each individual and of the community as a whole. In exchange, however, he is expected to nurture and protect. Basically, it is a reciprocal eating and feeding pattern (cf. Bayart's 1993 notion "politics of the belly"). In terms of the cultural model, LEADERSHIP IS EATING AND FEEDING, mixed in with the metaphor RESOURCES ARE FOOD (see below). Specifically, it is feeding one's kin, i.e., one's community or constituency. For some manifestations of this concept, note the following examples:

> Promise to deliver the "national cake" to your constituents. […] Come the day of election, the one who gave more "tea" […] emerges the winner. (Shikwati 2000, from Kenya)

> Because Taylor was able to distribute some rice and souvenirs […] the Liberian people quickly forgot seven years of hell and decided to stick with him […] The ordinary voters became contented with whoever gave them some rice to eat or some little 'cold water,' meaning financial offer in the form of a tip or a bribe. (Williams 2002: 33)

The thriving system of patronage and clientelism, which is pervasive (not only but especially) in sub-Saharan Africa may be regarded as the immediate manifestation of the eating-and-feeding pattern observed above. It rests on the availability and distribution of resources along vertical structures:

> Hence, the notion that politicians, bureaucrats or military chiefs should be servants of the state simply does not make sense. Their political obligations are, first and foremost, to their kith and kin, their clients, their communities, their regions or even to their religion. All such patrons seek ideally to constitute themselves as 'Big Men', controlling as many networks as they can. But to succeed as a 'Big Man' demands resources; and the more extensive the network, the greater the need for the means of distribution. The legitimacy of the African political elites, such as it is, derives from their ability to nourish the clientele on which their power rests. (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 15)

So far, we have sketched the prevalent nexus between the kinship model and political leadership, with a focus on the nurture aspect. In the following, we will outline its spiritual implications and its link to the realm of the supernatural. We may recall that the kinship model was described above as a lateral or horizontal network of relations. And its vertical dimension was described, so far, in terms of patron-client relations. Yet this is not its only range of vertical extension. In sociological terms, a hierarchy exists with elders and other persons of respect and authority occupying the highest level in the visible world, but the hierarchy does not end here. Since the boundaries to the world beyond are permeable, the hierarchy and line of command extends to the world of the ancestors and ultimately to God or the gods (cf. Musopole 1994: 77). Three conceptualizations are important here: ANCESTORS ARE SPIRITS, as in

> May our ancestors devour him, may he be punished by the spirits. (Saho 1994: 21, from Gambia)

SPIRITS ARE PART OF PRESENT REALITY, as illustrated by

> Angry people coming back to the living to demand justice on those who had killed them. (Luangala 1991: 34)

and the concept PERSONS OF RESPECT AND AUTHORITY ARE MEDIATORS BETWEEN THE SPIRITS AND THE LIVING, which brings forth expressions like

> Kings incarnate their cultural heritage and are intermediaries between the living and the ancestral spirits and deities. (CEC)

> The ancestors and gods keep a watchful eye on the living through the mediation of the king. (CEC)

This spiritual or magical dimension is ambiguous and the moral matrix which is applied to it is strongly derived from the values of the kinship model. Magical forces directed against the kinship order are thus perceived as negative, those that are in accordance with it, as positive. This ambiguity of occult practices is most notably embodied by the traditional doctors (or *herbalists*, *witch-doctors*, *traditional healers* for some alternative names). They protect and re-establish the social balance disturbed by witchcraft attacks, by applying magical means, i.e., by beating the threat with its own weapons. For the positive use of occult powers, see the following passages:

> In some African states like Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya laws have been passed long ago not only to tame witchcraft frenzy but to control witchcraft activities though sometimes the regulation affected people like witch-doctors who seek to protect society against witchcraft. (WCL)

> Traditional doctors are known to have the ability to cast evil spells, which can be attributed to death or illness, for example, or undo evil spells in the form of healing and rescue. (Williams 2002: 53)

Negatively, witchcraft is often ascribed to events which are a particular peril to the continuation of the community and the kinship order. This applies to illnesses in general:

> His second wife Zama had [...] died while still very strong and healthy. She had been bewitched by her grandmother. (Luangala 1991: 45)

and to sickness or death of children or young and healthy adults in particular (ILLNESS OR DEATH OF A YOUNG PERSON OR HEALTHY ADULT IS A SIGN OF WITCHCRAFT, see Wolf and Simo Bobda 2001: 247f):

> Aina is [...] sickly and dull in school [...] the mother attributes his [sic] son's predicament to the second wife's jealousy. She must be a witch. (Gbadegesin 1991: 111)

> In two months, not less than five young men in their early thirties [...] had been brought home in coffins [...] and their deaths are all connected with witchcraft. (CEC)

> There are already very strong feelings that witchcraft emanating not very far from his parents could be at the basis of the boy's death. (Cameroon Tribune 1995: 1)

In the same vein, the blocking of reproductive power is ascribed to the influence of witchcraft, both in traditional and modern contexts:

> Ms. Tibu's accusers, […] found her guilty of casting a spell on a local herbalist and supernaturally causing him to be poor and impotent. (WCL)

> The ECOMOG Commander has warned that his forces will deal severely with any person who attacked or accused Nigerian soldiers of making their genitals disappear. Several ECOMOG soldiers have been severely beaten in Monrovia [...] following rumours that strange men from Nigeria were capable of such witchcraft. (WCL)

As is evident, the kinship model has a pronounced and omnipresent spiritual dimension. A person, in the course of his or her life, is not only thought of as gathering experience but also as increasingly acquiring magical power and support. In other words, elders can be suspected of witchcraft, as the following example illustrates:

> Whenever a young child died shortly after the burial of an elder, people would say that it was that elder who was responsible; he wanted a human pillow upon which to rest his head. Whenever a young child died when there was an ailing elder in the family, it was thought that he had sacrificed the young child so that he could remain alive. (Luangala 1991: 230)

Yet normally the spiritual force of the elders is regarded as positive, i.e., as serving the good of the community. This understanding gives rise to notions like "sacred power" and "magical leadership" (see, e.g., Bernault n.d. *online* for discussion). These notions play a central role in establishing the legitimacy of modern African leaders. In communion with the related elements of the kinship model (e.g. age), magic is used as an effective means of legitimating political power, and with numerous contemporary African politicians, we thus witness a strong recourse to occult practices and tradi-

tional symbolism. In particular, the occult is perceived as a major and effective means of defending one's power against opponents. The following examples demonstrate this BEING A LEADER IS HAVING OCCULT POWERS conceptualization:

> Sankoh [the leader of the RUF in the Sierra Leonean civil war] claims to vanish into the thin air, ability [sic] to transform himself into cat, dog mouse and whatever […] Sankoh has been able to exploit this against his drugged, gun-totting youthful followers who call him "Paa" (Father). (WCL)

> The less democratic and illegal an African regime is, the more it relies heavily on jujumen and marabous to contain its insecurity. (WCL)

> Nigerian press reports reveal human sacrifices and other fearful juju / marabou rituals at Aso Rock [the seat of the Nigerian president] to 'protect' Abacha from Nigerians crying for democracy and human rights. (WCL)

Specifically, the abuse of political power and individual aspirations of leaders and politicians at the expense of the community are readily construed in terms of occult practices. This is an extension and transformation of a major aspect of traditional witchcraft, defined by van Binsbergen (2000 *online*) as "the celebration of individual desires and powers at the expense of one's kin."

Van Binsbergen's explication also accounts for a further important conceptual link, namely that of witchcraft and wealth. An individual's material wealth, if not shared with the community, is often seen in the light of witchcraft, as an undue acquisition of something that belongs to the community. WITCHCRAFT IS A MEANS TO OBTAIN WEALTH is a concept that underlies the following examples:[9]

> an exorcist allegedly accused Adamou Bako, the affluent director of a local bus company, of enriching himself by means of witchcraft. (WCL, from Cameroon)

> Ritual killing is common in some parts of Nigeria, where some people believe witchcraft involving the use of human parts can make them rich. (WCL)

> Belonging to a nyongo secret society that used human sacrifice to build its wealth. (Makuchi 1999: 125)

Likewise, the exploitation of people, i.e., their being made use of as (labor) resources, is seen in the light of witchcraft (see, e.g., Austen 2001 *online* and van Binsbergen 2000 *online* on this issue). We find the conceptu-

alization EXPLOITATION IS WITCHCRAFT (or vice versa) expressed, for example, in

> And so the mind is lured to a witch growing rich from the work of zombies as the "living dead." (WCL)

> Police in southern Tanzania have arrested a 90-year-old woman on suspicion she abducted an 11-year-old boy to turn him into a zombie-like slave through witchcraft, the regional police chief said today [...] Many people in the rich agricultural region believe that such zombies can be made to perform menial farming chores late at night. (WCL)

> Just before you blink your eyes, you are being taking [sic] away from this world, in to [sic] the under world, so called Nyongo. Nyongo is some how [sic] a satanic owned business, where people are being sold in to, to work for others who are on earth. This is very common in the villages and among some big, responsible men around town [...] When some one sells the other party in Nyongo, the person that is being sold goes to work in the spiritual world for the person that sold him/her. (WCL, from Cameroon)

WEALTH / SUCCESS IS A SIGN OF WITCHCRAFT underlies the belief that persons who are materially successful are thought of as having spiritually sold or eaten their relatives (also see the illustrations of the EXPLOITATION IS WITCHCRAFT conceptualization above). Therefore, individuals and entire groups may avoid the ostentatious display of material success, lest they be accused of witchcraft.

In this section, we gave a broad overview of salient and interrelated conceptualizations within the African community model. In the following section, we provide a more systematic account of some conceptualizations identified so far, in terms of conceptual networks.

3.2. Culture-specific conceptual networks

Throughout the discussion in the previous section, we observed the omnipresence of eating metaphors in the domains of political leadership, witchcraft and wealth. Given their salience, we focus on these particular conceptualizations. Some general considerations on eating metaphors should be made first. Resources, food, and the related concepts of hunger and eating as source domains for metaphoric conceptualizations are definitely not specific to the African context. Rather, there is a whole set of eating metaphors which may be termed "general" (see Grady 1999 for a related notion) and

which are observable cross-culturally and cross-linguistically. For our present concern, the following general eating metaphors may be identified (cf. Lakoff 1993 *online*):

— all sorts of drives are conceptualized as HUNGER, yielding STRONG DESIRES ARE HUNGER
— resources are conceptualized as FOOD, yielding RESOURCES ARE FOOD
— achieving is conceptualized as EATING, yielding ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS EATING
— being important and having achieved is conceptualized as BEING BIG as the result of EATING, yielding IMPORTANT IS BIG [10]

Depending on the cultural context, these metaphors may occur in isolation or as an entire metaphoric network. It is in order to illustrate these notions before applying them to our immediate object of study. Consider the well-known and well-documented case of eating metaphors in the information and ideas domain. Inter alia, the following metaphors have been observed:[11]

IDEAS ARE FOOD

That class gave me food for thought.
That's a very meaty book.

WANTING TO KNOW IS HUNGER / THIRST

He has an appetite for learning / thirst for knowledge.
She has an insatiable curiosity.

AQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS EATING / DIGESTING and GIVING INFORMATION IS FEEDING

She devoured the book.
The teacher spoon-fed them the material.
This lecture was hard to digest.

HAVING KNOWLEGE / IDEAS IS BEING BIG

He is a great philosopher.
Academic heavyweights.

In the framework we propose, these conceptual metaphors are thus regarded as special instances of the general eating metaphors identified above and, being interrelated, as forming a metaphoric network:

Figure 1. Conceptual network: AQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS EATING.

This specific eating-metaphor network in the domain of INFORMATION / IDEAS is common to all varieties of English (and is at work in various other languages, too). In the light of the discussion provided in Section 3.1. we now argue that in African varieties of English the entire network of eating metaphors is drawn upon in the conceptualization of the domains WEALTH, LEADERSHIP, and WITCHCRAFT. It is here where African English departs significantly from the conceptualizations of these domains found in the Western varieties. In the latter, eating metaphors occur, at best, in isolation in these domains.

Consider, first, the domain of WITCHCRAFT. Traditionally, witchcraft is often understood as a beast living inside one's belly (cf. Geschiere 1997: 62), which has to be fed. This understanding most likely has motivated the more general conceptualization WITCHCRAFT IS EATING. It is expressed in the following quotes:

> Her grandmother had eaten human meat somewhere from the other witches and she had promised that she would also kill her own relative and that they would share the meat. (Luangala 1991: 45)

> The head wife [...] was both ashamed and afraid to confess that she had been eating the life of the baby. (from: The Jealous Witch-Wife)

This conceptualization has been carried over to the modern spheres of life, e.g. the domain of politics as in

> The killing and eating of Bokassa's opponents is wrapped around the juju practices that by eating the dead body of one's enemies one would acquire the desired qualities of the person eaten, especially the brave enemy. (WCL)

> The Igbos are always bloodied by the northerners; and it seems their blood is desired by the witch-heads of Islam, who can only maintain the potency of their spells with the Igbo people's blood in their stomach. (WCL)

and to the domain of material wealth. A whole network of concepts is implicated here. In the frame of WITCHCRAFT IS EATING, people (often members of the same kin group) are conceptualized as FOOD, as the examples above make clear. JEALOUSY, the traditionally assumed driving force of witchcraft, and similar motives are conceptualized as HUNGER. The resulting conceptual network may be schematically represented as follows:

Figure 2. Conceptual network: WITCHCRAFT IS EATING.

We further observed the strong conceptual links between wealth and witchcraft. In the case of WITCHCRAFT IS A MEANS TO OBTAIN WEALTH, people, or their body parts, are conceptualized more generally as RESOURCES. Being big (cf. fixed expressions like *big man*, *big woman*, *fat cats*) is usually seen as an outward sign of being successful. Yet qua the associations of the eating domain with witchcraft, in the African context, these big persons are viewed with mixed feelings. On the one hand, being literally big stands for power, yet it may also evoke ideas of getting wealthy to the detriment of the community (see below). The link between witchcraft and wealth, and

the parallel pervasive presence of the eating-metaphor network in both domains is manifest in the following corpus example:

> Kwengong invokes spirits which kill him and his stomack [sic] gets swollen because of exploitation, greed and corruption. (CEC)

The numerous other examples of eating metaphors in the domain of wealth include:

> Cameroon immigration use Nigerians to grow fat. (The Mail, September 5, 2001: 1)

> Corrupt citizens dish out heavy bribes. (WCL)

> Few people dey fat with big money, and the rest dey hungry. (WCL, from Nigeria)

> For I do honestly believe that in the fat-dripping, gummy, eat-and-let-eat regime just ended – a regime which inspired the common saying that a man could only be sure of what he had put in his gut. (Achebe 1988: 149)

In terms of the network model proposed above, this may be captured in the following figure:

Figure 3. Conceptual network: ENRICHMENT IS EATING.

Against this background, the following sections will propose a cognitive linguistic view of collocations and fixed expressions and discuss the possible role of corpus-based analyses in the study of these phenomena. Generally, we take a comparative approach.

3.3. Fixed expressions: Conceptual integration and formal integration

We need to clarify how our above perspective relates to the study of fixed expressions and idiomaticity. In the standard view, idioms are regarded as fixed multi-word units which are, to varying degrees, non-compositional, i.e. their meaning cannot or not fully be recovered from the meaning of their constituents.[12] They thus form a subset of fixed expressions, along with lexicalized compounds, proper names, familiar quotes, etc. Besides the respective degree of compositionality, idioms are often classified according to criteria like transparency and syntactic flexibility (see Skandera 2003: ch. 2 for an overview of theoretical approaches to fixed expressions). It should have become apparent that our account is not specifically along these lines. In this paper, we approach fixed expressions from the angle of the underlying conceptualizations and neither compositionality nor syntactic behavior are our issues in the first place (for a brief discussion of some formal aspects, see, however, below). The linguistic examples given above for the information and ideas domain shall again serve as illustrations. The immediate relevancy to the study of fixed expressions should be obvious: All of the examples are strong collocations or even idiomatic and they are taken to be generated by conceptual metaphors.[13]

Our starting point is the observation that a conceptual metaphor or metonymy may find its linguistic expression in various ways: The IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor, for instance, is expressed as an NP in *a meaty book*. In *to devour a book* it is realized within a VP in communion with the AQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS EATING metaphor. In *This lecture was hard to digest*, the IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor realized in *this lecture* is only interpretable at sentence level: The metaphoric status of *this lecture* (IDEAS ARE FOOD) and of *was hard to digest* (AQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS EATING / DIGESTING) only become apparent and manifest in combination with each other. Thus, they cannot be recovered independent of the network. In an example like *Let me chew on that for a while* we even need to go beyond the sentence level to arrive at the interpretation, as the item *that*, in which the IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor may reside, needs to be conceptually filled.[14]

Consider now specific expressions in West African English that are generated by the eating-metaphor network in the domain of wealth, as identified above. At the lexical level, the MONEY IS FOOD metaphor is the conceptual basis of, for instance, numerous one-word items meaning 'bribe,' BRIBE IS FOOD being a special instance of the MONEY IS FOOD metaphor (see Polzenhagen and Wolf fc. for a more detailed discussion of the con-

ceptualizations underlying expressions of corruption). The best-known case is the item *kola*. Here, the meaning 'bribe' is fully lexicalized in addition to the "literal" meaning in the food domain ('cola nut'). This is illustrated by the following corpus example:

> An unqualified contractor is allowed to bid on a project – in exchange for a little kola and a little dash ['bribe']. (WCL)

The item enters the fixed expressions *to take kola*; *to give kola* in West African English, as in

> When he opens the office door there is a loud, pleased laughter inside, and a voice with a vague familiarity says, 'No. This is only your kola. Take it as kola'. (Armah 1988, from Ghana)

Further examples of the BRIBE IS FOOD metaphor lexicalized in single-word items include *soya* (literally 'fried beef stick', considered a delicacy) and *mimbo* (literally 'beer-like drink obtained from the raffia palm-tree'), both meaning metaphorically 'bribe'. *Gombo* (literally 'okra', 'okra sauce'), in addition to the meaning 'bribe', is used for 'funds' in general.[15] All of these items enter fixed expressions: *to have eaten soya* 'to have accepted a bribe'; *take this as mimbo* 'take this as a bribe'; *to take gombo* ('to take a bribe').

Items like *cold water*[16] and *beer money* (both meaning 'bribe') are illustrations of lexicalized compounds generated by MONEY / BRIBE IS FOOD. Note, too, that via a metonymic extension, *beer money* has acquired a further lexicalized meaning in Nigerian English: It is the linguistic label used for the 20 Naira banknote, the standard bribe paid to traffic policemen. A further example of a lexicalized compound is *chop money*, again meaning 'a bribe':

> Were they not, sort of, justified in supposing that the loans were some gifts to be taken as chop money? (WCL)

The fixed expression *national cake* and the Nigerian English item *national chin chin* (*chin chin* being a staple Nigerian dish), both meaning 'national funds', are illustrations of ADJ+N combinations generated by RESOURCES / MONEY ARE FOOD, cp.

> it is alleged that most government officials go there [the government] to chop money like Ola Rotimi's lead character, [...] who vowed that when he gets there, he would not only eat the national cake, but also huge mouthfuls of national chin chin! (WCL)

> Now his mouth was so full of the national cake that he could not even raise his voice against what he did not agree with. Power was very sweet to chew. (Luangala 1991: 146)

At the phrase level, in addition to the fixed expressions given above, we find the West African item *to eat money* and its Pidgin English equivalent *to chop money*.[17] They are especially frequent in the political context, as in

> How many million promises can fill a bucket when you eat money the way locusts eat tons of green. (CEC)

> All over the world, government is not bad, government is about service. It is the desire to serve. But here, you will hear people say 'Ah, he don go chop money!' (WCL, from Nigeria)

> "This national coffers koraa, where is it?" [...] "They've chopped everything in it." "But when you look at them, especially their mouths, nothing indicates they can chop so much money in so short a time o." (WCL, from Ghana)

We continue with some further considerations on formal issues, against the background of Turner and Fauconnier's (e.g. 1995 *online*) model of Formal Integration. Here, formal integration refers to the realization of a conceptual metaphor or metonymy on the linguistic surface, i.e., in particular types of construction. As an illustration of the underlying integration process we will exemplarily discuss kinship terms in «NP of NP» constructions. Again, our approach is comparative.

Consider first a non-figurative expression like *father of Sally*, analyzed by Turner and Fauconnier (1995 *online*) in the framework of Blending Theory. The item *father* evokes a generic kinship schema that includes, inter alia, the FATHER-CHILD relationship. The item *Sally* creates a further conceptual space. Now, the formal construction «NP of NP» simply prompts us to put the conceptual packet FATHER-CHILD into correspondence with X-SALLY, where X is some unspecified individual. What is created is a conceptual blend, where FATHER-CHILD is specified to FATHER-DAUGHTER and applied to X-SALLY, thus using material from both input spaces and the generic space. Note that this conceptual complexity is not expressed by the construction «NP of NP» itself, which is equally used to represent various other conceptual relations (e.g. possession). At the formal level, the elements are only named, and then need to be conceptually integrated.

Consider now items like *father of the nation*, *son of the soil*, *daughter of the land*, which are fixed expressions in AE. Being «NP of NP» constructions, they are formally identical to the literal example discussed above. Take the example of *father of the nation* in AE (see Medubi 2003 for a parallel analysis of the *son of the soil* example): Again, the kinship term (*father*) triggers the kinship schema, the element in the second NP, now, calls for an extension of the kinship schema in order to be conceptually integrated. For an African speaker of English, this extension is licensed by the deeply entrenched cultural conceptualization LEADERS ARE FATHERS. And, crucially, the entire kinship-based model of community will be metonymically evoked here. The conceptual integration process thus involves further material from additional mental spaces. As exemplified in Section 3.1., two links are crucial here: the spiritual dimension of leadership and the nurture aspect, as crystallized in the respective conceptual metaphors identified in earlier sections. Thus, *father of the nation* is a complex blend of several conceptual elements, and, most importantly, it draws on conventional conceptual links. Again, this conceptual complexity is not expressed by the formal construction «NP of NP» itself.

The conceptual integration process appears to take a markedly different course with speakers of Western varieties of English. For them, too, the kinship schema will be activated, and they will certainly arrive at some metonymic or metaphoric interpretation of items like *father of the nation* or *son of the soil*. Note that in Western varieties, too, kinship terms are customary in at least some communities, in particular religious groups, though scarcely beyond. Furthermore, Western varieties do have a number of metonymically or metaphorically motivated extensions of kinship terms, e.g.

The father of sociology, Adam Ferguson. (FLOB)

People said he [George Washington] was denied children in his private life so he could be the father of his country. (FROWN)

The most influential figure in this process was Tony Pastor, often called the father of American vaudeville. (FROWN)

Hawthorne was a true son of clerical New England in his formal and even stately style. (FROWN)

Here, however, the application of kinship terms is noticeably different from what was observed for the African context. *Father* relates to the ori-

gin of a worldview or paradigm, a founder of a school of thought, a particular movement, or a country. What is highlighted is the notion of causation. *Son* relates to mere geographical origin, and inheritance of some worldview, respectively. The rooting in a full-fledged model of community as in the African context and the related notions of reciprocal duties and patterns of expected behavior are virtually absent. This is also evidenced by the fact that in Western varieties the figurative extension is limited to particular kinship terms only, it is not the entire system which is transferred: We may call Freud the *father of psychoanalysis* and Ferguson the *father of sociology*, but psychoanalysts or social scientists of the respective persuasion would not address each other as *brothers* or *sisters*. And neither would people who belong to the *business family / community*. Thus, these conceptualizations are "isolated." Furthermore, they bear no spiritual dimension, which was observed to be crucial in the African cultural model. Confronted with items of the *son of the land / soil* and *father of the country / nation* type, Western speakers without a profound knowledge of the African context would thus arrive at scarcely more than an interpretation in terms of geographical origin and, respectively, foundation; i.e., they would fail to arrive at an adequate understanding of these expressions as they are used in the African varieties.[18] Cognitively speaking, the process of conceptual integration would yield a blend of a different kind, given, for instance, the absence of cultural conceptualizations like LEADERS ARE FATHERS, LEADERSHIP IS EATING AND FEEDING, and POLITICAL POWER IS MAGIC POWER in the *father of the nation* example.

3.4. Further evidence from computer corpora

As Wierzbicka (1997: 1) has stated, "there is a very close link between the life of a society and the lexicon of the language." If socio-cultural concepts are reflected in a stock of vocabulary (cf. Eastman 1979: 216), one should expect that lexical patterns reveal and are consistent with the underlying conceptualizations. For the study of AE or other L2 varieties of English, one could carry this point even further. Not only are specific cultural concepts reflected in loanwords (e.g. *nyongo* above) but also in the use of words that belong to the common core of English, i.e., which are part of all the varieties of English. Since these items are, in the words of Kachru (1982: 9), "used in entirely different semiotic and cultural sys-

tems," this dimension cannot be grasped by looking at the meaning of these items in isolation. Again, one has to look at the patterns of usage and consider them in the context of the cultural framework in which they occur.

With corpus linguistics, it has become possible to describe and compare lexical frequency and lexical patterns on a broad scale. Yet, although Aston and Burnard (1998: 15f) made note of the usefulness of computer corpora for comparing, in their terms, "geographical varieties and languages," to our knowledge, little has been done in this direction, especially with respect to culture.[19] Our investigation of the corpora was particularly driven by our interest in keywords, and the collocations these keywords form.[20] Some collocations occur so frequently that they can be considered multi-word units with a lexicalized status. A look at collocations also tells us something about the textual context in which keywords appear.

The corpora we used for our comparative analysis are the CEC and a combination of the FLOB corpus (British English) and the FROWN corpus (American English). These corpora roughly have the same structure, which should avoid skewed frequency patterns due to the predominance of certain lexemes in certain text types. FLOBFROWN united represent the two major native varieties of English and can thus count as a good representation of anglophone "Western" culture. The CEC stands *pars pro toto* for (West) African English. FLOBFROWN (2,064,764 tokens, as calculated by Word-Smith) has more than twice as many tokens as the CEC (898,572 tokens), but as Sinclair (2001: xii) has pointed out, "comparison uncovers differences almost regardless of size."

3.4.1. Cultural keywords

To the extent that computer corpora represent a variety used by speakers of a given society / culture or at least some text types produced in it, via a corpus-based analysis we can arrive at the keywords of a society. Wierzbicka (1997: 16) is right that "the question is not how to 'prove' whether or not a particular word is one of the culture's keywords, but rather to say something significant and revealing about that culture by undertaking an in-depth study of some of them." Wierzbicka's (1997: 16–17) demand to study keywords "as focal points around which entire cultural domains are organized," and to explore these focal points

in order to "show the general organizing principles which lend structure and coherence to a cultural domain as a whole, and which often have an explanatory power extending across a number of domains" is hoped to be met by relating our findings to the conceptual analysis above. Only, we take the conceptual system as our starting point, not the keywords.

For our elicitation of keywords, we lemmatized most of the items implicated by the cultural model across the corpora (i.e., the variant and inflected forms of the same word were joined to one entry). Some items were not lemmatized in order to facilitate the differentiation of the various senses, as in the case of *relatives* and *mediums*. The different senses an item may have were controlled as far as possible.[21] Here *spirit* is one exception, because in the CEC, it is not always clear from looking at the context if the term referred to the supernatural, the religious or the mental / emotional domain, and if these domains can be neatly distinguished (cf. Aston and Burnard 1998: 15–16). Where necessary, we also checked the spelling differences in British and American English.

WordSmith (Scott and Oxford University Press 1998) was the computer program we used. It computes keywords "by comparing the frequency of each word in the smaller of the two wordlists with the frequency of the same word in the reference wordlist" (Scott and Oxford University Press 1998). The statistical computations were also performed by WordSmith. Only words that occur at least 4 times were considered. The keywords deemed irrelevant to this study were disregarded.

The following findings were partially selected from earlier studies, which had different scopes (Wolf 2003, Wolf fc.). The tables consist of 5 columns; the first column contains the keywords, the second and third column show the frequency of occurrence of each item in the respective corpora, column four the "keyness"[22] and column five the p-value.

Table 1 reflects the salience of the community / family concept in Cameroon English. Not only are terms for family and community themselves significantly more frequent in the CEC, as listed in a), but also terms that highlight the importance of the continuation of the family, as listed in b). *Marriage* is deemed a prerequisite, and the roles, duties, and moral obligations associated with raising and enlarging a family are condensed in items like *husband*, *wife*, *parenting*, *maternity*, *procreation*, and inversely, *childless*.

Table 1. Keywords pertaining to the role of the community / family in the CEC.

	word	CEC	FLOBFROWN	keyness	p-value
a)	community	413	599	49.9	0.000000
	communal	35	27	18.1	0.000021
	family	545	1,010	16.0	0.000063
	relatives	44	43	15.5	0.000083
	kin	35	11	40.9	0.000000
	kinsman	9	3	10.2	0.001443
	kinship	19	18	7.1	0.007773
	lineage	18	16	7.5	0.006160
	brotherhood	14	8	10.4	0.001294
b)	marriage	189	281	20.7	0.000005
	marital	23	20	9.9	0.001616
	husband	171	300	7.7	0.005463
	wife	234	468	3.0	0.085403
	parent	344	493	43.6	0.000000
	parenting	16	4	21.1	0.000004
	maternity	31	12	31.7	0.000000
	procreation	11	7	7.3	0.007078
	birth	100	131	17.3	0.000033
	child	1,057	1,480	146.0	0.000000
	neonate	10	3	12.0	0.000535
	newborn	9	5	6.8	0.008901
	filial	9	2	12.5	0.000408
	offspring	38	24	32.4	0.000000
	childless	12	7	8.7	0.003202

Table 2 shows the salience of authority and respect and the figures that can be associated with them.[23] The items in this table correspond to the LEADERS ARE FATHERS metaphor and to the domain of PERSONS OF RESPECT AND AUTHORITY described earlier.

We saw that PERSONS OF RESPECT AND AUTHORITY ARE MEDIATORS BETWEEN THE LIVING AND THE DEAD. From the African perspective, the dead continue to exist and exert influence as *ancestors* or *ancestral spirit*. Table 3 reveals the significant status of these concepts, respectively their lexical expressions.

Table 2. Authority and respect and the figures associated with this domain.

word	CEC	FLOBFROWN	keyness	p-value
authority	301	556	9.1	0.002563
respect	232	226	82.2	0.000000
obedience	23	8	25.3	0.000000
obey	80	24	95.9	0.000000
disobedience	30	4	49.9	0.000000
chief	373	219	267.9	0.000000
chiefdom	28	2	53.5	0.000000
dignitaries	11	4	11.7	0.000610
leader	312	402	56.7	0.000000
leadership	86	128	9.4	0.002212
ruler	59	28	51.7	0.000000
father	365	793	22.5	0.000002
elder	59	68	22.5	0.000002
teacher	293	254	127.9	0.000000
priest	82	132	6.2	0.012755

Table 3. The relation between the living and the departed.

word	CEC	FLOBFROWN	keyness	p-value
ancestor	65	28	61.5	0.000000
ancestral	58	10	88.8	0.000000
spirit	396	175	367.3	0.000000
ghost	60	64	17.6	0.000027
taboo	18	14	9.2	0.002402
sacred	37	50	5.8	0.016266
rite	22	23	6.7	0.009409
ritual	58	65	15.3	0.000093
worship	47	46	16.5	0.000049
ceremony	131	66	109.1	0.000000
ceremonial	19	16	8.6	0.003283
cult	23	23	7.7	0.005400
sacrifice	73	47	47.5	0.000000
bless	83	72	36.0	0.000000
mediums	6	2	6.8	0.009286

In a traditional context, the relation between the living and the *ancestors* is *sacred* and involves *taboos*, *rites*/*rituals* and *sacrifices*. The worshipping of

the ancestors is, in modern terms, often called the 'cult of the ancestors'. In turn, the ancestors can *bless* the living. As indicated, *mediums* mediate between the ancestors and the living. We are not saying that all these terms refer to the traditional kinship model alone, but their use in "traditional" contexts may influence their understanding in "modern" ones, and there may not be a strict dichotomy. The following examples from the CEC demonstrate the use of some of these terms in reference to modern as well as traditional religion (see Wolf fc.):

> God bless you; to ask the blessing of their ancestors; worship the Lord, high priest of ancestral worship; sacred ministers of the church; the sacred shrine of the tribe.

The next set of keywords captures the witchcraft component of the kinship model. This includes the dual role of the *witch-doctors*, who, as we recall, have healing as well as destructive powers.[24]

Table 4. Keywords relating to witchcraft.

word	CEC	FLOBFROWN	keyness	p-value
Devil	27	26	9.8	0.001774
demon	32	32	10.8	0.001032
totem	8	3	8.4	0.003817
healer	5	2	5.0	0.025317
soothsayer	4	0	9.5	0.002004
juju-man	6	0	14.3	0.000154
seer	6	1	9.3	0.002291
witch-doctor	10	0	23.9	0.000001
divination	5	0	11.9	0.000552
fateful	10	5	8.4	0.003788
heal	69	32	61.7	0.000000

Devil is used in the Christian / Islamic sense but also in reference to a negative spirit or a traditional ritual masks, i.e., a *totem*, symbolizing this negative spirit (see Fyle and Jones 1980), a use which is probably due to the influence of the Christian missions. Then there is a whole cluster of synonymous terms for *witch-doctor*, as: *traditional doctors*, *healer*, *herbalist*, *soothsayer, juju-man* and *seer*. Other terms that are normally used in AE are *witch*, *wizard*, and *sorcerer*, with *witches and wizards* being a fixed expression. In critical linguistics, the phenomenon of a variety of terms for

the same concept is rightly seen as a society's obsession with certain themes and problems (see Fowler 1991). The reason that *witch*, *wizard*, and *sorcerer* do not appear as keywords can be put in perspective by looking at where and how they are used. *Sorcerer* is the name of a mountain bike frequently referred to in an article included in FLOBFROWN, and the name of a fictional character in another. Likewise, *witch* and *wizard* relate to fictional stories, e.g., *Witches of Eastwick*, not real people, or are used in a metaphoric sense, as in reference to Margaret Thatcher. In Africa, witchcraft is real and pervades all spheres of public life, and is not just limited to the realm of neo-pagan witchcraft, as in FLOBFROWN. Another interesting item is *fateful*, because unlike in native varieties of English, this term almost always signals an account of a fatal event, which, as we learned, is often interpreted in the light of witchcraft.[25]

3.4.2. Collocational patterns

From a corpus-linguistic perspective, collocations may first of all be understood in the broadest possible sense, i.e. as mere co-occurrence in a given numerically defined context. One may argue that such an approach has but little explanatory power. However, from our specific angle, it may yield some profitable insights. If items stemming from particular domains co-occur systematically, we take it to be an indication and evidence of a possible underlying conceptual link between them. Given that we are concerned with conceptual metaphor and metonymy, this may be put as an elaboration on Richards' (1981: 51) well-known statement that in metaphor "we have two thoughts of different things active together." We thus propose to see particular collocational patterns as the manifestation of parallel conceptual activation patterns.[26]

   Consider the following illustration. In Section 3.1. we pointed to the African cultural belief that sudden or unnatural death is attributed to the application of occult forces. Cognitively speaking, we argued that the concepts of death and of witchcraft are strongly linked, via a set of conceptual metaphors. Further links were observed between witchcraft and the concepts of health and wealth. Following the above assumption of simultaneously activated domains, this should show up at the textual level in the co-occurrence of items stemming from these domains. We exemplarily scanned all tokens of *kill** in the CEC (roughly 170, excluding doublets). A significant amount of the tokens show a direct reference to witchcraft / magic, cf. the following

occurrences (the italics mark items which belong to this domain and those of wealth and health):

> He was sorry he had brought shame to the family by his *diabolical* activities. [...] He had developed a certain *evil* urge to **kill** and **kill**. He had talked of a large cocoa *plantation* somewhere in the Kube Plains, where the victims were taken to some sort of *slave labour Camp*.

> The first victim was a well-known trader based in Njinikom "round about" 43. He is alleged to have **killed** more than two people by *witchcraft* and some are still critically *sick* in their homes.

> It should be recalled that in 1979 the fear of a woman of the *spiritual* world (*mami water*) is said to have swooked [sic] fear in the area as she was said to be moving around with a **killer** disease and "*Kikeng*" plant was used by inhabitants to prevent themselves from harm.

> So, in Palm-Wine, Kwengong and the women's *secret cult* successfully **kill** the Fon in order to liberate the people.

> In The Inheritance, lights go off when Sanga Tete invokes *evil spirits* to **kill** Ma Mende.

> She said he had been initiated in to the famous *witch-craft* society called "*Nyongo*" and named two young men he had **killed**.

Corpus-linguistically speaking, such patterns are thus traceable via a concordance in a numerically defined context. A defined context of 5 items to the left and 5 items to right of the token, the setting we used, would yield 2 occurrences of *witch**, 2 of *evil*, 2 of *spirit**, etc.[27] None of these items is, for instance, among the collocates of *kill** in the FLOBFROWN corpus. Technically, however, such patterns are awkward to trace, given the enormous amount of co-occurring content words even in a small context of 5 left and right. In communion with the indispensable text-analysis of the tokens, however, such patterns become apparent and may support claims about issues of underlying conceptualization. FLOBFROWN has a total of 428 tokens for *kill**. A close comparative scanning of the occurrences in the FLOB part revealed that none of them bears a relation to witchcraft, which again supports the above assumptions on culture-specific conceptualizations.

Formally speaking, such distant co-occurrence may appear insignificant to the study of fixed expressions. Conceptually speaking, however, it may be regarded as a manifestation of the same phenomenon. In fixed expressions, such conceptualizations are merely crystallized in entrenched formal representations.

The ancestor concept is another case in point to demonstrate that collocations are indicative of conceptual links but may be more or less formally entrenched. For example, *ancestor** collocates with *deities* 7 and with *cult* 6 times in the CEC, though only *ancestor cult* seems to be a fixed expression (4 times). Nevertheless, we also find the words *living* (6), *contact* (3), *God* (3), *gods* (3), *royal* (3), *supreme* (3), *children* (2), *divine* (2), *spiritual* (2), *rites* (2) which can be assigned to the domains discussed in relation to conceptualizations regarding the ancestors in Section 4.1. In FLOBFROWN, *ancestor** does not collocate with any content word except for *bred* more than one time. A look at collocations with *ancestral* is even more revealing:

Table 5.   CEC – collocates with *ancestral* (from Wolf 2003).

word	total	left	right	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	*	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
spirits	17	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	0
deities	7	3	4	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	0
spirit	7	1	6	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
African	5	3	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
land	5	1	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
realm	4	2	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
age	3	3	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
belief	3	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
lands	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
parents	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
self-hood	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0
spiritual	3	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
world	3	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1

Clearly, with 23 occurrences, *ancestral spirit** is a fixed expression in Cameroon English (and in other varieties of AE). While this seems to be the only one of the collocations with *ancestral*, other collocations, like *age* (3) *parents* (3), *spiritual* (3), and *world* (3) point again to the relevant conceptualizations, i.e., ANCESTORS AS SPIRITS, the continuation of the kinship order and the line of command and respect, so to say. Again in FLOBFROWN, no content word collocates with *ancestral* more than one time.

Significantly, the keywords listed in table 3 form clusters of interrelated collocations. For example, *rite** collocates with *rituals* 3 times, and with *sacrifices* 3 times, while *ritual** collocates with *sacrifices* 5 times, though none of these items appear in sufficient proximity and frequency to be called a

fixed expression. Others within the cluster, however, do, as many colloca-tions with *traditional*, and, to a lesser extent, *indigenous*. If used as an at-tribute, these items signal exactly the incorporation of "modern" elements into the conceptual network of the community model (see Wolf 2001: 271–272). Expressions relevant to our discussion are *traditional doctor** (9), which, interestingly enough, occurs more frequently than *medical doctor** (8), *traditional healer* (3), *traditional medicine* (4), *indigenous medicine* (4), *indigenous practitioners* (3). *Traditional* or *indigenous medicines* are the herbs prepared by the witch doctors.

4.   Conclusion

We hope to have shed some light on the conceptualization and lexicaliza-tion of leadership, witchcraft and wealth in the framework of the African community or kinship model. These findings may be taken as a further indication that the L2 varieties of English have become indigenized and can function as a medium for the expression of non-Western culture. Both ap-proaches, the cognitive analysis and the comparative corpus analysis, have not been given much attention in the field of World Englishes, but we deem them to be powerful tools for enhancing our understanding of the cultural dimension involved, even more so when they are combined in a meaningful way. It is our conviction that these kinds of analyses can also be applied to other second language varieties of English and can serve as a sound basis for investigations of cross-cultural encounters where English is used as the medium of interaction.

Notes

1.   It is outside the framework of this paper to give a review of the two para-digms. See Polzenhagen and Dirven (fc.) for a detailed discussion.
2.   The CEC was compiled as part of the ICE project (cf. *ICE* 2002) by a team of Cameroonians (see Tiomajou 1995). The corpus was near completion when work on it stopped. Therefore, only "unofficial" copies of it exist. We re-ceived ours from Josef Schmied, TU Chemnitz, who participates in the ICE project and whom we thank at this point.
3.   WCL is a text compilation thematically restricted to the domains of witch-craft, material wealth, and politics. It has a total of 240,000 words and com-

prises 147 individual texts produced by speakers of African English. The texts were obtained exclusively from internet sources.

4. It is far beyond the scope of this paper to review the rich literature on the issues we have chosen for analysis, i.e. community, witchcraft, wealth, politics and corruption in Africa. More detailed accounts and references to the literature from anthropology, cultural studies and the social and political sciences are given in parallel publications. Wolf (2001) analyzes the case of Cameroon, Polzenhagen and Wolf (fc.) focus on the corruption issue, Wolf (fc.) focuses on religion and traditional belief systems. A comprehensive account is in preparation (Wolf and Polzenhagen *in prep*.).

5. We leave the discussion of the concept of "culture" itself up to the anthropologists. For the purpose of this paper, we may define culture loosely as a particular view of reality as shared by a group of people, resulting in certain social practices, of which language is an integral part.

6. See, e.g., Schatzberg (2001), Chabal and Daloz (1999), Geschiere (1995), Moore and Sanders (2001), Niehaus (2001).

7. An elaboration of the notion of conceptual metaphor is given in the more recent framework of Blending Theory (see, e.g., Fauconnier 1997), on which our approach partially leans.

8. On the relation of the two notions, see Kövecses (1999) and Dirven, Wolf and Polzenhagen (fc.).

9. See Geschiere (1997), Bastian (1995 *online*), Niehaus (2001), and Moore and Sanders (2001) for a discussion from an anthropological perspective.

10. IMPORTANT IS BIG is, of course, not an eating metaphor in itself. In the logic of the network, however, BEING BIG IS HAVING EATEN and BEING BIG IS HAVING FOOD, which links up to and integrates the metaphor IMPORTANT IS BIG.

11. See Kövecses (2002: 16, 73) for discussion and the Conceptual Metaphor Home Page for further examples.

12. Compositionality is well-known to be a problematic issue. We share Turner and Fauconnier's (e.g. 1995 *online*) view that even literal language can hardly be described compositionally.

13. An analysis of fixed expressions in terms of underlying conceptual metaphors is proposed and undertaken, *inter alia*, by Glucksberg (2001). Accounts outside of the more narrow cognitive linguistics paradigm also draw this link, e.g. Moon (1998) in her corpus-based lexicologically oriented approach.

14. A classification of metaphoric expressions along these lines is provided by Dirven (1994: 16ff).

15. *Gombo* is also used in its metaphoric meaning in West African French. Compare the following example: In a cartoon from Ivory Coast (*Gbich* N°108 2001: 1), the abbreviation ONG (French for NGO) is spelled out as *organisation nationale de gombo* (i.e. National Gombo Organization) [we owe this example to Stefan Elders from the University of Bayreuth].

16. Also note the equivalent item *l'eau* in Cameroonian French.

17. For a telling example from West African English note that Cameroonians spell out the abbreviation CPDM of the current ruling party Cameroon People's Democratic Movement as *chop people dem money* [we owe this example to Samuel Atechi]. Note that *to eat money* is found in Western varieties, too. There, however, it occurs only in very restricted contexts, scarcely beyond examples like *this car eats all my money*. Furthermore, and significantly, the equivalents of *to eat* and *to chop* in African French (i.e. *manger* and *bouffer*) display the same pattern observed for AE, again unlike the situation in Western French.

18. This problem has significant implications for a theory of intercultural communication, in particular with respect to English as a global language. Specifically, it calls for a meaning-oriented pragmatics which focuses on the impact of the participants' cultural models. For an outline of this approach, see Wolf and Polzenhagen (ms.).

19. Studies include the paradigmatic article by Leech and Fallon (1992), a chapter in Stubbs (1996), and some work by Wolf (2001, 2003, fc.).

20. *Keyword* should not be confused with *search word*, terms which are sometimes interchangeably used (see, e.g., Barnbrook 1996: 67; Oakes 1998: 151), but is a word which is significantly more frequent or "key" in one corpus / variety than in other ones and thus has socio-cultural significance.

21. See Leech, Rayson and Wilson (2001: 1–20) on methodological issues of corpus exploitation, especially on dangers of over-interpretation.

22. In WordSmith (Scott and Oxford University Press 1998: help menu), "a word is said to be 'key' if a) it occurs in the text at least as many times as the user has specified as a Minimum Frequency b) its frequency in the text when compared with its frequency in a reference corpus is such that the statistical probability as computed by an appropriate procedure is smaller than or equal to a p-value specified by the user."

23. Specific titles, e.g. *president* or *king*, are not included, for differences in the political systems.

24. *Destroy* and *destruction* are also keywords in the CEC, but it is fair to say that they appear only rarely in reference to witchcraft in this corpus. Therefore, they are not listed in table 4.

25. For more on the WITCHCRAFT domain in the respective corpora, see Wolf (2003).

26. This approach bears some obvious parallels to contextualist theories of meaning. By Firth, to refer to an early account along these lines, collocations are seen as a genuine aspect of word meaning: He states that one "shall know a word by the company it keeps" (Firth 1968: 179). In modern contextualist approaches to metaphor, e.g. that of Leezenberg (2001), this is modeled in terms of 'thematic dimensions' which are established by the context and inherent in lexical items, respectively.

27. The asterisk indicates that the words were searched accordingly in the concord tool of Wordsmith.

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Varieties of English around the world: Collocational and cultural profiles[1]

Christian Mair

1. Phraseology: The "blind spot" in variety identification?

How do we recognise varieties of English? For spoken texts, the answer to this question is easy: they are almost always identified, reliably and within a very short time, on the basis of accent features. For written texts, the answer is more difficult. The number of clear orthographic or lexico-grammatical identifying features is small, and many of them tend to be so rare that we cannot count on their presence in a short passage of written text. What is even more problematical, however, is that most relevant lexico-grammatical features are variety-specific only in a statistical sense. What is important is not the presence or absence of a particular feature as such, but rather its cumulative frequency in large masses of discourse, or its relative importance with regard to alternative variants. It goes without saying that such lexico-grammatical profiles in written texts are usually much less salient than accents in the spoken language.

A specific number of pronunciation features may be said to bundle into an accent, and in a synchronic description of phonetic variability in English it is a permissible simplification to say that the language comes with a large number of regional and social accents which can be described in relative isolation from each other. This is not a fruitful approach to the study of variability in written English, however. A variety of written English cannot be defined by cataloguing a finite list of lexico-grammatical features which, as it were, provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying it, and no variety of written English can be described in isolation from a common Standard English core. The identification of the regional origins of a text will by its very nature remain probabilistic and therefore provisional. Typically, a text of some length will present a fairly characteristic statistical profile displaying variety-specific preferences in those areas in which present-day Standard English allows choices. These profiles may not always be salient to the reader but may enable the linguist to assign a text to a certain variety with some degree of like-

lihood. Some texts, especially at the formal end of the stylistic spectrum, may be so neutral as to make it impossible to detect their origin from linguistic criteria alone, and only very few will contain lexico-grammatical features which positively identify certain origins (or at least exclude others).

What is the implication of this state of affairs for the widespread practice of classifying world Standard English into various regional sub-varieties (British English, Irish English, North American English, Australian English, etc. – not to speak of more problematical fine-grained subdivisions such as Canadian English)? It works tolerably well for spoken English, but it is clearly inadequate for dealing with variation in written English. Varieties of written Standard English should not be seen as decontextualised systems which can be described by cataloguing their lexico-grammatical features. On the structural level, there is one written standard with minimal grammatical and very modest lexical variability. The best way to get a grip on what it means for a written text to be "American" or "British" (or representative of any other kind of more recent or emerging standard) is to shift the analysis from the level of abstract decontextualised structure to that of style and discourse and to describe the lexico-grammatical choices writers make from the range of options provided in the system in particular contexts and for particular purposes.

As M.A.K. Halliday has put it in a recent essay on English as a "written language, standard language, global language," the most appropriate approach to studying lexical variability in world English is to describe:

> 1. not just new words, but new word-making principles;
> 2. not just new words, but new word clusters (lexical sets);
> 3. not just new words, but new meanings;
> 4. not just new words, but new registers (functional varieties). (2003: 408)

This shift of emphasis from isolated words as static "products" in a decontextualised lexicon to the process of deploying (and combining) words in context-embedded discourses will lead to a richer linguistic description because it focusses on:

> […] ways of opening up, of expanding the semiotic potential that inheres in every language: opening up the creation of new terms; opening up the dimensions along which these terms are organized, opening up the meaning-making resources of the lexicogrammar; opening up the modes of creating and transmitting knowledge, maintaining and strengthening authority. (2003: 409)

Explaining variability in written English in a contextually sensitive us-age- and performance-based framework has several advantages. First, it helps us get around the obvious problem that writers do not consistently use the features supposedly "typical" or "characteristic" of their variety but also use alternative forms. This is true even for British and American texts, that is the two varieties with the longest history of standardisation behind them,[2] and it is glaringly obvious in the case of the more recent emerging standards of, say, India and the Caribbean, where the lexico-grammatical regionalisms almost always co-exist with British or American expressions (and are commonly used in a minority of instances). Second, the discourse-based model of variability allows us to treat phrase-ological phenomena not as exceptions and unsystematic aberrations in a clean and regular grammar, which they frequently appear to be on the level of decontextualised linguistic structure, but in a way which recognises their importance in differentiating varieties of written English. Third, the "Britishness", "Americanness", etc. of a text can be appropriately modelled as a matter of degree. This is necessary because the variety and frequency of lexico-grammatical regionalisms increases in informal genres, which means that informal British or American texts will almost always read more British or more American than their formal counterparts.

Last but not least, a discourse- and performance-based model of variability in written English will also be a culturally sensitive one – an extension which has prompted the formulation "collocational and cultural profiles" in the title of the present contribution and, it is hoped, justifies its inclusion in the present volume. After all, idiomatic and collocational preferences are the most direct reflection of a community's attitudes and pre-occupations in linguistic structure.

The present contribution is organised as follows. After a review of pertinent scholarship (Section 2), I will present first findings from an experiment in which the World Wide Web was used to establish collocational profiles of Britishness (Section 3). Section 4 will address a question which is important particularly for the study of the New Englishes, namely whether it is possible to identify collocational correlates of naturalness and idiomaticity, which would enable us to at least in part assess the degree of institutionalisation and/or autonomy of a particular New English on the basis of internal linguistic criteria rather than external sociological ones (as has been done traditionally). Section 5 offers a brief summary and conclusion.

2. Previous research on collocations in varieties of English

The literature on World Englishes contains many informal observations to the effect that the role of phraseology, collocations and idioms in variety identification might have been underestimated in research to date. Deploring the absence of relevant systematic research, Crystal, for example, notes: "Collocations, however, are likely to prove one of the most distinctive domains of varietal differentiation." (2003: 162) He goes on to give a number of examples from the literature, for example *take light* for *cut the power supply*. His very choice of examples, however, points towards the gaps in current research on the topic. Thus, it is certainly true that the expression just mentioned is occasionally encountered in West African English. However, the interesting thing about it is not the mere fact of its existence but rather the details of its use in context – questions such as how often it occurs (both in absolute terms and, more importantly, in relation to its internationally intelligible synonym), which genres or types of text it concentrates in, which type of writer uses it for which audience, and how its use is evaluated in the community. In all likelihood, such an analysis would show that – like most alleged lexico-grammatical features of West African English – this use is not really a distinctive feature of the variety (seen as a stable decontextualised system), but an option available to West African users of English for specific communicative purposes in specific discourse contexts.

In a study on collocations in science writing, Christopher Gledhill has defined phraseology as "the preferred way of saying things in a particular discourse" (2000: 1) and at the same time proved the usefulness of a genre-specific approach to collocations in English. As I hope to show in the present contribution, a similar approach can work for the study of regional variation in written English. It will lead to an empirically more comprehensive picture of regional variability in standard English and redress an unfortunate bias in previous scholarship which has tended to over-emphasise grammatical regionalisms, which are few in number and relatively unimportant, and lexical regionalisms, many of which tend to be diachronically unstable, at the expense of phraseological ones.

Given the importance of the phenomenon, it is surprising to see that there are relatively few previous studies, often conducted in isolation from each other. It seems that two types of phraseological phenomena have received privileged treatment in the literature on variation:

(a)   collocations with a prominent grammatical function (i.e. "colligations" in the terminology proposed by Firth), and

(b)   idioms, that is complex units whose meanings are not compositional and which exhibit a high degree of structural fixedness.

Frequently mentioned examples of the first phenomenon are variety-specific preferences in the choice between *different to*, *different than* and *different from*, or between *have a look*, *walk* etc. and *take a look, walk*.[3] With regard to idioms, it has been common knowledge that the English-speaking world divides into an American-dominated "baseball zone", in which idioms such as *(not) get to first/second base* are current, and a "cricket" zone largely co-extensive with the former British Empire, in which *knock someone for six* is used and understood (cf. Crystal 1999). A comprehensive survey of the use of (international and local) idioms in East African English is provided in Skandera (2003).

For the area in between, that is the prototypical collocations with lexical rather than grammatical function, compositional meaning, and a medium degree of fixedness, there is less previous research to rely on. An important contribution to the study of the phenomenon is made in Biber et al.'s *Longman Grammar*, which, among other things, amasses a wealth of information on contrasts between British and American adverbial usage, for example with regard to adverb + adjective collocations of the type *too bad* or *real good* (more common in American English) or *very nice* (more frequent in British English – see 1999: 545 for details).

Some recent work in cognitive linguistics is relevant to the present investigation because it explicitly aims beyond the boundaries of traditional descriptive linguistics and focusses on the language-culture interface. In several publications spanning a period of two decades, Anna Wierzbicka has pinpointed important context-bound discursive aspects of variation in varieties of English – so far mainly confined to Australian English (Wierzbicka 1986 and 2001) and Singaporean English (Wierzbicka 2003), but in principle transferable to other regions, as well. As the following list of concerns indicates, Wierzbicka does not explicitly study collocations, nor use machine readable corpora:

> The areas of language which are particularly revealing in this respect [i.e. in investigations of the language-culture interface] are, as usual, terms of address, conversational routines, discourse markers, names for categories of people perceived as distinctive and words and expressions designating values

and human attitudes perceived as either 'good' or 'bad' – especially words which can be regarded as cultural 'key words.' (2003: 329)

Cognitive research and the corpus-based study of collocational variability can thus be seen as complementary approaches to the same phenomenon, culturally motivated lexical variability in world Englishes.[4] An interesting complement to Wierzbicka's study therefore is Ooi 2000, who in a comparative analysis of Singaporean and British digitised databases has shown ten collocations, for instance *filial piety*, to be characteristically frequent in the former variety.

The major problem in the systematic corpus-based study of phraseological phenomena is succinctly summarised by Stubbs:

> Word frequency lists are a standard resource for linguists. However, although lists of well-known phrases are available in many taxonomies and dictionaries of collocations, only very limited frequency data are available. There are two obvious reasons for this lack of data on the frequency of phrases. First, although the phraseological nature of language has been thoroughly documented by corpus studies, there is still a tendency, following hundreds of years of lexicographic tradition, to think of individual words, rather than phrases, as the basic units of language. Second, since there are severe problems in defining phrasal units in corpora, it is difficult to know what to count. Indeed, it is doubtful if there could be a definitive 'phrase frequency list', since the units in question are so variable, and can be defined at such different levels of abstraction. (2002: 215–216)

On the practical level, such difficulties of definition are reflected in the greater computational volume and software requirements needed for the systematic analysis of collocations in a corpus, and a more indirect link between the statistical patterns uncovered and significant linguistic facts (see, e.g., Scott 2001 for a demonstration of this point).

3.   Collocational aspects of "Britishness"

A collocational profile of Britishness is an obvious point of departure for the present study. First, what little previous research there has been on collocational variability in world English has mostly been conducted on British and American English, and second, considering the crucial role of British English in the formation of many New Englishes, any future research to be conducted on collocational variability in the New Englishes will remain difficult to undertake until British English is described satisfactorily.

In what follows, I will proceed in two stages. To assess the extent to which an investigation of subdomains of the English-language Web can yield valid results on regional variation in the use of collocations, I will compare distributional profiles of ten "neutral" collocations (i.e. collocations for which there is no reason to assume that their use varies across varieties) with those of selected further idioms and collocations whose status as regional markers is well-established. As the results of this comparison generally justify cautious optimism about the value of the Web as corpus for the purpose at hand, I will then proceed to calculate profiles for further, hitherto neglected collocational indicators of Britishness.

The ten neutral collocations comprise six of the "adjective + noun" type (*deep breath, early age, biggest problem, coming year, bad luck, heavy rain*) and four of the "modifying adverb + participle/participial adjective" type (*greatly exaggerated, wildly exaggerated, badly damaged, severely damaged*). Raw figures and percentages can be gleaned from Table I.1.2 in the Appendix. Table 1 below presents a neutral distributional baseline for collocations in the Web abstracted from the individual results.

Table 1. Distribution* of a sample of ten "neutral" collocations in regional web domains

	.uk	.au	.nz	.ie	.za	.edu	.us	.ca
overall mean	32.9	12.6	2.9	2.3	1.7	29.6	6.9	10.2
6 adjective + noun	31.0	12.8	3.5	2.3	1.8	29.3	8.0	10.0
4 adverb + V-ed	35.7	12.3	2.0	2.3	1.5	30.0	5.3	10.5
overall span	26-48	8-19	2-7	1-4	1-3	18-41	2-11	7-13
span: adjective + noun	26-37	8-19	2-7	1-4	1-3	22-41	7-11	7-11
span: adverb + V-ed	27-48	11-13	2	1-4	1-2	18-41	2-11	7-13

*   Figures are given as rounded percentages. Percentages sometimes do not add up to precisely 100 due to rounding. The total, 100 per cent, does not cover the entire web but refers to the total amount of text provided in the eight top-level domains investigated.

While British English, Irish English and the British-derived New Englishes were easy to access through the respective country domains (.uk, .au, .nz, .ie, .za, for Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and South Africa), American English, as the de facto default variety of the Web, is somewhat more tricky to home in on. The country domain .us, which would seem to be the obvious choice, is a little used one and yields insufficient material. Possible

candidates to fill the gap are the .gov (US government) and .edu (academic) domains. The latter was used here because it provides a better mix of texts and an initial worry that non-US institutions of higher learning included in it might distort the results proved unfounded. Canadian English is again represented straightforwardly through its country extension.

The distribution reported in Table 1 is visualised in Figure 1:

Figure 1. Baseline distribution of neutral collocations

The middle line represents the averages calculated for Table 1, that is a baseline distribution to be expected in all those cases in which collocational preferences do not vary across varieties of English. The upper and lower lines represent the maximal deviations in either direction observed for the ten neutral collocations. The middle band of the diagram therefore represents a range of expectation into which a given variety-neutral collocation is very likely to fall. Conversely, collocations falling outside this range are likely to be variety-specific, at least in a statistical if not an absolute sense.

General imponderables concerning web size, composition and growth (see Mair 2005) mean that only the most robust statistical distributions permit meaningful linguistic interpretation. Table 2 shows how well-established collocational markers of Britishness are distributed in the material. (The two final bracketed forms are the neutral alternative for one British collocation and a further neutral idiom included for control purposes):

Table 2. Distribution of established collocational markers of Britishness on the Web (figures = rounded percentages)

	.uk	.au	.nz	.ie	.za	.edu	.us	.ca
bog standard	91	3	1	1	*	1	*	*
TAKE the mickey	80	13	4	1	2	1	*	1
KNOCK them for six	76	12	-	12	-	-	-	-
KNOCK us for six	75	15	-	10	-	-	-	-
knocked for six	83	7	8	1	*	*	*	-
I should like to	64	7	*	9	*	14	1	5
(I would like to)	25	10	2	2	2	41	6	13
(foot the bill)	39	14	2	4	3	17	9	12

NB: CAPITALISED forms include figures for morphological variants; TAKE thus includes *take, takes, took, taken* and *taking*. Percentages sometimes do not add up to precisely 100 due to rounding. * stands for attestations amounting to percentages < 1.

Unsurprisingly, the percentage figures for the two last-named neutral collocations fall squarely into the span indicated in Table 1. The British colloquialisms *bog standard* ('ordinary'), *take the mickey*,[5] the cricket idiom *knock someone for* six, and the grammatical Briticism *I should like to*, on the other hand, are all conspicuously overrepresented in Britain at rates which are robust enough to compensate for the distorting effects of the notorious web imponderables mentioned above.

But couldn't we have arrived at these findings through smaller and tidier traditional corpora? Frequencies in the BNC of 5 (for the combined *knock-for-six* expressions covered in Table 2) and 49 for *TAKE the mickey* suggest not. Even these perfectly ordinary idioms require far more material for a systematic regional comparison than even a one-hundred-million-word corpus provides.

However, if the method works tolerably well for identifying British usage, this does not mean that success is guaranteed elsewhere. Present-day Standard English is a pluricentric language, but this does not mean that the various centres are hierarchically on a level. And nowhere is this more obvious than in an analysis of English usage on the web, where the influence of American English is all-pervasive. Thus, the distribution of the American equivalents of the British cricket idioms, baseball idioms such as *get to first base*, just barely falls outside the "neutral" band presented in Table 1. Nor does *real good*, a well-known and well-documented grammatical Americanism, show up as such in the web data, as becomes evident both in Table 3 and in Figure 2.

Table 3. Distribution of American idioms and lexico-grammar on the Web (figures = rounded percentages)

	.uk	.au	.nz	.ie	.za	.edu	.us	.ca
GET to first base	20	29	3	1	1	27	5	15
NOT get to first base	12	29	2	1	2	16	8	16
real good	25	9	3	1	2	29	18	15

NB: CAPITALISED forms include figures for morphological variants. Percentages sometimes do not add up to precisely 100 due to rounding. * stands for attestations amounting to percentages < 1.

Figure 2. American collocations peaking against baseline

These figures are clearly not strong enough to refute current assumptions about the "American" quality of these expressions, all the more as at least in the case of *real good* the assumption can be backed by solid evidence from closed corpora (see Biber et al. 1999: 545). What they seem to indicate is that there is much American linguistic input in other national web-domains, and that the "Web-corpus" is therefore least suited to isolate what is specifically American. But as the aim of the present study is to use the web to establish collocational profiles of Britishness, this limitation is, of course, not crucial. From a large number of collocations investigated, the following table presents a number which in works of reference or the linguistic literature have not been identified as typically British but whose distribution resembles that of the well-established Briticisms reported in Table 2. In these cases, the Web data could

be said to provide the empirical proof. At a future stage, analysis of collocations could be at least partially automatised, so that the analysis of collocations in web-data would constitute a genuine discovery procedure, revealing variety-specific distributions beyond the analyst's initial hunches:

Table 4.   Distribution of previously undocumented collocational markers of Britishness on the Web (figures = rounded percentages)

	.uk	**.au**	**.nz**	**.ie**	**.za**	**.edu**	**.us**	**.ca**
CANNOT be bothered	64	14	3	2	1	7	4	4
surely that is	52	19	1	8	2	9	2	7
surely that's	62	14	2	1	1	9	1	10
get a life	54	11	4	2	4	12	7	7

NB: CAPITALISED forms include figures for morphological variants. Percentages sometimes do not add up to precisely 100 due to rounding. * stands for attestations amounting to percentages < 1.

Figure 3 visualises the variety-specific peaks of typically British usage against the average baseline from Table 1/Figure 1:

Figure 3. British collocations peaking against baseline

Note that one of the "British" usages, *surely that is*, also peaks in Australian and Irish English. Whether – given the risks of interpreting web-based usage statistics – these two minor peaks should be regarded as representing a genuine linguistic fact or as mere statistical noise, remains an open question.

The overwhelming concentration of *CANNOT be bothered* in the British material establishes as a fact what the figures from closed corpora merely suggest.[6] The figures for *surely that is / surely that's* are also robust evidence that this particular strategy of verbal emphasis is not very common outside the British sphere of influence.[7] The most interesting Briticism in Table 4, however, is *get a life*. The *OED* entry (s.v. *life* n.) defines this idiom as "to adopt a more worthwhile and meaningful lifestyle, esp. by making new acquaintances or developing new interests, or by abandoning pointless or solitary pursuits" and attests it from 1983. All the early citations are from American sources, with a first British attestation for 1994.[8] The current distribution therefore shows that (a) the originally American idiom spread into other varieties extremely fast and (b) its popularity may by now be on the wane in the originating variety.

Table 5 shows that the web-based documentation of collocational variability also has some potential for the description of Australian English. The benchmark for Australianness is provided by the values for *good on you/ him*, which are known collocational markers of Australian and New Zealand English and recorded as such in the *OED* (with attestations from 1914 onwards – cf. s.v. good). An interesting case is *fair enough*, which was originally included among the putative collocational Briticisms on account of a comparison of frequencies in the BNC (500, of which 179 from the spoken-demographic material) and the Longman Corpus of Spoken American English (5). Figure 4 visualises the distribution:

Table 5. Distribution of collocational markers of Australianness on the Web (figures = rounded percentages)

	.uk	.au	.nz	.ie	.za	.edu	.us	.ca
good on you	29	38	11	3	1	4	2	11
good on him	35	28	13	3	1	3	3	14
fair enough	44	21	3	3	2	11	7	9

NB: CAPITALISED forms include figures for morphological variants. Percentages sometimes do not add up to precisely 100 due to rounding. * stands for attestations amounting to percentages < 1.

Figure 4. Australian collocations peaking against baseline

Good on you/him is conspicuously over-represented in Australia and New Zealand and occurs at frequencies in the neutral span (Table 1) in the British sphere of influence, including – this time – Canada. It is underrepresented in the two US domains. At a figure of 44 per cent, *fair enough* is attested at the top end of the "neutral" frequency band for the .uk-domain. It is obviously underrepresented in the American data and overrepresented in the Australian domain. In this variety, it may work as part of the lexical-semantic substrate of the spirit of good-natured egalitarian companionship which Anna Wierzbicka has described as the essence of Australian culture (cf. Wierzbicka 1986, 2001; and Ramson 2001 for a critique).

4.   Collocational correlates of naturalness and idiomaticity

In a review of Biber et al.'s 1999 *Longman Grammar*, Edgar Schneider draws attention to the authors' notion of "lexical bundles",[9] "prefabricated verbal chunks, as it were, extended collocational patterns, regardless of their structural status" (Schneider 2001: 140), and goes on to say:

> This refers to sequences like *I don't know why*, *should be noted that*, *the relationship between the*, *come as a surprise*, etc. These chunks will be of particular interest to scholars interested in grammaticalization, and also to readers of this journal [*English World-Wide*] because I suspect that nativization, the

emergence of structural characteristics of New Englishes, operates (amongst other things) through the emergence of specific co-occurrences of this type. (2001: 140)

Of course, it is worthwhile to look for collocational patterns which identify a particular New English and set it off against established varieties or other New Englishes. In the present investigation, however, I would like to follow a slightly different tack and look at some collocational patterns which are common to a large number of natively spoken varieties of English but largely absent from learner or foreign-language English. It is certainly worthwhile to investigate the use or non-use of such collocations in institutionalised second- or official-language varieties of English. In doing so, several possible results might be expected:

(a)   Second-language varieties pattern with the natively spoken ones, because of the long period of contact with natively spoken English and the institutionalisation of English in the relevant communities.

(b)   Second-language varieties pattern with foreign-language ones because fully natural and idiomatic use of collocations cannot be expected in any learned variety, regardless of the degree of institutionalisation of English in the community.

(c)   Different second-language varieties show different patterns, because the stability of local norms, and their closeness to or distance from native-speaker norms are variable from community to community.

Minor fossilizations apart, the English of advanced learners tends to be grammatically correct and usually displays a rich and differentiated vocabulary. However, it is very rare for advanced learners to produce text that is fully natural or idiomatic, and it is reasonable to assume that collocations play a major role in accounting for this gap between correctness and naturalness. Collocational profiles of natively spoken varieties of English seem to be at once more complex and more focussed[10] than those of learner ones. For second-language institutionalised varieties of English, collocational patterns might provide language-internal criteria for assessing the degree of naturalness and stability of usage norms they display.

To show how such an assessment might be undertaken, I will investigate secondary grammatical uses of the highly frequent verb *see*. As a lexical verb, *see* exhibits complex polysemy, with the three main focal meanings being "(involuntary/subconscious) visual perception", "understand" and "visit". In addition, *see* has developed several conventionalised grammatical uses

through processes of grammaticalisation, for example in the complex conjunction *seeing (that)* (see *OED* entry for the historical development of the various uses and Alm-Arvius 1993 for a synchronic survey). The focus of the present investigation will be neither on the fully lexical nor on the conventionalized grammatical uses just sketched, but on a diffuse middle ground which has not been paid sufficient attention to in previous studies. Uses I will be concerned with in particular are, for example, illustrated in the following passage:

> The World Trade Center atrocity saw Orion head honcho Anthony "Fatty" Cheetham displaying the tact and sensitivity for which he is renowned. (*Private Eye* 1037, 21 Sept. 2001, p. 25)

The constituent order of this sentence is not a very direct mapping of the semantic proposition. Thus, the sentence can be regarded as being derived from an underlying propositional structure which can informally be paraphrased as follows:

> On the occasion of the World Trade Center atrocity Orion head honcho Anthony "Fatty" Cheetham displayed the tact and sensitivity for which he is renowned.

If we wish to include the verb *see* as part of the underlying proposition, the paraphrase is:

> On the occasion of the World Trade Center atrocity we [or some unspecified agent] saw Orion head honcho Anthony "Fatty" Cheetham displaying the tact and sensitivity for which he is renowned.

Regardless of which underlying proposition one adopts, one thing is clear. The use of *see* is not motivated by semantic considerations but merely serves to reorganise the syntactic constituent order and the information structure of the sentence. The use of *see* is thus grammatical, diathetic, comparable in function to devices such as the passive or the mediopassive. The difference is that these last-named diathetic strategies are grammaticalised to a high degree, whereas the use of *see* in diathesis is a moderately conventionalised stylistic option in present-day English.[11]

The most common type of subject in presentational structures of this type is represented by temporal expressions such as *yesterday* or *last year*. Indeed, collocations such as *yesterday saw* or *[…] year saw* are frequent enough to allow analysis in the BNC. *Year saw*, for example, occurs 60 times, with all examples from written sources only, which, in addition to its being an indicator of idiomatic, natural or native-like language-use, makes

the construction a prime indicator of register and style. Here are some typical examples from the British National Corpus:

> The summer holidays that year saw me at my most apathetic – and my most miserable. (BNC A0F 569)

> This year saw the completion of 45 quality 2 and 3 bedroomed homes in picturesque Bampton on the fringe of the Cotswolds by Stanley Hugh Leach. (BNC AAY 353)

> Last year saw half of privately-held Tivoli's revenues come from sales of Tivoli Works, the framework, toolkits and services. (BNC CMY 111)

The use of *see* with a secondary or derived subject illustrated in the above example is not the only structure of this type. Semantically redundant uses of *see* are also found in less register-specific and less conventionalised constructions of the following kind:

> As one group member said: "What I'd like to see happening is this room set up with the computer and using it regularly to type up the notes from our meetings." (BNC FPJ 1390)

> This is what I would also like to see happen throughout Great Britain, with devolution and regional assemblies. (BNC K52 4443)

> But even so, <name>'s point is a good one, that there isn't, there's seldom if ever enough <pause> this is a small problem in psychoanalysis, I myself hope to put right to some extent, and some of you may live long enough to see this happen, I hope you will. (BNC HUN 523)

In none of these examples is the semantic notion of visual, or even intellectual, perception essential to the utterance. The following would thus be satisfactory paraphrases of the mere propositional content of the citations:

> What I'd like to happen is for this room to be set up with the computer and for [me?/us?] to use it regularly to type up the notes from our meetings.

> This is what I would also like to happen throughout Great Britain, with devolution and regional assemblies.

> This is a small problem in psychoanalysis, I myself hope to put [it] right to some extent, and some of you may live long enough for this to happen, I hope you will.

The BNC data suggests that, unlike the preceding presentational structure, this one is also common in spoken English, but unfortunately even this very

large corpus yields insufficient material to investigate such forms system-
atically.[12]

However, provided that one is willing to look at large numbers of in-
stances of *see* (and its morphological variants *sees, saw, seen* and *seeing*)
and sift the evidence manually, it is possible to obtain sufficient data even
from the relatively small (c. 1 million words) corpora of the International
Corpus of English (ICE), a project designed to provide generically and sty-
listically stratified matching samples of national varieties of English.[13] For
the present study the press sections of the currently available six national
ICE components were investigated, which comprise c. 60,000 words each.
The target of the search was defined as any form of *see* governing a depend-
ent non-finite clause in which the literal meanings of perception or cogni-
tion were not dominant. Thus, a sentence such as *we saw him run a good
race* would have been excluded, while *we don't want to see inflation rise*
would have been included. Obvious cases for inclusion were the correspond-
ing structures in which the subject of *see* was inanimate, and hence incapa-
ble of either visual perception or cognition, such as *last year saw inflation
rise to new heights*. For the British material, this left a total of eight very
clear cases, which are listed below:

> Though he is keen to see the matter debated, he is clearly in no hurry to see
> the Bank of England's supervisory responsibilities passed to a pan-European
> institution. (ICE-GB, press W2C-005)

> While councillor Richard Harrod, who has represented the estate on the coun-
> cil for five years, said the community had been pleased to see the police act
> and regarded it as important that they had worked closely with other agen-
> cies […] (ICE-GB, press W2C-011)

> Stephen Bierley sees Newcastle United selling themselves (ICE-GB, press
> W2C-004)

> Long-suffering holders in Ferranti International saw the shares sink to a new
> low of 9 ½ p as a line of 3.5m went through at 8 ½ p in what seemed to be a
> bed and breakfast deal […](ICE-GB, press W2C-012)

> Last year was one of the most depressing on record for the US corporate
> sector, which saw its credit-worthiness plummet to alarming new lows. (ICE-
> GB, press W2C-013)

> Throughout the past decade, he has been buying armaments and fortifica-
> tions from Western countries eager both to see him defeat the fundamental-
> ists in Iran and to take his cash. (ICE-GB, press W2E-001)

> Four, if the UN emerges intact from the crisis, it would be far better to see the cost of any future war channelled through New York. (ICE-GB, press W2E-003)

> Given that the Government is militantly opposed to monopolies – to the extent that it has just negotiated rights for a second British airline to fly to the US – it would surely not wish to see all this traffic funnelled into the maw of a single, rather greedy airport. (ICE-GB, press W2E-008)

The New Zealand material, currently the only ICE corpus documenting a native-speaker variety other than British English, yields 6 clear instances, which are very similar to the British material in kind (see Appendix II).

It is impossible to establish statistically significant trends for frequencies so small, but it is certainly worth mentioning that this highly idiomatic usage is attested in all the second-language ICE corpora. Thereby, the frequencies are consistently lower (with one exception which will be discussed below) than in the British or New Zealand material. In all, there are four cases in ICE-India, three[14] in ICE-Singapore, and five in ICE-Philippines:

> The additional commissioner of police (traffic), P.S. Pasricha, had earlier granted the park permission to remain open only till 5 pm for fear of congestion. However, after seeing the traffic arrangements made, he has now allowed it to operate till 8 pm. (ICE-India, press W2C-014)

> It showed even lesser interest in fully utilising the paltry grants received from the State Government (incidentally given more of compulsion than with a view to see the GHB flourish). (ICE-India, press W2C-019)

> Cousin Abhijit Rajan's hand in the Gammon India takeover controversy saw the Bachchans scripting an indeterminate role as industrialists for themselves – with a little help from the financial institutions, of course. (ICE-India, press W2C-018)

> This is the fourth time that they have been postponed even after both the ruling Congress and the opposition Bharatiya Janata party had loudly proclaimed that they were keen to see grassroots democracy flourish in accordance with the new law that allows reservation for all the weaker sections, including women. (ICE-India, press W2E-008)

> The SDU and SDS have also seen the number of old members rise faster than those of other age groups. <ICE-Singapore, W2C-010>

> KINDERGARTENS run by the PAP Community Foundation are seeing a rush of toddlers some as young s 18 months being enrolled for classes. <ICE-Singapore, W2C-019>

> A watershed not just because it produced three more opposition members of parliament but because it was an election that saw Mr Goh Chok Tong getting the endorsement of his prime ministership from Singaporeans rather than just his People's Action Party colleagues. <ICE-Singapore, W2E-008>

> Finally, experts see the Philippines heading towards recovery after more than a year of suffering from the effects of the Asian financial crisis, but Filipinos will find rebuilding the economy can be very expensive. <ICE-Philippines, W2C-010>

> Maceda does not see Nationalist People's Coalition founding chairman Eduardo Cojuangco supporting Angara, and since most NPC members take the cue from Cojuangco, he believes it is unlikely that Angara will get the backing of NPC stalwarts. <ICE-Philippines, W2C-018>

> The past few weeks have seen MILF units and the Army's 39th Infantry Brigade trade mortar fire at Buldon. <ICE-Philippines, W2C-011>

> "For those of us who signed the accords in Paris, we would not be very happy seeing the results of the elections set aside, especially by use of force," says Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon, Jr. <ICE-Philippines, W2E-005>

> Yet recent tragic events saw parents lose their sons over senseless loyalties and abusive initiation rites. <ICE-Philippines, W2E-009>

At least as far as these grammatically motivated uses of *see* are concerned, second-language varieties of English can thus be shown to resemble natively spoken varieties more closely than learner language, from which such uses are largely absent.[15]

An interesting case is represented by ICE-Jamaica, because the status of Jamaican English as a native or second language is controversial. Technically, the language situation in Jamaica could be classified as a diglossic one, with official English complementing the local English-lexifier creole as a "high" variety. However, in practice there is extensive mixing of the two codes along a continuum, and most Jamaicans, whatever their attitude towards the local creole and creolised English, see themselves as English-speaking. It would thus be reasonable to expect the *see*-phraseologisms studied here to occur freely, possibly even at the relatively higher rates found in the New Zealand and British data. This, however, is not the case, as the material yields a single relevant example:

> These include the introduction of the new fee structure on a phased basis, which would see undergraduate students at Mona paying 5 percent of their

economic cost in 1993–1994, 7.5 percent in 1994–1995 and 10 percent in 1995–1996; (...) <ICE-Jamaica, W2C-009>

The other result that is difficult to interpret (already hinted at above) is from ICE-East Africa, where the Tanzanian data produces rather fewer examples than expected (two), whereas Kenyan usage (eight examples) conforms to British and New Zealand expectations.[16] Of course, it would be foolhardy to take this as conclusive proof of the different degree of institutionalisation of English in the two countries. On the other hand, if the pattern were to repeat itself in the analysis of a large number of comparably sensitive constructions, such a conclusion would certainly gain in conviction.

5. Conclusion

What the present study has shown is that previous work on lexico-grammatical variation in international Standard English needs to be complemented by the systematic corpus-based study of collocational variability. Empirically, such work fills an important gap in existing descriptions. Methodologically, it provides a bridge between traditional descriptive work on varieties of English, which has focussed on phonetic, lexical and morphosyntactic variation, and more recent research, which has broadened the scope to include the language-culture interface (as is done, for example, in Wierzbicka's cognitive-semantic approach to variation). After all, collocational preferences emerge in text and discourse and are therefore much more direct reflections of a community's attitudes and pre-occupations than isolated sounds, words or constructions. Ultimately, the systematic corpus-based study of collocations should be developed into one central element of a principled description of variability in world English on the discourse level – a necessary and long overdue complement to the many existing descriptions with a structural orientation.

With regard to the practicalities of corpuslinguistic research, the present investigation has shown that collocations tend to occur in frequency ranges that test the limits of current practice. Even for fairly common phenomena such as the diathetic uses of *see* discussed in Section 4, standard one-million word corpora such as the various national components of ICE yield barely enough material. For the majority of the collocations investigated, even a mega-corpus such as the BNC proved inadequate, and web-material had to be "domesticated" for the purposes of linguistic research in ways which,

while effective, are not always fully satisfactory in terms of traditional philological standards in corpus linguistics.

In its analysis of a small judgment sample of collocations, the present study has necessarily remained exploratory. It has demonstrated the importance of collocational patterns in variety differentiation, but it has merely been a first step on the way towards the ultimate goal – the comprehensive and maximally automatised profiling of collocational patterns in corpora. Such profiling will not only add to our knowledge of variation in English, but also lead to breakthroughs in corpus technology. It is, for example, a promising strategy to adopt in the automatic identification of types of web texts on purely language-internal criteria – one of the current challenges in the field, and an area in which the solutions found will have repercussions far beyond linguistics.

Notes

1. I would like to dedicate this paper to my colleague, collaborator and friend Günter Rohdenburg, Paderborn, on the occasion of his 65th birthday on 28 July 2005.
2. Thus, even the contrast between the "British" participle *got* and the American form *gotten* (for most non-auxiliary uses), which is the closest one probably gets to a grammatical indicator of variety status in present-day English, has a characteristic leak. The presence of *gotten* in a text rules out British origin, but the "British" usage can easily be attested in contemporary American texts. A search for the strings "have got(ten) + *ed" (with * representing any sequence of characters following a space) in the Longman Corpus of Spoken American English yielded four instances of *got* and *gotten* each. The examples do *not* suggest an explanation to the effect that clear *get*-passives (e.g. *have got pushed over*) prefer *got* and adjectival participles *gotten*. The material contains instances of *I wouldn't have gotten arrested* (*gotten* in *get*-passive) as well as *you […] have got acquainted* (*got* and adjective). Further grammatical regionalisms usually cited in textbooks – from the mandative subjunctive to variable uses of prepositions in collocations of the type *different from/to/than* – present an even more confusing picture, because statistical tendencies in regional distribution are much weaker.
3. These have been empirically corroborated in numerous corpus-based studies: cf., e.g., Kennedy 1998: 194 or Hundt 1998: 106 for prepositional usage after *different.*
4. Wolf 2001 and 2003 could be cited as two further efforts to integrate the cognitive and corpus-based lines of research. Wolf 2001 proposes a cultural-cognitive

model of community to account for the "Cameroonianness" of Cameroonian English and then moves on to study its supposed reflections in corpus data. The problem that I see in his approach is the directness of the posited link. The argument all but short-circuits observations on points of linguistic detail with a cultural model which remains very general and diffuse, being defined by "three basic elements of African spirituality: the sanctity of life, the role of spirits and ancestors, and the relation between illness, misfortune and sin" (p. 198). However, it must be added, if only for fairness' sake, that like almost any other attempt at modelling the language-and-culture interface, Wierzbicka's has not escaped severe criticism either – see Ramson 2001.

5.   The *OED* (s.v. *mickey*) classifies it as "chiefly British", gives a first citation for 1948, and further illustrations from British and Australian sources.

6.   A search for *be bothered* in the Longman Corpus of Spoken American English yields 12 hits, of which a mere two instantiate the idiomatic use *of CANNOT be bothered* in question. The corresponding figures for the spoken-demographic BNC are 133, with c. 9 out of ten instantiating *CANNOT be bothered*.

7.   For a detailed discourse analysis of the use of *surely*, mainly on the basis of BNC data, see Downing 2002.

8.   This is rather late, as the spoken-demographic material of the BNC, which was sampled a few years earlier, contains three examples. The roughly contemporary and comparable Longman Corpus of Spoken American English has eight.

9.   See Biber et al. 1999: 990 for a more comprehensive definition and illustration of the concept.

10. The term *focussing* is used here in the technical sense that it has in Le Page/ Tabouret-Keller's 1985 model of standardisation.

11. The grammaticalisation of *see* as a passive marker is documented for other languages in Heine and Kuteva's (2002) *World Lexicon of Grammaticalization*. English usage in this regard is strikingly similar to French (e.g. *quelqu'un s'est vu refusé quelque chose*), as any web search for phrases such as "s'est vu(e) refusé(e)" or "se sont vus refuses" or even technically non-existent misspelled variants such as "s'est vu refusée" or "s'est vu refuser" will testify. Whether English copies French, French copies English, or we are dealing with an independent development in the two languages cannot be determined here.

12. Searches for *see this happen* and *see this happening* yielded 3 and 5 matches, respectively. *See happening* and *see happen* were attested 11 times each.

13. For details of the project see http://www.ucl.ac.uk/english-usage/ice/. Of an envisaged total of c. 20 national sub-corpora, six are currently available.

14. A further two borderline cases illustrating the idiomatic expression *see something coming* might have merited inclusion:

   The PCF, Dr Beng said, has seen the demand for nursery places coming, based
   on these two developments: THE birth rate has been going up since 1987 and

is now about 49,000 a year PCF kindergartens have seen a big jump in the number of nursery places up from 11,893 in 1991 to 20,825 in 1992. <W2C-019>

He and his staff had seen this new demand for nursery places coming, he said. <W2C-019>

They were excluded here because they represent a clear metaphorical extension of the visual-perception sense of *see*.

15. This is the impression gained from the present author's long experience with student writing and the International Corpus of Learner English (ICLE), which – admittedly – is not a perfect match for the ICE press texts in size and composition.
16. See Appendix III for examples.

Appendix I:

1. Frequencies for ten neutral collocations in the British National Corpus, the COBUILD Collocations Database and selected top-level domains on the World Wide Web

The BNC contains c. 100,000,000 words, the COBUILD database slightly over 200,000,000. Comparing the frequencies for these two corpora shows that, as expected, the figures for COBUILD are consistently higher, but also that there still is considerable fluctuation in the frequency of occurrence of individual collocations. The figures for the individual top-level web domains need to be interpreted in this light. They give a rough idea of the proportion of the various domains relative to each other, and they allow a rough estimate of the amount of material looked at in comparison to the 100,000,000 words of the BNC. Thus, the .edu and .uk domains appear broadly comparable in size, and so do the .au and .ca ones, which seem to contain roughly a fourth of the material found in the two bigger ones. While it is fairly safe to determine rough proportions, it is much more risky to calculate approximate numbers of words. For example, by extrapolation from the BNC, the 7,650 instances of *deep breath* in the Australian web material would indicate a size of c. 1.34 billion words. Performing the same calculation on *early age*, on the other hand, we would arrive at the rather different estimate of 5.5 billion words. In view of such fluctuation, estimates should not be based on individual collocations but on aggregate frequencies.

Table 2. Distribution of established collocational markers of Britishness on the Web (figures = rounded percentages)

Collocation	BNC	COBUILD Collocations Database	.uk	.au	.nz	.ie	.za	.edu	.us	.ca	sum of all www examples considered
deep breath	571	768	28,400	7,650	3,920	699	744	19,700	8,900	8,340	78,353
early age	369	878	55,300	20,300	3,690	4,180	3,850	60,800	11,900	19,300	179,320
biggest problem	112	632	30,600	11,300	2,930	1,850	2,950	30,300	6,400	9,940	96,270
coming year	271	782	95,400	28,500	7,500	12,000	5,130	151,000	32,500	39,700	371,730
bad luck	266	700	32,500	16,500	2,440	1,780	2,220	20,300	6,010	8,620	90,370
heavy rain	225	628	32,600	17,000	6,340	3,740	1,970	20,700	6,410	6,460	95,220
greatly exaggerated	36	83	3,480	1,520	199	304	142	5,370	444	1,710	13,169
wildly exaggerated	10	22	541	167	22	20	20	408	34	174	1,386
badly damaged	193	461	18,100	5,020	699	1,600	711	6,870	1,690	2,840	37,530
severely damaged	94	241	11,100	4,840	570	643	703	12,300	4,250	3,380	37,786

NB: date of access: 11 March 2004

2. Frequencies for selected variety-specific collocations and idioms in the British National Corpus and selected top-level domains on the World Wide Web

This table contains the raw counts providing the basis for the diagrams and tables in Section 3. In addition to the idioms and collocations reported on in the text, the table contains the figures for some other, less clear-cut cases. Idioms which are not variety-specific, such as *foot the bill* or *spill the beans*, have been included for control purposes. For items given in CAPITALS, all morphological variants were collected, so that *GET to first base* represents *get, getting, gets, got, gotten to first base*, and *NOT get to first base* represents *not get, didn't get, don't get, doesn't get* (though not the many additional forms involving contracted modal verbs such as *can't get* or *wouldn't get*). Search items have been categorised into (1) idioms, whose meaning is not compositional, (2) colligations, representing preferred grammatical contexts of occurrence of particular words, and (3) collocations, whose meaning is compositional.

Collocation / Idiom	BNC	sum of all www examples considered	.uk	.au	.nz	.ie	.za	.edu	.us	.ca
(1) idioms										
foot the bill	80	18,945	7,730	2,730	331	654	640	3,190	1,730	2,340
spill the beans	23	9,089	3,570	693	229	165	2,330	545	1,080	477
(NOT) get to first base	3	86	12	29	2	1	2	16	8	16
GET to first base	–	1,177	231	343	30	13	13	317	53	177
KNOCK them for six	1	51	39	6	–	6	–	–	–	–
KNOCK us for six	–	52	39	8	–	5	–	–	–	–
knocked for six	4	456	337	34	37	5	1	1	1	–
TAKE the mickey	49	5,471	4,352	652	226	50	97	48	9	37

Collocation / Idiom	BNC	sum of all www examples considered	.uk	.au	.nz	.ie	.za	.edu	.us	.ca
(2) colligations										
began working	49	115,285	12,800	6,540	1,530	652	663	65,700	16,300	11,100
began to work	65	28,027	4,950	1,740	276	240	191	10,300	7,460	2,870
I like watching	16	3,281	817	412	262	27	30	734	475	524
I like to watch	8	7,438	1,640	566	186	32	31	2,640	1,500	834
I should like to	310	96,125	61,400	6,620	325	8,010	462	13,600	628	5,080
I would like to	1,598	1,813,100	450,000	185,000	36,800	36,00	35,300	738,000	105,000	227,000
give it me	23	1,176	412	220	8	5	5	422	46	49
give it him	9	765	248	145	6	3	5	291	16	51
give it her	9	511	198	43	6	9	7	164	38	46
wish he would have	–	647	144	18	7	–	5	199	140	134
wants to	7	8,419	3,050	1,740	233	132	219	1,600	620	835
out the window	151	98,842	21,600	13,200	3,320	2,170	952	33,200	10,100	14,300
out of the window	753	49,583	30,300	4,700	618	495	720	8,430	1,870	2,450
ever so kind	4	159	57	17	4	4	3	43	10	21

Collocation / Idiom	BNC	sum of all www examples considered	.uk	.au	.nz	.ie	.za	.edu	.us	.ca
(3) collocations										
surely that is not	5	1,028	459	149	7	149	15	138	9	102
surely that is	28	9,012	4,710	1,650	135	754	159	807	141	656
surely that's not	6	445	280	49	7	8	6	52	11	32
surely that's	36	3,898	2,400	567	71	28	31	369	49	383
second of all	3	28,796	15,700	2,650	549	37	1,420	3,510	2,690	2,240
it in five minutes time	–	3	1	2	–	–	–	–	–	–
fair enough	500	77,220	34,000	15,900	2,560	2,510	1,300	8,300	5,410	7,240
reasonably close	20	21,692	4,640	2,500	470	210	202	8,360	2,310	3,000
real good	96	62,788	15,400	5,900	1,720	535	993	17,900	11,000	9,340
quite good	596	160,720	62,700	22,900	9,500	2,690	1,690	41,000	9,040	11,200
get a life	12	60,112	32,500	6,390	2,310	982	2,140	7,170	4,490	4,130
CAN NOT be bothered	238	50,860	32,447	7,319	1,685	1,064	649	3,646	2,096	1,954
bog standard	9	20,391	18,600	631	344	284	91	292	99	50
good on you	6		4,590	6,080	1,730	130	523	632	358	1,800
good on him	2		811	635	297	16	69	73	59	328

NB: dates of access: 11 March 2004, 17 March 2004 (for CAPITALISED items), 17 April for *good on*, 23 April for *bog standard*

Appendix II: Diathetic uses of *see* in the ICE-New Zealand (press texts)

A step in that direction comes today in Hamilton, when Mr Palmer gives a "winter lecture" - a vision of where he sees things going - and later attends the big rugby game between Waikato and Australia. <W2C017>

Some 10,000 investors were hit by the collapse which could see some, particularly shareholders, left with nothing. <W2C012>

There is though an opportunity for a result. A day and a half down the track I can see this being an excellent game. <W2C013>

"Labour has argued that pulling millions of dollars out of the economy would seriously impact on domestic activity. The resulting loss of retail sales has seen an extraordinary number of women lose their jobs," she said. <W2C011>

In this society it is generally accepted that the majority of people wish to see standards applied to films and videos that eliminate the excessively violent, explicitly sexual and pornographic trash that seems to be too widely available. <W2E006>

[…] we are certain that, in the manner of these things, if the pendulum swings too far towards conservatism, pressure will build up once more for liberalisation. But at the moment we are happy to see it move towards more control. <W2E006>

Appendix III: Diathetic uses of *see* in the ICE-East Africa (press texts)

And to prove it, women cited individual cases which they would have liked to see firm decisions taken. <W2C024K>

Unfortunately for them and fortunately for those who wish to see Kenya continue playing a leading role in her efforts to bring about peaceful democratic and political change, all these attempts to incite wananchi have miserably failed. <W2E008K>

Can we be that much trapped in multi-party political bickering that we fail to see our brothers and sisters equally trapped in such a sad tangle? <W2E006K>

Violence can, therefore, see South Africa engulfed in a conflagration fuelled by blood in which there can be no winners. <W2E003K>

One of the most common accusations made against those who expressed dissatisfaction with the system was that they were selfish, well-to-do people who did not wish to see the benefits of education extended to other Kenyans. <W2E006K>

Finding fees has become a problem of unbearable proportions for the average parents who daily see their purchasing power remorselessly eroded by inflation. <W2E004K>

To give such people the management of a ministry as central to the democratic process as the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting is to bring to question the seriousness of the government's declared intentions to see the country fully democratise. <W2E005T>

It is from these youths that we see those hawking commodities on the streets of Dar es Salaam and other townships. <W2E006T>

Though it is a pity that these negotiations are resuming only after Monday's Bisho massacre which saw 28 supporters of the ANC shot dead and another 200 wounded on the orders of Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, leader of the so-called nominally independent Ciskei homeland, the time is right and ripe for talks. <W2E003K>

The picture that emerged towards the end of the last decade was bleak and African countries saw the prices of their primary export commodities failing in the world market and the costs of imports escalating. <W2E002T>

We have seen both the clergy and the secular leadership err in many areas of human endeavour. <W2E009K>

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Epilogue

Formulaic language in cultural perspective

Penny Lee

1.   Introduction

Conventional ways of saying things are subtle indices of cultural preoccupations and values, subtle because their automatic, routine, habitual nature renders them largely out of awareness for members of the culture, just as any other routine behavioural pattern, socially acquired in the course of enculturation, may remain out of awareness until violated in some way by cultural rebels, visitors or novices.

The ability to reproduce and participate in strongly entrenched patterns of cultural behaviour, whether these be realized in the form of relatively ephemeral social markers or trends persistent across generations, is fundamental to being recognized as a member of any social group. Confident and authentic control of conversational ways of saying things that are characteristic of particular groups is part of this ability. Acquisition of formulae in the course of early and later language learning must, accordingly, be as central to linguistic competence as to performance, to use the Chomskyan dichotomy without its distracting idealizations. Competence, in the sense of the stock of neurolinguistic resources individuals use to understand and produce utterances or written expressions recognizable as representative of particular languages, dialects or jargons, evidently includes a great deal that is reproduced verbatim or generated on analogy with previous utterances or expressions compatible with specific social situations. Performance, in the sense of externally observable language behaviour (also observable internally from an introspective point of view), provides us with data as centrally important to theoretical linguistics as to our understanding of social or cultural phenomena. As such, we might expect formulaic language, phraseological proficiency and the cultural relevance of language patterning of all kinds to be recognized as central topics in linguistics, sociology, anthropology and education (just to name the disciplines that first come to mind) and find them treated routinely in introductory textbooks.

That this is not the case in linguistics, although the shift must come very soon, is significantly a product of our history as a discipline. The relegation

of data from actual language use to the periphery of mainstream linguistics for several decades, the scornful mid-twentieth century dismissal of analogy as a useful construct in theory building, and the foolish separation of language as a mental phenomenon from its realization in socio-cultural situations of use impoverished linguistic science and rendered the role of conventionalization in language production and use invisible to most linguists-in-training. To say this is not to underestimate the enormous gains made in linguistics over the same period of time. It is merely to point out that an area of study cannot really be regarded as a "major field" of inquiry (with due deference to Cowie 1998: 1) from the point of view of a discipline as a whole if it does not warrant a substantial section in texts used to induct newcomers into the discipline. It is also, however, to affirm the currently escalating appreciation of real language data as subject matter that has come with the maturation of discourse analysis, lexicography, corpus linguistics, cultural linguistics, applied linguistics and (patiently all the while) anthropological linguistics in recent decades. Such appreciation will lead to general recognition of the central status of conventionalization in language when investigators of specific phenomena increasingly locate their research in larger, more integrative theoretical frameworks and, in doing so, force textbook makers to reassess their priorities in new editions and in volumes newly designed for the twenty-first century.

Andrew Pawley (this volume) delineates nine distinct areas where significant progress in understanding formulaic language had been made as early as the 1970s. Literary scholars had discovered the role of formulae in modern and ancient epic poetry, while anthropologists, folklorists and ethnographers of speaking had documented the importance of fixed formulae with distinctive intonation in ritualistic behaviour of social groups ranging from British school children to Trobriand Islanders. Philosophers and sociologists had studied speech routines in social interactions, emphasizing the conventionality of situation-bound expressions used in the performance of speech acts in a wide variety of culturally structured social contexts. Neurophysiologically, it had become evident that routinized language is produced differently from novel utterances, while psycholinguistic explanations had been put forward to account for the fact that familiar chunks of language are produced more fluently than novel strings. A few educationists took up ideas about links between language, culture and worldview inherited from anthropological linguistics and psychology and noted that conventional ways of saying things often seemed to reflect, and also promote, particular ways of thinking about experience. Applied linguists explored the importance of

idiomatically apt phrasing in speech and writing and observed the special challenges that learners seeking high levels of control of new languages face in this regard. Some grammarians insisted that lexicon and grammar were not as easy to separate as current idealizations required. Lexicographers were producing phrasal dictionaries and, in Eastern Europe in particular, attempting to differentiate kinds of multiword units in systematic ways.

Work on all these fronts has continued into this century, gaining strength over time, a testament to the ubiquity and significance of conventionalized language knowledge and use. Given the diversity of methodological approaches, terminology, specific subject matter and theoretical frameworks associated with these developments, however, it is not surprising that an integrated broader field of inquiry, with recognized core principles, methods and research questions having self-evident parts to play in the construction and presentation of linguistics as a science, is still fighting its way into existence. That this larger field is still consolidating is suggested by the fact that its practitioners might come together in a volume such as this, while their primary academic allegiances remain with other named sub-fields of linguistics which do not, with the exception of lexicography, as Pawley (this volume) points out, currently give formulaic language or phraseological proficiency central places in the construction of their own sub-disciplinary identity.

That it is not yet the integrated, coherent field it deserves to be on account of what is already known is also suggested by the paucity of cross-referencing to the broader field of established knowledge and theory about conventional language in much descriptive work. Describing and generalizing across constrained sets of primary data within one's methodological and theoretical comfort zone provides useful information for the broader field to build on. Additional value is added when such research is located in relation to theoretical frameworks relevant to understanding the larger significance of the data and when descriptions are structured to support or challenge previously formulated generalizations and theories. Alison Wray (2002) is an outstanding example in this regard, with effective synthesis of diverse findings and meticulous acknowledgement of sources from an impressively broad range of research fields throughout her book.

The scattered nature of work done on formulaic language across the largely non-intercommunicating "islands of research" listed by Pawley has, in particular, obscured the focal role formulae play in native-like use of language and concomitant acceptance of people as cultural insiders. In doing so, it has also sometimes tended to bypass the theoretical challenge of ex-

plaining the status of conventional phrasing (particularly when character-
ized by productive mini-grammars) in the individual internalized linguistic
systems that generate such performance. Pawley and Syder (1983a) high-
lighted these points in their landmark article, while also emphasizing the
contribution of idiomatic control of formulae to fluency, but references to
that article, although it is probably cited more often than other important
papers by Pawley and his associates (e.g. Pawley and Syder 1983b, 2000;
Pawley 1985, 1986, 1987, 1991, 2001; Pawley and Lane 1998; Kuiper 1991,
1992, 1996; Kuiper and Austin 1990; Kuiper and Flindall 2000; Kuiper and
Haggo 1984, 1985; Kuiper and Tan 1989) are often perfunctory or marginal
(e.g. Fillmore et al. 1988) or missing altogether where they might be expected
(e.g. Barlow and Kemmer 2000). That there are no references in many of
the papers in this volume to Pawley, or to Wray (2002), Cowie (ed.) (1998),
Moon (1998) or Stubbs (2001), to take some major recent publications, also
suggests perhaps that the research has not primarily been conceptualized as
located within the larger field of inquiry encompassed by the volume as a
whole and, beyond it, the broader field represented by these publications.

It is a natural thing for sub-fields to proliferate in any science, especially
in today's academic climate. The reasons include demands by university
managers for demonstrations of international leadership that can often only
be met by establishing a research profile in a small, distinctively delimited
area. Pressures generated by other academic responsibilities also limit indi-
viduals' opportunities to develop the depth and breadth of knowledge needed
to support theory building across extensive bodies of scholarship. How big,
after all, does a "big picture" view of one's field need to be to provide a
viable context for one's own research focus? Insularity is fine if one's goal
is to achieve excellence in a narrowly defined field, leaving synthesis (and
big picture theorizing) for others. Nevertheless, although the significance of
repetition and analogical patterning in the use of conventional expressions
continues to remain out of focus for many linguists, a substantial base of
relevant description is now in place and growing all the time, while theory
building and methodological refinements help to ensure that the role of for-
mulaic language in both linguistic competence and performance cannot much
longer remain out of the contents lists of foundational texts.

This volume builds on the pioneering work outlined by Pawley in this
book's prologue and the developments since the 1970s that he describes. In
particular, it focuses on formulaic language in cultural perspective. In what
follows, I will attempt to summarize some of the ways in which the papers
in each section extend our understanding of the cultural roles played by con-

ventionalized patterns of use. I will also discuss methodological issues as relevant. I will then return to Pawley's paper and the list of research questions he has devised to highlight theoretical concerns that had emerged by the 1970s and continue to require further investigation. Although most of Pawley's questions have not been explicitly addressed by contributors to this volume, we will do well to review them before closing because, diverse though they may be in their cross-disciplinary concerns, they help to give us a "big picture" view of where we are going in the process of puzzling out the place of conventionalized expressions in language and culture as a whole.

2.   Guiding words, key words and collocational distinctiveness in cultural perspective

The papers by Anna Wierzbicka, Bert Peeters, Monika Bednarek and Wolfram Bublitz, and Doris Schönefeld in this volume focus on single lexemes and their collocational predilections. In each case, familiar English words are revealed as having culturally specific configurations of use that offer suggestive insights into the preoccupations and values of the societies in which they serve as common currency.

Wierzbicka's illuminating essay traces the development of a "cultural script" (Strauss and Quinn 1997) that is epitomized – or indexed – by the collocation *reasonably well*. She counters Sinclair's (1991) doubts about the feasibility of adequately defining and explaining frequently used words by distinguishing in fine detail between different meanings of *reasonably* and showing how these have evolved from a bifurcation in the meaning of *reasonable* dating back to a shift in Locke's (1959 [1690]) usage in the late seventeenth century. Wierzbicka argues convincingly that *reasonable* is a "guiding word" (at least in long established English speaking cultures). As such, it operates in a powerful, though largely out-of-awareness, way through a range of conventionalized collocations that encapsulate (Stubbs 2001) the knowledge that native speakers acquire in the course of primary socialization and which they use to guide their evaluations of behaviour and situational outcomes in daily life.

Methodologically, Wierzbicka's paper provides a structured guide for similar research. She clearly explains the steps used in her investigation. These include the generation of a set of research questions to structure the inquiry initially and details about corpora and other resources used. The guiding questions asked include why *reasonably* collocates with some words

and not others that might logically be expected to follow the same pattern, why the direct translation of *reasonably well* into French is not found with the same frequency as the English phrase, why the target phrase is more commonly found in spoken than written language, whether a meaning for *reasonably* can be extracted from the collocation (or whether the collocation has a separate global meaning) and, if so, how that meaning is related to the use of the same adverb used ad-verbally or ad-adjectivally. Beginning with her last question, the relationship between the different meanings of *reasonably*, Wierzbicka first turns to dictionary definitions, then quickly shows that these are not only circular but that they also do not accommodate a range of familiar use patterns she cites. A difference between uses of *reasonably* with verbs and adjectives highlights a subtle contrast that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. The use of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) is also explained and promoted as a means of moving to a yet more finely grained decomposition of meanings.

A reserved tentativeness fundamental to the cultural script is highlighted when attested uses of *it is reasonable to* are examined and found to occur mainly with verbs of thinking and saying. The "epistemic reserve" implicit in these examples is summarized using NSM and then explained in more detail in associated commentary. That a modern (down-toning) interpretation of "reasonableness" exists is then demonstrated with reference to changing uses of the word over time and an interesting review of historical commentary on the British Enlightenment – the Age of Reason. *Reason* was unequivocally a "key word" (Wierzbicka 1997) in the eighteenth century, being highly salient, not only to philosophers, but to the proponents of the new empiricism, which valued the practicality of demonstrable, if probabilistic, knowledge above all. With it, certainty had to be set aside, reasonableness taking its place and becoming, three centuries later, the core of the cultural script Wierzbicka explores. The value of using historical evidence for cultural changes in ways of thinking about experience that are linked to conventionalized language patterns is particularly interesting when we remember Whorf's (1956 [1941]: 159) comments on relations between cultural norms and linguistic patterns:

> There are connections but not correlations or diagnostic correspondences between cultural norms and linguistic patterns. … There are cases where the "fashions of speaking" are closely integrated with the whole general culture, whether or not this be universally true, and there are connections within this integration, between the kind of linguistic analyses employed and various

> behavioural reactions and also the shapes taken by various cultural developments. … These connections are to be found not so much by focusing attention on the typical rubrics of linguistic, ethnographic, or sociological description as by examining the culture and the language (always and only when the two have been together historically for a considerable time) as a whole in which concatenations that run across these departmental lines may be expected to exist, and, if they do exist, eventually to be discovered by study.

On the basis of her findings and the detailed analysis she provides, Wierzbicka hypothesizes six logical stages in the history of the word *reasonable*, arguing that the four final stages are all current in modern English, accounting for semantic variations found in the corpus data.

That the guiding word status of *reasonably* is culture specific is demonstrated by reference to a French corpus where *raisonnablement* is found to collocate differently from its English counterpart, to occur with lower frequency and to have different semantics that, in general, do not support the cultural frame explored in this study. Further, Wierzbicka's study demonstrates that using authentic examples of the way people talk and write reveals, as Stubbs (2001) argues, that evaluative meanings and speakers' attitudes may be embedded in lexico-semantic structures to a degree unrecognized by those who rely on invented examples and believe that pragmatic meanings are chiefly inferred conversationally.

Peeters' entertaining and culturally revealing study of references to the weekend, and collocations of the word *weekend* in Australia demonstrates the virtues of good old-fashioned accumulation of examples of usage and related discussion over time. By trawling the web, consulting with friends and through personal observation, he has collected an impressive array of data relating to the iconic status in Australia of the phrase *Land of the Long* (or increasingly since the mid 1990s *Lost*) *Weekend*. The polysemy of *weekender*, the enduring significance in popular culture of the 1966 hit *Friday on My Mind* by the Easybeats, with its lyrics about yearning during the working week for the pleasures of the weekend, the common name for social events held on Friday afternoons or evenings *(Thank God / Goodness it's Friday (T.G.I.F.))*, references to Friday as *Poet's Day* (*Piss off Early, Tomorrow's Saturday*), the phenomenon of *Mondayitis* and the use of highly formulaic farewells and greetings in workplaces (*Have a good / nice / great weekend*; *Did you have a good (etc.) weekend?*; *How was your weekend?*; *How did the weekend go?*, etc.) are also revealed. Peeters argues for the status of *weekend* as a cultural key word on the basis of its high salience, not only in terms of frequency of use in general discourse, but also on

account of regular discussions, both negative and positive, by media commentators, authority figures and others about Australian attitudes towards weekends. That all the prefabricated expressions he describes participate in a well entrenched cultural script is suggested by the fact that the values they embody in relation to remunerated labour and carefree enjoyment of one's leisure time do not mean that Australians actually work less than other people. Working hours statistics cited by some of Peeters' sources show that we are evidently not immune to pressures of the globalized world, although we like to talk and think of ourselves, often with self-deprecating humour, as though we are.

A little more seriously insistent than Australian allusions to weekends is the use of the directive *Enjoy!* and its various more extended collocations (e.g. *Enjoy yourself!*, *enjoy a/an/the* NP, etc.) to remind consumers in the UK and USA that the point of consumption is enjoyment. Bednarek and Bublitz use corpus analysis (their sources, techniques, tools and procedures are fully explained in the paper) to explore this phenomenon in promotional and advertising texts. Their objective is to determine how distributional patterns illuminate a "fun-related ideology" revealed in the corpora examined. Confronting the contradiction inherent in the use of imperatives (a) in relation to the private matter of personal welfare and (b) in polite exchanges, they suggest that "happiness, fun or, indeed, enjoyment are not regarded as private and optional matters but as public and obligatory assets" in the situations where the expressions are typically used. Their analysis seems to demonstrate that *enjoy*, being frequently out-of-awareness for users in the sense that it is not generally a matter of metalinguistic attention, is another guiding word in Wierzbicka's terms. The authors argue that its automatic, habitual use functions to reinforce a particular way of relating to experience, backgrounding alternative ways. It is, in other words, a significant component of a cultural script pervasive in the cultures concerned, particularly in service and promotional industries. Different syntactic and semantic preferences of the target term are systematically investigated along with "clusters" (which have tighter relationships in probabilistic terms and are identified by the computational tools used) and some subtle differences are uncovered within an otherwise broadly similar configuration of findings in the two countries.

If the authors are right, the widespread drifting of formulaic utterances involving *enjoy* as imperative to other parts of the world provides a subtle level of psycholinguistic support to the spread of cultural values associated with western consumerism. I say psycholinguistic in line with Whorf's rea-

soning about the role of language in cognition. Language, he argued, is deeply and pervasively implicated in conceptual activity in a process he called "linguistic thinking". In its most elusive form, linguistic thinking involves fleeting reflexes of the linguistic system activated in passing in predominantly nonlinguistic conceptual activity. In its most easily observable (introspectively) form it manifests as fully formed utterances "heard" inside the head as we plan something or try to puzzle out a situation that disturbs us. In between these two extremes lie a great complexity of modes and manifestations inescapably implicated in thought as a general phenomenon for any person who is a languaging being, i.e. has acquired language in the normal way in the course of social enculturation (Lee 1996).

Schönefeld takes the English word *hot* as her starting point in making contrastive analyses of collocations of *hot*, *heiss* (German), and *gorjachij* (including *zark** as well as *gorjac** in Russian). She takes care to define her use of the term "collocation" and to locate the study in a broader understanding of the role of collocations in native speaker proficiency. Acknowledging the cultural specificity of collocations, particularly interesting in the case of words that relate to pan-human elements of experience such as the sensation of heat, she argues, following Shore (1996), that different conventionalized mental models intervene to structure interpretation of experience built on the basic level of response to situations. Schönefeld suggests that what she calls the "cultural load" generated by such models is especially noticeable in formulaic language of all kinds, including proverbs and nursery rhymes, etc., and is more observable at the fixed end of the continuum compared with the more open end where its effects, nevertheless, may often still be seen.

In her arguments about scalar concepts of temperature and the structures of concepts, Schönefeld draws on cognitive linguistic theory (Langacker 1991; Palmer 1996) arguing that the "default sense" of translation equivalents should be similar, other senses, including metaphorical senses of the words, being more likely to come under the influence of culturally specific mental models. We see in the notion of a basic or default sense an idea similar to that of Whorf's "isolates of experience" (see Lee 1996, 2000, 2003 for discussion). Whorf differentiated between "egoic" or internally experienced isolates (relevant here) and "external" ones, e.g. the projections outside the body of visual images, their objects being conceived as existing in the external field in line with Gestalt theory. Schönefeld uses an etymological study of the target words to support her argument that the central sense of *hot* was originally construed in the same way in the three languages. In this

context it is interesting to note that *hot* does not appear in Wierzbicka's list of NSM primes, suggesting that research on non-European languages might reveal interesting culturally specific linguistic responses to the bodily sensations in focus here.

Systematic searches for attributive, predicative and adverbial usages of the target words in non-default use contexts, and for idioms, provides Schönefeld with a comprehensive data base for exploring extended senses of the words, including metaphors. Her detailed discussion of metaphors provides a useful resource for others interested in exploring conventionalization embodied in metaphors across cultures. Cross-linguistic comparisons in the categories of use studied allow a picture of variation patterns to emerge and suggest, to some degree at least, the activity of different cultural models or frames active in interpretations of experience anchored in the shared bodily sensations of heat.

Together, the four papers in this section of the book provide a useful collection of approaches to studying collocational preferences of specific words and their cultural implications. We see the importance of defining key terms, providing full details of data bases (including their sizes, representativeness and provenance), taking a historical perspective where relevant, providing full details of steps taken in the research and reasoning with regard to each procedure, locating the specific inquiry within one or more larger fields of theoretical import, and explicitly drawing attention to ways in which the findings inform or challenge existing articles of faith within those fields.

3.   Conventionalization in proverbs, similes and modality clusters

There are two senses in which language patterns may be regarded as entrenched: sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic. While the patterns themselves may participate in both kinds of entrenchment, and while the two are significantly dependent on each other, it is nevertheless useful from a theoretical point of view to keep the two phenomena apart conceptually. Sociolinguistic entrenchment occurs when some language patterns are pervasively used in a speech community in preference to others that seem just as appropriate from an outsider's point of view. Psycholinguistic entrenchment occurs when, in a connectionist (Lee 1996) or network (Lamb 1999) sense, some language patterns are more heavily weighted, frequently activated and intensively interconnected than others in the internalized linguistic systems

of individuals. Such robust incorporation into an individual's idiolectal re-sources depends significantly, of course, on that person's exposure to the patterns in their social environment (their social enculturation), but not ex-clusively. People also have characteristic ways of talking (and thinking) that are truly idiolectal in that they index those aspects of the person's style that mark them out as unique individuals. But for such individuals to also be recognized as members of speech communities, these idiosyncracies need to be embedded in matrices of patterns that are characteristic of social groups as wholes. When they are not, the person is not merely different, but functions as an outsider in both personal and cultural terms.

As a distinctive and long recognized category of culturally entrenched formulae, proverbs are interesting in their greater accessibility to metalin-guistic awareness compared with many other formulae. This is attested by the history of paremiology outlined by Charles Doyle (this volume). Col-lections of sayings and proverbs ("fixed superlexical locutions" in Doyle's terms) have been compiled for over five centuries, with the comprehensive *Adagia* of Erasmus of Rotterdam in the early sixteenth century being the first to offer serious study of the phenomenon rather than simply listing ex-amples. As pithy repositories of received wisdom predominantly passed down orally from generation to generation, proverbs encapsulate insights into hu-man nature, interpersonal relationships and life experiences in ways that may reflect typical patterns of reasoning or interpretation among the people who use them. If deeply entrenched within the culture, they also provide ready-made patterns of interpretation that are absorbed by individuals into their own belief and reasoning systems in the course of developmental so-cialization. Once entrenched psycholinguistically, they have the "projective" power to shape understandings about events that Whorf and Sapir ascribed to language patterns in general (Lee 1996), except that their workings are less subtle and elusive than the focusing and selecting activity of lexemes and grammatical patterns. Proverbs are typically statements of perceived truths that overtly offer interpretations of events and behaviour, while single lexemes and grammatical processes work at a more fine-grained level to cov-ertly organize attention to aspects of experience in culturally patterned ways.

In terms of provenance, Doyle draws attention to the fact that at some stage every proverb must have been a newly created formulation, which then gained currency within a group before becoming more widely entrenched in a society. Here we see in action the dialectical relationship between the psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic, between idiolectal and cultural or com-munal forces at work. Doyle also considers the issue of ephemerality, tradi-

tionally a concern for makers of proverb dictionaries and one on which judgments are difficult to make. Apart from the difficulties involved in collecting proverbs that are fundamentally part of oral traditions and often not found in written form, an expurgatory tendency on moral grounds has also ensured that true representativeness is not achieved in most collections intended for a general readership. Doyle concludes his paper with a number of "gendered proverbs" current among students he is in contact with, some of which would not find their way into dictionaries. He suggests that some denigrative women's sayings about men reflect social changes in recent decades, including greater independence and choice for women. They also, of course, in the projective sense mentioned above, help to promote and sustain attitudes that support these changes by providing catchy and therefore memorable formulations of values and attitudes that might be used interpretively to make sense of relationships and events. Men's sayings similarly offer guidance in the form of maxims or precepts about how to think about women. Although Doyle points out that these gendered proverbs often satirize traditional formulations, and that even the most confronting from the point of view of the maligned gender may be shared as quips or jokes, we would do well to give them more serious personal attention in many cases. Perhaps consciousness can intervene in the entrenchment process to some degree when we actively choose a different expression in preference to one that comes more quickly to mind. I say this in the belief that every exposure to a form, whether heard, thought, read, spoken or written, has reinforcing power in terms of its weighting in the internal linguistic system (Hockett 1987; Lee 1996). Well-entrenched linguistic patterns participate in unconscious as well as conscious processes of linguistic thinking and there is no guarantee that the unconscious mind, sifting and shuffling formulaic strings, differentiates in the way the conscious mind might want to do between irony and disrespect.

After all, as Wolfgang Mieder reminds us in the opening paragraphs of his paper, proverbs reflect cultural scripts (although he does not use this term) and may represent, to some degree at least, "the social and moral value system or the worldview of those who use them". He agrees that to calculate to what degree this is so, one would need to do a more comprehensive study of the culture than of its proverbs alone. Nevertheless, as "cultural signs", they do repay careful study, as his survey of the "Yankee wisdom" embodied in New England proverbs demonstrates. They can function overtly and authoritatively (as well as subversively) to guide behaviour and orient people in socially sanctioned ways as they face life's challenges. The value

of historical depth in a study of this kind is clear. Benjamin Franklin's eighteenth century promotion of proverbs as repositories of generations of wisdom is argued to have played an important role in developing attitudes to the world that are recognized as typical of New England folk. In the nineteenth century Ralph Waldo Emerson also reflected extensively on the nature and role of proverbs in human life, using them copiously himself in his writings and building on Franklin's contribution. Although many of the proverbs discussed in Mieder's paper are widely found in the Unites States, a significant core are not widely known, according to Mieder, although frequently heard in New England. These have to do with ingenuity and common sense, independence and perseverance, thrift and economy, the value of silence, attitudes to work, friends, enemies, money and fate, etc. They intermesh effectively to constitute what might well be regarded as evidence of a "worldview" marked by reserve and careful and serious management of human affairs.

A starkly different picture of a culture's typical patterns of response to daily experience is presented by Pam Peters in her paper on similes and other evaluative idioms in Australian English. Like the proverbs discussed above, the wealth of formulaic structures she discusses are shown to index a values framework that gives the society in which it is current (and individuals within that society) culturally acceptable ways of understanding and engaging with life's ups and downs. Unlike the reticent seriousness of Mieder's New Englanders, however, Peters's Australians use an extensive stock of often comic conventionalized similes and evaluative grammatical frames to make light of life's challenges and to ruthlessly (or slyly) undercut all kinds of pretence. Australians, it seems, not only draw on a cultural script that, traditionally at least, gives weekends iconic status, but also another that elevates word play, alliteration and rhythmic and structural properties characteristic of oral poetry to a colloquial art form. This script guides evaluation of behaviour and helps people cope with the more oppressive impingements of life's contingencies.

The paper is a model of systematic exploration of the kind of prefabricated structures that Peters examines. She lists her sources in detail, draws profitably on relevant historical material, tracks changes and variations in meaning, extracts, describes and analyses recurrent themes that emerge from the data, analyses the structures of open grammatical frames, and identifies rhetorical and literary devices that contribute to the effectiveness and memorability of the idioms treated. A useful advance organizer helps the reader anticipate and negotiate the structure of the report, while a synthesis

of major themes and their theoretical value in terms of the postulated cultural script is provided at the end. The Australian ethos, as suggested by the patterns uncovered in this study, encourages people to face adversity with stubborn resilience and wry humour, to draw on extravagantly elaborated tropes when making judgments about other people's behaviour and to use word play to mask unkind references. It maximizes the value of iconic vernacular terms drawn from the rural and later rudimentary urban experiences of European settlers in previous centuries and exploits them innovatively in contemporary journalism and conversational repartee.

In terms of the rhetorical and pragmatic force of similes and other evaluative formulae used in the context she describes, Peters argues that their purpose is to render key words or concepts especially salient by embellishing them in artful ways and, in doing so, giving extra force to the evaluations embodied in them.

The pragmatic force and cultural use of modals is routinely taught in English foreign language classes and research into individual lexical items is well established, but little has been done to date on the possibility that modality clusters may carry composite meanings not decomposable to their constituent elements. Svenja Adolphs's paper demonstrates the value of a corpus based study of spoken language in this regard, showing how Sinclair's 1991 "idiom principle" sees certain co-selection patterns occurring in preference to others, with consequent impacts on meaning. Whereas, on the basis of what is routinely taught, accumulation of modality items might be expected to either increase the degree of politeness or have an incremental effect on speech act indirectness, the two structures focused on in the paper, *might just* and *could possibly*, not only do not validate such expectations but are intriguingly shown to have meanings that are diametrically opposed to the meanings of their constituents. Methodologically, this study again shows the value of conducting principled analyses of authentic language on the scale made possible by electronically accessible corpora. In this case, the use of five categories of material ranging from "intimate" to "pedagogical" also pays dividends, helping to reveal preferred contexts of use in finer detail than might otherwise be possible. Adolphs's attention to intonation patterns also highlights the importance of this dimension in phraseological studies.

While there is a clear case for further research into modality clusters and for new approaches to teaching culturally specific politeness routines in English varieties, it is also important to acknowledge how difficult it is for even advanced learners to use politeness formulae with completely native like proficiency. When it comes to the use of culture-specific similes and

idiomatic evaluative formulae with iconic status, study rather than use should probably be advised as a means of gaining entry to the target culture. Apart from anything else, some of the impact of these sayings may be carried by the distinctive speech style and pronunciation patterns of native speakers – this is a possibly productive area for further research in the Australian context at least. Proverbs are possibly not so different. Learning to notice recurrent patterns of occurrence of conventionalized formulations like these can be helpful in building insight into the cultural preoccupations of groups and is valuable in itself. Learning when, how often and in precisely what contexts to use specific proverbs in a native like way that enhances fluency and does not distract listeners is, however, more challenging.

4. Formulaicity in speech registers

The papers by Melina Magdalena and Peter Mühlhäusler, Andrea Gerbig and Angela Shek, and Karin Aijmer in this volume provide interesting insights into the role of conventionalized language patterns as markers of register and participant identity as integral to the construction of identifiable fields of cultural activity. In all three studies, attention to changes over time in patterns of use helps to clarify the significance of current patterns, either in terms of their ideological implications or, in the case of Aijmer's study of messages left on telephone answering machines, in terms of the functional refinement of routines over time, as the technology involved became more familiar to users.

Magdalena and Mühlhäusler investigate the relatively new semantic domain of "eco-speak" or "green-speak". They identify, among other things, typical construction patterns of high frequency terms, the emergence, both planned and unplanned, of new multiword units, the shortening of word bases over time as words become emotively charged or central in discourse within the register, sub-register use and user contrasts between alternative forms of terms (e.g. *eco-* versus *ecological* in compound units), the widespread use (and more recent subversion by corporate advertising in some cases) of slogans and catch cries, and so on, generating some intriguing insights in the process. One example, the substitution of *malestream* for *mainstream* among some users, throws the key concept into "conceptual relief". We saw similar word play in examples documented by Pam Peters. In both cases, Hockett's (1987) discussion of the power of resonances of all kinds in the internalized linguistic system helps us to understand how this con-

ceptual highlighting is achieved (see also Lee 1996 for discussion of Hockett's theory).

The high frequency of abstract compound nouns in the register (e.g. *resource development*, *management strategies*, etc.) where verbal constructions (e.g. *develop the resources, plan ways to manage*, etc.) would provide alternative construals focusing on human agency and responsibility for outcomes is described in terms of "language calming" and "thingification". We might recall that Halliday and his associates (e.g. Halliday and Martin 1993) have a long tradition of referring to this phenomenon as "grammatical metaphor", arguing that it deserves careful metalinguistic attention in the interest of ensuring that we, as speakers and writers, are not unwittingly hijacked into implying attitudes that we do not consciously subscribe to. The nominalizing process is highly efficient in compressing concepts into compact linguistic packages and has its place in many discourse contexts, especially in written scientific reports. For skilled users of registers who rely heavily on it, it promotes fluency, especially when the compounds are highly conventionalized. Its downside is that it backgrounds or totally obscures agency. To do so, as Magdalena and Mühlhäusler stress, may be to harbour an ideology that may or may not be in line with users' expressed convictions.

One tends to forget that spoken language corpora have now been around for over 30 years. That they can be put to excellent use to track register changes is demonstrated by the other two papers in this section of the volume. Aijmer's 1970s data reveal the uncertainty many of us faced when first requested to leave messages for people who had failed to respond to our telephone calls. Formulaic phrases used in letter writing or person-to-person interactions make their appearance in the data, as do indications of confusion or concern. By contrast, data from the 1990s show more stable configurations of conversational routines using predictable and functionally efficient formulae suited to the task of communicating with someone who is not there as we speak.

Bearing in mind Wray's (2002) reservations and cautions about what corpus linguistics can and may not be able to deliver with regard to better understanding of formulaic sequences, the paper by Gerbig and Shek is exemplary in methodological terms. Key theoretical concepts are explained, a brief background section on the topic of the research (tourism) provides historical context in general terms, and findings from corpora from different periods of time (again ranging from the 1970s to the 1990s) are systematically compared as a means of tracking specific changes over time. A

thoughtful theoretical discussion of what it means to talk about relation-ships between language, cognition and culture is also offered.

The authors instructively make use of constructivist concepts synthe-sized from a variety of sources and argue that corpus analysis can highlight "norms, routines and deviances probably not obvious to the language user". References to Halliday's (1978) concept of "duality" acknowledge the re-ciprocity of the relationship between "cultural-institutional" and "individual-cognitive" processes in diachronic variation (Halliday 1992, 1993). Although the terminology is different, the point is the one I made in the previous sec-tion when discussing the dialectical interplay between psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic constitutive processes. Gerbig and Shek's review of litera-ture on collocational activity and associated formulaicity in language further consolidates the theoretical foundation they provide for their tightly con-strained investigation of collocational patterns associated with the key words *tourist/tourists* and *travel* and the phrase *package holiday*. "Intertextual nets" in which concepts are delimited by their neighbours are identified in the data and used to show cultural shifts in relation to who is able and expected to travel, and to show changing values with regard to the benefits of travel.

The authors make a strong case for including corpus-based studies of the kind they model in larger ethnographic investigations, emphasizing the value of including a linguistic focus in such studies. I would concur, having long been concerned about tendencies in the social sciences to focus on the con-tent of what informants or their texts say without turning metalinguistic attention onto the language patterns themselves. If language, and especially highly entrenched formulaic language, is constitutive of linguistic thinking, then studying these patterns helps to show the structure of cognitive activ-ity whenever it involves activation of the internalized linguistic system at any level, overt or covert. To say that there are always alternative ways of saying things, that the creative potential (Sinclair's 1991 "open principle") is always available even when habitual formulations are more readily ac-cessible, is not, in my opinion, to prove that there is "no direct link between language use, cognition and culture", as Gerbig and Shek cautiously ob-serve. What it does prove is that we are not *bound* to make particular utter-ances in particular contexts, like automatons. This point was made by many leading linguists in the mid-twentieth century, not least by Hockett (1968) in his joust with Chomsky as the creativity banner began to prevail over that of habitual behaviour, or as we say now, conventionalization. As Hockett pointed out (p. 54), stability in a system is not to be confused with determi-nacy (or 'well-definition').

Neither culture nor cognitive activity can exist without language in a languaging species. If these phenomena are inextricably interrelated, as is so often stated, this must be taken into account when relationships between them are discussed, as I argued at length in Lee (1996). Language, as Chomsky stressed, is essentially a mental as well as a social phenomenon and linguistics is one of the cognitive sciences. Although some kinds of cognitive activity do not involve linguistic processes, they are more rare than we might like to think in the case of most people. Not only does culture integrally include much that is linguistic, but we, as individuals, are also significantly enculturated through language and cannot easily thereafter separate process from product. We plan, solve problems, and understand relationships and events through the use of culturally sanctioned and idiolectally internalized scripts, frames or schemata that come into being as a function of habitual exposure to, and use of, language patterns available in social environments. It is often difficult to separate language and thought introspectively and is similarly problematic from a theoretical point of view. This is the case even though certain kinds of thinking (for instance some kinds of planning and problem solving) do not involve language, and, as Sapir (1921: 14) wryly reminds us with his reference to the "grooves of habitual expression", some highly conventionalized utterances do not require conscious attention or a monitorable level of cognitive engagement.

5.   Formulaic language and dialectology

Christian Mair (this volume: p. 423) cogently argues that phraseology is the "'blind' spot in variety identification". Configurations of variety-specific lexico-grammatical features may be so subtle as to be identifiable only in a statistical sense and with difficulty, even then, if corpora are not large or representative enough. By contrast, distinctive pronunciation features contributing to a recognizable accent are generally easier to identify and describe and are more consistently available in small samples of oral language. This means that the challenge of differentiating between written forms of different varieties, where pronunciation is unavailable, is one that dialectology has yet to fully come to grips with. Mair argues that it requires a shift from studying isolated words to engaging with the text at the level of style and discourse. Context needs to be taken into account, especially the level of formality or informality. A globally accepted core of language patterns provides the point of departure in assessing written texts.

Varietal distinctiveness emerges probabilistically and provisionally wherever choices are allowed, in formal written English at least. (We might note that electronic communication in new varieties of English is a whole new ball game for dialectologists from the point of view of lexico-grammatical distinctiveness.) Mair (p. 425) argues that "a discourse- and performance-based model of variability in written English will also be a culturally sensitive one" since collocational profiles that reflect varietal selection patterns and idiomaticity are necessarily cultural profiles. He goes further, asserting that: "idiomatic and collocational preferences are the most direct reflection of a community's attitudes and preoccupations in linguistic structure".

Mair's paper models an exploratory web-based approach to investigating differences between British, American, Irish, Australian, South African, Canadian, and New Zealand English. His techniques for establishing baseline data against which variation may be measured repay careful study, as it is the use of the baseline range of occurrence of variety-neutral items that throws variety-specific patterns of occurrence into relief where they can be identified. Mair makes the point that, although collocations of interest occur in frequency ranges that are only just able to be dealt with using tools available today, ultimately the goal is comprehensive automatized profiling of collocational patterns to the point where the varietal origin of texts can be identified on language-internal grounds.

Attention to conventionalized collocations in spoken language can also be useful from a dialectal point of view. This is demonstrated by Ian Malcolm and Farzad Sharifian and Daniel Schreier in their papers on Aboriginal and Tristan da Cunha Englishes, respectively. Some of the phenomena they describe operate as complexes of interconnected signals of shared identity (along with pronunciation features) that are generally out of speaker awareness, although noticeable by outsiders. Others may have high metalinguistic salience and be emblematic of that identity, as is sometimes revealed in comments to outsiders who unsuccessfully appropriate patterns "owned" by the dialect group. This seems to be the case with greeting formulae in Tristan da Cunha, for instance.

Malcolm and Sharifian's compendium of processes involved in generating variety-specific lexemes and multiword units in Aboriginal English shows how lexico-grammatical patterning and metaphorical extension can be intimately associated with conceptual schemas of central cultural significance. They argue that this demonstrates that English has been appropriated for cultural uses that maintain and nourish traditional ways of relating to the world, a point that is also made by Hans-Georg Wolf and Frank Polzenhagen in

their paper on fixed expressions as manifestations of cultural conceptualizations in African varieties of English. The latter authors bring corpus, cognitive and cultural linguistics together to show that, in the varieties they study, key words collocate differently from the way they do in, for example, British English, and that they index culture-specific conceptual frames that are continuous with those traditionally structured and accessed through African languages.

6.   Conclusion

I began this paper by asserting the centrality of conventionalized language in competence and performance and by arguing that linguistics as a discipline needs to acknowledge this in a practical way by giving significantly more attention to formulaic language in introductory textbooks than is currently the practice. I also discussed the value of having a "big picture" understanding of the broader field in which one works when conceptualizing one's own research problems and questions. The study of conventionalization in language – in both process and product terms – will always constitute a sprawling and conceptually unwieldy field because of the diversity of perspectives that can be taken. That very diversity, however, points to the centrality of the phenomena under investigation. To develop a sound appreciation of the role of one's own research in developing better understandings of relationships between language, cognition, society and culture, one really needs some level of awareness, at least in a peripheral way, of the state of the art in the contributing areas of research that Pawley describes in his opening paper. To gain a better sense of the specific ways in which research is advancing, and where more work is needed, one might profitably look again at Pawley's paper and, in particular, his list of research questions (Pawley, this volume p. 11–12) summarized below. These, it will be recalled, had emerged as relevant to the study of formulaic language by the end of the 1970s. Pawley also reviewed developments in a number of the areas involved.

   Pawley's questions first deal with issues of taxonomy and description. He asked how we are progressing in the identification of well-formed conventional expressions in text. He then considers classification, asking what structural and functional criteria need to be taken into account. Transcription issues feature next. These definitely need more attention than they are currently receiving, if only because conventionalized expressions can

be especially difficult for non-native listeners to understand in speech. Better insights into shifts of pace, prosodic structure and slurring of pronunciation in the articulation of prefabricated expressions are urgently needed for more effective language teaching. Also from a technical point of view, Pawley draws attention to the fact that we are still developing the substantive concepts and a repertoire of notional devices needed to describe variability in productive formulae. When it comes to the composition of pragmatic speech formulae (also referred to as situation-bound expressions and discourse-strategic formulae), Pawley stresses the importance of identifying the range of features that set them apart from word-like conventional phrases that often operate as large lexemic units. He lists eight criteria and comments that there are still relatively few studies that attempt to accommodate the full array of features of these "quintessential speech formulae" which function as "tried and true ways of doing things" in recurrent social situations. A substantial amount of work on oral formulaic genres has been done by Kuiper and his colleagues (see reference list for representative examples), but this is another area in which more work might fruitfully occur; parliamentary discourse comes to mind. Finally, in regard to matters of taxonomy and description, it is still profitable to try to estimate the prevalence of formulae in so-called "ordinary language". The answers have profound implications for linguistic theory and cognitive science.

Pawley also lists research questions about the role of formulae in speech production and comprehension. In spite of his pioneering work with Syder in the 1980s, we still need to know more about the psycholinguistic and social dimensions of native-like selection, fluency and comprehension. At the core of this issue is the baffling question of how speakers (and listeners) know what is native-like and what is not when choices available in what may be said are all grammatically acceptable. The fluency of simultaneous interpreters is equally puzzling from a processing point of view. We also need better ways of understanding and talking about social enculturation. Pawley draws attention to the fact that we may know that well socialized native speakers know when and what to say in different situations, but we do not yet have a satisfactory theoretical framework that brings developmental, psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic perspectives into engagement with each other for talking about how this happens, although progress is being made in understanding acquisition of conventional expressions in children and adults and their role in neurolinguistic terms. Pawley reminds us that questions about the location of different kinds of language processes in the brain and

the functions of formulae in aphasia are still important questions that help to throw light on formulaic language in normal social and cultural use.

Pawley also reminds us that at the heart of all these concerns in theoretical terms, given the widely held assumptions by theoreticians and practical linguists alike that grammar and lexicon are in some sense essentially different and separate, there are questions to do with the origin of grammar, the grammar-lexicon boundary and the kinds of models we need to bring conventional language from the periphery of theoretical attention to its core. In this context we might do well to listen to Hockett (1987: 87) who argued that we should throw out the morpheme notion

> and just acknowledge that idioms come in a variety of sizes. Some idioms, true enough, are tiny and compact and don't seem to be divisible into smaller pieces that are also idioms. But that is a matter of degree…

I refer readers to Hockett's book for an instructive and extensive exploration of this idea developed in the context of an acute awareness that everything we say and think (linguistically) depends on our exposure to, and absorption of, language patterns we have heard and probably said before. Of course creativity as well as conventionality is fundamental to language use, but the small chunks of language that we put together or pull apart may not be so very different from the large chunks with their inbuilt mini-grammars and situation-bound ties when it comes to creative manipulation. A proper understanding of language takes this into account and accepts that cultural as well as social and cognitive perspectives on language knowledge and use are all needed if we are to develop a better understanding of what we do when we talk, listen, read, write and engage in thinking that activates the internalized linguistic system at any level.

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