

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Language, Politics and Society

The New Languages Department

Festschrift in Honour of Professor D.E. Ager

Edited by
Sue Wright, Linda Hantrais and
Jolyon Howorth

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Dennis E. Ager
Professor of Modern Languages
Aston University, 19711999

Contents

Introduction

Sue Wright and Jolyon Howorth

The thirteen essays in this volume are dedicated to Professor Dennis Ager on his retirement.

Their range is eloquent testimony to the catholicity and openness of Professor Ager's approach to what was originally called 'Area Studies'. They celebrate the diversity over which he presided as head of the French department and head of the faculty of Modern Languages in the period 19711998. Dennis Ager was one of the instigators of a new style of modern languages department in which literary criticism played a lesser role and where contemporary politics and society replaced them as the main focus of study Although a linguist by training, he was convinced that a new approach was required in language departments with inputs from across the whole range of disciplines clustering under the umbrella of the social and human sciences. Another innovation was the belief that this scrutiny would be undertaken *entirely* in the language of the society studied. Since language acquisition was often linked to the study of texts on the same subjects, the distinction between language classes proper and study of the society was blurred; there were no longer two strands to a languages degree. This model has been refined and elaborated over the years, but the philosophy remains essentially the same as that developed in the mould-breaking innovations of the 1970s to which Dennis Ager contributed so influentially He not only advanced theory tested out in his own department and in his own classes, but was also instrumental in promoting the associations which spread the new ideas and socialised academics into the new culture.

All the authors in this present volume are, or have been, members of the faculty at Aston. Dennis Ager had an outstanding gift for spotting talented young researchers and, as the list of former Aston staff demonstrates, succeeded in building up and constantly replenishing a department which acted as a crucible for many of the teachers and scholars who currently lead the field both at Aston and in other departments throughout the country Above all, he knew how to encourage his staff to give of their best, both in teaching and in

research. He always managed to find ways of helping staff to deliver papers at international conferences, to take time out for necessary fieldwork, to associate themselves with research centres in Europe and the United States. Leading from the front by taking on the enormous and growing responsibility of heading a complex and dynamic department over a very long period, he allowed his staff to get on and do their own thing in ways which gradually helped put Aston on the map.

In his own research and writing he dealt with the interface of language and society and helped found the new discipline of sociolinguistics. His work on language and polity in the French-speaking world inspired generations of undergraduates and postgraduates. His books on the subject led to international recognition.

These essays reveal some of the diversity inherent in the new style languages department. Its members are political scientists, economists, sociologists and sociolinguists who only differ from their colleagues in social science faculties and business schools in that they give their courses in the target language. The authors in this collection are typical of the heterogeneity over which Dennis presided and show how the interests of the new language department intermesh with many other disciplines.

In the first essay, Mike Townson shows how the idea that language can best be learnt in its social environment developed in tandem with the ideas on instrumental and integrative motivation for learning languages introduced through the work of Gardner and Lambert (1972). Their concept of integration demanded a process of acculturation with learners coming to understand the values shared by the speakers of the target language and able to draw upon the same intertextual skills (in their widest sense) as those born into the community of communication. It follows that language learners in higher education need a thorough understanding of the social, political and historical context in which the speakers of that language operate. Intellectually this allows them to step outside the confines of their own socialisation and reflect more easily upon it than those imprisoned within a monolingual and monocultural experience.

The essays by Eva Kolinsky, Mark Roseman and Mairi Maclean have a historical dimension and show the long shadow cast by the Second World War on the European societies being studied. Roseman and Kolinsky review some widely propagated assertions and present new evidence which must lead us to make more nuanced judgements on what could have been the reality of those times. Roseman questions the claim that it was difficult for Germans to know what was

taking place in the concentration camps by showing that it was possible to gain detailed knowledge of the transports for those who had the nerve to listen to the illegal broadcasts of the BBC. Kolinsky reviews the very small Jewish community that survived the Holocaust in Germany and who elected to remain there after the war. The identity which this group built for itself depended on distance from the host community and a rejection of its past. Maclean discusses the political and economic muscle of the 200 families who constitute the core of the French business class and reveals some of the intertwining networks of the French élite. She shows how structures built during the Vichy era survived the Liberation and still exercise influence today.

France comes under the microscope again in the essays of Gino Raymond, Susan Hayward and Jim Shields. Shields' essay is a Political Science piece, giving an account of the recent split in the *Front National* and explaining the effect this dissension has had on *FN* results in the recent European elections. The situation is complex since, in addition to the split, the *FN* constituency is changing radically In the 1980s, the main pool of support had been among sections of the extreme right wing, Catholic bourgeoisie. Now the typical *FN* supporter and voter belongs to a deprived sector of society is likely to be unemployed, to have a low level of educational achievement and to be young and male. In the wake of this change, Shields shows how the party has changed tack on some of its policies, particularly social welfare. The ultra-liberal position has been jettisoned for a promise of more benefits (reserved of course for French nationals exclusively). Hayward's essay is in the Cultural Studies tradition. She traces the semiotics of the city in the French cinema, arguing that class and political division are revealed through location, in a shorthand which metropolitan audiences immediately apprehended. She finds that this has been true for all phases of the French cinema from the early depictions of the working class at play in certain popular Parisian *arrondissements* to the studies of social exclusion made during the last decade. Raymond directs our attention to the development of attitudes and movements which are undermining Republicanism and the traditional relationship of the centralising state to its citizenry He finds that the focus of power is both more local and more international than before, and that the congruence of nation and state is proving as transitory in France as in many other 'nation' states.

The next set of essays, from Jolyon Howorth, Andreas Musolff, Linda Hantrais and Sue Wright, moves the focus to Europe and to its impact on aspects of French, German and British life. Howorth's paper

evaluates the effect that the European cooperation on Kosovo may have on the development of a European security and defence identity. He shows through a review of two articles how attitudes have altered in the last few years and how it has become more feasible that some kind of European institution may develop. He recounts the background to the concept of European defence and the ongoing debate over the relationship of the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU). He argues that the political/defence establishment has always seen Europeanisation as more threatening than is the case among the commercial classes. However, the context has changed. Sovereignty is threatened and the nation state appears powerless on its own. Now perhaps common defence can be envisaged. Musolff explores the political uses of imagery in an essay which relates the political to the linguistic. He assembles a number of instances where the image of the train has been used to portray the European project. For pro-Europeanists, the train speeding on its way down a predefined track represents the way that integration has become an unstoppable process. The power of the propulsion shows there is no turning back. For commentators, the image of the driver or the reluctant passenger always ready to leave the train is convenient shorthand to evoke the relative commitment of the various Member States. For those opposed to European integration, the images of the single track, the uniform speed and the obligatory halts imposed by the railway system are employed to underline the unbearable constraints inherent in Europeanisation. Hantrais examines aspects of methodology in studying the societies of Europe. She questions whether the nation state is the most appropriate unit for studying variation, when there is greater difference between Paris and the Limousin, the north and the south of Italy, the east and the west of Germany (for example) than there is between many of the Member States. Moreover, Europe is remarkably homogenous when compared with other parts of the world. The comparisons that can be made are less significant than the contrasts which can be drawn between Europe and the rest. Hantrais also considers the theoretical grounding of sociological research in Europe, reflecting on questions of culture, relativism and universalism in the European tradition. Sue Wright traces the waxing and waning of the use of lingua francas within the European space and notes that they mirror political events closely In the medieval period when marriage across linguistic frontiers among members of the ruling class was habitual and when the Catholic church provided a pan-European framework, Europeans used lingua francas and

practised personal multilingualism. In the era of nationalism these practices waned. As European integration progresses, it becomes clear that the lack of a European community of communication is a barrier to certain aspects of the process.

The last two essays are also sociolinguistic in approach. Frank Knowles reviews language policy in the USSR, reminding the reader of the curious mixture of tolerant multiculturalist policies and top-down language imposition that the communist regime followed. He suggests that the new regime has need of a new breed of sociolinguists who will monitor and explain language use and change rather than set and implement norms. He regrets the previous lack of data and wonders whether there will now be a different approach. Chris Upward's piece is an appeal for more logic in the orthography of English. In an elegantly argued piece he shows that it would be appropriate to envisage reform given the role English has come to play as a lingua franca and the difficulty of acquiring it for many second language learners. He sets out some of the changes suggested by the Simplified Spelling Society movement in which he has played a leading role. Of course, such changes would be difficult to implement given the psychological attachment that mother tongue speakers develop for their language. The outrage which greeted the minor spelling reforms suggested by the French and German governments illustrates the immense resistance that such comprehensive reforms would provoke.

This Festschrift is an expression of our thanks to Dennis for his support and encouragement over the years. It is also to celebrate his own scholarship. We were always intrigued by his ideas and inventiveness. We also admired his tenacity and energy He kept writing and publishing even when serving as head of faculty, dean and pro-vice chancellor, where his duties were often onerous and time consuming.

Dennis also paid particular attention to the social dimension of the department's life. Members of the 'Aston diaspora' will all remember with pleasure evenings spent at the Agers' home where Annis Ager's outstanding culinary skills were properly appreciated. There was a sense of family about the department and, despite the inevitable irritations and rows which are such a feature of academic life (put a handful of prima donnas in a room and watch them declare war on one another), Dennis Ager always managed to keep everybody pulling in the same direction. It is, as everybody knows, a source of some sadness that, as a result of a new managerial style from on high which hit the university in the 1980s, many colleagues moved on as soon as they felt ready But, by the same token, this constant re-stocking of the

department was a source of unusual strength. It used to be said that the biggest political party in France was that made up of former members of the Communist Party. Although the analogy is in many ways inappropriate (Aston and Communism do not immediately appear to belong in the same frame), it is probably the case that the biggest virtual Modern Languages department in the UK is composed of former members of the Aston department. And yet, as this volume goes to press, the Aston department remains strong and confident with a fourth generation of scholars bearing the Ager torch.

This volume is dedicated to a great teacher, inspirer, scholar and friend.

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Christopher Upward taut jermn for 25 years at Aston University until retiring in 1995. From 1982, folloing Dennis Agers encurajmnt, he became incresingly involvd in spelng studis, subsequently contributing articls on th subject and devising th Cut Spelng systm of simplifyd spelng for english.

Sue Wright is a lecturer in the School of Languages and European Studies at Aston University. She has published extensively on language policy in France and Europe.

Chapter 1
Strange Encounters in the Fourth Dimension:
Foreign Language Study As a Voyage of Exploration

Michael Townson

This chapter considers the role of history within a third-level languages curriculum. Foreign language study is seen primarily as a concern with the other, and is metaphorised as a journey. A distinction is drawn between the traveller and the tourist. Language education is seen as a process which transcends the acquisition of (phonologically, morphologically, syntactically and lexically) 'accurate' language habits and also goes beyond the production of often instrumentally motivated 'appropriate' utterances. Its principal objective is a learning dialogue with the other, firstly to understand the other, but ultimately to gain a better understanding of self, i.e. a fuller appreciation of identity. Identity is perceived as being essentially a diachronic concept, enshrined in memory, and it can only be accessed through an awareness and knowledge of that memory.

The 'Aston Model' of foreign language study, with which Dennis Ager is closely identified, saw the study of language integrated with the study of contemporary society; language was located in its socio-cultural and socio-political context and was studied principally through the medium of contemporary texts. In this, the Aston Model was perceived as differing from 'traditional' models of foreign language study, which separated the study of language from the study of culture - studied mainly through the medium of literary texts and often concentrating on the historical at the expense of the contemporary This is not to say, however, that 'Aston' pursued an ahistorical or even anti-historical path, nor that it was somehow 'against' literature, as both literature and history had an established place in the curriculum. Given the constraints of the traditional three- or

four-year language degree, however, it is impossible to cover everything, and curricular decisions involve choices. At Aston, the emphases may have been different, but ultimately the dichotomy between the 'contemporary' and the 'traditional' must turn out to be a false one, and in the intervening period we have seen a growing synthesis between the two approaches. In this contribution I should like to 'map out' some thoughts on developments in foreign language study and consider some of the challenges facing the discipline and its role in developing notions of a European citizenship in the dialectic between unity and diversity I should like to do this by attempting a travelogue through the space/time continuum.

It is one of the contentions of this paper that a knowledge and appreciation of the past and responses to it is essential to the success of the European project, both for an understanding of its significance in overcoming centuries of rivalry and for an understanding of the diversity of European cultural identity. The recognition and appreciation of cultural diversity is of particular importance, as one of the strengths of Europe is the wealth which this diversity affords, and European regional policy rightly has as one of its objectives support for sub-national cultures. The alternative to a Europe drawing strength from the richness of its cultural diversity is that of a Europe which is no more than a trading association, held together by a superficial instrumental communication and with a cultural uniformity which will probably owe more to extra-European influences.

The travel metaphor is powerful and pervasive; images of travel accompany us throughout life's journey (*sic*). We find them in both the personal and the public sphere; sometimes they are grounded in 'real' journeys - as in the 'Long March' - but more often they are deployed as a metaphor of process - process, because very often the route and the destination are unclear; the journey is into the unknown, the voyage is one of discovery.

The discovery may be of that which is outside the self, of 'the other', but very often it is of the self, of that which is within. For many, the goal of life's journey is self-knowledge, the realisation that truth and reality are to be found within oneself; thus, for example, Gottfried Benn, in one of his later poems *Reisen* (1950) negates the value of travelling:

> Ach, vergeblich das Fahren
> Spät erst erfahren Sie sich:
> bleiben und stille bewahren
> das sich umgrenzende Ich.

As well as life being metaphorised as a journey the theme of the journey as an educational experience is also a prevalent one in Western literature and culture, whether the journey is allegorical, as in Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* or actual, in a pilgrimage or the aristocratic 'Grand Tour' of earlier centuries. Heinrich von Kleist, for example, in his *Aufsatz, den sichern Weg des Glücks zu finden* writes; "Denn Bildung muß der Zweck der Reise sein.'

We are thus following a well-trodden path (*sic*) if we adopt the topos of the journey to examine some aspects of (foreign) language education.

The journey motif is, of course, particularly appropriate here, as the desire to travel often provides an instrumental motivation for the study of a foreign language, and the potential to visit 'target cultures' and demonstrate an ability actually to use the language in its 'natural surroundings' is often seen as the culmination of a course of study. For this reason, the study of foreign languages in the majority of universities on these islands includes an obligatory period of residence in the territory of the language studied, and much effort and thought goes into ensuring that students derive the maximum benefit from the experience.

It is, however, not only on this aspect that I wish to concentrate, as travelling to a foreign country is but one means of interfacing with another culture - and I am alluding here not to the often superficial and trivial toying with 'virtual reality' via the Internet, but to the considered and deepening engagement with the manifestations of that culture through the medium of literature, art, music and film.

When we undertake a 'real' journey, we travel through landscapes shaped by time - whether measured in the millions of years of geological formation, the thousands of years of human impact on the 'natural' environment or the (mainly) hundreds of years enshrined in the 'built' environment. If we are to understand the landscapes of our journey, then we must also 'travel' through their developmental strata, so that a journey in space also involves a journey in time - it means engaging with history.

It is suggested that the 'journey' analogy applies to language study in two ways; firstly to the study of the language itself, and secondly to the involvement with the culture expressed in and through the language - and of which the language is itself a part. Let us concentrate on the second.

For too many years, foreign language teaching (FLT) theory and methodology were bedevilled by technocratic behaviourist theories of learning which concentrated on the 'surface' features of the language

in terms of pronunciation, vocabulary and grammar. There was insufficient acknowledgement of the fact that the acquisition of a new language involves far more than the learning of a new set of verbal habits and that the successful language student will have to appreciate and adopt appropriate features of behaviour which characterise the members of a different linguistic community; for that student, the words, the grammatical patterns, the mode of pronunciation, and the sounds themselves will have a significance and a value of their own as distinctive aspects of the behaviour of the other cultural group that does not require reference back to the learner's original language in the form of simple translations or glosses given by a teacher, a grammar book or a dictionary.

The 'in many ways ideal learner' will be oriented principally towards the representatives of a novel and interesting ethnolinguistic community, towards *people* with whom s/he would like to develop personal ties, in other words the ideal learner is willing to embark on a voyage of exploration and is open to the experience of alterity. In ground-breaking work on motivation some 25 years ago, Lambert and associates suggested that this type of learner possesses what they call an '*integrative*' motivation.

There is, however, also a different type of motivation, which Lambert *et al*. regarded as being less democratic, and this is the type of motivation which obtains when the learner is interested primarily in acquiring a skill or tool which will be of use in some future occupation, but has little genuine regard for the people or the culture represented by the other language. Indeed, in certain circumstances, the learner might be anxious to develop skill in another group's language as a means of getting on the 'inside' of another cultural community in order to exploit, manipulate or control, with only selfish ends in mind. Typical instances here might be the spy, the 'imported' revolutionary or a representative of multinational fast-food chain.

Now, 'integrative' and 'instrumental' motivations are ends of a continuum; they are not binary choices, and it can and does often happen that a learner may well start off with an essentially instrumental motivation, but in the course of his/her studies will grow to appreciate the 'target' culture - often as a result of experiencing it first-hand - and thus develop an increasingly integrative attitude towards his/her language study, and perhaps one of the most valuable things a language teacher can do is to try and foster an integrative approach by encouraging students to explore and to build up their own picture of the language and its speakers by engaging with these in an explorative manner. The proposition here is that 'deep', i.e.

integrative language learning involves a process of acculturation, and it is suggested that there are two aspects to this.

The first relates to socialisation, which is a matter of learning the norms of acceptable social behaviour, norms which are not only transmitted via language but also consist very largely of standards of appropriate, i.e. acceptable, *verbal* behaviour, such as learning not only which words and phrases to use, but also learning who speaks to whom when, and importantly learning which words are not to be used.

Now, much of what has been said here about socialisation can in fact be applied more generally to human learning, particularly to 'apprentice' models, which can be seen as a process of socialisation in a new 'community of practice', part of which process involves an increasing command of the discourses of that community.

We now need to go into more detail as we discuss what is involved in becoming a 'cultured', i.e. integrated (as opposed to a 'naked', i.e. instrumental), linguist. Or, to remain with the journey metaphor, what is it that distinguishes the traveller from the tourist?

It is suggested that firstly it is to do with *understanding* and with *appropriate behaviour* (i.e. acting in the right way), with being able to 'move comfortably within a culture', and that the rote/formulaic modes of learning which still bedevil much discussion of 'language teaching' are not adequate to the demands of sophistication and flexibility placed on the successful language graduate. An alternative is one which encourages reflection and experimentation, reflection so that students are aware both of their learning tasks and the reasons behind them, and experimentation because this leads to discovery and gives students ownership of their knowledge. What is required is reflective learners who can formulate, discuss and test hypotheses about the target language and culture, who can develop interests and specialisms and thus construct and own their command and perception of the target language and culture.

'Moving comfortably in a culture' involves being able to engage with educated native speakers in uninhibited discourse, i.e. the ability to initiate discourse, to appreciate target language (TL) texts at all levels and to formulate adequate responses. This means that actively and passively foreign language graduates should possess 'near-native competence' which will enable them to pick up and appreciate cues and references, to appreciate, explain and contextualise artefacts, and to appreciate, understand and handle situations with reference to the culture and institutions of the target societies. Although the texts initiating discourse and the responses to TL texts will not necessarily

display all the complexities of texts originating from educated native speakers of the TL, the competent non-native must be able to understand and appreciate the complexities of TL texts at the syntactic, lexical, content and cultural levels, i.e. be able to grasp text-internal and text-external references and relationships, and have a sufficiently wide vocabulary and knowledge of the principles of word-formation in the TL to be able to deduce the reference of unfamiliar lexical items. Now, these are 'universal' requirements which can apply to the instrumentally motivated as well as the integratively motivated.

At this point the use of the term 'integrative' should be examined a little more closely. In debates on national identity and the role and treatment of 'immigrants', one finds three positions taken up - 'ghettoisation', 'integration' and 'assimilation', the two extremes indicating denial, either of the 'host' culture or of the 'immigrant' culture, while the middle position means enrichment of the two cultures. It is suggested that it is this central position which is the proper one for foreign language study. The ultimate aim of foreign language education, it is argued, is to help students develop the ability to engage with alterity, and by so doing to question their own identity as part of a process of self-discovery. The aim of foreign language study should not be to produce a clone of a native speaker, but to help students develop intercultural literacy and fluency; students should not be encouraged to deny their own identity and to 'assume' a foreign one, for if they do, they are replacing one monolinguality with another and possibly running the risk of developing a form of 'schizophrenia'. As foreign language educators, we should help students not only to 'move comfortably within a culture', but also to move comfortably between cultures, i.e. to acquire the ability to understand and to appreciate, but in addition to mediate, i.e. to explain both the target culture and their own culture, which requires the ability to produce and transmit adequate descriptions.

There are those who would see the student of a foreign language confronted with the 'target culture' in the role of the ethnographer, observing and registering customs and patterns of behaviour - perhaps by keeping a journal - and the ethnographic approach undoubtedly has its value and uses, particularly when the linguistic token of exchange is primarily oral; like any approach, however, it has its limitations. A simple example might serve to illustrate this. Take, for example, a humble artefact, a token of exchange - to be more precise, a German coin, around the edge of which are engraved the words 'Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit'. In his/her dealings with contemporary German life and politics, the student is more than likely to

have come across these terms on repeated occasions, and will thus be able to identify them as political keywords, an interpretation which will be strengthened if s/he happens to be present on one of those occasions when the German national anthem is sung, with its first line '*Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit für das deutsche Vaterland*', at which point the realisation will dawn that the engraving on the coin is in fact a quotation. A 'full' understanding will only come about, however, when s/he delves into the history of the text, discovering that it was written by Hoffmann von Fallersleben in 1841 as a manifestation of an attempt to establish an emancipatory nationalist tradition in Germany in opposition to the particularism of the aristocratic system restored after the Napoleonic Wars. S/he might also discover the significance of Hoffmann von Fallersleben's profession as a Germanist and link this to the political role of the 'new' subject of *Germanistik* and the political activities not only of Hoffmann von Fallersleben but also, for example, of the Grimms; further investigation would reveal that both the Grimms and Hoffmann von Fallersleben (among other Germanists) were dismissed from their posts for engaging in unwelcome political activity. Tracing 'Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit' back further would lead to the insight that we are, in fact, dealing with one of the influences of the French Revolution on German political thought, thus opening up the whole field of Franco-German relations, which could lead us off on to yet another track, studying the way in which perception of self is influenced by perception of the other, as evidenced by Kiberd's contention that Ireland was 'invented' by the English in order to strengthen their own sense of identity, in a similar way to that in which the 'Germans' played a major part in 'inventing' 'France' (Kiberd, 1995).

With this example, we come to a second aspect of acculturation, namely that of joining a tradition, of plugging into the collective memory which is culture. To a very large extent, 'culture' is a diachronic concept. Culture is a system of orientation for a group, and is handed down within that group; it draws on specific symbols, and it influences, indeed forms, its members' perceptions, thinking, values and actions, enabling them to come to terms with their environment by mapping on to it fields of action ranging from objects to institutions, ideas and values. Culture is then a matter of 'shared values' - 'A pattern of perceptions which is accepted and expected by an identity group is called a culture.'

Culture possesses an identity over time enshrined in its traditions. Cultures are to a very large part defined by their past; they have a continuous memory, a memory which is articulated in such phenomena

as the relationship to landscape, as Schama has so graphically demonstrated. In *Landscape and Memory*, Schama (1995) deals *inter alia* with the role of the forest for the German psyche, in which connection it is significant that in the ongoing environmental debate, it was the threat to the German forest, which embodies so much of the German 'soul', that acted as such a powerful trigger when it came to forcing the pace for the introduction of catalytic converters in automobile engines. Much of the German landscape is perceived as being defined by 'forests', hence *Waldsterben*, whereas it could be argued that the English landscape is defined by trees, and in English the term 'Tree-death' was used. Thus, culture is concerned with memory, with tradition, and the process of acculturation involves engaging with that tradition, a tradition enshrined in its symbolic forms, of which texts form a most important element.

The case of the German coin illustrates the importance of language in culture and memory, and demonstrates how, to connect with history, the artefact is linked to a text. The brief discussion of the Hoffmann text demonstrates two important points, the one being the role played by context in the interpretation of the historical text, the second - more important - one being the way in which one text (the engraving round the edge of the coin) points to another text.

Let us deal with these points in sequence. There can be no doubt that knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the production of a text can help us to understand its historicity, and may give some pointers to references and allusions within it. At the same time, however, we should not fall into the trap of regarding a literary text primarily as an historical source document relating to an extra-textual reality, although it will be useful in helping us to divine the spirit of an age. Far less is it a source for biographical speculation about the author, and here we have recourse to Ricoeur (1981:1467), who points to the essential break in the dialogic relation with the written text:

> . . . the book divides the act of writing and the act of reading into two sides, between which there is no communication. The reader is absent from the act of writing; the writer is absent from the act of reading. The text thus produces a double eclipse of the reader and the writer.

In a provocative, but ultimately flawed, paper by Wolfgang Klein (1995) which attempts to give academic respectability to Henry Ford's contention that 'History is bunk'. Klein (rightly) castigates that type of speculation which endeavours to draw biographical conclusions about the writer from the text (another misuse of a literary text as an

historical source document). The example he cites is that surrounding a passage from Goethe's *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, adduced by some as evidence that Goethe had (or may have had) homosexual inclinations (Klein 1995: 8889). Whether, however, the futility of that type of speculation can be used as an argument against the historical perspective as such, which appears to be the line Klein is pursuing, is more than dubious.

That being the case, we need to turn to our second point, which is neatly encapsulated in Steiner's comment quoted above that 'Western literature is more often than not about preceding literature' (1975: 461) i.e. that Western literature is concerned with intertextuality. The consequence of this is that in literary texts we are dealing with those continuities which lie at the heart of that tradition which determines our culture.

At this point we must beware of falling into another trap. Having warned against using literary texts purely as historical source documents, we must not see in them no more than the expression of cultural continuity, for to do so would be to ignore both their inherent creativity and their aestheticity. For the sake of the present argument, however, we shall set these aspects to one side.

Although the nineteenth century was concerned with establishing the study of 'national literatures' - an understandable enough undertaking, given the plurality of 'national' languages in which literature is written - one of the striking things about the European literary tradition is that one can sensibly talk about a *European* literary tradition, which is not, of course, to deny the vitality of local, regional and national traditions and the role played by texts in the national context. The key sources of this European tradition are to be found in Israel and Greece, and not only in the texts handed down from these two traditions, but also, as Jan Assmann has demonstrated, in the role played by texts in the Greek and Jewish traditions (Assmann, 1992). In a lecture delivered in Pforzheim on the occasion of his being awarded the Reuchlin Prize, Albrecht Schöne, Professor Emeritus of the University of Göttingen, took up a comment by Thomas Aquinas that 'the Jews are our book-makers and librarians' to illustrate the central significance of the Judaic tradition for European literature (Schöne, 1995). By way of illustration, he took the close parallels between Goethe's *Faust* and Books of the Old Testament. In his text, Schöne also utters a warning note about the loss of diachronic understanding, as knowledge of the old texts (on which our identity is founded) is lost, and here he echoes Steiner, who, two decades earlier, alerted us to 'the threat of dispersal, of a crisis in the organic coherence between

language and its cultural content' (Steiner, 1975: 467). Schöne is aware that he might be seen as engaging in cultural pessimism, but it behoves us all to be aware of the power of memory and the dangers of forgetting - for the only true death is oblivion. By helping our students engage with the past, we keep that past alive, and with it, our own sense of identity. By pointing to the role of tradition and showing that tradition does not stop at national boundaries, we are helping to contribute to a deep sense of European identity However, this appeal to the unity of the European humanist tradition is only one side of the coin; it concerns identity and not alterity.

When we come to consider the cultural role of language and text in the engagement with alterity, we can distinguish two elements, the one being the role of language as an identifier, the other seeing acculturation as the entry into an ongoing discourse.

In the same way that some cultures give themselves the same name as they give to 'human beings' (e.g. Bantu and Inuit), so some cultures regard their languages as being the only 'true' languages; thus, for example, the verb 'slovo', from which Slav is derived, means 'word', while the name given to German, 'nemjecki' means 'silence', i.e. the Slavs are the 'speakers' and the non-Slavs, the Germans, are the silent ones. We can observe the same kind of mechanism at work in the etymologies of words such as 'barbarian' and 'Welsh'. On a slightly different tack, the German word 'deutsch' for German literally means 'the vernacular', i.e. the language of the people, and in Germany as a fragmented political entity there is a long tradition of language as 'the unifying band'. In cultures with a re-awakening of their awareness, there is a strong sense of the value of language as a cultural identifier; thus in a *Guardian* article (17 October 1995) reporting on growing Maori militancy in Aotearoa, the example of one young Maori was cited:

> Like many young Maoris, he grew up speaking only English. When he was laid off work he signed up for a Maori language course at Auckland University . . . 'My father had his mouth washed out with soap at assembly for speaking Maori at school. I have had my heritage stolen from me. They took my language. Now I have to come here and pay money to reclaim my own birthright.'

Language is not, however, solely a definer, it is also seen as an *element of continuity*, as demonstrated in the following quotation:

> In Irish, not merely does one react to the same beauty, the same delicacy of inflection and suggestion that delighted our fathers,

> but we can still share through it the desires and hopes, the failures and successes, the nobility and even, in a healing manner, the human weaknesses of practically the whole of our recorded history.
>
> (Brennan, 1969)

For the second element, the entry into an ongoing discourse, we turn again to Ricoeur:

> Conversation, i.e. ultimately the dialogical relation, is contained within the limits of a vis-à-vis which is a face-à-face. The historical connection which encompasses it is singularly more complex. The 'short' intersubjective relation is intertwined, in the interior of the historical connection, with various 'long' intersubjective relations, mediated by diverse social institutions, social roles and collectivities (groups, classes, notions, cultural traditions, etc.). The long intersubjective relations are sustained by an historical tradition, of which dialogue is only a segment. Explication therefore extends much further than dialogue, coinciding with the broadest historical connection.
>
> (Ricoeur, 1981: 10)

The didactic point to be taken from this is a simple one. Students engaging with the other culture will remain isolated, will only be able to participate fully in relatively simple and superficial 'conversation' without a knowledge of the historical connectivities; they will find themselves in the position of a cinema-goer who comes in half-way through a film and who will only be able to describe the events on the screen without truly understanding the connectivities - indeed, they will be in a worse position, because at least the cinema-goer knows that the film has a fixed starting point and can always be re-visited. To illustrate this, I should like to take an example from what for us today is perhaps the ultimate travel experience, the journey into space, 'the final frontier', the phrase which is the motto of *Star Trek*. Language can and does play an important role in utopian and futuristic works, of which 'science fiction' is one sub-category The notion of a 'universal language', the attempt to return to the state of grace 'before Babel' is itself utopian (this time in the sense of 'not realistic' as can be seen from the failure of efforts to establish 'universal languages' such as Esperanto). One possible reason for the failure of the Esperanto experiment is that Esperanto is a cultureless language which cannot confer identity.

Language is a recurring theme in utopian novels, for example, Orwell's *1984* is essentially about language and memory, and there

have been various attempts in science fiction novels to establish 'new' languages - or to recast language in an attempt to shift certain paradigms, as in some feminist sci-fi writing. To come to *Star Trek*, the script includes the Klingon language, a fully fledged artificial language with its own band of followers among *Star Trek* adherents, but it is not Klingon that is our concern here.

The particular text with which we shall deal here is one episode of *The Next Generation* entitled 'Darmok': Star Fleet and the Enterprise crew are continually faced with communication problems - they are not just dealing with problems of terrestrial inter-cultural communication, but of inter-galactic inter-cultural communication. Fortunately, successive generations of DCU graduates have succeeded in building a 'universal translator', but in the case of Darmok, *it fails*. What the episode demonstrates is why it fails and how Picard overcomes the communication problem by engaging with his counterparts' collective memory manifested through language, how he is involved in nonlinguistic activity, and how himself becomes integrated into that memory In addition we see the progression for Picard from an instrumental to an integrative motivation. The initial situation is that the Enterprise is investigating the presence of a foreign ship crewed by 'The Children of Tarma' transmitting 'a simple mathematical progression'. Starfleet believes their presence is an attempt to communicate. However, as one member of the crew states: "The Children of Tarma were called incomprehensible', upon which Picard wonders whether they are truly incomprehensible, stating, 'In my experience, communication is a matter of patience, imagination'. With this he demonstrates an openness and a willingness to try and engage in conversation. The initial attempts at verbal communication fail, as Picard tries to offer a formal contractual relationship, and the upshot is that the Tarmarians beam Picard down to the surface of the planet with their Captain, Dathon. Dathon is armed with two knives, one of which he offers to Picard, who interprets this as a challenge to fight.

Their interaction reveals a total failure to understand based on gestures and actions, because the interpretation of gestures and actions is culturally determined; Picard (and his crew) perceive the situation as a challenge ritual and interpret actions as threats to Picard's safety. In fact, Dathon is trying to engage Picard in a shared action which will bond them by re-enacting an episode from the Tarmarian past. Slowly, they grow closer, but as Picard starts to bond with Dathon, his crew are still reacting according to their own cultural presuppositions, which are predicated on confrontation, on conflict, on 'winning'. The exception is Counsellor Troi - perhaps significantly one of the few

women in the crew - who begins to doubt whether in fact 'this is some kind of challenge ritual'. She is frustrated at their inability to communicate: All our technology and experience, our universal translator, and we still can't even say hello to these people.' She also demonstrates a keen appreciation of the importance of language in politics: A single word can lead to tragedy, one word mis-spoken or misunderstood! Meanwhile, as Picard begins to engage positively with Dathon, the realisation suddenly dawns on him that 'That's how you communicate, isn't it, by citing example - by metaphor!'

Back on the Enterprise, the crew are deploying massive computer power to come to the same conclusion, expressed by Spock's successor, Data, thus:

> The Tarmarian ego-structure does not seem to allow what we normally think of as self-identity. Their ability to abstract is highly unusual. They seem to communicate through narrative. Their imagery is a reference to the individuals and places that appear in their mytho-historical accounts.

He cites as a terrestrial example 'Juliet on her balcony' as an image of romance and continues: 'Imagery is everything to the Tarmarians. It embodies their emotional states, their very thought processes. It's how they communicate - and how they think.' Thus, for communication to succeed: 'It is necessary for us to learn the narrative from which the Tarmarians draw their imagery.'

The crew are attempting to decode the Tarmarian discourse in a highly instrumental fashion in pursuit of their own tactical response to the situation; Picard, on the other hand, adopts an increasingly integrative approach as he attempts to relate to Dathon on a human level. Back on the planet, Picard is asked to recount an episode from his 'mytho-historical account' - which he finds difficult, as this is not part of his normal communicative behaviour.

The outcome of the encounter is that the Enterprise crew, in pursuing solely selfish ends, attempt to beam Picard back up to the ship just as Picard and Dathon are joining a fight with a monster, and by distracting Picard at the crucial moment, the crew are instrumental in Dathon's death. Despite this, however, the Tarmarians acknowledge Picard's achievement in communicating with Dathon, and 'Dathon and Picard' becomes an image in the Tarmarian 'mytho-historical account'.

The episode closes with Picard re-reading Homer, 'one of the root metaphors of our culture', and in response to the (instrumental) question from a fellow crew-member 'For the next time we meet the

Tamarians?' Picard replies, 'More familiarity with our own mythology might help us to relate to theirs'. whereas, in fact, it was the experience of Tarmarian culture which helped Picard to (re-)discover his own.

As Adler (1975: 22), puts it:

> . . . the more one is capable of experiencing new and different dimensions of human diversity, the more one learns of oneself. Such learning takes place when one transcends the boundaries of ego, culture, and thinking.

To engage in another discourse we must be aware of what has gone before and of the values and perceptions which inform that discourse and of which that discourse is a part; culture is 'handed down within the group'. Cultures are to a very great extent defined by their past; they have a continuous memory enshrined in their symbolic forms, and those engaging with that culture will remain isolated and will only be able to participate in relatively simple and superficial instrumental communication without a knowledge and appreciation of the historical connectivities. To engage in another discourse we must be aware of what has gone before and of the values and perceptions which inform that discourse and of which that discourse is a part.

So far, we have been discussing the demands placed on the foreign language learner in coming to grips with cultural difference and considered the personal enrichment which this affords. But there is another enrichment, to which George Bernard Shaw alluded in *John Bull's Other Island*, when he wrote 'I did not know what my own house looked like, because I had never been outside it'. In other words, by becoming aware of cultural difference, by engaging with the other, we also become more aware of ourselves and of our own linguistic and cultural identity. This can not only strengthen our self-awareness, but also make us realise the relativity of our own culture as we perceive that our construction of reality, our value-systems, which we may well have regarded as 'natural' and 'absolute', are in fact neither.

This realisation is, however, not only of importance for language learners, for the experience of cultural alterity is not reserved to this group. As the world 'grows smaller', we are all more likely to be confronted with 'the other', even if we do not speak foreign tongues or travel outside our own island.

The successful use of another language presupposes a genuine desire to communicate and to learn, and in this process one gains in understanding, not only of the 'target culture', but ultimately of one's own culture and thus of oneself, which knowledge and understanding

is the basis for personal growth - and here ultimately lies the educational value of studying foreign languages.

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Chapter 2
Living There: Jewish Identity and Culture in Germany after the Holocaust

Eva Kolinsky

National Socialism in Germany inflicted so total a destruction of Jewish life and cultural institutions in Germany that continuity with the 'German-Jewish culture' of the pre-1933 era was impossible after liberation. Yet, Jewish culture was rebuilt by German-Jewish Holocaust survivors and Displaced Persons of Eastern European origin with nowhere else to go, by a small number of returning exiles unable to settle in foreign lands and, at the organisational level in particular, by Jews who had escaped the worst ravages of the Holocaust because they were married to German gentiles. The common core of this culture was neither tradition nor observance, but the negative experience of Germany as a land hostile to Jews. This chapter examines how the Holocaust legacy has shaped Jewish identity in Germany and considers reactions to a Jewish presence there, from outside the country. It concludes that Jews regard Holocaust memory and a distance to Germany's past as the core of their identity and of the Jewish culture that they rebuilt after the Holocaust. Even those with German passports in their pockets do not regard themselves as German. They just live there.

Before the National Socialists seized control, Germany had a particularly rich Jewish culture and German Jewry bore 'the hallmark of modernity' (Sorkin, 1990: 3). Jewish writers and thinkers advanced the agendas of German, Jewish and European culture, while Jewish educational and religious institutions in Germany were particularly numerous and innovative in their approach (*Deutsch-Jüdische Geschichte*, 1997). This German-Jewish 'symbiosis' occurred despite

the failure to meet the promise of emancipation by establishing political democracy. And it occurred in a society where cultural difference was never fully accepted and always entailed a threat of exclusion (Pulzer, 1992). When the National Socialists staged a public 'Burning of the Books' on 10 May 1933, in order to subjugate culture to state ideology, the list of authors whose works were thrown into the flames read like a roll-call of modernity (Kolinsky & van der Will, 1999: 12). The German Jews who were forced into exile included so many prominent scientists, politicians, professionals, painters, journalists, composers, musicians, actors, religious leaders and university teachers as to amount to an exile of culture and the destruction of Jewish culture in Germany.

More than a decade of persecution under National Socialism erased Jewish communities, depriving Jews first of their livelihood and then of their lives. Inside the Third Reich, some Jews were shielded precariously by mixed marriages and Nazi regulations on their special treatment. They were the exception. From 1941 onwards, Jews were deported from Germany to ghettos and concentration camps. Very few survived (Burgauer, 1993:1418, 356). After liberation, the victorious Allies helped those found in camps, labour compounds and on death trains and restored - with differences between zones of occupation - human and civic rights of which Germans had deprived Jews so completely and for so many years.

Given the physical, material and cultural destruction of Jewish life and Jewish culture between 1933 and 1945, there could be no continuity with the pre-Nazi era. Could there be a new beginning?

Could There Be Jewish Culture in Germany after the Holocaust?

In 1946, Robert Weltsch, the former editor of the *Jüdische Rundschau* who had sought refuge in Palestine in the 1930s, visited Germany in order to see for himself what had remained there of Jewish culture. He found close to 200,000 'displaced persons', most of them Jews from Eastern Europe, who had been liberated from camps inside Germany or who had fled there from renewed anti-Semitism in their home towns. Cared for in special camps, they had begun to rebuild their lives, publish Yiddish newspapers and create an orthodox Jewish religious culture while waiting for resettlement elsewhere. Most were trapped in Germany as in a 'waiting room' (Königseder & Wetzel, 1994) for three to four years until the creation of the State of Israel and amendments to US immigration legislation in 1948 and 1950 allowed them to leave.

Weltsch also found reborn communities, set up by German-Jews on the ruins of synagogues and other Jewish institutions of yesteryear. For him and for many Jews world-wide, the prospect of a Jewish presence inside post-Holocaust German society was altogether unpalatable:

> We cannot assume that there are Jews who are attracted to living in Germany Here, the stench of corpses, of gas chambers and of torture cells remains pertinent. But several thousand Jews are still living in Germany. . . . This remnant of Jewish settlement should be liquidated as soon as possible. Germany is no place (*kein Boden*) for Jews.
>
> (Richarz, 1988: 14)

On his appointment as 'Jewish Advisor' to the Military Governor in the US zone of occupation, the last holder of this post, Harry Greenstein estimated that after resettlement no more than 2700 Jews would remain in Germany: so called 'hard core cases' who were too old or too ill to settle in Israel (Greenstein, 1949a). In his first full report after arriving in Germany, he admitted that this low estimate had been based on 'hope rather than an analysis' (Greenstein, 1949b: 1) while the actual number who 'would remain to form the nucleus of a new German Jewish community' was closer to 25,000 (Greenstein, 1949b: 6). His assistants, Abraham Hyman and Louis Baruch, took a less charitable view. They held that displaced persons generally besmirched the Jewish image through black market activities with those deciding to stay there the worst offenders:

> It is discouraging that these people who have built their little empires on the fringe of the German economy delude themselves that they are, in fact, living *in* the German economy and are postponing plans for the ultimate resettlement. In our opinion this element will constitute a large part of the non-medical hard core.
>
> (Hyman & Baruch, 1949: 7)

On 1 September 1949, a conference took place in Heidelberg under the auspices of the Jewish Advisor to take stock of resettlement, review community development and create an organisation which could act as a Jewish voice in the up-coming. West German state. Despite the pragmatic agenda, there was no consensus. Given the small number of Jews in Germany, the shortage of rabbis and religious teachers, the high percentage of inter-marriage, one speaker concluded 'the future of these communities is not bright. Assimilation and peripheral Jewish living rather than an integrated Jewish life are the prospects' (Future, 1949: 18). These doubts about post-Holocaust Jewish communities in Germany were widely shared and included doubts

whether anybody choosing to live in Germany could be accepted as Jewish. At the Heidelberg conference, a representative of the World Jewish Congress indicated a way forward when he acknowledged that misgivings about a Jewish presence in Germany would continue to exist but also pledged not to sever links:

> The promise upon which . . . this conference was based was the reality of today - a fact that there are Jews who live in this land. This fact and not the question as to whether or not these Jews ought to leave or ought to stay here is our starting point. . . . As long as there are and will be Jews in Germany, we shall serve them in whatever capacity they wish us. We shall be at their disposal and help them to live a life of pride, self respect and dignity, to the extent that such a life is possible in a country torn asunder by so many problems and conflictions [*sic*].
>
> (Future, 1949: 46)

Perceptions and Identities

Unease about the presence of Jews in Germany and reservations whether what developed in the shadow of the Holocaust in Germany constitutes Jewish culture are less acute today than 50 years ago, but have not disappeared. Paradoxically, the Jewish population in Germany has been one of the few in western Europe to stabilise through migration gains from Eastern Europe, Iran and even Israel, and, more recently grow rapidly as Jews from the former Soviet Union opted to settle there. (Carlebach, 1994: 205, 206) Yet, during his state visit to Germany in 1996, the Israeli President, Ezer Weizmann, declared himself unable to comprehend that Jews should still wish to live there. Ignatz Bubis, as President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany also their official spokesman declared, on behalf of all Jewish inhabitants: "I have no cause to leave Germany' (Bubis, 1996: 34). Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a member of the European Parliament and former protagonist of the Student Movement who had grown up in France, replied more forcefully, linking the choice of place with his perception of Jewish identity: 'I live in Germany today on the basis of my own free decision, and without any guilty feelings' (Cohn-Bendit, 1996: 1). Moritz Neumann, a member of the Central Council of Jews in Germany executive, challenged the implication in Weizmann's statement that Jews in Germany helped to whitewash the Holocaust and Germany's anti-Semitic legacy and that it was impossible to live in Germany as a Jew - allegations that date back to the beginnings of Jewish community organisation in Germany after the Holocaust:

> As far as Jewish religious and Jewish traditional awareness are concerned, Jewish communities in Germany are more secure than many a Jewish community throughout the world, including in Israel. We Jews in Germany are, with certainty, no fountain of deep religiosity and we are, as far as I am concerned, even nowhere near enough to securing a stable, traditional, religious life. But compared with many Israelis who stay in Germany for a visit or more permanently, we can virtually claim to be a stronghold of lived and practised Jewish tradition.
>
> (Neumann, 1996: 67)

In the past, community leaders had remained defensive in the face of doubts about their choice of country, stressing the role of communities in providing welfare support for needy Jews, in fighting for individual and collective restitution and in making sure that Hitler's aim to cleanse Germany of Jews would not be fulfilled. They had not portrayed their culture as a model for others with its bipolarity of secular German-Jewish and orthodox Eastern European Jewish traits, which had been diversified further by Jewish migration and its impact on religious observance. Until the mid-Sixties, Jewish culture in Germany acted as if it was a gatekeeper for a Jewish identity elsewhere. Its hallmark was a strong Zionist commitment and the expectation that young people should settle in Israel. This no longer applies. Jews in Germany and young Jews in particular have begun to articulate a personal sense of identity, including their own answers about what it means to live in Germany as a Jew. This is what Cohn-Bendit expressed when he declared to have no guilty feelings. Jews in Germany no longer accept accusations of complicity with the Holocaust or the failure of post-war Germany to confront it (Bodemann, 1996; Wolfssohn, 1997). Their sense of identity as Jews includes, as a core component, a sense of non-identity with Germany, its people and its history:

> I have a very divided relationship with Germany. I believe everyone of us has lived through his own identity crises of who he is - a German Jew, a Jew in Germany or an Israeli, despite holding a German passport and being born here. I have decided for myself that I am a Jew who lives in Germany. In the first instance, I am a Jew, because this I can be anywhere in the world.
>
> (*Der Spiegel*, 1994: 112)

The young Jew whose words are cited here, was asked about his sense of place and self in German society. He, and the group of friends interviewed with him, took pride in expressing their Jewishness. One even wanted to wear a skullcap in public but was prevented from

doing so by his parents who dreaded this kind of visibility. Yet, the sense of identity of these young people also included an awareness that a refuge might be needed in case Germany became too hostile to live there. Recasting Jewish culture after the Holocaust established a Jewish presence and Jewish communities in Germany, not a German-Jewish culture but a newly diverse and different Jewish culture in Germany Has Germany, therefore, become a 'place for Jews'?

A Place for Jews?

In December 1946, a leader in the *Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt* focused on a common experience of Jews in Germany - whether Jewish members of the allied forces, residents of displaced persons camps or Jews living in German society at the time, i.e. the collective amnesia among Germans about persecution, concentration camps - even those in their immediate vicinity - and the Holocaust generally. Giving his name as 'X', the author wrote:

> About six months ago, I returned to Germany. I came back from exile since I belonged to those who believe they have a duty, as German Jews, to contribute to building a really democratic Germany. . . . When I decided to return, I assumed there would be many people in Germany who, immediately after the collapse of National Socialism, would have the courage to admit that Jews were treated badly. . . . To this day, I have only found Germans who told me that they had known nothing about what happened to the Jews.
>
> (*Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt*, 10 December 1946)

The unspoken consensus among Germans that nobody except a tiny circle of top-level leaders and perpetrators knew about the Holocaust or that Jews were driven to their death rather than resettled in the east as Nazi propaganda claimed, translated in the harsh years of post-war shortages and dislocation into hostility towards survivors as an unfairly privileged group. In a speech to the American Jewish Conference, Judge Simon Rifkind, the first civilian to serve as 'Jewish Advisor' to General Lucius D. Clay in the US zone recalled:

> I shall never forget that one of the first requests of the so-called de-nazified civil government of Germany to the Allied Control Council was that the rations of the displaced persons be reduced. That is a measure of the German confession of guilt; that is an index to the level of character that today prevails among the Germans
>
> (Rifkind, 1946: 2)

Most displaced persons camps were located on or near the site of former concentration- and labour camps where the survivors had been liberated. Yet, local populations resented their presence; burgomasters only agreed to supply clothing, milk or fresh vegetables if ordered to do so by the military and if those orders were enforced. Nazi-style raids by German police on displaced persons camps provoked an outcry among Jewish survivors and resulted in a decree placing Jews under Military Police protection. In Buchenwald, Dachau and Bergen-Belsen, Allied commanders forced the Germans living near these camps to witness the suffering inflicted on survivors and to help dispose of the many unburied bodies. They complied but did not develop the sense of guilt and personal accountability that had been intended. 1 The same holds true for the Nuremberg trials and for trials of concentration camp commanders and guards: Germans remained aloof, pre-occupied with their own plight and unwilling to take an interest either in the Holocaust or in the Jews who survived it. Travelling in Germany in the 1960s, the Israeli writer Amos Elon noted that Germans had constructed their own Holocaust:

> It has become common to compare - even equate - the extermination camps of Auschwitz and Treblinka with the destruction of Dresden by Allied bombers a few weeks before the end of the war, or with the expulsion of the German population from East Prussia, Silesia or Czechoslovakia in 1945. Some people demand trials against Allied War Criminals'.
>
> (Elon, 1967: 22)

Yet, the Germany that emerged from the rubble of World War II seemed sufficiently transformed to offer a political and social environment in which the Jews who lived there could at least feel physically secure and accepted, in general terms, as equal citizens. Political division produced two divergent models. In the east, the German Democratic Republic adopted Soviet-style state socialism and prescribed ideological conformity. While Jews could secure integration if they renounced their culture, anyone living as a Jew was suspected of being an enemy of the East German state. When the GDR ceased to exist, just 600 Jews were members of a Jewish community there.

West Germany offered a more favourable environment. Its constitution, the Basic Law, proved an effective shield against Weimar-type anti-democratic tendencies and political polarisation, laying the foundations for a stable polity and a democratic political culture. Moreover, by guaranteeing human and civil rights of individuals and groups, the Basic Law created a legal framework in which cultural diversity individualism and, in principle at least, the acceptance of

difference could develop. In this recast polity Jews, it seemed, had nothing the fear. This was the message when Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the FRG, declared in the *Bundestag* on 27 September 1951:

> The attitude of the Federal Republic to its Jewish citizens has been unambiguously defined in the Basic Law. Article 3 of the Basic law stipulated that all human beings are equal before the law and that nobody may be disadvantaged or advantaged on account of gender, origin, race, language, country of origin or background, belief, religious or political views. . . . These legal norms . . . obligate every German citizen, and in particular every civil servant, to refrain from any form of racial discrimination. 2
>
> (*Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung*, 28 September 1951)

When a draft version of the Basic Law was published in 1948, Jews objected to the use of 'race' as a classification of an individual's status and to the implication that democracy ruled out that any group received special considerations. Writing in the *Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt*, Ralph Giordano asked:

> Will not German civil servants tell persons who are seeking restitution: 'We are now living in a democracy You are no longer discriminated against but you are also not receiving preferential treatment.' . . . Who can tell us, us Jews of all people, that an admittedly democratically worded constitution will suffice to close the undemocratic crevasses in the interior and exterior life of Germany?
>
> (Giordano, 1948)

The contention that the *Grundgesetz* remained too vague to protect Jews from a denial of their rights and the fear that democracy was less well rooted in society than in the constitution, have been at the core of Jewish self-perception in post-war Germany The democratic political order and its elected representatives are seen as guarantors of civic rights. Jews in Germany view democracy as a barrier between xenophobic tendencies and the right of minorities to articulate cultural difference.

As a place of residency, however, even a democratic Germany remains an uncomfortable location for Jews. Anti-Semitism has stood at 15% since the 1950s (Bergmann & Erb 1990). Calls to 'draw a line', to relegate Holocaust memory to the past and to endorse post-war Germany as a reborn country never abated; indeed they have gained in intensity since unification. While not endangering the protective function of democracy, they make everyday life more unsettling for

Jews. In their perception of identity, Holocaust memory is at the core of their life as individuals and as citizens; it is neither a merely private matter nor an unnecessary burden. Today's Jews dare to refute demands that they should stop looking back to the Holocaust and abandon their reservations about German history and the German people. German society finds it difficult to accept that the Jews who live there will always be reminded of and wish to remember the persecution during the Nazi years and fear its repetition. Although permanent residents and often passport holders, Germany's Jews regard memory and distance as a core of their identity and of the Jewish culture they rebuilt after the Holocaust. Residency does not turn Jews into Germans. 3 They just live there.

Notes

1. In April and May 1945, General Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered visits to the liberated concentration camps by American and British members of parliament and public figures, see e.g. 'Statement by 18 American editors and publishers who toured German concentration camps at the invitation Eisenhower, *New York Times* 6 May 1945, p. 8.

2. Cabinet resolution presented to the Bundestag by Konrad Adenauer on 27 September 1951, reprinted as 'Das Bekenntnis der Bundesregierung' in *Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung*, 28 September 1951.

3. Ignatz Bubis in a discussion on Holocaust Erinnerung, ZDF, 15 December 1989.

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Chapter 3
The Fugitive, the Transport, the BBC and Mass Murder: A BBC Broadcast about Gassings in Auschwitz in June 1944

Mark Roseman 1

This chapter examines testimony provided by a victim of the Holocaust who survived the war on the run in Nazi Germany. According to the testimony it was possible to gain detailed knowledge, via the BBC and other sources, of what was happening in the Holocaust, even down to the level of the fate of particular transports. Because this challenges our general assumptions about what was knowable in the Third Reich, our initial impulse is to discount the testimony. Subsequent research proved, however, that the testimony was true, not only in relation to a specific BBC broadcast in June 1944, but also in documenting substantial information flows into and out of the Theresienstadt ghetto. The broadcast was highly unusual and did not answer all questions in the minds of its listeners, but it did place very precise information about the gassings of particular transports into the German arena. Such information was available to those with the nerve to listen to illegal broadcasts, or for those belonging to a communication network with people who listened. The evidence here shows also how valuable survivor testimony can be in challenging and adding new nuances to our assumptions and understanding of the Third Reich.2

For those living in Nazi Germany during the war, how much was it possible to know about the Holocaust? After the war, of course, ordinary Germans claimed to have known nothing of what was going on. The extraordinary lengths to which the Nazis had gone to keep the mass-murder programme secret seemed to lend credence to this assertion. But there were always doubts as to whether ignorance had

really been so widespread. The sheer number of people directly or administratively involved in the killing was one stumbling block to accepting such general ignorance. British officials inspecting the wallets of captured German prisoners of war found that photographs of atrocities were in common currency (Grunberger, 1971). More recently David Bankier (1992) has argued that the Nazis deliberately used widespread knowledge that Germany was committing atrocities, and the fear that such atrocities would lead to reprisals after the war, to secure continuing loyalty from their own population as the war turned against them. But a vague sense that terrible things were happening in the East in Germany's name is one thing. The question of whether it was possible for the ordinary German to gain specific knowledge of the extermination programme is quite another. Was it possible to obtain and communicate such knowledge under the draconian conditions of wartime Nazi Germany?

One potential source of information, of course, was foreign broadcasts. Until fairly recently, it was generally assumed that the Allies themselves did not really understand the enormity of what was happening in the concentration camps until they came to liberate them in the closing phase of the war. Gradually, however, as documents have become declassified and taboos broken, studies have begun to show that the Allies gained detailed knowledge of the murder programme at an early stage. Most recently Richard Breitman has shown that Ultra decodings of *Einsatzkommando* dispatches meant that even in 1941 the Allied governments knew of systematic liquidation of entire Jewish populations (Breitman, 1998). But this information was often suppressed to avoid wartime policy from being "distracted' from its principal aims. When the Polish underground hero Jan Karski arrived in Washington in 1942, his revelations about the extermination programme were not widely disseminated (Gilbert, 1994). Given that such knowledge was being withheld from the Allies' own home populations, it has generally not been assumed, until now, that Allied broadcasts were used effectively as a way of informing German listeners about the details of the Holocaust.

This chapter explores the testimony of a German-Jewish woman, Marianne Ellenbogen, who survived the war on the run in Nazi Germany Her testimony, and documents in her possession, suggest that she obtained knowledge via the BBC and other sources about what was happening in the camps that in extent and precision go well beyond what we would have thought available to an ordinary citizen, let alone to someone on the run. Indeed, the episode offered here forms only a small part of a truly remarkable wider story which

challenges many of our broad assumptions about what it was possible to find out and to communicate in Nazi Germany Full references to documents used here can be found in the biography of Marianne Ellenbogen (Roseman, 2000).

Marianne Ellenbogen and Her Testimony

Marianne Ellenbogen, née Strauß, was born in 1923 into a prosperous Jewish family in the Ruhr town of Essen. The older of two children, she grew up in Essen. Her parents were extremely patriotic German-Jews - her father received the Iron Cross in the First World War - and did not seek to leave the country until it was too late. As a result, the whole family was trapped in Nazi Germany From 1941 to 1943 they lived under very unusual official protection from the Abwehr, the Wehrmacht's counter-intelligence organisation; there were probably several hundred Jews who enjoyed such protection. The Jews were shielded from deportation under the pretext that they could be used as agents abroad, and indeed, some *were* spirited across the border into Switzerland and elsewhere. The full story of this protection, which derived above all from the anti-Nazi convictions of Oster and Dohnanyi, has not yet been told. The best account until now is Meyer (1993). The Strautß connection to the Abwehr is pursued in more detail in Roseman (2000). Under the Abwehr's umbrella Marianne lived for almost two years with her parents, Seigfried and Regina (Ina) Strauß, her brother Richard, her maternal grandmother Anna Rosenberg, her uncle Alfred Strauß, his wife Lore and Lore's mother Else Dahl. In the summer of 1943, however, the Abwehr as an independent organisation collapsed and with it the family's hopes of getting out of the country

On 31 August 1943, the Gestapo came to arrest the family Marianne, then just turned 20, escaped and went on the run. She was assisted by a little-known left-wing group, based in the Ruhr, the *Bund-Gemeinschaft für sozialistisches Leben*. This is a group which even regional studies of resistance to Hitler have until now failed to recognise, partly because as an only semi-formal grouping - as much a network of friends as a political organisation - it does not match conventional assumptions of what a resistance group was. Indeed, this was a major reason why the group was not detected by the Gestapo. While Marianne fled, the rest of the family was held in Essen for a few days, as the Gestapo waited for Marianne to show up. When she failed to do so, her relatives were deported to Theresienstadt, the 'show camp' for Germany's more prominent Jews, from which in reality the

majority were deported to Auschwitz. Marianne herself spent almost two years on the move, travelling backwards and forwards across Germany staying for a few days at a time with different members of the Bund. She survived the war and was liberated in Düsseldorf. She remained there until the end of 1946 and then, having met Basil Ellenbogen, a British Jew attached to the Occupation forces, she came to Britain and spent the rest of her life in Liverpool until her death in December 1996.

In the 1980s, Marianne was prevailed upon by her former protectors from the Bund to write a short account of her life underground for an obscure Essen journal, *Das Münster am Hellweg* (Ellenbogen, 1984). In this article, Marianne wrote amongst other things that, while on the run, she learned that her parents were deported to Auschwitz in December 1943. On her birthday, 7 June 1944, she was listening to the BBC and heard that the occupants of the transport which had left Theresienstadt for Auschwitz in December 1943 had just been killed. In our first conversation in 1989 she added a little more detail to the written account. She said that she was staying with her relatives in Beverstedt at the time:

> Während des ganzen Krieges und jetzt besonders in der Illegalität weiter noch hatten wir immer den englischen Sender gëhort. Das war natürlich außerordentlich gefährlich denn das Anfangszeichen aus dem Beethovenkonzert war weitaus höbar, so daß man vorsichtig sein mußte, daß man nur ganz, ganz, daß man sehr abgestellt hatte und wirklich mit dem Ohr am Sender liegen mußte. Aber das war eine Lebenslinie für meine Eltern und meine Familie und dann später für mich und meine Freunde in der Illegalität um zu hören wie die Lage des Krieges wirklich war, denn was man in Deutschland hörte war alles Propaganda und Sieg und Vorwärts stürmen, und was sich wirklich abspielte, konnte man nur aufgrund der deutschen Übersendungen des englischen BBC erfahren, und das war für uns außerordentlich wichtig. An einer solchen Radiosendung am Mittag [an diesem Tag] . . . hörten wir dort auch den englischen Sender und hörten dann . . . daß der Transport vom 18 Dezember 1943 von Theresienstadt nach Birkenau-Auschwitz dort innerhalb der letzen Tage vergast worden sei. Ich wußte, daß meine Eltern und mein Bruder diesem Transport nach Auschwitz mitgemacht hatten. Also hatte ich einen unvergeßlichen Geburtstag.

Our initial reaction is to discount this. After all, it does not seem plausible that Marianne could have learned exactly when her parents had been deported from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz. And, as already

noted, it is generally assumed that the BBC was not broadcasting news of anything like this precision. But subsequent research proved that the all the salient assertions are true.

The Transport

My first step was to try and establish whether the Strauß family really had been deported from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz in December 1943. The Theresienstadt records survived the war intact, so in theory it is possible to identify all deportations to and from the ghetto. While the research for the present project was underway, Professor Mirolsav Karny published a volume of all Czech citizens deported to the ghetto. The companion volume for German deportees was in progress. One of the team involved in this project, Dr Zdenek Schindler, sent me the following email:

A list of our (not yet fully authenticated) data follows. The list needs an explanation:

(1) First datum is a code of a transport. VII/4 means Dusseldorf, 9.9.1943.

(2) The transport number of a person follows.

(3) At the end of the line the code of transport from Terezin and the personal number is printed.

(4) I have added manually also the destination and the date of deportation from Terezin (please, check it)

Dr Roseman's questions . . . 29 January 1997

VII/4 3	Ep 128 (Auschwitz 9.10.1944)	Dahl, Else	Born 25.1.1883 Died?
VII/4 67		Rosenberg, Anna	Born 4.1.1867 Died 9.1.1944 Terezin
VII/4 1	El 497 (Auschwitz 29.9.1944)	Strauß, Alfred	Born 24.4.1891 Died?
VII/4 2	Ep 127 (Auschwitz 9.10.1944)	Strauß, Lore Rosa	Born 16.8.1907 Died?
VII/4 5	Ds 2215 (Auschwitz 18.12.1943)	Strauß, Regina	Born 13.1.1896 Died?
VII/4 6	Ds 2216 (Auschwitz 18.12.1943)	Strauß, Richard	Born 26.10.1926 Died?
VII/4 4	Ds 2214 (Auschwitz 18.12.1943)	Straufß, Siegfried	Born 24.4.1891 Died ?

The data confirmed first of all that the family had been transported to Theresienstadt in September 1943. Thereafter, their fates had varied. Marianne's parents, Siegfried and Regina Strauß, and her brother, Richard, had been deported together on 18 December 1943. Regina's mother, the 77-year-old Anna Rosenberg, died in Theresienstadt on 9 January 1944. Marianne's uncle and aunt, Alfred and Lore Strauß, and Lore's mother had all gone in the last great wave of transports in September and October 1944.

So Marianne really had known which transport her parents had taken. When we spoke about this, she could no longer remember exactly how she had found out. It is known that, as a 'show camp', Theresienstadt was still allowed postal contact with the outside world. The regulations varied and there were always many restrictions and limitations but the fact is that post could go in and out (Adler, 1955: 124). After Marianne's death, information emerged which showed that her relatives had been involved in an extensive communication network. From post-war correspondence between Marianne and survivors who had been with her parents in Theresienstadt, it emerged first that Marianne's uncle had worked in the post office and had thus been able to send out post more often than normally allowed. Then it became clear that even while on the run Marianne had been sending food and other parcels to her family in the camp, even managing to get a book to her aunt on the latter's birthday. There is some circumstantial evidence that a non-Jewish friend of the family in the Wehrmacht, who had already played an extraordinary role in maintaining contact with Marianne's fiancß in a Polish ghetto, had either visited Theresienstadt or at least sent in parcels. Marianne's parents and uncle sent out a large number of cards to a distant relative in Sweden. She in turn passed on news to relatives in the USA. These relatives in turn used a family lawyer in Switzerland to send food parcels into Theresienstadt. Thanks to his position, Marianne's uncle was able to ensure they reached the family. Even after being sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau, Marianne's mother and brother were able to send out brief confirmations to Sweden that they were still alive. It is true that Marianne became aware of many of these letters only after the war. Nevertheless, the scale of the communication - including a goods- and information-flow from Theresienstadt to Sweden to the USA to Switzerland and back to the ghetto - begins to render much more plausible the idea that Marianne would have found out when her parents were deported from Theresienstadt.

The Broadcast

The next step was to establish whether the BBC did broadcast the information Marianne claimed to have heard. Research in Britain and in Germany and in particular the assistance of Gabriel Milland, who was then just completing a PhD on the BBC and the Holocaust, confirmed that the part of Marianne's story about the BBC was, apart from the fact that the broadcast could not have been on her birthday, pretty well entirely true as well (Milland, 1998).

The BBC on this occasion really did broadcast precise information about the gassing of a particular transport, a fact which is not noted even in much of the specialist literature on the Holocaust. It is true, though, that the circumstances surrounding this broadcast were quite unusual. In the case of the December transport from Theresienstadt, the underground resistance movement within Auschwitz had, for reasons to which we shall have to return, obtained advance knowledge long before of its impending fate. Wanting to convince outsiders of the credibility of their revelations about Auschwitz, the movement needed to be able to present as much detailed information as possible. So, the fact that they were able to predict that the occupants of a specific transport would soon be murdered, was important. Armed with this information, two Slovakian Jews, Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler, who were part of the camp underground, hid between the inner and outer perimeter fences in April 1944, and after several days succeeded in escaping. By the end of April, Vrba and Wetzler had written and translated their detailed report, which in sober language gave by far the most detailed description yet available to the outside world of Auschwitz-Birkenau. Copies of the report can still be found at the Wiener Library and at the Leo Baeck institute in New York (Vrba, 1944). One copy reached Dr Jaromir Kopecky the diplomatic representative in Switzerland of the Czech exile government, sometime in May Kopecky showed a copy of the report to the Swiss-based general secretary of the World Jewish Congress, Gerhart M. Riegner, a man who played an important role in informing the outside world about the Holocaust. Because of the imminence and clarity of Vrba and Wetzler's prediction that thousands of Czech citizens would be murdered on 20 June, Kopecky and Riegner decided to inform the Czech government in exile. Noting that the occupants of one large transport from Theresienstadt had already been murdered, Kopecky requested that British and US radio stations broadcast the report immediately to prevent further slaughter:

> Considering the fact that the first group has been wholly exterminated, the peril menacing with extermination of the second group is to a high degree serious. Please, broadcast promptly the most urgent warning possible to the German murderers who are managing the slaughter in Upper Silesia.
>
> (Karny, 1994: 557)

This message was sent on 14 June with the help of Elizabeth Wiskemann, the British legate in Bern. On 15 June it was deciphered in London. We know that in its Czech and Slovak service, the first BBC broadcast of the news was made on 16 June. On 17 June, a more comprehensive version and insistent warning was transmitted. And around this time, a German transmission was made which Marianne heard. We do not have the direct transcripts of the German service, but we do find in the records of the BBC's German service the following item:

> Here is an important announcement. News has reached London that the German authorities in Czechoslovakia have ordered the massacre of 3000 Czechoslovak Jews 2 at Birkenau on or about 20 June. These Jews were transported to Birkenau from the concentration camp at Theresienstadt on the Elbe last December. Four thousand Czechoslovak Jews who were taken from Theresienstadt to Birkenau in September 1943 were massacred in the gas chambers on 7 March. The German authorities in Czechoslovakia and their subordinates should know that full information is received in London about the massacres in Birkenau. All those responsible for such massacres from the top downwards will be called to account.
>
> (BBC, 1944)

One of the most remarkable documents that surfaced after Marianne's death was a diary written while she was on the run. On the 20 June, a cryptic entry remarks 'Awful! What's going to happen?!', which was surely a reference to the fact that this was the day on which the broadcast had predicted the occupants would be murdered.

The Family Camp in Auschwitz-Birkenau

Before we explore the implications of this broadcast, we should look at the circumstances under which the Auschwitz Underground could be so sure that the transport would be murdered on such a specific date. For this was no ordinary transport. The December transports were the second tranche of two very large waves of deportations from Theresienstadt to the so-called 'family camp' in Auschwitz-Birkenau,

one of the bizarrest elements of the Nazi murder programme (Vrba, 1944; Adler, 1955: 536; Vrba and Bestic, 1963; Kulka, 1984; Czech, 1989; Karny, 1994; Keren, 1994). The camp 'Familienlager BIIb' was established in September 1943 with the arrival of 5006 Jews from Theresienstadt. In his memoirs Rudolf Vrba recalled:

> Nobody who survived Camp A in Birkenau will ever forget September 7, 1943, for it was unlike any other day we had ever known. That morning we felt wonder, elation, nostalgia and overwhelming amazement, as we gazed on a sight which most had forgotten existed and the rest doubted if they would ever see again.
>
> Into Camp B beside us, separated from us by only a few strands of wire, poured men, women and children, dressed in ordinary civilian clothes, their heads unshaven, their faces bewildered, but plump and unravaged. The grown-ups carried their luggage, the children their dolls and their teddy-bears; and the men of Camp A, the Zebra men who were only numbers, simply stood and stared, wondering who had tilted the world, spilling a segment of it on top of them. . . . The SS men treated them with consideration, joking with them, playing with the children. . . . I noted that each of them, even the youngest children, who were about two years of age, had been tattooed with a special number that bore no relation to Auschwitz; and each had a card on which was written: 'six months quarantine with special treatment'.
>
> (Vrba, 1963:180, 181)

Soon after the arrival of the September transportees, the camp Underground became aware that the official transport list was headed, 'SB - Transport tschechischer Juden mit sechsmonatlicher Quarantäne'. The Underground knew that 'special treatment', Sonderbehandlung, was a euphemism for murder. But it was not clear what was intended in this case. Unlike other sections of Auschwitz, no selection was carried out. All those who arrived were taken to the camp. They were able to retain their personal property their hair and their clothes. How exceptional the conditions here were can be gleaned by comparing them with the fate of 1260 Jewish children and 53 carers who arrived from Theresienstadt on 7 October. All were gassed on the day of the arrival. On 16 and 20 December the second wave from Theresienstadt entered Birkenau, amongst them Siegfried, Regina and Richard. They too had the symbol SB6, i.e. special treatment after six months, marked against their names in the camp files (though, unlike the camp underground, they themselves will not have known this). They, too, arrived in the 'family camp', this strangely privileged area in the heart of the most

horrific place of the twentieth century. No one knew why they had been given this special status.

Again, in Auschwitz terms the daily routine was unlike any other part of the camp. According to some accounts, they were allowed to write to family members every two weeks and receive parcels. The men did not have to report to work and for the children a school was opened up under the leadership of the inspirational Fredy Hirsch. There was a small garden area for the children and, initially, somewhat better food than the rest of the camp. With the exception of the position of camp elder, the Jewish inmates themselves were able to run the administration of the camp. And best of all, because the men's and women's barracks were in the same enclosure, families could meet in the evening visiting hour in the Lagerstraße. From the viewpoint of the inmates themselves, of course, unaware of their relative privilege, they were in the middle of the most horrific experience of their lives. With diet consisting of little more than watery soups, hunger and disease took an enormous toll. Within the first six months, more than 1000 of the 5000 who arrived in September had died of 'natural causes'.

The whole meaning of the camp experience for the December arrivals changed dramatically in March. In that month, almost exactly six months after the arrival of the first transport, instructions came from the RSHA that all those who had arrived in September were to be killed. The illusion was maintained that those affected were going to be transferred to work camps in the interior. All were instructed to send postcards to acquaintances and all capable of work were transferred to quarantine camp BIIa, the men in one set of blocks, women in another and all were allowed to take their things with them. But the suspicions of the Underground hardened. On 4 March, the head of the Auschwitz Underground confided his thoughts in Rudolf Vrba, telling him that the group members had all been told to write home and to post-date their letters by one month. The Sonderkommando had been ordered to stoke the furnaces for 4000 on the night of 7 March and the SS men had been talking about a special job.

The Underground hoped that the size of the operation, the certainty of it, and the fact that there were some 30 odd members of the Underground within the group might lay the basis for an uprising. They decided that Fredy Hirsch, the inspirational youth leader who had done so much for the youngsters with the transports, was the man who might enjoy enough confidence in the camp to lead the uprising. But after Vrba talked to Hirsch, the latter went off, ostensibly to consider, and poisoned himself.

Finally, in June (though then delayed to July), it was the turn of the December transport to be murdered. Their imminent fate was what Marianne heard on the radio. What the Underground had not predicted, however, and I think Marianne did not ever know, was that this time there was a selection. It is possible that this was the result of the publicity about the killings. But in any case, the Nazis were growing more aware of the need to conserve labour. So, unlike the March killings, where all had been sent to the gas chambers without exception, in June those deemed fit to work were taken to labour camps in Germany According to Adler, of the 2503 people transported to Auschwitz from Theresienstadt on 18 December 1943, some 443 survived and of the two December transports overall 705 or 13% survived (Adler, 1955: 5356, 692). I do not know what Marianne would have made of it, if she had been alive long enough for me to let her know that this was the case. It is just possible that some of the Straußes, perhaps Richard, made it through at this stage. But if they did, there is no trace of them in any records.

These two six-month quarantine periods surely form one of the most bizarre and macabre twists in the Auschwitz chronicle. What could have been the purpose of this murder by clockwork? One thing is clear - the killings were planned from the very beginning. It seems certain now that the family camp was part of the actions that the RSHA was undertaking for the concealment of the murder programme. There was some expectation that the Red Cross representatives who visited Theresienstadt might also wish to see Auschwitz, and the camp, the mail facilities, the receipt of packages sent through the auspices of the International Red Cross and so on were all part of an elaborate smoke screen. In May 1944, for example, Himmler agreed to conduct a tour of inspection of 'one Jewish labour camp [in Birkenau]' with representatives of the German and International Red Cross. It was shortly after the Red Cross decided that the visit to Theresienstadt in 23 June 1944 had 'satisfied all expectations' and that a further visit to Auschwitz would not be necessary, that the special family camp was wound up and its last inmates disposed of.

Impact and Implications

It is clear that this broadcast was highly unusual. It was rare that the BBC could authenticate reports of killings so clearly that it felt able to transmit them as news. On the other hand, when the BBC did make such broadcasts, they had enormous resonance. We know from several sources that this particular transmission had a considerable

impact in Germany It was received in Auschwitz by the SS and actually delayed the killings for a couple of weeks. It may also have influenced the decision to make a selection. The selection took place on 1112 July 1944 (Czech, 1989: 800, 1). Again, though not widely known, this broadcast seems to have been an important source of information for other Jews still in Germany (by now almost exclusively half-Jews, those in mixed marriages or the very few in hiding). On 20 August 20 Viktor Klemperer noted in his diary:

> Ich erfuhr: Vor einiger Zeit seien viele ältere Juden (dreihundert? dreitausend?) aus Theresienstadt fortgeschafft worden, und danach habe der englische Sender die Vergasung dieses Transports gemeldet. Wahrheit? Forse che si, forse che no.
>
> (Klemperer, 1996: 565)

In other words, even for those who did not directly hear the BBC broadcast but were part of a communication network with people who did listen, the information it contained began to seep into common currency

Of course, the broadcast, remarkable as it was, did not end the uncertainty about exactly what was happening. As Klemperer's entry shows, one did not know whether one could really believe it. Of course, Klemperer, unlike Marianne, heard it only at second hand, which must have added to his uncertainty But we know from an unusual source that Marianne herself was not sure whether to give the report full credence.

Elfriede Nenadovic was the much younger sister of Meta Kamp, a Göttingen-based woman who was one of Marianne's hosts from the *Bund*. Elfriede was at this time largely away from Göttingen on labour service on a placement in Upper Silesia. She did however pay at least one visit while Marianne was there and remembered in particular taking a long walk with Marianne. Meta had told her that she had a young guest with her who wished to ask Elfriede something about Upper Silesia. And so the two went for a walk. Elfriede found Marianne very nice and lively but wondered what she wanted. It soon came out. 'Have you heard of a camp for political unreliables?' asked Marianne. In this cautious way, Marianne sought to find out the truth behind the BBC report about Auschwitz. Elfriede of course did not know why Marianne was asking, nor had she at this stage heard anything about Auschwitz and so could offer little enlightenment. But they agreed a code by which Elfriede could communicate anything she found out. After her return to Oberschlesien, she asked around. A farmer confirmed that special trains were coming through continually to the camp but more than that he could not say. In any case, Elfriede's

base was relatively distant from the camp. It was only after the war that she came to understand the significance of the encounter, that in this seemingly casual question Marianne was trying to confirm whether Theresienstadt deportees really were being murdered.

As well as encouraging a reappraisal of the kind of information flows that were possible within Nazi Germany, the case of Marianne Strauß also reminds us of the value of survivor testimony. In Marianne's case, it was often the most implausible assertions that turned out to be correct. On the other hand, her testimony also frequently contained minor displacements, omissions or changes. Such changes did not seem to be merely lapses of memory, since they usually occurred at moments of great trauma (Roseman, 1988; Roseman, 1999). In the present case, the change was a very small but arguably very significant one, namely that she displaced the date on which she received the news back to her birthday.

Though there is no room to develop the argument in any detail here, we can see this as one of a number of similar small magnifications or polarisations which Marianne's memory 'enacted' on the past. On the one hand, it gave the past an extra 'literary' punch. The shocking gruesomeness of the birthday 'present' brought out even more poignantly the horrible contrast of those times, that here she was, living in comparative security, whilst learning that her parents suffered the most hideous fate. On a day that should have been a day of family togetherness came the news that the family would never again be together. But on the other hand, by adding an extra garnish of horror, Marianne also brought the past's unbearable reality slightly under control. What had actually happened was just a nuance less grim than the memory she had invented. The difference was infinitesimal, but the act of making that difference important.

Notes

1. author acknowledges with gratitude the financial support provided by the Nuffield Foundation and by Keele University towards the research costs of this investigation.

2. Here the report reproduced the Auschwitz camp's own description of the transport. This was incorrect since the Jews were not only of Czech origin. See Adler, 1955: 53.

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Chapter 4
Business Élites in France: Reflections on the Continued Exercise of Power

Mairi Maclean

The French élite (or élites) has enjoyed extraordinary success in maintaining its hold on the reins of power and influence since the 1789 Revolution replaced a hated aristocracy with an almost equally powerful oligarchy of 200 families'. This chapter reflects on the prodigious success enjoyed by the French business élite in surviving and holding on to power even at times of monumental change. One such period of upheaval comes under particular scrutiny: the years of the Vichy government and the Occupation of France by the German invader during World War II (19401944), during which French business élites thrived. The Vichy years may be seen as a unique and interesting case-study potentially yielding privileged insights into the ways in which élites seek to survive and prosper even in extremis. French employers, of course, do not enjoy an illustrious wartime record of patriotic conduct, the leitmotif of their behaviour being an attitude of 'business as usual'. Subsequently many employers pleaded 'résistance professionnelle', and many supplied misleading information to the German authorities. Nevertheless, the legislative and administrative legacy of Vichy and the Occupation is considerable: the debt owed by the Conseil National du Paronat Français (CNPF), now renamed MEDF (Mouvement des Entreprises de France), or indeed by French economic planning to the experience and methods of administration acquired during the war, has yet to be fully appraised. Perhaps, in the wake of the cathartic 'revelations' of September 1994, when President Mitterrand admitted his own role in the Vichy regime, the time is ripe to re-examine employers' wartime activities and their

strategies for survival and prosperity, for maintaining the 'status quo' amid chaos and uncertainty. Finally, despite the far-reaching changes to the organisation of business administration which are currently on-going, such as those wrought by European financial integration or globalisation, it is unlikely that we shall see the eventual disappearance of the French business élite in the face of these forces maieures. Far more likely is gradual consolidation with élites from other EU member states, leading to the emergence of a European élite in the new millennium.

> What is essential and comes before all other things is stability. If we had to choose between exceptionally favourable but unstable general conditions and other less brilliant but assured of great stability conditions, we would not hesitate to choose the latter.
>
> (Eugène Schneider)

I would like to begin this chapter in honour of Professor Dennis Ager by referring to one of his own papers: namely, the chapter on political control and persuasion in contemporary France which appeared in the edited collection resulting from the inaugural conference of the Association for the Study of Modern and Contemporary France, entitled *Élites in France. Origins, Reproduction and Power*. Here Professor Ager alludes to the domination of France by a French élite, or élites, in so all-encompassing a manner as to embrace even language itself, despite the natural resistance of language to control: 'there is no reason to suppose that an élite will have less success in imposing its will on language than on any other aspect of social life' (Ager, 1981: 154).

The term 'élite' is defined by the Robert dictionary as, 'les personnes qui occupent le premier rang, de par leur formation, leur culture'. This chapter is concerned primarily with business élites, the source of whose power is derived from the pivotal roles they occupy or have occupied in French business, banking and finance, positions which bestow upon the office-holders not only wealth and distinction but also power over the economy, and which are themselves often due to ties of family or kinship and/or educational achievement.

The French élite has enjoyed extraordinary success in maintaining its hold on the reins of power and influence since the 1789 Revolution replaced a hated aristocracy - aloof and out of touch, as encapsulated by the notorious remark attributed to Marie Antoinette 'Qu'ils mangent de la brioche!' - with an almost equally powerful oligarchy A mere 200 families are said to dominate the world of big business

(Bauer & Bertin-Mourot, 1987): although in the new century, this view may be seen arguably as somewhat obsolete.

The Revolution, of course, vaunted the ideals of egalitarianism, in conjunction with liberty and fraternity But the extolled virtue of *égalité* barely conceals an equally important national predilection in favour of hierarchy, this tension between egalitarianism and élitism permeating much of French society and above all its education system. Thus, all who pass the *baccalauréat* may enrol at university, but only a select few may proceed to the prestigious *grandes écoles*, in particular *ENA (Ecole Nationale d'Administration)* and the *Polytechnique* and the *grands corps* (the pinnacle of France's civil service élite including the *Corps des Mines*, the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* and the *Inspection des Finances*, introduced by Napoléon specifically to form a closed order) which mark the élite as distinct while preparing its members for governance and for power. The fact that so few pass through these élitist institutions virtually guarantees membership of the managerial élite for those who do: a surplus of graduates would mean competition on graduation, eschewed in favour of group solidarity, status and security, albeit at the cost of some incompetence. Theoretical knowledge is prized over practical business competency: as Jean Monnet observed, 'Les hauts fonctionnaires qui dominent [l'administration] ont toutes les qualités, sauf l'esprit d'entreprise' (Monnet, 1976: 290). And those members of the business élite who fail, even spectacularly, often find themselves cushioned from the consequences of failure, such as dismissal, by the coterie of like-minded associates which surround them: the protection afforded Jean-Yves Haberer, former chairman of the stricken bank *Crédit Lyonnais*, prevented timely action from being taken and allowed financial crisis to deepen into bankruptcy. 1

At the same time, the fact that the worlds of big business, politics and administration in France are not distinct from one another, but are interconnected and overlapping - sharing as they do the same route to the top - fosters in turn the establishment solidarity which binds the élite together. Top positions in business, politics and administration are often interchangeable. Moreover, it is common for the chairmen of large French firms to have 'earned their spurs' in key administrative jobs in service to the State, prior to their being 'parachuted' into top business positions, a practice known as *parachutage* or *pantouflage*, literally 'shuffling across'. Paradoxically, the French remain profoundly attached to the accumulation of privileges and distinctions which separate them, tolerating in particular significant inequalities of power (Bourdieu, 1979; Hofstede, 1980; Barsoux &

Lawrence, 1990). In *Du Contrat Social* (first published in 1762), Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes convincingly of the primacy of the general will (*la volonté générale*) to which all particular wills must be subservient, in which conviction it is possible to see the *raison d'être* determining the supremacy of the State in France. Yet at the same time, it is the State which is responsible for engendering much of the privilege at the heart of French society, a paradox explored by Pierre Bourdieu in *La Noblesse de l'Etat*.

This chapter reflects on the prodigious success enjoyed by the French business élite in surviving and holding on to power, in preserving the *status quo*, even at times of monumental social change and upheaval. One such period of upheaval is accorded particular attention: the years of the Vichy government and the Occupation of France by the German invader during World War II (19401944). French business élites thrived under Vichy and the Occupation, which may thus be seen as a unique and interesting case-study potentially yielding privileged insights into the ways in which élites seek to survive and prosper even *in extremis*. The continued survival of the French business élite is also considered briefly against the background of the ground-breaking developments which France is witnessing today, some of which are discussed: privatisation; the new emphasis on corporate governance, focusing attention on matters of accountability and transparency in the ways in which firms are managed and controlled; globalisation, as demonstrated by the growing mobility of French and European firms within (and outside) the Community; and the abandonment of the franc in favour of the euro, signifying the gradual but perhaps inexorable supersedence of the nation state by the European Union (EU) as the primary locus of collective identity The French business élite continues to thrive at the dawn of the twenty-first century despite the prospect and promise of seemingly far-reaching change to the organisation of business in France and Europe.

French Business Élites under Vichy and the Occupation

Our knowledge of French business during the Vichy interregnum suffers from two layers of *non-dit* or taboo. In the first place, Vichy is perceived as an inglorious, best-to-be-forgotten moment in French history, implicating by association and according to the degree of their involvement in the administration those who lived under it in the Nazi policy of exterminating the Jews. Of course, the French were not all supporters of Pétain or, indeed, de Gaulle. As Eric Duhamel observes:

> Being French (between 1940 and 1944) was to find a place on the spectrum accommodating all shades between ideological collaboration with the Nazis and Resistance born of rejection of the Armistice. . . . Resistance fighters included those who were *maréchaliste* and those who were not, those who were Pétainist, non-Gaullist and even those who moved from being *maréchaliste* to Giraudism and then Gaullism.
>
> (Duhamel, 1998: 227)

The ambivalent relationship of the French to Vichy and the Occupation, and their difficulties in coming to terms with the large overlap between collaboration and resistance inhabited by many French people at the time - 'between the heroes and the traitors there were . . . the mass of people . . . thrown off their balance by the policy pursued by the traitors' (Guéhenno, cited in Pickles, 1946: 139) - is captured in the film classic *Le Chagrin et la Pitié*. Perhaps one benefit of the 'psychodrama' of September 1994, when President Mitterrand publicly acknowledged in a televised interview his own (albeit modest) role in the Vichy regime, his admiration for Pétain, as well as his long friendship with René Bousquet, chief of police under Vichy, may be to facilitate a cathartic if difficult acceptance of a painful chapter in French history - particularly since in France, the Head of State *is* the nation.

The second taboo concerns the occupation of *homme d'affaires*. Businessmen in France have traditionally suffered from a poor public image, despite the fact that by the end of the nineteenth century top industrialists were well integrated into the upper classes: members of the old industrial dynasties, Schneider and de Wendel for example, fully participated in Parisian society (Cassis, 1991). The conduct of French businessmen during the years of occupation has certainly exacerbated this image. Public perception of their wartime behaviour is summed up by de Gaulle's chiding remark to business leaders after the Liberation who had come to protest against the flood of accusations directed at them, 'Où étiez-vous, messieurs?', 2 to which he allegedly added that he had seen none of them in London (Weber, 1986: 67).3 But the image of French businessmen as blood-suckers and swindlers predated Vichy. The Parisian millionaires of *la haute banque* who dominated the financial sector of the French economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had to contend with a deeply rooted hostility felt by the lower-middle and rural classes towards banks in general (Cassis, 1991). Often more concerned with pride, status and tradition than with balance sheets, top industrialists tended to treat their firms much as an aristocrat might treat his lands (Vinen,

1995). In 1936, at the time of the Popular Front, and the nationalisation of the Banque de France, the 200 families were stigmatised, and accused of exploiting the masses. Indeed, it has even been suggested that Vichy was the revenge of the *patronat* for the Popular Front (Kolboom, 1986). As Ehrmann notes, the portrayals of businessmen and financiers in the works of celebrated French novelists, such as Zola or Balzac, is exclusively negative:

> For a country where literary incarnations still command wide popular appeal, it is significant that in the French novel there seems to be not a single example of an outstanding entrepreneurial pioneer; where they appear at all, they are slightly ridiculed rather than pictured as heroes.
>
> (Ehrmann, 1957: 210, cited in Barsoux & Lawrence, 1990: 118, 119)

This poor image reinforces the secrecy and obfuscation which characterise French business in the period in question - and, indeed, before and afterwards - exacerbating in turn public distrust. But what distinguishes 1944 from other periods is the universal pillorying of business leaders from all sides, emanating not just from traditional adversaries, such as the trade unions or the Marxist left, but from Christian Democrats and Gaullists. Thereafter, top businessmen remained conspicuously absent from the entourage of de Gaulle.

The seminal work by Henry Ehrmann, *Organized Business in France*, which examines and appraises the activities of employers' associations in France in the aftermath of World War II, is valuable and illuminating for the purposes of this chapter. Published in 1957, the research was conducted sufficiently close to events to benefit from numerous first-hand accounts by managers directly involved in wartime business activity, yet equally with the necessary critical distance to enable appropriate conclusions to be drawn. The passage of time also enabled Ehrmann to ascertain the extraordinary stability of the French business élite even following their universal condemnation for alleged unpatriotic conduct. Ehrmann confirms, again at first hand, that the post-war boards of directors of all large French corporations consisted invariably of *the same men*, and almost always of the same social groups, as before the war, despite the publicly proclaimed goal of unseating the upper bourgeoisie and permanently eliminating it from positions of economic and administrative power, promoted in particular by a Resistance press bent on targeting what it described as an 'oligarchy of big business leaders' (Ehrmann, 1957: 109).

The wartime collaboration of the French business élite in general, and certain members of the business élite in particular, is, of course,

well known and has entered the realm of public mythology. The *leitmotif* of their conduct seems to be an attitude of 'business as usual', of keeping the factory wheels turning, of accommodating the particular circumstances in which they found themselves. According to Weber, cohorts of employers became integrated into the Vichy administrative machine, many of whom collaborated to the fullest extent (Weber, 1986: 68). Ehrmann writes that in 1940 French business, whether from modern or backward sectors, unanimously supported the armistice regime which had turned over to them the running of the French economy - albeit under the enemy's heel. However, it is by no means clear that French employers were more Pétainist than the general population. Ehrmann and Weber agree that they seem, on the contrary, to have followed closely the general trend of public opinion:

> a shrewd observer remarked afterwards that a Gallup poll in wartime France would have shown 95 percent of the population 'Pétainist' after the armistice, 50 percent until the Allied landings in North Africa, and still 30 percent on D-Day.
>
> (Ehrmann, 1957: 94)

The steel magnate François de Wendel records his astonishment at how rapidly following the armistice it became fashionable among top industrialists to be Anglophobic, and to avoid Jews whom they had previously frequented (Jeanneney, 1975). In Kolboom's view, the French business élite regarded the birth of Vichy as something of a divine surprise: 'it cannot be denied . . . that the events of 19391940 brought about a situation in social affairs and politics that matched the wishes of the majority of the political and social élites at the time, especially those of the employers' (Kolboom, 1986: 349, 50, cited in Vinen, 1991: 98). If this was certainly the case in 1940, thereafter the balance began to shift perceptibly, as the French population began to question the permanency of the German victory.

The activities of Louis Renault led to the spectacular expropriation of his company by the State; what is less well known is that he died in prison awaiting trial, and was therefore never convicted. The car manufacturer Marius Berliet suffered the same fate of expropriation. At his trial in September 1945, Berliet claimed in his defence that his company had produced fewer cars for the German occupants than any other French car producer: 2239 cars for Germans as against 6548 for French customers. This compared with Renault which had delivered 32,887 vehicles to Germans and only 1697 to French clients, a pattern followed also by Citroën (32,248 produced for Germans and 2052 for French clients) (Aron, 1974). Managers at Renault claimed, for their part, that they had deliberately slowed down production, producing

7677 fewer vehicles than the target of 41,909 vehicles imposed by the German occupants. This argument, however, cut no ice with the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), who maintained that the go-slow had been organised by workers, not by management. Louis Renault may have been punished more for his attitude than for his actions, which were mirrored by those of many other employers. Robert Aron reports that, when visited by a Gaullist seeking his support for the Free French, Renault is alleged to have replied: 'De Gaulle, connais pas!' (Aron, 1974: 234).

Ultimately, Renault's experience of expropriation was undeniably symbolic, while simultaneously serving as a warning to all employers of the fate which might befall them if they fell from grace: a symbolic reaffirmation of the collective sentiments and ideas which make up the unity and personality of French society, and which have been periodically enacted throughout French history since the Revolution. French society is extraordinarily tolerant of power distance and, indeed, of abuses of power; but from time to time, in a symbolic catharsis and confirmation of national identity and values (as exemplified by the 1848 Revolution, the seizure of power by Louis Bonaparte in 1851, and the 1871 *Commune*), heads must roll (Turkle, 1975). 4 This exemplary punishment of an individual, it could be argued, works in favour of the stability of the group as a whole, 'cleansed' by this symbolic act of retribution, however collaborationist the experiences of individual members.

In 19441945, several thousand employers were, for a limited period, removed from the management of their firms, the running of which was temporarily assumed by workers or vigilantes. Most were never brought to trial, and most recovered their property within a matter of weeks; but the experience of near-expropriation was bitterly resented by the business community as a whole (Ehrmann, 1957: 104).

Nevertheless, it would seem that French employers were on the whole well integrated into the Vichy administrative machine, as evinced by the organisation of French business today, which is marked by the experience. The law of 16 November 1940, for example, united the functions of chairman and chief executive in the role of *Président Directeur Général* (PDG), concentrating power in the hands of one individual, mirroring the concentration of political power in the hands of Pétain; this remains the case for over 95% of large French companies today. A system was developed under Vichy which was hallmarked by the close association of bureaucracy on the one hand and economic oligarchies on the other, resembling in many respects the structured planned economy of Germany The modern employers'

movement in particular, dominated by the Conseil National de Patronat Français (CNPF), renamed MEDEF (Mouvement des Entreprises de France) in 1998, which was created in its current form in 1946, owes much to the impulses it received during the Vichy interregnum (Ehrmann, 1957; Weber, 1986; Vinen, 1995). In the summer of 1940, the economy was in chaos, unemployment was rife, and factories were at a standstill. Understandably, the German occupants wanted a French economy which was working and which would serve the needs of their war machine directly As a result, a campaign was launched to encourage employers to return to their posts and resume production, leading to the law of 16 August 1940 on the provisional organisation of industrial production. *Comités d'organisation* (COs) were created to carry out the indispensable functions specified in the new law, including: inventories of production facilities, raw materials and manpower; the establishment of manufacturing programmes; the organisation of the purchase and distribution of raw materials; the development of standards of production, quality and competition; and price fixing, and so on (Ehrmann, 1957: 79). So all-encompassing were these tasks, however, that they gave the presidents of the committees - almost always leading businessmen who had been prominent in their own trade associations, with which the COs thereby became fused - considerable power, as they asserted themselves as the country's élite through industrial self-government. At the same time, public and private interests became blurred, since by law all those employed in the administration of vital raw materials became public officials: the CO presidents thus became civil servants. In the end, however, whatever their individual intentions or motives, it was perhaps inevitable that they should identify with the government which had entrusted them with running the economy, thereby becoming the indirect adjuncts of the invader. It is a severe indictment of the employers' movement that no part of it ever assumed a position which might have been interpreted as encouragement to the forces which were or which became hostile to Vichy (Ehrmann, 1957: 95). As Vinen notes, after the war, resistance records in business or civil service circles proved to be valuable currency precisely because they were so rare (Vinen, 1995: 267).

The experience of Vichy and the Occupation intensified the secrecy which characterises French business to this day The withholding of information had previously been commonplace among French businessmen, with owners concealing business details even from their own sons and heirs. But a modern industrialised economy, such as the Germans needed to realise their military aims, requires the gathering of detailed statistical information, an objective which collided with

the bourgeois mentality of French manufacturers and merchants. Under Vichy, the patriotism of many businessmen found expression in the lies they told the CO when required, under pain of severe sanctions, to provide statistics for the German authorities: since the enemy could use the information provided, it made sense to distort the truth. Arguably, however, by their very secrecy, and in the absence of any obvious acts of courage and patriotism on the part of the business community, the employers unwittingly contributed to the distrust of which they complained. At the same time, after the Liberation, this atmosphere of hostility was not conducive to establishing or reestablishing truthfulness in the furnishing of business statistics. Nor did the subsequent law of 7 June 1951 on 'duties, coordination and secrecy in statistical matters' greatly change things. Even at the end of the twentieth century, top businessmen frequently display a cavalier attitude to statistical veracity At the parliamentary enquiry into the collapse of Crédit Lyonnais in 1994, for example, ex-*PDG* Jean-Yves Haberer admitted that the chairmen of large state-owned banks regularly colluded to agree their financial results. Having selected, on one occasion, the date of the death of Henri IV as an interim figure (1610, or a figure of FF 1610 m.), Haberer was amused to observe that one of FF 1611m. was announced by the Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) the following week! On another occasion, Haberer agreed to announce on the same day as the BNP an increase in operating profit of no more than 10%; in the event, the BNP, which prided itself on being first among French state-owned banks, broke the agreement and published an increase of 15%! (Séguin & d'Aubert, 1994; Leser, 1995). Admittedly, the effect of scandal on such a large scale as the collapse of the Crédit Lyonnais, in which secrecy and obfuscation are clearly implicated, is partly to promote the cause of transparency, accountability and good corporate governance. As a public servant, Haberer was technically answerable to the State, the Banque de France, the Trésor, the Commission des Opérations de Bourse (the stock market watchdog), and to numerous financial auditors - indeed to so many different and competing bodies that he ultimately answered to no one. But the French passion for secrecy (and its corollary, privacy) endures. For all the talk in France of 'le corporate governance' 5 as the twentieth century draws to a close, it remains in meaning and substance an imported term, not an indigenous one, but one which has been overlaid on and remains exogenous to French business culture. The remuneration packages of top executives, for example, whose publication has been mandatory in the UK since the 1995 Greenbury Report, are conspicuously absent from the annual reports of French companies: to publish these without

the express permission of the individuals concerned would, after all, infringe French privacy laws, among the most draconian in the western world.

The French Business Élite at the End of the Twentieth Century

The struggle for survival characteristic of wartime is unique and cannot be replicated in time of peace. Nevertheless, the changes which France and Europe are witnessing as the new millennium begins are extensive: to recap, far-reaching privatisation, blurring the traditional public-private divide; globalisation, as evinced by the internationalisation of the Bourse, or the growing mobility of French and European firms, bringing with it the fear that jobs in France will be sacrificed for low-cost labour elsewhere; the abandonment of the franc (symbol *par excellence* of economic sovereignty) in favour of the euro, suggesting the gradual but ultimately unavoidable supersedence of the nation state by the EU as the main locus of collective identity; and the new emphasis on corporate governance, yet in which there is perhaps more rhetoric than reality, more style than substance (Maclean, 1999). Constraints of space preclude a detailed discussion here of each issue and its likely impact on French business élite. For the purposes of economy, the following discussion reflects briefly on two of these issues, privatisation and corporate governance, as potential agents of change in the constellation of French business élites.

The extensive privatisation carried out in France, albeit in fits and starts, since the first sell-off of glass-maker Saint-Gobain in December 1986, was generally expected to prelude a major reorganisation of the French corporate landscape. As the business magazine *L'Expansion* predicted:

> The privatisation of two-thirds of the French financial system (the banking and insurance sector), still in the hands of the State, will, according to all the evidence, give rise to a new capitalist landscape. . . . New alliances will form, others will shatter; some unions will be undone, new knots will be tied. Already behind the scenes, scenarios are being worked out, contacts made, positions taken up. These ultimate privatisations, which toll the knell for the mixed economy represent far more than a simple change of ownership.
>
> (*L'Expansion*, May 1993, cited in Maclean, 1995: 285)

It is interesting to note, however, that the far-reaching change which is prophesied in this analysis is envisaged purely in terms of

shifting configurations of alliances, and not in terms of the dissolution of such alliances in favour of a wider, more democratic shareholder base. In fact, the notorious *noyaux durs or groupes d'actionnaires stables* put in place by Édouard Balladur - first as finance minister (19861988), subsequently as prime minister (19931995), although ostensibly a Commission de Privatisation was by then responsible for the selection process - allegedly to give newly privatised firms an anchor following their change of status, were in direct contravention of the Chirac government's stated aim of creating 'popular capitalism'. Among individuals who made up the *noyaux durs* were many personal friends of Balladur. Through cronyism. (*copinage*) and through the continued immobilising exchange of shares as crossed shareholdings, which shelter individual chairmen from the threat of dismissal in the event of bad management, privatisation in France has continued to bolster the traditional system of establishment solidarity Admittedly, the 1990s have seen more European partners invited to join these groups of stable shareholders. An astonishing 35% of French equity is now owned by foreign investors, a world record, and a reflection, perhaps, of the intrinsic weakness of French capitalism which crossed shareholdings long sought to disguise, now requiring this massive influx of foreign capital to remain competitive. Significant as this undoubtedly is, the change which might be effected by the increasing Europeanisation of the hard cores of corporate shareholders on the part of leading French companies should perhaps not be overestimated at this stage. Many of these shareholdings continue to be reciprocal, even with European partners. Interlocking directorates continue to insulate business leaders, as they seek to protect their power at this time of change. Interestingly, it seems that French business élites may have seen fit to maximise their chances of continuing survival and prosperity by trading a stake in French capitalism for a stake in a wider European game.

Similarly, the new emphasis on corporate governance in France, on the importance of promoting sound practices in the management and control of business enterprise, as recommended by the Rapport Viénot (1995) and the Rapport Marini (1996), is expected by some observers to lead to the unwinding of the crossed shareholdings which have been at the heart of French capitalism since the 1960s. There is evidence of some incremental change in this direction. In the late 1990s some longstanding crossed shareholdings in major French companies were unravelled: notable examples include the dissolution of the alliance between Suez and Saint-Gobain in 1997, or the loosening of the tie binding AXA with former ally Paribas in 1996, following the takeover of UAP.

Yet often on the cusp of promised change, France has a knack of reverting to type. France retains distinctive characteristics bequeathed by her specific historical experiences, ranging from unique legal and institutional frameworks to the dominance of specific business élites; it would be unwise to underestimate their enduring influence. If, in France, the machinery which produces the business élite remains intact - and after all, the élites who hold the reins of power are unlikely to alter a system which has recruited and promoted them - than radical change is unlikely to ensue. As Marceau suggests, 'plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose' (Marceau, 1981). Hamdouch predicts that the state-dominated system of patronage and ownership, which she terms the 'State of influence', nurtured by a business élite which has itself become self-perpetuating while masquerading as a meritocracy, will endure in France for many years to come despite its eternal protestations to the contrary: 'Adieu, je reste!' (Hamdouch, 1989: 234). Far more likely than the eventual disappearance of French business élites in the face of *forces majeures* such as European financial integration or globalisation, or the prospect of major change in the ways in which businesses are managed and controlled, is their gradual consolidation with élites from other EU member states, leading to the emergence of a European élite in the twenty-first century.

Conclusion

This chapter reflects on the continued exercise of power by French business élites even at times of social change and upheaval, such as are represented by the years of the Vichy government and the Occupation of France during World War II. French business élites thrived under Vichy and the Occupation, partly due to a convergence of interest with the German occupant, who required a well-run economy to meet the needs of the Nazi war machine. The period 19401944 may thus be seen as a unique and interesting case study yielding privileged insights into the ways in which élites seek to survive and prosper even *in extremis*. With some notable exceptions, the wartime activities of French employers, keen to achieve stability amid chaos and uncertainty have been covered by the same blanket of taboo which cloaks all things associated with Vichy. Perhaps, in the wake of the cathartic 'revelations' of September 1994, in which the then Head of State, who embodies the nation, admitted his own role in the Vichy regime, the time is ripe to examine afresh employers' wartime activities. The debts owed by the CNPF to Vichy, or indeed by French economic planning, which enjoyed considerable post-war success

during '30 glorious years', to the experience of administration acquired during the war, have yet to be fully assessed and acknowledged.

At the end of the twentieth century, French business élites have successfully reproduced and retained their hold on the reins of power for more than 200 years. Despite the far-reaching changes to the organisation of business administration which are ongoing, such as those wrought by European financial integration or globalisation, it is unlikely that we shall see the eventual disappearance of French business élites in the face of these *forces majeures*. Far more likely is their gradual consolidation with élites from other EU member states, leading to the emergence of a European élite in the new millennium.

Notes

1. Even more telling, when, in 1993, Haberer was eventually removed from his position as Président Directeur Général of Crédit Lyonnais, he was given a new job as PDG of Crédit National (for one year from 1993 to 1994).

2. Forty years later, François Ceyrac, a former president of the CNPF, offered a potential response to de Gaulle's rhetorical question: 'Je lui aurais répondu [. . .] "Non, mon général, nous n'étions pas à Londres. Nous sommes chefs d'entreprise et, à ce titre, responsables des industries et des salariés de ce pays. Nous étions dans nos usines, avec notre personnel, pour éviter qu'à la débâcle militaire ne s'ajoutent la déroute économique et la mainmise directe des occupants sur nos ressources. Nombreux sont les chefs d'entreprise, au demeurant, qui ont freiné la production pour la machine de guerre allemande. La *résistance professionnelle* était moins voyante que la résistance armée, elle n'était pas moins efficace ni moins dangereuse". (Cited in Weber, 1986: 68.)

3. This meeting took place on 4 October 1944. The remark may be apocryphal, as claimed by Jean-Noël Jeanneney, as there is no record of it in the minutes of the meeting. Authentic or not, it nevertheless conveys the virulence of national feeling against employers in the wake of the Liberation.

4. A recent example of this phenomenon is provided by the prosecution of a well-respected former prime minister, Laurent Fabius, over the tragic infection of several thousand French haemophiliacs in the mid-1980s through the distribution of blood contaminated with the AIDS virus.

5. There is no French equivalent of the term 'corporate governance', a direct translation of the English, 'gouvernement d'entreprise', normally sufficing for convenience.

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Chapter 5
'Le Retour Du Civil' in French Political Culture

Gino Raymond

The distinction between the civil and the civic has a particular resonance in France because of the legacy of the Revolution of 1789, which defined the rights of the individual as both 'man' and 'citizen' and therefore shaped a political culture which, in the eyes of some critics, has conflated the two concepts and consequently rendered the operation of civil society subservient to the imperatives of le tout politique. This chapter will look at the defining assumptions of French political culture which have been placed under scrutiny concerning the individual and the citizen, identify the principal reasons for the challenge to these assumptions, and argue that this challenge is symptomatic of the decline in the specificity which has been regarded traditionally as a powerfully differentiating factor in the comparison of France's political culture with that of other leading liberal democracies.

As the title of this chapter suggests, the notion that the prerogatives of civil society are being redefined and reasserted suggests that until recently they have enjoyed insufficient scope to develop because of the prevailing assumptions that underpin the political culture of modern France, especially the role attributed to the citizen in his or her civic identity and the way this is crucially determined by the relationship with the state. This chapter will begin by taking the temperature of the current debate on individualism in France, and particularly the anxiety among some commentators regarding the loss of those reference points that lie outside individual experience and that used to situate the individual in relation to the collectivity It will then contrast the classic republican assumption underlying these anxieties, namely, that the exercise of citizenship is mediated by membership of the body politic, with the assumption by the new *mouvements revendicatifs* in France that severing the obligation that

forms the nexus between the citizen and the state is crucial to the release of the former's potential as an active citizen. Finally, the essay will argue that the challenge to the classic republican political culture of France is indicative of the convergence with the post-modern societies of the Anglo-Saxon world and the diminishing significance of French specificity.

Breaking the Jacobin Mould

In philosophical terms, the twentieth century is ending in France with a sometimes anguished debate as to the all-pervasive triumph of individualism and its inevitable corollary, the derecognition of the debt to those structures - historical, generational, political and social - that had anchored the individual in a network of relationships that contributed to the organic development of his or her identity It is the result of what some commentators perceive as *l'idolâtrie démocratique*, that adulation of the individual that envisages the arrival of the subject into the world naked and unencumbered of those ties or *repères* which provide a framework of orientation (Finkielkraut, 1999). For some observers, the disintegration of hierarchies regarded as characteristic of post-modern societies can take a spatial form that impacts fundamentally on the social. The acceptance of an ideology of continual change, it has been argued, reduces the subject to an experience of life that is purely individual, severing him or her from the sense, described by Edmund Burke, that the citizen participates in a contract that binds the state to generations past and those yet unborn (Houellebecque, 1998).

This philosophical debate on individualism followed logically on the heels of a debate as to the durability of the Jacobin mould which has shaped the relationship between the citizen and the state since 1789. For a commentator like Nicolas Tenzer, the pattern of voter disaffection and abstentionism that began to grow in France during the 1980s and to undermine the position of the established political parties, reflected the increasing redundancy of the axes along which political opinion had split traditionally and mobilised. It was a change which challenged the culture established by the Revolution of 1789. For example, it was evident that the terms 'left' and 'right' that had derived from the competition between Jacobins and Girondins had become a poor catalyst for the arousal of passionate partisan support, given that all governments, whether of left or right in France, adopted policies aimed at attenuating the demands of welfare budgets as France endeavoured to adapt to the demands of the global economy

Even the classic battle over the role of the state in education had taken on a quite different hue. The defeats dealt to the planned reforms, first, of the socialist education minister Alain Savary in 1984, and then to the proposals of centre-right education minister Alain Devaquet in 1987, illustrated the fact that education was no longer the battleground for the archetypal conflict between anti-clericalists and defenders of the Catholic faith, but had become another source of grievance for citizen-consumers frustrated by what they felt to be inadequate provision in the field of education. The perceived 'failure' of the state had led to a "parasitic' notion of liberty as the result of which individuals or groups had hollowed out a space in the body politic, without a corresponding sense of obligation to that collectivity (Tenzer, 1990).

Both the importance and the redundancy of 1789 as the foundation stone for the political culture of modern France was underlined in a different manner by Alain Minc, who saw the locus of the citizen's allegiance shifting from the Republic to those 'grey' zones that lie outside its perimeters, thereby reversing the integrating impetus of the Revolution and taking France into a new 'medieval age' (Minc, 1993). Where Minc identified the integrating impetus of the Revolution, others perceived the voluntarist uniformisation that constitutes the problematic at the heart of the French Republican paradigm for the relationship between the citizen and the state. There was an understandable desire by the authors of the Revolution to replace the social determinisms that had divided the French nation under the *ancien régime* with a will to unity embodied in the notion of citizenship that would rapidly serve as a foundation myth for the nascent *République* (Le Bras & Todd, 1981) However, the very 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen' articulates the assimilation that occurs between the perception of the individual in his or her civil guise as a private person, and the perception of the individual in his or her civic guise, as a citizen defined by the obligations to the collectivity, in a manner which parallels the assimilation of the nation into the republican state. The end result, it has been argued, is that the national state came to act as an overarching means for condensing and regulating social and political questions, and questions concerning the private and public individual. In terms of the political culture of the governing élite in France, this has established the conviction that the aim of all political combat is the conquest of the state, because the state is the incarnation of the indivisible nation and the sole legitimate instrument of social transformation (Wievorka, 1993).

The analysis offered by commentators like Tenzer and others was, however, in itself formulated in a way that reflected the cultural

conditioning characteristic of the republican paradigm for active citizenship. A traditional 'top-down' study of the pursuit of political objectives that fixes on leaders, parties and the structure of organisations which support them and the wider networks through which they operate cannot be sensitive to the pursuit of change from below - those shifts in the political landscape which occur when the institutional pillars of the state are circumvented as the ground around them moves. What more recent studies of the discourse of new voices in the civil sphere have shown is that the distrust of the institutional means offered by the state for pursuing change does not signal a rejection of the notion of civic obligation, but the desire to engage with the polity by other means.

New Voices in the Civil Sphere

For a political society that has known as many changes of regime as France over the last two centuries, challenges to the assumptions and presumptions that underpin the attitudes of the ruling élite are regular occurrences, especially in periods of economic transition and the social upheaval usually associated with these periods. An archetypal post-war movement of this kind was Poujadism which, between 1953 and the high point of its success in the elections of 1956, rallied shopkeepers and artisans to the rhetoric of Pierre Poujade and its condemnation of the political class for the allegedly punitive tax regime it foisted on them. The eclipse of Poujade after the renewal of the state's institutional credibility resulting from the establishment of the Fifth Republic is seen by some commentators as indicative of the destiny of most of the *mouvements revendicatifs* that have flourished since May 1968: the conjunction of a critical point in the economic cycle and specific social pressures lead to a challenge to the institutions of the state which subsides when that combination of factors no longer cohere. However, the experience of the last two decades suggests that the recovery of credibility by the institutions of the state is far less assured that it used to be. The competition between Brice Lalonde and Antoine Waechter that had seemed to deal a body blow to the rising Green movement in the 1980s did not dissipate the concern for environmental issues across France, and the unexpected success of the Socialists in the legislative elections of 1997 led to a government dependent on a pluralist left-wing alliance that accommodates the leader of the Greens, Dominique Voynet, as minister for the environment.

More significantly, the conflict of personalities at the head of the extreme right *Front National* in France in 1998, and the break-up of the

party into two in 1999 (one rechristened the *Front national - Mouvement national* and headed by Bruno Mégret, and the other called *Front national pour l'unité française* and headed by Jean-Marie Le Pen), has not restored the credibility of the traditional centre-right parties in France, especially the non-Gaullist *UDF*. While for most of the 1980s and 1990s the centre-right could claim that the *FN* was poaching from its natural constituency due to the *Front*'s demagogic discourse assimmilating immigration with social and economic ills, the implosion of the *FN* offered little perceptible benefit to the fortunes of the centre-right according to the polls preceding the next major electoral contest; the European elections of June 1999. Instead, during those decades, what have been called the *révolutions invisibles* (Rosanvallon *et al*., 1999) continued apace. In contrast to a previous generation of *mouvements revendicatifs*, challenges to the political establishment emanating from civil society manifested qualitatively different characteristics. Over issues ranging from culture, consumerism, the environment, human rights, immigration, public health, racism and unemployment, what has become noteworthy is the heterogeneity of the actors involved and the plurality of discourses adopted. The notion of civic obligation has undergone a transformation that allows it to be interpreted in a much more differentiated and individual manner, and most importantly, it is an interpretation which gives a new dynamic to the prerogatives of the civil sphere to determine the activity of the institutions of the state.

In contrast to the classic *coordinations* and *associations* of the past, France has witnessed the growth of *mouvements revendicatifs* which reflect the dispersal characteristic of post-modern society, whether of opinions, initiatives, or actions, and which are defining a relationship with the state that requires a corresponding levelling process of the pyramid of relations within it. The movements themselves are articulated in ways which mean that national structures coexist with local structures that have an autonomous existence and can serve as a hub of initiatives underpinned by structures of regional, municipal and local identity. These are movements with independent articulations for a new era in which the commitment to action is not conditioned by membership of a socio-economic class or even interest group, but dependent on individual choices marked by the contingencies concomitant with the rejection of the rigidities that result in the occlusion of the self. 1

Numerous surveys have charted the remarkable rise of social movements in France pursuing the idea of 'doing politics differently' (Waters, 1998). The doubling of the number of associations created

each year in France between 1975 and 1990 was also accompanied by a high degree of differentiation in the way they were organised and managed. While some associations (particularly in the fight against racism) have defined themselves very much as local initiatives by local people, others (particularly in the field of environmental, gay and human rights) have joined loose networks that promote the idea of a *citoyenneté planétaire*, underscoring the pursuit of rights in a manner that divorces this entitlement from the attribution of membership of the nation-state implied in the classic notion of citizenship.

Interestingly, what is often deployed in the theoretical perspective supporting these new social movements is an argument that has its intellectual antecedents in the critique deployed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau of models of representative government like those in England, where the citizens were forced into a state of passivity and from which they were only allowed to emerge occasionally to cast their vote. Only, in this case, the challenge to the state's monopoly in the realm of politics is not one that is motivated by the desire to liberate the will of another generality, but to facilitate the operation of a will that may be goal-orientated, qualified by a complex of characteristics, and particularist (Bastide, 1997). Taken to its logical conclusion, the challenge to the republican state by the new social movements in France is founded on the belief that their activities liberate the individual as an autonomous moral agent and restore his or her sovereignty as a citizen (Cordiero, 1996). Furthermore, this *transfiguration du politique* should not be perceived as an end or closure, but rather an opening with infinite possibilities. 2

Post-Modern Convergences and the End of French Specificity

One of the paradoxes of the last two decades is that, although France has been governed by socialist-led majorities for most of that period, the pace of market differentiation and social individuation continued to accelerate. The range of services available to the citizen-consumer continues to multiply, even in the supply of goods such as audio-visual products where it was once assumed that the hidden hand of the state would remain omnipresent. The decline of the state-determined hierarchy governing the consumption of these goods is part of a wider change in the supply side of the economy, where market-driven oligarchic competition has largely undone the ties that hitherto bound the governing élite and corporate interests. As is illustrated by the recent purchase by the Renault car company of a

major stake in the troubled Japanese manufacturer Nissan, although the French state remains a shareholder, it is now one among others and can no longer presume on the cosy relationships that used to exist between governments and the heads of nationalised enterprises. The development of an Anglo-Saxon 3 appetite for takeovers and consolidation has been demonstrated domestically by the Banque Nationale de Paris' attempt to absorb the Société Générale and Paribas, and highlighted internationally by the very muscular confrontation between the French luxury goods giant LVMH's battle with François Pinault's PPR for the spoils from Italy's designer goods' producer, Gucci.

Corresponding to the foregoing changes in corporate behaviour in France have been changes in the behaviour of citizens, who are also intent on eschewing what was once regarded as the obligatory mediation of the state in the pursuit of socio-economic change. The alternative political economies created, notably in the United States, by self-help groups where mutual support is calculated in social currencies like 'time dollars', have found their parallels in France where, for example, the *systèmes d'échanges locaux* (*SELS*) that numbered only a few hundred at the beginning of the 1980s, have grown to 30,000 at the end of the 1990s. France, like all other post-industrial societies, has now become an 'I' culture, where individuality independence, identity and interactivity constitute the 'devise' that mobilises its citizens. The hierarchy of needs in the twentieth-century identified by Maslow, that began with sustenance, and gave way to security in the middle of the century, has now reached the stage in which the individual in France has emerged as the individual in any other post-industrial society: the pursuit of 'self-actualisation' (Maslow, 1999).

One may safely argue that the *retour du civil* underlines the conclusion that the revolutionary impetus given to the creation of the Jacobin republican state has run its course (Hayward, 1990), and that the two great fears of the French governing class, particularism and communitarianism, whether defined by gender, sexuality, race, or any other identifying feature, have transformed irrevocably the Jacobin blueprint for the Republic, from one and indivisible, to an Anglo-Saxon style polity of pluralisms.

Notes

1. It has become a commonplace observation of social commentators that the co-identity of state and nation, with the latter as the collectivity of citizens whose interests the state defends, is no longer accepted as a given of civic action. Inevitably therefore, any challenge to the identity of the

nation must impact on the identity of the state and its role. As Lipianski suggests:

> Cette identitée [nationale] n'a plus un contenu très précis: elle est davantage évoquée que décrite. C'est comme une image effacée dont on ne percevrait plus que le contour. On a l'impression d'un cadre vide ou, du moins, un contenu flou dans lequel chaque groupe peut introduire les valeurs qu'il veut défendre.
>
> (Lipianski, 1991: 253.)

2. Maffesoli argued at the beginning of the 1990s that the panic at the evidence of 'non-participation politique' and other forms of 'désengagement' was unwarranted, and that it could be interpreted as symptomatic of something much more healthy for the life of the polity: 'on peut voir, au contraire, dans cette "non-réponse", autre forme de la *secessio plebis*, une force spécifique, une attitude dynarnique par laquelle la vie sociale se recentre sur l'essentiel' (Maffesoli, 1992:122).

3. I use Anglo-Saxon' in the way that it is commonly used by French commentators, to designate a different approach emanating from different cultural assumptions from across the Atlantic.

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Chapter 6
The City As Narrative: Representations of Paris in French Cinema (19301990s)

Susan Hayward

This chapter looks at the shifts in representations of Paris from the early sound cinema to the late 1990s. It argues that there are four major shifts. The first set of imaged representations of the city are the safe and naturalised images of the 1930s cinema where class boundaries are 'respected' and where the working class is represented as at play in this city of attractions; the second delves more deeply into Paris and represents the city as a gendered space - particularly in the gangster films of the 1950s; the next shift comes with the 1960s and 1970s where Paris is no longer represented as a safe city but rather as a city where modernisation has brought about a dislocation between the city's inhabitants and the new technologies and building programmes that surround them; the final shift examined is that of the late 1980s to 1990s where Paris is represented as a city based in the principle of inclusion and exclusion.

Paris is perceived as a cultural mecca, as a place that generates culture. Buildings affirm this idea, or at least one idea of culture. Either the culture is the building and stands for national prestige in the form of cultural exchange (Palais du Louvre) or history (Hôtel des Invalides) or economic well-being (La Défense). Alternatively culture is put into buildings - which may originally have held another purpose but which have now become museums (Le Grand Palais, Musée d'Orsay). State-funded theatre and opera also figure in this category Finally culture becomes indissolubly linked with the names of 'great men' - mostly former Presidents (Centre Pompidou, Bibliothèeque Nationale François Mitterrand). In this meaning of culture, we are talking of institutionalised culture, of the city as Cultural Capital with capital 'C's.

But the city also bears, or is marked by other concepts of culture. The city of artists and intellectuals gives us another idea of culture - this time we speak of the city as cultural capital with small 'c's because it is first perceived as anti-institutional culture, and, therefore, as challenging to Capital Culture. Typically this city of cultural capital is located in specific geographical spaces: cafées, areas of Paris (Montmartre), the Left Bank (St Germain des Prées).

Moving down the chain of cultural signification we arrive at more popular forms of cultural meaning such as night clubs, jazz clubs, gay bars, the Folies Bergères, strip joints (most of which are located around the Pigalle area, some - particularly jazz clubs - on the Left Bank). Often these cultural sites are associated with *altérité*, otherness, be it in the form of the black body the homosexual body or the female body. The body comes into view in these cultural sites and comes into view through its difference: the visibly different black body of the jazz musician or singer, the homosexual body displaying its difference, and the female body exposed as spectacle.

Thus, as we move down this chain of signifiers, Paris shifts in cultural meaning from 'great moments in history' and institutionalised culture, to oppositional foment, to counterculture subculture and sexuality And this is but a thumbnail sketch of the city as cultural meaning. But clearly already it is self-evident that these three sets of signifiers are in tension and so a crucial question becomes how is this tension to be contained if it is to make sense? And how is this tension policed so that it does not threaten the social order of things?

Policing the Polis

A little history is needed here to develop and answer these questions. Ever since Louis XIV, France has increasingly become a centralised nation state and Paris has become constructed as *the* site and symbol of this increased centralisation, as the showcase of French greatness and cultural supremacy Thus the city in this instance Paris, can be seen as the means by which the nation represents its history to itself. So the city is already doing two things. First, it is self-referentially at the heart of producing its own meaning. It produces its own very particular set of images: 'Paris is this (the Tour Eiffel)', 'Paris is that (Place des Vosges)' and so on. The city refers to itself incessantly Second, Paris is also constantly refurbishing itself to stay up to date with history, and does so either through new buildings or through cleaning itself up.

In this respect, then, Paris becomes an imaged city but also an

imagined city - by which we mean three things. The city is imagined because it selects the images by which it will represent itself. Similarly the city is imagined when it refurbishes itself to stay up to date with history. The questions become: what is that history about, what is the hidden agenda, which and whose history? So already as an imaged and imagined city we can see that we are talking about the idea of exclusion, that is, that there are parts of the city that do not meet the criteria of the imagined city and so cannot be shown or represented. And as soon as we are talking about inclusion and exclusion we are necessarily talking about power relations. Neither is it merely a case of what can and cannot be shown. Because a city depends for its meaning also upon the movement of bodies within the city, the question now becomes which bodies can be allowed where and which not? This in turn raises issues of class, race, gender and age.

Let us take a couple of important periods in Paris' architectural history to develop these ideas: the Haussmannisation of Paris in the second half of the nineteenth century; and Paris of the De Gaulle and Pompidou era (in the 1960s and early 1970s). Baron Haussmann's plan for the massive urban transformation of Paris had as its ostensible reason the cleaning up of Paris - to clear the slums and narrow streets, to put an end to the chaos of the city - and to put in its place a modern city in tune with the idea of France as a great Empire. The hidden agenda was to clear Paris of the dissident intellectuals and the labour classes, both of whom were perceived as threats to social stability and the well-being of the bourgeoisie. Both were seen as eminently capable of causing a renewed revolt (a *commune*) as indeed they had done in 1848. So the city with its huge avenues and strategic viewpoints down them would now become a visually policed city The effect of Haussmannisation was also however to leave Paris as a divided city The complete rebuilding of Paris was never accomplished, only the west side of Paris was fully modernised. Here is how Brogan, (1989: 110) describes it:

> The rebuilding of Paris was pushed on. . . . The old project of joining the Louvre to the Tuileries was taken up again, and the Rue de Rivoli was made. The great new Boulevard de Sébastopol was driven through the old revolutionary areas and continued, in nearly a straight line, across the river in the Boulevard Saint-Michel. The improvements were justified from a political point of view: they provided work, increased real wealth and made the repression of revolt easier.
>
> They had other less desirable consequences. They made the

> class divisions in Paris more visible. . . . Whole new quarters were developed around the Boulevard Malesherbes. . . . The Boulevard de Sébastopol was more than an artery; it was a frontier. To the west lay the "smart districts, to the east the workers' districts, visibly cut off from the new, brilliant, lavish life of the west.

The panopticon city imagined by Haussmann was a policed city designed to contain movement.

The city imagined under De Gaulle, and subsequently Pompidou, was one of speed and expediency The Paris De Gaulle inherited in 1958 had been left in decline more or less since the 1870s and it had to be modernised to reflect De Gaulle's *politique de grandeur*. Paris was to become a great and major European city This Paris had to be adapted to the automobile and capitalism (in the form of multinationalism) and renounce its aestheticisation. Thus, expressways were thrust through Paris along the right bank of the Seine; *périphériques* were built around the city boundaries - literally encircling the city; low-cost housing in the form of *habitations àa loyer modéré* (HLMs) were thrown up quite randomly at first outside the official gates of the city and the other side of the *périphériques* to house the increased working-class population but also to make way within the city for a modern vision of the city as a series of skyscrapers devoted to multinationalism. This city was close to the concept Le Corbusier had of the concrete city, the *cité radieuse*, the functional city that replaced the need for social change. This was then one that was conceived for functional capitalism not for any greater well-being of its citizenry.

Only the advent of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as President in 1974 put an end to this *bétonisation* of Paris (to help win the election he needed the ecology vote so he campaigned for greener spaces and a city on a human scale). Even though he halted the concrete jungle effect on Paris, it was not until 1977 when for the first time a Mayor of Paris was instituted, in the person of Jacques Chirac, that a new policy for change emerged. Under Chirac the 'cultural' was brought back into the urbanisation of Paris - a policy subscribed to by Giscard and then both President Mitterrand and his cultural minister Jack Lang. Paris, for the most part, was retained as *The* Cultural Capital which took the form of cleaning up existing buildings, gentrifying run-down *quartiers* such as the Marais and launching major *grands projets*. Space was not given over to developing housing for the poor and working classes - they still had to live beyond the *périphériques* either in the old *HLM*s or the more recently built *cités*. Thus, whereas during the 1960s and 1970s mercantile considerations forced the extradition of certain

classes out of the city, now aesthetic ones were doing precisely the same thing.

The Filmic City

Modern cities have become, in their spatial organisation, too disparate and complex to be adequately mapped in human consciousness. What is required for the representation of an urban matrix is some sort of visual or narrative shorthand, a monument or an overarching spatial metaphor that boils the city down to its often clichéd essences. This seems natural and commonsensical enough: to understand the city and to represent it to ourselves we leave things out and focus on the few. Modern cities as they are represented in film are equally summed up in visual shorthand by key images that can then be followed by multiple variations (e.g. on top of the Eiffel tower, below the Eiffel tower, circling round it, etc.). The city becomes the sum of its imaged monuments and buildings which the camera roams around. Paris becomes a postcard city and, simultaneously, an imaginary playground within which characters act out their stories.

Film functions to aestheticise the city and in so doing reduces the city to a stock set of sights including social sites through which bodies move. If we think of cinematic Paris, the images we can enumerate, other than the monumental Paris and the boulevards, boil down to a tiny selection of social sites. Within the public sphere we can think of cafés, restaurants, parks, playgrounds, schoolrooms, shops, offices, the Seine and the *bateaux mouches* and the courtyard of apartment buildings (this latter space already halfway between the public and the private sphere). As far as the private sphere is concerned, film offers us the apartment, the hotel bedroom. Little else. What all of this tells us is that cinema provides a simplified vision of the city But in a very important sense we are dealing here with Paris, the city as a structured absence. It is both there and not there. So it acts as endlessly familiar to us (we see the Tour Eiffel, the cafés, the courtyards and all the other usual images) and endlessly unfamiliar to us (is that all there is?) and therefore strange and distant because it is structured, created as meaning as much by what is absent, invisible (left out) as by what is represented.

We can already begin to see that to speak of the city is to speak in terms of opposites (public/private, visible/invisible, presence/absence, familiar/unfamiliar). Until the 1960s, that is until the French New Wave, the Paris we were shown on screen was, for the most part, the imagined city - the public, visible, familiar, present with dashes of

the private sphere. This is not a Paris that threatens to break out of its boundaries - or at least not one where the labour classes, the unruly mob of the working classes and the *apaches* will break into the safely contained west side of Paris. If, in a particular film, the imagined city is that of the working class, that class will remain within its sets and décors, the *apaches* in their own domain - and we will be privy to their activities, mostly represented as the working class at play (see for example René Clair's *Sous les toî>ts de Paris*, 1930). Conversely, such is the hierarchy of power, the rich classes can come and visit (penetrate into) the working-class zones for their thrills (see for example Jacques Becker's *Casque d'Or*, 1952).

If the imagined city is the gangster underworld of the 1950s *film policier* (the *polar*) again it is represented as contained and safe. Paris is not the hostile environment associated with the city of the American *film noir* of the 1940s. French *polars* such as Jacques Becker's *Touchez pas au grisbi* (1954) and Jules Dassin's *Du Rififi chez les hommes* (1954) reveal how Paris is not the site of paranoia that the city is in the American genre. If anything it is the city, not the protagonist, that is represented as threatened by foreigness (e.g. the jazz clubs, the drug dives, whiskey) and foreigners (e.g. the untrustworthy double-dealing Italians). What is occurring here is an interesting form of othering through an anthropomorphisation of the city: Paris becomes the maternal body that protects her honourable indigenous gangsters against the foreign other.

This romantic, unthreatening imaging of the city begins to disappear by the end of the 1950s. Jacques Tati's *Mon Oncle* (1958) heralds a new way of looking at the city. Now Paris is perceived negatively as a concrete jungle and an aggressive space. The idea of the city as utopia, as a dreamscape, as promising freedom and economic mobility, gets displaced by the city as hostile, given over to technology, alienating. Tati's film portrays the real city of the architects (the Le Corbusiers of the modernist ideal) which devours the old chaotic quarters - bull-dozing them aside to make room for the concrete structures of functional living. Jean-Luc Godard's *Alphaville* (1965) delivers a bleak image of the real city of the future, one that is completely controlled by artificial intelligence (in the form of Alpha 60 - the mainframe computer), the city of the nuclear age where feelings are not allowed and indeed are punishable by death, the nightmare city of pure technology, the dystopian city of imprisonment and segregation.

In this New Wave cinema, Paris is no longer the simple backdrop to action. Its architecture is investigated and so too its policing. The city is now revealed as one of divided spaces that are controlled. In

Alphaville, the central protagonist (Lemmy Caution) probes the city through his investigation of the central female body (Natasha von Braun's) as she moves around the different zones of the city We see the effects of the technological city over its citizenry as it reduces them to apathy and the impossibility of political motivation.

The alienating effect of the city given over to the imperative of capitalism and modernisation serves further ideological purposes still, in that it hides other more threatening truths. The city becomes a form of disguise, secreting political and social realities away. The clean architectural lines of the Arpel's home in *Mon Oncle* and Mrs Arpel's obsession with hygiene may solicit laughter at the expense of its architects, but it tells us a great deal about the political climate of the times and the State's attempts at repressing truths about the Algerian crisis and the Cold War through a valorisation of the domestic space and modernisation.

Ross (1995: 79122) gives an elegant analysis of this containment of political realities and their displacement into the domestic sphere. She details how during the 1950s the culture of the home was commodified and machines for living (stoves, fridges, washing machines) became the capitalist answer to the reconciliation of industry and domestic life. The selling of the all-electric dream home and its satisfied housewife and husband was, however, more than just a pitch at commodity consumerism and the American way of life. The 'linking of the new ideology of the privatised consuming couple to a national agenda' (Ross, 1995:89) was also at work. First, this western promotion of consumerist dreams must be seen within the context of the Cold War as a way of competing - on French territory - for the loyalty of the masses. And given the increase in the culture of credit from the late 1950s through the 1960s these gleaming domestic goods became more and more available. Second, in this period of the unspeakable, censored and dirty war of Algeria, the modern and clean homes of France stood as a metaphor for a modern nation that had nothing to reproach itself for. The argument went as follows: if the homes of France were clean, maintained as clean by the mothers of France, then the children of France would also be clean, and therefore the nation clean (Ross, 1995: 7778).

Although the cinema of the 1960s exposed the imperatives of capitalism and showed the alienating effects on the citizenry of a city given over to the principle of modernisation at any price - a narrative trope which the cinema of the 1970s continued to develop - we are still not yet at the point where boundaries fail to contain. Films of the 1960s and 1970s show how boundaries exist and contain, and show the

effects of this containment. However, it is the cinema of the 1980s (coming out of the 1970s) and even more that of the 1990s that will actually go on to challenge the effects of containment. In Tati's film, *Mon Oncle*, the uncle lives in an old-fashioned *quartier* of Paris where he is at ease and into which he retreats when the terrors of the technological zones where his relatives live get to be too much for him. In Godard's film, *Alphaville*, part of the imprisonment he shows is class containment. Similarly, in his film about the *HLM*s of the 1960s, *Deux ou trois choses que je sais d'elle* (1966), the working class environment he portrays is very much on the periphery of Paris.

It is only once we get to the 1980s and 1990s that we see these boundaries being seriously challenged in film. The challenge is to residential specialisation and spacialisation. Those on the periphery (*zones*, *HLM*s, *cités*) come into the centre (as in Mathieu Kassovitz's *La Haine*, 1995) and subvert social spaces through trespassing (into buildings), through graffiti, skateboarding, and so on. Those on the economic periphery, the homeless (the *SDF*s) come into the the centre and take over historic sites/sights such as the Pont Neuf and the Louvre (*Les Amants du Pont Neuf*, Léos Carax, 1991). The gay and lesbian body refuses to be invisibilised any longer (*Les Nuits fauves*, Cyril Collard, 1992; *Gazon maudit*, Josiane Balasko, 1994). In their challenge to the policing of the city and the boundaries that safely enclose it, these marginalised characters fight as the disempowered and disenfranchised persons they are for a distinctive social space of their own. At long last the repressed, the pathology of the city, surfaces to inhabit the screen. The underbelly, the peripheral becomes visible, dissolving the myth of the imagined and imaged Paris, revealing the structuring absence that has so long been in denial by the representation of Paris as a safe and privileged site. The Paris before our eyes up there on screen is the multicultural, unidealised, fragmented city it always has been. But it is only now that it is plainly visible for us to see.

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Chapter 7
The *Front National* in the 1990s: From Consolidation to Crisis

James G. Shields

While the 1980s witnessed the electoral breakthrough and uneven advance of the Front National (FN), the 1990s saw this far-right party consolidate and extend its electoral base in terms of its local implantation, its national spread and its growing voter loyalty. This period also signalled some important developments within the FN electorate, accompanied by notable shifts in the party's electoral platform and strategy. The purpose of this chapter is to outline some of the changes in the FN's support base and electoral programme over the course of the 1990s, with particular reference to the two major national elections in which Jean-Marie Le Pen and his party achieved their strongest performances to date: the presidential election of AprilMay 1995 and the parliamentary elections of MayJune 1997. After a further strong showing in the 1998 regional elections, the FN vote collapsed in the European elections of June 1999, following the damaging split within the party between Lepenists and Mégrétists. Together with a number of other problems which the FN now faces, this schism has substantially weakened the party and raised new questions over its ability to make an enduring impact on French politics.

The 1995 Presidential Election: A High Point for Le Pen

The momentum which the *FN* had acquired in the 1984 European elections (11%), the 1986 legislative elections (9.8%) and the 1988 presidential election (14.4%) gave way in the early 1990s to an apparently declining pattern of support: 13.9% in the regional elections of 1992, 12.4% in the legislative elections of 1993 and 10.5% in

the European elections of 1994. The first round of the presidential election on 23 April 1995 sharply reversed this trend. With fully 15% of the poll, the support of 4.6 million voters, Le Pen surpassed his 1988 performance (4.4 million votes) and set a new record for the extreme right in a French national election (Shields, 1995). 1

In a campaign dominated by unemployment (at 12.2%, 3.26 million) and the associated issues of social deprivation and 'exclusion', Le Pen's programme (*Le Contrat pour la France avec les Français*) was an exercise in populism. He promised to create four million jobs over the seven-year presidential mandate, to repatriate three million immigrants, to ensure priority for French citizens over foreigners in employment, housing, social welfare and education, and to protect French goods and jobs against international competition. Extending his concerns to the homeless, the poor and low income families, he pledged an increase in the national minimum wage (*SMIC*), the introduction of a monthly 'parental income' (6000 francs), a house-building programme, and a review of family allowances and of the *Revenu minimum d'insertion* (*RMI*). His first act as President, he declared, would be to found the 'Sixth Republic', with a Constitution giving force of law to the principle of 'national preference'.2

With public attention focused on the contest between the Gaullist leader, Jacques Chirac, and the outgoing Gaullist Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, Le Pen was able to run a relatively 'normal' campaign - indicating the extent to which he and his party had become a feature of the electoral landscape. Campaigning on the slogan '*Homme du peuple, Homme d'Etat - Le Pen, la France*', the *FN* leader held rallies

Table 7.1 The 1995 presidential election (first round)

Candidate (party)	Votes cast	%
Jospin (Socialist)	7,097,786	23.3
Chirac (Gaullist)	6,348,375	20.84
Balladur (Gaullist)	5,658,796	18.58
Le Pen (FN)	4,570,838	15
Hue (Communist)	2,632,460	8.64
Laguiller (Far Left)	1,615,552	5.3
De Villiers (Far Right)	1,443,186	4.74
Voynet (Green)	1,010,681	3.32
Cheminade	84,959	0.28

Source: Le Monde: dossiers et documents, 'L'élection présidentielle 23 avril7 mai. 1995'

throughout France and was clear in defining his target audience: 'Je ne m'adresse pas aux riches bourgeois du seiziéme arrondissement, je m'adresse, moi, aux Français qui sont actuellement malheureux, et il en est des millions' (*Le Monde*, 14 April 1995).

The first round results on 23 April 1995 threw up two surprises: the advance by the Socialist Lionel Jospin on the favourite, Chirac, and the 15% polled by Le Pen. The latter's vote was particularly high across the north and north-east, in parts of Ile-de-France and the Rhône valley, and along the Mediterranean periphery Le Pen emerged as the leading candidate of the right in five of France's 22 regions (Alsace, Provence-Alpes-Côte-d' Azur, Lorraine, Languedoc-Roussillon and Nord-Pas-de-Calais) and in 18 of the 96 metropolitan departments. 3 In one department only (Chirac's rural stronghold of Corrèze) did the vote for Le Pen fall below 7%. Among the most striking results were those in the industrialised Rhône-Alpes region and in the textile, mining and steel areas of the north and north-east. Across a sweep of departments north of a line from Saint-Malo to Besançon, Le Pen's share of the vote represented a marked progression on his 1988 performance.4 The results recorded in cities and towns confirmed the predominantly urban character of this vote. Le Pen emerged as the leading candidate in a large number of towns, among the most notable Tourcoing (27%), Mulhouse (26.7%), Toulon (24%), Nice (23.75%) and Marseille (22.3%).

Reading the Le Pen Vote in 1995

The peaks of support for Le Pen in this election occurred, as before, in the most populous and industrialised areas of France, those most sensitive to the effects of economic restructuring, unemployment, immigration and crime. The most striking feature of Le Pen's performance was the increase in support from working-class, underprivileged and unemployed voters. In these traditional constituencies of the left, Le Pen emerged as the leading force. Comparison with the 1988 presidential election showed Le Pen's share of the blue collar vote up from 16% to 27%, beyond that of Jospin (21%) and almost double that of the *Parti Communiste Français* (*PCF*) candidate, Robert Hue (15%). While Jospin and Hue drew 17% and 13% respectively from those classing themselves as underprivileged, support for Le Pen here was put as high as 34%. Though polls were at variance in measuring the vote among the unemployed, all showed strong support for Le Pen (*BVA* crediting him with 18%, *IFOP* with 24% and *CSA* with all of 31%).

Le Pen outpolled Hue by a clear margin in some traditional Communist strongholds such as the *départements ouvriers* of Nord, Pas-de-Calais and Seine-Maritime, and by an emphatic margin in other comparable departments: 10% in Meurthe-et-Moselle and Bouches-du-Rhôone, 14% in Var. In the traditional Communist bastion of Seine-Saint-Denis in Ile-de-France, Le Pen won 18.8% to Hue's 14%. Rather than a simple transfer of votes from the *PCF* to the *FN*, these results suggested that Le Pen had garnered support, often from first-time voters, that might formerly have gone to the *PCF* in its role as tribune party. Placing unemployment and social deprivation at the centre of his campaign, Le Pen's incursions into these popular constituencies showed the effect with which he had exploited Chirac's campaign theme of the '*fracture sociale*'. By contrast, Le Pen's share of the vote among white collar categories and liberal professionals declined sharply on his 1988 performance, while his support among small shopkeepers and artisans, though still strong, dropped from 31% to 21%.

Two further features marked the Le Pen vote in this election: its youth and its increasing stability In 1988, Le Pen drew his main support from the 3549 age group; in 1995, from the 1834 group, with a strong showing (21%) among first-time voters. Despite this apparent shift towards a younger support base, the Le Pen vote was also characterised by a strong element of voter loyalty It was among Le Pen voters that polls recorded the highest proportion (64%) of those having decided on their candidate several months before the election; here, too, polls registered the highest levels of partisan attachment (*BVA*, 1995; *CSA*, 1995; *IFOP*, 1995). Le Pen voters were predominantly male, relatively poorly educated, with no marked religious orientation. This profile of the Le Pen electorate in 1995, and the shift towards a more partisan commitment, confirmed the evolution undergone by the *FN* since its emergence in the mid-1980s, when it drew the bulk of its support (for a time) from the older, wealthier, better educated and more strongly Catholic electorate of the Gaullist *Rassemblement pour la République* (*RPR*) and the centre-right *Union pour la Démocratie française* (*UDF*). Though Le Pen failed in his bid to reach the second round (where Chirac beat Jospin by 52.6% to 47.4%), his performance in the first round signalled important developments in the *FN*'s electoral appeal, leading commentators to detect the growth of a *gaucho-lepénisme* - to the detriment of the Socialists mainly - in areas scarred by the industrial recession of the previous two decades (Perrineau, 1995).

The 1997 Legislative Elections: A High Point for the *FN*

The first round of the early legislative elections on 25 May 1997 set the *FN* the challenge of replicating Le Pen's success. In 1988, Le Pen's 14.4% in the presidential election had been followed by 9.7% for the *FN* in the legislative elections, indicating a substantial gap between Le Pen's personal appeal and voter identification with the *FN* as a party. In 1997, the performance of the *FN* matched that of its leader. With 14.9%, it emerged as the second force on the right, within 2% of the Gaullist *RPR* (16.8%) and ahead of the centre-right *UDF* (14.7%) (Shields, 1997). 5

These elections consolidated and, in some places, extended the ground made by Le Pen in 1995. Again, support for the *FN* peaked in the urbanised and industrialised departments of the north and northeast and along the Mediterranean coastline, with notable results in Paris, Marseille and Lyon; again, too, the lowest mainland scores were registered in the rural departments of the Massif Central (Creuse, Cornèze, Cantal) and along parts of the Atlantic seaboard.

As in 1995, the areas of real strength lay in a sweep of regions across the north and north-east - Haute-Normandie, Picardie, Champagne-Ardenne, Alsace, Lorraine and Franche-Comté. The *FN* vote held up well in the border regions of Alsace and Lorraine, where Le Pen had

Table 7.2 The 1997 legislative elections (first round)

Party	Votes cast	%	Seats won (over 2 rounds)
RPR	4,255,671	16.8	139
UDF	3,723,616	14.7	109
Droite indép.	709,764	2.8	1
Divers droite	466,681	1.84	7
FN	3,783,623	14.94	1
PS (+ Parti rad-soc.)	6,469,766	25.55	259
PCF	2,509,357	9.91	37
Verts	912,921	3.6	8
Mouv. des citoyens	265,921	1.05	7
Divers gauche	506,524	2	9
Extrême gauche	552,024	2.18	-
Divers écolog.	675,338	2.67	-

Source. Le Monde: dossiers et documents, 'Elections législatives 25 mai1er juin 1997'

made significant breakthroughs in 1995. In the industrial Moselle department of Lorraine, the *FN* increased its average vote from 15% in 1993 to 20.6%. The gains in certain locations were arresting. In the mining town of Forbach, the *FN*'s score rose from 14.7% in 1993 to 22%, an advance mirrored in other industrial towns such as Sarrebourg (13.2 to 20.4% Rombas (14.3 to 21%) and Moyeuvre-Grande (15 to 22%). While these results illustrated the strength of the *FN*'s challenge in the industrial north-east, advances were also made in more rural areas. In Ardennes, the party increased its vote from 13.2 to 19.7%, and in the Jura from 11.5 to 16.2%, winning 17.7% in Dominique Voynet's Green constituency of Dole.

The *FN* recorded some imposing scores in Ile-de-France, Rhône-Alpes and especially Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur. It was here that Le Pen's party was able to build on real local power bases following the election of *FN* majorities in the town councils of Toulon, Orange, Marignane and Vitrolles. Of the 40 constituencies across the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur region, *FN* candidates recorded scores of 20% or more in 34, coming first in eight of these. The performances of Bruno Mégret in Marignane-Vitrolles (35.5%), Jean-Marie Le Chevallier in Toulon South (32.4%) and Jacques Bompard in Orange (28.8%) confirmed the *notabilisation* of the *FN* in these towns (though Toulon was the only location in which the *FN* converted its lead into election on the second ballot, Le Chevallier beating the Socialist, Odette Casanova, with 53.2% to take the sole *FN* seat from these elections). The strongest results recorded by *FN* candidates elsewhere were those of Marie-France Stirbois in Dreux (31.4%), Maurice Gros in Marseille (31.2%), Jean-Claude Lunardelli in Toulon North (30%), and the former *Organisation armée secrète* (*OAS*) leader, Jean-Jacques Susini, in Marseille (30.9%).

While these represented the high points of the *FN*'s performance in this election, the results as a whole confirmed the success with which the party had strengthened its national electoral base. In the legislative elections of 1986 and 1988, the *FN* exceeded 10% in a third of France's 96 metropolitan departments, and in 1993 in two thirds of departments; the 1997 results showed that *FN* support now exceeded 10% in three quarters of departments (Mayer, 1997: 438). The *FN* qualified for the second round in 133 of France's 577 constituencies, winning 2030% of the vote in over 100 and contributing to the victory of the left by maintaining candidates in 76 three-way runoffs.

Reading the *FN* Vote in 1997

These elections reaffirmed the trend towards a more working-class *FN* support base with a sociological profile marked by masculinity, youth, low educational attainment, urban location, and weak (or no) religious attachment (Perrineau, 1997). Comparison with the 1995 presidential election suggested a stable pattern of voting, with an estimated 90% of those who voted for Le Pen in 1995 casting their vote again for the *FN* in 1997 (*BVA*, 1997; *CSA*, 1997a; *IPSOS*, 1997). This represented a strikingly high fidelity rate, especially when compared with the fall-off in support between the presidential and legislative elections of 1988. Similarly, the highest proportion of those who had determined their choice a month or more before the 1997 election were to be found among *FN* voters (*BVA*, 1997). 6

Again in 1997 the appeal to threatened and disaffected sectors of the electorate was strong: according to *BVA* polling figures, 24% of blue collar, 22% of unemployed and 29% of underprivileged voters supported the *FN* in this election (compared with 29%, 27% and 28% respectively for the Socialist Party, which reclaimed some of the ground lost by Jospin to Le Pen in 1995 among these constituencies).7 Polls also suggested growing support for the *FN* among left-wing trade union members and sympathisers, with 11% of the Communist-leaning *Confédération Générale du Travail* (*CGT*) and 18% of *Force Ouvrière* sympathisers voting *FN* in the first round (*CSA*, 1997b). While support for the *FN* held up among *petit patronat* and small self-employed (shopkeeper, artisan) categories (23%), it was much lower among farmers, liberal professions, management and white collar workers (1016%) (*BVA*, 1997).

As the *FN* support base evolved, so too did the motivating factors underlying this vote. In the 1980s and early 1990s, immigration and law and order far outweighed other reasons for voting *FN* (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992). In 1995, and again in 1997, there was evidence of a change. Though the same authoritarian and ethnocentric tendencies persisted, unemployment now figured as a prime motivating factor in the *FN* vote, displacing *both* immigration and law and order in the frequency with which it was cited in some polls (Perrineau, 1995:253; *CSA*, 1997a; Mayer, 1998: 14). Significantly, the *FN* electorate in 1997 accounted for the highest proportion of voters worried about their personal and professional future (81%), and of those "with faith in neither the left nor the right to govern the country" (72%) (*CEVIPOFSOFRES*, 1997). Among blue collar unemployed, noted Nonna Mayer, support for the *FN* in this election came 'within a hair's breadth of 40 per cent' (Mayer, 1998: 11).

The *FN* Programme: A 'Third Way'?

In line with such concerns, the *FN*'s 1997 programme (*Le Grand changement*), like that of Le Pen in 1995, struck a resonantly populist note. Particularly prominent was the stress laid on social welfare issues, signalling an important shift in the *FN*'s electoral strategy. In the mid-1980s, taking his cues from Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, Le Pen had accused France's unemployed of 'parasitisme social' and decried a society where 'le nombre des travailleurs ne cesse de décroître en face de l'augmentation du nombre des parasites sociaux ou des assistés sociaux' (Le Pen, 1984: 1379). In the same period, he argued for abolishing the *SMIC* and statutory working week, clamping down on trade unions, and phasing out the welfare state (Le Pen, 1984:12931; 1985: 199, 207, 21113). The *FN* programmes of the 1980s rang with calls for deregulation, swingeing tax cuts, and the disengagement of the state from welfare and social security provision (*Front National*, 1985: Chapters 47 and 12).

A decade later, with growing support among the most vulnerable sections of French society Le Pen and the *FN* had undergone a conversion - superficially at least - to the politics of social welfare. The 1997 programme promised 'une nouvelle et grande politique sociale', with the buttressing of the social security system, the launch of a national welfare support scheme 'en direction des plus défavorisés', the raising of the *SMIC* (from 6400 to 7000 francs per month), the introduction of a 'parental income' (equivalent to the *SMIC*) and higher family allowances, and the provision of state-subsidised loans for families purchasing houses.

While the development of this major social dimension - exclusively for French nationals - marked a clear attempt to court the popular vote, it posed problems for the coherence of the *FN*'s programme. Purporting to offer a 'troisième voie économique et sociale, ni libérale, ni socialiste' (*Libération*, 1 April 1997), the 1997 programme served up an incongruous mix of ultra-liberal and state welfarist elements. Thus the *FN* rehearsed once again its proposals to phase out income tax and inheritance tax, reduce the professional taxes on small and mediumsized businesses, cut employers' social security contributions, and free the economy from the state - while imposing none the less a new 'taxe de préférence nationale' on those employing immigrant labour (*Le Monde*, 2 April 1997). Nowhere, however, was there any explanation as to: how higher wage bills might be reconciled with easing the financial burden on employers; how a 'parental income', increased family allowances and loan subsidies might be financed alongside a

massive reduction (220 billion francs over five years) in public expenditure; or how the proposed national welfare support scheme would be implemented by a party that had long argued for the transfer of health care and welfare provision from the state to the private sector.

The 1995 and 1997 elections also marked a clear shift by the *FN* towards a more stridently protectionist discourse. While there had always been a protectionist instinct at the heart of the *FN*'s nationalism, the 1997 programme promoted this to a first principle of economic policy 'Réguler le commerce par le biais d'écluses douaniéres et maîtriser ainsi les effets pervers de la compétition internationale, tel est le premier axe de la politique économique du Front National' (*Front National*, 1997: 50). The *FN* called for resistance to American economic imperialism and the withdrawal of France from 'l'Europe de Maastricht' ('elle fabrique du chômage, du fiscalisme, de la bureaucratie et de la récession') (*Front National*, 1997: 55). The problem here again lay not just in the *FN*'s deviation from its earlier, ostensibly free-market, posture (Bastow, 1997); it lay also in the basic failure to explain how tariff barriers might be raised against imported goods without exposing French exporters to the same restrictions in return. 8

There is no doubt that the 1990s altered the electoral strategy - and, with it, the ideological contours - of the *FN*. Seeking to extend its working-class support while retaining its lower middle-class base, the *FN* found itself wedded increasingly to objectives that were not easily reconciled. Desisting from its long-standing claim to be a party of the right, it sought to rally its sociologically varied electorate with the slogan 'Ni droite, ni gauche . . . Français!' (Maréchal, 1994). The programme underlying this change of emphasis, however, represented less a 'third way' between free-market liberalism and *étatisme* than an uneasy amalgam of elements borrowed at will from both.

Future Prospects: Obstacles and Imponderables

The 1995 and 1997 elections saw the *FN* more firmly implanted within the French political landscape. They confirmed the electoral progression of Le Pen's party and suggested its capacity to survive the departure of its imposing, but ageing, leader. While the *FN*'s electorate remained a highly composite one, it was among low income, unemployed and underprivileged voters that support for the party grew most markedly, while there was some erosion of support among lower middle-class voters and a marked decline among white collar categories and liberal professionals. This reconfiguration of the *FN*'s support base was accompanied by a much stronger degree of allegiance among

FN voters than was the case in the 1980s, when the party faced the structural difficulties of carving out a new space within a well established party system (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992).

It has been estimated that as many as a quarter of French voters have, at some time, cast a vote for the *FN* (Mayer, 1998: 20). In addition, polls in the 1990s showed up to a third of those interviewed to be 'in agreement' with the views of Le Pen, notably on immigration and security (Perrineau, 1997: 1939; Mayer, 1998: 22). Given the obduracy of the social problems that favoured the rise of the *FN*, and the risks involved in further European integration, the reservoir of real and potential support remains considerable (Ivaldi, 1998).

In the way of the *FN*'s advance, however, stand three major obstacles. The first is institutional. Under the system of proportional representation (PR) introduced exceptionally for the legislative elections of 1986, the *FN* won 35 parliamentary seats. Since the return to the two-round majority system in 1988, the party has never held more than one token seat in the National Assembly Had the PR system used in 1986 been applied in 1997, the *FN* would have won an estimated 77 seats, making it an indispensable ally for the mainstream right (*Le Monde*, 5 June 1997). The strong showing of the *FN* in the regional elections of March 1998, and the subsequent deals with the mainstream right in several of France's 22 regions, demonstrate how susceptible some mainstream right leaders are to the siren calls of the *FN* when it succeeds in converting support into seats (Downs, 1998; Moinet, 1998). While it has attained substantial representation at the municipal and regional levels (where an element of PR is employed), the *FN* emerged in 1997 from its most spectacular electoral performance ever with a single, symbolic seat - which it subsequently lost on a technical irregularity.

The second - related - obstacle in the way of the *FN*'s advance lies in the limits of the 'legitimation' which Le Pen and his party have been able to achieve. Despite the development of its electoral base, the *FN* failed to go beyond its ceiling of 15% and convert itself from a protest party into a potential party of government. At the same time, the numbers of those perceiving the *FN* as 'a danger for democracy' rose consistently, from 43% in 1983 to 75% in 1997 (Mayer, 1998: 22; *Le Monde*, 24 February 1999). This failure to shake off the extremist label and become a mainstream force was as much a factor as personal rivalry in the acrimonious split between Le Pen and his deputy Bruno Mégret, in December 1998. Mégret had long held that the way forward lay in a pragmatic *rapprochement* with the *RPR* and *UDF* (on the lines of Gianfranco Fini's *Alleanza Nazionale* in Italy), while Le Pen, with

his crude national-populism and taste for controversy, inclines to an isolationism endemic among movements of the French extreme right.

Though the *FN* has always been an uneasy alliance of ideological tendencies and factions (Camus, 1992), this split between the traditionalist and modernising wings of the party, occurring at the very moment when it seemed poised to exert its strongest influence yet, is potentially the most serious obstacle to further progress. The departure of the *Mégrétist* faction fragmented the party apparatus, with a large number of the *FN*'s departmental secretaries, political bureau and central committee members, and regional and local councillors defecting to Mégret's breakaway *Mouvement National* (*MN*). The 5.7% (just over one million votes) polled by Le Pen's list in the European elections of June 1999 was the lowest score recorded by the *FN* in a major national election since 1984 (when it used the same European elections to break on to the political scene with 11%, 2.2 million votes). With the 3.3% polled by Mégret's list, the combined score of both movements came close to the 10.5% recorded by the *FN* in the 1994 European elections; compared with the recent presidential, legislative and regional elections, however, it was little short of a *débâcle*. It followed months of legal wrangling over the party's funds, assets, and even name, the rights to which Le Pen was finally granted - though too late, he claimed, to allow his party to mount an effective campaign (*Le Monde*, 15 June 1999).

This result sees the *FN*'s representation in the European Assembly cut from eleven to five MEPs (including a recent high-profile recruit in the grandson, and namesake, of Charles de Gaulle). 9 This was a spectacular reversal for a party that had once set its sights on 20% but instead found itself overtaken by its old enemy, the *PCF* (6.8%), and - humiliatingly - by the fringe movement *Chasse, Pîche, Nature et Traditions* (CPNT) (6.8%). More ominously for Le Pen, his list was well outdistanced by that of Charles Pasqua and Philippe de Villiers, whose *Rassemblement pour la France* (RPF) secured 13% on a nationalist, anti-European platform (*Le Monde*, 16 June 1999). Though Le Pen is resolved to rebuild his own and his party's strength for the municipal elections of 2001 and the presidential election of 2002, the damage inflicted by the recent schism has pitched the *FN* into crisis, posing a threat to its survival as a major political force.

Added to these obstacles are a number of imponderables: the capacity of the governing left to deliver on its electoral promises, or that of the mainstream right to resolve (at least some of) its perennial divisions; the results of closer European integration and the single currency, and the extent to which these issues may be further

mobilised by Pasqua and de Villiers; the pace of France's recovery from a still chronic level of unemployment. All of these could have a determining impact on the *FN*'s prospects for recovery and future growth. There is political capital yet to be made from protest in France. Despite the *FN*'s recent internal difficulties, the challenge from this party to right and left alike may yet be far from subdued.

Notes

1. Unless otherwise specified, analysis of the 1995 election is based on results and BVA polling data published in *Le Monde: dossiers et documents, L'élection présidentielle: 23 avril7 mai 1995'*. Data for the 1988 presidential election are drawn from *Le Monde: dossiers et documents, 'L.élection présidentielle: 24 avril8 mai 1988'*.

2. Other proposals in Le Pen's programme were: to cut employers' taxes, phase out income tax, reduce public expenditure, reinstate the death penalty, introduce proportional representation and a 'referendum by popular initiative', disengage France from the Schengen Convention and Maastricht Treaty, and restore full French border controls.

3. Le Pen outpolled all candidates in the departments of Bas-Rhin (25.8%), Haut-Rhin (24.8%) Moselle (23.8%), Vaucluse (23.1%), Var (22.35%), Bouches-du-Rhône (21.4%) and Loire (21%).

4. Le Pen's score rose by 45% in the departements of Aisne, Eure, Haute-Marne, Meuse, Seine-Maritime and Vosges, and by 34% in Aube, Bas-Rhin, Marne, Meurthe et Moselle, Moselle, Nord, Oise, Orne and Pas-de-Calais.

5. Analysis of the 1997 election is based primarily on results published in *Le Monde: dossiers et documents, Elections législatives: 25 mai-1er juin 1997'*, and on data from the CSA exit-poll, *Les élections législatives du 25 mai 1997*, and the BVA exit-poll, *Elections législatives - mai 1997*. My thanks to Nonna Mayer for making these polls available to me; for extracts, see *Le Parisien*, 26 May 1997, and *Le Figaro*, 3 June 1997.

6. See also the high proportion of FN voters (59%) who had 'always known' how they would vote (CSA, 1997a).

7. The PCF, by comparison, was credited with 14% of working-class, 13% of unemployed and 16% of underprivileged voters.

8. 'Des taxes à l'importation seront donc instaurées . . . Parallèlement, tout sera fait pour encourager les exportations . . .' (*Front National*, 1997: 50).

9. By falling short of 5%, Mégret's movement failed to win a single seat and lost out on reimbursement of its campaign costs.

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Chapter 8
Franco-British Relations and the European Common Foreign and Security Policy:
From Cooperation to Integration?

Jolyon Howorth

This essay reviews two schools of thought on the question of sovereignty, defence and the European Union. One school sees the prospects for a unified and effective EU foreign and security policy as poor and finds that the EU is illequipped to deal quickly and effectively with external crises. Protagonists argue that sovereignty in the defence sphere is not the same as sovereignty in the economic sphere. It is far less likely to be relinquished; governments would never send their armies to battle on the basis of qualified majority voting. However, the interdependence of states, the role of NATO and the dominance of the United States make claims to sovereignty extremely hollow, and perhaps success in defence integration is not to be gauged by the existence of institutional structures. Members of the other school see divergent attitudes among the member states, particularly France and Britain, at the heart of the issue. They argue that when France and the UK are at loggerheads there will be no progress on CFSP, but that when they see their interests best served by cooperation, pragmatism may win out over both ideology and institutions. Thus the measure of progress towards a CFSP may be better measured through actual instances of cooperation rather than by the existence of institutions. However, such ad hoc arrangements will always fall prey to budget and other constraints, and are therefore less durable than those enshrined in legal frameworks.

There are two main schools of thought on an integrated Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), perhaps best symbolised by, on the one hand, Philip Gordon and, on the other hand, Nicole Gnesotto. Gordon is increasingly sceptical; Gnesotto is doggedly optimistic. In his recent provocative article in International Security, Gordon argued forcefully that:

> the prospects for a unified and effective EU foreign and security policy are poor, and likely to remain so, the EU is not a very unified or credible diplomatic actor, is poorly equipped to deal quickly and effectively with external crises and has a vastly under-developed military force projection capability. This situation is unlikely to change significantly even over the longer term.
>
> (Gordon, 19978: 76)

Gnesotto, on the other hand, in her recent book *La Puissance et l'Europe*, insists that:

> l'intégration politique de l'Europe prendra sans doute des formes différentes de celles qui ont modelé à ce jour les dèbats européns, mais n'en paraît pas moins inévitable.
>
> (Gnesotto, 1998:129)

To some extent, the difference of emphasis can be explained by the timing of the publication. The summer of 1997, when Gordon was writing, represented the nadir of expectations about a CFSP By 1998, the tide had changed and by the summer of 1999, after the NATO allies occupied Kosovo, there was a virtual consensus among security analysts that the emergence, in the medium term, of a European CFSP was a near certainty

The stakes are very high. There is no doubt at all that a Europe which did succeed in integrating its diplomatic and military assets would be in a position to challenge United States regional hegemony and begin to exert real influence not only in the European hinterland (Maghreb, Africa, Middle East, Russia) but also in more far-flung corners of the globe. If Europe does not succeed in political integration, it will forever remain a bit player - even in its own back yard. Since the stakes are clearly so high, why does Europe appear to have such difficulty in reaching agreement on CFSP?

Theoretical Conundrums

There is an initial definitional problem which pits functionalism against intergovernmentalism in a way which seems to replicate the integration versus cooperation dichotomy. In so far as functionalism

seems inevitably linked to institution-building, there is, in this domain as in many others, an implicit assumption that, for integration to really happen, some new central(ising) institution needs to arise. By the same token, if no such institution is forthcoming, then one has to conclude that it is impossible to go beyond the bounds of 'mere' cooperation.

I am not so sure. I believe that in the field of 'high politics', diplomacy security and military intervention, these distinctions (which may or may not be valid in other areas of policy such as trade and money) do not necessarily hold. After all, it is in the domain of high politics that sovereignty first acquired political significance and it is in this domain that sovereignty will fight its last stand. Security is the first and the last serious remit of any polity or state. One does not send young men to their deaths on the battlefield without some semblance of legitimacy And one cannot send them on the basis of Qualified Majority Voting! When the stakes are as dramatic and significant as a military engagement, if there is not unanimity in support of the operation, it simply will not work.

At this sort of level, even cooperation begins to take on the trappings of integration. It is precisely in this field that a new, more cumulative definition of sovereignty is beginning to make its mark. For what is at issue here is not so much the abandonment of sovereignty as the recovery of sovereignty which had previously been eroded. If Europe is dependent on NATO and the USA for its security, what is the value of sovereignty? This was the real significance of General de Gaulle's important distinction between independence (which suggests something absolute and self-contained - which he was not opposed to) and non-dependency (which is compatible with membership of an alliance, and which was his main objective). There are increasing signs that EU states - even the 'big' ones and indeed (more importantly) those which pride themselves on still being 'world actors' - have begun to realise that their impotence in places like Bosnia and Kosovo stems precisely from their attempts to cling on to vestiges of 'sovereignty' which have long since ceased to have any reality Michael Smith (1997) has come up with the useful distinction between 'evolutionary' and 'constitutive' processes in CFSP. At some stage, the former cease merely to be a simple addition of new elements and become the bases of a new integrated whole.

High politics will therefore be the last area to 'integrate'. To date, apart from the CED fiasco, there has been no serious attempt to theorise CFSP - from a functionalist or neo-functionalist (as opposed to intergovernmental) perspective. Although there is a residual differ-

ence of opinion over the value of new institutional architecture (see below), it is probably fair to say that all actors in Europe recognise that CFSP will take place in very small steps as a result of a succession of bilateral and multilateral negotiations between heads of government. And those negotiations are neither easy nor straightforward.

Despite what I have just said, most of the theoretical work on CFSP remains embedded in integration theory as it has applied to the development of the EEC/EC/EU. This takes on a similarity of form, whether the argument is pro or anti. On the one hand, comparisons (invariably negative) with successful attempts such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the EEC itself, the SEA and even European Monetary Union (EMU) are a standard feature of such analyses. On the other hand, reflections on institution-building are also ever present. And yet it was clear to Jean Monnet at the time of the European Defence Community (EDC) debacle that you cannot integrate armies, soldiers and diplomacy in the same way as you integrate coal and steel and money There is, therefore, little point in comparing the successes of the latter with the perceived failure of the former. There is also little point in measuring the essentially pragmatic piecemeal progress of CFSP against a functionalist/institutionalist yardstick. The fact that, during the 1996 IGC, there was failure to reach agreement on substantially increasing QMV in Pillar Two decisions tells us little about the long-term prospects for CFSP.

In his stinging critique of the inadequacies of CFSP, Philip Gordon offers two types of argument. First, that the criteria which have held for successful integration in the fields of commercial and monetary matters do not hold for foreign and security policy Those criteria he identifies as being threefold.

The perceived gains of common action through the advantages of scale outweigh the potential costs of lost sovereignty or national prestige; government preferences or perceived national interests have converged sufficiently so that the first condition holds (because lost sovereignty is likely to matter less when EC member governments have similar interests and ideologies); particular interests of large states remain protected either through the application of strict limits or conditions to the terms of integration or through the "opting-out" of the state with the particular interests.

So far as CFSP is concerned, Gordon argues that 'these conditions have not held in the past, do not currently hold and are not likely to hold in the future' (Gordon, 1998: 81). The second type of argument he uses considers the circumstances when, in his view, integration

does not happen. Among these, he claims, it does not happen 'simply because states want to keep up the momentum towards functional integration'.

I am not convinced that either of these negations holds water. To begin with, one could argue that the three conditions outlined above have produced a type of CFSP in the shape of the Atlantic Alliance. The fact that an external threat acted as a galvanising force and that a superpower acted as a catalyst does not de-legitimise the process. Conditions 1 and 2 were common to all West European nations in 194749 and condition 3 was later invoked when France sought a special status. Although the Soviet threat has disappeared and although the superpower remains energetic, there is no reason to believe that other factors cannot coalesce at some stage in the future to produce a genuinely European policy which will be distinguishable from (though not necessarily in opposition to) the American view. I shall outline those conditions shortly.

But, by the same token, I believe we can question Gordon's second negation (that political will and momentum are not sufficient). Political will is very unlikely to be enough on its own, but it is a very important pre-condition and also a significant driving force. Political will has proved crucial in forging most of the success stories of the EU and this is as true in the field of CFSP as it is in the other cases. Without political will, would ECSC or the SEA or EMU ever have happened? It is important to remember that in the domain of CFSP, the forging of political will takes place much more slowly than in other policy areas. Theoretical approaches can help shed light on what has happened, but are often poor guides to action in the future. A pragmatic approach is far more appropriate.

Pragmatism to the Rescue: And Don't Expect Miracles Overnight

CFSP is, in historical terms, a new-born infant on the world stage. Let us not ask it to run before it can even toddle. And let us recognise that, in the year 2000, it is quite unrealistic to compare the security and military potential of Washington with that of the EU. On the one hand, a unitary state, a colossal defence budget, a heavily rationalised and largely unified defence industrial base and a massive presence throughout the globe; on the other hand, a congeries of distinct sovereign states with their own (usually conflicting) interests, histories and perspectives, fifteen separate armed forces (most of them already dependent on the USA/NATO rather than at the service of the EU)

and far too many competing defence industries - not to mention a grossly inadequate defence budget.

Furthermore, it is impossible to overstate the difference over past centuries between trade and diplomacy. Whereas the world of commerce, though structured through competition, recognised very early on the advantages and indeed necessity of interdependence, the world of diplomacy was informed by naked struggle for influence. Where businessmen have long appreciated the value of positive sum games, diplomats have tended to see everything in terms of zero sums. Realism has reigned supreme ever since the Treaty of Westphalia. For governments to begin to see foreign policy in terms of cooperation rather than rivalry requires a qualitative leap which has only just recently begun to happen.

Most analysts have tended to be very scathing or dismissive about the piecemeal steps which have been taken towards a CFSP since the idea was first launched at Maastricht in 1991. There is an entire debate about the 'capabilities-expectation gap' surrounding Europe's emergence as a foreign and security policy actor. The Bosnian fiasco is often held up as an example of why Europe will never succeed in generating a CFSP But it is important to get this in perspective.

Bosnia/ex-Yugoslavia is probably the most intractable problem in European history geography and culture. It is hardly an appropriate yardstick by which to judge the real potential of CFSP. It is rather like putting Lennox Lewis's five-year-old son in the ring with Mike Tyson! Moreover, although it is true that the EU was at sixes and sevens in 1991, there has been a considerable learning curve ever since.

It is easy to say that not much was achieved through the 1996 IGC. But the various measures which were adopted (Mr CFSP', Planning Cell, Constructive Abstention and Flexibility redefinition of troika, integration of Petersberg tasks) are not insignificant steps in the right direction. This is very largely a question of the half-full or the half-empty glass.

It is necessary to inject a modicum of patience into the debate on CFSP. It took 10 years - at the second attempt - to put an embryonic European Monetary Union (EMU) in motion. CFSP will not happen overnight. But that is not to say that it is not already making significant progress. There are important signs that, since 1998, political will and the quest for pragmatism has driven the governments of France and the UK towards a form of cooperation (perhaps leading to integration?) which was almost unthinkable only five years ago. What has actually happened?

The Centrality of Franco-British Entente

Nicole Gnesotto (1998), in her excellent (though sobering) book *La Puissance et l'Europe*, attributes the vast majority of the failings and shortcomings of Europe's protracted crawl towards a CFSP to the divergence of policy between the UK and France. This divergence is long-standing and researchers are only just beginning to realise that it accounts to an extent for much of Europe's failure to get its act together. If the only two significant military (not to mention nuclear) powers in Europe, the two permanent members of the UN security council, the two with some vestiges of global reach, are pulling constantly in opposite directions, there is little chance that a CFSP will ever see the light of day However, if they do begin to pull in the same direction, then there are some positive prospects. This is precisely what is now beginning to happen in Europe.

Between 1947 and 1997, there was an unresolved conflict between the UK and France over the impact of a hypothetical European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) on Atlantic relations. France has traditionally wanted as much defence integration as possible - whether of the Jean Monnet/CED variety or of the de Gaulle 'tight alliance' variety. France has also been supremely confident that a genuine ESDI would enhance (rather than weaken) the transatlantic link. The UK has been reluctant to engage in anything more than cooperation, partly out of a fear of being 'entrapped' by the Europeans, partly because the UK has believed it had to choose between Europe and the USA, and above all because the UK remained convinced that an ESDI with teeth would encourage the USA to revert to isolationism. This was true in 1947 over the Dunkirk Treaty It was true in the early 1950s in the debates over the EDC. The Fouchet negotiations in 196062 also failed because of a mismatch between various states' appreciation of the role(s) of the UK and the US in the process of European foreign policy coordination.

This is an excellent example of how the institution-building versus 'pragmatism' debate effectively gets in the way of progress. Throughout the 1996 IGC negotiations, one of the most significant proposals from France (backed by most main member states) was for the institutional merger of the European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU). This proposal was eventually formalised at the Rome summit in March 1997 into an elaborate three-stage process rather on the model of EMU. The British reaction was totally negative, for a variety of reasons - some of which were procedural (the perceived need not to upset the neutrals, the Norwegians or the Turks) but some

of which were substantial (the desire not to duplicate or subvert NATO). One of Tony Blair's first actions as Prime Minister, at the Amsterdam summit on 18 June 1997, was to veto the proposed merger of WEU with the EU. The debate over 'institutionalism' versus 'pragmatism' is in fact something of a dialogue of the deaf which nevertheless reflects the deep-rooted cultural preferences of the two sides. When the British see the French setting up an institution, they become nervous. When the British insist on 'pragmatism', the French raise their eyes to heaven. Does this represent an insuperable problem?

My answer is 'No', because, over and above the contradiction between these national approaches to problem-solving, the external world is increasingly demanding progress on CFSP - and the margin of manoeuvre of governments is receding. Prior to the UK veto of the EU-WEU merger at Amsterdam, both Britain and France had been making significant moves in the same sort of direction, largely as a result of external constraints or pressures. European security in the post-Wall world is a real problem - one which Europeans cannot evade for ever. It is also a real problem which Washington would clearly prefer the Europeans to cope with on their own, albeit in close consultation with NATO. On the ground in Bosnia, UK and French forces were increasingly working together (in a quasi-integrated manner) within the United Nations Protection Force UNPROFOR or IFOR or SFOR and rapidly coming to appreciate that their cooperation was not only necessary but also relatively easy to arrange. The UK was beginning to realise that a genuine European security capacity was not only necessary, but possible. France had, since about 1995, come to the inescapable conclusion that her necessary involvement in military intervention operations required a completely new approach to NATO. Pragmatism was winning out over both ideology and institutions.

After 1990, France focussed tightly on Europe/ESDI as an end and only tangentially on NATO as a means. The UK encouraged this approach in the hope that, once France was safely back inside NATO, she would begin to see the Alliance as an end in itself. This has been a long-standing delusion within the British defence establishment. Yet France is currently in a transitional period where it is not impossible that she will adopt a much more pragmatic approach to NATO - for two very important reasons: the French military are more than ready for it, and the politicians have painted themselves into a corner. The UK, on the other hand, flirted with the ESDI notion, partly out of necessity (Reagan, Bosnia) and partly as a tactical ploy to help nudge

France back towards NATO. But the UK's absolute priority was NATO. However, NATO is changing, and Europe is calling. Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) seemed to provide an answer which combined pragmatism with institutionalism.

Throughout 1995, Franco-British collaboration in selling the CJTF concept to Washington was tight and highly productive. The Berlin ministerial meeting of June 1996 was a triumph of French creativity and of British brokerage. But the French interpretation of that triumph was immediately couched in institutional rather than in pragmatic terms. The problem with the institutional focus is that symbolism can be more significant than reality For a French admiral to be appointed to NATO's Southern command (CINC South) was, for Paris, arguably more important for its symbolic value than any genuine shift of power or influence in the Mediterranean. Moreover, since France had been agitating for almost 50 years to turn WEU into the 'European Pillar' of the Alliance, the prospect of making WEU the 'institutional sword' of the EU was too tempting to resist, even though this actually complicated the (increasingly important) direct relationship between the EU and NATO. Many in France had seen - as early as 199495 - that the logic of the French *rapprochement* with NATO was the side-lining of WEU.

By the same token, the British - aware that the European agenda would not wait for ever - were extremely keen to ease France back into the Alliance framework and made considerable efforts to facilitate this development. But their preoccupation with pragmatism was clouding their vision of final objectives. And the prevailing climate in the UK which interpreted all things European (and above all, all things integrationist) as akin to cardinal sin made it particularly difficult for the new Blair team to see where exactly the inchoate historical forces were leading. The Amsterdam veto on EU-WEU merger actually changed nothing, but gave the appearance of having scuttled the prospects for CFSP - just when the urgency of CFSP was becoming paramount. Throughout most of the year after Amsterdam, progress on CFSP was stalled. But throughout 1998, the problems in Albania and Kosovo dictated that the Europeans could wait no longer. And the pragmatic Mr Blair (who appears to be a genuine aspirant European, but whose hands were tied on the big European dossier: EMU) was casting around for a role. History was there waiting in the wings to dictate that role: the promotion of CFSP. The story of the Pörtschach 'breakthrough' in October 1998 and the Saint Malo summit in December 1998 is already part of CFSP legend.

Since Saint Malo, progress has been extremely rapid. The UK and

France have agreed on the institutional merger of the WEU and the EU, which was endorsed by the WEU summit in Bremen in May and consecrated by the EU Council meeting in Cologne in June. The crisis in Kosovo saw the UK and France co-chairing the Rambouillet negotiations and the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia served to strengthen the resolve of the EU member states to act as one. The NATO ('50th Anniversary') summit in Washington in April 1999 endorsed the arrangements whereby the EU could have access to NATO assets and planning capabilities. The EU Council meeting in Cologne bestowed upon the Union not only the institutional apparatus necessary for a CFSP and an ESDI, but also the first 'High Representative' for the CFSP in the person of former NATO secretary general, Javier Solana. CFSP can therefore be considered to have been born. Whether it will live to be a fully-fledged security actor depends on four significant variables, all of which remain relatively open-ended at the time of writing.

Permanent Resolution of Transatlantic Tensions

Although the US has supported European integration in general, it has traditionally been highly ambivalent about the emergence of a credible ESDI. In the immediate post-Cold War years, President George Bush repeatedly warned the Europeans not to push their joint defence plans too far. However, President Clinton has proved genuinely supportive of a greater European capacity and there is little doubt that the majority of expert opinion in Washington currently approves. The NATO summit in April 1999 outlined plans to allow an EU force access to sophisticated United States assets, including satellite intelligence, strategic lift, C3I, logistics and precision-guided munitions, as well as NATO's planning capabilities, in the event that Washington wished to remain uninvolved in some future regional conflict. But, as with any such trade-off, the devil is in the detail and the details remain fuzzy. Above all, what is the meaning of the word 'autonomy' which now appears in all security documents as the objective for a European defence capacity? Do all parties to the agreements interpret the word in the same way?

Many analysts believe that US and European strategic interests are increasingly diverging. For a variety of reasons, to do with increasingly complex trade rivalry, with the decline in the percentage of Americans of European descent, with the increasing emotional and intellectual distance between Europe and the USA, and above all with budgetary wrangles in Congress, such analysts feel that the US com-

mitment to European security cannot be sustained in the long term. If such an analysis proved correct, it is hard to see any arrangements for asset-sharing proving viable. On the other hand, if European and American interests and values remain tightly meshed, it is not easy to imagine Washington ceding its undisputed hegemony in security matters. A new administration in the White House could change the parameters of EU-US relations just as rapidly and just as radically as did President Clinton. Much, in this area, will depend on the outcome of the second development.

Europe's Defence Industrial and Procurement Restructuring

The emergence of a unified European Aerospace and Defence Company (EADC) to rival the American giants Boeing, Lockheed and Raytheon was dealt a blow by the 'Anglo-US' merger between BAe and Marconi in January 1999. Since the merger, most key players have been eyeing each other with a view to the next move. Most analysts predicted a Franco-German merger, probably involving Germany's Dasa and either Thomson or Aérospatiale-Matra. In the event, Dasa created the first ever cross-border merger by uniting with Spain's CASA, thereby creating the biggest single partner in Airbus.

However, at the same time, all the key European players have been holding talks with their closest US counterparts with a view to engineering a significant transatlantic partnership. The nature and format of EU-US defence industry relations now lies at the heart of the procurement conundrum. Although the European record on joint procurement has been poor (in April 1999, the Anglo-Franco-Italian Horizon frigate programme was abandoned), European governments are in no doubt about the stakes. The defence industries of the six main procurement countries are due to report to their respective governments at the end of June with plans to promote greater cross-border cooperation. A key test will be the contract for the beyond visual range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) which will equip the Eurofighter. In April the US electronics giant Raytheon began intensive lobbying in European capitals to secure the contract for a variant of its AIM-120 system. In May, the French government offered serious financial backing to Britain to establish a joint European missile programme based on the Meteor system developed by Matra-BAe Dynamics. Britain, despite pulling out of the Horizon programme, has committed itself to developing the five-nation Trigat anti-tank missile. London understands the strategic importance of European autonomy in the cutting

edge area of missile technology and it is likely that the European BVRAAM programme will get the green light.

This poses the entire future of transatlantic procurement. The US government has recently become sufficiently concerned about European mergers to begin questioning its own long-standing reluctance to authorise EU penetration of the US defence market. In the early summer of 1999, the US deputy Secretary of Defense, John Hamre, dropped several large hints about Washington's willingness to open up to transatlantic mergers as a way of avoiding headlong conflict between the three US defence giants and emerging European groups. Emphasising the need for interoperability in the context of NATO's new strategic concept, he insisted that it was not through cost-cutting that European firms would succeed in the twenty-first century, but through high-technology investment in research and development - which means joint ventures with US companies.

If Europe is serious about acquiring an 'autonomous' military capacity, it will have to grasp the nettle of balancing its own internal requirements against the equally important challenge of coordinating these developments with US industry. With so many players involved and so much at stake, the outcome of this particular battle continues to be open-ended.

The Successful Functioning of the EU's New Security Institutions

The institutional arrangements agreed at the June 1999 Cologne summit will, for the first time, offer Europe the mechanisms for serious discussion of defence and security issues (which, hitherto, had remained outside the remit of the EU). The absorption, by the EU, of the assets and functions of the WEU, will enormously facilitate this development. The appointment of Javier Solana to the post of 'Mr CFSP' will confer on that function both a seriousness of purpose and a credibility which few other individuals could have represented. The apparent commonality of purpose between Paris, London and Berlin is a third ingredient for success. The united front presented by the 'EU fifteen' (including the neutrals) during the Kosovo crisis has also provided a major boost to European confidence in its collective security potential. The desire, on the part of all European capitals, for the CFSP to be foreign policy led, is yet another positive feature. On paper, the smooth functioning of the new institutional framework ought to be a guarantee of Europe's steady accession to the status of significant security player, albeit primarily a regional one.

And yet, there remain a number of significant problems to be resolved before success can be guaranteed:

Are Britain and France, beyond declaratory rhetoric, really on the same wavelength? How much has the gap narrowed betwen French maximalist ambition for a genuinely autonomous ESDI and the UK's more cautious acceptance of a simple division of labour within NATO?

Can the very different statuses of Paris and London in Washington be harmonised? Can Britain distance herself from the emotional attachment to a 'special relationship' which is no doubt exaggerated in its real import but none the less resented by Paris? It is much easier for France to embrace an Atlantic framework (which she never rejected - just its imbalance) than it is for Britain genuinely to embrace a European framework.

What will be the chances of harmony once sensitive issues such as intelligence and nuclear weapons enter the debate?

Will these new institutions withstand the accession to the EU of new members from Central and Eastern Europe?

Above all, what are the real chances of Europeans agreeing on the fourth significant development?

The Willingness of the EU Member States to Address the Issue of Defence Spending

Everybody agrees that the main lesson of Kosovo is that the EU can never enjoy 'autonomy' as long as it remains overwhelmingly dependent on US military equipment. Even assuming that the arrangements for access to NATO assets were to work, the impetus for Europe to develop its own military equipment will continue. To some extent, despite the US warnings about 'no duplication' of assets, there will be a measure of 'necessary duplication' in strategic areas such as intelligence, lift and C3I. This has massive budgetary implications.

The EU fifteen currently spend, on average, 2.1% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence, while the US figure is 3.2%. Only the UK and France (apart from Greece) spend proportionately more than the US. Italy is entering a financial crisis and Germany aims to cut its defence spending even further. On paper, this problem alone could negate the move towards an ESDI. The problem, however, is not so much the global figure as the type of expenditure. With the exception of the UK and, to a lesser extent, France, EU states are still spending far more on men than on equipment. The need now is for force 1

projection, mobility, flexibility and sustainability Several studies have shown that, with greater synergy and industrial organisation, the EU could acquire significant capacity without having recourse to significant increased spending. The problem is to reach agreement on how to achieve this objective. At a time when all countries are looking to channel further resources into overstretched education, health and welfare schemes, and when the bill for rebuilding the Balkans will be largely met from EU funds, this may yet prove to be the biggest obstacle of all to the emergence of an ESDI.

Note

1. Representative of several dozen similar 'think pieces' in the wake of Kosovo are: Joseph Fitchett, 'Kosovo spur to military role for EU, *International Herald Tribune*, 2/5/1999; Luke Hill, Europe pushes toward unified military policies, *Defense News*, 24/5/1999; Craig R. Whitney, European Union vows to become military power, *New York Times*, 4/6/1999; Richard Ernsberger Jr, Getting Serious: Kosovo has pushed the EU towards common defence policies, *Newsweek*, 28/6/1999.

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Chapter 9
Metaphors and Trains of Thought: Spotting Journey Imagery in British and German Political Discourse.

Andreas Musolff

Metaphors play a central role in public discourse about the European Union. They concretise the abstract notion of economic and political integration in the form of stereotypical schemas, such as that of the European train. This chapter compares the use of train metaphors in German and British press texts, and in particular focuses on the division of roles within the train journey scenario of EU integration. In the German press, Britain is 'cast' as the late passenger, or as a passenger trying to get off the train or trying to catch up, or as a loose carriage, whilst Germany is depicted as the driver/locomotive. Significantly British media share this basic metaphorical scenario and its hierarchical structure but they are divided on the evaluation of the roles. Pro-EU media tend to take a pessimistic view of British lateness' on the Euro-train, whereas 'Eurosceptic' politicians and media exhibit a rather proud assessment of British non-compliance with the rules of a 'normal' train journey (i.e. that all carriages/passengers/participants have to travel in the same direction, at the same speed).

At the end of the Edinburgh 'summit' meeting of EU heads of governments in December 1992, *The Times* summarised the political situation of the Union in terms of the scenario of a *train* leaving the *station*:

> (1) The European train finally chugged out of the station last night; for most of the day it looked as if it might be stalled there for some time. It managed to pull away at around 10.30 pm only

> after the Spanish prime minister, Felipe Gonzalez, forced the passengers in the first class carriages into a last minute whip round to sweeten the trip for the European Community's poor four: Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. The fat controller, Helmut Kohl, beamed with satisfaction as the deal was done. The elegantly-suited François Mitterrand was equally satisfied. But nobody was as pleased as John Major, stationmaster for the UK presidency, for whom the agreement marked a scarce high point in a battered premiership. The departure had actually been delayed by seven months by Danes on the line. Just when that problem was solved, there was the voluble outbreak, orchestrated by Spain, from the poor four passengers demanding that they should travel free and be given spending money, too. The coupling of the carriages may not be reliably secure but the pan-European express is in motion. That few seem to agree the destination suggests that future arguments are inevitable at every set of points. Next stop: Copenhagen.
>
> (*The Times*, 13 December 1992)

The extended metaphor of the EU as a *train* in this example serves to explain some of the more intricate aspects of the political negotiations at Edinburgh. It allocates different roles in the *train departure* scenario (*stationmaster, controller, spokesperson* for *poor passengers, first class passengers*) to the most important summit participants, illustrating their differences of opinion and political clout and helping the reader to form an opinion concerning the outcome of the summit.

Specifically the metaphor invites the conclusion that, despite the progress made in Edinburgh, substantial problems (*secure coupling of the carriages*) will probably still arise in the course of further EU negotiations, so that a positive outcome of the *journey* is by no means assured. The metaphor thus carries with it a certain degree of evaluation and political judgement of the behaviour of the participants in the political process. This effect is heightened even further by deviations from an everyday *train departure* scenario: people who 'demand that they should travel free and be given spending money too' are not the normal kind of passengers one would expect on a train. Taken 'literally', this description would fit a group of people who receive social security benefit, or perhaps adolescents on a tourist trip - a rather sarcastic characterisation of national economies! The phrase 'Danes on the line' refers to the problem of the first, negative referendum in Denmark about the Maastricht Treaty, which delayed the implementation of the Treaty. The *Danes* represent some kind of

obstacle on the railway line, equivalent to the infamous 'leaves on the line' that British Rail used to blame for late-running trains. Strictly speaking - in terms of the image underlying the whole passage - the Danes should also be *passengers* on the EU *train*; however, the apparent contradiction between this role and that of obstacles *on the line* does not impede the comprehension of the metaphor.

Train metaphors such as this one are among the most popular and prominent of *travel/transport* metaphors in the British and German press. They invoke what has been called in cognitivist metaphor theory the *schema* of a train and the *scenario* of its *journey*, both comprising assumptions that the general public makes about 'prototypical' railway travel. 1 The *train* schema would consist of a *locomotive* or *engine* and several *carriages*; the train *stands still* or it *travels* on *railway tracks* at a certain *speed*, according to a *timetable*, starting from a specific *station* and going to another *station* as its destination. The *train* has *passengers*, an *engine driver* and, possibly, further *personnel*. Examples for the validity of this schema can be found in the following passages, taken from the German press:

(2) In Maastricht fahre der Zug langsam durch den Bahnhof, so sieht es der deutsche Kanzler, "und wer jetzt aufsteigen will, steigt auf". Doch Helmut Kohl ist sich ganz sicher, daé in einigen Jahren alle im Zug sitzen werden.

(*Der Spiegel*, 9 December 1991)

(As the German Chancellor sees it, the train moves slowly through the station in Maastricht, and whoever wants to get on it can do so. But Kohl is quite certain that in a few years *everyone* will be on the train.)

(3) Alle Mitglieder müssen im gleichen Tempo in dieselbe Richtung fahren. . . . Tun sie es nicht, kann man den Zug 1999 zusammen-koppeln, aber er wird außrhalb des Bahnhofs mit Sicherheit entgleisen. Bei einem Zug ist es logischerweise unmöglich, daß manche Waggons in diese, andere in jene Richtung fahren. Ankoppeln ist einfach, dabeibleiben ist schwer.

(*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18 October 1996).

(All members must travel at the same speed in the same direction. If they don't, it may be possible to join the train together in 1999 but outside the station it surely will run off the tracks. In a train, it is logically impossible that some carriages go in this, others in that direction. It is easy to join, but to stay on the train is the difficult bit.)

(4) [Ich habe] stets darauf bestanden, daß wir uns nicht dem Druck

beugen werden, Europa als einen Zug zu entwickeln, dessen Wagen alle mit gleicher Geschwindigkeit vorankommen.

(John Major in *Die Zeit*, 12 July 1996)

(I have always insisted that we must not bow to any pressure to develop Europe as a train, whose carriages all move along at the same speed.)

The propositions put forward in examples (2) to (4) are all compatible with the notion of a normal train journey. The last two examples even seem to be stating the obvious, i.e. that *all the carriages* following the *locomotive* must go at the *same speed* in the *same direction*. However, this seemingly trivial point about train travel gains argumentative relevance through its application to a hotly contested topic: the question of EU member states linking their economic and their policies ever more closely. In example (3), the contrast between a 'regular' and a *malfunctioning train* that would be *derailed* soon after the start of its *journey* is used to argue for the establishment of solidarity or discipline among the EU members. Conversely, in (4), Major attempts to explain to the German public, in a translated text, that his government rejects the image of a *one-speed/one-direction train* as a model of EU integration precisely because it does not want to link its policies very closely to those of the other EU countries.

Examples (3) and (4) illustrate a specific argumentative dimension of metaphors. The metaphorical scenario contains specific presuppositions, which are tacitly assumed to be valid; in this case: that all parts of a train travel in the same direction at the same speed. Questioning these presuppositions amounts to questioning both the source image and the intended target notion: it is inconceivable to have a train whose carriages go in different directions at different speeds. Thus, in (4) Major, in order to criticise what he sees as a rigid, integrationist concept of EU policy, refutes the whole of the train image, whereas in (3), the 'internal logic' of the train image is invoked to argue for closer integration among EU member states. However, such an all-or-nothing approach of endorsing or rejecting the *train journey* script is not the only form of usage of train metaphors. Often, individual aspects of the scenario are highlighted as problem areas, e.g. the question of slowing down or stopping the train, as in examples (5) and (6):

(5) Martin Hüfner, economist of the *Bayerische Vereinsbank*: Nachdem die Regierungen in den letzten Jahren so viele Vorleistungen erbracht haben und sich gegenüber den Wählern so festgelegt haben, ist ein gütlicher Rückzieher [= eine Verschiebung

des Euro] kaum mehr möglich. . . . Ist also eine Notbremsung oder ein Abspringen vom fahrenden Zug überhaupt nicht mehr möglich? Keineswegs.

(*Die Welt*, 22 July 1997)

(After the governments have invested so much in the preparations and have made so many commitments to the voters in the last few years, a quiet retreat [= postponement of EMU] is almost inconceivable. . . . So, is it absolutely impossible to do an emergency stop or jump off the train? Not at all!)

(6) Nun könnte man . . . darauf vertrauen, daß Großbritannien auch diesmal, wie schon wiederholt in der Vergangenheit, später auf den fahrenden Zug aufspringen wird. . . . In der Vergangenheit galt dies jedoch nur, wenn London den Zug nicht aufhalten konnte, weil andere ihn steuerten. . . . In Maastricht jedoch sitzen die Briten mit in der Lokomotive. Sie wird den EG-Zug nur dann vorwärtsziehen, wenn die Regierung in London einwilligt - und der Anreiz dazu hält sich, aus britischer Sicht jedenfalls, in Grenzen.

(*Die Zeit*, 29 November 1991)

(Great Britain can yet again be trusted to jump on the train once it's rolling, as it has done several times in the past. . . . But in the past this assumption was valid only when Britain could not stop the train, because others were driving it. . . . In Maastricht, however, the British are among the drivers in the locomotive. The locomotive will only pull the train forward, if the government in London agrees, and the motivation to do so is, at least from the British point of view, limited.)

(7) Derweil rettet sich Tony Blair mit ein bißchen A-la-carte Diplomatie über seine Europa-Blößen hinweg. Schulterschluß mit Paris bei neuen europäischen Verteidigungsinitiativen . . . - und immer wieder die Hoffnung, daß die deutsch-französische Suppe nicht so heiß gegessen wie gekocht wird, angesichts großer Meinungsverschiedenheiten in den Kernfragen der EU-Haushaltspolitik. Aber in diesem Fall hat der Dritte, wenn zwei sich streiten, noch keinen Vorteil davon. Der Euro-Zug nämlich läuft seinen vorgeschriebenen Gang, und Großbritannien Lafontaine hinterher.

(*Die Welt*, 5 December 1998).

(Meanwhile, Blair tries to paper over the holes in his EU-policy by using a bit of à la carte diplomacy. He closes ranks with France on European defence policies . . . and hopes that the Franco-German love affair will cool down, due to massive differences of opinion over central EU budget problems; but in this case, an argument between the two won't result in

a gain for the third party. The Euro-train, after all, is running its assigned course, and Lafontaine runs faster than Britain.)

As examples (6) and (7) show, the train metaphor may be used to single out an EU member state as being unwilling or unable to participate in the *drive* for further political and economic integration by depicting it as having to catch up or hurry to join the *train* or as being in danger of *missing the train*. Most often, though not exclusively (cf. example 1), Britain is being depicted as the 'problem passenger': in a sample of some 200 travel or transport metaphors depicting the EU states as parts of a larger moving entity (*carriages/passengers on a train, ships in a convoy, passengers on a ship, cars in a rally*), Britain both under the Conservative as well as under the Labour government is seen as the *laggard* or *late participant*, or in danger of *falling/jumping off the train/ship* or *dropping out of the race*, in 30% of the cases. 2 Even if Britain is *on board*, it must not be in the *driving seat*, as the warning against the British government being admitted to a place on the *locomotive* in example (6) demonstrates.

On the other hand, German politicians and media tend to refer to one country as being already in *the driving seat* of the EU *train* or even as the main *driving force*, i.e. Germany itself. Federal Chancellor Kohl, speaking at a Conference, 'Forum für Deutschland', in Berlin, on 13 March 1991, told his audience:

(8) Wir können also mit voller Berechtigung sagen, daß Deutschland dank des Vereinigungsprozesses die europäische Konjunkturlokomotive ist, die verhindert, daß der europäische Zug nicht [*sic*] allzu stark abgebremst wird.

(We are therefore fully justified in claiming that, thanks to the unification process, Germany is the European economic locomotive which will prevent the European train from slowing down too much.)

In an interview with the Munich-based *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (= SZ) on 9 December 1996, the Bavarian Minister-President Edmund Stoiber used the *train* metaphor to assert Germany's pivotal role in the process of monetary integration:

(9)

SZ:	Das heißt, daß Sie bereit sein müssen, die Währungsunion zu verschieben, wenn sich zeigen sollte, daß für 1998, 1999, 2000 die Kriterien nicht erfüllt werden. Wer hält den Zug an?
Stoiber:	Wir versuchen these Folgen ja gerade auszuschalten, und

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	wir sagen unseren Freunden klipp und klar: Wir müssen uns auch nach 1997 anstrengen. Da gibt es einige, die sagen: Dann haben wir wieder ein bißchen Luft für höhere Staatsschulden. Die deutsche Seite kann so etwas nicht akzeptieren.
SZ:	Also müssen wir den Zug anhalten?
Stoiber:	Nicht anhalten. Wir müssen den Zug auf das richtige Gleis setzen. Deswegen ist der Stabilitätspakt, also die Verlängerung der Kriterien, so entscheidend. . . .
Stoiber:	Stabilität nicht nur für 1997. Wenn man sich hinterher nicht mehr an die Kriterien halten müßte, wäre die europäische Zentralbank nicht in der Lage, wie die Bundesbank Hüter der Währung zu sein.
SZ:	Müssen wir in einem solchen Fall den Zug anhalten, ja oder nein?
Stoiber:	Wir müssen ihn nicht anhalten. Ohne uns fährt er nicht. (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 9 December 1996)
(SZ:	That means you must be prepared to postpone EMU, if it were to become clear that the criteria are not going to be met in 1998, 1999, 2000. Who is going to stop the train?
Stoiber:	That is what we are trying to avoid at the moment, and we are telling our friends absolutely clearly: We must work hard after 1997 as well. There are some who say: By then there'll be a bit of slack in the budget, so we can risk higher deficits again. The German side can't accept that.
SZ:	So we must stop the train?
Stoiber:	No, not stop it. We must put the train on the right track. That is why the stability pact, i.e. the extension of the criteria, is so important. . . .
Stoiber:	Stability not just for 1997! If after that year member states would no longer have to meet the criteria the Central European Bank would not be able to guard the strength of the currency as well as the Bundesbank is doing it now for the Deutschmark.
SZ:	Must we stop the train in such a case, yes or no?
Stoiber:	We don't have to stop it. It won't go anywhere without us.)

Kohl's claim, in example (8), that Germany is *driving/leading the European train* as well as the statements by the Bavarian Minister-President Stoiber are indicative of deep-seated attitudes towards the EU particularly among conservative German politicians. Kohl justifies with hindsight, as it were, German unification as a boost to European integration, implicitly suggesting that the EU was in need of such a

boost from Germany - otherwise it would have slowed down. In example (9), the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* journalists try to get an answer from Stoiber on whether his warnings about the stability pact are to be taken as a threat to block EMU, i.e. *stop* the EMU *train*. The Minister-President manages to avoid giving a clear-cut answer by shifting the image from *stopping the train* to a *right platform* scenario in the first instance and, when pressed on this topic again, by asserting that the German side *need not stop* the EU train at all: it won't even go anywhere without Germany on board. Clearly, he judges Germany to be *the* most important member of the train - something like the *locomotive* or the *driver*.

It does not come as a great surprise that British politicians' and media's perspectives on European politics differ from this assessment; however, they, too, often rely on the train metaphor and, significantly, also see Britain as a *passenger who will not or should not join in the journey*. In 1992, for instance, *The Times* quoted a warning by the former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher:

> (10) Misleading analogies such as the European train leaving the station have been used in the debate. . . . If that train is going in the wrong direction it is better not to be on it at all.
>
> (*The Times*, 31 October 1992)

Thatcher here manages to have her metaphorical cake and eat it by rejecting and utilising the train image at the same time. On the one hand, she criticises others for employing such imagery at all but on the other hand, she herself depicts the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty as the *wrong* train. Six years later, *The Times* claimed that to many Britons Europe still 'seems like a high-speed train, hurtling its reluctant passengers into a new millennium of continental government where Britain becomes a dependent province' (*The Times*, 5 December 1998).

One might have expected that British Eurosceptics would avoid the use of the train image, as its in-built distinction of an active *engine* or *driver* versus passive *passengers/carriages* lends itself to casting Britain in the role of the *late* or *problematic passenger*. To some extent, its rejection as a 'misleading analogy' by Thatcher and Major reflects this opposition, but they and other Eurosceptics seem to be unable to forego using the semantic potential of the image altogether as it allows them to voice their criticism of a closely integrated EU.

From a Europhile view, the problematic status of the British *passenger* is nothing to be proud of. In 1993, the then economic editor of *The Guardian*, Will Hutton tried to alert the public to the imminent

departure of 'The European train we must not miss' (*The Guardian*, 1 November 1993), to criticise the Tory government's Euroscepticism. But four years later, after a Labour government had taken over, his successor, Ian Black, reissued the same warning: 'the train heading to the heart of the continent is now leaving, on time, without Britain, cool or not' (*The Guardian*, 5 December 1997). It seems that the train metaphor provides enough 'semantic space' for all political positions to be expressed. What is significant about it is not so much the divergence of the respective political evaluations, but the relative uniformity in the use of the *train* image - across party political and national boundaries - for 'casting' different nations in asymmetric roles as *parts of the train*, invoking the idea of a hierarchically structured EU. Thus, although it does not predetermine any specific position regarding EU policy, the train metaphor (and travel/transport imagery generally) provides a definite structure that media and politicians can rely on when offering the public their political conclusions.

Notes

1. For discussion of the concepts of *schema* and *scenario* in the cognitivist metaphor theory cf. Lakoff (1987) 6876, 2856.

2. This sample is part of a larger project of charting the main metaphors used in the EU debates in German and British media. For further studies of EU-related imagery cf. Childton and Ilyin (1993), Musolff (1996a, b, 1997) and Schäffner (1996).

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Chapter 10
From Contexts to Concepts: Comparing Social Policy Inputs and Outcomes in Europe

Linda Hantrais

This chapter examines different approaches to the study of policy formation and implementation from a comparative perspective. It reviews the theoretical and practical issues arising in universalist, culturalist and societal approaches to public policy analysis, with particular reference to the social dimension of the European Union and the policy environments in its member states. The importance of identifying an appropriate contextual frame of reference for observation of the policy process is emphasised. The case is argued for and against adopting the nation as the policy context. Reference is made to the principle of 'variable distance' to the effect it can have on the selection of the unit of observation and to the contextual features that are considered relevant in a particular study. Illustrative examples are drawn from an analysis of the interactive relationship between sociodemographic trends, and policy responses and outcomes. The influence of the researchers' own cultural and linguistic backgrounds on the research process is also taken into account. In conclusion, it is suggested that an appreciation of the political, socio-cultural and economic environments in which policies are formulated and implemented can result in a better understanding of the extent to which policy contexts are converging but without obscuring their diversity.

Much of the international comparative research undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s in the universalist tradition claimed to be culture- or context-free. Universalist theory was grounded in the assumption that universal characteristics could be identified in social phenomena,

independently from a specific context. Generalisations could then be made by observing social processes in a given society, culture or nation, in line with a functionalist logic (Grootings, 1986). One of the conclusions drawn on the basis of this type of research was that industrial societies would undergo the same evolutionary process and ultimately converge (Wilensky & Lebeaux, 1958).

At the other extreme, context-boundedness was the central tenet for the culturalists. As developed, in particular, by urban sociologists in the 1950s, culturalism placed such great emphasis on individualistic contextualisation and inductive causality that comparison and generalisation became very difficult, if not impossible. According to the doctrine of cultural or linguistic relativism, it follows that the concepts and values characteristic of a specific society cannot be transported into another cultural or linguistic community.

A more balanced view developed from the 1980s, embodied in the societal approach, which is generally attributed to Marc Maurice (1989) and the Aix School, who applied it to the study of organisations in industrial sociology Proponents of this approach have tried to steer a course between universalism and culturalism, arguing that all international comparisons should aim to demonstrate the effect of the national context on the object of study in order to determine the extent to which generalisations can be made from the theoretical models and hypotheses that the researcher is seeking to test empirically. According to this line of argument, comparisons are made possible by the fact that each unit of observation has a systemic coherence, rooted in national specificity.

In the area of public policy, and more especially social policy, interest in understanding how developments come about in national systems has brought comparative analysis to the fore as a legitimate topic of study and an important source of policy information (Clasen, 1999: 4). National developments have been closely monitored at European level and have also served as reference points for European debates. The attention devoted to the social dimension in the European Union (EU) 1 and the obligation on member states to observe the criteria laid down for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), in particular by controlling social expenditure, have given greater recognition to social affairs as a component in European integration. They have also encouraged scrutiny of national welfare systems and an interest in seeing how different governments are solving what can be seen as common social problems (George & Taylor-Gooby, 1996; Hantrais, 1999a). The availability of funding from the European Commission under the Framework Programmes and from the Directorates General

has acted as an incentive for international cooperative studies in the policy field, justifying European-wide comparisons as well as smaller scale studies of policy developments in selected EU member states. National initiatives have further encouraged international comparisons as a means of gaining a better understanding of the policy transfer process and the potential for cross-national learning. 2

Not all comparative studies, however, take proper account of the national contexts in which policies are formulated and implemented; nor is there general agreement that 'politics matter', or that policies can be transported from one national jurisdiction to another. The attempts made to categorise welfare regimes, in terms of the interaction between political institutions, economic structures and social policy, most notably by Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990), have reopened the long-standing debate between proponents of the theory that welfare states will inevitably converge, and detractors who maintain that politics do still matter (Mabbett & Bolderson, 1999). Socioeconomic pressures have intensified a debate that is reminiscent of the arguments advanced by the proponents of universalism and culturalism. On the one hand, the perceived or real impact on social protection systems of economic globalisation and of the agreement reached at European level over the convergence criteria for European Monetary Union (EMU) has served to reinforce the proposition that welfare retrenchment is an unavoidable, universal policy response. The common concern across the EU about the effects of population decline and ageing on the public provision of welfare has lent further support to the argument that the search for solutions to these common problems will result in the alignment, or convergence, of social protection systems through a levelling down process, or even the end of the 'welfare state' as known in twentieth-century Europe. On the other hand, analysis of the national contexts in which sociodemographic change is occurring suggests that the supposed universality of trends, policy responses and policy outcomes cannot be taken for granted, that convergence over time is by no means a foregone conclusion and that the exact shape of any future European 'social model' cannot be readily predicted.

This chapter adopts the middle course between the extremes of universalism and culturalism, and draws on comparative analyses of public policy inputs and outcomes in EU member states to illustrate the interest and importance of determining how national contexts can shape values and concepts and to look for signs of convergence. The contention here is that an in-depth understanding of the socioeconomic and political contexts in which policies are formulated and

implemented, and their possible impact on the conceptualisation of policy issues is a *sine qua non* for effective cross-national comparative research into public policy, particularly when the objective is to assess the potential for policy transfer or learning among countries that display some similarity in their policy environments.

Adapting to Contexts

The criteria for selecting units of observation, for identifying the contexts within which they are located and for evaluating the possible implications of the choices made are not always fully addressed in comparative studies. When researchers are in a position to define the contextual framework of the phenomenon or process to be studied, their choices may often be determined largely by pragmatic factors, rather than by the intrinsic interest and appropriateness of analysing a particular mix of countries, regions or local areas from a comparative perspective (Hantrais & Mangen, 1996). Many small-scale projects are, for example, constrained by the researcher's knowledge of languages, by the financial resources available for fieldwork and by the potential breadth of relevant contextual features that can be considered without the project becoming unmanageable. The international, interdisciplinary team is in a better position to capture contextual diversity, but finding the right combination of skills and interests, and managing a multinational team may also require compromise. Moreover, the choice of the contextual frame of reference in studies of the policy process within Europe is often determined by sponsors insisting on coverage of all member states, as in the case of the Commission's observatories and networks. Alternatively, the requirement may be for a comparative analysis of a sample of countries representing different waves of membership, welfare types or stages of economic development.

For researchers seeking to understand the logic underlying policy formulation and implementation, the task of identifying and characterising contexts for comparative study is not unproblematic. The rationale for selecting nation states as the frame of reference is relatively easy to justify in the EU social policy context, since, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, policy making is considered to be, primarily the concern of national governments, who are directly represented on the EU's supreme decision-making body, the Council of Ministers, and through nationally elected members of the European Parliament. Even in federal states, such as Germany, Basic Law is applicable nation-wide, and central government sends

national representatives to Brussels. The adoption of the nation as the policy context is complicated, however, by the multi-level nature of EU governance, which means that individual member states, through their representatives in EU institutions, are contributing to the formation of policy that must be acceptable to all member states, especially in cases where unanimous voting applies.

National governments are also required to implement the measures agreed at supranational level in countries with differing institutional structures, as can be exemplified by the case of EU equality policy (Hantrais, 1999b). European-wide legislation on equal pay and equal treatment, maternity and parental leave, part-time work and childcare has been actively sought by countries, such as the Nordic states or France, where gender equality has long been high on the policy agenda, and where women-friendly measures are supported by the state as an essential component of employment and social protection policies. European equality directives also have to be implemented in countries, such as Greece, Portugal or Spain, where public policy has not shown the same concern with gender equality, and where the state has left working mothers to find their own solutions to childrearing.

A further complication in taking the nation as the context for comparative analysis relates to the nature of the policy-making process itself, both at national and supranational level, since non-governmental organisations, issue networks, policy communities and interest groups have all come to play an increasingly important role as policy actors operating across national boundaries. Women's lobbies, committees and networks have been particularly active in taking forward women's issues at European level (Stratigaki, 1999).

The appropriateness of the nation, and more especially of EU member states, as the policy context can be criticised at one and the same time for not being sufficiently discriminating and for being too discriminating. According to the principle of *verschiedene Distanz*, developed by Simmel (1917), the distance from the object under observation changes the way it is observed. Applied to comparative studies, it can be argued that a 'close-up' comparison of a social phenomenon within a country may reveal differences attributable to regions, class, age, sex or ethnicity - for example in population ageing, levels of poverty or access to social rights - that may not be apparent when aggregated national-level data are being compared from a distance. What may emerge as significant differences between a small number of neighbouring EU member states may also pale into insignificance when Europe as a whole is compared with the less developed world.

Comparative analysis of population ageing, resulting from the combined effect of falling fertility rates and increasing life expectancy, provides a pertinent example of the effect of varying the distance from the object being observed and its context. In the mid-1990s, the difference was greater between the north and south of Italy, between East and West Germany, or between the Paris region and the Limousin in France, than it was between EU member states (Eurostat, 1997). Variations between member states were also smaller than those between the EU and the less developed regions of the world. Thus, if EU member states that display seemingly quite different patterns of fertility and life expectancy, for example Ireland and Italy, are selected for a study of the policy issues and responses to population ageing, the findings would be likely to demonstrate heterogeneity, at least with regard to inputs. Contrasting the EU situation as a whole with that in the less developed regions would, however, emphasise the homogeneity existing within the EU, where trends over time are moving in the same direction, but where even the highest fertility rate is significantly below the national level in, for example, Nigeria.

European comparisons over the distance of time also run the risk of distortion, because the size and shape of the EU is constantly changing. Just as earlier waves of EU membership have altered the European 'mean', the addition of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe will further change the shape of social Europe, in the same way that territorial boundaries have done within countries. German unification, for example, created a national unit in which some of the internal disparities in terms of policy inputs, as well as outcomes were greater than those observed across the EU. Policies developed in the mid-1970s in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in response to population decline (including higher family allowances, paid parental leave, priority in housing for women with children, public childcare) were followed by a dramatic rise in the birthrate, earlier family building and very high rates of full-time economic activity for women. By contrast, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), where mothers were strongly encouraged to be home-makers rather than full-time workers, saw its birthrate fall and childlessness rise, while female economic activity rates remained well below those of men, and women continued to withdraw from the labour market when they had young children.

Observing the EU from a middle distance, both temporally and spatially, can enable clusters of EU member states to be identified that share certain characteristics with regard to a particular phenomenon or social process, for example through the analysis of the relationship

between socio-demographic trends, policy responses and outcomes. Such studies enable the position of individual countries to be calculated in relation to a European mean. They are, therefore, useful for an assessment of the situation facing policy makers at a given point in time, which can then be analysed with reference to contextual factors (political environment, economic and social systems). The 'close-up' view makes it possible to demonstrate that the seriousness of socio-demographic trends is not necessarily matched by the level of concern shown by national governments, their responses or the outcomes of policies (Hantrais & Letablier, 1996; Hantrais, 1997, 1999b; Byrne, 1999).

The detailed information needed to examine the wide range of contextual factors impacting on the policy process across 15 countries can easily lead to the excesses of culturalism. It is unlikely that a lone researcher will possess the necessary knowledge and expertise in all these disciplinary areas, and the more so across a number of linguistic settings. The international, interdisciplinary team of researchers is in a better position to be able to identify the most pertinent contextual factors, but may be faced with another contextual problem that is too rarely taken into account in comparative studies: how to deal with the impact of the researchers' intellectual and cultural backgrounds on their approach to the study.

Researchers inevitably bring with them their own culturally and linguistically determined assumptions and their own mindsets, which shape not only their formulation of the research question and the theoretical and conceptual parameters underlying it, but also the data with which they will be working and the interpretations they proffer (Hantrais & Mangen, 1996). In a comparison of the research environment in Britain and France, for example, Jean Tennom (1995) has argued that the very different research traditions, or contexts, in which British and French researchers are operating inform their approaches to international cooperation. As French social science researchers have the status of civil servants, they have long been protected from external interference, enabling them to concentrate on fundamental research, theoretical and conceptual work, and the production of new knowledge, independently from the major economic, political and social concerns of the day and the need to attract external funding. British researchers, by contrast, are driven by the market demands of productivity obliged to ensure 'maximum output for minimum input' (Tennom, 1995: 275), and forced to become entrepreneurs, concentrating on applied, policy-relevant research and the user interface. As a result, they prefer to avoid theoretical excursions and intellectual adventurousness.

Finding the Right Distance

Given the complexities of the research process when contextual factors and their conceptual implications are being examined, it would be tempting to conclude that the universalists' long distance vision appears to offer the easier option. It may be reassuring for researchers and EU policy makers to be able to identify a specifically European 'social model' towards which all present and future EU member states will ultimately converge under the impetus provided by EU law and practice. It would also be tempting for researchers and for policy makers at national level to be able to conclude that, from close up, national specificity (and sovereignty) have not been eroded, and that no single social model has become dominant within Europe, despite the best efforts of individual governments to impose their own practices through negotiation and compromise. Nations within Europe can, undoubtedly learn from one another through observation and exchange of information. They need, however, to remain mindful of the fact that the nature and intensity of social issues vary from country to country and within national boundaries, and that a common policy response will not necessarily produce the same outcomes. While not rejecting the feasibility of policy learning in certain circumstances, a strong case can be made for a greater appreciation of the environments in which policies are formulated and implemented. Such an approach enables clusters of countries to be identified within the EU that display communality in terms of policy inputs and outcomes, pointing to convergence within diversity as well as diversity within convergence.

Notes

1. As presented in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, the Agreement on Social Policy appended to the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993, and the social provisions contained in the Amsterdam Treaty, adopted in 1997.

2. For example, in the United Kingdom, the ESRC Future Governance Programme: Lessons from Comparative Public Policy, launched in 1998.

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Chapter 11
Communicating Across Divides: Lingua Francas in Europe

Sue Wright

Patterns of language use, particularly the rise and fall of lingua francas, reveal the changing balances of political power. In Europe the ancient and medieval worlds possessed lingua francas which allowed the élites to communicate; the great mass of the people moved little and the limitations of their language competence was rarely apparent to them. Nationalism by imposing a national language on populations affected both groups, making the élites less 'international' and the peasantry less 'local'. In the wake of globalisation, patterns of language use are changing again. English has assumed the role of global lingua franca despite profound resistance among some of the other language communities. Whether or not this will endure depends as ever on economic and political factors far outside the influence of any one language planning and policy authority

The story of the Tower of Babel is part of both the Jewish and Christian traditions. In the ideal world before Babel, all had been able to communicate. Then men had built a tower to the heavens whose size, grandeur and pretension were an affront to God. To punish human arrogance, God created many languages where there had been only one before. This legend illustrates the deeply rooted feeling that language difference and mutual incomprehension are undesirable and menacing. Plurilingualism can only lead to separation, conflict and suffering, and must, therefore, be interpreted as divine punishment. The quest for the magic language which would restore the community of communication that existed before the Flood and before the Tower of Babel persisted throughout the Middle Ages and well into the Modern era. The invented languages of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are a continuation of this tradition. Umberto Eco (1995) in his history of this search for the perfect

language, records 83 projects for universal languages in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and 173 in the nineteenth.

This essay provides a brief overview of the waxing and waning of lingua francas in Europe and links these histories to the wider social and political perspective. Language is not simply a means of communication, it is also a tool of domination in colonial and expansionist situations, an agent of unification and a symbol of identity in nation and community building. At the same time language responds to market forces. Ultimately, élites who try to harness language for political ends are only successful where their aims and economic forces coincide. Language shift, decay and domination are thus never merely coincidental or random. Choice of one language over another always reveals forces at play within and between groups.

The First Lingua Francas

The fear of those we cannot understand and the threat posed by a multiplicity of idioms are mitigated by the development of a lingua franca. Greek was probably the first to play that role in Europe. The Koine dialect created a community of communication in the wake of the empire of Alexander the Great and long outlasted it. Greek was widely used throughout the eastern Mediterranean for several centuries. This role as lingua franca coexisted with another purpose for Greek. Language was one of the defining criteria of group membership in the Greek world. Those who were not part of Greek society were *barbaroi*, i.e. those who could not speak Greek and who uttered incomprehensible babbling noises. By extension, those who could not be understood and who could not communicate were strangers, foreigners and, ultimately, the enemy. Further, since *logos* is both speech and thought, then, by implication, *barbaroi* and Greeks could not share the same thought processes (Eco, 1995) and language difference acquired a profound significance. As a lingua franca, Greek survived into the Modern era, becoming the sacred language of the eastern tradition of Christianity, the Orthodox church.

Latin was the second international language in Europe. First as the language of military rule and administration throughout the Roman empire, then as the language of political thought, philosophy and culture, the inheritor of the Greek tradition, and finally as the language of religious thought and the Catholic church, Latin played the role of international lingua franca for over 15 centuries. Across space and through time, Latin provided the medium in which speakers of different languages could make and maintain contact. The proportion of

society able to speak Latin changed over the period of Roman hegemony In the early period, Latin was an élite language, spoken by those in power or those at the geographical centre of the Roman empire. Subsequently, many among the subjugated peoples learnt the language and it was adopted in numerous areas as the main local language. The increase in numbers of Latin speakers, whose different language backgrounds brought different influences to bear on language practice, started the process of linguistic fracturing. The fall of the empire in the fifth century completed it. Latin speaking communities cut off from one another and under the influence of different invaders developed different and mutually incomprehensible forms of the language.

However, the unitary influence of Latin was not lost, because the Catholic church adopted Latin as its sacred language, and in this variety it remained fixed and unchanging, giving western Europe a stable lingua franca. Since the Church and intellectual life were synonymous in the medieval period this meant that for centuries the educated élites of Europe could exchange ideas through Latin.

The patterns of communication in the medieval world were both wider and more restricted than in the following age of nationalism (Gellner, 1983). The ruling classes operated at a European level, maintaining contact through marriage, feudal relationships, inheritance and the Crusades. Because of these networks and contacts, the courts of Christendom were mostly multilingual. The peasants, however, remained in their villages, locked into their agricultural timetable, and had little exchange with wider society (Duby, 1987). They were resolutely monolingual in the dialects of their regions. These were part of the great dialect continua which spanned Europe and within the continuum there was always comprehension between contiguous groups. Mutual comprehension was, however, not assured over wider tracts. In the medieval world this was not a problem. People were subjects not citizens. They were rarely asked to participate in a society which believed firmly in monarchical rule by divine right and which recognised the infallibility of the pope. They rarely moved far from their place of birth.

The Growth of National Sentiment

When the absolute power of the Catholic church to govern all aspects of society was challenged, Latin's role as the language of power, knowledge and science diminished in western Europe. It was too closely allied to Catholicism to survive in Protestant lands and was replaced by the languages of the emergent nation states. Benedict

Anderson (1983) has explained how the Reformation, capitalism and the printing press interacted to promote the standardisation and promotion of national languages. The Protestant Churches' translation of the Bible into the vernaculars and the growth in literacy among both sexes and all classes in order to have access to the scriptures provided a new and large market for the printed word. The desire of the printers to sell to the biggest market possible encouraged standardisation, even in those countries where governments had not set up academies in order to establish a norm.

National sentiment begins to appear in western Europe in the late Middle Ages along with an awareness of 'national' history and an affection for 'national' language (Duby, 1987; Greenfeld, 1992). In France the vernacular starts to replace Latin as the language of popular history as early as the thirteenth century The medium in which history is written reveals the purpose of the writing. In early times there was little choice. Latin was the language of literacy. Thus the fact that Gregory of Tours' (538594) *Historia francorum* was written in Latin reveals little. Nor is it surprising that the Benedictine histories 1 of the Franks which trace the founding of Paris back to the Trojans and legitimise the monarchy with this link to the Ancients are also in Latin. In later periods, however, the choice of Latin reveals that the author's aim is to reach an international audience of scholars. Baudouin's *De institutionae historiae*, Bodin's *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem*, de Thou's *Historia mei temporis* and Dom Mabillon's *De re diplomatica* (1681) show that the Latin internationalist tradition carried on in France through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Choosing to write in the vernacular, on the other hand, shows that the target is a national audience - which the text also helps to bring into being. National history in the national language fed a growing national consciousness and was one of the means by which the imagined community of the nation was created.

By the fifteenth century the chroniclers of the French kings were writing their histories in French; Philippe de Commynes (14471511), chronicler of the reign of Louis XI, is a noted early example (Caire-Jabinet, 1994). A century later, Etienne Pasquier (15291615) called for fellow historians to use French:

> Quoy? Nous porterons donc le nom de Français, c'est-à-dire de francs et libres, et, néanmoins nous asservirions nos esprits (à une langue étrangère).
>
> (Pasquier cited in Caire-Jabinet, 1994: 41)

In terms of growing national awareness it is significant that Pasquier is not only the champion of the vernacular, but that he also argues for

history to be a record of the origins and history of the nation of France as well as of their rulers.

Nationalism fractured pan-European structures and European linguistic networks while it unified groups within the frontiers of the state. In the polities which first became nation states (e.g. France, Spain and the United Kingdom), frontiers were set by conquest, marriage and inheritance (Seton-Watson, 1977). After the limits of the territory had been established, the governments (in both monarchies and republics) set about assimilating regional minorities to achieve homogeneity within the nation. The ideas which led to the English Civil War and the French and American Revolutions made the subjects of the state its citizens with participatory rights and duties, and a new focus for identity

The education system and conscription were powerful means by which the state socialised its citizens into the national community - and into the national community of communication. The obligatory passage through national schooling and national service had a powerful effect on the spread of the dialect variety adopted as the national language. Gellner (1983) explains how industrialisation meshed with the nationalising process and linguistic unification. Only the state can organise and fund education when technology is complex and changing and where generic education must last over a long period to give the individual the competence and flexibility to function in an industrial society The education system which fits citizens for their industrial role will also socialise them into their role as citizens of a single national society In the early nation states, immense efforts were made to eradicate differences within the nation, particularly linguistic differences.

Linguistic Nationalism and Eastern Europe

The second wave of nation state formation came in the nineteenth century and happened in the reverse order. Groups such as the Italians and the Germans who felt that they broadly shared a common culture and language combined in new nation states. Ethno-linguistic nationalism, a mythical, anti-intellectual tradition of nationalism, was born. German Romantics such as Klopstock (17241803), Voss (17511826), Herder (17441803) and Hamann (17301788) argued that it was the *Volk* with its common roots and pre-existing characteristics - language, culture, history and religion - which created the nation. Language was seen as the repository for the nation's uniqueness. The cosmopolitanism and universalism of the Enlightenment was rejected:

for a group to preserve its specificity and survive as a discrete entity it must preserve its own language and culture. Difference in language reflected the natural divisions between nations and thus linguistic diversity was, *per se*, good and any reduction of it catastrophic in its consequences for those who lost their link with the past.

Herder's idea that human civilisation lives not in its general and universal, but in its national and peculiar manifestations (Kohn, 1946: 429) gained wide currency among the élites of proto-nations, particularly in central and eastern Europe. At that time, the peoples of that part of the continent were, in the majority, under the rule of the Tsarist, Ottoman or Habsburg empires. Poles and Balts under Russian domination, Serbs under Turkish rule, Croats and Hungarians under the Habsburgs, all saw in German ethno-linguistic nationalism a model for their own liberation. In the wake of the First World War and by the Treaties of Versailles, Sèvres and Trianon, the empires were dismantled and 'nation states' were set up.

The mosaic of nation states was always a construct. The differences between nations was sometimes less than the differences within nations. However, as the boundaries between the nation states were raised high in every sense: cultural, economic, political, juridical and linguistic, the reality began to fit the myth. This can be illustrated in the way that homogenous communities of communication have been created within state boundaries. The dialect continua were cut as national markets were established. Customs posts, tariffs and duties blocked trade and the linguistic contacts of economic exchange. The 'armed peace' between 1871 and 1914 was fraught with tension. National interest was pursued with aggression, and cooperation across borders was not a feature of the era.

Nationalism was the antithesis of internationalism, and as national societies developed within state boundaries, the need and desire for a language to ensure contact across frontiers lessened. French had become an élite lingua franca during the Enlightenment and retained a role as the language of diplomacy, the language of negotiation between sovereign states, the one international contact that thrived in the Westphalian system. In a few places (e.g. Hungary), Latin survived as the language of scholarship in the universities well into the nineteenth century

Internationalism and Globalisation

It is against this nationalist background and the great nationalist wars of the twentieth century that the ideology of internationalism

gained ground. The carnage of the First World War prompted a number of international initiatives: the League of Nations was set up to promote cooperation among the nations; Coudenhove-Kalergi, Aristide Briand and Edouard Herriot and others promoted the idea of a united Europe which would guarantee peace through common markets; the Left hoped that the Revolution would spread and unite the world. Greater contact across frontiers and increased trade demanded a medium of exchange. The post-war period saw a surge of interest in a number of auxiliary languages that had been invented at the end of the nineteenth century Volaptik, dating from 1879, had some early success, but was then eclipsed by Esperanto, first conceived in 1887. The Esperantists were anti-nationalist, humanist and pacifist and the movement was banned in many countries. In particular the Tsarist government and the Fascists persecuted its speakers. The numbers of Esperantists peaked in the 1930s. Although the movement continues today, the language failed to recruit the number of speakers necessary to succeed as an international lingua franca.

Ultimately, the idealist internationalism of the 1920s and 1930s was not powerful enough to withstand the growth of fascism. However, the Second World War, a further 'episode of carnage without parallel' (Hobsbawm, 1995: 52), caused great numbers of Europeans to call for political and legal internationalism, and provoked a profound desire for future pan-European cooperation and a new European order to make war on the continent impossible. A number of the Resistance leaders and activists who contributed to the founding of the *Union européenne des Fédéralistes* in 1946 2 had started to develop ideas about European federalism even before the end of hostilities. Winston Churchill made two influential speeches calling for European Union (21 March 1943 and 19 September 1946), although, in his interpretation, Europe did not include the UK.

At the global level, the two decades following the war saw the founding of a number of different institutions with the primary aim of locking states into forms of cooperation which would prevent recourse to war as a first solution to dissension. The division of the world into the communist bloc and western capitalism meant that in the medium term at least there would be two internationalisms and that these would confront each other. The United Nations, set up in 1945 with the principal aim of preserving world peace through diplomatic means, spanned both the western and communist worlds, but in its early years was crippled by the cleavage between these two blocs. Other agencies - the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the (International

Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or World Bank) IBRD - focused on economic cooperation for similar ends but were restricted to the western capitalist world. The languages in which these associations function have been the languages of the largest and most powerful nation states, in particular English.

One can plot the various stages which have brought English to its present role. It was imposed by colonisers and missionaries as a 'civilising' force in the early colonial period! It became the language of administration and power of the British empire. The allied victory in the Second World War assured its pre-eminence in the non-communist world (if the Axis powers had prevailed, no doubt German would have fulfilled a similar role). After decolonisation, English was retained as an official language in many independent states. In the post-communist world, it became the language of international police keeping and policy-making in security regimes dominated by the United States.

English also became the language of access to technology as the Anglo-American scientific tradition became pre-eminent. All new discoveries came to be published in the scientific lingua franca and English became an essential requirement for all scientists hoping to operate internationally or wanting access to new discoveries. As electronic media developed, English became the medium of most cultural exports. Hollywood had learnt how to appeal to speakers of English as a second language in the films it produced for the domestic American market in the early part of the century This skill allowed it to dominate the world market with lowest common denominator films as accessible to the multilingual audiences in Bangkok, Ankara and Buenos Aires as to English mother tongue speakers in Sydney, Manchester and Toronto.

In the sphere of economic globalisation, the US and the English-speaking world dominate. Siguan (1996) claims that the commerce of the English-speakers accounts for half of the global total of all gross national products. The Anglo-American influence comes not simply because of the large numbers of multinationals with American connections, the size of the American domestic market or the large global market share of US companies, but also from the general acceptance of the American paradigm (Held, 1995; Sassen, 1995). Concrete examples of how the world embraces the American way are legion, perhaps none more telling than the world-wide power of Standard and Poor's or Moody's credit ratings. Economic globalisation too has meant progressive anglicisation. English is the language that facilitates access to global markets and the language of the dominant players. It has become, in short, the current language of power (Cassen, 1995, Held *et al*., 1999).

In a structuralist, positivist reading of this development, English has been portrayed as a neutral and value-free medium for international exchange. 3 In August 1997, it seemed that even the French had accepted this as reality Claude Allègre, the French education minister, suggested that the French should cease 'de considérer l'anglais comme une langue étrangère and treat it instead as a tool, to be acquired in much the same way that they would computer literacy The subsequent storm in the press was in part nationalist reaction to a language spread deemed to be imperialist and detrimental to the best interests of the francophone world. However, in among the rhetoric was the entirely correct point that it was 'naïf de ne pas donner un sens politique à la domination de l'anglais' (*Le Monde* 1 December 1997: 15). A national language which becomes a lingua franca brings to that role all the connotations it carries as a symbol of national identity and culture as well as all the advantage it affords its mother tongue speakers in the international arena. The French seem more aware than some other groups that the spread of English is, like all the preceding examples of language dominance, proof of political and economic power. This may well stem from the fact that French has only recently lost the position of lingua franca and they know what privileges it confers.

Historically, the position of a lingua franca has never been secure. Whenever economic and political power shifts, the language of the group becoming dominant gains precedence. Where a lingua franca is adopted by many disparate groups, the language has usually fractured. The current situation could evolve in both those directions. At the present time it is difficult to know whether the penetration of English has been deep enough to survive future political changes. This could only happen where societies have shifted wholesale to English. Where English only plays a role as an auxiliary language, it could disappear within a generation. The case of Russian in the former Warsaw pact countries is a vivid illustration of how shallow rooted lingua francas may be. As far as fracturing is concerned the situation is equally opaque. There are already signs that English is evolving in a pluricentric way Singlish, Australian English, Hong Kong English, Punglish, Black English all have lexical items and features of syntax peculiar to themselves. However, the global communications network may be dense enough to prevent this fracturing of English. Alternatively both processes may continue and develop in a classically diglossic way The only thing of which we can be sure in all of this is that the economic and political factors which affect language use are largely outside the competence of language policy makers.4

Notes

1. For example the *Historia francorum* from the Abbaye de Fleury (end of tenth century) and the histories of the French kings undertaken at Saint Denis (twelfth and thirteenth centuries).

2. Among them Altiero Spinelli. For a detailed discussion of post-war European federalism see Lipgens (1982).

3. For a critical review of those in the Anglo-Saxon world who take this line see Pennycook (1994). Siguan (1996) gives the view from continental Europe.

4. This essay is drawn from my current research on language and European integration. See also *Whose Europe? The Turn Towards Democracy*. (with D. Smith) Oxford: Blackwell (1999) and *Community and Communication: The Role of Language in Nation State Building and European Integration*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters (2000).

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Chapter 12
Sociolinguistics in a Classless Society?

Frank Knowles

This chapter addresses the conundrum of whether sociolinguists have any job to do at all in an - allegedly - classless society, such as that claimed and paraded by protagonists of the erstwhile Soviet Union. The existence throughout the USSR of the regional variants of Russian was - somewhat reluctantly, one feels - conceded by the politicised and enormously influential literati in the USSR and much effort was directed in the education system towards the sanitisation of 'parole' in order to draw it closer to the norms of 'langue'. A particular emphasis was placed on literacy and orthoepy by the universal education system which, of course, had in all areas of the Soviet Union attempted to instil in all pupils/students a good functional command of literacy, that is to say 'cultured' Russian and also, by force of linguistic proselytisation, in suitable (for example the 'upwardly mobile' in the Western parlance) speakers of indigenous minority languages.

A hundred years ago the Tsarist Russian Empire was beginning to experience mounting social and economic pressures, caused by many factors. Among these were massive industrialisation, urbanisation and flight, where feasible, from a huge 'countryside'. Many people became mobile for the first time, migrating townwards and leaving behind them the hard and prospectless life of a serf or freed man. The industrialisation-cum-urbanisation process was pushed along by thoroughly entrepreneurial and capitalist urges: a 'get rich quick' ethos prevailed. Poverty and famine in the counTryside weRe rife and people were destined to stay in that sorry state for a long time to come. Such change and disarray provided almost ideal conditions for initiatives by new and not necessarily legal political groupings. Lenin's tract 'What is to be done' was published in 1902 and from then

on political assassination was not eschewed by those seeking to overthrow the 'establishment. Russia suffered defeat in its war with Japan. Strikes became and remained regular events, producing ever more acrimony and polarisation, along with deaths resulting from civil unrest.

Russia's entry into the First World War led to huge loss of life among its soldiery, much of which can be blamed on the military incompetence and insouciance of senior officers (Pipes, 1990). The inevitable accession to power of the Bolsheviks, under Lenin's leadership, led to ongoing internecine conflict as 'unfinished businesS' was dealt with in the Civil War and as the new Soviet Union needed to establish itself politically and prevail militarily against enemies such as Poland. After all the upheavals of the previous two decades or more, the Soviet Union - now led by Stalin after Lenin's premature death and essentially secure within its borders - commenced a concentrated and single-minded period of 'nation-building' in the setting of a multi-ethnic community the members of which were at different stages of evolution. This involved creating a government, the writ of which would run throughout its entire territory and the authority of which was to be underpinned by centralised planning via a command economy directed labour, often forced labour, internal exile, closed borders, and, of course, a huge, efficient and totally vigilant security police apparatus.

It might be supposed, as a consequence of the USSR's overriding dedication to Marxism, that some sort of egalitarianism would emerge in society, at least to a certain degree. The old and traditional division of society into aristocracy, middle class and working class was clearly too capitalist to subscribe to officially. And was not Marxism about the building of a classless society? If the USSR were really on the way to such a society, would it, could it, really succeed in this enterprise? If it did, there would be no basis for sociology as an investigatory activity worth pursuing! The USSR did face reality, however, and empirically acknowledged social strata in its society These were:

'peasants'/agricultural workers predominantly tied to and trapped within the collective farm system;

industrial workers in directed employment, without any of the civic rights of a freely operating labour market - 'trade unions' were used to enforce this slavery of labour;

civil servants;

the intelligentsia;

military personnel.

It is worth noting that the Soviet government operated a universal system of so-called 'passports'. The name belies the facts. These 'passports' were merely ID cards which could be required for inspection at any time. They provided basic personal information. Much more important was the accompanying system of what might be called internal visas (*propiski*). Only a *propiska*, which needed to be wheedled or bribed out of someone in authority, such as a civil servant, gave an individual the authority to be somewhere other than at their normal abode.

The USSR (covering approximately one-sixth of the globe's land surface) had many ethnic minorities. They were 'permitted' to benefit from various measures, the most important of which was the right to use native languages - rather than Russian - in certain settings, notably the workplace. However, senior local officials, especially representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), enjoyed massive discretionary powers which were clearly open to abuse within the 'favour-swapping' culture in Which they had all grown up and which was constantly being re-infused in the same unchanging way

The official policy with regard To the language question in the USSR was that all languages (well over 100 of them) were equal as vehicles of communication and as ways of thinking about and of talking about the world. However, in terms of so-called functional load, clearly Russian, as the favoured and statistically prevalent language of cross-ethnic communication, had pride of place. This notion was quite frequently usurped to put a triple message across to the general public with regard to inter-ethnic communication: firstly, that, for non-Russians, Russian was the non-contentious common denominator, 'value-free' and almost like Esperanto; secondly (and in direct contrast), that, although all languages are of equal communicative value, the predominant use of Russian across the complex planes of the ethnic divide would assist the consolidation of Soviet solidarity; thirdly, that assisting people to learn Russian - from their earliest school-days onwards - and to use it habitually would make it easier for ethnic minorities to relate to Russians. There was the contentious notion that these latter should be role models for the 'younger brothers or sisters' in the Soviet family.

Native (Great-)Russian speakers seemed sometimes to provoke particular anger by clumsiness towards and ignorance about their East Slavonic cousins in the Ukraine and Belarus. Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, it was quite common to hear Russians say that Belorussian was merely a dialect of Great Russian and hence could not be a real literary language. They had no answer to the comment

that Belorussian (now spelled Belarusan in English) has a different and systematic orthography which, unlike Russian, works on the basis of a univocal relationship between phonemes and graphemes.

The complications of Ukrainian are too ramified to be entered into here, but it is worth noting that there are numerous historically determined cultural differentials between Eastern and Western Ukrainian. Currently there are pressures on speakers of the western variety to align more closely To the metropolitan linguistic and cultural norms of Kiev. HaVing suffered from Soviet pressure to shift from Ukrainian to Russian, it is ironic that the Ukrainians of the capital should in their turn now attempt to impose their variety on others. The imposition of a national standard throughout the territory of the state is, of course, a classic and traditional feature of nation building and Ukraine is following many 'nation states' in this attempt at standardisation.

Let us now return to Russia and Russian speakers. As might be already clear, Russia (and its Soviet predecessor state) is a very 'corporate' society, with not much latitude available, until recently, for individuals to 'do their own thing'. Now, it is also possible to hear in Russia echoes of a type of comment that has been bandied about in the UK for several years: Our children are not being taught their native language properly at school - they can't spell, they can't write, all they do is follow totally unsuitable role models from the TV and the tabloid Press! Emancipation has its dangers, since it is now possible for there to be more than one right, even official, answer to a question. Hence there is a judgement to be made by individuals not just about appropriacy and discernment but about personal emancipation, privacy, life plans and choices. Having choices was not one of the features of life in the USSR but, for many people in the new Russia and elsewhere in the CIS it has become the new reality This is causing much difficulty among thousands upon thousands of people who still have fond memories of and hanker after the old nanny state.

In the area of language and cultural behaviour in public space many new corporate freedoms and personal options are on offer to a slightly bemused but none the less essentially enthusiastic populace. And even in linguistic formulations there are both the old and now new choices to be made and more Personalised styles to be adopted. These have always existed but they have become less encumbered. The only problem is the number of options there are. These linguistic and cultural facts of life are applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to any language that one might care to mention. The key to success is still felt to be the choice of the 'right' linguistic option to solve a crux of formulation and/or persuasion/dissuasion. BuT how do we know intellectually

rather than instinctively what is the 'right' choice? The lexical elements of language structure help us here because those lexical building blocks have the important characteristics - besides mere habituality and availability in the lexicon - of gregariousness and contextual predictability The essential 'non-structural' information needed by speakers and writers (especially anyone operating in L2) relates to lexis and collocability One might also claim that operational information about phraseology is a considerable desideratum, if not completely essential for the 'star performer'. The highest premium needs to be placed on fixed phrases and standard 'recipes', plus a warning that many linguistic elements are not amenable to variation by individuals without very good cause, such as a 'nonce' situation.

Yet variability of expression is not just a fact of life, it is a welcome fact of life, provided meanings are not compromised *en route*. It behoves linguists to log, accumulate and analyse data ariSing from their coRpora. With computeriSed corpora theRe has been an exponential growth of corpus linguistics, and linguists can constantly update their data and promulgate their findings very frequently This is an important message for Russia because Russian sociolinguists have not traditionally engaged in such woRk.

One important focus of sociolinguistic enquiry is the study of sUitable chunks of discourse/text in order to determine just how fixed they are and to see whether any variability that occurs could reasonably be attributed to some visible or 'buried' factor. Those who worked in this way in the Soviet eRa were the exceptions rather than the rule. The sociolinguistic data first reported on by Graudina and her colleagues (1976) in the Soviet Union of the 1970s were a serious attempt to quantify corporate linguistic tendencies and uncertainties among several sub-populations of respondents (See appendix for an example of their work). Suprun (1969) and Guboglo (1984) were also exceptions.

Other sociolinguists in the USSR (Karpenko & Seymonov, Gorbachevich, 1973, 1978, etc.), although prepared to acknowledge the same 'palette' of professional concerns as their counterparts in other countries, were essentially concerned with what was called *kul'tura rechi*, or speech culture. This was a 'norm-driven' concentration on orthography, orthoepy, and literacy (*gramotnost*). The ways in which these societal gifts and 'riches' (*bogatstva*) were taken to the people were varied:

the formal, very traditional but highly successful mass education system at primary, secondary, apprenticeship, technical college and university;

the mass media;

the book-publishing industry;

Special workshops;

Special campaigns.

Much of this infrastructure has, it would seem, decayed in the new Russia. The top down, norm-driven language approach is in retreat. At the same time, there are serious societal concerns about new usage, departure from the norm, and the potential future contamination and debasement of Russian. The attractions of Western media seem to have made captiveS - only temporarilY it must be hoped - of large sectors of the Russian population. Russia, once a highly respected bastion and centre of excellence in high culture is in the doldrums and Russian speakers are in a period of change - as well as shock at that change.

In this situation, Russia needs sociolinguistic research and cadres of sociolinguists, not least because it is now a 'transition state' treading, as rapidly as circumstances permit, its chosen path away from corporatism towards respectable democracy and free-market economics. There is, however, little precedent for the empirical approach. The legacy of Soviet culture means that for reasons, both good and bad, language was not the property of the individual but of power élites. Given the ideological prism of this class there is little interest in linguistic emancipation and studying the reality of individual use. And the frameworks to start doing this are not yet fully in place.

Appendix

The scores (i.e. tallies of instantiations) yielded by the investigation of Graudina *et al*. (1976)

on byl vesjoly	he was cheerful		262
on byl vesjolym	he was cheerful		2021
on byl vesel	he was cheerful		630
		TOTAL	2913
ne el xleba	he didn't eat any bread		1964
ne el xleb	he didn't eat the bread		744
		TOTAL	2708

(table continued on next page)

(table continued from previous page)

sto chelovek sideli	a hundred people were seated		1168
sto chelovek sidelo	a hundred people were sitting		346
		TOTAL	2514
ego professija slozhnaja	his profession is complicated		349
ego professija slozhna	his profession is complicated		1513
		TOTAL	1862
ona vitse-chempion	she is the vice-champion		533
ona vitse-chempionka	she is the Vice-championka		204
		TOTAL	1737
vysota dva metra	two meters high		231
vysota v dva metra	two meters high		395
		TOTAL	626
on byl uchitel	he was a teacher		37
on byl uchitelem	he used to be a teacher		541
		TOTAL	578
s pomoshchju chego	with the help of s.t.		481
pri pomoshchi chego	with the help of s.t.		54
		TOTAL	535
zhdat' poezd	to wait for (the) train		404
zhdat' poezda	wait for (a) train		130
		TOTAL	534
okolo milliona bastuet	about a million are on strike		331
okolo milliona bastujut	about a million are on strike		197
		TOTAL	528
ne mogut sozdat' muzeja	they can't establish (the) museum		193
ne mogut sozdat' muzej	they can't establish (a) museum		252
		TOTAL	445

(table continued on next page)

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rabota na sele	work in a village/countryside	302
rabota v sele	work in a village	142
	TOTAL	444
po otnosheniju chego	reference to s.t.	423
v otnoshenii k chemu	in respect of s.t.	129
	TOTAL	552
komandujushchij armiej	army commander	371
komandujushchij armii	army commander	15
	TOTAL	386
prijexal dlya oznakomenija	came for familiarisation	191
prijexal, chtoby oznakomit'sja	came in order to familiarise himself	55
prijexal oznakomit'sja	came to familiarise himself	7
	TOTAL	253
po okonchanii	on finishing	101
po okonchaniju	on finishing	6
posle okonchanija	after finishing	142
	TOTAL	249
direktor skazal	the (female) director said . . .	11
direktor skazala	the (female) director said . . .	230
	TOTAL	241
vozmozhnosti dlja rasshirenija	opportunities to expand	131
vozmozhnosti rasshirenija	expansion opportunities	56
vozmozhnosti dlja rasshirenija	opportunities for expansion	49
	TOTAL	236

(table continued on next page)

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neskol'ko chelovek prishlo	several people came		174
neskol'ko chelovek prishli	several people came		60
		TOTAL	234
oni byli razdetye	they were undressed		12
oni byli razdetymi	they were undressed		121
oni byli razdety	they were undressed		97
		TOTAL	230
upravlenie proizvodstvom	the direction of production		188
upravlenie proizvodstva	the direction of production		32
		TOTAL	220
napravit' usilija na to	to direct efforts to s.t.		185
napravit' usilija k tomU	to direct efforts towaRds s.t.		9
		TOTAL	194
bol' shinstvo sidelo	the majority were seated		118
bol' shinstvo sideli	the majority were seated		57
		TOTAL	175
pribavit' skorost'	to increase speed		70
pribavit' skorosti	to increase speed		93
		TOTAL	163
reshenija po oplate truda	decisions on payment for labour		64
reshenija ob oplate truda	decisions about payment for labour		84
		TOTAL	148
nash shkola-internat	our boarding school		144
nasha shkola-internat	our boarding school		122
		TOTAL	266

(table continued on next page)

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vesjolyj on byl	he was cheerful	33
vesjolyrn on byl	he was cheerful	93
vesel on byl	he was cheerful	18
	TOTAL	144
po oshibke	by mistake	19
iz-za oshibki	because of a mistake	118
po prichine oshibki	by reason of a mistake	5
	TOTAL	142
jexat' na poezde	to travel on the train	64
jexat' v poezde	to travel on the train	18
jexat' poezdorn	to travel by train	51
	TOTAL	133
nel' zja kupit' spichek	it is impossible to buy matches	74
nel' zja kupit' spichki	it is impossible to buy any matches	54
	TOTAL	128
dokumenty ne sokhranilis'	the documents have not been preserved	26
dokumentov ne sokhranilos'	no documents have been preserved	54
	TOTAL	80

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Chapter 13
Real-World Contexts for English Spelng Studis 1

Christopher Upward

This chaptr, which is ritn in cut spelng (se note at end for explnation), considrs a numbr of studis of english spelng and litracy (by linguists, sycolojists and litracy teaching methodolojists) publishd in recent decades, and argus that sevrl of th most influential wer unhelpful because they neglectd th real-world context of ther ideas. Thus, in linguistics, claims that english speing has an esentialy regulr structur ignord its histry and efect on users; in sycolojy, atemts to modl th process of litracy aquisition paid insuficient atention to clasroom practis; and teachng theorists ho tryd to bypass spelng overlookd th role of th alfabet. This paper develops a vew of litracy that atemts to unite its linguistic, syclojicl and pedagojic aspects and presents th optmization of litracy in english (both as a nativ and non-nativ languaj) as a policy goal. These perspectivs finaly focus on a cal for english spelng to be simplifyd.

Two Premises

Two premises undrlie th argumnts presentd belo, one concernng th sycolojy of alfabetic litracy, th othr its individul, nationl and global function.

How peple read and rite in an alfabetic script depends on ther familiarity with th words being procesd. If th sound and spelng of words ar unfamilir (as ofn with lernrs, sorntimes with non-nativ speakrs, and ocasionly even with th most litrat), readrs and riters depend on letrs to indicate both pronunciation and ritn form. Conversly wen words ar entirely familir, ther overal apearance (Gestalt) sufices for readrs to recal pronunciation from memry

Litracy is th prerequisit for al education, and education is th pre-

requisit for individul, nationl and global welbeing. Globaly, a special responsbility fals to english as th languaj thru wich modrn nolei and ideas ar most accesbl worldwide. Therfor, nativ- and non-nativ speakng peples dificltis in handlng ritn english need closer study than hithrto undrtaken, as a basis for futur spelng policy These ar th real-world contexts, syclojicl and social, that shud shape our vew of english spelng.

Linguistic Theoris

Many english-speakng linguists in recent decades (unlike erlir riters and non-nativ speakrs jenrly) hav belitld th iregularity of english spelng, typicly describing it as 'alejd', 'exajrated', or 'less than ofn claimd', and hav insted ernfasized its systm, structur and desyn.

Thus Chomsky & Halle (1968) cald english spelng a 'near-optimal' systm on acount of words hos spelng remains unchanjed in derivativs despite chanjed pronunciation. Thus th form *courage* persists in *courageous*, despite difrntly pronounced vowls; and th letr C persists in pairs like *elastic/elasticity*, altho its valu chanjes from /k/ to /s/. Howevr, wider considration reveals such 'morfofonemic stability' to be untypicl of ritn english, countrexampls being lejon. Som words do chanje ther spelng acordng to pronunciation, as wen stresd AI in *maintain* becoms unstresd E in *maintenance*, and voiceless C in *advice* becoms voiced S in *advise*. Countless comn stems chanje ther spelng befor inflections without chanjing ther sound, as wen *hop* has PP in *hopping* and *hope* no E in *hoping*. Th letr C is especialy suseptbl to substitution, varying with K in *provocation/provoke*, or with S in *prophecy/prophesy*, or With S in th british (not americn) noun/verb homofones *practice/practise* (so wy not also *promice/promise*?). Unmotivated variation is seen in th vowls of words like *speech/speak* and *height/high*. So not merely is the Chomskyan analysis mistaken, but th fact that *som* exampls suport his case furthr undrlines th unsystamatic caractr of english spelng. Th lak of systm perhaps reachs its nadir less in hole words than in parts of words (e.g. prefixs, sufixs), as in th plethra of unpredictbl endngs of *beggar, teacher, actor, glamour, acre, murmur, injure, martyr*. Frequent mispelng and mispronunciation ar th inevitbl real-world consequence of an orthografy in wich Dewey (1970) calculated an avraj of 13.7 posbl spelngs for each of th 40+ sounds of spoken english.

Related to th abov 'morfofonemic' theory is th *a priori* belief that english spelng canot be fundmently iregulr because 'languaj is a rulegovrnd systm' and must therfor hav a definebl structur (e.g. Venezky, 1970; Albrow, 1972). Strenuus efrts hav been made to discovr rules in

english spelng, pointng for instnce to patrns such as th P-dublng in *hopping* as instrices of 'rules'; but difrnt explnations ar then needd for numerus exeptions such as singl V in *having*, *living*, etc, or th PP/P variation in *worshipping/gossiping*, or th S/SS uncertnty in *focus(s)ing* (shud *discussing* or *accusing* be th modl?). Th 'rules' may then be described as 'complex' or 'non-obvius' (Stubbs, 1986), or computers may be used to try and discovr rules wich th human anlyst has faild to find (Carney, 1994). So english spelng is treatd as a systm of natur, like th human jenome, unfathmbl without computer asistnce, rathr than as an (orijnly simpl) systm developd by humans for day-to-day practicl purposes (Yule, 1986). Th ultmat failur of th aternt to sho english spelng as a 'rule-govrnd systm', howevr, shud be seen in th admission by both Venezky and Albrow that ther findngs ar not suitd to th real world of th clasroom. Spelng 'rules' that ar not suitd to th needs of lernrs, in an aje that sets stor by hy standrds of litracy, canot be considrd adequat to ther purpos.

Th notion that english spelng has 'desyn' has also been comnly advanced by linguists. It implys that somone had a rationl overal plan for how english shud be spelt. Yet th real-world histry of english spelng (Scragg, 1974) shos how litl substrice th notion has. Perhaps ther was desyn in th first aplication(s) of th roman alfabet to Old English around th 7th century, and varius conventions hav subsequently been set (by monastic scriptoria for late Old English from th 9th century by th royl chancery in th 14th century for late Midl English, by dictionris from th 18th century) that wer observd by th best traind riters. Howevr, tho these conventions may hav determnd th 'corect' spelng of individul words, they hav not in recent centuris constituted a coherent overal desyn. A consensus of printrs from th end of th 16th century apears graduly to hav acheved wat eventuly produced th spelng conventions of 20th-century english, but ther is no evidnce of 'desyn'. Thus th forms *city*, *pity* with singl T hav prevaild over th once comnly used alternativs *citty*, *pitty* with TT, wich ocurs in numerus 'regulr' spelngs like *patty*, *petty*, *potty*, *putty*, or *bitty*, *gritty*, *witty*, etc. (was ther a desire to adhere to th singl T of french *cité*, *pitié*? or wer th nouns *city*, *pity* thot to deserv difrnt spelngs from rymng ajectivs such as *gritty*, etc?). Here, as in countless othr instnces, we se english spelng failng to implmnt th ke desyn principl of consistncy of sound-symbl corespondnce, wich lies at th hart of a riting systm desynd for human needs and abilitis.

We may conclude that th linguists in question oprated on a levl of linguistic abstraction that neglects to considr th empiricly asrtainbl, real-world impact of th presnt spelng of english.

Advances in Sycolojy

Wile linguists wer seekng systm, structur and desyn in english spelng, among sycolojists we observ a progression from abstract theory to empiricl reserch. On th theoreticl levl, Downing and Leong (1982) interpretd litracy (in any languaj) in terms of skils, wich, like othr skils, ar aquired in thre stajes: first, cognition (identifyng wat has to be lernt), secnd, practis (wen errs ar frequent), and third, autmaticity (wen th skil is exrcised unconciusly and larjly without err). Tho that scema may ofr a convincing acount of skil-aquisition in jenrl, it begs questions wen aplyd to th english riting systm: wat exactly shud th first 'cognitiv' staje consist of? and wy do so many peple complete ther scoolng with such poor standrds of litracy? (Downing wel new th reasn.)

Othr sycolojists proposed lernng stajes that began to adress th iregularity of english spelng. Thus Frith (1985) proposed a first 'logografic' staje of litracy aquisition (words being perceved holisticly, rathr than alfabeticly), follod by an 'alfabetic' staje (how letrs represent sounds is graduly deduced), and finaly an 'orthografic' staje (mature grasp of english-spelng conventions). By relegating th study of letrs to a secnd staje, this scema seemd to asume a lernng curiculum of th 'look-and-say' (or 'real books', or 'hole languaj') typ, such as was fashnbl wen Friths paper was ritn, wher children wer first encurajd to internlize words in ther totality, rathr than being taut to anlyz or compose them as strings of letrs representng speech sounds. But if teachrs taut th 'alfabetic' staje first, this thre-staje concept wud lose its validity It thus canot claim universality.

An advance from that vew of litracy is seen in th 'dual process modl (Seymour, Barry in Sterling & Robson, 1992) put forwrd in th late 1980s. This proposed that litracy shud proceed along two paralel traks, one for words hos spelng represents ther sound, and one for iregulr spelngs. Howevr, this distinction seems unreal in practis, since many 'iregulrly' spelt words use many of ther letrs in a perfectly regulr way (eg, 3/4 letrs in *debt* ar 'regulr'), and th perception of iregularity depends on th criterion of regularity chosen, thus *paid* is regulr if machd against *maid*, but iregulr if machd against *played*. Nevrthless, th proponents of this theory hav at least considrd th sounds of words in ther experimnts, and seen ther pedagojicl relevnce.

By th 1990s reserch evidnce (evidnce not always figrng larj in th abov theoris) from America had acumulated shoing th importnce of lernrs nolej of letr-sound corespondnces for decoding (reading) and encoding (riting) words (Stanovich, 1991), and hence for acheving

efectiv litracy. Implicit therin is th belated aknolejmnt that th success across most of th modrn world of th 3000+ year-old alfabetic principl of letrs predictbly representng sounds is based on its syclojicl user-frendliness. It is clear wy this shud be: nativ-speakng lernrs com to th task of litracy aquisition with th sounds of ther languaj alredy in ther minds, and once th relationship between those sounds and th symbls used in riting is graspd, readng is no mor than a process of convertng ritn text into words mostly stord in readrs memris, and riting a process of convertng th remembrd sounds of words into a predictbl, visbl form. In jenrl, th mor predictbly th ritn form of words relates to ther herd form as stord in th memry th mor esily and succesfuly ar litracy skils aquired in th real world; conversly, th mor remote th relationship, th hardr th task is, and th less succesful th outcom.

Recent findngs from nurosience on how th brain develops lend furthr suport to this aje-old insyt (Rose, 1992). Centrl to litracy ar lernng and mernry lernng being th process of creating memry Lernng involvs th establishmnt of nural pathways in th brain induced by th input of sense impressions, and mernry arises wen those pathways ar suficiently reinforced (hence th importnce of repetition in th lernng process) to permit recal. Thus, repeatd, simpl sense impressions lay down strong, simpl pathways, quikly alowing relyabl recal. This ocurs in th erly stajes of litracy aquisition wen a smal set of sound-symbl corespondnces is repeatdly encountrd (as in many languajs, such as finish, hungarian, italian, spanish), and th skils of en- and decoding ar rapidly consolidated. Howevr, if, as in english, frequent confused messajs of sound-symbl corespondnce ar receved (as with EA in *to read, he read, great, react, create, idea, a teardrop, to tear, heard, heart, sergeant, bureau, beauty*), th lernng process itself becoms confused. Memris ar then sloer to establish and mor prone to eratic recal, and both spelng and pronunciation of less familir words ar hardr to predict.

Yet tho many hole words in english ar unpredictbly spelt, most of ther letrs acuratly represent th sounds of th intendd words (misleadng letrs ar ofn redundnt, rathr than sujestng th tong sound), and most letr-sequences belong to one or othr of a numbr of recurent patrns. That is wy teachng litracy skils alfabeticly by th sounds of th letrs produces far betr results even in english than dos coaxng lernrs to memrize undifrentiated letr-strings for each word.

Litracy Teachng

With th relationship between speech-sounds and spelngs so ofn unpredictbl, english litracy teachng has for centuris been a hit-and-miss afair (Michael, 1987). So poor wer th results that in th mid-19th century Isaac Pitman (of shorthand fame) decided to devise a regulrized riting systm, with wich beginrs aquired basic litracy skils befor confrontng th dificltis of traditionl spelng (Pitman & St John, 1969). Th success of this aproach inspired th Simplified Spelling Societys *Nue Speling* (SSS, 1924) in th first half of th 20th century and James Pitmans *initial teaching alfabet* (*i.t.a*.) in the 1960s. As wud be predictd from th findngs of nurosience, lernrs came to read and rite fastr and betr using such scemes than did beginrs using conventionl spelng. Comparativ studis of litracy in english and othr, mor regulrly spelt languajs hav shown th same efect (Thorstad, 1991; Upward, 1992). One test with th i.t.a. reportd th gain to childrens intlectul developmnt extendng beyond litracy itself (Downing, 1967), so perhaps implyng that iregulr spelngs hampr mor than just readng and riting.

By th 1970s two trends wer comng togethr that altogethr over-shadod th i.t.a. experimnt: one was th concept of 'lernng by discovry' rathr than by direct teachng; and th othr was a reaction against 'authoritarianism', wich ment teachrs imposing traditionl vews and valus (including ther nolej, experience and skils). Children wer thus expectd to absorb th spelngs of words without forml practis and to work out th sound valus of letrs for themselvs (if at al), indeed corection of mispelngs was felt to inhibit childrens self-expression. Readng was not a matr of identifyng words intendd by authrs, but a 'sycolinguistic gesng game' (Goodman, 1982); or if they wer to be identifyd, it was not a matr of decoding sounds from spelngs, but of recognizing words as holes. Th ritn word was a visul entity without sound, and spelngs wer not to be 'soundd out'. It wil redily be seen how this vew of litracy teachng related to linguists vews of english spelng as esentialy structurd (if it is structurd, lernrs can discovr it for themselvs), and to Friths stajes of litracy aquisition (first take in th spelng of words as a singl imaj, not as a specific sequence of letrs representng sounds). Yet som awkwrd paradoxs wer here entaild: if english spelng is predictbly structurd, then mastrng th letrs shud surely be th first step in litracy aquisition; but because lernrs in practis find th sound-symbl relationships so unpredictbl, it was thot wiser initialy to downplay them. That th alfabet myt be fundmentl despite th iregularitis of english spelng was not aknolejd.

Th proof of th pudng was in th real-world eatng: in th 1990s reports

of declining standrds of litracy multiplyd. Turner (1990) reveald that a numbr of Local Education Authoritis in suthrn England had mesurd such a decline in ther children over sevrl years. A Basic Skills Agency survey (1995) showd an accelrating decline in riting skils thru successiv jenrations of adlts, those ho had left scool since th mid-1980s performng markedly worse than ther eldrs. Massey and Elliott (1996) reportd a dramatic drop in spelng acuracy in examnations by 16 year-olds between 1980 and 1994. Conversly, those few litracy scemes that wer based on systmatic initial teachng of th sound valus of letrs (fonics), such as Lloyd (1992) or McGuinness (1997), consistntly enabled lernrs to aquire ther litracy skils fastr and mor soundly This is now oficialy aknolejd in th UK (and elswher), and curiculr chanjes at being implmntd undr th National Literacy Strategy wich recognizes that letrs ar desynd to represent sounds, and that nativ-speakng lernrs hear words befor they se them.

Conclusion: Let th Disiplins Unite in th Real World

This paper has argud that th confusion of english spelng has in recent decades preventd som influential linguists, sycolojists and teachng methodolojists from recognizing th tru jenius of th alfabet, wich is that undrstandng th corespondnces between letrs and speech-sounds enables litracy skils to be optmized. Th latest linguistic, syclojicl and methodlojicl reserch is now confirmng that ancient truth, and som remediation is in syt. Yet th confusion of english spelng remains an obstacl to th optmization of litracy: unpredictbl corespondnces wil always burdn users by prolongng and complicating th lernng process, tripng up nativ speakrs especialy in riting and non-nativs especialy in speakng, and jenrly making english a less user-frendly languaj than it cud be.

Today, wen th hyest educationl standrds ar recognized as crucial for futur prosperity, and th english languaj has a uniqe role in spredng nolej and undrstandng around th world, that obstacl needs to be adresd. Th Cut Spelng 1 in wich this paper is ritn ofrs one concept for progress, targetng th redundnt letrs that lie at th hart of much of th presnt orthografic confusion of english. If th disiplins of linguistics, sycolojy and teachng methodolojy can unite in recognizing th potential of th alfabetic principl in english, reserchng its presnt shortcomngs, and proposing solutions for th real world, then english spelng may awake from its presnt 300-year-old torpr, and th role of th english languaj for individuls and th world at larj cud be significntly enhanced.

Note

1. This chaptr is ritn in Cut Spelng (CS) (Upward, 1996). CS is a simplifyd orthografy that removes thre categris of redundnt letrs from conventionl english spelng: 1) letrs irelevnt to pronunciation (*debt* becoms det); 2) letrs representng unstresd vowls (shwa) befor L, M, N, R aftr stresd sylabls (thus *bottl, bottm, buttn, buttr*) and in som sufixs (*washd, washng, washs, washbl*); 3) dubld consnnts, wich ar mostly simplifyd (*bottl, bottm, buttn, buttr, committee* becom *botl, botm, butn, butr, comitee*). CS also makes thre letr-substitutions: 1) GH, PH pronounced /f/ becom F (*enuf, fotograf*), 2) *G, DG* pronounced as J becom J (*jinjr, juj*), 3) IG pronounced as long Y becoms Y (*sigh, sign, sight* becom *sy, syn, syt*). Th use of apostrofes and capitl letrs is reduced.

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