

INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND THE DOUBLE

Troubled Matters

Brian Seitz

Intersubjectivity and the Double

Brian Seitz

Intersubjectivity and the Double

Troubled Matters

palgrave
macmillan

Brian Seitz
Arts & Humanities
Babson College
Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts, USA

ISBN 978-1-137-56374-3 ISBN 978-1-137-56375-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56375-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016949264

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer Science+Business Media LLC New York

For
Fiona Maguire
Your feet on the ground, my head in the clouds

Preface

Requisites of the Double

When I was an undergraduate, I was taught that there was such a thing as *dualism*, and that, along with dichotomies more generally, it might be a bad thing, theories riddled with determinative fissures propping them up while at the same time dooming them (Descartes was held up as Exhibit A). At the time, I lacked interest in this concept as a problem, which I also suspected was mostly an analytic philosopher's game, the sort of game that held no appeal to me. So while I was vaguely aware that there was a debate about dualisms in some philosophy circles, my interest in it was displaced onto other spheres of philosophy and in particular to observing with both fascination and alarm the acute and yet mesmerizing dichotomy that lay coiled like a worm in the heart of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre's tome in which the game is about existence. Around the same time, I also read Hegel's, *The Science of Logic*, during the course of which I suffered a certain vexed and dismissive impatience with Hegel, who fancied moving toward a very baroque and comprehensive resolution of juxtapositions, which is to say that Hegel thought he had mastered the double (mastery being another prominent philosophy game). I understood that while Sartre's model was derived from Alexandre Kojève's reading of Hegel, at least Sartre had seen the advantage of moving beyond the resolutions of Hegelian dialectics. As a college student, what had not yet occurred to me was the sense in which Sartre is one of Hegel's doubles (and that's the last I'll say about that).

Then, in the MA phase of my apprenticeship, and intensifying my ingress into the text, it became increasingly clear that *Being and Nothingness* was thoroughly premised and dependent on hyperbolic and ultimately untenable metaphysical splits, splits that of course harkened back to and even plagiarized from Hegel's master–slave relation, but "with a difference." I knew that Sartre was overly committed to his crystalline axioms for his own good, and I was highly suspicious that it took hundreds of pages to sketch out "nothingness," but I was also mesmerized. During the same period, I encountered the elegant ways in which Maurice Merleau-Ponty overcame dichotomies while at the same time creatively tapping into the double in many configurations, most dramatically and notably in *The Visible and the Invisible*, where Merleau-Ponty explores the *chiasm*, reversibility, and the paradigmatic thought that "There is not the For Itself and the For the Other. They are each the other side of the other,"[1] a thought that firmly implants the double in the choreographies of intersubjectivity. There is a wholesome or even benign and inspiring aspect to Merleau's philosophical inclinations, which may obscure the significance of the struggle, tension, and incommensurability that frequently subtends the relations that constitute the double.

However, it was not until my doctoral training and encounters with the next generation of French philosophy that I realized that dualism isn't a *problem* as such, but, like Scylla and Charybdis, a hazard that is impossible to avoid and seldom what it seems, something like a fact of not just philosophy but of life that gets reflected in philosophy. This sunk in most dramatically through the combined impact of the works of Foucault, who tracked doubles in, among other places, institutions and epistemic formations, and of Derrida, who traced the determinative impact of the double in the text, both philosophers drawn in very different ways to the instabilities of "hierarchized binary oppositions"—a phrase now somewhat diminished through overuse—oppositions in which the dominant or privileged aspect is dependent on its *other*, which eludes capture (even if it is inside a mental institution or hovering in the margins of the text that it surreptitiously supports). For this later generation, the double sometimes seems to have a more malign or insidious profile or association and often culminates in an *aporia*, an impasse anticipated by Nietzsche's observation that "'All truth is simple'—isn't that doubly a lie?"[2]

If the rebellious generation that ascended in France in the 1950s and 1960s inherited the double from Sartre's generation, well, that is only a

reflection of the sense in which, as I will take up in this book, the double was always at work in philosophy because it preceded philosophy.

From these philosophers and from my mentors and friends, I began to learn, too, the sense in which philosophy attempts to reposition the double from the ontological sphere of enactment to the logical sphere of discourse, thereby producing another double.

Enactments of the double may always have been a necessary condition for configurations of intersubjectivity, as I shall explore here. My previous books have focused on the double entangled in the dynamics of political representation, or, somewhat more specifically, as associated with a narrative that drives both practices and institutions. If, following the first chapter, my effort is to disentangle the double from politics or to turn from community to individual, it is my hope that the result is to help reveal the sense in which "there is no individual," that is, what the book repeatedly and consistently represents in its engagements with different figures and terrains is above all the sense in which subjectivity is always enmeshed in and indissociable from configurations of intersubjectivity that are intimately associated with and dependent upon the double.

Preoccupied as it is with what I'd like to think of as visitations or vignettes, this book is an experiment, by which I mean that the motif of the double is admittedly just one take on divides, a supplement to other approaches to division. By no means would I intend to suggest that the double occludes other forms of multiplicity. Seen in a certain way, the double may be nothing more than a mist, or, in this case, a methodology or an analytical prism. Exercising that prism, the subtext of continuity here is intersubjectivity, since the double—the subject's other—is typically more or less a *person*, dead or alive: one might imagine the double as a motif, figurine, or armature that supports the constitution of intersubjectivity (but not the only support!). This is obvious when it comes to figures such as Dostoevsky or Freud. However, it is also true for Plato, for whom the elusive sophist represents the possibility of providing definition for the philosopher, for the one who also traffics in more abstruse divides and oppositions, including the one between appearance and reality, the sophist and philosopher being personifications of these respective categories (or are the categories distillations of personae?). Then, regarding even Kant, the distinction between the world of the senses and the world of the mind reflects the differences between, on the one hand, humans as individuated, empirical creatures and, on the other hand,

rational beings belonging to a realm of ends, that is, robust intersubjectivity, cast as universal.

Following my address of the double in classical philosophy, I will visit Dostoevsky and Freud, and also fancy philosophy, phenomenology. But this book is not a phenomenology as such, and I would like to put a spin on things, to ally myself with James M. Cain—who wrote that "It's just got that cock-eyed look to it that generally goes with the truth"[3]—and to announce my irregularities by characterizing this book as a cousin of something like an existentialism.

Wellesley Hills, MA, USA Brian Seitz

Acknowledgments

This book was engendered most directly by interminable conversations with Nickolas Pappas about country western music, conversations that eventually dwelt on the doubles that emerge from the tombs buried in the tunes.

The doubles revealed in those conversations had their roots in what came before them—the origin always has a prior origin—namely encounters with doubles at work in the origins of the Haudenosaunee.

Thomas Thorp is an integral part of my association with Haudenosaunee origins. Tom and I have shared a few decades becoming philosophers, and, as is the case with Nick, he is a philosopher who has taught me much along the way.

If I were to draw a Venn diagram of acknowledgment here, it would feature Haudenosaunee/Pappas/Thorp.

At Babson College and its extensions, I've never had an innocent or idle conversation with Kevin Bruyneel, Jon Dietrick, or Jason Mohaghegh. Well, even the idle conversations helped push this project forward.

Jens Veneman is one of the most exceptional souls I've ever met, a constant flow of creativity, energy, and ideas.

Thank you, Sabina, for your patience with my nomadism. You're in my thoughts always, a true inspiration.

I would like to thank the Babson College Faculty Research Fund for its support.

I would also like to thank the generosity of the British Library, which is where much of this book was written. There and in Dalston, London; Red Hook, Brooklyn; Somerville, Massachusetts; Frost Valley, New York; and

St. Petersburg, Russia, a city that remains home to a very large population of doubles, including all of the dead souls in the ground.

Notes

1. Notes

   Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *The Visible and the Invisible*, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern Univerisity Press, 1968), p. 263.
2. Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Richard Polt (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), p. 5.
3. Cain, James M., *The Postman Always Rings Twice* (New York: Vintage Crime, 1989), p. 56.

Contents

CHAPTER 1

The Politics of Intersubjectivity: Representation and the Double

Intersubjects

The double might best first be characterized as an existential phenomenon or—better—an ontological configuration, one animated by its profound association with intersubjectivity, an open-ended and unstable assurance that the parameters of subjectivity are fundamentally breached from the outset, that the subject is never solo. While this configuration is housed within philosophy and literature, it filters into their fancy frames from the multifarious, animated shapes the double takes in human life and stories. Since the double takes many forms, the profiles thematized in the chapters that follow this opening salvo will offer vibrant variants, with the thread of continuity being the inevitability of the sense in which the double is both an expression of intimately linked up with the dynamics of intersubjectivity. I might call it a "social" phenomenon, but that appellation is too domestic and numbingly familiar for my purposes. Putting a spectral spin on things, Thomas Thorp observes thus: "To exist in an awareness of one's own death is to be forced to exist within a 'second life,' not the biological life given to us. We live within a world that is a dream of death, and this is a world that we must construct, a human world, a world defined, in short, by politics."[1]

Meanwhile, it might be most effective to begin this series of visitations with a chapter on the double's visage in this theater of politics, where intersubjectivity finds its most ritualistic and fecund voice, the relation

B. Seitz, *Intersubjectivity and the Double*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56375-0_1

between the double and intersubjectivity released and extended in new directions by the powers of representation.

From the outset, political representation is itself double, formulating itself both in practices and in narratives, entangled in both iconographies (stills, e.g. twos) and choreographies (ballets, e.g. character relations), with the stills serving to reinforce and intensify the power of the dance of the deuce. Starting here, in this opening chapter and encounter with stills and ballets, I will exercise the practice of something like eidetic variation, borrowed from phenomenology.

Orchestrating a Double

In the field, numerous permutations of the double play out not just in different examples but in variant expressions and configurations of political representation, The most conspicuous, "literal" variant is probably the one at work in the substitutions associated with what in its modern version is conceived of in terms of the practice of representative government, with representatives *standing in the place of* their electorates, constituencies, interests, nation, or "people" (the referent or subject of representative government takes decisively different shapes in different historical, political, and socioeconomic contexts, sometimes exhibiting different and even conflicting shapes simultaneously). Having written about that vexed and unavoidable double elsewhere,[2] I will not dwell long on it here, although I would be remiss not to pause to acknowledge it and to observe that there is, of course, nothing actually literal about any such substitution, and that, marked by a fracture, this type of representation is by its very nature not only deeply double but also thoroughly metaphysical.

However otherwise conceived, this is a stage inhabited and enlivened by what Thomas Hobbes called "artificial persons,"[3] a concept that prefigures and is the condition of the much later, unabashedly tumescent yet degraded assertion that "corporations are people, my friend!"[4] To paint a picture of this dual beast—artificial persons and what they stand in for—John Adams famously wrote that a legislative body " should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large."[5] Now the image of an exact portrait is in itself both illuminating and compelling, particularly since exactitude in representation is not only an impossible but a fundamentally misguided ideal (the double is not only persistent but also seldom a neat binary affair, just as a mirror's reflection is never neat). Less dramatic but perhaps even more compelling and even startling, though, is the reference

to "the people at large": metaphysics openly occupies the miniature portrait, but it is equally at work in that portrait's referent.

To translate this into a context immediately recognizable and noteworthy to philosophers and political theorists today, the matter-of-fact givenness assumed by and asserted in "the people at large" is a paradigmatic exemplification of the motivations for a deconstruction of presence as well as for genealogies of the subject: It's not that nothing is there, but the problematic portrait is as constitutive of what it represents as vice versa, a frequent characteristic of the double, which is to say that political representation is what Foucault describes as a "semio-technique."[6] And it is worth adding that while Adams' illustration is not exactly quaint and should not be historically diminished, the dynamics of contemporary political representation, which would seem to continue to be rooted in eighteenth-century theory, have gotten immeasurably more complex in the intervening years, a case of an evolving and increasingly complicated double characterized by new forms of convoluted yet creative disjunction embedded in the interdependence between its two aspects, an interdependence largely now informed and shaped by the convergence of electronic technology and global capitalism. One might say that representative politics of the electronic world is a double of eighteenth-century political representation.

The last observation regarding evolving or mutated relations between prominent aspects or twinned elements of the political double could lead to questions regarding quality of representation, a Nietzschean assessment of which might perhaps be conceptualized by measures of health: robust representation, life-promoting representation, therapeutic representation, anemic representation, necrotic representation, and so on. And it is Nietzsche who provokes us with the question, "Are you genuine, or just an actor? A representative? Or the very thing that's represented? In the end you may simply be an imitation of an actor."[7]

Alternatively, representation might be gauged in terms of degrees, splayed out in terms of a spectrum: full representation, moderate representation, some representation, meager representation, misrepresentation, or even *the absence* of representation (that last is a peculiar one that would seem to make no philosophical sense), and so on. Regardless of the register, the ability to make judgments about either quality or degree is clearly of paramount importance on an empirical plane, and philosophers have devoted considerable efforts toward making the conceptual distinctions upon which such judgments might be based.[8] However, and while it is

not my intention to conflate variegations, what philosophers say has little bearing on things once the general discourse of representation is established (which it always will have been). So in contrast with, in particular, political *science*, I am taking something like a phenomenological stance[9] here, focusing on one facet or a subset of the essence of representation: Once there are representative bodies, some version of the double is always in play in the realm of political intersubjectivity, and it is that ineluctable reality that is of abiding philosophical interest. This is the case whether representatives are understood to be, on the one hand, *delegates* bearing instructions and an already defined agenda, or, on the other hand, *trustees* endowed with the license and prerogative to determine what that agenda might be (and of course, representatives typically tend to pose as delegates while exercising their license as much as they can get away with). The delegate model assumes a solid, determinate identity to be represented, while the trustee is free to define and articulate what that identity is. But whether the representative stands for those who elected her or stands for something more openly ethereal—for example, national interest—and whether representation is understood to be actual or virtual, its practice introduces a deep double into the dynamics of political intersubjectivity, and there is no getting around a double that is just there.

All of this having been said, the curious thing about this sort of representative double is that, however it is understood, that which "speaks in the name of" the average, must itself be exceptional, extraordinary. The split embodied in this double is no more symmetrical than others we will encounter along the way.

Originary Doubling

But that general type of representation is only the first, most conspicuous or literal sort, and I intend to devote the remainder of this study exploring other varieties of the political double, which seem invariably to entail elements of the extraordinary. Second, not in order of priority but simply in order of address, another prominent linkage between the double and political representation is the one that revolves around and flows from a political community's or political culture's need to represent a coherent identity and thus by extension its legitimacy. This need—this *necessity*—manifests itself in a variety of ways, featuring often phantom-like images of twinnings and of reflections in narratives that both create and sustain, or that sometimes sustain by offering accounts of the origin. Representation

in this second sense provides a political community's foundation. And it is worth noting in advance that while such narratives often feature overt doubles, the narrative is itself a double in relation to the community, as well as vice versa (as a compact metonym, think here of the mutually constitutive relation between Adams' portrait and the people at large). Sometimes these stories are even told by or reflected in social structures that are physical structures rather than in literal narratives.

The first variety of political representation and this second sort—the representation of doubles in narratives—overlap under the auspices of leadership. Parliaments, councils, senates, Russian soviets, Iceland's Althing, even prime ministers, chieftains, and kings: all of these practices of leadership and leadership roles (subject positions) are instances of representation entailing substitution—standing for and acting for—and are thus by their very nature practices of doubling. But aligned with practices of representation, the *stories* about leaders and bodies of leadership are also permeated by the double, in both the form and content of theories and origin narratives, and in the rituals associated with these things.

The Double in the Flesh

My first self-conscious contact with this second sort of political representation—and thus with the determinative double featured in theories and stories—was in *Discipline and Punish*, where Foucault makes reference to Ernst Kantorowicz's *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*.[10] Kantorowicz's work should be familiar to anyone who has read Foucault, so, like Foucault, I will recount only its most general contours.

First of all, and most telling, in the historical backdrop of this later political theory about the double nature of the King is an earlier theological understanding of the twinned nature of Jesus Christ, who, to simplify some of the nuanced extensions contained within a protracted and variegated debate, has two bodies, his human body and his divine body (directly related to which are other theological twinnings, including Augustine's distinction between the earthly city and the City of God[11]). Christ is the exemplary double for European Catholicism, and it is a bit stunning to ponder the fact that it his body that is the subject of this twinning.

While the discourse regarding Jesus' two bodies is fundamentally theological in nature, it is also already political insofar as Christianity is an institution or network of institutions, and so the eventual historical

transference of the two bodies discourse from a religious context to an overtly political context is not so mystical. Kantorowicz asks, "Did the idea of doubleness—'One body of Christ which is he himself, and another body of which he is the head'—find its equivalent in the secular sphere when the *corpus reipublicae mysticum* came into being?" (K 268). But he has already paved the way to answering the question, having bluntly noted that "The idea of the *corpus mysticum* was undeniably transferred and applied to the political entities" (K 267), which is to say displaced from a Christological discourse to a political discourse regarding, now, the necessarily double status of the King.

Thus from a rich theological account is derived a complicated and even more nuanced set of what comes to be specifically English political theories regarding the two bodies of the king, which starts with his head in heaven and his feet on the ground, but evolves into the semi-secular and even more wildly metaphorical distinction between the King's individual body and the King as body politic. The word *Crown* thus comes to mean "something not quite identical with 'realm'" yet "not quite identical with 'king' either… As opposed to the pure *physis* of the King and to the pure *physis* of the territory, the word 'Crown,' when added, indicated the political *metaphysis* in which both *rex* and *regnum* shared, or the body politic (to which both belonged) in its sovereign rights" (Kantorowicz, 341–342). In other words, an understanding of the legitimacy and multi-layered, complex status of the King in his relation to the realm required a double, one whose gravity was amplified by the extra subliminal power provided by its derivation from an understanding of the Son of God. Summarizing the broad ramifications of this theory, Kantorowicz writes thus: "There can be no doubt that in the later Middle Ages the idea was current that in the Crown the whole body politic was present—from king to lords and commons and down to the least liege-man" (Kantorowicz, 363). Through the image of the King's two bodies, the political picture was complete. Looping back to our discussion of the first form of political representation, and in a way that might sound counter-intuitive, this would seem to indicate the temporal and perhaps even ontological priority of the metaphysics of virtual over direct representation. Stating that metaphysics differently, the Crown was a fiction enabled by layers of doubles borne by the body of the King, body personal, body politic, a necessary fiction in the history of English political discourse.

Another World

Circuitously introduced to it by Kantorowicz via Foucault, this remarkable medieval political theology was my first self-conscious appreciation for the second sort of political representation—representation in narrative—and I consequently wrote about medieval English politics in an earlier book,[12] which focused not on a thematized double but on a contrasting range of historical configurations of political representation, with special attention to variations in what was represented, that is, in the *subject* of representation, in representation's referent. Later, refracted through that initial encounter, where the double was already staring me straight in the face, my first revelation regarding the significance of, specifically, the double in the narrative representations of political communities occurred during later research into Iroquois or Haudenosaunee political culture.[13] However, the conceptual frame of my project at that time did not allow me to isolate, emphasize, and attend directly to the double. And so I take up the opportunity here.

What follows, then, is about the power of the double in the life of the Haudenosaunee, which is to say that it is about the power of the *representation* of the double; at the same time, it is about a reality embedded or enshrined in a precious, multifarious representation. Intimately linked to the motif of the double, and thus to ghosts, my focus is largely on the sense in which the organization of practice of living as a community—Iroquois intersubjectivity—is premised on the relation to death, in this case Haudenosaunee life emerging from death as much as the other way around. In other words, I want to say a few words not about the Peacemaker (Deganawidah[14]) as if he and his achievements exist in remote isolation or as if he were a stick figure, but about what flows from the relationship between the originary double constituted by the Peacemaker and Hiawathah, and other related pairings understood as ontological enactments.

The Renewal of Life from Death

Death is the beginning here. Or, rather, concern revolves around not just death as a biological fact but a distinct death relation, namely the relation of the Haudenosaunee living to those who are dead, and this concern is intimately linked to the broader yet more basic need to keep things going,

to respond to the questions, "How to continue?" "What to do now?" and to understand that those who are alive inherit obligations and responsibilities from the dead that provide guidance into the future.

In various configurations, the double bears a determinative force in the formation of Haudenosaunee intersubjectivity, but since it is in the context of this specific death relation that the double appears most vibrantly, that is where I'll pivot, working from death to life. Which is to say that I will begin with two stories about the birth of the Haudenosaunee, an origin intimately embedded in death directed toward life. Both of these stories feature the Peacemaker, whose aim is to link arms and extend the rafters.

First Double Story

The Peacemaker climbed onto the stranger's roof and lay down there on his chest, so he could see through the smokehole when the cannibal entered his house carrying a human corpse on his back. The cannibal lit a fire, cut up the meat, and boiled it in his cooking pot. The Peacemaker observed all of this from his perch on the roof and peered down into the kettle beneath him. After awhile, the cannibal said to himself, "Maybe I'll eat now." But when he looked into the pot, he saw a human being looking at him, and it distracted him from the meat, and he sat down to think about what he'd seen. Then he got up and went to the pot and glanced into it again, and the person was still looking at him. "Maybe," thought the cannibal, "someone is tricking me." He looked up at the smokehole but saw nothing. He thought about this awhile, concluding, "If no one is tricking me, that must be my own reflection I'm seeing in the cookpot," and he grabbed the pot and went outside and walked to the bank of the nearby stream.

The Peacemaker now climbed off of the stranger's house, and he joined the stranger by the stream, and the stranger said to him, "It's true that I'm looking for a friend. Come back inside my house with me."

When they were back inside, the man said, "Please. Sit on that side of the fire, and I'll sit over here, with the fire between us. You're my guest, and I want to relate to you an unusual experience. I'll tell you my story. Then you can tell me your message, because you must be carrying some message with you."

The Peacemaker agreed, and the man told the story about seeing the reflection of the person in the pot he used to cook human meat. "I was not tricked," he said, "it is true that it was my face and that it was beautiful,

not the face of a man who eats other human beings. So I went to an uprooted tree by the stream bank, and I buried the human flesh into a hole because I knew I was no longer a cannibal. Then I saw you, and I was happy because I knew you were the friend I was looking for. Now it is your turn to give me your message."

And the Peacemaker responded, "This is a good story, and now you have changed the kind of person you are and have a new mind of peace and righteousness. I, too, am looking for a friend who will help spread my message of Peace, Power, and Righteousness. Our two minds meet now, our two minds are the same, so let's prepare a meal together. If you go fill your kettle with fresh water from the stream, I'll go hunt for some meat, then we'll eat."

"This is my mind, too," said the friend, "We're of one mind," and he went and filled his pot with fresh water and took it back to the fire to boil, while The Peacemaker went hunting. Shortly, he returned carrying a large deer on his back. "Venison to feed the people, antlers to wear on their heads." After they had cut up the deer and cooked the meat, the two men lifted the pot together and put it to the side of the fire. The Peacemaker told the man to stand where he'd been standing when he'd seen his reflection. "One has brought you a new mind," and the two looked into the pot and they saw that indeed their reflections looked identical in the bottom of the pot.

Brief commentary: Through a reflection, a double is constituted, and this will turn out to have been a story about the beginning of both a transformation and of a larger community. The deer, too, is doubled, half a reference to food, the other half a reference to antlers symbolic of politics, the two coextensive with each other. As one tale in a whole genre of interconnected narratives, this will turn out to have been a story about the politics of survival undergirded by a doubling, and attended by a burial, the burial of a time before the Peace.

Second Double Story

This second story is the central Haudenosaunee origin narrative, not a cosmogony—not Sky Woman's fall to Turtle Island—but an account of the doubling at the beginning of the Iroquois League, that is, at the beginning of the People of the Longhouse, the Five and later Six Nations. The backdrop to the story has two primary facets. First, the Senecas, Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas, and Mohawks are at war with each other; no one can even trust their own neighbor. Second, the resolution to this problem is

embodied in The Peacemaker's Great Message fused with a second thing, the Condolence Rite. An outsider to what will become the Five Nations—some say he was a Wendat[15]—the Peacemaker's Good Word has so far been rebuffed every time he has tried to deliver it, and so the Peacemaker is alone, just wandering, carrying his Message. In the foreground of the story, Hiawathah is so devastated by the death of his daughters—victims of war—that he leaves his community, and Hiawathah is alone, just wandering, carrying his grief. In this story, an originary message will converge with a father's grief.

Hiawathah saw a flock of ducks on a lake, and they rose into the sky, taking the lake's water with them so that he could cross. Hiawathah walked onto the lakebed, and when he arrived at the place over which the ducks had before been floating, he discovered in the mud a bunch of white and purple shells, which he picked up and placed in a pouch.

Later, beside the fire, he removed the shells from the pouch, and he was amazed to see the shells become words. He had never seen this before, and he put them on a string. Every day after that, he pulled out the strings of shells, and the strings of shells would become words. Shells-words: here is a fundamental double. *But his grief remained.*

Eventually, Hiawathah erected two poles and suspended the strings from them, and the strings of shells became words, and he said, "If I were to see someone suffering in deep grief, I would remove these strings from the poles and console them. The shells would become words that would lift the darkness that covers them, and they would be consoled." Hiawathah said this, but it did not console him, and he ached deeply for his daughters, and he remained covered in darkness.

One day, the two men met on a path and the Peacemaker saw that Hiawathah was covered in darkness, and with the strength of his Message, he knew that he could console him. They sat together across from each other, and with the strings of shells that became words, they sang songs and made a ritual of condolence—thirteen strings of shells marking the thirteen condolences or "matters"—*and this lifted the darkness that covered Hiawathah, and the rite's Three Bare Words wiped away Hiawathah's tears so that he could see again* (look at me), *and removed the obstruction from his ears so that he could hear again* (listen to my words), *and cleared his throat so that he could once again speak* (talk to me). *Together, they thus created a gift.*

Then they went to the Mohawks, who before had rebuffed the message of Great Peace, and they taught the Mohawks the condolence rite, and now the

Mohawks were finally persuaded by the Peacemaker's Message of Peace, and they accepted it, and adopted the two into their nation. Then, the two went to the Oneidas, who had previously also rebuffed the Peacemaker's message, and the Peacemaker and Hiawathah showed the Oneidas the condolence rite, and now the Oneidas, too, were persuaded and accepted the Peacemaker's message. Then the Peacemaker and Hiawathah and the others traveled to Onondaga.

The visitors were horrified when they arrived there and finally saw the one who posed the greatest obstacle to acceptance of the Peacemaker's message; Thadodahoh, the witch (we have probably already met him, unnamed, have already rehearsed his conversion). Thadodahoh was grotesque. His hands were like those of a turtle, and his feet like those of a bear. Instead of hair, his head was covered with writhing, hissing snakes. His penis was so long that he had to wrap it around his neck. The Peacemaker knew that the Onondagas would not accept the Message of Peace until Thadodahoh became human. And so—here I am speeding the story along—*the Peacemaker sang songs and slowly transformed Thadodahoh into a man, which enabled him at last to consider with a clear mind the Peacemaker's Good Word, which he soon finally accepted. The Peacemaker made him keeper of the fire, the first named of fifty chiefs. The Peacemaker made Thadodahoh first among equals.*

After that, the Cayugas accepted the message, and joined the Oneidas as "the two brothers," and then, finally, the Senecas accepted the Peacemaker's message and joined the Onondagas and Mohawks as "the three brothers," and the Peacemaker named the remainder of the fifty chiefs, who would wear deer antlers on their heads, and he made the Great Law, and the Five Nations buried their weapons underneath the Tree of Peace.

This is the story of how the fighting between the Five Nations came to an end, of how the Kaienerekowa—the Great Law—was established, and of how the Iroquois Longhouse—the Great League—came into being.

The Peacemaker's work was now complete. "Now I'll go home, conceal and cover myself with bark and there shall be none other called by my name."[16] *So he withdrew from Iroquoia and covered himself in bark.*[17]

The most obvious doubles at work here are, of course, the Peacemaker/Hiawathah and the Peacemaker/Thadodohoh. The intimacy between the members of the first of these configurations is such that one might be inclined to believe that the Peacemaker and Hiawathah are actually simply different faces and names for the same character, particularly since in some versions of the story the Peacemaker has a speech impediment and

Hiawathah has to speak for him "… and some say he never was seen by any man but Hiawatha."[18] In connection with their singular relation, it is worth mentioning (1) that the name "Deganawidah" is not among the fifty chiefs of the League Council, and (2) that while the name "Hiawathah" is one of the fifty, it has historically usually and quite literally been vacant. And as an expression of the intimate relation between the Peacemaker and Thadodahoh, it is curious that the latter is the first among equals, as if he were a sort of proxy for the Peacemaker.

Going back to the first story I told, there is also an overt sense in which the characters of the Peacemaker and the converted cannibal—reflections of each other—are the same. And yet in both cases, each character must remain distinct, that is, in order for significant events to occur, there must be interaction and exchange, the net achievement of which is the constitution of Haudenosaunee identity, that is, the origin of the Longhouse is definite and yet at the same time defused in and emerging from a rich double.

I would like to emphasize here that while these *stories* feature doubled characters, doubles appear in seemingly countless other forms in Haudenosaunee culture (I will address just a few), the doubles mentioned so far serving as a precedent for, prefiguring, or simply representing the broader significance of doubles in the constitution of Iroquois intersubjectivity.

Given their distinctive role in the Condolence Rite, one conspicuous double is the shells that become words, a quasi-alchemical semiotic substitution (the motif of substitution has appeared frequently in these studies of the double). Shells are not words and words are not shells, and yet shells carry words within them, effectively serving as both a placemarker and a mnemonic device for the ceremonies enacted on the occasion of someone's death. From the shells come wampum, and from the wampum come voices from, literally, the past.

The most significant thing that flows from the Condolence Rite is the acceptance of the Peacemaker's Good Word and thus the constitution of the League Council. But also flowing from the convergence of the Rite and the Council—both of which originate from the Good Word—is a double grid of moieties ("moiety" is nothing more than a concept used by anthropologists to talk about formal cultural divisions/doublings). One grid is directly political. The other grid has to do with death.

Regarding death moieties, the two that cut across clan and nation affiliation in ways that are not well understood today, and which apparently did not have names (anthropologists call them A and B), clearly extend and reflect the originary interaction between the Peacemaker and Hiawathah. In the event of someone's death, and determined by moiety affiliation, every single Haudenosaunee was traditionally either in a posture of grieving or in the posture of condoling those who were in grief, every individual implicated in a living double predicated on someone's death.

Regarding political moieties, in the old days, debate protocol in League Council meetings was very formal. The moiety division into older and younger brothers provided the organizational structure for decision-making procedures in Council meetings, with the Mohawks, Senecas, and Onondagas forming the older brother, and the Oneidas and Cayugas forming the younger brother. The fire having been lit, the two moieties—older brothers, younger brothers—sat across from each other on either side of the fire. While a member of the older brothers moiety, the Onondagas sat apart, since their identity as "firekeepers" gave them a distinctive status that actively played into the decision-making process. In addition to their own internal deliberations, their task was to mediate; here, a Hegelian might say "ah ha!, resolution requires a third" but it might be fruitful to see this as yet another split, with the Onondagas making up one component of an irreducible double of which the other component was the other four nations.

The opening rituals having been performed, and with the issue at hand relayed by the Onondagas to the older brothers, it was Mohawk prerogative to take up the issue first. After the Mohawks had come to "one mind"—remember the image of one mind from the first story—the Senecas would talk together. Once they had reached a consensus, they would parley quietly with the Mohawks. When these two—the older brother moiety minus the Onondagas—had come to an agreement, the Mohawks would "pass the matter across the fire" to the Cayugas, who would take it up with the Oneidas. After reaching a shared conclusion, the younger brothers would then pass it back across the fire to the Mohawks. If the Mohawks and Senecas were in harmony with their younger brothers, the Mohawks would pass the matter to the Onondagas, who would then discuss the issue amongst themselves. If the Onondagas were of one mind with the others, their speaker would announce the Council's resolution. If the Council was

of two minds, the Onondagas, as mediators, would pass both opinions back to the Mohawks, with recommendations, and the process just described was repeated, and the discourse continued. If one mind was achieved, policy was established. If it was not, there simply was no League policy regarding that particular issue; the practice of majority rule had no role in traditional Iroquois decision-making procedures. In fact, and in what could be viewed as its clumsy efficiency, and when detached from the realities of compromise, majority rule could be about hegemonic obliteration of the double. Whether or not that is true, one might suspect that for traditional Iroquois, face-to-face, and exceeding images of unity, it was literally a matter of either double or *nothing*, that is, the doubles—older and younger brothers—either functioning together by attaining consensus or, short of that, simply abandoning the fire and going home.

Pursuit of the double in key Haudenosaunee narratives has brought us full circle as we are now would seem to have returned to the first kind of political representation, the general, practical kind at work here in the leadership embodied in the League council, which "represents" in its own singular way, one characterized above all by rich discourse housed—Longhoused—in formal protocols of deliberation, driven by a profusion of necessary and specific doubles, conditions of the possibility of Iroquoia.

Continental Drift

Considering Iroquoia has meant depicting some choreographies of the double: all of the Haudenosaunee doubles are engaged in gestures of animated exchange. Now it is time to turn to some iconographies.

As suggested earlier, it is through images and practices of leadership that the two general types of political representation and the doubles that sustain the forms of intersubjectivity associated with them converge. Put differently, through that convergence, leadership takes many convoluted forms, and is often installed in images, objects, and icons.

The classical double-headed eagle, which has been found in ancient Hittite digs, represented the Byzantine Emperor's dual role in matters both secular and divine, looping us back, not incidentally, to the motif of the king's two bodies. And that eagle becomes a redoubled double in its transmigration to Russia (and Serbia and elsewhere), where its meaning remains obscure: Some say that one head represents vigilance while the other represents being asleep or resting, although on the face of it, this

is unconvincing. Some say that one head of the Russian eagle is pointed toward Europe and the other toward Asia, an indication of Russia's complex national and cultural identity (which frequently skews toward the worried and never resolved question, "Is Russia European, or… ?"). Others may be more likely to explain, though, that one head is pointed toward Moscow while the other is pointed toward Constantinople, a symbolic intersection whose central referent would seem to be the Russian Orthodox Church, although the eagle—which was displaced during the Soviet period by another double symbol, the hammer and sickle—is also closely associated with Imperial Russia, in which case, the second head might be pointed not toward Constantinople so much as the Bosphorus, the Russian Navy's southern passageway out of the Black Sea, that is, one head representing Mother Russia, while the second head points toward open water and the world outside.

Double Premises

Situated on the Gulf of Finland just west of St. Petersburg, the czar's palace, Peterhof, is flanked by geometrical gardens and manicured, tree-covered grounds. On its northern side, the palace is fronted by a cascade of gilded fountains that feature Samson (Russia) muscling open the jaws of a lion (Sweden). Upon walking out onto the terrace and viewing the fountains after a tour of the palace's interior, I once heard a student exclaim, "Now I see what the Revolution was about!" His use of the verb *see* was quite literal even if it simultaneously served its dual role in designating *understanding*: at Peterhof, one can see and thus understand everything that is relevant to the political doubles that inhere in the premises.

Inspired by not just a French aesthetic but by Versailles in particular, it is nevertheless not a copy or mirror-image and so, more than an echo or mere derivative, it is in some fundamental senses a truly deep architectural double, one self-consciously in competition with Versailles. The palace is also an architectural artifact reflective of rigid, 300-year-old Russian class divisions and hierarchies, hierarchies that persisted into the early twentieth century (and then morphed onward). Beyond the general display of extravagance built on the backs of the Russian people, Peterhof also embodies a profound socioeconomic and thus thoroughly political double incorporated into the design itself (a design that is no doubt familiar to anyone who has watched British television in its various depictions of upstairs and downstairs).

Upstairs is the space of nobility. It is filled with fine art and fussy, beautiful things, capacious spaces for dining and dancing, cozy nooks for resting, intimate entertaining, philosophical conversation and gossip, and noble bodies warmed by ceramic-tiled "Dutch style" stoves in the corners of the many rooms.

Downstairs, of course, is the utilitarian space of the servants, the ones who cooked and cleaned and fed the fire and maintained the upstairs and had their own conversations as they labored in this parallel universe. Without downstairs, upstairs would not have been able to function, would not have existed at all; in a Kantian and also Marxist sense, downstairs is the foundation and condition of the possibility of upstairs (without labor, no philosophy and no ballroom dancing).[19] And yet, like the unconscious to the ego, downstairs needed to be hidden away as much as was possible. Until, that is, material reality could finally no longer be concealed.

Double Revolution

Some 200 years after Peter the Great built that palace, the revolutions erupted. First, there was the 1905 Revolution in which, in a historic and historical holding action,[20] Czar Nicholas II recognized the Duma—this in October, prefiguring the later, iconic second October—thus inaugurating a limited constitutional monarchy in Russia. Second, there was 1917, the year that two Revolutions occurred in Russia. In February, Nicholas abdicated his throne, effectively abolishing the position of Czar. In October, the Bolsheviks seized power.

These two explosive *events* of 1917 might easily capture the bulk of our attention, particularly if our attention is defined by a desire to isolate and identify moments of decisive change. However, between these events—this is an image I want simply to flag and foreground—there is another, differently revolutionary aspect to Russian institutions of political representation during 1917, and that is the fleeting period following Lenin's return from exile and just before the October Revolution, when there were effectively two separate governments operating simultaneously in Petrograd,[21] a case of double governance. On the one hand, and installed in the Winter Palace, there was the official Provisional Government, which promoted what the communists thought to be a bourgeois understanding of representation, one that pivoted around a liberal belief in social reform. On the other hand, and simultaneously yet precariously installed

in Smolny, there was the Petrograd Soviet, which understood itself to be the vanguard of the proletariat, a sort of super-representative for the working class, eschewing faith in reform in favor of (1) a conviction that revolution was the only way to overcome the problems coextensive with class division, and (2) that the working class needed a leader, namely the vanguard of the proletariat, another instance of the extraordinary doubling for the ordinary or the average. In other words, through the lens of dialectical materialism, the Bolshevik aspect of this double-headed government was devoted to eliminating the deep social class bifurcation that divided Russia. The double government was very short-lived, but the other double—another version of class division—would be impossible to eradicate, the old version of upstairs/downstairs replaced by the difference between privileged Communist Party members and everybody else. What Soviet Russia actually became was a country of double standards, official reality and empirical reality as if two disparate streams. And since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian socioeconomic divide has only intensified, that is, the double reality of Soviet life gave birth to the new doubles of the Russian Federation.

The Past Is the Future

A dead soul asks, "Rus, where are you racing to?"[22] To which Rus does not reply. Historical materialism, however, always had an answer, which hinged on class conflict. Yet the Marxist framing of history offered a double compromised by the third of dialectics; communism represents resolution of class conflicts and thus defeats the double, *at least in theory*.

Still another striking, contrasting, and less conspicuous aspect of historical materialist theory is that the communist future must and thus does have a precedent—a double—in the communist past, that is, there has to have been that before in order for it to become, in order for that which becomes to be.

Friedrich Engels makes reference to Russia several times and in different sections of *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, where he writes that,

> It is only within the last ten years or so that such great family communities have been proved to be still in existence in Russia; it is now generally recognized that they are as firmly rooted in the customs of the Russian people as the *obschina* or village community.[23]

So while Russia's agrarian-based economy makes for a hard measure in relation to the Marxist philosophy of history—in theory, the Revolution should occur in the most advanced capitalist socioeconomies—the commune will always already have been there (and it is worth emphasizing that Engels, who maintained an eye on Russia from England, wrote this decades before the October Revolution).

But this is just one reference point for the injection of communist precedents into the future of humanity. Regarding an anthropological angle on history more generally, Engels' primary inspiration in this book is the work of Lewis Henry Morgan, who lived in New York State and who studied, in particular, the Iroquois.[24] Consequently, it is thus the Iroquois who catch much of Engels' attention in this work.

Turning to the League, an enthusiastic and paternalistic Engels writes, "And a wonderful constitution it is, this gentile constitution in all its childlike simplicity!"[25] Ouch! Then he continues the drift into a dreamy world, one distinguished by thoughts such as "the household is maintained by a number of families in common and is communistic," "there cannot be any poor or needy," and "all are equal and free—the women included."[26] The clear implication is that the future communism will be a return on a higher level of our lost, collectivist, cooperative past, from which there was a "fall"[27] (a theological thought if ever there was one, a thought that conveniently effaces both the impact of settler colonialism and the resilience of Iroquoia). From Engels' perspective, the Iroquois past prefigures or models future forms of intersubjectivity, future forms that will echo or intensify a double that has already existed, not a simple repetition but a new configuration grounded in an originary precedent, repetition with a difference (all due respects to Nietzche and Deleuze).

Then, given that Engels' book refers to but is not about Russia, it is a bit startling that it contains an addendum entitled "A Recently Discovered Case of Group Marriage," which features the Gilyaks, who lived on Sakhalin Island, in Russia (or Japan, depending on one's geopolitical allegiances, a troubling double mapped onto geography). If strains of communist theory challenge the confines of the bourgeois family, well, here is an allied challenge to those same confines, one that is already real, and future forms of love and of family will always echo what has already existed, in Russia, whose doubles we now leave behind, along with many other political doubles still waiting to be mined, which will mainly be left in the ground.

Working the Double

In the context of a broader philosophy project, the connections displayed in these varied encounters—from late medieval England to classical Iroquoia to modern Russia—have opened up new domains of the double while also, I hope, contributing some alternative, experimental insights into not just how, more specifically, political intersubjectivity gets constituted (representation as narrative) but about how it becomes functional, activated, or animated (representation as practice), providing along the way an initial perspective on how these two aspects of political representation converge in ways that are more organic than systematic while yet nonetheless conveying a sense of inevitability and mutual reinforcement.

In attempting to maintain a quasi-phenomenological resonance with this material, I have refrained from making any direct arguments, offering instead something more like argument by suggestion or implication. Nevertheless, I hope that the patterns associated with these variant examples are recognizable and real, and that beyond providing new windows onto curious aspects of political intersubjectivity, these visitations to politics add volume to philosophy's understanding of the double.

Traditionally, philosophy tried to master the double. But the double has always gone in its own direction, finding an endless range of pathways for exercising its determinative power, including in the realm of political representation, the condition of the experience of politics, politics just one more arena for the constitutive and ineluctable play of the deuce.

Notes

1. Remarks delivered on April 24, 2014 at St. Xavier University, Chicago.
2. Brian Seitz, *The Trace of Political Representation* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995).
3. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 125.
4. Mitt Romney, Iowa State Fair, August 11, 2011.
5. John Adams, "Thoughts on Government," in John Adams, *The Political Writings of John Adams*, ed. George A. Peek, Jr. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1954), p. 86.
6. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 255.
7. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Richard Polt (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), p. 11.

8. The classic, mainstream American work is Hannah Fenichel Pitkin's, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). However, continental philosophy has significantly altered the fundamental terms of the discourse, as exemplified by F.R. Ankersmit's, *Political Representation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), and by philosophers such as Jacques Rancière.
9. While we know that it is impossible to suspend the natural attitude, we know, too, that it is possible for philosophy to disengage from standard-issue forms of judgment or, put more simply, to engage in a sort of eidetic variation.
10. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Foucault's references are in *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 28–29.
11. Augustine, *The City of God*, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 2003).
12. Seitz (1995), Chap. 2.
13. Brian Seitz and Thomas Thorp, *The Iroquois and the Athenians: A Political Ontology* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).
14. That it is bad manners to use his name is reflective of the necessity of his withdrawal from Iroquoia.
15. Although quite distinct from the Haudenosaunee, the Wendats—whom Europeans call Hurons—spoke a dialect of Iroquoian.
16. Arthur C. Parker, *The Constitution of the Five Nations or The Iroquois Book of Great Law* (Ohsweken, Ontario: Iroqrafts, Ltd., 1991), p. 105.
17. It is worth noting the archaeological disinternment of numerous Iroquois burial sites in which the corpse was covered with bark.
18. Anthony F. C. Wallace, *The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 98.
19. Capitalism, however, typically gets this relationship wrong, lost in its self-flattering fantasy that capital makes labor possible rather than the reality, which is the inverse.
20. By "historic" I mean a synchronic milestone event. Appealing as such milestones might be, however, the synchronic perspective is in this context finally simplistic, so I must invoke "historical." By "historical," I am thinking this event in diachronic terms, that is, as part of a complex process that relates back to nineteenth-century Russian political debates (say, to give it all a handle, they begin in 1825 with the Decembrists Revolt) as well as ahead to 1917 and beyond.
21. The city's name was changed from St. Petersburg, which sounded too German when World War I broke out. Later, of course, Petrograd became Leningrad, which then, by popular vote, reverted back to its original name following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

22. Nikolai Gogol, *Dead Souls*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Vintage, 1997), p. 253.
23. Friedrick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State: In the Light of the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan*, ed. Eleanore Burke Leacock (New York: International Publishers, 2001), p. 123.
24. Published in 1851, Morgan's first book was *The League of the Iroquois.*
25. Engels (2001, p. 159).
26. Engels (2001, p. 159).
27. Engels (2001, p. 161).

References

Engels, Friedrick. 2001. *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State: In the Light of the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan*, ed. Eleanore Burke Leacock. New York: International Publishers.

Seitz, Brian. 1995. *The Trace of Political Representation*. Albany: SUNY Press.

CHAPTER 2

Philosophy's Use and Abuse of the Double: Plato and Kant

Philosophy's Double Vision

In politics, one witnesses the double doing determinative work in origin narratives, in practices, and even in objects (shells that become words, palaces, heralds, etc.). At the same time, the history of philosophy has been accompanied and driven by the multifarious figure of the double, which appears as if a shady character in a dream inhabited and animated by a fluid nexus of stories. In entering this dream and in tracking the double, we encounter, too, the markers that dot cemeteries and designate where the bodies are buried, which is why it is worth trying to represent the double as if it were engaged in *ontological enactments*, philosophy always shadowed by elusive ghosts. In encountering the double, expect to meet something like ghost stories devoid of resolution, perhaps designating nothing other than finitude.

Once upon a time, philosophy might have liked to dispense with the dream and to instead imagine eternity. But the double disrupts this desire. Coming before philosophy and exceeding philosophy's desire to domesticate it, the double is not confined to dualisms or hierarchized binary oppositions but in its wilder manifestations appears in the form of obscure twinnings and hauntings, uncanny ingeminations, strange, often shady substitutions, oneiric images, and elliptical couplings and conjunctions that tend to render the conceptual apparatuses introduced and offered by tradition inadequate and frequently frustrating if not ultimately futile.

B. Seitz, *Intersubjectivity and the Double*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56375-0_2

Having made these claims in advance, I will frame philosophy here as narrative. Not narrative reduced to the currently fashionable and sometimes facile status of "social construct" or of, simply, fiction, but narrative taken up by means of something like eidetic variation understood as a passage to ontology, with the gaze focused on the text, and the edges of the text always connecting with *other* things: As Nietzsche instructs us, "We have no right to be single in anything: we may neither err singly nor hit upon the truth singly."[1]

Before touching on some specific texts in order to show these stories at work in philosophy proper,[2] it is important to emphasize, first, that my readings will be openly weighted and selective, determined by specific apparitions and operations of the double doing its multifarious and sometimes nefarious work, and that—second—it is at the same time crucial to stress at the outset that the partiality of my readings is not artificial or imposed, but simply a tracing that concentrates on and follows from the double itself. Stated differently, my partialities are contingent, but they are by no means arbitrary, and it is my hope that they are also representative.

In a myriad of configurations, the ontological motif of the double is all over philosophy, often appearing in its existential profiles while also frequently cornered by metaphysics. Its shape-shifting ubiquity and persistent intrusion suggest both its necessity and the way in which it fuels, exceeds, and eludes philosophy itself. Philosophy finds power and security in the double but from it simultaneously inherits countless forms of dependence, instability, and insecurity.

***

I will introduce the problem of the double in philosophy first by addressing some twentieth-century philosophy and then by focusing primarily on patterns exhibited in selective passages of texts by two archetypal luminaries, Plato and Kant. Both philosophers seem to resolve what for each is a fundamental philosophical problem by recourse to doubles, although what might come across as calculable, clear, possibly formalistic, and relatively static in these resolutions is shadowed by that which is wild, ambiguous, fluid, and highly kinetic (and is not a shadow, that familiar double which appears wherever there is light, which must always emanate from a source, a particular position).

Regarding Plato, I have chosen him to illustrate how archaic the issue is, and I mean "archaic" in a rich sense. With him, I will reexamine the oppositions embodied in his use of divisions and divides, including of course,

the sense in which the apparent world is dependent on and conjoined with the real or ideal world. But Plato is also not so simple, and he does not conceal the sense in which the double eludes him, so I will attend to more than just these more obvious or typical oppositions and will consider, too, the compelling sense in which the real world is dependent on the apparent, even and precisely insofar as the latter is drifting away.

Regarding Kant, I have chosen him because his efforts to deploy and insist on the necessity of a double analysis are arguably the most important and sophisticated in modern academic philosophy as well as illustrative of philosophy's inevitable failure, so with him I will highlight and explore a succinct form of the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental domains, a bifurcation that echoes Plato and secures philosophical necessity but, possibly, at the cost of this world; that is, the price for saving philosophy is the assertion of the necessity of a steady, purely structural domain of reality, a second realm, a second light, until maybe all that is left is… nothing.

Plato will occupy the bulk of this chapter, followed by the visit to Kant. The very last part of the chapter, though, will offer an initial indication of the wilder and darker side of the double before turning to ontological configurations of the double different from more historically typical philosophical engagements. I will take up philosophically atypical configurations in later chapters. Yet even along the way here, Plato and Kant cannot be confined to or by metaphysics, so one might anticipate encounters with many occasions and species of the double, including, for example, not only hierarchized binary oppositions but the trickster double, the benign double, the threatening double, the dominating double, the copulating double—a reminder that "copula" *is* "to be" or, giving it a less discursive emphasis, intercourse is the condition of existence—not to mention the dialogical double, the diabolical double, the deadly double, the uncanny double, and many more. In the long run, and insofar as it is possible, I would like to pass through and then move beyond a by-now familiar and sometimes formulaic discourse about hierarchized binary oppositions, preferring to approach the topic in terms of something like an accumulating list or archive of instances or types. I hope that later chapters will be more entertaining. But first we need to do some work.

***

The terms of philosophy's efforts to master and deploy the double—for example, reality/appearance, being/nothingness, or the seemingly simple, self-assured assertion, "this, not that"—reflect something significant about

the double that evades philosophy's grasp and which yet it seems philosophy cannot help but try to get a hold of, to secure and subdue. Philosophy has always kept a focus on and tried to sort the double out, as if philosophy were the custodian or curator of all pairings, and as if its opening distinctions and insistences were its own preference and innovation, as if, that is, it had a choice and were in charge of the rules of identification: "This differentiation is of my own making," it seems to want to say, "I am the origin of reality and appearance, I fear no ghosts, I am the origin of all distinctions, all lines of division"[3] (and yet what I make is also really there).

Philosophy would thus like to represent itself as self-originating and self-replicating, abruptly bursting forth beyond the lures of conventional narrativity in a dazzling yet disciplined display of insight. Failing that fantasy, it might imagine making its entrance something like the virgin goddess herself, born from the head of Zeus fully developed and armed for combat, a prospect that seems apt given Plato's suggestion that Athena means *nous*,[4] although this association with mind has a dissonant resonance with the image of Zeus' actual head, not to mention with Athena's lance, shield, and virginity. It is noteworthy that the sex in these images of emergences or non-begettings remains at a remove, one of philosophy's first awkward but inevitable moves having been the declaration for mind before the distractions of the body (the double can be distracting when it's not simply dissimulating or projecting a mirage). But philosophy in all of its mortality originates neither from itself nor from the head of a god but is something like an effect of and deeply implicated in the double, which is embodied in originary difference, including the originary biological difference between a woman and a man.

As an engagement with Plato's *Sophist* will illustrate, philosophy tends to see itself on the offense. Philosophy is the hunter, either tracking the truth through its bifurcations or stalking its own double, who might turn out to be an elusive sophist, the one from whom philosophy must distinguish itself in order to secure its own identity. Alternatively, however, it might be fruitful to suggest that philosophy has always been both summoned and stalked by that which was always as if waiting for it to appear, summoned, and stalked, that is, by its double. Translated into the language of philosophy, the condition of the possibility of philosophy is thus not itself philosophical, but is also not "not philosophical."

Before visiting Plato, though, and in order to establish the relevance of this issue for contemporary philosophy, it is worthwhile to cultivate some context by observing more recent philosophical efforts to grapple with

the double. I will signal the thread of tradition I'm following by briefly flagging some specific highlights from twentieth-century continental philosophy. The ensuing chapter will mimic the serial aspect of a traditional academic essay. But if I were a phenomenologist, I might, as already intimated, consider it to be more of an exercise in eidetic variations on a theme, the focal theme being either the double or Plato and Kant, who, according to Nietzsche, themselves comprise a singular double of historical and philosophical import, bookends of sorts, the sunny south and icy north conjoined together, constituting an odd pair.

Being's Other

Featuring what is from one side the indifferent yet from the other side desperate drama of the relation between things and nothing, Jean-Paul Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* could be read as an elaborate, epic-scale homage to the philosophical double,[5] particularly given the powerful and liberating sense in which that text dispenses with dialectical philosophy's devotion to the third—the third had been mummified, done to death by post-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean logorrheics—Sartre thereby obliterating any delusions regarding the resolution of ontological conflict. I want to tune into only one brief passage of this seminal text, and so assume on the part of the reader familiarity with everything that precedes it.

Sartre opens the conclusion of the book with a section entitled, "In-itself and For-itself: Metaphysical Implications," noting that "after our description of the in-itself and the for-itself, it appeared to us difficult to establish a bond between them, and we feared that we might fall into an insurmountable dualism"[6] (note: "fear of dualism," an articulation of a phobic relation to a conceptually uncontrollable double). He then writes that, "For consciousness there is no being except for this precise obligation to be a revealing intuition of something. What does this mean except that consciousness is the Platonic *Other*?" In a way that will become more relevant later in this chapter, he continues, "We may recall the fine description which the Stranger in the *Sophist* gives of this 'other,' which can be apprehended only 'as in a dream,' which has no being except its being-other" (Sartre 1975, 618). The configuration of the double cast as in a dream—an exemplary reference point—will return in subsequent chapters in this book, but what is of note here is Sartre's resolution of the question of dualism in his text, since what he does in his efforts to confront the non-reciprocity and schism harbored in his depiction of the relation

between being and nothingness is observe that "The question of the totality, however, does not belong to the province of ontology," (Sartre 1975, 624), but belongs, rather, to metaphysics. So, "For ontology it makes no difference whether we consider the for-itself articulated in the in-itself as a well marked *duality* or as a disintegrated being. It is up to metaphysics to decide which will be more profitable for knowledge." And then he writes, "After having decided the question of the origin of the for-itself and of the nature of the phenomenon of the world, the metaphysician will be able to attack various problems of primary importance" (Sartre 1975, 624–625). And then Sartre moves onto another issue he asserts is also beyond ontology, the ethical implications of Sartrean phenomenology (Sartre never did publish his promised ethics, but his double, de Beauvoir did, and she designated her ethics as "ambiguous").

What Sartre has accomplished in this passage is remarkable. First of all, he has explicitly acknowledged the critical problem that he has constructed after hundreds of pages of epic ontology. Second, he has invoked as an illustration or even an ally Plato, who some existentialists, such as Nietzsche, might be inclined to view as the metaphysician par excellence (note thus that Sartre simultaneous shifts the burden to metaphysics just as he decides to lean on the patriarch of metaphysics). More specifically, Sartre has cited the Stranger in the *Sophist*, a dialogue rife with and defined by a myriad of doubles; in fact the Stranger is a strange reference for Sartre since, as a *xenos*, he is an openly ambiguous character, both guest and alien, maybe a friend but maybe not, probably not Sartre's friend (possibly, though, a character in a novel by Sartre's once friend, Albert Camus). This reference does nothing to defuse but only intensifies the problem of dualism at work in Sartre's text. Third, by rapidly deferring the problem of dualism to metaphysics, Sartre is engaging in an interesting evasive maneuver. Insofar as it seeks to distract attention from the ornate yet ultimately austere dualism spelled out by Sartre's truncated dialectic, the tactic is in the first instance purely rhetorical, pitched not to philosophers but to sophomoric suckers (probably the very readers who never got that far into the book). Maybe more important, this effort to unburden ontology and to escape responsibility—this exercise in bad faith—is a sophistic claim that underestimates the power of metaphysics, conflating its own idiosyncratic breakdown of sub-disciplines with a deferral of philosophical import, as if specialists can now take over after Sartre has done the heavy ontological lifting. Finally, the subtitle of *Being and Nothingness* is *An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, and it seems very peculiar that a

Heideggerian-inspired ontologist should remain relatively unconcerned about questions of metaphysics or could believe that one could simply sidestep these concerns under the banner of dubious distinctions between philosophical disciplines.

In a nutshell, this steadfast reluctance to acknowledge the way that his attempt to harness the double has turned him metaphysical is emblematic of Sartre's undoing: While posing as a philosopher's philosopher—while himself having inhabited a certain post-dialectical double, Sartre managed to build a massive trap for himself and then pretend that he wasn't stuck in it. This trap was the effect of trying to harness the double—of trying to *use* it for all it is worth—which leads to the question, was it Sartre's doing, or the double's? Well, better to submit to the power of the double than to yield to the resolution proffered by dialectic's third.

After Sartre, continental philosophy turned more clever, if not more honest. In the second half of the twentieth century, a prominent thread of philosophy devoted much of its retrospective energy in attending to hierarchized binary oppositions, prominent and specific, textual and archaeological. This was a necessary exercise in documenting the contours and effects of metaphysical baggage, and its exercises opened up the problem in incisive ways, ways that just begin to appreciate the inevitable power of the double. Continuing to defer turning to Plato himself, I will briefly highlight what are selectively but clearly two of the most significant examples relevant to the problem.

Plato's Dilemma

In *White Mythology*, Jacques Derrida explores the necessarily enabling and yet simultaneously disruptive intrusion of metaphor into philosophy, observing that "Metaphor is less in the philosophical text (and in the rhetorical text coordinated with it) than the philosophical text is within metaphor."[7] This thought, a thought that features a certain ambiguous yet necessary double, worriedly reflects or echoes the tradition of Platonism and would perhaps worry Plato too, he whose clever *writing* repeatedly claimed a reverence for unadorned *speech*, he who expressed reservations about sophists, rhetoricians, and poets, those whose concern is not with the truth but with the profusion of mesmerizing metaphors and, well then, with words about words. The problem—the threat—would seem to involve the effect of certain kinds of words. However, the problem is more basic and pervasive than that.

Derrida's essay, *Plato's Pharmacy*[8] opens with reference to Plato's *Phaedrus*, and more specifically with Plato's characterization of writing in its relation to truth as a *pharmakon*, as a drug, "which acts as both a remedy and poison… This charm, this spellbinding virtue, this power of fascination can be—alternately or simultaneously—beneficent or maleficent" (Derrida 1981, 70), thereby establishing from the outset a certain doubling, and thus fundamental instability in both Plato's discourse and, by extension and inheritance of infection, in philosophy more generally. As Derrida notes regarding the translation of the Greek word *pharmakon*—translation not just into modern French but "between Greek and Greek"—"With this problem of translation we will thus be dealing with nothing less than the problem of the very passage into philosophy" (Derrida 1981, 72), philosophy always concerned with its own origins, the passage into being what it is. How does it pass into being, and what then threatens it?

Central to Plato's critique of writing is his antipathy toward sophists, toward those dissimulators who traffic in imitations of the truth. As Derrida observes, "For it is above all against sophistics that this diatribe against writing is directed… The man who relies on writing, who brags about the knowledge and power it assures him… has all the features of the sophist: 'the imitator of him who knows'" (Derrida 1981, 106). As Plato depicts it, this is because the written text is about not spontaneous discourse but the replacement of and distancing from memory and thus the departure from the truth. "The sophist thus sells the signs and insignias of science: not memory itself (mneme), only monuments (hypomnemata), inventories, archives, citations, copies, accounts, tales, lists, notes, duplicates, chronicles, genealogies, references. Not memory but memorials" (Derrida 1981, 107). The sophist thus relies not on his own power but on an external gimmick, on some *other* thing, on, in short, a double. Derrida's references here are to the *Lesser Hippias*, and then, turning to the *Greater Hippias* and the *Sophist*, he continues:

> In truth, the sophist only pretends to know everything; his "polymathy" (*The Sophist*, 232a) is never anything but pretense. Insofar as it *lends a hand* to hypomnesia and not to live memory, it, too, is foreign to true science, to anamnesia in its properly psychic motion, to truth in the process of (its) presentation, to dialectics. Writing can only mime them (Derrida 1981, 107).

However, he continues, "What Plato is attacking in sophistics, therefore, is not simply recourse to memory but, within such recourse, the substitution of mnemonic device for live memory, of the prosthesis for the

organ… What Plato *dreams* of is a memory with no sign. That is, with no supplement… no *pharmakon*" (Derrida 1981, 108–109) and, I will translate, thus no double. And this, for Plato, is an ontological threat, since "here, the supplement *is* not, is not a being (*on*). It is nevertheless not a simple nonbeing (*me on*), either. Its slidings slip it out of the simple alternative presence/absence. *That* is the danger… writing appears to Plato… as… the representative of a representative" (Derrida 1981, 109). In short, and through the monuments bequeathed us by Plato—monuments which insure its inseparability from writing—philosophy itself, ontology's home, is threatened by an *other* ontology, one that condemns philosophy not to sophistry but to an inability to escape sophistics… except through a *pharmakon*, a potion that can go either way. Which is to say that sophistry is philosophy's ineluctable double, and that truth is thus inevitably compromised, breached in advance, a failure.

Socrates was a memory for Plato, but Plato bequeathed us with a memorial, a surrogate, a substitute, a figurine, a *kolossos*.[9] Dialectics in all of its attentive yet divided fisticuffs would seem to be the antidote. But then "The text excludes dialectics" (Derrida 1981, 122), which would seem to indicate that the written text—"weakened speech, something not completely dead: a living-dead, a reprieved corpse, a deferred life, a semblance of breath" (Derrida 1981, 143)—offers no cure, no *pharmakon*. Except, perhaps, for the hemlock—the *pharmakon*—depicted in the *Phaedo*, the text that embalms Socrates and offers him as a god whose immortality hinges on his sacrifice, a sorcerer's trick, indeed, constituting not an illusion but something somewhere other than between reality and appearance.

Nietzsche Double Teasing Plato's Double

Derrida's observations indicate a fundamentally disruptive and possibly fatal force at work in the discourse of philosophy, in, more specifically, the text of Plato (quite literally fatal in the case of Socrates). Gilles Deleuze finds an intimately related, but philosophically *recuperative* dynamic at work in Plato himself, one set in motion yet in the same instance beyond Plato's control—create something and once it's out there, it'll tend to have a life of its own—one equally animated by a double intimately related to the oscillating doubles and myriad of disruptive, polysemic ghosts that concern Derrida (it is worth mentioning that Deleuze cites *Plato's Pharmacy* in his notes). This dynamic is advanced by Plato as an analytical tool, although it might more honestly and accurately be characterized as

a rhetorical tactic that unwittingly serves to compromise a philosophical strategy. If one's aim were to preserve Plato—to preserve him the way that he embalmed Socrates—one might perceive this dynamic as a threat. Yet this double is launched by Plato—conscious or not, it is his apparent choice—and so it is his own doing and thus possible undoing, or at least it becomes so in the hands of Deleuze, who is interested in neither preserving nor deconstructing Plato but, following Nietzsche, in "reversing" him (not exactly, but Nietzsche wasn't quite here yet).

"The Platonic project," writes Deleuze, "comes to light only when we turn back to the method of division, for this method is not just one dialectical procedure among others."[10] This method, which is deployed in several Platonic texts, proceeds through an identificative process that breaks things down into pairs of contrasts and contraries (I shall get more specific in my own reading of the *Sophist*), and it asserts a difference that in establishing its terms transforms and in an uncanny sense destabilizes rather than masters them, destabilizes not the individual terms but the entire system they are deployed to uphold. It is thus in the very text of Plato that Deleuze locates Nietzsche's "reversal of Platonism," the effect of which would be "the abolition of the world of essences *and* of the world of appearance" (Deleuze 1990, 253). Quite an ambition, particularly retrojected back 2400 years (or, possibly, this is a reference not to Dasein's time but to the immortality of a mummy).

"The characteristic of division is to surmount the duality of myth and dialectic, and to reunite in itself dialectical and mythical power" (Deleuze 1990, 255). To what specific end? Ultimately, its objective is to lay down the conditions for characterizing the difference between two kinds of images and then the difference between their users, the one who knows (the philosopher) and the one who does not know (the sophist). The issue is thus simultaneously ontological and epistemological, but also a matter of engineering insofar as it is about shoring up the position of philosophy. And yet it is not straightforward, since according to Deleuze's attentive reading, *both personae*—philosopher and sophist—are pretenders. One's pretense, the philosopher's, is grounded in resemblance, while the other's is not (it is in fact not grounded or anchored at all). Plato is articulating two varieties of discursive currency and two kinds of discourses that use them, one that traffics in resemblances or copies, and another that simulates, projecting not echoes but mirages, not even a copy of a copy, just a shimmering delight (thereby in the first instance making a mockery of resemblances and thus of the truth). "If

the simulacrum still has a model, it is another model, a model of the Other (l'Autre), from which there flows an internalized dissemblance… There is no longer even right opinion, but rather a sort of ironic encounter which takes the place of a mode of knowledge, an art of encounter that is outside knowledge and opinion" (Deleuze 1990, 258). For Plato, this is philosophy's nemesis.

The philosophical upshot, that is, is that the very process of laying down the terms for distinguishing truth from its other (and philosophy from its other) sets up a logic that renders truth impossible. The system is breached and the double *seems* to have dissolved.

Aided by Deleuze's intervention (if you can believe him), Nietzsche's dream would thus seem to be achieved, the dream of reversing Plato and attaining terrain in which masks refer only to other masks. And yet a dream is itself always a double, even a philosopher's ambitious dream, Plato's and Nietzsche's dreams intertwining, constituting exotic twins in all of their fluid incompatibility. In the text of Plato, the distinction between the philosopher and the sophist does not dissolve but just gets murkier. The system might be breached, but the double is not dissolved.

***

Both Derrida and Deleuze direct fruitful, revealing attention to the effects of Plato's efforts *to use* the double and to some of the prominent ways the double eludes his control. Each accomplishes something unique, and yet their projects—both profoundly influenced by cues, clues, and strategies left behind by the ghost of Nietzsche—open up different problematics that nevertheless share a family resemblance. Derrida focuses on the fundamental indecideability established by Plato's decisions and to the insecurity it introduces into the text; this is one way, in shorthand (and referring back to an implicit thread of Derrida's text), of accounting for the death of Socrates. Deleuze depicts Plato's effort to preserve philosophy through deployment of a certain double as being one that mutates into an ontological Trojan horse, leading to a reversal that is in a certain sense beyond the traditional disjunction of security/insecurity since, indeed, it is the figurine of a horse with only shadow warriors hidden within. Against the backdrop of these exercises, I will now push forward and begin to intervene directly in Plato with a somewhat different emphasis on his reliance on the double and the way that it keeps open the very matters that it seems he would like to see closed.

"The Way Up and Down Is One and the Same."[11]

Since before Plato, this deuced gesture or character has always haunted and eluded philosophy's efforts to force it into formal, fixed, and to varying degrees rigged configurations, which is why we will eventually find ourselves talking again about being and non-being (Sartre's continued devotion to this particular pair, just 2500 years after Parmenides, is testimony to its enduring power). To some scholars, Plato himself seems to have mastered the double. But Plato's attention to the double is not confined to his forms or his theories about the world of difference between appearance and reality, but instead, one might surmise, it is what either drives his thought or is what his thought appears to drive toward. Part of the brilliance of Plato is the way he maintains a marked distance or harbors a certain reservoir of ambivalence or reluctance to take a stance, which, covered by his rhetorical virtuosity, or by the virtuosity of his double, Socrates, is not always that conspicuous.

***

The most obvious starting point for a view of the double at work in Plato, the canonic divided line articulated by Socrates at the end of Book VI of the *Republic* is a curious phenomenon, broken up as the line is into not just two segments—the visible and the intelligible, a pair that will get repeated and further refined and formalized millennia later in Kant—but then each half subdivided again. The subdivision is clearly not unimportant, but part of its importance is that it helps soften or deflect attention from the basic division into two or maybe, more generally, it simply helps to complicate it, although on second thought this is not really a line but a division masquerading as a line. A somewhat idiosyncratic version of the very technique addressed by Deleuze, the gesture of division and then subdivision featured here is of course significant in its own right (one can only begin to imagine the sheer quantity of discourse this specific division has added to the accumulated sedimentations of Western thought) as well as overtly relevant to Plato's relation to and parsing of the double, particularly given that it describes philosophy's opening assumptions not as "absolute beginnings"—good guesses then?—but as enabling philosophy "to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting point of it all… making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas" (*Republic*, 511b–c). If words are only echoes—"My words, like yours, are but an echo"[12]—and if echoes play off echoes, there's plenty of echolalic dissimulation already in play here.

Regarding the divided line, all I will further state is that while the back-to-back sequence may make it seem as if the line is something like an abstract rehearsal for the gritty narrative of the cave allegory that immediately follows it in Book VII, the thought of rehearsal is either a mirage, a ploy, or the consequence of an editing error, since there are massive disjunctions between the two sets of images, line and cave, particularly given that, unlike the former, the latter concludes not with an ascension into free space—the space free because, there, ideas would be unencumbered by the weight of individuation—but with a convoluted descent to death, to anything but *the idea*, anything, that is, but the finest, most ethereal, possibly empty point of the line, a line that should probably be thought of first as vertical since the discussion of it immediately follows reference to the "power of the sun," the ferocity and sometimes blinding materiality and thus arc of *directionality* of the sun perhaps compromising the abstract purity of the line, the line thought in terms of, "pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas" (*Republic*, 511c). Put differently, while the articulation of the line seems to go up or face up, the story of the cave goes down, or at least its protagonist does, possibly face down in the stone cold ground.

Then again, some might dispute the thought that Plato's line is all about transcendence. The real line has always been about the doubling enacted by following the eternally returning arc traced by the luminous path of Apollo; in this arc which is neither vertical nor horizontal, we are not reflections so much as beneficiaries, and the pious Plato cannot not have recognized the obvious.

With an openly acknowledged preference for intensifying the association of the sun with *power*—yes, this is a metaphor, a metaphor without which nothing would grow—I would really like someone to explain the connection between the sun and ideas. I'm not going to try to question a dead man, but returning to Derrida, it would appear that the very effort to transcend or detach from the power of metaphor is itself born of metaphor. If, that is, the sun is a metaphor at all. Maybe it turns out that Derrida is extraordinarily shrewd and insightful but also that he has an obsession with a specific configuration of the double that would distract and hinder him from considering the sense in which, distant though it might be, there is no "difference" between the sun above and, refracted through its warmth and through writing, the sun that extends itself into, illuminates, and complicates Plato's text, maybe it's all really refraction and translation. Or maybe there is no solarity as such, only the effects

of the sun, including shadows (with this, Derrida might agree). Or: "As above, so below."[13] Time to go underground.

***

The outline of the allegory of the cave is familiar enough. But I'll restage aspects of it briefly here since I want not to offer an outline but to indicate fragments of a narrative that is riddled with doubles. First, though, and before entering, a minor excursus:

As is typically the case, this otherwise extraordinary cave has an *opening*, which is where I will enter the story, eccentrically. Insofar as it goes both ways—entrance/exit, exit/entrance, in and out, out and in, a pair that exists beyond or before symmetry—it is a central yet understated feature of the narrative, so let's linger there a moment at the threshold before entering the cave. For sake of an eidetic variation emphasizing doubles, and since Plato does not specify where this cave is, locate its opening not in Athens but in Rome, which city had such a deep, curious, and worried relation to Athens. If, then, this were not a Greek but instead a Roman cave (possibly the one in which Romulus and Remus were nursed by their lupine mother?), the opening would be the haunt of two-faced Janus, an overtly double deity with no Greek equivalent, god of gateways, keeper in this case of the passage between interior and exterior, variegated darkness and light, ensuring that neither aspect is granted priority, and that neither place is really dark, neither Athens nor Rome, neither interior nor exterior. Plato would like to imagine the demarcation line positioned at this passage as simultaneously impermeable and permeable, and it is fortunate that Janus abides here since only a god could authorize and enable such an impossibility. The cave's opening is impermeable insofar as none of the cave's prisoners have breached it. At the same time, the opening is permeable since, in Plato's account, one of the cave's inhabitants must cross it, must, in fact, literally and fatally double cross it (he is compelled not only to leave but to return). This conflicting thread might seem weird, but it's just a story, one in which Janus is there making all conflicting or dissonant alternatives possible. One face eyeing the future, the other gazing at the past, Janus does not guard so much as conduits, conducts, or chaperones. For Romans, the opening of the cave might have signified wartime, since the doors to the temple of Janus were closed during times of peace.[14] In this case, Janus provides neither openings nor closings but *sees both sides* of either possibility, a case of double vision.

I open this visitation to Plato's cave with Janus because while Plato could not have recognized Janus, he is clearly relying here on or at least

benefitting from the god's powers. Nodding to the deity now, this entry is attended by Bachelard's question, "But is he who opens the door and he who closes it the same being?"[15]

Having just departed the divided line, Plato abruptly opens the cave allegory with the prisoners, who are "fettered from childhood" (*Republic*, 514a), their heads held in place so they cannot turn and look at what is behind them, cannot see, for starters, the fire back there, nor the shadow-masters working the firelight, can see only the shadows that these bearers project on the only wall that the prisoners' fetters allow them to face, the wall on which play shadows of *shapes of things*, so that "in every way such prisoners would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the artificial objects" (*Republic*, 515c). Plato thus offers us a double layer of images, the shadows on the wall and then the objects the outlines of which are used to create the shadows, things of "stone and wood and every material" which, degraded copies though they may be, paraded as they are before the fire by the imagists, have a kind of dual ontological status, being real insofar as they are material and yet also deriving a certain borrowed reality through their reference to real things.

> "A strange image you speak of," said Glaucon, "and strange prisoners."
> "*Like ourselves, I said*" (*Republic*, 515c).

The last line is arguably the strangest sentence in this extended passage, and I will remark on it momentarily. Meanwhile, this would seem to be the fundamental setting of the drama about to unfold. However, before moving to that drama, we cannot help but pause and comment on two double-related exotica already in play, in play, that is, before the drama, exotica functioning thus not just as the drama's backdrop but as its conditioning terrain or subterrain, as the case may be:

First, since Plato keeps them in the deep subliminal or shady side of the text, it is impossible to do more than simply wonder about the identity of the shadowmasters, without whom, unless someone else does it, the fires would go unstoked and the prisoners would be in the dark, presumably seeing *nothing*; unlike the prisoners, these toiling proletarians are not described as "like ourselves." In fact, they are not really described at all except as object carriers who sometimes speak (signifying what?), which means that they are as effectively concealed from us as they are from the prisoners. What have these shadowmasters seen, what do they say when they speak—what do they say when they speak to each other?—and why

does Plato introduce them and then glide right over them, as if he were pretending to take them for granted? They themselves are necessarily *un*fettered—free?—since they would not be able to handle and manipulate things were they in constraints, nor would they be able to stoke the fires (who carries the firewood? is a question an aristocrat in a slave economy might have forgotten to ask). Conclude that the condition of the possibility of some people living in a world of delusion—more precisely, in a world of shadows passing as a world of delusion—is that there are others who do not, and this is a stronger move than, for instance, the truism that a contrary is necessary in order for something to be or to show itself (true needs false, light needs dark, etc.). Two kinds of people? People or not (politician's tools, whomever), the shadowmasters are a force, and this second force is necessary in order to make the shadow world possible—in order to introduce some light into pitch black—and while Plato must relegate the shadowmasters to the shade, they themselves are not shadows, nor are they in the shadows that they make dance on the wall. Suffice it to note here that in this regard, the representation of the double is essential, that is, the condition of perception (starting with pseudo-perception) is some second agency, even a super agency. Put in the terms of Plato's story, a prison cannot function without its wardens. In this case, the wardens are barely visible, but the necessity of their eccentric presence seems to throw a bizarre skew into the mixture in advance, and one can only wonder if these shadowmasters are themselves familiar with Janus, wonder, that is, if they pass freely and without anxiety in and out of the cave, at least to fetch faggots, everything coming down to the power of not just light but the combustion upon which light is predicated. What is Plato driving toward?

Second, the prisoners are described not only as "strange" but as *like ourselves.* Does Plato mean to suggest that Socrates, being human, sees not things but only shadows of things, or that Plato wants the character of Socrates to imagine that about himself or wants Socrates to make Glaucon imagine that? Is Plato insinuating that we are all like these strange prisoners? Could Plato himself possibly be like them, since he tells the story of both shadows and the sun, darkness and light? To contain these questions, I will simply flag this other double, the one comprised of the prisoners in the allegory and then those who are similar to them, including those telling the story about a world of fire and of shadows. Or at least that seems to be the case until the drama kicks in.

Reiterating what is familiar to us all, the action begins when one prisoner is freed from his constraints—ask not who or what obscure force

released him—freed into painful confusion at the sight of the fire and of the objects whose shadows is all he's known until now. Freedom immediately followed by a moment of perceptual pandemonium and resistance to acknowledge new objects of perception, a moment of stubborn regression. Fine. Then he's dragged forcibly out of the cave (again, by what or whom?). Of course the sunlight hurts the former prisoner's eyes. And then his eyes adjust and in this order begins to see shadows, reflections, things, the heavens, starlight, moonlight, and finally the sun itself. And he appreciates what he sees and pities those remaining below.

Several points before considering the double crossing, which is what the cave allegory might finally be all about (advanced not as a mere narrative flourish but as a philosophical necessity). First, Plato has now firmly established the necessity of a double world, one that, as previously noted, might in an obvious sense seem to illustrate the terms of the divided line. Except, reference back to Deleuze, it only simulates illustrating that other story, since the divided line winds up with ideas moving to ideas, and the protagonist of the cave allegory winds up basking in the same sun we all know, basking, that is, until he eventually returns to the cave.

Neither whimsically nor arbitrarily, Plato has thus concocted a double world, governed by twinned forms of light, fire and sun: One aspect is the cave and the world it represents—human error would seem to be the point, but as I have already observed regarding the shadowmasters, it's more complicated than that—and the other aspect is the world graced by the sun, the real world. And the latter is the most curious thing of all. While the divided line leads to ideas moving to ideas, the cave allegory delivers *the world that we all live in*, provoking us to ponder Plato's point. While the legacy of Platonism seems to steer us into considering that reality is anywhere but here, Plato himself delivers us into sunlight. Leaving us to wonder: Why the cave? And why must the reader once again descend down into it?

Having seen the light, the former prisoner doubles back across the opening—what exactly motivates him, we do not know, just that he is compelled, possibly needs to share—and he returns to his former abode, where he is mocked and scorned, and then probably killed… an odd reference, apparently, to Socrates. Finally, and exiting the cave story, Socrates sums up the allegory:

> This image then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a whole to all that has been said, likening the region revealed through sight to the habituation

> of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the things above is the soul's ascension to the intelligible region, you will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. But the god knows whether it is true (*Republic*, 517b–c).

That last is a thoroughly ironic note, since of course (1) the god knows it cannot possibly be true, knows that Plato is a dissimulator and (2) Socrates' summary ends up on a penultimate high note, pointedly neglecting to mention the deadly descent that follows, which he himself has just described.

Plato insists on a double world—two kinds of illumination, fire and sun—but the only thing gained through the allegory is the very world that we live in, or, rather, the only thing gained is the troubling subterranean scenario that exists nowhere outside of Plato's *Republic*, which is to say that there never was a cave. The light the former prisoner has seen is not some special light—certainly not a transcendental illumination—but simply the same old sun we see every day.

In trying to pass itself off as an allegory, the story's image of enlightenment is simply a representation of this world in this sunlight. Given Plato's efforts to spin his own tale, the cave story thus leaves a lingering sensation that one has just been subjected to a very fancy sleight of hand, advanced sophistry. Whether you buy the doubles the way that Plato presents them or not—forcing us to rely on peripheral vision—they've been lodged deep in us a long, long time.

Digging back into philosophy's flesh before Plato, the god of fire bequeaths us, "The sun is new each day,"[16] a thought that would seem to compromise the stability and ontological security of the sun represented in the narrative of the cave, thereby disrupting any advantage Plato thinks he's gained, although what Plato thinks is literally immaterial since he's a dead man, will never think again, hasn't had a thought in eons, but will nevertheless continue to intrude so many lifetimes later, such is the power of writing. Plato is a dead man. In this case as in so many others, a dead man shadows us, a dead man is our double, or we his.

"The Sophist Runs Away into the Darkness of Non-being"[17]

One conspicuous peculiarity that emerges at the opening of Plato's *Sophist* is that the central character is *the Stranger* from Elea, described by Theodorus at the outset as a follower of Parmenides and Zeno and as

a "real philosopher" (*Sophist*, 216a). If linked to a constellation of archetypes, this character might as well be as real as the stranger who rides into town in so many country songs that he constitutes a relatively distinct subgenre. With loaded reference to another balladeer, Homer, the young Socrates then muses or musics that maybe this philosopher is not a mere stranger but a god, a god, specifically, of refutation, a god, then, of denial and, by implication, negativity, possibly a god of the void (*Sophist*, 216b). Not a devotee of disputation, replies Theodorus—not thus a gamester, trickster, sophist, or nihilist—and also not a god. Certainly, though, divine, as is the case of any philosopher (*Sophist*, 216c). To which Socrates responds that it is not much easier to recognize a philosopher than it is a god (*Sophist*, 216c), to which I will add a god or a ghost; here, Plato has already linked the identity of the philosopher to the obscure operations of the double.

The opening stretch of the dialogue works toward making not the philosopher but the sophist recognizable, although despite the interlocutors' best efforts, the sophist never actually appears in the dialogue, instead just skulks around the dialogue's edges (while he is certainly present, he is also absent). This first stretch rides on a sequence of not just distinctions but more specifically crisp divisions into two, for example, two kinds of hunting, two kinds of fighting, two kinds of persuasion, two kinds of controversy, two kinds of purification, two kinds of evil, two kinds of vice, and two kinds of ignorance; these reductive doubles are relatively transparent and predictable and thus not as philosophically interesting as others in play in this dialogue. But then we encounter two kinds of instruction leading to the difference between those who are cross-questioned and those who are not, which prompts the Stranger to remark that "a wolf is very like a dog" (*Sophist*, 231a), a move into different terrain since it is more about camouflage in motion than it is about a more typically tame or static distinction between appearance and reality.

Images of entities in motion are often tender spots in the corpus of Plato. So pause a moment over this new inscription of the double, which is more than just another note in a pattern since it introduces a truly variant configuration, the first one here that is totemized rather than abstract: Is the sophist a wolf or a dog? And what about the philosopher? Dog is an image of something that could be cast as a human companion, maybe thus a surrogate human (or perhaps something simply servile). The wolf, though, is a stalker, maybe a predator poised to take down Nietzsche's lamb.

At this point in the dialogue, it's observed that "the sophist has by this time appeared to be so many things that I am at a loss to know what in the world to say he really is" (*Sophist*, 231c). It's not so much that the sophist eludes the philosopher but that the Stranger's dominating double analysis seems for now to have pushed the sophist a bit beyond reach. But only briefly, since it finally comes down to the familiar but hardly innocent distinction between mere opinion and true knowledge (*Sophist*, 233c). Which means that it comes down to the difference between people who merely believe they know and… Well, the truth is that the alternative—the identity of the philosopher, the one who thinks he actually knows—remains totally opaque.

Now, the Stranger and Theatetus become the hunters who do not want "to let the beast get away again" (*Sophist*, 235b). So it's a return to hunting, to tracking, and stalking, that and more specifically to Plato's desire to encircle the sophist with nets, a desire imagined by means of divisions of imitative art. "We must follow him," states the Stranger, "always dividing the section into which he has retreated, until he is caught" (*Sophist*, 235c), philosophy on the drive, moving in for the kill. Back on secure territory, then, back, that is, to a method of division, this time a division regarding the two classes of imitation determined by the difference between, on the one hand, likeness or resemblance and, on the other hand, mere appearance (it is the difference between these that fuels Deleuze's "reversal" of Plato).

An apparently clear distinction, but still, and getting to the real point, the Stranger is uncertain into which of these categories the sophist should be placed: "in the cleverest manner he has withdrawn into a baffling classification where it is hard to track him" (*Sophist*, 236d). And here is where the other central theme of the dialogue is introduced. Isn't it a contradiction to say that a falsehood—a form of non-being—exists? (*Sophist*, 237a). On the one hand, we have an ontological issue in play here, which revolves around the question of whether or not the designation "non-being" can be applied to anything, this with profound epistemological ramifications, namely the possibility of affirming that false statements exist. But if taken as an existential issue, "non-being" could mean being dead. By extension, this could open up the possibility that the sophist does not exist. Which then leads to the question, what about the philosopher or anyone else when they say something false? "To speak of what is not 'something' is to speak of nothing at all," says the Stranger (*Sophist*, 237e). "In such a case, a person is saying something, though he may be speaking of nothing."

The dialogue continues to characterize the sophist in a familiar way—the sophist is an illusionist, a juggler, and other ad hominems (*Sophist*, 241b)—but Plato knows that he has not encircled the sophist, maybe because how can you net a man who is possibly already dead, even if the security of the philosopher's identity would seem to depend on defining its elusive double? At this point then, and precisely because the sophist continues to elude them, the dialogue turns from the sophist to what different philosophers say about the status of non-being in relation to being. The Stranger makes some bizarre feints before finally invoking and reconfiguring the theme of the double in what might be described as an ontologically intensive way: "Then don't let anyone say that it is the contrary of the existent that we mean by 'what is not,' when we venture to say that 'what is not' exists" (*Sophist*, 258e). Both epistemological and ontological, this confident declaration imagines a double whose elements are theoretically distinguishable but not simply oppositionalized and in so doing it shatters the line between being and non-being, between, that is, life and death, a complication that will carry over into the kinds of hauntings that permeate later existentialisms, a world in which the dead sometimes shadow the living. In Plato's dialogue, this passes itself off as a secure position, one that will pretend to drive the remainder of the exchange. However, and even couched in the language of logical discourse, acknowledging the non-being in being or the death in life is a bold and bleak move. The dialogue continues, but the ontological damage has been done, and the sophist slips away under the cover of the Stranger's pose of certainty that he has caged a chimera, which still stalks us today.

If "furtive presence" is a philosophical oxymoron, it is nevertheless a good way of indicating both the sophist's appearance in the dialogue and the existential impulses at work in so many visages of the double, which itself is ontological. One might push that claim and suggest that ontology is the thought of the double.

The double is a furtive presence. This fundamental image will animate the chapters to follow. Meanwhile, I turn to Kant.

Repetition with a Difference[18]

Having observed some of the philosophical drama associated with Plato's dependence on and idiosyncratic encounters with the double (and acknowledging my own idiosyncratic and openly partial selection of his encounters), I would like to fast forward to some episodes in Kant. An

analysis confined to the general concept of dichotomies or to the more specific model of hierarchized binary oppositions might in certain obvious respects indicate that Kant's deployment of the double resonates with and essentially repeats Plato's: Nietzsche's quasi-comic-strip thought is that the history of an error entails a climatological and geographical aspect, becoming more refined, stripped down, exposed, and probably increasingly absurd as the error moves north from Athens to Königsberg. However, the double is not just an error, and Kant's deployment or encounter is in fact utterly different from Plato's (and, for the record, Nietzsche of course knows this).

For the most part, and as illustrated by the line and, differently, the cave, Plato *seems* inexorably drawn to the image of ascent or cordoning off of one domain of reality from the other, an image reinforced by the elusiveness of the sophist—and by extension the elusiveness of the philosopher's identity—who seems to thwart Plato's desires (Plato is not so conclusive or secure as Platonism might make him appear). For Kant, however, there is a chasmic divide between the two general regions of his metaphysics, and it is as if philosophy is obliged to inhabit ontologically simultaneous or parallel universes, which are fundamentally, mutually disjointed.

Kant's "Copernican Revolution" might most succinctly and quite accurately be characterized as an insistence on the necessity of a double analysis. In order to avoid getting bogged down in technicalities—this is not about Kant but about his exercise of the double—I'll revisit his philosophical move with reference to passages from the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* before touching on his *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.*

***

Kant observes that, "Today, philosophers are accustomed to please people by serving up a vague mixture of the empirical and the rational."[19] On the one hand, some philosophers crank out conceptual sludge, treating philosophy's resources as a mishmash, and thereby obliterating a massive domain of distinctions, a domain dominated by the most important distinction of all. Kant cites no specific personages in this passage, so while he no doubt has particular individuals in mind, we might imagine this as perhaps a caricature of salon philosophers (whom Plato would probably have decried as sophists, poseurs). But Kant is not merely posturing and his point rapidly becomes clear: the bottom line is that empiricism—the domain of anthropology but not pure philosophy—inevitably compromises and darkens exercises in illumination since its uneven particularities

and mechanics (including animal mechanics) undermine the prospects for establishing general, universal *principles*, a point graphically illustrated by the uncontrollable intrusion of empirically driven self-interest, the intrusion of "the dear self" when trying to hammer out a metaphysics of morals. Equally so, dogmatic rationalism leaves the world behind. Without peer in his clarity, precision, and ambition, Kant understands, accepts, and tries to take account of everything, which is possible only through a double analysis.

On the other hand, and as Kant makes clear in his metaphysical and epistemological works, staking exclusive claim either to empiricism or to its apparent contrary, rationalism—take your pick, go with the utterly ungrounded, dogmatic contingencies of your preference—generates equally inevitable antinomies from which there is no escape, just philosophical oscillation, a scape that reveals the ultimately arbitrary nature of siding with either route, low road or high (there is no road in between, and there is no divided line establishing a connection!). Abandoning the terms of Plato's ascent, embracing one and forsaking the other is a case of myopic commitment, synonymous with gambling on an unfounded assumption. And—spark turned to light unimagined by Plato—this observation begets Kant's Copernican Revolution, which hinges on the transcendental move.

I will assume familiarity with the maneuvers by which Kant articulates and establishes the categorical imperative, which functions by means of, first, distinguishing between laws of nature and laws of freedom: this distinction is the opening, determinative double in the *Groundwork*. If there is such a thing as morality, observes Kant, it must be associated with a force—the force of ontological necessity—as inexorable as the force associated with laws of nature. Given the inescapable confusion that attends any consideration of everyday life, saturated as it is with contingencies and mixed motivations, Kant insists that only by purging philosophical analysis of anything empirical can we discover the fundamental conditions of morality; he does not ignore the empirical, just filters it out and sets it aside. The crucial outcome of his analysis is the wedding of necessity with freedom. Which is to say that it is by understanding the structures associated with freedom that we can reveal the nature of moral experience. The particularities and ensuing certainties of this project occupy the First and Second sections of the text.

The Third Section, *Going from the Metaphysics of Morals to a Critique of Pure Practical Reason*, is a different story. While Kant's focus here is on autonomy, he notes along the way—a relatively abrupt disruption

in his discourse, a detour—that, "It may seem as though, in the idea of freedom, we have actually presupposed the moral law, the principle of the autonomy of the will itself, as though we could give no proof of its reality and its objective necessity on its own" (Kant 2003, 63), and then he notes "We see a kind of circle from which, it seems, we cannot escape." That Kant acknowledges the threatening possibility that he has built his entire analysis on a presupposition (assumptions are a dime a dozen, why this one rather than that?) is a sign of both his rigor and his candor. But that he then proceeds to propose a resolution is a sign of his ambition: "However," he writes, "there is a way out… a division, however crude it may be, between *the world of the senses* and *the world of the mind*" (Kant 2003, 64–65).

Now, to an inattentive generalist—a lazy reader of the history of philosophy, one perhaps driven by the desire to turn everything into metaphysics, that is, to generalize the particular—this might sound familiar, might, that is, sound like the same story we get if not from the mesmerizing confusions of the cave allegory, preceded by the divided line. But Kant's is a different story from Plato's, a different double. Plato seems to have ontological favorites. But Kant—German, scientific—is compelled to remain neutral. Which in this instance means capable of articulating and sustaining a double vision. So he writes:

> Thus, to the degree that we have constructed our self-image by means of our awareness and sensations, we must be regarded as belonging to the *world of the senses*; yet, to the degree that all this comes down to our unmediated activity (not affected by the senses but arising directly from our consciousness) we must regard ourselves as belonging to *the world of the mind*, although we can get no father into it than this. (Kant 2003, 65)

The last clause is important, since it signals his phenomenology, which I will address momentarily. Before that, though, I will let him finish his thought:

> *First*, insofar as we belong to the world of sensation, we see ourselves as subject to the laws of nature (of *heteronomy*). *Second*, we see ourselves belonging to the intelligible world, subject to laws that are independent of nature, not empirical but grounded in reason alone… This, in turn, is the ground of all actions of *rational* beings, just as natural law is the basis of all things appearing in nature. (Kant 2003, 66)

First, *second*: A twinned recognition signaling the action of the Kantian double. What is most phenomenological is that he is no longer making arguments in a typical fashion but is rather simply engaged in descriptive acts of recognition. Plato's gaze was turned outwards, and so for him, philosophy is fundamentally about seeing the light. But for Kant it is all about not just seeing, but about seeing ourselves, and about the necessity of seeing ourselves from different perspectives, Kant insisting that we view reality from this angle and then from the other, always there will be an other. To reinforce a linkage to later phenomenologies (which we shall take up in Chap. 4), a linkage directly relevant to the motif of the double, what Kant is engaged in methodologically is a formalist exercise in eidetic variation, one that pivots around the observation that we look at the subject from an intrinsically double perspective, one that can be traced back in this text to the distinction between laws of nature and laws of freedom. Looking at the subject from an empirical standpoint yields one set of structures. Looking at the subject from a rational standpoint—what will parlay into the transcendental move—yields an entirely, radically different set of structures. Without acknowledging the reality and necessity of both perspectives (and the reality of their simultaneous separation and relation), philosophy will remain mired in an endless squabble of dueling ideologies. Like Janus, philosophy must have its gaze facing two directions simultaneously. And this is as true for metaphysics and epistemology as it is for ethics.

The Temptations of Reason

His papers always in impeccable order, Kant seems so philosophically fastidious, that it might seem hard to imagine him as anything but in complete command of his deployment of the double, a command seemingly confirmed by the openly double analysis that provides the armature for the entirety of the *Groundwork*. Yet in the *Prolegomena*—as in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, which the *Prolegomena* was written to outline and defend—we see the wild side of Kant, or the wild side not shown but indicated by the Kantian double, half of which is knowable domain, the other half ontologically blockaded by the limits of reason.

Prominent deuces drive Kant's critical philosophy, divisions and pairs in all their modern visages barely akin to Plato's, any distant kinship undergirded not by the content but simply by the appearance of some crucial divisions originally introduced in *The Critique*: analytic and synthetic

judgments, a posteriori and a priori judgments are the most conspicuous sets, recombinations of which also always appear in configurations of two. Synthetic a priori judgments are of course Kant's key to metaphysics since they provide the basis for understanding the structures provided by pure reason, that is, they are the condition for the possibility of the order of experience, for the representation of a coherent world. Regarding metaphysics, the synthetic a priori is the magical combination and the basis for universal principles, which cash out into such irrevocable observations as "'substance is permanent' and 'every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws,' etc."[20] The philosophical punchline, of course—Kant's central insight—is that, "*The understanding does not derive its laws (*a priori*) from, but prescribes them to nature*" (Kant 2001, 58). I revisit this fundamental point only to put it fresh in mind. The sets of divisions that lead to this punchline function as critical tools, and Kant is completely confident about his mastery of them.

Written partly out of frustration at the reception of *The First Critique*, Kant's motivation in *The Prolegomena* is itself dual. First, he aims to establish the conditions for the possibility of metaphysics. Second, and in so doing, he wants to demarcate the limits of reason.[21] The latter point brings us to the ultimate dyad, the distinction and relation between phenomena and noumena (which may be translated into the difference between things as we experience them and things as they are in themselves). While this weighty deuce has profound epistemological implications, it is itself ultimately not epistemological but ontological, which observation reinforces Kant's relevance to my general orientation regarding the problem of the double. Here are some high points of how this plays out in the text:

"Experience therefore can never teach us the nature of things in themselves" (Kant 2001, 35). This is the linchpin of Kant's core insight and thus entire system. A priori principles provide the conditions for all possible experience, but experience is by definition experience of *phenomena*. Thus "the question is not how things in themselves but how the cognition of things is determined… Hence if the pure concepts of the understanding try to go beyond objects of experience and be referred to things in themselves (*noumena*), they have no meaning whatsoever" (Kant 2001, 50–51). Yet the understanding does try to reach beyond experience and thus needs to be disciplined by philosophy in order to remain vigilant about its limits, even if, ironically, it is philosophy that perhaps sets up the terms of the understanding's inclination to overreach:

> Since the oldest days of philosophy, inquirers into pure reason have thought that, besides the things of sense, or appearances (*phenomena*), which make up the sensible world, there are certain beings of the understanding (*noumena*), which should constitute the intelligible world… And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing… The understanding, therefore, by assuming appearances, grants also the existence of things in themselves. (Kant 2001, 53)

And it is in this very assumption of noumenality that the understanding sets itself up for danger, since "There is indeed something seductive in our pure concepts of the understanding which tempts us to a transcendent use—a use which transcends all possible experience" (Kant 2001, 53). Something seductive and tempting: as we shall see throughout this book, these are characteristic marks of the double. Thus, "The imagination may perhaps be forgiven for occasional vagaries and for not keeping carefully within the limits of experience… But the understanding which ought to think can never be forgiven for indulging in vagaries; for we depend on it alone for assistance to set bounds, when necessary, to the vagaries of the imagination" (Kant 2001, 55). Imagination, forgiven. Understanding, chastised, since it operates under an epistemological imperative and has a job to do. And Kant offers advice regarding the means for maintaining discipline: "Since all illusion consists in holding the subjective ground of our judgments to be objective, a self-knowledge of pure reason in its transcendent (hyperbolical) use is the only safeguard against the aberrations into which reasons falls when it mistakes its destination" (Kant 2001, 65).

Finally, unless someone is not really listening to this consistent thread, the terms of which are thoroughly familiar to anyone who has read *The First Critique*, Kant does not give up, but brings the force of his arguments to a head in offering: "The clearest arguments having been adduced, it would be absurd for us to hope that we can know more of any object than belongs to the possible experience of it… But it would be, on the other hand, a still greater absurdity if we conceded no things in themselves or declared our experience to be the only possible mode of knowing things" (Kant 2001, 83).

From the broader standpoint of the problematic of the double, what is most significant here is that while Kant understands part of his job as determining the length of philosophy's leash and reminding philosophy to stay on it, there is a *noumenal* domain, which is not a place but an

imagined profile of reality, more than a hypothesis, but a necessity. The imagination, however, is endlessly tempted to picture it as a place, and, like that tree in a forest, to go there by saying something about it. Inhabited as it is by an overt longing for that which is ontologically inaccessible and unobtainable, the imagination wants to say things it cannot say, wants to speak about things regarding which, by definition, it knows nothing.

Here, the double is doubly sealed. On the one hand, Kant has delineated the limits of understanding. In the very same stroke, he has, if not confirmed, at least acknowledged the possibility of *noumena* while at the same time letting the *noumenal* realm go. Reality is fractured by a chasm, on the edge of which Nietzsche will perform his untimely dance.

A Few Words and Things

In strange ways even more resonant with Kant's *Critique* and *Prolegomena* than his own *The Archaeology of Knowledge*,[22] Foucault's *The Order of Things*[23] is a brilliantly dry yet paradoxically scintillating archaeology of a massive mutation that occurs within the human sciences, an account of a certain staging on which appears a new object of inquiry, the human subject. Chapter 9 is entitled "Man and His Doubles," and it would be a missed opportunity were I to avoid a touching on the message of this chapter as a transition between Kant's double and the world of confusion that follows (the world that will occupy the remainder of this book).

At this late stage in the book, Foucault has spent several hundred pages digging up and documenting the massive historical shift between the "classical" and the modern periods, one marked by the dramatic entrance of the figure of the human subject onto the epistemological stage, "Man"—the human subject—now the central character of a problematic taken an anthropological turn. The grid of Foucault's narrative is itself a certain sort of double, featured by the Nietzschean-inspired contrast[24] between, on the one hand, the classical period, which Foucault associates with the European discursive formation that appears after the Renaissance and extends until mid- to late-eighteenth century, and, on the other hand, the modern period, which Foucault understands as the historical backdrop to where we are now, from which we are perhaps only now beginning to emerge.

The specific discursive shift and contrast tracked by Foucault begins with the clarity embodied by Kant, who, as we have just recounted, draws a lucid line while insisting that the understanding—in the face of what I will call an *existential* longing to exceed the limits or rational propriety—

retain clarity about itself, that is, about the realm of possible experience. In the most general sense an echo of Plato's divisions, Kant's thought pivots around the line and its maintenance (cf. Foucault 1994, 341). But what follows Kant is not the maintenance of the line but a discursive mutation expressed in the materialization of what Foucault calls "the strange empirico-transcendental doublet" (Foucault 1994, 318), not a division but a new, specific confusion, as nature and human nature become indissociable, coextensive fields. For Kant, and sticking to this side of the divide, the empirical is the realm of "common sense" and of that which is most familiar, like the body of a machine, relatively unproblematic from a philosophical visage. Yet according to Foucault's ambitious reading, the dynamics of the empirico-transcendental doublet shift rapidly and dramatically, and soon after Kant, under the auspices of the complications introduced by the anthropological move, the empirical becomes associated with "the unthought" (Foucault 1994, 325): the creature understands itself as a hybrid, fundamentally dual system, knows itself as an animal also, but cannot penetrate its own animality, even as it "articulates itself upon it" (Foucault 1994, 325).

> The unthought (whatever name we give it) is not lodged in man like a shriveled-up nature or a stratified history; it is, in relation to man, the Other: the Other that is not only a brother but a twin, born, not of man, nor in man, but beside him and at the same time, in an identical newness, in an unavoidable duality… Though this double may be close, it is alien, and the role, the true undertaking, of thought will be to bring it as close as possible: the whole of modern thought is imbued with the necessity of thinking the unthought… of becoming absorbed in its silence, or of straining to catch its endless murmur (Foucault 1994, 327).

Here, as we stumble into an Other described as brother, twin, yet alien, we may seem to be looping straight back to Foucault's nemesis, Sartre. But Sartre is only the expression of an ontological dynamic working itself out in time. And Foucault, who knew that Sartre's first published essay was on Nietzsche,[25] knows Nietzsche and knows that something is working itself out in the history of philosophy.

The subject is tracked by ghosts, including the one who eluded Plato's Stranger and the one at chasmic distance from Kant. Put differently, and to anticipate what will become increasingly apparent in the following chapters, the double is intimately conjoined with and expressed in the often conflicted workings of intersubjectivity.

Notes

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Geneaology of Morality*, trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swenson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998), p. 2.
2. Nothing problematic or ironic here, as should become evident once, in the following chapter, we get to Dostoevsky and truly improper philosophy.
3. "I, Plato, am the Truth," Nietzsche, "How the True World Finally Became a Fable: The History of an Error," in Friedrich Nietzsche *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Tracy Strong (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997).
4. Plato, *Cratylus*, trans. Harold Fowler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), 407b.
5. As will become clear in later chapters in this book, the philosophical double, itself admitting of great variation, is not the same as the wild double, which also has seemingly countless forms.
6. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1975).
7. See Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 258.
8. Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," in *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
9. See Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Thought among the Greeks*, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone Books, 2006).
10. Gilles Deleuze, "Plato and the Simulacrum," in Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantine V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 253.
11. Heraclitus of Ephesus, in Freeman, Kathleen, trans., *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 29.
12. Plato, *Gorgias*, trans. W.R.M. Lamb (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1925), line 482a.
13. Apologies to Dr. Michael Bruner.
14. After his defeat of Antony and annexation of Egypt, Octavian made a show of closing the temple doors, signifying that he represented peace for Rome. See Anthony Everitt, *Augustus: The Life of Rome's First Emperor* (New York: Random House, 2006), p. 198.
15. Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), p. 224.
16. Heraclitus (1996, p. 25).
17. Plato, *Theaetetus-Sophist*, trans. Harold North Fowler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), line 254A.

18. This phrase is Deleuze's rendering of Nietzsche's notion of eternal return. See Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), the book that when originally published in 1962 reinvigorated not the study so much as the active use of Nietzsche in contemporary philosophy, arguably Deleuze's most lasting contribution to the history of philosophy.
19. Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993), p. 8.
20. Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Paul Carus with revisions by James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2001).
21. It is relevant to mention Ludwig Wittgenstein, who while not a Kantian at all, was preoccupied in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* with a related objective, namely the distinction between what can, scientifically, be said and what cannot.
22. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982).
23. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).
24. I would argue that while Foucault's distinction has a historical basis, it is also strategic and thus creative in a Nietzschean sense: Nietzsche himself insists on a "historical sensibility," but takes liberties in order to make and score points.
25. Michel Foucault, "Structuralism and Post-structuralism," in Michel Foucault, *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1998), p. 446.

References

Deleuze, Gilles. 1990. *The Logic of Sense*. Trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantine V. Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press.

Derrida, Jacques. 1981. *Dissemination*. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1994. *The Order of Things*. New York: Vintage Books.

Kant, Immanuel. 2001. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Trans. Paul Carus with revisions by James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.

Kant, Immanuel. 2003. *Foundations of Ethics*. Trans. Albert A. Anderson. Millis, MA: Agora Publications.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1975. *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*. Trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press.

CHAPTER 3

Precisely Not Me: The Deuce in Dostoevsky

Second Chance

If Kant represents modern philosophy, Dostoevsky represents modern philosophy's *other* side, a side so other that it appears not in the Prussian form of a critical system but in a Russian form that infuses fiction with philosophy and that in retrospect acquires the appellation "existential," as expressed by Dostoevsky specialist Mikhail Bakhtin, who writes thus: "A man never coincides with himself. One cannot apply to him the formula of identity A=A."[1] Propriety and irony together determine that "Fyodor Dostoevsky" could serve as a metonym for the entirety of existential if not also more broadly philosophical fiction, which is to say that the polyphonic artist's texts could be erected as a *Kolossos*, a substitute or monument for every experimental ontological impulse that courses through later modern literature, including alternative configurations of the double that play out in numerous and determinative forms in Dostoevsky's works, paying particular attention to the interplay between motifs of substitution and inversion, counterfeits, repetitions, eccentric twinnings, and death. My interest is related to but a distinct perspective on what has been described as a "constellation of demonic markers"[2] at work in Dostoevsky's text, and I will emphasize here a highly variegated version of these deuces, which functions as a sort of animated or animating armature.

The obvious maneuver here is to turn to *The Double*—phenomenology has sound methodological reasons for commencing with the obvious—which will function as a Janus-shaded passageway for encounters with

B. Seitz, *Intersubjectivity and the Double*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56375-0_3

even less obvious deployments of the double in the corpus of Dostoevsky, lingering longer over the dark delights of *Crime and Punishment* (as well as taking a fleeting peek at *Dream of a Ridiculous Man*).

What follows is neither a survey nor catalogue, nor an effort at a comprehensive reading of the double in Dostoevsky, just an idiosyncratic sampling. While I will stick close to the text—so close that I may sometimes risk the impression that I am merely repeating it—I will also try to avoid or at least downplay engaging the narrative as such insofar as it is possible, preferring to follow not the story itself but simply, and without forcing it, to track the growing intensity of the dynamic display of deuces and doubles in some St. Petersburg poems. And yet there is a clear objective at work here, since my goal is to trace or reveal a story of doubles, something like a second narrative—a shadow or ghost narrative *already in the story*—in order to expose and help intensify the philosophical significance of the double in Dostoevsky, who did not just make this double up: Omnipresent throughout the entire history of philosophy, the double has an ontological valence and is not merely a literary flourish or technique, nor—in this case—is limited to the expression of a curious nineteenth-century fixation with the Doppelgänger, even if I will begin there, with Dostoevsky's, *The Double*, a relatively late entry in the catalogue of nineteenth-century literary preoccupations with the double.[3] And just as Dostoevsky's double is real, this second narrative or "other" story is not imposed on, nor even extracted from, but is embedded in Dostoevsky's story. While it may function as something like an unconscious, this second narrative is not in any way hidden, nor in need of a hermeneutic, but since it may otherwise remain inconspicuous, it is in need of the sort of intervention in which I will be engaged. More than that, it is this second narrative that enables the line of the story to function the way that it does. In short, Dostoevsky's story is intrinsically double, as is life itself, always haunted.

Ruinations

Julie Buckler observes that the city of St. Petersburg is infused with urban legends of the uncanny, including whispers of apparitions and, more specifically, of doubles.[4] So part of Dostoevsky's genius in writing *The Double: A Petersburg Poem* was not the psycho-literary imagination of a very specific configuration of the Doppelgänger but a translation of the double from oral circulation into writing that retained the specificity and intensity of the city, his works featuring not only the singular surfaces of

St. Petersburg, but also its rich social heteroglossia, voices of the city invited to infiltrate the text. While I will not pursue the ambiguous relationship between oral discourse and written word, it is worth acknowledging and appreciating the sense in which, thanks to Dostoevsky's translation or transubstantiation, one dimension or archaeological layer of nineteenth-century St. Petersburg remains alive, something like an artifact, only still breathing, preserved intact. Does that make Dostoevsky not the opposite of an archaeologist but something more like the archaeologist's double, the archaeologist absorbed in sorting out a complex temporal nexus while Dostoevsky's nineteenth century extricates itself from time?

Meanwhile, try squaring these two observations about that town:

1. "To see better, and to see everything, one must be in Petersburg."[5]
2. "This is a city of half-crazy people" (Dostoevsky 2004, 467).

Sounds like a case of wildly oscillating double vision. In the account that follows, keep an eye on the twos.

Nemesis to Death

In the second sentence of the story, Dostoevsky writes "For some two minutes, however," Yakov Petrovich Goliadkin, "lay motionless on his bed, like a man who is not fully certain whether he is awake or still asleep, whether what is happening around him now is a reality or a continuation of the disordered reveries of his sleep."[6] Second sentence, two minutes, but then being awake or asleep conjoined in uncertainty; this is an auspicious, deuce-skewed introduction to the peculiarly split character of what will turn out to be the haunted Goliadkin, who then looks into the mirror—already not exactly the first doubling but clearly a foreshadowing—and sees a reflection of his bald-pated self, while saying, "What a thing it would be" and then repeats "what a thing it would be if something was amiss with me today, if, for instance, something went wrong?" (Dostoevsky 2007, 4), and then, a few paragraphs later, it begins to go quite psychedelic when a talking samovar substitutes for Goliadkin's servant, Petrushka, who, before long, is wearing a rented livery that is clownishly too large for him, paving the way for Goliadkin's initial charade, our hero showing himself off to be someone he's not while at the same time reassuring himself that this is who he is or should be—"after all, why not?"

all reassurances edged with a very defensively pitched moral judgment—everything seeming strangely normal despite the fact that it's all headed in a very wrong direction.

But before things do go wrong, dear reader, please back up briefly to that mirror. Or return, rather, to Goliadkin's gaze not on himself but on his second, his reflection on and of himself, which reflection of course gazes back at him with an intensity equal but not exactly symmetric with his interest not in himself but in the reflection, which is more than a mere "image"—both positions are either original and originary or mutually determinative character-surfaces—its alterity fixed in the gaze on our hero, literally doubled. The double hinges on reflection, and on the obscurity of the difference between the one and the other.

In this story, the first specific reference to the city itself is to an edge of its heart, the turn from Liteinaya onto Nevsky Prospect,[7] where Goliadkin runs into two colleagues (who intimidate him or make him nervous) and then promptly another, the head of his department, Andrei Filippovich. This pair of encounters provokes a fit of anguish in Goliadkin who asks himself, "Should I… pretend it's not me but someone else strikingly resembling me, and look as if nothing has happened? Precisely not me, not me, and that's that!" (Dostoevsky 2007, 8), an early foreboding of the double that comes to dominate the narrative, which appears here in the form of an obsessive self-consciousness (Who should I be? Not me!).

Detour to the doctor, Krestyan Ivanovich—intimations that something is not right—and then back to Nevsky and more specifically to Gostiny Dvor, where Goliadkin makes his bizarre round of shops, bargaining his way through purchases while promising along the way that he's going to pay at the end of the day without any intention whatsoever of following through, a passage that might have been slightly less extraordinary, perhaps merely a feint, had he not actually made two curious acquisitions, one, a pair of gloves, the other a bottle of scent (Dostoevsky 2007, 22). While cologne suggests a whiff of diversion, what are gloves but a hand's double, attention to the uncanniness of which is usually diverted by the hand itself?

At a restaurant, Goliadkin encounters the two colleagues he'd seen earlier. When one asks, "But what is it with you, all scented, all pomaded, such a dandy?" he repeats to them a version of what he'd uttered to himself before: "You all know me, gentlemen, but so far you know me from only one side… Till now, gentlemen, you have not known me… There are people, gentlemen, who dislike roundabout paths and mask themselves only for masked balls… I'm not an intriguer, and I'm proud of it.

I wouldn't make a good diplomat. They also say, gentlemen, that the bird flies to the fowler. That's true, and I'm ready to agree: but who is the fowler here, and who is the bird? That's still a question, gentlemen!" (Dostoevsky 2007, 24–25). Is Goliadkin the hunter or the hunted? In short, our hero is spruced up in a way that his colleagues have never seen before, and when they ask for an explanation, his final question indicates that even he cannot give a clear answer but he's represented the terms of the answer by means of a wildly asymmetrical pair, one that prefigures the peculiar dynamic soon to appear.

Continuing on his confused way, and arriving at what might be described as somewhere not exactly his destination, certainly somewhere he did not belong, and "he did not know what he was going to do with himself, because at that moment he was decidedly neither dead nor alive" (Dostoevsky 2007, 25). Being somewhere he is not supposed to be in a certain sense really makes him "not," the only way to comprehend the sense in which our hero might be neither dead nor alive. This in-between condition is exacerbated by the fact that he's refused entry at the house of State Councillor Olsufy Ivanovich Berendeev, from which he is forced to retreat. But not for long!

The event from which Goliadkin has been ejected is the birthday celebration for Olsufy Ivanovich's daughter, Klara Olsufyevna, object of our hero's affections, whose figure he'd just glimpsed through the second-floor window. Opening elements of the party are described at the beginning of Chapter IV, but not by Goliadkin and nor by Dostoevsky either since the narrator's pen is "too weak, sluggish, and dull for a proper portrayal of the ball" (Dostoevsky 2007, 33), clearly then neither the pen of "the writer," the one who could be said to be bearing witness to our hero's accelerating tribulations. And what he and we are witnessing right now is Goliadkin standing for nearly three hours in the darkness of the back stairs of Olsufy Ivanovich's apartment (Dostoevsky 2007, 34), the reference to time here functioning to intensify the absurdity of the actual place in which Goliadkin is lurking, his oblique sequence of thoughts ending with "'What a little fool, what a Goliadka—that's what your name is!'" (Dostoevsky 2007, 35), a detail of relevance here because it is as if this self-reminder signifies that he were on the verge of becoming detached from his self. Having finally resolved to go home (Dostoevsky 2007, 36), he does just the opposite, bursting into the ballroom, crashing the party from which he has already been once ejected, and—oblivious of everyone in the room aside from Klara Olsufyevna—he repeats to himself who he is

not, namely "not an intriguer" (Dostoevsky 2007, 37). He casts a glance at Andrei Fillipovich, who gives Goliadkin "such a look that, if our hero had not already been fully, completely destroyed, he would certainly have been destroyed a second time" (Dostoevsky 2007, 37).

The most awkward moment in this absolutely awkward situation (painfully displayed in a passage that goes on for pages) is when Goliadkin reaches his hand out to Klara Olsufyevna, who is so stunned that she takes it before promptly panicking. For a fleeting moment there thus exists the appearance of a pair (Dostoevsky 2007, 41), although since it is in fact a mistake—a simulation of heterosexual duality, even an ontological error—it is a double of sorts, namely a mock double, mockery being a close and frequent attendant of the double. And then for the second time Goliadkin is expelled from the party, his expulsion setting the stage for the appearance of he who will become his worst nightmare, the beginning of the end.

Losing his galosh (boot's double) as he struggles in mixed rain and snow—miserable weather cutting through any difference between interior and exterior life—our hero stares in a state of despair into "the muddy black water of the Fontanka," that is, water that at this moment cannot show him his reflection. Suddenly, he senses that someone had been standing next to him: "However, there was nothing new, nothing special struck Mr. Goliadkin's eye. It seemed that everything was in order, as it ought to be" (Dostoevsky 2007, 45). Then a man passes him, walking quickly, like Goliadkin, and dressed like him. Beat. Our hero closes his eyes in order to try "not to think about anything at all" (Dostoevsky 2007, 47), and when he opens them, he sees the same man approaching him and stops ten paces away, prompting Goliadkin to say, "Excuse me, perhaps I'm mistaken," and then he recognizes the man, who he had seen often before, although "there was nothing special about him… Mr. Goliadkin knew this man perfectly well; he even knew what he was called, knew what the man's last name was; yet not for anything… would he wanted to have named him" at which point he breaks into a run, stumbles, and in a proverbial sense the other shoe drops, that is, his "other boot became orphaned, also abandoned by its galosh" (Dostoevsky 2007, 48), two boots exposed to the weather.

When he sees the stranger again, the two are walking in the same direction until they reach Shestilavochnaya and the stranger stops in front of Goliadkin's house and disappears within. When Goliadkin gets into his apartment, he discovers that "His night companion was none other than

himself—Mr. Goliadkin himself, another Mr. Goliadkin, but perfectly the same as himself—in short, what is known as his double in all respects" (Dostoevsky 2007, 50).

The following morning, the wild events of the previous night return to him upon waking, but strangely enough there is no mention of Goliadkin's double; effectively, it is as if the double has appeared but not yet shown himself, not until Goliadkin gets to the office. When the double does appear seated across from our hero at his own work desk, he is described as Goliadkin's "horror," "shame," and "nightmare from yesterday, in short, he was Mr. Goliadkin himself" and "nothing, decidedly nothing, had been overlooked for a complete likeness, so that… no one, decidedly no one, would have undertaken to determine precisely which was the real Goliadkin and which was the counterfeit, which was the old and which the new, which the original and which the copy" (Dostoevsky 2007, 55). The differences and asymmetry between the two will of course show themselves, but the ontological complication at this juncture is that the notion of the original and copy is rendered so moot that Goliadkin himself is stupefied to hear a colleague admit a "certain sort of familial resemblance… when here it was like looking in a mirror!… You know, sometimes there are twins like that, that is, exactly like two drops of water, so there's no telling them apart" (Dostoevsky 2007, 57). The next thing we know, our hero has brought his "guest" home with him, and the two have an actual if not also peculiar and extraordinarily affectionate exchange, with Goliadkin-the-second's inferior status—"Goliadkin Jr."—simply a rehearsal for the reversal of their mutually hierarchical relation, a reversal portending of doom.

The following morning, the double himself has vanished, and our hero thinks, "I wish I knew precisely what in particular is hidden here—the goal, the direction, the various hitches" (Dostoevsky 2007, 75), so the pleasantries and pleasures of the previous evening have clearly not defused the sense of impending danger. The turn occurs in the office (Chapter VIII), when "Mr. Goliadkin Jr. seemed not to notice Mr. Goliadkin Sr., though they met almost nose-to-nose" (Dostoevsky 2007, 76). Our hero observes to his colleague, Anton Antonovich, that "people who wear masks are no longer a rarity, sir, and that it is now hard to recognize the man behind the mask, sir" (Dostoevsky 2007, 78), and soon the second G. has begun displacing Goliadkin in his official position, and the latter is rapidly trying to persuade himself that "it's a completely impossible thing" (Dostoevsky 2007, 82). By closing time at the end of the day, the tables

have radically turned, and when our hero says, "'But allow me to tell you, my dear sir, that your game is extremely convoluted,'" the imposter responds, "'Who says so? It's my enemies who say so…' It seemed that all was lost for Mr. Goliadkin" (Dostoevsky 2007, 87), who is thrown back onto his exaggerated self-consciousness, which, given Jr.'s diabolical trajectory, is characterized by a desperate desire to simplify the problem in order to make it go away:

> Well, so, suppose, for example, that we're twins, that we were born like that, twin brothers, and that's all—that's the way it is! Well, what of it? Well, it's nothing!… There's even something touching here, say, there's such a thought: that, say, God's design created two perfect likenesses, and our beneficent superiors, seeing God's design, gave shelter to both twins… of course, it would be better if none of these touching things existed, and there were also no twins… Lord God! What a nice kettle of fish the devil's cooked up! See, though, what a character he has, what a playful, nasty temper—what a scoundrel he is, what a fidget, a smoocher, a lickspittle, what a Goliadkin!… And he'll supplant a man, supplant him, the scoundrel—he'll supplant a man like an old rag and never consider that a man is not an old rag. Ah, Lord God! What a misfortune! (Dostoevsky 2007, 91–92).

The extent of that misfortune is signaled clearly when, in a restaurant, Goliadkin notices that "in the doorway, which, incidentally, till then our hero had taken for a mirror, stood a little fellow—stood he, Mr. Goliadkin himself—not the old Mr. Goliadkin, not the hero of our story, the other Mr. Goliadkin, the new Mr. Goliadkin" (Dostoevsky 2007, 93). This is too much, mistaking his diabolical double for a mirror. The incident pushes our hero over the edge, and he storms home and writes a letter to his other, whom he implores to restore "everything as it was before" (Dostoevsky 2007, 95), and he sends his servant, Petrushka off to deliver it, and before long, Petrushka is threatening to quit Goliadkin's employment (and to go work where Goliadkin2 is living!), saying "'I'll go to good people… Good people live honestly, good people live without falseness, and they never come in twos… Yes, sir… they never come in twos'" (Dostoevsky 2007, 102), and of course, Petrushka is partially right, even if he does not understand that the dilemma in which our hero finds himself is precisely that in mocking the difference between reality and appearance, the figure of the double simultaneously undermines the very grounds of the distinction between truth and falsity (plus maybe also being human means being shadowed by the double). Which, perhaps, is why the first

four pages of Chapter X are occupied by a dream, which culminates in images of doubles proliferating, perfect likenesses all chasing each other, sending our hero into a state of horror, pain, torment, anguish (Dostoevsky 2007, 108–111). The consequence of the dream or of waking from it is that Goliadkin writes yet another letter to his nemesis, this time insisting, "Either you or me, but two of us is impossible!" (Dostoevsky 2007, 113), closing with *a challenge to a duel.*

What does happen is that Goliadkin2 secures his subsumption of Goliadkin's position at the department, destroying our hero's reputation in the process, and prompting Goliadkin to repeat—this time to a colleague—"What we have here is God's design creating two perfect likenesses, and our beneficent superiors, seeing God's design, gave shelter to both twins, sir" (Dostoevsky 2007, 126), but of course, this statement turns in on itself since its conditions are the reverse of its claims, that is, it is not God's design, the likenesses are not perfect, their superiors are not beneficent, and it is already too late for Goliadkin to find shelter from his diabolical "twin" or from even himself.

Soon, Goliadkin is more than apologizing to Goliadkin2 for the second letter, begging "I implore you to read it the other way round—quite the other way round, that is, with a deliberately friendly intention, giving the contrary sense to all the words of my letter" (Dostoevsky 2007, 134), leading the reader to wonder, what is the contrary of a duel, and how can a letter be read contrariwise?

Shortly later, and immediately following a strange chase scene—Goliadkin after Goliadkin2 (who the fowler, who the bird?)—Goliadkin remembers a letter he'd been given and pocketed earlier in the day, and is stunned to find that it is, apparently, from Klara Olsufyevna, a proposal that they meet at "exactly two a.m." in order to elope (Dostoevsky 2007, 138–139), that number two continuing to cycle into the story with regularity and persistence, as Goliadkin soon takes two steps back after dropping and breaking a vial of medicine prescribed by Krestyan Ivanovich, prompting our hero to exclaim, "'That means my life's in danger!'" Indeed, when he gets home, he receives a letter terminating his employment (Dostoevsky 2007, 140), and then—odd reflection, odd double—Petrushka is packing to quit Goliadkin in order to work for the woman with whom Goliadkin2 is boarding. Before long, Goliadkin is immersed in yet another intense and circuitous internal dialogue, which features the thought that "Things aren't done this way, and imposture doesn't get anywhere with us; an imposter, my good sir, is a man who is—useless and of no use to the

fatherland… What am I babbling, like an utter fool!" (Dostoevsky 2007, 146). And what is most remarkable here is that he seems to be addressing both his Doppelgänger and himself at the same time, and also that he finds himself on Liteinaya, where "The weather was terrible; there was a thaw, heavy snow fell, rain came—exactly as in that unforgettable time, at the dreadful midnight hour, when all of Mr. Goliadkin's misfortunes had begun," that is, when he'd first encountered his nemesis. "He's a different man, Your Excellency, and I'm a different man; he's separate and I'm also my own man; I'm really my own man, Your Excellency; really my own man; so there. I'll say, I can't resemble him; change it, if you please, order it changed—and do away with the godless, unwarranted substitute" (Dostoevsky 2007, 148). And before long, as if the previous words were a rehearsal destined for repetition, he is back at Berendeev's house in order to try to explain and justify himself (as if anyone would be interested). Once inside, "In a doorway which till then our hero had been taking for a mirror, as had happened to him before—*he* appeared—we all know who, an extremely close acquaintance and friend of Mr. Goliadkin's," his "mean twin" (Dostoevsky 2007, 152 & 153).

Goliadkin's vile other bids him farewell as he is ejected yet again from Olsufy Ivanovich's house. "'However, so far it's all not so bad,' our sturdy and undaunted hero added… Adding that it was all nothing, our hero tried to seat himself on a rather thick block of wood that lay near a the pile of firewood in Olsufy Ivanovich's courtyard," a posting that makes him somewhat of a stalker, even if he believes himself to be waiting for a prearranged signal from Klara Olsufyevna, despite the fact that there is no such prearranged signal. "'Did I get the date wrong?'" he asks himself, reaching into his pocket only to discover that the letter is not there (Dostoevsky 2007, 155–157), thereby leaving us—dear reader—*to question ourselves* since we might be inclined to wonder if the letter ever existed, even though we ourselves have already read it.

Following a "Judas kiss" from Goliadkin2 (Dostoevsky 2007, 167), a familiar figure appears, and our hero hears "'This, this is Krestyan Ivanovich Rutenspritz, doctor of medicine and surgery, your old acquaintance, Yakov Petrovich!' someone's disgusting voice chirped right in Mr. Goliadkin's ear. He turned: it was Mr. Goliadkin's twin, repulsive in the qualities of his soul" (Dostoevsky 2007, 167–168). In a crowd of people, he is shoved into a carriage with the doctor, and then the people eventually thin out and disappear, although the "indecent twin" lingers longest, and the carriage takes off, and suddenly Goliadkin notices that "This was not Krestyan Ivanovich!

Who was it? Or was it him? Him! It was Krestyan Ivanovich, only not the former, but another Krestyan Ivanovich! This was a terrible Krestyan Ivanovich!" (Dostoevsky 2007, 169) and "Our hero cried out and clutched his head. Alas! he had long foreseen it!" (Dostoevsky 2007, 170).

***

The double delivered by this tale turns out to be an impossible or aporetic disjunction invoked by the inevitability of the obvious question, is Goliadkin mad? But that obvious question and its destination may be translated into a syllogism, one in this case implicitly proffered by Dostoevsky:

- If Goliadkin is mad, then there is no double, no *Doppelgänger*.
- We have witnessed the double for ourselves.
- Conclude: Therefore, Goliadkin is not mad, and, by extension, *the double exists*, although which one of the many displayed, we cannot be sure, and so we must accept the entire concatenation and spectrum of possibilities, including the proliferation of doubles at the end, which are doubles of not Goliadkin but his doctor.[8]

This not necessarily valid nor invalid but certainly loopy syllogism characterizes the specific configuration of the double shown in this story. From the standpoint of logic, it is clearly a cousin with the Underground Man's confrontation with "the wall" and with the laws of nature. What it shares in common with other doubles is the inevitability of the deathly shadow that stalks not only Goliadkin, who is clearly doomed, but also the reader, who is also clearly doomed, doomed for reasons simultaneously illuminated and shrouded by Dostoevsky's St. Petersburg poem. What this is all supposed to "mean" would be up for grabs were we not to acknowledge that meaning is overrated. What we witness in this story is not meaning but deadly shadows.

Partners in Crime

The doubles at work throughout *Crime and Punishment* tend to be of a variety different from and, in a Derridean sense, less restricted than those tailing Goliadkin, although they, too, may be associated with both madness and with being haunted. In this case, the doubles are so ubiquitous

and multifarious that they seem to defy the conditions necessary for the emergence of a hero of any sort, and are related to a certain consistently expanding "asymmetry" of the variety represented by Goliadkin's fowler and bird (this despite the fact that Raskolnikov, too, is eventually hunted down). Whoever the fowler, the double is a strange bird.

In the case of *Crime and Punishment*, while I will no doubt neglect, pass over, or simply be blind to many of its instances—the double could never be enclosed since one of the things it represents is the very impossibility of enclosure or of finality—I will again follow the course of and yet try to downplay the overt narrative, thus tracking and trying to identify something like a second narrative in order to represent a prominent dimension of the novel's unconscious and to facilitate the exposure of as many configurations of the double as seem philosophically significant; the structure of the sequence is necessary for uncovering the double, which in so many ways propels the story, even if the fleshed-out narrative would distract from the problem at hand or get in the way. Put differently, my story will make sense only to someone already familiar with Dostoevsky's.

Doubles appear at the outset of the novel in the form of Raskolnikov's relentless chatter, which is not just "internal" but is either addressed to or dialogically implicates others, penetrating the reader and effectively modeling a form of consciousness that is always outside of itself (a phenomenological axiom—intentionality—already understood by Dostoevsky). Then, in an intertextual echo of Goliadkin's gloves, the first definite double one might identify is Raskolnikov's hat, which, he observes to himself, is *the wrong kind* of hat, one that "will be remembered later" (Dostoevsky 2004, 5), so through anticipation—*now* and *then*—he is already engaging in an act of double-thinking that cuts through time. While this instance involves an object, too, it is a matter different from the acts of substitution involved in pawning objects for money, in this case a watch for a ruble and a half (Dostoevsky 2004, 9), the transformation of a specific object into an abstraction, money the very abstraction that will compel the crime, although the fact that Raskolnikov will miss the money in the commission of the crime plunges a tangible goal back into the intangible, thus marking a signal failure.[9] These doublings are also quite different from Marmeladov's claim that "'I drink, for I wish doubly to suffer!'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 16), in this case, as in so many others, doubling having the effect of amplification.

The number two keeps repeating as if it had followed Raskolnikov from a previous story, or from his life before the story begins. Citing just

a couple of early instances associated with this number, "it is over two months now since I've spoken with you in writing" (Dostoevsky 2004, 30), written in a letter that is itself two sheets long (Dostoevsky 2004, 9).

Then possibly the first deeply queer note occurs when Raskolnikov dubs the stranger lasciviously trailing the young, drunken girl "Svidrigailov." Although R. already knows from his mother's letter that S. is the landowner who had been Dunya's employer and who had tried to seduce and run away with her (etc.), he has not yet met Svidrigailov, and so it is quite strange that the name should come to him so effortlessly. Read literally, R.'s invocation of Svidrigailov's name is simply a way of calling the man a lecher and, given the girl's intoxicated and thus vulnerable condition, a potential rapist, a force of destruction. A reference to the future of the mutual relation between Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov, this is a loaded intimation that exceeds a literal reading regarding a large, sleazy stranger who "could take on two men like him" (Dostoevsky 2004, 47).

And then, following this detour, Raskolnikov remembers where he's going, to visit his only friend from university, Razumikhin. However, as if he were drifting into or already in a dream, he does not remember why he's going to visit him and begins brooding over his own possibly sinister motivations, and then, abandoning his purpose, he crosses the Little Neva onto Petrovsky Island, crawls into the bushes, falls asleep, and has an actual dream, which prompts me to explicitly emphasize what may be obvious, which is that *a dream is always a double*, never just an "alternative reality," always tenuously tied to and reflective of the waking world. In a strange paragraph not in Raskolnikov's head, this particular dream is described in almost clinical fashion as "morbid" (Dostoevsky 2004, 54).

The dream revolves around a complex and extended image of a group of drunken people tormenting and finally killing an old horse. The *old mare* is beaten with various objects; someone suggests using an axe, which does not happen, but the image of an axe reappears when Raskolnikov actually awakens from the dream, asking himself, "'Can it be that I will really take an axe and hit her on the head and smash her skull… Lord, can it be?'" He ponders the previous day's visit to Alyona Ivanovna, the pawnbroker—a trial run, clearly a rehearsal for what is to be repeated—and in the wake of the dream he finds himself now decrying, "'I couldn't endure it!'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 59), and he feels relieved and renounces his dream and declares himself free of his obsession, a self-inverting declaration that effectively seals his fate.

And yet rather than going directly home, he takes another detour, this time through Sennaya Ploschad—the Haymarket—where he happens to overhear a conversation with Lizaveta Ivanovna, the pawnbroker's sister (representing yet another pair), in which he learns that she, Lizaveta, will not be home at a certain point the following day, that is, "that the old woman *would be left home alone*" a piece of information quite useful for the commission of a crime (Dostoevsky 2004, 62). This reminds Raskolnikov of another eerie conversation he'd overheard in a tavern, as if his intentions were outside of him, not he but *someone else* had imagined the justification for knocking off the very same Alyona Ivanovna, who "doesn't deserve to be alive" (Dostoevsky 2004, 65), and in which killing her is described as achieving justice while not killing her would mean the opposite, justice itself now caught up in the turning tables of yet another kind of double. Raskolnikov was agitated hearing this earlier conversation, since he'd already, independently had exactly the same thought, his thought now expressed in the words of a stranger, as if the plan had a life of its own and were moving forward with him not as an agent but as an instrument of powers beyond him, as if, that is, he were in the clutches of another's intentions, "as though there were indeed some predestination, some indication in it" (Dostoevsky 2004, 66).

Two inches wide is the fabric strip he folds in two then sews into his coat, a loop from which to hang and hide the murder weapon, the idea for which Raskolnikov had had two weeks before (Dostoevsky 2004, 68). The dummy "pledge" he carries for the pawnbroker, which is made of two different objects, wood and iron, tied together, is intended to double for a cigarette case, a decoy to briefly distract the pawnbroker. These preparations made, things start going wrong immediately. Raskolnikov is not able to steal his landlady's axe, but he does find one elsewhere—a substitute, maybe the wrong weapon ("wrong" like his hat had seemed wrong)—laying between two logs and he proceeds on his way.

Dostoevsky's references to specific places in Petersburg are utterly inconsistent, as he frequently, and with no apparent logic, masks proper nouns (e.g. K_____y). At this juncture, though, Raskolnikov passes the Yusupov Garden, and then imagines a *reconfiguration* of the Summer Garden, the Field of Mars, and the garden of the Mikhailovsky Palace, these very specific references as much about what is in R.'s head than in what is around him, and he observes that "It must be the same for men being led out to execution—their thoughts must cling to every object they meet on the way," Dostoevsky's actual experience before a firing squad

now dialogically inserted into and actively displacing and at the same time amplifying the consciousness of Raskolnikov (Dostoevsky 2004, 73).

Physical space remains in the foreground; R. enters the building, passes an apartment on the second floor—the door open wide, painters working within—then notes that Alyona Ivanovna's apartment is yet two more floors above, the twos continue returning (Dostoevsky 2004, 73–74); it takes him two minutes to fuss with the key strung around the bloodied neck of the pawnbroker's dead body, and there are two crosses on the string holding the key (Dostoevsky 2004, 78). This proliferation of twos portends nothing in itself but reinforces or intensifies all of the more complicated doubles that accelerate as the novel develops, acceleration immediately entering the scene here in the unexpected form of Lizaveta, who would function as a witness to Raskolnikov's crime did she not become the second victim in what is now a double murder, sisters bound in death (Dostoevsky 2004, 79). And then two voices in the distance, arguing and swearing, and then two people knocking on the door to visit the sisters. In an effort to hide, Raskolnikov dashes into the now-empty second-floor apartment in which the painters had previously been working (Dostoevsky 2004, 81–85).

I will pass over various simple twos that pepper the text, but will mention the more complex double signaled by the summons to the police station, which is both real insofar as he owes his landlady money but also a literary or philosophical feint insofar as it is not about the murders, not, that is, until Raskolnikov overhears two police officers discussing the crime.

Having retrieved his meager booty—traces of the crime—from the hiding place in the wall, Raskolnikov wanders, hides the loot under a rock, passes the spot where he'd encountered the drunken girl and "Svidrigailov" two days before, and then, on Vasilievsky Island, discovers that "I seem to have brought myself to Razumikhin! The same story all over again… I said… two days ago… that I'd go and see him the day after *that*; well, so I'll go!" (Dostoevsky 2004, 110). And he does, but it is an awkward encounter, and Raskolnikov soon departs.

Standing on the Nikolaevsky Bridge, a woman hands him twenty kopecks, apparently *mistaking him for a beggar* (Dostoevsky 2004, 112). Later, in a feverish sleep, R. dreams that Ilya Petrovich, the police officer, was beating his landlady, an odd oneiric substitution.

When Raskolnikov finally emerges several days later from his delirium, Razumikhin is among the several people there in his room, and it is clear

that he, Razumikhin, is one of Raskolnikov's doubles, a poverty-stricken former student, only one who is sane (Dostoevsky 2004, 121).

In a conversation that appears to be about the handling of the murder case on the part of the police, Razumikhin makes several peculiar statements: "Not that they're lying; lying can always be forgiven; lying is a fine thing, because it leads to the truth" and "But facts are not everything; at least half the game is knowing how to handle the facts!" (Dostoevsky 2004, 135). Doublings abound here, but the really eerie thing in this passage is that Razumikhin accurately reconstructs the murderers' movements as he escaped the building, and he does so in the presence of Raskolnikov (Dostoevsky 2004, 142), which prompts the latter to say, "'Must be a cunning and experienced rogue! What boldness! What determination!'" to which Razumikhin responds, "'But he's not, that's precisely the point!… Assume calculation and a cunning rogue and it all looks improbable. Assume an inexperienced man, and it looks as if he escaped disaster only by chance… They found fifteen hundred roubles in hard cash and notes besides! He couldn't even rob, all he could do was kill!'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 150). The simple truth begins to emerge: Raskolnikov is not who he thought he was, and a process of reversal has begun. But before departing this exchange, it is equally interesting and relevant to the theme of the double to observe that while Luzhin has just articulated a philosophy of rational egoism[10] (Dostoevsky 2004, 148ff.)—the very articulation of which indicates its absurdity—Raskolnikov tells him, "Get to the consequences of what you've just been preaching, and it will turn out that one can go around putting a knife in people" (Dostoevsky 2004, 151), thus distancing himself from the experimental thoughts that have led him to justify the crime, which is to say that he now poses as someone other than the criminal, which is today other than himself.

Raskolnikov seems unable to bear his guilt, and in a stray encounter with the policeman, Zamyotov, makes what comes so close to a confession that Zamyotov says to him, "'You're either crazy, or…'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 162) and he does not fill in the word "guilty." And then, dancing with the devil, Raskolnikov goes on a tirade about incompetent crooks—counterfeiters, criminals openly devoted to the double!—who get caught, clearly both talking about himself and at the same time not talking about himself, his discourse itself a counterfeit. Zamyotov responds, "'It's all just talk; in reality you'd be sure to make a slip'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 163).

Just after, Razumikhin tells our hero, "'Some little suffering comes along, and you brood over it like a hen over an egg! Even there you

steal from other authors! There isn't a sign of independent life in you!'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 167), and of course he's right, how could there be any independent life for a character attended and defined by so many doubles?

***

Bridges are the condition of the possibility of St. Petersburg and thus feature prominently in Dostoevsky's representation of the city; the next significant double that Raskolnikov encounters is a woman on a bridge. Maybe R. is going to jump off—maybe not?—and maybe this woman is acting on his thoughts before he has them, as she leaps into the water, and it's at least her second recent suicide attempt, and the fact that she gets saved is less significant than the connection between R.'s own suicidal thoughts and his subsequent return to the scene of the crime (Dostoevsky 2004, 169ff.), a mad form of repetition.

The door to Alyona Ivanovna's apartment is open, there are workmen in it, he enters, and, as if he were a ghost, they do not even notice him at first. Eventually, he proposes that they all go to the police station. "But no reply came from anywhere; everything was blank and dead, like the stones he was walking on, dead for him, for him alone" (Dostoevsky 2004, 174). The stones are dead, and Raskolnikov is dead, too.

Straightaway from there—dead to dead—Marmeladov is run over, and Nikodim Fomich—chief of police—says to Raskolnikov, "'But really, you're all soaked with blood,'… making out by the light of the lantern several fresh spots of blood on Raskolnikov's waistcoat." Does that make him a corpse? (Dostoevsky 2004, 186). Is a blood-spattered murderer a corpse?

Then he's again on the bridge from which the woman had earlier attempted suicide (Dostoevsky 2004, 188). Two steps away, a conspicuous number turned into motion; two serving girls with two samovars: "'To bed without delay… I've already prepared it… a little powder' 'Or two, even,' Raskolnikov replied" (Dostoevsky 2004, 189).

And then, his mother and sister are waiting for him, and "he stood like a dead man" (Dostoevsky 2004, 192) before the two women. More simple twos follow before Razumikhin says, "'Lying is man's only privilege over other organisms. If you lie—you get to the truth! Lying is what makes me a man'" but then only paragraphs later he claims to be speaking sincerely (Dostoevsky 2004, 202–203), which means that he is speaking out of both sides of his mouth.

An awkward conversation deteriorates into heavy silence, which Pulcheria Alexandrovna abruptly breaks by marking a morbid double:

"'What an awful apartment you have, Rodya; like a coffin,'" to which he responds, "'But if you knew what a strange thought you just said, mama,'" because she does not know how dead he really is (Dostoevsky 2004, 231). At this juncture, the difficulty in maintaining conversation is becoming unbearable for R., but he has to make one fundamental point to his sister, which is, "'It's either me or Luzhin. I may be vile, but you must not be. One of us is enough,'" as if there were any escaping a web of twos (Dostoevsky 2004, 232).

Enter Sofya Semyonovna Marmeladov (Dostoevsky 2004, 235), on whom Raskolnikov had not laid eyes until the day before (worth flagging that fact that while Sonya is a good girl forced into prostitution, Dunya is a "prostitute" in selling herself off to Luzhin, i.e. the difference between these two characters is ambiguous). Sonya has arrived on behalf of her mother in order to invite Raskolnikov to her father's funeral, a curious affair since the funeral will be paid for by money given by Raskolnikov to Marmeladov's family, money first given by his mother to him.

A mysterious man follows Sonya back to her lodgings, an anonymous creep. "'We're neighbors,'" he says when he catches up to her at her door, but it is not she for whom he will develop into a dark and decisive double (Dostoevsky 2004, 243ff.).

And now into the belly of the beast, Raskolnikov and Razumikhin go to visit Razumikhin's "distant relative," Porfiry Petrovich, who happens to be the officer in charge of the murder investigation. Raskolnikov has "business" with the policeman, namely, that he wants to retrieve a silver watch that he had loaned to the pawnbroker, a game whose danger is made clear when Porfiry Petrovich says to R., "'Your things would not be lost in any event… because I've been sitting here a long time waiting for you'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 252), intimations of the fowler and the bird, cat and mouse. Raskolnikov's thoughts go wild, but perhaps not as wild as Porfiry Petrovich's remark that "'Just imagine what they got on to yesterday, Rodya: is there such a thing as crime or not?'" and Razumikhin defuses or displaces the tension by bemoaning social scientific deferral to environmental conditions as the cause of "crime" (Dostoevsky 2004, 256–257).

At this point, Porfiry Petrovich reveals that he had recently read the latter's article "On Crime" in *Periodical Discourse*. Raskolnikov is of course surprised both by reference to his article and also by hearing that it had been published, noting that he'd submitted to *Weekly Discourse*, not *Periodical*, and that *Weekly* had "ceased to exist" (and by implication that

the article was thus never published) and P.P. says, yes, but *Weekly* then merged with *Periodical Discourse*, and this confusion and Raskolnikov's belief that the article had never been published serve only to defer getting to its point, the central philosophical theme of which is that "'All people are divided into the 'ordinary' and the 'extraordinary'… and that the extraordinary have the right to transgress the law'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 258–259). The question hovering on the edge of this passage, then, is to which of these two categories does Raskolnikov belong?

Reference to his article prompts Raskolnikov to launch into a speech, in which he mentions, first, Napoleon and, second, those with "'the gift or talent for speaking a *new word*'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 260). Implicitly claiming Napoleon as a double is delusional (not to mention simply bizarre coming from a nineteenth-century Russian). Regarding a new word, well, in the final analysis it will turn out that Raskolnikov is thrown back on *repeating the old word*. Which is probably relevant to the fact that in response to Raskolnikov's speech, Porfiry Petrovich mentions the biblical Lazarus, this for the second time in just a few pages, although the earlier reference is to Lazarus the beggar (Dostoevsky 2004, 246) while this second reference is to Lazarus raised from the dead (Dostoevsky 2004, 261), the two biblical Lazaruses. This deep double—the twinning of Raskolnikov with the brother of Mary—becomes quietly and yet inexorably determinative for the remainder of *Crime and Punishment*.

Raskolnikov's theoretical justification for crime aside, the police do have circumstantial yet nevertheless material evidence linking him to the pawnbroker, namely not only his pledges—his literal material doubles—on which she had marked his name, but also the conspicuous reality that he is the last one to step forward to claim his pledges. The police clearly suspect him. After the pair leave Porfiry Petrovich's house, Raskolnikov tells Razumikhin, "'They have no facts, however, not a one—it's all a mirage, all double-ended, just a fleeting idea'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 268). And then, Raskolnikov repeats the murder in a dream (Dostoevsky 2004, 277). When he awakens, it is to the visage of Svidrigailov. Raskolnikov wonders if he is still dreaming (Dostoevsky 2004, 278–280). These two characters have begun to intermingle.

"Only" *twice* is how many times Svidrigailov had struck his now-deceased wife, Marfa Petrovna, with a riding crop (Dostoevsky 2004, 282). Listening to the story, Raskolnikov wants to leave, but he does not. Svidrigailov mentions how his now-dead wife, Marfa Petrovna, had paid off his gambling debt, and then it sounds as if he were changing the topic

when he asks, "'By the way, do you believe in ghosts?'" a strange turn given all of the hauntings already at work in this story (Dostoevsky 2004, 286). In the case of Svidrigailov, it is his dead wife who has visited him, although he admits that he had also once seen the ghost of a household serf. "'You should see a doctor,'" says Raskolnikov, issuing advice that clearly applies to himself or equally to himself. And this is just the point, as Svidrigailov proceeds to observe that "'ghosts come only to sick people'" and then, as if he were quoting someone else, he continues:

> As soon as a man gets sick, as soon as the normal earthly order of his organism is disrupted, the possibility of another world at once begins to make itself known, and the sicker one is, the greater the contact with this other world, so that when a man dies altogether, he goes to the other world directly. I've been reasoning it out for a long time. If one believes in a future life, one can believe in this reasoning (Dostoevsky 2004, 286).

Raskolnikov promptly responds, "'I do not believe in a future life'" and then thinks to himself "'He's a madman'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 288–289), signaling that the line between the two character zones is, well, wildly ambiguous, as expressed by Svidrigailov, who says "'Well, wasn't it true when I said we were two apples from the same tree?'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 290). And S. proposes that R. mediate between him and Dunya in Svidrigailov's effort to persuade her to take a significant sum of money in exchange, in effect, for abandoning her plans to marry Luzhin, a suggestion that is rife with multiple doubles, both character substitutions and then the substitution of money for love. Raskolnikov asks him where he's going on the journey he's mentioned, and Svidrigailov responds, "'Well, that is a vast question… You have no idea what you're asking however!'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 293), and the morbid intimation is already that deep doubles must be doomed to twinned but different destinations (difference is the condition of the double).

Svidrigailov and Razumikhin *cross paths*, signifying a multiplication of doubles.

If something like the concept of "asymmetry" applies here, the fundamental skew is that Raskolnikov does not know that Svidrigailov is his double, while, curiously, the latter does know. Raskolnikov tells Razumikhin "'I don't know why, but I'm very afraid of the man… He's very strange, and is set on something… He seems to know something'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 294). And then a clincher—Raskolnikov's most significant reference to Svidrigailov so far—which is "'You've all been saying that I was mad…

and just now I imagined that perhaps I really am mad and was only seeing a ghost'" and then he adds, "'Maybe I really am mad, and everything that's happened during these days, maybe everything is just my imagination,'" which is to say that maybe there never was a Svidrigailov but also neither a murder and that, by extension, maybe even Razumikhin, whom Raskolnikov is here addressing, doesn't exist (Dostoevsky 2004, 295). All of which would in a certain convoluted way confirm Raskolnikov's sanity, but not in the way that he is suggesting, in fact in inverted form, that is, he is imagining insanity as an escape from the truth. This nexus of tensions houses a massive paradox, which is precisely the point.

Pulcheria Alexandrovna meets Luzhin *at the threshold* (locus of two-faced Janus), while Dunya meets her brother. Through Luzhin, the two women, mother and daughter, learn that Svidrigailov is in Petersburg, the suggestion being that he is following them (Dostoevsky 2004, 296–297). And then Luzhin unleashes a flush of doubles: First, a female acquaintance of Svidrigailov's, a moneylender—not exactly a pawnbroker, but…—who lives in Petersburg, and whose daughter hanged herself under obscure circumstances rumored to be connected to Svidrigailov. And then, a second tale from Luzhin about a servant of Svidrigailov who also hanged himself. Finally, he mentions that Marfa Petrovna "died so strangely," a cluster of corpses in the wake of Svidrigailov (Dostoevsky 2004, 299).

Raskolnikov informs Dunya of Svidrigailov's offer of money contingent on her breaking off with Luzhin, and Razumikhin responds by dramatically announcing that he will help Dunya out, that she and he and Raskolnikov can do *translations* together, he'll secure the two women a new apartment, and so on, and that he will get some money for them straightaway by *pawning their watch*, time turned into a fetish and a ghoulish echo amplified by Razumikhin's innocence, which does not last long (Dostoevsky 2004, 312). Raskolnikov tells Razumikhin that he wants to be alone: "'Leave me,'" he tells Razumikhin, "'but *don't leave them*. Do you understand me?'" Suddenly grasping who Raskolnikov is, "Razumikhin turned pale as a corpse." But it is Raskolnikov who has death inside him, and so "from that evening on, Razumikhin became their son and brother" (Dostoevsky 2004, 313–314).

Coupling and Confession

The substitution of Razumikhin for Raskolnikov is a nodal point in the novel. But so is the fact that the sentence following the one just quoted sends Raskolnikov straight to Sonya, straight, that is, from Dunya to Sonya, key figures morphing into one another. And as if we cannot be

allowed to forget the profusion of corpses, Sonya asks R. if he'll be at her father's funeral the next day before he notes, "'How thin you are! Look at your hand! Quite transparent. Fingers like a dead person's'" and then *he takes her hand* (Dostoevsky 2004, 316), two characters making contact between the living and the dead, at which point she says that she thought she'd seen her father that day, a dead man walking down the street.

After discussing her family's poverty, Raskolnikov says, "'It's bound to be the same for Polechka,'" his point being that Sonya's little sister is destined to become a prostitute, too, destined to repeat the desperate path of Sonya. She protests that God will protect Polechka, Raskolnikov replies, "'But maybe there isn't any God,'" and then when Sonya begins sobbing, he says, "'You say Katerina Ivanovna is losing her mind, but you're losing your mind yourself'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 321), and in this respect Sonya is a reflection of him. Then he kisses her foot and talks about human suffering, and ruminates on the thought that Sonya has kept her "purity of spirit," somehow held onto her soul, which she has managed through devotion to God.

Sonya's copy of the New Testament had been given to her by Lizaveta, Raskolnikov's second victim, a detail that straddles the lines between holy, wholesome, sinful, and unseemly. "'Where is the part about Lazarus?' he asked suddenly." She directs him to the fourth Gospel, confesses that she does not go to church, but then says (1) that she will go to church for the memorial service for her father and (2) that she had been the week before for a memorial for Lizaveta. When she tells him that she and Lizaveta used to read the Bible together, Raskolnikov thinks to himself, "some sort of mysterious get-togethers with Lizaveta—two holy fools… 'One might well become a holy fool oneself here! It's catching!'" and then he asks her to read to him. "She tried twice to begin, but kept failing to get the first syllable out" until finally she begins reading the story of the resurrection of Lazarus (Dostoevsky 2004, 324–326). Suddenly, Dostoevsky's text is replaced by words from the New Testament, which is not a subtext, but *the other text* of *Crime and Punishment*.

When Sonya is done reading, Raskolnikov informs her that he has left his mother and sister and tells her, "'I have only you now… Let's go together… I've come to you. We're cursed together, so let's go together!'… 'He's crazy,' Sonya thought in her turn." And then he does sound crazy: "'You laid hands on yourself, you destroyed a life… *your own* (it's all the same!)… You're nearly crazy already; so we must go together, on the same path! Let's go!'" Just before leaving, he says, "'If I come tomorrow, I'll tell you who killed Lizaveta'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 329–330).

And all this time, Svidrigailov has been in the empty room next, eavesdropping on the entire exchange.

In the police station, Porfiry Petrovich asks Raskolnikov if the "little paper… about the watch" is in order—paper representing the watch, in effect a pledge for a pledge—and then it goes all double, as Raskolnikov says:

> "You seemed to be saying yesterday that you wished to ask me…. Formally… about my acquaintance with this… murdered woman?" Raskolnikov tried to begin again. "Why did I put in that *seemed*?" flashed in him like lightning. "And why am I so worried about having put in that *seemed*?" a second thought immediately flashed in him like lightning. And he suddenly felt that his insecurity, from the mere contact with Porfiry, from two words only, two glances only, had bushed out to monstrous proportions in a moment (Dostoevsky 2004, 333).

And then, the game takes a curious turn when Porfiry Petrovich says, "'And have you noticed, Rodion Romanovich, that among us—that is, in our Russia, sir, and most of all in our Petersburg circles—if two intelligent men get together, not very well acquainted yet, but, so to speak, mutually respecting each other, just like you and me now, sir, it will take them a whole half hour to find a topic of conversation,'" as if this were not a double game but an awkward conversation between equals, which it clearly is not. P.P. promptly turns to talk the topic of accusation and modes of inquisition, leading up to unadulterated philosophy with,

> But at the same time, my good Rodion Romanovich, it must be observed that the general case, the one to which all legal forms and rules are suited, and on the basis of which they are all worked out and written down in the books, simply does not exist, for the very reason that every case, let's say, for instance, every crime, as soon as it actually occurs, turns at once into a completely particular case (Dostoevsky 2004, 339).

And he continues to rattle on ("two times two"). Raskolnikov thinks to himself, "'This isn't even like cat and mouse anymore, as it was yesterday'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 340), which is true, it is far more subtle, as evidenced, for example, by P.P.'s use of military references, including the close-to-the-bone, "'I should be serving in the military, really, sir. I might not have become a Napoleon, perhaps, but I'd be a major at least, heh, heh, heh!'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 341), naming one of Raskolnikov's own reference points. And the tactic works, provoking Raskolnikov to protest that

he should either be arrested or Porfiry Petrovich should stop tormenting him (the external source of torment clearly exacerbating the damage of R.'s internal torment). And of course, this is precisely the response the policeman intends, as he now begins revealing things he knows about Raskolnikov's return to the pawnbroker's apartment, and this draws Raskolnikov out. R. accuses P.P. of being a liar. The latter responds, "'You're quite a dodger yourself!'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 346).

Then a very peculiar thing occurs in the station, which is the appearance of one Nikolai, who goes down on his knees as he announces, "'I'm guilty. The sin is mine! I'm the murderer!'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 351). Porfiry Petrovich begins questioning this Nikolai and concludes, "'He's not using his own words!'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 351). The words he is not using are the ones that Raskolnikov has not yet said.

In his coffin—his cabinet—and late for the funeral, Raskolnikov thinks, "Porfiry also had nothing, nothing except this *delirium*, no facts except for *psychology*, which is *double-ended*, nothing positive" (Dostoevsky 2004, 357), double-ended meaning here essentially elusive, which the double typically tends to be. "'Everything's double-ended, now everything's double-ended'… and he walked out of the room more cheerful than ever" (Dostoevsky 2004, 358). In other words, what would seem to be most double-ended at this juncture is Raskolnikov himself, who is undergoing a transition, *becoming another self*.

Luzhin asks one Lebezyatnikov to witness the following exchange with Sonya. Luzhin hands Sonya a ten-rouble bill. Lebezyatnikov sees this and *mistakenly thinks* that Luzhin has made a noble gesture (Dostoevsky 2004, 376).

As it turns out, Katerina Ivanovna had spent nearly ten roubles—half of twenty roubles Raskolnikov had given them—on the memorial meal for Marmeladov (Dostoevsky 2004, 378), a complete extravagance given the family's poverty but necessary from her standpoint in order to represent who Marmeladov was, the meal itself Marmeladov's memorial double. Luzhin appears on the scene and announces that a one-hundred-rouble note had disappeared from Lebezyatnikov's room immediately after Sonya's visit (Dostoevsky 2004, 392). In response to his accusation, Sonya says, "'I took nothing from you… You gave me ten roubles—here, take it'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 394), and the game of substitutions initiated by Luzhin continues. Katerina Ivanovna grabs the bill from Sonya, crumples it up, and throws it into Luzhin's face, and then, in a demonstration of Sonya's innocence turns the girl's pockets inside out; a hundred-rouble

note neatly folded into eighths falls out, and Sonya declares her innocence (Dostoevsky 2004, 396).

Lebezyatnikov steps forward to denounce Luzhin, Luzhin pushes his way out, Sonya flees in despair, and then Raskolnikov says to himself, "'Well, Sofya Semyonovna, we'll see what you have to say now,'" and he sets out for Sonya's (Dostoevsky 2004, 405).

"He looked at Sonya from the threshold"—that place in between—"She stood in front of him, two steps away, exactly as the day before" (Dostoevsky 2004, 406). She talks about Providence, he talks about forgiveness, and then a wild image of reversal:

> And suddenly, a strange, unexpected feeling of corrosive hatred for Sonya came over his heart. As if surprised and frightened by this feeling, he suddenly raised his head and looked at her intently, but he met her anxious and painfully caring eyes upon him; here was love; his hatred vanished like a phantom. That was not it; he had mistaken one feeling for another. All it meant was that *the moment* had come (Dostoevsky 2004, 409).

Mistaking love for hatred would itself seem to be a curious thing, and so would its instantaneous inversion were it not for the fact that the recognition of her love immediately illuminates his feelings for her, and he realizes that the "hatred" is a sign of his need for confession, which is to say that his hatred is connected to the crime, which is to say that if hatred is what it really is, it is hatred of himself, which, it will seem to turn out, can be cured only by her love for him.

When he reaches his confession, he projects himself in the "third person," his double: "'This Lizaveta… he didn't want to kill her… He killed her… accidentally… He wanted to kill the old woman… when she was alone… and he went there… And then Lizaveta came in… Then he… killed her, too'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 410). In the end, he does not have to directly say, *I am the murderer*, but there is something about the refracted obliqueness of his confession that makes it as clear as it could be.

When she asks him how he could have committed such a crime, he says, "'To rob her, of course'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 412), which completely deflates the significance of the murder, reducing a meaningful experiment—*meaning*—to something mundane, and then simply confusing when he effectively admits that he doesn't even know what he stole, but that it is still buried under a stone. But he turns back to meaning, explaining, "'You see, I wanted to become a Napoleon, that's why I killed… Well, is it clear now?'" and of course it is not (Dostoevsky 2004, 415), the less,

so the further he tries to explain himself, and he continues trying, sinking deeper into a fever the longer he goes, the only thing becoming clear is that "Sonya understood that this gloomy catechism had become his faith and law," an anti-faith, which culminates in the thought that "'I'm exactly the same louse as all the rest'" followed by the counterfactual claim "'I killed myself, not the old crone!'" followed in turn by "'Maybe I'm still a man and not a louse, and was being too quick to condemn myself… I'll *still* fight'" and "'All their evidence is double-ended'" as if he could continue to inhabit some already irretrievably lost counter-reality, as if he could retreat into his fever.

Then, an elliptical exchange; Sonya gives him her cypress cross to wear and says that she will wear a brass cross that Lizaveta had traded her in exchange for an icon. "'We'll go to suffer together,'" she says, "'and we'll bear the cross together!'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 418–422).

Back in his room with "vague thoughts crowding in his head, the door suddenly opened and Avdotya Romanovna came in. She stopped first and looked at him from the threshold, as he had done earlier at Sonya's; then she went and sat down on a chair facing him, in the same place as yesterday." Doubles in spades, thresholds occupied and breached in multiple, overt repetitions, sister standing in for him, she repeating another day, even echoing another woman: "He could see that this one, too, had come to him with love." And it is a curious passage indeed, as Raskolnikov seems not only to be bowing out of Dunya's life, but explicitly leaving Razumikhin in his place: "'He is a practical man, hard-working, honest, and capable of deep love'… Goodbye, Dunya" (Dostoevsky 2004, 425). She departs, he thinks of her, "And then he thought of Sonya" (Dostoevsky 2004, 426).

As Katerina Ivanovna is singing and making delirious utterances before she dies, Svidrigailov pulls Raskolnikov aside and tells him that he will cover the cost of the funeral and help the two young ones "So that Sofya Semyonovna can be completely at ease. And I'll get her out of her quagmire, because she's a nice girl, isn't she? So sir, you can tell Avdotya Romanovna that that is how I use her ten thousand" (Dostoevsky 2004, 435). The gesture is curious enough in its own right, but given that Raskolnikov had paid for Marmeladov's funeral and that Svidrigailov's now suggesting using money intended for Dunya for Marmeladov's widow's funeral, for her children, and—vaguely—for Sonya, well, this is an intensively doubled knot, one prominently featuring images both of death and of life, amplified when Svidrigailov quotes Raskolnikov back to him regarding both the

pawnbroker as a "louse" and Polechka's destiny to follow Sonya's path of prostitution. "Raskolnikov turned pale and cold, hearing the very phrases he had spoken to Sonya." Svidrigailov says, "'I told you we'd become close, I predicted it—well, and so we have'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 436). Very distinct from each other, *but also very close*.

Passing into the penultimate part of the novel, Part Six, the reader now experiences "A strange time for Raskolnikov: it was as if a fog suddenly fell around him and confined him in a hopeless and heavy solitude," a solitude that oddly enough only introduces variations in the presence of doubles: "At least, remembering afterwards, he learned much about himself, going by information he received from others." He was also beset by extended periods of apathy, "an apathy resembling the morbidly indifferent state of some dying people," which makes sense given that Lazarus had to die in order to be resurrected. What makes less sense but is more philosophically interesting is that "He was especially anxious about Svidrigailov; one might even say he had become stuck, as it were on Svidrigailov," once even finding himself waiting for Svidrigailov, imagining that the two had agreed to a meeting, which they had not (Dostoevsky 2004, 439–440). And Raskolnikov is as haunted as could be: "the more solitary the place was, the stronger was his awareness as of someone's near and disquieting presence, not frightening so much as somehow extremely vexing" (Dostoevsky 2004, 441).

"'I must finish with Svidrigailov,' he thought, 'at all costs, as soon as possible: he, too, seems to be waiting for me to come to him.' And at that moment such hatred rose up from his weary heart that he might have killed either one of them: Svidrigailov or Porfiry'… But no sooner had he opened the door to the entryway than he suddenly ran into Porfiry himself," as if just thinking about this nemesis causes him to materialize. Porfiry notes that he had been by to visit two days before, and then says, "'You see, sir, I have perhaps come out very guilty before you… In my judgment, it would be better now if we were to proceed with frankness'" deuced remarks that turn on themselves (Dostoevsky 2004, 447–448), which is why "Raskolnikov felt the influx of some new fear. The thought that Porfiry regarded him as innocent suddenly began to frighten him" (Dostoevsky 2004, 451), and the policeman launches into another one of his endless monologues, noting along the way "'that this cursed psychology is double-ended… And when we began going through your article, when you were explaining it—one just takes your every word in a double sense, as if there were another sitting under it!'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 453).

Translated: one must take Porfiry's every word in a double sense, as if there were another sitting under it (like the loot sitting under the stone), and sure enough, before long, he is onto the topic of Mikolka's guilt, and he begins repeating "there's no Mikolka here," and describes without naming him Raskolnikov's actions during the crime—mentions even the loot under the stone, saying, finally, "'Well, let's say he was sick then, but here's another thing: he killed, and yet he considers himself an honest man, despises people, walks around like a pale angel—no, forget Mikolka, my dear Rodion Romanovich, there is no Mikolka here!'" Then when Raskolnikov asks who did commit the murder, Porfiry responds, "'But *you* did, Rodion Romanovich! You killed them, sir'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 456). And then, the policeman tells him that he has a "little trace," but of course refuses to say what it is. Then he describes himself as a "finished man," while he tells Raskolnikov "'But you are quite a different matter: God has prepared a life for you.... What matter that you'll be passing into a different category of people?'" Then, when Raskolnikov asks when he'll be arrested, P.P. tells him that he, R., won't run away because "'You no longer believe your own theory—what would you run away on?... *It's impossible for you to do without us*'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 460–461).

And then, as if fulfilling the murderous double thought that opened the previous paragraph, Raskolnikov hurries off to find Svidrigailov, noting to himself, "And yet here he was hurrying off to Svidrigailov; could it be that he expected something *new* from him—directions, a way out? People do grasp at straws! Could it be fate, or some instinct, bringing them together" (Dostoevsky 2004, 463). He briefly considers going to Sonya instead, but she is not interchangeable with Svidrigailov on any level, particularly since she represents the inevitability of his *sentence* (which nevertheless on a certain level Svidrigailov does, too). He imagines that Svidrigailov is plotting against Dunya and thinks "'Then I will kill him.'" Passing a tavern near the Haymarket, he glances in the window and sees Svidrigailov. "This struck him terribly, to the point of horror. Svidrigailov was observing him, gazing at him silently, and what also struck Raskolnikov at once, seemed about to get up in order to slip away quietly before he was noticed" (Dostoevsky 2004, 464), exactly what one might expect one's double or a ghost to do.

Raskolnikov suggests that it's a chance meeting, but Svidrigailov claims that he'd given him directions to meet him at this tavern, "'I told you twice'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 467). "'Why did you need me so much?'" asks Raskolnikov. Svidrigailov says, "'I confess that your question is too complicated for me, and I find it difficult to answer'" and then he remarks

that he does not normally drink but that he's having a champagne right now "'because I'm on my way somewhere,'" a very mysterious indication (Dostoevsky 2004, 469). He then says that he's here because of a woman, and he remains vague, but indicates that he's getting married (later revealing that his intended is not yet sixteen). Then he tells Raskolnikov that Avdotya Romanovna, Dunya, had heard the depraved and even sinister tales that follow Svidrigailov. Dunya had felt pity for him, wanting to "'save' him then, to bring him to reason, to resurrect him,'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 474); in other words, to do the very things that Sonya seems intent on doing with Raskolnikov, the transformation expressed in the story of the raising of Lazarus, intensifying the uncanny link between these two men.

Having left the tavern, Svidrigailov says, "'You go right, and I'll go left, or perhaps vice versa'" only Raskolnikov has decided to follow him, and he does (Dostoevsky 2004, 483), and they continue their contentious banter until Svidrigailov gets in a carriage (from which he disembarks as soon as he is out of Raskolnikov's sight) and Raskolnikov goes his own way until, on a bridge (again![11]), he passes his sister *without noticing her*. Svidrigailov notices Dunya, however, and here we learn that the previously mentioned letter was from him. He takes her to his apartment, and shows him the chair where he'd sat as he eavesdropped on Raskolnikov and Sonya, and he reveals to Dunya that Raskolnikov is a double murderer (Dostoevsky 2004, 488), and then provides her with what comes down to a double reason for the crime, (1) money and (2) R.'s theoretical justification for it (which comes unhinged from money). And here, Svidrigailov makes a profound if not entirely true observation, which is that "'In our educated society, Avdotya Romanovna, we have no especially sacred traditions, except for what someone somehow pieces together from old books'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 489). Old books such as the New Testament? New books such as *Crime and Punishment*.

Dunya is of course upset, and Svidrigailov asks, "'Do you want me to take him abroad?'" a curious suggestion only because S. has already hinted about going on a journey himself (Dostoevsky 2004, 492). At this point, it becomes clear that he has locked them into his apartment. "'I'll send him away at once, and I'll get a passport, two passports. One for him, the other for me,'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 493) and now it gets creepier as he observes that no one can hear them, and intimates that he might rape her. At this juncture, Dunya pulls a revolver on him. The gun had belonged to Svidrigailov, or, rather, to Marfa Petrovna. Dunya now accuses him of

having poisoned his wife, and Svidrigailov complicates things by telling Dunya that "'You would still be the cause of it'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 495). She takes a shot but the bullet just grazes his head. The second shot is a misfire. Svidrigailov lets her leave the apartment, notices that there is one shot remaining in the revolver she's abandoned, and he pockets the pistol and goes out.

Eventually, Svidrigailov winds up at Sonya's, where he gives her money. "'And you will need it,' he says, 'There are two ways open for Rodion Romanovich; a bullet in the head, or Siberia'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 500). And then he leaves, allegedly for America, but actually for Vasilievsky Island (who does not long for that elliptical center?), where he leaves his fifteen-year-old fiancée 15,000 silver roubles, and then, as if in a dream, he's back on the other side, and he winds up getting a room in a sketchy hotel there, where he has a dream featuring a coffin in which lay a fourteen-year-old girl, suicide by drowning (Dostoevsky 2004, 507). Now awake, he wanders corridors where he finds a little girl, about five, hiding, possibly doubling for the girl in Dostoevsky's later *Dream of a Ridiculous Man*, the girl feverish but finally laughing at him. "But at the moment he woke up" (Dostoevsky 2004, 509), a dream within a dream inhabited by girls. A dead girl standing in for all of the carnage he has wreaked on women. A laughing girl mocking him, pathetic creature that he is.

Revolver and notebook. He tells a stranger on the street that he's going to America and then puts the revolver to his temple and pulls the trigger (Dostoevsky 2004, 511), Svidrigailov to America (death), Raskolnikov destined for Siberia (house of the dead), one to the West, one to the East ("as above, so below"). If Svidrigailov had taken Raskolnikov on his journey, that would have made him a murderer, too.

"'Rodya, don't be angry,' says his mother, 'but all the same tell me just two words, are you going away?'" "'Very far'" are his two words (Dostoevsky 2004, 516). Back at his apartment, he encounters Dunya, and he rants about his theory before finally saying, "'The main thing is that now everything will go a new way, it will break in two'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 519–520). At Sonya's he grins, "'I've come for your crosses, Sonya. You're the one who is sending me to the crossroads…' Sonya silently took two crosses from a drawer, one of cypress, one of brass; she crossed herself, crossed him, and hung the cypress cross around his neck" (Dostoevsky 2004, 522), the two materials of the crosses, wood and metal, strange repetition of the materials from which he'd fashioned the simulated pledge—"cigarette case"—that served as bait for the murder, a surrogate never an innocent object (cigarettes killed Dostoevsky).

Heading to the police station, "An apparition flashed before him, but he was not surprised by it, he had already anticipated that it must be so," and it is actually unclear whether or not this apparition is Sonya, who is following him all the way to the ends of the earth, passing through the police station on the way, Dostoevsky offering us a blur at what would seem to be the penultimate moment, would be the penultimate moment were it not for the Epilogue, which was tacked on, as it were, by either a genius or a madman.

The End, the End

As if the architectonic expression of the double that inhabits and drives the text, *Crime and Punishment* has two distinct endings, formally embodied in the fact that the novel has six parts with an Epilogue appended to the end. However, it is not as simple as that. For example, the novel might dramatically and coherently have concluded not just with "'It was I who killed the official's old widow and her sister Lizaveta with an axe and robbed them'" but with the very last sentence of Part Six, "Raskolnikov repeated his statement" (Dostoevsky 2004, 531), that is, the novel might have concluded with a double confession regarding a double homicide. If this were American hard-boiled fiction—think James M. Cain—that is in fact precisely how it would have ended (cut to the credits).

A disjunctive interpretation might suggest that those six parts could be called *Crime* and the Epilogue *Punishment*, although such a facile division would have to overlook the fact that Raskolnikov's pathologies, anxieties, and "second thoughts" continually haunt him throughout the book, even before the crime, and it would also have to overlook the sense in which his punishment is synonymous with his love and by extension his redemption, and that this is not just about even if it is indissociable from religion.

Raskolnikov's criminal sentence—eight years—is shaped by the conclusion that "Raskolnikov was not quite like the ordinary murderer, outlaw, and robber, but that *something else* was involved" (my emphasis added), as indicated by the gap between his claim that he'd committed the murder for money but then had in fact never bothered to look in the purse he'd buried under the stone (Dostoevsky 2004, 536).

Then twos proliferate in Siberia: "Rodya had been burned and was even laid up after saving two little children" (Dostoevsky 2004, 540); "Two weeks later she died" (Dostoevsky 2004, 541); "A cool spring somewhere in the untrodden wilderness, noticed two years before" and "two seminarians" (Dostoevsky 2004, 545); "During the second week of the Great

Lent" (Dostoevsky 2004, 546); "It was already the second week after Holy Week"; and "Sonya had been able to visit him in the ward only twice" (Dostoevsky 2004, 548). Again, I would not try to suggest that any of these references in isolation are "meaningful," only that their concatenation is mysterious and serves to reinforce the power of the more determinative doubles at work in the text. In conjunction with the motif of the double, however, two conjoined things do stand out in the end. First, "Instead of dialectics, there was life," and life turns out to be about Raskolnikov and Sonya; heterosexual pairing exemplifies the sense in which the double confounds and mocks the notions of symmetry and asymmetry in duality [an echo of Nietzsche's thought that with the abolition of the true world, we have also abolished the apparent one (cf. "How the True World Became a Fable"[12])]. Second, without disappearing into her, and without resolution, Raskolnikov becomes a version of Sonya: "'Can her convictions not be my convictions now? Her feelings, her aspirations, at least'" (Dostoevsky 2004, 550).

And yet that is not the end of *Crime and Punishment*. First, as Dostoevsky notes in the final paragraph, "But here begins a new account" (Dostoevsky 2004, 551), thereby leaving the entire novel radically open-ended.[13] Second, the pre-existentialist Dostoevsky must wait over one hundred years before the appearance of his own double in the post-existentialist Michel Foucault, whose *Discipline and Punish* transubstantiates into modern recognition Fyodor Mikhailovich's concerns, Foucault's thoughts and sympathies clearly closer to Dostoevsky's and Pussy Riot's survival in *House of the Dead* than to Raskolnikov's salvation in *Crime and Punishment* and the beginning of a new account, no salvation in eternal return, finally no voice afforded the luxury of solitude, every echo forcing uninvited company.

Light Not from a Dead Star

Finally, I cannot resist a fleeting reference to Dostoevsky's *Dream of a Ridiculous Man*. Here, a nihilistic suicide *is taken* to another planet, the double thoroughly spatialized in a science-fiction dream. "It was absolutely the same as our sun, its replica and double,"[14] except of course that it is not the same, nor is the Earth's double circling it really a replica but is, rather, paradise, at least until our hero enters the scene, thereby introducing corruption and destroying its peace and perfection. And yet it's all a dream (and, again, dreams are the double of life) one that lasts thousands

of years and winds up back where it started, only in a different place. No longer a nihilist and no longer dreaming, the character now has a message to preach, although he has lost the words, remembering only, "The main thing is—love others as yourself, that's the main thing" (Dostoevsky 2008, 342). Lofted by severe doubles, a spectral Dostoevsky nevertheless seems to speak to us—to, that is, his audience, his other—directly, "not as the light of dead stars reaches you."[15]

Don't Move, Dance

To remind you: The double seems always to be entangled in iconographies (stills, e.g. twos) and choreographies (ballets, e.g. character relations) of representation, with the stills serving to reinforce and intensify the power of the dance of the deuce. In the case of Dostoevsky, each participant in any given configuration of the double seems to embody or display aspects of its other, thus performing an ontological labor that in regard to personal identity renders irrelevant, inadequate, and futile standard distinctions between internal and external. Dostoevsky does not fabricate but rather imports or channels the double into his writing, thus displaying and witnessing the work of the double in life.

Notes

1. M. M. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 59.
2. William Leatherbarrow, *A Devil's Vaudeville: The Demonic in Dostoevsky's Major Fiction* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), p. 92.
3. Including the doubles of E.T.A. Hoffmann and Antony Pogorelsky.
4. Julie A.Buckler, *Mapping St. Petersburg: Imperial Text and Cityshape* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), Chapter Four, "Stories in Common," cf. p. 135ff.
5. Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), p. 147.
6. Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Double and the Gambler*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Vintage Classics, 2007), p. 3.
7. Nevsky Prospect literally embodies a compelling natural or earthly double, if there can be anything natural about a designed boulevard that is also a *perspective*: Nevsky's north side is sunny (when there's sun), while its south side tends to be very shady. It's a mixed matter of both relative light/dark and of warm/cool.

8. Of course, the alternative conclusion is that the reader is mad, and this would be unacceptable.
9. "Tangible abstraction." I leave it to the reader to ponder this instance of the material symbolic.
10. Experience has shown me, as a professor, that business students frequently adhere to this self-serving ideological balderdash.
11. There is nothing unusual about bridges in St. Petersburg, but it is noteworthy how frequently Raskolnikov has interesting experiences on them.
12. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Richard Polt (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997).
13. This tactic is prefigured by the ending of *Notes from Underground*, where the "editor" stops listening to the continued rants of the underground man.
14. Fyodor Dostoevsky, "Dream of a Ridiculous Man," in *The Eternal Husband and Other Stories*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Bantam Classic, 2008), p. 330.
15. Vladimir Mayakovsky, "At the Top of My Voice," in Vladimir Mayakovsky, *The Bedbug and Selected Poetry*, ed. Patricia Blake, trans. Max Hayward and George Reavey (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1960), p. 221.

References

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. 2004. *Crime and Punishment*. Trans. Richard Pevear, and Larissa Volokhonsky. New York: Vintage Books.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. 2007. *The Gambler*. In *The Double and the Gambler*. Trans. Richard Pevear, and Larissa Volokhonsky. New York: Vintage Classics.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. 2008. *The Eternal Husband and Other Stories*. Trans. Richard Pevear, and Larissa Volokhonsky. New York: Bantam Classic.

CHAPTER 4

Proximities to Death: Freud's Archaic Doubles

Prior Analysis

Undergirding the axiomatic distinction between the conscious and the unconscious, the central assumption undergirding psychoanalytic theory is the "suspicion" or expectation that everything is meaningful, that everything has an *other* side.[1] Nothing is innocent for Freud, nothing to be taken at face value, nothing simple or single. Adjusting the emphasis here, everything Freud's gaze lands on is invariably riddled with fissures, dissociations, tensions, and splits, all in need of negotiation and of translation. At the most fundamental level, everything is meaningful precisely because nothing is ever just "this," but seems always also to be "this conjoined with that," every appearance the manifestation of some deeper, uneasy nexus of necessity, never a question of one thing, always a matter of conflicted pairings—alliances, struggles, substitutions—of forces. Put slightly different, a given phenomenon cannot simply be but must also be *about* something. In this sense, all psychoanalytic phenomena are fated to be implicated in doubles and in doublings.

The Double Incarnate

Originally published as part of a German translation of the works of Dostoevsky, Freud's 1928 essay, *Dostoevsky and Parricide*, is a curiosity in several senses of the word. From the standpoint of psychoanalytic theory, it would seem to offer nothing really new. From the standpoint

B. Seitz, *Intersubjectivity and the Double*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56375-0_4

of psychobiography, however, Freud sketches a character who vibrantly illustrates that theory. Given the instability of and consistent fixation associated with the central terms of the sketch, this means that the essay reveals more about Freud than it does about Dostoevsky.

After some opening remarks about Dostoevsky the artist and Dostoevsky the moralist, Freud considers the profile of Dostoevsky the sinner, a subtle and, from a literary standpoint, deliberately twisted opening to an analysis of Dostoevsky the neurotic, subtle, that is, unless one refers back to the originary Oedipal transgression that later gets sublimated into the status of "sin" (a sublimation that amplifies its meaningfulness). Then, Freud immediately complicates the terms of the analysis by observing that "Two traits are essential in a *criminal*[2]: boundless egoism and a strong destructive impulse,"[3] the opening salvo an immediate and very self-conscious assault on the line between sin and crime but also an image of a twinned trajectory, egoism coupled with destruction. In other words, we might extrapolate, Raskolnikov. Freud then offers, " it must be asked why there is any temptation to reckon Dostoevsky among the criminals," neglecting to acknowledge that the temptation in question would in its very remarking seems to be exclusively his. But then the temptation is not so obscure given how many of Dostoevsky's stories feature characters marked by these criminal traits.

Freud does not directly discuss Dostoevsky's egoism, but he does observe that the destructive impulse in Dostoevsky was aimed largely at himself, a psychopathology displaying predominantly in the form of guilt and masochism. The origins of these manifestations lurked in the specific determinants of Dostoevsky's Oedipal situation, a matter, as always, of a fundamentally conflicted cathexis, love, and hate fused in the mother/father relation. In this case, on the one hand—primal desire—Dostoevsky wanted his father dead. On the other hand—contingent event—his father was murdered when the writer was eighteen: Freud states the latter as decisive fact when the actual fact is that there are competing stories of how Mikhail Andreevich died, and this claim is thus only conjecture. Indeed, Freud's analysis of Dostoevsky largely hinges on that conjecture and its extensions, which ensures the instability of the remaining contents of the essay.

However, just before sharing this conjecture and continuing with the analysis, Freud cannot refrain from going on what might at first appear to be a detour, namely his suggestion that Dostoevsky's epilepsy was psychogenic, this despite his open acknowledgment that he has no scientific grounds for diagnosing it as such; the unsurprising upshot is that of

the two kinds of epilepsy proposed by Freud—organic and affective—Dostoevsky's is the latter, which means that he is a neurotic.[4] The epilepsy's psychogenic origins "cannot, strictly speaking, be proved," writes Freud (Freud 1963, 279). However, this admission does not serve to curb the conclusive pitch of his speculations, as he proceeds to venture the "probable assumption" that the epileptic symptoms began *after* Fyodor's father's murder, stretching his analysis to the limits and thus exposing his own desire by then proceeding to ponder the possibility that the symptoms had ceased when Dostoevsky was in a prison camp in Siberia (i.e. the guilty man's troubles subside when he is being properly punished), despite the fact that, *as Freud himself notes*, "other accounts contradict this" (Freud 1963, 280); that is, other accounts conflict with a surmise that would be most convenient for Freud's theory, the wish embodied in theoretical commitments fulfilled as they bypass reality. In any event, and murder or not, the upshot is that, according to Freud, Dostoevsky's father's actual death effectively sealed the guilt of the criminal's desire.

"Death-like seizures" in Dostoevsky's youth pre-figured the epilepsy, remarks Freud, and these " signify an identification with a dead person, either with someone who is really dead or with someone who is still alive and whom the subject wishes dead… One has wished another person dead, and now one *is* this other person and is dead oneself… self-punishment for a death-wish against a hated father" (Freud 1963, 280–281). At this point, and with explicit parenthetical reference to *Totem and Taboo*, Freud recapitulates the theme of parricide in the Oedipal complex, which, in short, reduces the extraordinary figure of Dostoevsky to a casebook example,[5] captured in the sentence, "We can safely say that Dostoevsky never got free from the feelings of guilt arising from his intention of murdering his father" (Freud 1963, 285), and then offering this as an explanation for Dostoevsky's fundamental ambivalence about religion: "He wavered, up to the last moment of his life, between faith and atheism" (Freud 1963, 286). While it is unclear whether or not Freud's analysis adequately or accurately accounts for that particular ambivalence, it is true that the various apartments in which Dostoevsky lived in St. Petersburg shared in common a view of a church, as if he required a visual reminder of the right direction, as if he had to see it in order for it to be real, as if a view of a church were a surrogate for a sinner's vision of Christ the Redeemer (who himself in turn serves as a signifier for God, yes, the Father).

I will refrain from wagering here that "existentialism" trumps psychoanalysis in advance. However, for the record, and as a witness par-

tial in this case to Dostoevsky, I suspect that his religious ambivalence is more existential than Oedipal in nature (the Father be damned either way). While it is the case that Dostoevsky was fundamentally ambivalent—related to which no doubt is the fact that he was an inveterate gambler—it is most curious that Freud was not ambivalent regarding Dostoevsky, this despite the overt fact that much of his analysis is a case of dead-certainty secured in wild speculation (i.e. Freud's take on Dostoevsky is a gamble). Which may be why Dostoevsky has the final anticipatory word on Freud when he writes, "But psychology, gentlemen, though a profound thing, is still like a stick with two ends."[6] Given Freud's explicit reference to the infamous, near-canonic quotation, this might alternatively be read: "Sigmund wants to be Fedya's father"—he wants to dominate Fyodor—"and wants Dostoevsky to kill him." In anticipation of the struggle that will feature later in this chapter, it might be worth wondering if Freud wanted it all to go… quiet.

To See and Not to See

The Oedipus trope features a noteworthy double on which I will touch only lightly here. This particular facet functions as a determinative fracture lodged not in the events that drive the narrative as such but in a specific motif that is central to and yet cuts across that narrative—cuts across and destabilizes even the distinction between the diachronic and synchronic—a version of and stand-in for the ineluctable divergence between and linkage of the conscious and the unconscious (and a motif perhaps something like a Jungian archetype).

The central drama of the tragedy revolves around a man who kills his father and fornicates with his mother, two utterly distinct and yet inseparable events which according to Freud effectively constitute an a priori pairing, an essential double. The noisy drama of this inevitability draws so much attention to itself that it partially obscures or sidelines the significance of another motif, a double that is of direct relevance to psychoanalytic theory insofar as it plays out in the oscillating dynamic between being aware and being unaware, between, more specifically, *being* blind and *becoming* blind, and as it plays out in all the ways in which sight and the lack thereof—consciousness and repression—is implicated in and infuses this dynamic.

Enter Teiresias, who is blind but sees everything. In connection with the Oedipus story, it is unnervingly close to home that Teiresias was not

born blind but was blinded by Athena, punishment for seeing her naked as she bathed. Now, blind Teiresias sees the one who is blind to his own crime, is conscious of the one who is unconscious, who that is, is blind to himself, blind to the twinned facts that he is the murderer of his father, Laius, and has experienced carnal pleasure with his own mother, Jocasta. When Oedipus finally does see that which he has actively resisted seeing, he literally blinds himself, stabbing his eyes with a pin from his mother's gown, the accoutrement that held together the garment that should have concealed his mother's body from him. Oedipus' life is thenceforth defined by having to see in his blindness that which blind Teiresias had seen all along.

As an instance of the double as substitution (repetition with a difference), it would be remiss of me not also to remind the reader that Oedipus replicates or repeats himself through the children he fathers with his mother, just as Jocasta repeats the birth of Oedipus through mothering his children—Eteocles, Polynices, Antigone, and Ismene—and in so doing redoubles herself, becoming at the same stroke a grandmother biologically coextensive with being her son's lover.

Jocasta hangs herself, and Antigone eventually hangs herself, too, the prominence of the latter's fully developed personae and the clarity of her convictions ensuring the legendary status and entombment of a protracted family drama that turns out also to be a fundamental drama of the human species, a drama of repetition compulsion, perpetually disinterred.

One last note here as we work our way closer to the intertwining of life and death: Pasolini introduces yet another double into his cinematic Oedipus by beginning and ending the film in a modern setting, between which narrative brackets comes a depiction of the ancient story, that is, the ancient is borne within and yet resurrected and replicated by the modern.[7] Following Freud, the double-time of Pasolini's depiction thus reenacts a tragedy that cleaves through temporal and cultural difference: the archaic tragedy lives on, may always be "the same."

Desiring Ambivalence

The worship/destroy dynamic that characterizes the father relation is a privileged instance of fundamental ambivalence, one that the groundbreaking, wildly interdisciplinary *Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics* [8] portrays in its most hyperbolic form, fleshing out the deep and enduring libidinal

tensions associated with this conflicted configuration by representing its origins as a primordial prehistoric event mapped onto the general animality of human nature or, to be more accurate, mapped out by Freud's understanding of male nature: prehistoric females will be implicitly represented by him as there for the taking, or are taken for granted by the theory—all that the women are is implicit—a restricted, heterosexist male perspective on the object of desire, a case of ontological neglect.[9]

The text comprises four essays. The first of these, "Horror of Incest," introduces a topic to be explored in greater depth later in the book. Freud focuses here on (1) clan affiliation organized around a totem, (2) the totem understood as the clan's common ancestor, and then (3) two taboos. The first taboo is the prohibition against killing or eating the totem animal. The second taboo is the practice of exogamy, that is, the prohibition against sexual relations with a member of the same clan affiliation. Later, Freud will suggest that these two taboos ultimately originate from the same source and are thus conjoined with each other.

While Freud catalogues a series of totem/taboo arrangements documented by anthropological literature of his time—catalogues them as if they were curios in a nineteenth-century trophy room—he holds off on reaching any really dramatic theoretical conclusions, noting only a general connection between incest-fear among primitive peoples and incest-fear among modern neurotics. Like any great detective (as distinct from scientific) stylist, timing is Freud's thing, and he reserves the most dramatic revelations for the fourth and final essay.

Meanwhile, this opening essay is marked by a dyad that nowadays seems like a metaphysical artifact and a bit of an intellectual embarrassment. This would be Freud's repeated and unquestioned reliance on the metaphysical distinction between "primitive" and "civilized," a distinction that both makes a lot of noise and seems to perform serious conceptual labor throughout *Totem and Taboo*. At the same time, however, this reliance stops short of insistence, and what defuses the embarrassment of the opposition is Freud's inclination to defuse the dyad even while asserting it. Yes, primitive people have an extreme fear of incest. But, Freud observes, modern neurotics do, too. So in his assertion of the distance of the primitive, Freud may be engaged here in a gesture of repression in support of a hierarchical opposition, but the gesture is only half-hearted, not decisive, openly transgressed. While Freud never pauses to question the clumsy ethnocentrism expressed by the notion of "the primitive," the fact of the doubled matter is that Freud is convinced that the primitive*/primordial*

haunts and inhabits the psychic structure of the modern neurotic, even if it would be sloppy and obscene to conflate the unarticulable difference between primordial and modern conditions (and of course it is important to note explicitly that any conception or image of this difference is wholly modern).

The philosophical pace picks up in the second essay, "Taboo and Emotional Ambivalence." Freud writes, "The meaning of 'taboo', as we see it, diverges in two contrary directions. To us it means, on the one hand, 'sacred', 'consecrated', and on the other 'uncanny', 'dangerous', 'forbidden', 'unclean'" (Freud 1989, 24).[10]

Another way of laying out the terms of this very same double is to state that the unconscious instinctual desire and the conscious prohibition against that desire exist simultaneously in a tense, fundamentally conflicted but not exactly oppositional nexus, and "The principal characteristic of the psychological constellation which becomes fixed in this way is what might be described as the subject's *ambivalent* attitude towards a single object" (Freud 1989, 38). The fundamental conflict, then, is between the unconscious and conscious, that is, it is the same basic struggle from which originate all neuroses, which is to say that the struggle is the consequence of the active, indomitable power of the unconscious:

> The prohibition owes its strength and its obsessive character precisely to its unconscious opponent, the concealed and undiminished desire—that is to say, to an internal necessity inaccessible to conscious inspection… The instinctual desire is constantly shifting in order to escape from the *impasse* and endeavors to find substitutes—substitute objects and substitute acts—in place of the prohibited ones. In consequence of this, the prohibition itself shifts about as well, and extends to any new aims which the forbidden impulse may adopt (Freud 1989, 39).

The relevance to the motif of the double plays out here in an animated logic of opportunistic substitution ("opportunistic" because the substitution of any overt aim will do). Applying the logic of obsessional prohibition to the phenomenon of the taboo, and thereby extending the previously mentioned relation to the "primitive" and the neurotic,

> One thing would certainly follow from the persistence of the taboo, namely that the original desire to do the prohibited thing must also still persist among the tribes concerned. They must therefore have an ambivalent attitude towards their taboos. In their unconscious there is nothing they would

> like more than to violate them, but they are afraid to do so; they are afraid precisely because they would like to, and the fear is stronger than the desire. The desire is unconscious, however, in every individual member just as it is in neurotics. (Freud 1989, 40–41)

The central points are that (1) the fear is stronger than the desire, despite the fact that the fear, unlike the desire, is conscious, and yet (2) the desire will periodically breach the "The most ancient and important taboo prohibitions [that][11] are the two basic laws of totemism: not to kill the totem animal and to avoid sexual intercourse with members of the totem clan of the opposite sex" (Freud 1989, 41). What is of note, that is, is the specific character and intensely mobilized nature of this libidinal ambivalence. At the same time, what is consistent is desire. What is mobile—and now Freud shifts from the primitive to the neurotic—is the propensity for "the unconscious instinct… to shift constantly along associative paths on to new objects" (Freud 1989, 43). The drive toward gratification is characterized by inexorable insistence and must assert itself by any means necessary. And yet, to be clear here, the ambivalence is not a simple case of desire versus prohibition, since the unconscious drive is itself a "cauldron of seething excitations,"[12] which is to say that it embodies an explosive mixture of love and hate, a lust that is simultaneously sexual and murderous.

Freud then spends many paragraphs and pages continuing to list peculiarities and patterns of specific taboos involving kings (Freud 1989, 59), patterns that reflect the "situation of emotional ambivalence" (Freud 1989, 62). Then we reach the section entitled "The Taboo upon the Dead" (Freud 1989, 65).

Engaging in an elegant elision—blurring lines but unconcealing new truths by shifting seamlessly from literal kings to the authority exercised by the dead—Freud opens this section with, "We know that the dead are powerful rulers; but we may be surprised when we learn that they are treated as enemies" (Freud 1989, 65). Their power is signified by prohibitions imposed on those who have touched a dead body as well as by the prohibition against uttering a dead person's name (Freud 1989, 68). Both practices pivot around fear of the retaliatory power of the dead.

Freud makes an aside to a connection that recurs in the book, which connection may help reveal his motivation in undertaking the project[13]: "As was only to be expected, obsessional neurotics behave exactly like savages in relation to names" (Freud 1989, 71), and for essentially the

same reason as the primitives; the utterance of a name is a form of contact, and the power dynamics in play are completely asymmetrical (i.e. what remains remote until made present by the contact has all the power over the vulnerable living and over the vulnerable neurotic), and then, taking care to distinguish mourning from taboo practices, he turns back to his anthropological mode, noting, of savages, that,

> For they make no disguise of the fact that they are *afraid* of the presence or of the return of the dead person's ghost… that a dearly loved relative at the moment of his death changes into a demon, from whom his survivors can expect nothing but hostility and against whose evil desires they must protect themselves by every possible means (Freud 1989, 72–73).

How to account for this transformation of the beloved into demons? What is the origin of the threat? What, that is, is its psychogenesis?

A not infrequent "pathological form of mourning," observes Freud (Freud 1989, 75) occurs when a person is tormented by the thought that they themselves are responsible for the beloved's death, which death might have been thwarted or postponed if only they, the bereaved, had been more attentive to the needs of the dying. *I am responsible*, is the thought, and this thought is in the deepest sense justified given that, "In almost every case where there is an intense emotional attachment to a particular person we find that behind the tender love there is a concealed hostility in the unconscious" (Freud 1989, 76).

The object of fondness is simultaneously the object of hostility. Thus,

> Taboo observances, like neurotic symptoms, have a double sense. On the one hand, in their restrictive character, they are expressions of mourning; but on the other hand they clearly betray—what they seek to conceal—hostility against the dead disguised as self-defense (Freud 1989, 77).

Freud is accomplishing two major things here. First, he is exposing the double action—love and hate, mourning and fear—at work in both taboo prohibitions and in neurotic symptoms. Second, in exposing this double action, he is in the same stroke registering a deep continuity in human psychic life, one that finds primitive (or primal) life at work in the dynamics of modern neurosis, that is, an *archaic double* inhabits the contemporary psyche. Coextensive with one's mourning is a deep dread that the dead will exact revenge for the hostility that always sub-

tended the love. And yet Freud wants to insist on a difference between the primitive and modern version of this ambivalence: “Neurotics, who are obliged to reproduce the struggle and the taboo resulting from it, may be said to have inherited an archaic constitution as an atavistic vestige; the need to compensate for this at the behest of civilization is what drives them to their immense expenditure of psychical energy” (Freud 1989, 83).

Given that his catalogue of taboo practices is also an archive of anxiety and dread, it is not a stretch to conclude that the human creature has long spent immense energy immersed in systems of ambivalence. And yet, Freud takes care to remind us that “ taboo is not a neurosis but a social institution” (Freud 1989, 89). Taboos and neuroses both blur any clear lines between an interior life and relations to external reality, so the question is what is the difference between them? Freud’s explanation is not altogether convincing. Regarding taboos, he observes that punishment derived from the dead is feared to fall on the one who has violated the taboo. Regarding neurosis, punishment will fall not on the neurotic but on someone else (Freud 1989, 89). This distinction directly contradicts, for example, Freud’s (later) diagnosis of Dostoevsky the criminal-sinner. Thus, rather than focusing on the line as drawn here by Freud, maybe better in his favor and better overall to consider the prospect that the line between individual neurosis and sociosis is a highly permeable one, as he implicitly acknowledges when, toward the end of the book, he writes that, “ I have taken as the basis of my whole position the existence of a collective mind, in which mental processes occur just as they do in the mind of an individual” (Freud 1989, 195). In the very last paragraph of the book, he notes, too, that “ Neurotics are above all *inhibited* in their actions; with them the thought is a complete substitute for the deed. Primitive men, on the other hand, are *uninhibited*: thought passes directly into action. With them it is rather the deed that is a substitute for the thought” (Freud 1989, 200).

For now, and as is typical with Freud, we can only anticipate that the analysis of ambivalence in *Totem and Taboo* has not yet pushed deep enough since we have so far witnessed only substitutions and must follow Freud trying to get to the Deed, which may be originary but cannot be prior to the action of the double, which, on the one hand, is about love and hate directed toward a single object while, on the other hand, is also about frustrated sexual desire, that is, about the distance between lust and the unobtainable object that would satisfy it.

Devouring Sacrifice

The third essay of *Totem and Taboo*, "Animism, Magic, and the Omnipotence of Thoughts," follows from and is relevant to the previous developments insofar as it addresses, among other things, techniques for both injuring others and for protecting one's self against demons (the link between these two apparently disparate practices being the theme of "enemies"). For example,

> One of the most widespread magical procedures for injuring an enemy is by making an effigy of him from any convenient material. Whether the effigy resembles him or not is of little account: any object can be 'made into' an effigy of him. Whatever is then done to the effigy, the same thing happens to the detested original… It is the *similarity* between the act performed and the result expected (Freud 1989, 99–101).

The effort at homology (or homeopathy) described here clearly intends to overcome difference through the exercise of representation, that is, intends to take advantage of the double by superseding and mastering it.

Freud then makes a startling reference to *Anánke* (necessity) versus narcissism, noting that "Primitive man would thus be submitting to the supremacy of death with the same gesture with which he seemed to be denying" (p. 116).

These instances are interesting both in their own right and in connection with the double that shapes and characterizes fundamental ambivalence. Although they both also in fact anticipate central aspects associated with intensification of the theme of atavism, much of what remains of this third essay feels like a stall and a tease, so I will pass over the rest and turn attention to the fourth, final, and on all counts most audacious essay in the book, "The Return of Totemism in Childhood."

Freud begins with reference back to the first of the four essays, where "we became acquainted with the concept of totemism," noting that totemism's

> original characteristics are these: Originally, all totems were animals, and were regarded as ancestors of the different clans. Totems were inherited only through the female line. There was a prohibition against killing the totem (or—which under primitive conditions, is the same thing—against eating it). Members of a totem clan were forbidden to practice sexual intercourse with one another (Freud 1989, 133).

The claim that totem inheritance is intrinsically matrilineal would seem to bolster the Oedipal point that Freud is working toward here. However, modern anthropology has long since determined that the practice of totem inheritance is not always matrilineal, so it is a false claim. But not to detract from the critical point, the fundamental double to which we are getting closer and closer.

What Freud is most interested in—and regarding which he finds all other theories lacking—is the connection between totem identification and sexual practices, the latter displaying itself in connection with exogamy and "the problem of incest" (Freud 1989, 150). Here Freud quotes Frazer, who writes that " We may safely assume that the crimes forbidden by law are the crimes which many men have a natural propensity to commit" and that "instead of assuming, therefore, from a legal prohibition of incest that there is a natural aversion to incest, we ought rather to assume that there is a natural instinct in favor of it" (Freud 1989, 153). This double-logic is such that Freud might as well be quoting himself, and is only using Frazer as his surrogate.

From here on, the pace picks up. Freud inserts a prefatory note—a transition toward the revelation—"We are ignorant of the origin of the horror of incest and cannot even tell in what direction to look for it" (Freud 1989, 155). And then things begin to accelerate. The setup begins, significantly, by highlighting a "historical" approach initiated through reference to Darwin, to *the primal horde* and to what pre-figured the formal, totem-related practice of exogamy, namely, alpha males jealously maintaining exclusive sexual access to the females (Freud 1989, 155).

Then Freud loops into the seemingly tangential topic of modern childhood animal phobias, that is, to the substitution of animals in the place of Oedipal fixations on parents. More specifically and striking a familiar note, he writes that, "The child finds relief from the conflict arising out of this double-sided, this ambivalent emotional attitude towards his father by displacing his hostile and fearful feelings on to a substitute for his father" (Freud 1989, 160). This reference to modern psychodynamics may seem at first to move away from the totemic arrangements of traditional cultures—cultures that knew and know actual "wild" animals—but intensifies the topic of totemism and helps situate it in relation to Freud's Oedipal obsession: "If the totem animal is the father, then the two principal ordinances of totemism, the two taboo prohibitions which constitute its core—not to kill the totem and not to have sexual relations with a

woman of the same totem—coincide in their content with the two crimes of Oedipus" (Freud 1989, 163–164).

Now, extending the theme of substitution, Freud turns to the topic of ritual sacrifice in the form of the totem meal. Freud's emphasis is on the historical and semiotic priority of animal sacrifice coupled with the claim that "It was essential that each one of the participants should have his share of the meal" (Freud 1989, 166). His emphasis, that is, is on the common, public aspect of sacrificial ritual. "Everywhere a sacrifice involves a feast and a feast cannot be celebrated without a sacrifice. The sacrificial feast was an occasion on which individuals rose joyously above their own interests and stressed the mutual dependence existing between one another and their god" (Freud 1989, 166). Here, he is revisiting a motif he had introduced a bit earlier through reference to Durkheim,[14] where Freud writes, "The totem, he argues… embodies the community, which is the true object of their worship" (Freud 1989, 141). Anyone with whom one shares the act of such eating is an ally in whom one "may feel secure in his protection and help. Not, however, for an unlimited time; strictly speaking, only so long as the food which has been eaten in common remains in the body. Such was the realistic view of the bond of the union. It needed repetition in order to be confirmed and made permanent" (Freud 1989, 167). It is a feast of kinship, but kinship *needs to be maintained*, that is, "permanence" is the product of repetition.[15] This is wildly important material, the significance of which pivots on the thought that " the sacrificial animal was treated as a member of the tribe; the sacrificing community, the god and the sacrificial animal were of the same blood and members of one clan" (Freud 1989, 169), and he begins reinforcing the psychoanalytic, sociological, and religious aspects by noting that "We have heard that in later times, whenever food is eaten in common, the participation in the same substance establishes a sacred bond between those who consume it when it has entered their bodies" (Freud 1989, 170), then embeds it back into prehistory with, "It was in fact the ancient totem animal, the primitive god himself, by the killing and consuming of which the clansmen renewed and assured their likeness to the god" (Freud 1989, 171), this bond with each other coextensive with bond with the god, an impossible elision of the double constituted by the relation to the god.

New turn: "When the deed is done, the slaughtered animal is lamented and bewailed… But the mourning is followed by demonstrations of festive rejoicing: every instinct is unfettered and there is license for every kind of gratification," a dissonant double—the conjunction or conjugation of

mourning and celebration—that would appear to be contradictory. "What are we to make, though of the prelude to this festive joy—the mourning over the death of the animal? If the clansmen rejoice over the killing of the totem—a normally forbidden act—why do they mourn over it as well?" (Freud 1989, 174). The material for resolving this apparent dilemma and answering the question is already in play; "the totem animal is in reality a substitute for the father" (Freud 1989, 175). And now, repeating the reference to Darwin's primal horde, to an animal time predating the later emergence of totem practices—predating, that is, practices of substitution (but as will be elucidated, not predating the double)—Freud begins to lay out his "fantastic hypothesis."

This archaic time was simple, defined by its essential herd characteristic: "All that we find there is a violent and jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and drives away his sons as they grow up" (Freud 1989, 175). While field biologists today observe versions of this dynamic in some non-human species, anthropologists have never witnessed this primal human dynamic because it was long, long ago displaced by the first forms of human social organization, which entail the very practices of substitution—totem and taboo—that I have been passing on from Freud. Here, it is worth indulging in a lengthy quotation in order to capture the full force of his account:

> One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde. United, they had the courage to do and succeeded in doing what would have been impossible for them individually… Cannibal savages as they were, it goes without saying that they devoured their victim as well as killing him. The violent primal father had doubtless been the feared and envied model of each one of the company of brothers: and in the act of devouring him they accomplished their identification with him, and each one of them acquired a portion of his strength. The totem meal, which is perhaps mankind's earliest festival, would thus be a repetition and a commemoration of this memorable and criminal deed, which was the beginning of so many things—of social organization, of moral restrictions and of religion (Freud 1989, 176).

I will let the passage speak for itself since it ends in a conclusion. But I will also emphasize that if ritualized practices of doubling and duplication, practices of substitution that are all about commemoration through repetition, originate from the Oedipal deed—from patricide—and if they are thus the origin of humanity, then humanity is founded in failure. Yes,

the brothers knocked off their father, but they did not kill their memory of him or their remorse over the deed. Freud passes lightly over the other half of the Oedipal deed—the brothers copulating with their sisters and mothers—but, as he tells the story, there is failure there, too, because if, prior to the primal murder, each of their individual desires had been to "become" in the sense of displace their father in his exclusive sexual access to the women, then if they had followed through, pitted against each other in a fundamental rivalry replicating the rivalry between their father and themselves, the brothers would not have been able to get along together, and thus the anarchic release let loose by the murder must have been a passing one, must have come to an end. And so "They revoked their deed by forbidding the killing of the totem, the substitute for their father; and they renounced its fruits by resigning their claim to the women who had now been set free. They thus created out of their filial sense of guilt the two fundamental taboos of totemism, which for that very reason inevitably corresponded to the two repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex" (Freud 1989, 178).

In short, the brothers redeemed their originary crime by instituting laws, which themselves function by means of an impossible representation and reenactment of the very thing simultaneously acknowledged, denied, and prohibited by means of its commemoration. "The patriarchal was replaced in the first instance by the fraternal clan, who existence was assured by the blood tie. Society was now based on complicity in the common crime" (Freud 1989, 181).

But then the dominant double here is of a very distinctive variety. The brothers of course did not want literally to become their father, just to destroy his authority and power over the women. Beyond choice, the full-fledged and intrinsically uneven or asymmetrical double is restored and preserved once the totem is erected, even if half of its significance pivots around its ritualized transgression and literal incorporation: the brothers kill and eat the totem, but the totem survives the ritual, which means that the father is preserved.

This might sound like a strange script, and yet for anyone who has researched the dynamics of traditional politics,[16] it is also a relatively familiar one, familiar because we encounter versions of the scenario that plays out in the totem meal—representation, repetition, withdrawal—over and over again when we utilize the resources offered by anthropology and ethnohistory to investigate the actual rituals rather than theoretics[17] that constitute community. But let me be clear; here, we are looking not

at actual political community but at the speculations of Freud, whose lingering message is conveyed in the thought that, "I have often had occasion to point out that emotional ambivalence in the proper sense of the term—that is, the simultaneous existence of love and hate towards the same object—lies at the root of many important cultural institutions" (Freud 1989, 194).

So the "original social" organization is that of the brothers, whose commonality is derived from their lack of access to women. I will not linger over this topic but will make a direct linkage with political philosophy by observing that, as is the case with all modernist images of a state of nature, *the social organization that follows the founding act—in this case, the Oedipal murder—presupposes social organization.*

***

But even something like a primordial, prior social organization is perpetually destabilized and threatened by the compulsion to repeat that originary murder. Having begun this chapter with reference to Freud's infamous "Dostoevsky and Parricide," I would be remiss not to remark on Freud's references to *The Brothers Karamazov* in that essay. It is not just that intense and conflicted familial relations between father and three brothers—Dmitri, Ivan, and Alyosha—animate that novel but that one of them murders the father, Fyodor. The eldest, Dmitri is accused of the murder and convicted of the crime, and it would seem that he has strong motivation given that he and his father are in competition for the amorous affections of a woman, Grushenka. However, it is apparently not he who committed the patricide, but Fyodor's bastard son and servant, Smerdyakov, who clearly also carries his own animus and "other" motivations to kill the father, even if the death instinct delivers him his own suicide rather than sexual access to women. While the novel is some 800 pages long, it could nevertheless be seen as a compact metonym for Freud's Oedipal complex. Freud himself saw it that way (Freud 1963, 275, 281, 287ff.).

Interlude: Sister Desire

Freud's account of the primal horde and of "the great event in human prehistory" (Freud 1989, 188) features males by putting the spotlight on the sons depicted by Freud as, above all, brothers, brothers who created a system that was "a covenant with their father" (Freud 1989, 179).[18] But what about the female perspective? What about the daughters, who were

also sisters? If heterosexuality, for example, is not just the basic biological double but also an *erotic double*—an intrinsically doubled desire—what about the women?

On the one hand, there is the violent and jealous "father," who, given that the situation predates taboos, is presumably fornicating with all of the women, including his own daughters; in fact, to flesh things out, where a law against incest emerges, it comes into being in order to check an existing desire, so the safest Freudian assumption is that the father actively wants to have sex with his daughters. On the other hand, there are the randy young men, who, much later—eons after the primal horde and the originary Oedipal crime—eventually create young male divinities who are represented as "enjoying the favours of mother-goddesses and committing incest with their mother in defiance of their father" (Freud 1989, 189).

But Freud gives us zero insight into what is going on with the women as if they were simply off his radar. All we know is that, following the parricide, he characterizes the women as having been "set free." But free in what sense? Free from the domineering patriarch (who also would have represented protection)? Free to have sex? Sex with whom?

Various possibilities suggest themselves. Given the absence of social institutions of any sort beyond the power hierarchy that governs the primal horde—given, that is, the basic conditions of the situation as Freud understands it—the least plausible possibility is that there would be anything inhibiting the women from desiring young men, even if those young men are their blood relatives, brothers, sons, even simultaneously both; again, Freud seems to consider incestuous desires to be primary or exemplary. But moving beyond the constraints of psychoanalytic theory, what if the women are weary of Freud's father (or what if they are weary of Freud)? What if they bear their own hostilities, perhaps, in fact, grudges derived from jealousy related to being sexually underserved, underserved because their man—the alpha—has plenty of other women competing for his attention? What if they are having sex with each other? What if, all other considerations aside, the women of the primal horde simply lust after the young men? What if they are already having clandestine sex with them on the periphery? Pushing further, what if they incite the young men to commit the transgression? What if they assist in its commission? What if, in the interregnum before the institution of totem and taboo, they actively throw themselves into a celebratory orgy, an orgy defined by the disappearance of all hierarchical restraints, a fleetingly active war machine until consolidation into a reactive state machine, which emerges

when those original restraints are resurrected through the totem system and the twinned pair of taboos it inaugurates (do not kill the father, do not fornicate with your family members).

Beyond that pair of what, for Freud, are taboos that express seemingly inescapable twinned desires, what do these questions have to do with the dream of the double? Sex.

Desiring Dalliance

Since I have strayed to the outskirts of Freud in speculating about the women of the primal horde, and since I have mentioned heterosexuality, I will take this opportunity to make one more remark about the sexual double, even if what I have to say seems obvious yet relates directly to the sense in which actual sex is as much "mental" as it is physical, that is, sexual desire is fundamentally psychosomatic.

The double might be thought to be most blatantly on display in heterosexuality, beginning with reproductive biology. But then, as noted above, there is the vital distinction between the biological double and the erotic double, a distinction that need refer to nothing more than the fact that when people experience lust, what each tends to want is *the other*. Yet since this distinction takes us beyond reproductive necessity, it is obvious that the same dynamic is in play in heterosexual, bisexual, homosexual, and polymorphous desire. What each party wants is an other, that is, what each party wants is to couple (to copula, to copulate) or to double. Even onanistic sex is infused by doubles visiting the imagination, if not on a screen.

This brief dalliance needs no justification in this chapter, particularly insofar as it anticipates one-half of the ontological double announced by and articulated in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

Yet at the same time, my few words on this topic seem meager given the situation of Eros that Freud is about to reveal: We "couple" (we orgasm) and then we die, actual orgasms prefiguring actual death, this no chiasm—no intertwining—but a battle that would have a fated ending were it only about individuals rather than forces of the universe.

Combat

Tracing his trajectory over the course of a long and extraordinarily prolific career, Freud leaves the impression that he felt perpetually compelled to take the analysis further, which is why, in turning to *Beyond the Pleasure*

Principle, [19] it seems apt to repeat that "We can only anticipate that the analysis of ambivalence in *Totem and Taboo* has not yet pushed deep enough." Now, however, and while ambivalence remains center stage, the nature of the struggle in relation to which it is a human-all-too-human experience is conceived in terms of a larger contest.

The historical backdrop of Freud's concern with pleasure and pain is a tradition that emerges within Greco-Roman philosophy, a tradition that embodies a rich and worried discourse on this double-topic, frequently wary of pleasure and tolerant of pain, and displaying a deep appreciation for the sense in which humanity is the battlefield for the struggle between them. And yet, in this ancient context, reference to pain cannot be extricated from reference to pleasure as if the relation were mapped onto a single spectrum or unbroken plane, and the conceptual possibilities thus remain relatively restricted, a restriction that probably endures intact up until Freud published this book: The modern version of the linkage is the obvious and unnuanced thought that humans are motivated by a desire for pleasure and an avoidance of pain. This is the pleasure principle, an "economic" read. So seemingly rational and mechanical, it is precisely where Freud begins the book, a beginning reminiscent of Heidegger's repeated deconstructive maneuver, that is, of beginning with *the obvious* precisely in order to subject it to deeply compromising interrogation that reverses nothing but entirely recalibrates the central tenets of the discourse: As Freud observes, " the impressions that underlie the hypothesis of the pleasure principle are so obvious that they can scarcely be overlooked" (Freud 1961, 1). That is, one cannot overlook being mesmerized by impressions, impressions that might support commitment to a monolithic ideology, a one-note song. So Freud begins to turn things by observing that

> Strictly speaking it is incorrect to talk of the dominance of the pleasure principle over the course of mental processes. If such a dominance existed, the immense majority of our mental processes would have to be accompanied by pleasure or to lead to pleasure, whereas universal experience completely contradicts any such conclusion. The most that can be said, therefore, is that there exists in the mind a strong *tendency* toward the pleasure principle, but that that tendency is opposed by certain other forces (Freud 1961, 3).

These "certain other forces" appear in the first instance for reasons that would seem to be entirely logical, that is, serving some "advantage."[20] From the standpoint of the interests of the organism's self-preservation,

the pleasure principle is "inefficient and even highly dangerous" (Freud 1961, 4), so the reality principle develops, asserting itself for dominance.[21] Checked by this second principle, which is derived from experience (i.e. from the interaction between the ego and external reality), pleasure is of course not in itself renounced—the reality principle is in fact a modified or tempered version of the pleasure principle—but is now subject both to deferral and to tolerance of immediate unpleasure for the sake of longer term satisfaction. And yet, subject as it is to the sexual instincts, and thus perpetually pushing to express itself, the pleasure principle is capable of overriding the reality principle, and frequently does: for example, immediate, perceived pleasure is not deferred, in which case ego typically pays a price. But this still assumes the primacy of the pleasure principle, providing no insight into "the operation of tendencies *beyond* the pleasure principle, that is, of tendencies more primitive than it and independent of it" (Freud 1961, 11).

Freud then discusses the evolution of psychoanalytic technique, which invariably aims to engage "some portion of infantile sexual life—of the Oedipus complex, that is, and its derivatives" (Freud 1961, 12). The struggle it encounters is not simply between the conscious and the unconscious but is rather between the ego and the repressed; the upshot here is that while the splits are there, the lines are not so obvious since large portions of the ego are actually unconscious. Why is this relevant? Because of the specific split it indicates, namely a split between "unpleasure for one system and simultaneously satisfaction for another" (Freud 1961, 14).

Woven in here is an emerging emphasis on a theme familiar from *Totem and Taboo*, namely, the compulsion to repeat. Taking these two themes together—a split between systems and the compulsion to repeat—what will become increasingly relevant is Freud's thought that "we shall find courage to assume that there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure principle" (Freud 1961, 16). In the hands of Freud, this functions as something like an ontological clue. Moving forward, "What follows is speculation, often far-fetched speculation, which the reader will consider or dismiss according to his individual predilection" (Freud 1961, 18).

With the problematic of pleasure and pain providing the motivating thread of continuity, Freud moves to a discussion of traumatic memories that are incompatible with consciousness, finally proposing that "*consciousness arises instead of a memory-trace*" (Freud 1961, 19), and he is soon actually talking about a portion of the cortical layer of the brain that

"becomes to some degree inorganic" and thus resistant to stimuli in order to protect the organism. "By its death, the outer layer has saved all the deeper ones" (Freud 1961, 21), an early intimation of the deepest imaginable double—death within and even shielding processes of life—and also a reference to a recurring theme in Freud's writings, which is the timelessness of unconscious mental processes, a timelessness preserved here in the form of the inorganic, death effectively insinuated into the most fundamental processes of life.

At this juncture, in conjunction with the theme of the timelessness of unconscious mental processes but not otherwise clearly motivated, Freud mentions that "we are today in a position to embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem that time and space are necessary forms of thought" (Freud 1961, 22). But he does not follow through with this offhand philosophical suggestion, and he rapidly returns to the central problem at hand, the interim observation that "no light has yet been thrown on the cases that contradict that dominance" of the pleasure principle (Freud 1961, 23).

Freud had always vigorously defended his theory of dreams as wish-fulfillment, and he does not exactly let go of that theory now, but, and with reference to anxiety dreams, he now adds a major theoretical supplement and thus advance, observing that these dreams seem to represent something " more primitive than the purpose of gaining pleasure and avoiding unpleasure" and that it is thus "impossible to classify as wish-fulfillments the dreams we have been discussing, which occur in traumatic neuroses, or the dreams during psychoanalyses which bring to memory the psychical traumas of childhood. They arise, rather, in obedience to the compulsion to repeat" (Freud 1961, 26). Shedding little light on his reference to Kant, Freud observes that if there is a beyond the pleasure principle, it is because "there was also a time before the purpose of dreams was the fulfillment of wishes" (Freud 1961, 27).

The prominence of wish-fulfillment dreams has thus been supplemented by and put into competition with the logic of repetition compulsion, which must express a different "purpose," that is, Freud has now exposed a doubling of the origin of dreams. As he writes, "The manifestations of a compulsion to repeat… exhibit to a high degree an instinctual character and, when they act in opposition to the pleasure principle, give the appearance of some 'daemonic' force at work"[22] (Freud 1961, 29). And yet these manifestations do not necessarily conflict with the pleasure principle, since repetition itself can be pleasurable. But the theorist cannot be distracted

by this potentially reassuring yet reductive thought—a thought of mastery—since, and working against this is the fact that patients in therapy disregard the pleasure principle in every way, are driven by instincts that compel them to repeat, that subject them to returns that are anything but pleasurable. This—his practice, the therapeutic situation—gives Freud the extraordinary theoretical insight that "*It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things*… the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life… an expression of the *conservative* nature of living substance" (Freud 1961, 30). If libido is license, living substance might embody a seemingly contrary impulse.

Fleetingly, Freud questions this, wondering via reference to variances in stream-homing behaviors of fish and migratory patterns of birds if it's not just a "historical" acquisition rather than biological phenomenon, a reverie that stalls in the thought that, however these patterns fluctuate, these, too, might display the compulsion to repeat (the salmon finds its way back to its contingent yet precise birthplace, spawns, then dies). On the one hand, yes, there is history, that is, "learned" adaptations. On the other hand, though, there are the instinctual forces that undergird and infuse these historical variants: Thus, "it is tempting to pursue to its logical conclusion the hypothesis that all instincts tend toward the restoration of an earlier state of things" (Freud 1961, 31).

Now things start to take a decisive turn. Indulge a lengthy quotation from our physician:

> Let us suppose, then, that all organic instincts are conservative, are acquired historically and tend towards the restoration of an earlier state of things. It follows that the phenomena of organic development must be attributed to external disturbing and diverting influences. The elementary living entity would from its very beginning have had no wish to change… Every modification which is thus imposed upon the course of the organism's life is accepted by the conservative organic instincts and stored up for further repetition. Those instincts are therefore bound to give a deceptive appearance of being forces tending toward change and progress, whilst in fact they are merely seeking to reach an ancient goal by paths alike old and new… It must be an *old* state of things… If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for *internal* reasons—becomes inorganic once again—then we shall be compelled to say that '*the aim of all life is death*'… that '*inanimate things existed before living ones.*' (Freud 1961, 31–32)

A pedestrian or under-reading of this conclusion might see it as only stating the obvious. But rather than being obvious, what Freud is moving toward is intrinsically discordant, with the instincts for self-preservation now represented as apparently in fundamental conflict with these more archaic, "conservative" instincts. The scientific cultural milieu in which Freud came up was premised on the assumption of not just "meaning" and logic, but, more specifically, the logic of non-contradiction; in relation to this milieu, Freud represents not just a paradigm shift but a metaphysical outrage. And the conflict and paradoxical nature of the relation between these sets of instincts will only intensify as the text continues exploring its major discovery, which is the oscillating opposition and peculiar collusion between the sexual instincts and the conservative instincts that would like to restore an original order, life infused with and inhabited by death. Elsewhere, Freud installs this tension within the relations between ego and superego, writing that, "What is now holding sway in the super-ego is, as it were, a pure culture of the death instinct, and in fact it often succeeds in driving the ego into death, if the latter does not fend off its tyrant in time by the change round into mania."[23]

Proximities to Death

Section VI of the text begins with an excursus on the latest biological theories of his time regarding the problematic phenomena of *natural* death: "Why do organisms die?" asks biology, as if this were a scientific question.[24]

The upshot of this unavoidable detour is Freud's conclusion that, "Thus our expectation that biology would flatly contradict the recognition of death instincts has not been fulfilled" (Freud 1961, 43). And so he not only sticks with consideration of his "dualistic view of instinctual life," but jarringly inserts here a reference to Schopenhauer, for whom "death is the 'true result and to that extent the purpose of life,' while the sexual instinct is the embodiment of the will to live" (Freud 1961, 43–44). Given Freud's own intense ambivalence toward philosophy and his fear that philosophy would lead him away from science, this reference, like his earlier reference to Kant, is a conspicuous fold in the text, an expression of the sense in which scientific theory needs to be supplemented by philosophy (which is different from saying that when Freud is being philosophical, he is not being scientific).

Now, and perhaps to defuse the suspicion that the new idea introduced by this text is unmotivated or is not the result of its own developmental or evolutionary consistency, Freud discusses his earlier distinction—going back to 1901—between sexual instincts and narcissistic ego instincts, which are simultaneously at odds with each other and yet which also work in mutual complicity. Now, he explicitly translates that earlier distinction into the current one, that is, between life instincts and death instincts (Freud 1961, 47). Freud the scientist is inclined to expect phenomena to line up into causal sequences traceable to an origin and would thus like to view one set of instincts as derived from the other. His brief reference to sadism does not resolve but only complicates this conceptual dilemma: Directed at a love-object, sadism would seem to be an expression of the death instincts put in the service of Eros, and masochism would seem to be introjected sadism—that is, outward directed sadism suddenly turned inward on the ego—but, and Freud is now considering something he had dismissed earlier in his career: What if this secondary masochism is an expression of a primary masochism? What, that is, if it is consistent with his remarks regarding the connection between repetition compulsion and the death instincts, a regression to an earlier state, the primal desire for a lack of stimuli fused with and put in the service of but yet remaining fundamentally distinct from the sexual instincts, death of a Trojan horse within the forces of life? Pushing further still, Freud makes reference to the Nirvana principle—oceanic bliss, the desire to return to the womb—and notes that while this finds expression in the pleasure principle (e.g. the experience of orgasm), he also asserts that "our recognition of that fact is one of our strongest reasons for believing in the existence of death instincts" (Freud 1961, 50), and he reminds us, the reader, again that it is the compulsion to repeat that led him to the death instincts.

What is the best that he can do here in his effort to track down not the origins as such of instincts but, more specifically, the origin of the association between the two sets? *Nothing scientific*. So he reinforces the speculative nature of his inquiry by turning to Aristophanes' speech in Plato's *Symposium*, where the origin of sexual instincts is traced to "*a need to restore an earlier state of things*" (Freud 1961, 51). Science remains mute to Freud's questions, so in order to provide a representation, he is forced to resort not just to ancient philosophy but to a comedic playwright's story about love contained within the philosophical archive. I do not need to restage that story, which is discussed elsewhere in this book. But I will emphasize the sense in which Freud's recourse to the story expresses the

depths of his own ambivalence, which wants to assert two competing sets of instincts at work in the governance of phenomena and seeks not to find common ground between them—they are both opposed to and yet find ways of co-opting each other—but to find the origin of their intertwining, that is, the origin of the universal double constituted by Eros and Thanatos.

> Shall we follow the hint given us by the poet-philosopher, and venture upon the hypothesis that living substance at the time of its coming to life was torn apart into small particles, which have ever since endeavored to reunite through the sexual instincts? (Freud 1961, 52).

Where does Freud stand in relation not just to Plato's or Aristophanes' hint and not just to the doubling of instincts but to the fact that the latter represents a radical departure from the efficiencies of the philosophical commitments of nineteenth-century science? Regarding the death instincts and thus his reference to Plato, "My answer would be that I am not convinced myself and that I do not seek to persuade other people to believe them" (Freud 1961, 53). Are we to believe Freud? Are we to believe him when, moving toward a perverse commitment, he writes that "The pleasure principle seems actually to serve the death instincts"? (Freud 1961, 57), as if he could consider exceeding the deconstruction he has already incurred, as if, that is, he could retreat back to the game of assuming an unproblematic primary cause?

It is as if within Freud there were two disparate yet inseparable theories, theoretical twins. Pleasure principle; any sophomore would enthusiastically get that. But death is not going away. The two are adversaries who work in collusion with each other and yet which can never be conflated.

***

As I pass *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, it is worth noting that the title of that text is misleading, since for Freud there is no going beyond pleasure and certainly no going beyond Oedipus. Nothing in his previous theory is neutralized, just supplemented, all the previous material now subtended, haunted, and permanently cleaved and contested by a double, love not now replaced or displaced by death, just perpetually pitted against it. We could follow this conflicted doubling to its next intensification in *The Ego and the Id*.[25] Or after that, most radically, to the contest between Eros and Thanatos and "the battle of the giants" once Freud writes *Civilization and Its Discontents*.[26] But we have visited the point in the development of his

theory at which the primacy of the pleasure principle gets compromised by the emergence of its double (which perhaps had been haunting it all along).

If one looks at what I have written so far in a certain light—if one squints one's eyes—it might appear that it has been in part an exercise in deconstruction, or in a cross between deconstruction (text) and something like phenomenology (body). And some people thought that it was existentialism that was concerned with matters of life and death.

I do not want to artificially circumscribe or limit the configurations of the double encountered in Freud, which is to say that my own book is an exercise in eidetic variation and not an attempt to create a theory about or taxonomy of the double. In retrospect, though, Freud's book features two general varieties. First, the double is always animated insofar as it appears in the form of struggle, including the struggle—emotional struggle, libidinal struggle, struggle of the will—associated with and expressed by fundamental ambivalence. Second, Freud's double plays out—as the double always does—in the form of seemingly countless substitutions, in effigies, in surrogacies, as well as hauntings and spectral reflections.

Finally, then, I will close with brief reference to Freud's junior colleague, Otto Rank. Regarding him, Freud writes,

> The theme of the 'double' has been thoroughly treated by Otto Rank (1914). He has gone into the connections which the 'double' has with reflections in mirrors, with shadows, with guardian spirits, with the belief in the soul and with the fear of death; but he also lets in a flood of light on the surprising evolution of the idea (Freud 1919, 9).

There is something chilling about the first example with which Otto Rank begins his book, *Double: A Psychoanalytic Study*,[27] since it is a "photoplay," that is, a film, *The Student of Prague*, doubly chilling because it is so early in the history of cinema and because films have since become the double of life, an aesthetic and cultural version of the dream; films are literally a play of shadows, and this particular early film depicts a story that is about shadows. In fact, the examples of doubles that Rank uses in the early parts of the text are all about shadows or about the uncanny loss or absence of shadows or about winding up without a self and with only a shadow, or maybe with a twin.

Rank's focus is largely on the double as *Doppelgänger*, a configuration that shares an intimation of death in common with other shapes of

the double. I am more interested in the fact that, later in the book, he quotes Freud's double, Nietzsche: "Man's shadow, I thought, is his vanity" (Rank 1971, 49). And it is indeed the double as shadow (as, that is, soul) and imagery of mirrors and reflections that dominates the anthropological terrain covered by Rank, "the ruinous and the erotic" attending these reflections, the Narcissus legend particularly troubling since the figure of Tiresias is part of the story (Rank 1971, 67). But the most incisive aspect of the double articulated by Rank is in connection with not just the story of Narcissus but the more general relation between narcissism and the double, and the sense in which, as is the case with Dorian Gray, it promises immortality while simultaneously announcing death (Rank 1971, 69ff.), thus providing a metonym for the central ambiguity that preoccupies Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*,[28] immortality converging perversely in the determinative contest between Eros and Thanatos, without resolution.

Notes

1. Of course, the other central presupposition is a faith in science, see Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989).
2. Emphasis mine.
3. Sigmund Freud, "Dostoevsky and Parricide," in *Character and Culture*, ed. Phillip Rieff (New York: Collier Books, 1963), p. 275.
4. It is worth noting that Dostoevsky's son, Alyosha, was also epileptic and in fact died from it.
5. Some say that being a psychoanalyst is a tedious job since in the end it's a monotonous matter of hearing the same story over and over again.
6. Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhnsky (London: Vintage, 1992), p. 727.
7. Pier Paolo Pasolini, dir., *Oedipus Rex* (Arco Film, 1967).
8. Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989). Originally published in two parts in 1912 and 1913.
9. Cf. the brief later section, *Interlude: Sister Desire*.
10. Readers of Derrida will immediately recognize the philosophical significance of Freud's double-reading. I am thinking in particular of Derrida's address of *pharmakon* in "Plato's Pharmacy," in Jacques Derrida,

Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

11. My insertion.
12. Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990), pp. 105–106.
13. In fact, it be reductive to suggest or argue that Freud's underlying motivation must be that of a psychoanalyst. If anything, the opposite argument might be made, namely Freud's interest in the psychological past might have been simply one facet of his broad interest in the past more generally (witness the artifacts that haunted his office), which might mean that the subtitle of the work serves to legitimate that broader interest.
14. Durkheim (2008).
15. See Brian Seitz and Thomas Thorp, *The Iroquois and the Athenians: A Political Ontology* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013).
16. See Seitz and Thorp (2013).
17. For example, social contract theory.
18. See Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
19. Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton, 1961). Originally published in 1920.
20. See Dostoevsky's extended mockery of the notion of "advantage" or "profit" in *Notes from Underground*, Part I, Section VII.
21. Freud had introduced these concepts in his 1911 essay, "Two Principles of Mental Functioning."
22. It is worth noting that in his essay, "The Uncanny," Part I Freud observes that "In Arabic and Hebrew 'uncanny' means the same thing as 'daemonic,' 'gruesome.'" Of course, the Greek word "daimon" does not have automatic associations with "gruesome." See Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny" (1919), p. 2 (http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/freud1.pdf).
23. Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, trans. Joan Riviere (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1960), p. 43.
24. See *Zorba the Greek*, directed and written by Michael Cacoyannis, based on the novel by Nikos Kazantzakis (1964):
    Alexis Zorba: Why do the young die? Why does anybody die?
    Basil: I don't know.
    Alexis Zorba: What's the use of all your damn books if they can't answer that?
    Basil: They tell me about the agony of men who can't answer questions like yours.
    Alexis Zorba: I spit on this agony!

25. Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, trans. Joan Riviere (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1960). Originally published 1923.
26. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1962). Originally published 1930.
27. Otto Rank, *Double: A Psychoanalytic Study*, trans. and ed. Harry Tucker Jr. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971). Originally published in 1914.
28. Lest some wonder why I have neglected other texts (including those of Jacques Lacan or Slavoj Zizek, whose innovations are not under consideration in this project), it is worth reminding the reader that the focus here is on sampling aspects of the double in selected Freudian texts, not on psychoanalysis as such.

References

Durkheim, Èmile. 2008. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. Trans. Carol Cosman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freud, Sigmund. 1961. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Trans. and ed. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton.

Freud, Sigmund. 1963. *Character and Culture*, ed. Phillip Rieff. New York: Collier Books.

Freud, Sigmund. 1989. *The Future of an Illusion*. Trans. and ed. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Rank, Otto. 1971. *Double: A Psychoanalytic Study*. Trans. and ed. Harry Tucker Jr. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Seitz, Brian, and Thomas Thorp. 2013. *The Iroquois and the Athenians*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

CHAPTER 5

The Ineluctable Double: Phenomenology's Other

The doubles operating in Dostoevsky and Freud are intimately and indissociably associated with social relations, with, that is, various configurations of what the phenomenologists call "intersubjectivity." More flatly stated, intersubjectivity is what these doubles are about, what they inhabit, and what they animate. The passageway from them to phenomenology is thus an organic one and there is no need for literary or philosophical flourish to concoct continuity as we shift focus onto this horizon.

It is neither a philosophical nor a historical accident that phenomenology, which emerged as a vibrant school of philosophy in early twentieth-century Germany, is beset by numerous doubles. For starters, and regarding methodology, the *epoché* or phenomenological reduction is twinned with its desire to problematize and challenge "the natural attitude" (the everyday mode of consciousness that is buoyed by a myriad of assumptions). More formally, a double is in deep play with the "intentional" model of consciousness—noetic–noematic, that is, consciousness is always consciousness of something other than consciousness—that served this school as a privileged axiom.[1] But I'm not really interested in intentionality here. Nor am I interested in giving a *general* account of the double in phenomenology, since, for one thing, such a misguided effort would have to take the form of a desiccated catalogue. More relevant, my previous efforts in this book have been not general but selective, and there is a certain logic at work in my choice of texts and tactics—moving in and out of philosophy proper—a logic that will continue to shift shape

B. Seitz, *Intersubjectivity and the Double*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56375-0_5

in this chapter. One eloquent channel into this world is Merleau-Ponty's reflection that "My life must have a sense that I do not constitute, there must be, literally, an intersubjectivity; each of us must be at once anonymous in the sense of an absolute individuality and anonymous in the sense of an absolute generality. Our being in the world is the concrete bearer of this double anonymity."[2]

The *problem* of intersubjectivity is one of the most prominent threads binding the phenomenologists.[3] But it takes so many forms that there is no general account of this more restricted problem, either. Accordingly, I will focus on just one exemplary text, Edmund Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*, and make some brief remarks on another, Jean-Paul Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*.

These texts are utterly different from each other: While one is painstakingly methodical and technical, never cracks a smile, and strives to keep the anxiety at bay, the other is tinged with amphetamine-fueled melodrama, its key character dripping quasi-paranoid beads of ontological sweat as it interjects philosophical swear words ["Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being—like a worm"! (Sartre 1975, 56)]. While Husserl's text is governed by an open and unyielding commitment to "the transcendental ego," Sartre's is premised on an apparent rejection or transcendence of that ego.[4] Directly related to this last contrast, Husserl's effort is ultimately a catastrophic failure, while Sartre's is largely *about* failure. These contrasts are decisive, which is why it's worth taking them both on. And yet, they are bound together here by one motif regarding their respective representations of intersubectivity, namely, forms of visual perception. Husserl "apperceives" the other's body, while Sartre feels the gaze of the other. The double is a struggle for them both.

Transcendental Isolation

Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology was initially delivered as lectures at the Sorbonne in 1929. In them, Husserl spends four chapters delivering a radical subjectivity that seems to lack a body and, not incidentally, in no obvious way includes reference to an other, delivers, that is, no double.[5] This is a philosophically precarious situation, and Husserl is fully aware of the dilemma he has so carefully crafted: Without an account of intersubjectivity, he asks himself, "Should not a phenomenology that proposed to solve the problems of Objective being, and to present itself actually as philosophy, be branded therefore as transcendental solipsism?"[6]

Having secured the subject as transcendental Ego, Husserl now risks the empty yet nevertheless menacing possibility of the *solus ipse*: geared as they have been toward an intensive and finally exclusive focus on Ego, his "meditations" thus lead inexorably to the as of yet unaddressed problem of the other, a problem now situated in a discursive framework governed by the monadic Ego. Unless he can broaden the subject to include its other, "the idea guiding our meditations" will have been betrayed, and the meditations will have failed to provide a foundation upon which to "solve the problems of Objective being" (Husserl 1977, 89). Husserl thus embarks on the "Fifth Meditation"—which is nearly as long as the text of all of the preceding meditations combined—in an effort to establish intersubjectivity, since a world locked rigidly within the constituting, intentional architecture of transcendental subjectivity could be "Objective" in only a very restricted way, a way that would threaten phenomenology's ambition to provide a grounding for the natural sciences, that is, when it comes down to it, it could not really be Objective at all.

Several major issues are at stake here, two of them particularly prominent. First and most obvious is precisely the problem of transcendental solipsism, of an Ego so radically reduced and boxed into itself that there is nothing else that can be recognized or discussed within the parameters of the epoché. In the broadest picture, this first problem is the one that cuts the deepest by circumscribing the domain of what can and cannot be taken up by a transcendental ontology whose primary ambition is the rigorous construction or revelation of the foundation of science itself.

The second really critical problem falls not on the side of the object of philosophy, but on the side of the activity and nature of phenomenology itself. More specifically, I do not become *solus ipse* "naturally": it is a consequence of the application of phenomenological epoché, which, by implication, is to say that there is no transcendental solipsism in the realm of the natural attitude. Transcendental solipsism is the product of the application of an extremely refined, rigorous, and consistent philosophic method. Solipsism is not exactly a conclusion, is not a position at which one arrives, an identity to be adopted. And yet solipsism is a horizon—a truly terminal horizon—perpetually on the edge of subject-centered philosophies. On one level, Husserl knows exactly where he is headed and is thus not concerned he will wind up locked within a solipsistic position, although it would be an error to characterize the "Fifth Meditation" as an afterthought (particularly since he had previously rehearsed the argument in *Ideas II*[7]), and he has an enormous task facing him. In short, if "a

consistent self explication under the name phenomenology" lands him on the doorstep of solipsism, Husserl understands that either his phenomenological method will lead him away from the problem, or that something is wrong with the method itself.

Obviously, Husserl has confidence that the method must lead him away, which is why Ricoeur represents Husserl's position very generously when he notes that, "The Fifth Meditation teaches us that transcendental solipsism is not an impasse but a strait through which philosophy must pass."[8] But Ricoeur's sympathies were with phenomenology, and he was not engaged in deconstruction.[9] Yet it is "something like"[10] a deconstruction that I will display here, focusing on the tensions in the text that expose the sense in which the central referent of Husserl's text—the transcendental Ego—both requires (for its own completion) and yet simultaneously makes impossible the acquisition of a double subject and thus of intersubjectivity. Husserl has indeed meditated himself into an impasse or an aporia (and the only way he will get out of it is by walking[11]).

Two fundamentally divergent tendencies govern Husserl's discourse here: (1) A privileged desire to maintain and advance the primacy and constitutive power of the monadic Ego, which (2) is the origin of a *necessary*, conflicting desire to recognize the other, that is, to establish intersubjectivity as a passage to an Objective world.[12] This second desire involves a fundamental conflict with and a compromise of the first desire, since alterity—otherness, difference from transcendental Ego, the possibility of a true double—poses a fundamental threat to the privileged Ego. In short, the Husserlian hierarchy makes a resolution impossible, and the "Fifth Meditation" does not resolve the problem of the other but generates and marks out the contours of the double's threats to phenomenology. These are the marks of the epochal philosophy of the subject, a philosophy that does not begin with the coupling of bodies but is more or less awkwardly (and yet conveniently?) forced to recognize them along the way.

So the problem has been identified. Husserl needs a doubled subject, and he knows it. Without a double that will establish intersubjectivity, the *monad* remains locked within a compartment, something significantly and decisively less than a world. And yet as the embodiment of ontological difference, a double cannot follow from a monad, and as I intend to show here, Husserl's desire is an impossible one; his turn to the body in order to find a passageway to intersubjectivity is a desperate maneuver since it is too late to secure a double subject. Ultimately then, and left to its own devices, the *Cartesian Meditations* is a dramatic failure that tries to mask

its fatal flaw, and while the clash between solipsism and intersubjectivity is the vibrant foreground issue, what is truly at stake in the background here is thus phenomenology itself.[13]

Purely Mine

At the outset of the "Fifth Meditation," Husserl indicates a "transcendental clue" that will guide us, a clue embodied—literally embodied, as we shall soon discover—in the experienced other itself. " I experience the world (including others)… not as (so to speak) my private synthetic formation but as other than mine alone, as an intersubjective world" (Husserl 1977, 91).

Thus, Husserl begins his final meditation by reaffirming the unifying motif of the *Cartesian Meditations*, the return to experience itself. But it is not "raw experience" that provides our clue, which is to say that it is not a return to experience under the auspices of anything like a natural attitude. The experience we turn to has undergone an elaborate treatment, namely, a sustained philosophical reduction opening onto "the realm of transcendental-phenomenological self-experience." Meanwhile, although the possibility of transcendental solipsism lingers on the peripheral horizon of the transcendental Ego, it remains held at bay because the other ego is still there, because, that is, experience delivers this clue. Before taking advantage of the clue, a reminder for clarity:

> Imperturbably I must hold fast to the insight that every sense that any existent whatever has or can have for me—in respect of its "what" and its "it exists and actually is"—is a sense in and arising from my intentional life (Husserl 1977, 91).

Having unlocked the intentional structures of transcendental subjectivity in the first four meditations, it is to my intentional life that Husserl must turn in order to reveal the intersubjective world, must because there is no longer any other life (i.e. there is no *other*). None of the previous ways of meditating on my intentional structure have uncovered an intersubjective complex, so Husserl introduces a special epoché aimed at producing a fundamental "ownness sphere."[14] That is, now that we have firmly established that all sense arises from my intentional life, we must further describe and define that intentional life in order to expose the way that the sense, "other," is constituted within it. We begin this process by

bracketing every intentional element related to other subjectivity, so that the essential structures constituting me are clearly evident in pure form. Husserl asserts that this does not alter the world-sense, "experienceable by everyone" (Husserl 1977, 93); it simply makes explicit what is fundamentally mine so that the structures of otherness—that is, the structures of otherness whose sense, as is the case with all other sense, is necessarily constituted by me—will stand out in unambiguous relief.

This initial move, the special reduction to the ownness sphere, is extraordinarily noteworthy, because its first stage aims at the production of a hyper-level *solus ipse*, which is to say that the special reduction aims to push things to their extreme. The reduction to the ownness sphere attempts to isolate, as thoroughly and exhaustively as possible, the domain of the subject in order to provide a pure backdrop against which the origins and location of the sense, "other," can appear in full clarity. So Husserl takes the transcendental solipsism constructed in the course of the first four meditations to heart, and deliberately and explicitly ups the ante, screening out all signs of the other precisely to see where the other will appear in such a radically solipsized realm.

However, as Merleau-Ponty observes, "The 'solipsist' thing is not primary for Husserl, nor is the *solus ipse*. Solipsism is a 'thought-experiment'; the *solus ipse* a 'constructed subject'," [15] a purely philosophical entity (or device). If the solipsism that appears in the first series of meditations is, more or less, a by-product of the devotion to one set of problems, the *solus ipse* of the ownness sphere is a valuable, useful construct at the overt center of a concentration on a second set of problems, problems that are intrinsically related to and an extension of the first set, but which are nevertheless critically distinct, a remainder. That this is a "thought-experiment" is borne out both by the specifics of the technical tenor of the text and by Husserl's gesture of *abstraction* which, he points out (Husserl 1977, 93), is meant in an ordinary sense. Thus, the reduction to the ownness sphere consists in abstracting myself from the others so that all that is left over is I and I *alone* (in my transcendental solitude). The product of this special epoché is a residuum that includes everything that is not alien. Put simply, the reduction to the ownness sphere is a recasting of the circumscription of who I am, aimed at eliciting or discovering who the other is.

So what do we forfeit through this special epoché, and what are the features of the ownness sphere that it reveals? On the side of forfeit, the biggest, seemingly paradoxical loss is the very thing we are ultimately

trying to gain, the Objective world, whose objectivity relates most fundamentally to intersubjectivity. The nature of the natural scientist vanishes into the black hole between our brackets—vanishes, that is, into our suspension—and a substratum of nature and a world purely mine remains as residuum. This is where the real business at hand begins—how can we envision science in a world that is not shared with others—and it is also where what is unique about the "Fifth Meditation" begins to become evident.

Until now, my body has had no place in the schema of transcendental phenomenology as it is articulated in the *Cartesian Meditations.* Here, though, my body moves into a paramount position, appearing as if out of nowhere or by philosophical sleight of hand (cf. Husserl 1977, 97). In the broader context of the text as a whole, the abrupt significance granted to my corporeal being must be taken as a sign that Husserl is straining. The primary reductions of meditations one through four lead to a transcendental Ego that might as well be incorporeal, since the body is not an issue at all. Sections 1 through 41 cultivate an egology in which flesh and blood and motility have no apparent place. Why does it suddenly take a new, special reduction to make the body an important, even necessary, domain for phenomenological description? Why does this new reduction lead to the body? Why could the transcendental reduction—in contrast with this special epoché—not have entailed an address of the intentional network of my carnal being? The role of the body in the constitution of the other appears, more or less, out of the blue, and in the broader scope of the *Cartesian Meditations*, its belated arrival is an early signal of failure.

The body is not simply bracketed out until the "Fifth Meditation"; it has no place whatsoever in Husserl's text until this late stage, and we might ask whether the "Fifth Meditation" would have been necessary if the body had played an active role in the processes of the previous four meditations, if, that is, the intentional structure of his transcendental Ego had extended into arms, legs, a visual field, a nexus of animated appetites, including erotic desire, a fundamental reference and opening onto the other? An exploration of the structure of intersubjectivity necessarily entails a discussion of the body, of "kinaesthetic being," of "somatic intentionality," and Husserl's own text confirms this. The course of this final meditation might seem to lead from the body to intersubjectivity, although it might be more accurate to say that, in the broader picture, the search for intersubjectivity leads Husserl to the body.[16]

These Other Bodies

The world rendered purely mine by this special reduction is still filled with bodies, all of which now present themselves as having the same ontological status as each other. All, that is, except for one (later two), my own, which distinguishes itself as being not a mere body among bodies, a thing among things, but a special body, an animate organism, a kinaesthetic system of intentionalities, which actively experiences and perceives all of nature, and itself as well. The reduction to the ownness sphere cannot reduce my body to being a body among bodies, like all the other bodies; I am "the bodily organism, the psychophysical Ego, with 'body and soul' and personal Ego—utterly unique members of this reduced 'world'" (Husserl 1977, 98).

But it is not as if in observing my body and other bodies we are viewing two radically separate dimensions of the world as it appears in the context of my ownness sphere. On an ontological plane, all of those other bodies are radically distinct from mine in terms of kind, in terms of what they are like. That has already been established. But the sense-components (i.e. the *what* that they are like) of those bodies have the same origin as the sense of my body. It is within my apperception that the other bodies present themselves; it is through my sensuous, bodily being that the other things appear as external, through me that they appear at all. That is, their sense-structure is my sense-structure, their appearance is my apprehension, the world is positively my own. The strength of the distinction between those mere bodies and my animate body, between those things and my psychophysical or, most properly, psychosomatic Ego is reinforced by the fact that the distinction is one constituted by me. A thing out there external to me is concretely "a point of intersection belonging to my constitutive synthesis" (Husserl 1977, 105). As Husserl wants to emphasize and reemphasize,

> That my own essence can be at all contrasted for me with something else, or that I (who am I) can become aware of someone else (who is not I but someone other than I), presupposes that not all my own modes of consciousness are modes of self-consciousness. (Husserl 1977, 105).

What is critical here for Husserl's representation of intersubjectivity—for his securing of a double subject—and for the consistency of this representation with the rest of his egological enterprise is the theme of modes of consciousness and the thought that these modes are described as

fundamentally my own. This point is a compact one, but it is, in fact, the determinative locus of his entire investigation of the constitution of the other. What Husserl is saying is a reaffirmation of a very familiar Husserlian theme, namely, that the sense or the meaning of those external bodies—even their very externality itself—is a mode of my consciousness. The *what* of what they are originates from me and nowhere else. When we get to the other ego in our meditation, the importance of this point and the reason Husserl brings it up here will become clear. He is walking a tightrope in his address of intersubjectivity, and he must maintain a perfect balance.

To intensify my characterization of that tightrope walk, on one side of the rope is the problem of the radical autonomy of the other, an other whose independence would reduce the absolute authority and prominence of my presence, finally rendering it—rendering me (and possibly my phenomenology!)—superfluous.[17] On the other side, though, is the problem of full-blown idealism, in which not only the otherness of the other is constituted as a function of my intentional network, but she, in her very existence, collapses into me as well. An idealism of this sort would simply return us to the problem we had faced at the end of the "Fourth Meditation," the problem of a world consisting only and purely of me and my productions, a world in which the alter ego would simply be another face worn by the transcendental Ego itself. The problem of transcendental solipsism is that it domesticates and thus neutralizes alterity in advance, thus sabotaging phenomenology's effort to depict an other who is really an other at all, to depict, that is, a double subject (and, from there, a shared world).

From Husserl's standpoint, a fall either way would commit him to one of two positions he believes he must avoid. Not a step can be omitted in the effort to circumvent a fall, and every step must be complete and self-conscious if he is to reach his goal, a position between and yet somewhere quite other than positivism and idealism, a position which will be unique, not simply a hybrid amalgamation of the two.

However, the situation is not as simple as this. Husserl clearly favors one side of the rope, the one tending toward transcendental solipsism, the side attained through four "rigorous" meditations, the domain of the transcendental Ego. *If he did not favor this side, he would not be in this dilemma*. But he also knows that he must establish the very alterity of the other if he is going to achieve his broader ambition of making transcendental phenomenology a founding science. His interests are severely fractured, then, and in the course of the "Fifth Meditation" he leans back and

forth, foraging ever forward, but with the two fundamentally conflicting and ultimately irreconcilable tendencies steering him along the way, as they have ever since he articulated the apparent impasse that opens this chapter of *Cartesian Meditations*.

Despite this massive conflict, Husserl knows where he stands at this point—knows that he is walking the rope—and he wants to insure that he does not lose his balance before intersubjectivity opens the way for securing the Objective world. He writes,

> And now the problem is how we are to understand the fact that the ego has, and can always go on forming, in himself such intentionalities of a different kind, intentionalities with an existence-sense whereby he wholly transcends his own being (Husserl 1977, 105).

While he may be acknowledging the problem, he proceeds to actively avoid it. What is important to him is that his audience accepts the mixed thought that the "constitutionally secondary Objective transcendency"—and the "Objective world" and "Objective experience"—is "not my own essence and has no place as a constituent part thereof, though it nevertheless can acquire sense and verification only in my essence" (Husserl 1977, 106). Always reinforced by the primacy of transcendental Ego, this tension is what in the same stroke defines and compromises the Husserlian constitution of intersubjective being.

As a final preliminary elucidation (Section 49 is described as a "predelineation")—yes, despite having already made some fancy maneuvers, we are still in a preliminary phase of the constitution of the other!—Husserl briefly mentions that while not yet describing how the first level of the constitution of the existence-sense "Objective world," which is based on the fundamental world of my ownness sphere, is related to other egos. The Objective world has to be essentially the same for any ego, which includes myself but also refers to other egos as well. So, he claims, the constitution of the Objective world relates originally to a community of egos—a "community of monads"—and refers us to " the transcendental intersubectivity" which " has an intersubjective sphere of ownness" (Husserl 1977, 107). Although this is not a rigorous description, and Husserl provides no real arguments for it at this point, it intimates a sound position or, more accurately speaking, a strategic objective. However, if there is nothing wrong with his bringing it up here as an anticipation of the results of what is to come, it is nevertheless curious that he chooses to

do so. That Husserl believes that an Objective world refers first to other egos is implicit from the start of the "Fifth Meditation," but he has no basis for mentioning a transcendental intersubjectivity at this stage of the game, since, via the special reduction, we have only just entered our own ownness sphere. Perhaps more interesting or revealing is the absence of a description of an intersubjective ownness sphere, which absence does not prevent Husserl from making mention of it even before making use of the first ownness sphere, mine. Is this a rigged game?

All indications are that Husserl knows with complete confidence just where he intends to go before undertaking the steps that will lead him there. Put more plainly, despite phenomenology's claims of "suspension," Husserl is clearly making some profound presuppositions, prompting the question, is this "the circle in which the Husserlian analysis moves, inasmuch as it presupposes what it attempts to explain"?[18] While this suggests a massive breach in the text as a whole, there are other problems already emerging here, too, especially considering the specific contents of what is about to follow. For example, how do we establish a *transcendental* intersubjectivity, and what is the relationship between its transcendental features and the mediating body? How can we grant primacy to the transcendental when the corporeal is ever-present at the core of intersubjective being (unless the transcendental is merely a complete abstraction, which Husserl would clearly not want to maintain)? These are neither peripheral nor speculative questions, and, despite himself, Husserl has assured that they will arise here, yet will remain unanswered, standing as a fundamental challenge to the text, a challenge that, outside of authorial intentions, is cobbled into it.

Analogically Her

Section 49 is transitional. We have sketched out an ownness sphere and are now ready to work our way toward the other ego. Above all else, the special epoché has revealed what is most my own, namely, the distinct uniqueness of me as a psychological ego, as an organism that is animated, active, and refers to itself while referring to other things. I, the meditating Ego, look across a world in which all intentionalities related to other subjectivities have been bracketed, and of all the bodies I see, there is one which stands out as different and unique, my own. Or so it seems at first.

There is also the other over there, and I recognize her as another ego, she is there "in person."[19] I recognize her, we are co-present, and there

is another like me (even if I am not a woman). At the beginning, we have to note explicitly that I do not recognize the other immediately, that the other ego is not given as such in my original experience. If she were, then, according to the Husserlian axiom—reprising the initial problem of the "Fifth Meditation"—she would be not truly other but just another feature of myself. No, I do not grasp her immediately, but, rather, through the mediating presence of her body. I apperceive the other—the other enters my intentional network—through her body. Now, although the apperception of the other ego bears similarities with my apperception of other objects, of, say, the apperception of the whole house through the perception of its partial front, my intentional relationship with the other ego is utterly distinct from my relationship with any other sort of phenomena. This is where we reach the first and formal element of the constitution of the other ego, the constitution founded on analogy.[20] It is worth noting here that arguments from analogy are always a gamble.

In the perceptual sphere pertaining to my primordial nature, a body is presented, which, as primordial, is of course only a determining part of myself, an "immanent transcendency." Since, in this nature and this world, my animate organism is the only body that is or can be constituted *originally* as an animate organism (a functioning organ), the body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as an animate organism, must have derived this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my animate organism. It is clear from the very beginning that, within my primordial sphere, only a similarity connecting that body over there with my body can serve as the motivational basis for the "analogizing" apprehension of that body as another animate organism (Husserl 1977, 110–111).

This passage advances two pivotal points:

First is this notion of apperceptive transfer, of an analogical grasping of the other as like myself. Through the apperception of the other given by my perception[21] of her body, I *see* that she is like me. So the theme of analogizing apprehension of the other and the non-cognitive nature of this apprehension is the first point Husserl makes in this passage of his meditation.

The second point is not really new, though, but the return of a familiar Husserlian theme, and an expression of the mutually conflicted pair of interests articulated earlier. While not exactly originating in my "primoridal sphere," the existence-sense, "other ego," is *my* sense. What is apperceived as an other ego through the analogizing transfer—the

> sense "alter ego," "an other ego like me"—is derived from the analogy, and the analogy is my apperception. Through perception, apperception involves the other's body, but the existence-sense appropriated in the process is mine.[22]

Husserl calls the specific form of this analogy a "pairing"[23] of the Ego and alter ego (Husserl 1977, Section 51), a passive associational synthesis whose appearance is a unity of similarity, a "mutual transfer of sense." Much of the world is intentionally constituted, related together, and unified by means of analogizing, but the passive synthesis of the pairing analogy is unique to the Ego/alter ego configuration. The analogy that relates things—"things" meaning mere bodies among bodies here—simply cuts across the field of what is presented on a single plane (the plane of all those things "external" to me). The pairing analogy is unique because the mutual transfer of sense runs from what is peculiarly my own to what is alien, from what I have established as being my sphere to what is, on an "originary" level, truly other.

So far, I would characterize this so-called pairing as an artificial or even fake double.

This first, formal constitution of the other is not sufficient by itself. The other body is related to mine through the analogizing transfer, but Husserl recognizes that we can still ask what makes this other organism genuinely other, what prevents it from collapsing altogether into my sphere, why is it not a second organism of mine rather than an ego that is more than just alter, but truly other? That question is simply not going away.

According to Ricoeur's reading, the otherness of the other ego remains in play for Husserl at this point because the analogizing apperception renders only a *logical* sense, "other ego." That is, "'Pairing' is a relation which lacks the fullness of a living experience" (Ricoeur 2007, 127), this despite Husserl's thought that apperception is delivered through perception (rather than cognition). The similarity of the body "paired" with mine is a purely formal similarity, one not yet wearing flesh, only an initial stage in the process of getting at an Objective, intersubjective world. So we are led to the second stage of the constitution of the other, the stage that will produce a real other, more—it is hoped and assumed—than what might possibly be a mere modification of my Ego. This is where ap*presentation*—as a correlate of and yet distinct from ap*perception*—acquires vital importance.

Husserl begins here with a question, namely, given that I am dealing with the invisible, how is it that I appropriate the sense transferred by

analogy with an existence-status?[24] I have no direct, immediate experience of the psyche "in" that body over there; the psychical features of that body are not presented as or part of my primordial ownness sphere. How is it, then, that it has an existence-sense related to the psychical? We now encounter what makes that body stand out from all of the other, mundane bodies, in a way related to the way mine stands out. "The experienced animate organism of another continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious 'behavior'" (Husserl 1977, 114).

By itself, this argument is not novel and would not get Husserl very far: when it comes to brass tacks, philosophers have always known that you can expect any instance of being (mineral, vegetable, animal, cosmological, ontological) to "behave" in an internally concordant manner. Harmoniousness is precisely what enables the observing, philosophical Ego to distinguish one kind of thing from another.

But this is by no means an isolated argument of Husserl's. It follows the initial constitution of the other via the observations about analogizing apperception. That is, the formal link between that body of the other and this body which is mine has already been set up, and this second moment depends upon that link. Husserl is now adding color to what, on the basis of analogy, is so far only a sketch. The first stage of the meditation—the "ideal" moment of analogy—tells us that the other is like me. This second stage—the moment of real constitution, the psychological move, the move whose content is behavior itself—tells us several new things (or several new sides of the same thing). First, it tells us how she is like me. Second, it affirms that the other body is definitely not my own. Third, through the appresentation of behavior it delivers the invisible network of psychical determinations which, precisely, *are* the other ego. The general style of concordant behavior of the other body is like mine (the formal analogy now picks up some substance), the specific style (i.e. harmoniousness) is not like mine (otherness seems secured), and, finally, the physical aspect of the harmonious behavior appresentatively indicates a psychical aspect, indicates, that is, another ownness sphere that is not the same as my own.

So this is what we come up with on the noematic pole of the structure. On the noetic side, on the other hand, we are led to talk about this sense of the other—the sense of something not as such but appresentatively—as an intentional modification of my Ego, "or as an intentional modification of my primordial 'world': the Other as phenomenologically a 'modification' of myself" (Husserl 1977, 115). This is the first phase of "objectification"

of an experiential field, that is, it is the first context in which the *solus ipse* is, apparently, overridden.

The harmonious behavior of the other appresentatively delivers her primordial world to me, which brings with it an-other concrete ego: "Another monad becomes constituted appresentatively in mine… so in my primordial sphere, by means of appresentations occurring in it and motivated by its contents, an ego other than mine can become constituted" (Husserl 1977, 115). Here, at last, and as an extension of the conditions that provide Ego with his new partner, Husserl believes he has provided the grounds for beginning to discuss a true community of egos. Husserl has also by now irrecoverably committed himself to the notion that the sense "other ego" is a modification of the intentional structure that is my primodial world, while at the same, discordant time, requiring an other who is truly other.

The situation at this stage is not is secure as Husserl wants and needs it to be, as becomes clear when we remember certain details of how we got where we now are in the meditation. We began with a special epoché, the reduction to the ownness sphere, which, Husserl emphasized, is an abstraction. We arrived at the ownness sphere—in which my body suddenly and at last becomes a central and necessary theme—pursued our investigation, and now the other is defined as an intentional modification of my Ego. This is all clear enough, but since we never abandoned or retrieved our philosophical selves from the abstraction we undertook at the outset of the present phase of our meditative enterprise, we might reasonably conclude that what has now been modified—the ownness sphere and all that follows from it—is itself an abstraction.

There is a sense in which the other appeared *despite* my abstraction. But what is modified (the non-alien, me) is structured abstractly from the start. One would not expect an easy fusion of abstract egological structures (me and what is my own) and other egos that might challenge the primacy of these first structures. However, such a fusion is precisely what Husserl desires, since he does not want a war going on within the transcendental Ego, since *he actually cannot afford a double subject*. The other ego is an intrusion of sorts here, but it is a soft intrusion, one we can address in terms such as "intentional modification" rather than the cruder and less controllable language of, for instance, desire. There is a sense in which Husserl does produce a fusion; however, he also constructs but avoids addressing another issue, which is the problem of an other ego secured through a modification of something—an ownness sphere—that is abstract or is the result of an explicit abstraction.

This is a distressing complication, but let us simply acknowledge the complication and move onto the third and last major phase of the constitution of the other, the dynamic, imaginative, and ultimately obstructed phase in which Husserl brings intersubjectivity to its most vibrant transcendental–phenomenological dimension by moving from an actual relation (the other's harmonious behavior) to a potential one. It is also a move from the "real" constitution of the other in a more or less non-localized and atemporal schema to the real in a situated or existential context, a context which claims the affirmation of the otherness of the other (the other as not an originary feature of my primordial sphere), while at the same time producing an even more penetrating fusion of other and Ego, of the alien and non-alien.

In its self-reflexive relation, my body gives itself as situated, as located, as fundamentally here. But just as the phenomenological now is not a discrete unit organized as a pure, isolated positivity, so the here immediately implies, relates to, and is defined by the there; I am here and everything else is there, but the there is there *for me*. Phenomenological spatiality is constituted for me by virtue of my kinaesthetic ability to transform any not-here—any there—into a here (where I am), to apprehend the world from the perspective tied to there, which relates to the possibility of my making that there my here, and also to the actuality of the here standing out against the backdrop—the horizon—of what is not-here, but there. This ability is not just an empty possibility, but a real potential linked with what I am. The there is truly my potential here; it presents itself as such, and I can (and constantly do) actualize it on the basis and by means of my fundamentally kinaesthetic mode of being. In short, the here–there relation is a self-relation/other-relation that establishes a major dimension of what I am.

***

I would like to pause here and note that while the problem at hand—the problem of intersubjectivity—keeps Husserl from exploring this issue in any broad depth beyond its bearing on my relation to the other, this section and other sections of the "Fifth Meditation" in many ways reflect Husserl's growing interest in spatiality (or, more accurately, spatio-temporality). The here–there relation addresses space overtly, but the actual-potential aspect of the relation keys directly into themes of temporality, as well. Husserl is utilizing the here–there relation as a way of situating—of further specifying—the intersubjective structure, but that he does so indicates the broader importance of space(/spatio-temporality), an importance that will occupy his attention more in his later projects,

perhaps the other side of the intensity of his earlier focus on temporality. Husserl does discuss temporality later, in Section 55, but it is in a more restricted sense, a sense related to repeatability and the derivation of the apprehension of the same. An analysis of the temporal themes related to the here–there structure might have dovetailed cleanly into this third stage of the constitution of the other, but Husserl chooses to emphasize the more clearly spatial aspects of the relation. The choice is hardly arbitrary, especially given the general significance of the body as such in the "Fifth Meditation," but a development of temporal dimensions would have been more than a mere auxiliary passage in the course of this phase of the meditation. In some ways, this obviously refers us to Heidegger, whose *Being and Time* was published just a couple of years before Husserl delivered the lecture version of *Cartesian Meditations* at the Sorbonne. In fact, it is extraordinarily interesting that Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* was published during the same period in which Heidegger published *Being and Time*, where the analysis of Dasein is framed in terms of temporality. But back to space.

***

So I am here. What is there is the body of the other (all bodies other than mine are there, whether they are animate organisms or not). As I have already noted, the actuality of my here is essentially related to the distinctive contrast expressed by there. I am here, the other is there. However, again, the two sides of the (spatial) relation are not only not cut off from each other, but my apprehension of the there (as my kinaesthetic possibility) draws out my here, contributes to its fundamentally ekstatic visage; there, where the other is, is another perspective that I could assume on the situation folding out around me. The other's there could be my here; her spatial experience there is the (analogically same if not identical) experience (i.e. perspective stripped of empirical content[25]) I would have if her there were my here, if I were where she is. Another way to describe this scene is to say that the other's here and my here are not equivalent, which would seem to indicate a double. The very specificity of the appearance of the world, of the way it appears, has everything to do with where I am—here—and I apperceptively grasp, first, that the way the other's world appears is a function of her being there—not here—and, second, that I would see things like her if I were there, if, that is, I kinaesthetically made her there my here. Yet, all of this may be undercut by the fact that I am a man and she is a woman, and thus I cannot possibly apperceive

her there or imagine making it mine, that is, cannot imagine being in her place, which is not just a geometric position but a fully embodied, fully spatialized perspective.

We can articulate the result of this (Husserl 1977, Section 54) several ways. Through the free variation of my imagination, the there of the other is grasped as my potential here. Further, a feature of this grasping is that I apperceive that the other's there is for her a here, but it is a here that, although analogically apprehended as like mine, is different from but has the same status as mine, the status of being the locus point for—the literal location of—the presentation of the structuring of the world. That is, her here [which is where I could be but am not (where I could be were I a woman, which I am not)] appresents—through an imaginative apperception—another ownness sphere, a sphere that is not mine, but which is the other's. By the end of Section 54, and through the indirect route of apperceptive appresentation, the here–there relation thus opens up a new dimension of analogical pairing, an apparently fundamental and fully fleshed pairing. But in the process of so doing, it gives the otherness of the other an even more concrete surface, a surface on which my eyes must fall without really penetrating. Nor can her gaze penetrate and directly apprehend me. If there is a genuine reciprocity in play here—a thoroughly problematic issue, given that the entire analogical structure always originates in me—it is a reciprocity bought at a high price, a chasmic distance, a difference that literally embodies an impasse. Transcendental Ego remains in monadic solitude.

A Circle Squared[26]

Section 54 concludes the tiered constitution of the other ego, upon which depend the higher-level forms of intersubjectivity worked out in the remainder of the "Fifth Meditation." Section 55 is the initial foray into intersubjective nature (from which will follow the Objective world). For the most part, then, it is beyond my interests in this chapter. But this section is also transitional in some respects, bridging the constitution of the other ego with the series of succeeding meditations upon other forms of intersubjectivity. As transitional, it contains several remarks which are directly pertinent to the focal theme here. From these, I shall extract two highlights to use as the opening of my conclusion, since together they embody the tension to which Husserl has remained committed in the course of the Fifth Meditation:

> These two primordial spheres, mine which is for me as ego the original sphere, and his which is for me an appresented sphere—are they not *separated* by an abyss I cannot actually cross, since crossing it would mean, after all, that I acquired an original (rather than appresenting) experience of someone else? (Husserl 1977, 121)

Husserl spends roughly five pages addressing this problem, trying to demonstrate that there is actually not an abyss separating the other and myself (i.e. that the other is not radically or absolutely other), that our appearance-systems map into each other, and that yet nevertheless the constitution of the sense, "other," is mine. The quoted question forms the first highlight. The second, enclosing highlight is:

> After these clarifications it is no longer an enigma how I can constitute in myself another ego or, more radically, how I can constitute in my monad another monad, and can experience what is constituted in me as nevertheless other than me… It is no longer an enigma how I can identify a Nature constituted in me with a Nature constituted by someone else (or, stated with the necessary precision, how I can identify a Nature constituted in me with a Nature constituted in me *as* a Nature constituted by someone else). (Husserl 1977, 126)

Husserl thus concludes that there is no genuinely separate other, no abyss, and that the "enigma" has been resolved. But between the bookends provided by these two quotations, Husserl has told us nothing really new, nothing that has not already been established by means of the heavy artillery of Sections 42 through 54. Which is to say that despite the "clarification" and the claim, the enigma remains, and the tension is still there, captured in the juxtaposition of, "a Nature constituted by someone else," and, "a Nature constituted in me as a Nature constituted by someone else." What are we to make of this?

One response to this question would be a straightforward defense of Husserl,[27] which might argue that almost despite himself, he has uncovered a fundamental ambiguity inherent in the eidetic structures or intentional webs of intersubjectivity (an ambiguity enthusiastically pursued by later existential phenomenologies). But what if instead of trying to either resolve or embrace the tension we take Husserl's dual inclinations seriously? What if we stick with the dissonance generated by the relation between these conflicting inclinations? We would then be left in between the constitutions of a transcendental Ego and the necessity of an

independently constituted and truly alien autonomy of the other. If we follow not Husserl's intentions but the competing lines of his text, we would not have achieved intersubjectivity, certainly not in a sense robust enough to provide passage to an Objective world, the passage essential to Husserl's broader enterprise, the ambition to provide the sciences with a phenomenological foundation. Husserl has thwarted that very ambition in advance.

Divided by the apparition of solipsism haunting his Ego, by the incontrovertible evidence of the other, and then by the philosophical necessity of establishing intersubjectivity in order to procure an Objective world, Husserl's inclinations or desires are conflicted at the opening of the "Fifth Meditation." However, by granting advance privilege to transcendental Ego, he has committed himself to an inescapable and irresolvable hierarchy, a hierarchy of a variety inherited by Husserl and not simply invented in his meditations—*The Meditations* are, after all, "Cartesian"—since it is governed by the desire to make that phenomenology transcendental, a desire from which later phenomenologies would endeavor to disentangle themselves. It is no accident that *existential* phenomenologists—represented in the richest complexity by Merleau-Ponty—would encounter the body not late in their ontologies but would instead offer a subject whose intentionality was corporeal from the outset.

If the transcendental Ego is not only the beginning but also retains its ontological sovereignty—its status as monad occupying an originary domain—Ego will always absorb otherness. But the absorption must ultimately fail, since the other will always be a discomforting intrusion, perpetually and indefinitely displacing, compromising, and encroaching upon the dominant position of Ego in Ego's imaginative but ultimately silent, originally disembodied world, Ego's ultimate vulnerability being its need for an other as guarantee of an Objective world. Which is to say that the other will always threaten Ego's sovereignty, since he cannot control her, can only imagine putting himself in her place. Her difference cannot be contained by a generic discourse of "otherness." And in engaging his own body at such a late stage of his constitution, Ego will never *pair* and never encounter its robust double.

Through his commitment to a monad and his earlier neglect of the body, Husserl delivers not ambiguity in the "Fifth Meditation" but a failed encounter with intersubjectivity: by extension, the phenomenology represented in *Cartesian Meditations* is itself a failure, an unwilling yet open statement of transcendental solipsism. Here, by maintaining focus on the

conflict within Husserl and by not imagining but insinuating the image of an overtly gendered subject into his meditation, I hope that I have indicated the sense in which the double has always haunted and threatened subjectivity, expressing the ineluctability of intersubjectivity and, at the same time, the elusiveness of the other. This might have been a different "clue" for Husserl's genderless and erotically neutral meditations on intersubjectivity. But that would have been a different Husserl. A real double eludes Husserl, and thus so too does a dynamic intersubjectivity.

To sum things up, Sartre is correct in observing that, "Because Husserl has reduced being to a series of meanings, the only connection he has been able to establish between my being and that of the Other is a connection of knowledge. Therefore, Husserl cannot escape solipsism any more than Kant could" (Sartre 1975, 318).

A Hell of a Double

> The night before, I resolved… to let it all go for naught, and with that purpose in mind I went to Nevsky for the last time, just to see how I was going to let it all go for naught. Suddenly, within three steps of my enemy, I unexpectedly decided, closed my eyes, and—we bumped solidly shoulder against shoulder! I did not yield an inch and passed by on a perfectly equal footing! He did not even look back and pretended not to notice: but he only pretended, I'm sure of that. To this day I'm sure of it! Of course, I got the worst of it; he was stronger, but that was not the point.
>
> Dostoevsky[28]

As indicated in the opening chapter of this book, Sartre's writing is so saturated with and defined by doubles that he winds up pondering the significance of the problem of "dualism" in the conclusion of *Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology*. As Sartre sees it, dualism is merely a philosophical problem, one outside the domain of his curiosity or project. By way of contrast, the double is an *existential* problem: While, for better or worse, many of us were trained early on to suspect that philosophical dualism is a bad idea, a bad idea is nothing palpable compared, for example, with being perpetually shadowed by a ghost. Put bluntly, the double was a problem before philosophy, and it will remain a problem after philosophy ceases to exist, after, that is, philosophy itself becomes a ghost, a vapor, and then simply dissipates in the hot winds beyond time.

Meanwhile, and as an extension of the fraught and deliriously ambitious book title, *Being and Nothingness* features such determinative doubles as in-itself and for-itself, the basic dynamics of which are obliquely captured in the axiomatic formula "existence precedes essence." Sartre insists that the rearranged ranking for the latter dyad—an inverted metaphysical order—makes all of the difference in the world. Regarding that flagship formula, Heidegger famously points out that the simple "reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement,"[29] which is to say that the dexterous Sartre can't write fast enough to wriggle out of a dilemma so easily. Beyond these complications, it is worth noting that Sartre is in many respects himself a double, a double of Heidegger's above all, since Sartre frequently mimics and even plagiarizes[30] *Being and Time* in *Being and Nothingness*, starting, quite brazenly, with the title.[31] These philosophical and authorial instances of the Sartrean double are noteworthy, fascinating, and even entertaining, but I will simply mention them and shift attention to the problem of "the other." Sartre is both extraordinarily verbose and remarkably repetitive regarding a distressing double, so I will be brief.

The Other Subject

As I have tried to demonstrate, Husserl is doomed to fail in his effort to establish intersubjectivity because he maintains a stubborn commitment to his philosophical protagonist, who seems to experience little in the way of struggle or confrontation (maybe what the transcendental ego doesn't experience is experience, vanished as it has between the brackets). Along the way, Husserl's protagonist was retired by Sartre in *The Transcendence of the Ego*, one of the most underrated books of twentieth-century philosophy.[32] Meanwhile, Sartre understands that Heidegger offers a massive advance over Husserl: As Sartre writes with Heidegger and explicitly against Husserl, "We *encounter* the other; we do not constitute him" (Sartre 1975, 336). This claim seems to change the game decisively and might be seen as a marker for a massive mutation in the field of phenomenology, one that entails an abandonment of Husserl's preoccupation with formal methodology while at the same time moving to the foreground a less technically encumbered commitment to description.[33]

Sartre opens his lengthy address of intersubjectivity with, startlingly and without obvious motivation, reference to *shame* (Sartre 1975, 301), a direction utterly different from either Husserl or Heidegger, one that

leads Sartre to announce early on that "What I constantly aim at *across* my experiences are the Other's feelings, the Other's ideas, the Other's volitions, the Other's character. This is because the Other is not only the one whom I see, but the one *who sees me*" (Sartre 1975, 310), Sartre thereby delivering a second subjectivity not as an afterthought driven by philosophical exigency but as coextensive with me. " My apprehension of the Other as an object essentially refers me to a fundamental apprehension of the Other in which he will not be revealed to me as an object but as a 'presence in person'" (Sartre 1975, 340). Consciousness is now characterized as a "twin upsurge," (Sartre 1975, 340), the twin being she and I, her and me. As Sartre observes, the other is given as an extraordinary object that is at once a subject, and this is a fundamental experiential relation, a world away from Husserl's high-brow, high-altitude apperceptions and appresentations; Sartre is not in a laboratory but quite literally on the street, sitting outdoors at a café, watching women walk by as he philosophizes. But this is not an ontologically wholesome situation since not all the people walking by are necessarily benign, certainly not the German soldiers marching by.

The most famous passage in *Being and Nothingness*, which forms the nucleus of the section, "The Existence of Others," is Part IV, "The Look." Sartre would seem to be borrowing here from Dostoevsky and the underground man's pathological struggles for recognition (in a sense, he is in many ways quoting *Notes from Underground*). Taking, too, from a source fundamentally contrary to Dostoevsky, Sartre is also borrowing from Hegel's master–slave dialectic as channeled by the Russian émigré philosopher, Alexandre Kojève. Yet, despite this peculiar, dissonant collection of heavy precedents, "The Look" is not only unique but also arguably the most influential chunk of text that Sartre ever wrote since it sets a precedent for the basic trope of the objectifying gaze that is of paramount importance to, above all, both feminist theory and postcolonial theory (one can only speculate about Simone de Beauvoir's contribution to this section).[34]

Life in Sartre's world just happens too fast for stultifying methodological compliance, and what he gives us is a noisy, extended, inexplicably lop-sided, and, as I have noted, sometimes remarkably repetitive description: thus here I will simply shadow and flag a few high points of "The Look" that are relevant to the phenomenological double. To indicate the dynamics in advance while recalling the absence of either gender or desire within the stringent confines of Husserl's special reduction, there does not

seem to be much of an epoché going on as that woman is coming toward me; if anything, she is bursting right through any efforts to bracket.[35] And rather than confirming the centrality of my subjectivity, she turns out to represent an ontological challenge. Perhaps even as I am voyeuristically (?) admiring her, the possibilities literally embodied in her stride are a threat to my possibilities and thus to me. She is an ontological thief!

I apprehend this man on the park bench as both object and man, which is to say that he has the status of a "privileged object" (Sartre 1975, 341). That is one issue; the other *is* simultaneously an object and yet not a thing. But what is extraordinary is that "instead of a grouping *toward me* of the objects, there is now an orientation which *flees from me*… Suddenly an object has appeared which has stolen the world from me"(Sartre 1975, 342–343). If I am at the non-thetic center of the universe, the other represents a fundamental de-centering, the imposition of thetic consciousness, a feature of existence that is not a state so much as it is an ontological event (as a solar eclipse is an event), the other always gaining and in so doing embodying my loss. And yet this loss—loss of the center that is simultaneously the loss of the world—is not the effect of the other's indifference. In fact,

> My fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of *being seen* by the Other. It is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject… He is the subject who is revealed to me in that flight of myself toward objectification" (Sartre 1975, 344–345).

And so we arrive at the ontological significance of the look or the gaze, the gaze that is, somewhat oddly, not mine on the other (not me admiring her) but the other's on me. To capture a prominent literary and philosophical motif that Sartre reiterates in different ways, "There is no self to inhabit my consciousness,"[36] not, that is, until *I am seen*, captured in a conundrum; "I see myself because somebody sees me" (Sartre 1975, 349). My foundation thus intrudes from outside of myself. *I am* through my double, who holds my being in her gaze as she catches me in the act of spying through the infamous keyhole, constituting my shame in a world that now flows away from me and toward her. The upshot is that " *I am no longer master of the situation*" (Sartre 1975, 355). Pushing further toward the peculiarities of the Sartrean representation of the intersubjective dou-

ble, "I am *in danger*. The danger is not an accident but the permanent structure of my being-for-others" (Sartre 1975, 358).

How does this come to be? Through, apparently, the self-certainty of the Sartrean assertion, which obviates or sidesteps the typical demand to provide an argument, replacing the argument with a self-coherent riff: "The Other is in no way given to us as an object. The objectification of the Other would be the collapse of his being-as-a-look" (Sartre 1975, 359). It is, at the same time, thus, not as simple as him objectifying me but, rather, a case of me objectifying myself through the other's gaze, or—to put it passively—of me being objectified through my experience of his gaze—an experience forced on me by him—even when the other seems not to notice me (as once transpired on Nevsky Prospect). And yet none of this is as straightforward as it might seem, since the other does constitute me as an object for him, since, that is, and underthematized here as this fact must be, the other must be experiencing the same decentering dynamic, yet leaving me for myself in the wake of this doubly lop-sided exchange, me as an "uneasiness," one indissociably linked to "the presence of a strange freedom" (Sartre 1975, 367), namely, linked to the other, who "is present to me everywhere as the one through whom I become an object" (Sartre 1975, 373), as must simultaneously be happening to her or to him.

> My ego may emerge only through the gaze of the other, but "The Other is what consciousness is" (Sartre 1975, 379).
>
> Bingo: *"The Other is what consciousness is."*

Derived from or implicated in the shame that emerges as I am fixed by the look of the other, this might appear to be the conclusion of Sartre's representation of the effects of the power of the other's intrusion. Does he reach a resolution in suggesting that, "The Other-as-Object 'has' a subjectivity as this hollow box has 'an inside.' In this way, I recover myself, for I can not be an object for an object"? (Sartre 1975, 384). No, he does not reach resolution since rather than resting, he continues rattling on about shame and then makes the bizarre claim that "Only the dead can be perpetually objects without ever becoming subjects" (Sartre 1975, 394), a claim that stalls and collapses in on itself since the dead are something like super subjects who do not allow themselves to become objects, and since the presence of the other is indissociable from the dead, who remind ourselves of our fragile *subjectivity* precisely as they turn us into "objects."

My thought is that the double escapes Sartre, who at high cost—the cost of possibilities, of, that is, freedom (slave to himself)—fancies himself fixed by the other but incapable of directly engaging the mutuality of the intersubjective relation. Or if "mutuality" suggests some sort of symmetry, maybe intersubjectivity might better be characterized as riding on what Bakhtin might call the dialogically constituted double, immersed in and emerging from an atmosphere of heteroglossia.[37]

To put a blunt finish on it, Sartre's discourse is compromised in advance by his reliance on and commitment to the fixity of the subject–object dyad and by his desire to endow the gaze with a fundamental clarity, to make experience make sense, to, that is, universalize. Through his obsession with "the other" framed by the subject–object dyad, the double eludes Sartre. But then from the outset—the outset here being epitomized by *The Sophist*—the double seems frequently to escape.

Notes

1. I use the past tense because while intentionality may be dead, phenomenology is not.
2. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Donald A. Landes (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 474.
3. "Binding" in both senses of the term, that is, "binding together" and "limiting."
4. See Jean-Paul Sartre, *Transcendence of the Ego*, trans. Forrest Williams (New York: Hill and Wang, 1960). Extending and developing the core thought of that earlier work, consciousness in *Being and Nothingness* is characterized by Sartre as nothingness, but it is a very vigorous form of nothingness, as evidenced by the fact that it takes hundreds of pages to describe.
5. I will make reference to the double in order to extend and put a certain torque on Husserlian locutions regarding alterity. The advantage of the motif of the double is that it is an open recognition of the impossibility of the isolation of a self-contained subject while at the same time being a suggestion that the other, while distinct, will never be discrete. In fact, the motif of the double is confirmation of Husserl's own nascent image of pairing.
6. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 89.
7. Cf. Timothy M. Costelloe, "Husserl's Attitude Problem: Intersubjectivity in *Ideas II* and The Fifth Cartesian Meditation," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 34, No. 1, January 2003: pp. 74–86.

8. Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), p. 92.
9. The relationship between Ricoeur and deconstruction is of course far from straightforward. I refer the reader to Eftichis Pirovolakis, *Reading Derrida and Ricoeur: Improbable Encounters between Deconstruction and Hermeneutics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010).
10. By way of describing some of his own excursuses, Derrida used to say "something like a phenomenology."
11. See the discussion of walking in Edmund Husserl, "The World of the Living Present," trans. Frederick A. Elliston and Lenore Langsdorf, in *Husserl: Shorter Works*, ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 249–250.
12. A passage ruled, as are all others, by two-faced Janus.
13. Needless to say, neither Husserl nor phenomenology more generally had any problem recovering in countless ways from the deep and beautiful flaws that attended the Husserlian project as represented in *Cartesian Meditations.*
14. Here we witness the reinscription of a philosophical trope, that of wish fulfillment: I need an "ownness sphere" in order for my philosophy to function, so I "design"—i.e. introduce into the text—a special epoché that will deliver the object of my desire (that will fulfill my wishes).
15. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, trans. Richard C. McCleary. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 173.
16. Perhaps this is a necessary transition eventually to Husserl's remarkable later investigations of space.
17. From a Husserlian standpoint, the next step beyond an independent otherness would be a fundamental independence of the being of the world, the foundation of a realism or positivism to which Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is steadfastly opposed.
18. Michel Henry, *Material Phenomenology*, trans. Scott Davidson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), p. 109.
19. The other cannot be an "it," must be gendered, a fact that Husserl's high-altitude choreography ignores or obscures.
20. It is Ricoeur who identifies the three stages of Husserl's constitution of intersubjectivity (cf. Ricoeur 2007, 125ff).
21. An important ambiguity here—perhaps a decisive site for the play of difference in the "Fifth Meditation"—is the distinction between perception and apperception, the former being too corporeal for Husserl's needs, too material to serve as anything other than a mere medium for the process of apperception. Perception is thus the vehicle of apperception (which itself is in turn the condition of appresentation). Husserl gives the weight to apperception, a concept with a solid Kantian pedigree.

However, doesn't the very necessity of perception—and apperception's dependence on it—disrupt the hierarchy of this dyad?

22. While what Husserl is saying here is not opaque, the content of the description is not as clear and distinct as the title of these meditations might suggest. If the origin of the existence-sense of the other ego is external to me, then it would seem that the strong side of the sense is not mine, but hers, as indicated by the apprehension of her body as distinct from mine, even if it is like mine. This ambiguity remains precisely that—both indecipherable and undecidable—throughout the course of the meditation.
23. Ricoeur describes Husserl's use of the term *pairing* as "bold" (cf. Ricoeur 1967, p. 126), a red flag if nothing else.
24. This is a particularly problematic question considering that existence is one of the prominent things bracketed in the phenomenological reduction.
25. If my reading is correct, this phase of the text reveals the profound Kantian element undergirding Husserl's transcendental enterprise.
26. "Is this the squaring of a circle?" (Ricoeur 2007, p. 124).
27. Which some persist in attempting to do, including, relatively recently: Kevin Hermberg, *Husserl's Phenomenology: Knowledge, Objectivity, and Others* (New York: Continuum Press, 2006) and Alexander Schnell, "Intersubjectivity in Husserl's Work," in *Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy*, II/1, 2010: pp. 9–32.
28. Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Notes from Underground*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 55.
29. Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in *Basic Writings: Nine Key Essays, plus the Introduction to* Being and Time, trans. David Farrell Krell (London, Routledge; 1978), p. 208.
30. Forrest Williams once told me that Merleau-Ponty complained that whenever he shared his thoughts with Sartre, he'd see them in print under Sartre's name the following week. This says something about Sartre's relation to the other.
31. Sartre is also a double of Hegel's refracted through Kojève, a fact that guarantees his entrapment in metaphysics.
32. To his credit, I would argue that Sartre's early critique of Husserl was the opening salvo in the evacuation or destabilization of the subject, a major discursive development that paved the way for later philosophers such as Foucault and Deleuze.
33. At least honest in both style and intent, even if embedded in some fancy-pants writing.
34. It is worth mentioning here that "the look" is *the gaze*, which is quite different from the glance, about which Edward S. Casey has written,

thereby disrupting the tradition that can be traced back to Sartre (and Hegel and Dostoevsky).

35. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 340.
36. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 347.
37. See M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, trans. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson (Austin: University of Texas, 1982).

References

Husserl, Edmund. 1977. *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Ricoeur, Paul. 2007. *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*. Trans. Edward G. Ballard, and Lester E. Embree. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1975. *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*. Trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press.

CHAPTER 6

Epilogue: Second Guessing—Emergent Doubles

Doppelgänger

Emerging from the terroir of nineteenth-century Western culture, the spectral figure of the *Doppelgänger* typically terminates in a catastrophe, as is the case for Dostoevsky's Goliadkin, who is dragged off shrieking in the end, and who is so effectively written that while Goliadkin clearly had a double, it is not clear that it is really a Doppelgänger, or maybe it is. Sometimes, the catastrophe is truly final, as in Edgar Allan Poe's "William Wilson," which finishes on a hallucinatory note featuring a mirror, with Wilson's dying double informing him, "In me didst thou exist—and, in my death, see by this image, which is thine own, how utterly thou hast murdered theyself."[1] Other noteworthy issues aside, it is stunning that suicide is represented here not in solitude or isolation but as dependent on an inextricable *other*, death embedded in tight forms of coupling, tight loops of intersubjectivity. While innumerable yet recognizable iterations of the double seem to be ubiquitous in many cultures, places, and times, its expression in the form of the nineteenth-century *Doppelgänger* might appear to be exactly what it is, a literary fascination and flourish, perhaps merely an aesthetic vogue belonging to a particular historical period (such a vogue that e.g. the Ukrainian Antony Pogorelsky blatantly and quite clumsily mimics the German E.T.A. Hoffmann). However, it is worth considering that this specific flourish is just one manifestation of the pervasive presence of the double in the experience of the subject, who seems always to have been followed an other.

B. Seitz, *Intersubjectivity and the Double*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56375-0_6

Moving forward, the twentieth century experimented with the double's progress and demise in film, as evidenced in Hitchcock's ominous *The Lady Vanishes*, which has a happy ending, as if in a fairy tale that recovers after taking some nasty turns. However, Wilder's *Double Indemnity*, which squares insurance claims with murder, does not have a happy ending. Nor, more recently, does Cronenberg's *Dead Ringers*—twin brothers bound in psychotic sexual and surgical relations—not to mention Ayoade's *The Double* and Villaneuve's *Enemy*, the last of which is set in Toronto doubling for St. Petersburg, but featuring motorcycles and ending with a gun, as does Saramago's novel, *The Double* (upon which *Enemy* is based).

But these are all fictions. Or are they, given that all of them share in common phenomena, patterns that are recognizable? Fiction or not, every one of them offers representations of constricted and conflicted intimations of intersubjectivity.

New Doubles

> We will see industrial production of a personality split, an instantaneous cloning of living man, the technological re-creation of one our most ancient myths: the myth of the **double**, of an electroergonomic double whose presence is spectral—another way of saying a ghost or the living dead.
>
> Paul Virilio[2]

The double is a "myth" and yet not a myth, and this oscillating thought holds true for the robotic double. Who is actually manufacturing the automobile, including the smart automobile, and who is flying the airplane? It holds true, too, for the bioengineered double: We have not yet seen a cloned human being except as depicted in film, but a Korean company already specializes in cloning favorite pets (http://en.sooam.com/dogcn/sub01.html). Perhaps even trickier, it also holds true for the digital double engineered by virtual reality, which was in its infancy when Virilio wrote that last portentous sentence. Here, and depicting the double in its ancient role as *threat*, I identify several lines of thought associated with this experiential configuration.

First, extending Karl Marx's uncontroversial thought that labor is the condition of the possibility of human life—this, in short, is what "materialism" means—how do we gain perspective on a new form of socioeconomy increasingly driven by robots and computer systems? American workers

complain about labor being "shipped overseas" when a longer-term peril may already be insinuating itself all over shop floors. What will it mean as human labor is displaced by robots, and as the consequent impact of this displacement on global unemployment starts to show itself? The machines will double for and render irrelevant the human labor that will be increasingly idled (recall here Dostoevsky's Goliadkin). Marx will thus have turned out to be not wrong but as having committed himself to an axiomatic truth that concealed its expiration date.

Second, there is the double that emerges from and is embodied in the split between the "actual" and the "virtual," a split easy to lose track of as we live in the blurry connection between them, the blur illustrated most vividly by phenomena such as online pornography and computer games.

Recently, I looked out a sixth-floor window in Manhattan's financial district, from which I could see clearly into many windows of office buildings, a vista of people staring into screens of computers and devices. A voyeur, I was their double undetected. No doubt everyone staring into a screen imagines that they are engaged in rich forms of intersubjectivity, which is not exactly true, since the double in their faces is their gaze on the screen. We witness this phenomenon everywhere, device-starers grinning at something that is both there and not there. They look like robots.

Third, these new doubles represent a new generation of ghosts. As virtuality absorbs and effaces history, the ghosts intensify their presence, although they tend to do little to call attention to themselves. In the film *Ghost Dance*, Derrida is asked if he believes in ghosts. He responds, essentially, that while one might imagine that the ghosts withdraw from a world dominated by applied science, the contrary is true, that a culture of applied science and all of the delusions of instrumental "management" associated with it breed more ghosts.

Having begun this book with a focus on politics and the double, I have visited a series of different representations of the double. The thread of continuity between the different chapters is that the motif of the double shadows and haunts variant forms of subjectivity, the upshot of which is that one way of framing the subject is to refract it through the necessity of the double, which delivers intersubjectivity. Gary Snyder puts it eloquently in suggesting that "Our 'soul' is our dream of the other."[3]

To talk about the necessity of the double is thus nothing less simple than an indication that the "other" is always by our side, including on the richest scale, which is where I began in Chap. 1, the double in politics. Looping back to that opening chapter and to the double associated

with political representation, I would like to respond to Virilio's alarmist thought of "media representation winning out by a long way over the classical political representation" (Virilio 1998, 87). The thought is both true and untrue. It is of course true that media representation has found firm footing in the world of politics. Yet his thought also assumes that there once was classical political representation, which I hope my earlier chapter helped put into question. Images rule the electronic world, but they have served to supplement and mutate other forms of political representation, which does not mean that they are of the same fabric but that there has been a split or doubling of the way that intersubjectivity gets constituted in the contemporary world.

Double or Nothing

So is it double, or is it nothing, this troubled subject? "We must not hasten to decide," cautions Derrida.[4] Which in this case means that we will be better philosophers if we do not attempt to straighten out the crooked motif of the double. Representing, embodying, or animating both nonbeing and plenitude, or the twinning of these two, the double defeats even as it subtends and sustains the hierarchized binary, and nothing is resolved. And yet—mindful of its profile in the dynamics of intersubjectivity—the double also breeds multiplicity.

Notes

1. Poe, Edgar Allan, "William Wilson," in *Edgar Allan Poe: Complete Tales and Poems* (Edison: Castle Books, 2002), 568.
2. Virilio, Paul, *Open Sky*, trans. Julie Rose (London: Verso, 1998), 40.
3. Snyder, Gary, "Survival and Sacrament," in *The Etiquette of Freedom* (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1990), 180.
4. Derrida, Jacques, "Différance," in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 19.

Reference

Virilio, Paul. 1998. *Open Sky*. Trans. Julie Rose. London: Verso.

Index

B. Seitz, *Intersubjectivity and the Double: Troubled Matters*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56375-0